Fraud
Statutes
7204- Fraudulent
Statement or No Statement to Employees:
Providing False Forms
W-2
[91-1
USTC ¶50,022] Martin J. Hughes, Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee v.
United States of America
, Defendant-Appellee/ /Cross-Appellant.
United States of America
, Respondent v. Martin J. Hughes, Petitioner
(CA-6),
U.S. Court of Appeals, 6th Circuit, 87-4052, 87-4069, 87-4125, 4/4/90,
Affirming, reversing and remanding a District Court decision, 88-1
USTC ¶9277
[Code Secs.
7204 and 7206 ]
Criminal penalties: Fraud and false statements: Aiding and advising
preparation of false returns.--The U.S. Court of Appeals at
Cincinnati (CA-6) affirmed a decision of the district court which
reduced a union vice-president's felony conviction under Code Sec. 7206(2) for aiding and
assisting in the filing of a false W-3 wage transmittal form with the
IRS to a misdemeanor conviction under Code Sec. 7204 . If the
government could charge an employer with a felony for filing a false W-3
form with the IRS, it would render useless Congress's intent to punish
as a misdemeanant a person who provides false information on a statement
required under Code Sec.
6051 . In addition, the appellate court reversed the district
court's denial of a similar reduction with respect to another count of
the indictment against the union official. With respect to this count,
the government conceded that the official could not have violated Code Sec. 7206(2) merely by
furnishing a particular employee with a false W-2 form, since Code Sec. 7204 provided the
exclusive sanction for such an act. In refusing to reduce the union
official's felony conviction on this count, the district court
improperly found that the jury could have reasonably concluded that the
official took other steps in counseling the employee to understate her
income on her tax return. In fact, the employee denied that the official
gave her any advice concerning the filing of her tax return. On remand,
the district court was instructed to vacate the official's felony
conviction, enter a misdemeanor conviction on that count, and resentence
the official accordingly.
Percy
Squire, Catherine M. Ballard, Bricker & Eckler, 100 S. Third St.,
Columbus, Ohio 43215, Martin J. Hughes III, 21410 Morewood Parkway,
Rocky River, Ohio 44116, Merritt C. Dietz, Jr., Dietz, Fridy &
Freeburger, Main St., Sebree, Ky. 42455, for
plaintiff-appellant/cross-appellee. Christian H. Stickan, John Siegel,
Assistant United States Attorneys, Cleveland, Ohio 44114, for U.S.
Michael P. Butler, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Cleveland, Ohio, for
amicus curiae.
Before
BOGGS and NORRIS, Circuit Judges, ENGEL, Senior Circuit Judge.
ALAN
E. NORRIS, Circuit Judge:
Defendant,
Martin J. Hughes, appeals from his conviction on twelve counts of a
thirty-seven-count indictment charging him with various federal criminal
offenses. The government also appeals the district court's decisions
acquitting defendant on two of the counts and reducing his conviction to
a lesser included offense on another count. For the reasons stated
below, we affirm the district court's judgment in part and reverse in
part.
I.
On
May 6, 1986
, the grand jury issued a thirty-seven-count indictment against
defendant, a district vice-president for the Communications Workers of
America, AFL-CIO ("CWA"), charging him with mail fraud,
embezzlement, falsification of union records, aiding and assisting in
the filing of false W-2 and W-3 forms with the Internal Revenue Service
("IRS"), and with making false statements to the United States
through the submission of falsified labor reporting documents. The
government alleged that defendant submitted to the CWA International
office expense vouchers that falsely claimed reimbursement for mileage
and meal expenses for union employees. The government alleged that
defendant received nearly $400,000 in reimbursement funds from the CWA
International and used those funds to make political contributions and
to pay salaries at the United Telephone Credit Union ("UTCU").
Specifically,
the government charged defendant in Counts 1 through 6 and Counts 19
through 23 with mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1341 . Counts 7 through
12 and Counts 24 through 28 charged defendant with embezzlement, in
violation of 29 U.S.C. §501(c)
. Counts 13 through 18 and Counts 29 through 32 charged
defendant with falsification of union records, in violation of 29 U.S.C.
§439(c). Counts 33 through 35 charged defendant with aiding and
assisting in the filing of false W-2 and W-3 forms to the IRS, in
violation of 26 U.S.C. §7206(2) . Finally, Counts
36 and 37 charged defendant with making false statements to the United
States through the submission of false labor reporting documents, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §1001 .
