Friday, September 28, 2007

Tax Help IRC 6330 appeal of an OIC
The extent of the review by the tax court is to determine whether the Appeals officer's decision to reject the offer in compromise actually submitted by the taxpayer was arbitrary, capricious, or without sound basis in fact or law. Skrizowski v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-229; Fowler v. Commissioner, supra; see Woodral v. Commissioner, 112 T.C. 19, 23 (1999).


Michael D. Cornwell and Hilary J. Iker v. Commissioner, Dkt. No. 15013-06L , TC Memo. 2007-294, September 27, 2007.[Code Sec. 6330]

Collection Due Process hearing: Offer-in-compromise: Reasonable collection potential: Abuse of discretion. --

MEMORANDUM OPINION

COHEN, Judge: This proceeding was commenced in response to three Notices of Determination Concerning Collection Action(s). The issue for decision is whether the settlement officer abused his discretion in determining the amount of an acceptable offerin-compromise (OIC) by including prior overtime earnings in the calculation of reasonable collection potential (RCP). Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code, as amended.
Background

All of the facts have been stipulated, and the stipulated facts are incorporated as our findings by this reference. Petitioners resided in California at the time that their petition was filed. Petitioner Michael D. Cornwell (petitioner) is and for many years has been employed as a legal assistant at a law firm.

For tax years 1994 through 1996, petitioner filed Forms 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, but failed to pay the amounts shown as tax due on those returns. For 1997 through 2002, petitioners filed joint Federal income tax returns but did not pay the balances due on those returns.

On October 20, 2003, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) sent to petitioner a Notice of Federal Tax Lien Filing and Your Right to a Hearing Under IRC 6320, advising petitioner that a Notice of Federal Tax Lien had been filed with respect to his unpaid liabilities for 1994, 1995, and 1996. (The parties' stipulation of facts and respondent's brief erroneously set forth the date as October 20, 2004.)

On October 24, 2003, the IRS sent to petitioners a Notice of Federal Tax Lien Filing and Your Right to a Hearing Under IRC 6320, advising petitioners that a Notice of Federal Tax Lien had been filed with respect to their joint unpaid liabilities for 1997 through 2002.

On November 24, 2003, the IRS received from petitioners a Form 12153, Request for Collection Due Process Hearing, signed by petitioners and dated November 19, 2003, with respect to the notices sent October 20 and October 24, 2003.

On July 2, 2004, the IRS sent to petitioner a Final Notice of Intent to Levy and Notice of Your Right to a Hearing, advising petitioner that respondent intended to levy to collect unpaid liabilities for 2002. On July 29, 2004, petitioners filed a Form 12153 with respect to the July 2, 2004, notice. The July 29, 2004, request for hearing included the following paragraph:

This hearing request may be moot as IRS advises Final Notice of Levy was mistakenly issued. See attached Letter 3212 dated 7/15/04.

HOWEVER, out of caution, we are submitting the hearing request. The basis of the hearing request is that the Final Notice was incorrectly issued as an Offer In Compromise concerning this tax period is and has been pending. A pending OIC prohibits issuance of a levy.

A July 15, 2004, letter to petitioner from the IRS stated:

We're sorry that we made a mistake in recently sending you a Notice of Intent to Levy and Notice of Your Right to a Hearing, dated July 2, 2004. The letter advised you that we would take collection action if you did not pay the amount of tax you owe or ask for a Collection Due Process (CDP) Hearing within 30 days. Because we do not intend to take levy or seizure action against you at this time, we are rescinding the Notice of Intent to Levy.

By law, you are entitled to only one CDP Hearing under Internal Revenue Code Section 6330 for the unpaid taxes listed in our Notice of Intent to Levy. This letter preserves your right to a future CDP hearing should that become necessary. You don't need to do anything further regarding this request. * * *

*******

The law entitles you to a CDP Hearing, but the hearing would take place after the levy or seizure.

The IRS later advised petitioners that the July 15, 2004, letter rescinding the notice of levy was issued in error.

On May 6, 2005, petitioners and respondent's Settlement Officer, Patrick S. Lin (Lin), had a face-to-face meeting to discuss petitioners' hearing requests. During the meeting, petitioners expressed their intent to submit an OIC to settle their respective tax liabilities for 1994 through 2002.

After the face-to-face meeting, on July 27, 2005, petitioners filed two separate OICs. The first offered to compromise petitioner's individual 1994 through 1996 tax liabilities for $4,000. The second offered to compromise petitioners' joint 1997 through 2002 tax liabilities for $16,000. Subsequently, petitioners filed amended OICs and increased the amounts of the offers to: (1) $6,250 for petitioner's separate tax liabilities for 1989, 1993, 1994, 1995, and 1996 and (2) $18,500 for petitioners' 1997 through 2002 joint tax liabilities (for a total offer of $24,750).

On April 21, 2006, Lin sent to petitioners a letter summarizing his work on petitioners' income and expense table for the purpose of calculating the RCP. At that time, based on the information received from petitioners, the RCP was calculated to be $81,456. Lin further informed petitioners that, unless he received an amended OIC offering at least that amount, the OIC would be rejected.

On May 4, 2006, petitioners sent to Lin a letter stating the grounds for their objection to the inclusion of overtime pay in calculating their future income for the purposes of determining the RCP. The letter stated, in bold print, that "My firm has a written policy that overtime is not permitted unless expressly authorized in advance by a supervisor." Petitioner enclosed a copy of an Office Handbook issued May 2004 that supported petitioner's assertion. Petitioners asserted that, pursuant to an enclosed economics publication, it is incorrect for petitioner's overtime pay to be included in their future income calculations, because overtime may not continue in the future. Further, petitioners provided more information related to petitioner wife's employment status and her student debt loan.

On May 19, 2006, Lin sent to petitioners a letter responding to their objection to the inclusion of overtime pay in future income. The letter stated that Lin appreciated petitioner's arguments in objecting to the inclusion of overtime pay in future income, but he noted that 1 Administration, Internal Revenue Manual (CCH), section 5.5.5.5, at 16,339-7, provides a guideline to compute future income. The cited section provides for adjustments when income is expected to increase or decrease. After considering that overtime pay would result in variable income, Lin decided to average petitioner's most recent 5 years of income to calculate future income. The calculations are set forth below:



Period Adjusted Gross Income

2001 $98,315.00

2002 100,392.00

2003 100,203.00

2004 100,297.00

2005 107,024.00

Total 506,231.00

Average (annual) 101,246.20

Average (monthly) 8,437.18


Lin further explained that, based on this revised figure for future income, the RCP was now $56,976. The letter reminded petitioners that Lin would be rejecting their OICs if they did not amend their offer to at least pay the RCP.

In a letter dated May 30, 2006, petitioner mailed the declaration of Dr. Joyce Pickersgill, a forensic economist, to support petitioners' position that overtime pay should be excluded entirely when calculating future income for the purpose of computing the RCP. Petitioner again referred to "a recent change in the overtime pay policy of my employer."

After reviewing the correspondence, Lin made a determination to permit the collection action to proceed. On June 26, 2006, he sent three separate Appeals Case Memorandums, delineating the facts and reasons underlying his decision, for managerial approval. As of that time, petitioners owed approximately $84,000 for the years in issue.

After managerial approval, the Appeals Case Memorandums were incorporated into three separate notices of determination: (1) Notice of determination for levy for 2002 taxes dated July 7, 2006; (2) notice of determination for lien for 1997 through 2002 taxes dated July 14, 2006; and (3) notice of determination for lien for 1994 through 1996 taxes dated July 14, 2006.

After Lin's June 26, 2006, Appeals Case Memorandums and prior to the issuance of the notices of determination, petitioner sent two faxes to Lin. Each fax attached a copy of an email dated July 5, 2006, referring to overtime at the law firm where petitioner was employed. The email stated:

After assessing the current work load in the firm, it has been determined that no overtime is necessary at this time for support staff.

If something changes in your work load which would require a necessity for overtime, you will need to have approval from your supervisor in advance.
Discussion

Petitioners invoke our jurisdiction under section 6330(d) to review the three notices of determination described above. (The petition erroneously alleged that both petitioners appealed all three notices, but only petitioner husband is the recipient of the October 20, 2003, notice of lien and the July 2, 2004, notice of levy and of the determinations relating to those notices.) Their challenge to the notices is that the settlement officer abused his discretion in requiring an increased OIC of their outstanding liabilities.

Petitioners contend, among other things, that the notices of determination sustaining two liens and a levy were an abuse of discretion because the settlement officer failed to consider evidence of "changed circumstances" presented by petitioners before the notices of determination were issued and "in choosing to not further investigate this change of circumstance caused by a new overtime policy change". Respondent contends that the faxes sent in July 2006 merely reiterated the employer's policy in effect in 2004 and that the settlement officer considered that policy in adjusting the amount of an acceptable OIC based on averaging petitioner's earnings for the prior 5 years of his employment.

The review applicable in cases such as this one was stated in Murphy v. Commissioner, 125 T.C. 301, 320 (2005), affd. 469 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2006), as follows:

We do not conduct an independent review of what would be an acceptable offer in compromise. Fowler v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-163. The extent of our review is to determine whether the Appeals officer's decision to reject the offer in compromise actually submitted by the taxpayer was arbitrary, capricious, or without sound basis in fact or law. Skrizowski v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-229; Fowler v. Commissioner, supra; see Woodral v. Commissioner, 112 T.C. 19, 23 (1999).

The proposals presented to Settlement Officer Lin were for less than $25,000 against total liabilities approximating $84,000 as of June 2006. Petitioners' proposals were rejected by the settlement officer, who calculated an acceptable offer by reference to petitioner's actual earning history, in accordance with the Internal Revenue Manual. Petitioners then suggested that overtime pay that had been consistently earned by petitioner should be excluded from the calculation altogether. That suggestion does not appear to be reasonable, because petitioner continued to receive overtime pay notwithstanding his employer's policy. Petitioners never offered any evidence that petitioner's actual earnings were declining as a result of the 2004 or allegedly "new" in 2006 overtime policy.

Petitioners argue that the settlement officer should have conducted a further investigation before sending the notices of determination. Respondent points out that the negotiations over petitioners' long delinquent tax liabilities had gone on for years and that reasonable deadlines had been set and had passed when the notices of determination were sent. See Murphy v. Commissioner, supra at 322-323.

Respondent declined an opportunity at the time for trial to cross-examine petitioner or representatives of his employer about the effect of the allegedly new policy, apparently because respondent maintains the position that nothing may be considered outside of the administrative record made before the settlement officer. Petitioners did not attempt to introduce any evidence concerning the actual effect of the allegedly new policy, which had purportedly been in effect 10 months as of the time set for trial in May 2007 and presumably would have been reflected in petitioner's 2006 or current compensation. Thus we need not decide whether to reconsider our position as to evidence first presented at trial. See Murphy v. Commissioner, supra at 311-312; Robinette v. Commissioner, 123 T.C. 85, 94-101 (2004), revd. 439 F.3d 455 (8th Cir. 2006).

Because petitioners' proposed OIC was not supported by evidence of petitioner's actual current or future earning potential, we cannot conclude that the settlement officer's rejection of their offer was arbitrary, capricious, or without sound basis in fact or law. The settlement officer's computation of what would be acceptable reflected actual earnings that have not been shown to be unreliable as an indicator of future earnings, because the claim that the employer's policy would reduce petitioner's earnings is merely speculation. Petitioners failed to show that the allegedly new overtime policy had an effect on petitioner's actual earnings and constituted a change of circumstances. Thus they have not shown that the settlement officer's further investigation would have made a difference. We cannot conclude that sustaining the liens and the proposed levy was an abuse of discretion.

We have considered the other arguments of the parties. They are moot, irrelevant, or lacking in merit.

Decision will be entered for respondent.

Alvin S. Brown, Esq
Tax Attorney
703 425-1400

http://www.irstaxattorney.com/


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Thursday, September 27, 2007

Tax Attorney Offer in Compromise IRC 7122 comment by NAEA

National Association of Enrolled Agents (NAEA) Responds to IRS Request for Comment About OIC and IASeptember 27, 2007NAEA comments:

Offers in compromise: Installment agreements.NAEA Responds to IRS Request for Comment about OIC and IASeptember 21, 2007

Kathy PetronchakCommissioner, Small Business/Self Employed DivisionInternal Revenue Service1111 Constitution Ave. NW
Washington, DC 20224

Dear Commissioner Petronchak,

As president of the National Association of Enrolled Agents (NAEA), I write on behalf of 46,000 enrolled agents (EAs) nationwide. NAEA appreciates the opportunity to respond to the IRS request for comments about offers in compromise (OIC), allowable living expenses (ALEs), and installment agreements (IAs). Given that EAs specialize in representing taxpayers before IRS, we believe NAEA is well-positioned to offer an informed perspective about these topics.Offers in CompromiseWe have found widespread frustration among EAs about the current state of the OIC program. At the risk of being overly blunt, some believe that IRS is operating the program with the intent to reject as many offers as possible. To some degree, perhaps a more detailed public airing of offers statistics, particularly those after July 16, 2006, (when the TIPRA down payment rules took effect) would prevent people from drawing this conclusion. Also, given that some believe that results differ between Brookhaven and Memphis, it also may make sense to separate the statistics by campus.Further, we remain concerned by the non-refundable partial payment required with every offer submission (twenty percent for lump-sum offers and regular monthly payments for periodic-payment offers). The National Taxpayer Advocate expressed a similar concern, and stated in a recent study that "most taxpayers who submitted good offers [prior to the TIPRA change] that the IRS accepted would have had difficulty submitting those offers if the partial payment rules had been in place."1 Our assertion --that it would severely reduce the number of submissions --seems to have been realized. We wonder what the reduced volume of offers has done both to total OIC dollars collected, and to total projected receipts on accepted offers. (This is important in light of the $2 billion TIPRA expected the provision would raise within ten years). Members raised a number of examples in which the partial payment rules (i.e., the down payment will not be returned if the offer is rejected) are preventing taxpayers from making offers. While the individual details vary widely, in some cases taxpayers will no longer use gifts or payments from friends/family when the sole purpose of the funds is to settle an outstanding tax debt.We are concerned by the 24-month timeframe the Service now is permitted to consider (and reject) offers. We trust those running the program are working aggressively to shorten turnaround times and that no decision comes close to requiring 24 months. Notwithstanding general timeliness of responses, the larger concern enrolled agents face is the skill level and training of the staff reviewing the offers. Our frustration could be in part due to the fact that the Internal Revenue Manual (IRM) has not been updated to reflect the new post-TIPRA OIC procedures and that the interim guidance is not well publicized. As a result of this IRM opacity, the practitioner is hard-pressed to understand the actual rules of the road.Because of the partial payment requirement and the general perception of IRS antipathy toward the OIC program, many enrolled agents are reluctant to advise a client to submit offers they otherwise in the past would have advised him or her to submit. In lieu of submitting offers, we see clients either filing bankruptcy or remaining in currently not collectible status until the statute expires.Allowable Living ExpensesWe are pleased to see the announcement that an updated ALE framework will be launched on October 1, 2007. The change is long overdue; EAs have long been concerned that the allowable expenses are perpetually outdated. We note that the new framework differs in some ways significantly from the existing standards (for instance, the national standard expenses, which include food, housekeeping supplies, apparel, and personal care products, no longer include income ranges). As a result, we are reserving judgment on the changes.With these new standards, we hope that the Service redoubles its efforts to provide collection staff with more encouragement to allow for deviations from the standards, when appropriate and in circumstances that optimize collection of unpaid tax. We suggest, however, that an even greater problem than revenue officer inflexibility is the length of time between ALE revisions. Perhaps IRS could consider a more frequent update schedule?Otherwise, a few EAs wondered whether offers that are in process on October 1 will be evaluated under the old standards or under the new standards. Will the taxpayer be able to select one instead of the other?We understand you are interested in specific examples in which IRS staff fails to make reasonable deviations from standard allowed expenses. As the new ALE framework is put into effect, we will let SB/SE staff know as appropriate should IRS staff fail to make what we consider to be reasonable deviations.Installment AgreementsWe offer a few suggestions for how to improve the administration of installment agreements (IAs). While mandating electronic fund transfer (EFT) may be a bridge too far, we do note that some states (e.g., California2 and Wisconsin3 ) have requirements in place. Perhaps another, less controversial way to move taxpayers towards direct debit would be to significantly lower the fee charged to those who avail themselves of this option while simultaneously increasing the fee for those who choose to mail payments. IRS could structure this in a revenue neutral fashion, so that the Service's net processing costs are covered (though disproportionately by those without direct debit).We also note that the Form 2159 (Payroll Deduction Agreement) does not carry the reduced $52 user fee that the EFT option on Form 9465 (Installment Agreement Request) carries. Instead, these taxpayers must pay the full $105 fee. Perhaps this disparate treatment could be remedied? Further, the Form 2159 option is one of IRS' best kept secrets. If more taxpayers (and tax practitioners) were aware of this option, it could help improve the installment agreement default rate.Some EAs believe that lowering the amount acceptable for monthly payments as well as extending the 60 months for a streamlined agreement would help persuade more taxpayers to enter into installment agreements. Also, with respect to partial pay installment agreements, we are wary about what appears to be routine requests to extend the collection statute (CSED). Routine extensions would appear to be inconsistent with the legislative intent of permitting partial pay installment agreements.With respect to the IA program overall, we believe IRS should immediately provide taxpayers:
a. documentation that an installment agreement is in effect; and,

b. payment coupons, perhaps a Form 9465-V (to those who do not choose EFT/payroll deduction).
The documentation should state clearly what the agreement is and should include an amortization table. Taxpayers also should receive regular (perhaps quarterly or semiannually) statements charting their progress towards completing the IA. The payment coupons will help remind taxpayers of their obligation.Untold numbers of enrolled agents work every day on behalf of taxpayers who are attempting to negotiate payment plans with IRS. As always, we appreciate the opportunity to comment on tax administration topics of mutual interest. Thank you for soliciting our observations and suggestions and please do not hesitate to contact NAEA Senior Director, Government Relations, Robert Kerr, at (202) 822-6232.Sincerely,Diana Thompson, EAPresident1 The National Taxpayer Advocate's Report to Congress, July 2007. In October 2006, the NTA looked at 414 OICs that the IRS accepted before the implementation of TIPRA. She determined that in about 70 percent of the accepted offers, the 20 percent partial payment was not available from liquid assets.2 California Revenue and Taxation Code, Part 10.2, Chapter 4, Article I, §§19008, 19010-190113 583 Wis. Admin. Reg. 25

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Wednesday, September 26, 2007

Back Taxes IRC 6330 - notice of levy must be received

"Receipt of a statutory notice of deficiency for this purpose means receipt in time to petition the Tax Court for a redetermination of the deficiency asserted in the notice of deficiency." Sec. 301.6330-1(e)(3) Q&A-E2, Proced. & Admin. Regs. Therefore, section 6330(c)(2)(B) contemplates actual receipt by the taxpayer.


Alan Lee and Debi Marie Kuykendall v. Commissioner.Dkt. No. 16232-06L , 129 TC --, No. 9,

September 25, 2007. [Code Sec. 6330]
Collection of tax:Collection Due Process hearing: Procedures: Underlying tax liability. --
R mailed a notice of deficiency to Ps' last known address, but Ps did not receive it because they had moved. During a subsequent examination of their 2000 return, Ps were informed that a notice of deficiency for 1999 had been sent to them. At Ps' request, the examiner faxed a copy of the 1999 notice of deficiency to them that day, when only 12 days remained in the 90-day period within which to petition this Court. Ps did not petition this Court. R then issued a final notice of intent to levy with respect to 1999. In response, Ps requested a sec. 6330, I.R.C., hearing. R's Appeals Office determined that Ps had an opportunity to petition this Court for review, and therefore they could not contest the underlying tax liability. Ps now seek to challenge the underlying tax liability before this Court.

Held: Under sec. 301.6330-1(e)(3) Q&A-E2, Proced. & Admin. Regs., 12 days was insufficient time to allow Ps to petition this Court for redetermination of a notice of deficiency. Therefore, Ps were not barred from contesting the underlying tax liability at their sec. 6330, I.R.C., hearing.
OPINION

HAINES, Judge: This case is before the Court on respondent's motion for summary judgment filed pursuant to Rule 121.1 Respondent's motion argues that petitioners were statutorily barred from challenging the existence or amount of the underlying tax liability in their section 6330 hearing because they received a notice of deficiency, and therefore, they are barred from challenging the liability before this Court.
Background

Petitioners, Alan Lee and Debi Marie Kuykendall (husband and wife) resided in Middletown, California, at the time the petition was filed.

Ms. Kuykendall was primarily employed as an accountant and bookkeeper. She also worked part time as a shift lead supervisor at a restaurant. On February 28, 2002, while working at the restaurant, Ms. Kuykendall was assaulted and robbed at gunpoint. She suffered from severe physical and psychological difficulties as a result of the assault. She was subsequently diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder.


In a letter dated April 29, 2002, respondent notified petitioners that their 1999 Federal income tax return had been selected for review. On May 23, 2002, Ms. Kuykendall requested that respondent delay the examination because of her medical difficulties. Respondent's examiner denied the request. On July 10, 2002, respondent sent petitioners an audit report showing the changes made to petitioners' 1999 return. Petitioners were allowed until September 3, 2002, to submit documents pertaining to their 1999 return. Petitioners did not respond.

On May 1, 2003, respondent issued a notice of deficiency to petitioners' last known address determining a tax deficiency of $4,591 for 1999. In the notice of deficiency, respondent disallowed petitioners' unreimbursed employee business expenses claimed on Schedule A, Itemized Deductions, of $18,169, and certain Schedule C, Profit or Loss From Business, expenses, totaling $8,063.

On July 18, 2003, Ms. Kuykendall called respondent's examiner regarding a letter she had received related to petitioners' 2000 tax year. During the conversation, Ms. Kuykendall was informed that a notice of deficiency for 1999 had been mailed to them. Ms. Kuykendall informed respondent that petitioners had moved and that they did not receive the notice of deficiency. At Ms. Kuykendall's request, the examiner faxed a copy of the notice of deficiency to petitioners that day. With respect to the notice of deficiency, petitioners did not file a petition with this Court.

On February 14, 2004, respondent sent petitioners a Final Notice of Intent to Levy and Notice of Your Right to a Hearing for 1999. On March 7, 2004, petitioners submitted a Form 12153, Request for a Collection Due Process Hearing. In their request for relief, petitioners disputed the underlying tax liability by asserting that the disallowed business expenses were valid. They also disputed the examiner's decision not to postpone the examination. On May 6, 2004, respondent's Appeals Office sent a letter to petitioners, offering them a hearing. On May 19, 2004, Ms. Kuykendall sent a letter to respondent's Appeals Office, accompanied by several documents relating to the disallowed business deductions.

On August 17, 2004, Appeals Officer Terrence Riddle conducted a face-to-face hearing with Ms. Kuykendall. At the hearing, petitioners sought to challenge the underlying tax liability by providing documentation to substantiate the disallowed deductions. Officer Riddle determined that petitioners could not properly challenge the underlying tax liability at the hearing because they previously had the opportunity to petition this Court for review of the deficiency. As to the examiner's decision not to postpone the audit, Officer Riddle determined that petitioners were allowed a reasonable amount of time in which to respond to the audit report.

On July 20, 2006, respondent issued a notice of determination sustaining the proposed collection action for 1999. Petitioners timely filed a petition with this Court. In the petition, they sought to challenge the underlying tax liability by asserting that the disallowed deductions were valid. Petitioners also challenged respondent's failure to postpone the examination of their 1999 return.

On June 19, 2007, respondent filed a motion for summary judgment on all issues in the case. On July 27, 2007, petitioners filed their response.
Discussion

Summary judgment is intended to expedite litigation and avoid unnecessary and expensive trials. Fla. Peach Corp. v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 678, 681 (1988). The Court may grant summary judgment when there is no genuine issue of material fact and a decision may be rendered as a matter of law. Rule 121(b); Sundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 518, 520 (1992), affd. 17 F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 1994); Zaentz v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 753, 754 (1988). The moving party bears the burden of proving that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Dahlstrom v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 812, 821 (1985); Naftel v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 527, 529 (1985). The Court will view any factual material and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Dahlstrom v. Commissioner, supra at 821; Naftel v. Commissioner, supra at 529.

Before the Commissioner may levy on any property or property right, the taxpayer must be provided written notice of the right to request a hearing during the 30-day period before the first levy. Sec. 6330(a).
If the taxpayer requests a hearing, an Appeals officer of the Commissioner must hold the hearing. Sec. 6330(b)(1). At the hearing, the taxpayer may raise any relevant issue relating to the unpaid tax or the proposed levy, including appropriate spousal defenses, challenges to the appropriateness of collection actions, and offers of collection alternatives. Sec. 6330(c)(2)(A).

Section 6330(c)(2)(B) limits the taxpayer's ability to challenge the underlying tax liability during the hearing. Specifically, the taxpayer may "raise at the hearing challenges to the existence or amount of the underlying tax liability for any tax period if the person did not receive any statutory notice of deficiency for such tax liability or did not otherwise have an opportunity to dispute such tax liability." Id.

"Receipt of a statutory notice of deficiency for this purpose means receipt in time to petition the Tax Court for a redetermination of the deficiency asserted in the notice of deficiency." Sec. 301.6330-1(e)(3) Q&A-E2, Proced. & Admin. Regs. Therefore, section 6330(c)(2)(B) contemplates actual receipt by the taxpayer.2 Tatum v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-115.

We have not previously addressed the issue of how much time is required under section 301.6330-1(e)(3) Q&A-E2, Proced. & Admin. Regs. for a taxpayer to petition this Court for redetermination of a deficiency. However, we have addressed similar questions in determining whether a taxpayer who failed to file a timely petition with this Court was prejudiced by an improperly addressed notice. Our decisions in those cases inform our analysis of the current issue.

The jurisdiction of this Court is dependent on the timely filing of a petition. Rule 13(c). In a deficiency suit, a taxpayer is generally given 90 days from the issuance of a notice of deficiency to petition this Court for review. Sec. 6213(a). However, we have jurisdiction to decide whether a taxpayer had insufficient time to properly file a petition because he was prejudiced by an improperly addressed notice. Looper v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 690, 699 (1980).

In general, we have held that when a notice of deficiency is actually received by the taxpayer with at least 30 days remaining in the filing period, the taxpayer had sufficient time to petition this Court for review. See, e.g., Mulvania v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 65, 67-69 (1983) (74 days remaining); Masino v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-118 (69 days remaining); Fileff v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1990-452 (60 days remaining); George v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1990-147 (52 days remaining); Bulakites v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-256 (45 days remaining); Loftin v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1986-322 (30 days remaining); Eger v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1984-325 (30 days remaining).

However, when a notice was received with only 17 days remaining in the filing period, we held that the taxpayer had insufficient time to petition this Court. Looper v. Commissioner, supra at 699. Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held as a matter of law that receipt of a notice of deficiency with only 8 days remaining in the filing period was insufficient to permit the timely filing of a petition. Sicker v. Commissioner, 815 F.2d 1400 (11th Cir. 1987).

In this case, petitioners received the notice of deficiency with 12 days remaining to petition this Court. Petitioners did not deliberately avoid receipt of the notice. In fact, upon realizing that they did not receive it, petitioners asked respondent's examiner to fax it to them immediately. Since petitioners received the notice of intent to levy, Ms. Kuykendall has diligently sought to dispute the underlying tax liability by requesting a section 6330 hearing and providing respondent's Appeals officer documentation supporting the disallowed deductions.

Applying the standards set forth in Mulvania v. Commissioner, supra, and Looper v. Commissioner, supra, to section 301.6330-1(e)(3) Q&A-E2, Proced. & Admin. Regs., we hold that 12 days was insufficient time for petitioners to petition this Court for redetermination of the notice of deficiency. Therefore, petitioners were entitled to challenge the existence or the amount of the underlying tax liability during their section 6330 hearing.

By setting forth specific facts, petitioners have shown there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the deductions disallowed by the notice of deficiency should be allowed. See Rule 121(d). We shall, therefore, deny respondent's motion for summary judgment and remand the case to respondent's Appeals Office for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

To reflect the foregoing,

An appropriate order will be issued.
1 Unless, otherwise indicated, section references are to the Internal Revenue Code, as amended. Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. Amounts are rounded to the nearest dollar.2 If, however, the notice of deficiency was not received because the taxpayers deliberately refused delivery, they may not seek to challenge the underlying tax liability at a sec. 6330 hearing or before this Court. Sego v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 604, 611 (2000). Respondent does not argue, nor would we find, that petitioners deliberately refused delivery of the notice of deficiency.

