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Revenue Ruling 99-14

Revenue Ruling 99-14, I.R.B. 1999-13, 3, March 11, 1999.
ISSUE
May
a taxpayer deduct, under §§162 and 163 of the
Internal Revenue Code, rent and interest paid or
incurred in connection with a
"lease-in/lease-out" ("LILO")
transaction?
FACTS
X is a
U.S.
corporation. FM is a foreign municipality
that has historically owned and used certain
property having a remaining useful life of 50 years
and a fair market value of $100 million. BK1
and BK2 are banks. None of the parties is
related.
On
January 1, 1997, X and FM entered into
a LILO transaction under which FM leased the
property to X under a "Headlease,"
and X immediately leased the property back to
FM under a "Sublease." The term of
the Headlease is 34 years. The "primary"
term of the Sublease is 20 years. Moreover, as
described below, the Sublease may also have a
"put renewal" term of 10 years.
The
Headlease requires X to make two rental
payments to FM during its 34-year term: (1)
an $89 million "prepayment" at the
beginning of year 1; and (2) a "postpayment"
at the end of year 34 that has a discounted present
value of $8 million. For federal income tax
purposes, X and FM allocate the
prepayment ratably to the first 6 years of the
Headlease and the future value of the postpayment
ratably to the remaining 28 years of the Headlease.
The
Sublease requires FM to make fixed, annual
rental payments over both the primary term and, if
exercised, the put renewal term. The fixed, annual
payments during the put renewal term are
substantially higher than those for the primary
term. Nevertheless, the fixed, annual payments
during the put renewal term are projected (as of
January 1, 1997
) to equal only 90 percent of the fair market value
rental amounts for that term.
At
the end of the Sublease primary term, FM has
a "fixed-payment option" to purchase from X
the Headlease residual (the right to use the
property beyond the Sublease primary term subject to
the obligation to make the rent postpayment) for a
fixed amount that is projected (as of
January 1, 1997
) to be equal to the fair market value of the
Headlease residual. If FM exercises the
option, the transaction is terminated at that point
and X is not required to make any portion of
the postpayment due under the Headlease. If FM
does not exercise the option, X may elect to
(1) use the property itself for the remaining term
of the Headlease, (2) lease the property to another
person for the remaining term of the Headlease, or
(3) compel FM to lease the property for the
10-year put renewal term of the Sublease. If FM
does not exercise the fixed-payment option and X
exercises its put renewal option, X can
require FM to purchase a letter of credit
guaranteeing the put renewal rents. If FM
does not obtain the letter of credit, FM must
exercise the fixed-payment option.
To
partially fund the $89 million Headlease prepayment,
X borrows $54 million from BK1 and $6
million from BK2. Both loans are nonrecourse,
have fixed interest rates, and provide for annual
debt service payments that fully amortize the loans
over the 20-year primary term of the Sublease. The
amount and timing of the debt service payments
mirror the amount and timing of the Sublease
payments due during the primary term of the
Sublease.
Upon
receiving the $89 million Headlease prepayment, FM
deposits $54 million into a deposit account with an
affiliate of BK1 and $6 million into a
deposit account with an affiliate of BK2. The
deposits with the affiliates of BK1 and BK2
earn interest at the same rates as the loans from BK1
and BK2. FM directs the affiliate of BK1
to pay BK1 annual amounts equal to 90 percent
of FM's annual rent obligation under the
Sublease (that is, amounts sufficient to satisfy X's
debt service obligation to BK1). The parties
treat these amounts as having been paid from the
affiliate to FM, then from FM to X
as rental payments, and finally from X to BK1
as debt service payments. In addition, FM
pledges the deposit account to X as security
for FM's obligations under the Sublease,
while X, in turn, pledges its interest in FM's
pledge to BK1 as security for X's
obligations under the loan from BK1.
Similarly, FM directs the affiliate of BK2
to pay BK2 annual amounts equal to 10 percent
of FM's annual rent obligation under the
Sublease (that is, amounts sufficient to satisfy X's
debt service obligation to BK2). The parties
treat these amounts as having been paid from the
affiliate to FM, then from FM to X
as rental payments, and finally from X to BK2
as debt service payments. Although this deposit
account is not pledged, the parties understand that FM
will use the account to pay the remaining 10 percent
of FM's annual rent obligation under the
Sublease.
X requires FM
to invest $15 million of the Headlease prepayment in
highly-rated debt securities that will mature in an
amount sufficient to fund the fixed amount due under
the fixed-payment option, and to pledge these debt
securities to X. Having economically defeased
both its rental obligations under the Sublease and
its fixed payment under the fixed-payment option, FM
keeps the remaining portion of the Headlease
prepayment as its return on the transaction.
