7203 - Appeal without merit

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Fraud Statutes 

Additional Information:

 

7203 - Accountant-Client Privilege
7203 - Accrual Basis
7203 - Admissibility 1 p1
7203 - Admissibility 1 p2
7203 - Admissibility 1 p3
7203 - Admissibility 1 p4
7203 - Admissibility 1 p5
7203 - Admissibility 1 p6
7203 - Admissibility 2 p1
7203 - Admissibility 2 p2
7203 - Admissibility 2 p3
7203 - Admissibility 2 p4
7203 - Admissibility 2 p5
7203 - Admissibility 3 p1
7203 - Admissibility 3 p2
7203 - Admissibility 3 p3
7203 - Admissibility 3 p4
7203 - Admissibility 3 p5
7203 - Admissibility 4 p1
7203 - Admissibility 4 p2
7203 - Admissions p1
7203 - Admissions p2
7203 - Advice of Counsel p1
7203 - Advice of Counsel p2
7203 - Amendment
7203 - Appeal Right to
7203 - Appeal Timeliness
7203 - Appeal Waiver
7203 - Appeal without merit
7203 - Arrest
7203 - Fraudulent Return
7203 - Defeat & Evade Income Taxes p1
7203 - Defeat & Evade Income Taxes p2
7203 - Defeat & Evade Income Taxes p3
7203 - Defeat &  Evade Income Taxes p4
7203 - Attorney Disqualified
7203 - Attorney's Testimony p1
7203 - Attorney's Testimony p2
7203 - Attorney's Testimony p3
7203 - Attorney's Testimony p4
7203 - Bail
7203 - Bank Records &  Net Worth Increases 1 p1
7203 - Bank Records &  Net Worth Increases 1 p2
7203 - Bank Records &  Net Worth Increases 1 p3
7203 - Bank Records &  Net Worth Increases 1 p4
7203 - Bank Records &  Net Worth Increases 1 p5
7203 - Bank Records &  Net Worth Increases 1 p6
7203 - Bank Records &  Net Worth Increases 2 p1
7203 - Bank Records &  Net Worth Increases 2 p2
7203 - Bank Records &  Net Worth Increases 2 p3
7203 - Bank Records &  Net Worth Increases 2 p4
7203 - Bank Records &  Net Worth Increases 2 p5
7203 - Bank Records &  Net Worth Increases 3 p1
7203 - Bank Records &  Net Worth Increases 3 p2
7203 - Bank Records &  Net Worth Increases 3 p3
7203 - Bank Records &  Net Worth Increases 3 p4
7203 - Bank Records &  Net Worth Increases 3 p5
7203 - Bank Records &  Net Worth Increases 4 p1
7203 - Bank Records &  Net Worth Increases 4 p2
7203 - Bank Records &  Net Worth Increases 4 p3
7203 - Bank Records &  Net Worth Increases 4 p4
7203 - Bank Records &  Net Worth Increases 4 p5
7203 - Bank Records &  Net Worth Increases 5 p1
7203 - Bank Records & Net Worth Increases 5 p2
7203 - Bank Records & Net Worth Increases 5 p3
7203 - Bank Records & Net Worth Increases 5 p4
7203 - Bank Records & Net Worth Increases 5 p5
7203 - Base Sentence p1
7203 - Base Sentence p2
7203 - Base Sentence p3
7203 - Base Sentence p4
I7203 - Bill of Particluar Conspiracy
7203 - Bill of Particulars
7203 - Books and Records
7203 - Burden of going forward with evidence
7203 - Burden of Proof
7203 - Carryback Offset
7203 - Changing Plea
7203 - Character witness p1
7203 - Character witness p2
7203 - Circumstanial Evidence p1
7203 - Circumstanial Evidence p2
7203 - Circumstanial Evidence p3
7203 - Circumstanial Evidence p4
7203 - Collateral Estoppel
7203 - Collection
7203 - Commitment by U.S. Commissioner
7203 - Communication to Jury
7203 - Compromise
7203 - Consolidation
7203 - Conspiracy p1
7203 - Conspiracy p2
7203 - Conspiracy 1 p1
7203 - Conspiracy 1 p2
7203 - Conspiracy 1 p3
7203 - Conspiracy 1 p4
7203 - Conspiracy 1 p5
7203 - Conspiracy 1 p6
7203 - Conspiracy 1 p7
7203 - Conspiracy 1 p8
7203 - Conspiracy 2 p1
7203 - Conspiracy 2 p2
7203 - Conspiracy 2 p3
7203 - Constitutional Grounds 1 p1
7203 - Constitutional Grounds 1 p2
7203 - Constitutional Grounds 1 p3
7203 - Constitutional Grounds 1 p4
7203 - Constitutional Grounds 1 p5
7203 - Constitutional Grounds 2 p1
7203 - Constitutional Grounds 2 p2
7203 - Constitutional Grounds 2 p3
7203 - Constitutional Grounds 2 p4
7203 - Constitutional Grounds 2 p5
7203 - Constitutional Grounds 3 p1
7203 - Constitutional Grounds 3 p2
7203 - Constitutional Grounds 3 p3
7203 - Constitutional Grounds 3 p4
7203 - Constitutional Grounds 3 p5
7203 - Constitutional Grounds 4 p1
7203 - Constitutional Grounds 4 p2
7203 - Constitutional Grounds 4 p3
7203 - Constitutional Grounds 4 p4
7203 - Constitutional Grounds 5 p1
7203 - Constitutional Grounds 5 p2
7203 - Constitutional Grounds 5 p3
7203 - Constitutional Grounds 5 p4
7203 - Constitutional Grounds 5 p5
7203 - Constitutional Grounds 6
7203 - Contempt Finding Ag. Defendant's Counsel
7203 - Continuance p1
7203 - Continuance p2
7203 - Continuance p3
7203 - Conviction Required
7203 - Copies of Records p1
7203 - Copies of Records p2
7203 - Corporation Officer
7203 - Costs
7203 - Credit for Time Served
7203 - Criminal Contempt
7203 - Cross-Examination PART 1 p1
7203 - Cross-Examination PART 1 p2
7203 - Cross-Examination PART 1 p3
7203 - Cross-Examination PART 1 p4