Alvin S. Brown, Esq
Tax Attorney

703.425.1400
www.irstaxattorney.com

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Tuesday, September 25, 2007

Tax Help International tax issues

JCT-DOC, JCX- 85-07, Joint Committee on Taxation Present Law and Analysis Relating to Selected International Tax Issues, , (September 25, 2007)Joint Committee on Taxation Present Law and Analysis Relating to Selected International Tax IssuesSeptember 25, 2007110th Congress
PRESENT LAW AND ANALYSIS RELATING TO SELECTED INTERNATIONAL TAX ISSUESScheduled for a Public Hearing Before the SENATE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE on September 26, 2007Prepared by the Staff of the JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATIONSeptember 24, 2007JCX-85-07
CONTENTSPageINTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
I. BACKGROUND
II. PRESENT LAW
A. Federal Income Tax Treatment of Insurance Companies
B. Reinsurance Excise Tax
C. International Taxation
D. Present Law and Background of the Unrelated Business Income Tax and Debt-Financed Income
E. Overview of Ways to Defer Services Income
1. Qualified plans
2. Nonqualified deferred compensation
III. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS IN RECENT CONGRESSES
A. Proposals Relating to Offshore Reinsurance
B. Proposal Relating to Unrelated Debt-Financed Income
IV. ISSUES AND ANALYSIS
A. Issues and Analysis Relating to Reinsurance
B. Issues and Analysis Relating to the Unrelated Business Income Tax and Debt-Financed Income
C. Issues and Analysis Relating to Nonqualified Deferred Compensation
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARYThe Senate Committee on Finance has scheduled a public hearing on selected international tax issues on September 26, 2007. This document,1 prepared by the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, includes a description of present law and analysis of Federal tax issues relating to offshore reinsurance, offshore entities as investment vehicles for tax-exempt investors, and offshore entities as vehicles for deferral of certain types of compensation.Part One of this document provides background information about offshore reinsurance and about use of offshore entities by investment funds in connection with tax-exempt investors and for deferral of income of fund managers. Part Two describes present law relating to Federal income tax treatment of insurance companies, the excise tax applicable to premiums paid to foreign insurers and reinsurers covering U.S. risks, applicable international tax rules under U.S. Federal tax law and international tax treaties, unrelated business income tax and debt-financed income, and an overview of ways to defer services income. Part Three provides a description of legislative proposals in recent Congresses relating to offshore reinsurance. Part Four provides a discussion of issues and analysis relating to offshore reinsurance, unrelated business income tax and debt-financed income, and nonqualified deferred compensation.
I. BACKGROUNDOffshore reinsuranceIn generalInsurance company reinsurance transactions with offshore reinsurers, particularly affiliated reinsurers, have been characterized as creating the potential for tax avoidance and as causing a competitive disadvantage for U.S. insurance businesses. At the same time, reinsurance is a fundamental component of global risk management techniques.Insurance transactions are characterized by risk shifting and risk distribution.2 Risk shifting means transferring the risk from one person to another person. Risk distribution means spreading risks among a pool or group of persons.Insurance is a specific mechanism for transferring the financial consequences associated with the occurrence of identifiable but uncertain ("fortuitous") adverse events (e.g., the risk of damaging one's automobile in an accident, the risk of fire damaging one's home, or the risk of dying prematurely). The concept of risk shifting is best understood from the perspective of the insured: it contemplates that the insured shifts to another person the financial consequences of the adverse fortuitous events, so that (at least to the extent of the insurance) the occurrence of the event has no direct financial impact on the insured. Thus, self-insurance generally is not insurance in the tax sense, because the insured retains the financial consequences that follow from the occurrence of the adverse fortuity.Many financial contracts - for example, many derivative contracts - shift risk between parties, but that fact does not mean that those contracts necessarily constitute insurance, because the other critical component of true insurance - risk distribution - typically is not present. Just as risk shifting is most easily understood when viewed from the perspective of the insured, risk distribution is a concept that is best visualized from the perspective of the insurer. Risk distribution refers to the fact that, in entering into any one line of the insurance business (such as automobile liability insurance or health insurance), insurers assume or underwrite numerous individual risks that, at least ideally, are independent but homogeneous. Risks are independent when the occurrence of one adverse event in the pool of risks held by the insurer does not increase the likelihood that the other adverse fortuities in the pool will occur. Risks are homogeneous when they are similar in nature. When an issuer has a sufficiently large pool of independent but homogeneous risks, it can rely on the law of large numbers - a statistical tool that enables insurers to model with a relatively high degree of confidence the pattern of actual losses that it can expect in each period. Risk distribution and the associated application of the law of large numbers can be understood in a general sense as the core mechanism by which insurers manage their underwriting risks (i.e., the risk of paying claims arising from insured events), as contrasted with the insurer's investment risks.When the conditions of risk shifting and risk distribution are satisfied, the insurer can price the premiums it charges to reflect with some precision the total losses it expects from the relevant pool of risks in each period. For example, when an individual buys automobile collision insurance, he shifts from himself to the insurer the risk of paying for damages sustained by his automobile as a result of an accident. The insurer in turn manages that risk by pooling it with other similar automobile insurance contracts that it writes. In this way, each customer (through the premiums that he pays) effectively pays for a portion of the damages sustained by all the automobiles in the pool: because most people are risk averse, they prefer in effect to suffer small but definite losses (the premiums they pay) to unpredictable but much larger losses (the financial consequences of a loss event if one were self-insured).Insurance covers a variety of types of risks, which are grouped by line of business under current industry practice and regulatory reporting rules. Some lines of business are paid out relatively promptly following the time when the risk is incurred, such as health insurance and automobile liability; these are known as short-tail lines of business. Other lines of business are characterized by longer pay-out periods, such as medical malpractice and workers compensation; these are known as long-tail lines of business.3 Insurance companies are regulated by State insurance regulators in the States in which they do business. State regulators look to the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (the NAIC) for recommendations on regulatory and reporting standards. State insurance rules require annual financial reporting by insurers in accordance with a conservative accounting method known as "statutory accounting," which is designed to maintain insurer solvency.Types of reinsuranceReinsurance is a form of further risk shifting and risk distribution. Reinsurance is sometimes characterized as insurance for insurers. A reinsurance transaction is an agreement between insurance companies to pass a risk, or a block of risks, from one company to the other company. Risks can be subdivided and portions reinsured. For example, a portion of the risk may consist of a specific dollar amount such as a layer or band of the total dollar amount, the excess over a dollar amount, or a percentage of the total dollar amount of the risk.Risks can be reinsured singly or in groups. "Facultative" reinsurance covers a specific risk and is separately negotiated, often because the risk is specialized, high-hazard, or extraordinarily large. A reinsurance "treaty" generally covers a block of risks or type of risks. Under a reinsurance treaty, the primary insurer and the reinsurer agree that all or a specified portion of the primary insurer's business or policies of a particular type or types are covered automatically by the reinsurer until the agreement is terminated.The portion of a risk covered under a reinsurance agreement can be determined in a variety of ways. Proportional, or pro rata, reinsurance can be on a "quota share" basis, that is, a set percentage of premiums received and losses covered for the applicable risks. Alternatively, proportional reinsurance can be on a "surplus share" basis, that is, an agreed dollar amount of premiums received and losses covered for the applicable risks. Non-proportional reinsurance is known as "excess of loss," representing the reinsurer's coverage for losses above the primary insurer's retention amount. Excess of loss coverage can be on an individual risk basis, on an occurrence basis (relating to the occurrence of a particular event such as a storm or earthquake), or on a aggregate basis (covering losses above a dollar amount per policy or per year).Alternatives to reinsuranceA number of alternatives to reinsurance transactions may also be used to shift and distribute risks. These alternatives comprise the "alternative risk transfer" or ART markets and products. These markets and products can become more attractive when reinsurance prices rise, for example,4 and can serve financing, hedging, or other financial purposes as well as more traditional risk management goals.There is no generally accepted definition of what constitutes an ART product, and the ART marketplace continues rapidly to evolve. The term has been applied to arrangements as diverse as self-insurance, captive insurance, sidecar reinsurance, finite risk insurance or reinsurance, capital markets financings such as catastrophe ("cat") bonds, and weather derivative contracts.5 Some ART products (e.g., captive insurance and finite risk insurance) typically are structured with a purpose to constitute insurance under State regulatory rules. Others, such as cat bonds, are not treated as insurance for regulatory purposes.The characterization for Federal income tax purposes of ART products as insurance, or as some other financial product, may not be clear in all cases. Some ART products involve risk shifting, but not necessarily risk distribution. Other ART products, including many that are analyzed as insurance for regulatory purposes, raise questions of whether the product embodies sufficient risk shifting and risk distribution that it should be treated as insurance for Federal income tax purposes.6 Reasons for engaging in reinsurance transactionsPrimary insurers have a variety of reasons for reinsuring some of their business. A principal reason is to shift risk, just as any other insured does, because an insurer's pool of risks is too concentrated in some fashion. For example, the primary insurer's risk pool may fall unacceptably short of the goal of homogeneity.Another reason relates to regulatory compliance. State insurance rules generally require that an insurance company maintain "surplus," and the States limit the amount of new business the company can write based on a ratio of net premiums to surplus. Reinsuring some of the company's risks can lower the ratio of net premiums7 to surplus and allow the company to write more insurance. Thus, reinsurance can serve in effect as a form of financing for growth in the primary insurance company's business.A reinsurance transaction can also function as a business acquisition technique for the reinsurer. By reinsuring a block of business, for example, a reinsurer can enter a new line of business more easily than by directly writing policies in that line of business. Similarly, a primary insurer can divest itself of a line of business by reinsuring its entire book of business in that line.8 Several related risk management and financial reporting concerns also motivate the use of reinsurance. A primary insurer can use reinsurance to reduce exposure to extremely large losses from one source such as a catastrophic event (for example, a hurricane) or a particular environmental hazard (for example, asbestos). By reinsuring amounts above a certain level, the primary insurer can smooth loss payments over the year or between years. This can reduce volatility in the company's earnings.Reinsurance can have U.S. tax benefits as well as book or financial benefits. In general, premiums ceded for reinsurance are deductible in determining a company's Federal income tax.9 If the transaction effects a transfer of reserves and reserve assets to the reinsurer, the tax liability for earnings on those assets generally is shifted to the reinsurer as well. If earnings on these assets are shifted to a reinsurer in a no- or low-tax foreign jurisdiction, generally these earnings are not subject to income taxation.Federal tax issues relating to offshore reinsuranceThe transfer of U.S. risks to foreign reinsurers in low-tax or no-tax jurisdictions, whether by corporate expatriations, foreign acquisitions, or by reinsurance transactions to affiliates and third-party reinsurers, has been criticized as causing a tax-induced competitive disadvantage for U.S. insurers and reinsurers.10 The issue has been publicized repeatedly in recent years11 despite 2004 changes in the Federal tax law to limit the tax benefit of "inversions"12 - expatriation of a U.S. corporation or partnership to a foreign jurisdiction - and to strengthen the Treasury Department's regulatory authority to reallocate items in reinsurance arrangments.13 Though these changes may have made some types of transactions transferring U.S. risks to foreign reinsurers less attractive to a U.S. insurer from a tax planning standpoint, reinsurance with offshore reinsurers has remained strong.14 Insuring risks with captive insurance affiliates generally can have the effect of reducing U.S. tax on certain earnings. Because of tax accounting rules applicable to insurance companies, under which additions to insurance reserves are deductible, investment earnings on insurance company reserves can be viewed as tax-favored.15 The use of captive insurers as well as the use of affiliated reinsurers are thought to be a means by which U.S. insurance risks migrate to offshore reinsurance markets.Reinsurance can provide a tax benefit to the primary insurer of U.S. risks principally by shifting to the reinsurer the tax liability for earnings on reserves, that is, on investment assets that fund the future payment of insurance claims.16 In the case of reinsurance with an unrelated or third-party reinsurer, this tax benefit is counterbalanced by the yielding of the business opportunity for profit on the reinsured risks to that unrelated reinsurer.The tax benefit of reinsurance can be duplicated without yielding the business to a third party, however, if the reinsurer is a foreign affiliate. The corporate structure under which earnings on U.S. risks reinsured with an affiliate are treated as not subject to U.S. tax involves the use of a parent corporation in a low-tax or no-tax foreign jurisdiction. The foreign parent's subsidiaries include both the primary insurer, a U.S. corporation, and the reinsurer, also a foreign corporation in a low-tax or no-tax jurisdiction. The primary insurer of the U.S. risks engages in a reinsurance transaction with the foreign affiliate, shifting the reserve assets to the foreign affiliate. The earnings on the reserve assets associated with the reinsured risks are shifted outside the U.S. tax system. Present-law U.S. tax rules such as the Subpart F rules requiring current inclusion of certain income for U.S. shareholders, the "toll charge" for certain outbound transactions under section 367, and the inversion rules of section 7874,17 generally do not apply to the transaction, although the Treasury Department has the authority to reallocate items under section 482 or section 845, and the one-percent reinsurance excise tax applies.18 The tax benefit of such reinsurance with a foreign affiliate is greater for long-tail lines of business that tend to require reserve assets to be maintained for a longer period of time than for short-tail lines of business.Property and casualty insurance industry and reinsurance marketsProperty and casualty insurers operating in the U.S. recorded $499 billion in directly written premiums in 2006. Such insurers ceded reinsurance of $340 billion to affiliates, and $64 billion to non-affiliates, while assuming $310 billion of reinsurance from affiliates and $48 billion from non-affiliates. Thus, net premiums written totaled $453 billion.19 Since 1998, net premiums written have increased at an annualized rate of 6.0 percent, compared to an annualized rate of 3.6 percent between 1987 and 1997. Assets of these insurers totaled $1,671 billion in 2006, and grew at an annualized rate of six percent from 1998 to 2006, compared to an annualized rate of eight percent from 1987 to 1997.20 Over the recent past, U.S. property and casualty insurers have increased both the amount of reinsurance assumed and ceded, both in absolute terms and relative to direct premiums written. In 2006 the amount of assumed reinsurance, as noted above, was an amount equal to 71.7 percent of direct premiums. Ceded reinsurance equaled 80.9 percent of direct written premiums. In 1990, in comparison, U.S. property and casualty insurers assumed reinsurance in amounts equal to 60.5 percent of direct written premiums, and ceded reinsurance in amounts equal to 66.0 percent of direct written premiums.21 While there has been growth in both assumed and ceded reinsurance, reinsurance assumed and ceded with respect to non-affiliates has declined relative to direct premiums written. Reinsurance assumed from non-affiliates has fallen from an amount equaling 12.2 percent of direct premiums in 1990 to an amount equal to 9.6 percent of direct premiums in 2006, and reinsurance ceded to non-affiliates has fallen over the same period from an amount equal to 16.5 percent of direct premiums to 12.7 percent of direct premiums. In contrast, reinsurance assumed from affiliates grew over that period from an amount equal to 48.4 percent of direct premiums in 1990 to an amount equal to 62.1 percent in 2006, while insurance ceded to affiliates over the same period grew from an amount equal to 49.5 percent of direct premiums to an amount equal to 68.2 percent of direct premiums.22 With respect to insurance ceded to offshore reinsurers, according to the Reinsurance Association of America, $54.7 billion of U.S. premiums were ceded to offshore reinsurers in 2006, $22.2 billion of which was ceded to unaffiliated offshore reinsurers and $32.5 billion of which was ceded to affiliated offshore reinsurers. These amounts compare to approximately $37.3 billion ceded to offshore reinsurers in 2001, $21.5 billion of which was ceded to unaffiliated offshore reinsurers and $15.9 billion of which was ceded to affiliated offshore reinsurers. Hence from 2001 to 2006, total premiums ceded to offshore reinsurers grew by 46.7 percent, of which premiums ceded to unaffiliated offshore reinsurers grew by 4.7 percent and premiums ceded to affiliated offshore reinsurers grew by 104.4 percent.23 Markets for reinsurance have become global. Historically, London has been an insurance and reinsurance center. Very large reinsurers are also located in Germany and Switzerland. Bermuda is an increasingly large global reinsurance market.24 Between 1983 and 2001, net premiums written in the Bermuda insurance market grew from $4.7 billion to $41.4 billion, and total assets in the Bermuda insurance market grew from $17.1 billion to $172.7 billion.25 It is reported that capital grew 24 percent to $65 billion in 2006 among a group of Bermuda reinsurers, a doubling in their capital since 2002.26 Bermuda is considered to have insurance regulatory rules favorable to insurance companies and products, and does not impose a corporate income tax.27 Use of offshore entities by investment fundsIn generalOver the past several decades, private equity funds, venture capital funds, hedge funds, and similar alternative investment vehicles28 that are managed by U.S. fund managers have attracted large amounts of investment capital. Investors in these funds often include institutional investors such as pension funds and educational and charitable institution endowments, and wealthy individual investors. These investors become limited partners in the funds, which are generally structured as partnerships. Some investment funds are established in offshore jurisdictions,29 particularly those offshore jurisdictions that impose no (or little) income tax. The assets invested in the funds generally are managed by groups of individuals who contribute a relatively small amount of capital to the fund (in relation to amounts of capital contributed by the investors) and who provide investment expertise in selecting, managing, and disposing of fund assets.Investors in the funds have historically (though not exclusively) been of three general types: high net-worth individuals who are subject to U.S. tax; foreign persons who are not otherwise subject to U.S. tax; and U.S. institutional investors (such as charities and private and government pension funds) that are tax-exempt under U.S. tax rules.30 These types of investors have differing U.S. tax situations, and therefore, confront differing tax issues when they invest in investment funds such as hedge funds and private equity funds.In general, U.S. high net-worth individuals may be concerned about limitations on deductions, such as the 2-percent floor on miscellaneous itemized deductions, the overall limitation on itemized deductions, and the alternative minimum tax. They may prefer to let the fund manager's carried interest serve to reduce their distributive share of partnership income as it is earned, rather than having a higher share of partnership income along with a deduction for manager compensation that may not be fully or currently usable because of a deduction limitation. These individual investors may also be sensitive to the rate differential between longterm capital gain and qualified dividend income, on the one hand, and other forms of investment returns, on the other hand.Tax-exempt organizations and foreign persons not subject to U.S. tax may be indifferent to deductions. Instead, tax-exempt organizations may be concerned about becoming subject to unrelated business income tax.Foreign investors may be concerned about becoming subject to U.S. net income tax or U.S. withholding tax.31 Foreign investors may prefer not to have to file a U.S. income tax return (even if no tax is ultimately due).Funds have been structured to accommodate these various concerns, and to maximize aggregate tax savings with respect to all the parties (investors and fund managers). These arrangements may be based on the "master-feeder" structure, in which a single fund is held by separate domestic and foreign entities through which different types of investors invest.32 The structure may include the interposition of a foreign corporation - a "blocker" corporation - between the investment fund and certain of its investors, typically the fund's foreign and taxexempt investors, which serves to block types of income received that could be subject to U.S. tax in their hands, and to convert this income into dividends (or interest) when distributed to them.33 The foreign corporation may also serve as an income deferral mechanism for individual fund managers in the case of management fees.
Investment Fund Structure with Foreign Feeder Corporation
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Reasons for selecting offshore entitiesAn initial issue involves identifying which aspects of the structure and business activities of hedge funds and private equity funds and their managers are offshore, and which aspects remain onshore in the United States. Use of intermediate foreign corporations is relatively common. Sometimes the investment fund itself is established offshore.34 Generally the foreign corporation or entity is established in a jurisdiction that does not impose an income tax, or imposes very little tax.Foreign individuals may find it attractive to invest in an alternative asset fund through an offshore corporation rather than directly because by doing so, the individuals may avoid the direct imposition of U.S. tax on income effectively connected with a U.S. trade or business and the concomitant requirement to file a U.S. tax return. Foreign individuals may also hold the view that it is preferable to invest through a foreign corporation in order to interpose an additional non-U.S. entity between themselves and U.S. tax administration. To the extent, however, that a foreign individual would have effectively connected income if the individual invested in a fund directly rather than through an offshore corporation, the foreign corporation itself has effectively connected income. Investment in a fund through an offshore corporation therefore generally does not reduce the aggregate U.S. tax liability of foreign individual investors.Generally, an entity principally engaged in active trading in securities through agents in the United States would be considered as engaged in a trade or business in the United States. However, under rules referred to as the "securities trading safe harbor," an exception is provided for a range of securities and commodities activities conducted in the United States by or on behalf of foreign persons.35 Investment funds that are organized in offshore jurisdictions may satisfy the securities trading safe harbor and thereby may not be treated as engaged in a U.S. trade or business even if the funds' investment or securities trading activities are managed by individuals working in the United States. As a result, a foreign partner investing in an offshore fund organized as a partnership may not be treated as engaged in a U.S. trade or business solely by reason of that investment, and may not be subject to U.S. net income tax on income from the investment.A U.S. taxable investor generally obtains no tax advantage from investing in an offshore investment fund rather than a domestic one. If the fund is organized as foreign partnership, the U.S. investor is taxed on its distributive share of partnership income, just as if the fund were a U.S. partnership. If the fund is organized as a foreign corporation, or if the U.S. investor invests through a foreign "feeder" corporation, the passive foreign investment company or subpart F rules may cause the U.S. investor to lose the benefit of deferral of U.S. taxation of that investor's share of the fund's income.36 Thus, neither a foreign investor nor a U.S. taxable investor would generally reduce U.S. net income tax liability by investing through an offshore investment fund, when compared to the U.S. tax liability that would be imposed were the investor to conduct the same activities directly. However, tax-exempt investors can reduce U.S. net income tax liability for unrelated business income tax by investing in an offshore investment fund organized as a corporation, or in offshore "feeder" corporation that is a partner in an offshore investment partnership.Tax-exempt investors and unrelated business income taxOne reason for investing in alternative investment funds through a foreign corporation relates to the imposition of unrelated business income tax ("UBIT") on tax-exempt organizations under present law. If a tax-exempt organization were to invest directly in the strategies followed by many alternative investment funds, it is likely that the tax-exempt organization's income from that investment would be subject to UBIT, because, for example, the assets are active business assets that are unrelated to the organization's exempt purpose, or the assets are debt-financed.If tax-exempt organizations hold such investments through a partnership, a lookthrough rule applies, potentially subjecting the tax-exempt investors' returns to UBIT. By contrast, if tax-exempt organizations hold potentially UBIT-producing partnership investments through a corporation, the corporation's separate existence generally is respected for Federal tax purposes so that the lookthrough rule does not apply, and dividends paid by the corporation to the taxexempt investors generally are excluded from the investors' unrelated business taxable income. Tax-exempt organizations thus may have an incentive to invest in alternative investment funds through these "UBIT blockers" or "blocker corporations." Such corporations often are established offshore in low-tax or zero-tax jurisdictions to avoid corporate tax at the blocker corporation level; in turn, the blocker corporation relies on the securities trading safe harbor described earlier to avoid U.S. net income tax on its securities investment/trading strategies.Deferral of income of managersA U.S. based manager of an offshore investment fund can agree by contract to take performance-based returns to which the manager may be entitled either in the form of a carried interest, or in the form of contingent compensation. In the latter case, the manager can also negotiate to defer receipt of that income (and likewise to defer the concomitant tax liability) for a period of years.The typical structure of an offshore hedge fund, in which the underlying fund is organized as a partnership, taxable U.S. investors invest through a "feeder" domestic partnership, and tax-exempt U.S. investors and foreign investors invest through a "feeder" foreign corporation, permits fund managers to optimize their after-tax performance-based returns. Fund managers do so by arranging to take those returns as carried interest where the underlying investment fund is expected to generate long-term capital gain (or where an alternative form might disadvantage taxable U.S. investors), and to take those returns in the form of contingent compensation (which compensation in turn often is subject to a voluntary agreement to defer receipt of the income) when the underlying investment fund generates short-term capital gain or ordinary income (and when doing so does not otherwise disadvantage investors). In a typical structure, managers can combine both approaches, by arranging to take performance-based income, not from the underlying investment fund, but rather from the domestic "feeder" fund, in the form of a carried interest in the domestic "feeder" partnership, and a contingent deferred compensation arrangement with the offshore "feeder" corporation.In the case of an investor who is subject to U.S. tax, structuring the fund manager's performance based returns as deferred compensation is not desirable as a tax planning matter because the payor's deduction is postponed under U.S. tax law until the amount is included in income by the fund manager. In the case of a U.S. taxpayer, this deferral of the deduction creates a tension which, in theory, may limit the amount of compensation that is deferred. This tension is not present with respect to the relationship between fund managers and offshore "feeder" corporations, because the ultimate investors in these corporations are tax exempt or otherwise not subject to U.S. tax and are indifferent as to the timing of a tax deduction for compensation.If the carried interest is structured as nonqualified deferred compensation, all amounts received by the fund manager pursuant to the carried interest are taxable as ordinary income. In contrast, if the carried interest is structured as a partnership profits interest in the fund, the fund manager's distributive share of the fund's income and loss items retains the character that those items had at the fund level under present law. Thus, to the extent the fund's income constitutes long-term capital gain or qualifying dividends eligible for the preferential capital gain tax rate, the consensus understanding of current law is that the fund manager's share of that income is eligible for the preferential capital gain tax rate. However, in the case of funds (such as hedge funds) whose investment strategy involves relatively rapid turnover of assets, income generated by the fund is generally not eligible for the long-term capital gain tax rate, but rather, is generally subject to income tax at the same rate as ordinary compensation income.37 In this situation, where preferential long-term capital gains tax rates are not available, the tax benefit of deferred compensation to the recipient may be substantial.Quantifying the tax benefit of deferral of compensationThe principal advantage of deferral is the ability to retain earnings in the foreign corporation and invest them such that they are not subject to tax on an annual basis, i.e., invest them on a pre-tax basis. Suppose that a taxpayer in the 35 percent bracket earns $100 of compensation today and defers it for five years, such that the foreign corporation can invest the money and earn a 10 percent return per year. The taxpayer would then have $161.05 and pay tax of $56.37, for an after-tax income of $104.68. Suppose there is another taxpayer who cannot defer compensation, but has access to the same investment opportunity. This taxpayer receives $100 in compensation today, pays tax of $35, and has only $65 to invest. The taxpayer invests that amount at an after-tax rate of 6.5 percent, i.e. a 10 percent pretax rate less 35 percent tax on the earnings each year. At the end of five years, the taxpayer will only have $89.06. The $15.62 ultimate difference in economic wealth between the taxpayer who could defer the compensation income for five years (whose deferred income in turn compounded at 10 percent per year), compared to the otherwise identically-situated taxpayer who was required to pay tax on the compensation income immediately (whose after-tax income compounded at 6.5 percent per year), can be analyzed as follows.In the deferral case, the employee can be understood at a conceptual level (by virtue of her agreement with her employer under which her deferred compensation grows at 10 percent per year) as if she also received $100 in cash compensation (but in her case not taxable income) immediately, and then set aside $35 of that $100 to fund her entire tax liability (which $35 in turn also was invested at 10 percent). Of course the employee did not actually receive cash upfront, but the effect of her agreement with her employer was to put her in the same economic position as if she did receive that cash and immediately invested it at a 10 percent rate. Each year the $100 (and therefore the employee's ultimate tax bill) would notionally grow at 10 percent, but so would the $35 component of that amount set aside to fund the employee's future tax bill. As a result, the $35 notionally set aside by the employee in the first period would be sufficient to pay her taxes at the end of the fifth year. This means that the employee's total aftertax wealth at the end of the fifth year would equal $65 (the portion of the $100 notionally received at the start that was not needed to fund her tax liability) compounded at the full pretax rate of 10 percent, or $104.68.In other words, the incremental value of deferring income in this example is equivalent to the difference between investing $65-the after-tax value of the compensation-at the pre-tax interest rate (10 percent), rather than the after-tax rate (6.5 percent), for the five-year life of the deferral. More generally, any deferral of income can be analyzed in the same way: the value of deferral is equivalent to the value of investing the after-tax amount of the income over the period of the deferral at the pre-tax rate of return.38 It is as if the taxpayer who can defer her income must pay tax currently on the deferred amount, but then can invest the after-tax proceeds on a tax-exempt basis.39 The above example assumed that the employee could earn the normal pre-tax return on her deferred compensation. When the employer is a U.S. taxpayer, that assumption is not necessarily accurate, because the employer itself will be subject to tax on the returns that it earns on the cash attributable to the deferred compensation during the deferral period. This result follows from the fact that U.S. employers in general may not deduct expenses attributable to deferred compensation until that compensation is paid. In theory, therefore, if the employee and the U.S. employer are taxed at the same rate (e.g., 35 percent), and if the employer is not willing to subsidize the employee's deferred compensation (by effectively giving the employee additional compensation), the employer should not be willing to pay more than its after-tax rate of return (6.5 percent, in the above example) to the employee in respect of deferred compensation amounts.40 If these facts were universally the case, there would be no tax disadvantage to the U.S. tax administration system in deferred compensation arrangements. In practice, however, these facts often are not the case: an employer might, for example, be in a lower tax bracket than an employee (for example, by virtue of operating losses or the tax rates then in effect).41 Notwithstanding these (and other) exceptions, the general presumption appears to be that there exists sufficient tension in the tax positions of employees and employers as to serve at least as a partial constraint on compensation deferral arrangements.This tension in tax positions disappears entirely when the employer is an offshore corporation owned by foreign investors, and U.S. tax-exempt institutions. In that case, the employer never obtains a tax benefit from paying compensation or a tax detriment from deferring the payment of that compensation, because it is not a taxpayer at all. As a result, there is no incremental cost to the employer (or its owners) in permitting an employee to defer compensation, and the employer therefore in theory should be willing to pay to the employee up to the pre-tax return on the cash attributable to the deferred compensation. This result can be extended beyond simple time value of money type returns. For example, the deferred compensation may be treated by contract as if it were invested in the underlying investment fund, and the fund manager's synthetic investment therein would then compound as if it were a taxexempt investment.
II. PRESENT LAW
A. Federal Income Tax Treatment of Insurance CompaniesIn generalPresent law provides special rules for determining the taxable income of insurance companies (subchapter L of the Code). Separate sets of rules apply to life insurance companies and to property and casualty insurance companies. Insurance companies are subject to tax at regular corporate income tax rates.Life insurance companiesIn generalUnder the law in effect from 1959 through 1983, a life insurance company was subject to a three-phase taxable income computation under Federal tax law. Under the three-phase system, a company was taxed on the lesser of its gain from operations or its taxable investment income (Phase I) and, if its gain from operations exceeded its taxable investment income, 50 percent of such excess (Phase II). Federal income tax on the other 50 percent of the gain from operations was deferred, and was accounted for as part of a policyholder's surplus account and, subject to certain limitations, taxed only when distributed to stockholders or upon corporate dissolution (Phase III). To determine whether amounts had been distributed, a company maintained a shareholders surplus account, which generally included the company's previously taxed income that would be available for distribution to shareholders. In the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, the three-phase tax structure was eliminated and the statutory scheme for taxation of life insurance companies was redesigned.Present law provides rules for taxation of the life insurance company taxable income (LICTI) of a life insurance company. For Federal income tax purposes, a life insurance company means an insurance company that is engaged in the business of issuing life insurance and annuity contracts, or noncancellable health and accident insurance contracts, and that meets a 50-percent test with respect to its reserves (sec. 816(a)). This statutory provision applicable to life insurance companies defines the term "insurance company" to mean any company, more than half of the business of which during the taxable year is the issuing of insurance or annuity contracts or the reinsuring of risks underwritten by insurance companies (sec. 816(a)).LICTI is life insurance gross income reduced by life insurance deductions (sec. 801). An alternative tax applies if a company has a net capital gain for the taxable year, if such tax is less than the tax that would otherwise apply. Life insurance gross income is the sum of (1) premiums, (2) decreases in certain reserves, and (3) other amounts generally includible by a taxapyer in gross income. Life insurance deductions means the general deductions provided in section 805, and the small life insurance company deduction under section 806 (which functions as a reduction in the tax on LICTI equal to 60 percent of tentative LICTI up to $3 million, phasing out for companies with tentative LICTI between $3 and $15 million, provided that assets of the company do not exceed $500 million).Deduction for increases in reservesA life insurance company includes in gross income any net decrease in reserves, and deducts a net increase in reserves (sec. 807). Methods for determining reserves for tax purposes generally are based on reserves prescribed by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners for purposes of financial reporting under State regulatory rules. Special rules are provided, eliminating unrealized gains and losses from reserve increases and decreases, in the case of reserves based on separate accounts with respect to variable contracts (sec. 817).Proration of deductions relating to untaxed incomeBecause deductible reserves might be viewed as being funded proportionately out of taxable and tax-exempt income, the net increase and net decrease in reserves are computed by reducing the ending balance of the reserve items by a portion42 of tax-exempt interest (sec. 807(b)(2)(B) and (b)(1)(B)). Similarly, a life insurance company is allowed a dividends-received deduction for intercorporate dividends from nonaffiliates only in proportion to the company's share of such dividends (secs. 805(a)(4), 812). Fully deductible dividends from affiliates are excluded from the application of this proration formula (so long as such dividends are not themselves distributions from tax-exempt interest or from dividend income that would not be fully deductible if received directly by the taxpayer). In addition, the proration rule includes in prorated amounts the increase for the taxable year in policy cash values of life insurance policies and annuity and endowment contracts owned by the company (the inside buildup on which is not taxed).Property and casualty insurance companiesIn generalUnder the law prior to 1986, a variety of special rates, deductions, and exempts applied to mutual property and casualty insurance companies, distinguishing their Federal income tax treatment from stock property and casualty companies. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 repealed the special rates, deductions, and most of the exemptions,43 and consolidated and modified the tax rules applicable to property and casualty companies.Under present law, the taxable income of a property and casualty insurance company is determined as the sum of its gross income from underwriting income and investment income (as well as gains and other income items), reduced by allowable deductions (sec. 832). For purposes of determining the company's gross income, underwriting income and investment income are computed on the basis of the underwriting and investment exhibit of the annual statement approved by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (sec. 832(b)(1)(A)).Deduction for unpaid loss reservesUnderwriting income means premiums earned during the taxable year less losses incurred and expenses incurred (sec. 832(b)(3)). Losses incurred include certain unpaid losses (reported losses that have not been paid, estimates of losses incurred but not reported, resisted claims, unpaid loss adjustment expenses). Present law provides for the discounting of the deduction for loss reserves to take account partially of the time value of money (sec. 846). Thus, present law limits the deduction for unpaid losses to the amount of discounted unpaid losses. Any net decrease in the amount of unpaid losses results in income inclusion, and the amount in included is computed on a discounted basis.The discounted reserves for unpaid losses are calculated using a prescribed interest rate which is based on the applicable Federal mid-term rate ("mid-term AFR"). The discount rate is the average of the mid-term AFRs effective at the beginning of each month over the 60-month period preceding the calendar year for which the determination is made.To determine the period over which the reserves are discounted, a prescribed loss payment pattern applies. The prescribed length of time is either the accident year and the following three calendar years, or the accident year and the following 10 calendar years, depending on the line of business. In the case of certain "long-tail" lines of business, the 10-year period is extended, but not by more than 5 additional years. Thus, present law limits the maximum duration of any loss payment pattern to the accident year and the following 15 years. The Treasury Department is directed to determine a loss payment pattern for each line of business by reference to the historical loss payment pattern for that line of business using aggregate experience reported on the annual statements of insurance companies, and is required to make this determination every five years, starting with 1987.Under the discounting rules, an election is provided permitting a taxpayer to use its own (rather than an industry-wide) historical loss payment pattern with respect to all lines of business, provided that applicable requirements are met.Reinsurance premiums deductibleIn determining premiums earned for the taxable year, a property and casualty company company deducts from gross premiums written on insurance contracts during the taxable year the amount of premiums paid for reinsurance (sec. 832(b)(4)(A)).Unearned premiumsFurther, the company deducts from gross premiums the increase in unearned premiums for the year (sec. 832(b)(4)(B)). The company is required to reduce the deduction for increases in unearned premiums by 20 percent. This amount serves to represent the allocable portion of expenses incurred in generating the unearned premiums, so as to provide a degree of matching of the timing of inclusion of income and deduction of associated expenses.Proration of deductions relating to untaxed incomeIn calculating its reserve for losses incurred, a property and casualty insurance company must reduce the amount of losses incurred by 15 percent of (1) the insurer's tax-exempt interest, (2) the deductible portion of dividends received (with special rules for dividends from affiliates), and (3) the increase for the taxable year in the cash value of life insurance, endowment or annuity contracts the company owns (sec. 832(b)(5)). This rule reflects the fact that reserves are generally funded in part from tax-exempt interest, from wholly or partially deductible dividends, or from other untaxed amounts.Treatment of reinsurancePresent law includes a rule enacted in 1984 providing authority to the Treasury Department to reallocate items and make adjustments in reinsurance transactions to prevent tax avoidance or evasion (sec. 845).44 The rule generally permits the Treasury Department to make reallocations in related party reinsurance transactions and in reinsurance transactions between unrelated parties. The legislative history of the provision states that "the operative standards for both of the reinsurance adjustment provisions are objective tests of (1) whether adjustments are necessary to more properly reflect income or (2) whether the transaction has a significant tax avoidance effect."45 The legislative history further provides that in determining whether a reinsurance agreement between unrelated parties has a significant tax avoidance effect with respect to one or both of the parties, appropriate factors for the Treasury Department to take into account are (1) the duration or age of the business reinsured, which bears on the issue of whether significant economic risk is transferred between the parties, (2) the character of the business (as long-term or not), (3) the structure for determining potential profits, (4) the duration of the reinsurance agreement, (5) the parties rights to terminate and the consequences of termination, such as the existence of a payback provision; (6) the relative tax positions of the parties, and (7) the financial situations of the parties.46 The provision was amended in 2004 to provide the Treasury Department with authority to allocate among the parties to a reinsurance agreement or recharacterize income (whether investment income, premium or otherwise), deductions, assets, reserves, credits and any other items related to the reinsurance agreement, or make any other adjustment in order to reflect the proper source, character, or amount of the item.47 In expanding this authority to the amount (not just the source and character) of any such item, Congress expressed the concern that "reinsurance transactions were being used to allocate income, deductions, or other items inappropriately among U.S. and foreign related persons," and that "foreign related party reinsurance arrangements may be a technique for eroding the U.S. tax base."48
B. Reinsurance Excise TaxAn excise tax applies to premiums paid to foreign insurers and reinsurers covering U.S. risks (secs. 4371-4374). Under this rule, a gross-basis excise tax is imposed at the rate of 1 percent on reinsurance and life insurance premiums. The excise tax is imposed at the rate of 4 percent on property and casualty insurance premiums. The excise tax does not apply to premiums that are effectively connected with the conduct of a U.S. trade or business or if an applicable income tax treaty provides an exemption from the tax.49 The excise tax does not provide a credit with respect to the excise tax paid by one party if, for example, the risk is reinsured with a second party in a transaction that is also subject to the excise tax.
C. International TaxationGeneral U.S. tax rules applicable to business operationsThe United States employs a worldwide tax system under which U.S. persons (including U.S. citizens, U.S. resident individuals, and domestic corporations) generally are taxed on all income, whether derived in the United States or abroad. In contrast, foreign persons (including nonresident alien individuals and foreign corporations) are taxed in the United States only on income that has a sufficient nexus to the United States.Foreign persons are subject to U.S. tax on income that is effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business in the United States. Such income may be derived from U.S. or foreign sources. This income generally is taxed in the same manner and at the same rates as income of a U.S. person. In addition, foreign persons generally are subject to U.S. tax at a 30-percent rate on certain gross income (such as interest, dividends, rents, royalties, and premiums) derived from U.S. sources.An income tax treaty between the United States and a foreign country may reduce or eliminate the 30-percent gross-basis withholding tax on certain payments. A tax treaty also may permit the United States to tax a foreign person's income from business operations only to the extent the income is attributable to that person's permanent establishment in the United States. Finally, a tax treaty may eliminate the insurance premiums excise tax described above.U.S. persons --income from a foreign businessSection 367If a U.S. corporation reincorporates in a foreign jurisdiction, seeking to replace the U.S. parent corporation of a multinational corporate group with a foreign parent corporation, several provisions of the tax law apply to the transaction. In certain outbound stock transactions, the U.S. shareholders generally recognize gain (but not loss) under section 367(a), based on the difference between the fair market value of the foreign corporation shares received and the adjusted basis of the domestic corporation stock exchanged. To the extent that a corporation's share value has declined, and/or it has many foreign or tax-exempt shareholders, the impact of this section 367(a) "toll charge" is reduced. The transfer of foreign subsidiaries or other assets to the foreign parent corporation also may give rise to U.S. tax consequences at the corporate level (e.g., gain recognition and earnings and profits inclusions under secs. 1001, 311(b), 304, 367, 1248 or other provisions). The tax on any income recognized as a result of these restructurings may be reduced or eliminated through the use of net operating losses, foreign tax credits, and other tax attributes.In asset inversions, the U.S. corporation generally recognizes gain (but not loss) under section 367(a) as though it had sold all of its assets, but the shareholders generally do not recognize gain or loss, assuming the transaction meets the requirements of a reorganization under section 368.InversionsRules limiting the tax benefits of certain corporate and partnership inversion transactions were added to the Code in 2004.50 Present law defines two different types of corporate inversion transactions and establishes a different set of consequences for each type. Certain partnership transactions also are covered.The first type of inversion is a transaction in which, pursuant to a plan or a series of related transactions: (1) a U.S. corporation becomes a subsidiary of a foreign-incorporated entity or otherwise transfers substantially all of its properties to such an entity in a transaction completed after March 4, 2003; (2) the former shareholders of the U.S. corporation hold (by reason of holding stock in the U.S. corporation) 80 percent or more (by vote or value) of the stock of the foreign-incorporated entity after the transaction; and (3) the foreign-incorporated entity, considered together with all companies connected to it by a chain of greater than 50 percent ownership (i.e., the "expanded affiliated group"), does not have substantial business activities in the entity's country of incorporation, compared to the total worldwide business activities of the expanded affiliated group. The provision denies the intended tax benefits of this type of inversion by deeming the top-tier foreign corporation to be a domestic corporation for all purposes of the Code.In determining whether a transaction meets the definition of an inversion under the provision, stock held by members of the expanded affiliated group that includes the foreign incorporated entity is disregarded. For example, if the former top-tier U.S. corporation receives stock of the foreign incorporated entity (e.g., so-called "hook" stock), that stock would not be considered in determining whether the transaction meets the definition. Similarly, if a U.S. parent corporation converts an existing wholly owned U.S. subsidiary into a new wholly owned controlled foreign corporation, all stock of the new foreign corporation would be disregarded, with the result that the transaction would not meet the definition of an inversion under the provision. Stock sold in a public offering related to the transaction also is disregarded for these purposes.Transfers of properties or liabilities as part of a plan a principal purpose of which is to avoid the purposes of the provision are disregarded. In addition, the Treasury Secretary is to provide regulations to carry out the provision, including regulations to prevent the avoidance of the purposes of the provision, including avoidance through the use of related persons, passthrough or other noncorporate entities, or other intermediaries, and through transactions designed to qualify or disqualify a person as a related person or a member of an expanded affiliated group. Similarly, the Treasury Secretary is granted authority to treat certain non-stock instruments as stock, and certain stock as not stock, where necessary to carry out the purposes of the provision.The second type of inversion is a transaction that would meet the definition of an inversion transaction described above, except that the 80-percent ownership threshold is not met. In such a case, if at least a 60-percent ownership threshold is met, then a second set of rules applies to the inversion. Under these rules, the inversion transaction is respected (i.e., the foreign corporation is treated as foreign), but any applicable corporate-level "toll charges" for establishing the inverted structure are not offset by tax attributes such as net operating losses or foreign tax credits. Specifically, any applicable corporate-level income or gain required to be recognized under sections 304, 311(b), 367, 1001, 1248, or any other provision with respect to the transfer of controlled foreign corporation stock or the transfer or license of other assets by a U.S. corporation as part of the inversion transaction or after such transaction to a related foreign person is taxable, without offset by any tax attributes (e.g., net operating losses or foreign tax credits). This rule does not apply to certain transfers of inventory and similar property. These measures generally apply for a 10-year period following the inversion transaction.Inversion transactions include certain partnership transactions. Specifically, the provision applies to transactions in which a foreign-incorporated entity acquires substantially all of the properties constituting a trade or business of a domestic partnership, if after the acquisition at least 60 percent of the stock of the entity is held by former partners of the partnership (by reason of holding their partnership interests), provided that the other terms of the basic definition are met. For purposes of applying this test, all partnerships that are under common control within the meaning of section 482 are treated as one partnership, except as provided otherwise in regulations. In addition, the modified "toll charge" proposals apply at the partner level.A transaction otherwise meeting the definition of an inversion transaction is not treated as an inversion transaction if, on or before March 4, 2003, the foreign-incorporated entity had acquired directly or indirectly more than half of the properties held directly or indirectly by the domestic corporation, or more than half of the properties constituting the partnership trade or business, as the case may be.Passive foreign investment companiesThe Tax Reform Act of 1986 established an anti-deferral regime for passive foreign investment companies. A passive foreign investment company generally is defined as any foreign corporation if 75 percent or more of its gross income for the taxable year consists of passive income, or 50 percent or more of its assets consists of assets that produce, or are held for the production of, passive income.51 Alternative sets of income inclusion rules apply to U.S. persons that are shareholders in a passive foreign investment company, regardless of their percentage ownership in the company. One set of rules applies to passive foreign investment companies that are "qualified electing funds," under which electing U.S. shareholders currently include in gross income their respective shares of the company's earnings, with a separate election to defer payment of tax, subject to an interest charge, on income not currently received.52 A second set of rules applies to passive foreign investment companies that are not qualified electing funds, under which U.S. shareholders pay tax on certain income or gain realized through the company, plus an interest charge that is attributable to the value of deferral.53 A third set of rules applies to passive foreign investment company stock that is marketable, under which electing U.S. shareholders currently take into account as income (or loss) the difference between the fair market value of the stock as of the close of the taxable year and their adjusted basis in such stock (subject to certain limitations), often referred to as "marking to market."54 Subpart FUnder the subpart F rules, 10-percent U.S. shareholders of a controlled foreign corporation ("CFC") are subject to U.S. tax currently on certain income earned by the CFC, whether or not such income is distributed to the shareholders. The income subject to current inclusion under the subpart F rules includes, among other things, insurance income and foreign base company income. Foreign base company income includes, among other things, foreign personal holding company income and foreign base company services income (i.e., income derived from services performed for or on behalf of a related person outside the country in which the CFC is organized).Foreign personal holding company income generally consists of the following: (1) dividends, interest, royalties, rents, and annuities; (2) net gains from the sale or exchange of (a) property that gives rise to the preceding types of income, (b) property that does not give rise to income, and (c) interests in trusts, partnerships, and REMICs; (3) net gains from commodities transactions; (4) net gains from certain foreign currency transactions; (5) income that is equivalent to interest; (6) income from notional principal contracts; (7) payments in lieu of dividends; and (8) amounts received under personal service contracts.Insurance income subject to current inclusion under the subpart F rules includes any income of a CFC attributable to the issuing or reinsuring of any insurance or annuity contract in connection with risks located in a country other than the CFC's country of organization. Subpart F insurance income also includes income attributable to an insurance contract in connection with risks located within the CFC's country of organization, as the result of an arrangement under which another corporation receives a substantially equal amount of consideration for insurance of other country risks. Investment income of a CFC that is allocable to any insurance or annuity contract related to risks located outside the CFC's country of organization is taxable as subpart F insurance income.Temporary exceptions from foreign personal holding company income, foreign base company services income, and insurance income apply for subpart F purposes for certain income that is derived in the active conduct of a banking, financing, or similar business, or in the conduct of an insurance business (so-called "active financing income").In the case of insurance, in addition to a temporary exception from foreign personal holding company income for certain income of a qualifying insurance company with respect to risks located within the CFC's country of creation or organization, certain temporary exceptions from insurance income and from foreign personal holding company income apply for certain income of a qualifying branch of a qualifying insurance company with respect to risks located within the home country of the branch, provided certain requirements are met under each of the exceptions. Further, additional temporary exceptions from insurance income and from foreign personal holding company income apply for certain income of certain CFCs or branches with respect to risks located in a country other than the United States, provided that the requirements for these exceptions are met.In the case of a life insurance or annuity contract, reserves for such contracts are determined as follows for purposes of these provisions. The reserves equal the greater of: (1) the net surrender value of the contract (as defined in section 807(e)(1)(A)), including in the case of pension plan contracts; or (2) the amount determined by applying the tax reserve method that would apply if the qualifying life insurance company were subject to tax under Subchapter L of the Code, with the following modifications. First, there is substituted for the applicable Federal interest rate an interest rate determined for the functional currency of the qualifying insurance company's home country, calculated (except as provided by the Treasury Secretary in order to address insufficient data and similar problems) in the same manner as the mid-term applicable Federal interest rate (within the meaning of section 1274(d)). Second, there is substituted for the prevailing State assumed rate the highest assumed interest rate permitted to be used for purposes of determining statement reserves in the foreign country for the contract. Third, in lieu of U.S. mortality and morbidity tables, mortality and morbidity tables are applied that reasonably reflect the current mortality and morbidity risks in the foreign country. Fourth, the Treasury Secretary may provide that the interest rate and mortality and morbidity tables of a qualifying insurance company may be used for one or more of its branches when appropriate. In no event may the reserve for any contract at any time exceed the foreign statement reserve for the contract, reduced by any catastrophe, equalization, or deficiency reserve or any similar reserve.Present law permits a taxpayer in certain circumstances, subject to approval by the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") through the ruling process or in published guidance, to establish that the reserve of a life insurance company for life insurance and annuity contracts is the amount taken into account in determining the foreign statement reserve for the contract (reduced by catastrophe, equalization, or deficiency reserve or any similar reserve). IRS approval is to be based on whether the method, the interest rate, the mortality and morbidity assumptions, and any other factors taken into account in determining foreign statement reserves (taken together or separately) provide an appropriate means of measuring income for Federal income tax purposes. In seeking a ruling, the taxpayer is required to provide the IRS with necessary and appropriate information as to the method, interest rate, mortality and morbidity assumptions and other assumptions under the foreign reserve rules so that a comparison can be made to the reserve amount determined by applying the tax reserve method that would apply if the qualifying insurance company were subject to tax under Subchapter L of the Code (with the modifications provided under present law for purposes of these exceptions). The IRS also may issue published guidance indicating its approval. Present law continues to apply with respect to reserves for any life insurance or annuity contract for which the IRS has not approved the use of the foreign statement reserve. An IRS ruling request under this provision is subject to the present-law provisions relating to IRS user fees.Foreign persons --income from a U.S. businessThe United States taxes on a net basis a foreign person's income that is effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business in the United States.55 Any gross income derived by the foreign person that is not effectively connected with the person's U.S. business is not taken into account in determining the rates of U.S. tax applicable to the person's income from the business.56 U.S. trade or businessIn generalA foreign person is subject to U.S. tax on a net basis if the person is engaged in a U.S. trade or business. Partners in a partnership and beneficiaries of an estate or trust are treated as engaged in the conduct of a trade or business within the United States if the partnership, estate, or trust is so engaged.57 The question whether a foreign person is engaged in a U.S. trade or business has generated a significant body of case law. Basic issues involved in the determination include whether the activity constitutes business rather than investing, whether sufficient activities in connection with the business are conducted in the United States, and whether the relationship between the foreign person and persons performing functions in the United States with respect to the business is sufficient to attribute those functions to the foreign person.The Code includes specific rules for determining whether certain activities constitute a trade or business. The term "trade or business within the United States" expressly includes the performance of personal services within the United States.58 An exception is provided in the case of a nonresident alien individual's performance of services for a foreign employer, where both the total compensation received for the services during the year and the period in which the individual is present in the United States are de minimis.59 Securities trading safe harborDetailed rules govern whether trading in stocks or securities or commodities constitutes the conduct of a U.S. trade or business.60 Under these rules (colloquially referred to as trading safe harbors), trading in stock or securities or commodities by a foreign person through an independent agent such as a resident broker generally is not treated as the conduct of a U.S. trade or business if the foreign person does not have an office or other fixed place of business in the United States through which the trading is effected. Trading in stock or securities or commodities for the foreign person's own account, whether by the foreign person or the foreign person's employees or through a resident broker or other agent (even if that agent has discretionary authority to make decisions in effecting the trading) also generally is not treated as the conduct of a U.S. business provided that the foreign person is not a dealer in stock or securities or commodities.Effectively connected incomeA foreign person that is engaged in the conduct of a trade or business within the United States is subject to U.S. net-basis taxation on the income that is "effectively connected" with such business. Specific statutory rules govern the determination of whether income is so effectively connected.In the case of U.S.-source capital gain or loss and U.S.-source income of a type that would be subject to gross basis U.S. taxation, the factors taken into account in determining whether the income, gain, deduction, or loss is effectively connected with a U.S. trade or business include whether the amount is derived from assets used in or held for use in the conduct of the U.S. trade or business and whether the activities of the trade or business were a material factor in the realization of the amount.61 In the case of any other U.S.-source income, gain, deduction, or loss, such amounts are all treated as effectively connected with the conduct of the trade or business in the United States.62 Foreign-source income of a foreign person that is effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business in the United States may also be taxed by the United States, subject to a credit for any foreign income taxes.63 However, foreign-source income, gain, deduction, or loss generally is considered to be effectively connected with a U.S. business only if the person has an office or other fixed place of business within the United States to which such income, gain, deduction, or loss is attributable and such income is of a certain type (i.e., certain rents or royalties for the use of intangible property, certain interest or dividends derived in the active conduct of a banking or financing business, or certain income from sales of inventory or other property held primarily for sale in the ordinary course of a trade or business).64 Foreign-source income of a type not specified above generally is exempt from U.S. tax.65 In determining whether a foreign person has a U.S. office or other fixed place of business, the office or other fixed place of business of an agent generally is disregarded. The place of business of an agent other than an independent agent acting in the ordinary course of business is not disregarded, however, if either the agent has the authority (regularly exercised) to negotiate and conclude contracts in the name of the foreign person or the agent has a stock of merchandise from which he regularly fills orders on behalf of the foreign person.66 Assuming that an office or other fixed place of business does exist, income, gain, deduction, or loss is not considered attributable to such office unless the office was a material factor in the production of the income, gain, deduction, or loss and the office regularly carries on activities of the type from which the income, gain, deduction, or loss was derived.67 Source of incomeThe Code provides rules for the determination of the source of income. For example, interest and dividends paid by U.S. persons generally are considered U.S.-source income.68 Conversely, interest and dividends paid by foreign persons generally are treated as foreign-source income. Special rules apply to treat as foreign-source income (in whole or in part) interest paid by certain U.S. persons with foreign businesses and to treat as U.S.-source income (in whole or in part) dividends paid by certain foreign persons with U.S. businesses.69 Rents and royalties paid for the use of property in the United States generally are considered U.S.-source income.70 Subject to significant exceptions, the source of income from the sale of personal property depends on the residence of the seller (e.g., if the seller is foreign, the gain is foreign source).71 Underwriting income from issuing insurance or annuity contracts generally is treated as U.S.-source income if the contract involves property in, liability arising out of an activity in, or the lives or health of residents of, the United States.72 Insurance companiesSpecial rules apply to a foreign corporation carrying on an insurance business in the United States that would qualify as an insurance company (based on its effectively connected income) if it were a domestic corporation.73 Under those rules, the foreign corporation generally is taxed on that effectively connected income in the same manner as a U.S. insurance company. Any other income of the foreign corporation is taxed under the gross-basis taxation rules described below.Special rules apply for purposes of determining the effectively-connected income of an insurance company. The foreign-source income of a foreign corporation that is subject to tax under the insurance company provisions of the Code is treated as effectively connected, provided that such income is attributable to its U.S. business.74 Withholding taxIn the case of U.S.-source interest, dividends, rents, royalties, premiums, or other similar types of income (known as fixed or determinable, annual or periodical gains, profits and income), the United States generally imposes a flat 30-percent tax on the gross amount paid to a foreign person if such income or gain is not effectively connected with the conduct of a U.S. trade or business.75 This tax does not apply to insurance premiums paid with respect to a contract that is subject to the insurance premiums excise tax described above.76 The 30-percent gross-basis tax generally is collected by means of withholding by the person making the payment to the foreign person receiving the income.77 Accordingly, the tax generally is referred to as a withholding tax. In most instances, the amount withheld by the U.S. payor is the final tax liability of the foreign recipient and, thus, the foreign recipient files no U.S. tax return with respect to this income.The United States generally does not tax capital gains of a foreign corporation that are not connected with a U.S. trade or business. Capital gains of a nonresident alien individual that are not connected with a U.S. business generally are subject to the 30-percent withholding tax only if the individual was present in the United States for 183 days or more during the year.78 Also subject to tax at a flat rate of 30 percent are any foreign person's gains from the sale or exchange of patents, copyrights, trademarks, and other like property, or of any interest in such property, to the extent the gains are from payments that are contingent on the productivity, use, or disposition of the property or interest sold or exchanged.79 Gains of a foreign person on the disposition of U.S. real property interests are taxed on a net basis under the Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax Act, even if they are not otherwise effectively connected with a U.S. trade or business.80 Similarly, rental and other income from U.S. real property may be taxed, at the election of the taxpayer, on a net basis at graduated rates.81 Although payments of U.S.-source interest that is not effectively connected with a U.S. trade or business generally are subject to the 30-percent withholding tax, there are significant exceptions to that rule. For example, interest from certain deposits with banks and other financial institutions is exempt from tax.82 Original issue discount on obligations maturing in six months or less is also exempt from tax.83 An additional exception is provided for certain interest paid on portfolio obligations.84 Portfolio interest generally is defined as any U.S.-source interest (including original issue discount), not effectively connected with the conduct of a U.S. trade or business, (1) on an obligation that satisfies certain registration requirements or specified exceptions thereto, and (2) that is not received by a 10-percent shareholder.85 This exception is not available for any interest received either by a bank on a loan extended in the ordinary course of its business (except in the case of interest paid on an obligation of the United States), or by a controlled foreign corporation from a related person.86 Moreover, this exception is not available for certain contingent interest payments.87 Earnings strippingA foreign parent corporation with a U.S. subsidiary may seek to reduce the U.S. subsidiary's U.S. tax liability by having the U.S. subsidiary pay deductible amounts such as interest, rents, royalties, and management service fees to the foreign parent or other foreign affiliates that are not subject to U.S. tax on the receipt of such payments. Although the United States generally subjects foreign corporations to a 30-percent withholding tax on the receipt of such payments, this tax may be reduced or eliminated under an applicable income tax treaty. Consequently, foreign-owned U.S. corporations may seek to use certain treaties to facilitate earnings stripping transactions without having their deductions offset by U.S. withholding taxes.88 Generally, the Code limits the ability of corporations to reduce the U.S. tax on their U.S.- source income through earnings stripping transactions. A deduction for "disqualified interest" paid or accrued by a corporation in a taxable year is generally disallowed if two threshold tests are satisfied: the payor's debt-to-equity ratio exceeds 1.5 to 1 (the so-called "safe harbor"); and the payor's net interest expense exceeds 50 percent of its "adjusted taxable income" (generally taxable income computed without regard to deductions for net interest expense, net operating losses, and depreciation, amortization, and depletion).89 Disqualified interest includes interest paid or accrued to: (1) related parties when no Federal income tax is imposed with respect to such interest; or (2) unrelated parties in certain instances in which a related party guarantees the debt ("guaranteed debt"). Interest amounts disallowed under these rules can be carried forward indefinitely. In addition, any excess limitation (i.e., the excess, if any, of 50 percent of the adjusted taxable income of the payor over the payor's net interest expense) can be carried forward three years.Under a provision included in the Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005, except to the extent provided by regulations, the foregoing earnings stripping rules apply to a corporate partner of a partnership.90 The corporation's share of partnership liabilities is treated as liabilities of the corporation for purposes of applying the earnings stripping rules to the corporation. The corporation's distributive shares of interest income and interest expense of the partnership are treated as interest income or interest expense of the corporation.Branch level taxesA U.S. corporation owned by foreign persons is subject to U.S. income tax on its net income. In addition, the earnings of the U.S. corporation are subject to a second tax, this time at the shareholder level, when dividends are paid. As discussed above, when the shareholders are foreign, the second-level tax is imposed at a flat rate and collected by withholding. Similarly, as discussed above, interest payments made by a U.S. corporation to foreign creditors are subject to a U.S. withholding tax in certain circumstances. Pursuant to the branch tax provisions, the United States taxes foreign corporations engaged in a U.S. trade or business on amounts of U.S. earnings and profits that are shifted out of, or amounts of interest deducted by, the U.S. branch of the foreign corporation.91 The branch level taxes are comparable to these second-level taxes. In addition, where a foreign corporation is not subject to the branch profits tax as the result of a treaty, it may be liable for withholding tax on actual dividends it pays to foreign shareholders.U.S. income tax treatiesThe United States has entered into comprehensive income tax treaties with more than 50 countries, including a number of countries with well-developed insurance industries such as Barbados, Germany, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. The United States has also entered into a tax treaty with Bermuda, another country with a significant insurance industry, which applies only with respect to the taxation of insurance enterprises.92 Comprehensive tax treatiesThe traditional objectives of U.S. tax treaties have been the avoidance of international double taxation and the prevention of tax avoidance and evasion. Another related objective of U.S. tax treaties is the removal of the barriers to trade, capital flows, and commercial travel that may be caused by overlapping tax jurisdictions and by the burdens of complying with the tax laws of a jurisdiction when a person's contacts with, and income derived from, that jurisdiction are minimal. To a large extent, the treaty provisions designed to carry out these objectives supplement U.S. tax law provisions having the same objectives; treaty provisions modify the generally applicable statutory rules with provisions that take into account the particular tax system of the treaty partner.The objective of limiting double taxation generally is accomplished in treaties through the agreement of each country to limit, in specified situations, its right to tax income earned from its territory by residents of the other country. For the most part, the various rate reductions and exemptions agreed to by the source country in treaties are premised on the assumption that the country of residence will tax the income at levels comparable to those imposed by the source country on its residents. Treaties also provide for the elimination of double taxation by requiring the residence country to allow a credit for taxes that the source country retains the right to impose under the treaty. In addition, in the case of certain types of income, treaties may provide for exemption by the residence country of income taxed by the source country.Treaties define the term resident so that an individual or corporation generally will not be subject to tax as a resident by both of the countries. Treaties generally provide that neither country will tax business income derived by residents of the other country unless the business activities in the taxing jurisdiction are substantial enough to constitute a permanent establishment or fixed base in that jurisdiction. Treaties also contain commercial visitation exemptions under which individual residents of one country performing personal services in the other country will not be required to pay tax in that other country unless their contacts exceed certain specified minimums (e.g., presence for a set number of days or earnings in excess of a specified amount). Treaties address passive income such as dividends, interest, and royalties from sources within one country derived by residents of the other country either by providing that such income is taxed only in the recipient's country of residence or by reducing the rate of the source country's withholding tax imposed on such income. In this regard, the United States agrees in its tax treaties to reduce its 30-percent withholding tax (or, in the case of some income, to eliminate it entirely) in return for reciprocal treatment by its treaty partner.U.S.-Bermuda tax treatyThe U.S.-Bermuda treaty generally exempts from U.S. taxation the business profits of a Bermuda insurance enterprise from carrying on the business of insurance (including insubstantial amounts of income incidental to such business), unless the insurance enterprise carries on business in the United States through a U.S. permanent establishment. For the purposes of the treaty, an insurance enterprise is defined as an enterprise whose predominant business activity is the issuing of insurance or annuity contracts or acting as the reinsurer of risks underwritten by insurance companies, together with the investing or reinvesting of assets held in respect of insurance reserves, capital, and surplus incident to the carrying on of the insurance business.Permanent establishmentThe permanent establishment concept is one of the basic devices used in income tax treaties to limit the taxing jurisdiction of the host country and thus to mitigate double taxation. Generally, an enterprise that is a resident of one country is not taxable by the other country on its business profits unless those profits are attributable to a permanent establishment of the resident in the other country. In addition, the permanent establishment concept is used to determine whether the reduced rates of, or exemptions from, tax provided for dividends, interest, and royalties apply, or whether those items of income will be taxed as business profits.In general, under the United States Model Income Tax Convention of November 15, 2006 (the "U.S. model treaty") and many bilateral U.S. tax treaties, including the treaties with Barbados, Germany, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, a permanent establishment is a fixed place of business in which the business of an enterprise is wholly or partly carried on.93 A permanent establishment includes a place of management, a branch, an office, a factory, a workshop, a mine, an oil or gas well, a quarry, or other place of extraction of natural resources.The U.S. model treaty and many bilateral U.S. tax treaties provide that the following activities are deemed not to constitute a permanent establishment: (1) the use of facilities solely for storing, displaying, or delivering goods or merchandise belonging to the enterprise; (2) the maintenance of a stock of goods or merchandise belonging to the enterprise solely for storage, display, or delivery or solely for processing by another enterprise; and (3) the maintenance of a fixed place of business solely for the purchase of goods or merchandise or for the collection of information for the enterprise. The U.S. model treaty and many bilateral U.S. tax treaties also provide that the maintenance of a fixed place of business solely for the purpose of carrying on, for the enterprise, any other activity of a preparatory or auxiliary character does not constitute a permanent establishment. The U.S. model treaty and many bilateral U.S. tax treaties provide that a combination of these activities will not give rise to a permanent establishment, if the combination results in an overall activity that is of a preparatory or auxiliary character.Under the U.S. model treaty and many bilateral U.S. tax treaties, if a person, other than an independent agent, is acting in a treaty country on behalf of an enterprise of the other country and has, and habitually exercises in such first country, the authority to conclude contracts in the name of such enterprise, the enterprise is deemed to have a permanent establishment in the first country in respect of any activities undertaken for that enterprise. This rule does not apply where the activities are limited to the preparatory and auxiliary activities described in the preceding paragraph.No permanent establishment is deemed to arise, under the U.S. model treaty and many bilateral U.S. tax treaties, if the agent is a broker, general commission agent, or any other agent of independent status, provided that the agent is acting in the ordinary course of its business. Generally, whether an enterprise and an agent are independent is a factual determination, and the relevant factors in making this determination include: (1) the extent to which the agent operates on the basis of instructions from the principal; (2) the extent to which the agent bears business risk; and (3) whether the agent has an exclusive or nearly exclusive relationship with the principal.The U.S. model treaty and many bilateral U.S. tax treaties provide that the fact that a company that is a resident of one country controls or is controlled by a company that is a resident of the other country or that carries on business in the other country does not in and of itself cause either company to be a permanent establishment of the other.Exemption from the insurance premiums excise taxCertain U.S. tax treaties, including the treaties with Germany, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, apply to the insurance premiums excise tax of section 4371, in addition to the Federal income taxes imposed by the Code. Generally, when a foreign person qualifies for benefits under such a treaty, the United States is not permitted to collect the insurance premiums excise tax from that person. To prevent persons from inappropriately obtaining the benefits of exemption from the excise tax, the treaties generally include an anti-conduit rule. The anticonduit rule provides that the treaty applies to the insurance premiums excise tax only to the extent that the risks covered by the premiums are not reinsured with a person not entitled to the benefits of the treaty (or any other treaty that provides exemption from the excise tax).The U.S. tax treaties with Barbados and Bermuda also provide that they apply to the insurance premiums excise tax, although the Senate's ratification of the U.S.-Bermuda treaty was subject to a reservation with respect to the treaty's application to the insurance premiums excise tax. Moreover, section 6139 of the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988 provides that neither the U.S.-Barbados nor the U.S.-Bermuda treaty will prevent imposition of the insurance premiums excise tax on premiums, regardless of when paid or accrued, allocable to insurance coverage for periods after December 31, 1989.94 Accordingly, no exemption from the insurance premiums excise tax is available under those two treaties with respect to premiums allocable to insurance coverage beginning on or after January 1, 1990.
D. Present Law and Background of the Unrelated Business Income Tax and Debt-Financed IncomePresent law of the unrelated business income tax and debt-financed property rulesOverview of the unrelated business income taxThe Code imposes a tax, at ordinary corporate rates, on the income that a tax-exempt organization obtains from an "unrelated trade or business ... regularly carried on by it."95 Most exempt organizations are subject to the tax.96 Generally, "unrelated trade or business" is "any trade or business the conduct of which is not substantially related ... to the exercise or performance by such organization of its charitable, educational, or other purpose."97 The Code thus sets up a three-part test for determining whether income from an activity is subject to the unrelated business income tax: (1) the activity constitutes a trade or business; (2) the activity is regularly carried on; and (3) the activity is not substantially related to the organization's taxexempt purposes. An organization that is subject to the unrelated business income tax and that has $1,000 or more of gross unrelated business taxable income must report that income on Form 990-T (Exempt Organization Business Income Tax Return).Passive income, such as dividends, interest, royalties, certain rents, and certain gains and losses from the sale or exchange of property, is exempt from the unrelated business income tax.98 In general, the exemption for such passive income applies unless the income is derived from debt-financed property99 or is in the form of certain payments from certain 50-percent controlled subsidiaries.100 Other exemptions from the unrelated business income tax are provided for activities in which substantially all the work is performed by volunteers, for income from the sale of donated goods, and for certain activities carried on for the convenience of members, students, patients, officers, or employees of a charitable organization. In addition, special unrelated business income tax provisions exempt from tax certain activities of trade shows and State fairs, income from bingo games, and income from the distribution of certain low-cost items incidental to the solicitation of charitable contributions. Organizations liable for tax on unrelated business taxable income may be liable for alternative minimum tax determined after taking into account adjustments and tax preference items.Overview of the debt-financed property rulesIn general, income of a tax-exempt organization that is produced by debt-financed property is treated as unrelated business income in proportion to the acquisition indebtedness on the income-producing property. Special rules apply in the case of an exempt organization that owns an interest in a partnership (or a pass-through entity taxed as a partnership) that holds debtfinanced property.101 In general, in such cases, if the partnership incurs acquisition indebtedness with respect to property that, if held directly by the exempt organization, would not qualify for an exception from the debt-financed property rules, the receipt of income by the exempt organization with respect to such property may result in recognition of unrelated debt-finance income.Acquisition indebtedness generally means the amount of unpaid indebtedness incurred by an organization to acquire or improve the property and indebtedness that would not have been incurred but for the acquisition or improvement of the property.102 Acquisition indebtedness does not include, however, (1) certain indebtedness incurred in the performance or exercise of a purpose or function constituting the basis of the organization's exemption, (2) obligations to pay certain types of annuities, (3) an obligation, to the extent it is insured by the Federal Housing Administration, to finance the purchase, rehabilitation, or construction of housing for low and moderate income persons, or (4) indebtedness incurred by a qualified organization to acquire or improve real property (the "real property exception").103 Exception for debt-financed real property investments by qualified organizationsFor purposes of the real property exception, a qualified organization is: (1) an educational organization described in section 170(b)(1)(A)(ii)104 and its affiliated supporting organizations; (2) a qualified trust described in section 401(a) (hereinafter "pension funds"); (3) a title holding company described in section 501(c)(25) (insofar as it holds shares of organizations described in (1) or (2)105 ); or (4) a retirement income account described in section 403(b)(9).106 To qualify for the real property exception, an acquisition or improvement by the qualified organization must meet several requirements. These include: (1) a requirement generally that the price of the property is a fixed amount determined as of the date of the acquisition or completion of the improvement; (2) restrictions against payment of the indebtedness of the arrangement being dependent upon the revenue, income, or profits derived from the property; (3) restrictions concerning sale-leaseback arrangements; and (4) in general, a prohibition against seller financing.107 Additional requirements must be met for the real property exception to apply where the real property is held by a partnership in which a qualified organization is a partner. To qualify for the real property exception, the partnership must meet all of the above-described general requirements and must meet one of the following three requirements: (1) all of the partners of the partnership are qualified organizations; (2) each allocation to a partner of the partnership which is a qualified organization is a qualified allocation (within the meaning of section 168(h)(6)); or (3) the partnership satisfies a rule prohibiting disproportionate allocations.108 The disproportionate allocation rule requires two things: first, that the organization satisfy what commonly is referred to as the "fractions rule," and second, that each allocation with respect to the partnership have substantial economic effect within the meaning of section 704(b)(2).109 Under the fractions rule, the allocation of items to any partner that is a qualified organization cannot result in such partner having a share of the overall partnership income for any taxable year greater than such partner's share of overall partnership loss for the taxable year for which such partner's loss share will be the smallest.110 A partnership generally must satisfy the fractions rule on an actual basis and on a prospective basis for each taxable year of the partnership in which it holds debt-financed property and has at least one partner that is a qualified organization.111 The fractions rule generally is intended to prevent the shifting of disproportionate income or gains to tax-exempt partners of the partnership or the shifting of disproportionate deductions, losses, or credits to taxable partners.Legislative history of the unrelated business income tax and debt-financed property rulesBusiness and debt-financed income prior to 1950Until the introduction of the unrelated business income tax in 1950, exempt organizations enjoyed a full exemption from Federal income tax. There was no statutory limitation on the amount of business activity an exempt organization could conduct so long as the earnings from the business were used for exempt purposes. In court decisions, tax-exemption was extended to organizations that did not conduct any charitable programs, but rather operated commercial businesses for the benefit of a charitable organization. Tax exemption for such so called "feeder" organizations was recognized, for example in Roche's Beach, Inc. v. Commissioner,112 and C.F. Mueller Co. v. Commissioner.113 In addition to the use of feeder corporations as a source of revenue, another common practice of exempt organizations in the years before 1950 was the acquisition of real estate with borrowed funds. In a typical transaction, a tax-exempt organization would borrow the entire purchase price of real property, lease the property back to the seller under a long-term lease, and service the loan with tax-free rental income from the lease.114 Revenue Act of 1950As a response to these practices, in the Revenue Act of 1950 Congress subjected charitable organizations (not including churches), and certain other exempt organizations to tax on their unrelated business income.115 The legislative history of the 1950 Act provides that "the problem at which the tax on unrelated business income is directed here is primarily that of unfair competition."116 Congress decided not to deny or revoke tax-exempt status solely because the organization carried on unrelated active business enterprises, but instead "merely [imposed] the same tax on income derived therefrom as is borne by their competitors."117 The Congress excluded from the tax certain passive forms of income, concluding that such passive income was "not likely to result in serious competition for taxable businesses having similar income"118 and "should not be taxed where it is used for exempt purposes because investments producing incomes of these types have long been recognized as proper for educational and charitable organizations."119 The 1950 Act also taxed as unrelated business income certain rents received in connection with the leveraged sale and leaseback of real estate.120 Here, Congress cited three objections to such transactions: (1) "the tax-exempt organization is not merely trying to find a means of investing its own funds at an adequate rate of return but is obviously trading on its exemption since the only contribution it makes to the sale and lease is its tax exemption"; (2) unchecked, such transactions could result in exempt organizations owning "the great bulk of the commercial and industrial real estate in the country ... lower[ing] drastically the rental income included in the corporate and individual income tax bases"; and (3) the "possibility ... that the exempt organization has in effect sold part of its exemption ... by ... paying a higher price for the property or by charging lower rentals than a taxable business could charge."121 This provision was a precursor to the present-law tax on unrelated debt-financed income.Tax Reform Act of 1969In the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Congress extended the unrelated business income tax to all exempt organizations described in section 501(c) and 401(a) (except United States instrumentalities).122 In addition, the 1969 Act expanded the tax on debt-financed income. The provision enacted in 1950 to tax income from certain leveraged sale-leaseback transactions involving real estate had proved ineffective, as taxpayers succeeded in structuring transactions that escaped the reach of the statute.123 The Supreme Court considered one such transaction in the Clay Brown case.124 In Clay Brown, a corporate business was sold to a charitable organization, which made a small or no down payment and agreed to pay the balance of the purchase price to the former shareholders out of profits from the property. The charity liquidated the corporation and leased the business assets back to the sellers, who formed a new corporation to operate the business. The newly formed corporation paid a large portion of its business profits as deductible "rent" to the charity, which then paid most of these receipts back to the original owners as installment payments on the initial purchase price. The Supreme Court agreed with the taxpayer's characterization of the transaction. The original owners thereby succeeded in converting business income that would have been taxable at ordinary income rates to capital gains, while the exempt organization acquired the ownership of a business largely or wholly without the investment of its own funds. Thus, under the 1950 legislation, exempt organizations continued to be able to leverage exempt status to buy businesses and investments on credit, often at more than market price, without contributing much if anything to the transaction other than tax exemption.125 Citing principally to cases such as Clay Brown and the ability of taxable parties to convert ordinary income into capital gain through leveraged sale-leaseback transactions with taxexempt organizations,126 the Congress in 1969 expanded the unrelated debt-financed income rules to cover not only certain rents from debt-financed acquisitions of real property, but to tax in addition other debt-financed income such as interest, dividends, other rents, royalties, and certain gains and losses from any type of property. The 1969 Act provided for certain limited exceptions to the tax on debt-financed income, such as where the debt-financed property is related to the organization's exempt functions.Enactment of the real property exceptionIn the Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1980, Congress enacted an exception to the debtfinanced income rules for certain real property investments by qualified pension trusts (the progenitor of the real property exception, described above). The exception did not apply, however, if any of five situations were present: (1) the acquisition price is not a fixed amount on the acquisition date; (2) the amount of indebtedness is dependent on the revenue, income, or profits derived from the debt-financed property; (3) the property is leased back to the seller (or a related party); (4) the property is acquired from or leased to a related person of the trust; and (5) the seller or person related to the trust provides nonrecourse financing, and the debt is subordinate to any other indebtedness on the property or the debt bore an interest rate significantly lower than that provided by unrelated parties.127 Congress believed that such an exception was warranted because "the exemption for investment income of qualified retirement trusts is an essential tax incentive which is provided to tax-qualified plans in order to enable them to accumulate funds to satisfy their exempt purpose - the payment of employee benefits."128 Real estate investments are attractive "for diversification and to offset inflation. Debt financing is common in real estate investments." In addition, the exemption provided to pension trusts was appropriate because, unlike other exempt organizations, the assets of such trusts eventually would be "used to pay taxable benefits to individual recipients whereas the investment assets of other [exempt] organizations ... are not likely to be used for the purpose of providing benefits taxable at individual rates." In other words, the exemption for qualified trusts generally resulted only in deferral of tax; unlike the exemption for other organizations. Congress also believed that the five limitations placed upon use of the exception would "eliminate the most egregious abuses addressed by the 1969 legislation."In the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Congress extended the real property exception to educational organizations, finding that "educational organizations generally were unable to avoid taxation on income from real property acquired for investment purposes because few institutions had sufficient assets to purchase property not subject to debt."129 At the same time, Congress layered on additional conditions, including an absolute bar on seller financing and an anti-abuse rule in the case of qualified organizations that were partners in partnerships investing in debtfinanced real property. The new restrictions were needed because prior law was "inadequate to prevent the shifting of tax benefits between tax-exempt organizations and taxable entities."130 Between 1986 and 1988, Congress introduced and modified rules requiring that investments through a partnership satisfy a prohibition on disproportionate allocations, i.e., the requirements that each partnership allocation have substantive economic effect and that the partnership satisfy the "fractions rule."131 In 1993, Congress relaxed some of the conditions required to meet the real property exception. In general, leasebacks to the seller (or a disqualified person) are allowed if no more than 25 percent of the leasable floor space in a building is leased back and the lease is on commercially reasonable terms.132 Seller financing is permitted if the financing is on commercially reasonable terms.133 In addition, the fixed price restriction and the requirement that indebtedness not be paid out of revenue, income, or profits of the acquired property are relaxed for certain sales by financial institutions.134
E. Overview of Ways to Defer Services Income1. Qualified plansIn generalDeferred compensation occurs when the payment of compensation to a service provider is deferred for more than a short period after the compensation is earned (i.e., the time when the services giving rise to the compensation are performed). Payment is generally deferred until some specified event, such as the service provider's death, disability, or other termination of services, or is deferred for a specified period of time, such as five or ten years.The Code provides tax-favored treatment for certain types of employer-sponsored deferred compensation arrangements that are designed primarily to provide employees with retirement income. These arrangements include qualified defined contribution and defined benefit pension plans (sec. 401(a)), qualified annuities (sec. 403(a)), tax-sheltered annuities (sec. 403(b)), savings incentive match plans for employees or "SIMPLE" plans (sec. 408(p)), simplified employee pensions or "SEPs" (sec. 408(k)), and eligible deferred compensation plans of State or local governmental employers (sec. 457(b)). These plans are referred to as qualified retirement plans.In the case of a qualified retirement plan, employees do not include contributions in gross income until amounts are distributed, even though the arrangement is funded and benefits are nonforfeitable. In the case of a taxable employer, the employer is entitled to a current deduction (within limits) for contributions even though the contributions are not currently included in an employee's income. Contributions to a qualified plan, and earnings thereon, are held in a taxexempt trust.Present law imposes a number of requirements on qualified retirement plans that must be satisfied in order for the plan to be qualified and for favorable tax treatment to apply. These requirements include nondiscrimination rules that are intended to ensure that a qualified retirement plan covers a broad group of employees. The nondiscrimination requirements are designed to ensure that qualified retirement plans benefit an employer's rank-and-file employees as well as highly compensated employees.135 Under a general nondiscrimination requirement, the contributions or benefits provided under a qualified retirement plan must not discriminate in favor of highly compensated employees.136 Treasury regulations provide detailed and exclusive rules for determining whether a plan satisfies the general nondiscrimination requirement. For example, under the regulations applicable to qualified defined contribution plans and qualified defined benefit plans, the amount of contributions or benefits provided under the plan and the benefits, rights and features offered under the plan must be tested.137 Limits also apply on the amount of contributions that can be made to qualified plans and, in the case of defined benefit plans, on the amount that is payable annually from the plan. Limits also apply to the amount of an employer's deduction for contributions to qualified plans.Qualified employer plans are also generally subject to the requirements of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). For example, ERISA generally requires that the assets of a pension plan be held in a trust established for the exclusive purpose of providing plan benefits.Qualified cash or deferred arrangements (section 401(k) plans)Under present law, many defined contribution plans include a qualified cash or deferred arrangement (commonly referred to as a "401(k) plan"), under which employees may elect to receive cash or to have contributions made to the plan by the employer on behalf of the employee in lieu of receiving cash. Contributions made to the plan at the election of the employee are referred to as elective deferrals. The maximum annual amount of elective deferrals that can be made by an individual for any taxable year is $15,500 (for 2007). In applying this limitation, elective deferrals under 401(k) plans, tax-sheltered annuities, SEPs, and SIMPLE plans are aggregated. An individual who has attained age 50 before the end of the taxable year may also make catch-up contributions to a section 401(k) plan. As a result, the dollar limit on elective deferrals is increased for an individual who has attained age 50 by $5,000 (for 2007). An employee's elective deferrals must be fully vested. A special nondiscrimination test applies to elective deferrals under a 401(k) plan.Tax-sheltered annuities (section 403(b) annuities)A tax-sheltered annuity is also permitted to allow a participant to elect to have the employer make payments as contributions to the plan or to the participant directly in cash. As discussed above, the $15,500 annual limit on elective deferrals applies to elective deferral contributions to a tax-sheltered annuity. As with a 401(k) plan, special rules permit catch-up contributions to be made to a tax-sheltered annuity in the case of certain individuals, and special rules apply for purposes of nondiscrimination testing.Eligible deferred compensation plans of State and local governments (section 457 plans)Compensation deferred under a section 457 plan of a State or local governmental employer is includible in income when paid. The maximum annual deferral under such a plan generally is the lesser of (1) $15,500 (for 2007) or (2) 100 percent of compensation. A special, higher limit applies for the last three years before a participant reaches normal retirement age (the "section 457 catch-up limit"). In the case of a section 457 plan of a governmental employer, a participant who has attained age 50 before the end of the taxable year may also make catch-up contributions up to a limit of $5,000 (for 2007), unless a higher section 457 catch-up limit applies. Only contributions to section 457 plans are taken into account in applying these limits; contributions made to a qualified retirement plan or section 403(b) plan for an employee do not affect the amount that may be contributed to a section 457 plan for that employee. Thus, for example, a State or local government employee covered by both a section 457 plan and a section 401(k) or 403(b) plan can contribute up to $15,500 (for 2007) to each plan for a total of $31,000. In the case of a plan that fails to meet the dollar limitations or any other requirement of section 457 (an "ineligible plan"), compensation is includible in income for the first taxable year in which there is no substantial risk of forfeiture.138 2. Nonqualified deferred compensationIn generalA nonqualified deferred compensation arrangement is generally any deferred compensation arrangement that is not a qualified retirement plan. Nonqualified deferred compensation arrangements are contractual arrangements between a service recipient (e.g., an employer or a hedge fund) and a service provider (e.g., an employee or an entity that operates as a hedge fund manager) covered by the arrangement. Such arrangements are structured in whatever form achieves the goals of the parties; as a result, they vary greatly in design. Considerations that may affect the structure of the arrangement are the current and future income needs of the service provider, the desired tax treatment of deferred amounts, and the desire for assurance that deferred amounts will in fact be paid.ERISA contains exemptions from its requirements for certain nonqualified deferred compensation arrangements. Most nonqualified deferred compensation arrangements are designed to fall within these ERISA exemptions. Thus, nonqualified deferred compensation arrangements are generally not subject to the protections of ERISA. For example, there is no requirement that a nonqualified deferred compensation arrangement be funded by a trust established for the exclusive purpose of providing plan benefits.139 The Code and ERISA do not limit the amount that can be deferred by a service provider under a nonqualified deferred compensation arrangement.Tax treatment of service providerIn generalThe American Jobs Creation Act of 2004140 added section 409A to the Code which provides specific rules governing the tax treatment of nonqualified deferred compensation.141 Prior to section 409A, there were no rules that specifically governed the tax treatment of nonqualified deferred compensation. In determining the tax treatment of nonqualified deferred compensation prior to enactment of section 409A, a variety of tax principles and Code provisions were relevant, including the doctrine of constructive receipt, the economic benefit doctrine, the provisions of section 83 relating generally to transfers of property in connection with the performance of services, and provisions relating specifically to nonexempt employee trusts (sec. 402(b)) and nonqualified employee annuities (sec. 403(c)). Section 409A does not override these tax principles and Code provisions. Thus, they are relevant in determining the tax treatment of nonqualified deferred compensation and are discussed below. Section 409A does not prevent the inclusion of amounts in gross income under any provision or rule of law earlier than the time provided under its rules.Under section 409A, unless certain requirements are satisfied, amounts deferred under a nonqualified deferred compensation plan are currently includible in income to the extent not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture. The requirements imposed under section 409A affect the way that nonqualified deferred compensation arrangements are now commonly structured.General income inclusion rulesIn the case of a cash-basis taxpayer, if the nonqualified deferred compensation arrangement is unfunded, then the compensation is generally includible in income when it is actually or constructively received under section 451 (unless earlier income inclusion applies under section 409A).142 Income is constructively received when it is credited to an individual's account, set apart, or otherwise made available so that it may be drawn on at any time.143 Income is not constructively received if the taxpayer's control of its receipt is subject to substantial limitations or restrictions. A requirement to relinquish a valuable right in order to make withdrawals is generally treated as a substantial limitation or restriction.In general, an arrangement is considered funded if there has been a transfer of property under section 83. Section 83 provides rules for the tax treatment of property transferred in connection with the performance of services and generally applies to a funded nonqualified deferred compensation arrangement.144 The economic benefit doctrine is based on the broad definition of gross income in the Code (sec. 61), which includes income in whatever form paid. Under the economic benefit doctrine, if an individual receives any economic or financial benefit or property as compensation for services, the value of the benefit or property is includible in the individual's gross income. For example, courts have applied the economic benefit doctrine to the receipt of stock options or the receipt of an interest in a trust.145 A concept related to economic benefit is the cash equivalency doctrine.146 Under this doctrine, if the right to receive a payment in the future is reduced to writing and is transferable, such as in the case of a note or a bond, the right is considered to be the equivalent of cash and the value of the right is includible in gross income.147 Section 409AIn general.-Under section 409A, all amounts deferred by a service provider under a nonqualified deferred compensation plan148 for all taxable years are currently includible in gross income to the extent not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture149 and not previously included in gross income, unless certain requirements are satisfied. If the requirements of section 409A are not satisfied, in addition to current income inclusion, interest at the rate applicable to underpayments of tax plus one percentage point is imposed on the underpayments that would have occurred had the compensation been includible in income when first deferred, or if later, when not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture. The amount required to be included in income is also subject to a 20-percent additional tax.Under regulations, the term "service provider" includes an individual, corporation, subchapter S corporation, partnership, personal service corporation (as defined in sec. 269A(b)(1)), noncorporate entity that would be a personal service corporation if it were a corporation, or qualified personal service corporation (as defined in sec. 448(d)(2)) for any taxable year in which such individual or entity accounts for gross income from the performance of services under the cash receipts and disbursements method of accounting.150 Section 409A does not apply to a service provider that provides significant services to at least two service recipients that are not related to each other or the service provider. This exclusion does not apply to a service provider who is an employee or a director of a corporation (or similar position in the case of an entity that is not a corporation).151 In addition, the exclusion does not apply to an entity that operates as the manager of a hedge fund or private equity fund. This is because the exclusion does not apply to the extent that a service provider provides management services to a service recipient. Management services for this purpose means services that involve the actual or de facto direction or control of the financial or operational aspects of a trade or business of the service recipient or investment management or advisory services provided to a service recipient whose primary trade or business includes the investment of financial assets, such as a hedge fund.152 For purposes of section 409A, a nonqualified deferred compensation plan is any plan that provides for the deferral of compensation other than a qualified employer plan153 or any bona fide vacation leave, sick leave, compensatory time, disability pay, or death benefit plan.The regulations also provide that certain other types of plans are not considered deferred compensation, and thus are not subject to section 409A. For example, if a service recipient transfers property to a service provider, there is no deferral of compensation merely because the value of the property is either not includible in income under section 83 by reason of the property being substantially nonvested or is includible in income because of a valid section 83(b) election.154 Another exception applies to amounts that are not deferred beyond a short period of time after the amount is no longer subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture.155 Under this exception, there generally is no deferral for purposes of section 409A if the service provider actually or constructively receives the amount on or before the last day of the applicable 21/2 month period. The applicable 21/2 month period is the period ending on the later of the 15th day of the third month following the end of: (1) the service provider's first taxable year in which the right to the payment is no longer subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture; or (2) the service recipient's first taxable year in which the right to the payment is no longer subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture. Special rules apply in the case of stock options.156 The regulations provide exclusions from the definition of nonqualified deferred compensation for individuals who participate in certain foreign plans, including plans covered by an applicable treaty and broad-based foreign retirement plans.157 In the case of a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent alien, nonqualified deferred compensation does not include a broad-based foreign retirement plan, but only with respect to the portion of the plan that provides for nonelective deferral of foreign earned income and subject to limitations on the annual amount deferred under the plan or the annual amount payable under the plan. In general, foreign earned income refers to amounts received by an individual from sources within a foreign country that constitutes earned income attributable to services.Permissible distribution events.-Under section 409A, distributions from a nonqualified deferred compensation plan may be allowed only upon separation from service (as determined by the Secretary), death, a specified time (or pursuant to a fixed schedule), change in control of a corporation (to the extent provided by the Secretary), occurrence of an unforeseeable emergency, or if the participant becomes disabled. A nonqualified deferred compensation plan may not allow distributions other than upon the permissible distribution events and, except as provided in regulations by the Secretary, may not permit acceleration of a distribution. In the case of a specified employee who separates from service, distributions may not be made earlier than six months after the date of the separation from service or upon death. Specified employees are key employees158 of publicly-traded corporations.Deferral elections.-Section 409A requires that a plan must provide that compensation for services performed during a taxable year may be deferred at the participant's election only if the election to defer is made no later than the close of the preceding taxable year, or at such other time as provided in Treasury regulations. In the case of any performance-based compensation based on services performed over a period of at least 12 months, such election may be made no later than six months before the end of the service period. The time and form of distributions must be specified at the time of initial deferral. A plan may allow changes in the time and form of distributions subject to certain requirements.Back-to-back arrangements.-Back-to-back service recipients (i.e., situations under which an entity receives services from a service provider such as an employee, and the entity in turn provides services to a client) that involve back-to-back nonqualified deferred compensation arrangements (i.e., the fees payable by the client are deferred at both the entity level and the employee level) are subject to special rules under section 409A. For example, the final regulations generally permit the deferral agreement between the entity and its client to treat as a permissible distribution event those events that are specified as distribution events in the deferral agreement between the entity and its employee. Thus, if separation from employment is a specified distribution event between the entity and the employee, the employee's separation is a permissible distribution event for the deferral agreement between the entity and its client.159 Timing of the service recipient's deductionSpecial statutory provisions govern the timing of the deduction for nonqualified deferred compensation, regardless of whether the arrangement covers employees or nonemployees and regardless of whether the arrangement is funded or unfunded.160 Under these provisions, the amount of nonqualified deferred compensation that is includible in the income of the service provider is deductible by the service recipient for the taxable year in which the amount is includible in the service provider's income.161 Employment taxes and reportingIn the case of an employee, nonqualified deferred compensation is generally considered wages both for purposes of income tax withholding and for purposes of taxes under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act ("FICA"), consisting of social security tax and Medicare tax. However, the income tax withholding rules and social security and Medicare tax rules that apply to nonqualified deferred compensation are not the same.In the case of an employee, nonqualified deferred compensation is generally subject to income tax withholding at the time it is includible in the employee's income as discussed above. In addition, amounts includible in income are required to be reported on the employee's Form W-2 for the year includible in income. Income tax withholding and Form W-2 reporting are required even if the employee has already terminated employment. Income tax withholding and Form W-2 reporting are required when amounts are includible in income even if no actual payments are made to the employee.162 In the case of a service provider who is not an employee, nonqualified deferred compensation amounts includible in income generally are required to be reported on a Form 1099 for the year includible in income. Income tax withholding generally does not apply to such amounts.The Code provides special rules for applying social security and Medicare taxes to nonqualified deferred compensation of employees.163 In general, nonqualified deferred compensation is subject to social security and Medicare tax when it is earned (i.e., when services are performed), unless the nonqualified deferred compensation is subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture. If nonqualified deferred compensation is subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture, it is subject to social security and Medicare tax when the risk of forfeiture is removed (i.e., when the right to the nonqualified deferred compensation vests). This treatment is not affected by the timing of income inclusion.In the case of a self-employed individual, nonqualified deferred compensation amounts that are includible in income are also taken into account in determining net earnings from selfemployment for social security and Medicare tax purposes unless an exception applies.The Code requires annual reporting to the IRS of amounts deferred even if such amounts are not currently includible in income for that taxable year.164 The IRS has postponed the effective date of the statutory requirement and announced that an employer (or other payor) is not required for 2005 and 2006 to report amounts deferred during the year under a nonqualified deferred compensation plan subject to section 409A.165 Offshore arrangementsIn generalThe requirements under section 409A apply in the case of deferred compensation of a U.S. person participating in offshore operations such as a hedge fund located outside of the U.S. The general requirements of section 409A (i.e., the rules relating to elections, distributions and no acceleration of benefits) apply similarly to U.S. persons whether their activities are conducted in the United States or abroad.166 Foreign trustsSection 409A requires current income inclusion in the case of certain offshore funding of nonqualified deferred compensation. Under section 409A, in the case of assets set aside (directly or indirectly) in a trust (or other arrangement determined by the Secretary) for purposes of paying nonqualified deferred compensation, such assets are treated as property transferred in connection with the performance of services under section 83 (whether or not such assets are available to satisfy the claims of general creditors) at the time set aside if such assets (or trust or other arrangement) are located outside of the United States or at the time transferred if such assets (or trust or other arrangement) are subsequently transferred outside of the United States. Any subsequent increases in the value of, or any earnings with respect to, such assets are treated as additional transfers of property.Interest at the underpayment rate plus one percentage point is imposed on the underpayments that would have occurred had the amounts set aside been includible in income for the taxable year in which first deferred or, if later, the first taxable year not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture. The amount required to be included in income is also subject to an additional 20-percent tax.The provision does not apply to assets located in a foreign jurisdiction if substantially all of the services to which the nonqualified deferred compensation relates are performed in such foreign jurisdiction. The Secretary has authority to exempt arrangements from the provision if the arrangements do not result in an improper deferral of U.S. tax and will not result in assets being effectively beyond the reach of creditors.
III. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS IN RECENT CONGRESSES
A. Proposals Relating to Offshore ReinsuranceH.R. 1755 (107th Congress)H.R. 1755, "Reinsurance Tax Equity Act of 2001," was introduced in the House of Representatives by Nancy Johnson and Richard Neal during the 107th Congress on May 8, 2001. The bill would amend section 832(b)(4) of the Code to deny a deduction for premiums paid for direct or indirect reinsurance of U.S. risks with a "related insurer" in certain circumstances. However, when calculating its taxable income, an insurance company may generally deduct reinsurance recovered from a related insurer to the extent a deduction for the premium paid for the reinsurance was disallowed as a result of the bill. A U.S. risk includes any risk related to property in the United States, or liability arising out of the activity in, or in connection with the lives or health of residents of, the United States. A "related insurer" means a reinsurer owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests (within the meaning of section 482) as the person making the premium payment.The deduction is not denied if: (1) the income attributable to the reinsurance to which such premium relates is includible in the gross income of such reinsurer or one or more domestic corporations or citizens or residents of the United States; or (2) the related insurer establishes to the satisfaction of the Treasury Secretary that the taxable income (as determined under section 832) attributable to the reinsurance is subject to an effective rate of income tax imposed by a foreign country greater than 20 percent of the maximum rate specified in section 11 of the Code. A related insurer may elect to treat income from the reinsurance of U.S. risks, which is not otherwise includible in gross income, as income that is effectively connected with the conduct of a U.S. trade or business.H.R. 4192 (106th Congress)H.R. 4192 was introduced in the House of Representatives by Nancy Johnson and Richard Neal during the 106th Congress on April 5, 2000. This bill would amend section 845 to alter the treatment of related-party reinsurance. Under the bill, if a domestic person directly or indirectly reinsures a United States risk with a related foreign reinsurer, then the investment income of the domestic person shall be increased each year by an amount equal to the product of (1) the average of the applicable federal mid-term rates determined under section 1274(d)(1) and (2) the sum of the reserves and liabilities related to the U.S. risks ceded to the foreign reinsurer as shown on the national statement approved by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners. A U.S. risk includes any risk related to property in the United States, or liability arising out of the activity in, or in connection with the lives or health of residents of, the United States. An insurer is a "related foreign insurer" with respect to any domestic person if such person and foreign insurer are owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interest (within the meaning of section 482).Generally, this rule is not applicable if: (1) the foreign reinsurer retaining the reinsurance includes the income attributable to the reinsurance of the U.S. risks on its U.S. tax return either as a result of having made an election to be taxed as a domestic insurance company under section 953(d) or because such income is effectively connected with the foreign reinsurer's U.S. trade or business; (2) the foreign reinsurer elects to file a tax return and pay tax on income from the reinsurance of U.S. risks ceded to it by related domestic persons as if such income were effectively connected to a U.S. trade or business; (3) one or more domestic corporations or U.S. individuals include the income attributable the reinsurance of the U.S. risks ceded to the related foreign reinsurer on its tax return under subpart F; or (4) the foreign reinsurer establishes to the satisfaction of the Treasury Secretary that the taxable income (as determined under section 832) attributable to the reinsurance is subject to an effective rate of income tax imposed by a foreign country greater than 20 percent of the maximum rate specified in section 11 of the Code.The 1 percent excise tax on premiums paid to foreign reinsurers does not apply to premiums to which the bill applies.
B. Proposal Relating to Unrelated Debt-Financed IncomeH.R. 3501 (110th Congress)H.R. 3501 was introduced in the House of Representatives by Sander Levin during the 110th Congress on September 7, 2007. The bill amends section 514(c) of the Code to provide an exception to the unrelated debt-financed income rules for certain investments by tax-exempt organizations in qualified securities or commodities. Specifically, the bill provides that, where a tax-exempt organization is a limited partner in a partnership that holds qualified securities or commodities, indebtedness incurred or continued by the partnership in purchasing or carrying any such asset will not be "acquisition indebtedness" for purposes of the debt-financed income rules. Qualified securities and commodities generally include securities described in section 475(c)(2) of the Code, commodities described in section 475(e)(2) of the Code, and any option or derivative contract with respect to such a security or commodity.To qualify for the exception for investments in qualified securities or commodities, the partnership must satisfy the special rules that apply to investments in partnerships under the present-law real estate exception to the debt-financed income rules. The Secretary is given the authority to issue regulations providing for certain other anti-abuse rules as necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of the bill.
IV. ISSUES AND ANALYSIS
A. Issues and Analysis Relating to ReinsuranceIn generalBoth domestically-controlled and foreign-controlled insurance companies regularly cede a portion of their U.S. risks to affiliated or unaffiliated U.S. or foreign reinsurers. In general, the shifting, distribution, and geographic diversification of risks that may be accomplished by ceding such risks are valid business purposes. Further, ceding U.S. risks to foreign reinsurers generally serves a valid business purpose of minimizing multiple layers of regulation and consolidating regulatory oversight authority in a more business-favorable jurisdiction.The industry recognizes, however, that some companies may take such reinsurance activities to the limit. A business arrangement under which an insurer cedes most of its risks to one reinsurer is known in the industry as "fronting." Fronting raises issues of whether the insurer is acting as an agent of the reinsurer, and whether a foreign reinsurer is engaged in a trade or business in the United States, and if so, whether the activities result in the reinsurer having a permanent establishment in the United States to which the ceded premiums are attributable.In the case of foreign-based companies that reinsure policies issued or reinsured by independent or affiliated U.S. insurance companies, a well-advised reinsurer may in most cases avoid being engaged in a trade or business and having a permanent establishment in the United States by not having an office in the United States, by keeping separate the affairs of the foreign and U.S. companies, and by carefully following the formalities of contracts. In that case, the U.S. insurer may deduct its reinsurance premiums; those premiums are subject to neither net income nor withholding tax by the United States, notwithstanding that the reinsurance covers U.S. risks. The tax cost of such an arrangement is the one-percent excise tax on the reinsurance premiums,167 plus any U.S. income tax imposed on ceding commissions paid by the reinsurer to the ceding insurer. The premiums may or may not be subject to tax in the country in which the foreign reinsurer is resident, depending on the tax law there; generally this income is lightly taxed in the countries most frequently availed of, compared to U.S. tax rates.168 Further, because the premiums are actually paid to the foreign reinsurer, it may invest these funds, including in the United States. In so doing, it may avail itself of potentially low local tax rates,169 as well as, in the case of U.S. investment, the "securities trading safe harbor" tax exemption of section 864(b) and other portfolio investment exemptions.170 At the same time, a related foreign reinsurer's consolidated financial statements are not affected by such related-party reinsurance transactions.The above tax profile is in contrast to that of U.S.-based reinsurers, whose U.S. companies' income is subject to taxation in the United States when earned and whose controlled foreign corporations' insurance income is generally subject to U.S. tax under subpart F.171 The distribution of share ownership of a foreign corporation may determine, in part, whether it and its foreign subsidiaries are subject to the controlled foreign corporation tax regime or is able to obtain the superior tax treatment accorded other foreign corporations. A foreign corporation that is majority-owned, or even 100-percent-owned, directly or indirectly, by U.S. persons is not a controlled foreign corporation if its ownership is dispersed such that the majority of the voting power or value of the foreign corporation is not owned, directly or indirectly, by U.S. persons owning 10 percent or more of the voting power of the corporation's stock.Earnings strippingIn the case of the systematic reduction of the U.S. tax base of a U.S. foreign controlled company ("FCC") by its foreign parent by means of interest deductions - known as earnings stripping - Congress has provided a set of rules that disallow deductions for amounts of interest deemed to be excessive.172 The rules apply regardless of the taxpayer's or related creditor's intent or the existence of a valid business purpose for such debt. Indeed, it may be presumed that the debt qualifies as such under general debt-equity principles and that there is a valid business purpose for such debt. The earnings stripping rules operate in a mostly mechanical fashion to disallow the portion of the FCC's interest deduction over a certain threshold. The disallowed deductions may be carried forward indefinitely for use in future years.The earnings stripping rules are generally not affected by U.S. income tax treaties because they affect residents of the United States, not residents of treaty countries. When it enacted these rules, Congress did not believe they violated U.S. treaty obligations. The Committee on Ways and Means stated that "[t]he committee does not believe that the impact of this limitation on foreign-owned entities violates any treaty nondiscrimination provision....If the committee should be incorrect in its technical interpretation of the interaction between this provision and U.S. treaties, however, it does not intend that any contrary treaty provision defeat its purpose in enacting this limitation."173 Foreign related-party reinsurers and earnings strippingEarnings stripping transactions can involve the payment of deductible amounts other than interest.174 Even though interest earnings stripping is not a perfect analogy to reinsurance in every detail, the effects on the U.S. tax base of an FCC that reinsures U.S. risks with its foreign parent companies or foreign related parties is the same as earnings stripping. The Reasons for Change for the earnings stripping rules in the Ways and Means committee Report sets forth general principles that appear to be equally applicable to foreign related party reinsurance:
The committee believes, as a general matter, that it is appropriate to limit the deduction for interest that a taxable person pays or accrues to a tax-exempt entity whose economic interests coincide with those of the payor. To allow an unlimited deduction for such interest permits significant erosion of the tax base. Allowance of unlimited deductions permits an economic unit that consists of more than one legal entity to contract with itself at the expense of the government.
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The committee is particularly concerned that this ability to avoid tax tends to give an unfair advantage to business operations owned by foreign and other tax-exempt persons, as compared with business operations owned by taxable U.S. persons. In addition, such an advantage may enhance foreign investors' abilities to take over U.S. businesses, inasmuch as their reduced tax burden permits such investors to pay a higher price for a U.S. business than competing taxable domestic investors can pay. The committee believes that all such potential investors in U.S. businesses should compete on a level basis.175 If the rationale for the earnings stripping rules applies to foreign related-party reinsurance transactions, then it should be possible to devise a set of rules analogous to those of section 163(j) that would disallow, and possibly defer, deductions for ceding "excessive" reinsurance premiums covering U.S. risks paid by FCCs to foreign related persons, notwithstanding any current tax treaty provision.176 Despite the broad similarity between earnings stripping and foreign related-party reinsurance transactions, such reinsurance rules would not be identical to the earnings stripping rules because the two factual patterns are not identical. For example, by ceding premiums, an insurer generally decreases its financial leverage and debt-equity ratio, unlike the earnings stripping-by-debt scenario, in which these are increased. The ceding of premiums thus increases the ceding company's financial and regulatory capacity to write (or reinsure) more premiums, which may, in turn, be ceded. This creates a business incentive for an FCC and its foreign parent company to engage in or to increase fronting-type activities.In general, such a reinsurance provision would disallow deductions for premiums for U.S. risk ceded to tax-exempt related persons. A person would be considered tax-exempt to the extent of a treaty or Code reduction in withholding or other tax, including the elimination of withholding tax on premiums under Treasury Regulation section 1.1441-2(a)(7),177 taking into account the imposition of the one-percent excise tax on reinsurance premiums. One general approach might be to closely follow the rules of section 163(j) to disallow a deduction for the amount of reinsurance premiums paid to foreign related parties to the extent the amount of reinsured premiums exceeds 50% of an amount similar to "adjusted taxable income."178 As in the case of interest earnings stripping, disallowed deductions and an attribute analogous to "excess limitation" could be carried forward from prior years and taken into account.179 The earnings stripping rules do not apply unless the FCC's debt-to-equity exceeds a safeharbor ratio of 1.5 to 1.180 This amount is generally designed to be greater than the median debtto-equity ratio of U.S. corporations.181 As in the case of earnings stripping rules, providing an overall safe harbor could protect the companies from disallowance of deductions due to year-toyear changes in profitability. Such a safe harbor could be based on concepts analogous to the debt-equity ratio, for example, a median percentage of premiums ceded to unrelated parties on a group basis. This could be determined on the basis of overall industry transactions pertaining to unrelated party transactions, by lines of business, or based on some fixed criteria (as in section 163(j)).An alternative line-drawing approach might be to attempt to match up the FCC's premium-ceding tax burden with the tax burden that is imposed on U.S.-based insurers ceding premiums to their controlled foreign corporations. Proponents of such an approach might view this type of equalization approach as an opportunity to reform or reduce the current system of subpart F taxation of insurance income.182 Discussion of earnings stripping approachSome would argue that such a set of reinsurance-stripping rules is necessary to place U.S.-owned and FCC insurance companies on a level playing field, and that it is important to prevent other forms of earnings stripping in addition to interest. Others would argue that since there is a business purpose for such reinsurance, there should not be a formulaic limit imposed on deductions for ceded premiums. Applying a more equal amount of tax with respect to the insurance and reinsurance of U.S. risks does, in fact, level the playing field, but only with respect to tax. Some would argue that such a set of rules would cause property and casualty insurance coverage to become more difficult to obtain or would make such coverage much more expensive. Some proponents of this view might caution that the availability of appropriate insurance coverage at a reasonable cost, particularly catastrophic coverage, is a critical element in today's economy, and that adding any additional tax burden upon such insurers would put such availability at serious risk. Others would argue that the U.S. property and casualty market would not be disrupted thereby and would not become more expensive than the premiums currently charged by U.S. insurers who are unable to cede their premiums to an untaxed or lowtaxed foreign parent. These proponents might point to foreign manufacturers such as Toyota and Honda, which have built several factories in the United States since the earnings stripping rules were imposed in 1989, and which are still manufacturing and selling goods in the U.S. market notwithstanding those rules.Some would find the imposition of an earnings stripping-type provision to address related party reinsurance attractive because it would provide a degree of built-in flexibility to permit an appropriate level of business-driven reinsurance arrangements. Proponents might also suggest that, because it is possible for FCCs to engage simultaneously in both related party reinsurance transactions and earnings stripping using interest deductions, it would also be necessary to coordinate the two sets of rules, and that it is generally simpler to coordinate similar rules. Such coordination rules might also serve a policy objective of better equalizing the U.S. tax burden for the foreign insurance industry compared to other foreign industries.Another potential benefit of an earnings stripping-type regime is that it would minimally interfere with the operation of tax treaties and therefore it would be difficult or impossible to avoid such a regime by using a tax treaty. Others might argue that such rules violate the spirit, if not the letter, of tax treaties. In addition, since earnings stripping-type rules are not dependent upon tax treaties or foreign effective tax rates, the impact of an earnings stripping regime may not be circumvented by moving foreign reinsurance operations to another foreign country.Deduction disallowance183 A related approach is to disallow deductions to the insurer for premiums paid for the direct or indirect reinsurance of U.S. risks with a related foreign reinsurer. Under this approach, the entire amount of the deduction for reinsurance premiums is disallowed, while neither a safe harbor analogous to the 1.5 to 1 debt-equity ratio safe harbor of section 163(j) nor a carryforward of the disallowed deductions is permitted. However, this approach provides an exception for reinsurance premiums subject to income tax by a foreign country at an effective rate greater than 20 percent of the maximum rate of tax specified in section 11, i.e., greater than seven percent.Opponents of this approach argue that the effective tax rate test unfairly favors certain countries' reinsurers while disfavoring those in other countries,184 and that different taxpayers may calculate effective tax rates differently. They further argue that, by not providing a safe harbor, this approach operates harshly against all foreign related party reinsurance, even though there may be an important business purpose for reinsuring at least some risks in this manner. Proponents argue that such measures are necessary in order to terminate the tax planning opportunities available only to FCCs and their foreign affiliates and that it is appropriate to set a minimum effective rate of foreign tax to ensure that such reinsurance is equitably burdened with tax in some jurisdiction.Other alternativesAnother possible way to address the differential taxation of U.S. and foreign-based reinsurers might be to lower the U.S. corporate income tax rate on domestic reinsurers (or on domestic insurance in general) or to provide other incentives with similar effects. Such benefits could possibly be limited to certain lines of business. However, such actions would have very little effect on the underlying business purposes claimed by such reinsurers.Alternatively, a combination of decreasing the U.S. tax burden on domestic reinsurance (or on domestic insurance in general) and adding some restrictive rules designed to preserve the U.S. tax base might increase the likelihood of preserving the U.S. insurance and reinsurance industry and inducing the return to the U.S. of some foreign-based reinsurers that may pay little or no U.S. tax but still have a large business presence in the U.S. However, others might view this approach as an unwarranted and unfair preference of one industry or industry segment over others due to the mobility of such income, and, accordingly, not effective tax policy.U.S.-Bermuda tax treatyAnother possible option for consideration is to address Bermuda-based reinsurers, in part by terminating the U.S.-Bermuda income tax treaty pertaining to insurance and mutual assistance.185 That treaty is unique in that it provides no tax benefits for residents of the United States and therefore is a departure from the tax treaty model of reciprocal tax benefits.186 In addition, the U.S.-Bermuda tax treaty, like most U.S. tax treaties, contains anti-treaty-shopping rules intended to prevent residents of third countries from receiving benefits under the treaty. Unlike most U.S. tax treaties, however, the U.S.-Bermuda treaty's anti-treaty-shopping rules do not disqualify Bermuda companies from benefits on the basis of substantial U.S. ownership. This raises the question whether a U.S. tax treaty should provide an incentive to U.S. persons to locate their businesses outside the United States in order to obtain U.S. tax treaty benefits.187 Terminating the U.S.-Bermuda insurance tax treaty, however, might by itself have little or no effect on Bermuda reinsurers, because Bermuda reinsurance companies that do not have a permanent establishment in the United States also might not be engaged in a trade or business in the United States (or might be able to alter their activities to avoid being engaged in a U.S. trade or business).188 Moreover, Treasury Regulation section 1.1441-2(a)(7) precludes the United States from imposing withholding tax on insurance premiums paid with respect to contracts subject to the section 4371 excise tax (which includes reinsurance premiums ceded to Bermuda companies).In combination with terminating the U.S.-Bermuda insurance tax treaty, the regulation cited above could be overridden by new legislation and withholding could be imposed upon payments of reinsurance premiums to Bermuda reinsurers in lieu of imposing the section 4371 excise tax. A key economic question would be to determine an appropriate rate of withholding (between 1 and 30 percent) that would fairly tax the reinsurers' profits from insuring U.S. risks. In connection with these more significant changes, it would be desirable or necessary to consider the interaction of such withholding rules with other treaties and to equalize the treatment of Bermuda and other foreign reinsurers.189 Alternatively, different withholding rates could be applied to short-tail versus long-tail coverage. However, this could be quite complex in practice.Reinsurance excise taxAnother alternative that might be considered would be to increase the foreign reinsurance excise tax rates generally and coordinate them with the tax treaties, including possibly applying higher rates on certain long-tail coverage.190 The underlying principle for all these measures is that income from insuring U.S. risks should generally be subject to U.S. tax, regardless of a taxpayer's legal entity and contractual structure.Transfer pricingThe growth from 2001 to 2006 in the amount of premiums ceded to unaffiliated offshore reinsurers as compared with affiliated offshore reinsurers (4.7 versus 104.4 percent)191 suggests that related parties may be ceding a greater proportion of their premiums in this manner than unrelated parties. This concern is also raised in statements in the legislative history of the 2004 amendment to section 845(a).192 If true, the IRS may be able to apply section 482 in a particular case to reallocate income and deductions between such related parties on the basis of the argument that an unrelated party would not have reinsured such a large proportion of its U.S. risks. However, it might be difficult for the IRS to show that the questioned transactions are not at arm's length. Although it is possible to characterize the issue as a transfer pricing issue, applying a set of definitive rules similar to the earnings stripping rules would probably have a more systematic effect on taxpayers than relying on transfer pricing principles.Economic family doctrineAnother approach is suggested by a doctrine advanced by the government in several cases involving premium deductibility in captive insurance arrangements, the economic family doctrine. Under this doctrine, the insuring parent corporation and its domestic subsidiaries, and the wholly owned insurance subsidiary, though separate corporate entities, represent one economic family with the result that those who bear the ultimate economic burden of loss are the same persons who suffer the loss.193 Although the economic family doctrine was not adopted by courts in the absence of any legislative rule imposing it, it may nevertheless represent an analysis under which related party reinsurance premiums could be addressed by statute. In taking such an approach, consideration could be given to the percentage of ownership of affiliates, by vote, value, and in terms of practical business control, that should constitute an economic family. Other aspects of the analysis would involve a determination of the percentages of affiliated and third-party reinsurance, respectively, that would cause premiums paid to a member of the economic family not to be deductible, and whether imposition of tax in the affiliate's jurisdiction of incorporation is relevant.
B. Issues and Analysis Relating to the Unrelated Business Income Tax and Debt-Financed IncomeUse of offshore corporations to "block" unrelated business income taxAs discussed previously, the Code imposes a tax (the unrelated business income tax, or "UBIT"), at ordinary corporate rates, on an exempt organization's unrelated business taxable income ("UBTI"). An organization's UBTI includes the organization's unrelated debt-financed income.In the absence of planning, exempt organizations that invest in an investment partnership may have adverse tax consequences from the partnership's receipt (directly or through one or more partnerships) of certain items of income related to the partnership's portfolio investments. However, the IRS has concluded in a series of private letter rulings that, where UBTI-producing assets are owned by a corporation, or an entity that elects to be treated as a corporation for Federal tax purposes, and an exempt organization invests directly or indirectly in such corporation or entity, the exempt organization generally will not recognize UBTI as a result of the investment. Under such circumstances, the separate existence of the corporation or entity generally will be respected, and the exempt organization generally will be treated as receiving only passive dividend income that is excluded from the organization's UBTI. When such entities are interposed between an exempt organization investor and assets that would give rise to UBTI if owned by the exempt organization directly (or through a pass-through entity) they commonly are referred to as "UBIT blockers" or "blocker corporations." Because the assets of hedge funds and private equity funds frequently are debt-financed, exempt organizations that invest in such funds often use UBIT blockers to avoid attribution of the funds' acquisition indebtedness to the exempt organization and thereby to avoid recognition of UBTI.UBIT blockers may be established offshore in tax haven jurisdictions to avoid or minimize tax at the blocker corporation level.194 Most hedge funds and other alternative investment vehicles organize their affairs to comply with the securities trading "safe harbor" of section 864(b), so that little if any of the income is subject to U.S. net income tax in the hands of an offshore blocker corporation or any other foreign investor. An offshore blocker corporation in turn may be a PFIC for U.S. tax purposes, but income from a PFIC is not UBTI in the hands of a U.S. tax-exempt organization.195 Some argue that the use of offshore UBIT blockers creates inequities, because it allows for avoidance of UBIT by sophisticated organizations that can afford complex tax planning, whereas less sophisticated organizations that wish to invest in debt-financed or other UBTIproducing property must pay tax or not make the investment. Others argue that the ability to block UBIT by investing through blocker corporations established in tax haven jurisdictions results in the investment of capital offshore rather than domestically, and that this is undesirable. However, others argue that the use of offshore UBIT blockers does not have this result, because the underlying investment assets frequently are located in the United States.Some argue that recognition of the separate legal existence of a corporate entity, even if established offshore, is a bedrock principle of U.S. tax law and should not be modified in the UBIT context. In the context of debt-financed assets, some also argue that where an exempt organization investor is not liable for acquisition indebtedness incurred by a blocker corporation (or an entity in which the blocker corporation holds an interest), such indebtedness should not be attributed to the exempt organization and thereby give rise to UBTI.The unrelated debt-financed income rulesThe unrelated debt-financed income rules were expanded in 1969 to tax not only certain rents from debt-financed acquisitions in real property, but to tax in addition other debt-financed income such as interest, dividends, other rents, royalties, and certain gains and losses from any type of property. Some argue that, in enacting the broader debt-financed income rules in 1969, the Congress appeared to have been reacting principally to certain specific sale-leaseback arrangements involving the sale of assets by taxable persons to exempt organizations that were perceived to be abusive. They argue, for example, that the rules were an overbroad reaction to a specific problem, do not have a sound policy basis, and either should be repealed or substantially modified.196 Others, however, argue that in enacting the debt-financed income rules, the Congress believed that the rules were necessary to prevent exempt organizations from using debt to leverage tax-exempt status.197 For example, in testimony before the Senate Finance Committee in 1982, the Treasury Department, opposing a proposed exception to the unrelated debt-financed income rules, argued that the rules help prevent unintended tax benefits from taxexempt status, including the shifting of benefits of exempt status to taxable parties.198 Another argument sometimes made in opposition to the debt-financed income rules is that the rules may in certain cases treat similar transactions differently, because an exempt organization may be able to replicate the economic consequences of acquisition indebtedness through a derivative investment that would not be treated as debt under the debt-financed income rules. As a result, the rules have been described as creating "'traps for the unwary' and opportunities for the well-advised."199 The real property exception to the unrelated debt-financed income rulesThe unrelated debt-financed income rules include an exception for certain investments in real property by qualified organizations.When the real estate exception first was enacted for qualified pension trusts in 1980, the Treasury Department did not oppose its enactment. Consistent with Congress' rationale for limiting the real property exception to pension funds, the Treasury Department testified that an exception limited to pension funds could be justified, because exempting investment income was a primary reason for such funds' exemption from income tax.200 However, the Treasury Department opposed the subsequent extension of the real property exception to schools. The Treasury Department argued, for example, that providing an exception for investments by section 501(c)(3) schools would result in permanent exemption from income, whereas the exception for investments by pension funds results only in deferral of income recognition, because the income generally will be taxed to individuals upon receipt of distributions. In addition, the Treasury Department argued that there is no basis for providing an exception for schools but not for other section 501(c)(3) organizations, and likened such an exception to "piecemeal" repeal of the unrelated debt-financed income rules.201 Finally, the Treasury Department cautioned that expansion of the real property exception could lead others to seek exceptions for investments in other types of property.202 Commentators similarly have argued that there is no principled basis for providing an exception for investments in real property by section 501(c)(3) schools, while not providing such an exception for investments by other charitable organizations or for investments in other types of property.Some also argue that the mechanics of the real property exception, in particular the fractions rule, are overly complex and impose unfair burdens on qualified organizations.203 They argue, for example, that the requirement that the fractions rule be satisfied hypothetically on a prospective basis for future years of a partnership creates hardships in structuring what ordinarily would be routine real-estate investment transactions. Others, however, argue that qualified organizations today regularly structure investments that satisfy the fractions rule, and that the rule is necessary to prevent the inappropriate shifting of benefits from tax-exempt partners to taxable partners.
C. Issues and Analysis Relating to Nonqualified Deferred CompensationIn generalNonqualified deferred compensation is a common form of executive compensation. From the executive's perspective, the desire to defer taxes is generally the key motivating factor behind deferred compensation. Individuals may want to defer compensation to a future date because they believe that their rate of tax will be lower in the future than it is currently, thus resulting in payment of lower taxes than if the compensation had been received currently. To the extent that the deferral is credited with earnings, an additional advantage is the pre-tax compounding of such earnings. Individuals may defer compensation in order to provide a future income stream in retirement. ERISA's exemptions for nonqualified deferred compensation arrangements allow great flexibility in designing plans and individual arrangements.As discussed, fund managers' interests may be structured as a contractual arrangement to pay compensation based on the profits of the fund (as opposed to an ownership interest in the fund). In such cases, the compensation may be deferred. Questions have been raised as to whether deferral of the compensation for management services is appropriate in the case of an offshore structure.204 Magnitude of deferralsSome argue that nonqualified deferred compensation is merely an avoidance of current income taxation and that any amount of deferral should be prohibited. Others point to the amount of compensation that is deferred in certain cases as raising tax or social policy concerns. Much attention has been focused on the large amounts of compensation deferred offshore. While many would view this as inappropriate, it may be argued that the deferral opportunities for fund managers offshore are no different than for other individuals or entities providing services, such as key corporate executives. Nonqualified deferred compensation is a common compensation arrangement for executives in all types of industries, regardless of whether the executive's employer is a U.S. or foreign entity.As discussed above, neither the Code nor ERISA limit the amount of nonqualified deferred compensation. Because the service recipient (e.g., the employer or the investment fund) is denied a deduction for deferred compensation until the service provider (e.g., the employee or the fund manager) includes the compensation in income, in the case of a payor that is a U.S. taxpayer, there is often said to be a tension between the interests of the service provider and the service recipient that will result in an appropriate limit on deferred compensation. It is argued that this tension is not present in the case of offshore deferrals by hedge fund managers because the deferral agreement is between the fund manager and a foreign feeder corporation. The foreign feeder corporation is an entity that is not a U.S. taxpayer and the shareholders of which are either U.S. tax-exempt entities or are not U.S. taxpayers. As a result, the foreign feeder corporation and its shareholders are indifferent to the availability of a U.S. tax deduction for compensation. In contrast, deferral agreements are not typically entered into between the fund manager and the domestic feeder fund or the master investment fund. This is because U.S. taxpayers, directly or indirectly, hold interests in these entities, which typically are organized as partnerships, and these U.S. taxpayers are sensitive to the deduction timing issue.Many believe that it is inappropriate to allow deferral of income in cases in which the deferral of the payor's deduction has no consequence (e.g., in the case of an entity that pays no U.S. tax). Present law recognizes that different rules may be appropriate when the payer is not a taxable entity. For example, the Code provides more restrictive rules for deferred compensation plans of governmental and tax-exempt employers than for taxable entities.205 Some believe that allowing deferral of income is only appropriate when a corresponding deduction is also deferred. Of course, this issue is not unique to hedge funds or other investment management firms. A U.S. citizen working for a foreign employer may be permitted to defer compensation even though the foreign entity does not forego or postpone a deduction under its applicable tax laws.Some believe that the theoretical tension between the employer's interest in a current tax deduction and the employee's interest in deferring tax has little, if any, effect on the amount of compensation deferred by executives. It is pointed out that the tension in the corporate context is often more theoretical than real, because many corporations have net operating losses and do not currently pay taxes, there may be a business purpose to allow the deferral (such as the desire to provide a retention incentive), and because the employer may wish to accommodate the desire of the employee for deferral in order to attract and retain qualified executives.206 As previously discussed, the rules under section 409A provide requirements as to elections and permissible distribution events. Section 409A was enacted to address concerns relating to inappropriate access of executives to amounts deferred and does not limit the amount of compensation that can be deferred. Some believe that deferrals under an offshore hedge fund arrangement are not inappropriate as long as the deferrals satisfy the requirements of section 409A. Others believe that section 409A generally should be broadened to restrict the amount of compensation that can be deferred. They believe that a limit on the amount that can be deferred is appropriate given the relatively low limits that are imposed on amounts deferred under a qualified retirement plan. For example, rank and file employees who participate in a section 401(k) plan can defer no more than $15,500 in 2007, while executives in a nonqualified deferred compensation plan can defer an unlimited amount. Some also believe that additional restrictions on nonqualified deferred compensation are appropriate as such plans are free of most of the restrictions that apply to qualified employer plans (e.g., nondiscrimination rules).While some argue that allowing unlimited amounts of deferral through an offshore entity is inappropriate, it may be possible that the tax benefits that are achieved by deferring compensation paid by an offshore entity can also be achieved through other structures. For example, a foreign corporation could grant the fund managers options in the foreign corporation which could defer recognition of ordinary income until the options are exercised. However, if the corporation is a passive foreign investment company, the tax advantages of deferral may be negated.207 Compliance issues/reportingSome have raised the issue that there may be compliance issues under section 409A in the fund manager context, especially if there are foreign payors of nonqualified deferred compensation. On the other hand, the significant consequences of failing to comply with section 409A (current income inclusion, plus an additional 20-percent tax, plus interest) may provide sufficient incentive for compliance, at least if there is a belief that detection of noncompliance by the IRS is reasonably likely.Present law requires annual reporting of amounts deferred under a nonqualified deferred compensation plan even if amounts are not currently includible in income. The implementation of this requirement has been delayed by the Treasury Department. Final regulations issued by the Department of Treasury do not address the reporting requirements applicable to service recipients providing nonqualified deferred compensation covered by section 409A. Under Notice 2006-100, 2006-51 I.R.B. 1109, the IRS announced that an employer (or other payor) is not required for 2005 and 2006 to report amounts deferred during the year under a nonqualified deferred compensation plan subject to section 409A. Many believe that requiring reporting of amounts deferred to the IRS, even if the taxpayer takes the position that such amounts are not currently includible in income, could provide the IRS greater information regarding such arrangements. In most cases, the IRS does not have any information reported to it regarding amounts deferred, and therefore, no indication that a particular arrangement should be examined.208 This argument is present in the fund manager context as the IRS has little information as to such arrangements. Many believe that the reporting requirement under present law could provide the IRS with information necessary to better examine such arrangements and that the Treasury Department should require compliance with the statutory requirement.Offshore trustsAs previously discussed, section 409A provides for income inclusion in the case that assets restricted to deferred compensation are set aside in an offshore trust or similar arrangement. This provision was specifically intended to apply to foreign trusts and arrangements that effectively shield from the claims of general creditors any assets intended to satisfy nonqualified deferred compensation arrangements. This provision would not be triggered in the case of an offshore nonqualified deferred compensation arrangement so long as the amounts deferred are not set aside in an offshore trust or similar arrangement.Some believe that a fund manager's offshore deferred compensation should be treated as an arrangement similar to an offshore trust, even if the arrangement is not technically funded by a trust. Others believe that treatment as an offshore trust is not appropriate merely because the payor of the deferred compensation is a foreign person. Such persons argue that additional factors are necessary for offshore trust treatment, such as whether the creditors of the offshore fund are effectively shielded from access to the fund's assets in the event of default or whether the creditors of the fund are limited primarily to the fund's investors.1 This document may be cited as follows: Joint Committee on Taxation, "Present Law and Analysis Relating to Selected International Tax Issues" (JCX-85-07), September 24, 2007. This document is available on the internet at www.house.gov/jct.2 Helvering v. LeGierse, 312 U.S. 531 (1941).3 During the first years following the year of coverage, long-tail lines of business tend to have a relatively high proportion of unpaid losses, including losses that are incurred but not reported during the year, whether due to nonobservance of the event of loss, nonreporting of the claim, litigation, or other reasons.4 The property and casualty insurance industry has historically been cyclical, involving increases and declines in prices that are known as "hardening" and "softening" insurance markets. See, e.g., "Rate Hardening Forces Growth in Captive Market, Aon Says," Reactions Weekly News, Dec. 2, 2005; "Cat Bonds Benefit from Rate Hike," Reactions Magazine, Feb. 2002.5 See Peter A. Gentile, Spencer M. Gluck, Peter Senak, and Jeffrey M. Stewart, Modern ART Practice, Gerling Global Financial Products 2000; Thomas Holzheu, "Alternative Risk Transfer (ART) Products," in Reinsurance: Fundamentals and New Challenges (ed. Ruth Gastel), Insurance Information Institute (2004), 113-124; "The Picture of ART," Sigma, Swiss Reinsurance Company Economic Research and Consulting (2003).6 Two examples of the difficulties posed to the tax system by ART insurance products are finite risk insurance and captive insurance. Finite risk insurance for this purpose can be understood as a contractual arrangement whose returns predominantly reflect standard financial market terms (e.g., the time value of money), but which also embody just enough insurance underwriting risk as to be treated as insurance for at least some regulatory purposes. Captive insurance arrangements generally refer to instances in which (typically) a non-insurance company establishes an insurance subsidiary (often in Bermuda or another offshore location) to insure risks of the U.S. parent and other subsidiaries. The Internal Revenue Service has extensively litigated the tax status of various captive insurance or reinsurance vehicles (see cases at note 193, below). The IRS's original theory was that these arrangements did not constitute insurance in the tax sense, because the parent's ownership of the captive subsidiary meant that losses absorbed by the subsidiary ultimately were borne by the parent, as the owner of the insurance subsidiary's equity, and therefore no risk shifting occurred, and because there was no pooling of risks from outside of the affiliated group of companies. This analysis was described as the "economic family" theory. More recently, the IRS announced that, because no court had to that date wholly adopted the economic family theory, the Service would abandon that argument, although it would continue to challenge particular arrangements that in its view did not satisfy the risk shifting or risk distribution test.7 The amount of net premiums for this purpose is determined net of premiums ceded to a reinsurer. Under State regulation, a ceding company treats amounts due from reinsurers as assets or reductions of liability, an accounting practice known as credit for reinsurance. See Joseph Sieverling and Scott Williamson, "The U.S. Reinsurance Market," in Reinsurance: Fundamentals and New Challenges (ed. Ruth Gastel), Insurance Information Institute (2004) at 126.8 See Donald A. McIsaac and David F. Babbel, "The World Bank Primer on Reinsurance," Policy Research Working Paper 1512, The World Bank (1995).9 Sec. 832(b)(4).10 See Jon Almeras and Ryan J. Donmoyer, "Insurers Approach Congress to Fix 'Bermuda Loophole,'" 86 Tax Notes 1660, Mar. 20, 2000; Lee A. Sheppard, "News Analysis - Would Imputed Income Prevent Escape to Bermuda?," 86 Tax Notes 1663, Mar. 20, 2000.11 Susanne Sclafane, "U.S. CEO on a Mission to Tax Bermuda Competitors," National Underwriter Online News Service, Nov. 20, 2006; Susanne Sclafane, "Bermuda CEO Fights Back on Tax Issue," National Underwriter Online News Service, Nov. 21, 2006.12 Section 7874, imposing income U.S. tax on certain income and gain of expatriated entities and their foreign parents, was enacted in section 801 of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357. This provision is described in the section of this document entitled International Taxation.13 Section 845, providing authority to the Treasury Department for allocation in the case of a reinsurance agreement involving tax avoidance or evasion, was enacted in 1984 and was modified by section 803 of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357. This provision is described in the section of this document entitled Federal Income Tax Treatment of Insurance Companies.14 See below, Mark E. Ruquet, "Bermuda Reinsurers Had Record 2006 Results," National Underwriter On-Line News Service, March 23, 2007.15 Discounting rules applicable to tax reserves of property and casualty insurance companies partially take account of the time value of money (sec. 846). These rules are described in the section of this document entitled Present Law - Federal Income Taxation of Insurance Companies.16 In addition, premiums paid by property and casualty insurers for reinsurance generally are deductible (sec. 832(b)(4)(A), though there may be offsetting income items depending on the nature of the reinsurance transaction.17 Before the enactment of section 7874 in 2004, some U.S. insurers took the position that they were not precluded from expatriation transactions, and structures with foreign parent corporations in lowtax or no-tax jurisdictions were set up. Although the opportunity to set up such corporate structures has been limited by the enactment of section 7874, the pre-2004 structures are already in place and are used for these related-party reinsurance transactions. By contrast, U.S. insurers that did not engage in inversion transactions before the 2004 legislation, perhaps because they would have had a high tax cost imposed on the transaction under the section 367 toll charge on low-basis, long-held corporate assets, do not have this structure in place.18 These present-law rules are described in the section of this pamphlet entitled Present Law - Reinsurance Excise Tax. Issues raised by these arrangements are discussed in the section of this pamphlet entitled Issues and Analysis.19 A.M. Best Company, "Best's Aggregates and Averages, Property/Casualty, United States and Canada," 2007 edition, at 162.20 Id. at 409, and calculations of the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation.21 A.M. Best Company, "Best's Aggregates and Averages, Property/Casualty, United States and Canada," 1991 edition, at 82.22 A.M. Best Company, "Best's Aggregates and Averages, Property/Casualty, United States and Canada," 1991 and 2007 editions, at 82 and 162 respectively, and calculations of the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation.23 Reinsurance Association of America, "Offshore Reinsurance in the U.S. Market, 2006 Data," and calculations of the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation.24 See "Is Lloyd's Losing Out to Bermuda?," Reactions Weekly News, Aug. 1, 2002.25 See David Fox, "The Bermuda Market," in Reinsurance: Fundamentals and New Challenges (ed. Ruth Gastel), Insurance Information Institute (2004) at 137.26 Mark E. Ruquet, "Bermuda Reinsurers Had Record 2006 Results," National Underwriter On-Line News Service, March 23, 2007.27 See, e.g., id. at 140; Robert L. Carter and Leslie D. Lucas, Reinsurance Essentials, Reactions Publishing Group, 2004, at 256.28 These types of funds have differing investment strategies. These are briefly described in the Economic Data section of Present Law and Analysis Relating to Tax Treatment of Partnership Carried Interests and Related Issues, Part I (JCX-62-07), September 4, 2007. This document is available on the internet at www.house.gov/jct.29 Some offshore entities are established in foreign jurisdictions that imposed very little or no income tax on investment activities of firms domiciled there. The Cayman Islands and Bermuda are examples of such jurisdictions. See Lynnley Browning, "A Hamptons for Hedge Funds: Offshore Tax Breaks Lure Money Managers," New York Times, July 1, 2007.30 There are also other types of investors, including corporations subject to U.S. tax, and funds of funds. See the Economic Data section of Present Law and Analysis Relating to Tax Treatment of Partnership Carried Interests and Related Issues, Part I (JCX-62-07), September 4, 2007. This document is available on the internet at www.house.gov/jct.31 Investors have sought to avoid U.S. withholding tax by holding instruments that replicate the returns on stocks but that the investors have treated as notional principal contracts. The source of income from notional principal contracts is determined by the residence of the recipient of the income. A non-U.S. person's income from notional principal contracts therefore is foreign source and is not subject to U.S. withholding tax. See Treas. Reg. sec. 1.863-7(b)(1); Anita Raghavan. "Happy Returns: How Lehman Sold Plan to Sidestep Tax Man," Wall St. Journal, Sept. 17, 2007; David P. Hariton, "Equity Derivatives, Inbound Capital and Outbound Withholding Tax," 60 Tax Lawyer 313 (2007).32 A variant involves the use of parallel U.S. and foreign funds with substantially similar investments. The master-feeder structure is described in the Background section of Present Law and Analysis Relating to Tax Treatment of Partnership Carried Interests and Related Issues, Part I (JCX-62-07), September 4, 2007. This document is available on the internet at www.house.gov/jct.33 So-called blocker corporations can be used in different contexts, and for different purposes. For example, a publicly-traded partnership might use a lower-tier blocker corporation to earn income (such as fee income) of a type that would otherwise disqualify the publicly-traded partnership from its status as a partnership (rather than a corporation) for tax purposes. Similarly, an offshore hedge fund or other alternative investment fund might use an offshore upstream (or "feeder") blocker corporation as an intermediate holding company through which U.S. tax exempt institutions can invest indirectly in the underlying investment fund. In both cases, though, the affairs of the blocker corporation ordinarily are managed to minimize its U.S. taxable income. In the publicly-traded partnership case, for example, the blocker corporation might be funded by the publicly-traded partnership with debt capital, the interest on which would be sufficient to eliminate most or all of the blocker corporation's income; at the same time, the interest income, when received by the publicly-traded partnership, would be treated as qualifying income for purposes of its status as a partnership for tax purposes. In addition (or alternatively), the lower-tierblocker corporation might be the member of the publicly-traded partnership's group of affiliates that holds amortizable intangible assets generating substantial tax deductions (but not cash outlays). In the offshore hedge fund case, the blocker corporation itself typically would be a foreign corporation that is treated as not engaged in a U.S. trade or business (and therefore is not subject to U.S. net income tax), by virtue of the securities trading "safe harbor" of section 864(b). In both cases, the end result is the same: the blocker corporation serves to "cleanse" tainted income at minimal U.S. tax cost.34 In some cases, the offshore investment fund is one of two parallel investment funds, the other of which is established in the United States.35 Sec. 864(b). Special rules apply to foreign dealers. The securities trading safe harbor eliminates the need for the Internal Revenue Service to administer rules distinguishing between passive investment and active trading in this context. The securities trading safe harbor is believed to encourage foreign capital inflows to the United States, or is thought not to discourage them. The safe harbor is also thought to permit U.S. asset managers to compete with foreign asset managers in managing the investment assets of non-U.S. investors.36 The passive foreign investment company and subpart F rules are described in the section of this document entitled Present Law - International Taxation.37 Situations exist in which hedge funds are subject to ordinary income rates (e.g., if the fund makes a mark-to-market election under section 475(f)). In general, compensation income is subject to employment tax (2.9 percent for amounts over $97,500 for 2007), however, while short-term capital gain is not. See the Present Law section of Present Law and Analysis Relating to Tax Treatment of Partnership Carried Interests and Related Issues, Part I (JCX-62-07), September 4, 2007. This document is available on the internet at www.house.gov/jct.38 The proposition assumes that tax rates remain constant.39 This principle can also be understood as a special case of the well-known "Cary Brown theorem," which holds that, assuming constant tax rates, permitting an immediate deduction for the cost of a marginal asset that ordinarily would be purchased with after-tax dollars is equivalent to exempting the yield from the asset from tax. Cary Brown, "Business-Income Taxation and Investment Incentives," in Income, Employment and Public Policy: Essays in Honor of Alvin H. Hansen 300 (1948). In the income deferral case, the analog of the purchase price of an asset is the taxpayer's after-tax income, because in the base case assets are purchased with after-tax dollars. The value of income deferral then becomes the tax exemption of the yield from that after-tax income amount for the life of the deferral.40 Halperin, "Interest in Disguise: Taxing the 'Time Value of Money'" 95 Yale Law J. 506 (1986). For this reason, a corporation may prefer to provide a rate of return on nonqualified deferred compensation that is equal to the increase in the value of its stock for the deferral period.41 Id.42 The portion is referred to in the statute as the "policyholders' share" of tax-exempt interest; this term originates with the notion that a share of the assets of the company can be considered as belonging to the policyholders. The policyholders' share is the excess of 100 percent over the portion determined as the "company's share" under section 812. In general, the company's share is that percentage that reflects the investment income of the company for the taxable year, reduced by policyholder dividends, policy interest credited to policyholders, and a portion of investment expenses.43 A property and casualty insurance company is eligible to be exempt from Federal income tax if (1) its gross receipts for the taxable year do not exceed $600,000, and (2) the premiums received for the taxable year are greater than 50 percent of its gross receipts (sec. 501(c)(15)). This rule also applies in the case of certain mutual companies with gross receipts not exceeding $150,000 for the taxable year and meeting other requirements. A company that does not meet the definition of an insurance company (sec. 816(a)) is not eligible to be exempt from Federal income tax under this rule. A company whose investment activities outweigh its insurance activities is not considered to be an insurance company for this purpose. Present law further provides that a property and casualty insurance company may elect to be taxed only on taxable investment income if its net written premiums or direct written premiums (whichever is greater) do not exceed $1.2 million) (sec. 831(b)). For purposes of determining any of these amounts, amounts received by all members of a controlled group of corporations of which the company is a part are taken into account.44 Conference Report to H.R. 4170, The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, H. Rep. No. 98-861 (June 23, 1984), 1060.45 Id. at 1062.46 Id. at 1063-4. In Trans City Life Insurance Company v. Comm'r, 106 T.C. 274 (1996), nonacq., 1997-2 C.B. 1, Nov. 3, 1997, the Tax Court held that two reinsurance agreements did not have significant tax avoidance effects, based on the application of these factors.47 Section 803 of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357.48 See Joint Committee on Taxation, General Explanation of Tax Legislation Enacted in the 108th Congress, JCS-5-05, May 2005, 351.49 U.S. tax treaties that provide a waiver or exemption of the insurance excise tax generally include an anti-conduit rule to prevent third-country residents from taking advantage of the treaty exemption. See the section of this document entitled Present Law - International Taxation - exemption from the insurance premiums excise tax.50 Section 7874 was enacted in section 801 of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357.51 Sec. 1297. There are certain exceptions to "passive income," including any income derived in the active conduct of an insurance business by a corporation this is predominantly engaged in an insurance business and that would be subject to tax under subchapter L if it were a domestic corporation. Sec. 1297(b)(2)(B). Section 1297(c) provides a look-through rule to be used in determining whether a foreign coporation is a passive foreign investment company, if that corporation owns at least 25 percent by value of the stock of another corporation. When the look-through rule applies, the first corporation is treated as owning directly its proportionate share of the assets of the other corporation and as receiving directly its share of the income of the other corporation. Consequently, in such a case, ownership of 25 percent or more of an active business entity can cause a foreign corporation not to be treated as a passive foreign investment company.52 Secs. 1293-1295.53 Sec. 1291. This interest charge is imposed when a shareholder receives an excess distribution, which in general is a distribution in excess of 125 percent of the average amount received during the three preceding taxable years.54 Sec. 1296.55 Secs. 871(b), 882.56 Secs. 871(b)(2), 882(a)(2).57 Secs. 875.58 Sec. 864(b).59 Sec. 864(b)(1).60 Sec. 864(b)(2).61 Sec. 864(c)(2).62 Sec. 864(c)(3).63 Secs. 864(c)(4), 906.64 Sec. 864(c)(4)(B).65 Sec. 864(c)(4)(A).66 Sec. 864(c)(5)(A).67 Sec. 864(c)(5)(B).68 Sec. 861(a)(1), (2).69 Sec. 861(c).70 Sec. 861(a)(4).71 Sec. 865(a).72 Sec. 861(a)(7).73 Sec. 842.74 Sec. 864(c)(4)(C).75 Secs. 871(a), 881.76 Treas. Reg. sec. 1.1441-2(a)(7).77 Secs. 1441, 1442.78 Sec. 871(a)(2).79 Secs. 871(a)(1)(D), 881(a)(4).80 Secs. 897, 1445, 6039C, 6652(f).81 Secs. 871(d), 882(d).82 Secs. 871(i)(2)(A), 881(d).83 Sec. 871(g)(1)(B)(i).84 Secs. 871(h), 881(c).85 Sec. 871(h).86 Sec. 881(c)(3).87 Sec. 871(h)(4).88 For example, it appears that the U.S.-Barbados income tax treaty was often used to facilitate earnings stripping arrangements. That treaty was amended in 2004 to make it less amenable to such use. It is possible, however, that other treaties in the U.S. network might be used for similar purposes. For a discussion of this issue, see Joint Committee on Taxation, Explanation of Proposed Protocol to the Income Tax Treaty Between the United States and Barbados (JCX-55-04), September 16, 2004, at 12-20, 22.89 Sec. 163(j).90 Pub. L. No. 109-222, sec. 501 (2006).91 Sec. 884.92 The U.S.-Bermuda treaty also includes a mutual assistance provision.93 The U.S. tax treaty with Bermuda uses a definition of permanent establishment consistent with the description that follows.94 Pub. L. No. 100-647.95 Secs. 512(a)(1), 511(a)(1).96 Organizations subject to the unrelated business income tax include all organizations described in section 501(c) (except for U.S. instrumentalities and certain charitable trusts), qualified pension, profitsharing, and stock bonus plans described in section 401(a), and certain State colleges and universities. Sec. 511(a)(2).97 Sec. 513(a).98 Sec. 512(b)(1)-(3), (5).99 Sec. 512(b)(4).100 Sec. 512(b)(13).101 Sec. 512(c).102 Sec. 514(c)(1).103 Sec. 514(c).104 This Code section generally describes an educational organization that operates as a school (i.e., "an educational organization which normally maintains a regular faculty and curriculum and normally has a regularly enrolled body of pupils or students in attendance at the place where its educational activities are regularly carried on").105 Sec. 514(c)(9)(C) & (F).106 Sec. 514(c)(9)(C).107 Sec. 514(c)(9)(B)(i)-(v).108 Sec. 514(c)(9)(B)(vi) & (E).109 Sec. 514(c)(9)(B)(E)(i).110 Sec. 514(c)(9)(B)(E)(i)(I).111 Treas. Reg. sec. 1.514(c)-2(b)(2)(i).112 96 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1938) (holding that a bathing beach business that turned its profits over to a charitable organization was exempt).113 190 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1951) (upholding the exempt status of a corporation that acquired the C.F. Mueller pasta company, on the ground that the pasta company's profits were destined for the New York University School of Law's exempt programs).114 H.R. Rep. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 38-39 (1950); S. Rep. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 31-32 (1950).115 Revenue Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-814, sec. 301. In 1951, Congress extended the unrelated business income tax to the income of State colleges and universities. Sec. 511(a)(2)(B).116 H.R. Rep. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1950); S. Rep. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1950). The Supreme Court has stated that the "undisputed purpose" of the unrelated business income tax is "to prevent tax-exempt organizations from competing unfairly with businesses whose earnings were taxed." United States v. American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 114 (1986); United States v. American College of Physicians, 475 U.S. 834, 838 (1986) ("Congress perceived a need to restrain the unfair competition fostered by the tax laws.").117 H.R. Rep. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1950); S. Rep. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1950).118 S. Rep. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 30-31 (1950).119 H.R. Rep. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1950); S. Rep. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1950).120 There was an exception for rental income from a lease of five years or less.121 H.R. Rep. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 38-39 (1950); S. Rep. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 31-32 (1950).122 The tax also applies to certain State colleges and universities and their wholly owned subsidiaries. Sec. 511(a)(2)(B).123 Joint Committee on Taxation, General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 (JCS-16- 70), December 3, 1970, at 62.124 Commissioner v. Clay B. Brown, 380 U.S. 563 (1965).125 Joint Committee on Taxation, General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 (JCS-16- 70), December 3, 1970, at 62.126 S. Rep. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 62-63; H.R. Rep. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 44-46; Joint Committee on Taxation, General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 (JCS-16-70), December 3, 1970, at 62.127 Compare sec. 514(c)(9)(B)(i)-(v).128 S. Rep. No. 96-1036, 96st Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1980).129 Joint Committee on Taxation, General Explanation of the Revenue Provisions of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (JCS-41-84), December 31, 1984, at 1151.130 Id. In the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Congress provided exempt status for certain title holding companies (section 501(c)(25)) and at the same time extended the real property exception to such companies.131 Sec. 514(c)(9)(B)(vi) & (E).132 Sec. 514(c)(9)(G)(i).133 Sec. 514(c)(9)(G)(ii).134 Sec. 514(c)(9)(H).135 For purposes of the nondiscrimination requirements, an employee is treated as highly compensated if the employee (1) was a five-percent owner of the employer at any time during the year or the preceding year, or (2) either (a) had compensation for the preceding year in excess of $100,000 (for 2007) or (b) at the election of the employer had compensation for the preceding year in excess of $100,000 (for 2007) and was in the top 20 percent of employees by compensation for such year (sec. 414(q)). A nonhighly compensated employee is an employee other than a highly compensated employee.136 Secs. 401(a)(4), 403(b)(12), 404(a)(2), and 408(k)(3). A qualified retirement plan of a governmental employer is not subject to the nondiscrimination requirements. Special rules apply in the case of a SIMPLE plan to ensure that a broad group of employees are covered by the plan. Sec. 408(p)(2) and (4).137 See Treas. Reg. sec. 1.401(a)(4)-1.138 Sec. 457(f).139 As discussed later in this section, a participant in a nonqualified deferred compensation plan that is "funded" (such as a plan that is funded by a trust that is established for the exclusive purpose of providing plan benefits) must include vested benefits in gross income. Thus, there is no income deferral with respect to vested benefits in a funded nonqualified deferred compensation arrangement.140 Pub. L. No. 108-357 (2004).141 Section 409A generally applies to amounts deferred after December 31, 2004.142 In contrast, if the taxpayer uses an accrual method of accounting, compensation is includible in gross income when all events have occurred which fix the right to receive such compensation and the amount thereof can be determined with reasonable accuracy. Treas. Reg. secs. 1.451-1 and 1.451-2.143 Compensation that is constructively received is includible in income regardless of whether the requirements of section 409A are met.144 Special rules apply under the Code in the case of nonexempt employee trusts and nonqualified employee annuities (i.e., trusts and annuities not meeting the requirements applicable to qualified retirement plans and annuities). Secs. 402(b) and 403(c). These provisions apply rules similar to those under section 83. Although these Code provisions predate the enactment of section 83 in 1969, they were amended at that time to reflect the enactment of section 83.145 Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U.S. 177 (1945); E.T. Sproull v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 244 (1951), aff'd per curiam, 194 F.2d 541 (1952).146 In the case of nonqualified deferred compensation arrangements, these doctrines have largely been codified in the Code provisions discussed herein. However, because many of the legal precedents related to nonqualified deferred compensation predate these Code provisions, the economic benefit and cash equivalency doctrines are sometimes considered in analyzing the tax treatment of nonqualified deferred compensation.147 See, e.g., Cowden v. Commissioner, 289 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1961).148 A plan includes an agreement or arrangement, including an agreement or arrangement that includes one person. Amounts deferred also include actual or notional earnings.149 As under section 83, the rights of a person to compensation are subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture if the person's rights to such compensation are conditioned upon the performance of substantial services by any individual.150 Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.409A-1(f)(1).151 Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.409A-1(f)(2).152 Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.409A-1(f)(2)(iv).153 A qualified employer plan means a qualified retirement plan, tax-deferred annuity, simplified employee pension, and SIMPLE. A qualified governmental excess benefit arrangement (sec. 415(m)) is a qualified employer plan. An eligible deferred compensation plan (sec. 457(b)) is also a qualified employer plan. A tax-exempt or governmental deferred compensation plan that is not an eligible deferred compensation plan is not a qualified employer plan.154 Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.409A-1(b)(6).155 Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.409A-1(b)(4).156 Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.409A-1(b)(5).157 Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.409A-1(a)(3).158 Key employees are defined in section 416(i) and generally include officers (limited to 50 employees) having annual compensation greater than $145,000 (in 2007), five percent owners, and one percent owners having annual compensation from the employer greater than $150,000.159 Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.409A-3(i)(6).160 Secs. 404(a)(5), (b) and (d) and sec. 83(h).161 In the case of a publicly held corporation, no deduction is allowed for a taxable year for remuneration with respect to a covered employee to the extent that the remuneration exceeds $1 million. Code sec. 162(m). The Code defines the term "covered employee" in part by reference to Federal securities law. In light of changes to Federal securities law, the Internal Revenue Service interprets the term covered employee as the principal executive officer of the taxpayer as of the close of the taxable year or the 3 most highly compensated employees of the taxpayer for the taxable year whose compensation must be disclosed to the taxpayer's shareholders (other than the principal executive officer or the principal financial officer). Notice 2007-49, 2007-25 I.R.B. 1429. For purposes of the deduction limit, remuneration generally includes all remuneration for which a deduction is otherwise allowable, although commission-based compensation and certain performance-based compensation are not subject to the limit. Remuneration does not include compensation for which a deduction is allowable after a covered employee ceases to be a covered employee. Thus, the deduction limitation often does not apply to deferred compensation that is otherwise subject to the deduction limitation (e.g., is not performancebased compensation) because the payment of the compensation is deferred until after termination of employment.162 The required income tax withholding is accomplished by withholding income taxes from other wages paid to the employee in the same year.163 Because nonqualified deferred compensation arrangements generally cover only highly paid employees, the other compensation paid to the employee during the year generally exceeds the social security wage base. In that case, nonqualified deferred compensation amounts are subject only to Medicare tax.164 Sec. 6051(a)(13).165 Notice 2006-100, 2006-51 I.R.B. 1109.166 As discussed above, exceptions apply in the case of certain foreign plans.167 Sec. 4371. The U.S.-Switzerland, U.S.-United Kingdom, and U.S.-Germany tax treaties, but neither the U.S.-Bermuda nor U.S.-Barbados tax treaty, generally provide an exemption from the excise tax for reinsurance premiums paid to residents of Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and Germany, respectively. See the Present Law section on International Taxation.168 In the case of Bermuda, for example, the reinsurance premium is not taxed by Bermuda.169 In the case of Bermuda, for example, the investment income is not taxed by Bermuda.170 The cumulative benefits of such low-taxed or nontaxed investment may be greater in the case of longer-term investments, such as the investment of premiums from long-tail lines.171 In general, income from related-party reinsurance and reinsurance of U.S. risks are not exempt from subpart F. Secs. 953(e) and 954(i). See discussion of these rules in the Present Law section.172 Sec. 163(j). Those rules are discussed in the Present Law section. The President's budget for the past several years has included a proposal to further restrict certain related-party interest deductions. See Joint Committee on Taxation, Description of Revenue Provisions Contained in the President's Fiscal Year 2008 Budget Proposal (JCS-2-07), March 21, 2007, at 209.173 H.R. Rep. No. 101-247, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1249 (1989). See also Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Conference Report, H.R. Rep. No. 101-386, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 568 ("The conferees believe that the conference agreement does not violate treaties.")174 See Joint Committee on Taxation, Description of Revenue Provisions Contained in the President's Fiscal Year 2008 Budget Proposal (JCS-2-07), March 21, 2007, at 210.175 H.R. Rep. No. 101-247, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1241, 1242 (1989).176 Such rules could also be applied to related party guarantee or conduit arrangements that are similar in effect to back-to-back loans.177 See discussion of withholding taxes in the Present Law section on International Taxation.178 Sec. 163(j)(6)(A). Adjusted taxable income is the taxpayer's taxable income computed without regard to any deductions for net interest expense, net operating losses, income attributable to domestic production activities, depreciation, amortization, depletion, and adjustments provided in regulations.179 Sec. 163(j)(1)(B) and (2)(B)(ii)-(iii). Excess limitation is the excess of 50 percent of adjusted taxable income over the amount of net interest expense (which is interest expense less interest income).180 Sec. 163(j)(2)(A)(ii).181 H. R. Rep. No. 101-386, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 567 (1989).182 Secs. 953 and 954(i). These Code sections are described in the Present Law section of this document.183 This approach is similar to H.R. 1755 (107th Congress), described in the section of this document entitled Legislative Proposals in Recent Congresses.184 Reportedly, the effective tax rate test results in an exemption for Swiss reinsurers; clearly it does not exempt Bermuda reinsurers.185 The treaty is actually between the United States and the United Kingdom and is titled Convention between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (on behalf of the Government of Bermuda) relating to the Taxation of Insurance Enterprises and Mutual Assistance in Tax Matters.186 See Joint Committee on Taxation, Prepared Statement of H. Patrick Oglesby, Foreign Tax Counsel, Alan L. Fischl, Legislation Attorney, and Stephen M. Parks, Accountant, Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation Hearing on Proposed Tax Treaty With Bermuda Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, September 25, 1986 (JCX-26-86), September 24, 1986 ("JCT 1986 Statement"). While Article 5 of that treaty provides in summary form for mutual assistance in tax matters and Article 6 for confidentiality relating to such matters, and an exchange of notes provided substantial details in these areas, in 1988 the United States and Bermuda entered into a more complete agreement for the exchange of tax information, titled Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (on behalf of the Government of Bermuda) for the Exchange of Information with Respect to Taxes. These two treaties with the United States are the only tax treaties that Bermuda currently has in force. Of course, before taking any action with respect to the U.S.-Bermuda tax treaty, it would be important to determine what that treaty provides in the area of mutual assistance now that the exchange of information agreement is in effect.187 JCT 1986 Statement at 4. The U.S.-Barbados tax treaty, which the JCT 1986 Statement compared with the U.S.-Bermuda tax treaty, was amended by a protocol in 2004. See JCT 1986 Statement at 5; discussion of U.S.-Barbados tax treaty in the Present Law section on International Taxation.188 Even if terminating the U.S.-Bermuda tax treaty would have little practical effect, its termination might be viewed as an indication of U.S. tax treaty policy.189 It would also be important to address the effects of any such changes on U.S. trade agreements.190 As in the case of withholding taxes, it would be important to address the effects of any such changes on U.S. trade agreements.191 See discussion in the Background section of this document.192 See discussion in the Present law section of this document.193 Rev. Rul. 77-316, 1977-2 C.B. 53, obsoleted by Rev. Rul. 2001-31, 2001-1 C.B. 1348. The Internal Revenue Service announced in Rev. Rul. 2001-31 that it would not raise the economic family theory in determining whether payments between related parties are deductible insurance premiums. The deductibility of premiums paid by an insurer for reinsurance of 90 percent of its business with a Bermuda affiliate was successfully challenged by the IRS in Carnation Co. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 400 (1978), aff'd, 640 F. 2d 1010 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981). However, in a number of subsequent cases involving related party insurance or reinsurance in parent-subsidiary or brother-sister corporate structures, courts did not adopt the economic family theory. See Clougherty Packing Co. v. Commisioner, 84 T.C. 948 (1985), aff'd, 811 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir 1986); Humana Inc. v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 197 (1987), aff'd, rev'd, and rem'd, 881 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1989); Malone & Hyde v. Commissioner, T.C.M. 1989-604, T.C.M. 1993-585, rev'd, 62 F.3d 835 (6th Cir. 1995); Hospital Corp. of America v. Commissioner, T.C.M. 1997-482 (1997); Kidde Industries, Inc. v. U.S., 40 Fed. Cl. 42 (1997), dismissed, 194 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 1999).194 There may be methods by which an exempt organization can "block" UBIT without investing through an offshore corporation and without incurring an entity-level tax, such as by making certain investments in REITs.195 If a blocker corporation were subject to U.S. corporate tax on income that would be UBTI if derived directly by a tax-exempt organization, the use of the blocker corporation may not reduce the total U.S. tax liability attributable to an investment. In that case, avoidance of the administrative burdens of complying with the UBTI rules and similar concerns, rather than reduction of total tax liability, may be a principal reason for use of a blocker corporation. See Robert D. Blashek & Scot A. McLean, Investments in 'Pass-Through' Portfolio Companies by Private Equity Partnerships: Tax Strategies and Structuring, 704 Practicing Law Institute/Tax 689 (June 2006), p. 789.196 See, e.g., Suzanne Ross McDowell, Taxation of Unrelated Debt-Financed Income, The Exempt Organization Tax Review (Vol. 34, No. 2), November 2001, at 210.197 H.R. Rep. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 38-39 (1950); S. Rep. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 31-32 (1950).198 Statement of William McKee, Tax Legislative Counsel, Department of the Treasury, 1981-92 Miscellaneous Tax Bills, XVI: Hearing on S. 2498 before the Subcommittee on Taxation and Debt Management of the Senate Finance Committee, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1982).199 McDowell, supra, at 212 (arguing that well-advised organizations oftentimes can structure leveraged investments that are not treated as debt-financed under the unrelated debt-financed income rules, but which have similar economic consequences to investments that, if made, would be treated as debt-financed).200 Statement of Daniel I. Halperin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, Five Miscellaneous Tax Bills: Hearings on S. 650 before the Subcommittee on Taxation and Debt Management of the Senate Finance Committee, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 298 (1980).201 Statement of William McKee, Tax Legislative Counsel, Department of the Treasury, 1981-92 Miscellaneous Tax Bills, XVI: Hearing on S. 2498 before the Subcommittee on Taxation and Debt Management of the Senate Finance Committee, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 54-55 (1982).202 Statement of Robert G. Woodward, Acting Tax Legislative Counsel, Department of the Treasury, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Taxation and Debt Management of the Senate Finance Committee, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 88-89 (1983).203 See William H. Weigel, Unrelated Debt-Financed Income: A Retrospective (and a Modest Proposal), 50 Tax Lawyer 3 (1996-1997), at 632-635; see generally Arthur A. Feder & Joel Scharfstein, Leveraged Investment in Real Property through Partnerships by Tax Exempt Organizations after the Revenue Act of 1987 - A Lesson in How the Legislative Process Should Not Work, 42 Tax Lawyer 55 (Fall 1988).204 See Jenny Anderson, "Managers Use Hedge Funds as Big I.R.A.'s," New York Times, April 17, 2007. See also section 536 of H.R. 1591 (An act making emergency supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2007, and for other purposes), as passed by the Senate, which contains a provision that would generally impose a $1 million annual limit on nonqualified deferred compensation.205 Sec. 457(f).206 Additionally, in the case of a publicly traded corporation, the section 162(m) limit on the deductibility of remuneration paid to a covered employee provides an incentive for the corporation and covered employee to structure compensation in excess of the limit as deferred compensation since such compensation is not subject to the deduction limit.207 Proposed Treasury regulations under section 1291 provide that (1) an option to acquire stock in a passive foreign investment company is treated as stock for purposes of applying the excess distribution rules to the disposition of the option and (2) the holding period of a share of passive foreign investment company stock acquired by the exercise of an option includes the period the option was held. Section 1291(a)(2) provides that gain recognized on the sale of stock of a passive foreign investment company is treated as an excess distribution. Accordingly, under the tax-plus-interest rules of section 1291 and the accompanying proposed regulations, the sale of an option or the exercise of an option followed by the immediate sale of the underlying stock generally would trigger an interest charge computed based on the taxpayer's option and stock holding period.208 Securities and Exchange Commission regulations require disclosure in public filings of certain information related to nonqualified deferred compensation. See e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(i).

