Suppresion of
Evidence
7212- Interference
with Administration of Internal Revenue Laws: Suppression of Evidence
[98-2
USTC ¶50,650]
United States
, Plaintiff-Appellee v.
Florence
L. Peters, Defendant-Appellant
(CA-7),
U.S. Court of Appeals, 7th Circuit, 97-2634,
8/17/98
, 153 F3d 445, Affirming a District Court decision, 97-1
USTC ¶50,185
[Code
Sec. 6103 ]
Confidentiality of returns: Duty to inform: Possibility of criminal
penalties: Informants.--A podiatrist's motion to suppress evidence
obtained by the IRS during a civil audit and subsequently used in a
criminal tax fraud investigation was denied. The revenue agents had no
duty to warn the taxpayer that the audit might result in criminal
charges or to disclose that the audit was prompted by an informant's
tip.
[Code
Sec. 7203 ]
Crimes: Fraud and false statements on returns: Motion to suppress
evidence: Nature of investigation: Misrepresentation: Firm indication of
fraud.--A podiatrist's motion to suppress evidence obtained by the
IRS during a civil audit and subsequently used in a criminal tax fraud
investigation was denied. The IRS agents involved in the audit did not
affirmatively misrepresent the nature of their investigation because
they had not developed a firm indication of fraud before making the
criminal fraud referral.
[Code
Sec. 7206 ]
Crimes: Jury verdict: Evidence to support.--Records that
demonstrated a taxpayer's consistent pattern of diverting corporate
funds for her personal use and testimony of her accountant were
sufficient to support the jury's verdict convicting her of making false
statements on her tax returns.
Joan
B. Safford,
Chicago
,
Ill.
60604
, for plaintiff-appellee. Cynthia Giacchetti, 343 S. Dearborn St.,
Chicago, Ill. 60604, Sanford J. Boxerman, David V. Capes, Rosenblum,
Goldenhersh, Silverstein & Zafft, 7733 Forsyth, St. Louis, Miss.
63105, for defendant-appellant.
Before:
EASTERBROOK, RIPPLE and EVANS, Circuit Judges.
RIPPLE,
Circuit Judge:
After
a jury trial, Florence L. Peters was convicted of four counts of making
false statements on her tax returns in violation of 26 U.S.C. sec.
7206(1) 1 and one
count of corruptly attempting to impede the administration of the
internal revenue laws in violation of 26 U.S.C. sec. 7212(a). 2 On appeal,
Dr. Peters contends that the district court erred in denying her motion
to suppress evidence which, in her view, the IRS had obtained in
violation of her Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. In addition, Dr.
Peters asserts that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to
support the jury's verdict. For the reasons discussed in the following
opinion, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
I
BACKGROUND
A.
The Contours of an IRS Investigation
The
IRS splits the responsibility for enforcing the nation's tax laws
between its two investigative divisions. The Criminal Investigative
Division ("CID") is charged with investigating criminal
violations of the tax code and related federal statutes. CID
investigators are called "special agents." Like many other
criminal law enforcement agents, they carry firearms and badges. In
addition, special agents must recite an administrative warning prior to
soliciting information from taxpayers. See Beckwith v. United States
[76-1 USTC ¶9352], 425 U.S. 341, 343 (1976) (quoting warning provided
by special agents).
On
the other hand, the Examination Division of the IRS is responsible for
conducting civil tax audits. Examination Division investigators are
known as "revenue agents." In contrast to special agents,
revenue agents do not carry firearms; nor are they required to provide
taxpayers with an administrative warning. Although an Examination
Division audit typically concludes with some sort of civil settlement
between the IRS and the taxpayer, such an audit may uncover evidence
that causes the revenue agent to refer the case to the CID for criminal
investigation. Under IRS regulations, a revenue agent who uncovers a
"firm indication of fraud on the part of the taxpayer" must
immediately suspend her audit and refer the case to the CID. See
Internal Revenue Manual sec. 4565.21(1). At that point, the CID
enters the case and the IRS' efforts become focused on the possibility
of criminal prosection. See generally Michael I. Saltzman,
IRS Practice and Procedure para.para. 12.01 & 12.03[1][a]. This
case, in large part, concerns the distinction between a civil tax audit
and a criminal tax investigation.
B.
The Investigation
In
October 1988, Marshall Peters, the former husband of podiatrist Dr.
Florence Peters, called the Internal Revenue Service to report that he
had information indicating that Dr. Peters had been cheating on her
taxes.
Marshall
's call was received by Special Agent Gerald Padar of the CID. On
October 6, Special Agent Padar went to
Marshall
's home; there he met with Marshall and his new wife, Eloise. At that
meeting, Marshall showed Padar original corporate checks for Dr. Peters'
corporation, 3 checks that
Marshall had received in connection with a child support suit. A few
weeks later,
Marshall
provided Padar with photocopies of corporate checks allegedly used by
Dr. Peters to pay personal expenses. Marshall and Eloise Peters
ultimately provided Padar with more than 300 pages of documents,
including photocopies of more than 400 checks that Dr. Peters allegedly
wrote for personal expenses but deducted as business expenses.
Special
Agent Padar held this information for 18 months but did not open a
formal criminal investigation. Instead, he maintained a file on Dr.
Peters in the bottom drawer of his desk, where he collected the
information supplied by Marshall and Eloise. On a few occasions, Padar
reviewed the checks in that file. In addition, on one occasion, Padar
drove by Dr. Peters' home to see what he could glean about her lifestyle
and to attempt to corroborate information he had received from Marshall
and Eloise concerning an addition to Dr. Peters' home. During that time,
Padar received a few calls from Marshall and Eloise seeking information
on the progress of the investigation. 4 Padar
informed them that, under IRS nondisclosure regulations, he could not
tell them anything. In January 1990, Special Agent Padar
"walked" the information across the hall to the Examination
Division. At that time, he prepared a two-page handwritten summary
reflecting the informants' view of Dr. Peters' tax violations. He
included that summary with the file. Padar did no further investigation.
5
Padar's
file on Dr. Peters ultimately landed on the desk of Thomas Ridgeway, a
group manager in the Examination Division. Ridgeway assigned the case to
Revenue Agent Margo Thompson, whom he described as a "rookie"
in corporate audits. The Peters case was Thompson's first corporate
audit that needed significant further development. When Ridgeway passed
the file on to Thompson, he informed her that the case had begun because
of an informant's tip received by the CID. He instructed Thompson to
meet with the informants and to conduct an audit to determine if Dr.
Peters had, in fact, deducted personal expenses as business expenses.
Nonetheless, Thompson did not prepare a written audit plan because, in
her view, the audit was routine. Thompson held this view because she had
worked on other cases that were prompted by an informant's tip but were
treated as routine civil audits and did not evolve into criminal
investigations.
Revenue
Agent Thompson began her audit by inputting the checks on the computer
and calling up Dr. Peters' 1987 and 1988 returns. On
July 2, 1990
, Thompson initiated the first IRS contact with Dr. Peters. Thompson
sent a standard form letter to Dr. Peters notifying her that her
corporate returns for 1987 and 1988 had been selected for an audit and
requesting a meeting. Attached to the letter was the standard
Information Document Request for a corporate audit, requesting numerous
corporate and accountant records. Thompson also attached copies of two
other documents which are routinely sent to the taxpayer when the IRS
initiates a civil audit: (1) IRS Publication 1, a form called "Your
Rights as a Taxpayer," and (2) IRS Notice 609, the "Privacy
Act Notice." The purpose of IRS Publication 1 is to inform the
taxpayer of her rights and some of the basic procedures and policies
associated with a civil audit. The Privacy Act Notice informs the
taxpayer of the IRS' legal right to ask for information, the reason the
agency is asking for it ("to carry out the tax laws of the
United States
") and the consequences of failing to cooperate with the audit
("you may be charged penalties and, in certain cases, you may be
subject to criminal prosecution"). The letter and attached forms
contained no indication that the audit had been prompted by an
informant's tip or that the case had been referred by the CID.
In
response to this notice, Dr. Peters contacted the IRS and informed
Thompson that her accountant, William Morrison, would represent her in
the audit. Commencing shortly thereafter, Thompson conducted a series of
personal meetings and telephone contacts with Morrison. During the
course of these communications, Morrison asked Thompson whether she was
conducting a "routine" or "ordinary" audit, and she
replied in the affirmative. Although he did not remember Thompson
specifically using the words "random" or "routine,"
he "absolutely" had the impression that it was a routine
audit. Morrison came to this conclusion because of the normal manner in
which Thompson was proceeding more than anything she said. Indeed, at
the time of her initial meetings with Morrison, Thompson did not believe
that any fraud was involved or that Dr. Peters had any criminal
problems. She conducted the audit like any other. She did not inform
Morrison that the investigation had been prompted by an informant's tip
or referred by the CID. 6 Nor did she
provide a verbal warning that Dr. Peters might be subject to criminal
penalties. Accordingly, Morrison continued to provide information on the
belief that it was a routine audit. 7
On
November 5, 1990
, Thompson first met with Dr. Peters. Prior to this meeting, Thompson
had discovered an apparent discrepancy of approximately $100,000 in Dr.