7203 - Cross-Examination PART 1 p5
7203 - Cross-Examination PART 2
7203 - DefendantHaving Facts Available p1
7203 - DefendantHaving Facts Available p2
7203 - DefendantHaving Facts Available p3
7203 - Degree of Proof p1
7203 - Degree of Proof p2
7203 - Depositions
7203 - Different Statute Cited
7203 - Discovery, Scope Of
7203 - Documentary Evidence in Jury Room
7203 - Double Jeopardy 1 p1
7203 - Double Jeopardy 1 p2
7203 - Double Jeopardy 1 p3
7203 - Double Jeopardy 1 p4
7203 - Double Jeopardy 1 p5
7203 - Double Jeopardy 2 p1
7203 - Double Jeopardy 2 p2
7203 - Double Jeopardy 2 p3
7203 - Double Jeopardy 2 p4
7203 - Enhanced Sentence Sophisticated Means p1
7203 - Enhanced Sentence Sophisticated Means p2
7203 - Enhanced Sentence p1
7203 - Enhanced Sentence p2
7203 - Entrapment
7203 - Erroneous calculation of tax
7203 - Exclusion of Oral Testimony
7203 - Exercise Privilege-Exclusion from Courtroom
7203 - Expert Witness p1
7203 - Expert Witness p2
7203 - Expert Witness p3
7203 - Expert Witness p4
7203 - Extenuating Circumstances
7203 - Fact Finding p1
7203 - Fact Finding p2
7203 - Fact Finding p3
7203 - Fact Finding p4
7203 - Fact Finding p5
7203 - Failure of IRS to File Return
7203 - Failure to Assess Tax
7203 - Failure to Prosecute p1
7203 - Failure to Prosecute p2
7203 - Failure to Prosecute p3
7203 - Failure to Prosecute p4
7203 - Failure to Prosecute p5
7203 - Failure to Report Income 1 p1
7203 - Failure to Report Income 1 p2
7203 - Failure to Report Income 1 p3
7203 - Failure to Report Income 1 p4
7203 - Failure to Report Income 1 p5
7203 - Failure to Report Income 1 p6
7203 - Failure to Report Income 2 p1
7203 - Failure to Report Income 2 p2
7203 - Failure to Supply Information
7203 - False Return
7203 - Fictitious names
7203 - Fraud Case Procedures p1
7203 - Fraud Case Procedures p2
7203 - Fraud Case Procedures p3
7203 - Fraud Case Procedures p4
7203 - General Exception
7203 - Good Faith p1
7203 - Good Faith p2
7203 - Good Faith p3
7203 - Good Faith p4
7203 - Government Agent Prosecuting Claim
7203 - Grand Jury 1 p1
7203 - Grand Jury 1 p2
7203 - Grand Jury 1 p3
7203 - Grand Jury 1 p4
7203 - Grand Jury 1 p5
7203 - Grand Jury 2 p1
7203 - Grand Jury 2 p2
7203 - Hearsay Evidence p1
7203 - Hearsay Evidence p2
7203 - Hearsay Evidence p3
7203 - Hearsay Evidence p4
7203 - Hearsay Evidence p5
7203 - Hostility of the Court p1
7203 - Hostility of the Court p2
7203 - Hostility of the Court p3
7203 - Hypnosis
7203 - Identification
7203 - Ignorance of Law
7203 - Immunity p1
7203 - Immunity p2
7203 - Immunity p3
7203 - Impeachment p1
7203 - Impeachment p2
7203 - Improper Comment PART 1 p1
7203 - Improper Comment PART 1 p2
7203 - Improper Comment PART 1 p3
7203 - Improper Comment PART 1 p4
7203 - Improper Comment PART 1 p5
7203 - Improper Comment PART 2 p1
7203 - Improper Comment PART 2 p2
7203 - Improper Comment PART 2 p3
7203 - Improper Comment PART 2 p4
7203 - Improper Comment PART 2 p5
7203 - Improper Comment PART 3
7203 - Improper Question
7203 - Incrimination 1 p1
7203 - Incrimination 1 p2
7203 - Incrimination 1 p3
7203 - Incrimination 1 p4
7203 - Incrimination 1 p5
7203 - Incrimination 2 p1
7203 - Incrimination 2 p2
7203 - Incrimination 2 p3
7203 - Incrimination 2 p4
7203 - Incrimination 2 p5
7203 - Incriminaton Before Grand Jury p1
7203 - Incriminaton Before Grand Jury p2
7203 - Instructions to Jury 1 p1
7203 - Instructions to Jury 1 p2
7203 - Instructions to Jury 1 p3
7203 - Instructions to Jury 1 p4
7203 - Instructions to Jury 1 p5
7203 - Instructions to Jury 2 p1
7203 - Instructions to Jury 2 p2
7203 - Instructions to Jury 2 p3
7203 - Instructions to Jury 2 p4
7203 - Instructions to Jury 2 p5
7203 - Instructions to Jury 3 p1
7203 - Instructions to Jury 3 p2
7203 - Instructions to Jury 3 p3
7203 - Instructions to Jury 3 p4
7203 - Instructions to Jury 3 p5
7203 - Instructions to Jury 4 p1
7203 - Instructions to Jury 4 p2
7203 - Instructions to Jury 4 p3
7203 - Instructions to Jury 4 p4
7203 - Instructions to Jury 4 p5
7203 - Instructions to Jury 5 p1
7203 - Instructions to Jury 5 p2
7203 - Instructions to Jury 5 p3
7203 - Instructions to Jury 5 p4
7203 - Instructions to Jury 5 p5
7203 - Instructions to Jury 6 p1
7203 - Instructions to Jury 6 p2
7203 - Instructions to Jury 6 p3
7203 - Instructions to Jury 6 p4
7203 - Instructions to Jury 6 p5
7203 - Instructions to Jury 7 p1
7203 - Instructions to Jury 7 p2
7203 - Instructions to Jury 7 p3
7203 - Instructions to Jury 7 p4
7203 - Instructions to Jury 7 p5
7205 Convictions p1
7205 Convictions p2
7205 Convictions p3
7205 Convictions p4
7205 Convictions p5
7205 Double Jeopardy
7205 Exemption Certificates
7205 Hostility of the Court
7205 Indictment
7205 Information
7205 Intent to Deceive Lacking