Labels:

Tax Attorney IRC 6320, IRC 6323 - proper mailing of notice of tax lien

R.M. Downing, T.C. Memo. 2007-291, September 25, 2007,

RICHARD M. DOWNING, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.UNITED STATES TAX COURT. Docket No. 6452-05L. Filed September 24, 2007.

MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION

THORNTON, Judge: Pursuant to sections 6320(c) and 6330(d), petitioner seeks review of respondent's determination sustaining the filing of a Federal tax lien with respect to petitioner's 1995 and 1999 income tax.1

FINDINGS OF FACT

The parties have stipulated some facts, which we incorporate herein by this reference. When he petitioned the Court, petitioner resided in Kansas.Petitioner's 1995 Tax ReportingOn August 5, 1995, petitioner wed Astrid Downing in what was to prove a short-lived marriage (they divorced in 1997). About 10 days after the wedding, he and Astrid Downing moved to Singapore, where he was employed as senior vice president for a U.S. company, Seagate Technology, Inc.Petitioner's and Astrid Downing's 1995 Federal income tax reporting, and the IRS's handling of their accounts, is shrouded in mystery, confusion, and error. Although Astrid Downing filed her 1995 return (prepared by H&R Block) on time, for reasons not disclosed by the record she erroneously listed her filing status as "Single", provided a California address (even though petitioner claims she then resided in Singapore with him), and used the name "Astrid M Stevenson", notwithstanding that her name (according to petitioner's testimony) was Astrid Downing. On her 1995 return, Astrid Downing claimed a $1,940 overpayment. On May 6, 1996, respondent refunded this amount to her.On June 26, 1996, respondent received petitioner's application for an extension of time to file his 1995 income tax return. Petitioner sought, and respondent granted, an extension until January 30, 1997, on the ground that his tax home was in a foreign country and he expected to qualify for special tax treatment. Although petitioner represented on the application, under penalties of perjury, that he was including a $39,500 income tax payment, he actually included only $25,000 (the $25,000 payment).Respondent initially posted the $25,000 payment to petitioner's 1995 individual account. According to respondent's records, however, petitioner still had not filed his 1995 return as of September 29, 1997, when petitioner and Astrid Downing filed their 1996 joint return, which reflected an underpayment. Respondent transferred the $25,000 payment to petitioner's and Astrid Downing's 1996 joint account, used a portion of it to cover the 1996 underpayment, and refunded the $21,612 balance to petitioner and Astrid Downing, who both endorsed the refund check.In the meantime, petitioner's accountants, Ernst & Young L.L.P. (Ernst & Young), had prepared for petitioner various versions of his 1995 tax return. One version was a married filing separate return, which showed total tax of $77,017 for petitioner individually, with $13,635 owed after giving effect to prior payments, including the $25,000 payment. Ernst & Young also prepared a joint return for petitioner and Astrid Downing (the 1995 joint return), which showed total joint tax of $75,647 for petitioner and Astrid Downing, with $6,087 owed after giving effect to prior payments, including the $25,000 payment. At some point, Ernst & Young also prepared a Form 1040X, Amended U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, purporting to amend the "Single" return that Astrid Downing had filed for 1995 and to claim filing status of married filing joint return for Astrid Downing and petitioner. The amounts of income, deductions, credits, taxes, and payments shown on the Form 1040X are substantially identical to those shown on the 1995 joint return previously described. On line 16, the Form 1040X shows $8,728 as the "Amount of tax paid with original return plus additional tax paid after it was filed". Petitioner contends that he and Astrid Downing executed this Form 1040X and filed it sometime in October 1996. Respondent's records contain no indication that any 1995 joint return for petitioner and Astrid Downing was ever filed or processed. The record in this case includes no copy of any 1995 joint return that is signed by Astrid Downing.On October 30, 1996, respondent received payment of $8,728, which appears to be made up of the $6,087 tax liability shown on the 1995 joint return plus $701 of interest and $1,940 in repayment of Astrid Downing's May 6, 1996, refund of this same amount. The payment was accompanied by a payment voucher indicating that the payment was for Astrid Downing's and petitioner's 1995 joint account. The payment voucher lists Astrid Downing as the primary taxpayer and petitioner as spouse. Respondent's transcript indicates that the $8,728 payment was posted to Astrid Downing's 1995 account as a "PAYMENT WITH RETURN".2001 Correspondence About 1995 ReturnsBy notice dated March 12, 2001, and addressed to petitioner, respondent indicated that petitioner had not filed his 1995 return and requested petitioner to provide information. Petitioner responded by letter dated April 11, 2001, stating that he had been living and working in Singapore in 1995 and that Ernst & Young "was responsible for my tax returns." He stated that "my 1995 return" had been "done and submitted by" Ernst & Young and that an amended return had also been filed. The letter stated that petitioner was enclosing both returns. Included with the letter were: (1) An unsigned copy of the previously described 1995 married filing separate return for petitioner; and (2) a copy of the previously described 1995 joint amended return for petitioner and Astrid Downing, unsigned except for the signature of petitioner's tax return preparer, dated October 15, 1996.2 In this correspondence, petitioner listed an address in New Hampshire.In response, respondent sent a letter dated October 22, 2001, to petitioner's New Hampshire address. The letter was addressed to petitioner and a former spouse, Ruby L. Downing, but the heading and caption of the letter referenced only petitioner's individual Social Security number. In the letter, respondent advised that the IRS had received "your" 1995 Federal income tax return but that it was not signed. The letter requested that an enclosed declaration be signed and returned to respondent within 20 days so the 1995 return could be processed.In a letter to the IRS, dated November 15, 2001, petitioner responded from the New Hampshire address that he was not signing the declaration because he and Ruby L. Downing were not married in 1995 and did not file a return in 1995. He stated that he had previously supplied respondent a copy of "my 1995 return".Summary Assessment of Petitioner's 1995 Income TaxIn the meantime, having received no response from petitioner within the 20-day deadline stated in respondent's October 22, 2001, letter, respondent had summarily assessed against petitioner the $77,017 tax reported on the copy of petitioner's1995 married filing separate return included with his April 11, 2001, letter, plus interest and penalties. By notice dated November 12, 2001, respondent advised petitioner that, for his 1995 tax year, he had a balance due of $84,254, after giving credit for previous payments (except for the $25,000 payment, which, as previously described, had been applied partly to petitioner's and Astrid Downing's 1996 joint tax underpayment, with the balance having been refunded to petitioner and Astrid Downing).3 Petitioner's 1999 Tax ReturnOn September 3, 2002, the IRS received petitioner's delinquent 1999 Federal income tax return, showing his address as being in Idaho (the Idaho address). Petitioner's 1999 return showed that he owed $16,508, but no payment was remitted. The IRS assessed the tax shown on the return, plus interest and penalties, and by notice dated November 11, 2002, advised petitioner that he owed $27,318 on his 1999 account.First Power of AttorneyOn November 4, 2002, respondent received from petitioner Form 2848, Power of Attorney and Declaration of Representative, authorizing accountants L. Troy Clayton and Terry L. Roe to represent petitioner with respect to his 1995 through 2002 Federal income tax. The Form 2848 lists the New Hampshire address for petitioner and the Idaho address for these accountants. Pursuant to the terms of the Form 2848, original notices and other written communications were to be sent to petitioner and copies to Mr. Clayton.Notice of Intent To Levy and Notice of LevyOn April 22, 2003, respondent sent to petitioner, by certified mail to the Idaho address, a final notice of intent to levy and notice of right to a hearing for taxable years 1995 and 1999. Petitioner did not receive this notice during 2003. Neither he nor his accountants responded to this notice.On or about February 20, 2004, respondent mailed a notice of levy for 1995 and 1999 to Charles Schwab & Co. and received in response $161, which was applied to petitioner's 1995 liability.Notice of Federal Tax Lien FilingOn March 4, 2004, respondent sent to petitioner, by certified mail to the Idaho address, a notice of Federal tax lien filing and right to a hearing for taxable years 1995 and 1999.Petitioner's Request for Hearing and Second Power of AttorneyBy letter dated March 17, 2004, petitioner responded to the March 4, 2004, notice of Federal tax lien filing and right to a hearing, requesting a hearing. The letter states: "The taxpayer also received an earlier Notice of Levy against funds on deposit with Charles Schwab." The letter is signed by Certified Public Accountant Stuart Douthett, with an address in Kansas. Enclosed with the letter was a Form 2848, authorizing Stuart Douthett and Harold Wolgast to represent petitioner.Respondent treated this letter as a request for an equivalent hearing with respect to the notice of levy and as a timely appeal from the notice of tax lien.Appeals Office HearingOn July 9, 2004, petitioner's case was received in respondent's Appeals Office in Wichita, Kansas. The case was initially assigned to Appeals Officer Dee Dugan.By letter dated July 14, 2004, and sent to the attention of Appeals Officer Dugan, Mr. Douthett stated that in August 1996 petitioner had filed a separate 1995 return and that in October 1996 "an amended return was filed (technically amending the return of Astrid M. Downing) to file a joint return." Consequently, the letter asserted, "it appears that the statute of limitations should have expired prior to the first notification received by the taxpayer in 2001." In addition, the letter asserted that petitioner had not been given proper credit for the $25,000 payment that he had included with his request for a filing extension with respect to his 1995 return.Appeals Officer Dugan began investigating this matter but retired before making any final determination. In an undated file memorandum addressed to "Greg", Appeals Officer Dugan stated that she was "trying to get rid of a really messy CDP [collection due process case] as I don't want anybody else to have to spend time unraveling the mystery." In this file memorandum, Appeals Officer Dugan recounted petitioner's explanation that in August 1996 he had filed a 1995 married filing separate return that showed a balance due, but that in October 1996, petitioner and Astrid Downing had filed an amended return converting their prior 1995 returns to joint filing status and had paid the $8,728 balance shown on this amended joint return. Appeals Officer Dugan's file memo stated: "I happen to believe the taxpayer." The file memo concluded: "If I post the amended return along with the payments the taxpayer made, there is no balance due on 1995".In a letter dated November 23, 2004, and addressed to petitioner's representative Harold Wolgast, Appeals Officer Dugan reiterated her belief that petitioner and Astrid Downing had filed a joint amended 1995 return. She stated: "I do not know what the reason is for the return not being processed, but I will request that it be input as of 10/30/1996."On December 9, 2004, petitioner's case was transferred to Appeals Officer Troy Talbott, who continued to investigate petitioner's case and to communicate in writing and by telephone with petitioner's representative and with petitioner. According to the Appeals Office case activity records, at various times Appeals Officer Talbott requested petitioner to provide additional information, including a statement from Astrid Downing that she had intended to file a 1995 joint return with petitioner. Insofar as the record reveals, petitioner never provided such a statement.Ultimately, Appeals Officer Talbott determined that no joint return had been filed. According to his case activity records, however, Appeals Officer Talbott offered "to abate the 1995 FTF [failure to file] penalty, apply the $8,728 from excess collections and assume that a [married filing separate] return was filed as of 10/30/96." Petitioner rejected this offer.4 Nevertheless, the final notice of determination, dated March 8, 2005, adopted this approach, while sustaining the notice of tax lien.5 An attachment to the notice of determination, "Attachment --Letter 3193, Notice of Determination", states in pertinent part:
The administrative file includes a Form 1040 for 1995, which was not signed by either the taxpayer or the preparer, showing a tax liability of $77,017, claiming* * * a credit of $25,000 that was paid with Form 4868 * * *. The IRS stamped the page one of the Form 1040 as being received on May 17, 2001, and processed the return without a signature. The Form 1040 shows that the taxpayer was filing as married filing separate, and that his spouse was Astrid Downing. * * *

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The administrative file includes an amended tax return which was signed by the taxpayer and the preparer on October 25, 1996. The amended tax return shows that the taxpayer is electing to file a joint income tax return with Astrid Downing, however it was not processed by the IRS.

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All legal and procedural requirements are concluded to have been met in this case.

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The transcripts show that the taxpayer was given credit for $25,000 on the 1996 tax module, and that a refund was issued to the taxpayer's last known address. The taxpayer has not established that an amended tax return for 1995 electing to file jointly was filed within three years of the last date prescribed by law for filing of the separate return or returns, without taking into account any extension of time granted to either spouse. It is my determination that the IRS allow a credit of $8,728.00 for 1995, abate the failure to file penalty for 1995 and abate the interest and failure to pay penalty associated with the $25,000.00 payment from the date it was received, June 30, 1996, until the date the IRS issued a notice of demand for payment for 1995 which was on November 12, 2001.

OPINION

A. Statutory FrameworkSection 6321 imposes a lien in favor of the United States on all property and property rights of a person who is liable for and fails to pay tax after demand for payment has been made. The lien arises when assessment is made and continues until the assessed liability is paid. Sec. 6322.

For the lien to be valid against certain third parties, the Secretary must file a notice of Federal tax lien; within 5 business days thereafter, the Secretary must provide written notice to the taxpayer. Secs. 6320(a), 6323(a).

Within 30 days commencing after the end of the 5 business days, the taxpayer may request an administrative hearing before an Appeals officer. Sec. 6320(b)(1); sec. 301.6320-1(c)(1), Proced. & Admin. Regs.Similarly, section 6330 provides for notice and opportunity for a hearing before the IRS may levy upon the property of any person. To be entitled to an administrative hearing under section 6330, the person must request the hearing within the 30-day period commencing the day after the date of the pre-levy notice. Sec. 6330(a)(3)(B); sec. 301.6330-1(b)(1), Proced. & Admin. Regs.Once the Appeals officer issues a notice of determination, the taxpayer may seek judicial review in this Court. Secs. 6320(c), 6330(d)(1).

If the validity of the underlying tax liability is properly at issue, we review that issue de novo. See Sego v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 604, 609-610 (2000). Other issues we review for abuse of discretion. Id.B. Petitioner's Challenge to the Notice of DeterminationPetitioner challenges respondent's final notice of determination with respect to the notice of Federal tax lien filing for his 1995 and 1999 tax years. Petitioner contends that respondent's assessment of his 1995 income tax was time barred because he and Astrid Downing filed their 1995 joint amended return in October 1996 but assessment did not occur until 2001, well beyond the expiration of the 3-year limitations period of section 6501(a).6 Respondent contends that section 6330(c)(2)(B) precludes petitioner from raising this issue in this proceeding.1. Limitation on Challenging Underlying LiabilitySection 6330(c)(2) prescribes the matters that a person may raise at an Appeals Office hearing, including spousal defenses, challenges to the appropriateness of the Commissioner's intended collection action, and possible alternative means of collection. At the hearing, the person may challenge the existence or amount of the underlying tax liability only if the person did not receive a notice of deficiency or did not otherwise have an opportunity to dispute the liability. Sec. 6330(c)(2)(B); see Sego v. Commissioner, supra at 609; Goza v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 176, 180-181 (2000).

The regulations define a prior opportunity to dispute an underlying tax liability to include an opportunity for a conference with the Appeals Office that was offered either before or after the assessment of the liability. Sec. 301.6320-1(e)(3), Q&A-E2, Proced. & Admin. Regs. A taxpayer who previously received a notice under section 6330 with respect to the same tax and tax periods and did not request a hearing with respect to that earlier notice has already had an opportunity to challenge the existence or amount of the underlying liability. Sec. 301.6320-1(e)(3), Q&A-E7, Proced. & Admin. Regs.; see Lewis v. Commissioner, 128 T.C. 48 (2007); Bell v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 356, 358 (2006).

Respondent contends, and petitioner does not dispute, that pursuant to this Court's precedents, petitioner's limitations period argument constitutes a challenge to his underlying 1995 liability.7 See Hoffman v. Commissioner, 119 T.C. 140, 145 (2002); Boyd v. Commissioner, 117 T.C. 127, 130 (2001).Petitioner received no notice of deficiency with respect to his 1995 or 1999 tax. Respondent contends, however, that petitioner is not entitled to dispute his underlying liabilities in this proceeding because petitioner failed to take advantage of his prior opportunity to do so when, on April 22, 2003, respondent sent him a final notice of intent to levy and right to a hearing for taxable years 1995 and 1999. Petitioner argues that he never received the April 22, 2003, notice, because it was sent to his accountants' Idaho address "which was not, and never had been, the petitioner's address."