Peters' tax filings. However, she did not know yet whether this was a
real discrepancy. This initial meeting lasted about two hours. Thompson
conducted the meeting in the same manner as any other civil audit. She
did not give Dr. Peters any indication or warning that there might be a
possible criminal problem. She used the standard computer-generated
interview form and asked the same general questions that she would ask
in any audit. At the meeting, Thompson reiterated requests for
information concerning Dr. Peters' corporation in order to verify the
purpose of various corporate expenditures claimed by Dr. Peters. At this
point, Thompson did not believe there was fraud but had concluded that
there were expenses that needed to be explained.
However,
by March 1991, Thompson began to suspect that the case might involve
fraud. On March 28, after Thompson received Morrison's signed power of
attorney, she informed him that she had discovered approximately
$200,000 in unreported income and that she had questions regarding the
legitimacy of some claimed business expenses. A few days later during
another conversation, Morrison stated: "If [Dr. Peters] didn't
report $200,000, it would be a case that would be a referral to
CID." R.121-4 at 518. Thompson did not respond. By
April 30, 1991
, Thompson had concluded that the case involved fraud and began to
prepare a criminal referral. However, whether the case bore the
"firm indications of fraud" necessary for a criminal referral
was ultimately her supervisor's decision.
By
that time, Thompson had a new supervisor, Bruce Wilson.
Wilson
reviewed the case and concluded that there were not "firm
indications of fraud." After reviewing Thompson's work, he
determined that there were too many errors in Thompson's analysis to
substantiate a fraud referral. In particular, he believed that Thompson
had disallowed all claimed expenses without analysis and had not given
Dr. Peters adequate opportunity to prove the business deductions or to
explain the apparent excess income. He concluded that there were
"indicia of fraud" but decided that Dr. Peters should be given
further opportunity to explain the discrepancies discovered by Thompson.
In
July 1991,
Wilson
reassigned the Peters matter to Revenue Agents Cynthia Lensink and
Steven Mittl. He instructed Lensink to reanalyze the business expense
deductions and Mittl to recalculate Dr. Peters' income using a bank
deposit analysis. On
November 4, 1991
, Lensink met with Morrison and Dr. Peters' newly-retained attorney, Ben
Roth. During that meeting, Lensink asked Roth if his client would sign a
consent form to extend the civil statute of limitations, thereby giving
the IRS more time to settle the case or bring a civil action against Dr.
Peters. Roth responded that he would advise his client to sign the
consent form. Lensink stated that she wished to bring the matter to a
close quickly and that she had prepared a list of proposed adjustments
for that purpose. Both Roth and Morrison assumed that Lensink was
referring to a civil settlement. In addition, according to Roth, he
asked Lensink at that meeting whether the case might be referred for
criminal prosecution and she replied in the negative. Lensink, however,
stated that Roth never asked her that question and that she never denied
the possibility of a referral to the CID.
On
December 17, 1991
, Roth met with Lensink at Dr. Peters' home. The purpose of the visit
was to observe Dr. Peters' claimed home office. At this meeting, Roth
noticed a significant change in Lensink's attitude; she was no longer
interested in reaching an agreement on the proposed adjustments. By this
time, Lensink and Mittl had completed their analysis of both Dr. Peters'
income and claimed business expenses. On
December 19, 1991
, the Revenue Agents completed a proposed criminal referral concerning
Dr. Peters' 1988 and 1989 corporate and individual income tax returns.
The proposed referral was submitted to
Wilson
. After reviewing the agents' work,
Wilson
concluded that the case was now sufficiently developed and that there
were in fact "firm indications of fraud." Accordingly, he
signed the referral. Morrison and Roth first learned of the referral in
January of 1992.
After
further review of the information compiled in the Examination Division
audit, the CID recommended criminal prosecution of Dr. Peters. On
April 11, 1995
, a federal grand jury indicted Dr. Peters on four counts of criminal
tax fraud. Counts I and III charged her with fraudulent conduct in
violation of 26 U.S.C. sec. 7206(1) with regard to her corporate tax
returns for 1988 and 1989. Those counts alleged that Dr. Peters had
underreported her corporate income and had deducted personal expenses as
business expenses on those returns. Counts II and IV charged her with
making false statements on her personal returns for the same years in
violation of sec. 7206(1). In addition, on
November 14, 1995
, the grand jury returned a superseding indictment. In that indictment,
the grand jury added a fifth count. Count V charged Dr. Peters with
obstructing the due administration of the Internal Revenue Code in
violation of 26 U.S.C. sec. 7212(a).
C.
Proceedings in the District Court
Prior
to her trial, Dr. Peters moved to suppress the records and statements
that she had offered to the IRS auditors between April 1990 and January
1992. She asserted that the IRS obtained that evidence in violation of
her Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights by telling her that they were
conducting a routine civil audit when in fact they were carrying out a
covert criminal investigation. After a six-day suppression hearing, the
district court found that the civil revenue agents did not deliberately
mislead Dr. Peters as to the nature of their investigation. Accordingly,
the court denied Dr. Peters' motion to suppress. See generally United
States v. Peters [97-1 USTC ¶50,185], 944 F. Supp. 646 (N.D. Ill.
1996).
After
a lengthy trial in December 1996, a jury found Dr. Peters guilty on all
five counts of the superseding indictment. Dr. Peters now asks this
court to set aside her conviction on two grounds. First, she contends
that the district court erred in denying her motion to suppress. In
addition, she asserts that the evidence presented at trial was not
sufficient to support the jury's verdict.
II
DISCUSSION
A.
Dr.
Peters contends that the district court erred in denying her motion to
suppress the records and statements that she had offered to the IRS
auditors between April 1990 and January 1992. She asserts that the IRS
obtained that evidence in violation of her Fourth and Fifth Amendment
rights by conducting a criminal tax investigation under the guise of a
civil audit. On review of a district court's ruling on a motion to
suppress, this court reviews questions of law de novo and questions of
fact for clear error. See
United States
v. Sholola, 124 F.3d 803, 811 (7th Cir. 1997). We shall conclude
that a district court's factual finding is clearly erroneous only if we
are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
made. See
United States
v. Quinn, 83 F.3d 917, 921 (7th Cir. 1996).
1.
A
consensual search is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment or
violative of due process under the Fifth Amendment if the consent was
induced by fraud, deceit, trickery or misrepresentation by the revenue
agent. 8 See
United States v. Serlin [83-1 USTC ¶9368], 707 F.2d 953, 956 (7th
Cir. 1983); United States v. Lehman [72-2 USTC ¶9534], 468 F.2d
93, 104 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 967 (1972). In Serlin,
we set forth the heavy burden that a defendant seeking suppression under
this theory must meet:
To
prevail on this point defendant must produce clear and convincing
evidence that the agents affirmatively mislead [sic] him as to the true
nature of their investigation. Defendant must also prove that the
misinformation was material in his decision to speak with the agents.
Simple failure to inform defendant that he was the subject of the
investigation, or that the investigation was criminal in nature, does
not amount to affirmative deceit unless defendant inquired about the
nature of the investigation and the agents' failure to respond was
intended to mislead.
707
F.2d at 956 (internal citations omitted); see also United States v.
Stern, 858 F.2d 1241, 1249 (7th Cir. 1988).
We
turn, then, to the first part of the Serlin inquiry: Whether the civil
revenue agents affirmatively misrepresented the nature of their
investigation to Dr. Peters and her representatives. The district court
found that the revenue agents, through their conduct and words,
represented to Dr. Peters that they were conducting an ordinary or
routine civil audit. Accordingly, if the agents were in fact conducting
a criminal investigation under the auspices of a civil audit, then they
affirmatively misrepresented the nature of their investigation. See
United States v. Wadena, Nos. 96-4141, 96-4145 & 96-4146, 1998
WL 300523, at *16 (8th Cir.
June 10, 1998
); United States v. Grunewald [93-1 USTC ¶50,122], 987 F.2d 531,
534 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Nuth, 605 F.2d 229, 234
(6th Cir. 1979); United States v. Tweel [77-1 USTC ¶9330], 550
F.2d 297, 299 (5th Cir. 1977); see also Internal Revenue Manual
sec. 9311.83(1) (stating that the IRS may not develop a criminal tax
case under the guise of a civil audit). In addressing this issue, the
district court noted that, under IRS guidelines, "a civil audit
evolves into a criminal investigation at the point when the auditors
develop a firm indication of fraud." United States v. Peters
[97-1 USTC ¶50,185], 944 F. Supp. 646, 654 (N.D. Ill. 1996). Therefore,
the court held that it would "find that the revenue agents were
engaged in a covert criminal investigation if they continued to audit
defendant after they developed a firm indication of fraud."
Id.
We
believe that the district court's approach to this issue is a sound one.