7205 Right to Counsel
7205 Trial, Timeliness
7205 Variance
7205 Venue
7205 Willfulness
7206 False Returns 1 p1
7206 False Returns 1 p2
7206 False Returns 1 p3
7206 False Returns 1 p4
7206 False Returns 1 p5
7206 False Returns 2 p1
7206 False Returns 2 p2
7206 False Returns 2 p3
7206 False Returns 2 p4
7206 False Returns 2 p5
7206 False Returns 3 p1
7206 False Returns 3 p2
7206 False Returns 3 p3
7206 False Returns 3 p4
7206 Basis for Allegation of Fraud
7206 Concealment of Assets p1
7206 Concealment of Assets p2
7206 Conspiracy 1 p1
7206 Conspiracy 1 p2
7206 Conspiracy 1 p3
7206 Conspiracy 1 p4
7206 Conspiracy 2 p1
7206 Conspiracy 2 p2
7206 Constitutionality p1
7206 Constitutionality p2
7206 Constitutionality p3
7206 Costs
7206 Disclosure of Returns
7206 Estoppel p1
7206 Estoppel p2
7206 Estoppel p3
7206 Evidence 1 p1
7206 Evidence 1 p2
7206 Evidence 1 p3
7206 Evidence 1 p4
7206 Evidence 1 p5
7206 Evidence 2 p1
7206 Evidence 2 p2
7206 Evidence 2 p3
7206 Evidence 2 p4
7206 Evidence 2 p5
7206 Evidence 3 p1
7206 Evidence 3 p2
7206 Evidence 3 p3
7206 Evidence 3 p4
7206 Evidence 3 p5
7206 Evidence 4 p1
7206 Evidence 4 p2
7206 Evidence 4 p3
7206 False Claims Against U.S.
7206 False Documents p1
7206 False Documents p2
7206 False Statements in Return 1 p1
7206 False Statements in Return 1 p2
7206 False Statements in Return 1 p3
7206 False Statements in Return 1 p4
7206 False Statements in Return 1 p5
7206 False Statements in Return 2 p1
7206 False Statements in Return 2 p2
7206 False Statements in Return 2 p3
7206 False Statements in Return 2 p4
7206 False Statements in Return 3 p1
7206 False Statements in Return 3 p2
7206 False Statements in Return 3 p3
7206 False Statements in Return 3 p4
7206 False Statements in Return 3 p5
7206 False Statements in Return 4 p1
7206 False Statements in Return 4 p2
7206 False Statements in Return 4 p3
7206 False Statements in Return 4 p4
7206 False Statements in Return 4 p5
7206 False Statements in Return 5 p1
7206 False Statements in Return 5 p2
7206 False Statements in Return 5 p3
7206 False Statements in Return 5 p4
7206 False Statements to IRS Agents p1
7206 False Statements to IRS Agents p2
7206 False Statements to IRS Agents p3
7206 Forgery
7206 Grand Jury
7206 Guilty Plea p1
7206 Guilty Plea p2
7206 Immunity
7206 Indictment 1 p1
7206 Indictment 1 p2
7206 Indictment 1 p3
7206 Indictment 1 p4
7206 Indictment 1 p5
7206 Indictment 2 p1
7206 Indictment 2 p2
7206 Instructions to Jury 1 p1
7206 Instructions to Jury 1 p2
7206 Instructions to Jury 1 p3
7206 Instructions to Jury 1 p4
7206 Instructions to Jury 1 p5
7206 Instructions to Jury 2 p1
7206 Instructions to Jury 2 p2
7206 Instructions to Jury 2 p3
7206 Instructions to Jury 2 p4
7206 Instructions to Jury 2 p5
7206 Instructions to Jury 3 p1
7206 Instructions to Jury 3 p2
7206 Instructions to Jury 3 p3
7206 Instructions to Jury 3 p4
7206 Instructions to Jury 3 p5
7206 Jury Verdict Disregarded
7206 Jury p1
7206 Jury p2
7206 Jury p3
7206 Lesser Included Offense p1
7206 Lesser Included Offense p2
7206 Motion For Continuance
7206 Motion to Sever
7206 Motion to Transfer
7206 Motion to Vacate Sentence
7206 Net Worth Statement
7206 Offer in Compromise
7206 Perjury
7206 False or Fraudulent Returns p1
7206 False or Fraudulent Returns p2
7206 False or Fraudulent Returns p3
7206 False or Fraudulent Returns p4
7206 False or Fraudulent Returns p5
7206 Prior Convictions
7206 Prior Law
7206 Probation
7206 Prosecutor's Comment p1
7206 Prosecutor's Comment p2
7206 Restitution
7206 Right to Counsel p1
7206 Right to Counsel p2
7206 Sentence p1
7206 Sentence p2
7206 Sentence p3
7206 Sentence p4
7206 Sentencing Guidelines 1 p1
7206 Sentencing Guidelines 1 p2
7206 Sentencing Guidelines 1 p3
7206 Sentencing Guidelines 1 p4
7206 Sentencing Guidelines 1 p5
7206 Sentencing Guidelines 2 p1
7206 Sentencing Guidelines 2 p2
7206 Sentencing Guidelines 2 p3
7206 Statute of Limitations p1
7206 Statute of Limitations p2
7206 Venue
7206 Willfulness Defined p1
7206 Willfulness Defined p2
7206 Willfulness Defined p3
7206 Willfulness Defined p4
7207 Conviction
7207 Defenses
7207 Motion to Dismiss
7207 Sentencing
7207 Willfully Defined
7210 Willful Failure to Obey Summons
7212 Assault
7212 Bribery
7212 Constiutionality
7212 Indictment
7212 Interference p1
7212 Interference p2
7212 Interference p3
7212 Interference p4
7212 Jury Instructions
7212 Rescue of Seized, Levied Property p1
7212 Rescue of Seized, Levied Property p2
7212 Sentence p1
7212 Sentence p2
7212 Statute of Limitations
7212 Suppresion of Evidence
7215 Constitutionality
7215 Conviction
7215 Corporation
7215 Defenses
7215 Evidence
7215 Intent
7215 Speedy Trial
7216 Consent
7216 Preparer Defined
7216 Scope of Statute
7217 IRS Employees