Thus, petitioner argues, the final notice of intent to levy was invalid and offered him no prior opportunity to contest his underlying liability. For the reasons discussed below, we agree with petitioner.2. Petitioner's Last Known AddressSection 6330(a)(1) requires that, before making a levy, the Secretary notify the taxpayer in writing of the right to a hearing. Section 6330(a)(2) provides three options for the time and method of such a notice. The notice must be either: (1) Given in person; (2) left at the taxpayer's dwelling or usual place of business; or (3) sent by certified or registered mail, return receipt requested, to the taxpayer's last known address. Sec. 6330(a)(2).Regulations under sections 6330 and 6331 cross-reference section 301.6212-2, Proced. & Admin. Regs., to define "last known address". Secs. 301.6330-1(a)(1), 301.6331-2(a)(1), Proced. & Admin. Regs. As a general rule, a taxpayer's last known address is "the address that appears on the taxpayer's most recently filed and properly processed Federal tax return, unless the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is given clear and concise notification of a different address." Sec. 301.6212-2(a), Proced. & Admin. Regs.On September 3, 2002, the IRS received petitioner's 1999 return, showing his accountants' Idaho address. For reasons not revealed by the record, respondent did not process this return until November 11, 2002.In the meantime, on November 4, 2002, respondent had received petitioner's Form 2848, instructing that original notices and other written communications be sent to petitioner at the New Hampshire address and copies be sent to his accountant, Mr. Clayton, at the Idaho address.Respondent contends that notwithstanding his receipt of petitioner's Form 2848 on November 4, 2002, petitioner's last known address was his accountants' Idaho address as shown on petitioner's 1999 return, which was processed on November 11, 2002, because this was the last return that was "filed and properly processed" before April 22, 2003 (the date on which respondent sent the notice of intent to levy to the Idaho address).8 Respondent seems to suggest that respondent's processing of petitioner's 1999 return about a week after receiving the Form 2848 caused petitioner's last known address to revert to the Idaho address shown on that return. We disagree.In the first instance, respondent has offered no explanation why petitioner's 1999 return, which the IRS received on September 3, 2002, was not processed until November 11, 2002. According to the Commissioner's revenue procedure, "a return will be considered properly processed after a 45-day processing period which begins the day after the date of receipt of the return by the Internal Revenue Service Center." Rev. Proc. 2001-18, sec. 5.02(1), 2001-1 C.B. 708, 710. It appears that this 45-day processing period for petitioner's 1999 return would have expired before respondent received the Form 2848. Hence, pursuant to the revenue procedure, it would appear that petitioner's 1999 return should be considered as having been processed before respondent received the Form 2848. Assuming, then, that petitioner's last known address before he filed the Form 2848 was the Idaho address as shown on his 1999 return, Form 2848 provided respondent "clear and concise" notification of a change of address to the New Hampshire address. See Hunter v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-81. Petitioner's New Hampshire address thus became his last known address, notwithstanding respondent's belated processing of petitioner's 1999 return.More fundamentally, we reject respondent's suggestion that pursuant to section 301.6212-2(a), Proced. & Admin. Regs., "clear and concise notification" of an address different from that appearing on the taxpayer's most recently filed and properly processed Federal tax return is effective only if made after the tax return is processed. The relevant question is not whether the IRS received the change of address notification before or after the last-filed return was processed. Rather, "what is of significance is what respondent knew at the time the * * * notice was issued * * *, and attributing to respondent information which respondent knows, or should know, with respect to a taxpayer's last known address, through the use of its computer system." Abeles v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 1019, 1035 (1988). If the IRS has become aware of a change of address, it may not rely on the address listed on the last-filed return but must exercise "reasonable diligence in ascertaining the taxpayer's correct address". Pyo v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 626, 636 (1984); see Buffano v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-32.Upon receiving petitioner's Form 2848 on November 4, 2002, respondent should have known, with the exercise of reasonable diligence, that the address shown on the Form 2848 superseded the Idaho address shown on petitioner's 1999 return, which respondent had received 2 months earlier. As we stated in somewhat analogous circumstances in Hunter v. Commissioner, supra, "respondent bears the burden of conforming his actions to the knowledge at his disposal." Respondent failed to do so. We conclude and hold that respondent failed to send the final notice of intent to levy to petitioner's last known address and that the notice was therefore invalid. See Buffano v. Commissioner, supra.3. Whether To Impute to Petitioner Knowledge of the Notice of Intent To LevyOn reply brief, respondent suggests that it is ultimately irrelevant whether the final notice of intent to levy was mailed to petitioner's last known address because "it was, in fact, actually received by petitioner's attorney-in-fact in sufficient time to meet the deadline for filing a timely appeal with the Appeals office." In support of this contention, respondent cites St. Joseph Lease Capital Corp. v. Commissioner, 235 F.3d 886 (4th Cir. 2000), affg. T.C. Memo. 1996-256, and Estate of Citrino v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1987-565. In each of those cases, a statutory notice of deficiency was held valid even though not mailed to the taxpayer's last known address. In each of those cases, however, the notice was obtained by the taxpayer or the attorney, who then filed a timely petition. By contrast, neither petitioner nor his accountant ever responded to the final notice of intent to levy.Petitioner testified credibly that he received no copy of the final notice in 2003 and that if he had received it, he would have requested a hearing. Although the evidence suggests that petitioner's Idaho accountants received the final notice of intent to levy, there is no evidence that his Idaho accountants forwarded it to petitioner or discussed it with petitioner during 2003, or that petitioner otherwise actually received notification of the final notice in time to request a section 6330 hearing. Pursuant to the Form 2848 that respondent received on November 4, 2002, petitioner's Idaho accountant, Mr. Clayton, was supposed to receive only copies of notices; the original notices were supposed to have been sent directly to petitioner. Mr. Clayton might have been justified in thinking that this is what happened. By the time petitioner requested a hearing in March 2004, he was being represented by other accountants in Kansas.In these circumstances, we decline to impute to petitioner knowledge of the final notice of intent to levy. See Calderone v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-240. We conclude and hold that petitioner had no prior opportunity to dispute his underlying income tax liability. Accordingly, we conclude that section 6330(c)(2)(B) does not preclude petitioner from challenging his underlying liability in this proceeding.4. Whether Petitioner and Astrid Downing Filed a Joint 1995 ReturnAs previously discussed, petitioner claims that the assessment of his 1995 tax was made more than 3 years after he and Astrid Downing filed a joint return in 1996 and consequently is time barred pursuant to section 6501(a). For the reasons described below, we conclude that petitioner never filed his 1995 return. Accordingly, the assessment was not time barred. See sec. 6501(c)(3).In the final notice of determination, respondent's Appeals Office treated petitioner as having filed his 1995 married filing separate return on October 30, 1996, for purposes of abating penalties and interest and reallocating certain of petitioner's payments to his 1995 account. Although the notice of determination does not state the rationale for these downward adjustments, the administrative record reveals that the Appeals officer recommended these adjustments on the basis of an assumption that petitioner had filed his 1995 married filing separate return in October 1996.Notwithstanding any contrary implication that might arise from this aspect of the final notice of determination, the parties now agree that petitioner filed no 1995 married filing separate return in 1996. Petitioner states on brief (contrary to his prior representations to the IRS and contrary to his position at trial) that the 1995 married filing separate return "had never been filed." Instead, petitioner insists that he and Astrid Downing filed a joint 1995 return in October 1996.A tax return is generally invalid unless signed under penalties of perjury. Sec. 6065. Returns are required to be signed in accordance with forms or regulations prescribed by the Secretary. Sec. 6061. The applicable regulations require:"Each individual * * * shall sign the income tax return required to be made by him, except that the return may be signed for the taxpayer by an agent who is duly authorized in accordance with paragraph (a)(5) or (b) of §1.6012-1 to make such return." Sec. 1.6061-1(a), Income Tax Regs. A judicially crafted exception to this general rule holds that if an "income tax return is intended by both spouses as a joint return, the absence of the signature of one spouse does not prevent their intention from being realized." Estate of Campbell v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1, 12 (1971); see Olpin v. Commissioner, 270 F.3d 1297, 1301 (10th Cir. 2001), affg. T.C. Memo. 1999-426.There is no indication in respondent's records that petitioner and Astrid Downing ever filed any 1995 joint return or that respondent ever processed any such joint return. Petitioner has introduced into evidence copies of two different versions of a Form 1040X that he alleges he and Astrid Downing jointly filed in October 1996.9 Neither version bears Astrid Downing's signature.10 Although each version shows the signature of a tax preparer, petitioner does not contend, and the evidence does not show, that the preparer's signature qualifies as the signature of a duly authorized agent for Astrid Downing pursuant to the regulations.Petitioner's testimony regarding the circumstances of his purported filing of his 1995 income tax return was vague and inconsistent; conspicuously absent from his testimony was any convincing explanation of how or when Astrid Downing allegedly signed a joint return. Petitioner did not call Astrid Downing as a witness and has otherwise offered no credible evidence to establish that Astrid Downing ever intended to file a 1995 joint return with him or that she even tacitly consented to the filing of a joint return for 1995. Astrid Downing's intent in this regard is made more problematic by the undisputed fact that before the amended 1995 joint return was purportedly filed, she had filed a "Single" return for 1995 under a name other than her married name and listed an address other than petitioner's Singapore address. Petitioner has failed to persuade us that Astrid Downing ever intended to file a 1995 joint return with him.The copies of the incompletely executed Form 1040X, purporting to amend Astrid Downing's single 1995 return and claim joint filing status for petitioner and Astrid Downing, show $8,728 as "Amount of tax paid with original return plus additional tax paid after it was filed". Respondent's records show that this amount was posted to Astrid Downing's 1995 account as a "PAYMENT WITH RETURN".11 Petitioner relies upon this entry as establishing that the 1995 return was filed and processed by the IRS. We disagree. At most, this entry might suggest that a joint return was tendered with payment and that an IRS employee accepted the payment. Such action by an IRS employee, however, would not waive the statutory requirements for a valid return. See Lucas v. Pilliod Lumber Co., 281 U.S. 245 (1930); Olpin v. Commissioner, supra at 1301; Smart v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1987-279; Wallace v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1975-133.Petitioner places great weight on the preliminary assessments of Appeals Officer Dugan, who first handled petitioner's Appeals hearing. In an undated internal memo and in a letter to petitioner's representative Appeals Officer Dugan stated that she believed, on the basis of her preliminary investigation, that petitioner and Astrid Downing had filed a joint amended return in October 1996, as petitioner claimed.12 When petitioner's case was eventually transferred to Appeals Officer Talbott, however, he was unable, after investigation, to establish that Astrid Downing had signed or had intended to file any joint return. The administrative record indicates that Appeals Officer Talbott requested petitioner to provide a statement from Astrid Downing that she had intended to file a joint return. Insofar as the record reveals, petitioner never provided such a statement. Ultimately, the final determination reflected Appeals Officer Talbott's conclusion that petitioner and Astrid Downing never filed a valid 1995 joint return. On the basis of all the evidence in the record, we must concur with this conclusion.5. Summary Assessment of Petitioner's 1995 TaxThis does not end the matter, however, for in seeking to deflect petitioner's limitations period argument, respondent now contends, apparently for the first time in this proceeding, that petitioner filed his 1995 married filing separate return in April 2001, when petitioner included in correspondence to the IRS an unsigned copy of his 1995 married filing separate return (along with a copy of a 1995 joint amended return signed only by the preparer).13 In response to this argument, petitioner contends that in his April 2001 correspondence, he admitted only the liability shown on the copy of his and Astrid Downing's 1995 amended joint return included therewith and that he did not admit the liability shown on the unsigned copy of his 1995 married filing separately return. Petitioner contends that respondent improperly assessed his 1995 tax on the basis of the unsigned copy of his 1995 married filing separate return without first issuing the required statutory notice of deficiency. See sec. 6213(a).Pursuant to section 6201(a)(1), the Secretary is authorized to "assess all taxes determined by the taxpayer or by the Secretary as to which returns * * * are made under this title." Respondent cites, and we have discovered, no authority to suggest that the unsigned copy of petitioner's 1995 married filing separate return should be considered a valid return for purposes of section 6201(a). Cf. sec. 6065 (generally requiring any return to contain or be verified by a written declaration that it is made under penalties of perjury); Dixon v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 338, 348 (1957) ("The respondent does not cite any decision where * * * it was held that an unsigned and otherwise unverified duplicate copy of a purported income tax return was held to be the return required by statute and was to be given effect as such"). An unsigned return "is no return at all." Vaira v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 986, 1005 (1969), affd. on this issue, revd. and remanded on other grounds 444 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1971); see Borgeson v. United States, 757 F.2d 1071 (10th Cir. 1985). A signature on a letter attached to the return cannot be considered an imputed signature on the return itself. Richardson v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 818, 824 (1980). Moreover, even if we were to assume, arguendo, that the IRS accepted petitioner's unsigned copy of the 1995 married filing separate return and processed it, such acceptance would not cure an invalid return. See Olpin v. Commissioner, 270 F.3d at 1301; Dixon v. Commissioner, supra at 347.Pursuant to the deficiency procedures, the Commissioner generally is precluded from assessing a deficiency until he has mailed the taxpayer a notice of deficiency and the period for filing a timely petition in this Court has expired. See sec. 6213(a). Respondent issued no notice of deficiency to petitioner.Section 6330(c)(1) requires, in the case of any hearing conducted with respect to a proposed collection action, that the Appeals officer "obtain verification from the Secretary that the requirements of any applicable law or administrative procedure have been met." Pursuant to this provision, the Appeals officer must verify, among other things, that tax was properly assessed. Cox v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 237, 255 (2006). The verification requirement may be met where the Appeals officer secures formal or informal transcripts showing that the tax was properly assessed and that the taxpayer had been properly notified of the assessment. See id.; see also Jones v. Commissioner, 338 F.3d 463, 466 (5th Cir. 2003) (the verification requirement was satisfied where an Appeals officer referred to a Form 4340, Certificate of Assessments, Payments, and Other Specified Matters, to determine that the IRS had followed legal and administrative procedures); Roberts v. Commissioner, 329 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 2003) (Form 4340 provides prima facie evidence that the IRS has complied with its statutory duties), affg. 118 T.C. 365 (2002).The final notice of determination notes without comment that the IRS processed a 1995 married filing separate Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, that was not signed by either petitioner or the preparer. The final notice of determination goes on to state summarily: "All legal and procedural requirements are concluded to have been met in this case." The final notice of determination does not, however, reveal the basis for this statement as it might pertain to the propriety of a summary assessment made on the basis of the unsigned copy of the 1995 married filing separate return; indeed, the administrative record does not show that the Appeals officer ever specifically considered the issue.14 Respondent has offered no reasoned defense of his summary assessment of petitioner's 1995 tax. On the basis of the record before us, we conclude that petitioner's 1995 tax was improperly assessed summarily without the issuance of a statutory notice of deficiency. Accordingly, we conclude and hold that the final notice of determination sustaining the notice of tax lien filing is invalid insofar as it pertains to petitioner's 1995 tax year. See Freije v. Commissioner, 125 T.C. 14, 35-36 (2005).C. "Equivalent Hearing" Decision LetterIf a person requests a hearing pursuant to section 6330 but the request is untimely (i.e., the hearing request is not made within the 30-day period commencing the day after the date of the pre-levy notice, see sec. 6330(a)(3)(B); sec. 301.6330-1(b)(1), Proced. & Admin. Regs.), the person is not entitled to a hearing but nevertheless may receive a so-called equivalent hearing. See Kennedy v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 255, 262 (2001); secs. 301.6320-1(i)(1), 301.6330-1(i)(1), Proced. & Admin. Regs. At the conclusion of an "equivalent hearing", the Appeals Office does not issue a notice of determination but instead issues a decision letter, which generally includes the same information as a notice of determination. Secs. 301.6320-1(i)(2), Q&A-I5, 301.6330-1(i)(2), Q&A-I5, Proced. & Admin. Regs.As previously discussed, petitioner did not timely request a hearing in response to the final notice of intent to levy, issued April 22, 2003, because it was not sent to his last known address and he did not receive it. Petitioner received an "equivalent hearing" decision letter regarding the levy. An "equivalent hearing" decision letter, unlike a notice of determination, generally does not constitute a "determination" for purposes of section 6320 or 6330 and so does not provide the requisite basis for invoking this Court's jurisdiction under section 6320 or 6330. See Moorhous v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 263, 269-270 (2001); Kennedy v. Commissioner, supra; cf. Craig v. Commissioner, 119 T.C. 252 (2002) (holding that a decision letter issued in response to a timely request for a hearing provides the requisite jurisdictional basis under section 6330(d)(1)).Petitioner has not properly placed before us any request to review the "equivalent hearing" decision letter as to the proposed levy upon his property.15 Nevertheless, as previously discussed, we have held that the final notice of intent to levy, issued April 22, 2003, was invalid because respondent did not send it to petitioner's last known address.16 D. ConclusionRespondent's final determination sustaining the filing of the notice of Federal tax lien is not sustained insofar as it relates to petitioner's 1995 tax year.To reflect the foregoing,An appropriate decision will be entered.1 Unless otherwise indicated, section references are to the Internal Revenue Code, as amended, and Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.2 Also included with petitioner's Apr. 11, 2001, letter was a copy of Notice CP-515M, Information About Your Return, completed and signed by petitioner under penalties of perjury. On the Notice CP-515M, petitioner indicated that his filing status for 1995 was married filing jointly.3 On Aug. 30, 2002, petitioner delinquently filed his Federal income tax returns for 2000 and 2001, showing overpayments of $11,102 and $14,893, respectively. The record does not reveal what address petitioner used on these returns. In September 2002, respondent applied these overpayments against petitioner's 1995 liability.4 The parties also continued to disagree over the treatment of the $25,000 payment that petitioner had submitted with his 1995 filing extension request. Respondent's records showed that $21,612 of this payment had been refunded to petitioner and Astrid Downing in 1996. Petitioner proposed that half this refund be applied to his 1995 tax. Appeals Officer Talbott rejected this offer but agreed to abate interest on petitioner's 1995 tax liability to the extent associated with a $25,000 payment.5 Also on Mar. 8, 2005, respondent issued an "Equivalent Hearing" decision letter concluding that the levy with respect to petitioner's 1995 and 1999 tax was appropriate.6 Petitioner does not dispute the assessment of his 1999 income tax, which was based on amounts reported on but not paid with his 1999 return. In his petition, petitioner's prayer for relief included a request that the Court order respondent to offset any unpaid balance on his 1999 account by application of certain amounts that respondent has allegedly collected from petitioner and to refund certain remaining amounts. Petitioner has not raised this claim for relief in his trial memorandum or on brief. We deem petitioner to have abandoned any such claim for relief. In any event, this Court lacks jurisdiction in a collection review proceeding to order a refund or credit of tax. Greene-Thapedi v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 1 (2006).7 While relying upon these precedents, respondent also expresses disagreement with them, stating:It is respondent's position that the issues raised by petitioner's contentions (involving the expiration of statutes of limitations and application of payments and credits) are more properly characterized as issues relating to the unpaid tax in section 6330(c)(2)(A), and should be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Nevertheless, respondent acknowledges that this Court has held otherwise.The administrative record shows that the Appeals Office not only considered petitioner's challenges but actually adjusted petitioner's liability downwards in response to the issues he raised. Nowhere in the administrative record is there any allusion to the sec. 6330(c)(2)(B) limitation. It would appear that the administrative hearing was conducted and the notice of final determination promulgated in adherence to respondent's espoused position that the issues petitioner raised were not properly characterized as challenges to the underlying liability. In these circumstances, it might be questioned whether respondent has effectively waived the limitation imposed by sec. 6330(c)(2)(B). Cf. Behling v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 572, 578-579 (2002) (holding that the Appeals Office's consideration of the taxpayer's challenge to his underlying liability, in a situation where the taxpayer had received a statutory notice of deficiency, did not result in a waiver by the Commissioner of the sec. 6330(c)(2)(B) limitation). Petitioner, however, does not contend that respondent has waived the sec. 6330(c)(2)(B) limitation. Accordingly, we give this issue of waiver no further consideration.8 On brief, respondent observes in a footnote that petitioner also listed the Idaho address on his timely filed 2002 Federal income tax return. Respondent does not contend, however, that the address shown on petitioner's 2002 return should establish his last known address as of Apr. 22, 2003, ostensibly because this 2002 return was not processed until May 5, 2003. Accordingly, we give this issue no further consideration.9 Petitioner does not contend that he and Astrid Downing ever filed the original joint return that Ernst & Young prepared but only the Form 1040X purporting to amend Astrid Downing's "Single" 1995 return to claim joint filing status.10 One version is a copy as enclosed in petitioner's Apr. 11, 2001, letter to the IRS and shows the signature only of the tax preparer, dated Oct. 15, 1996. The other version, dated Oct. 25, 1996, shows the signatures of both petitioner and the tax preparer. The two versions are otherwise substantially identical, although the Oct. 15, 1996, version appears to contain additional forms and schedules. Petitioner has not adequately explained how these two versions came about or why he included the Oct. 15, 1996, version in his Apr. 11, 2001, correspondence with the IRS but now appears to claim the Oct. 25, 2001, version as the relevant one.11 In the final notice of determination, the Appeals Office concluded that petitioner should be given credit for the $8,728 payment.12 At trial, respondent objected to admitting these two documents into evidence on the grounds that "they are hearsay. They are the opinions of a lower level IRS agent. They are not the position of the Service and not binding on the Service." The Court provisionally admitted the documents into evidence subject to respondent's right to renew his objections on brief. On brief, respondent renews his objections, but on different grounds than asserted at trial. On brief, respondent does not assert any hearsay objection; we deem respondent to have waived any such objection. In any event, as shown by the discussion in the text, we do not rely upon these documents to prove the truth of the matters asserted therein; moreover, we do not rely upon Appeals Officer Dugan's conclusions expressed in these documents and do not view them as binding upon the IRS. On brief, respondent also objects that admission of these documents into evidence is contrary to Fed. R. Evid. 602 and 701. We disagree. Fed. R. Evid. 602, which limits admissible testimony to matters as to which the witness has personal knowledge, is not germane, inasmuch as the documents in question do not represent testimony of a witness. Similarly, Fed. R. Evid. 701, which relates to opinion testimony by lay witnesses, is not germane. Accordingly, we overrule respondent's new and renewed evidentiary objections to Exhibits 31-P and 32-P.13 Respondent does not contend, however, that we should modify those aspects of the final notice of determination that treated petitioner as having filed a 1995 married filing separate return in October 1996.14 As previously discussed, the Appeals officer assumed, for purposes of abating penalties and interest and reallocating certain payments, that petitioner filed a 1995 married filing separate return in October 1996. If we were to infer that the Appeals officer meant to assume that petitioner's 1995 married filing separate return was filed in October 1996 for all purposes, this might explain why the Appeals officer would not have felt it necessary to address whether summary assessment was properly made on the basis of the unsigned copy of petitioner's 1995 married filing separate return that the IRS received in 2001. If we were to indulge the assumption, however, that petitioner filed a 1995 married filing separate return in October 1996, then we would have to agree with petitioner that the assessment in 2001 was outside the 3-year limitations period of sec. 6501(a). As previously discussed, both parties now agree that petitioner filed no 1995 married filing separate return in 1996.15 Petitioner's original petition, filed Apr. 5, 2005, broadly challenges respondent's assessment of his 1995 income tax and respondent's accounting for his payments on his 1995 and 1999 account but does not expressly mention either the notice of determination regarding the Federal tax lien or the decision letter with respect to the levy. The petition as originally filed makes no express reference to sec. 6320 or 6330 or any other statutory basis for this Court's jurisdiction. Contrary to Rule 331(b)(8), the petition as originally filed includes no copy of the notice of determination. At the commencement of the trial, petitioner amended his petition to assert that he had requested IRS Appeals Office consideration "in response to a Notice of Federal Tax lien Filing and Your Right to a Hearing Under IRS 6320 regarding alleged liabilities for 1995 and 1999", and that on Mar. 8, 2005, respondent had issued the notice of determination concerning the filing of the Federal tax lien. Attached to the petition thus amended is a copy of said notice of determination. In his opening brief and reply brief, petitioner states identically: "This Tax Court proceeding is an appeal from a CDP Hearing that Petitioner requested in response to a Notice of Federal Tax Lien Filing issued by Respondent for an alleged 1995 income tax assessment."16 If petitioner had properly placed in issue any challenge to the equivalent hearing decision letter, our holding as to the invalidity of the final notice of intent to levy would have been relevant in deciding the proper basis for dismissal of this issue. See Kennedy v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 255, 260-261 (2001); Buffano v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-32.


Alvin S. Brown, Esq.
Tax Attorney
703 425-1400
www.irstaxattorney.com

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Monday, September 24, 2007

Back Taxes Unreasonable Sentencing GuidelinesA sentence of probation and time in a halfway house imposed on a part-time income tax preparer for aiding and assisting in the preparation of false tax returns was unreasonable. The non-jail sentence did not take into account the nature and circumstances of the individual's criminal conduct, the seriousness of his offense or provide adequate deterrence to criminal conduct or to white collar crime.


United States of America, Appellant v. Talmus R. Taylor, Defendant, Appellee,
U.S. Court of Appeals, 1st Circuit; 06-2216, August 17, 2007.

Vacating and remanding an unreported DC Mass. decision.

[ Code Sec. 7206]

Crimes: Preparation of false tax returns: Aiding and assisting: Non-jail sentence: Probation: Community service: Sentencing guidelines: Reasonableness. --


Before: Torruella, Newman and Lynch, Circuit Judges.

TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge: Talmus R. Taylor was tried and convicted of sixteen counts of aiding and assisting in the preparation of false tax returns, a violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2). The district court sentenced Taylor to one year in a halfway house, five years of probation, and a $10,000 fine. The Government now appeals Taylor's sentence, claiming that it is substantively unreasonable. After careful consideration, we conclude that a non-jail sentence was unreasonable in light of the district court's explanation and the factors the court was obligated to consider under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).


I. Background


In 1997, Taylor, a teacher at Fifield Elementary School in Dorchester, Massachusetts, took a second job as a part-time income tax preparer. In this capacity, Taylor submitted federal tax returns on behalf of his clients. Many of the returns submitted by Taylor claimed deductions for charitable contributions of $9,000 to $19,000 worth of goods per year to Goodwill, donations which his clients had not in fact made. The false claims were accompanied by handwritten lists that purported to be records of specific contributions along with their alleged value.

When the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") noticed a suspicious pattern in the returns prepared by Taylor --in some cases, the lists of contributions submitted with one person's return were identical to lists submitted with another's return --they questioned Taylor. Taylor told the IRS that it was his clients who had provided the fraudulent lists of deductions, and that he had simply served as a scrivener. When confronted with the fact that many of the lists were identical, Taylor explained that he had mixed up documents at the copier, even though the lists had been submitted months apart. According to testimony, Taylor then asked his clients to provide false information to the IRS by, inter alia, filling out blank receipts obtained from Goodwill and forging the signature of Goodwill employees. The IRS did not believe Taylor's explanations for the discrepancies, and he was later arrested and charged with sixteen counts of tax fraud.

At trial, Taylor's clients testified that he had prepared the lists of deductions and that he had later asked them to lie to IRS agents if they asked about the returns. Taylor's clients also stated that before Taylor had filled out their tax returns and afterwards, they had never falsely claimed a charitable contribution. The clients testified that after the tax fraud was discovered, they were left with tax liabilities of, on average, $2,000 for each year that Taylor prepared their returns.

Taylor testified on his own behalf, denying involvement in any fraudulent scheme. The jury returned a verdict finding Taylor guilty on sixteen counts of aiding in the preparation of false tax returns. The jury further found that the aggregate value of the fraud --the amount of taxes not paid to the Government --was $129,879.

The Probation Office prepared a pre-sentence report ("PSR") for Taylor. The PSR calculated a total offense level of 19 by adding a base offense level of 15, U.S.S.G. § 2T4.1(J), a 2-level enhancement for being in the business of preparing tax returns, U.S.S.G. § 2T1.4(b)(1)(B), and a 2-level enhancement for obstruction of justice on the ground that Taylor counseled two witnesses to falsify evidence and lie to the IRS, U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. Taking into account that Taylor had no criminal history, the sentencing range under the advisory Sentencing Guidelines was 30 to 37 months in prison, one year of supervised release, and a fine of up to $60,000.

Taylor submitted a sentencing memorandum to the court suggesting that it depart from the sentencing guidelines and give him no jail time at all. Taylor offered a letter from Boston Public Schools stating that, based on the nature of his crime, Taylor would continue to be eligible for employment in the schools if he was not incarcerated. In addition, Taylor provided forty-eight letters from the president of the Boston Teachers Union, various current and former administrators and teachers in his school and the school system, parents and students, friends, colleagues, family members, members of his church, and members of the community. These letters all unequivocally stated that this crime was an aberration for Taylor, and that he was generally a law-abiding person. Some of the letters noted that Taylor had played a very important role as a teacher at Fifield, that he was loved by students, and that Taylor often went above and beyond his job duties in organizing concerts and field trips for students, and in leading the school chorus and the band. Other letters stated that Taylor was the guardian for his mentally disabled brother, and that he had provided aid and comfort to many members of the community in their times of need.

At the sentencing hearing, a colleague of Taylor and Taylor's principal both testified on his behalf. The witnesses mostly repeated what was said in the letters, but added that although they would likely be able to find a new music teacher, Taylor was irreplaceable, and that they felt it unlikely that they would find someone who would put in as much time as Taylor did. In addition, the witnesses noted that Taylor was African-American and that he was a good role model to students in his school, who often did not encounter educated and professional African Americans. The Government argued that while Taylor had made significant contributions to his community and while this might warrant a somewhat lower sentence, Taylor's case still merited some amount of jail time so as to deter future offenders and to reflect the seriousness of the offense. In particular, the Government noted that Taylor had not accepted responsibility for his actions and that he had lied about his role in the fraud throughout the case. Finally, Taylor made a brief statement to the court, stating that he was "embarrassed," and that he was "sorry that [he had] actually put [his] job into jeopardy as a music teacher." Taylor noted that he loved his job and wanted to continue working as a teacher in the schools.

The court decided to impose a sentence of five years probation, including five hours a week of community service and one year in a "halfway house," and a fine of $10,000. The court offered as justification for the sentence its belief that
[Taylor's] level of service to the community is extraordinary community involvement which involves a traditional departure ground. I also think that if for some reason the appellate court did not think that it was a traditional departure ground because they felt it doesn't rise to the level of extraordinary, I would do it on the basis of a variance on the history and characteristics of the offender and the need to impose a punishment that is adequate but not [greater than necessary.] ... I'm particularly not giving straight probation because I think that it's a serious crime, but I think that this is a way in which he can continue to give back to the community, and yet it will send that signal that the Government was correctly worried about to the world that you can't commit tax fraud and commit perjury and basically get straight probation.

The Government then objected to the sentence on the ground that it was not reasonable. The court overruled the Government's objection, and this appeal ensued.


II. Discussion



A. Standard of Review


First, we must discern the proper standard of review to apply to Taylor's sentence. The Government urges us to bifurcate our review, looking first to determine whether the district court abused its discretion in "departing" from the Sentencing Guidelines recommendation, and then reviewing the ultimate sentence for "reasonableness." Taylor, on the other hand, argues that we should eschew independent review of departures, and engage only in reasonableness review of the end product. Ultimately, because reasonableness review is not easily distinguishable from review for abuse of discretion, see Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2470-71 (2007) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("Simply stated, Booker replaced the de novo standard of review required by 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) with an abuse-of-discretion standard that we called 'reasonableness' review." (quoting United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 262 (2005))), Taylor and the Government differ only as to whether or not an independent review of "departures" is merited.

The Government finds support for independent review of departures in the history of the sentencing statutes. Prior to the enactment of the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003 ("PROTECT Act"), Pub. L. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003), we reviewed decisions to depart upwards or downwards from the sentencing guidelines for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Rodríguez, 327 F.3d 52, 55 (1st Cir. 2003). After passage of the PROTECT Act, courts of appeal reviewed out-of-Guidelines sentences de novo. 117 Stat. at 670, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e). However, in Booker, the Supreme Court severed and excised § 3742(e), finding that the effect of the de novo review standard was to "make Guidelines sentencing even more mandatory than it had been" and concluding that it "ceased to be relevant." 543 U.S. at 261. Although Booker extensively discussed the standard of review to be applied to sentencing appeals, the Court did not explicitly decide whether courts of appeal should return to the pre-PROTECT Act standard of review. Rather, it simply stated that the [pre-PROTECT Act] text told appellate courts to determine whether the sentence "is unreasonable" with regard to § 3553(a). Section 3553(a) remains in effect, and sets forth numerous factors that guide sentencing. Those factors in turn will guide appellate courts, as they have in the past, in determining whether a sentence is unreasonable.

Id. at 261.

In the absence of explicit instructions from the Supreme Court, the Government argues, and some of our sister circuits have concluded, that the proper course of action is to revert to the pre-PROTECT Act standard, which separately reviewed Sentencing Guidelines departures for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Wolfe, 435 F.3d 1289, 1295 n.5 (10th Cir. 2006) (explaining history of sentencing statutes and concluding that departures should be reviewed for abuse of discretion); see also United States v. Shan Wei Yu, 484 F.3d 979, 987 (8th Cir. 2007); United States v. Husein, 478 F.3d 318, 325-326 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Crisp, 454 F.3d 1285, 1288 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v. Smith, 440 F.3d 704, 707 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Fuller, 426 F.3d 556, 562 (2d Cir. 2005). Two circuits, however, have eliminated separate review of departures under the Guidelines, concluding that post- Booker, independent review of Sentencing Guidelines "departures" largely replicates reasonableness review. See United States v. Mohamed, 459 F.3d 979, 987 (9th Cir. 2006) ("If we were to declare the sentence unreasonable, then the sentence would be invalid both because of the erroneous departure and because it is unreasonable. In any case, our review of the so-called departure would have little or no independent value." (emphasis in original)); United States v. Johnson, 427 F.3d 423, 426 (7th Cir. 2005) ("It is now clear that after Booker what is at stake is the reasonableness of the sentence, not the correctness of the 'departures' as measured against pre-Booker decisions that cabined the discretion of sentencing courts to depart from guidelines that were then mandatory.").

We agree that the concept of "departures" is somewhat "outmoded" in the post- Booker world. See United States v. Rinaldi, 461 F.3d 922, 929 (7th Cir. 2006). However, district courts are still required by § 3553(a)(5) to consider policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission, and many of the traditional grounds for "departure" under the Sentencing Guidelines are, in fact, policy statements. District courts must properly interpret those policy statements (if they are relevant) and apply them to the facts of each case. See, e.g., United States v. Thurston ("Thurston I"), 358 F.3d 51, 78-79 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding that U.S.S.G. § 5H1.11 states that courts should impose lower sentences only for "extraordinary" good works), vacated and remanded in light of Booker, 543 U.S. 1097 (2005). Thus, at times, we may need to refer to our extensive body of departure-related law to independently determine whether a district court has complied with its obligation under § 3553(a)(5) to consider Sentencing Commission policy statements. As such, we cannot agree with the Seventh and Ninth circuits that appellate courts should never, as part of their reasonableness analyses, engage in an independent review of whether a district court properly interpreted the Sentencing Commission's policy statements in determining a sentence.

Thus, we think that where a party challenges a sentence as unreasonable because a district court has misconstrued a Sentencing Commission policy statement, appellate review should consist of determining whether a district court has correctly interpreted the policy statement and whether it has reasonably applied the policy statement to the facts of the case. Once we have determined that a district court has complied with its statutory obligation to correctly consider the Sentencing Commission policy statements, appellate review of the ultimate sentence, including the weighing of those policy statements against the other § 3553(a) factors, should be for "reasonableness." Booker, 543 U.S. at 261. 1



B. Did the District Court Properly Interpret U.S.S.G. § 5H1.11?

The Government argues that the district court misinterpreted U.S.S.G. § 5H1.11, and thus erroneously considered it to militate in favor of a lower sentence in this case. U.S.S.G. § 5H1.11 is a policy statement of the Sentencing Commission and states, "[C]ivic, charitable, or public service; employment-related contributions; and similar prior good works are not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a departure is warranted." We have interpreted § 5H1.11 to apply only to extraordinary civic and charitable contributions. See Thurston I, 358 F.3d at 78-79; see also U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0(a)(4) ("An offender characteristic ... not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a departure is warranted may be relevant to this determination only if such offender characteristic or other circumstance is present to an exceptional degree."). The district court appears to have properly interpreted the policy statement, given its statement that it considered § 5H1.11 to apply because of Taylor's "extraordinary" good works.

In deciding whether U.S.S.G. § 5H1.11 applied to the facts of Taylor's case, the district court noted that people from all walks of life wrote to the court to attest to the fact that Taylor had gone out of his way to help them and the community. Many of Taylor's students and colleagues also wrote and testified, explaining his importance to the school as a music teacher and that he had often gone above and beyond his job duties to organize concerts for pupils. Perhaps the most striking testimony to Taylor's contributions to his school was contained in a letter from the Boston Public Schools indicating that Taylor would be allowed to continue teaching if he was not sent to prison, notwithstanding the fact that he had been found guilty of fraud. In light of the testimony at Taylor's sentencing hearing and the vast number of letters documenting Taylor's extensive service to his community, we believe that the district court reasonably interpreted the facts to find that Taylor had engaged in extraordinary good works, and that as such, U.S.S.G. § 5H1.11 militated in favor of a lower sentence. Cf. United States v. Canova, 412 F.3d 331, 343 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding that a defendant had engaged in extraordinary good works "which included six years' service in the United States Marine Corps, 'exemplary and many times courageous service' as a volunteer firefighter, and Good Samaritan aid to 'three total strangers who were in extreme medical distress.'"). Although another judge might have decided otherwise, we conclude that the district court's determination was a reasonable interpretation of the facts before it.


C. Was Taylor's Sentence Unreasonable?


Because the district court properly calculated the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range and correctly interpreted the relevant Sentencing Commission policy statements, and because there is no dispute that the court gave proper weight to the Guidelines, the only remaining question at issue in this appeal is whether the court's sentence was "reasonable." Jiménez-Beltre, 440 F.3d at 518 ("Booker's remedial solution makes it possible for courts to impose non-guideline sentences that override the guidelines, subject only to the ultimate requirement of reasonableness."); see also United States v. Trupin, 475 F.3d 71, 74 (2d Cir. 2007) (reviewing a sentence for reasonableness after determining that "[n]either the way in which the district court performed its duty to consider the section 3553(a) factors nor its Guidelines calculation is at issue").

In past cases, we have attempted, mostly in general terms, to describe how a district judge might arrive at a reasonable sentence for a defendant. We have expressed the need for district courts to provide a "plausible explanation and a defensible overall result." Jiménez-Beltre, 440 F.3d at 519. And although the Guidelines are not presumptively reasonable in this Circuit, see id. at 518, we have also agreed with Judge Posner's statement that "[t]he farther the judge's sentence departs from the guidelines sentence ... the more compelling the justification based on factors in section 3553(a) that the judge must offer in order to enable the court of appeals to assess the reasonableness of the sentence imposed." United States v. Smith, 445 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Dean, 414 F.3d 725, 729 (7th Cir. 2005) (Posner, J.)). 2

Notwithstanding these general pronouncements, we have tended to eschew more specific guidance, recognizing that judges must consider each defendant and his or her crime individually. See Jiménez-Beltre, 440 F.3d at 528 n.10 ("[W]e required, even before Booker, that a court's explanation of its sentence 'sufficiently show a thoughtful exercise of the court's sentencing responsibility and a degree of care and individualized attention appropriate to the solemnity of the sentencing task.'" (quoting United States v. Vázquez-Molina, 389 F.3d 54, 59 (1st Cir. 2004))); see also United States v. Vázquez-Rivera, 470 F.3d 443, 449 (1st Cir. 2006) (Howard, J., concurring) ("District courts will inevitably approach sentencing differently post- Booker. Indeed, the legitimacy of a range of approaches is implicit in Booker's grant of added discretion to sentencing judges."). But see United States v. Thurston ( Thurston II), 456 F.3d 211, 220 (1st Cir. 2006) ("Having reviewed the record, the recommended guideline sentence, and the § 3553(a) factors, we conclude that a sentence of fewer than 36 months' imprisonment would fail reasonableness review in the present circumstances."). We leave broad discretion to a district judge to determine an appropriate sentence because he or she will ordinarily have observed a trial from its inception, becoming intimately aware of the facts and the players involved. 3 See Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2469 ("The sentencing judge has access to, and greater familiarity with, the individual case and the individual defendant before him than the Commission or the appeals court."). In addition, a district judge will ordinarily be involved in sentencing on a far more regular basis than appellate judges, and thus will have a better eye for the ins and outs of criminal conduct and those who engage in it. Thus, a district court will be best placed to make the sorts of individualized determinations that allow the imposition of a sentence that is sufficient, but no greater than necessary, to achieve the stated purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Unwarranted interference in this process is likely to hinder individualized consideration and result in one-size-fits-all sentencing, an approach that was rejected long ago. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949) ("The belief no longer prevails that every offense in a like legal category calls for an identical punishment without regard to the past life and habits of a particular offender.").

Turning to the case at hand, the district court decided that a sentence of probation and time in a halfway house was appropriate for Taylor, citing both U.S.S.G. § 5H1.11 and its belief that a "non-guidelines sentence" would best serve the sentencing goals listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 4 Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(5), it was proper for the district court to consider Taylor's extraordinary good works pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5H1.11, and in Thurston II, we stated that a district court might also consider ordinary charitable activities and good works as part of the "history and characteristics of the defendant," 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). 456 F.3d at 219.

While these ordinary and extraordinary contributions to the community may have justified a sentence with less imprisonment than an otherwise similarly situated defendant, we cannot sustain the ultimate sentence imposed on Taylor based on the factors identified by the district court. In explaining its ultimate sentence, the district court noted that Taylor had committed a serious offense, and that he had lied in court. The court also noted that under the sentencing guidelines, which were considered as part of the sentencing process, the recommended sentence for Taylor was 30 to 37 months in prison. The court explained, however, that it did not feel that a sentence of jail time was appropriate because of the "fantastic contribution he has made to the community." Although we do not wish to unduly constrain the district court's sentencing discretion on remand, we do not think that these factors make Taylor's sentence of probation a plausible result. See United States v. Scherrer, 444 F.3d 91, 93 (1st Cir. 2006) ("[O]ur main concern is whether the court has adequately explained its reasons for varying or declining to vary from the guidelines and whether the result is within reasonable limits."). We briefly explain.

The offense that Taylor committed no less than sixteen times over a four-year period --fraudulent preparation of tax returns --is a serious crime. While tax fraud is not violent in nature, at its heart, it is theft, specifically theft of money to which the public is entitled. See Trupin, 475 F.3d at 76 (noting that the defendant "in effect stole from his fellow taxpayers through his deceptions" and that "[a] seven-month term of imprisonment fails to reflect as much"). Furthermore, the tax fraud committed here was not part of an indigent's effort to avoid personal tax liability, but rather, the supplemental business of a moderately successful man who misled his clients. Cf. United States v. Thurman, 179 Fed. Appx. 971, 972 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting with approval that "[t]he district court concluded that because Thurman was not selling drugs to support his own addiction, but instead as an illegal business, his crime was more offensive in nature"). In addition, as the district court recognized, Taylor repeatedly obstructed justice during the course of the investigation and the trial by asking his clients to misinform the IRS and provide inaccurate testimony. See Rinaldi, 461 F.3d at 931 (finding reasonable a district court's consideration of the defendant's obstruction of justice as a factor meriting a higher sentence); United States v. Bradstreet, 135 F.3d 46, 57 (1st Cir. 1998) ("One convicted of criminal dishonesty is therefore not entitled to an aberrant conduct departure if he has testified dishonestly about his criminal conduct."). Moreover, the trial transcript provides no indication whatsoever that Taylor has accepted responsibility for his actions. To put it succinctly, we do not view the sentence as having given full consideration to the nature and circumstances of Taylor's crime, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), and the need to reflect its seriousness, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A).

In addition, we believe that the district court accorded incommensurate weight to the fact that Taylor's absence from school would negatively affect his students. We need not decide whether, in considering the history and characteristics of the defendant, a court may consider the effect of the defendant's incarceration on others. Cf. United States v. Holz, 118 Fed. Appx. 928, 935-36 (6th Cir. 2004) (deciding that a court may consider the impact on a defendant's business and employees when imposing a sentence). However, if a district court did take such an impact into consideration, we think it would also have been necessary to consider the fact that "[i]t is not extraordinary that in the area of white collar crime, a principal's business and employees may suffer if he is incarcerated." United States v. Pool, 474 F.3d 1127, 1129 (8th Cir. 2007).

Furthermore, the court was also obligated to consider whether Taylor's sentence would serve the purpose of providing "adequate deterrence to criminal conduct." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (B). In particular, we have recognized that "deterrence of white-collar crime [is] of central concern to Congress." United States v. Mueffelman, 470 F.3d 33, 40 (1st Cir. 2006). When passing the Sentencing Reform Act, Congress explained:
[It is our] view that in the past there have been many cases, particularly in instances of major white collar crime, in which probation has been granted because the offender required little or nothing in the way of institutionalized rehabilitative measures ... and because society required no insulation from the offender, without due consideration being given to the fact that the heightened deterrent effect of incarceration and the readily perceivable receipt of just punishment accorded by incarceration were of critical importance. The placing on probation of [a white collar criminal] may be perfectly appropriate in cases in which, under all the circumstances, only the rehabilitative needs of the offender are pertinent; such a sentence may be grossly inappropriate, however, in cases in which the circumstances mandate the sentence's carrying substantial deterrent or punitive impact.

S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 91-92 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3274-75; see also United States v. Martin, 455 F.3d 1227, 1240-41 (11th Cir. 2006) (considering the Senate Report and adding that "Rather than deter crime by others, [the defendant's] 7-day sentence suggests that those similarly situated ... could profit from fraudulent conduct"); Thurston II, 456 F.3d at 218 (noting that Congress has concluded that prison sentences tend to deter white-collar criminals). 5 We do not see why Taylor is an aberration from the overall conclusion that the threat of jail time deters white-collar crime, and thus we are not convinced that a non-jail sentence for Taylor would adequately serve the goal of general deterrence.

Finally, we are unpersuaded that this sentence reasonably reflects "the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct." 6 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). The Sentencing Guidelines highlight the problem:
Under pre-guidelines practice, roughly half of all tax evaders were sentenced to probation without imprisonment, while the other half received sentences that required them to serve an average prison term of twelve months. This guideline is intended to reduce disparity in sentencing for tax offenses and to somewhat increase average sentence length.

U.S.S.G. § 2T1.1 background note. In addition, courts have recognized that "the minimization of discrepancies between white-and blue-collar offenses" is an important goal in the sentencing process. Mueffelman, 470 F.3d at 40; see also Thurston I, 358 F.3d at 80. We recognize that because of Taylor's extraordinary service to the community, he may not be easily comparable to "defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). However, it is important to recognize that persons convicted of white collar crimes "are often expected, by virtue of their positions, to engage in civic and charitable activities." Thurston I, 358 F.3d at 80.

Thus, we conclude that the district court should resentence Taylor by taking proper account of all of the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and providing a reasoned explanation for its result.


III. Conclusion


For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the sentence of the district court and remand for resentencing.

Vacated and Remanded.

1 The Government also argues that appellate courts may not review a district court's decision to choose a lower (or higher) sentence based on a Sentencing Guidelines policy statement. We find this argument unusual, given that it would moot the Government's appeal inasmuch as the district court imposed a lower sentence on Taylor based on such a policy statement. While it is true that under existing circuit precedent, we may not review a district court's discretionary decision to find that a Sentencing Guidelines policy statement does not merit a sentence reduction in a particular defendant's case, United States v. Meléndez-Torres, 420 F.3d 45, 50-51 (1st Cir. 2005), this is beside the point. A sentence which takes into account a Sentencing Guidelines policy statement is, like all other sentences, subject to review for reasonableness.

2 In Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2463, the Supreme Court held that it was permissible for an appellate court to presume that if "both the sentencing judge and the Sentencing Commission will have reached the same conclusion as to the proper sentence in the particular case[,] ... . [t]hat double determination significantly increases the likelihood that the sentence is a reasonable one." However, the Supreme Court's opinion does not require such a presumption to be adopted, id. at 2468 (noting that "[s]everal courts of appeals have ... rejected a presumption of unreasonableness"), and we have declined to adopt one, Jiménez-Beltre, 440 F.3d at 518.

3 The discretion left to district judges in the wake of Booker, 543 U.S. 220, is not a particularly new development. Prior to the creation of the Sentencing Guidelines regime in the late 1980s, judges were given almost unfettered (and unreviewable) discretion to impose sentences as they saw fit. See generally Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363-65 (1989) (reviewing history of sentencing in United States); Douglas Berman, Conceptualizing Booker, 38 Ariz. St. L.J. 387, 388 (2006) ( "From the late nineteenth-century and throughout the first three-quarters of the twentieth-century, trial judges in both federal and state systems were given nearly unfettered discretion to impose any sentence from within broad statutory ranges provided for criminal offenses."). This discretion, however, led to "[s]erious disparities in sentences." Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 365; see also Berman, supra at 393 ( "[S]ome studies found that personal factors such as an offender's race, gender and socioeconomic status were impacting sentencing outcomes and accounted for certain disparities."). As a result, in determining a sentence, judges must now consider "the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct," 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). A judge must also continue to consider the sentencing guidelines, id. § 3553(a)(4)-(5), which reflect "the increased uniformity of sentencing that Congress intended its Guidelines system to achieve," Booker, 543 U.S. at 246.

4 We wonder, however, whether terming a sentence "guideline" or "non-guideline" appropriately reflects the proper role of the sentencing guidelines post- Booker. While the sentencing guidelines are to be accorded substantial weight, see United States v. Vázquez-Rivera, 470 F.3d 443, 449 (1st Cir. 2006), and can be used as a starting point in the sentencing process, see United States v. Parrilla Román, 485 F.3d 185, 190 (1st Cir. 2007), the Guidelines are but one factor in the sentencing analysis, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (4), a sentence outside of the guidelines need not be justified by unusual or extraordinary reasons, see Vázquez-Rivera, 470 F.3d at 449, and a within-guidelines sentence will not be considered presumptively reasonable by this court, see Jiménez-Beltre, 440 F.3d at 518. Thus, we do not find the term "non-guidelines sentence" to be useful except to the extent that it expresses the sentencing court's consideration that the advisory Guidelines recommendation was outweighed by other § 3553(a) factors.

5 As we noted in Thurston II, although a district court might disagree with the link between prison sentences and deterrence of white-collar crime, its focus should be on the individual characteristics of the defendant, rather than general policy considerations. 456 F.3d at 218.

6 Taylor cites various cases in which other defendants have received somewhat lower sentences for their past good works. See, e.g., United States v. Canova, 412 F.3d 331 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Woods, 159 F.3d 1132 (8th Cir. 1998). While these cases are persuasive inasmuch as they have held that a defendant's good works are a permissible consideration in the sentencing process, we do not believe them to be apt comparisons for the purpose of establishing that Taylor's sentence is or is not within the norm. As we have explained, the focus of § 3553(a)(6) is on nationwide sentencing disparities, rather than disparities between the sentences given to individual defendants. See Thurston II, 456 F.3d at 216.

To the extent that Taylor offers these cases to show that his sentence is reasonable, we respond that they are no more probative of reasonableness than cases in which courts have rejected appeals by defendants challenging their sentences as too high in light of their good works, see, e.g., United States v. Baxter, 217 Fed. Appx. 557 (7th Cir. 2007), or cases in which courts have found sentences unreasonable on the ground that they excessively relied on a defendant's good works, see, e.g., United States v. Mallon, 345 F.3d 943, 949 (7th Cir. 2003). In the post- Booker world, sentencing must be truly individualized.

Alvin S. Brown, Esq.
Tax Attorney
703.425.1400
www.irstaxattorney.com

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Friday, September 21, 2007

Tax Help IRC 104(a)(2) - compensation for emotional distress is taxable
Cecil R. and Carol L. Hawkins v. Commissioner.
Dkt. No. 22833-05 , TC Memo. 2007-286, September 20, 2007.
[1 Petitioners petitioned the Court to redetermine respondent's determination of a $7,153 deficiency in their 2003 Federal income tax and a $1,415 accuracy-related penalty under section 104(a)(2). We hold it is not.

Background

All facts were stipulated or contained in the exhibits submitted with the parties' stipulation of facts. Those stipulated facts and exhibits are incorporated herein by this reference. Petitioner and her spouse, Cecil Hawkins, filed a joint 2003 Federal income tax return. They resided in San Leandro, California, when their petition was filed commencing this proceeding.
Petitioner was employed as an executive assistant by Alameda County Fair Association (Alameda) from 1999 to 2002. Shortly after she was hired, she was told that she would receive a one-hour paid lunch. In May 2002, she was told that she was not entitled to a one-hour paid lunch and that she had to repay the wages she received from May 15, 2001, to May 15, 2002, attributable to her lunch hours. Petitioner refused to repay those wages, and she was placed on administrative leave. She was later told that she had resigned her position even though she was willing to continue working at Alameda.
Petitioner commenced the lawsuit in 2003 against Alameda and its chief executive officer (collectively, Alameda). She alleged in the lawsuit, filed and prosecuted by her pro se in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, that Alameda had caused her damages stemming from race discrimination, breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and harassment. She claimed in the lawsuit the following damages:

Backpay $24,000

Future pay 100,000

Emotional distress (including
mental and physical pain
and suffering) 75,000

Health benefits 800

Punitive and exemplary
damages 300,000

__________

Total 1 The
claimed
damages
actually
total
$499,800
rather
than
$490,800
as
reported
by
petitioner.

490,800

In November 2003, petitioner and Alameda agreed to settle the lawsuit. Under the settlement agreement, petitioner released all claims against Alameda in exchange for a single payment of $25,000. The settlement agreement stated that petitioner had filed the lawsuit against Alameda seeking "wages, penalties, other damages, and attorneys' fees", that Alameda would issue petitioner a Form 1099 in connection with its payment of the $25,000, and that petitioner had to give Alameda a completed Form W-9, Request for Taxpayer Identification Number and Certification, as a condition precedent to Alameda's paying the $25,000 to petitioner.
Petitioner received the $25,000 in 2003, and Alameda issued to petitioner a 2003 Form 1099-MISC, Miscellaneous Income, reporting its payment of that amount to her as nonemployee compensation. Petitioner did not report the $25,000 on her 2003 Federal income tax return.

Discussion

Respondent determined that the $25,000 is included in petitioner's 2003 gross income. Petitioners argue alternatively that the $25,000 is not "income" in the context of the 16th Amendment and that the $25,000, if income, is excluded from their gross income under section 104(a)(2) violated the 16th Amendment insofar as it permitted the taxation of an award of damages for mental distress and loss of reputation. The opinion reasoned that damages awarded to the taxpayer for mental pain and anguish were not received in lieu of something normally taxed as income, nor were they income within the meaning of the 16th Amendment.

Without regard to which party bears the burden of proof, we find and hold that the $25,000 is income to petitioner and that none of the $25,000 constitutes damages received "on account of personal physical injuries or physical sickness" within the meaning of 2 We reject at the outset petitioners' reliance on Murphy v. IRS, supra. After the filing of petitioners' posttrial brief, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit vacated its judgment resulting from that opinion and reheard arguments on the case. Later, in Murphy v. IRS, 493 F.3d 170 (D.C. Cir. 2007), the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that the damages received by the taxpayer were income included in the taxpayer's gross income and were outside the exclusion in section 104(a)(2).

section 104(a)(2) before its amendment in 1996); Robinson v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 116 (1994), affd. in part and revd. in part on an issue not relevant herein 70 F.3d 34 (5th Cir. 1995); Shaltz v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-173. We focus on the second requirement and ask ourselves whether petitioner's $25,000 settlement was received on account of "personal physical injuries" or "physical sickness". In this context, the terms "physical injury" and "physical sickness" do not include emotional distress, except to the extent of damages not in excess of the amount paid for medical care described in sec. 104(a) (flush language).

We determine the reason for the settlement payment by ascertaining the intent of the payor in making the payment. See Robinson v. Commissioner, supra at 127. We make that determination by analyzing all relevant facts and circumstances. See id.; see also Shaltz v. Commissioner, supra. We conclude from our analysis that petitioner never sought in the lawsuit a recovery of damages for "personal physical injuries" or "physical sickness" and, most importantly, that Alameda did not pay the $25,000 to petitioner with any intent to settle a claim of hers for "personal physical injuries" or "physical sickness". In the latter regard, we find from the record that the settlement agreement memorialized Alameda's understanding that petitioner had filed the lawsuit against Alameda seeking "wages, penalties, other damages, and attorneys' fees", that Alameda would issue petitioner a Form 1099 to reflect its payment to her of the $25,000 as a payment of income, and that Alameda required petitioner to give to it a completed Form W-9 as a condition precedent to Alameda's paying the $25,000 to petitioner. We also find with respect to the $25,000 payment that Alameda actually issued to petitioner a 2003 Form 1099-MISC reporting that it had paid her the $25,000 as nonemployee compensation.
We hold that the $25,000 was not paid to petitioner for personal physical injuries or physical sickness within the meaning of section 104(a)(2), except to the extent that they do not exceed the amount paid for medical care related to the emotional distress.

All arguments made by petitioners for a holding contrary to that expressed herein have been considered, and we reject those arguments not discussed herein as irrelevant or without merit.
Decision will be entered for respondent.1 Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. Unless otherwise noted, section references are to the applicable versions of the Internal Revenue Code.2 We apply

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Thursday, September 20, 2007

Tax Attorney IRC 6321 and IRC 6322 - IRS lien superior to State Court Judgment

Gatlinburg Airport Authority, Inc., Plaintiff v. Grant Cantwell, et al., Defendants. U.S. District Court, East. Dist. Tenn., Knoxville Div.; 3:06-CV-90, June 27, 2007.



MEMORANDUM OPINIONJORDAN, United States District Judge: This civil action is before the court for consideration of "United States' Motion for Summary Judgment" [doc. 24] and the "Motion for Summary Judgment of Grant Cantwell" [doc. 30]. Defendant, Grant Cantwell ("Cantwell"), has filed a response to and a reply regarding the United States' motion [docs. 31, 33]. Defendant, United States, 1 has filed a response to Cantwell's motion [doc. 25].The court has determined that oral argument is not necessary, and the motions are ripe for the court's determination. For the reasons stated herein, the United States' motion will be granted, and Cantwell's motion will be denied.

BackgroundThis case originated in the Circuit Court for Sevier County, Tennessee as a condemnation action for expansion of the Gatlinburg Airport. Named as defendants in a petition filed January 25, 2006, were the property owner Cantwell and several lienholders of record who held liens against a company named Magnetic Ideas, Inc. ("Magnetic"), but not against Cantwell. The United States removed the case to this court [doc. 1]. Cantwell filed a cross-claim [doc. 7] in which he explained the involvement of Magnetic, stated his contention that Magnetic had no property interest to which the liens could have attached, and asked the court to declare the liens of the cross respondents null and void as they relate to the property so he would receive the full amount of the proceeds from the condemnation. Only the issues concerning the federal tax lien remain for resolution, as all issues concerning the other lienholders have now been resolved.The parties have submitted an excellent and beneficial "Joint Stipulation of Facts" [doc. 26] that the court adopts and incorporates herein as if set out verbatim. However, a brief recitation of the facts at this point will facilitate the court's discussion.On July 12, 2000, Cantwell conveyed to Magnetic two tracts of real property located in Sevierville, Tennessee. The warranty deed was prepared by Cantwell's counsel of record herein and contained the description for a single tract of land. The selling price was $450,000: $50,000 to be paid at closing and $400,000 to be paid to Cantwell in installments, secured by a promissory note signed by Magnetic and payable to Cantwell and his wife. The promissory note called for 59 monthly payments of $3,218.49 and a final balloon payment of $386,739.07. The $400,000 balance was secured by a deed of trust against the real property that was also prepared by Cantwell's counsel of record. Both the warranty deed and deed of trust were recorded on July 13, 2000.Some months later, Cantwell discovered that the warranty deed reflected only one of the two tracts of property sold to Magnetic. In an effort to correct the situation, Cantwell's representatives prepared a correction warranty deed and corrected deed of trust that were sent to Magnetic. Magnetic's representative executed the correction warranty deed and returned it to Cantwell but did not return the corrected deed of trust.The correction warranty deed that reflected the sale to Magnetic of tract 1 and tract 2 was recorded on November 7, 2002. The corrected deed of trust that secured tract 2 was never recorded. On September 4, 2003, the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") filed a notice of tax lien against Magnetic in the amount of $143,241.74.On February 2, 2004, Cantwell sued Magnetic in state court to set aside the correction warranty deed until the corrected deed of trust was recorded. Although Cantwell did not name the IRS as a defendant or give the IRS notice of the lawsuit, he did reference in the complaint that a federal tax lien had been filed against Magnetic. On June 11, 2004, the Chancery Court for Sevier County, Tennessee entered a "Judgment by Default Setting Aside Conveyance" that determined the correction warranty deed was to be "set aside and declared null and void ab initio."

Analysis

I.To satisfy a tax deficiency, the government may impose a lien on the "property" and "property rights" of the taxpayer." See 26 U.S.C. 6331. The language of 6331(a) is broad and reveals that Congress intended to reach every interest in property that a taxpayer might have. Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49, 56 (1999). "The federal tax lien statute itself creates no property rights but merely attaches consequences, federally defined, to rights created under state law." United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 278 (2002) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

To determine whether a taxpayer has "property" or "property rights" under the federal tax lien statute, the court looks to state law "to determine what rights the taxpayer has in the property the Government seeks to reach, then to federal law to determine whether the taxpayers' state-delineated rights qualify as `property' or `rights to property' within the compass of the federal tax lien legislation." Drye, 528 U.S. at 58 (citations omitted).

The property at issue is tract 2 in the correction warranty deed. Because the corrected deed of trust was never recorded, Cantwell's interest in that tract was never secured. On September 4, 2003, when the IRS filed its notice of tax lien against Magnetic, it covered "all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to" Magnetic. 26 U.S.C.


The subsequent state court default judgment cannot disengage the federal tax lien nor can it alter the nature of Magnetic's property interest for purposes of the federal tax lien at the time it attached.


2 In addition, "[a] federal tax lien attaches to a taxpayer's property when unpaid taxes are assessed, and continues to attach until either the tax is paid or the lien becomes unenforceable because of lapse of time. 26 U.S.C. 6322.


The lien continues to attach to a taxpayer's property regardless of any subsequent transfer of the property." United States v. Donahue Indus., Inc., 905 F.2d 1325, 1330-31 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51, 57 (1958). "It is settled federal law that transfers subsequent to the attachment of a federal lien do not affect the lien in any way." United States v. Big Value Supermarkets, Inc., 898 F.2d 493, 497 (6th Cir. 1990) (also citing Bess, 357 U.S. at 57 ("it is of the very nature and essence of a lien, that no matter into whose hands the property goes, it passes cum onere").This "transfer" principle should apply here. The federal tax lien attached to tract 2 when Magnetic held the fee simple title, and it continues to be attached to that tract. This is the true, even if the title to tract 2 has been "transferred" back to Cantwell by action of the state court judgment.The court thus finds that the federal tax lien on tract 2 is valid and superior to Cantwell's interests. Based on that finding, the IRS is entitled to proceeds from the condemnation.


II.Cantwell argues that common law principles of equity and fairness should be applied to invalidate and dismiss the federal tax lien. While he cites quite a number of case authorities in which federal courts employed equitable principles, none of the cases concern federal tax liens."The federal tax lien is a constitutional exercise by Congress of its power to lay and collect taxes and represents supreme law of the land." In re May Reporting Servs., Inc., 115 B.R. 652, 655 (Bankr.D.S.D. 1990) (citations omitted). Attendant with that very significant power is the fundamental principle "that liens for federal taxes are entirely statutory and the provisions for their collection are to be strictly followed according to federal law." United States v. Heasley, 283 F.2d 422, 428 (8th Cir. 1960) (citations omitted). "Statutes create the tax lien, prescribe its duration and provide for the manner of releasing the lien." Id. (citations omitted). Further, the laws that aid in the collection of government revenues should be liberally construed. May Reporting, 115 B.R. at 655.The enforcement scheme of the federal tax lien statutes is comprehensive and complex. Cantwell has not offered any authority or adequate justification for why this court should depart from clearly established statutory law that must be strictly applied in this case. While equity and fairness make for worthy and noble argument, they cannot compete in the realm of the statutory federal tax lien. The court will not apply equitable principles in this case.

III.Though not determinative of the court's rulings on the pending motions, the court will address the United States' additional argument that the judgment of the chancery court is not binding on the United States because Cantwell failed to join the United States in his 2004 state court lawsuit. 3 For support, the United States relies on 26 U.S.C. §7425. The provision referred to in §7425 applies, the court must decide whether Cantwell's state court action is one of those listed under §2410. The complaint was titled "Complaint to Set Aside Deed" and sought to have the correction warranty deed set aside. Therefore, the action was not to foreclose a mortgage or lien, to partition, or to condemn.The complaint was also not one to quiet title. An action to quiet title is "[a] proceeding to establish a plaintiff's title to land by compelling the adverse claimant to establish a claim or be forever estopped from asserting it." Black's Law Dictionary 30 (7th ed. 1999). In Tennessee, to bring a quiet title action a claimant must have title or possession. May v. Abernathy, 130 S.W.2d 135, 139 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1939). Cantwell had conveyed title to Magnetic who was in possession of the property. Cantwell did not want to quiet his title but to protect his security interest in the property he had sold.The only remaining possible action listed under §2410 is interpleader, but that too does not describe the chancery court action. Interpleader is "[a] suit to determine a right to property held by a usu[ally] disinterested third party (called a stakeholder) who is in doubt about ownership and who therefore deposits the property with the court to permit interested parties to litigate ownership." Black's Law Dictionary 823 (7th ed. 1999). While Cantwell mentioned in the chancery court complaint the various liens filed against Magnetic, he did not include the lienholders as parties; he sued only Magnetic and its owner. Thus, the complaint was not even in the nature or appearance of an interpleader action.It certainly appears that the United States should have been given notice of the chancery court lawsuit, especially in light of the reference to its lien in the complaint. However, reliance on

IV.This case was removed to this court by the IRS on the jurisdictional basis of its tax lien. The federal tax lien issue has now been resolved by the court. When a status conference was held on October 19, 2006, the court proposed to the parties that once the issues concerning all of the liens had been resolved, the case would be returned to state court for completion of the condemnation proceedings. That time has now arrived.Therefore, unless the parties can provide the court with a very compelling reason why it should retain jurisdiction, this case will be remanded to the Circuit Court for Sevier County, Tennessee. The order that will accompany this opinion will provide a time frame for informing the court of any such reasons.
V.Accordingly, for the reasons stated herein, the United States' motion for summary judgment will be granted. Cantwell's motion for summary judgment will be denied. An order reflecting this opinion will be entered.
1 The Internal Revenue Service is the governmental agency involved in this case.2 Contrary to Cantwell's contention, the chancellor did not find that the correction warranty deed was not supported by any consideration. The chancellor entered a default judgment; thus, he did not reach the merits of any of Cantwell's claims. In this court's opinion, any failure of consideration would be the result of the unilateral conduct of Cantwell and his representatives in not following through in obtaining and recording an executed deed of trust on tract 2. In addition, the court believes that under Tennessee law it would have been inappropriate to grant Cantwell any of the correction or reformation relief asked for in the complaint. "Under Tennessee law, `[t]o be the subject of correction, a mistake in an instrument must have been mutual or there must have been a mistake of one party induced by the fraud of the other.'" In re Miller, 286 B.R. 334, 339 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1999) (quoting Kozy v. Werle, 902 S.W.2d 404, 411 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995)).Further, "a court of equity will not reform a written instrument even upon a showing of mutual mistake if the rights of innocent third parties have intervened." Miller, 286 B.R. at 341 (citing Needham v. Caldwell, 154 S.W.2d 535, 538 (1941) ( "[A] release or satisfaction entered by accident or inadvertence...or by a mistake as to an essential fact, such that it is not in accord with the real intention of the parties, may be set aside and the mortgage reinstated, except as the rights of third parties may prevent.")). There is no proof of fraud in this case. Cantwell's totally unsubstantiated statement in his brief that Magnetic "fraudulently refused" to execute the corrected deed of trust hardly proves fraud. Nor do the events that give rise to this litigation constitute mutual mistake. The record before the court indicates that the unfortunate events being dealt with here are the result of the actions of Cantwell and his representatives in allowing the correction warranty deed to be filed without also filing the corrected deed of trust to secure tract 2. Yet, even if there were mutual mistake present in these facts, between the time of the mistake and discovery of that mistake, the IRS filed its tax lien on the subject property.
Thus, the rights of an innocent third party had intervened, which would arguably make reformation inappropriate.However, even if the chancellor had reached the merits of Cantwell's requested relief, the result would still be the same. The action by the state court, whether in the form of a default judgment or a decision on the merits, would be ineffective to defeat the federal tax lien that attached to Magnetic's property interest in tract 2 that it held at the time the tax lien was filed.3 There is no indication in the record why Cantwell referenced the federal tax lien in his chancery court complaint but did not name the IRS as a party or give the IRS notice of the lawsuit.
Alvin S. Brown, Esq.
Tax Attorney
703 425-1400
To provide IRS transparency, upload your IRS experiences to http://www.irsforum.org/

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Wednesday, September 19, 2007

Tax fraud - sentencing guidelines - unreasonable departure - 100% varianc downward was rejected

United States of America, Appellant v. Richard L. Carlson, Appellee.
U.S. Court of Appeals, 8th Circuit; 06-3372, August 20, 2007.

Affirming an unreported DC Minn. decision.

[ Code Sec. 7203]

Crimes: Tax evasion: Sentence: Willful failure: Extraordinary circumstances: Sentencing guidelines: Downward departure: Reasonableness. --

A 100% downward variance from the guidelines range and a seven-level reduction in the total offense level by a federal district court to an individual's sentence for willful failure to pay over trust fund taxes was unreasonable. The court had failed to adequately consider the seriousness of the individual's offense, the deterrent effects of prison time, or avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among similar tax evaders. Moreover, neither the individual's charitable activities nor his repayment of the unpaid taxes prior to entering his guilty plea were extraordinary or sufficiently exceptional to justify the variance.




Before: Loken, Chief Judge and Gibson and Wollman, Circuit Judges.

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge: Richard L. Carlson pled guilty to willfully failing to account for and pay over trust fund taxes, in violation of 26 U.S.C. §7202, and was sentenced to eight months' home confinement, five years' probation, and 1,000 hours of community service. The government appeals the sentence, arguing that it is unreasonable. We vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing.




I.


From 1986 to 2003, Carlson and his brother each owned fifty percent of the capital stock of Jyland Development, Inc. (Jyland), whose business consisted of land development and new home construction. During each of the twenty-four quarters from 1998 to 2003, Carlson withheld payroll taxes from the wages of Jyland's employees, including himself and his brother, but did not pay those taxes over to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Carlson asserts that the money was used for business, rather than personal, expenses and that his failure to remit the withheld taxes began after a client defaulted on its obligation and there had been a downturn in the market. The total amount withheld but not remitted by Carlson was determined to be $561,223.76.

Carlson was charged with and pled guilty to one count of willfully failing to account for and pay over trust fund taxes, a violation of 26 U.S.C. §7202. Prior to pleading guilty, Carlson paid the IRS the full amount of payroll taxes owed. To do so, Carlson withdrew $35,000 from his retirement account and borrowed $175,000 from each of two friends, both of which loans were secured by the equity in his home. At sentencing, the district court adopted, without objection by either party, the factual statements and conclusions contained in the presentence report (PSR). Because of the amount of the tax loss, Carlson's base level offense was calculated to be eighteen. From this, Carlson received a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, resulting in a total offense level of fifteen. Since this was Carlson's first offense, his criminal history category was I. Given this offense level and criminal history category, Carlson faced a sentencing guidelines range of eighteen to twenty-four months' imprisonment, two to three years of supervised release, and a fine of $4,000 to $40,000.

At the sentencing hearing, Carlson asked the court to impose a sentence below the guidelines range, reasserting arguments proffered in an earlier motion. In response, the government stated that, in the circumstances, it opposed any downward variance. The district court thereafter varied downward from the guidelines range and imposed the sentence described above. In doing so, the district court noted that five years' probation is the maximum that can be imposed, that 1,000 hours of community service is the most the court has ever imposed, and that the district court "accorded significant weight to the guidelines range and believes that the sentence imposed is no more severe than necessary to take into account the purpose of the guidelines." The district court stated that the "substantial variance here is supported by comparably extraordinary circumstances," and justified the variance on the basis that Carlson (1) has a significant record of charitable activities; (2) accepted responsibility and made an exceptional effort to repay the money; (3) suffered damage to his business, reputation, and family relationships; and (4) was not motivated by a desire to defraud the government, but was instead attempting to resolve a financial crisis within the business. In its statement of reasons, the district court also distinguished this case from our decision in United States v. Ture, 450 F.3d 352 (8th Cir. 2006). 1




II.


Neither party challenges the district court's calculation of the guidelines range. When there is no dispute on appeal about the applicable guidelines range, we review "[a] district court's decision to vary from the advisory sentencing Guidelines range...for reasonableness, which is a similar standard to the abuse of discretion standard." United States v. Pepper, 486 F.3d 408, 411 (8th Cir. 2007). 2 A sentence that varies from the guidelines range is reasonable "so long as the judge offers appropriate justification under the factors specified in Section 3553(a)," but "[t]he further the district court varies from the presumptively reasonable guideline range, the more compelling the justification based on the 3553(a) factors must be." United States v. Bryant, 446 F.3d 1317, 1319 (8th Cir. 2006). In addition, a sentence imposed outside the guidelines range


may be unreasonable if a sentencing court fails to consider a relevant factor that should have received significant weight, gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or considers only appropriate factors but nevertheless commits a clear error of judgment by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the limited range of choice dictated by the facts of the case.


United States v. Haack, 403 F.3d 997, 1004 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 276 (2005). Our review of Carlson's sentence takes into account the fact that a variance from a guidelines sentencing range of imprisonment down to probation is not per se unreasonable. See United States v. Wadena, 470 F.3d 735, 738 (8th Cir. 2006).

The sentenced imposed upon Carlson in effect amounts to a 100% downward variance from the guidelines range and a seven-level reduction in Carlson's total offense level. 3 "`We have suggested that a variance to zero prison time where the Sentencing Commission has found that substantial prison time is indicated...requires extraordinary justification,' " United States v. Soperla, No. 06-3316, 2007 WL 2141678, at *3 (8th Cir. July 27, 2007) (quoting United States v. McDonald, 461 F.3d 948, 957 n.7 (8th Cir. 2006)), and "have routinely rejected this kind of variance as unreasonable." Id. at *4 (collecting cases). We similarly reject this variance here and conclude that the sentence is unreasonable because the district court, in formulating it, failed to accord significant weight to certain §3553(a) factors and failed to articulate sufficiently compelling circumstances to justify such a large variance.

Section 3553(a) requires the district court to consider, among other things, the need for the sentence to promote respect for the law, to reflect the seriousness of the offense, and to provide just punishment. In Ture, we addressed these considerations and recognized that "`[t]ax offenses, in and of themselves, are serious offenses,' " and that "`a greater tax loss is obviously more harmful to the treasury and more serious than a smaller one.' " Ture, 450 F.3d at 357-58 (alteration in original) (quoting United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) §2T1.1, cmt. background). We also noted that "`criminal tax laws are designed to protect the public interest in preserving the integrity of the nation's tax system' " and that "`[c]riminal tax prosecutions serve to punish the violator and promote respect for the tax laws.' " Id. at 357 (quoting U.S.S.G. Manual ch. 2, pt. T, introductory cmt.). With these considerations in mind, we concluded in Ture that, given the duration of the defendant's criminal conduct (nearly four years), the amount of tax evaded ($240,252), and his enlistment of an employee to assist with the crime, "the District Court failed to adequately consider the seriousness of Ture's offense, the goal of promoting respect for our federal tax laws, and the need for a just sentence" when it imposed a sentence of two years' probation and 300 hours of community service, which amounted to a 100% downward variance from the guidelines range and a five-level reduction in the defendant's total offense level. Id. at 358. The sentence imposed here compels the same conclusion, particularly in light of the fact that, as compared to Ture, (1) Carlson evaded a significantly greater amount of tax ($561,223.76), (2) his criminal conduct extended for a longer duration (six years), and (3) he received a larger reduction in his total offense level (seven-level). Although Carlson did not enlist the help of an employee in committing his offense and received a longer term of probation, more hours of community service, and eight months of home confinement, we still conclude, as we did in Ture, that the district court failed to adequately consider the seriousness of Carlson's offense, the goal of promoting respect for our federal tax laws, and the need for a just sentence when formulating Carlson's sentence.

The district court's 100 % variance additionally demonstrates a failure to accord significant weight to the need for sentences to deter future criminal conduct. See 18 U.S.C. §3553(a)(2) (2000). Terms of imprisonment are important "to deter others from stealing from the national purse." Ture, 450 F.3d at 358. This is particularly true in cases involving willful tax evasion, since that crime often goes undetected. Id. ("[W]illful tax evaders often go undetected such that those who are caught -especially those who are caught evading nearly a quarter-million dollars in tax - must be given some term of imprisonment."). Although the district court noted that "[i]t is highly unlikely that Carlson will ever commit another crime," it did not address the sentence's effect of deterring others - an important consideration. See United States v. Miller, 484 F.3d 964, 967-68 (8th Cir. 2007) ("[G]eneral deterrence...is one of the key purposes of sentencing...." (quotations omitted)) Because of the district court's failure to address the deterrence of others, the importance placed on imposing terms of imprisonment to deter future tax evaders, and the fact that Carlson received no term of imprisonment, we conclude that the district court failed to give the goal of deterrence adequate weight when formulating its sentence.

The district court further failed to adequately consider the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among similar defendants. 18 U.S.C. §3553(a)(6). As we have noted, "[t]o reduce sentencing disparities, the Guidelines sought to ensure more tax evaders were sentenced to prison, specifically focusing on those who evaded more than $100,000 in federal taxes." Ture, 450 F.3d at 358-59. In Ture, where the defendant had a similar record (first offense) and had been found guilty of similar conduct (tax evasion), we reversed a 100%, five-offense-level variance. Id. at 354-55, 357-59. Here, the district court recognized the similarities between Carlson's case and Ture, noting that both involved first offenses, expressions of remorse, and cooperation with the prosecution, but then attempted to distinguish Carlson's sentence from the one in Ture on the basis that, unlike the defendant in Ture, Carlson had a significant record of charitable activities, had not enlisted an employee to assist in the crime, and was motivated to commit the crime because of a financial crisis, rather than personal gain. Although we acknowledge these differences, we do not believe that they are sufficient to justify the imposition of a 100% (seven-level) variance here when we reversed a 100% (five-level) variance in Ture, particularly given the number of similarities between the two cases and the fact that Carlson failed to remit almost twice as much in taxes for a longer period of time.

Finally, we conclude that the "extraordinary factors" relied on by the district court to justify its sentence are not sufficiently compelling to justify a 100% variance - a variance that, as we acknowledged above, requires "extraordinary justification." See Soperla, 2007 WL 2141678, at *3. Carlson's record of charitable activities is certainly commendable, as evidenced by the numerous letters that outlined his involvement in his community and church and the impact he has had on many lives. We do not believe, however, that it was extraordinary, especially in light of some of our other cases addressing the issue. Compare United States v. Morken, 133 F.3d 628, 630 (8th Cir. 1998) (concluding that a defendant's "record of good works is neither exceptional nor out of the ordinary" even though he advised local business owners, hired young people, served on his church council, raised money for charity, and was an accommodating neighbor and a good friend), with United States v. Woods, 159 F.3d 1132, 1136-37 (8th Cir. 1998) (upholding a one-level downward departure based on a defendant's exceptional charitable activity, which included bringing two troubled women into her own home, paying for these women to attend a private high school, and caring for an elderly friend who lived nearby). We similarly do not believe that Carlson's repayment of the unpaid taxes prior to entering his plea of guilty, or the efforts associated therewith, constitutes a sufficiently exceptional circumstance. The district court stated that "Carlson liquidated his family's assets so that he could fully repay the debt owed to the Internal Revenue Service," and then classified Carlson's repayment efforts, which included the withdrawal of $35,000 from his retirement account and the borrowing of $350,000 from two friends, as "truly exceptional efforts" that "equate[d] in the Court's view to extraordinary acceptance of responsibility." As the government points out, however, Carlson had already received a three-level downward departure for his acceptance of responsibility, and the only asset of Carlson's that was shown to have actually been liquidated was his retirement account. In addition, these repayment efforts, when compared to other cases, are not exceptionally compelling. See United States v. O'Malley, 364 F.3d 974, 981-82 (8th Cir. 2004) (concluding that the defendant's pre-sentencing repayment of the $459,047.02 he owed did not constitute extraordinary restitution sufficient to justify a departure, even though the defendant "must have gone to great lengths" to come up with the money); United States v. Oligmueller, 198 F.3d 669, 672 (8th Cir. 1999) (upholding a one-level downward departure on the basis of the defendant's repayment efforts because the defendant, among other things, voluntarily began making restitution payments one year before he was indicted, worked hard to insure that his assets received the highest possible value, turned over his life insurance policy and wife's certificate of deposit, took up an outside job, and gave up his home). 4

In support of its variance, the district court also stated that "Carlson's crime was not motivated by a desire to defraud and was not for personal gain," but that he was instead "motivated by a financial crisis and...acted to preserve subcontractors and others who were relying on him in his business." Although Carlson's purported intentions were arguably better than a defendant who uses the funds for purely personal reasons, we note that Carlson, as a fifty percent shareholder of Jyland, still benefitted personally from his failure to remit the payroll taxes and that he still defrauded the government by doing so. This rationale is consequently not particularly compelling. Nor is the damage Carlson has suffered to his business, family, and reputation - another consideration relied on by the district court. Although Carlson has certainly suffered such damage, it does not appear to be anything out of the ordinary for individuals convicted of such crimes.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the circumstances present here do not justify the variance granted by the district court and that the sentence was therefore unreasonable in light of the relevant sentencing factors. Accordingly, we vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing consistent with the views expressed in this opinion.

1 The defendant in Ture was convicted of willfully attempting to evade federal income tax and ultimately sentenced to two years' probation and 300 hours of community service, which amounted to a five-level reduction in his total offense level and a 100% variance from the guidelines range. United States v. Ture, 450 F.3d 352, 355 (8th Cir. 2006). On appeal, we concluded that the district court's sentence was unreasonable and remanded for resentencing. Id. at 359-60.

2 Carlson asserts that the government did not properly preserve an objection to a below the guidelines sentence, limiting us to plain error review, because the government did not file a response to Carlson's motion for a sentence below the advisory guidelines range and because the government, at the sentencing hearing, stated only that, "for this crime, six years sustained pattern of stealing money from the IRS and the taxpayers, we stand by the guideline range to which we have stipulated and which was the result of substantial negotiations, and we respectfully oppose any downward departure or variance from the guideline range." We reject Carlson's assertion. As the government points out, the District of Minnesota's Local Rule 83.10, upon which Carlson relies on to assert that the government was required to file a response to his motion, prescribes the procedure used to resolve disputes concerning the content found in PSRs. Because such disputes are not present here, the local rule does not support Carlson's position. Furthermore, we conclude that the government's oral statement at sentencing was sufficient to apprise the district court of its position regarding a below the guidelines sentence and that the issue was thus preserved for appellate review.

3 We reject Carlson's contention that his sentence to eight months of home confinement should be considered equivalent to eight months of imprisonment when determining the extent of a variance from the sentencing guidelines. Although United States Sentencing Guidelines §5C1.1 provides that home confinement may be a substitute for imprisonment in some circumstances and that, in such a case, a day of home confinement is equivalent to a day of imprisonment, this substitute punishment is not permitted under the guidelines when the defendant's guideline range is in Zone D, as is the case here. See also United States v. Soperla, No. 06-3316, 2007 WL 2141678, at *4 (8th Cir. July 27, 2007).

4 We recognize, as did the court in O'Malley, that placing too much weight on a defendant's ability to make restitution immediately works to "differentiate criminal defendants on the basis of their economic resources, which is clearly contrary to the intent of the sentencing guidelines." United States v. O'Malley, 364 F.3d 974, 981 (8th Cir. 2004).

Alvin S. Brown, Esq.
Tax Attorney
703 425-1400
www.irstaxattorney.com

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Tuesday, September 18, 2007

Back Taxes IRC 7430(a) - recovery of administrative and litigation costs

Tests for recovery are discussed

Richard Edwin and Eva Ruth Elder v. Commissioner.Dkt. No. 7218-06 , TC Memo. 2007-281, September 17, 2007.

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Married taxpayers were denied an award of administrative and litigation costs because the position of the government was substantially justified. The taxpayers (one of whom was an attorney) used a distribution from a Roth IRA to make a first-time home purchase; thus the distribution was not subject to the ten-percent penalty under 1 For the reasons discussed below, we shall deny petitioners' motion.

Background

At the time the petition was filed, petitioners resided in Moraga, California. Petitioner Richard Elder is an attorney admitted to practice before the Tax Court. Petitioner Eva Elder is not an attorney.

In 2003, petitioners received distributions totaling $6,621 from Roth individual retirement accounts (Roth IRAs).2 Petitioners used the proceeds for first-time homebuyer expenses. Petitioners did not report the distributions as taxable income on their joint 2003 Federal income tax return.