Although this court has not yet addressed the precise issue presented in
this case, 9 other courts
that have addressed the issue have relied on the "firm indications
of fraud" rule as a good benchmark for determining whether the IRS
has attempted to conduct a criminal investigation under the guise of a
civil audit. See, e.g., Wadena, 1998 WL 300523, at *16 (requiring
defendant seeking suppression of evidence to show that IRS continued
with civil audit after it developed firm indications of fraud); 10 Groder
v. United States [87-1 USTC ¶9259], 816 F.2d 139, 142 (4th Cir.
1987) (holding that continuation of civil audit after the development of
firm indications of fraud is relevant to issue of whether agency
conducted investigation in good faith); United States v. Piper
[88-2 USTC ¶9575], 681 F. Supp. 833, 837 (M.D. Ga. 1988) (same).
Indeed, when examining whether a revenue agent has misrepresented the
true nature of her investigation, it is appropriate to consider the
procedures and regulations under which she functions, including the
"firm indications of fraud" rule:
If,
during an examination, an examiner discovers a firm indication of fraud
on the part of the taxpayer, the tax return preparer, or both, the
examiner shall suspend his/her activities at the earliest opportunity
without disclosing to the taxpayer, the taxpayer's representative, or
employees, the reason for such suspension.
Internal
Revenue Manual sec. 4565.21(1). Therefore, if a revenue agent
continues to conduct a civil audit after developing "firm
indications of fraud," a court may justifiably conclude that the
agent was in fact conducting a criminal investigation under the auspices
of a civil audit.
Nonetheless,
as the district court noted, the "firm indications of fraud"
standard is a difficult standard for federal courts to apply because it
is inherently vague and depends, in large part, on the good faith and
professional judgment of the revenue agents conducting the investigation
at issue. When applying this standard, federal courts must navigate
between two perils. On the one side, courts face the Scylla of judicial
micromanagement of the inner functionings of an administrative agency, a
peril recognized by many of the courts that have addressed this issue. 11 Yet, on the
other side, courts face the Charybdis of judicial abdication of their
Article III duty to protect the constitutional rights of criminal
defendants. As the district court recognized, this latter peril will be
realized if the courts are forced to rely solely on the after-the-fact
assessments of revenue agents who may have an incentive to use the
discretionary nature of the "firm indications" rule to shield
their actions from judicial scrutiny.
In
navigating the narrow course necessitated by these two perils, courts
must remember that the "firm indications of fraud" rule is but
a tool for courts to utilize in determining whether the revenue agents
made an affirmative misrepresentation to a defendant or her
representatives concerning the nature of their investigation. Although
we are mindful that the "firm indications of fraud" rule
cannot be expressed in a set of absolute criteria and that the facts and
circumstances of each case must be assessed in their own light, we
believe that the following discussion can serve as a guide to the courts
who are called upon to navigate these narrow waters in the future. Our
review of the relevant case law suggests several considerations that
ought to be helpful to the district courts.
The
IRS has been found to have engaged in impermissible deception if the
Service has conducted a civil audit at the behest of a criminal law
enforcement agency conducting an ongoing criminal investigation. This
rule is based on the Fifth Circuit's holding in United States v.
Tweel [77-1 USTC ¶9330], 550 F.2d 297, 299 (5th Cir. 1977) and has
been explicitly embraced by the IRS. See Internal Revenue Manual
sec. 9311.83(1) (stating that "under no circumstances" should
the Service "develop a criminal tax case under the guise of a civil
audit"); cf.
United States
v. Lehman [72-2 USTC ¶9534], 468 F.2d 93, 105 (7th Cir.) (stating
that "the appellate court cases dealing with fraud in tax
situations warn that revenue agents must not affirmatively mislead a
taxpayer into believing that the investigation is exclusively civil in
nature and will not lead to criminal consequences" (collecting
cases)), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 967 (1972). In Tweel, the
Examination Division began a civil audit of the taxpayer at the specific
request of the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section of the
Department of Justice. Thus, the audit was, in effect, conducted as part
of an ongoing criminal investigation. In an attempt to ascertain the
nature of the investigation, the taxpayer's representative asked the
revenue agent if a special agent was involved in the investigation; the
revenue agent answered in the negative. Although the revenue agent's
answer was technically correct, the court found that he knew the purpose
of the representative's question and that, therefore, his answer
amounted to affirmative deceit. "[T]he agent's failure to apprise
the appellant of the obvious criminal nature of this investigation was a
sneaky deliberate deception by the agent . . . and a flagrant disregard
for appellant's rights. The silent misrepresentation was both
intentionally misleading and material." Tweel [77-1 USTC ¶9330],
550 F.2d at 299. The court further cautioned: "Our revenue system
is based on the good faith of the taxpayers and the taxpayers should be
able to expect the same from the government in its enforcement and
collection activities." 12 Id.
at 300.
Active
involvement of CID personnel in a civil audit prior to the completion of
a criminal referral also has been treated as compelling evidence that
the IRS has proceeded beyond the point of "the firm indications of
fraud" and attempted to use the audit as a covert criminal
investigation. See United States v. Caldwell [87-2 USTC ¶9423],
820 F.2d 1395, 1399 n.4 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Robson
[73-1 USTC ¶9381], 477 F.2d 13, 17 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Smith, 898 F. Supp. 464, 468 (W.D. Ky. 1995); United States v.
Piper [88-2 USTC ¶9575], 681 F. Supp. 833, 838 (M.D. Ga. 1988).
This principle has its roots in the fact that the IRS, in an effort to
comply with Tweel and its progeny, has constructed a
"Chinese wall" between its civil examination and criminal
investigation divisions. 13 Indeed, IRS
guidelines specifically warn that revenue agents who are in the process
of determining the appropriateness of a criminal referral must not
"obtain evidence and/or direction from the Criminal Investigation
Division for a specific case that is under examination." 14 Internal
Revenue Manual sec. 4565.21(1). Conversely, a special agent who
refers a case to the Examination Division as lacking in criminal
potential must withdraw from the case under most circumstances. See
id. at sec. 4565.7.
Continuation
of audit activities after the revenue agent begins preparation of the
fraud referral also may be indicative of an agency attempt to gather
information for a criminal prosecution while keeping the taxpayer in the
dark as to the true nature of its investigation. See, e.g., United
States v. Wadena, Nos. 96-4141, 96-4145 & 96-4146, 1998 WL
300523, at *16 (8th Cir.
June 10, 1998
). Indeed, the Manual clearly directs a revenue agent to suspend her
activities at the earliest opportunity after developing firm indications
of fraud. See Internal Revenue Manual sec. 4350 HB 22(34); see
also Michael I. Saltzman, IRS Practice and Procedure para.
12.03[1][a] ("The IRS instructs its personnel to be alert to
indications of fraud and, when fraud is spotted, to suspend their civil
activities and refer the case to CID."). Similarly, another Manual
provision bars a revenue agent from "solicit[ing] an agreement or
solicit[ing] and receiv[ing] delinquent returns prior to the submission
of a fraud referral, if a referral is being considered." Internal
Revenue Manual sec. 4565.21(1). Accordingly, if a revenue agent has
determined that a case must be referred to the CID yet continues her
regular audit activities in the interim, such behavior suggests an
intent to gather evidence for a criminal prosecution under the aegis of
a civil audit.
The
case law suggests that a revenue agent has developed a firm indication
of fraud when she has established that the taxpayer has engaged in a
consistent pattern of substantial underreporting of income and/or
overstatement of deductions such that an intent to evade taxes can be
inferred. See Internal Revenue Manual sec. 4231 HB 940(1)(a)-(b),
(f)1; see also
United States
v. Grunewald [93-1 USTC ¶50,122], 987 F.2d 531, 534 (8th Cir.
1993). Such a pattern is usually established only after the revenue
agent has examined the taxpayer's returns filed over a period of several
years. See United States v. Lockyer [71-2 USTC ¶9641], 448 F.2d
417, 419-20 (10th Cir. 1971) (noting that evidence showed "a
pattern of substantial understatements" for a three-year period and
stating that referral is appropriate upon "discovery of a
substantial understatement coupled with an indication that the
understatement was deliberate"). Accordingly, once a revenue agent
has discovered solid evidence that a taxpayer has engaged in a
consistent pattern of this type of behavior, a court may infer that the
revenue agent has developed "firm indications of fraud."
The
case law recognizes that an assessment of the taxpayer's intent is the
most critical element in a revenue agent's determination of whether
"firm indications of fraud" exist in any particular case. See
Caldwell [87-2 USTC ¶9423], 820 F.2d at 1402-03; United States
v. Groder [87-1 USTC ¶9259], 816 F.2d 139, 143-44 (4th Cir. 1987); Piper
[88-2 USTC ¶9575], 681 F. Supp. at 838. Indeed, it is the taxpayer's
intent to evade taxes that differentiates a criminal violation from a
civil case. For this reason, a revenue agent who discovers potential
violations of the revenue laws will almost always give the taxpayer an
opportunity to explain the violations before determining the
appropriateness of a criminal referral. See Internal Revenue Manual
sec. 4565.21(1); see generally
United States
v. Kaatz [83-1 USTC ¶9156], 705 F.2d 1237, 1242 (10th Cir. 1983)
(revenue agent interviewed taxpayers and their accountant on a number of
occasions prior to referral). This step is viewed as a necessity
because, given the complexity of the tax code, many innocent
explanations exist for unreported income. See Groder [87-1 USTC
¶9259], 816 F.2d at 143 ("[A] failure to report income correctly
'may be due to mistake, inadvertence, reliance on professional advice,
honest difference of opinion, negligence or carelessness, none of which
constitutes deliberate intent to defraud.' " (quoting Internal
Revenue Manual sec. 4231 HB 933)). Once the revenue agent has
interviewed the taxpayer, he must assess the taxpayer's explanation.