 

Appeal without merit

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7203: Willful Failure to File Return, Supply Information, or Pay Tax: Appeal Without Merit

 

[80-2 USTC ¶9694] United States of America and Burnie W. Avrit, Internal Revenue Service Agent, Plaintiffs-Appellees v. Gladys T. Lillibridge, Trustee, et al., Defendants-Appellants

(CA-6), U. S. Court of Appeals, 6th Circuit, No. 79-1283, 5/21/80, Affirming an unreported District Court decision

[Code Sec. 7602]

Examination of books and witnesses: Self-incrimination: Contempt of court: Enforcement proceedings: Bail pending appeal: Right to jury.--Taxpayers, who were found in contempt of court for refusing to obey a court order enforcing IRS summonses, were not entitled to a jury trial in the enforcement and contempt proceedings because the right to a jury trial did not exist in tax cases or civil contempt proceedings. The taxpayers' rights against self-incrimination were not properly asserted where the taxpayers failed to make specific objections to particular questions but merely made blanket assertions of their right against self-incrimination. The amount of bond set for release pending appeal was not excessive. The order holding taxpayers in contempt was affirmed.

Legrande Lillibridge, Gladys Lillibridge, 2631 Fort Campbell Blvd., Clarksville, Tenn. 37040, pro se. Hal D. Hardin, United States Attorney, Nashville, Tenn. 37219, M. Carr Ferguson, Assistant Attorney General, Gilbert E. Andrews, Charles Brookhart, Ronald Dweck, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. 20530, for plaintiff-appellees.

Before KEITH, BROWN, and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.

Order

The defendants appeal from an order of the District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee finding them in contempt for refusing to obey the Court's order enforcing Internal Revenue Service (IRS) summonses and sentencing them to five (5) months and twenty-nine (29) days in jail or until such time as they purged themselves of contempt. This appeal has been referred to a panel of the court pursuant to Rule 9(a), Rules of the Sixth Circuit. After examination of the briefs and record, this panel agrees unanimously that oral argument is not needed. Rule 34(a), Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.

The defendants raise three primary issues on appeal:

(1) They were entitled to a jury trial in both the enforcement and contempt proceedings;

(2) Their Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination permitted them to refuse to disclose the information sought by the IRS; and

(3) The District Court set excessive bond for release pending this appeal.

An analysis of these issues shows them to be without merit.

There is no general right to a jury trial in tax cases. See Phillips v. Commissioner [2 USTC ¶743], 283 U. S. 589, 599 n.9 (1931); Wickwire v. Reinecke [1 USTC ¶265], 275 U. S. 101, 105-06 (1927); Olshausen v. Commissioner [60-1 USTC ¶9142], 273 F. 2d 23, 27-28 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. den., 363 U. S. 820, reh. den. 364 U. S. 855 (1960). Thus the defendants did not have the right to a jury trial in the enforcement proceeding. Kennedy v. Rubin [66-2 USTC ¶9603], 254 F. Supp. 190 (N. D. Ill. 1966).

Contempt proceedings relative to a defendant's failure to obey a court order enforcing an IRS summons is civil in nature, even if the defendant is incarcerated until he purges himself of contempt. McCrone v. United States [39-1 USTC ¶9484], 307 U. S. 61 (1939). The right to a jury trial does not attach to civil contempt proceedings, Shilitani v. United States, 384 U. S. 364, 370-71 (1966), and the defendants had no such right in the contempt proceedings giving rise to this appeal. United States v. Carroll [78-1 USTC ¶9141], 567 F. 2d 955, 958 (10th Cir. 1977).

The defendants did have a right to refuse to answer questions put forth by the IRS or to produce materials requested in the summonses if such answers or production would tend to incriminate them. Blanket assertions of that right, however, are improper. The defendants were required to answer and produce all unobjectable answers and materials and to make specific objections to the particular questions and materials they believed could incriminate them. See United States v. Jomes [76-2 USTC ¶9563], 538 F. 2d 225, 226 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. den., 429 U. S. 1040 (1977), and cases cited therein. The record in this case shows the defendants failed to make such specific objections either during the interview with the IRS Agent or during the contempt proceedings. This failure left the District Court with no basis to make a determination that the right against self-incrimination was properly asserted. United States v. Carroll, supra, at 957.