The Roth IRAs were held through E Trade Clearing LLC (E Trade). Forms 1099-R, Distributions From Pensions, Annuities, Retirement or Profit-Sharing Plans, IRAs, Insurance Contracts, etc., issued by E Trade list "J" as the distribution code. According to the instructions for the Form 1099-R for 2003, distribution code J indicates:
a distribution from a Roth IRA where * * * there are no known exceptions. For example, you may not know whether an exception under section 408A(d)(2).

Respondent examined petitioners' 2003 Federal income tax return and issued a notice of proposed adjustments, commonly referred to as a 30-day letter, in August 2005. Respondent proposed to include the distributions in gross income and impose a 10-percent early withdrawal penalty. The 30-day letter states in part: "Our records indicate that the full taxable amount of your retirement distribution(s) as shown on Form 1099R was not reported on your tax return. Please complete and return a Form 8606, Nondeductible IRAs, as verification of the taxable amount of the distribution(s)."

Petitioners disagreed with the proposed adjustments and indicated that they would provide respondent with Forms 8606, Nondeductible IRAs. As is relevant here, Form 8606 asks taxpayers to provide the total distributions from Roth IRAs, including distributions for qualified first-time homebuyer expenses. The taxpayer then subtracts from this amount his basis in his Roth IRA contributions and his qualified first-time homebuyer expenses. Form 8606 indicates that the remainder, if any, is the amount of taxable Roth IRA distributions.

In their response to the 30-day letter, petitioners stated that they were moving and that some of their records were in storage. Petitioners also questioned the need to provide basis information for their Roth IRA contributions. Petitioners indicated that if basis information was not necessary, they could provide the Forms 8606 sooner.

Respondent did not receive the Forms 8606 from petitioners and issued a notice of deficiency in January 2006 determining a deficiency of $2,681 in petitioners' joint income tax for 2003. Respondent determined that the Roth IRA distributions were includable in gross income and asserted a 10-percent early withdrawal penalty.

In a letter dated April 1, 2006, petitioners enclosed Forms 8606 indicating that no portion of the Roth IRA distributions was taxable. The letter states that petitioners used the Roth IRA distributions for qualified first-time homebuyer expenses. The letter also states that petitioners had been attempting to complete the Forms 8606 for some time but had been unable to obtain basis information. Petitioners wrote in part that "figuring out what [they] spent on stocks [they] bought as far back as 1996 has been difficult to impossible."

The petition herein was filed on April 14, 2006. Petitioners' case was assigned to an Appeals officer on May 16, 2006. After reviewing the file and performing research, the Appeals officer concluded on May 18, 2006, that the notice of deficiency was correct because a distribution from a Roth IRA could not qualify for the first-time homebuyer expense exception.

On July 6, 2006, Mr. Elder and the Appeals officer spoke by telephone. In a letter dated and sent by facsimile the same day, Mr. Elder memorialized the conversation. Mr. Elder indicated that he would perform additional legal research, although he did not state when he expected to complete the research.

On July 10, 2006, Mr. Elder again spoke to the Appeals officer by phone and memorialized the conversation in a letter sent via facsimile the same day. The letter states in part:
I believe that your interpretation of the law is incorrect and that if you would provide me with a day or two to complete the research that I have started, I believe I can present you with authorities from the code and/or regulations which would convince you to drop the case. * * *
If the foregoing does not comport with your recollection * * *, please advise.
On the same day, the Appeals officer closed petitioners' case and gave the administrative file to her manager. On July 11, 2006, petitioners sent a letter to the Appeals officer discussing in detail the Internal Revenue Code provisions and Treasury regulations that govern distributions from Roth IRAs for first-time homebuyer expenses (July 11 letter). The analysis in the letter indicates, inter alia, that a distribution from a Roth IRA can satisfy the exception for first-time homebuyer expenses. The July 11 letter was date stamped received by the Internal Revenue Service on July 17, 2007. It is not clear whether the Appeals officer ever saw the July 11 letter.
Petitioners' case was assigned to an attorney for respondent on December 5, 2006. Over the next 2 weeks, the parties exchanged correspondence. In a letter dated December 19, 2006, respondent's counsel indicated she had read and agreed with the legal analysis set forth in petitioners' July 11 letter. Respondent's counsel also stated, however, that factual issues remained unresolved. Respondent's counsel asked for evidence establishing that petitioners had held the Roth IRAs for 5 years and that petitioners had incurred first-time homebuyer expenses. Petitioners provided the requested information, and on January 10, 2007, respondent conceded that the distributions were not taxable.

On January 24, 2007, Mr. Elder filed an entry of appearance. In February 2007, petitioners filed the motion for an award of administrative and litigation costs. Respondent filed an objection to the motion, and petitioners filed a reply.

DiscussionI. In General

Sec. 7430(a), (b)(1), (b)(3), (c)(1). The requirements of section 7430 is a waiver of sovereign immunity and must be strictly construed in the Government's favor. Estate of Cervin v. Commissioner, 200 F.3d 351, 355 (5th Cir. 2000), affg. T.C. Memo. 1998-176; Simpson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-194.

To be the prevailing party, the taxpayer must substantially prevail with respect to either the amount in controversy or the most significant issue, or set of issues, presented. Sec. 7430(c)(4)(A)(ii). The taxpayer will not be treated as the prevailing party, however, if the Commissioner establishes that the Commissioner's position was substantially justified. The Commissioner's position is substantially justified if, based on all of the facts and circumstances and the legal precedents relating to the case, the Commissioner acted reasonably. Pierce v. Underwood, supra; Sher v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 79, 84 (1987), affd. 861 F.2d 131 (5th Cir. 1988). The Commissioner bears the burden of proving his position had a reasonable basis in both fact and law. section 7430, apportioning the requested award of fees among the issues according to whether the Commissioner's position on a particular issue was substantially justified. See Swanson v. Commissioner, 106 T.C. 76, 102 (1996); Hennessey v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-131. Although the notice of deficiency contained other adjustments, the parties' disagreement centered on the taxation of the Roth IRA distributions. We therefore limit our discussion to this issue.3

To decide whether the Commissioner's position was substantially justified, we first identify the point in time at which the United States is considered to have taken a position and then decide whether the position taken from that date forward was substantially justified. Maggie Mgmt. Co. v. Commissioner, 108 T.C. 430, 442 (1997). The fact that the Commissioner eventually concedes or loses a case does not establish that his position was not substantially justified. Estate of Perry v. Commissioner, 931 F.2d 1044, 1046 (5th Cir. 1991); Corkrey v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 366, 373 (2000). However, the Commissioner's concession is a factor to be considered. Estate of Perry v. Commissioner, supra.

In general, we bifurcate our analysis and look separately at the dates that the Government took a position in the administrative proceeding and in the proceeding in this Court. sec. 7430(c)(7)(B)(ii), and the date respondent's counsel became involved in the case,4 Huffman v. Commissioner, supra; Estate of Merchant v. Commissioner, 947 F.2d 1390, 1392 & n.6 (9th Cir. 1991), affg. T.C. Memo. 1990-160.

A. The Administrative Proceeding
Respondent's position in the administrative proceeding was substantially justified. Gross income includes all income from whatever source derived unless excluded by a specific provision of the Internal Revenue Code. Sec. 72(t)(2)(F); 5 "showed that the distributions were qualified distributions, not income." Petitioners are incorrect.

sec. 1.6001-1(a), Income Tax Regs. The books or records required shall be kept at all times available for inspection by authorized internal revenue officers or employees.

Furthermore, even if respondent did have prior years' records indicating that the distributions were nontaxable, each taxable year stands on its own, and the Commissioner may challenge in a succeeding year what was overlooked in previous years. See Rose v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 28, 31-32 (1970); Hahn v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-75. Accordingly, respondent was not required to accept information reported on previous years' tax returns and Forms 5498. We therefore conclude that respondent's position in the administrative proceeding was substantially justified.

B. The Court Proceeding
Costs incurred in connection with the filing of a petition and costs incurred thereafter are considered litigation costs. McGowan v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-80; sec. 301.7430-4(c)(3) and (4), Example 2, Proced. & Admin. Regs. Because petitioners dealt with the Office of Appeals after the petition was filed, any costs relating to such activity are litigation costs rather than administrative costs. See Goertler v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-136 n.7; sec. 301.7430-4(c)(4), Example 2, Proced. & Admin. Regs.

In support of their view that respondent's position was not substantially justified, petitioners discuss at length the Appeals officer's actions and the erroneous legal conclusion that she reached. We are not unsympathetic to the delay and frustration caused by the Appeals officer's misinterpretation of the law. Furthermore, we agree with petitioners that it should not be "[the taxpayer's] job to help employees of the Internal Revenue Service understand the tax code", as petitioners attempted to do in their July 11 letter. Nevertheless, the Government's litigating position is formed only after the Government's attorney becomes involved in the case. See Huffman v. Commissioner, supra; Estate of Merchant v. Commissioner, supra; Andary-Stern v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-212. Petitioners' discussions with the Appeals officer occurred before respondent's counsel became involved in the case. The Appeals officer's conclusion does not represent respondent's litigating position and does not prevent that position from being substantially justified. We therefore focus on the actions taken by respondent's counsel.
As discussed above, respondent did not initially file an answer. See supra note 4. Respondent's counsel was assigned this case on December 5, 2006. Approximately 2 weeks later, respondent's counsel acknowledged the Appeals officer's mistake and requested additional substantiation. Once petitioners provided the requested information, respondent's counsel promptly conceded. Under the circumstances, we conclude that respondent's position in the court proceeding was substantially justified. See Bertolino v. Commissioner, 930 F.2d 759, 761 (9th Cir. 1991) (upholding the denial of litigation costs where the Commissioner's attorney settled the case "with reasonable dispatch"); Andary-Stern v. Commissioner, supra (the Commissioner is given a reasonable period of time to resolve factual issues after receiving all relevant information); see also Estate of White v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-54 (and cases cited therein).

Because respondent's position was substantially justified, petitioners are not entitled to recover administrative costs or litigation costs. Accordingly, we need not decide whether petitioners paid or incurred attorney's fees or whether the claimed fees are reasonable. In reaching our holding, we have considered all arguments made by the parties, and to the extent not mentioned above, we find them to be moot, irrelevant, or without merit.
To reflect the foregoing,

An appropriate order and decision will be entered.1 Unless otherwise indicated, section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect at relevant times, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.2 In general, contributions to a traditional individual retirement account (IRA) are deductible when made, but distributions from the IRA are subject to tax. See Orzechowki v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 750, 755 (1978), affd. 592 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1979). In contrast, contributions to a Roth IRA are not deductible, but qualified distributions generally are not subject to tax. 3 In his objection, respondent contends that the petition did not make clear whether petitioners were also contesting the other adjustments in the notice of deficiency because "the petition alleged nothing with respect to [those] adjustments". The Appeals Case Memorandum states, however, that petitioners are "not disputing these issues, as they are di minimus [sic] and the real issue is the Roth [IRA] distribution." Furthermore, we have repeatedly held that issues not raised in the petition are deemed to be conceded. See Nicklaus v. Commissioner, 117 T.C. 117, 120 n.4 (2001); Evan v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-180 n.1.4 The Commissioner generally takes a position in the Court proceeding when the answer is filed. Corson v. Commissioner, 123 T.C. 202, 206 (2004). This case was originally designated a small tax case, and therefore no answer was required. See Rule 173(b) as in effect when the petition was filed. Respondent conceded that the Roth IRA distributions were not taxable on Jan. 10, 2007. Upon petitioners' motion, we removed the "S" designation on Jan. 29, 2007. Respondent filed an answer on Apr. 13, 2007.5 A Form 5498, IRA Contribution Information, is issued by a third party that maintains a Roth IRA for the taxpayer. As its name suggests, the Form 5498 shows the amount of contributions the taxpayer made during the taxable year to the Roth IRA.
Alvin S. Brown, Esq.
Tax Attorney
703.425.1400
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Monday, September 17, 2007


Tax Help TIGTA Report on "hobby losses". Curiously, the TIGTA report identifies current loopholes to taking business losses on Schedule C and also suggests legislation to close the loopholes

Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) Report:

Significant Challenges Exist in Determining Whether Taxpayers With Schedule C Losses Are Engaged in Tax Abuse (Reference Number: 2007-30-173)September 17, 2007Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) report: Schedule C losses: Tax abuse. --
TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION

Significant Challenges Exist in Determining Whether Taxpayers With Schedule C Losses Are Engaged in Tax Abuse

September 7, 2007Reference Number: 2007-30-173

This report has cleared the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration disclosure review process and information determined to be restricted from public release has been redacted from this document.Redaction Legend:1 = Tax Return/Return InformationPhone Number 202-927-7037Email Address Bonnie.Heald@tigta.treas.govWeb Site http://www.tigta.gov

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATIONSeptember 7, 2007MEMORANDUM FOR COMMISSIONER, SMALL BUSINESS/SELF-EMPLOYED DIVISIONFROM: Michael R. Phillips
Deputy Inspector General for Audit

SUBJECT: Final Audit Report -(Audit # 200630039)This report presents the results of our review to determine what actions the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is taking to address noncompliant, high-income1 Small Business/Self-Employed (SB/SE) Division taxpayers who claim business losses using a U.S. Individual Income Tax Return (Form 1040) Profit or Loss From Business (Schedule C) for activities considered to be not-for-profit. This audit was part of the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration's Fiscal Year 2007 audit plan.Impact on the TaxpayerIn general, if a taxpayer has hobby income and expenses, the expense deduction should be limited to the hobby income amount. About 1.5 million taxpayers, many with significant income from other sources, filed Form 1040 Schedules C showing no profits, only losses, over consecutive Tax Years 2002 - 2005 (4 years); 73 percent of these taxpayers were assisted by tax practitioners.

By claiming these losses to reduce their taxable incomes, about 1.2 million of the 1.5 million taxpayers potentially2 avoided paying $2.8 billion in taxes in Tax Year 2005. Changes are needed to prevent taxpayers from continually deducting losses in potentially not-for-profit activities to reduce their tax liabilities.SynopsisAccording to IRS estimates, incorrect deductions of hobby expenses account for a portion of the overstated adjustments, deductions, exemptions, and credits that result in about $30 billion per year in unpaid taxes. The IRS faces considerable challenges in administrating the tax law for taxpayers who take Schedule C losses year after year for potentially not-for-profit activities. Several recent efforts demonstrate these challenges. In an effort to change noncompliant taxpayer behavior, the IRS sent letters to taxpayers with potentially tax-abusive, home-based businesses as an alternate treatment to save audit resources. However, the taxpayer response rate was low, and IRS researchers concluded that the use of letters would not necessarily be productive as a tool to induce self-correction. The IRS also conducted correspondence examinations.3 However, these examinations did not always deter taxpayers from continuing to claim hobby losses in succeeding tax years.Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) Section (§) 1834 (Activities not engaged in for profit), also referred to as the "hobby loss" provision, and related Treasury Regulation § 1.183-15 do not establish specific criteria for the IRS to use to determine whether a Schedule C loss is a legitimate business expense without conducting a full examination of an individual's books and records.

The purpose of the hobby loss provision was to limit the ability of wealthy individuals with multiple sources of income to apply losses incurred in "side-line" diversions to reduce their overall tax liabilities.

Our analysis showed 332,615 high-income taxpayers received the greatest benefit by potentially avoiding approximately $1.9 billion in taxes for Tax Year 2005.The I.R.C. and Treasury Regulation do not require a taxpayer to have a reasonable expectation of profit; rather, the taxpayer needs just the "objective" of making a profit. I.R.C. § 183 makes it difficult for the IRS to efficiently administer tax law that ensures taxpayers are not deducting not-for-profit losses to reduce their taxes on other incomes year after year.RecommendationsTo reduce potential abuse, the Commissioner, SB/SE Division, should provide a copy of this report to the Department of the Treasury, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, to consider proposal of legislative changes to I.R.C. § 183.

The proposal should include establishing a clearly defined standard or bright-line rule6 for determining whether an activity is a business or a not-for-profit activity. Aside from a legislative remedy, due to the large number of tax returns with Schedule C losses being prepared by tax practitioners, the Director, Communications, Liaison, and Disclosure, SB/SE Division, should continue to coordinate with practitioner organizations to encourage compliance with existing provisions.ResponseThe Commissioner, SB/SE Division, agreed with the recommendations. The Director, Communications, Liaison and Disclosure, SB/SE Division, will coordinate with the Office of Legislative Affairs to forward a copy of the final report to the Department of the Treasury Office of Tax Policy and will include key messages and talking points about I.R.C. § 183 tax obligations as a Fiscal Year 2008 outreach initiative directed to practitioner organizations. Management's complete response to the draft report is included as Appendix V.Copies of this report are also being sent to the IRS officials affected by the report recommendations. Please contact me at (202) 622-6510 if you have questions or Daniel R. Devlin, Assistant Inspector General for Audit (Small Business and Corporate Programs), at (202) 622-5894.

Table of Contents



Background




Results of Review




The Internal Revenue Service Is Aware That Problems Exist With
Taxpayers Claiming Schedule C Losses From Not-for-Profit
Activities




The Internal Revenue Code and Treasury Regulations Make It
Difficult to Determine When a Schedule C Loss Is Related to a
Business or Hobby




Recommendations 1 and 2:




Appendices




Appendix I - Detailed Objective, Scope, and Methodology




Appendix II - Major Contributors to This Report




Appendix III - Report Distribution List




Appendix IV - Methodology for Determining the Number of Taxpayers
and Potential Tax Avoided in Tax Year 2005




Appendix V - Management's Response to the Draft Report Page

Abbreviations



I.R.C. Internal Revenue Code

IRS Internal Revenue Service

SB/SE Small Business/Self-Employed

Background

The Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) generally allows individuals to deduct expenses only when those expenses are incurred either for the purpose of producing income (I.R.C. Section [§] 212)1 or in a trade or business (I.R.C. § 162).2

In contrast, personal expenses are ordinarily not deductible. As Supreme Court Justice John Marshall Harlan, II once wrote, "For income tax purposes Congress has seen fit to regard an individual as having two personalities: one is a seeker of profit who can deduct the expenses incurred in that search; the other is a creature satisfying his needs as a human and those of his family but who cannot deduct such consumption and related expenditures."3

The first "hobby loss" provision in the I.R.C. was enacted by the Revenue Act of 1943.4 It was popularly known as "the Marshall Field Bill." Some believed (1) Mr. Field was operating his liberal newspapers, PM and the Chicago Sun, as a sole proprietorship and, (2) because they were both thought to be losing money at that time, the Federal Government was in a sense "financing" these publications out of taxes Mr. Field would otherwise have had to pay.

The Act was intended to limit the ability of wealthy individuals with multiple sources of income to apply losses incurred in "side-line" diversions to reduce their overall tax liabilities.

The first "hobby loss" provision in the I.R.C. was enacted by the Revenue Act of 1943.
The I.R.C. was last modified for this issue in 1988, as I.R.C. § 1835 (Activities not engaged in for profit).

Current I.R.C. § 183 provides a presumption that an activity is engaged in for profit if the activity is profitable for 3 years of a consecutive 5-year period or 2 years of a consecutive 7-year period for activities that consist of breeding, showing, training, or racing horses.

Treasury Regulation § 1.183-16 sets forth the following nonexclusive list of nine factors to guide courts in analyzing a taxpayer's profit objective:(1) The manner in which the taxpayer carries on the activity.(2) The expertise of the taxpayer or his (or her) advisers.(3) The time and effort expended by the taxpayer in carrying on the activity.(4) The expectation that the assets used in the activity may appreciate in value.(5) The success of the taxpayer in carrying on other similar or dissimilar activities.(6) The taxpayer's history of income or losses with respect to the activity.(7) The amount of occasional profits, if any, that are earned.(8) The financial status of the taxpayer.(9) The elements of personal pleasure or recreation involved in the activity.

However, the mere fact that the number of factors indicating the lack of a profit objective exceeds the number indicating the presence of a profit objective (or vice versa) is not conclusive.This review was performed at the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) National Headquarters in Washington, D.C., in the Small Business/Self-Employed (SB/SE) Division, the SB/SE Division Campus7 Compliance Services function in Florence, Kentucky, and the Office of Appeals, Technical Services, Tax Policy function in Dallas, Texas, during the period October 2006 through June 2007. The audit was conducted in accordance with Government Auditing Standards. Detailed information on our audit objective, scope, and methodology is presented in Appendix I. Major contributors to the report are listed in Appendix II.


Results of Review

The Internal Revenue Service Is Aware That Problems Exist With Taxpayers Claiming Schedule C Losses From Not-for-Profit ActivitiesA number of taxpayers who have significant income from other sources reduce their taxable incomes by reporting losses on a U.S. Individual Income Tax Return (Forms 1040) Profit or Loss From Business (Schedule C). According to IRS estimates, incorrect deductions of hobby expenses account for a portion of the overstated adjustments, deductions, exemptions, and credits that result in about $30 billion per year in unpaid taxes.The IRS has made several different efforts to administrate the tax law.

First, as part of the SB/SE Division Tax Gap8 - National Research Project Communication Plan, on April 25, 2007, the IRS issued on its web site (IRS.gov) a Factsheet reminding taxpayers to follow appropriate guidelines when determining whether an activity is a business or a hobby (an activity not engaged in for profit).

In general, if a taxpayer has hobby income and expenses, the expense deductions should be limited to the hobby income amount. The Factsheet detailed the nine factors to be considered when making this determination and the limitations for deducting some expenses from not-for-profit activities as itemized deductions on Form 1040 Itemized Deductions (Schedule A). In addition to the general public, the Factsheet's targeted audience included practitioner and industry groups.Second, in 2005, the SB/SE Division Research function performed a research project on home-based businesses that included a review of Schedule C expenses to identify alternate treatments of potentially noncompliant behavior that would save audit resources. The Research function sent letters to taxpayers with potentially tax-abusive, home-based businesses in an attempt to change their potentially noncompliant tax behavior.

Although some taxpayers did file amended returns, the overall response rate was low, and the SB/SE Research function concluded that the use of letters would not necessarily be productive as a tool to induce self-correction by home-based business participants.In a third effort, in 2003, the IRS performed limited testing to determine if examinations of tax returns with Schedule C losses from potentially not-for-profit activities could be accomplished through correspondence examinations.9 In general, a correspondence examination does not include an examination of a taxpayer's books and records. The testing included 148 returns for which 103 taxpayers' Schedule C losses10 were disallowed because they were considered hobby expenses. These taxpayers were assessed taxes and interest of $372,089. The IRS has collected $345,600 from 95 (92 percent) of these taxpayers.11 As a followup to the IRS effort, we reviewed the accounts of the 95 taxpayers who had paid their assessments, to determine whether Schedule C losses were claimed on returns filed subsequent to the correspondence examinations. The results showed 48 (51 percent) of the 95 taxpayers continued to claim these losses in the succeeding tax years. Based on the test results, the IRS Campus Compliance Services function believes working the hobby loss issue through correspondence examination is not productive because the multiple contacts with taxpayers increased the amount of time needed to complete the examinations. While identifying potential hobby losses is part of the tax return examination classification process, the number of taxpayers taking multiple, consecutive year losses presents significant challenges to tax administration.

The Internal Revenue Code and Treasury Regulations Make It Difficult to Determine When a Schedule C Loss Is Related to a Business or HobbyTwo conditions exist to make I.R.C. §183 a challenge to tax administration. First, I.R.C. §183, also referred to as the hobby loss provision, and related Treasury Regulation §1.183-1 do not establish specific criteria for the IRS to use to determine whether a Schedule C loss is a legitimate business expense without conducting a full examination of an individual's books and records.

The I.R.C. and Treasury Regulation do not require a taxpayer to have a reasonable expectation of profit; rather, the taxpayer needs just the "objective" of making a profit.

Therefore, all facts and circumstances need to be considered in each case. In determining whether a profit objective exists, courts have ruled it may be sufficient that there is a small chance of making a profit. For example, an inventor may incur very substantial expenses in a venture for a profit even though the expectation of profit might be considered unreasonable.

Additionally, the IRS, not the taxpayer, bears the burden to rebut the presumption that an activity was not a for-profit business.

Second, the law also allows taxpayers to justify a substantial Schedule C loss by claiming a minimal profit.

For example, an activity could be considered a for-profit business if a taxpayer shows any profit during a 5-year period, even though much larger losses are claimed in the other taxable years. This allows taxpayers to break the cycle of having continuous years of losses and gives the appearance of being a for-profit business.To identify the scope of the problem, we performed an analysis of Tax Year 2005 Form 1040 Schedules C showing no profits, only losses, over consecutive Tax Years 2002 - 2005 (4 years). We identified a universe of 1,483,246 taxpayers,12 many with significant income from other sources, that met this criterion; 1,076,796 (73 percent) of these individuals had their tax returns prepared by tax practitioners. Based on their Tax Year 2005 income levels, 1,203,175 of the universe of taxpayers potentially13 avoided paying $2.8 billion in income taxes (see Appendix IV for additional information).


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14 The Individual Return Transaction File contains data transcribed from initial input of the original individual tax returns during return processing. Subsequent or amended return data are not contained in the File.As previously noted, the purpose of the hobby loss provision was to limit the ability of wealthy individuals with multiple sources of income to apply losses incurred in "side-line" diversions to reduce their overall tax liabilities. Figure 1 shows 332,615 high-income15 taxpayers received the greatest benefit by potentially avoiding approximately $1.9 billion in taxes for Tax Year 2005. We also computed their expense-to-income ratios. Figure 2 shows almost 70,000 of the high-income taxpayers claimed expenses 5 times greater than their revenues.


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We also analyzed how close the taxpayers were to making a profit by the fourth year. Figure 3 shows 204,015 high-income taxpayers reported either no gross receipts or expenses that were at least 2 times higher than their gross receipts, which allowed them to avoid paying potential taxes of more than $1.1 billion.



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To further determine how well the IRS can actually administrate this provision through examinations, we analyzed IRS Audit Information Management System16 data and found 73,431 of the 1,483,246 taxpayers have either open or closed examination records for the 4-year period (2002 - 2005). The closed records resulted in assessments of about $345 million, which is only 12 percent of the $2.8 billion in potential tax avoidance for Tax Year 2005 alone.17 However, we were unable to determine the issue for which these taxpayers were examined. Consequently, the taxpayers' Schedule C losses may not be the reason for the tax assessments.The challenges to tax administration caused by I.R.C. § 183 can be traced back to the legislative process. During the legislative process, the original intent of the hobby loss provision evolved into the existing I.R.C., which does not clearly establish when an activity is a business or a not-for-profit activity.In February 1969, the House of Representatives Ways and Means Committee proposed a change to the hobby loss provision that would disallow the deduction of losses arising from a "business" that had not been operated with a reasonable expectation of realizing a profit from it. If an individual carried on an activity with a loss in excess of $25,000 in 3 years out of 5 consecutive years, it would be deemed that (unless shown to the contrary by the taxpayer) the taxpayer was not operating the activity with a reasonable expectation of realizing a profit from it.However, the Senate Finance Committee substituted a different hobby loss provision and recommended the term "profit" be specifically defined to include not only immediate economic profit but also any reasonably anticipated long-term increase in the value of property. In making the determination of whether an activity is not engaged in for profit, the Senate Finance Committee intended that an objective rather than a subjective approach should be used. A reasonable expectation of profit was not required, and the facts and circumstances would have to indicate that the taxpayer entered the activity, or continued the activity, with the objective of making a profit. The Senate Finance Committee recommended the IRS bear the burden for rebutting this presumption, not the taxpayer as proposed by the House bill.In addition, the final Treasury Regulation § 1.183-1 (issued in July 1972) did not clearly establish when an activity is a business or not-for-profit activity. The Treasury Regulation established nine factors that should be taken into account when determining if an activity is engaged in for profit. However, the factors are a guide to assist in making the determination; they do not establish a clear standard.A study conducted in September 1998 by the Joint Economic Committee18 defined a "good tax" as:
Ÿ Not costly for either the Federal Government or taxpayers to calculate or administer; on the other hand, tax avoidance is difficult and risky.

Ÿ Neutral in its impact on resource allocation decisions, minimizing negative effects on economic growth; it does not lead to unproductive economic activity that is tax induced.

Ÿ Fair; people believe the tax burden is equitably distributed among the taxpaying population.
When comparing the criteria for a good tax to what is stated in I.R.C. § 183, we conclude that it is difficult for the IRS to efficiently and effectively administer this provision. The tax law cannot be efficiently administrated when examination resources would be required to determine compliance. Additionally, taxpayers may be abusing the law by taking multiple, consecutive year losses for expenses that could be for personal use to reduce taxes on other incomes.RecommendationsRecommendation 1: The Commissioner, SB/SE Division, should provide a copy of this report to the Department of the Treasury, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, to consider proposal of legislative changes to I.R.C. § 183. The proposal should include establishing a clearly defined standard or bright-line rule19 for determining whether an activity is a business or not-for-profit activity.

Management's Response: The Commissioner, SB/SE Division, agreed with the recommendation. Upon receipt of the final report, the Director, Communications, Liaison, and Disclosure, will coordinate with the Office of Legislative Affairs to forward a copy to the Department of the Treasury Office of Tax Policy.

Recommendation 2: Aside from a legislative remedy, due to the large number of tax returns with Schedule C losses being prepared by tax practitioners, the Director, Communications, Liaison, and Disclosure, SB/SE Division, should continue to coordinate with practitioner organizations to encourage compliance with existing provisions.

Management's Response: The Commissioner, SB/SE Division, agreed with the recommendation, stating that the Division's education and outreach activities should include key messages regarding current provisions of I.R.C. § 183 to further supplement the April 2007 Hobby Loss Factsheet. Management will include key messages and talking points about I.R.C. § 183 tax obligations as a Fiscal Year 2008 outreach initiative directed to practitioner organizations.

Appendix I

Detailed Objective, Scope, and Methodology
The overall objective of the audit was to determine what actions the IRS is taking to address noncompliant, high-income1 SB/SE Division taxpayers who claim business losses on a U.S. Individual Income Tax Return (Form 1040) Profit or Loss From Business (Schedule C) for activities considered to be not-for-profit. Specifically, we determined the methods the IRS uses to classify tax returns to be selected for examinations and the outreach actions employed to discourage taxpayers who claim these losses to reduce their tax liabilities. To accomplish the objective, we:

I. Contacted the IRS SB/SE Division Campus2 Compliance Services and Examination functions to determine if there were any action plans with target dates for implementation of methods to classify and examine returns with Schedule C hobby losses.

II. Determined what outreach methods the IRS has in place or planned to advise taxpayers of the rules regarding the use of Schedule C for activities considered to be a hobby.

A. Reviewed the public IRS web site (IRS.gov) and the SB/SE Division Intranet web site for information pertaining to the deduction of Schedule C expenses for not-for-profit activities. We also contacted the Stakeholder Liaison Headquarters to determine if there are any additional planned outreach initiatives for either individual taxpayers or tax preparers for this area.

B. Obtained the results of the 148 taxpayer cases for the limited testing for Tax Years 1998 through 2002 conducted by the IRS beginning in 2003 to determine if tax returns with hobby loss issues could be examined by correspondence examination.3 We analyzed 95 of the cases in which taxpayers agreed and paid the tax assessments, to determine if IRS contact with these taxpayers deterred them from filing Schedule C losses in the succeeding tax years.

C. Obtained a computer extract from the Individual Return Transaction File4 for Tax Years 2002 - 2005 Form 1040 Schedules C showing no profits, only losses, over the 4 consecutive Tax Years. The universe of taxpayers, many with significant income from other sources, meeting this criterion was 1,483,246.

1. Analyzed data to obtain statistics about the population, including the amount of taxes avoided in Tax Year 2005, by calculating the additional tax that would have been owed if the taxpayers had not taken the Schedule C losses.

2. Determined the number of taxpayers examined during this period using the IRS Audit Information Management System.5 The data were verified by matching a judgmental sample of 33 taxpayers' information to the IRS Integrated Data Retrieval System.6

III. To determine the Congressional intent of I.R.C. Section (§) 183,7 we contacted the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration Office of Chief Counsel and conducted additional research to obtain the legislative/regulatory history of I.R.C. § 183 and Treasury Regulation § 1.183-1.8

Appendix II

Major Contributors to This Report
Daniel R. Devlin, Assistant Inspector General for Audit (Small Business and Corporate Programs)Philip Shropshire, DirectorLisa Stoy, Audit ManagerCarole Connolly, Lead AuditorTimothy Greiner, Senior AuditorTed Lierl, Senior AuditorAppendix III
Report Distribution List
Acting Commissioner COffice of the Commissioner - Attn: Acting Chief of Staff CDeputy Commissioner for Services and Enforcement SEAssistant Deputy Commissioner for Services and Enforcement SEChief, Appeals APChief Counsel CCDeputy Commissioner, Small Business/Self-Employed Division SE:SDirector, Campus Compliance Services, Small Business/Self-Employed Division SE:S:CCSDirector, Communications, Liaison, and Disclosure, Small Business/Self-Employed Division SE:S:CLDDirector, Examination, Small Business/Self-Employed Division SE:S:ENational Taxpayer Advocate TADirector, Office of Legislative Affairs CL:LADirector, Office of Program Evaluation and Risk Analysis RAS:OOffice of Internal Control OS:CFO:CPIC:ICAudit Liaisons:

Commissioner, Small Business/Self-Employed Division SE:S:CLD

Chief, Appeals AP

Chief Counsel CC

Appendix IV

Methodology for Determining the Number of Taxpayers and Potential Tax Avoided in Tax Year 2005
We used the following methodology to determine the number of taxpayers and potential tax avoided in Tax Year 2005.First, we obtained from the IRS Individual Return Transaction File1 a computer extract of Tax Years 2002 - 2005 U.S. Individual Income Tax Returns (Form 1040) with an attached Profit or Loss From Business (Schedule C) showing no profits, only losses, over the 4 consecutive Tax Years. Our results identified 1,483,246 taxpayers that met this criterion.We then calculated the additional taxes that would have been owed if taxpayers had not taken the Schedule C losses in Tax Year 2005. This was accomplished by using each taxpayer's filing status for Tax Year 2005 and applying the appropriate tax rate.Next, we added back the amount of the Schedule C loss to each taxpayer's taxable income and computed the tax. We then subtracted the tax computed on the amount including the Schedule C loss from the tax computed by eliminating the Schedule C loss. This calculation provided the amount considered to be the tax avoided in Tax Year 2005 by claiming the Schedule C loss.The total potential tax avoidance for Tax Year 2005 is $2,843,919,493 for 1,203,175 taxpayers. We determined 280,071 of the 1,483,246 taxpayers did not avoid any taxes by claiming a Schedule C loss in Tax Year 2005.

Appendix V

Management's Response to the Draft Report
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURYINTERNAL REVENUE SERVICEWASHINGTON, D.C. 20224COMMISSIONER SMALL BUSINESS/SELF-EMPLOYED DIVISIONAugust 20, 2007MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AUDITFROM: Kathy K. Petronchak

Commissioner, Small Business/Self-Employed Division
SUBJECT: Draft Audit Report --Significant Tax Administration Challenges Exist in Determining Whether Individual Returns With Schedule C Losses Are Engaged in Tax Abuse" (Audit #200630039)We have reviewed your draft report, "Significant Tax Administration Challenges Exist in Determining Whether Individual Returns With Schedule C Losses Are Engaged in Tax Abuse," and agree with the recommendations.As you mention in your report, Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Section 183 presents challenges to tax administration. We appreciate your recognition of our efforts to address this difficult provision, especially within our Small Business/Self-Employed Division Tax Gap Communication Plan. An important component of this plan included sharing fact sheets and key messages with our practitioner and industry partners emphasizing proper application of the current tax law.We plan to continue communicating with practitioners and industry groups to educate them about this and other tax issues where voluntary compliance can be improved. Per your recommendation, we will also share a copy of your final report with Treasury's Office of Tax Policy.Attached is a detailed response outlining our corrective actions.If you have any questions, please contact me or call Beth Tucker, Director, Communications, Liaison and Disclosure, Small Business/Self-Employed Division, at (972) 308-1676.AttachmentAttachmentRECOMMENDATION 1:The Commissioner, SB/SE Division should provide a copy of this report to the Department of the Treasury, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, to consider proposal of legislative changes to Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Section 183(d). The proposal should include establishing a clearly defined standard or bright-line rule1 for determining whether an activity is a business or not-for-profit activity.CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:We agree with your recommendation. Upon receipt of the final report, the Director Communications, Liaison and Disclosure will coordinate with Legislative Affairs to forward a copy to Treasury Tax Policy.IMPLEMENTATION DATE:October 15, 2007RESPONSIBLE OFFICIAL:Director, Communications, Liaison and Disclosure, Small Business/Self-Employed DivisionCORRECTIVE ACTION(S) MONITORING PLAN:Director, Communications, Liaison and Disclosure, Small Business/Self-Employed Division will notify the Director, Legislative Affairs once the report is shared with Treasury.RECOMMENDATION 2:Aside from a legislative remedy, due to the large number of tax returns with Schedule C losses being prepared by tax practitioners, the Director, Communications, Liaison, and Disclosure, SB/SE Division, should continue to coordinate with practitioner organizations to encourage compliance with existing provisions.CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:We agree that our education and outreach activities should include key messages regarding the current provisions of IRC Section 183 to further supplement the April 2007 Hobby Loss Fact Sheet. We will include key messages and talking points about IRC Section 183 tax obligations as a FY 2008 outreach initiative directed to practitioner organizations.IMPLEMENTATION DATE:July 15, 2008RESPONSIBLE OFFICIAL:Director, Communications, Liaison and Disclosure (CLD), Small Business/Self-Employed Division (SB/SE)CORRECTIVE ACTION(S) MONITORING PLAN:Director, Communications, Liaison and Disclosure (CLD), Small Business/Self-Employed Division (SB/SE) will advise the Commissioner, SB/SE Division of any delays in implementing this corrective action.1 We categorized taxpayers with total income sources of $100,000 or greater to be high-income taxpayers.2 The term potentially is used because an examination of books and records is necessary to determine whether there was tax avoidance or abuse.3 Correspondence examinations are conducted through the mail, with the IRS typically asking taxpayers for more support regarding one or two simple issues on individual income tax returns.4 I.R.C. § 183, Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 1001(h) (3), 102 Stat. 3352.5 T.D. 7198, 37 FR 13683, July 13, 1972.6 A bright-line test is a clear division between what is acceptable and what is not from a legal, accounting, or regulatory perspective.1 I.R.C. § 212, Pub. L. No. 94-12, § 208(b), 68A Stat. 69.2 I.R.C. § 162, Pub. L. No. 108-357, §§ 318(a), (b), §§ 802(b) (2), 118 Stat. 1470, 1568.3 Justice Harlan, United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39 (1963).4 Title I, § 129(a), 58 Stat. 48.5 I.R.C. § 183, Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 1001(h) (3), 102 Stat. 3352.6 T.D. 7198, 37 FR 13683, July 13, 1972.7 The campuses are data processing arm of the IRS. They process paper and electronic submissions, correct errors, and forward data to the Computing Centers for analysis and posting to taxpayer accounts.8 The tax gap is the difference between the amount of tax that taxpayers should pay for a given year and the amount that is paid voluntarily and timely. The tax gap represents, in dollar terms, the annual amount of noncompliance with the tax laws.9 Correspondence examinations are conducted through the mail, with the IRS typically asking taxpayers for more support regarding one or two simple issues on individual income tax returns.10 We and the IRS analyst who oversaw the test reviewed the returns for the remaining 45 taxpayers whose Schedule C losses had not been disallowed. Based on the IRS analyst's recollection of the cases, the Schedule C losses for 36 of the 45 taxpayers should also have been disallowed; however, the original case files were no longer available.11 This includes * * * * * Five other taxpayers also appealed their assessments. The Office of Appeals conceded the assessment in four cases and * * * * * The three remaining taxpayers have not paid their assessments and have balance-due accounts.12 Because of data limitations, we did not determine whether all consecutive losses were for the same activity.13 The term potentially is used because an examination of books and records is necessary to determine whether there was tax avoidance or abuse.15 We categorized taxpayers with total income sources of $100,000 or greater to be high-income taxpayers.16 This System traces examination results through final determination of tax liability, including any actions taken by the IRS Office of Appeals and the Tax Court.17 Our calculations were based on 1 year's tax, while a disallowed hobby loss could be for 3 or more years.18 Some Underlying Principles of Tax Policy, United States Congress Joint Economic Committee Study, Richard K. Vedder and Lowell E. Gallaway, Distinguished Professors of Economics, Ohio University, September 1998.19 A bright-line test is a clear division between what is acceptable and what is not from a legal, accounting, or regulatory perspective.1 We categorized taxpayers with total income sources of $100,000 or greater to be high-income taxpayers.2 The campuses are data processing arm of the IRS. They process paper and electronic submissions, correct errors, and forward data to the Computing Centers for analysis and posting to taxpayer accounts.3 Correspondence examinations are conducted through the mail, with the IRS typically asking taxpayers for more support regarding one or two simple issues on individual income tax returns.4 The Individual Return Transaction File contains data transcribed from initial input of the original individual tax returns during return processing. Subsequent or amended return data are not contained in the File.5 The system traces examination results through final determination of tax liability, including any actions taken by the IRS Office of Appeals and the Tax Court.6 This is the IRS computer system capable of retrieving or updating stored information; it works in conjunction with a taxpayer's account records.7 I.R.C. § 183, Pub. L. No.100-647, § 1001(h) (3), 102 Stat. 3352.8 T.D. 7198, 37 FR 13683, July 13, 1972.1 The Individual Return Transaction File contains data transcribed from initial input of the original individual tax returns during return processing. Subsequent or amended return data are not contained in the File.1 A bright-line test is a clear division between what is acceptable and what is not from a legal, accounting, or regulatory perspective.

The following is the recently published IRS Fact Sheet on "hobby losses."

IRS Fact Sheet FS-2007-18, April 16, 2007

.[Code Sec. 183]Deductions: Business expenses: Hobby losses: Activities not engaged in for profit: Itemized deductions. --The factors to be considered in determining whether an activity is a business or a hobby are listed in an IRS fact sheet. The rules governing the deduction of hobby expenses on Schedule A of Form 1040 are reviewed. Back reference: ¶12,177.173.The Internal Revenue Service reminds taxpayers to follow appropriate guidelines when determining whether an activity is a business or a hobby, an activity not engaged in for profit.In order to educate taxpayers regarding their filing obligations, this fact sheet, the eleventh in a series, explains the rules for determining if an activity qualifies as a business and what limitations apply if the activity is not a business. Incorrect deduction of hobby expenses account for a portion of the overstated adjustments, deductions, exemptions and credits that add up to $30 billion per year in unpaid taxes, according to IRS estimates.In general, taxpayers may deduct ordinary and necessary expenses for conducting a trade or business. An ordinary expense is an expense that is common and accepted in the taxpayer's trade or business. A necessary expense is one that is appropriate for the business. Generally, an activity qualifies as a business if it is carried on with the reasonable expectation of earning a profit.In order to make this determination, taxpayers should consider the following factors:
Ÿ Does the time and effort put into the activity indicate an intention to make a profit?

Ÿ Does the taxpayer depend on income from the activity?

Ÿ If there are losses, are they due to circumstances beyond the taxpayer's control or did they occur in the start-up phase of the business?

Ÿ Has the taxpayer changed methods of operation to improve profitability?

Ÿ Does the taxpayer or his/her advisors have the knowledge needed to carry on the activity as a successful business?

Ÿ Has the taxpayer made a profit in similar activities in the past?

Ÿ Does the activity make a profit in some years?

Ÿ Can the taxpayer expect to make a profit in the future from the appreciation of assets used in the activity?
The IRS presumes that an activity is carried on for profit if it makes a profit during at least three of the last five tax years, including the current year --at least two of the last seven years for activities that consist primarily of breeding, showing, training or racing horses.If an activity is not for profit, losses from that activity may not be used to offset other income. An activity produces a loss when related expenses exceed income. The limit on not-for-profit losses applies to individuals, partnerships, estates, trusts, and S corporations. It does not apply to corporations other than S corporations.Deductions for hobby activities are claimed as itemized deductions on Schedule A (Form 1040). These deductions must be taken in the following order and only to the extent stated in each of three categories:
Ÿ Deductions that a taxpayer may take for personal as well as business activities, such as home mortgage interest and taxes, may be taken in full.

Ÿ Deductions that don't result in an adjustment to basis, such as advertising, insurance premiums and wages, may be taken next, to the extent gross income for the activity is more than the deductions from the first category.

Ÿ Business deductions that reduce the basis of property, such as depreciation and amortization, are taken last, but only to the extent gross income for the activity is more than the deductions taken in the first two categories.
Link:
Ÿ Further information is available in IRS Publication 535, Business Expenses

Alvin S. Brown, Esq.
Tax Attorney
703.425.1400
www.irstaxattorney.com

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Friday, September 14, 2007

Tax Attorney IRC 6330(c)(2)(B) - taxpayer was able to challange the underlying tax liability


Robert L. Perkins v. Commissioner, Dkt. No. 21997-04L , 129 TC --, No. 7, September 13, 2007.



[Code Secs. 6213 and 6330]

Appeals: Collection due process: Review of underlying tax liability: Harmless error. --


An individual was entitled to challenge his underlying tax liability in a Collection Due Process (CDP) appeal, but the IRS Appeals Officer's refusal to allow him to do so was harmless error because his challenges to the liability were groundless. Although the taxpayer appealed the underlying tax liability, before such appeal was considered, the IRS issued a levy notice for the same liability. The Appeals team manager thereafter summarily denied the tax liability appeals request. At the subsequent CDP hearing on the levy notice, the taxpayer was prevented from challenging the tax liability. The notice of determination upholding the levy action was signed by the same Appeals team manager who denied the prior appeals request. The taxpayer was entitled to challenge the liability at the CDP hearing both because the self-assessed portion of the liability had not been considered in the prior appeal, and because, at the time the taxpayer became entitled to a CDP hearing, he had no prior opportunity to challenge the liability. The failure to allow the taxpayer to challenge the liability was, however, harmless error because his only arguments with respect to the liability were frivolous. For the same reason, the involvement of the Appeals team manager in both the tax appeal and the CDP hearing, even if contrary to Code Sec. 6330(b)(3), was also harmless error and the IRS was, therefore, entitled to proceed with the levy.





Robert L. Perkins, pro se; James M. Klein, for respondent.



P timely filed his Federal income tax return for 2000 but failed to pay fully the amount reported as due. R increased the Federal income tax liability reported by P on his 2000 return and assessed the increase pursuant to sec. 6213(b)(1), I.R.C. After expiration of the period in which to request abatement of the increased assessment under sec. 6213(b)(2), I.R.C., P appealed the increase in a letter that was forwarded to R's Office of Appeals.



While consideration by Appeals was pending, R issued P a notice of intent to levy to collect the outstanding liability for 2000. P timely requested a hearing pursuant to sec. 6330(a)(3)(B), I.R.C. Before a hearing was scheduled, R's Office of Appeals responded to P's appeal of the increase in his 2000 liability, treating it as a claim for abatement and denying it. Thereafter, the Appeals employee conducting P's hearing under sec. 6330, I.R.C., did not allow P to challenge the underlying tax liability on the grounds that P's previous submission to R's Office of Appeals constituted a prior opportunity to dispute the liability under sec. 6330(c)(2)(B), I.R.C. A notice of determination sustaining the proposed levy was thereupon issued under the signature of the same Appeals officer who had denied P's previous submission. P timely petitioned for review of the notice of determination under sec. 6330(d), I.R.C.



Held: P did not have an "opportunity to dispute" his underlying tax liability for 2000 within the meaning of sec. 6330(c)(2)(B), I.R.C., by virtue of his earlier request, still pending when the collection action was initiated, for Appeals Office consideration and abatement of the liability. Consequently, it was error for the Appeals employee conducting P's hearing under sec. 6330, I.R.C., to refuse to consider P's challenges to the underlying tax liability, and P's challenges are subject to de novo review in this Court.



Held, further, P's challenges to his underlying tax liability are groundless. Accordingly, the refusal to consider them at P's hearing was harmless error.



Held, further, the possibility that an Appeals officer having "prior involvement" with respect to the unpaid tax, within the meaning of sec. 6330(b)(3), I.R.C., participated in the conduct of P's hearing is not grounds for a remand in this case, since all of petitioner's arguments against the collection action were frivolous or groundless.



GALE, Judge: Pursuant to section 6330(d)(1),1 petitioner seeks review of respondent's determination to proceed with a levy to collect petitioner's Federal income tax liability for taxable year 2000. We conclude that respondent may proceed with collection.





FINDINGS OF FACT



Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found. The stipulation of facts and the accompanying exhibits are incorporated herein by this reference. Petitioner resided in Wisconsin when he filed the petition in this case.



On April 16, 2001, petitioner timely filed his Federal income tax return for 2000 on a Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return. Before doing so, he had received a publication from respondent entitled "2000 Instructions for Form 1040" which included a discussion of special rules for traders in securities. On line 13 of the Form 1040, "Capital gain or (loss)", petitioner checked a box indicating that no Schedule D, Capital Gains and Losses, was required and reported $55,778.28 in losses, which offset ordinary income in that amount. As he indicated on the Form 1040, petitioner did not attach a Schedule D. The Form 1040 did not include any election forms, any Schedules C, Profit or Loss From Business, any Forms 4797, Sales of Business Property,2 or any statement to the effect that petitioner was a trader in securities or was invoking section 475(f). Petitioner has not at any time elected to have section 475(f) apply to the securities he held in 2000.



Respondent sent petitioner a letter dated July 12, 2001, requesting that petitioner complete a Schedule D with information to support his entry of $55,778.28 in losses on line 13 of the Form 1040. Petitioner thereupon completed a Schedule D for 2000 and submitted it to respondent. Petitioner's Schedule D reported net short-term capital losses of $55,778.28 and no long-term capital gains or losses.



Respondent subsequently sent petitioner a so-called math error notice3 dated September 3, 2001, which stated: "We changed your 2000 return. As a result of these changes, you owe $30,965.64. * * * You figured your capital gains and losses on Schedule D incorrectly." Respondent did not send a notice of deficiency to petitioner for 2000.



Petitioner responded to the math error notice by means of a letter to respondent dated December 5, 2001, in which he maintained that his 2000 return as originally filed was correct, including the position that no Schedule D needed to be filed. In response, respondent sent petitioner a Letter 105C dated March 20, 2002, advising of the disallowance of most of petitioner's claimed $55,778.28 loss on the grounds that the loss was limited to $3,000. The letter provided instructions for the filing of an appeal of the disallowance. Pursuant to the instructions, petitioner appealed the disallowance in the Letter 105C by means of a letter to respondent dated May 17, 2002, in which he offered his reasons for disagreeing, including a declaration that his statements were true under penalties of perjury (Appeals request).



On August 10, 2002, before responding to petitioner's Appeals request, respondent sent petitioner a "Final Notice of Intent to Levy and Notice of Your Right to a Hearing" (Notice of Intent to Levy), notifying petitioner that respondent intended to satisfy petitioner's outstanding 2000 tax liability by a levy, and advising petitioner of his right to request a hearing. Petitioner timely requested a hearing on a Form 12153, Request for a Collection Due Process Hearing, sent to respondent on September 6, 2002. Petitioner's Form 12153 disputed both the underlying tax liability and the "appropriateness of the collection action", in light of the fact that consideration of his Appeals request was still pending.



At some point, petitioner's Appeals request was referred to and considered by respondent's Office of Appeals. On April 28, 2003, before any action was taken with respect to petitioner's hearing request under section 6330, the Appeals Office issued petitioner a written response to his Appeals request. Treating petitioner's Appeals request as a claim for abatement,4 the Appeals Office denied it and advised petitioner that he could pursue the matter further by filing suit in the U.S. District Court or the U.S. Court of Federal Claims.5 The Appeals Office response was signed by Timothy I. Gukich as "Appeals Team Manager".



On June 10, 2004, approximately 21 months after his request for a hearing under section 6330 and more than 13 months after denying his Appeals request, the Appeals Office sent a letter to petitioner offering him the opportunity to schedule a section 6330 hearing. In accordance with petitioner's request, a hearing was conducted via telephone by Settlement Officer Gwenda Dumas on August 31 and October 5, 2004. Petitioner was not allowed to raise challenges to the underlying tax liability during the hearing. Respondent thereupon sent petitioner a "Notice of Determination Concerning Collection Action(s) Under Section 6320 and/or 6330", with a Letter 3193 attached, dated October 15, 2004. The notice of determination was signed by Timothy I. Gukich, "Appeals Team Manager", and concluded that it would be appropriate for respondent to proceed with the proposed levy. The notice of determination reasoned that petitioner could not challenge the underlying tax liability because he had received a "prior opportunity to appeal."6



Petitioner timely petitioned the Court for review of respondent's determination.





OPINION




I. Background


Section 6331(a) authorizes the Secretary to levy upon property and property rights of a taxpayer liable for taxes who fails to pay those taxes within 10 days after notice and demand for payment is made. Section 6331(d) provides that the levy authorized in section 6331(a) may be made with respect to any unpaid tax only if the Secretary has given written notice to the taxpayer 30 days before levy. Section 6330(a) requires the Secretary to send a written notice to the taxpayer of the amount of the unpaid tax and of the taxpayer's right to a section 6330 hearing at least 30 days before any levy is begun.



If a section 6330 hearing is requested, the hearing is to be conducted by an officer or employee of the Commissioner's Office of Appeals who has had no prior involvement with respect to the unpaid taxes at issue before the hearing. Sec. 6330(b)(1), (3). The Appeals officer or employee shall at the hearing obtain verification that the requirements of any applicable law or administrative procedure have been met. Sec. 6330(c)(1). The taxpayer may raise at the hearing "any relevant issue relating to the unpaid tax or the proposed levy". Sec. 6330(c)(2)(A). The taxpayer may also raise challenges to the existence or amount of the underlying tax liability at a hearing if the taxpayer did not receive a statutory notice of deficiency with respect to the underlying tax liability or did not otherwise have an opportunity to dispute that liability. Sec. 6330(c)(2)(B). A taxpayer is treated as not having had an opportunity to dispute a liability that is reported as due on a return. Montgomery v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. 1 (2004). An opportunity to dispute the underlying liability that precludes a taxpayer from challenging it in a section 6330 hearing includes a prior opportunity for a conference with the Commissioner's Office of Appeals when the taxpayer availed himself of that opportunity. Lewis v. Commissioner, 128 T.C. 48, 61 (2007); see also sec. 301.6330-1(e)(3), Q&A-E2, Proced. & Admin. Regs.



At the conclusion of the hearing, the Appeals officer or employee must determine whether and how to proceed with collection and shall take into account (i) the verification that the requirements of any applicable law or administrative procedure have been met; (ii) the relevant issues raised by the taxpayer; (iii) challenges to the underlying tax liability by the taxpayer, where permitted; and (iv) whether any proposed collection action balances the need for the efficient collection of taxes with the legitimate concern of the taxpayer that the collection action be no more intrusive than necessary. Sec. 6330(c)(3).



With respect to determinations made before October 17, 2006,7 we have jurisdiction to review the Appeals Office's determination where we have jurisdiction over the type of tax involved in the case. Sec. 6330(d)(1)(A); see Iannone v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. 287, 290 (2004). Generally, we may consider only those issues that the taxpayer raised during the section 6330 hearing. See sec. 301.6330-1(f)(2), Q&A-F5, Proced. & Admin. Regs.; see also Magana v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 488, 493 (2002). Where the underlying tax liability is properly at issue, we review the determination de novo. E.g., Goza v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 176, 181-182 (2000). Where the underlying tax liability is not at issue, we review the determination for abuse of discretion. Id. at 182. Whether an abuse of discretion has occurred depends upon whether the exercise of discretion is without sound basis in fact or law. See Freije v. Commissioner, 125 T.C. 14, 23 (2005); Ansley -Sheppard-Burgess Co. v. Commissioner, 104 T.C. 367, 371 (1995).




II. Challenges to the Underlying Liability


Petitioner's principal argument is that he did not receive the hearing to which he was entitled under section 6330 because the Appeals employee refused to consider challenges to the underlying tax liability. Pursuant to section 6330(c)(2)(B), the existence or amount of the underlying tax liability may be challenged only if the taxpayer did not receive a statutory notice of deficiency with respect to the underlying tax liability or did not otherwise have an opportunity to dispute that liability.



No statutory notice of deficiency was sent to petitioner for 2000. The unpaid tax that respondent seeks to collect by levy consists in part of an amount reported as due on petitioner's return but unpaid, and an additional amount assessed by respondent pursuant to the "math error" procedures under section 6213(b)(1).



The settlement officer did not permit petitioner to challenge the underlying tax liability in connection with his hearing, on the grounds that he had a prior opportunity to dispute the liability within the meaning of section 6330(c)(2)(B) by virtue of his making a submission to the Appeals Office in response to the Letter 105C (i.e., petitioner's Appeals request).



A. Challenges to Self-Assessed Amount



A portion of the underlying tax liability was reported by petitioner as due on his return. Under Montgomery v. Commissioner, supra, petitioner was entitled to challenge that portion of the liability. Petitioner's earlier Appeals request concerned only the liability arising from respondent's disallowance of petitioner's claimed capital losses exceeding $3,000. Thus, the Appeals employee's position that petitioner was precluded from challenging any portion of the underlying liability was erroneous.



B. Challenges to Section 6213(b)(1) Assessment



The remaining portion of the underlying tax liability is attributable to the additional assessment made by respondent pursuant to section 6213(b)(1), resulting from the disallowance of petitioner's claimed capital losses in excess of the $3,000 capital loss limitation of section 1211(b).8 The notice of determination also concluded that petitioner was precluded from challenging this portion of the underlying liability because of the consideration by the Appeals Office of his Appeals request. The difficulty with this conclusion is that the Appeals Office had not taken any action with respect to petitioner's Appeals request when the Notice of Intent to Levy was issued to him.



Section 6330(c)(2)(B) states with respect to the right of a person, whose property is subject to levy, to challenge the underlying tax liability in a section 6330 hearing as follows:



(B) Underlying liability. --The person may also raise at the hearing challenges to the existence or amount of the underlying tax liability for any tax period if the person did not receive any statutory notice of deficiency for such tax liability or did not otherwise have an opportunity to dispute such tax liability. [Emphasis added.]



The statute utilizes the past tense in reference to the opportunity to dispute, indicating that Congress contemplated that the dispute opportunity would have already transpired when the hearing under section 6330 occurred. Respondent's regulations confirm this interpretation: "An opportunity to dispute a liability includes a prior opportunity for a conference with Appeals that was offered either before or after the assessment of the liability." Sec. 301.6330-1(e)(3), Q&A-E2, Proced. & Admin. Regs. (emphasis added). In upholding the validity of this regulation recently, we concluded that "Congress * * * intended to preclude taxpayers who were previously afforded a conference with the Appeals Office from raising the underlying liabilities again in a collection review hearing and before this Court." Lewis v. Commissioner, supra at 61 (emphasis added).



Should the earlier Appeals conference opportunity be treated as a prior opportunity where, as in this case, the requested conference opportunity is not resolved by Appeals until after the taxpayer has requested, but not received, a section 6330 hearing? We conclude not, because to construe the statute in this manner would consign to the Commissioner's discretion whether the underlying tax liability is subject to judicial review. The Commissioner could cut off judicial review in these circumstances by the simple expedient of processing the Appeals consideration of the liability outside section 6330 before offering the section 6330 hearing. If the requested section 6330 hearing were offered first, a liability otherwise subject to challenge under section 6330(c)(2)(B) would also be subject to judicial review under section 6330(d) upon the taxpayer's timely appeal. Conversely, if Appeals consideration outside section 6330 proceeds first, the consideration by Appeals operates to preclude a challenge to the underlying liability in the 6330 hearing and any subsequent judicial review. See Lewis v. Commissioner, supra at 60-61. That is precisely the position taken by respondent in this case.



In enacting what is commonly referred to as the "collection due process" provisions of sections 6330 and 6320, Congress intended to confer new rights upon taxpayers when the Commissioner initiated collection actions against them, including, in designated circumstances, judicial review of the underlying tax liability. Montgomery v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. at 13 (Laro, J., concurring); Davis v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 35, 37 (2000); Offiler v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 492, 495 (2000); Goza v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. at 179-180. To construe section 6330(c)(2)(B) to preclude a challenge to, and judicial review of, the underlying tax liability in the circumstances of this case would circumscribe the right to judicial review that Congress intended to extend to taxpayers against whom collection actions have been initiated. We accordingly hold that petitioner did not have an "opportunity to dispute" the underlying tax liability within the meaning of section 6330(c)(2)(B) by virtue of an Appeals review that was not completed until after a hearing was requested under section 6330. To hold otherwise would permit the Commissioner to cut off a taxpayer's right to judicial review of his challenge to the underlying tax liability by the simple expedient of postponing the section 6330 hearing until after a request for Appeals consideration, pending when the collection action was initiated, was completed by Appeals.9 We therefore conclude that the Appeals employee erred in refusing to consider petitioner's challenge to the underlying tax liability; petitioner's underlying liability was properly at issue in his section 6330 hearing and is consequently subject to de novo review in this Court. See, e.g., Goza v. Commissioner, supra at 181-182.



C. De Novo Review of Underlying Tax Liability



Having decided that petitioner was entitled to challenge his underlying liability in the hearing and obtain judicial review thereof, we proceed to consider de novo the merits of petitioner's challenges. At trial, we gave petitioner an opportunity to raise any issue concerning the underlying liability that he contended he would have raised at the hearing.



1. Self-Assessed Amount



Petitioner has not addressed that portion of the underlying liability reported as due on his return but unpaid, other than his claim regarding the limitations period for assessment or collection that we find to be without merit. See infra at II.C.3. We therefore deem that portion conceded.



2. Section 6213(b)(1) Assessment: Claim Under Section 475(f)



As for the portion of the underlying liability attributable to respondent's disallowance of petitioner's claimed capital losses in excess of $3,000, petitioner contends that he is entitled to the claimed losses on the "basis of being a day trader". While section 475(f) allows persons engaged in a trade or business as a trader in securities to treat the gain or loss from such securities as ordinary income or loss (not subject to the section 1211(b) limitation on recognition of capital losses), see sec. 475(d)(3)(A)(i), (f)(1)(D), we are satisfied after a de novo review of petitioner's claim that he has not shown eligibility for treatment of his securities losses under section 475(f).



Section 475(f) allows ordinary gain or loss treatment in conjunction with use of the mark-to-market method of accounting for the securities used in the securities trader's trade or business. Sec. 475(f)(1)(A). A taxpayer must elect the provision, however, no later than the due date (without regard to extensions) for the return for the year immediately preceding the election year. Rev. Proc. 99-17, sec. 5.03, 1999-1 C.B. 503, 504; Lehrer v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-167; see also Knish v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-268. Petitioner admits that he has made no such election at any time. Even if we were to treat petitioner's averments in this proceeding as an attempt to elect section 475(f) notwithstanding the requirements of Rev. Proc. 99-17, supra, such an election, coming almost 5 years after the close of the year at issue, would give petitioner an impermissible benefit of hindsight. Compare Vines v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 279 (2006)(3-month-late section 475(f) election permitted under section 301.9100-3, Proced. & Admin. Regs., where taxpayer made no securities trades between election's due date and its actual filing), with Knish v. Commissioner, supra (6-month-late section 475(f) election made on Form 3115, Application for Change in Accounting Method, was ineffective); Lehrer v. Commissioner, supra (34-month-late section 475(f) election made on amended Tax Court petition was ineffective).



In addition to the absence of an election, petitioner presented no evidence beyond his uncorroborated testimony that he was engaged in a trade or business of trading securities. Supporting the contrary conclusion is his 2000 return, which contains no Schedule C for any trade or business. Finally, the Schedule D submitted by petitioner, which documents the securities sales giving rise to his claimed $55,778.28 loss, demonstrates to our satisfaction that petitioner did not employ mark-to-market accounting with respect to his securities. No securities were marked to market as of yearend 2000.



In sum, petitioner's contention that he was entitled to recognize a $55,778.28 loss in 2000 on account of his being a "day trader" is groundless. Aside from his apparent reliance on section 475(f), petitioner's remaining argument against the application of the section 1211(b) limitation on his claimed losses is that the restriction is unfair or inappropriate for taxpayers in his circumstances and/or that the recognition of capital losses should not be limited because the recognition of capital gains is not. These arguments merit no discussion; the applicability of section 1211(b) to taxpayers in petitioner's circumstances is well established. See, e.g., Marrin v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-24, affd. 147 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Acharya v. Commissioner, 225 Fed. Appx. 391 (7th Cir. 2007); Jamie v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-22.



3. Limitations Period Claims



Petitioner also asserted in his pretrial memorandum that the periods for assessment and/or collection have expired with respect to the liability at issue. Assuming that petitioner would have presented this issue if the Appeals employee had permitted challenges to the underlying liability, the contention is groundless. Generally, the amount of any tax imposed by the Internal Revenue Code must be assessed within 3 years after the return is filed. Sec. 6501(a). The liabilities at issue were assessed in 2001, well within the 3 years after the filing of the 2000 return on April 16, 2001. The 10-year period of limitations on collection commenced upon the assessments of the tax in 2001 and therefore does not expire until sometime in 2011. See sec. 6502(a).




III. Issues Other Than the Underlying Tax Liability


A. Section 6330(c)(1) Verification



Petitioner also argues, without citing any specifics, that the Appeals employee conducting his section 6330 hearing failed to satisfy section 6330(c)(1), which requires that the Appeals officer obtain verification that the requirements of applicable law or administrative procedure have been met. We disagree. The notice of determination catalogues the investigation undertaken by the Appeals employee to satisfy section 6330(c)(1), petitioner cites no specific error, and we have likewise found no infirmity in the process by which the liabilities at issue were assessed. A portion of the unpaid liability was assessed after being reported as due by petitioner, and the remainder was properly assessed pursuant to section 6213(b)(1).



B. Appeals Officer's Prior Involvement



Finally, petitioner argues that his hearing failed to satisfy the requirements of section 6330(b)(3), which provides that the hearing "shall be conducted by an officer or employee who has had no prior involvement with respect to the unpaid tax specified in subsection (a)(3)(A) before the first hearing under this section or section 6320." Section 301.6330-1(d)(2), A-D4, Proced. & Admin. Regs., provides:



Prior involvement by an employee or officer of Appeals includes participation or involvement in an Appeals hearing (other than a CDP [collection due process] hearing held under either section 6320 or section 6330) that the taxpayer may have had with respect to the tax and tax periods shown on the CDP notice.



Given that he signed the April 28, 2003, Appeals letter denying petitioner's Appeals request, we believe Appeals Team Manager Gukich had prior involvement with respect to petitioner's 2000 unpaid tax. (The Appeals letter signed by Mr. Gukich preceded petitioner's section 6330 hearing by approximately 16 months.)



Somewhat less clear is whether Mr. Gukich's signature as Appeals Team Manager on the notice of determination demonstrates that he participated in the "conduct" of petitioner's section 6330 hearing within the meaning of section 6330(b)(3). The parties have stipulated that the hearing "was conducted via telephone by Settlement Officer Gwenda Dumas". Nonetheless, even if we assume, without deciding, that Mr. Gukich participated in the conduct of petitioner's hearing, it would not be grounds for a remand in this case, because the arguments that petitioner has raised against the collection action are all frivolous and groundless. Thus, we conclude that, even if Mr. Gukich's apparently supervisory role in issuing the notice of determination were considered "conduct" of the hearing for purposes of section 6330(b)(3), such participation by Mr. Gukich could not have affected the outcome of the section 6330 hearing and was therefore harmless error.




IV. Conclusion


Petitioner raised no other issues. Because we find that the Appeals employees' refusal to allow petitioner to challenge the underlying tax liability and Mr. Gukich's possible participation in the conduct of the hearing after prior involvement would constitute harmless error, we conclude that neither requires that this case be remanded to Appeals for a further hearing; it would not be "necessary or productive" to do so. See Lunsford v. Commissioner, 117 T.C. 183, 189 (2001). Instead, we shall sustain respondent's determination to proceed with the levy. To reflect the foregoing,



Decision will be entered for respondent.


1 Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.

2 Respondent's publication, "2000 Instructions for Form 1040", instructs taxpayers electing to use "mark-to-market" accounting for securities held in connection with a trade or business of trading securities to report gains and losses on Form 4797.

3 See sec. 6213(b)(1). The letter was headed "We Changed Your Return-You Have an Amount Due".

4 The parties have stipulated that petitioner did not file a Form 1040X, Amended U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, for 2000.

5 Insofar as the record discloses, petitioner did not file suit in either court. However, on Mar. 22, 2004, petitioner filed a petition for redetermination of a deficiency with this Court. Petitioner's case arising from that petition was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on May 25, 2004.

6 The notice did not address the issue raised by petitioner in his hearing request concerning the appropriateness of respondent's initiating a collection action when petitioner's abatement request was pending before respondent's Appeals Office.

7 Pursuant to the Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-280, sec. 855(a), 120 Stat. 1019, this Court has jurisdiction with respect to all determinations in sec. 6330 proceedings, effective for determinations made after the date which is 60 days after the Aug. 17, 2006 date of enactment, or Oct. 16, 2006.

8 We are satisfied that respondent was entitled to make this assessment under sec. 6213(b)(1). Petitioner's claimed $55,778.28 capital loss constituted a "mathematical or clerical error" within the meaning of sec. 6213(b)(1) because it was "an entry on a return of a deduction * * * in an amount which exceeds a statutory limit imposed by subtitle A [of Title 26]", which limit "is expressed * * * as a specified monetary amount", and "the items entering into the application of such limit appear on such return". Sec. 6213(g)(2)(E). With regard to the last requirement, we note that the Schedule D belatedly submitted by petitioner disclosed to respondent that the claimed $55,778.28 loss arose from sales of capital assets and the extent of any gains from such sales, thus triggering the $3,000 limit of sec. 1211(b). Nothing on the return or its accompanying schedules indicated that petitioner had taken the position that he was entitled to report his securities transactions under sec. 475(f), as he apparently now claims in this proceeding.

Petitioner would have been entitled to have the foregoing "math error" assessment abated, and the proposed increase in his 2000 tax liability considered instead under the deficiency procedures, if he had so requested within 60 days after the "math error" notice was sent to him on Sept. 3, 2001. See sec. 6213(b)(2)(A). However, petitioner failed to do so within the allotted 60 days; his letter disputing the "math error" assessment was not sent until Dec. 5, 2001.

Respondent does not contend that petitioner's right to invoke deficiency procedures with respect to the asserted liability pursuant to sec. 6213(b)(2)(A) constituted "an opportunity to dispute" the liability within the meaning of sec. 6330(c)(2)(B). We note in this regard that the "math error" notice sent to petitioner nowhere disclosed to him his right to deficiency procedures, let alone that such right was contingent upon petitioner's making the request within 60 days.

9 We note in this regard that the same Appeals officer who considered and denied any relief with respect to petitioner's Appeals request also signed off on the notice of determination which took the position that petitioner was precluded from challenging the underlying liability in the sec. 6330 proceeding because of "prior" Appeals consideration.


Alvin S. Brown, Esq.
703 425.1400
www.irstaxattorney.com


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Thursday, September 13, 2007

Back Taxes - Broad scope of search warrents not limited by Fourth Amendment


Uniteded States of America v. Neil Stierhoff. U.S. District Court, Dist. R.I.; CR 06-042-ML, March 13, 2007, 477 FSupp2d 423.

[ Code Sec. 7203]Evidence: Search warrant: Consent to search: Plain view doctrine: Independent source doctrine: Fourth Amendment. --

Tax-related evidence obtained from a search of a folder on an individual's computer by an IRS special agent, while helping police with a stalking investigation, was suppressed. Since he had limited his consent to the search of the "Creative Writing" folder in his computer, searches conducted of a folder labeled "Offshore" in the absence of a warrant exceeded that consent and were not reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The plain view exception to the warrant requirement did not apply because the incriminating nature of its contents was not immediately apparent. The government failed to show that the subsequent decision to seek a warrant was not prompted by the illegal search of the "Offshore" folder. However, the individual's statements made to the state (Rhode Island) police and other evidence seized by the police during the warrantless searches of his room and self-storage units following his arrest for misdemeanor stalking were legally acquired and not suppressed with respect to his indictment on tax evasion charges. The individual made a willing and reasoned choice to speak to the police and voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights following his arrest. Also, he freely and voluntarily consented to a search of his room and self-storage units. The seizure of business and financial documents as part of the stalking investigation did not exceed the scope of the individual's consent because they pertained to his true identity and the existence of any similar prior criminal history.


MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

LISI, Chief District Judge: Neil Stierhoff ("Defendant") was indicted by a federal grand jury on March 22, 2006, on four counts of tax evasion in violation of 26 U.S.C. §7201. Defendant now moves to suppress statements he made to Rhode Island State Police ("RISP") following his arrest on the night of April 12, 2002. Defendant also moves to suppress evidence seized by RISP during warrantless searches of his vehicle, room, and self-storage units. 1 In addition, Defendant seeks to suppress evidence taken from a computer seized from his residence. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion to suppress his statements is DENIED, and his motion to suppress evidence is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part.

I. Background

In March 2002, a young woman ("Complainant") contacted RISP about a man who she claimed was harassing her. Complainant told RISP that this individual was approaching her at work and giving her cards and poems. Complainant also informed RISP that the man in question was leaving poems on her car while it was parked in a dormitory parking lot at Rhode Island College. Subsequently, RISP obtained the individual's license plate number and identified the individual as Defendant. Between April 4-12, 2002, RISP conducted extensive surveillance of Defendant. On several successive evenings, Defendant was observed approaching Complainant's vehicle which was parked outside of her dormitory.Concerned with Defendant's behavior, RISP devised a "sting" operation. On the night of April 12, 2002, RISP observed Defendant leave his home and begin driving toward Rhode Island College. RISP instructed Complainant to sit in her car in the student parking lot and await Defendant's arrival on campus. A RISP detective was hidden in the backseat of Complainant's car. When RISP saw Defendant's vehicle arrive on campus, they instructed Complainant to begin driving her car on a predetermined route. Complainant complied, and RISP observed Defendant begin to follow her. RISP eventually instructed Complainant to pull into the parking lot of a Walgreen's Pharmacy and enter the store. Defendant followed Complainant into the store and RISP arrested him. Defendant was subsequently convicted in state court of misdemeanor stalking pursuant to R.I. GEN LAWS §11-59-2. See State v. Stierhoff, 879 A.2d 425, 436 (R.I. 2005) (affirming conviction).