During that process, the revenue agent may consider the proffered
explanation in light of that particular taxpayer's knowledge of taxes
and business practices. See Internal Revenue Manual sec. 4231 HB
940(1)(e)3. 15 In fact,
one court has held that a revenue agent engages in constructive
dishonesty when she continues a civil audit after receiving an
incredible explanation from a taxpayer with extensive knowledge of the
tax laws. See United States v. Toussaint [78-2 USTC ¶9793], 456
F. Supp. 1069, 1071-72 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
Finally,
a firm indication of fraud should be distinguished from a first
indication of fraud. This principle is set forth clearly in the Manual:
A
firm indication of fraud must be distinguished from a first indication
of fraud. A first indication of fraud can be described as a mere
suspicion of fraud. Examiners are legally permitted and should endeavor
to ask the taxpayer, the preparer, the representative, or any other
involved party for an explanation of the "discrepancies" which
are the basis of the examiners['] suspicion of fraud and any other
question(s) which will resolve the question of the taxpayer's intent.
The determination of firm indication of fraud is a factual determination
which can only be determined on a case by case basis. An examiner who is
in doubt should consult with his/her group manager and/or Examination
Fraud Coordinator to determine if the indicators of fraud are
sufficiently developed.
Internal
Revenue Manual sec. 4565.21(1); see also id. at sec.
52(10)1.2(3) ("Firm indications of fraud confirm, support, and add
to initial suspicions of fraud."). Revenue agents must take
adequate steps to perfect indications of fraud and must ensure that the
fraud is substantial prior to making a referral to the CID. See id.
at sec. 52(10)1.2(3)(a)-(d); see also Saltzman, IRS Practice and
Procedure para. 12.03[1][a]. This development is necessary because the
CID must have sufficient information from which "to evaluate the
criminal potential of the case." Internal Revenue Manual
sec. 4231 HB 981; see also
Caldwell
[87-2 USTC ¶9423], 820 F.2d at 1402-03. The courts that have
addressed this issue have embraced this rule and have cautioned that
"mere suspicion" should not be equated with firm indications
of fraud. See United States v. Powell [88-1 USTC ¶9140], 835
F.2d 1095, 1100 (5th Cir. 1988);
Caldwell
[87-2 USTC ¶9423], 820 F.2d at 1402-03; Groder [87-1 USTC ¶9259],
816 F.2d at 143. "[I]f a firm indication is taken to mean the same
thing as a mere suspicion, taxpayers would be subject to fraud
investigations as a matter of course, and 'the revenue agent would have
to cease almost before he started his investigation.' " Caldwell
[87-2 USTC ¶9423], 820 F.2d at 1397 (quoting United States v.
Lockyer, 448 F.2d 417, 421 (10th Cir. 1971)); see also Grunewald
[93-1 USTC ¶50,122], 987 F.2d at 534 ("If IRS agents, exercising
sound discretion and good judgment, fear suppression of the evidence
where no intentional, prejudicial misrepresentation is afoot, civil
audits will prematurely and unnecessarily be referred to CID.").
We
emphasize that the law of this circuit remains the test established in
Serlin. A consensual search is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment
or violative of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment if the
consent was induced by fraud, deceit, trickery or misrepresentation by
the revenue agents. For those elements to be present, the defendant must
establish that the agents affirmatively misled her as to the true nature
of their investigation and that this affirmative misleading was a
material factor in her decision to give information to the agents. With
respect to the first factor--whether affirmative misleading took
place--we believe, as do the other circuits that have addressed the
question, that the "firm indications of fraud" rule serves a
useful function in guiding the district court's inquiry on the ultimate
question as to whether there has been a deliberate misleading by the
government. The foregoing discussion notes circumstances that, when
present, have suggested strongly to reviewing courts that deceit and
trickery amounting to such an affirmative misrepresentation have
occurred. In identifying such circumstances, courts have viewed with a
jaundiced eye the IRS' deviations from its own rules and regulations.
That does not mean, of course, that such a deviation is sufficient,
standing alone, for exclusion of evidence. See United States v.
Caceres [79-1 USTC ¶9294], 440 U.S. 741, 755-57 (1979); see also
United States v. Mapp [77-2 USTC ¶9607], 561 F.2d 685, 690 (7th
Cir. 1977) (holding that rules in Internal Revenue Manual were
adopted for the internal administration of the IRS and therefore
conferred no substantive rights on the taxpayer). It simply means that
such deviations are relevant and probative evidence on the issue of
whether the requisite affirmative misleading by the government has in
fact occurred.
2.
We
now apply these principles to the case at hand and address the issue of
whether the revenue agents made affirmative misrepresentations to Dr.
Peters concerning the nature of their investigation. In this case, we
must review four stages of the IRS' civil audit of Dr. Peters: (1)
Special Agent Padar's initial involvement in this case and his
subsequent referral of the matter to the Examination Division; (2)
Revenue Agent Thompson's investigation prior to her preparation of a
fraud referral; (3) Bruce Wilson's decision to reject Thompson's
referral and to continue the civil audit of Dr. Peters; and (4) the
investigation of Revenue Agents Lensink and Mittl prior to their
preparation of the fraud referral.
We
turn first to the issue of whether the IRS engaged in affirmative deceit
by conducting a civil audit of Dr. Peters after Special Agent Padar's
initial involvement in the case. As we noted earlier, this case began
when the CID received an "information item" from Marshall
Peters, Dr. Peters' ex-husband. Padar then spoke with the informants
(Marshall and his new wife), received evidence from them, drove by Dr.
Peters' house to corroborate information given to him by the informants
and maintained a file on Dr. Peters in the bottom drawer of his desk for
18 months. However, Padar ultimately "walked" the file across
the hall to the Examination Division. Dr. Peters contends that the fact
that the IRS' investigation of her began in the CID and was prompted by
the informant's tip indicates that the Service had "firm
indications of fraud" prior to Padar's decision to walk the file
across the hall to the Examination Division. Accordingly, she asserts
that the IRS violated her constitutional rights by using the civil audit
as a covert means to obtain evidence for a criminal prosecution.
The
district court's finding that the IRS had not developed "firm
indications of fraud" at the time Padar walked the file across to
the Examination Division is not clearly erroneous. 16 The case
law is clear that the fact that the investigation was prompted by an
information item and therefore originated in the CID is not sufficient
to establish a firm indication of fraud.
Caldwell
[87-2 USTC ¶9423], 820 F.2d at 1399-1401; Robson [73-1 USTC ¶9381],
477 F.2d at 17; Piper [88-2 USTC ¶9575], 681 F. Supp. at 838.
Indeed, it is the standard procedure of the IRS to channel information
items through the CID, see Internal Revenue Manual sec. 9781 HB
3(10)3.2, and only a small number of the large quantity of information
items received ever develop into fraud investigations, see Saltzman,
IRS Practice and Procedure para. 12.03[1][c]. Moreover, in this case,
there was no evidence that Padar remained involved in the investigation
after it was referred to the Examination Division or that he made any
recommendations or provided any advice to the revenue agents concerning
their investigation. 17
Accordingly, unlike Tweel, this was not a case in which a
criminal law enforcement agency requested that the IRS conduct a civil
audit as part of an ongoing investigation. Finally, we agree with the
district court that the information provided to Padar by Dr. Peters'
ex-husband was not sufficient, standing alone, to constitute a firm
indication of fraud. Considering the source, there was good reason for
the IRS to follow its standard procedure of perfecting first indications
of fraud by, among other things, giving the taxpayer an opportunity to
explain the alleged violation. Cf. Grunewald [93-1 USTC ¶50,122],
987 F.2d at 533 (after receiving tip from partner of taxpayer, revenue
agent sought to determine whether the allegations were true or merely
the result of animosity toward the taxpayer); Robson [73-1 USTC
¶9381], 477 F.2d at 14 (tip called into CID by taxpayer's ex-fiancee).
We
turn next to the issue of whether Revenue Agent Thompson developed
"firm indications of fraud" prior to the preparation of her
criminal referral. As the district court found, the record contains
uncontroverted evidence that Thompson--through her words and
actions--represented her audit as an ordinary or routine civil audit.
Based on the record before us, we cannot conclude that the district
court's finding that Thompson's representations were honest is clearly
erroneous. 18 At the
suppression hearing, Thompson testified repeatedly that, in her view,
the audit was routine. She testified further that her view of the audit
as routine was not changed by the fact that it was a referral from the
CID and had been prompted by an informant's tip. In fact, she had worked
on other "informant cases" that did not turn out to be fraud.