The
case proceeded to trial on
July 1, 1987
. Before the case was sent to the jury, the district court dismissed
Counts 1 through 12 and Counts 19 through 28, the mail fraud and
embezzlement charges. After the case had been submitted to the jury, the
court dismissed Count 35, one of the tax charges, because of a
typographical mistake in the indictment. The jury returned guilty
verdicts on each of the remaining counts.
Defendant
then moved for acquittal on Counts 33, 34, 36, and 37. The court
acquitted defendant of the felony charges in Counts 36 and 37, finding
as a matter of law that false statements made by defendant were not
material. The court also reduced defendant's conviction of a felony
under 26 U.S.C. §7206(2) to the lesser
included misdemeanor under 26 U.S.C. §7204 in Count 33. The
court refused to reduce the felony conviction under section 7206(2) in Count
34.
Defendant
was sentenced to two years' probation and fined $10,000.
The
government appeals the district court's action in acquitting defendant
on Counts 36 and 37, and reducing the felony conviction on Count 33.
Defendant
appeals the district court's decisions denying his motions for acquittal
on Count 34, for recusal, for mistrial, and to dismiss the entire
indictment in light of the holding in McNally v. United States,
483 U.S. 350 (1987).
II.
A.
The False Statement Counts Under 18 U.S.C. §1001
The
government contends that the district court erred in acquitting
defendant on the felony charges under 18 U.S.C. §1001
in Counts 36 and 37, when it concluded as a matter of law
that false statements made by defendant were not material.
Section 1001 is a general
prohibition against falsifying information given to government agencies,
and provides:
Whoever,
in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the
United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up
by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false,
fictitious, or fraudulent statements or representations, or makes or
uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any
false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined not
more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
Although
the statute explicitly mentions materiality only in the first clause,
courts have read such a requirement into the second clause as well
"in order to exclude trivial falsehoods from the purview of the
statute." United States v. Abadi, 706 F.2d 178, 180 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 821 (1983). Under section
1001 , a false statement to a federal agency is material even
if it does not actually influence a decision of the agency, so long as
it has a natural tendency to influence or is capable of influencing a
decision of the agency.
United States
v.
Chandler
, 752 F.2d 1148, 1151 (6th Cir. 1985).
However,
materiality "is not an element of the offense that must be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt but a 'judicially imposed limitation to ensure
the reasonable application of the statute.' "
Chandler
, 752 F.2d at 1151 (quoting Abadi, 706 F.2d at 180 n.2).
Accordingly, "materiality is a question of law for the court to
decide."
United States
v. Keefer, 799 F.2d 1115, 1126 (6th Cir. 1986). "A
materiality determination is subject to complete review on appeal and is
not controlled by the clearly erroneous standard."
Chandler
, 752 F.2d at 1151.
In
this case, the jury found that the defendant made false statements to
the Department of Labor when he caused the CWA to file false LM-2
reports. These are the annual reports that unions are required to file
disclosing, among other things, the salary and expenses of each employee
who receives more than $10,000 during the year. See 29 U.S.C. §431(b)(3).
Evidence demonstrated that the LM-2 reports filed by the CWA for 1982
and 1983 contained false entries showing Gay Griffith, the manager of
UTCU, as a CWA employee who received $7,995 in 1982 and $10,540 in 1983
as reimbursement for expenses. In fact, these amounts were paid to
Griffith
as salary and were generated by the false expense vouchers filed with
the CWA at the direction of defendant.
The
district court found that the false statements were not material. The
district court took into consideration that the total amount paid to
Griffith was correctly stated, that the misstated amounts were small in
relation to the union's total expenses, and the testimony of a labor
department official that the chief purpose for requiring these figures
was to call attention to persons who were being paid by more than one
union and to "adequately describe" the total amount the union
paid to each employee. The court also relied upon the fact that the
false statements had no effect on any determinations by the Department
of Labor, even though the court also noted that the government need not
prove such an effect to sustain a conviction under section 1001 . Finally, the
court considered the fact that Congress had also included in the Labor
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act a prohibition against making
material false representations in documents required by the Act, but
provided that a violation would be punished as a misdemeanor, rather
than a felony. 29 U.S.C. §439. The court acknowledged that the United
States Supreme Court, in United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S.