II. Findings of Fact
Defendant now moves to suppress evidence seized from his room, self-storage units, and computer. A two-day evidentiary hearing held on December 12-13, 2006, elicited two different accounts of the events that occurred on April 12-13, 2002. In general, the Court finds the testimony of the government's witnesses to be more credible than the testimony offered by Defendant. Accordingly, the Court largely adopts the government's version of events. The Court makes the following findings of fact based on the parties' papers and evidence received at the evidentiary hearing.On April 12, 2002, at approximately 9:30 p.m., RISP observed Defendant follow Complainant into the Walgreen's Pharmacy at 25 Putnam Pike, Johnston. Although approximately ten RISP officers were involved in the surveillance effort, only four officers entered the store and approached Defendant. None of the officers who entered the store were wearing uniforms. RISP observed Defendant standing 10-15 feet from Complainant. According to Detective Timothy Sanzi ("Sanzi"), the officers identified themselves as members of the RISP and asked Defendant to place his hands behind his back. Defendant was handcuffed and searched for weapons. Sanzi and Detective David Palmer ("Palmer") then escorted Defendant out of the store and placed him in the rear of a marked RISP cruiser in the pharmacy parking lot. Sanzi testified that Defendant was quiet and "didn't show a great deal of emotion" during his arrest. See Suppression Hearing Transcript vol. 1, 114:19-20, December 12, 2006 ("Hr'g Tr."). Similarly, Detective John F. Killian ("Killian") described the Defendant as cooperative and responsive.After placing Defendant in the rear of the police cruiser, Sanzi proceeded to read Defendant his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966). See Gov't Ex. A-39. Sanzi testified that he asked Defendant if he understood his rights, and Defendant replied that he did. Defendant was then removed from the police cruiser and searched a second time, this time for identification. RISP seized several pieces of identification from Defendant's wallet. See Gov't Ex.'s A-16 through A-22. Two of the cards found in the wallet bore the name "Joseph Adams." Id. at A-17, A-22. According to Sanzi, there was some concern by RISP about Defendant's true identity and address. During their investigation between April 4-12, 2002, RISP had uncovered multiple names and addresses associated with Defendant. See Gov't Ex.'s A-1 through A-15, A-37, and A-38.After being searched, Defendant was again placed in the rear of the police cruiser. Sanzi and Palmer began to question Defendant about why he was following the Complainant. Sanzi sat next to Defendant and Palmer sat in the front passenger-side seat. According to Sanzi, Defendant was surprised to learn that RISP had been following him and he "spoke freely about ... his desire to have a relationship with [Complainant]." Hr'g Tr. vol. 1, 66:15-21. Sanzi described the Defendant as articulate and coherent. Id. at 67:6. According to Sanzi, Defendant answered the detectives' questions directly and specifically - "[h]e didn't beat around the bush at all." Id. at 67:9-11. Sanzi testified further that he told Defendant that he was under arrest for stalking. Id. at 146-148. It is undisputed that Defendant never asked for an attorney nor indicated to Sanzi and Palmer that he wished to remain silent.Upon being questioned about his address, Defendant stated that he rented a room on the second floor of a house at 25 Hollywood Road, Providence. Sanzi requested Defendant's permission to search his room. Sanzi told Defendant that the RISP were interested in recovering evidence related to the poems Defendant left on Complainant's car. Specifically, Sanzi informed Defendant that RISP wanted to retrieve the poems that he had generated on his computer. Defendant expressed some concern about awakening his roommates, but eventually agreed to the search. According to Sanzi, Defendant was removed from the police cruiser and his handcuffs were removed from behind his back and placed in front of his body. Defendant was then presented with a consent-to-search form that Sanzi testified he always carried with him. See Gov't Ex. A-23. Defendant was instructed to read the consent-to-search form. Although Sanzi did not read the form to Defendant or ask him to read it aloud, Sanzi testified that Defendant took his time reading the form before he signed it. According to Sanzi, no promises or threats were made to Defendant to induce him to sign. At the time, both the dome light in the cruiser and the parking lot lights were on. Sanzi testified that the officers discussed the consent to search with Defendant for approximately twenty minutes.After signing the consent-to-search form, five to six RISP officers escorted Defendant in unmarked vehicles to his residence at 25 Hollywood Road. Sometime between 11-11:30 p.m., RISP entered the residence through a side door, which Defendant unlocked using his keys. Defendant escorted the officers to his room on the second floor, and four RISP officers, including Sanzi, Palmer, and Killian, entered Defendant's room. Defendant, still handcuffed, was instructed to sit on a corner of his bed while the search was being conducted. Killian immediately noticed and seized Defendant's computer. 2 Sanzi testified that the officers discovered a briefcase containing manila envelopes which, according to Defendant, held approximately $100,000 in cash. Defendant directed Sanzi's attention to a drawer in his desk where another $40,000 or so in cash was found. A search of Defendant's desk uncovered several documents, including a Fleet Bank account statement in the name of "Joseph Adams," with a balance of over $1 million. See Gov't Ex.'s A-24 through A-30. RISP seized the documents that they found on Defendant's desk, but did not seize the cash. According to Sanzi, the documents were seized for identification purposes. Because of Defendant's use of aliases, Sanzi was not "going to be completely satisfied [as to Defendant's true identity] ... until he was fingerprinted." Hr'g Tr. vol. 1, 77:21-23. RISP also seized a package of Harp Workshop greeting cards that they found in Defendant's room. Sanzi testified that the cards were similar in appearance to cards that had been left on Complainant's car.According to both Sanzi and Killian, Defendant made several statements to RISP during the search of his room. In response to Sanzi's questions concerning the large amount of cash that was found, Defendant stated that he did not believe in banks, and that the money was his personal savings from his business. Sanzi and Killian both testified that Defendant also stated that he did not pay federal or state taxes. Defendant told the officers that he operated a computer business under the name of "Joseph Adams," and used his computer to make sales on "Ebay" under the name "JA." See Gov't Ex.'s B-6 and B-7; Hr'g Tr. vol. 1, 75-77; vol. 2, 5. Sanzi testified that Defendant spoke about his money and his business nonchalantly, and Killian described Defendant's demeanor during the search as "cooperative" and "conversant." Hr'g Tr. vol. 1, 76:12; vol. 2, 4:18.Sanzi also testified that during the search of the residence one of Defendant's roommates was awakened by the police presence and yelled into the room to Defendant, "you can withdraw your consent, get them out of the house." Id. at vol. 1, 79:16-17. Although Defendant did not respond to his roommate, Sanzi testified that Defendant told police that he wanted to "get on with this ... [and] get on out of here." Id. at 80:1-2. After the roommate left the doorway, the search resumed without objection from Defendant. According to both Sanzi and Killian, the entire search of Defendant's room lasted approximately thirty minutes.After the search of Defendant's room was completed, Defendant was removed from the residence at 25 Hollywood Road and placed in an unmarked RISP vehicle parked outside. RISP then requested Defendant's permission to search the self-storage units that he rented from Shelby Self-Storage, located at 879 Waterman Avenue, East Providence. During the RISP investigation between April 4-12, 2002, RISP had observed Defendant using these storage units before traveling to Rhode Island College and approaching Complainant's car. Sanzi testified that RISP believed that further evidence related to Defendant's identity could be obtained from the storage units. Sanzi also testified that he told Defendant that RISP "just wanted to examine the facility ... to make sure there wasn't anything illegal ... going on there." Id. at 83:19-21. According to Defendant, RISP asked to search the storage units to "see if there's anything dangerous or weapons or something like that so we can satisfy ourselves that you're not a dangerous person." Id. at vol. 2, 141:1-3.Defendant was presented with a second consent-to-search form which, according to Sanzi, Defendant read and signed. See Gov't Ex. A-32. The same five to six RISP officers then escorted Defendant to the self-storage units in East Providence. Defendant gave RISP his keys to the storage units, which they then opened. According to Sanzi, the storage units contained "a great deal of very high-end computer equipment." Hr'g Tr. vol. 1, 85:21-22. Likewise, Killian testified that the three storage units that were searched predominantly contained computer and electronic equipment. Killian further testified that Defendant reiterated his statement that he did not pay state or federal taxes in connection with his computer business. Several utility bills for 25 Hollywood Road, which were in the names of Defendant, Universal Audio, and Jos P. Mulvaney, were seized. See Gov't Ex.'s B-3, B-4, and B-5. In addition, a box containing sales records was also seized. Id. at B-2 and B-7. According to Killian, RISP seized these particular documents for a number of reasons, including concerns over Defendant's use of aliases and the potential that these documents represented a violation of Rhode Island tax law.After the search of the self-storage units was complete, Defendant was brought to the RISP Lincoln Woods Barracks. At approximately 2 a.m., on the morning of April 13, 2002, Defendant executed a written waiver of his Miranda rights. See Gov't Ex. A-33. Defendant then proceeded to give a formal tape-recorded statement to Sanzi. See Gov't Ex. A-34. Later that morning, Defendant was arraigned on one charge of stalking pursuant to R.I. GEN LAWS §11-59-2.

III. Discussion
Defendant now moves to suppress the statements he made to RISP following his arrest on April 12-13, 2002. 3 In support of this motion, Defendant argues that he did not waive his Miranda rights voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. Defendant also moves to suppress the evidence seized by RISP during the warrantless searches of his room and self-storage units. Defendant argues that he did not validly consent to the searches of his room and self-storage units because his consent was not given voluntarily. Alternatively, even if Defendant's consent was voluntary, he argues that RISP exceeded the scope of his consent when they seized financial documents and other evidence that Defendant asserts is unrelated to the state stalking investigation.1. Motion to Suppress StatementsWhen an individual is taken into custody, but before interrogation, Miranda requires that the individual be advised:

that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478-79. "After being advised of his Miranda rights, the accused may validly waive his right to remain silent and his right to counsel and respond to questions." United States v. Garcia, 983 F.2d 1160, 1169 (1st Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). A defendant may make a valid waiver of his rights under Miranda only if he does so voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. See United States v. Downs-Moses, 329 F.3d 253, 267 (1st Cir. 2003). The determination of a valid waiver usually entails two separate inquiries. See United States v. Bezanson-Perkins, 390 F.3d 34, 39 (1st Cir. 2004).

First, the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Second, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.

Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986); see Bezanson-Perkins, 390 F.3d at 39. Both inquiries require the Court to look at the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation. See Bezanson-Perkins, 390 F.3d at 39-40. An express waiver, however, is not required. See Garcia, 983 F.2d at 1169 (citation omitted). "What is required is a clear showing of the intention, intelligently exercised, to relinquish a known and understood right." Id. (citations omitted). Although courts "must presume that a defendant did not waive his rights, the government may prove a waiver by a preponderance of the evidence." United States v. Palmer, 203 F.3d 55, 60 (1st Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).First, the Court flatly rejects Defendant's testimony that RISP failed to read him his Miranda rights. Sanzi clearly and credibly testified that Defendant was read his Miranda rights immediately upon being placed in the police cruiser in the drugstore parking lot. See Hr'g Tr. vol. 1, 61-62; see also Gov't Ex. A-39. Defendant's self-serving testimony to the contrary is simply not credible. At the evidentiary hearing on December 12-13, 2006, Defendant's testimony was interspersed with legal jargon, and many of his answers to the government's questions were evasive and obfuscatory. The Court finds that Defendant was read his Miranda rights on April 12, 2002, shortly after he was taken into custody. The next question the Court must address, therefore, is whether Defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived those rights.A. VoluntaryAlternatively, Defendant argues that he was in such a state of shock and under such duress upon being arrested that the rights read to him by Sanzi were meaningless. Defendant points to several factors that he alleges support a finding of involuntariness. First, Defendant argues that the number of officers involved and the lateness of the hour during which he was arrested contributed to his feelings of coercion. Defendant claims that the undercover officers never identified themselves as members of the RISP. Furthermore, Defendant claims that he was forced to his knees during his arrest in the pharmacy. Second, Defendant asserts that during his time in the police cruiser he was never asked if he wanted to make a statement. Defendant contends that Sanzi and Palmer repeatedly switched seats in the cruiser, adding to his feelings of distress and confusion. Finally, Defendant draws the Court's attention to the fact that he had never been arrested before. Defendant claims that he felt insecure, and that his "life was in jeopardy." Hr'g Tr. vol. 2, 167:3. Defendant testified that RISP acted "jubilant," or as if they "had captured their prey." Id. at 157:6, 10-11. In essence, Defendant argues, given the totality of the circumstances, that he was under such duress that he was incapable of making a voluntary choice to waive his rights.The Court is not convinced. Defendant's arguments are based on a version of events that the Court summarily rejects. Sanzi testified that four officers approached Defendant in the pharmacy. Sanzi also expressly denied the assertion that he had forced Defendant to his knees before handcuffing him. Moreover, Sanzi testified that he remained seated with Defendant in the rear of the police cruiser during the entire conversation with Defendant. As for Defendant's alleged feelings of duress and insecurity, although the Court is cognizant that Defendant's mental state is pertinent to a voluntariness inquiry, First Circuit precedent "still require[s] some degree of coercion or trickery by government agents to render a statement involuntary ... ." United States v. Santos, 131 F.3d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). The voluntariness of a waiver "has always depended on the absence of police overreaching, not on free choice in any broader sense of the word." United States v. Rojas-Tapia, 446 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The focus in determining whether a waiver is voluntary, therefore, is on curbing abusive police practices. See generally id. In making this determination, "it is necessary to look at the totality of the circumstances, including the tactics used by the police, the details of the interrogation, and any characteristics of the accused that might cause his will easily to be overborne." Palmer, 203 F.3d at 60 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).There is simply no credible evidence that Defendant was subjected to physical or psychological coercion, intimidation, or deception by the RISP. Defendant conceded at the evidentiary hearing that although RISP were armed at the time of his arrest, no officer ever drew his or her weapon or threatened Defendant with physical violence. See Hr'g Tr. vol. 2, 162, 168, 182. According to Sanzi, Defendant spoke freely about his desire to have a relationship with Complainant and answered the detectives' questions directly and specifically. During this conversation in the police cruiser, at no time did Defendant indicate to the officers that he wished to remain silent or speak to an attorney. See Garcia, 983 F.2d at 1169 (noting that an express waiver is not required, only "a clear showing of the intention, intelligently exercised, to relinquish a known and understood right").Although, according to his testimony, Defendant had no previous experience with law enforcement, at the time of his arrest Defendant was forty-six years of age and possessed a Bachelor of Science Degree in Engineering from Brown University. Defendant was also operating his own business with sales nationwide. See id. (explaining that the determination of a valid waiver includes examining the background, experience, and conduct of the accused). The record facts lead the Court to conclude that Defendant made a willing and reasoned choice to speak with RISP. The government has successfully demonstrated, therefore, by a preponderance of the evidence, that no coercive or abusive police practices were employed to extract Defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights or his subsequent statements to RISP. Accordingly, the government has shown that both were given voluntarily.B. Knowing and IntelligentThe question remains whether Defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights was knowing and intelligent, i.e. a waiver "made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it." Moran, 475 U.S. at 421. Like the voluntariness inquiry, the focus of the Court in determining whether a waiver is knowing and intelligent "ultimately turns not upon any one factor, but upon all the attendant circumstances ... ." Rojas-Tapia, 446 F.3d at 7 (citations omitted). Here, again, the government carries its burden. No evidence was adduced at the evidentiary hearing that Defendant suffered from mental problems or was otherwise incapable of understanding his rights or the consequences of a waiver. Indeed, according to Sanzi, Defendant indicated to the detective that he understood his rights as they had been read to him. Sanzi also testified that Defendant was coherent and articulate throughout his conversation with RISP. See United States v. Solis, 299 F.3d 420, 439-40 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting that observations as to a defendant's demeanor and articulateness during a confession are evidence relevant to whether a confession was knowing and voluntary).Additionally, as the Court has already noted, Defendant is a highly educated and mature individual, readily capable of understanding the warnings given to him. Cf. Rojas-Tapia, 446 F.3d at 7-9 (collecting cases where defendants were found to have made a knowing and intelligent waiver despite relatively low I.Q.'s and other intellectual limitations). Based on the testimony elicited at the evidentiary hearing, it is clear that Defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver. Under the totality of the circumstances, therefore, the Court finds that Defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Miranda rights following his arrest on April 12, 2002.2. Motion to Suppress EvidenceDefendant also moves to suppress all evidence seized during the warrantless searches of his room and self-storage units by RISP. Although Defendant signed two written consent-to-search forms, see Gov't Ex.'s A-23 and A-32, Defendant now argues that his consent was not made freely and voluntarily. Alternatively, Defendant contends that the searches made by the RISP exceeded the scope of his consent. The Court will address each of Defendant's arguments in turn.A. Consent to Search"A warrantless search violates the Fourth Amendment unless it comes within one of the 'few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions' to the warrant requirement. A consensual search is one such exception." United States v. Forbes, 181 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1999) ( quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973)). In order to be valid, a person's consent to a search must be freely and voluntarily given. See United States v. Coraine, 198 F.3d 306, 309 (1st Cir. 1999) ( citing United States v. Schaefer, 87 F.3d 562, 569 (1st Cir. 1996)). The government has the burden of proving a valid, voluntary consent by a preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Winston, 444 F.3d 115, 121 (1st Cir. 2006) ( citing Forbes, 181 F.3d at 5).Whether the government has established the voluntariness of a consent to search is a question of fact that turns on the totality of the circumstances. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227; see also United States v. Genao, 281 F.3d 305, 309 (1st Cir. 2002). This includes "both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation." Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226. In determining whether consent to a search is voluntary, "[t]he court should take into account factors such as the consenting party's 'age, education, experience, intelligence, and knowledge of the right to withhold consent.' Further considerations 'include whether the consenting party was advised of his or her constitutional rights and whether permission to search was obtained by coercive means or under inherently coercive circumstances.'" Forbes, 181 F.3d at 5 ( quoting United States v. Barnett, 989 F.2d 546, 555 (1st Cir. 1993)). Consent is voluntary only if it is the product of an "essentially free and unconstrained choice," and not because a defendant's "will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired ... ." Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Moreover, "[s]ensitivity to the heightened possibility of coercion is appropriate when a defendant's consent is obtained during custody." United States v. Trueber, 238 F.3d 79, 95 (1st Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Custody alone, however, "has never been enough in itself to demonstrate a coerced ... consent to search." United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424 (1976); see Forbes, 181 F.3d at 6.i. Defendant's Consent to a Search of his RoomDefendant again argues that the circumstances surrounding his arrest and his consent to a search of his room at 25 Hollywood Road were inherently coercive. Defendant points to, inter alia, the number of officers involved, the time of his arrest, his inexperience with law enforcement, and his feelings of confusion and fear at the "jubilant" demeanor of the RISP. Hr'g Tr. vol. 2, 157:6. In addition, Defendant alleges that RISP: 1) never told him he could refuse to consent, 2) promised him that they would not disturb his roommates, and 3) threatened to obtain a search warrant and "break down [Defendant's] door" if he did not consent. Id. at 163:16-17.First, in response to Defendant's arguments that the circumstances surrounding his consent were inherently coercive, the Court again notes that Defendant was forty-six years of age at the time and had an Engineering Degree from Brown University. See Barnett, 989 F.2d at 555 (finding that age, education, and intelligence are relevant factors bearing on the vulnerability of a consenting party). Furthermore, both Sanzi and Killian described Defendant at the time of his arrest as calm, quiet, and cooperative. Hr'g Tr. vol. 1, 61, 153. Sanzi stated that Defendant "appeared to be relaxed," and was not sweating or shaking. Id. at 61:4-11. Sanzi also testified that Defendant "didn't show a great deal of emotion" during his interaction with RISP. Id. at 114:19-20. Likewise, Killian testified that Defendant was "cooperative and responsive." Id. at 153:18. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226 (noting that voluntariness of a consent to search is a question of fact that includes "the characteristics of the accused").Additionally, although Defendant was arrested at approximately 9:30 p.m., shortly before the pharmacy closed, Sanzi testified that the parking lot where Defendant gave his consent was lit and "at the corner of a busy intersection, Route 44 and I think Woonasquatucket Road." Hr'g Tr. vol. 1, 65:21-23. Furthermore, no officer raised his or her voice to Defendant during his arrest. Id. at 61:12-14. It is also undisputed that no officer drew his or her weapon or threatened Defendant with physical violence on the night of April 12-13, 2002. See id. at vol. 2, 162, 168; see also Forbes, 181 F.3d at 5 (weighing arresting officer's decision not to show his gun to the defendant in favor of a finding of voluntariness). Accordingly, although the Court notes that an arrest is an inherently stressful situation, nothing in the record demonstrates that the circumstances surrounding Defendant's consent to a search of his room were so coercive as to dictate a finding that Defendant's will was overborne by police action.Although Defendant claims that he was never told he could refuse to give his consent to a search, the consent-to-search form presented to Defendant clearly stated that Defendant had the right to refuse to give his consent. See Gov't Ex. A-23. Sanzi also testified that Defendant took his time reading the consent to search form before he signed it. See Hr'g Tr. vol. 1, 69:11. Finally, Defendant acknowledged that he had consented to a search of his room and self-storage units during his formal tape-recorded statement to RISP on April 13, 2002. See Gov't Ex. A-34 at 11. There is no evidence, therefore, that Defendant did not understand what he was agreeing to when he signed the consent-to-search form. 4 It is clear that Defendant appreciated the significance of giving his consent and that he understood his right to withhold that consent. Cf. Barnett, 989 F.2d at 555-56 (concluding that consent was voluntary even though the defendant was met at the door of his home by seven or eight police officers with guns drawn, was arrested and handcuffed, and was not informed that he could withhold consent).Defendant also argues that the promises Sanzi and Palmer allegedly made to him about not disturbing his roommates gradually eroded his reluctance to give permission to RISP to search his room. There is no credible evidence, however, to support this assertion. Although Sanzi remembered Defendant expressing his concern about not awakening his roommates, Sanzi testified that no promises were made to Defendant in exchange for his consent. See Hr'g Tr. vol. 1, 70:15-16. Furthermore, according to Sanzi, when one of Defendant's roommates yelled into the room to Defendant, "you can withdraw your consent, get [the police] out of the house," Defendant responded to Sanzi that he wanted to "get on with this and get on out." Id. at 79:16-17, 80:22. Based on this exchange, it is clear that Defendant understood his right to refuse or withdraw his consent. Defendant, however, made a conscious and free choice to allow the search in the first instance, as well as to allow the search to continue.Likewise, there is nothing, other than his self-serving testimony, to support Defendant's claim that RISP threatened to obtain a search warrant and "break down [his] door" if he did not consent. Id. at vol. 2, 163:16-17. Sanzi clearly and unequivocally denied that such a statement was made to Defendant. Id. at vol.1, 70:17-20; 121:2-11. In sum, there is simply no credible evidence that Defendant was tricked, threatened, or bullied by RISP into agreeing to give his consent. See Forbes, 181 F.3d at 5 (weighing whether permission to search was obtained by coercive means). There is no reason to believe that the circumstances surrounding Defendant's arrest were so inherently coercive that Defendant was unable to make an "essentially free and unconstrained choice." Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225. Based on the testimony elicited at the suppression hearing, the Court has no reason to believe that Defendant's "capacity for self-determination [was] critically impaired." Id. Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant freely and voluntarily consented to a search of his room at 25 Hollywood Road.ii. Defendant's Consent to a Search of his Self-Storage UnitsAgain, there is no evidence, other than Defendant's self-serving and unreliable testimony, that RISP made any promises or threats to Defendant in order to obtain his permission to search the self-storage units at 879 Waterman Avenue, East Providence. Defendant points out that when he signed the second consent-to-search form, it was sometime around midnight and he had been handcuffed for several hours. Defendant also draws the Court's attention to the fact that his consent to a search his self-storage units was obtained immediately following the search of his room. Essentially, Defendant argues that he had no choice but to agree to the search; to refuse would have been futile.The Court notes, however, that before Defendant agreed to a search of his self-storage units, he was again presented with a consent-to-search form. See Gov't Ex. A-32. The consentto-search form clearly communicated to Defendant that he could refuse to give his consent, and that any incriminating evidence found during the search could be used against him. Id. According to Sanzi, Defendant read and signed the form. See Hr'g Tr. vol. 1, 84:7-10. Again, no officer raised his or her voice to Defendant or drew his or her weapon. Defendant also conceded at the evidentiary hearing that no officer expressly threatened him with any physical abuse. Id. at vol. 2, 182:10-19. Although it was late at night, Defendant read and signed the form under the dome light of the RISP vehicle he was placed in. Sanzi and Killian both described Defendant as being calm, coherent, and cooperative throughout the night and early morning hours of April 12-13, 2002. Moreover, at no time did Defendant indicate that he wished to withdraw his consent to a search of his room or self-storage units. In short, there is simply no credible evidence to indicate to the Court that Defendant was unable to make an "essentially free and unconstrained choice." Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225. Accordingly, the Court finds that the government has demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Defendant freely and voluntarily consented to a search of his self-storage units in East Providence.B. Scope of Consent"Warrantless searches may not exceed the scope of the consent given. The scope of consent is measured by a test of objective reasonableness: 'what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and subject?'" United States v. Marshall, 348 F.3d 281, 286 (1st Cir. 2003) ( quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991)). "Courts 'therefore look beyond the language of the consent itself, to the overall context, which necessarily encompasses contemporaneous police statements and actions.'" Marshall, 348 F.3d at 286-87 ( quoting United States v. Melendez, 301 F.3d 27, 32 (1st Cir. 2002)). Put more simply, "the scope of a warrantless, but consensual, search is generally defined by its expressed object." Marshall, 348 F.3d at 287 ( citing Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251).Defendant argues that the documents seized from the desk in his room at 25 Hollywood Road exceeded the scope of his consent. These documents included a Fleet Bank account statement indicating over $1 million on deposit, as well as letters, bills of sale, and checks all in the name Joseph Adams. See Gov't Ex.'s A-24 through A-30. Defendant questions the nexus between financial and business records and a state stalking investigation. Defendant asserts that the documents are unrelated to his relationship with Complainant, and therefore, they should be suppressed.According to Sanzi's testimony, Defendant was told that RISP wanted to search his room for evidence of the poems Defendant had left on Complainant's car. Although Sanzi specifically indicated that RISP wanted to see the computer the poems were generated on, he also informed Defendant that he was under investigation for stalking. See Hr'g Tr. vol. 1, 146-148. The consent-to-search form Defendant signed gave RISP permission to "take any letters, papers, or other property from my premises ... ." Gov't Ex. A-23. The relevant question, therefore, is whether a reasonable person would conclude that the financial and business documents seized from Defendant's room were within the "expressed object" of the intended search. See Marshall, 348 F.3d at 287. The Court answers this question affirmatively.First, although the documents seized were not themselves evidence of the poems Defendant had written to Complainant, this is not a case where the items seized are wholly unrelated to the expressed object of the search. Cf. United States v. Turner, 169 F.3d 84, 88 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that seized computer files containing child pornography fell outside the expressed object of the search - i.e. to gather concrete, physical evidence of an assault - because physical evidence would not be found on a computer). All of the documents seized were in the name of Joseph Adams, a name Defendant admitted to RISP he used as an alias. Sanzi testified at great length about the difficulties RISP had in establishing Defendant's true identity. See Hr'g Tr. vol. 1, 42-57. During the RISP investigation of April 4-12, 2002, officers had connected Defendant to several names, including Joseph Adams and J.P. Mulvaney. Id.; see Gov't Ex.'s A-1 through A-15, A-37, and A-38. Sanzi specifically testified that he took the documents from Defendant's desk "to identify him further," because "I wasn't going to be completely satisfied with his identification until he was fingerprinted." Hr'g Tr. vol. 1, 77:19-23. The government argues, therefore, that RISP prudently seized the documents as part of their investigation of Defendant, specifically to determine whether the individual RISP had arrested had a prior criminal history of similar behavior - i.e. stalking. It seems clear, based on Sanzi's testimony, that Defendant's identity was a central concern of the RISP stalking investigation. Accordingly, the Court finds this explanation not only plausible, but reasonable.Defendant also argues that records and sales journals seized from his self-storage units exceeded the scope of his consent. The phone records seized were in the names of Jos P. Mulvaney and Universal Audio. See Gov't Ex. B-3 and B-4. The Narragansett Electric bill was in the name of Defendant. Id. at B-5. Also seized was a box containing twenty-two sales journals, recording, inter alia, the type, model, price, and buyer of the computer equipment Defendant was selling. Id. at B-2 and B-7. According to Sanzi, Defendant was told at the time he was presented with the second consent-to-search form that RISP "just wanted to examine the [self-storage units] ... to make sure there wasn't anything illegal ... going on there." Hr'g Tr. vol. 1, 83:19-21. In fact, Defendant testified that RISP asked to search the storage units "so [they could] satisfy [themselves] that [he was] not a dangerous person." Id. at vol. 2, 141:2-3; see Marshall, 348 F.3d at 286 (finding that the scope of consent is based on what the typical reasonable person would have understood by the exchange between the officer and subject). Notably, Defendant conceded that when he signed the second consent-to-search form he was no longer limiting his consent to just evidence of the poems, he acknowledged that the second consent was broader than the first. Id. at 178:19-25; 180:1-8.Killian testified that the documents seized from the storage units had evidentiary value, i.e. the documents provided "clues" about Defendant's identity, because his identity "was not entirely clear to us, having an alias and addresses in different states, [and] renting different cars under different names." Id. at 7:16-25. Again, the Court finds this explanation reasonable and supported by the record. A reasonable person, viewing in context the exchange between Defendant and RISP, would surely have concluded that RISP were authorized to seize documents pertaining to Defendant's identity. Accordingly, the Court finds that the documents seized from Defendant's self-storage units were within the scope of his consent. 5 Finally, Defendant argues that the searches of his room and self-storage units for evidence of stalking were a pretext for a federal tax investigation. In support of this argument, Defendant points out that Sanzi contacted the IRS during his preliminary investigation, which was conducted between April 4-12, 2002. In response to Sanzi's inquiry, Defendant believes that the IRS conducted a search for any income tax records or returns associated with Defendant's social security number. When the IRS was unable to locate any, Defendant contends that the IRS's interest was piqued. As further circumstantial support, Defendant again draws the Court's attention to the nature of the documents seized - i.e. financial and business records - as well as to the fact that RISP turned Defendant's computer over to the IRS on April 16, 2002. Defendant, however, is grasping at one final straw. The record simply does not support Defendant's argument. Although Sanzi contacted the IRS during his preliminary investigation, he also contacted numerous other agencies, including the Postal Inspector and INS. Sanzi testified that other than this initial contact, the IRS had no further involvement with the RISP investigation until that agency was contacted about the computer on April 16, 2002. See Hr'g Tr. vol. 1, 145:11-19. Moreover, Sanzi and Killian both consistently testified that the purpose behind the search of Defendant's room and self-storage units was to further the stalking investigation. Accordingly, the Court rejects Defendant's contention that the RISP investigation was a pretext for a federal tax investigation.

IV. Seizure and Search of Defendant's Computer
"Since electronic storage is likely to contain a greater quantity and variety of information than any previous storage method, computers make tempting targets in searches for incriminating information." Raphael Winick, Searches and Seizures of Computers and Computer Data, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 75, 105 (1994). Defendant argues that this temptation was simply too great for the government to resist. Although Defendant consented to a search of his computer for evidence of stalking, Defendant claims that he limited that consent to the "D: Drive," "My Files" directory, "Creative Writing" folder. According to Defendant, this folder contained the poems he had written for Complainant. During the search of Defendant's computer, however, IRS Special Agent James Donahue ("Donahue") opened and viewed the contents of a folder labeled "Offshore," which he believed contained evidence of tax violations. Defendant argues that Donahue's actions exceeded the scope of his consent. Accordingly, Defendant now moves to suppress any and all tax-related evidence seized from his computer.1. Findings of FactBased on the parties' papers and evidence received at the suppression hearing, the Court makes the following findings of fact. On April 12, 2002, sometime between 11-11:30 p.m., RISP searched Defendant's room at 25 Hollywood Road, Providence, pursuant to Defendant's valid consent. Upon entering the room, Killian observed a computer on Defendant's desk. 6 Earlier that night, in response to questions from Sanzi, Defendant had stated that most of the poems he had written to Complainant were generated on his computer. Both Sanzi and Killian testified at the suppression hearing that the primary purpose of the search of Defendant's room was to find evidence of the poems Defendant left on Complainant's car in the parking lot at Rhode Island College. Although RISP had no formal computer unit at the time, Killian testified that his duties included "handling computers" for the RISP. Hr'g Tr. vol. 1, 149:6-14. Killian testified that Defendant's computer appeared highly sophisticated. This description was based on his personal observations of the computer and his discussion with Defendant about the "nature of the system" and "how it was configured." Id. at 156:4-5. Because computers are also capable of containing a vast amount of information and "a computer is a huge area to search," Killian asked Defendant where on the computer the poems were located. Id. at vol. 2, 20:2. Defendant told Killian that the poems were located on the "D: Drive," in the "My Files" directory, "Creative Writing" folder. Id. at 19-20; see Gov't Ex. B-6. Defendant also stated that he used the computer for business purposes. Sanzi told Defendant that RISP would have to physically seize his computer. Both Killian and Sanzi testified that Defendant did not object to the seizure. Killian further testified that he did not attempt to examine the computer on scene, but simply unplugged it and removed it from the residence.On April 15, 2002, Sanzi contacted IRS Special Agent Robert Ferraro ("Ferraro") for assistance in retrieving the poems from Defendant's computer. As both Ferraro and Donahue testified, at the time it was common for the IRS to lend its computer forensics capabilities to local law enforcement. Likewise, Killian testified that RISP did not have the forensic capabilities in April 2002, to properly examine Defendant's computer and that it was common practice for RISP to request assistance from federal authorities in retrieving digital evidence. In addition to his request for assistance, Sanzi also informed Ferraro about the details of the RISP investigation. See Gov't Ex. C-12. This information included Defendant's statements to RISP that he did not pay state or federal taxes, as well as information concerning Defendant's computer business and the aliases that he used to conduct it. RISP subsequently provided Ferraro with, inter alia, copies of cancelled checks and the Fleet Bank account statement, all in the name of Joseph Adams. Soon thereafter, and based on the information from RISP, Ferraro initiated a tax-related investigation of Defendant. Ferraro also contacted Donahue, an IRS computer specialist, and informed him of what he had learned from the RISP.On April 16, 2002, Ferraro and Donahue went to the RISP Barracks in Scituate, Rhode Island to assist RISP in preserving and accessing the poems located in the "Creative Writing" folder. Donahue, like Killian, testified that Defendant's computer was highly sophisticated. According to Donahue, Defendant's computer contained four physical hard drives, three of which were configured in what is known as a RAID system. 7 In order to preserve the digital evidence, Donahue attempted to create an "image," or exact replica of Defendant's hard drive. 8 Donahue testified, however, that because of the configuration and size of Defendant's hard drive, he was unable to make an image of the computer at the RISP barracks. Donahue asked RISP if he could take the computer back to his office in Boston where he had better resources available to preserve and access the digital evidence. RISP agreed.Over the period of April 25-29, 2002, Donahue made a "logical copy" of the hard drive on Defendant's computer, copying approximately 300,000 files. See Hr'g Tr. vol. 2, 115:18-20. In attempting to access and copy the file folder "Creative Writing," Donahue noticed another folder labeled "Offshore." Both folders were located in the "My Files" directory. See Gov't Ex. D-1. In addition to "Creative Writing" and "Offshore," the "My Files" directory listed numerous other file folders, including some labeled "Ebay," "Important Docs," "Import-Export," "Orders," and "Local Real Estate." Id.At the time of the search, Donahue was aware of the potential tax-related information the RISP investigation had uncovered, including information that Defendant: (1) was in possession of a large amount of cash; (2) stated that he did not pay state or federal taxes; and (3) admitted to selling a large amount of computer equipment online. See e.g. Hr'g Tr. vol. 2, 95:3-19. According to Donahue, the file folder labeled "Offshore" indicated to him that Defendant "was interested in off-shore activities or the possibility of getting funds off-shore." Id. at 96:19-21. Donahue testified that he based this opinion on his years of experience as an IRS agent and on the information he had received about Defendant from Ferraro and RISP. Consequently, Donahue proceeded to open and view the contents of the "Offshore" folder. 9 According to Donahue, when he opened the "Offshore" folder he viewed numerous files relating to banking, conspiracy, and references to countries known as tax havens. See Gov't Ex. D-1 at 2. This information included, inter alia, files labeled "Banking," "Conspiracy," "Cuba," "Escape," "Grenada," "Havens," "Passports & ID's," "Panama," and "Switzerland." Id. Donahue also testified that the "Offshore" folder contained a file labeled "Money Laundering." According to Donahue, the files in the "Offshore" folder "jumped out [at him] as potential evidence of a tax case." Hr'g Tr. vol. 2, 103:6-7. After viewing the names of the files within the "Offshore" folder, Donahue terminated his search and did not open any additional folders or files. Donahue did, however, copy the contents of the "Creative Writing" folder onto a CD and sent it to the RISP.On or about April 25, 2002, Donahue contacted Ferraro and informed him of the contents of the "Offshore" folder. According to Donahue, he told Ferraro that the IRS "may want to consider getting a search warrant." Id. at 103:2-3. Donahue testified that although he knew that Defendant had consented to a search of his computer for poems, he thought that at this point it "was more prudent to get a search warrant." Id. at 103:16-21. On April 30, 2002, Ferraro obtained a search warrant for Defendant's computer to search for all evidence of tax violations under 26 U.S.C. §§7201 and 7203. 10 In preparing the affidavit in support of the search warrant application, Ferraro included, inter alia, the following information: (1) the approximately $147,000 in cash found in Defendant's room; (2) Defendant's statements that he never paid federal or state taxes; (3) the statement that Defendant used the name "Joseph Adams" as a business alias; (4) a bank statement indicating Defendant had over $1 million on account in the name of Joseph Adams; (5) Defendant's admission that he used his computer for business, including transactions over the internet on "Ebay;" (6) results from his investigation indicating that Defendant had failed to file a federal income tax return since at least 1996; and, finally, (7) the information discovered by Donahue, including the file folder names "Offshore," "Cuba," "Europe," "Crenada [sic]," "Belize," "Switzerland," "Citize [sic]," and "moneylaundering" [sic]. See Gov't Ex. C-3 and C-4. Although Ferraro was unable to recall exactly when he began preparing the affidavit, he testified that it was sometime between April 17-29, 2002.2. Scope of ConsentThe government argues that Defendant's consent to the search of his computer was unlimited. According to the government, the seizure of the computer was authorized by Defendant's consent for RISP to "take any letters, papers, or other property from [his] premises." Gov't Ex. A-23. This agreement, by its own terms, however, did not permit RISP to open the files contained in the computer. Defendant told RISP that his computer contained the poems he had written for Complainant. Defendant specifically told RISP where on his computer the poems were located and indicated his assent for RISP to retrieve those poems. According to both Sanzi and Killian, Defendant did not object when Killian unplugged and removed the computer from the residence. 11 Although the government concedes that Defendant "advised" the RISP that the poems were located on the "D: Drive," in the "My Files" directory, "Creative Writing" folder, the government contends that this direction from Defendant was not a limitation of Defendant's consent to the search of his computer. Gov't Resp. to Def.'s Mot. to Suppress Evidence at 38. Instead, the government argues that Defendant "was simply assisting the RISP as to where they could expeditiously find the poems." Id. The Court finds the government's argument unpersuasive.As the Court has already noted, the scope of a defendant's consent to search is limited by the breadth of the consent itself. See Marshall, 348 F.3d at 286-87. "The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect's consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of 'objective' reasonableness - what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?" Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251 (citations omitted). Courts must examine the totality of the circumstances in determining the scope of consent. See Turner, 169 F.3d at 87 (recognizing that a court must "look beyond the language of the consent itself, to the overall context, which necessarily encompasses contemporaneous police statements and actions").In the instant case, RISP made repeated reference to their interest in seeing the poems that Defendant had generated on his computer and left on Complainant's car. Sanzi testified that he told Defendant, immediately following his arrest, that RISP wanted to see "how these poems were created." Hr'g Tr. vol. 1, 68:17-18. During the search of Defendant's room, Sanzi testified that Defendant indicated that the poems were created on his computer and "that some of them were ... in his files." Id. at 74:9-10. When Sanzi "told [Defendant] that [RISP] were going to want to look at that, to retrieve that information," Defendant stated that "he didn't have a problem with that." Id. at 74:10-14. After Killian asked Defendant where on the computer RISP could locate the poems, Defendant responded that they were on the "D: Drive," in the "My Files" directory, "Creative Writing" folder. Id. at vol. 2, 19-20. Killian then unplugged the computer and removed it from the residence.Sanzi specifically told Defendant that RISP wanted to retrieve the poems that he had written to Complainant. See Marshall, 348 F.3d at 287 (finding that "[t]he scope of a warrantless, but consensual, search is generally defined by its expressed object") (emphasis added). Based on Sanzi's testimony, Defendant clearly gave his consent for RISP to retrieve the poems from his computer. At no time, however, did RISP express an interest in anything on Defendant's computer other than these poems. See United States v. Dichiarinte [ 71-1 USTC ¶9460], 445 F.2d 126, 129 (7th Cir. 1971) ("Government agents may not obtain consent to search on the representation that they intend to look only for certain specified items and subsequently use that consent as a license to conduct a general exploratory search."). Furthermore, Killian went so far as to ask Defendant where on the computer RISP could find the incriminating poems. Cf. Turner, 169 F.3d at 87-88 (where detectives explained to the person whose consent was being sought that they just wanted to look for "any signs the suspect had been inside [the apartment]," and "any signs a suspect had left behind," the court concluded that a typical reasonable person would have construed these additional statements as expressly limiting the scope of the detectives' request); see 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, §8.1(c), at 620 (3d ed. 1996) ("When a purpose is included in the [officer's] request, then the consent should be construed as authorizing only that intensity of police activity necessary to accomplish the stated purpose.").In responding to Killian's request, Defendant expressly restricted the scope of his consent by informing RISP exactly where on his computer the poems could be located, i.e. on the "D: Drive," in the "My Files" directory, "Creative Writing" folder. See Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 252 ("A suspect may of course delimit as he chooses the scope of the search to which he consents."); Marshall, 348 F.3d at 287 (noting that "a consenting party may limit the scope of his or her consent or withdraw it altogether"). In light of the conversations between RISP and Defendant, the Court finds that a reasonable person would conclude that the statement by Defendant that the poems were located on the "D: Drive," in the "My Files" directory, "Creative Writing" folder limited the scope of Defendant's consent to the search of his computer to that particular file folder. The question now becomes whether RISP and the IRS exceeded the scope of Defendant's consent when Donahue opened and viewed the contents of the "Offshore" folder. See Turner, 169 F.3d at 87 n.3 (noting that the burden is on the government to prove that the computer file search is within the scope of consent).3. Search of Defendant's Computer Files"The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness." Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 250 ( citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967)). In order to assert a right under the Fourth Amendment, Defendant must show that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place searched or the item seized. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979). Defendant can establish this expectation by demonstrating: (1) a subjective expectation of privacy, and (2) an expectation that society judges as objectively reasonable. See Id.; Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978). Here, although Defendant consented to a search of one particular file folder, Defendant maintains that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the other files on his computer."Computers record and store a remarkable amount of information about what users write, see, hear, and do." Kerr, supra, at 532. Modern computers contain massive quantities of information relating to all aspects of an individual's life, including business and personal documents, financial records, address and phone lists, and email. See Winick, supra, at 81; see also Hunter, 13 F.Supp.2d at 583 ("With their unparalleled ability to store and process information, computers are increasingly relied upon by individuals in their work and personal lives."). "The variety of information commonly stored on a computer, and the enormous and ever-expanding storage capacity of even simple home computers, justifies the highest expectation of privacy." Winick, supra, at 81.A computer can be analogized to a vast container, or warehouse, that stores thousands of individual containers in the form of discrete files. See Kerr, supra, at 533, 555. Each individual container, or discrete file, in this warehouse potentially contains personal or business information entirely unrelated to that stored in the other containers. This configuration raises the problem of intermingled documents, i.e. incriminating information and non-incriminating information so intermingled that a search for one type of information will often reveal a tremendous amount of other unrelated information. See United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591, 595-96 (9th Cir. 1982). Courts have acknowledged that computers often contain such "intermingled documents." See United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 1999) ( citing Tamura, 694 F.2d at 595-96). Under the approach first articulated in Tamura, and explained in Carey:
law enforcement must engage in the intermediate step of sorting various types of documents and then only search the ones specified in a warrant. Where officers come across relevant documents so intermingled with irrelevant documents that they cannot feasibly be sorted at the site, the officers may seal or hold the documents pending approval by a magistrate of the conditions and limitations on a further search through the documents. The magistrate should then require officers to specify in a warrant which type of files are sought.
172 F.3d at 1275 (internal citations omitted). "[The] very quantity and variety of information [on a computer] increases the likelihood that highly personal information, irrelevant to the subject of the lawful investigation, will also be searched or seized." Winick, supra, at 105.Defendant's consent to a search of his computer was narrowly tailored; i.e. it was limited to the "Creative Writing" file folder. Defendant had no reason to believe, nor did RISP indicate, that any additional file folders on Defendant's computer would be searched. As even Killian acknowledged, Defendant's computer contained a massive amount of information, the majority of which was unrelated to the RISP stalking investigation. See Hr'g Tr. vol. 2, 20:1-11. Consequently, Defendant contends, and the Court agrees, that although he gave his consent to RISP to search the "Creative Writing" folder, Defendant maintained a legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents of the other file folders on his computer. See United States v. Gourde, 440 F.3d 1065, 1077 (9th Cir. 2006) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (finding that "for most people, their computers are their most private spaces"); United States v. Adjani, 452 F.3d 1140, 1146 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that "individuals undoubtedly have a high expectation of privacy in the files stored on their personal computers"). The next question, therefore, is whether opening and viewing the "Offshore" folder by Donahue constituted a search or seizure.As described supra, Donahue opened and viewed the contents of the folder labeled "Offshore" only after he had located the "Creative Writing" file folder on the "My Files" directory. See Hr'g Tr. vol. 2, 96:8-14. Donahue entered commands into Defendant's computer that caused the contents of the "Offshore" folder to visually appear on the screen. Id. at 99-102; see Gov't Ex. D-1 at 2. As this Court understands his testimony, Donahue's actions were the functional equivalent of a computer user viewing a picture of a file folder on the screen, clicking on the folder with a mouse, and viewing the contents. These actions undoubtedly constituted a search by a government agent. See Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, §2.1(a) (4th ed. 2004) ("Under the traditional approach, the term 'search' is said to imply some exploratory investigation, or an invasion and quest, a looking for or seeking out."). Donahue testified that the label "Offshore" indicated to him that Defendant "was interested in off-shore activities or the possibility of getting funds off-shore." Hr'g Tr. vol. 2, 96:19-21. Donahue's suspicions were not confirmed, however, until he opened and viewed the contents of the "Offshore" folder, which contained files labeled, inter alia, "Banking," "Conspiracy," "Switzerland," and "Money Laundering." See Kerr, supra, at 551 (concluding that a search of computer files occurs "when information from or about the data is exposed to possible human observation, such as when it appears on a screen"). It was at this point that Donahue terminated his search and concluded that the prudent course of action would be to obtain a warrant to search the rest of Defendant's computer files for evidence of tax violations.The Court finds that by opening and viewing the contents of the "Offshore" folder, Donahue engaged in a search subject to the strictures of the Fourth Amendment. The remaining question, however, is whether Donahue's search of the "Offshore" folder was unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 250 ("The Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all state-initiated searches and seizures; it merely proscribes those which are unreasonable."). The government does not deny that Donahue searched the "Offshore" folder without a warrant. The Court concludes, therefore, that given the narrow scope of Defendant's consent to search, Donahue's search of the "Offshore" folder exceeded Defendant's consent, and thus, any evidence derived from this search should be suppressed unless the government can offer some other exception to the warrant requirement. The government responds that Donahue was entitled to search the "Offshore" folder and seize its contents under the plain view exception to the warrant requirement.4. Plain View DoctrineThe plain view doctrine "permits the seizure of items located in plain view if '(1) the seizing officer has a prior justification for being in a position to see the item in plain view and (2) the evidentiary value of the item is immediately apparent.'" Perrotta, 289 F.3d at 167 ( quoting United States v. Owens, 167 F.3d 739, 746 (1st Cir. 1999)). "Evidentiary value is 'immediately apparent' if there are 'enough facts for a reasonable person to believe that the items in plain view may be contraband or evidence of a crime.'" Id. ( quoting United States v. Hamie, 165 F.3d 80, 83 (1st Cir. 1999).According to the government, Donahue lawfully accessed the "My Files" directory on Defendant's computer in order to retrieve evidence of the poems related to the state stalking investigation - and, thus, he was legally in a position to see the "Offshore" folder in plain view. Up to this point in the analysis, the Court agrees with the government's position. The government next argues, however, that the file folder "Offshore" was clearly incriminating on its face and, therefore, its search and seizure was justified under the plain view doctrine. It is here that the Court parts company with the government's argument.Applying the plain view doctrine in the context of computer files leads the Court into uncharted waters. The plain view doctrine is based on physical rules: what the officer can see, touch, and smell to determine whether an object or container is contraband or evidence of a crime. The fact that an officer can only look in places and containers large enough to contain the specific physical evidence sought necessarily limits the scope of warrantless searches. These physical rules do not easily fit the digital world; a computer forensic analyst can not rely on the physical characteristics of a computer file to determine what information the file contains. Nonetheless, analogizing a computer file to a closed container is a logical, if not entirely accurate, starting point for addressing the plain view doctrine's application to computer files.A. Closed ContainersThe basic premise of container cases is that "opening a container constitutes a search of its contents; if a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of a container, opening the container and seeing the contents violates that reasonable expectation of privacy." Kerr, supra, at 550; see Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 142 n.11 (recognizing that the seizure of a container "does not compromise the interest in preserving the privacy of its contents because it may only be opened pursuant to either a search warrant, or one of the well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement") (citations omitted). In Arkansas v. Sanders, a case subsequently overruled on other grounds, see California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 579 (1991), the Supreme Court stated in a footnote that:
Not all containers and packages found by police during the course of a search will deserve the full protection of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, some containers (for example a kit of burglar tools or a gun case) by their very nature cannot support any reasonable expectation of privacy because their contents can be inferred from their outward appearance. Similarly, in some cases the contents of a package will be open to "plain view," thereby obviating the need for a warrant.
442 U.S. 753, 765 n.13 (1979) (citation omitted)."Although a person generally has an expectation of privacy in items he places in a closed container, some containers so betray their contents as to abrogate any such expectation." United States v. Meada, 408 F.3d 14, 23 (1st Cir. 2005) ( citing United States v. Huffhines, 967 F.2d 314, 319 (9th Cir. 1992)). "The contents of such containers are treated as being in plain view." Id. (citation omitted). Thus, the government's argument runs, even if Defendant did not consent to a search of the "Offshore" folder, the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if the "Offshore" label caused the contents of the file folder to be in "plain view" of Donahue.In Meada, the First Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of a gun case because the case's "GUN GUARD" label clearly revealed its contents. 408 F.3d at 22. After obtaining a restraining order against the defendant, the defendant's girlfriend asked police to accompany her to defendant's apartment, where she also resided, to recover her belongings. Id. at 17-18. Defendant's girlfriend told the police that the defendant kept firearms in the apartment. Id. Police ran a criminal history check on defendant and discovered that he had a criminal record and did not have a license to carry a firearm. Id. After police entered the apartment with the girlfriend, they observed in plain view a handgun and what the officer's recognized as an "ammunition can." Id. at 18. Inside the "ammunition can" were two grenades. Upon entering the bedroom, police also saw a case labeled "GUN GUARD" standing upright against a wall. Meada, 408 F.3d at 18. Officers opened the case and discovered three guns inside which they then seized. Id. The district court denied the defendant's motion to suppress the contents of the gun case, finding that the defendant "did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of the gun case because the case's GUN GUARD label clearly revealed its contents. It was specifically made to carry guns and was stamped accordingly." Id. at 22 (internal quotation marks omitted). On the other hand, the district court did suppress the grenades found in the ammunition can because "its outward appearance did not reveal that it contained grenades." Id. at 19.In concluding that the guns were seized pursuant to the plain view exception, the First Circuit found that, "the container at issue was readily identifiable as a gun case. Particularly in light of the GUN GUARD label, the container's contents were unambiguous." Id. at 23. The First Circuit explained that "[w]hat justified the search of the gun case was that it reasonably appeared to contain a gun and that, as a convicted felon, [the defendant] was prohibited from possessing one." Id. at 24. As for the ammunition can, because the government did not appeal the suppression of the grenades, the First Circuit did not reach the issue of whether the search of the can would withstand constitutional scrutiny.Unlike the gun case in Meada, the "Offshore" folder was not readily identifiable as contraband or evidence of a crime. The "Offshore" folder itself was identical in size, shape, and color to literally thousands of other folders on Defendant's computer. The file folder here, therefore, is more akin to the nondescript metal can that the officers in Meada suspected of containing ammunition. The file folder has no distinctive configuration or outward appearance that immediately betrays its contents in the same way the distinctively shaped gun case did. Although the gun case was labeled GUN GUARD, it was the label and the distinctive shape of the gun case that readily identified the case as containing contraband. As the First Circuit stated, "the container's contents were unambiguous." Meada, 408 F.3d at 23. The same can not be said for the "Offshore" folder on Defendant's computer.As Defendant points out, the word "offshore" on its face is not clearly incriminating. 12 It has many potential and innocuous meanings. In essence, Defendant contends that the "container" at issue here is really nothing more than a label and an ambiguous label at that. This argument finds some support in the case of United States v. Villarreal, 963 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1992). In Villarreal, two fifty-five gallon drums labeled "phosphoric acid" were searched without a warrant and were found to contain marijuana. Employees of a common carrier alerted customs agents to the drums because the employees "thought them too light to contain acid and noticed that they did not make sloshing noises when moved." Id. at 772. The government argued that the contents of the nondescript metal drums could be inferred from the label. Id. at 775-76. That is, "the defendants never had an expectation of privacy because the drums literally proclaimed their contents for all to see." Id. at 776. The Fifth Circuit was not persuaded by this argument:
The fact that the exterior of a container purports to reveal some information about its contents does not necessarily mean that its owner has no reasonable expectation that those contents will remain free from inspection by others. Stated another way, a label on a container is not an invitation to search it. If the government seeks to learn more than the label reveals by opening the container, it generally must obtain a search warrant.
Id. (citation omitted). The Fifth Circuit did provide one caveat, however, noting that it did not consider whether "an individual could have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a container when he has plainly communicated its incriminating character to the public - if, for example, the drums in this case were labeled as marijuana." Id. at n.3. This concern is echoed by the government in this case; the government analogizes the "Offshore" file folder to a closed, opaque bag labeled marijuana. See Gov't Supplemental Mem. at 11. Again, however, the Court emphasizes the ambiguity of the word "offshore" in comparison with words like "marijuana," or even GUN GUARD. Donahue testified that the "Offshore" folder indicated to him that Defendant "was interested in off-shore activities or the possibility of getting funds off-shore." Hr'g Tr. vol. 2, 96:19-21. Such activity in and of itself is not necessarily incriminating. Unlike a bag labeled "marijuana," or a gun case labeled GUN GUARD in the possession of a convicted felon, a folder labeled "Offshore" is not immediately apparent as contraband or evidence of a crime.The government asserts, however, that given the information Donahue had at the time of the search concerning Defendant's possible tax violations, as well as his experience and training as an IRS agent, Donahue was able to reasonably infer that the contents of the "Offshore" folder contained evidence of a crime. See United States v. Johnston, 784 F.2d 416, 420 (1st Cir. 1986) (noting that experience and knowledge of the officers at the time of the search can be considered). A similar argument was rejected by the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Donnes, 947 F.2d 1430 (10th Cir. 1991). In Donnes, officers searched a camera lens case that was found inside a glove with a syringe. The camera lens case contained narcotics. The Tenth Circuit found that "the plain view container exception [had] never been extended to a container as ambiguous as a camera lens case." Id. at 1438. The Donnes Court further recognized that:
the officer's experience and training could have led him to infer that the camera lens case contained narcotics in light of the fact that it was found inside the glove with a syringe. However, this inference does not alter the cardinal principal that searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment ... .

Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).Likewise, in United States v. Bonitz, the Tenth Circuit declined to apply the plain view exception to a hard plastic case, recognizing that the "hard plastic case did not reveal its contents to the trial court even though it could perhaps have been identified as a gun case by a firearms expert." 826 F.2d 954, 956 (10th Cir. 1987).
Here, although Donahue may have suspected that the "Offshore" folder might contain evidence of tax violations, the incriminating nature of its contents was not immediately apparent.
According to Donahue's own testimony, it was only after he opened the "Offshore" folder and viewed its contents, that the files "jumped out [at him] as potential evidence of a tax case." Hr'g Tr. vol. 2, 103:6-7. Notably, after Donahue opened the "Offshore" folder he testified that he came to the conclusion that it "was more prudent to get a search warrant" than to continue to open computer files. Id. at 103:16-21.As his testimony makes apparent, at the time Donahue opened the "Offshore" folder he had no reason to believe that the folder contained evidence related to the RISP stalking investigation. To the contrary, Donahue suspected that the folder contained evidence of tax violations. See e.g. Carey, 172 F.3d at 1274 (focusing on the searching officer's subjective intent when opening computer files). In Carey, a warrant was obtained to search the defendant's computer files for "names, telephone numbers, ledger receipts, addresses, and other documentary evidence pertaining to the sale and distribution of controlled substances." 172 F.3d at 1270. During the search of the defendant's computers, police came across numerous files with sexually suggestive titles and the label "JPG." Id. After opening one of these files and discovering child pornography, police abandoned their search for evidence of drug transactions and viewed similarly labeled files for further evidence of child pornography. Id. at 1271.Although the government argued that the files containing child pornography were in plain view, the Tenth Circuit found that police had exceeded the scope of the warrant and did not address the question of what constitutes "plain view" in the context of computer files. Id. at 1273. The Tenth Circuit did comment, however, that "[t]he government's argument [that] the files were in plain view [was] unavailing because it is the contents of the files and not the files themselves which were seized ... . [The contents] were in closed files and thus not in plain view." Id. As for the scope of the search, the circuit court found that after opening the first file and seeing an image of child pornography, the searching officer knew that when he opened the subsequent files "he was not going to find items related to drug activity as specified in the warrant." Carey, 172 F.3d at 1274.Similarly here, based on his testimony, Donahue knew that when he opened the "Offshore" folder he had gone beyond the area identified by Defendant as containing the poems which were at the center of the RISP stalking investigation. When Donahue decided to open the "Offshore" folder, he effectively abandoned his search for evidence of stalking and expanded the scope of the computer search. Given Donahue's training and experience, as well the information he had available to him through the investigations of Ferraro and RISP, Donahue likely had probable cause to believe that the "Offshore" folder contained evidence of a crime. This is not a justifiable exception, however, in the words of the Tenth Circuit, to "the cardinal principle that searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment ... ." Donnes, 947 F.2d at 1438. Consequently, when Donahue saw the file folder labeled "Offshore" on Defendant's computer he should have terminated his search and applied for a warrant to search Defendant's computer for evidence of potential tax violations. The mere fact that the label "Offshore" was in plain view does not justify police opening the closed file to learn more. See Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 658-59 (1980) (finding that the descriptive labels on boxes of obscene films did not eliminate the reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of the films). Consequently, the government's argument that the contents of the "Offshore" folder were in plain view is unavailing.5. Independent Source DoctrineThe government argues that even if the contents of the "Offshore" folder were not in plain view, the evidence subsequently obtained from Defendant's computer is admissible because the search was authorized by a valid warrant. The Court, however, is not persuaded. On May 2, 2002, the government obtained a warrant to search Defendant's computer for "[a]ny and all evidence of [tax] violations [pursuant to] 26 U.S.C. §§7201 and 7203." Gov't Ex. C-4. In preparing the affidavit in support of the warrant, Ferraro included the information that Donahue had obtained from his illegal search of the "Offshore" file folder on Defendant's computer. See Gov't Ex. C-4. When faced with a warrant affidavit containing information obtained from an illegal search, a court must address two questions: (1) "whether the affidavit contain[s] sufficient facts to support probable cause when the offending facts [are] excised," and (2) whether the decision to seek the warrant was "prompted by what the police observed during the prior search." United States v. Dessesaure, 429 F.3d 359, 367-69 (1st Cir. 2005).This analysis ensures that the evidence obtained through the warrant was "discovered by means wholly independent of any constitutional violation." Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984). The "independent source doctrine" rests "upon the policy that, while the government should not profit from its illegal activity, neither should it be placed in a worse position than it would otherwise have occupied." Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 542 (1988). Here, however, the Court is not convinced that the search of Defendant's computer pursuant to a warrant was in fact a genuinely independent source of the tax-related information at issue. It appears more likely than not that Ferraro's decision to seek the search warrant was prompted by what Donahue saw when he revealed the contents of the "Offshore" folder.The Court need only briefly address the issue of probable cause. "Probable cause exists when 'the affidavit upon which a warrant is founded demonstrates in some trustworthy fashion the likelihood that an offense has been committed and that there is sound reason to believe that a particular search will turn up evidence of it.'" Schaefer, 87 F.3d at 565 ( quoting United States v. Aguirre, 839 F.2d 854, 857-58 (1st Cir. 1988)). Even if the Court excises the tainted facts from the affidavit, i.e. the file names "Cuba," "Europe," "Grenada," "Belize," "Switzerland," and "Money Laundering," it is likely that there are still sufficient facts to support probable cause to search Defendant's computer for evidence of tax crimes. See Gov't Ex. C-4. The more difficult determination, however, is whether Ferraro's decision to seek the search warrant was prompted by the information discovered in the "Offshore" folder.The specific question presented is whether Ferraro would have sought the warrant if he had not known, as a result of the illegal search, that Defendant's computer contained suspiciously labeled files, including for example, "Money Laundering" and "Conspiracy." The government argues that "[t]he facts gathered by the state police on April 12, 2002, and provided to the IRS beginning on April 15th, provided compelling proof that [D]efendant committed tax crimes, and that evidence of those tax crimes would be found on his computer - thus providing more than enough incentive to seek a warrant." Gov't Supplemental Mem. at 17. In essence, the government argues that even if Donahue had never viewed the contents of the "Offshore" folder, a warrant to search Defendant's computer surely would have eventually been obtained. Despite the government's post-search assurances, the Court finds that the record does not support this contention.In making its factual determination as to Ferraro's intent, "the [Court] is not bound by after-the-fact assurances of [his] intent, but instead must assess the totality of the attendant circumstances to ascertain whether those assurances appear implausible." Dessesaure, 429 F.3d at 369 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Both Ferraro and Donahue repeatedly testified that the purpose of the computer search by Donahue was to assist the RISP in their stalking investigation by locating the poems. On or about April 25, 2002, however, Donahue contacted Ferraro and informed him about the contents of the "Offshore" folder. According to Donahue, the files in the "Offshore" folder "jumped out [at him] as potential evidence of a tax case." Hr'g Tr. vol. 2, 103:6-7. Donahue testified that he told Ferraro that they "may want to consider getting a search warrant." Id. at 103:2-3. Five days later, on April 30, 2002, Ferraro submitted his affidavit in support of a warrant to search Defendant's computer. Accordingly, it seems abundantly clear to the Court, based on this testimony, that Ferraro's decision to seek a warrant was prompted by the call from Donahue relaying what he had already found on Defendant's computer.Ferraro did, however, testify that he was unable to recall the precise date when he began preparing the affidavit, but stated that it was likely sometime between April 17-29, 2002. Id. at 45:5-7. The implication of this testimony is that if Ferraro began preparing his affidavit before Donahue contacted him on or about April 25, 2002, then obviously, the contents of the "Offshore" folder could not have motivated Ferraro to obtain the warrant. There is nothing in the record, however, to substantiate this inference. Furthermore, the burden is on the government to show that Ferraro was not prompted by the illegal search of the "Offshore" file folder. This the government has failed to do. Accordingly, the Court finds that all tax-related evidence obtained from Defendant's computer was not wholly independent of the constitutional violation, i.e. the illegal search of the "Offshore" file folder, and should therefore be suppressed.

V. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's motion to suppress statements is DENIED, and his motion to suppress evidence is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part.SO ORDERED.1 Although Defendant moves to suppress evidence from the search of his vehicle, Defendant notes that nothing incriminating was seized from his vehicle and makes no specific argument as to the search of the vehicle. Consequently, the Court does not address the propriety of that search.2 Factual findings and the Court's analysis of the search and seizure of Defendant's computer are discussed, infra, at Part IV, pg. 24.3 Defendant does not move to suppress the formal tape-recorded statement that he made to RISP at the Lincoln Woods Police Barracks on the morning of April 13, 2002. See Gov't Ex. A-34.4 Defendant argues that the consent-to-search forms that he signed on April 12-13, 2002, were defective on their faces. See Gov't Ex.'s A-23 and A-32. This argument is unpersuasive. Defendant points out that both forms omit the word "search" at one point, authorizing RISP "to conduct a complete [sic] of my premises ... ." Id. The forms also contained a Spanish translation. Accordingly, Defendant argues that the forms were confusing and misleading. Both consent-to-search forms, however, clearly state at the top, "CONSENT TO SEARCH." Id. Additionally, although certain information is omitted, the forms plainly inform a defendant of his or her right to refuse to consent. Id. The forms also make clear that if anything incriminating is found as a result of the search, it can be used against the defendant. Id.5 Alternatively, the government argues that the documents seized by RISP from Defendant's room and self-storage units were seized under the plain view doctrine. See United States v. Perrotta, 289 F.3d 155, 167 (1st Cir. 2002) (explaining that officers may seize items located in plain view if (1) the seizing officer has a prior justification for being in a position to see the item in plain view and (2) the evidentiary value of the item is immediately apparent). The government argues that RISP were lawfully in Defendant's room and self-storage units pursuant to Defendant's valid consent. Given Defendant's statements about not paying taxes, his admissions about conducting a business under an alias, and the large amounts of cash found in his room, the government argues that the documents seized were "immediately apparent" as evidence of a state or federal tax crime. Both Sanzi and Killian testified that they recognized at the time of the seizures that the documents represented potential evidence of a violation of Rhode Island law. See e.g. Hr'g Tr. vol. 2, 7:16-25. The Court finds this rationale plausible as well.6 Defendant's computer was a Dell Precision Workstation, Model 530 MT, serial number J98DQ01, with an Intel Xeon 1.70 Gigahertz processor. See Gov't Ex. C-4.7 RAID is an acronym for "redundant array of inexpensive disks," which allows a user to "configure several independent physical disk[] [drives] to appear to the operating system as one large volume or drive." Hr'g Tr. vol. 2, 87:4-11. Donahue testified that the four hard drives in Defendant's computer had a combined total of 330 gigabytes of memory. Id. at 86:22-24. One gigabyte is the equivalent of 500,000 typewritten pages. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION FOURTH §11.446 at 77 (Federal Judicial Center 2004). Defendant's computer therefore could theoretically hold 165,000,000 typewritten pages. According to Donahue, a personal computer would normally have only one hard drive. Consequently, the number of drives and the amount of memory in Defendant's computer contributed to Donahue's conclusion that he was dealing with a highly sophisticated computer.8 Creating an image, or a copy of an entire hard drive, is different from making an electronic copy of individual files. See SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS, United States Department of Justice at n.6 (2d ed. 2002), available at http://www.cybercrime.gov/s&smanual2002.htm ( "DOJ Manual"). A normal file-by-file copy (also known as a "logical copy") duplicates only the identified files, but an image duplicates every bit and byte on the hard drive (allowing a computer forensics analyst to see an exact copy of the original, including deleted data). See Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 540-41 (2005); see also Hr'g Tr. vol. 2, 84:4-17.9 Donahue examined Defendant's computer in a DOS command line environment. See Gov't Ex. D-1 at 3. Donahue did not see the contents of Defendant's computer in the way a typical computer user would. In order to open and view the contents of the "Offshore" folder Donahue had to first type DIR at the "My Files" prompt. Id. This listed the contents of the "My Files" directory. Donahue then typed "CD Offshore" to change directories, and typed DIR once again to view the contents of the "Offshore" folder. Gov't Ex. D-1 at 6. Donahue testified that these actions are the functional equivalent of what a typical computer user would see if he clicked on the folder with a mouse. See Hr'g Tr. vol. 2, 99-102; Gov't Ex. D-1 at 1-2.10 Ferraro subsequently realized that he made an error in 10 transcribing the serial number from Defendant's computer onto the search warrant application. See Gov't Ex. C-3 at 1 (serial number J89DQ01). The correct serial number was J98DQ01. Gov't Ex. C-4. After correcting the mistake, a second search warrant was issued on May 2, 2002.11 As Defendant points out, despite being told with great specificity where on the computer the poems were located, RISP simply seized the entire computer for future analysis. This is frequently the case with computers; the normal sequence of "search" and then selective "seizure" is turned on its head. Because of the difficulties of conducting an on-site search of computers, the government increasingly seeks (and, as here, obtains) authority to seize computers without any prior review of their contents. See United States v. Hunter, 13 F.Supp.2d 574, 583 (D. Vt. 1998) ( "Often it is simply impractical to search a computer at the search site because of the time and expertise required to unlock all sources of information."); see also Hr'g Tr. vol. 1, 157:4-7.12 "Offshore" is defined as "off or away from the shore;" "at a distance from the shore, on or in a body of water;" and "in a foreign country." Webster's College Dictionary 940 (1992). Defendant also points out, for example, that there is a boating publication named "Offshore." Def.'s Supplemental Mem. at 22.

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Wednesday, September 12, 2007

Tax Help: Notice of Levy Appeal and Right to Hearing Under IRC 6330

The government was entitled to summary judgment with respect to married taxpayers' claim that their civil rights were violated in a Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing in which they attempted to challenge assessment of frivolous return penalties. The CDP hearing allows taxpayers to request judicial review of process, rather than to appeal the underlying merits of the case.R. Kintzler, DC Nev., 2001-2 USTC ¶50,703.

The district court remanded to the IRS Office of Appeals a married taxpayers' suit seeking a judicial determination that civil penalties assessed against them for filing frivolous tax returns were improper. The taxpayers were entitled to a CDP hearing on the merits of the issue.R.D. Joling, DC Ore., Dec. 53,803.