Moreover, as we noted above, it is standard IRS procedure to route
informant tips through the CID, yet few ever develop into full-scale
criminal investigations. 19 Finally,
Thompson testified that, at the time of her initial meeting with Dr.
Peters on November 5, 1990, she had concluded that there were
discrepancies in Dr. Peters' tax returns that needed to be explained but
had not yet developed firm indications of fraud. Thompson's decision to
interview Dr. Peters and to give her the opportunity to explain the
discrepancies was consistent with both IRS procedures and the relevant
case law. See Internal Revenue Manual sec.sec. 4565.21(1)
(distinguishing first indications of fraud from firm indications and
instructing revenue agent to seek explanation from taxpayer or her
representative for any discrepancies) & 4231 HB 981 (stating that
revenue agent must develop initial indications of fraud prior to
referral in order to provide CID with sufficient information from which
"to evaluate the criminal potential of the case"); accord Caldwell
[87-2 USTC ¶9423], 820 F.2d at 1402-03; Groder [87-1 USTC ¶9259],
816 F.2d at 143-44; Piper [88-2 USTC ¶9575], 681 F. Supp. at
838.
The
next stage of the investigation we must examine is the period
immediately following Thompson's submission of her proposed referral to
the CID. As we noted earlier, Thompson submitted her fraud referral to
her supervisor Bruce Wilson in May 1991. However, after reviewing the
case,
Wilson
concluded that there were not "firm indications of fraud"
because Thompson had made too many errors in her analysis and had not
provided Dr. Peters with an adequate opportunity to provide an
explanation for the discrepancies noted by Thompson. Accordingly, the
civil audit continued, albeit under the direction of two new revenue
agents.
The
IRS did not act improperly by continuing its audit of Dr. Peters after
Thompson initiated her fraud referral in the Spring of 1991. The IRS
guidelines specifically instruct revenue agents to consult with their
supervisors in determining whether a particular audit is ripe for
referral to the CID. See Internal Revenue Manual sec. 4565.21(1).
Moreover, there is nothing in the record which suggests that
Wilson
did not honestly believe that Thompson's work was faulty and needed
further development and that Dr. Peters should be given further
opportunity to explain the discrepancies noted by Thompson. In fact, the
explanation offered by the IRS in this case is nearly identical to the
one accepted by the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Powell
[88-1 USTC ¶9140], 835 F.2d 1095, 1096-97 (5th Cir. 1988). In Powell,
an inexperienced revenue agent concluded that there were "firm
indications of fraud" and began preparing a criminal referral. See
id. However, her supervisor instructed her to perform additional
tests to verify her conclusion before completing her referral. See
id. The Fifth Circuit held that the Agency's approach in that case
did not amount to fraud, deceit and trickery, but rather was consistent
with guidelines set forth in the Internal Revenue Manual. See id.
at 1101 ("We view the careful approach of the Manual as a wise and
praiseworthy safeguard against the whimsical disregard of taxpayers'
rights by decisions of agents who, through inexperience, might otherwise
act too quickly or impetuously."); see also Caldwell [87-2
USTC ¶9423], 820 F.2d at 1397. Similarly, in this case, we conclude
that
Wilson
's decision to develop the audit further was consistent with the
directives in the Internal Revenue Manual and was not part of an
effort to conduct a covert criminal investigation.
We
now turn to the final stage of the civil audit and examine the actions
of Revenue Agents Lensink and Mittl prior to their referral of this
matter to the CID. Based on the record before us, we cannot conclude
that the district court's finding that Lensink and Mittl did not develop
firm indications of fraud prior to their initiation of the criminal
referral is clearly erroneous. As we noted earlier, in November 1991,
Lensink asked Dr. Peters' attorney if his client would sign a consent
form to extend the three-year civil statute of limitations. See
26 U.S.C. sec. 6501(a). As the district court noted, this request
strongly suggests that, at that point, the IRS was still pursuing a
civil case and that the revenue agents had not yet developed "firm
indications of fraud." Indeed, such an extension would be
unnecessary if the Service had already made the decision to pursue
either civil fraud charges (with no statute of limitations) or to
commence a criminal prosecution (with a six-year statute of
limitations). See id. at sec.sec. 6501(c)(1) & 6531.
In
light of the foregoing discussion, we conclude that the district court's
finding that the IRS did not engage in affirmative deceit during its
audit of Dr. Peters is not clearly erroneous. 20 In
addition, we note that the district court's legal analysis of this issue
was guided by sound principles. The court properly looked to both the
internal guidelines of the IRS and the existing case law.
B.
We
turn now to Dr. Peters' contention that the evidence presented at trial
was not sufficient to support the jury's verdict. First, with respect to
Counts I and III, which charged Dr. Peters with making false statements
on her corporate returns, she contends that the government's proof was
insufficient because, at trial, the government calculated her taxes
using a method of accounting different from the method used by her
accountant in preparing her corporate returns. Second, with respect to
Counts II and IV, which charged Dr. Peters with making false statements
on her personal returns, she asserts that the government's proof was
insufficient because the government failed to present any proof that the
unreported income diverted from her corporation represented taxable
"constructive dividends" rather than nontaxable return of
capital. In evaluating Dr. Peters' challenges to the sufficiency of the
evidence, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the
government and shall reverse only if no rational jury could have found
Dr. Peters guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See
United States
v. Jean, 25 F.3d 588, 595 (7th Cir. 1994).
1.
Counts I & III: Accrual v. Cash Basis
Dr.
Peters contends that the government's evidence with respect to Counts I
and III (charging her with making false statements on her 1988 and 1989
corporate returns) was not sufficient to support the jury's verdict
because the government's proof used a different method of accounting
from that used by her accountant. The government used the cash basis
method of accounting to make its case against Dr. Peters; however, she
asserts that her accountant used the accrual method. In making this
argument, Dr. Peters points to her corporate tax returns. On those
returns, her accountant clearly checked the box indicating that the
corporation was an accrual basis taxpayer. However, despite the marking
on the return, Dr. Peters' accountant testified repeatedly that he used
the cash basis method to prepare her corporate returns. This conflicting
evidence was put before the jury during the course of the trial, and it
chose to credit the accountant's testimony that Dr. Peters was in fact a
cash basis taxpayer. We shall not second-guess the jury's determination
on appeal.
2.
Counts II and IV: Constructive Dividends
Dr.
Peters' second contention involves Counts II and IV, which charged her
with making false statements on her individual returns. In those counts,
the government alleged that Dr. Peters diverted corporate funds into her
personal accounts and that she made corporate expenditures for her
personal benefit. These funds were not reported on either her corporate
or personal return. Dr. Peters contends that the government failed to
prove that she received such income because it did not prove that her
corporation had sufficient earnings and profits in the relevant years to
pay "constructive dividends." In her view, the government was
required to put forward such proof in order to show that any diverted
funds constituted taxable income to her rather than nontaxable return of
capital.
In
making this argument, Dr. Peters relies on the rule used in several
civil tax cases involving the proper characterization of corporate funds
which have been diverted to the sole shareholder of a wholly-owned
corporation. In such a case, the government must provide evidence of
corporate earnings and profits to show that the money
"skimmed" by the taxpayer was a taxable "constructive
dividend" as opposed to nontaxable return of capital. See e.g.,
Truesdell v. Commissioner [CCH Dec. 44,500], 89 T.C. 1280, 1298
(T.C. 1987). However, the majority of courts that have addressed this
same situation in the context of a criminal proceeding have held that
the government need not prove the character of the diverted funds. See
United States v. Williams [89-2 USTC ¶9390], 875 F.2d 846, 849-52
(11th Cir. 1989); United States v. Miller [76-2 USTC ¶9809], 545
F.2d 1204, 1213-14 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 930
(1977); Davis v. United States [55-2 USTC ¶9685], 226 F.2d 331,
335-36 (6th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 965 (1956). These
cases have stressed the distinction between the nature of a civil
collection action and a criminal tax proceeding:
In
civil tax cases the purpose is tax collection and the key issue is the
establishment of the amount of tax owed by the taxpayer. In a criminal
tax proceeding the concern is not over the type or the specific amount
of tax which the defendant has evaded, but whether he has willfully
attempted to evade the payment or assessment of tax.
The
difficulty in automatically applying the constructive distribution rules
to this case is that it completely ignores one essential element of the
crime charged: the willful intent to evade taxes, and concentrates
solely on the nature of the funds diverted. That latter aspect is not
the important element. Where the taxpayer has sought to conceal income
by filing a false return, he has violated the tax evasion statutes.