For
tax purposes, X claims deductions for
interest on the loans and for the allocated rents on
the Headlease. X includes in gross income the
rents received on the Sublease and, if and when
exercised, the payment received on the fixed payment
option. By accounting for each element of the
transaction separately, X purports to
generate a stream of substantial net deductions in
the early years of the transaction followed by net
income inclusions on or after the conclusion of the
Sublease primary term. As a result, X
anticipates a substantial net after-tax return from
the transaction. X also anticipates a
positive pre-tax economic return from the
transaction. However, this pre-tax return is
insignificant in relation to the net after-tax
return.
LAW
AND
ANALYSIS
In
general, a transaction will be respected for tax
purposes if it has "economic substance which is
compelled or encouraged by business or regulatory
realities, is imbued with tax-independent
considerations, and is not shaped solely by
tax-avoidance features that have meaningless labels
attached."
Frank
Lyon Co. v.
United States
, 435
U.S.
561, 583-84 (1978); James v. Commissioner,
899 F.2d 905, 908-09 (10th Cir. 1990). In assessing
the economic substance of a transaction, a key
factor is whether the transaction has any practical
economic effect other than the creation of tax
losses. Courts have refused to recognize the tax
consequences of a transaction that does not
appreciably affect the taxpayer's beneficial
interest except to reduce tax. The presence of an
insignificant pre-tax profit is not enough to
provide a transaction with sufficient economic
substance to be respected for tax purposes. Knetsch
v.
United States
, 364
U.S.
361, 366 (1960); ACM Partnership v. Commissioner,
157 F.3d 231, 248 (3d Cir. 1998); Sheldon v.
Commissioner, 94 T.C. 738, 768 (1990).
In
determining whether a transaction has sufficient
economic substance to be respected for tax purposes,
courts have recognized that offsetting legal
obligations, or circular cash flows, may effectively
eliminate any real economic significance of the
transaction. For example, in Knetsch, the
taxpayer purchased an annuity bond using nonrecourse
financing. However, the taxpayer repeatedly borrowed
against increases in the cash value of the bond.
Thus, the bond and the taxpayer's borrowings
constituted offsetting obligations. As a result, the
taxpayer could never derive any significant benefit
from the bond. The Supreme Court found the
transaction to be a sham, as it produced no
significant economic effect and had been structured
only to provide the taxpayer with interest
deductions.
In
Sheldon, the Tax Court denied the taxpayer
the purported tax benefits of a series of Treasury
bill sale-repurchase transactions because they
lacked economic substance. In the transactions, the
taxpayer bought Treasury bills that matured shortly
after the end of the tax year and funded the
purchase by borrowing against the Treasury bills.
The taxpayer accrued the majority of its interest
deduction on the borrowings in the first year while
deferring the inclusion of its economically
offsetting interest income from the Treasury bills
until the second year. The transactions lacked
economic substance because the economic consequences
of holding the Treasury bills were largely offset by
the economic cost of the borrowings. The taxpayer
was denied the tax benefit of the transactions
because the real economic impact of the transactions
was "infinitesimally nominal and vastly
insignificant when considered in comparison with the
claimed deductions." Sheldon at 769.
In
ACM Partnership, the taxpayer entered into a
near-simultaneous purchase and sale of debt
instruments. Taken together, the purchase and sale
"had only nominal, incidental effects on [the
taxpayer's] net economic position." ACM
Partnership at 250. The taxpayer claimed that,
despite the minimal net economic effect, the
transaction had a large tax effect resulting from
the application of the installment sale rules to the
sale. The court held that transactions that do not
"appreciably" affect a taxpayer's
beneficial interest, except to reduce tax, are
devoid of substance and are not respected for tax
purposes. ACM Partnership at 248. The court
denied the taxpayer the purported tax benefits of
the transaction because the transaction lacked any
significant economic consequences other than the
creation of tax benefits.
Viewed
as a whole, the objective facts of the LILO
transaction indicate that the transaction lacks the
potential for any significant economic consequences
other than the creation of tax benefits. During the
20-year primary term of the Sublease, X's
obligation to make the property available under the
Sublease is completely offset by X's right to
use the property under the Headlease. X's
obligation to make debt service payments on the
loans from BK1 and BK2 is completely
offset by X's right to receive Sublease
rentals from FM. Moreover, X's
exposure to the risk that FM will not make
the rent payments is further limited by the
arrangements with the affiliates of BK1 and BK2.
In the case of the loan from BK1, X's
economic risk is completely eliminated through the
defeasance arrangement. In the case of the smaller
loan from BK2, X's economic risk, although
not completely eliminated, is substantially reduced
through the deposit arrangement. As a result,
neither bank requires an independent source of funds
to make the loans, or bears significant risk of
nonpayment. In short, during the Sublease primary
term, the offsetting and circular nature of the
obligations eliminate any significant economic
consequences of the transaction.