Similarly.T.H. Pierson, 115 TC 576, Dec. 53,938.R.D. Van Fossen, 79 TCM 2049, Dec. 53,932(M), TC Memo. 2000-198.R. Baxter, 82 TCM 897, Dec. 54,702(M), TC Memo. 2002-86. Aff'd, CA-9, Dec. 54,704(M), TC Memo. 2002-88. Aff'd, CA-9 (unpublished opinion), Dec. 54,718(M), TC Memo. 2002-100.S.D. Coleman III, 83 TCM 1748, Dec. 54,771(M), TC Memo. 2002-140.M. Crow, 83 TCM 1853, 2003-1 USTC ¶50,123.J.J. Green, 86 TCM 355, Dec. 54,821(M), TC Memo. 2002-182.G. Bentley, DC Ohio, Dec. 54,861(M), TC Memo. 2002-221.D. Schmith, 84 TCM 413, Dec. 54,829(M), TC Memo. 2002-190.J. Tornichio, 84 TCM 578, Dec. 54,877(M), TC Memo. 2002-235.R. Wagner, 84 TCM 96, Dec. 54,909(M), TC Memo. 2002-263.W. Davidson, 84 TCM 156, Dec. 54,828(M), TC Memo. 2002-189.C.P. Bartolomeo, DC Pa., 2003-2 USTC ¶50,696.A. Sciola, 86 TCM 681, Dec. 55,545(M), TC Memo. 2004-38.J.L. Jensen, 87 TCM 1340, Dec. 55,584(M), TC Memo. 2004-73.E.P. Heaphy, 87 TCM 1022, Dec. 55,991(M), TC Memo. 2005-81. Aff'd, on another issue, CA-9 (unpublished opinion), Dec. 55,992(M), TC Memo. 2005-82. Aff'd, on another issue, CA-9 (unpublished opinion), Dec. 56,022(M), TC Memo. 2005-109.K P. Krueger, 89 TCM 1241, Dec. 55,981(M), TC Memo. 2005-71.B.J. Casey, 88 TCM 332, Dec. 55,775(M), TC Memo. 2004-233.O. Scibilia, 89 TCM 1043, Dec. 55,908(M), TC Memo. 2005-7.R. Hamzik, 88 TCM 316, Dec. 56,116(M), T.C. Memo. 2005-193.J. Kaplowitz, 89 TCM 948, Dec. 56,091(M), TC Memo. 2005-170.R.L. Moore, 89 TCM 1112, 2005-2 USTC ¶50,481, aff'g unreported Tax Court decision.A.L. Poe, 89 TCM 1248, 2005-1 USTC ¶50,288, aff'g unreported Tax Court decision.R.S. Quigley, 89 TCM 1486, Dec. 55,970(M), TC Memo. 2005-61. Aff'd, per curiam, CA-5 (unpublished opinion),2005-1 USTC ¶50,287, aff'g an unreported Tax Court decision.D. Holguin, CA-9 (unpublished opinion), Dec. 56,135(M), TC Memo. 2005-211.G.L. Bailey, 90 TCM 392, Dec. 56,515(M), TC Memo. 2006-100.G.K.J. Yuen, 92 TCM 1, Dec. 56,562(M), TC Memo. 2006-143.N.I. Goodman, 92 TCM 349, Dec. 56,842(M), TC Memo. 2007-40.N.E. Dehring, 93 TCM 1135, Dec. 56,959(M), TC Memo. 2007-143.An individual was precluded from challenging her underlying tax liability during her Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing because she received a notice of deficiency and had an opportunity at that time to dispute her tax liability. An earlier Tax Court Summary Opinion involving the same tax liability and in which a decision was entered was final and determinative as to that liability. J.H. Ginalski, 87 TCM 1249, Dec. 55,351(M), TC Memo. 2003-319.J.R. Forrest, 90 TCM 343, Dec. 56,621(M), TC Memo. 2006-196.An individual contention at his CDP hearing that the period of limitations for assessment and collection of his tax liabilities for eight years had expired was an impermissible challenge to the existence of his underlying tax liability because he failed to establish that he did not receive notices of deficiencies for the taxes in question.B.L. Moore, 82 TCM 930, Code Sec. 6330 hearing from contesting his underlying tax liability for six tax years because he received notices of deficiency for those years. The Secretary's authority to issue Notices of Deficiency was properly delegated to the District Director and also to the Director of the Service Center.M.E. Nestor, 118 TC 162, 2002-1 USTC ¶50,319.The IRS Appeals Office did not abuse its discretion in failing to consider an argument that a taxpayer had failed to bring to its attention in connection with his Collection Due Process hearing. The taxpayer's case did not involve an allegation of recent, unusual illness, hardship, or special circumstance that justified an exception to the general rule.R.B. Magana, 118 TC 488, Reg. §301.6320-1(e)(3), Q&A-E11, was reasonable and was consistent with the plain language of Dec. 54,787.The IRS's determination to proceed with a levy action on an individual's property for his tax deficiency did not constitute an abuse of discretion. The validity of the taxpayer's underlying tax liability was not at issue as he had received a notice of deficiency and had the opportunity to dispute his liability in his Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing. The taxpayer failed to assert any spousal defenses, any challenges to the appropriateness of the collection actions or any offers of collection alternatives at the CDP hearing. Moreover, his various claims alleging that the Appeals officer failed to follow proper procedure were rejected.W.A. Carroll, DC Tenn., CCA Letter Ruling 200152043, November 15, 2001.A corporate taxpayer's allegation that an Appeals Officer failed to collect and credit funds owed to the taxpayer by another government agency to its outstanding tax liabilities was dismissed. Because the taxpayer essentially objected to its underlying tax liability, such arguments were properly disregarded during the CDP hearing.Triad Microsystems, Inc., DC Calif., Code Sec. 6330 satisfies the "opportunity to dispute" requirement of Code Sec. 6330 ensure that a taxpayer is afforded an opportunity to dispute the underlying tax liability, regardless of whether that opportunity is given before or after the effective date of 2003-1 USTC ¶50,157.The Tax Court's finding that an individual taxpayer had been sent a refund was clear error and, therefore, the finding was vacated and remanded for further factual determinations. The IRS had failed to credit the taxpayer for amounts withheld, was unable to account for the taxpayer's refund, and had discrepancies in its records. Instead, the IRS relied on a 21-R internal computer report that showed a "freeze code" to show that the taxpayer had been mailed a refund. Moreover, the IRS's records on the appropriate amount of statutory interest the taxpayer owed were contradictory, and the testimony of the Appeals officer was not conclusive. Records presented by the IRS did not indicate the amount of interest that had accrued, how it was calculated, or whether the taxpayer's payment stopped the running of interest on that amount.R. Wright, CA-2, Code Sec. 6330(c), the IRS's motion to dismiss the case for failure to state a justiciable claim was granted. J.G. Beery, 85 TCM 842, Dec. 55,068(M), TC Memo. 2003-61.A frivolous return penalty was properly imposed against an individual who, despite the receipt of earned income, filed a zero-income return and questioned the IRS's authority to collect taxes. The taxpayer failed to establish that the Appeals officer at his Collection Due Process hearing abused her discretion in disregarding issues that he attempted to raise that did not relate to spousal defenses, the appropriateness of the collection actions, and offers of collection alternatives. The taxpayer had previously been given an opportunity to challenge the penalty when the IRS notified him by letter that his tax form should be corrected; however, he took no action at that time. M.B. Loze, DC La., Dec. 55,091(M), TC Memo. 2003-83.Similarly:R.H. Frank, 85 TCM 1066, Code Sec. 6213(a), he was barred from challenging the liability at trial. Moreover, the IRS was not required to conduct an audit before determining a deficiency, and it possessed statutory authority under 2003-1 USTC ¶50,337, 59 FedAppx 808.The Collection Due Process (CDP) determination denying innocent spouse relief to a wife who, with her family, engaged in a systematic plan to place assets beyond the reach of the IRS was upheld. She knew of the understatements generated by the improper tax shelter deductions, significantly benefited from the unpaid liabilities, and attempted to conceal family assets. Thus, it was not inequitable to deny her relief from joint tax liability. N.B. Doyle, 85 TCM 1108, Dec. 55,110(M), TC Memo. 2003-102.The Collection Due Process (CDP) determination permitting the IRS to proceed with collection of an individual's deficiency and a delay penalty was upheld. Because the taxpayer had received statutory notice of deficiency, he was precluded from challenging his underlying tax liability at the CDP hearing. The imposition of sanctions against him was not an abuse of discretion based on the finding that he had instituted the action primarily for purposes of delay. H.E. Call, CA-9, Dec. 55,122(M), TC Memo. 2003-113.Married taxpayers who were not present to accept delivery of a notice of deficiency sent to them by the IRS were allowed to challenge the validity of the deficiency and penalty assessed against them at their Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing. Both taxpayers credibly testified that they did not receive a notice of attempted delivery from the United States Postal Service (USPS) and that they did not know that the USPS was attempting to deliver a certified letter to them. Accordingly, the avoidance exception to actual receipt was not applicable and they were afforded the opportunity to dispute their tax liability for the year in issue.C.B. Tatum, Jr., 85 TCM 1200, Dec. 55,552(M), TC Memo. 2004-44.On reconsideration, an order granting partial summary judgment against the secretary/treasurer of a corporation on the issue of his liability for unpaid trust fund recovery penalties and interest was reversed. It was not clear whether the taxpayer had the opportunity to dispute his underlying tax liability before the IRS made its assessment. There was a question of fact as to whether the deficiency notice went unclaimed because it was not mailed to the proper address.B.S. Pollack, DC Tenn., 2003-2 USTC ¶50,721.The IRS's Collection Due Process (CDP) determination spanning four tax years was upheld where, in properly contesting his underlying tax liability, an individual failed to establish that he was entitled to claimed loss deductions. The taxpayer unsuccessfully advanced tax-protestor type arguments to support his contention that he was not responsible for the underlying tax liability. Moreover, no abuse of discretion was established, and the collection alternatives were deemed conceded because they were not raised during the CDP hearing. As a result, the IRS was permitted to proceed with collection. E.C. Aston, 85 TCM 1260, 2003-1 USTC ¶50,458.The IRS's determination to proceed with a collection action against an individual for income tax liabilities was not an abuse of discretion. The merits of the taxpayer's claim of entitlement to itemized deductions had previously been determined in court; thus, in the taxpayer was not entitled to contest the underlying tax liability in the Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing. Since the taxpayer did not raise any other issues about the conduct of the hearing or verification that administrative procedures had been followed, he did not show any abuse of discretion by the IRS.S.G. Orr, 85 TCM 1319, 2003-1 USTC ¶50,529.R. Rodriguez, DC Ariz., Dec. 54,787 (2002), followed. F. Pahamotang, 85 TCM 1506, 2003-2 USTC ¶50,536.The IRS did not abuse its discretion in determining to proceed with a collection action against an individual with respect to two tax years. Although the taxpayer did not receive a notice of deficiency with respect to his unpaid liability for either tax year, the contentions and arguments he raised in his Appeals office hearing, petition, and trial memorandum, and which challenged the existence or the amount of each such unpaid liability, were frivolous and/or groundless. The court determined, sua sponte, to impose the delay penalty because the court previously had warned the taxpayer about such arguments. I. Israel, 86 TCM 23, Dec. 55,225(M), TC Memo. 2003-205.An individual who failed to file a Tax Court petition after receiving a notice of deficiency was barred from raising any issues regarding his underlying tax liability at his Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing.J.R. Peacock, 86 TCM 64, 2004-2 USTC ¶50,310, 105 FedAppx 127.Married taxpayers who had an opportunity to challenge a notice of deficiency were barred from raising any issues regarding their underlying tax liability at their Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing. Because the taxpayers entered into an agreement as to the amount of their tax liability in one tax year, they were precluded from arguing the amount of their tax liability at their CDP hearing or in their petition. A. Thomas, 86 TCM 216, 2003-2 USTC ¶50,620.Similarly:W.F. Currie, DC Ga., 2006-2 USTC ¶50,474.The Tax Court properly dismissed an individual's challenge to an adverse Collection Due Process (CDP) determination where the taxpayer attempted to dispute his underlying tax liability during his CDP hearing. The taxpayer received a notice of deficiency and failed to object to the tax liability at that time. E.P. Tolotti, Jr., CA-9 (unpublished opinion), 2001-2 USTC ¶50,735), a federal district court held that the return assessments were validly entered, adequately noticed, and not dependent upon the prior issuance of notices of deficiency. The district court also concluded that the taxpayer's execution of a Form 900 was a valid extension of the period of limitations on collection. The taxpayer was not collaterally estopped from litigating issues regarding examination assessments.J. Perez, 84 TCM 501, Dec. 54,866(M), TC Memo. 2002-225.The IRS was permitted to proceed with collection against an individual who gave no bona fide basis for his objection to the Service's collection actions. The Tax Court had given the taxpayer an opportunity to contest his underlying tax liabilities for two years at a Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing because he had received no deficiency notices for those years. However, he did not attend the CDP hearing, attempted to delay the hearing, did not challenge the existence or amount of his underlying deficiencies, and raised previously rejected frivolous arguments in response to an order to show cause. Because he instituted and maintained the proceeding solely for delay, the court concluded that the IRS's collection determination was not an abuse of discretion.M. Nestor, 84 TCM 410, Dec. 54,816(M), TC Memo. 2002-226.The validity of married taxpayers' underlying liability was properly at issue in the Code Sec. 6330(d) appeal from a Collection Due Process (CDP) determination, and the review was to be conducted under the de novo standard. By raising the issue of whether the limitations period had expired at the CDP hearing, the taxpayers challenged their underlying tax liability. The IRS's assessment was the result of the taxpayers' voluntarily filed amended return. No deficiency notice had been issued to them, and they did not otherwise have an opportunity to dispute their tax liability.P. Hoffman, 119 TC 140, 2002-2 USTC ¶50,802.Married taxpayers failed to set forth a valid argument to support their claim that a notice of determination issued to them should be vacated. They raised the same issues in the district court that they had raised in their Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing. Their tax protest arguments were rejected, as was their challenge to the frivolous return penalty imposed in connection with their return that contained zeros while an attached Form W-2 showed income. Moreover, their conclusory allegation that their CDP hearing was improperly conducted was unsupported, as were their contentions that the Treasury Secretary was required to send the notice of determination, and that computer generated transcripts were invalid to show notice and amounts owed.R. Harrison, DC Nev., Code Sec. 6330 and he was afforded every opportunity to address issues of his choosing. Moreover, the taxpayer did not have a right to discovery in connection with his CDP hearing, and the IRS did not fail to produce documentation that he was entitled to receive. The mere fact that the notice of a right to a CDP hearing was sent by an IRS official, rather than by the Treasury Secretary, did not invalidate the notice.B.R. Kelly, DC Mo., Code Sec. 6703, the statutory deficiency procedures did not apply and the taxpayers had no prior opportunity to dispute the penalties.P. Lemieux, DC Nev., Code Sec. 6703 prior to the CDP hearing, the taxpayer was barred from contesting the existence or amount of the assessed liability. Moreover, he failed to establish that documents sent to him by the IRS were invalid or that IRS personnel lacked authority to proceed against him. Thus, no showing was made to justify further delay in the government's collection efforts.P. Tkac, DC Md., 2002-2 USTC ¶50,740.Taxpayers who spuriously claimed no income or expenses on their tax return were precluded from contesting their underlying tax liability at a Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing because they had been provided with sufficient notice and demand for payment of taxes but had not timely dispute their tax liability. The Appeals officer did not abuse his discretion in concluding that the taxpayers were afforded the applicable administrative procedures but failed to raise spousal defenses, challenge the appropriateness of the collection action, and propose alternative means of collection. The purported collection alternative proposed by the taxpayers concerning payment of the penalty did not qualify as an alternative to collection by levy. Instead, it was a proposed condition to payment of the underlying liability, and the Appeals officer did not err in rejecting the plan.D. Bentley, DC Ohio, Code Sec. 6330(c)(2). He did not challenge the appropriateness of the intended method of collection, offer alternative means of collection, or raise a spousal defense. Moreover, the taxpayer's frivolous claims that the IRS employees who imposed the penalties had to be named, and that the Appeals officer failed to identify the regulations that required payment of the penalty, were rejected.L. Gillett, DC Mich., ¶38,184.35.The IRS was entitled to levy on an individual's pension in order to collect a tax liability for five tax years. The taxpayer was not entitled to a determination as to the amount of his pension subject to the liens and, implicitly, a determination that no other assets of the taxpayer were subject to the IRS liens. The taxpayer failed to make such argument before the IRS Appeals officer at his collection due process hearing because he raised no alternatives to collection. The Tax Court noted that it would be inappropriate to anticipate, determine and limit the scope of the liens on the record in the case. The amount of liability was not disputed; the taxpayer's arguments only addressed collectibility. L. Fusaro, 86 TCM 731, 2004-1 USTC ¶50,145, 86 FedAppx 409, aff'g unreported Tax Court decision.An IRS Appeals officer did not abuse his discretion in issuing a Collection Due Process (CDP) determination permitting the collection of the trust fund recovery penalty and interest from a corporate treasurer/responsible person. The treasurer's claim that the government improperly failed to credit a third party's payments to his account was moot because the amounts had either been credited to his account or the government's erroneous deletion of a credit was being corrected. J.A.P. Leiter, DC Kan., 2004-1 USTC ¶50,239.Similarly:C. Jackling, DC N.H., Dec. 55,747(M), T.C. Memo. 2004-208). The IRS Appeals Officer issued a supplemental notice of determination upholding the levy after the taxpayer put off his opportunity for an administrative hearing and then, more than four months after the hearing was to take place, failed to submit proof of his entitlement to business expense deductions. The determination to proceed with the levy was not an abuse of discretion. The taxpayer failed to provide information about his financial situation on Form 433-A, Collection Information Statement, which was a prerequisite for consideration of an alternative collection arrangement.R. Newstat,, 90 TCM 486 , 2005-1 USTC ¶50,154.A Collection Due Process hearing correctly concluded that an individual could not offset his unpaid tax liability for one year with purported Schedule C losses sustained in three subsequent years. No evidence was offered during the taxpayer's Collection Due Process hearing or at trial concerning the manner in which the losses were incurred or why they were incurred. The taxpayer did not produce returns on which the losses were reported. The taxpayer's return for the year in dispute was untimely and the limitations period for filing an amended return had expired.J.W. Winters, Jr., 89 TCM 693, Dec. 55,950.An IRS Appeals Officer did not abuse his discretion in concluding that a Notice of Intent to Levy regarding tax liabilities arising from a notice of final partnership administrative adjustments had been rendered moot by virtue of an installment agreement voluntarily entered into by the taxpayer with the IRS.D. Hudspath, 89 TCM 1051, Code Sec. 6330 hearing.I. Molina, 88 TCM 441, Code Sec. 6330(c)(2)(B) from contesting his underlying tax liability at his CDP hearing.R.W. Howard, 89 TCM 1135, Code Sec. 6330(c)(2)(B) generally entitles taxpayers to raise the issue of an underlying liability if they did not receive a notice of deficiency or otherwise have an opportunity to dispute the liability, the individual here, who did not receive notices of deficiency, was not entitled to proactively prevent delivery of the notices by giving an old address and subsequently failing to inform the IRS of new addresses. Furthermore, although the Appeals officer had refused to allow a stenographer to record the collection due process hearing, whereupon the individual refused to proceed, the Tax Court declined to remand the case. No purpose would be served by a remand or additional hearings.D.A. Lehmann, 89 TCM 1084, Dec. 56,152(M), TC Memo. 2005-224.The IRS did not abuse its discretion when it determined that collection of an individual's tax liability could proceed. The taxpayer was given the opportunity before the Tax Court to identify legitimate issues to warrant further consideration of the merits of his case but he continued to focus on the denial of a recorded hearing and offered no substantive issues of merit.H.E. Call,90 TCM 601 , Dec. 56,229(M), TC Memo. 2005-295.An individual who received a notice of the IRS's intention to assess him with a penalty, but who failed to file an administrative appeal, could not contest his liability for the penalty at a Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing. Because the taxpayer did not file an administrative appeal, he was precluded, under 2006-1 USTC ¶50,152, 438 F3d 739.An individual's failure to submit an income tax return for the year at issue should not have prevented consideration of his claims regarding bases and interest deductions. Even though he did not file a tax return, the evidence the individual presented proving loss on the sale of stock and regarding a mortgage interest deduction was credible and corroborated by documentation. Consequently, the individual did not have an outstanding tax liability for the year at issue, and the IRS's collection action was not sustained.R.L. Sherer, 91 TCM 759 ,Dec. 56,472(M), TC Memo. 2006-66.An individual's challenge to the merits of his underlying trust fund recovery penalty was not properly before the federal district court because the issue could not be raised at a Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing. Correspondence showed that he had the opportunity to contest the merits of his underlying tax liability prior to the CDP hearing. Therefore, he was statutorily precluded from raising the issues at a hearing.R. Plumb, DC Fla., Dec. 56,203(M), TC Memo. 2005-271.Summary judgment was granted against an individual who sought to dispute his underlying tax liability in a Collection Due Process hearing. By signing Form 2848, the taxpayer authorized a representative to conduct tax matters on his behalf. Because the representative signed Forms 4549, Income Tax Examination Changes, on the taxpayer's behalf, the taxpayer waived his right to contest the underlying tax liability. Even if the representative executed the waivers without seeking his consent, the taxpayer was bound by his representative's acts because the IRS had no reason to know that the representative's conduct may have been improper.F. Deutsch, 91 TCM 846, Dec. 56,526.The IRS has recommended acquiescence in N. Montgomery, 122 TC 1, Code Sec. 6330 extends substantive and procedural protections to taxpayers who are confronted with a lien, or proposed levy, but who did not have a prior opportunity to challenge their tax liability.2006-2 USTC ¶50,493.The IRS did not abuse its discretion in rejecting an offer-in-compromise and sustaining a proposed levy action against a taxpayer who was a partner in a cattle breeding partnership through which he claimed deductions for farming losses and carried back related net operating losses that gave rise to refunds. The Tax Court rejected the taxpayer's argument that the longstanding nature of the case required the IRS to accept his offer-in-compromise. Further, the IRS's reliance on an example in the Internal Revenue Manual was not arbitrary or capricious. Also, the mere fact that certain "equitable facts" present in the case did not persuade the IRS did not mean that they were not considered. Finally, the IRS did not fail to balance the need for efficient collection of taxes with the concern that the collection action not be more intrusive than necessary. The IRS did seek to collect the taxpayer's outstanding tax liability through less intrusive means --an installment agreement. But the taxpayer rejected it.M. Keller, 92 TCM 114, 2006-2 USTC ¶50,571.A taxpayer who did not receive a refund for a particular year or notice from the IRS that his refund for that year had not been applied to deficiencies for previous tax years was entitled to an abatement of interest under 2004-2 USTC 50,343, 381 F3d 41. R. Wright, 92 TCM 525, Dec. 56,905(M), TC Memo. 2007-94.The IRS was entitled to enforce a federal tax lien against an individual relating to unreported discharge of indebtedness income. The taxpayer argued that she did not receive the notice of deficiency associated with the underlying tax liability when it was originally mailed. Nonetheless, she participated in an equivalent hearing after a second levy notice was sent. During the hearing, the taxpayer had the opportunity to discuss and dispute with the IRS' Appeals Office her underlying tax liability. Since the notice of federal tax lien related to the same tax liability and same tax year, the taxpayer could not contest that liability when opposing the notice of federal tax lien.D.L. Newsome, 93 TCM 1193, Code Sec. 6330(b). W.F. Middleton, 93 TCM 1222, Dec. 57,057(M), TC Memo. 2007-235.

In the absence of any reason why the taxpayers could not access the equity from their residence immediately, an Appeals officer did not abuse his discretion by determining that the taxes were currently collectible and that the collection should not be delayed to allow the taxpayers more time to sell or refinance the house.K.F. Foley, 94 TCM 210,

Labels:

Tax Attorney: Fraud and False Statements: Evidence

Defendant's records, voluntarily produced to revenue agents in investigation of his income tax liability, were not suppressible as evidence in proving assistance in the preparation of fraudulent returns for others. There was no evidence that the records were obtained by misrepresentation.

J.P. Dupont, DC, 59-1 USTC ¶9204, 169 FSupp 572.

Motion to suppress evidence of wilfully preparing false returns was denied.

L.H. Kupper, DC, 60-1 USTC ¶9235, 179 FSupp 264.

E.G. Austin, DC, 63-1 USTC ¶9157, 209 FSupp 101.

A motion by defendant to suppress as evidence papers seized by IRS inspectors was granted where the warrant for his arrest on a complaint charging him with making false statements was unlawful, the arrest itself was unlawful, and the search and seizure were unreasonable.

L.M. Bayley, DC, 65-2 USTC ¶9610.

All materials seized by the IRS under a defective search warrant were suppressed and the defendants' convictions (one convicted of willfully subscribing to a false corporate return, the other convicted of aiding in preparation of a false return, and both convicted of conspiracy) were reversed. The warrant used to seize corporate records authorized an unlawful general search of the business premises and thus the warrant was impermissibly general in scope. Total suppression was required since no portion of the warrant was particularized.

J.B. Cardwell, CA-9, 82-2 USTC ¶9470, 680 F2d 75.

A bingo hall operator's conviction for filing a false tax return was reversed because it was based on evidence obtained in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable search and seizure. The evidence was seized pursuant to a search warrant for records pertaining to the taxpayer's illegal gambling activities, but was unrelated to his bingo operation; instead, it revealed his failure to report income during a year that preceded his involvement in any gambling operation. The government's argument that the warrant covered the records at issue because they established the taxpayer's overall financial condition, showed that a charitable organization functioned as his alter ego, and demonstrated that his bingo operation was permeated by fraud was rejected as overbroad. The government also failed to prove that the inevitable discovery doctrine exempted the records from the exclusionary rule since it failed to show that it would have uncovered the records during its civil investigation of the taxpayer.

D. Ford, CA-6, 99-2 USTC ¶50,724, 184 F3d 566.

The IRS was entitled to retain copies of financial documents that it had seized from a chiropractic office pursuant to a valid search warrant, but it could not retain similar documents that had been seized from the taxpayer's residence because the seizure was not authorized by a warrant. A co-tenant's permission was inadequate because the taxpayer retained full authority over the records and did not relinquish any authority or control to him.

J.L. Marvin, CA-8, 85-2 USTC ¶9858.

The testimony of the taxpayer's wife was sufficient to establish probable cause to seize records relating to his car rental business that were used as evidence to convict him of tax evasion and fraud. The wife's statements to IRS agents did not constitute testimony to which the privilege against adverse spousal testimony applied nor did the privilege for confidential marital communication apply because the wife did not inform the IRS of any communicative utterance by the taxpayer.

A.M. Lefkowitz, CA-9, 80-2 USTC ¶9722.

The taxpayer's motion to suppress evidence obtained from him by an IRS agent who failed to state the criminal nature of the investigation was dismissed since the taxpayer was properly given his Miranda warnings and the information was voluntarily given without any fraud or deceit by the agent.

D.C. Potter, DC, 75-1 USTC ¶9328, 385 FSupp 681.

In a prosecution for falsely claiming automobile expense deductions on a taxpayer's returns for 1956-1958, it was error to admit returns for earlier years as evidence of wilfulness where it was not claimed that the prior returns violated the law. The court also erred in precluding the defendant from introducing his copies of the W-2 forms filed with his returns and in not permitting him to prove that statements made by a witness for the prosecution and allegedly in the possession of the government were in existence.

A.J. Accardo, CA-7, 62-1 USTC ¶9170, 298 F2d 133.

Evidence of federal income tax fraud was admissible even though derived from inadmissible evidence of a nontax offense. That evidence had been seized during the course of an illegal search by county officials five months before the alleged fraud was perpetrated. The derivative evidence was cleansed of taint by the lapse of time. Moreover, exclusion of the evidence of tax fraud would not have achieved "substantial deterrence" of unlawful conduct by law enforcement officers since, under the facts, the local authorities could not have foreseen this prosecution at the time of the defendant's arrest.

T.A. Paepke, CA-7, 77-1 USTC ¶9302, 550 F2d 385. After remand, unreported District Court decision was aff'd in unreported CA-7 opinion, 7/12/79.

On the trial of an individual charged with wilfully and knowingly assisting salesmen in preparing false income tax returns by advising them that they did not have to report commissions, the trial court erred in refusing to require the salesmen to deliver to the defendant reports of Internal Revenue Service agents making adjustments to their income.

J.F. Hull, CA-5, 63-2 USTC ¶9821, 324 F2d 817.

Evidence that a certified public accountant who prepared salesmen's returns deducted expenses, which should have been capitalized, was not sufficient to prove willful violation of the law. However, evidence that he advised the salesmen not to report commissions was a violation.

J.F. Hull, CA-5, 66-1 USTC ¶9259, 356 F2d 919.

It was not error to refuse to admit evidence of income tax overpayment. Although this evidence might have aided the defendant's defense that he relied on his accountant in good faith, it could have had no impact on the case as a whole because the evidence suggested that he withheld relevant data from the accountant.

L.E. Johnson, CA-5, 77-2 USTC ¶9622, 558 F2d 744.

Even assuming that certain documentary evidence was exculpatory, its production during (instead of before) the trial did not result in an unfair trial. The jury considered the evidence in arriving at its verdict and there would have been no point in ordering a new trial during which a different jury would have to consider the same evidence.

J. Kaplan, CA-3, 77-1 USTC ¶9441, 554 F2d 577.

Certain invoices and cancelled checks admitted to prove that the defendant had failed to report gross income from his business, which were allegedly obtained through the use of information taken from illegally seized records, should not have been suppressed as "fruit" of the illegal seizure.

A.B. Carsello, CA-7, 78-2 USTC ¶9580, 578 F2d 199. Cert. denied, 11/27/78.

The evidence was sufficient to support the jury's conclusion that the defendant was a party in a scheme to conceal corporate income, which fact was the basis of the criminal actions. The fact that the defendant did not sign or file the corporate returns was not material.

A. Maius, CA-6, 67-2 USTC ¶9521, 378 F2d 716. Cert. denied, 389 US 905.

A 1961 income tax return was admissible as evidence in a trial involving the willful making of fraudulent returns in 1963-1965 as it was intended to show a pattern of overstatement of deductions. It was also proper to admit as evidence a 1965 income item that was reported in the taxpayer's 1964 return, admission being only to show knowledge and willfulness.

C. Bishop, CA-9, 73-2 USTC ¶9674, 485 F2d 248.

The taxpayer's conviction on two counts involving false statements in an offer to compromise his civil tax liability was reversed. The trial court had erroneously received in evidence an exhibit offered by the government wherein the taxpayer admitted a prior felony conviction for tax fraud, which had no connection with the charge that he had made false statements and could only be prejudicial since he had not elected to take the stand.

A.S. Birns, CA-6, 68-1 USTC ¶9365, 395 F2d 943.

The trial court did not err by admitting evidence of other related income tax crimes, since the evidence helped to establish the taxpayer's intent and also the other elements of the crime of willfully aiding and advising in the preparation of false and fraudulent tax returns.

L.V. Amos, CA-8, 74-1 USTC ¶9447, 496 F2d 1269.

A taxpayer's conviction for claiming false estimated tax payments on his return, with the aid of IRS employees, was affirmed. The manner in which the IRS gathered evidence (from the IRS employees and taxpayer's accountant) was not a ground for reversal.

D. Lopez, CA-2, 70-1 USTC ¶9115, 420 F2d 313. Decision remanded on another issue, CA-2, 70-2 USTC ¶9488, 428 F2d 1135.

Taxpayer's conviction for willfully and knowingly aiding and assisting in the fraudulent preparation of tax returns was upheld. Evidence of an IRS agent's return preparation procedures was properly excluded. Also, taxpayer's noncriminal activity was properly excluded as being irrelevant.

W.P. Dobbs, CA-5, 75-1 USTC ¶9210, 506 F2d 445.

The government should have produced, at trial, its audits of the defendant in response to a defense request. The case was remanded for the trial judge to inspect the contents of the audit.

G.F. Brown, CA-5, 78-2 USTC ¶9550, 574 F2d 1274. Cert. denied, 439 US 1118.

The evidence was not sufficient to show that a defendant was involved in a conspiracy to conceal the name of the winner of a twin double at a racetrack and to prepare a false Form 1099. However, the fact that the government did not offer proof of the conspiracy's existence at regular intervals during the period charged did not preclude another defendant's conviction.

T. Cantone, CA-2, 70-1 USTC ¶9394, 426 F2d 902.

Taxpayer's conviction for conspiring to conceal the fact that he was the actual winner of horse races for purposes of reporting his winnings on Form 1099 was upheld.

P.J. Dumaine, CA-1, 74-1 USTC ¶9317, 493 F2d 1257.

In cases that involved the same racetrack, the evidence was sufficient to prove a conspiracy.

S. Haimowitz, CA-2, 69-1 USTC ¶9107, 404 F2d 38.

S. Green, CA-2, 70-1 USTC ¶9199, 421 F2d 1237.

Similarly.

J.A. Rizzo, DC, 70-2 USTC ¶9660, 313 FSupp 734.

A. Kessler, CA-2, 71-2 USTC ¶9693, 449 F2d 1315.

L. Maistrow, CA-2, 71-2 USTC ¶9762, 451 F2d 1342.

L. Salerno, DC, 72-1 USTC ¶9169, 330 FSupp 1401.

A.J. Cobb, CA-2, 71-2 USTC ¶9593, 446 F2d 1174.

D. Handel, CA-2, 72-2 USTC ¶9521, 464 F2d 679. Cert. denied, 409 US 984.

R.J. Lincoln, CA-5, 73-1 USTC ¶9209, 472 F2d 1183.

F. La Haye, CA-3, 77-1 USTC ¶9152, 548 F2d 474.

A conviction could not stand under circumstances where a taxpayer allegedly was observed by Government agents while cashing a racetrack ticket for the true owner and signing Form 1099 in exchange for a commission. The conviction was reversed because the Government failed to prove a tax deficiency against the true owner for the year involved. Thus, his testimony was rendered incompetent and caused a material deficiency in the proof.

L. Petti, CA-3, 71-2 USTC ¶9653, 448 F2d 1257.

A man who filled out race track forms for the true winners was properly convicted of filing false returns. Evidence of other acts to demonstrate intent was properly admitted. Nor did the government have to show a loss of tax revenue from the scheme.

M.H. Cohen, CA-4, 80-1 USTC ¶9288, 617 F2d 56.

The appellate court, in affirming taxpayer's conviction for making and subscribing to false income tax returns, held that the District Court did not err by not requiring the government to introduce evidence of all items which the jury might find to be an allowable reduction of his income.

R.H. Lawhon, CA-5, 74-2 USTC ¶9634, 499 F2d 352.

During a criminal prosecution of a return preparer, it was not reversible error to introduce into evidence a chart summarizing the testimony of the preparer's clients. Although the chart contained inadmissible portions, the fact that the jury did not unduly rely upon it was shown by that body's acquittal of the preparer on five of the thirteen items with which the chart dealt.

W.R. Conlin, CA-2, 77-1 USTC ¶9291, 551 F2d 534. Cert. denied, 434 US 831.

Falsified information on taxpayer's return indicating that sums had been deposited with the Federal Reserve bank was material, even though the IRS relies primarily on information supplied it by the bank.

H.M. Romanow, CA-1, 75-1 USTC ¶9153, 509 F2d 26.

The lower court did not err in admitting testimony of the taxpayer's failure to file tax returns for the six years preceding 1968, since such evidence was relevant to the issue of willfulness, which must be proved whether the offense charged is failure to file or false filing.

K.L. Snow, CA-9, 76-1 USTC ¶9227, 529 F2d 224. Cert. denied, 429 US 821.

The taxpayer's conviction for filing false federal tax returns was reversed because the trial judge erred in excluding the taxpayer's testimony concerning allegedly inconsistent statements made by a government witness.

W.E. McLaughlin, CA-9, 82-1 USTC ¶9105, 663 F2d 949.

The Government's failure to disclose certain exculpatory evidence that the accountant's employee was responsible for the preparation of the false returns of two of the prosecution's witnesses until near the close of the presentation of the defense did not warrant an automatic reversal. The suppression of such evidence was not complete, but merely late, and was not prejudicial because the judge offered the defendant a continuance. Moreover, the evidence would not have been helpful because the jury was already aware of this fact from the testimony of these two witnesses at trial.

O.H. Miller, CA-9, 76-1 USTC ¶9228, 529 F2d 1125. Cert. denied, 426 US 924.

The evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction under the net worth method of calculating income as applied by the Commissioner; the evidence was sufficient to show willfulness on the part of the taxpayer to evade taxes; and the trial court did not commit prejudicial error when it permitted an IRS agent to testify that the taxpayer had been previously investigated for possible tax fraud in connection with his returns for 1958 and 1959 since it was made clear that no criminal liability ever attached.

M. Stone, CA-8, 76-1 USTC ¶9310, 531 F2d 939. Cert. denied, 429 US 824.

The U.S. Supreme Court remanded a case involving the government's failure to produce certain material in its possession when requested to do so by the defendant's attorney. The case was remanded for reconsideration in light of a decision in a nontax case (Agurs, 427 US 97).

J.M. McCrane, Jr., SCt, 76-2 USTC ¶9517, 427 US 909, vacating and rem'g CA-3, 76-1 USTC ¶9147, 527 F2d 906.

On remand, the Third Circuit again held that the government should have produced the evidence in its possession. The defendant's request for material that could be used to impeach prosecution witnesses, including, but not limited to, any standards used by the government in declining prosecution of similar cases, was sufficiently specific under Agurs.

J.M. McCrane, Jr., CA-3, 77-1 USTC ¶9376, 547 F2d 204.

Motion for a new trial on the grounds of newly discovered evidence was denied. The evidence, had it been disclosed to the defendant promptly, would not have affected the outcome of the case.

J.M. McCrane, Jr., CA-3, 78-2 USTC ¶9600.

The appellate court held that handwriting exemplars, taken from two prosecution witnesses during taxpayer's trial for willfully and knowingly filing a false tax return at the request of the prosecution and outside the presence of the court, the jury, and defense counsel, for examination by the Government's expert, were properly admitted into evidence since neither witness was on trial, and defense counsel had an opportunity to cross-examine each individual concerning the circumstances in which he made the exemplars.

V.M. Pastore, CA-2, 76-2 USTC ¶9513, 537 F2d 675.

It was not error to admit into evidence documents that the defendant had turned over to the government in compliance with a subpoena issued pursuant to a grand jury investigation of other persons. He had waived his privilege against self-incrimination by complying with the subpoena. Nor did admission of the documents violate the secrecy of grand jury proceedings.

J.E. Penrod, CA-4, 79-2 USTC ¶9728, 609 F2d 1092. Cert. denied, 446 US 917, 100 SCt 1850.

Out-of-court declarations made by one defendant in a false statements case were properly introduced against the other defendant. The statements were not hearsay because they were offered to prove their falsity rather than their truth.

R.L. Fox, CA-5, 80-1 USTC ¶9337, 613 F2d 99.

Tape-recorded statements of a partner which were not given "under an oath subject to the penalty of perjury" were hearsay. The prejudice resulting from the use of the hearsay at trial to support the government's conviction of the partnership's accountant was not harmless when balanced against "the marginal evidence developed by the government." The use of the hearsay evidence supporting a partner's conviction on two counts also was not harmless error for the same reason; however, the prejudice resulting from his conviction on a third count was harmless when balanced against overwhelming evidence that he had received unreported partnership payments.

D.E. Day, CA-6, 86-1 USTC ¶9394.

A former IRS agent and his brother were properly convicted of a number of offenses, including filing false returns. Exemplars of the former agent's handwriting were properly authenticated. Statements of one conspirator that implicated the other were properly admitted. Admission of the former agent's returns to show acquisition of wealth was not enough, in and of itself, to mandate reversal.

F. Mangan, CA-2, 78-1 USTC ¶9349, 575 F2d 32.

A false return conviction was affirmed. Willfulness was established by the defendant's use of false names and his surreptitious use of cash. It was not improper to admit testimony of a prosecution witness who had testified differently in the past or to deny a motion for severance. Notebooks seized at the defendant's gas station were properly admitted.

F.W. Holladay, CA-5, 78-1 USTC ¶9218, 566 F2d 1018.

A false return conviction was affirmed. Failure to report substantial amounts of gross livestock receipts on Schedule F, Form 1040, rendered the return materially false. Truthful reporting is required on the schedule even though it was not expressly promulgated by any regulation. Nor did government implications of underpayment of taxes alter the rule that tax liability is immaterial to false returns prosecutions.

M.A. Taylor, CA-5, 78-1 USTC ¶9474, 574 F2d 232. Cert. denied, 99 SCt 251.

A corporate vice president, who reported as "ordinary business losses" on Schedule C his losses in connection with numerous stock option and commodity futures transactions, was properly convicted on two counts of willfully making and subscribing false federal income tax returns. The evidence established the false characterization of his trading activity and business name on Schedule C, which suggested that the vice president knew that accurate descriptions would trigger inspection and ultimate disallowance of the ordinary loss deductions by the IRS. The evidence also established that the vice president's education and professional experience suggested an extraordinary sophistication with respect to tax matters, and he reported trading losses in prior and subsequent years as "capital losses" and caused his father to so report his losses from similar activity.

P.H. Diamond, CA-4, 86-1 USTC ¶9356, 788 F2d 1025.

A labor union official was properly convicted of filing a false return. The evidence given by an accomplice was not inherently implausible. Alleged government misconduct could not vitiate the conviction; it was acceptable to pay informant fees to the accomplice, it was irrelevant that the government submitted evidence to the jury related to items of unreported income in excess of the limitation imposed by the court and the defendant was not harmed by the late disclosure of exculpatory material. The lower court did not err in denying his request for a special verdict. The jury instructions adequately defined a gift and were sufficient even though they did not state that the offense could not have been willful if the defendant believed that the items in question were gifts to him.

D.E. Shelton, CA-9, 79-1 USTC ¶9189, 588 F2d 1248.

A conviction for aiding in the preparation of false returns was remanded so that the trial judge could decide whether a report made by a special agent, which the trial judge had refused to order produced, would show that a substantial number of the returns prepared by the defendant contained no error. This report might have had a bearing on the critical issues of motivation and intent.

D. Sternstein, CA-2, 79-1 USTC ¶9338, 596 F2d 528.

After the remand, the appellate court affirmed the trial judge's finding that the probative value of the report was negligible at best.

D. Sternstein, CA-2, 79-2 USTC ¶9626, 605 F2d 672.

The convictions of a manager of a cooperative and its accountant for conspiracy and for wilfully subscribing false and fraudulent corporate income tax returns were affirmed. Personal income tax returns of the officer were relevant to the conspiracy count and were properly admitted in evidence. Rulings at trial curtailing cross-examination of an IRS agent, refusal to give jury instructions offered by the defendants governing taxation of loans from a corporation to an officer and comments by the trial court on the evidence did not preclude the defendants from presenting their theory of defense to the jury. The trial court did not err in not inspecting a file containing a memorandum prepared by IRS counsel in camera since defense counsel accepted the prosecution's assurance that the file did not contain material subject to discovery.

J.E. White, CA-8, 82-1 USTC ¶9220, 671 F2d 1126.

No basis existed for excluding evidence relating to the proposed and final amendments of Reg. §1.612-3(b)(3) from the trial of a group of individuals on tax fraud charges because prosecution for violation of the regulation was not necessary to establish criminal fraud under the indictment. Evidence concerning the regulation, the defendants' understanding of it, and their alleged actions to circumvent its effects may be relevant in the trial.

R. Osserman, DC, 82-1 USTC ¶9315.

The trial court did not commit reversible error in excluding evidence relating to bias during the cross-examination of a government witness. Although the taxpayer was precluded from asking about a specific incident, he was permitted to cross-examine the witness extensively regarding his possible motives in testifying favorably for the government. Moreover, the jury was in possession of sufficient information to assess the witness's possible bias. In addition, the trial court did not err in refusing to admit into evidence, for impeachment purposes, copies of a civil action brought against the witness. The documents did not contradict the witness's testimony. Furthermore, the trial court did not err in admitting and relying on the government's sentencing memorandum and affidavit.

F.P. Tracey, CA-1, 82-1 USTC ¶9325. Cert. denied, 105 SCt 787.

The taxpayer's conviction for willfully filing false corporate income tax returns was affirmed. The evidence was sufficient to establish that he willfully omitted substantial amounts of income from the returns. A denial of a proposed jury instruction was not error. The taxpayer's conviction for obstruction of justice, based on evidence of intimidation and threats of force against former employees to prevent their communication with IRS investigators, was affirmed.

R.C. Thetford, CA-5, 82-1 USTC ¶9393, 676 F2d 170.

The fact that the taxpayer's name was signed to the tax returns was prima facie evidence in prosecution for income tax violations that he actually signed them.

V. Carrodeguas, CA-11, 85-2 USTC ¶9567.

A taxpayer's conviction for understating his income and the income of his deceased aunt's estate for the purposes of preparing her income tax return was upheld. Documents belonging to the law firm engaged by the taxpayer to prepare the return and testimony of its employees was properly admitted. The information given to the attorneys by the taxpayer was transferred to the firm for the purpose of preparing a tax return and was not protected by the attorney/client privilege.

D.H. Windfelder, CA-7, 86-1 USTC ¶9402.

A tax shelter promoter's conviction on charges of willfully filing and assisting others in filing false returns was upheld where the appellate court rejected allegations of error regarding jury instructions and the admission into evidence of certain statements.

W.J. Kelley, CA-7, 89-1 USTC ¶9132, 864 F2d 569.

Suppression of evidence on collateral estoppel grounds was unwarranted. The lower court barred evidence that the taxpayer owned certain stock accounts or committed tax law violations because he had been acquitted of tax evasion. The appellate court held that the taxpayer did not prove that the jury in the first trial decided the issues in his favor.

I.P. Citron, CA-2, 88-2 USTC ¶9552.

A mayor who failed to report the receipt of income from a constituent was properly convicted of filing false tax returns. The evidence indicated that the mayor knew that the constituent was not making a loan or a campaign contribution. Given the large amount of unreported income in comparison to his reported income, the jury could infer that the mayor intended to violate the tax laws and had not made an honest mistake.

W.R. Tucker, III, CA-9, 98-1 USTC ¶50,147, 133 F3d 1208.

Evidence of a public official's zoning and political activities on behalf of a developer that paid the official for consulting services was properly admitted.

J. Howard, CA-11, 88-2 USTC ¶9522.

A statement by a husband in a previous affidavit that was inconsistent with his testimony supporting false claims at a trial for willfully aiding and assisting in the preparation of false and fraudulent income tax returns was admissible under the hearsay rule only to establish the credibility of the witness and could not be used as substantive evidence. An accountant's testimony of a conversation he had with the defendant in which the defendant offered to backdate documents for another taxpayer was admissible under the recent admission of a party exception to the hearsay rule. Additionally, the offer to commit a similar crime was itself a similar act and was relevant as to the issue of willfulness.

N. Micke, CA-7, 88-2 USTC ¶9553.

Perjury convictions were overturned against married taxpayers who were charged with making false federal income tax returns. The government had failed to prove the materiality of allegedly false testimony given by the wife in the course of a deposition in connection with her sex discrimination suit against a federal agency.

A.B. Adams, CA-6, 89-2 USTC ¶9438, 870 F2d 1140.

Conviction for preparing false tax returns was upheld. Materiality of false information on returns was a matter of law left to the court. Proceeding in the taxpayer's brief absence with part of the trial was proper since the government's case was strong and trial transcripts were made available to the taxpayer. Evidence of convictions for passing bad checks was properly admitted since dishonesty and false statements were elements of the convictions. Finally, the government's harsh closing argument did not constitute plain error due to its strong case.

S.E. Rogers, CA-4, 88-2 USTC ¶9538.

A trial judge properly refused to admit the expert testimony of a CPA in a criminal tax fraud case because the charge was not that the returns were filled out improperly, but that the returns contained misstatements of fact of which the accountant had no knowledge. Further, there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction since it was up to the jury to decide whether to accept the testimony as to the taxpayer's limited ability to read and his capacity to understand the returns.

E.K. Dorotich, CA-9, 90-1 USTC ¶50,202, 900 F2d 192.

A taxpayer's conviction for filing false individual and corporate returns was upheld. The jury had ample evidence to sustain the three counts, which involved gambling debts that were paid as "commissions" from the taxpayer's wholly owned corporation and the unreported constructive dividends that the taxpayer received from his corporation. Statements that the taxpayer made to an IRS agent, which were obtained by the agent in violation of IRS manual guidelines, were not obtained through "fraud, trickery and deceit." Finally, evidence of the taxpayer's alleged dealings with bookmakers was relevant because it showed a continuing course of conduct, was not directed at the taxpayer's character, and was not prejudicial.

E.R. Knight, CA-5, 90-1 USTC ¶50,246, 898 F2d 436.

The due process clause did not require the suppression of currency seized at the Canadian border, even though the taxpayers alleged that they did not know they were required to report the currency upon leaving the United States. Thus, other evidence obtained as a result of the seizure was not suppressed.

B. Romano, DC N.Y., 89-2 USTC ¶9653. Rev'd and rem'd on other issues, CA-2, 91-2 USTC ¶50,471.

See, also, related cases at ¶41,333.210.

Evidence of transfers between corporations wholly owned by the taxpayer demonstrated that the taxpayer engaged in transactions for the purpose of evading income tax and were admissible to show intent to commit the crime of filing a false income tax return.

L.R. Mews, CA-7, 91-1 USTC ¶50,044, 923 F2d 67.

A taxpayer was properly convicted of aiding and assisting in the preparation or presentation of false documents where he willfully caused false statements to be included in Form 1099-B, Proceeds from Broker and Barter Exchange Transactions. A motion for judgment of acquittal on the grounds of insufficient evidence was properly denied. Certain bank transactions, currency reports and tax returns were properly allowed into evidence. Evidence of an acquittal on a criminal charge involving state securities' laws was properly excluded. Finally, the issue of materiality of alleged false statements was properly submitted to the jury because it was submitted at the request of the taxpayer.

R.S. Cutler, CA-10, 92-1 USTC ¶50,062, 948 F2d 691.

An individual's conviction for aiding in the preparation of false income tax returns was affirmed. The district court properly denied his motions for a new trial and reconsideration because his claims that the prosecution used perjured or erroneous testimony were speculative and unsupported by the evidence. Moreover, any use of false testimony by the government was unknowing and the defendant was unable to establish that barring such testimony would probably result in an acquittal on retrial.

T.W. Tierney, CA-8, 91-2 USTC ¶50,509.

The convictions of individual taxpayers for filing false corporate returns, aiding and assisting in the preparation of false corporate returns, and conspiracy were upheld. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting daily sales sheets as properly authenticated business records because the sales sheets were delivered by the defendants' attorney pursuant to a subpoena and were identified by government witnesses.

C.W. Lawrence, Jr., CA-7, 91-2 USTC ¶50,522.

An individual's conviction for filing false tax and information returns was upheld. At trial, the taxpayer failed to properly preserve the issue of whether the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's findings. Even if the issue had been properly preserved, the evidence was sufficient to permit a reasonable trier of fact to convict the taxpayer. After the taxpayer's wages and truck were seized for nonpayment of taxes, he sent letters demanding payments from a former employer, a co-worker and several IRS agents. Additionally, the taxpayer admitted that he intentionally filed false Form 1096 and Form 1099 information returns.

M.G. Kuball, CA-9, 92-2 USTC ¶50,501, 976 F2d 529.

Sufficient evidence supported an individual's conviction for willfully filing false income tax forms. Based on the individual's issuance of Forms 1099 to several IRS employees showing payments that he never made, it was reasonable for a jury to conclude that he voluntarily and intentionally violated the law and, thus, acted willfully. In addition, the false statements were material since they involved income and the computation of tax and the IRS was forced to implement special procedures to intercept the false filings.

K.H. Winchell, CA-10, 97-2 USTC ¶50,890, 129 F3d 1093.

In proving that the taxpayer filed a false return, the IRS was not required to establish that it was a joint return, as described in the indictment. Further, the variance between proof of the taxpayer's unsigned return and indictment allegations of willful tax evasion and filing of a false return was not material. Since the taxpayer was aware of the charges against her and of the particular evidence that supported those charges, she was not prejudiced by use of this evidence.

S.N. Robinson, CA-5, 92-2 USTC ¶50,565, 974 F2d 575.

A doctor was properly convicted of willfully filing or assisting in filing false tax returns because evidence on the improper deduction of depreciation on a car did not constitute a constructive amendment of the indictment or a prejudicial variance. The evidence was properly admitted because it went directly to the issue of whether a physician understated his total income and did not prove facts that were materially different from those alleged in the indictment or modify essential elements of the charged offense.

M.K. Tandon, CA-6, 97-1 USTC ¶50,373, 111 F3d 482.

An architect's conviction for filing a false return was affirmed. Evidence presented in the case, including the books and testimony of the taxpayer's bookkeeper and accountant, was sufficient to satisfy the reasonable doubt standard. Amounts posted in the taxpayer's books and records as professional legal fees were actually used by the taxpayer for an investment in a horse partnership. Although the taxpayer contended that the conviction should have been upheld only if the evidence inexorably supported an inference of guilt, this higher standard of proof is applicable in cases involving embezzlement, not in cases alleging the filing of false returns.

J.G. Crozier, CA-2, 93-1 USTC ¶50,219, 987 F2d 893.

The taxpayer's motion to suppress statements made to IRS agents in the course of their civil and criminal investigations of the taxpayer was denied. The taxpayer's contention that an IRS agent assured his accountant that no criminal charges would be filed was unsupported.

L.A. Robinson, DC Miss., 93-1 USTC ¶50,213, 811 FSupp 1174.

A tax preparer's conviction for aiding and abetting the preparation of false returns was remanded so that the trial judge could redetermine whether prior year tax returns filed by the government's taxpayer witnesses were material to his defense. In denying the preparer's request for production, the trial court improperly imposed a "heavy burden" standard of materiality. First, similar treatment of a similar issue in a prior year, as to which the tax preparer played no role, might suggest that the falsify originated with the taxpayer rather than the preparer. Second, if a taxpayer testifies that he supplied the return preparer with accurate information, prior returns are a potential device for impeachment. Finally, such erroneous nondisclosure as to any taxpayer upon which the conviction was based might have undermined the government's entire case.

C.N. Lloyd, Jr., CA-D.C., 93-1 USTC ¶50,317, 992 F2d 348.

A federal district court had jurisdiction over an individual who was prosecuted for making false statements and attempting to interfere with the administration of the IRS. His claim that, as a natural born citizen of Montana, he was a nonresident alien exempt from the tax laws lacked merit. Further, sufficient evidence supported his conviction. His admission that he filed a false return was not excused by his genuine belief that the tax laws did not apply to him and that filing a false return would prompt an investigation which would thwart an overthrow of the government.

L.T. Hanson, CA-9, 94-1 USTC ¶50,075, 2 F3d 942.

An office manager's conviction for filing a fraudulent return was upheld because sufficient evidence of her consistent pattern of underreporting large amounts of income supported the inference of willful behavior. Additionally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing an IRS revenue agent to testify as an expert in the calculation of income and taxes.

E.A. Pratt Stokes, CA-5, 93-2 USTC ¶50,545, 998 F2d 279.

A trial court did not commit reversible error by excluding certain testimony proffered by married taxpayers who were ultimately convicted of filing incomplete income tax returns. The trial court erred in treating a third party's testimony on whether the husband possessed the requisite guilty state of mind as inadmissible hearsay because it was offered only to demonstrate its effect on his state of mind, as opposed to proving the truth of the matter asserted. However, such error was harmless because the evidence of guilt with respect to the husband was overwhelming and did not deprive him of the ability to put on a defense. The trial court's error was also harmless with respect to the wife because it did not affect her ability to present a defense.

L.D. Hanson, CA-7, 93-2 USTC ¶50,558.

A construction equipment dealer's conviction for tax fraud was upheld even though the government cross-examined him about his alleged bank fraud. Since the dealer placed his credibility in issue when he chose to testify, the government was entitled to cross-examine the dealer on his alleged bank fraud in an attempt to impeach him through evidence of specific instances of dishonesty that would tend to prove untruthfulness.

M.A. Chevalier, CA-7, 93-2 USTC ¶50,581.

Evidence presented by the government against two real estate construction business owners convicted of filing and subscribing false income tax returns was sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Although most of the evidence was circumstantial and subject to differing interpretations, a reasonable jury could have found the individuals guilty.

J.D. Morris, CA-11, 94-1 USTC ¶50,234, 20 F3d 1111.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted a transcript of a taped interview between a dentist and his former wife's attorney into evidence at the dentist's trial for willful failure to pay taxes and filing a false income tax return. The taxpayer's statements were not hearsay, the transcript was adequately authenticated through testimony of the transcriber and the attorney, and the best evidence rule was not violated because the original tape had been erased. Finally, the government did not offer false evidence because the dentist's disagreement with an IRS agent's characterization of certain amounts as income did not convert the agent's testimony into a falsehood.

W.L. Workinger, CA-9, 96-2 USTC ¶50,402, 90 F3d 1409.

An attorney was properly convicted of conspiracy for attempting to hide his client's business income from the IRS, and the client was properly convicted of conspiracy and filing false tax returns. A pretrial ruling barring the client from introducing evidence of business deductions unless he established that he knew he was entitled to claim them before the returns were filed was not erroneous since the amount of taxes owed was irrelevant to the tax fraud. Other claimed errors with respect to prosecutor's comments and jury instructions did not warrant reversal of the convictions.

J.C. Minneman, CA-7, 98-1 USTC ¶50,347, 143 F3d 274. Cert. denied, 3/8/99.

Sole stockholders who made personal car payments using unreported business income were properly convicted of willfully filing false income tax returns for three tax years. The district court correctly permitted an IRS agent to give expert opinion testimony that was limited to factual determinations regarding the process by which summaries of invoices, sales tickets, and checks were compiled.

J.P. Proctor, CA-10 (unpublished opinion), 98-2 USTC ¶50,884, aff'g an unreported District Court decision.

The conviction and sentence of a former judge and compulsive gambler for filing false tax returns was upheld. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding expert testimony regarding compulsive gambling, expert testimony on tax and accounting laws or testimony concerning the reasonableness of the taxpayer's belief that he could net out gambling wins and losses.

W.L. Scholl, CA-9, 99-1 USTC ¶50,230, 166 F3d 964.

Search warrants issued in connection with an IRS investigation of an individual who marketed a book promoting the evasion of taxes were sufficiently specific. The warrants limited the search to documentary evidence related to violations of the Code concerning possible conspiracy to evade taxes. The fact that the warrant failed to name the taxpayer or his wife was not fatal to its validity since it only had to identify the place to be searched and the targets of seizure.

D.L. Leveto, DC Pa., 2000-1 USTC ¶50,278. Aff'd on another issue, CA-3, 2001-2 USTC ¶50,536.

Evidence that a taxpayer voluntarily provided to an IRS agent during a civil investigation was properly admitted in the taxpayer's subsequent trial for criminal tax fraud. The taxpayer alleged that the IRS agent in charge of the civil investigation violated the Internal Revenue Manual by continuing the investigation after she had evidence of criminal fraud. Although the agent had information that the taxpayer used her corporation to pay her personal expenses, she did not have evidence indicating that the taxpayer acted with criminal intent.

I.L. McKee, CA-6, 99-2 USTC ¶50,867, 192 F3d 535.

Evidence relating to willfulness that was uncovered pursuant to a search warrant authorizing the seizure of bank records was properly admitted against an accountant who was convicted of filing a false return. Although the warrant may have been insufficiently specific, it was executed by an IRS agent who acted on a good-faith belief that it was valid. Moreover, he was intimately involved in the investigation of the taxpayer prior to the execution of the warrant and in the preparation of an affidavit in support of the warrant, which gave him obvious knowledge of the crimes that were under investigation.

A.L. Guidry, CA-10, 2000-1 USTC ¶50,118, 199 F3d 1150.

Evidence was properly admitted and excluded from a return preparer's trial for filing false returns and assisting in the preparation of false returns. A revenue agent's testimony that the false information she provided was material to the computation of tax liability was admissible because it merely assisted the jury in understanding the facts. Documents that her mother voluntarily surrendered to an IRS agent were also admissible absent a showing that the agent made any misrepresentations to obtain them. Evidence that her husband once forced his former wife to sign a false return was properly excluded. While the husband may have forced her into the return preparation business and appropriated her proceeds, there was no evidence that he forced her to prepare any of the returns at issue.

B.K. Scarberry, CA-10 (unpublished opinion), 2000-1 USTC ¶50,272, 208 F3d 228.

Married taxpayers who filed tax returns on which they claimed that their wages constituted nontaxable compensation were properly convicted of filing false returns. The trial court's admission into evidence of the couple's tax return bearing the stamp "Frivolous Tax Penalty Assessed" was harmless error because it was more probable than not that the evidence did not materially affect the verdict.

B.R. Rosco, CA-9 (unpublished opinion), 2000-1 USTC ¶50,355. Aff'g an unreported District Court decision.

Evidence indicating that a taxpayer was not a partner in a company supported his conviction for filing a false tax return. The taxpayer argued that he was a partner and any funds he received from the company were nontaxable partnership distributions. However, evidence indicated that the taxpayer was never a partner, and partnership returns that identified the taxpayer as a partner had a tax avoidance motive and lacked economic substance.

L.L. Worman, CA-10 (unpublished opinion), 2000-1 USTC ¶50,359, 210 F3d 391. Aff'g an unreported District Court decision.

The president of a steel cutting company that failed to report advances that it received from a purchaser of scrap metal was properly convicted of signing false corporate returns. Evidence regarding unreported advances received by the corporation during a prior tax year and the evasion of the cash transaction reporting requirement was properly admitted because it was relevant to the issue of willfulness.

L. Ristovski, CA-6 (unpublished opinion), 2000-1 USTC ¶50,409, 211 F3d 1271. Aff'g an unreported District Court decision.

Insufficient evidence existed to support a conviction against a co-conspirator for assisting in the preparation of false returns for a business in connection with a tax evasion scheme. He did not prepare the returns and his mere association with the business was inadequate to establish a violation of Code Sec. 7206.

T.C. Gaskill, CA-9 (unpublished opinion), 2000-2 USTC ¶50,702. Rev'g and rem'g in part an unreported District Court decision.

A motion to suppress documents and statements taxpayers gave to an IRS Agent in the course of a civil investigation that were subsequently used to convict them in criminal fraud proceedings was properly denied. There was no evidence that the agent improperly failed to refer the matter for criminal investigation or otherwise cease the civil investigation once there were firm indications of fraud. Moreover, the agent was not in uniform, and was unarmed and unaccompanied at the time he interviewed the taxpayers. Thus, they were not disadvantaged or under pressure to answer his questions.

K.P. Kontny, CA-7, 2001-1 USTC ¶50,197. Cert. denied, 5/14/2001.

The appellate court rejected taxpayer's argument that the trial court's exclusion of a tax expert's testimony concerning her ignorance of the law constituted an abuse of discretion. The expert was consulted only for trial and had no involvement in the taxpayer's preparation of her return. Thus, he could not have offered testimony as to her confusion or good faith in failing to report rental income.

S.F. Rosales, CA-9 (unpublished opinion), 2001-1 USTC ¶50,397, 7 FedAppx 766, aff'g an unreported District Court decision.

Convictions for conspiracy to defraud the government were upheld against sibling owners and managers of a family construction business who attempted to pay employees significant overtime wages off-payroll without withholding taxes, skimmed cash from their business, and failed to report income. The taxpayers signed paychecks, reviewed them, made changes and advised employees of the benefit of making purported pre-tax mortgage payments.

J.A. Gambone, Sr., CA-3, 2003-1 USTC ¶50,162, 314 F3d 163.

Evidence was sufficient for a jury to find that the signatures on the false returns belonged to the taxpayer and to support his conviction of conspiracy to defraud the government and filing false personal and corporate tax returns.

G. Rhodis, CA-2 (unpublished opinion), 2003-1 USTC ¶50,197, 58 FedAppx 855, aff'g in part and rem'g in part an unreported District Court decision.

A trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence in a tax fraud proceeding that showed how a taxpayer handled the proceeds from the sale of his home in a manner designed to deceive the IRS. The evidence, which demonstrated an intent to defraud the government, was relevant, did not cause unfair prejudice to the taxpayer, and did not affect his substantial rights.

F.F. Paul, CA-6 (unpublished opinion), 2003-1 USTC ¶50,222, aff'g, per curiam, an unreported District Court decision.

An individual's conviction for preparing or assisting in the preparation and presentation of fraudulent tax returns was upheld. The trial court's decisions on the admissibility of evidence, as well as its denial of a motion for a mistrial, were not abuses of discretion, as the court did not act "arbitrarily or irrationally." Furthermore, requests for particular jury instructions were either properly denied, or their denial was not reversible error.

W.A. Montes, CA-4 (unpublished opinion), 2003-1 USTC ¶50,274, aff'g, per curiam, an unreported District Court decision.

Evidence presented by the government against an individual was sufficient to sustain a jury's verdict to convict him of conspiracy to defraud the government and two counts of aiding and assisting in the preparation or presentation of false income tax returns. Based on the testimony of the individual and several of his clients, it was reasonable for the jury to find that the tax preparer converted ordinary personal expenditures into tax deductible business expenses.

D.S. Fletcher, CA-8, 2003-1 USTC ¶50,283, 322 F3d 508.

A federal district court properly convicted a tax preparer of procuring the presentation of tax returns containing false statements by fraudulently inflating taxpayers' deductions. The preparer's appeal asserted that there was insufficient evidence to support six of his convictions. However, the weight of the evidence, including the testimony of witnesses for whom he had prepared returns, was sufficient to support a finding of the preparer's guilt.

W.M. Hayes, CA-4, 2003-1 USTC ¶50,312, 322 F3d 792 .

Sufficient evidence existed to find that an individual taxpayer willfully filed false returns for two tax years. During the years in issue, the taxpayer accepted and cashed checks from two corporations owned and controlled by her father, claiming the proceeds as "wages" on her tax returns, even though she had done no work for the two companies. Based on the evidence presented by the government, the jury reasonably could have found that the taxpayer knew of her obligation to accurately report income, she knew that the money she was receiving from the companies was not "wages", and she repeatedly attempted to cover up the truth about her relationship with the businesses.

L.A. Boulerice, CA-1, 2003-1 USTC ¶50,392, 325 F3d 75.

Two individuals' convictions for aiding and abetting in the fraudulent preparation of tax returns were upheld. Evidence of a settlement agreement between the IRS and the individuals, which disallowed 80 percent of the deductions that the IRS claimed to be fraudulent, was properly excluded. The evidence's probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of confusion its introduction would have caused.

B.F. Manko, CA-2 (unpublished opinion), 2003-1 USTC ¶50,461, 63 FedAppx 570, aff'g an unpublished District Court decision.

Any error was harmless in the face of overwhelming evidence against the taxpayer.

W.N. Jackson, CA-2 (unpublished opinion), 2003-1 USTC ¶50,478, 65 FedAppx 754, aff'g an unreported District Court decision.

Tax shelter promoters willfully aided clients in filing false or fraudulent tax returns in violation of Code Sec. 7206(2). The promoters charged hundreds of clients to set up and manage trusts known as Unincorporated Business Organizations (UBOs), which purportedly avoided taxes on income streamed into them. The government sufficiently proved the three elements of a Code Sec. 7206 violation.

D.L. Smith, CA-9, 2005-2 USTC ¶50,565, 424 F3d 992.

Evidence that a tax return preparer agreed to pay 60 penalties for understating tax liability for multiple tax years was admissible in a criminal trial, in which the tax return preparer was charged with aiding the preparation and presentation of false tax returns. The imposition and payment of the penalties was material to the criminal case, was reasonably proximate to the criminal indictment and the circumstances surrounding the imposition of the penalties was sufficient to prove the prior bad acts. Likewise, evidence of a civil judgment against the tax preparer obtained by clients was admissible because it formed the factual setting of the crime in issue.

R.E. Reiss, DC Minn., 2005-2 USTC ¶50,538.

The Fourth Amendment rights of two brothers were not violated when notebooks containing accounting information were searched; thus, their request to suppress the contents of the notebooks as evidence of tax fraud and evasion was correctly denied. They had no expectation of privacy in the notebooks after the notebooks were given to a police officer for fingerprinting during a burglary investigation. They voluntarily allowed a police officer to take the notebooks in their entirety and hold them for several days and did not place any limitations on access to the notebooks. Further, one of the brothers permitted an officer who had knowledge of an IRS investigation of them to make copies of the notebooks. He did not keep the contents to himself, separate the notebook covers or secure the contents of the notebook so that only the covers could be accessed.

Y.B. Yang, CA-7, 2007-1 USTC ¶50,395.

Evidence of prior bad acts was properly admitted during a tax return preparer's criminal trial on charges of aiding and assisting in the preparation of false federal income tax returns. The evidence possessed significant probative value.

R.E. Reiss, CA-8, 2007-2 USTC ¶50,532.

Evidence provided by an individual to an IRS agent during a civil audit of his federal income tax returns that subsequently resulted in his indictment for tax evasion was not suppressed. He failed to prove that the IRS agent induced his compliance through false promises that his cooperation would result solely in a civil tax assessment and that the case would conclude after he turned over the requested records. The IRS agent never stated that he would not be prosecuted if he cooperated. Also, the agent never promised that she would not refer his case to the Criminal Investigation Division, but maintained that any decision was dependent upon a review and final determination.

J.F. Greve, CA-7, 2007-2 USTC ¶50,547.



Alvin S. Brown, Esq.
Tax attorney
703.425.1400
http://www.irstaxattorney.com/

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Back Taxes: Education-related deductions

IRS News Release IR-2007-158 , September 11, 2007.

[
Eligible educators include those who work at least 900 hours during a school year as a teacher, instructor, counselor, principal or aide in a public or private elementary or secondary school.Worth up to $250, the educator expense deduction is available, whether or not the educator itemizes their deductions on Schedule A. In tax-year 2005, teachers and educators deducted just over $893 million of these out-of-pocket classroom expenses. Under current law, this deduction is scheduled to expire at the end of this year.Three key tax breaks --the tuition and fees deduction, the Hope credit and the lifetime learning credit --help parents and students pay for the cost of post-secondary education. All three are available, regardless of whether an eligible taxpayer itemizes their deductions. Under current law, the tuition and fees deduction is scheduled to expire at the end of this year, but the two credits remain in effect. In tax-year 2005, taxpayers claimed tuition and fees deductions totaling nearly $11 billion and education credits of almost $6.2 billion.Normally, a taxpayer can claim tuition and required enrollment fees paid for their own and their dependent's college education. A taxpayer cannot take both an education credit and the tuition and fees deduction for the same student in the same year. Income limits and other special rules apply to each of these provisions.
Education credits are claimed on Form 8863, and the tuition and fees deduction for 2007 will be claimed on new Form 8917.IRS Publication 970, Tax Benefits for Education, can help eligible parents and students understand the special rules that apply and decide which tax break to claim. The publication also describes other education-related tax benefits, including qualified tuition programs (also known as 529 plans), the student loan interest deduction, Coverdell education savings accounts and the education savings bond program.Publication 970 is posted on IRS.gov or can be obtained, without charge, by calling the IRS toll-free at 1-800-TAX-FORM (829-3676).

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Tuesday, September 11, 2007

Tax Help: IRC 6662 penalty - "reasonable cause" exception to the negligence penalty is not proven if a taxpayer or his accountant had an affirmative duty to investigate a second large W-2. The Tax Court applied the following test in order for a taxpayer to use reliance on a tax professional to avoid liability for a section 6662(a) penalty: (1) The adviser was a competent professional who had sufficient expertise to justify reliance, (2) the taxpayer provided necessary and accurate information to the tax adviser, and (3) the taxpayer actually relied in good faith on the adviser's advice. See Neonatology Associates, P.A. v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 43, 99 (2000), affd. 299 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2002). However, (3) was not met if the taxpayer did not read his own tax return carefully enough.

It appears that the Court was influenced by the fact that over $73,000 of W-2 income was omitted and that the taxpayer should have known that this income should have been included in his tax return.

[T.C. Summary Opinion 2007-161]
IRC 6662 negligence penalty -


Perry Alan Pedersen v. Commissioner.


Docket No. 3391-05S . Filed September 10, 2007.

[Code Sec. 6662]

Tax Court: Summary opinion: Accuracy-related penalty: Reliance on return preparer. --

An individual who underreported his income failed to demonstrate reasonable cause and good faith for the underpayment; thus, he was liable for the accuracy-related penalty under Code Sec. 6662(a). His contention that he was not liable for the penalty because of his reliance on his accountant was rejected. Although he had established that his accountant was a competent professional who had sufficient expertise to justify reliance and he provided his accountant with the necessary and accurate information, he admitted that he had not examined his tax returns "closely enough." to ensure that all income items were included. His failure to inquire from his employer regarding the two Form W-2s he received, rather than one, supported the conclusion that his reliance on his accountant was not in good faith. Finally, because neither Form W-2 was marked as corrected, it was not reasonable for the individual or his accountant to believe that only one of the forms was correct. -

PURSUANT TO INTERNAL REVENUE CODE SECTION 7463(b),THIS OPINION MAY NOT BE TREATED AS PRECEDENT FOR ANY OTHER CASE.



Perry Alan Pedersen, pro se. Charles M. Berlau, for respondent.

WHERRY, Judge: This case was heard pursuant to section 7463 of the Internal Revenue Code in effect when the petition was filed.1 Pursuant to section 7463(b), the decision to be entered is not reviewable by any other court, and this opinion shall not be treated as precedent for any other case.

Respondent determined a deficiency in petitioner's Federal income tax for the 2002 taxable year in the amount of $23,277. Respondent also determined an accuracy-related penalty pursuant to section 6662(a) in the amount of $1,068. Petitioner does not dispute the deficiency as determined by respondent.2 Thus, the sole issue now before the Court is whether petitioner is liable for the section 6662(a) accuracy-related penalty.



Background


Some of the facts have been stipulated, and the stipulated facts and accompanying exhibits are hereby incorporated by reference. At the time he filed his petition, petitioner resided in Albuquerque, New Mexico.

Petitioner filed, in a timely manner, a Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, for the 2002 taxable year. For the 2002 taxable year, petitioner received from his employer, Altana, Inc., two Forms W-2, Wage and Tax Statement, in the amounts of $103,955.11 and $73.313.30. Petitioner failed to report, on his Form 1040, $73,310.30 in wages, the amount on one of his Forms W-2, and $15 in dividend income. In addition, in Schedule E, Supplemental Income and Loss, petitioner improperly reported a $7,584 passive loss. On January 24, 2005, respondent issued the aforementioned notice of deficiency. Petitioner then filed a timely petition with this Court disputing only his liability for the accuracy-related penalty. A trial was held on November 27, 2006, in Albuquerque, New Mexico.



Discussion




I. Parties' Contentions

Petitioner argues that he is not liable for the accuracy-related section 6662(a) penalty because he relied on his accountant for the preparation of his 2002 tax return. In addition, petitioner contends that he and his accountant were confused by the fact that petitioner's employer, Altana, Inc., had issued two separate Forms W-2 for the 2002 taxable year. Petitioner asserts that he believed that only one of the Forms W-2 was correct and that one Form W-2 superseded the other. In support of this contention, petitioner has provided two letters from his accountant, David M. Beail (Mr. Beail), sent to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in August and October 2004 in an attempt to persuade the IRS to abate the section 6662(a) penalty. In the October 2004 letter, Mr. Beail asserts that "It was our thought that only one W-2 was correct, as Mr. Pedersen had never received two W-2[]s from his company."3

Respondent contends that nothing other than petitioner's own testimony indicates whether his accountant was competent. More importantly, respondent asserts that petitioner and his accountant's assumptions regarding the two Forms W-2 were not reasonable in light of the fact that neither Form W-2 was marked revised. Respondent further asserts that the failure of petitioner and his accountant to contact Altana, Inc., in order to verify the correct amount of petitioner's wages reflects a lack of good faith and reasonable cause. Finally, respondent points out that, at trial, petitioner admitted that he had not examined his tax return "closely enough" and that petitioner's failure to do so resulted in his failing to report more than 40 percent of his wages on his 2002 tax return.



II. Section 6662 Penalty

Under section 7491(c), respondent bears the burden of production with respect to petitioner's liability for the section 6662(a) penalty. This means that respondent "must come forward with sufficient evidence indicating that it is appropriate to impose the relevant penalty." Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 446 (2001).