The bond amount set by the District Court for release pending appeal, which amount the defendants produced the day it was set, was not excessive.

The Court has reviewed the entire record in this case and finds no other errors of a constitutional magnitude. The District Court's order of April 5, 1979 finding the defendants in civil contempt and ordering their incarceration is hereby affirmed. Rule 9(d)3, Rules of the Sixth Circuit.

 

 

[84-1 USTC ¶9130] United States of America , Appellee v. William E. Richards, Appellant

(CA-8), U. S. Court of Appeals, 8th Circuit, No. 83-1954, 723 F2d 646, 12/30/83, Affirming an unreported decision of the District Court

[Code Sec. 7203]

Criminal penalties: Failure to assess tax.--Failure to assess tax did not preclude indictment of the taxpayer for willfully failing to file income tax returns for three tax years.


[Code Sec. 7203]

Criminal penalties: Willful failure to file returns.--Considering the taxpayer's gross income for three taxable years, he was clearly commanded to file tax returns for those years. Therefore, his claim that his failure could not be deemed "willful," because the filing of a tax return is voluntary, was rejected as totally without arguable merit.

[Code Sec. 7203]

Criminal penalties: Miscellaneous defenses.--The district court properly rejected the taxpayer's argument that the government's delay in charging him with failure to file tax returns prejudiced the defense because witnesses' memories had dimmed. Also, the taxpayer should have raised before trial by motion any objections based on defects in the indictment, instead of claiming for the first time on appeal that he should have been indicted earlier to prevent him from committing so many offenses. In addition, the taxpayer's claim that the trial court erred in its instructions defining the offerse and the number of possible violations was totally lacking in merit. Finally, the district court properly admitted evidence consisting of a letter from the IRS to the taxpayer concerning his failure to claim exemptions on his Form W-4 and the reply letter of the taxpayer challenging the government's right to tax his wages as income. The contested letters showing the taxpayer's willfulness in failing to file were executed less than two years after the date for filing his return, and subsequent tax paying conduct was relevant to the issue of willfulness in a prior year.

[Code Sec. 7203]

Criminal penalties: Appeal without merit.--The taxpayer's appeal from a conviction for failure to file income tax returns on the grounds that wages and salaries are not "income" within the meaning of the sixteenth amendment, thus relieving him of any duty to file, was without merit. The courts have interpreted the term "income" to mean gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined.

William E. Richards, 1966 E. 72nd St., Kansas City, Mo. 64132, pro se. Rob ert G. Ulrich, United States Attorney, Thomas M. Larson, Assistant United States Attorney, Kansas City, Mo. 64106, for appellant.

Before HENLEY, Senior Circuit Judge, GIBSON and FAGG, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Following trial by jury William E. Richards was convicted on three counts of willfully failing to file income tax returns for calendar years 1979, 1980 and 1981 in violation of 26 U. S. C. §7203. The court 1 sentenced Richards to consecutive one-year terms of imprisonment on the first two counts. On court three execution of a one-year sentence was suspended and defendant was placed on probation for a period of four years. On each count a fine of $2,000.00 was assessed.

As will appear, on appeal Richards makes a number of arguments, all of which we reject.

During calendar years 1979, 1980 and 1981 appellant was employed by Missouri Pacific Railroad and received a gross income of $20,328.78, $20,995.38 and $20,690.57, respectively. The IRS notified appellant on November 6, 1979 that a meeting was scheduled on November 9, 1979 with a Revenue Officer to prepare a correct W-4 form (employee wage withholding form). Appellant responded by letter on November 7, 1979 that his W-4 was correctly filed with his employer. On September 12, 1980 the IRS notified appellant that it had not received his income tax return for the 1978 calendar year. On September 22, 1980 appellant replied to the Service by letter explaining that he was not required to file even though he had filed in previous years. No further governmental action was taken until March 28, 1983 when a three-count indictment was returned charging appellant with willful failure to file income tax returns for the years 1979, 1980 and 1981.

Appellant contends that his conviction under 26 U. S. C. §7203 is invalid because the IRS did not provide an assessment or notice of taxes due as required by 26 U. S. C. §§ 6201(a), 6203, 6303. This claim is without merit. "The filing of an admin istrative assessment record is not required before a criminal prosecution may be instituted under 26 U. S. C. §§ 7201-07 (1976) for failure to report or pay income tax." United States v. Voorhies [82-1 USTC ¶9710], 658 F. 2d 710, 714 (9th Cir. 1981).

Appellant claims that his failure to file cannot be deemed "willful" within the meaning of the charging statute, 26 U. S. C. §7203, because the filing of a tax return is voluntary. This claim was rejected in United States v. Drefke [83-1 USTC ¶9354], 707 F. 2d 978, 981 (8th Cir. 1983), wherein the court described appellant's argument as "an imaginative argument, but totally without arguable merit." Id. at 981. Considering appellant's gross income for 1979, 1980 and 1981, he was clearly commanded to file tax returns for those years. See 26 U. S. C. §6012.

Appellant challenges his conviction on the grounds that wages and salaries are not "income" within the meaning of the sixteenth amendment, thus relieving him of any duty to file. Although the sixteenth amendment, giving Congress the power to tax income, does not define "income," the courts have interpreted the term in its every day usage to mean gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined. See United States v. Safety Car Heating & Lighting Co. [36-1 USTC ¶9042], 297 U. S. 88, 99 (1936); Helvering v. Edison Bros. Stores, Inc. [43-1 USTC ¶9273], 133 F. 2d 575, 579 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 319 U. S. 752 (1943). Clearly wages and salaries fall within this definition and are therefore constitutionally taxable.