Miller,
545 F.2d at 1214; see also Williams, 875 F.2d at 850.
The
Second Circuit recently has taken a view different from that expressed
in Williams, Miller and Davis. See United States v. D'Agostino
[98-1 USTC ¶50,380], 145 F.3d 69, 72-73 (2d Cir. 1998). In D'Agostino,
the taxpayers argued that they did not owe any tax on the diverted
corporate funds because those funds were not constructive dividends. The
taxpayers further asserted that the diverted funds could not be
constructive dividends because the corporation had no earnings and
profits in the years in question and therefore must constitute a
reduction in the taxpayer's loan account or capital account with the
corporation. Because there was no tax deficiency, there could be no
violation. By contrast, the government argued, per Williams, that
whether the diverted funds constitute personal income or corporate
income depends on the intent of the taxpayer at the time the funds are
diverted. If the intent is to evade taxes, the income is personal and
taxable. If the intent is to take a reduction under the loan account or
capital account, then the funds are not taxable. The Second Circuit took
the view of the defendants and followed their precedent in civil cases
that required the government to put on earnings and profits evidence in
this type of case. See id. at 73.
D'Agostino
and the other criminal cases we have just discussed involved alleged
violations of 26 U.S.C. sec. 7201, 21 which
requires the existence of a tax deficiency. 22 By
contrast, sec. 7206(1) 23 requires
only that the taxpayer file a return "which he does not believe to
be true and correct as to every material matter." Indeed, this
court has recently held that the government need not prove an actual tax
deficiency in order to convict a defendant under sec. 7206(1). See
United States v. Minneman [98-1 USTC ¶50,347], 143 F.3d 274, 279
(7th Cir. 1998); accord United States v. Marashi [90-2 USTC ¶50,482],
913 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Wilson, 887 F.2d
69 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Miller [74-1 USTC ¶9307],
491 F.2d 638 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 970 (1974).
Rather, the elements of a sec. 7206(1) violation are: (1) that the
defendant made or caused to be made, a federal income tax return for the
year in question which he verified to be true; (2) that the tax return
was false as to a material matter; (3) that the defendant signed the
return willfully and knowing it was false; and (4) that the return
contained a written declaration that it was made under the penalty of
perjury. See United States v. Whyte [83-1 USTC ¶9185], 699 F.2d
375, 381 (7th Cir. 1983). A false statement is "material" when
it has "the potential for hindering the IRS's efforts to monitor
and verify the tax liability" of the corporation and the taxpayer. United
States v. Greenberg [84-1 USTC ¶9509], 735 F.2d 29, 32 (2d Cir.
1984). Here, the evidence showed that Dr. Peters diverted corporate
funds directly to a personal account and that these funds were not
accounted for in any way.
The
focus of sec. 7206(1) is clearly on the taxpayer's intent. Here, there
is no evidence in the record indicating that Dr. Peters intended the
distributions at issue to be a return of capital. The record shows,
however, a consistent pattern of diverting corporate funds into her
personal accounts and making corporate expenditures for her personal
benefit. Such a pattern is sufficient evidence to support the jury's
conclusion that Dr. Peters filed tax returns which she did not
"believe to be true and correct as to every material matter."
26 U.S.C. sec. 7206(1). Accordingly, we hold that the government was not
required to present evidence concerning the earnings and profits of Dr.
Peters' corporation in order to convict her of a violation of sec.
7206(1).
Conclusion
For
the reasons stated in the foregoing opinion, we affirm the judgment of
the district court.
AFFIRMED
Easterbrook,
Circuit Judge, concurring. Peters, who turned records over to the IRS in
an audit, wants to prevent their use in this criminal prosecution
because, she insists, the IRS had "firm indications of fraud"
on her part before or during the audit. She advances two propositions.
The first is that acquisition of evidence must cease once the IRS
acquires enough information to refer the case to a criminal prosecutor.
The second is that "firm indications of fraud" are
inconsistent with a representation that the audit is "civil",
rendering cooperation involuntary and the acquisition of documents a
violation of the fourth amendment. (Peters also invokes the due process
clause of the fifth amendment, but it is inapplicable to the seizure of
evidence.
Sacramento
v. Lewis, 118 S. Ct. 1708, 1715 (1998); Graham v. Connor,
490
U.S.
386 (1989). Cf. Fisher v. United States [76-1 USTC ¶9353], 425
U.S. 391 (1976) (no fifth amendment privilege in the contents of
business records).) Although decisions can be found that accept both of
these propositions, the first is antithetical to the fourth amendment
and the second problematic.
Probable
cause to believe that a crime has been committed is the constitutional
requirement for a warrant; it is not an objection to a seizure. Why
should a solid basis for believing that the suspect has committed a
crime require the government to curtail its investigation? "Law
enforcement officers are under no constitutional duty to call a halt to
a criminal investigation the moment they have the minimum evidence to
establish probable cause, a quantum of evidence which may fall far short
of the amount necessary to support a criminal conviction." Hoffa
v.
United States
, 385
U.S.
293, 310 (1966). Peters relies heavily on statements in IRS publications
that instruct auditors to hand cases over to their criminal counterparts
when evidence begins to build--this is where the phrase "firm
indications of fraud" comes from--but United States v. Caceres
[79-1 USTC ¶9294], 440 U.S. 741 (1979), holds that the IRS's violation
of its own rules or procedures for conducting investigations does not
justify use of the exclusionary rule. See also United States v. Mapp
[77-2 USTC ¶9607], 561 F.2d 685 (7th Cir. 1977). What is more--and
dispositive--is Beckwith v. United States [76-1 USTC ¶9352], 425
U.S. 341 (1976), which holds that so far as the Constitution is
concerned revenue agents may interrogate and gather evidence from
taxpayers who the IRS believes have engaged in criminal wrongdoing.
Although
the Constitution permits agents to keep gathering evidence long after
they have "firm indications" of crime, Congress has blocked
the use of one investigative tool. While "a Justice Department
referral is in effect" it is not possible to enforce a summons for
tax records. 26 U.S.C. sec.7602(c)(1); United States v. Michaud
[88-2 USTC ¶9577], 907 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc). This rule
offers Peters no aid--first because the case was not
"referred" to the Department of Justice until after the audit
(see the definition of "referral" in sec.7602(c)(2)),
and second because a limitation on compulsory process does not imply a
limitation on voluntary production. Agents are entitled to ask, however
much (see Beckwith) or little (see
Florida
v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991)) evidence they possess. Taxpayers
may find cooperation in their interests no matter how far along the road
toward criminal prosecution the IRS has traveled; cooperation with
auditors and prompt payment of civil penalties has staved off many a tax
prosecution. So there is nothing to Peters' contention that "firm
indications of fraud" oblige the IRS to stop inquiring and require
the suppression of evidence voluntarily disclosed.
Was
disclosure voluntary? If a revenue agent uses deceit to get a taxpayer
to turn over documents that could not have been secured either by a
summons under 26 U.S.C. sec.7602(b) or by a search warrant, it might
make sense to suppress the results in order to ensure that the statutory
line is honored. But what role would "firm indications of
fraud" play in such an inquiry? The statutory question is whether
the case has been referred for criminal prosecution, not whether the IRS
has "firm indications of fraud". As for the constitutional
standard: although the validity of consent obtained by overstating the
weight of evidence in hand--making it look to the suspect like the jig
is up, so there is no point in resisting--is questionable, why would
understating the weight of existing evidence imperil voluntariness? A
suspect who believes that the IRS lacks the evidence to commence a
criminal prosecution, but who knows that records will furnish what the
IRS needs, has powerful reasons to withhold consent. If despite this the
suspect provides tax records, it is hard to see how the decision could
be called involuntary. Law enforcement agencies are understandably
reluctant to tell suspects what evidence they have gathered (indeed,
they do not have to provide this information even after prosecution has
begun). How can reticence about the weight of evidence the government
possesses overbear a suspect's free will and prevent rational
decision-making? That is the standard of voluntariness.
Ohio
v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. 417 (1996); Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412
U.S.
218 (1973);
Rogers
v.
Richmond
, 365
U.S.
534 (1961);
United States
v. Rutledge, 900 F.2d 1127, 1130-31 (7th Cir. 1990). Peters knew
that the IRS questioned the accuracy of information on her returns and
that disclosure might either quell its doubts or reinforce them; she
knew that she was entitled to withhold consent and force the IRS to use
a summons, which she could resist in court; she had and used an
opportunity to consult an accountant and could have consulted a lawyer
as well. A person in Peters' position can make a rational choice among
known risks and opportunities, and the election therefore properly may
be called voluntary. Schneckloth holds that a consent to search
may be voluntary even when the suspect is unaware that he is entitled to
refuse; Peters' decision was much better informed than Bustamonte's
(or Robinette's).
My
colleagues opine that consent following an agent's misstatement about
the weight of existing evidence is involuntary. Several of our cases say
that a suspect in a tax case cannot have the evidence suppressed unless
he shows, by clear and convincing evidence, that material misstatements
of fact undercut the voluntariness of the consent to search. United
States v. Serlin [83-1 USTC ¶9368], 707 F.2d 953, 956 (7th Cir.
1983); United States v. Lehman [72-2 USTC ¶9534], 468 F.2d 93,
105 (7th Cir. 1972); cf.
