Bank Records and Net Worth Increases
3 Page4
The
Government proceeded first by accepting the defendant's net worth
statement as of January 1, 1941 and then stating the defendant's net
worth as of the end of each calendar year through 1948. The defendant's
assets and liabilities as disclosed in these annual opening and closing
statements came from the records of the defendant's real estate agents,
his stock brokers and his bank; the source records of these amounts were
reliable and stated the property he then owned and his indebtedness.
There were, however, no records to establish the amount of cash on hand
listed among the assets, save only as appeared in the defendant's
statements of his net worth as of January 1, 1941 and December 31, 1948.
The Government, following recognized practice, calculated the difference
between the net assets of the defendant at the beginning and end of each
calendar year from 1941 through 1948. In this manner, it showed the
gradual annual increase in net worth for each year and accounted for the
total increase admitted by the defendant to be $81,956.76 (with the
adjustment for capital improvements). 13 These
annual net worth increases accrued almost entirely during 1943 through
1948 and were found in the increase in the equity in defendant's realty
holdings resulting from amortization and payment of mortgage liens and
in defendant's brokerage accounts because of cash payments made by him
into those accounts.
To
these annual net worth increases, the Government then, again following
accepted procedure, added the defendant's non-deductible expenditures
(being admitted personal living expenses) and in 1948, $7,500. for a
loan repaid and $6,080. for a remittance to
Italy
. 14 Continuing,
then, the Government credited the defendant with accounting for the
amount of income reported in his returns, the amount claimed in his
returns for depreciation on realty, and the non-taxable portion of
capital gains. 15
It
was the difference between this resultant figure of income accounted for
by the defendant and the sum of his net worth increases and other
non-deductible expenditures, which the Government sought to illustrate
by the schedule Ex. 67 as the amount which the defendant failed to
report and this was stated as follows:
Net Worth Less Total
Increase and nondeductible Income Accounted Difference being
expenditures for by defendant income unreported
1941 .......................... $ 3,457.57 $ 1,897.33 $ 1,560.24
1942 .......................... 2,203.09 688.14 1,514.95
1943 .......................... 2,386.18 844.60 879.08
1944 .......................... 9,198.99 3,403.51 520.48
1945 .......................... 17,116.70 3,808.39 7,508.97
1946 .......................... 32,368.71 14,415.13 17,953.58
1947 .......................... 21,570.42 12,592.33 8,978.09
1948 .......................... 30,048.00 22,842.99 7,205.11
We accept these calculations as far as they go; they are sufficiently
supported by data and admissions of the defendant; they do not, however,
present the complete picture.
The
evidence showed that prior to trial the defendant's accountant had
satisfied the examining agents that in the years 1946, 1947 and 1948 the
defendant had made errors in under-reporting his income from his realty
holdings--to the extent of $5,222.68 in 1946, $5,788.22 in 1947 and
$11,144.15 in 1948. These amounts, the Government conceded on trial to
have been erroneously not fraudulently unreported by the defendant. By
crediting these amounts, the income fraudulently not reported as claimed
by the Government and demonstrated by its schedule Ex. 67, was reduced
in 1946 from $17,953.58 to $12,730.90, in 1947 from $8,978.09 to
$3,189.87 and in 1948 from $7,205.11 to an over-declaration of income
(when viewed from the standpoint of fraud) of $3,909.04. It was the
failure of the Government to include these adjustments for these years
which made Ex. 69 necessary. Exhibit 67 did not present the figures as
they were known to the prosecution; it was erroneous in that it did not
take into account these realty income adjustments. Exhibit 67 was
confusing unless read with and interpreted by the computations shown in
Ex. 69.
[Failure
of Adjust]
It
is urged by the defendant on this appeal that the Government's failure
to make adjustments with respect to defendant's realty income for these
three years fundamentally and adversely to him affected the validity of
its calculations, resulting (a) in an entirely fictitious and inadequate
opening item of cash of $100. as of
December 31, 19
46 and (b) in an erroneous overstatement of at least $5,222.68 in the
Government's claimed "Increase in New [Net] Worth for 1947,"
and (c) in the erroneous creation of the item of alleged fraud in 1947
in the amount of $3,189.87.