Appellant claims that the trial court's instructions defining the offense and the number of possible violations were erroneous. We do not reach these allegations because appellant failed to object to these instructions at trial as required by Fed. R. Crim. P. 30. In any event, appellant's contentions are totally lacking in merit.

Appellant maintains that the trial court erred in denying his motion pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 48(b) to dismiss the indictment for prosecutorial delay. At trial appellant argued that the government's delay in charging appellant prejudiced the defense because witnesses' memories had dimmed. The district court rejected this argument, finding neither actual prejudice nor unreasonable delay. See United States v. Lovasco, 431 U. S. 783, 789-90 (1977); United States v. Taylor, 603 F. 2d 732, 735 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 982 (1979). On appeal, appellant claims for the first time that he should have been indicted earlier to prevent him from committing so many offenses. A defendant must raise before trial by motion any objections based on defects in the indictment. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(2). Failure to raise nonjurisdictional objections prior to trial constitutes waiver of such objections. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(f). We observe, however, that the contention while perhaps imaginative is essentially frivolous.

Finally, appellant alleges that the district court erroneously admitted evidence of other acts in violation of Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). This contested evidence consisted of a letter from the IRS to appellant dated May 6, 1983, concerning appellant's failure to claim any exemptions on his Form W-4, and appellant's reply letter of May 18, 1983, in which appellant propounded eight questions challenging the government's right to tax his wages as income.

It is settled that evidence of other crimes or acts is admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) to show intent, plan, or absence of mistake, so long as four additional prerequisites are met, i. e., (1) a material issue has been raised; (2) the proffered evidence is relevant to that issue; (3) the evidence of other crimes is clear and convincing; and (4) the evidence relates to wrongdoing similar in kind and reasonably close in time to the charge at trial.

United States v. Farber [80-2 USTC ¶9580], 630 F. 2d 569, 571 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 1127 (1981).

In the case at bar, the government offered the contested evidence to show appellant's willfulness in failing to file. Appellant contends that the evidence did not meet the fourth prerequisite listed above because the correspondence was far removed in time from the crimes charged. We disagree. Both of the contested letters were executed less than two years after the return date for 1981. See id. at 572 (three and one-half years reasonably close in time). Moreover, subsequent tax paying conduct is relevant to the issue of willfulness in a prior year. 2 Id.

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

1 The Honorable D. Brook Bartlett, United States District Judge, Western District of Missouri .

2 In his reply brief appellant mentions that his consecutive sentences are excessive in that he was found guilty of a misdemeanor for which the maximum punishment cannot exceed one year. He cites no authority in support of this contention and we know of none applicable to the circumstances of this case.

 

 

[2002-1 USTC ¶50,239] United States of America , Plaintiff-Appellee v. Donald P. Thibodeaux, Defendant-Appellant

(CA-7), U.S. Court of Appeals, 7th Circuit, 00-2325, 9/14/2001, 19 Fed. Appx. 409

19 Fed. Appx. 409

2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 28337. Affirming an unreported District Court decision.

[Code Sec. 7203 ]

Conviction: Tax evasion: Willful failure to file returns: Tax protestor: Constitutional arguments: Frivolous claims: Sixteenth Amendment.--Sufficient evidence existed to sustain multiple counts of a tax protestor's convictions for tax evasion and willful failure to file returns. The government did not violate precedent when it produced nothing in response to the taxpayer's request for it to provide all relevant information necessary to his defense. Moreover, the taxpayer's contention that the district court should have dismissed his indictment on the ground that the Sixteenth Amendment was never properly ratified was frivolous. Finally, his contention that federal prosecutors, magistrates and circuit judges within the Seventh Circuit should be disqualified from his case due to an alleged elaborate conspiracy lacked merit.

Eric Wilson, Office of U.S. Attorney, Chicago , Ill. , for plaintiff-appellee. Donald P. Thibodeaux, Chicago , Ill. , pro se.

Before: FLAUM, Chief Judge, EASTERBROOK and KANNE, Circuit Judges.

è Caution: This court has designated this opinion as NOT FOR PUBLICATION. Consult the Rules of the Court before citing this case.ç

ORDER

Donald Thibodeaux, a career tax protester who has not filed a tax return or paid income taxes since 1979, appeals his conviction on four counts of tax evasion, 26 U.S.C. §7201, and six counts of willfully failing to file a tax return, 26 U.S.C. §7203. We affirm.

Thibodeaux first argues that, because he repeatedly asked the government to provide "all relevant information necessary for his defense" but received nothing, the government necessarily violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 10 L.Ed.2d 215, 83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963). But Brady does not require the government to gather information on a defendant's behalf, as Thibodeaux seems to think, see United States v. Senn, 129 F.3d 886, 893 (7th Cir. 1997); the government need only disclose favorable, material evidence already within its knowledge or control, see United States v. Grintjes, 237 F.3d 876, 880 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Hamilton, 107 F.3d 499, 509 (7th Cir. 1997). Even assuming that the evidentiary items Thibodeaux describes exist, the government's failure to disclose them would not have amounted to a Brady violation: two of the items--an anti-tax "memorandum" sold over the Internet and documents supporting Thibodeaux's theory that the Sixteenth Amendment was "fraudulently obtained"--were easily obtainable by Thibodeaux himself, see Senn, 129 F.3d at 893 (Brady inapplicable to evidence defendant can obtain through "reasonable diligence"); the others--a "dossier" on the district judge and "files" on "government operatives"--have no demonstrable relevance. Nor do we see the relevance of Thibodeaux's excluded "rebuttal evidence" to the effect that no one really "pays" taxes because United States currency lacks intrinsic value. This evidence was properly excluded.