United States
v. Stern, 858 F.2d 1241, 1249 (7th Cir. 1988). None of these holds,
however, that agents' deceit compels a finding of involuntariness, for
in each case the court held that the evidence was properly admitted. To
hold that X, Y, and Z are necessary conditions of suppression is not to
hold that they are sufficient. "[A]t least since Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, it cannot be said that . . . deception [about the
purpose of the investigation] is inherently incompatible with consent,
for in Schneckloth the Court adopted the voluntariness test from
the coerced confession cases, which has not been deemed to compel the
exclusion of statements obtained by police misrepresentation of the
crime under investigation." Wayne R. LaFave, 3 Search and Seizure:
A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment sec.8.2(n) at 710 (3d ed. 1996)
(footnotes omitted). A statement's voluntariness is not undercut by the
fact that the speaker was unaware that he was a target (unaware, that
is, that the prosecutor had "firm indications" of his criminal
conduct). See
United States
v. Washington, 431
U.S.
181, 188-90 (1977);
United States
v. Mandujano, 425
U.S.
564 (1976); cf.
United States
v. Wong, 431
U.S.
174 (1977). If a misunderstanding of one's status as a
target--misunderstanding abetted by calculated silence and half-truths
from agents and prosecutors--does not invariably make a statement
involuntary, why should it make a disclosure of physical evidence
involuntary?
Police
engage in deceit all the time in order to induce suspects to reveal
evidence. Think of the undercover officer posing as a buyer of drugs.
Much evidence is properly acquired by concealing a person's status as an
agent of law enforcement. E.g., On Lee v. United States,
343 U.S. 747 (1952); Hoffa, 385
U.S.
at 300-03; Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966); see
also LaFave, Search and Seizure sec.8.2(m). Deception plays an
important and legitimate role in law enforcement. Even chicanery that
creates the crime being prosecuted is constitutionally tolerable. See
United States
v. Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518, 1528-29 (7th Cir. 1985). If dissimulation
so successful that the suspect does not know that he is talking to an
agent is compatible with voluntariness, how could there be a rule that
misdirection by a known agent always spoils consent? Professor LaFave
is rightly puzzled by courts' greater willingness to suppress evidence
when agents who reveal their status give deceptive answers to inquiries
about the purpose of the investigation than when agents lie about their
status as agents.
One
of these days the Supreme Court will confront the tension between these
lines of cases. All that matters today, however, is that lack of candor
about the purpose of an investigation is no more fatal to a consent
search than it is to a confession--and that in either case the court of
first instance must take all of the circumstances into account. Any
attempt to separate "firm indications of fraud" from
"first indications of fraud"--the distinction my colleagues
suggest--is a snipe hunt, for reasons developed in Hoffa and
reiterated in Beckwith. Because voluntariness of a consent is a
question of "fact" whose resolution by the trier of fact is
subject to deferential appellate review, our role is limited. Robinette,
117 S. Ct. at 421; Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248-49; United
States v. Chi Fa Chan, 136 F.3d 1158 (7th Cir. 1998); United
States v. Sholola, 124 F.3d 803, 819 n.16 (7th Cir. 1997); United
States v. Shelby, 121 F.3d 1118, 1120 (7th Cir. 1997); United
States v. Yusuff, 96 F.3d 982, 986 (7th Cir. 1996); United States
v. Stribling, 94 F.3d 321, 323-24 (7th Cir. 1996). The district
judge found that Peters' consent was voluntary because the agents did
not deceive her. That finding is not clearly erroneous. No more is
necessary to resolve the appeal. If and when, in some future case, a
judge concludes that agents prevaricated but that consent was
nonetheless voluntary, our review should be equally deferential.
1
That section provides in pertinent part:
sec.
7206. Fraud and false statements
Any
person who--
(1)
Declaration under penalties of perjury.--Willfully makes and subscribes
any return, statement, or other document which contains or is verified
by a written declaration that it is made under the penalties of perjury,
and which he does not believe to be true and correct as to every
material matter;
.
. . .
shall
be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not
more than $100,000 ($500,000 in the case of a corporation), or
imprisoned not more than 3 years, or both, together with the costs of
prosecution.
2
That section provides in pertinent part:
sec.
7212. Attempts to interfere with administration of internal revenue laws
(a)
Corrupt or forcible interference.--Whoever corruptly or by force or
threats of force (including any threatening letter or communication)
endeavors to intimidate or impede any officer or employee of the United
States acting in an official capacity under this title, or in any other
way corruptly or by force or threats of force (including any threatening
letter or communication) obstructs or impedes, or endeavors to obstruct
or impede, the due administration of this title, shall, upon conviction
thereof, be fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned not more than 3
years, or both, except that if the offense is committed only by threats
of force, the person convicted thereof shall be fined not more than
$3,000, or imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both. The term
"threats of force", as used in this subsection, means threats
of bodily harm to the officer or employee of the
United States
or to a member of his family.
3
Dr. Peters practiced podiatry through a personal services corporation,
Dr. Florence L. Peters, Ltd.
4
On an earlier occasion, Marshall and Eloise filled out a claim form
seeking a reward for the disclosure of original information about a
criminal violation of the Internal Revenue Code. The record does not
indicate whether they ever received a reward for their assistance in
this case.
5
On one occasion after he had given the file to the Examination Division,
Eloise contacted Padar and suggested that Dr. Peters would attempt to
deduct expenses incurred in connection with her daughter's Bat Mitzvah
as business expenses on her 1990 tax return. Padar forwarded this
information to the Examination Division.
6
At this point, Thompson had not yet received a signed power of attorney
authorizing Morrison to act on behalf of Dr. Peters' corporation.
Accordingly, under IRS guidelines, she could receive information from
Morrison but could not disclose any information to him concerning the
investigation.
7
At the suppression hearing, Morrison testified that he would have
discontinued the audit and advised Dr. Peters to retain an attorney if
Thompson had informed him of any of these facts at the initiation of the
audit.
8
Because all of the constitutional violations alleged by Dr. Peters
depend on a showing of the existence of fraud, deceit and trickery, it
is not necessary to discuss each constitutional claim separately. See
United States v. Prudden [70-1 USTC ¶9336], 424 F.2d 1021, 1032
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970).
9
In United States v. Mapp [77-2 USTC ¶9607], 561 F.2d 685 (7th
Cir. 1977), we addressed the "firm indications of fraud"
standard in a slightly different context from the one we encounter here.
In this case, Dr. Peters argues that the evidence obtained by the IRS
during its civil audit should be suppressed because the IRS obtained
that evidence by fraud, trickery, deceit and misrepresentation in
violation of her Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. By contrast, in
Mapp, the taxpayer-defendant did not cast his argument in constitutional
terms, but rather argued that the evidence obtained by the IRS during a
civil audit should be suppressed because the revenue agents conducting
the audit failed to refer the case to the CID after they developed
"firm indications of fraud" in violation of the guidelines in
the Internal Revenue Manual. In the first place, we held that the
rules in the Internal Revenue Manual were adopted for the
internal administration of the service and not for the protection of the
taxpayer and therefore "conferred no rights on the taxpayer."
Id.
at 690 (citing United States v. Lockyer [71-2 USTC ¶9641], 448
F.2d 417, 420-21 (10th Cir. 1971)). We went on to conclude that the IRS
rules concerning criminal referral were not violated in that case.
In
Serlin, although we dealt with the issue of deception during the
course of the IRS investigation, that case involved a taxpayer who was
aware of the criminal nature of the investigation but did not realize
that he was a potential target of that inquiry. Indeed, the Serlin
court noted that its case differed from the "typical deceit
case," which "involves a taxpayer who claims that his
volubility was induced by assurances that the investigation was
'routine' and only civil rather than criminal." See Serlin
[83-1 USTC ¶9368], 707 F.2d at 957.
10
We note that the approach we adopt today differs slightly in its
articulation from the formula set forth by the Eighth Circuit in Wadena
and Grunewald. In those cases, the Eighth Circuit set forth the
following standard:
Evidence
obtained in the course of a criminal investigation, where the defendant
has not been apprised of the nature of the investigation, may be
suppressed only if the defendant establishes that: 1) the IRS had firm
indications of fraud by the defendant, 2) there is clear and convincing
evidence that the IRS intentionally misled the defendant, and 3) the
IRS's conduct resulted in prejudice to defendant's constitutional
rights.
Wadena,
1998 WL 300523, at *16 (quoting Grunewald [93-1 USTC ¶50,122],
987 F.2d at 534). This articulation differs slightly from the
formulation that we enunciated in Serlin in that the Eighth
Circuit sets forth a "firm indications of fraud" test as an
additional showing a defendant must make in order to succeed on a motion
to suppress evidence obtained by the IRS during a civil audit. We agree
with the Eighth Circuit, for the reasons discussed infra, that the
"firm indications" rule is an important guide for courts that
encounter a motion to suppress based on the allegation that the IRS has
obtained evidence through fraud, trickery, deceit and misrepresentation.