To
determine the merits of the first contention the evidence presented
concerning cash payments by the defendant during the years 1941 through
1946 must be separately considered. Records of the defendant's realty
purchases showed that he had expended $9,095. in acquiring title to an
apartment building in 1943, $3,750. in 1944 and $25,000. in 1945 for a
like purpose, making his total cash expenditures for realty in these
years $37,845. Records of the defendant's brokerage accounts showed that
he made cash deposits in these accounts of $2,882. in 1944, $8,172.26 in
1945 and $24,202.11 in 1946--a total of $35,256.37. The grand total of
cash disbursements for realty and securities was $73,101.37 for these
years. There was no proof of cash expenditures in 1941 and 1942; the
evidence showed that the cash fund of the defendant, which he admitted
having on
January 1, 19
41, had been entirely disbursed prior to the prosecution year, 1947. In
fact, the Government proved that after full allowance for the cash on
hand on
January 1, 19
41, the defendant had expended an amount of income considerably greater
than that which he had accounted for in his returns or otherwise prior
to 1947.
Some
observations should be made as to the extent that the reality income
adjustments for 1946, 1947 and 1948 (or for any other year) would affect
the net worth calculations.
The
income for any year did not directly enter into the calculations of
defendant's assets and liabilities for either the beginning or the end
of the calendar year periods. The assets were the sum total of cash on
hand, the bank balances, the cost of realty and the cost of securities;
the liabilities were the mortgages on realty, and the indebtedness to
realty agents and stock-brokers--the difference was the defendant's net
worth. There was no direct evidence that the defendant possessed any
greater amount of cash on December 31, 1946 or on December 31, 1947 than
he stated he did on December 31, 1948, that is $100. Assuming, however,
that he did have the $5,222.68 realty adjusted income of 1946 on hand
and unexpended as cash on December 31, 1946, it would effect an increase
in net worth for the year 1946 from $118,581.34 to $123,804.02 since the
defendant's assets as of December 31, 1946 would be increased from
$541,499.75 to $546,722.43 occasioned by the increase of cash on hand
from $100. to $5,322.68. Assuming, also, that he had the $5,788.22
realty adjusted income of 1947 on hand and unexpended as cash on
December 31, 1947 it would effect an increase in net worth during 1947
(taking into account the assumed increase in cash of 1946) from
$136,901.76 to $147,912.66. This would operate to reveal an increase in
net worth for the calendar year 1947 of $24,108.64 instead of
$18,320.42, as claimed by the prosecution, and would not benefit the
defendant. An even larger increase in net worth in 1948 would result, if
we assume that the additional realty income of $11,144.15 in 1948 was
retained as cash and unexpended as in 1946 and 1947. Such assumptions
would simply demonstrate that the defendant had misstated the amount of
cash on hand on December 31, 1948, and that he in fact had at that time
a cash hoard not revealed of $22,255.05 instead of the $100. From these
assumptions it would also follow that the defendant's income for 1946,
1947 and 1948 was larger than that contended for by the prosecution. In
absence of proof to the contrary we have assumed that the amounts of
additional realty income were expended; this we have done by accepting
the defendant's own statement of net worth as of December 31, 1948
wherein he stated his amount of cash on hand to be $100., this being the
interpretation most favorable to him. The very plausible explanation
advanced by the Government on this appeal is that the defendant had
understated his living expenses as $2,750. for 1946, $3,250. for 1947
and $3,741. for 1948. The items of adjusted realty income for 1946, 1947
and 1948 do not affect the basic integrity of the Government's net worth
calculations, under this view, except to reduce the amount of
fraudulently unreported income as we have above noted.
[Prejudicial
Error]
Nevertheless,
the omission of these items, of which the Government had notice prior to
trial, from Ex. 67 entitled "Analysis of net worth increase and
computation of unreported income" served to make that exhibit
incomplete, inaccurate and misleading and the failure of the trial judge
to sustain objection to its admission in evidence operated to the
prejudice of the defendant. It was not an analysis of the net worth
increase or a computation of fraudulently unreported income which
conformed to the Government's evidence, and it did not fully state the
facts. This is especially so because the omission of these items in
effect forced a balance between the Government's calculations and the
defendant's statement of his net worth as of
December 31, 19
48. The Government contended that its calculations were corroborated by
this statement, but there was no agreement with the amount stated to be
cash on hand if these items of adjusted realty income remained
unexpended and they were not revealed or accounted for by schedule Ex.
67.