Thibodeaux next argues that the district court should have dismissed his indictment on the ground that the Sixteenth Amendment was never properly ratified. As if our earlier opinions foreclosing this line of argument were not enough, see, e.g., United States v. Thomas [86-1 USTC ¶9354], 788 F.2d 1250, 1253-54 (7th Cir. 1986), Thibodeaux was personally informed of the frivolousness of this argument when he sought postconviction review of an earlier failure-to-file conviction in 1987. The district judge wrote:

[Thibodeaux contends that because] the Sixteenth Amendment was never properly ratified, he was convicted under void criminal statues. . . .

. . . Even if I were to consider this claim, I would dismiss it as frivolous. The idea that the Sixteenth Amendment was never properly ratified has been repeatedly rejected by the Seventh Circuit. . . . Likewise, I reject the idea here.

United States v. Thibodeaux, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7380, Nos. 87 C 5732 & 83 CR 968, 1987 WL 15738, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 17, 1987). The argument is just as frivolous today.

Finally, Thibodeaux contends that, due to their participation in an elaborate conspiracy involving the IRS, various educational and financial institutions, the Rockefeller family, and Israel's secret service, all federal prosecutors in the Northern District of Illinois as well as all magistrate, district, and circuit judges within the Seventh Circuit must be disqualified or recused from his case. In addition to being wholly conclusory, Thibodeaux's contentions have been rejected before. A motions panel of this court denied Thibodeaux's petition for a writ of mandamus based on similar arguments, and a district court denied a series of comparable recusal motions Thibodeaux filed in a bankruptcy appeal:

According to Thibodeaux, the IRS protects itself from investigation by blackmailing public officials, including a former Illinois governor, three former United States Attorneys, and several Northern District of Illinois and Seventh Circuit judges, to name just a few. Thibodeaux alleges that this "influence" prejudices the court against his interests. Thibodeaux also accuses judges in this circuit of treason and racketeering.

In re Thibodeaux, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2203, No. 90 C 7377, 1991 WL 28271, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 22, 1991). The district court in that case noted that Thibodeaux alleged no facts warranting recusal, only "reckless and malicious speculation, conjecture and innuendo," and concluded that his motions were frivolous. Id. at *3. Because this is an accurate description of Thibodeaux's argument in this appeal, we do the same.

AFFIRMED.

 

 

[2001-2 USTC ¶50,604] United States of America , Plaintiff-Appellee v. Edgar F. Bradley, Edgar Francis Bradley II, Roy Claudius Bradley, Defendants-Appellants

(CA-6), U.S. Court of Appeals, 6th Circuit, 99-3765, 99-3767, 99-3769, 8/9/2001, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 18944. Affirming an unreported District Court decision

[Code Secs. 7203 and 7206 ]

Crimes: Conspiracy to defraud the government: Willful failure to file returns: Tax protestors: Individuals subject to tax: Miscellaneous frivolous arguments.--Three pro se tax protestors were properly convicted of conspiracy to defraud the government and willful failure to file tax returns, and their sentences were upheld. On appeal, they persisted in raising frivolous and patently meritless arguments. They contended that they had no taxable income, the prosecutor committed fraud upon the court because the income tax is voluntary and they had committed no crimes, their indictment was not presented in open court, the trial court lacked jurisdiction, and there was no "meeting of the minds" among the statutes and regulations authorizing the income tax. They also played a "name game," which involved arguing that certain variations of their names were "corporate fictions."

Before: MOORE and COLE, Circuit Judges, ROSEN, District Judge. *

è Caution: This court has designated this opinion as NOT FOR PUBLICATION. Consult the Rules of the Court before citing this case.ç

ORDER

In this consolidated appeal, Edgar F. Bradley ("Edgar I"); Edgar Francis Bradley, II ("Edgar II"); and Roy Claudius Bradley ("Roy Claudius"), tax protestors proceeding pro se, appeal their judgments of conviction and sentence. The case has been referred to this panel pursuant to Rule 34(j)(1), Rules of the Sixth Circuit. We unanimously agree that oral argument is not needed. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a).

Edgar I and Edgar II were each convicted by a jury of one count of conspiracy to defraud the United States and three counts of willful failure to file income tax returns, violations of 18 U.S.C. §371 and 26 U.S.C. §7203, respectively. The jury convicted Roy Claudius of one count of each of these crimes. Edgar I was sentenced to 60 months of imprisonment to be followed by three years of supervised release. He was fined $150,000. Edgar II was sentenced to 57 months of imprisonment to be followed by three years of supervised release; he was fined $145,000. Roy Claudius was sentenced to 46 months of imprisonment to be followed by three years of supervised release, and he was fined $118,500. Each defendant was ordered to pay $635,925 in restitution.

On appeal, the Bradleys raise only frivolous tax-protestor arguments or patently meritless contentions. For example, Edgar I argues that: (1) neither he, nor most Americans, has any taxable income; (2) the prosecutor committed a fraud upon the court because the income tax is voluntary, therefore, no crime exists in this case; and (3) the grand jury indictment was not presented in open court and is therefore defective, and the district court had no jurisdiction. Edgar I also plays the "name game," contending that "Edgar Francis; Bradley" is a natural born man of the State of Ohio , while "Edgar F. Bradley" is merely a corporate fiction. Edgar II essentially reasserts the arguments of Edgar I, while adding, without supporting argument, that the Supreme Court's recent decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466, 147 L.Ed.2d 435, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (2000), somehow compels a reversal of the Bradleys' convictions. Edgar II also adds a contention that United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 131 L.Ed.2d 626, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995), demonstrates that Congress lacks the power to tax income. Finally, Roy Claudius plays the name game using variations involving capital letters, he repeats the arguments of his codefendants, and he argues that there is no "meeting of the minds" among the statutes and regulations that authorize the income tax.

These arguments have been rejected as frivolous in previous cases, See, e.g., United States v. Mundt [94-2 USTC ¶50,366], 29 F.3d 233, 237 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing cases), or are patently meritless.