However, rather than articulating this factor as independent from a
showing that the IRS affirmatively and intentionally misled the
defendant, we believe that the "firm indications" rule is best
utilized as a tool for assessing whether the IRS has affirmatively
misrepresented the nature of its investigation by conducting a criminal
investigation under the guise of a civil audit. We do not believe that
the Eighth Circuit's formulation is a doctrinal departure from the
approach in Serlin. Indeed, in Grunewald, the Eighth
Circuit stressed that the essence of its approach was the presence of
affirmative and intentional misleading by the IRS. See [93-1 USTC
¶50,122] 987 F.2d at 534 ("If IRS agents, exercising sound
discretion and good judgment, fear suppression of evidence where no
intentional, prejudicial misrepresentation is afoot, civil audits will
prematurely and unnecessarily be referred to CID.").
11
See Grunewald [93-1 USTC ¶50,122], 987 F.2d at 534 ("If IRS
agents, exercising sound discretion and good judgment, fear suppression
of evidence where no intentional, prejudicial misrepresentation is
afoot, civil audits will prematurely and unnecessarily be referred to
CID."); United States v. Michaud [88-2 USTC ¶9577], 860
F.2d 495, 498-99 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that courts must give
considerable weight to the IRS' own interpretation of their
regulations); United States v. Caldwell [87-2 USTC ¶9423], 820
F.2d 1395, 1402 (5th Cir. 1987) (noting that referral decision was
discretionary in nature and was not governed by any absolute criterion);
United States v. Groder [87-1 USTC ¶9259], 816 F.2d 139, 143-44
(4th Cir. 1987) (holding that second-guessing a revenue agent's judgment
should not become a routine chore for judges because the administration
of the revenue laws is a function which by congressional directive and
by expertise belongs to the IRS, and warning that a less deferential
approach "would encourage premature referrals of taxpayers for
fraud investigations based on little more than a revenue agent's
unsubstantiated hunch").
12
See United States v. Groder [87-1 USTC ¶9259], 816 F.2d 139, 144
(4th Cir. 1987) ("[B]ad faith would arise if a revenue agent
misrepresented to taxpayer the possibility of referral in order to
elicit information for use in a fraud investigation. For the agent to
obtain information in such a manner would destroy whatever reservoir of
trust remains in citizen taxpayers and discourage the cooperation that
might resolve matters in a prompt and satisfactory way."); see
also United States v. Piper [88-2 USTC ¶9575], 681 F. Supp. 833,
837 (M.D. Ga. 1988) (" 'Inherent in our democracy is a belief that,
since the government represents the will of the people, the people will
accept its dictates voluntarily. There is a sense of trust between the
government and the people. . . . [Therefore], a private person has the
right to expect that the government, when acting in its own name, will
behave honorably. When a government agent presents himself to a private
individual, and seeks that individual's cooperation based on his status
as a government agent, the individual should be able to rely on the
agent's representations. [It is] clearly improper for a government agent
to gain access to records which would otherwise be unavailable to him by
invoking the private individual's trust in his government, only to
betray that trust.' " (quoting SEC v. ESM Government Sec., Inc.,
645 F.2d 310, 316 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981))).
13
Under the IRS guidelines, a special agent may not participate in a civil
audit. However, a revenue agent may participate in a joint investigation
with the CID; once a joint investigation is undertaken, the criminal
aspects of the investigation take precedence and the IRS must present
the investigation to the taxpayer as such. See Internal
Revenue Manual sec.sec. 9311.83(1) & (31)610; see generally
Michael I. Saltzman, IRS Practice and Procedure para. 12.01 (In
recognition of the fact that attempts to pursue the criminal and civil
aspects of a case concurrently can jeopardize successful prosecution of
a criminal case, "the Service's policy is that criminal action in a
case takes precedence over its civil aspects and that any civil
enforcement action involving the same tax and periods as an active
criminal investigation is suspended or deferred until the criminal
aspects of the case are closed.").
14
Cf. Robson [73-1 USTC ¶9381], 477 F.2d at 17 (finding
that revenue agent was not conducting covert criminal investigation
because he had no instructions from CID, no interim conferences with CID
personnel, and "was under no obligation to report to it unless his
audit uncovered an indication of fraud").
15
That subsection also gives other examples of conduct by taxpayers
evidencing an intent to evade taxes: false statements, attempts to
hinder examination (e.g., failure to answer questions and
repeated cancellations of appointments), testimony of employees
regarding irregular business practices, destruction of books and
records, or transfer of assets for the purpose of concealment.
16
We note at the outset that the IRS did not have an affirmative duty to
warn Dr. Peters or her representatives that the audit could lead to
criminal consequences or that it was prompted by an informant's tip. See
United States v. Serlin [83-1 USTC ¶9368], 707 F.2d 953, 956 (7th
Cir. 1983); see also United States v. Knight [90-1 USTC ¶50,246],
898 F.2d 436, 438 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Meier [79-2
USTC ¶9697], 607 F.2d 215, 216-17 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
445 U.S. 966 (1980); Robson [73-1 USTC ¶9381], 477 F.2d at 17; cf.
26 U.S.C. sec. 6103(i)(6) (prohibiting the IRS from disclosing "any
return or return information" that "would identify a
confidential informant"); Internal Revenue Manual sec.
9373.1(1) (identity of informants must not be divulged to taxpayer under
investigation).
17
Dr. Peters makes much of the fact that, on one occasion, the informants
contacted Padar with additional information after the investigation had
been transferred to the Examination Division and that Padar passed this
new information along to Revenue Agent Thompson. The evidence in the
record shows that Padar was the passive recipient of this information
and that, at the time he received it, he was no longer investigating Dr.
Peters. The fact that he passed that information along to the branch of
the Service currently handling the investigation hardly constitutes
active involvement in the audit.
18
Dr. Peters relies heavily on the fact that Thompson's supervisor, Bruce
Wilson, testified that it was improper for a revenue agent to
characterize her audit as "routine" or "random." Dr.
Peters contends that Thompson made such characterizations in response to
the inquiries of her accountant, William Morrison. However, Morrison
testified that he did not remember Thompson specifically using the words
"random" or "routine." Instead, he concluded that
the audit was routine from the ordinary way in which Thompson was
proceeding. In any event, even if Thompson did characterize the audit as
"routine" during her initial meetings with Morrison, such a
characterization does not amount to an affirmative misrepresentation
because, as discussed above, Thompson did view the audit as routine at
that time. Cf. Piper [88-2 USTC ¶9575], 681 F. Supp. at 839
(agent's characterization of audit as "routine" did not amount
to affirmative misrepresentation).
19
Dr. Peters also contends that Thompson misrepresented the nature of her
audit by mailing her IRS Publication 1, a form entitled "Your
Rights as a Taxpayer" and IRS Notice 609 ("The Privacy Act
Notice") at the initiation of the audit. The IRS sends these forms
to taxpayers at the inception of routine, ordinary audits, but does not
mail them to the targets of a criminal investigation. As we concluded
above, the district court's finding that Thompson believed herself to be
engaged in a routine and ordinary civil audit is not clearly erroneous.
Accordingly, to the extent her decision to mail Publication 1 was
consistent with the Service's practices at the inception of a routine
civil audit, it was not an affirmative misrepresentation. In addition,
the documents themselves contain no statements which amount to an
affirmative misrepresentation of the Service's understanding of the case
at the time they were mailed.
Similarly,
Dr. Peters asserts that the suppression of the evidence is required in
this case based on the Taxpayer Bill of Rights of 1988 (as distinct from
her constitutional arguments). See Pub. L. No. 100-647, §§
6226-6247, 102 Stat. 3342, 3730-3752 (1988) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). Section 6227 of that law required the
IRS to "prepare a statement which sets forth in simple and
nontechnical terms--(1) the rights of the taxpayer and the obligations
of the Internal Revenue Service during an audit."
Id.
at sec. 6227(a). The statute further required the statement to "be
distributed . . . to all taxpayers the Secretary contacts with respect
to the determination or collection of any tax (other than providing tax
forms)."
Id.
at sec. 6227(c). In response to this statutory directive, the IRS
developed Publication 1. Because that document was provided to her by
statutory directive, Dr. Peters asserts that any misrepresentations in
Publication 1 would require suppression of the evidence obtained by the
IRS during the civil audit. We note, at the outset, that the Taxpayer
Bill of Rights contains no provision providing for suppression of the
evidence as a remedy. However, because we conclude that Publication 1
contains no affirmative misrepresentations concerning the Service's
understanding of the case at the time it was mailed, we need not decide
whether the Taxpayer Bill of Rights of 1988 provides a viable ground for
the suppression of evidence in a criminal tax proceeding.
20
Accordingly, we need not reach the second prong of the Serlin
inquiry--whether the agents' representations were material to Dr.
Peters' decision to cooperate with the IRS during the audit.
21
That section provides:
sec.
7201. Attempts to evade or defeat tax.
Any
person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax
imposed by this title or the payment thereof shall, in addition to other
penalties provided by law, be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction
thereof, shall be fined not more than $100,000 ($500,000 in the case of
a corporation), or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both, together
with the costs of prosecution.
22
The taxpayer in Miller was charged with violations of both §§
7201 and 7206(1). See 545 F.2d at 1212. Yet, the court's
determination that the government need not put on evidence of earnings
and profits in a criminal case applied to prosecutions under either
statute. See id. at 1214.
23
See supra note 1.