It
is also contended by the defendant that the Government knew or should
have known that adjustments were necessary with respect to the realty
income of 1943, 1944 and 1945 and that it failed to make these thus
affecting the validity of its net worth calculations. The very short
answer to this is that the evidence, including the realty agents'
reports, did not reveal any facts which would necessitate or support an
adjustment of defendant's realty income for these years.
We
recognize that in a net worth computation "the cogency of its proof
depends upon its effective negation of reasonable explanations by the
taxpayer inconsistent with guilt."
Holland
v.
United States
, p. 135. This in turn places the burden on the Government to
"track down relevant leads furnished by the taxpayer--leads
reasonably susceptible of being checked, which, if true, would establish
the taxpayer's innocence." (pp. 135-136).
In
the computation of the defendant's income for the years 1943, 1944 and
1945 no adjustment was made for unreported realty income. However, even
were such adjustments found to have been necessary and were they made,
they would not have affected the defendant's unassuming the amounts
involved not to have been expended, reported income for 1947 and would
have operated only to increase by an equal amount the cash the defendant
had on hand at the beginning and end of 1947. The realty agents
testified on the trial and the defendant neither inquired nor pointed
out the necessity or occasion for adjustment of reported realty income
for these years--1943, 1944 and 1945. It was not incumbent on the
Government to minutely examine each and every one of the statements of
the firms managing the real estate to determine what expenses were
charged to maintenance, when in fact they were capital expenditures, or
whether the defendant accurately carried over from these statements to
his returns the multitude of other expenditures made by his agents in
operating his property during the years 1943, 1944 and 1945. The
particulars as to those items lay with the defendant and his agents; the
defendant voluntarily disclosed them as to 1946, 1947 and 1948 and this
resulted in the adjustments discussed. It is but fair to assume that by
his silence as to them they would disclose nothing to his benefit; in
any event, the realty agents' statements in evidence do not disclose
information which would enable one to determine whether the expenses
incurred were deductible. Prima facie, it was sufficient for the
Government to establish, as it did, the net amount the defendant
received from his real estate agents after they had deducted the
operating costs. We find no substance in the point made that the
Government was obligated to negative any real estate income adjustments
which were entirely speculative and which, in any event, would not have
affected the 1947 income.
The
charge of the Court gave the jury but little guidance as to the
interpretation to be placed on the schedules which were introduced in
evidence by the Government. It explained none of the calculations shown.
The Court emphasized Ex. 67 without calling attention to Ex. 69 or
mentioning that the items of adjusted realty income for 1946, 1947 and
1948 were omitted from Ex. 67 or that these items should be credited to
the defendant in the computation of unreported income alleged by the
Government to have been fraudulently unreported for these three years.
The charge did not meet the requirements of a net worth prosecution.
[Jury
Instructions]
The
defendant contends that he was prejudiced by the refusal of the Court to
charge that "whether or not the jury finds or believes that the
defendant was guilty with respect to the years prior to 1947, if it
finds or believes that with respect to 1947 he did not wilfully
understate his income he should be acquitted." We do not agree; the
charge was adequate on this matter.
However,
the charge insofar as it concerned the weight which might be given to
the defendant's 1948 return on the issue of wilfulness with respect to
the 1947 return was misleading and erroneous. In the 1948 return, as we
have pointed out, the defendant under-reported his income but this, as
conceded by the Government, was not pursuant to a purpose or intent to
evade payment of income tax for 1948. In fact, as we have noted, from
the standpoint of fraud this constituted an overstatement of income to
the extent of $3,939.04. In its charge the Court first instructed the
jury:
"The
jury may consider likewise on the issue of wilfulness the correctness or
incorrectness of the returns filed by the defendant from 1941 to 1944,
1945, 1946, 1947 and 1948. In this connection, however, you will firmly
bear in mind that the defendant is not charged with having violated the
income tax law any year other than the year 1947."
At
the conclusion of the charge the defendant's counsel took exception (out
of the hearing of the jury) as follows:
"Mr.
Lorenz: Well, I except to the charge that anything with respect to 1948
may be considered in connection with intent in prior years."
After
some extended colloquy the court stated to the jury:
"The
Court: I made the following statement, members of the jury, which I
think bears correction: I said the jury may consider on the issue of
wilfulness the correctness or incorrectness of the return filed by the
defendant for 1941 to 1944, 1945, 1946 and 1948. Now you may strike that
from your minds as a definite correction and not consider that, but I
will substitute for that the following:
"The
jury may also consider on the issue of wilfulness, if it finds it to be
a fact, that the returns filed by the defendant from 1941 to 1944, were
false and fraudulent - - -
"Mr.