114 (1979), held that if two separate laws cover certain criminal
activity, the government may prosecute under either law. However, the
district court felt that the existence of a misdemeanor statute covering
the making of false statements to the Department of Labor was relevant
in determining the issue of materiality.
The
district court erred in concluding that the false statements were
immaterial. The statements were clearly of the type capable of
influencing the Department of Labor's information-gathering and
regulatory decision-making process. Since Congress specifically required
a union to disclose the amounts it disburses in salary and reimbursement
expenses for each employee who receives over $10,000, and the LM-2 form
provided by the Department of Labor requires the union to separately
list the amounts given to an employee for salary and for reimbursed
expenses, it follows that a false reporting of information specifically
required to be disclosed is material.
The
fact that the misstated amounts are relatively small when compared with
total union expenditures is not particularly relevant to the issue of
materiality. Instead, the relevant inquiry is whether the false
information is of the type that is capable of influencing a decision of
an agency, as opposed to an examination of the magnitude of the
falsehood. See United States v. Norris, 749 F.2d 1116, 1121-22
(4th Cir. 1984) (false inclusion of $650 in expense statement totalling
$35,584 is material), cert. denied, 471
U.S.
1065 (1985). Similarly, the district court's reliance upon the fact that
Congress also provided that essentially identical conduct could also be
punished as a misdemeanor is misplaced, especially in view of the court
having acknowledged that "the false statements do rise to the level
of materiality required" to violate the misdemeanor statute. Since
the government may bring a prosecution for making a false statement to
the Department of Labor under either 18 U.S.C. §1001
or 29 U.S.C. §439, see
United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. at 123-24, and no different
standard for determining materiality is set out in the statutes, there
is no basis for concluding that a statement that is material under 29
U.S.C. §439 is not also material under 18 U.S.C. §1001
.
Accordingly,
we reverse the district court's decision acquitting defendant on Counts
36 and 37 of the indictment. Upon remand, the court is instructed to
reinstate the jury's felony convictions on these Counts, and to
resentence defendant accordingly.
B.
The False W-2 and W-3 Forms
The
government contends that the district court erred in reducing
defendant's Count 33 felony conviction under 26 U.S.C. §7206(2)
to a misdemeanor conviction under 26 U.S.C. §7204 . Defendant contends
that the district court erred by refusing to also reduce his felony
conviction in Count 34 to a misdemeanor.
1.
Count 33
In
Count 33, the government charged defendant with aiding and assisting in
the filing of a false W-3 wage transmittal form with the IRS. 26 U.S.C. §6051(a) provides that an
employer who is required to deduct and withhold taxes from its employees
must furnish to each employee a statement, the W-2 form, that sets forth
the amount of wages the employee earned and the amount withheld in
taxes. 26 U.S.C. §6051(d) provides that the
employer must also file a duplicate of the statement with the IRS. This
duplicate is the W-3 form.
26
U.S.C. §7206(2) provides, in
pertinent part, that a person is guilty of a felony if he
[w]illfully
aids or assists in, or procures, counsels, or advises the preparation or
presentation under, or in connection with any matter arising under, the
internal revenue laws, of a return, affidavit, claim, or other document,
which is fraudulent or is false as to any material matter, whether or
not such falsity or fraud is with the knowledge or consent of the person
authorized or required to present such return, affidavit, claim, or
document.
26
U.S.C. §7204
provides that:
In
lieu of any other penalty provided by law
(except the penalty provided by section 6674 ) any person
required under the provisions of section 6051 to furnish a
statement who willfully furnishes a false or fraudulent statement or who
willfully fails to furnish a statement in the manner, at the time, and
showing the information required under section 6051 , or
regulations prescribed thereunder, shall, for each such offense, upon
conviction thereof, be fined not more than $1,000, or imprisoned not
more than one year, or both. (Emphasis added.)
In
reducing defendant's section
7206 felony conviction to a section
7204 misdemeanor offense, the district court concluded that section 7204 provides the
exclusive sanction against an employer for submitting a false W-3
statement to the IRS and that it was a lesser included offense of that
defined in section 7206 .
The
government argues that section
7204 deals exclusively with statements furnished to employees
and does not cover the filing of a false W-3 form with the IRS, pointing
to the language in that section providing that it is the exclusive
sanction for persons who furnish a statement required to be furnished
under section 6051 and t |