At
the end of the 20-year Sublease primary term, X
will have either the proceeds of the fixed-payment
option or a Headlease residual that has a fair
market value approximately equal to the proceeds of
the fixed payment option. If, at the end of the
20-year Sublease primary term, the Headlease
residual is worth more than the payment required on
the fixed-payment option, FM will capture
this excess value by exercising the fixed payment
option, leaving X with only the proceeds of
the option. Conversely, if, at the end of the
20-year Sublease primary term, the Headlease
residual is worth significantly less than the
payment required on the fixed-payment option, X
will put the property back to FM under the
put renewal option at rents, that while initially
projected to be at only 90 percent of estimated fair
market value, are (because of the decline in the
value of the property) greater than fair market
value. Thus, the fixed payment option and put
renewal option operate to "collar" the
value of the Headlease residual during the primary
term, limiting much of the economic consequence of
the Headlease residual.
In
addition, facts indicate that there is little
economic consequence from X's nominal
exposure to FM's credit under the
fixed-payment option and, if exercised, the put
renewal term. At the inception of the transaction, FM
was required to use a portion of the Headlease
prepayment to purchase highly-rated debt securities
that were pledged to X, ensuring FM's
ability to make the payment under the fixed-payment
option. If FM does not exercise the
fixed-payment option and X exercises the put
renewal option, X can require FM to
purchase a letter of credit guaranteeing FM's
obligation to make the put renewal rent payments. If
FM does not obtain the letter of credit, FM
must exercise the fixed-payment option. Thus, as a
practical matter, the transaction is structured so
that X is never subject to FM's
credit.
The
conclusion that X is insulated from any
significant economic consequence of the Headlease
residual is further supported by several factors
indicating that the parties expect FM to
exercise the fixed-payment option. First, FM
has historically used the property. Second, because
the fixed payment obligation is fully defeased, FM
need not draw on other sources of capital to
exercise the option. However, if FM does not
exercise the fixed payment option and X
exercises the put renewal option, FM would be
required to draw on other sources of capital to
satisfy its put renewal rental obligations.
In
sum, the LILO transaction lacks the potential for
significant economic consequences other than the
creation of tax benefits. During the primary term of
the Sublease, X's obligations to provide
property are completely offset by its right to use
property. X's obligations to make debt
service payments on the loans are completely offset
by X's right to receive rent on the Sublease.
These cash flows are further assured by the deposit
arrangements with the affiliates of BK1 and BK2.
Finally, X's economic exposure to the
Headlease residual is rendered insignificant by the
option structure and the pledge of the securities
that defeases FM's option payment. Thus, the
only real economic consequence of the LILO
transaction during the 20-year primary term of the
Sublease is X's pre-tax return. This pre-tax
return is too insignificant, when compared to X's
after-tax yield, to support a finding that the
transaction has significant economic consequences
other than the creation of tax benefits.
Some
of the features of the LILO transaction discussed
above are present in transactions that the Service
will respect for federal income tax purposes. For
example, an arrangement for "in-substance
defeasance" of an outstanding debt was
respected in Rev. Rul. 85-42 , 1985-1 C.B. 36. By
contrast, in the LILO transaction, the deposit
arrangement exists from the inception of the
transaction, eliminating any need by BK1 and BK2
for an independent source of funds. Similarly, other
features of the LILO transaction, such as
nonrecourse financing and fixed-payment options, are
respected in other contexts. However, when these and
other features are viewed as a whole in the context
of the LILO transaction, these features indicate the
transaction should not be respected for tax
purposes.
As
a result of the transaction lacking economic
substance, X may not deduct interest or rent
paid or incurred in connection with the transaction.
The
Service will scrutinize LILO transactions for lack
of economic substance and/or, in appropriate cases,
recharacterize transactions for federal income tax
purposes based on their substance. See, e.g.,
Gregory v. Helvering 293 U.S. 495 (1935), Bussing
v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 449 (1987), Supplemental
Opinion, 89 T.C. 1050 (1987). Use of terms such
as "loan," "lease," "Headlease,"
and "Sublease" in this revenue ruling
should not be interpreted to indicate the Service's
acceptance of X's characterization of the
LILO transaction described above.
HOLDING
A
taxpayer may not deduct, under §§162 and 163 ,
rent and interest paid or incurred in connection
with a LILO transaction that lacks economic
substance.
EFFECT ON OTHER DOCUMENTS
Rev.
Rul. 85-42 is distinguished.
DRAFTING INFORMATION
The
principal author of this revenue ruling is John
Aramburu of the Office of Assistant Chief Counsel
(Income Tax and Accounting). For further information
regarding this revenue ruling contact Mr. Aramburu
at
(202)
622-4960
(not a toll-free call).
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