Hill: Excuse me, your Honor, I don't mean to interrupt your Honor, but I
think it is 1946.
"The
Court: What do you say?
"Mr.
Hill: I say I don't mean to interrupt your Honor, but I think it is 1941
to 1946.
"The
Court: Well, not the way this reads.
"Mr.
Hill: No, your Honor. That was written before your Honor's ruling with
respect to the other thing.
"The
Court: To 1946. That is correct. Further, the jury may consider on this
same issue, if it finds it to be a fact, if it finds it to be so, that
the 1948 return was false and fraudulent.
"And
that will complete my instructions to you."
In
view of the exceptions taken by the defendant to the charge as
originally given it was prejudicial to the defendant to ask the jury to
consider on the issue of wilful evasion in 1947 whether the 1948 return
was false and fraudulent when the Government had conceded on the trial
that it was not.
We
feel, too, that it was prejudicial to the defendant to have denied the
request to charge "what the amount of fraudulently claimed income
is in 1947." We feel that errors which might otherwise have been
disregarded as not affecting the substantial rights of the defendant,
here, because of the nature of the prosecution's proof and the exhibits
may not be overlooked.
The
judgment is Reversed and new trial ordered.
1
Count 1 of the indictment charged that on
March 15, 19
46 defendant attempted to evade income tax for the calendar year 1945,
and alleged that the defendant made a false and fraudulent income tax
return for that year wherein he stated that his net income was $3,808.39
and the tax due thereon $677.11 when he well knew that his net income
for that year in fact was $11,317.86 on which there was due income tax
of $2,408.22.
Count
2 of the indictment charged that on
March 15, 19
47 the defendant attempted to evade income tax for the calendar year
1946, and alleged that the defendant made a false and fraudulent tax
return for that year wherein he stated that his net income for the year
was $4,391 and the amount of tax due thereon $670.71, when he well knew
that his net income for the year in fact was $20,217.01 on which there
was due income tax of $5,830.79.
Count
3 of the indictment charged that on
March 15, 19
48 the defendant attempted to evade income tax for the calendar year
1947, and that the defendant made a false and fraudulent tax return for
that year wherein he stated that his net income for the year was
$4,293.33 and the amount of tax due thereon $650.24, when he well knew
that his net income for the year in fact was $14,118.70 on which there
was due income tax of $3,036.75.
2
The trial judge at first denied a motion for a directed verdict of
acquittal but under Rule 29 reserved the right to reconsider. He later
granted the motion for a directed verdict. Since the Government has
filed no appeal, the procedure adopted is of no import. We have before
us only the conviction on Count 3.
3
The defendant objected to the admission in evidence of many of these
statements, contending that they were given under a promise that there
would be no criminal prosecution. The trial was interrupted and a
separate hearing held on these objections out of the presence of the
jury. The objections were overruled. On this appeal, this ruling has not
been questioned by the defendant. We accept these statements as having
been voluntarily made.
11
The Assistant
United States
Attorney stated: "The 1948 net worth statement is the document
which the Government will use to corroborate its build up of the
taxpayer's net worth from 1941 forward. All we want to do is work
backward from the end of 1948 to the end of 1947 to prove that the
figure we arrive at, at the end of 1947, is correct. That is all."
(S. M. 205.)
12
Thus, concerning Ex. 73 which is described as a reconciliation of net
worth increases, the following colloquy took place on trial:
"The
Court: Well, let us be sensible. Is it a mass of figures?
"Mr.
Hill (Ass't U. S. Attorney): Yes, Your Honor, it is a mass of
figures."
Examination
of the exhibit shows this description to be entirely fitting. Exactly
why such a reconciliation was at all necessary is difficult to
understand. If the schedule of net worth increases (Ex. 67) had been
correctly prepared in the first instance, there would have been no need
for the reconciliation (Ex. 73). It was the admitted error in Ex. 67
which was "reconciled."
[55-1
USTC ¶9366]C. A. Dupree, Appellant v.
United States of America
, Appellee
(CA-5),
In the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, No. 14659,
220 F2d 748,
April 15, 19
55
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of
Texas.