Accordingly, all pending motions are denied, and we affirm the judgments of conviction and sentence. Rule 34(j)2)(C), Rules of the Sixth Circuit.

* The Honorable Gerald E. Rosen, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Michigan, sitting by designation.

 

 

[94-2 USTC ¶50,366] United States of America , Plaintiff-Appellee v. Schubert E. Mundt, Defendant-Appellant

(CA-6), U.S. Court of Appeals, 6th Circuit, 93-2623, 7/11/94, 29 F3d 233, Affirming an unreported District Court decision

[Code Secs. 1 and 7203 ]

Crimes: Failure to file returns: Jurisdiction: Frivolous constitutional claim.--An individual's conviction on charges of failing to file returns for two years was upheld. His argument that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because he was not a resident of a "federal zone" was rejected as frivolous. The Sixteenth Amendment authorizes a direct nonapportioned tax on U.S. citizens throughout the nation, not just in federal enclaves.

Richard Delonis, James C. Mitchell, Assistant United States Attorneys, 231 W. Lafayette Blvd., Detroit, Mich. 48226, for plaintiff-appellee. Richard M. Helfrick, 645 Griswold, Detroit, Mich. 48226, Schubert E. Mundt, P.O. Box 7, Manchester, Ky. 40962, for defendant-appellant.

Before KENNEDY and JONES, Circuit Judges; and GRAHAM, District Judge. *

KENNEDY, Circuit Judge:

Defendant Schubert E. Mundt appeals his conviction and six-month sentence for failing to file federal income tax returns for the tax years 1983 and 1984, in violation of 26 U.S.C. §7203 . Defendant argues that the three and a half year time lapse between the date of the indictment and the date of his arrest violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. He also contends that the District Court lacked jurisdiction over him because he is not the resident of any "federal zone." For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

I.

On February 8, 1989, a grand jury handed down a two-count indictment charging defendant with tax evasion for the years 1983 and 1984. Federal officials did not arrest defendant until July 3, 1992. Upon motion of defendant, the indictment was dismissed for failure to allege an essential element of the crime. On March 30, 1993, a grand jury issued a two-count superseding indictment charging defendant with the failure to file income tax returns for the years 1983 and 1984. On June 14, 1993, the court conducted an evidentiary hearing on defendant's previously filed motion to dismiss for violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial and denied it. After a first jury trial ended in a mistrial, a second jury found defendant guilty of both counts. The court sentenced defendant to six months on each count, to be served concurrently. Defendant timely appealed.

II.

Defendant did not file a single valid federal income tax return with the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") from 1966 through 1991. In 1980, defendant was convicted of tax evasion and sentenced to three consecutive one-year terms of imprisonment. On February 2, 1983, he was released on parole. Defendant violated the terms of his parole when he again failed to file a return for 1983 and was returned to jail on November 3, 1984.

In 1985, IRS special agent Joseph Boley began an investigation of defendant, which led to the present charges. On August 15, 1985, Boley located defendant at his workplace, Final Engineering and Development ("FEDCO"). Boley told defendant that he was investigating defendant's tax status for the years 1983 and 1984. At that time, Boley learned that defendant was living out of his car and sleeping at FEDCO. Boley also learned of defendant's beliefs that he was not obligated to pay federal income taxes because he did not live in a federal zone, because he was a member of the underground economy working for cash as a natural person, and because he did not own any privileges or was not a member of a privileged class.

After the investigation was completed, the IRS recommended prosecution to the U.S. Department of Justice. On March 3, 1987, a letter was mailed to Mundt at the FEDCO address informing him of the recommendation. By 1987, FEDCO had gone out of business with no forwarding address and the letter, which was returned to sender, never reached defendant.

The original two-count indictment was returned in February 1989. Boley began looking for defendant in July 1989. From defendant's driver's license number and car registration, Boley obtained two addresses for defendant, one in Howell, Michigan and the other at a motel in Port Huron, Michigan. The investigation of these addresses was fruitless. A subsequent check with the Secretary of State revealed that defendant had changed his address to a second motel in Port Huron . Boley checked both motels periodically during 1990 and 1991 to no avail. Boley learned from motel managers that defendant would stay for a week or two at a time on occasion. After learning from a motel employee that defendant may have gone to Florida and knowing that defendant had once held a real estate license, Boley checked with both Florida and Michigan authorities to see if defendant had renewed his license; he had not. Boley was not alone in his problems of locating defendant; the collection division of the IRS closed down an investigation of defendant in September of 1990 because it could not find him.

In July 1991, Boley learned that defendant might be working for a business called CDI. Boley monitored CDI's premises looking unsuccessfully for defendant's car.

Aware that defendant had reached retirement age, Boley explored a hunch that defendant might be collecting social security benefits. The Social Security Administration provided two different address for defendant: (1) a post office box in Westland , Michigan ; and (2) Mail Boxes Etc., a mail forwarding service company in Sterling Heights , Michigan . Boley's hunch proved to be correct. Defendant was receiving benefits and the checks were being directly deposited into the Research Credit Union. Boley then learned that shortly after the funds were deposited, the money would be withdrawn. The two branches of the credit union where the withdrawals were made were surveilled and on July 3, 1992, when defendant arrived to make a withdrawal, he was arrested.

III.

The Sixth Amendment guarantees that, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy . . . trial . . . ." The Supreme Court has developed a four-part balancing test to use in determining whether a defendant's right to a speedy trial has been violated: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) whether the defendant has asserted his right; and (4) prejudice to the defendant. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-32 (1972). The test was crafted to deal with the "vague," "amorphous," and "slippery" quality of the right, which "is necessarily relative . . . . [and] consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances." Id. at 521-22 (citation omitted).