[1939 Code Sec. 145(b)--similar to 1954 Code Sec. 7201]
Criminal prosecution for fraud: Proof under net worth method:
Rehearing.--On the Government's motion for rehearing on taxpayer's
acquittal on charges of criminal prosecution for fraud, it was held that
neither the adequacy of proof as to the starting available funds under
the net worth method nor the clarity of the trial court's charge to the
jury met the standard implicit in the pronouncement of the Supreme
Court. Rehearing denied.
John
D. Cofer and G. Hume Cofer, 905-9 Littlefield Bldg.,
Austin
,
Texas
, for appellant. C. F. Herring, United States Attorney, and Bradford F.
Miller, Assistant United States Attorney, Post Office Box 1701, San
Antonio 6, Texas, for appellee.
Before
HOLMES and TUTTLE, Circuit Judges, and ALLRED, District Judge.
On
Petition for Rehearing
PER
CURIAM:
We
have carefully considered the motion for rehearing filed by the
United States
. In the light of the teaching of Holland v. United States, 1 which was
not available to the Government when presenting this case or to the
trial court [55-1 USTC ¶9169] when considering the difficult issues
involved, "appellate courts should review the cases [of this
general type] bearing constantly in mind the difficulties that arise
when circumstantial evidence as to guilt is the chief weapon of a method
that is itself only an approximation." We are also told that
"the complexity of the problem is such that it cannot be met merely
by the application of general rules," and that "charges should
be especially clear, including, in addition to the formal instructions,
a summary of the nature of the net worth method, the assumptions on
which it rests, and the inferences available both for and against the
accused."
We
do not believe this case either in the adequacy of proof as to the
starting available funds in January, 1946, or in the clarity of the
charge, meets the standards implicit in this pronouncement of the
Supreme Court.
The
motion for rehearing is, therefore, DENIED.
1
348
U. S.
121, 129 [54-2 USTC ¶9714].
[56-1
USTC ¶9473]Fred M. Ford, Appellant v.
United States of America
, Appellee
(CA-5),
In the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, No. 15672,
233 F2d 56,
April 19, 19
56
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of
Texas.
[1939 Code Sec. 145(b)--substantially unchanged in 1954 Code Sec. 7201]
Criminal prosecution: Fraud: Appeal from jury verdict: Second
trial.--Taxpayer, a former chief of police, appealed from a
conviction and sentence following a second trial for filing fraudulent
returns for 1945-1947. In affirming the trial court's judgment, the
appellate court held that there was sufficient evidence of tax evasion
to support the trial court's denial of taxpayer's motion for acquittal,
the Government being required in criminal prosecutions to prove no more
than that the taxpayer failed to compute his income tax honestly. The
trial court did not err in admitting testimony about alleged
"pay-offs" through third parties to the taxpayer, testimony
about expenditures made by the taxpayer's wife, and testimony about
unsworn statements made by taxpayer to Government agents. The trial
court did not err in refusing to permit cross-examination of the local
mayor as to his views on prostitution and in refusing to permit
interrogation of the jury regarding a newspaper article about the
mayor's views. The indictment upon which taxpayer was convicted was not
void because the only witness who appeared before the Grand Jury was a
Government agent with no personal knowledge of the facts or because that
witness did not compute before the Grand Jury the amount of taxes, if
any, due by taxpayer.
Douglas
W. McGregor,
Houston
,
Tex.
, for appellant. Harman Parrott, Assistant United States Attorney, San
Antonio, Tex., Fred B. Ugast, Tax Division, Department of Justice,
Washington, D. C., for appellee.
Before
BORAH, TUTTLE and JONES, Circuit Judges.
JONES,
Circuit Judge:
An
indictment in three counts charged that appellant had wilfully and
knowingly attempted to evade and defeat a large part of the income tax
due and owing by him and his wife for the years 1945, 1946 and 1947 by
filing false and fraudulent returns on behalf of himself and his wife
wherein he reported income for a less sum than the true amount, and in
which he stated the tax for smaller amounts than he knew to be owing.
The counts were in substantially the same form. A separate count set
forth the amounts of income and tax for each of three years. The
indictment alleged violations of the portion of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1939 which provided that:
"*
* * any person who wilfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat
any tax imposed by this chapter or the payment thereof, shall, in
addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a felony and,
upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned
for not more than five years, or both, together with costs of
prosecution." Internal Revenue Code of 1939, former 26 U. S. C. A.
§145(b); Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26
U. S.
C. A. §7201.
This
is an appeal from a conviction and sentence following a second trial of
this case held at
Austin
,
Texas
. This Court reversed a conviction obtained at the first trial. Ford
v.
United States
, 5th Cir. 1954, 210 Fed. (2d) 313 [54-1 USTC ¶9233]. At the second
trial, as at the first, the Government relied upon the cash receipts and
expenditures method, sometimes called the net worth method, of
establishing unreported income. In the first appeal, as in the present
appeal, the appellant contended that the District Court should have
granted a motion for acquittal because of the insufficiency of the
evidence. After relating in some detail the evidence adduced at the
former trial it was held by this Court that the motion for acquittal was
properly denied. The evidence in the record now before us presents
proofs no less convincing, and without setting forth the evidentiary
facts, we hold, as we held before, that the motion for acquittal was
properly denied.
[Motion
for Acquittal]
The
appellant contends that error was committed in denying his motion for
acquittal because there had been no determination of his tax liability
by the Commissioner under §272 or §3612 of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1939. §272 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, former 26 U. S. C.
A., provides for the procedure in determining the correctness of a tax
deficiency proposed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, including
the issuance of the familiar ninety-day letter. §3612 authorizes the
Collector to make a return where no return or a false or fraudulent
return has been filed, and requires that the Commissioner [of Internal
Revenue] shall determine and assess all taxes, other than stamp taxes,
as to which returns are made pursuant to the section. Whatever bearing
the appellant's contention might have in a proceeding for the collection
of a tax, it has no application in a criminal prosecution for attempting
to evade and defeat a tax by filing false and fraudulent returns. As
this Court has heretofore said:
"A
prosecution for income tax evasion is not an effort by the Government to
compute income tax at all. It is an effort by the Government to prove
that the taxpayer failed to compute it honestly. There is nothing in
this Section [Former 26 U. S. C. A. §41] nor in any other applicable
statute that restricts the Government in the method of proving this fact
if it exists." Dupree v.
United States
, 5th Cir. 1955, 218 Fed. (2d) 781 [55-1 USTC ¶9169].
[Pay-Off]
At
the first trial of this case, Margaret Lera testified as a witness for
the Government. She testified as a witness for the Government at the
second trial. On the first trial this witness testified to the making of
pay-offs to the police department of
Galveston
. There was no testimony in the first trial that the appellant received
any of the moneys. We held, on the former appeal, that the admission of
the testimony of this witness was erroneous and highly prejudicial. For
this error, and another which we need not here mention, a new trial was
granted. At the second trial the witness testified that she sent pay-off
money to the appellant during the years 1945, 1946 and 1947 by
detectives. Being interrogated about conversations between the appellant
and herself during these years, she stated that she had asked appellant
if the detectives had been delivering what she had been sending, and
quoted his reply as being "Yes, that everything was all
right". This, we think, was enough to meet to objection which was
found to be error on the former appeal. It was shown that Mrs. Lera had
made a settlement after the first conviction of the appellant of her own
income tax liability. On cross-examination she told of being interviewed
by Government agents about a month before the trial, being furnished
with a transcript of the questions and answers comprising the interview,
and of burning the transcript of the testimony during the
noon
recess of the day she testified. The owing and settlement of income
taxes, the discussion with Government agents regarding some matter,
possibly the Ford case, and the destruction of the transcript of
the interview are not matters which would exclude Mrs. Lera's testimony.
The
District Court admitted testimony as to expenditures made by appellant's
wife and error is assigned because such testimony was received. There
was evidence that such funds as Mrs. Ford had and spent were received
from the appellant. The court declined to give a charge to the jury,
requested by appellant, that it should give no consideration to
purchases of Mrs. Ford in determining the taxable income of the
appellant. We need not discuss these questions as they are disposed of
in the former appeal. Ford v. United States, supra. See Lloyd
v.
United States
, 5th Cir. 1955, 226 Fed. (2d) 9 [55-2 USTC ¶9665].
Relying
chiefly upon Calderon v. United States, 9th Cir. 1953, 207 Fed.
2d 377, the appellant urges that the unsworn statements made by
appellant to Government agents were inadmissible because, he says, the
corpus delicti had not been established. The agents testified that
appellant had said, in response to questions, that he kept cash in a
chifforobe drawer in the amount of two or three thousand dollars in 1945
and 1947. Again he said, that in 1944, prior to the tax years involved,
he had $12,00