We conclude that respondent has met the section 7491(c) burden of production with respect to the substantial understatement penalty. As explained below, in this close case, we ultimately find unavailing petitioner's argument that he is not liable for the accuracy-related penalty because he acted with reasonable cause and in good faith by relying on his accountant in failing to report $73,313.30 in wages for the 2002 taxable year.

Subsection (a) of section 6662 imposes an accuracy-related penalty on an underpayment of tax that is equal to 20 percent of any underpayment that is attributable to a list of causes contained in subsection (b). Among the causes justifying the imposition of the penalty are (1) negligence or disregard of rules or regulations and (2) any substantial understatement of income tax. Section 6662(c) defines negligence as "any failure to make a reasonable attempt to comply with the provisions of this title." "[D]isregard" is defined to include "any careless, reckless, or intentional disregard." Id. Under caselaw, "'Negligence is a lack of due care or the failure to do what a reasonable and ordinarily prudent person would do under the circumstances.'" Freytag v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 849, 887 (1987) (quoting Marcello v. Commissioner, 380 F.2d 499, 506 (5th Cir. 1967), affg. on this issue 43 T.C. 168 (1964) and T.C. Memo. 1964-2990), affd. 904 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1990), affd. 501 U.S. 868 (1991).

There is a "substantial understatement" of income tax for any taxable year where the amount of the understatement exceeds the greater of (1) 10 percent of the tax required to be shown on the return for the taxable year or (2) $5,000. Sec. 6662(d)(1)(A)(i) and (ii). However, the amount of the understatement is reduced to the extent attributable to an item (1) for which there is or was substantial authority for the taxpayer's treatment thereof, or (2) with respect to which the relevant facts were adequately disclosed on the taxpayer's return or an attached statement and there is a reasonable basis for the taxpayer's treatment of the item. See sec. 6662(d)(2)(B).

There is an exception to the section 6662(a) penalty when a taxpayer can demonstrate (1) reasonable cause for the underpayment and (2) that the taxpayer acted in good faith with respect to the underpayment. Sec. 6664(c)(1). Regulations promulgated under section 6664(c) further provide that the determination of reasonable cause and good faith "is made on a case-by-case basis, taking into account all pertinent facts and circumstances." Sec. 1.6664-4(b)(1), Income Tax Regs.

Reliance upon the advice of a tax professional may, but does not necessarily, establish reasonable cause and good faith for the purpose of avoiding a section 6662(a) penalty. See United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 251 (1985) ("Reliance by a lay person on a lawyer is of course common; but that reliance cannot function as a substitute for compliance with an unambiguous statute."). Such reliance does not serve as an "absolute defense"; it is merely a "factor to be considered." Freytag v. Commissioner, supra at 888. The caselaw sets forth the following three requirements in order for a taxpayer to use reliance on a tax professional to avoid liability for a section 6662(a) penalty: (1) The adviser was a competent professional who had sufficient expertise to justify reliance, (2) the taxpayer provided necessary and accurate information to the tax adviser, and (3) the taxpayer actually relied in good faith on the adviser's advice. See Neonatology Associates, P.A. v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 43, 99 (2000), affd. 299 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2002).

In this case, the notice of deficiency included the imposition of a $1,068.00 section 6662(a) penalty on the basis that there was a substantial understatement of petitioner's income tax for the 2002 taxable year. Petitioner does not contest that he substantially understated his 2002 income tax. The vast majority of that understatement was attributable to petitioner's failure to report $73,313.30 in wages on his income tax return for that year. Although petitioner also failed to report $15 in dividend income and improperly claimed a $7,584 Schedule E passive activity loss, all of petitioner's and respondent's arguments, at trial and in their briefs, focus on petitioner's failure to report the $73,313.30 in wages.

With respect to the first prong of the Neonatology, test, we conclude that petitioner has established that his accountant was a competent professional who had sufficient expertise to justify reliance.4 See Neonatology Associates, P.A. v. Commissioner, supra at 99. With respect to the second prong of the Neonatology test, Mr. Beail's letters make clear that petitioner did provide Mr. Beail with both Forms W-2. Because petitioner's failure to report all of his wages is the sole basis argued by respondent to support the imposition of a penalty in this case, petitioner has satisfied the second prong of the Neonatology test.

Turning to the third prong of the Neonatology test, we note that petitioner admitted at trial that he had not examined his 2002 tax return "closely enough." Petitioner had a duty to read his return to ensure that all income items were included. Magill v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 465, 479-480 (1978), affd. 651 F.2d 1233 (6th Cir. 1981). Petitioner was not permitted to bury his head in the sand and ignore his obligation to ensure that his tax return accurately reflected his income for the 2002 taxable year. In the end, reliance on his accountant does not excuse petitioner's failure to closely examine his 2002 tax return.

To the extent that petitioner and/or his accountant might have been confused by the fact that petitioner's employer, Altana Inc., issued two Forms W-2 for the 2002 taxable year rather than one, they were free to contact petitioner's employer to inquire as to that issue. As was conceded by petitioner at trial, neither petitioner nor his accountant contacted Altana, Inc., before filing petitioner's 2002 tax return, in order to determine why petitioner had been issued two Forms W-2 for the 2002 taxable year. Given (1) the materiality of the large amount of unreported Form W-2 income, (2) the fact that petitioner and his accountant were both confused as to why petitioner had received two Forms W-2, and (3) the fact that neither one of them made a reasonable effort to resolve that issue, the Court cannot find that petitioner relied in good faith on Mr. Beail's advice. Finally, as respondent correctly points out, because neither Form W-2 was marked as having been corrected, it was not reasonable for petitioner and his accountant to believe, without questioning petitioner's employer, that only one of the Forms W-2 was correct.

Although this close case might have been more equitably resolved by the parties, this Court is constrained to apply the full penalty or no penalty at all. Because petitioner has not demonstrated reasonable cause and good faith for the underpayment, the Court sustains respondent's imposition of the section 6662(a) penalty.

The Court has considered all of petitioner's contentions, arguments, requests, and statements. To the extent not discussed herein, we conclude that they are meritless, moot, or irrelevant.

To reflect the foregoing,

Decision will be entered for respondent.

1 All subsequent section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the taxable year at issue. The Rule reference is to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.

2 Although the amount of tax owed is not in dispute, it is noteworthy that the actual amount of tax owed by petitioner was $5,337.10, significantly less than the $23,277 deficiency listed in the notice of deficiency. The difference is attributable to the fact that withholding from one of petitioner's Forms W-2, Wage and Tax Statement, was not initially accounted for by respondent because petitioner had failed to report the income from that Form W-2. Respondent accounted for that difference before determining the accuracy-related penalty in this case. In any event, the deficiency in this case constitutes a substantial understatement of income tax.

3 At trial, respondent conceded that the October 2004 letter is contained in respondent's administrative file. Petitioner had already raised that letter in his pretrial memorandum. Nevertheless, when petitioner referred to that letter at trial, respondent objected to its introduction into evidence on the basis of hearsay. Noting that this is a small tax case, the Court observed that section 7463 generally allows disputes in small tax cases to be decided in proceedings in which the normally applicable procedural and evidentiary rules are relaxed. In addition, the Court referenced Rule 174(b), which provides: "Trials of small tax cases will be conducted as informally as possible consistent with orderly procedure, and any evidence deemed by the Court to have probative value shall be admissible." The Court then overruled respondent's objection.

4 Mr. Beail's letters indicate that he is a certified public accountant, and records of the Washington State Board of Accountancy, which this Court will take judicial notice of, indicate that Mr. Beail is currently licensed to practice public accounting. In addition, the Supreme Court has held that accountants, like attorneys, are professionals upon whom taxpayers can rely for advice "on a matter of tax law, such as whether a liability exists." United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 251 (1985).There is an exception to the section 6662(a) penalty when a taxpayer can demonstrate (1) reasonable cause for the underpayment and (2) that the taxpayer acted in good faith with respect to the underpayment. Sec. 6664(c)(1). Regulations promulgated under section 6664(c) further provide that the determination of reasonable cause and good faith "is made on a case-by-case basis, taking into account all pertinent facts and circumstances." Sec. 1.6664-4(b)(1), Income Tax Regs.

Reliance upon the advice of a tax professional may, but does not necessarily, establish reasonable cause and good faith for the purpose of avoiding a section 6662(a) penalty. See United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 251 (1985) ("Reliance by a lay person on a lawyer is of course common; but that reliance cannot function as a substitute for compliance with an unambiguous statute."). Such reliance does not serve as an "absolute defense"; it is merely a "factor to be considered." Freytag v. Commissioner, supra at 888. The caselaw sets forth the following three requirements in order for a taxpayer to use reliance on a tax professional to avoid liability for a section 6662(a) penalty: (1) The adviser was a competent professional who had sufficient expertise to justify reliance, (2) the taxpayer provided necessary and accurate information to the tax adviser, and (3) the taxpayer actually relied in good faith on the adviser's advice. See Neonatology Associates, P.A. v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 43, 99 (2000), affd. 299 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2002).


Alvin S. Brown, Esq.
Tax attorney
703.425.1400
www.irstaxattorney.com

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Monday, September 10, 2007


Tax Attorney: IRS stops Robert L Shultz and "We the People" from promoting an illegal tax shelter. Schultz and his company have long maintained argument that the IRS has deemed to be frivolous. It has been astonishing that Mr. Shultz and his organization have not been previously stopped from encouraging positions that the courts have identified as frivolous. It is likely that the IRS will take other actions against Mr. Shultz. In cases like this, the injunction is accompanied by a criminal examination.

United States of America, Plaintiff v. Robert L. Schulz; We the People Foundation for Constitutional Education, Inc., and We the People Congress, Inc., Defendants.

U.S. District Court, No. Dist. N.Y.; 1:07-cv-0352, August 9, 2007.

[ Code Sec. 7408]

Abusive tax shelter: Promoter: Injunctive relief: Commercial speech: First Amendment violation. --

An individual and his companies were permanently enjoined from promoting an illegal tax shelter intended to help clients evade their federal tax liabilities. The companies offered materials to clients that intentionally made false statements claiming that participation in their tax plan would ensure that participants would not have to pay income taxes. A disclaimer provided in the materials was irrelevant for purposes of determining whether false statements were made regarding the tax benefits from participating in the plan. Unless the entities were enjoined from doing so, they would continue to propagate and sell the plan. Granting the injunction did not violate the entities' First Amendment rights. To the extent the materials constituted commercial speech, it could be enjoined because it prompted the participants to engage in unlawful conduct. First Amendment protection for political speech was not available because the materials were intended to persuade clients to violate the tax laws.







DECISION and ORDER


MCAVOY, Senior United States District Judge: The United States of America commenced the instant action seeking to enjoin Defendants from promoting an illegal tax shelter. Presently before the Court are Defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 and Plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.



I. FACTS

Defendant Robert L. Shulz ("Schulz") organized Defendant We the People Foundation for Constitutional Education Inc., and We the People Congress, Inc. in 1997. The Complaint alleges that, although Shulz purports to have founded the corporate defendants for educational purposes, he "has used the two ... entities ... to market a nationwide tax-fraud scheme designed to help customers evade their federal tax liabilities and to interfere with the administration of the internal revenue laws." Compl. at ¶ 6. Defendants distributed a "Tax Termination Package" as part of "Operation Stop Withholding" to help individuals stop withholding, paying, and filing federal taxes. The United States alleges that Defendants furthered their scheme through the use of false and misleading forms in place of standard Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") forms, and based upon the false premises that the federal income tax system is voluntary, the 16 th Amendment to the United States Constitution was not property ratified, and that federal income tax does not apply to most wages.

The Complaint alleges that, among other things, "[a]s part of the Tax Termination scheme, Defendants give customers (both employers and employees) step-by-step instructions on how to fraudulently terminate withholding of federal income and employment taxes." Compl. at ¶ 14. The entire scheme is alleged to be premised upon false representations and legal positions known to have been rejected by the courts, including a criminal trial in which Schulz testified. See United States v. Simkanin, 420 F.3d 397 (5 th Cir. 2005).

The Complaint alleges that Defendants' scheme causes harm to the Untied States by assisting customers to evade taxes and obstructing the IRS's efforts to administer the federal tax laws. The United States seek an injunction pursuant to Internal Revenue Code § 7408 precluding Defendants from making known false or fraudulent statements in connection with the organization or participation in the sale of a plan or arrangement regarding any tax benefit.

Presently before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 and Plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.



II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures governs motions for summary judgment. It is well settled that on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, see Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 593 (2d Cir. 1999), and may grant summary judgment only where "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56( c). An issue is genuine if the relevant evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of informing the court of the basis for the motion and of identifying those portions of the record that the moving party believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact as to a dispositive issue. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the movant is able to establish a prima facie basis for summary judgment, the burden of production shifts to the party opposing summary judgment who must produce evidence establishing the existence of a factual dispute that a reasonable jury could resolve in his favor. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon "mere allegations or denials" asserted in his pleadings, Rexnord Holdings, Inc. v. Bidermann, 21 F.3d 522, 525-26 (2d Cir. 1994), or on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation. Scotto v. Almenas, 143 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir. 1998).



III. DISCUSSION



a. Plaintiff's Request for Injunctive Relief

"Section 7408 of the Internal Revenue Code empowers a district court to grant an injunction when (1) the defendant has engaged in conduct subject to penalty under 26 U.S.C. § 6700, and (2) injunctive relief is appropriate to prevent recurrence of such conduct." United States v. Gleason, 432 F.3d 678, 682 (6 th Cir. 2005). "Because section 7408 expressly authorized the issuance of an injunction, the traditional requirements for equitable relief need not be satisfied." Id.



1. Internal Revenue Code § 6700

The Court will first address whether Defendant's conduct implicates the proscriptions of 26 U.S.C. § 6700. 1 Section 6700 is aimed at abusive tax shelters. To obtain an injunction under § 6700, the government must prove five elements:


(1) the defendants organized or sold, or participated in the organization or sale of, an entity, plan, or arrangement; (2) they made or caused to be made, false or fraudulent statements concerning the tax benefits to be derived from the entity, plan, or arrangement; (3) they knew or had reason to know that the statements were false or fraudulent; (4) the false or fraudulent statements pertained to a material matter; and (5) an injunction is necessary to prevent recurrence of this conduct.


United States v. Estate Preservation Servs., 202 F.3d 1093, 1098 (9 th Cir. 2000); Gleason, 432 F.3d at 682. The Court will address each element seriatim.



a. Whether Defendants Organized or Sold, or Participated in the Organization or Sale of, an Entity, Plan, or Arrangement

Under § 6700, "any 'plan or arrangement' having some connection to taxes can serve as a 'tax shelter' and will be an 'abusive' tax shelter if the defendant makes the requisite false or fraudulent statements concerning the tax benefits." United States v. Raymond, 228 F.3d 804, 811 (7 th Cir. 2000). In Raymond, the Seventh Circuit found that "the definition of a tax shelter in § 6700 is 'clearly broad enough to include a tax protester group.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Kaun, 827 F.2d 1144, 1147 (7 th Cir. 1987).

The facts in the Raymond case are quite similar to the present one.


Raymond and Bernhoft [were] active members of the U.S. Taxpayers Party and were the chief participants in a business known as Morningstar Consultants ("Morningstar"). Between January and June of 1996, Morningstar ran a weekly advertisement in a local Wisconsin newspaper under the caption "Just Say No." The Just Say No advertisement contained the following statements: 1) "Federal, State & Social Security Taxes are Voluntary;" and 2) "The Internal Revenue Service has no Statutory Authority to: Compel you to file a Tax Return, Require withholding from your paycheck, Levy or Lien your property, Audit your Books & Records." This advertisement was part of an effort by Morningstar to market the "De-Taxing America Program" (the "Program"). The Program consists of three volumes of materials. These materials contain information presenting the view that, among other things, the federal income tax is unconstitutional and that persons who are not federal employees or residents of the District of Columbia are not legally required to pay federal income tax. In addition to providing information regarding general tax-protest principles, the Program includes several forms and instructions to guide the purchaser through the process of "de-taxing." Purchasers are informed that if they complete the materials and directions in the Program they will be "withdrawn" from the jurisdiction of the federal government's taxing authorities and the social security system and will no longer be required to pay federal taxes... . Program customers are instructed to file W-4 forms with their employers asserting that they are exempt from federal taxation and requesting that the employers stop withholding federal income tax and social security payments from their paychecks... .



The Program also provides the purchaser with instructions on how to complete future tax returns to reflect that the purchaser has not incurred any tax liability in the previous year and consequently does not owe any federal income or social security taxes.


Id. at 806-07. "The Program purported to provide step-by-step instructions for 'removing' the purchaser from the federal income and social security tax systems. The Program materials assured readers that the federal government is without authority to tax them and that by following the instructions outlined in the Program individuals can legally refuse to pay federal income and social security tax." Id. at 811. The Seventh Circuit concluded that the program was a tax shelter. The Raymond court further found that because the defendants in that case had sold the product, it qualified as a plan within the meaning of § 6700.

Here, as in Raymond, Shulz has organized the two corporate Defendants. See Def.'s Stmnt. of Mat. Facts at ¶ 1. Defendants offer materials to employees and employers stating that, among other things, Congress is without authority to legislate an income tax on people except in the District of Columbia and United States territories, the IRS is prohibited from compelling people to sign and file income tax returns, and the Sixteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution was never properly ratified and, therefore, the income tax violates the Constitution. Schulz Decl. #1 at Ex. B. Among other things, Defendants' materials instruct workers how to terminate their W-4 Agreement and demand that the employer discontinue making withholdings from their pay. Id. at Ex. C. In fact, Defendants provide forms for that very purpose. Id. 2 Thus, the Court finds that Defendants have organized a "plan" or "arrangement." Although there are some questions of fact concerning whether Defendants sold their materials, they clearly "organized" the materials for presentation. 3 Defendant Schulz admits that he undertook "'Operation Stop Withholding,' a national campaign to instruct company officials, workers and independent contractors on how to legally stop wage withholding." Schulz Decl. #1 at ¶ 4. Defendants also offer to provide a "customized legal opinion letter from an attorney or CPA to be sent to your company or their tax and/or legal advisors." Schulz Decl. #1 at Ex. C, p. 11. Stated otherwise, Defendants are promoting an abusive tax shelter. Accordingly, the first element is satisfied because Defendants organized a plan or arrangement concerning the avoidance of taxes.



b. Whether Defendants Made or Caused to be Made, False or Fraudulent Statements Concerning the Tax Benefits to be Derived From the Entity, Plan, or Arrangement

"[T]o prove a violation of § 6700, the Government must also show that the [defendants] made false or fraudulent statements concerning the tax benefits of participating in the plan or arrangement." Raymond, 228 F.3d at 812. "Two types of statements fall within the statutory bar: statements directly addressing the availability of tax benefits and those concerning factual matters that are relevant to the availability of tax benefits." United States v. Cambpell, 897 F.2d 1317, 1320 (5 th Cir. 1990). Once again, referral to Raymond is instructive. In that case, the Seventh Circuit found that the defendants' statements that "payment of income tax is a voluntary activity and that individuals cannot be legally compelled to file tax returns or submit to tax investigations or penalties" "are clearly false representations concerning the government's authority to tax its citizens." Id. That court concluded that "[t]hese statements made in conjunction with the sale of the Program operated as false assurances that refusing to pay taxes in accordance with the Program's instructions is a lawful activity for which the government has no legal authority to punish Program subscribers." Id.

Defendants' conduct here is virtually identical to that in Raymond. Defendants make claims similar to those in Raymond. Among other things, Defendants affirmatively state that domestic income is not taxable, the filing of a tax return is voluntary, see Defs' Mem. of Law at 10; Schulz Decl. #1 at Ex. B, p. 14, and that the 16 th Amendment was not properly ratified and, therefore, the income tax is unconstitutional. 4 Defendants also instruct that, "[o]nce the government has been properly notified and termination of withholding has been procedurally put into effect, the [employer] has no further reporting requirements under U.S. law." Schulz Decl. #1 at Ex. C, p. 8. Defendants further claim that the IRS is prohibited by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments from compelling people to sign and file income tax returns. Schulz Decl. #1 at Ex. C. Defendants also claim that they, and other taxpayers, have the right to "retain[] [their] money until [their] grievances are redressed (remedied)." Schulz Decl. #1 at Ex. H, p.2. 5 These are all false statements of fact. See 26 U.S.C. § 3102 (requiring employers to make deductions from wages); Raymond, 228 F.3d at 812 (discussing various similar false statements about taxes); Schiff v. United States, 919 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Sitka, 845 F.2d 43, 47 (2d Cir. 1988) ("[F]ederal courts have upheld and relied on the Sixteenth Amendment for more than seventy-five years... . The Sixteenth Amendment was proposed by Congress and ratified by the states in accordance with procedures set out in Article V of the Constitution, and its ratification was then certified after careful scrutiny by a member of the executive branch acting pursuant to statutory duty. The validity of that process and of the resulting constitutional amendment are no longer open questions.") (internal citations omitted); Coleman v. Commission of Internal Revenue, 791 F.2d 68, 70-72 (7 th Cir. 1986) (statements that wages are not income and that the income tax is unconstitutional are false and "tired arguments"); United States v. Carley, 783 F.2d 341, 344 (2d Cir. 1986) ("'[T]here is no question but that Congress has the authority to impose an income tax.'") (quoting Ficalora v. Commissioner, 751 F.2d 85, 87 (2d Cir. 1984)); Ficalora, 751 F.2d at 88 (wages are taxable income); Kile v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 739 F.2d 265, 167-68 (7 th Cir. 1984) (similar to Coleman); Denison v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 751 F.2d 241 (8 th Cir. 1984) (similar); Wright v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 752 F.2d 1059, 1062 (5 th Cir. 1982) (claim that tax returns violate the right against self-incrimination is frivolous); see also Allamy v. United States, 207 Fed. Appx. 7, at *2 (2d Cir. 2006) ("[A]rguments that the federal income tax is unconstitutional and that wages are not taxable income" have been "long-rejected"); Stearman v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, T.C. Memo. 2005-39, 2005 WL 488646 (March 3, 2005), aff'd, 436 F.3d 533 (5 th Cir. 2006).

Moreover, it is evident that Defendants' false statements concern the tax benefits to be derived from the plan. As Defendants' literature makes clear, their campaign includes "instructions for companies, workers and independent contractors on how to legally stop withholding, filing and paying the tax." Schulz Decl. at Ex. C., p. 3 (emphasis added). The obvious claimed benefit from participating in Defendants' plan is that individual income taxes need not be paid. Further, Defendants advise employers that they can "eliminate payment of 'matching' employment taxes (FICA, etc.)," id. at p. 7, another claimed tax benefit from participating in the plan.

The undisputed evidence further demonstrates that Defendants knew, or had reason to know, that their statements were false. See Estate Preservation Servs., 202 F.3d at 1102. "The 'knew or had reason to know' standard ... includes what a reasonable person in the defendant's subjective position would have discovered." Estate Preservation Servs., 202 F.3d at 1103. The following factors are relevant in determining whether a defendant had the requisite scienter to violate § 6700: (1) the extent of the defendants' reliance upon knowledgeable professionals; (2) the defendants' level of sophistication and education; and (3) the defendants' familiarity with tax matters. Id.

There is a paucity of evidence, if any, suggesting that Defendants relied upon knowledgeable professionals. To the contrary, the evidence is that they relied on fringe opinions of known tax protestors whose theories have repeatedly been rejected by courts across the country. Several of the people on whom Defendants claim to rely have been convicted of tax crimes. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of finding the requisite intent.

Turning to the second and third factors, a search of case law reveals that Defendant Schulz has been litigating tax-related issues, and presenting similar arguments, for a long time. Schulz states in his Declaration #3 that he has extensive experience researching, writing briefs and arguing cases against "wayward government" in state and federal courts. Schulz Decl. #3 at ¶ ¶11-13. He specifically states he has significant experience researching and arguing tax-related issues. See generally id. Accordingly, Defendants have sufficient sophistication and education to be held accountable for their actions. 6

Furthermore, Defendants have long been involved with these tax-related arguments. Defendant Schulz acknowledges that he is aware that numerous courts across the country have rejected attacks on the Sixteenth Amendment as improperly ratified. See Schulz Decl. #3 at ¶ 21. He also admits being aware of various Circuit Court of Appeals decisions rejecting the types of claims he makes in his materials. Id. at ¶¶ 23-24. In addition, the obligation to pay taxes is common knowledge. As the Second Circuit has stated, "'[t]he payment of income taxes is not optional ... and the average citizen knows that the payment of income taxes is legally required'." Schiff, 919 F.2d at 834 (quoting United States v. Schiff, 876 F.2d 272, 275 (1989)). It is thus clear that Defendants actually knew, and certainly had reason to know, their statements were false.

Defendant claims that it has not made any false or fraudulent statements because it provided a disclaimer in its materials. Defendants' materials state that:


The materials presented herein contain legal content referencing and directly citing official U.S. tax statutes, tax regulations and federal court decisions regarding the limited authority of the U.S. Government to impose income taxes or withholding, and the legal duties and obligations (or lack thereof) that are allegedly imposed upon American business and the Americans that labor for them.



These materials are presented solely for educational purposes. Although these materials may be used in attempting to secure and exercise one's Constitutionally protected Rights ... We The People makes NO representation that there materials constitute legal advice and furthermore specifically encourages all workers and business owners to submit these materials to qualified legal counsel for review and advice.


Schulz Decl. #1 at Ex. C, p. 1.

The fact that Defendants purport to contain disclaimers in their materials is irrelevant. "[I]t is well established that a general, boilerplate disclaimer of a party's representations cannot defeat a claim for fraud." Dallas Aerospace, Inc. v. CIS Air Corp., 352 F.3d 775, 785 (2d Cir. 2003). Significantly, the purported disclaimer is insufficient for several reasons. First, nowhere do Defendants' materials disclaim the basis for their claims concerning the tax laws. Rather, Defendants merely "encourage" people to have the material reviewed by "qualified legal counsel." Second, although the materials are claimed to be presented only for education purposes, the materials affirmatively state that they are based on "legal content" "directly citing" various laws and court opinions. This gives the impression that the statements in the documents are based upon a sound legal foundation. Third, the purported disclaimer says that the "materials may be used in attempting to secure and exercise one's Constitutionally protected Rights." This could be construed as consistent with Defendants' position that the federal government may not impose an income tax because, among other arguments, the Sixteenth Amendment was not properly ratified. The "disclaimer," therefore, appears not to disclaim at all. Fourth, the materials provided by Defendants represent that "[t]he information is the result of research by tax attorneys and CPA's, a forensic accountant, a Special Agent of the Criminal Division of the IRS, a former Revenue Agent of the IRS, a former IRS Auditor and Fraud Examiner, a constitutional attorney and numerous expert tax law researchers and certified paralegals. Schulz Decl. #1, at Ex. C, p. 5. This, again, detracts from the effectiveness of any purported disclaimer. Fifth, it appears that the "disclaimer" appears on Defendants' website, but it is not clear whether it appears on all the distributed materials. For example, no such disclaimer is included on the "Statement of Facts and Beliefs." Schulz Decl. #1 at Ex. B. The Court, therefore, finds the claimed "disclaimer" to be irrelevant. Thus, the second element has been satisfied.



c. Whether the False or Fraudulent Statements Pertained to a Material Matter

The next issue is whether these false statements pertained to a material matter. "Material matters are those which would have a substantial impact on the decision-making process of a reasonably prudent investor and include matters relevant to the availability of a tax benefit." Campbell, 897 F.2d at 1320. Statements that one need not file tax returns, that employers need not make withholdings, that "companies, workers and independent contractors [can] ... legally stop withholding, filing and paying the tax," Gordon Aff. at Ex. 4, etc. clearly are relevant to the availability of the tax benefit and, thus, are material. Indeed, Defendants' statements appear to be the cause of its clients/members in failing to file tax returns or otherwise attempting to stop having taxes withheld from their wages. 7 The third element has been satisfied.



d. Whether an Injunction is Necessary to Prevent Recurrence

The final element is whether an injunction is necessary to prevent recurrence.


Factors that a court may consider in determining the likelihood of future Section 6700 violations and, thus, the need for an injunction include: (1) the gravity of the harm caused by the offense; (2) the extent of the defendant's participation; (3) the defendant's degree of scienter; (4) the isolated or recurrent nature of the infraction; (5) the defendant's recognition (or non-recognition) of his own culpability; and (6) the likelihood that defendant's occupation would place him in a position where future violations could be anticipated.


Estate Preservation Servs., 202 F.3d at 1105.



(1) The Gravity of Harm

The gravity of harm is manifest. Defendants have embarked upon a nationwide plan to disseminate its materials to encourage people to stop having taxes withheld from their wages. Defendants' materials are intended to cause employees to believe that they need not pay an income tax and employers to believe that they need not withhold taxes from employees' wages or pay matching amounts. As previously noted, people are acting upon Defendants' materials by submitting forms supplied and created by Defendants in an effort to get their employers to stop withholding taxes from their wages. This is causing individuals to expose themselves to criminal liability. Defendants' conduct also is causing insufficient payments to the United States Treasury. Lastly, Defendants' conduct is causing the IRS significantly increased efforts at collecting taxes. Although the exact cost of Defendants' conduct appears to be unknown, the IRS estimates that it spends $1,607 in processing substitutes for returns for non-filers and, therefore, "[t]he estimated cost to the U.S. Treasury attributable to filing substitutes for returns for the 2991 unfiled returns equals $4,806,537," 8 excluding the time or expense IRS Revenue Officers must expend attempting to collect unpaid taxes from these individuals. Gordon Aff. at ¶ 40. Thus, the gravity of the harm is sufficient to warrant injunctive relief. See Raymond, 228 F.3d at 813 (evidence of the administrative burden placed on the IRC to investigate the tax evasion activities and engage in collection efforts establishes harm).



(2) The Extent of Defendants' Participation

This factor clearly weighs in favor of an injunction. Defendants are the primary figures in establishing the plan and encouraging other to participate in it. See Raymond, 228 F.3d at 814.



(3) Degree of Scienter

The degree of scienter element also weighs in favor of injunctive relief. As previously discussed supra, Defendants were well aware (or reasonably should have been aware) that their assertions have been consistently rejected by the courts. Nevertheless, Defendants set up their plan, disseminated it, and fully expected that people would buy, or freely download, their materials and use them. In fact, Defendants claim (which is supported by the evidence submitted by the United States) that people have used their forms to stop having taxes withheld from their wages. Thus, there is ample evidence that Defendants intended that their members and others would follow the instructions provided in the materials and submit the forms contained therein. Id.



e. Isolated or Recurrent Nature of the Infraction

The record evidence is that Defendants' conduct is not isolated. According to Defendants' own documents, Schulz "has now spoken to well over two thousand people as part of 'Operation Stop Withholding' and continues to be greeted by appreciative and attentive audiences everywhere." Schulz Decl. #1, at Ex. H, p. 1. Moreover, Defendants admit to having handed out "3,500 copies" of the "blue folder" 9 "at 37 meetings in 2003 and that [they] put the entire contents of the materials on the website for anyone to read, download and copy... ." Defs.' Responsive Stmnt. of Mat. Facts at ¶ 4. The United States submits evidence that "997 of defendants' customers ... have not filed federal tax returns for a period of three years or more, which represents more than 2991 unfiled tax returns." Gordon Aff. at ¶ 38. Accordingly, this factor also weighs in favor of issuance of an injunction. See Raymond, 228 F.3d at 814.



f. Defendants' Recognition (or non-recognition) of Their Own Culpability

Defendants express no recognition of their culpability. Despite the uniform rejection of their positions, they continue to maintain them and attempt to get others to adopt their views. As in Raymond, Defendants have "consistently held to their view that federal tax laws are unconstitutional and that the government has no authority to compel the payment of federal taxes." 228 F.3d at 814. Defendants also continue to claim that they may withhold money from the government until the government responds to its "petition for redress." Given Defendants' long-time pursuit of these goals, it is easy to conclude that they are likely to continue to engage in their conduct if not enjoined from doing so. Id. Indeed, Defendants' materials continue to be available via their website and the mails.



g.The Likelihood that Defendants' Occupation Would Place Them in a Position Where Future Violations Could Be Anticipated.

Lastly, although Defendants are not professional tax advisers, Defendants' own papers demonstrate that they spend a substantial amount of time, money, and effort promoting their plan. Their main purpose is to continue to disseminate their plan and encourage employees and employers alike to participate. It is a virtual certainty that, absent injunctive relief, future violations can be anticipated.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that injunctive relief is warranted.



b. First Amendment

Defendants move to dismiss and otherwise defend this action on the ground that their speech is protected by the First Amendment. Defendants argue that their tax-related materials are discussions of the manner in which government is operated and, therefore, constitutionally protected. Defendants further claim that their speech constitutes the lawful exercise of the right to petition the government.

A very similar argument was presented to the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Freeman, 761 F.2d 549 (9 th Cir. 1985). In that case, as here, it was alleged that the defendant "counseled violations of the tax laws at seminars he conducted." Id. at 551. "He urged the improper filing of returns, demonstrating how to report wages, then cross out the deduction line for alimony and insert again the amount of the wages, showing them as 'nontaxable receipts.'" Id. The defendant claimed "he did nothing more than advocate tax noncompliance as an abstract idea, or at most as a remote act, and that the First Amendment necessarily bars his prosecution." Id.

The Ninth Circuit noted that:


Words alone may constitute a criminal offense, even if they spring from the anterior motive to effect political or social change. Where an indictment is for counseling, the circumstances of the case determine whether the First Amendment is applicable, either as a matter of law or as a defense to be considered by the jury; and there will be some instances where speech is so close in time and substance to ultimate criminal conduct that no free speech defense is appropriate... .



Where there is some evidence ... that the purpose of the speaker or the tendency of his words are directed to ideas or consequences remote from the commission of the criminal act, a defense based on the First Amendment is a legitimate matter for the jury's consideration.


Freeman, 761 F.2d at 551. Where, on the other hand, there is evidence that the defendant assisted in the filing of false returns, there is no First Amendment defense. Id. at 552. The Freeman court continued to note that:


Though a statute proscribes certain speech, in this case counseling, the defendant does not have a First Amendment defense simply for the asking. Counseling is but a variant of the crime of solicitation, and the First Amendment is quite irrelevant if the intent of the actor and the objective meaning of the words used are so close in time and purpose to a substantive evil as to become part of the ultimate crime itself. United States v. Barnett, 667 F.2d 835, 842-43 (9th Cir. 1982); [ United States v.] Buttorff, 572 F.2d [619] at 624 [(8 th Cir. 1978)]. In those instances, where speech becomes an integral part of the crime, a First Amendment defense is foreclosed even if the prosecution rests on words alone.


Id.

The Second Circuit agreed with this line of reasoning in United States v. Rowlee, 899 F.2d 1275 (2d Cir. 1990). In Rowlee, the Second Circuit noted that "'speech is not protected by the First Amendment when it is the very vehicle of the crime itself.'" 899 F.2d at 1278 (quoting United States v. Varani, 435 F.2d 758, 762 (6 th Cir. 1970)). Similar to the Ninth Circuit's analysis in Freeman, the Second Circuit noted that:


[C]onduct [is] not protected by the First Amendment merely because, in part, it may have involved the use of language. When speech and nonspeech elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms.


Id. (internal quotations, alterations, quotations, and citations omitted). To the extent one comments "generally on the tax laws without aiding, assisting, procuring, counseling or advising the preparation or presentation of the alleged false or fraudulent tax documents," he does not violate the Internal Revenue Code. Id. at 1280. If, however, a defendant urges the preparation and presentation of false IRS forms with the expectation that the advice will be heeded, "the First Amendment afford[s] no defense." Id.; see also United States v. Konstantakakos, 121 Fed. Appx. 902 (2d Cir. 2005) (Noting that "it has long been established that the First Amendment does not shield knowingly false statements made as part of a scheme to defraud" and that "[n]o different conclusion is warranted simply because a knowing falsehood might be couched as an 'opinion'.").

Much of Defendants' conduct is protected speech. For example, Defendants are free to give speeches on whether the Sixteenth Amendment was properly ratified. The Court further understands that any injunctive relief will be a prior restraint. Nevertheless, as discussed, Defendants' scheme violates § 6700 of the Internal Revenue Code. It is Defendants' "speech" (primarily its written materials) that facilitates the violation of § 6700.

To the extent Defendants' speech can be considered commercial speech, 10 it may be enjoined because the government may prohibit false, misleading or deceptive commercial speech, or speech that promotes unlawful conduct. United States v. Bell, 414 F.3d 474, 480 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Schiff, 379 F.3d 621, 626 (9 th Cir. 2004). 11 Even assuming Defendants are not intending to profit from their services, they are offering a product that is based on false representations. Defendants seek to have people obtain and use copies of their tax avoidance program based upon false representations. Defendants sell numerous other products on their websites. Although Defendant may sometimes give their materials away for free, they do solicit a donation of $20 for each packet of materials they provide. Thus, if the materials are properly characterized as commercial speech, they may be enjoined and the First Amendment provides no defense.

Assuming Defendants' speech to be political in nature, it still may be enjoined. The First Amendment does not protect speech that incites imminent lawless action. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). Because Defendants are not merely advocating, but have gone the extra step in instructing others how to engage in illegal activity and have supplied the means of doing so (the "We The People" forms created by Defendants supported by a purported legal analysis of the tax laws), their speech may be enjoined. See United States v. Schiff, 269 F. Supp.2d 1262, 1280 (D. Nev.); see also United States v. Bell, 414 F.3d 474 (3d Cir. 2005); Raymond, 228 F.3d a5 815-16; United States v. Fleschner, 98 F.3d 155, 158-59 (4 th Cir. 1996) (no first amendment protection where the defendants held meetings and collected money from attendees whom they instructed and advised to claim unlawful exemption and not to file income tax returns or pay tax on wages in violation of the law.); United States v. Moss, 604 F.2d 569, 571 (8 th Cir. 1979); United States v. Kelley, 769 F.2d 215, 217 (4 th Cir. 1985) ("The cloak of the First Amendment envelops critical, but abstract, discussions of existing laws, but lends no protection to speech which urges the listeners to commit violations of current law."); United States v. Burtoff, 572 F.2d 619, 624 (8 th Cir. 1978) ("[T]he defendants did go beyond mere advocacy of tax reform. They explained how to avoid withholding and their speeches and explanation incited several individual to activity that violated federal law... .").

As previously noted, the government has presented evidence that Defendants gave lectures, collected money in the form of donations and membership fees, provided forms with instructions on the preparation of the forms, and provided statements supporting their false legal beliefs/conclusions. See e.g. Gordon Decl. at Ex. 4 ("Our national campaign will include instructions for companies, workers and independent contractors on how to legally stop withholding, filing and paying the tax."); id. at Ex. 5 ("Many of you will discover the [employer] has been negligently advised by its so-called 'tax professionals' (attorneys and CPA's) who falsely claim 'the law requires the Entity to obtain your social security number' or 'the law requires the Entity to withhold' ... ."); id. at Ex. 6 ("The Individual Income Tax is fraudulent in its origin and enforced without legal authority and without legal jurisdiction on most Americans and American entities... . Under U.S. tax law you may legally stop withholding taxes and employment taxes, plus legally stop issuing W-2 and 1099 forms to your workers and payees/contractors... . Eliminate payment of 'matching' employment taxes (FICA, etc.)"); id. at Ex. 8 ("You will utilize the [We The People] Forms to willfully and legally cease withholding, deducting and diverting any portion of a worker's ... earnings to pay any tax, fee or other charge... ."); id. at Ex. 9 (a form created by Defendants and intended to be signed by employees which states "I do not derive Subtitle A wage Gross Income ... and my remuneration does not constitute wages for withholding purposes under IRC § 3401(a)(8)(A)(I)" and "I do not derive taxable income ... from a taxable source... . I am outside the venue and the jurisdiction of 26 USC and 26 CFR," and "I incurred no liability for income tax imposed under subtitle A of the Code for the preceding year."); id. at Ex. 10 (a form created by Defendants and intended to be signed by employers which states "[i]t is the Entity's understanding that no American living in a state is 'subject to the jurisdiction of Congress,' generally speaking, unless one is a nonresident alien involved in immigration proceedings or nonresident employee... ."). The government also has supplied evidence of Defendants' clients or members using Defendants' materials to avoid tax withholdings, failing to file tax returns, or from otherwise refusing to pay money to the government. See Gordon Decl. at ¶¶ 33, 36, 37, 38 and Exs. 26, 27, 28. Because Defendants have actually persuaded others, directly or indirectly, to violate the tax laws, Defendants words and actions were directed toward such persuasion, and the unlawful conduct was imminently likely to occur, the First Amendment does not afford protection. That being said, any injunction must be narrowly drawn to separate protected speech from unprotected speech and to protect Defendants' First Amendment rights.

Accordingly, the Court rejects Defendants' First Amendment defense and denies their motion to dismiss in its entirety.



IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motion to dismiss is DENIED and Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. 12

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that:


a. Defendants and their representatives, agents, servants, employees, attorneys, and those persons in active concert or participation with them are hereby permanently enjoined from directly or indirectly:




1. engaging in activity subject to penalty under 26 U.S.C. § 6700, including the organizing, selling, participation in the organization, or participation in the sale of any plan or arrangement and making a statement regarding the securing of any tax benefit that they know or have reason to know is false or fraudulent as to any material matter;



2. engaging in activity subject to penalty under § 6701, including preparing or assisting in the preparation of a document related to a matter material to the internal revenue laws that includes a position that they know will, if used, result in an understatement of tax liability;



3. promoting, marketing, organizing, selling, or receiving payment for any plan or arrangement regarding the securing of any tax benefit that they know or have reason to know is false or fraudulent as to any material matter;



4. engaging in any other activity subject to penalty under IRC §§ 6700 or 6701 or other penalty provision of the Internal Revenue Code;



5. advising or instructing persons and/or entities that they are not required to file federal tax returns or pay federal taxes;



6. selling, distributing or furnishing any document, newsletter, book, manual, videotape, audiotape, or other material purporting to enable individuals to discontinue or stop withholding, or payment of, federal taxes;



7. instructing, advising, or assisting anyone to stop withholding or paying of federal employment or income taxes; and



8. obstructing or advising or assisting anyone to obstruct IRS examinations, collections, or other IRS proceedings.



b. Defendants shall, at their own expense, notify all persons who have purchased or otherwise obtained their tax plans, arrangements, and materials of this Memorandum, Decision and Order and provide them with a copy of this Memorandum, Decision and Order;



c. Defendants shall produce to counsel for the United States a list identifying by name, address, e-mail address, telephone number, and Social Security number, all persons and entities who have been provided Defendants' tax preparation materials, forms, and other materials containing false information and otherwise likely to cause others to violate the tax laws of the United States;



d. Defendants, and anyone in active concert or participation with them, shall remove from their websites and all other websites over which they have control, all tax-fraud scheme promotional materials, false commercial speech concerning the internal revenue laws, and speech likely to incite others imminently to violate the internal revenue laws;



e. Defendants shall remove from its websites all abusive tax shelter promotional materials, false commercial speech, and materials designed to incite others to violate the law (including tax laws), and, for a period of one year from the date of this Memorandum, Decision & Order, display prominently on the first page of the website an attachment of this Memorandum, Decision and Order;



f. Defendants shall immediately implement the terms of this injunction and provide the Court with an affidavit of compliance within twenty-one days of the date of this Decision and Order; and



g. This Court shall retain jurisdiction concerning Defendants' compliance with the injunctive relief.


IT IS SO ORDERED.

1 That section reads, in relevant part, as follows:


(a) Imposition of penalty. --Any person who --



(1)



(A) organizes (or assists in the organization of) --



(i) a partnership or other entity,



(ii) any investment plan or arrangement, or



(iii) any other plan or arrangement, or



(B) participates (directly or indirectly) in the sale of any interest in an entity or plan or arrangement referred to in subparagraph (A), and



(2) makes or furnishes or causes another person to make or furnish (in connection with such organization or sale) --



(A) a statement with respect to the allowability of any deduction or credit, the excludability of any income, or the securing of any other tax benefit by reason of holding an interest in the entity or participating in the plan or arrangement which the person knows or has reason to know is false or fraudulent as to any material matter, or



(B) a gross valuation overstatement as to any material matter,


shall [be guilty of a crime].

2 Other examples of Defendants' plan are set forth infra at pp. 9-10 and 22-23.

3 The evidence in the record is that Defendants provided the program materials and gave seminars for free. The evidence also demonstrates that Defendants used the materials to solicit donations to the organizations and to encourage people to join their organization for a fee. In a prior case involving Defendant Shulz, it was noted that

We The People Foundation's website invites visitors to make a donation to an organization via credit card to PayPal or by mail directly to We the People Foundation. The address given for the We The People Foundation is Schulz's home address. The website also contains an on-line store where products can be purchased through PayPal. One of the products sold over the website is the "Tax Termination Package," which is offered for sale for $39.95. The product is described as "Bob Schulz, Chairman of the We The People Foundation, stopped paying income taxes and filing returns. These are the materials he sent to the IRS. Make sure to get a copy for your personal records." [The IRS] has also learned that the We The People Foundation filed IRS Form 990 for the years ending December 31, 2001, December 31, 2002, and December 31, 2003 and the returns indicate that the organization showed considerable revenue for each year.

Schulz v. U.S., 2006 WL 1788194, at *1 (D. Neb. 2006).

4 Other false statements are discussed infra at pp. 22-23.

5 Defendants sent a long list of questions to various government agencies demanding answers. It is Defendants' position that, until the government responds, it need not pay taxes.

6 Inasmuch as Schulz operates the two corporate entities, his knowledge may be imputed to them.

7 In support of this, the United States has provided copies of Defendants' "We The People" tax forms that have been submitted to the IRS or their employers by various individuals. Gordon Aff. at Exs. 27, 28. Defendants also have submitted affidavits from Defendants' members indicating that they have stopped paying taxes. See Deitz Decl. #1 at ¶ 13. Moreover, Defendants' own submissions reveal that people have acted upon Defendants' advice. See Schulz Decl. #1 at Ex. H, p. 2 ( "Another case involves as group of 12 oil workers in Arkansas that recently sought to terminate their withholding agreements (W- 4s) en masse, by submitting WTP [We The People] Form #1 to their company."). Other examples are listed in Schulz Decl. #1 at Ex. H ( "[W]e are hearing daily about many individuals that have filed the forms... .").

8 As is explained below, the United States asserts that 997 of Defendants' customers have not filed federal tax returns for a period of three years, which represents more than 2,991 unfiled tax returns. Gordon Aff. at ¶ 38.

9 The "blue folder" contains the materials prepared by Defendants and discussed throughout this opinion.

10 Several facts suggest that the speech may be considered commercial. This includes the following: (1) Defendants request a "donation" for each packet of materials they provide; (2) Defendants invite individuals to become members of their organization for a fee; Gordon Aff. at Ex. 20; (3) Defendants offer numerous items for sale, including videos, pamphlets, CD-ROMs, bumper stickers, brochures, flags, etc., see id.; (4) Defendants offer to sell a "customized legal opinion letter from an attorney or CPA" (noting "discounts are available for WTP Congress members"), Schulz Decl. #1, at Ex. C, p.11; and (5) Defendants advertise their program.

11 The Court already has concluded that many of Defendants' statements are false.

12 Because Defendants submitted numerous materials outside of the pleadings in support of its motion to dismiss, the United States cross-moved for summary judgment, and Defendants have had an opportunity to reply to the cross-motion, Defendants' motion is properly considered as one made under Rule 56. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b). Even without converting Defendants' motion, this matter is fully resolved upon Plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment.


Alvin S. Brown, Esq.
Tax attorney
703.425.1400
www.irstaxattorney.com

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Friday, September 7, 2007

Back Taxes: IRC 6330(c)(2)(B)provides that a taxpayer may challenge the existence or amount of the underlying tax liabilityif the taxpayer failed to receive a statutory notice of deficiency for such tax liability or did not otherwise have an earlier opportunity to dispute such tax liability. Sec. 6330(c)(2)(B). In this case, taxpayer was unable to prove that he received a statutory notice of deficiency from the IRS. Taxpayer could have introduced an Offer in compromise under IRC 6330(c)(2)(A), but that issue did not arise in this case

T.C. Summary Opinion 2007-157, T.C. Summary Opinion 2007-157
JEFFREY SANDOR ORLING, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.

UNITED STATES TAX COURT. Docket No. 11456-06S. Filed September 6, 2007.

Jeffrey Sandor Orling, pro se.

Michelle L. Maniscalco, for respondent.

GOEKE, Judge: This case was heard pursuant to the provisions of section 7463 of the Internal Revenue Code. Unless otherwise indicated all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect when the petition was filed, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. Pursuant to section 7463(b), the decision to be entered is not reviewable by any other court, and this opinion shall not be treated as precedent for any other case.

This matter is before the Court on respondent's motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 121. This case results from a timely petition of respondent's notice of determination sustaining respondent's intent to levy regarding petitioner's income tax liability for 2002. Because we determine that petitioner may not raise the underlying tax liability in this proceeding, we find no abuse of discretion in respondent's determination, and we shall grant respondent's motion for summary judgment.



Background


On March 31, 2003, respondent issued a notice of deficiency to petitioner for the taxable year ended December 31, 2002. Respondent determined a deficiency of $12,758, which was based on the disallowance of certain deductions claimed on Schedule C, Profit or Loss From Business, and itemized deductions claimed on Schedule A, Itemized Deductions. A petition to this Court was not filed in response to this notice of deficiency.

Petitioner gave conflicting testimony relative to the receipt of the notice of deficiency, which was mailed to petitioner's address, the same address at which he currently resides. Initially, petitioner admitted receiving the notice of deficiency. Later, he testified he could not remember whether he received it, but he acknowledged receipt of other documents mailed by respondent.

Respondent submitted a United States Postal Service (USPS) Track and Confirm document verifying delivery of a postal package to petitioner's address on April 5, 2005. Respondent maintains the notice of deficiency was enclosed in this package. The actual receipt received upon delivery of the notice of deficiency was no longer available in the records of the USPS.

Following the issuance of the notice of deficiency, respondent began efforts to collect the liability for 2002. These actions culminated in the issuance by respondent of a Final Notice of Intent to Levy and Notice of Your Right to a Hearing on February 22, 2006. Petitioner timely filed a Form 12153, Request For A Collection Due Process Hearing, and subsequently had a telephone conversation with the Appeals officer assigned by respondent. Respondent alleges that during this discussion petitioner refused to address anything other than the underlying liability for 2002. Petitioner did not submit any alternative payment options to respondent's Appeals officer.

On June 8, 2006, respondent issued to petitioner a Notice of Determination Concerning Collection Action(s) relating to 2002 (notice of determination) sustaining the proposed intent to levy. A timely petition for a review of the determination was filed in this Court.

A hearing was conducted on respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment on April 30, 2007, at which time the testimony of petitioner and exhibits were received into the record. Respondent's motion was also supported by an affidavit with attached exhibits.



Discussion


Summary judgment is intended to expedite litigation and avoid unnecessary and expensive trials. Fla. Peach Corp. v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 678 (1988). Summary judgment may be granted with respect to all or any part of the legal issues presented if the acceptable materials available show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that a decision may be rendered as a matter of law. Rule 121(a) and (b). The moving party bears the burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and any factual inferences will be read in a manner most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. Dahlstrom v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 812 (1985). The nonmoving party, however, cannot rest upon the allegations or denials in his pleadings but must "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Rule 121(d).

Under section 6330(a), the Secretary is required to notify a person upon whose property respondent intends to levy that the person has a right to a hearing. If a timely request for hearing is made, a hearing shall be held before an impartial officer or employee of respondent's Appeals Office. Sec. 6330(b). At the hearing, a taxpayer may raise any relevant issue relating to the unpaid tax or the proposed levy, including collection alternatives. Sec. 6330(c)(2)(A). The taxpayer may challenge the existence or amount of the underlying tax liability, however, only if the taxpayer failed to receive a statutory notice of deficiency for such tax liability or did not otherwise have an earlier opportunity to dispute such tax liability. Sec. 6330(c)(2)(B).

Section 6330(d)(1)(A) grants this Court jurisdiction to review the Appeals officer's determination. Where the underlying tax liability is not properly at issue, we review the determination for abuse of discretion. Goza v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 176, 181-182 (2000).

Petitioner maintains that he is not precluded from contesting the underlying liability for 2002 because he did not receive the notice of deficiency. Petitioner was given an opportunity to testify at the hearing and to produce any other evidence he had to support his allegation. Petitioner's testimony and the documents he provided do not create a genuine factual issue regarding his receipt of the notice of deficiency. Petitioner offers only his testimony that he never received the notice of deficiency, about which he himself gave conflicting testimony. Petitioner simply has not provided credible factual assertions to overcome the strong presumption of proper mailing and delivery in the instant case. Figler v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-230. Accordingly, petitioner failed to establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact in this case.

Petitioner also did not offer any factual information to rebut respondent's position that petitioner raised only the liability issue before the Appeals officer. Based upon the petition and petitioner's testimony, we find that such is the only issue in this case. Because petitioner cannot raise the underlying liability for 2002 in this proceeding, we sustain respondent's determination and shall grant respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment.

To reflect the foregoing,

An order and decision will be entered.

Alvin S. Brown, Esq.
Tax attorney
703.425.1400
www.irstaxattorney.com

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Thursday, September 6, 2007

Tax Help: Records required to be kept for business expenses



Deductions are a matter of legislative grace, and the taxpayer bears the burden of proving that he is entitled to any deduction claimed. INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934).


The taxpayer is required to maintain records sufficient to enable the Commissioner to determine his correct tax liability. Sec. 6001; Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 440 (2001); sec. 1.6001-1(a), Income Tax Regs. Such records must substantiate both the amount and purpose of the claimed deductions.


T.C. Summary Opinion 2007-154]
Ibrahim B. Keita v. Commissioner.
Docket No. 9596-06S . Filed September 5, 2007.

[Code Sec. 162]

Tax Court: Summary opinion: Business use of home: Business expense deductions: Automobile expenses. --

Automobile expenses incurred while commuting between an individual's residence and his various contracting jobs were not deductible when his home office was not his principal place of business. -


[Code Sec. 212]

Tax Court: Summary opinion: Tax preparation fees. --
The amount paid by an individual for tax preparation software was not deductible because he could not substantiate it and admitted at trial that the amount claimed on his return was an estimate. There was no reasonable basis on which the court could estimate the deduction under the Cohan doctrine. --


[Code Sec. 274]

Tax Court: Summary opinion: Business use of home: Business expense deductions. --
An individual was denied deductions pertaining to computers, monitors and a fax machine, which were listed property under Code Sec. 280F(d)(4), used in his trade or business because he failed to produce receipts or otherwise substantiate the cost of such items or when they were purchased. The strict substantiation requirements of Code Sec. 274(d) were not met. Furthermore, there was no substantial basis to estimate the claimed expenses under the Cohan rule. -


[Code Sec. 280A]

Tax Court: Summary opinion: Business use of home: Business expense deductions. --
A taxpayer could not deduct expenses related to his home office because it was not his principal place of business. Rather, his principal place of business was the hospitals where he performed services as a licensed vocational nurse. -



PANUTHOS, Chief Special Trial Judge: This case was heard pursuant to the provisions of section 7463 of the Internal Revenue Code in effect when the petition was filed. Pursuant to section 7463(b), the decision to be entered is not reviewable by any other court, and this opinion shall not be treated as precedent for any other case. Unless otherwise indicated, subsequent section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the year in issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.



Respondent determined a deficiency in petitioner's 2004 Federal income tax of $3,231. After concessions,1 the issues for decision are:

(1) Whether petitioner is entitled to certain deductions claimed on Schedule C, Profit or Loss From Business, and

(2) whether petitioner is entitled to certain deductions claimed on Schedule A, Itemized Deductions.





Background



Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found. The stipulation of facts and the attached exhibits are incorporated herein by this reference. At the time the petition was filed, petitioner resided in Santa Rosa, California.



Petitioner was employed as a psychiatric technician during tax year 2004, earning wage income. He also worked as a licensed vocational nurse, for which he received income that he reported on his Schedule C.



On his 2004 Federal income tax return, petitioner reported wages totaling $59,580, a Schedule C business loss of $15,652, and Schedule A itemized deductions of $48,599. Respondent issued petitioner a notice of deficiency in February 2006 disallowing $11,802 of petitioner's claimed Schedule C deductions, consisting of $7,853 for business use of petitioner's home, and $3,949 in other expenses for computers, monitors, and a fax machine. The notice of deficiency also disallowed $19,897 of petitioner's itemized deductions, consisting of $9,384 in unreimbursed employee vehicle expenses, and $11,375 in attorney's and tax preparation fees, reduced by 2 percent of petitioner's adjusted gross income.





Discussion



In general, the Commissioner's determinations set forth in a notice of deficiency are presumed correct, and the taxpayer bears the burden of proving that these determinations are in error. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances. Petitioner has neither alleged that section 7491(a) applies nor established his compliance with the requirements of section 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B) to substantiate items, maintain records, and cooperate fully with respondent's reasonable requests. Petitioner therefore bears the burden of proof.



Deductions are a matter of legislative grace, and the taxpayer bears the burden of proving that he is entitled to any deduction claimed. INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934).

The taxpayer is required to maintain records sufficient to enable the Commissioner to determine his correct tax liability. Sec. 6001; Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 440 (2001); sec. 1.6001-1(a), Income Tax Regs. Such records must substantiate both the amount and purpose of the claimed deductions. Higbee v. Commissioner, supra.




I. Schedule C Deductions


Petitioner claimed a $15,652 Schedule C business loss for 2004 that resulted from his deducting $20,548 in business expenses and reporting $4,896 in income. The notice of deficiency disallowed $7,853, the entire amount claimed for business use of the home, and $3,949 in other expenses claimed for computers, monitors, and a fax machine.



A. Business Use of Home



Section 162(a) allows a taxpayer to deduct all ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred in carrying on a trade or business. The taxpayer is generally precluded from deducting expenses incurred in connection with the business use of the residence. See sec. 280A. As an exception to the general rule, section 280A(c)(1) permits the deduction of expenses allocable to a portion of the dwelling unit which was used exclusively and regularly (1) as a principal place of business, (2) as the place for meeting with customers, clients, or patients in the normal course of business, or (3) in the case of an unattached separate structure, in connection with the business. The deduction cannot exceed the gross income derived from the business use of the residence over the sum of certain deductions allocable to such income. Sec. 280A(c)(5); Tobin v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-328; Cunningham v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-141, affd. without published opinion 110 F.3d 59 (4th Cir. 1997).



In order for a taxpayer to establish use on a "regular" basis, the business use must be more than occasional or incidental. Irwin v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-490, affd. without published opinion 131 F.3d 146 (9th Cir. 1997); Hefti v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1993-128. A taxpayer "exclusively" uses a portion of his dwelling unit in a trade or business if the portion in question is not used for other than business purposes. Irwin v. Commissioner, supra; Hefti v. Commissioner, supra. The use of a portion of a dwelling unit both for personal purposes and for the carrying on of a trade or business does not meet the exclusive use test. See Sengpiehl v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-23; Hefti v. Commissioner, supra. Whether a taxpayer's home office is his principal place of business is dependent on the amount of time spent at each location, and the relative importance of the activities performed at each location. See Commissioner v. Soliman, 506 U.S. 168, 175 (1993).



Petitioner contends that he is entitled to a deduction for business use of his home because he used his garage as a home office for scheduling purposes, sending and receiving faxes, keeping mileage records, and meeting with clients at times. Although petitioner testified that he maintained his home office for those reasons, the record does not indicate that petitioner met with clients or patients in his garage. Nor does the record establish that the garage was an "unattached separate structure". Therefore, the claimed deductions for business use of petitioner's home can be sustained only if he used the garage on a regular basis as the principal place of business for a trade or business.



Although petitioner may have done some work related to his business in his home office, his principal place of business as a licensed vocational nurse was not in his home office. Petitioner testified that when he was working as a licensed vocational nurse out of his home, he received his schedule by fax at his home office, he called the places at which he was going to work, and then he went to the actual jobs at various hospitals in the community. At the hospitals, petitioner worked as a nurse, where he sometimes supervised certified nursing assistants, dispensed medications, and gave wound treatments. Based on the record, we find that petitioner's primary place of business as a licensed vocational nurse was not in his home where he received his work schedule, but at the hospitals in which he provided licensed vocational nursing services. To the extent that petitioner used his home for administrative activities, he has not established that the work at home was for the convenience of his employer. Based on the foregoing, we hold that petitioner's use of his garage for scheduling and faxing does not fulfill the business use exception of section 280A(c)(1), and petitioner is therefore not entitled to a deduction for business use of his home.



B. Computers, Monitors, and Fax Machine



At trial, petitioner tried to establish that he was entitled to deduct $3,949 as Schedule C business expenses on his 2004 tax return for computers, monitors, and a fax machine. Because petitioner's computer and peripheral equipment do not fall within the home office exception to section 274 under section 280F(d)(4)(B),2 they are listed property under section 280F(d)(4), and their deductibility is subject to the strict substantiation requirements of section 274(d).



When a taxpayer establishes that he has incurred a deductible expense but is unable to substantiate the exact amount, we are generally permitted to estimate the deductible amount. Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540, 543-544 (2d Cir. 1930). To apply the Cohan rule, the Court must have a reasonable basis upon which an estimate can be made. Vanicek v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 731, 742-743 (1985). Without such a basis, any allowance would amount to unguided largesse. Williams v. United States , 245 F.2d 559, 560 (5th Cir. 1957). However, the strict rules of substantiation that apply to certain business deductions described in section 274(d) supersede the rule in Cohan v. Commissioner, supra at 544. Sanford v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 823, 827-828 (1968), affd. per curiam 412 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1969); Keating v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-101; Jeffers v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1986-285; sec. 1.274-5T(a)(4), Temporary Income Tax Regs., 50 Fed. Reg. 46014 (Nov. 6, 1985).

Alvin S. Brown, Esq.
Tax attorney
703.425.1400
www.irstaxattorney.com


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Petitioner did not provide any receipts or any other evidence to establish when the computers, monitors, and fax machine were purchased, or the cost of the items. Petitioner testified that the amount he claimed on his Schedule C for the computers and peripheral equipment was "a little over-inflated" and that one of the computers was not even purchased in the tax year in issue. There is insufficient evidence to establish that these items were purchased during the year in issue, or to substantiate the cost. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to a deduction for his computers, monitors, and fax machine.




II. Schedule A Deductions


On Schedule A of his 2004 return, petitioner claimed itemized deductions of $48,599. Respondent disallowed $19,897 of this amount, which consisted of claimed unreimbursed employee expenses of $9,384, and attorney's and tax preparation fees of $11,375, reduced by 2 percent of petitioner's adjusted gross income.



A. Unreimbursed Employee Expenses



Petitioner claimed a deduction of $9,384 for his vehicle expenses on Schedule A. He completed Form 2106-EZ, Unreimbursed Employee Business Expenses, and claimed that he drove 25,024 miles for business. Petitioner provided mileage logs totaling 12,985 miles.



Petitioner contends he worked as a licensed vocational nurse and contracted with several agencies to work at various jobs at hospitals in the community. Petitioner argues that he is entitled to a deduction for the mileage because he was traveling from his home office to the various contracting jobs, so he was traveling from one job to another.



Pursuant to section 162, expenses relating to the use of an automobile that a taxpayer pays or incurs while commuting between the taxpayer's residence and the taxpayer's place of business or employment are not deductible because such expenses are personal, and not business expenses. See Fausner v. Commissioner, 413 U.S. 838 (1973); Commissioner v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465 (1946); secs. 1.162-2(e), 1.262-1(b)(5), Income Tax Regs. Automobile mileage deductions are also subject to the strict substantiation requirements of section 274(d).



Transportation expenses between a home office and another place of business, however, may be deductible if the home office is the taxpayer's principal place of business. Strohmaier v. Commissioner, 113 T.C. 106, 113-114 (1999); Curphey v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 766, 777-778 (1980); Gosling v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-148.



Where a taxpayer shows that his automobile expenses satisfy the requirements of section 162 but fails to establish that his records satisfy the heightened substantiation requirements of section 274(d), the expenses will not be allowed. To substantiate such expenses, the taxpayer must provide the following adequate records or sufficient evidence to corroborate his own testimony: (1) The amount of the expenditures; (2) the mileage for each business use of the automobile and the total mileage for all use of the automobile during the taxable period; (3) the date of the business use; and (4) the business purpose for the use of the automobile. Sec. 1.274-5T(b)(6), Temporary Income Tax Regs., 50 Fed. Reg. 46016 (Nov. 6, 1985).



For the reasons discussed supra, petitioner's residence was not his principal place of business. Even if petitioner had established that his use of the vehicle satisfied the requirements of section 162, the logs he provided listing the business miles he drove do not meet the substantiation requirements of section 274(d), because petitioner did not provide the total mileage for all use of the automobile during the taxable period. Therefore, petitioner's transportation expenses do not meet the trade or business requirement of section 162, or the substantiation requirements of section 274(d), so he is not entitled to deduct his transportation expenses as Schedule A unreimbursed employee expenses.



B. Tax Preparation Fees



A taxpayer may be allowed a deduction for ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in connection with the determination, collection, or refund of any tax. Sec. 212(3). Petitioner claimed a deduction for tax preparation fees of $375 as a miscellaneous deduction on Schedule A. At trial, respondent conceded that petitioner was allowed $250 of the claimed deduction, so we do not further address this amount.



Petitioner claims that he purchased Turbo Tax software for $125 to prepare his return for tax year 2003, after his taxes were not prepared satisfactorily by a professional tax preparer. Petitioner admitted at trial that he did not know how much Turbo Tax cost and that the $125 was an estimate. Petitioner presented no evidence to support the claimed deduction for the purchase of tax preparation software.



As discussed supra, when a taxpayer establishes that he has incurred a deductible expense but is unable to substantiate the exact amount, the Cohan doctrine permits the Court to estimate the deductible amount. Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d at 543-544. The Court must, however, have a reasonable basis upon which an estimate can be made. Vanicek v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. at 742-743. Because the record contains no evidence upon which we could base an estimate, we conclude that petitioner is not entitled to the remaining $125 deduction claimed for tax preparation fees, and respondent's determination with regard to this amount is sustained.



To reflect the foregoing and the concessions made by the parties,



Decision will be entered under Rule 155.


1 Petitioner conceded that he received a State income tax refund in the amount of $269 and that he received $575 in wages from Maxim Healthcare Services, Inc., during tax year 2004. Petitioner also conceded that he is not entitled to his claimed itemized deduction of $11,000 for legal fees related to defense of a tax lien. At trial, respondent conceded that petitioner is entitled to a $250 deduction for tax preparation fees.

2 Listed property does not include any computer or peripheral equipment used exclusively at a regular business establishment. Sec. 280F(d)(4)(B). Any portion of a dwelling unit shall be treated as a regular business establishment if (and only if) the requirements of sec. 280A(c)(1) are met with respect to such portion. Sec. 280F(d)(4)(B). For the reasons discussed above, petitioner's use of his garage does not satisfy the requirements of sec. 280A(c)(1), and therefore the computers, monitors, and fax machine are listed property.

Labels:

Wednesday, September 5, 2007

Tax Attorney: Joint Committee on Taxation Report on Tax Treatment of Partnership Carried Interest

September 5, 2007

110th Congress

PRESENT LAW AND ANALYSIS RELATING TO TAX TREATMENT OF PARTNERSHIP CARRIED INTERESTS AND RELATED ISSUES, PART I


Scheduled for a Public Hearing Before the HOUSE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS on September 6, 2007

Prepared by the Staff of the JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION

September 4, 2007

JCX-62-07



CONTENTS


INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

I. BACKGROUND

II. ECONOMIC DATA

III. PRESENT LAW --CARRIED INTERESTS AND COMPENSATION OF INDIVIDUALS


A. Tax Rates Applicable to Ordinary Income, Capital Gains, and Dividends of Individuals

B. Tax Treatment of the Receipt of a Partnership Profits Interest for Services

C. Tax Treatment of Property Transferred in Connection with the Performance of Services

D. Tax Treatment of Nonqualified Deferred Compensation

E. Self-Employment Tax Treatment of Partners

IV. PRESENT LAW --TAXATION OF BUSINESS ENTITIES


A. Tax Treatment of Partnerships and Partners

B. Treatment of Publicly Traded Partnerships

C. Comparison to Corporations and to Other Business Entities


1. Tax treatment of corporations

2. Tax treatment of other business entities

V. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS IN THE 110TH CONGRESS

VI. FEDERAL TAX ISSUES AND ANALYSIS



INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY


The Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives has scheduled a public hearing on September 6, 2007, on the Federal tax issues surrounding the use of partnership carried interests. This document,1 prepared by the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, includes a description of present law and analysis of Federal tax issues relating to partnership carried interests in general.

Part One provides background information about carried interests and going-public transactions of partnerships involved in private equity, hedge fund, venture capital fund, and similar alternative asset management and financial advisory business activities. Part Two provides economic data relating to partnerships, and to private equity, venture capital, and hedge funds, and certain carried interests. Part Three describes present law relating to Federal tax rates for individuals, tax treatment of partnership profits interests for services, and tax rules relating to compensation and employment tax. Part Four describes present law relating to taxation of partners and partnerships, including publicly traded partnerships, and compares the tax treatment of taxable corporations and of passthrough and untaxed entities. Part Five describes recent legislative proposals. Part Six provides a description and analysis of Federal tax issues relating to carried interests.

A companion document2 relating to the Ways and Means Committee hearing on September 6, 2007, prepared by the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, provides a description of present law and analysis of Federal tax issues relating to partnership carried interests and related issues particularly involving the use of offshore entities.

Part One of the companion document provides background information about offshore structures for private equity, hedge fund, venture capital fund, and similar alternative asset management and financial advisory business activities. Part One also provides background information about tax-exempt investors and unrelated business income tax, foreign individual investors and income effectively connected to a trade or business, and deferral of income of managers. Part Two describes geographic distribution of hedge funds and private equity funds. Part Three describes present law and history of the law relating to unrelated business income tax and debt-financed income, an overview of U.S. international tax rules, and an overview of ways to defer services income under present law. Part Four provides a discussion of issues and analysis of Federal tax issues relating to these areas.



I. BACKGROUND




Factual background

Over the past several decades, private equity funds, venture capital funds, hedge funds, and similar alternative investment vehicles3 have attracted large amounts of capital investment from institutional investors such as pension funds and educational and charitable institution endowments, as well as from wealthy individual investors. These investors become limited partners in the funds, which are generally structured as partnerships. Some of the funds are established in offshore jurisdictions as well as in the U.S.4 The assets invested in these funds generally are managed by groups of individuals who contribute a relatively small amount of capital to the fund (in relation to amounts of capital contributed by the investors) and who provide investment expertise in selecting, managing, and disposing of fund assets.



Private Investment Fund Structure




It is a common practice for managers of the funds to receive "carried interests." A carried interest generally is a right to receive a percentage of fund profits without an obligation to contribute to the capital to the fund. In the case of a fund that is a partnership, the carried interest may be structured as a partnership profits interest, under which the partner has a right to receive a percentage of partnership profits, but has no obligation to contribute capital to the partnership, and has no right to partnership assets on liquidation of the partnership.5 Under a partnership profits interest, a partner generally does not have an obligation to contribute to the partnership's capital if the partnership experiences losses.

In addition to a carried interest, a fund manager typically may receive a management fee, often calculated as a percentage of fund assets. The combination of a management fee and a carried interest has been referred to as "two and twenty," referring to the practice of providing the fund managers a fee at two percent of capital and a carried interest at 20 percent of overall partnership profits.

In a typical structure for this arrangement (though other structures are possible), the investment fund is a partnership (a triangle shape in the above diagram). The fund manager is a separate partnership whose partners are the individuals with investment management expertise. The fund manager partnership is itself a partner in the investment fund partnership. The investors are limited partners in the investment fund partnership.

In this typical structure, the carried interest held by the fund manager is a profits interest in the investment fund partnership. The Internal Revenue Service takes the position that the receipt of a partnership profits interest for services generally is not a taxable event.6 Because the character of a partnership's in come passes through to partners, the fund manager's share of income has the same character as the income has when it is realized by the underlying investment fund. Accordingly, income from a carried interest may be reported as long-term capital gain to the extent that the income is attributable to gains realized by the investment fund from capital assets held for more than one year.



Master-Feeder Investment Fund Structure




When intermediate entities (partnerships or corporations) are inserted into the structure, serving to feed capital to the investment fund, the arrangement is sometimes referred to as a "master-feeder" structure. A master-feeder structure generally involves a corporate "feeder" through which tax-exempt and foreign investors invest, and a partnership "feeder" through which U.S. taxable investors invest. The corporate feeder also serves as a "blocker," in that it blocks the character of the income and operations of the underlying investment fund from flowing through to investors holding interest in the investment fund indirectly through that corporation.

Under any of these structures, the fund manager's carried interest may be subject to a "hurdle rate," so that the profits percentage is payable only after the fund has returned their capital, or returned a specified rate, to the investors. The carried interest may also be subject to a "clawback" provision, under which the recipient partner must repay amounts previously received if, in a later year, agreed profit targets in the fund being managed are not met. For example, if the fund sells a portfolio investment at a profit so that the hurdle rate for investors is met and the fund manager receives a distribution pursuant to the carried interest, the fund manager could be required to pay back the amount of the distribution in a later year under the clawback provision if a cumulative fund return below the hurdle rate results after sales of other portfolio investments. By contrast, without a clawback provision, if the carried interest percentage is payable on a deal-by-deal or investment-by-investment basis, the fund manager receives its profits payment for those investments that are individually profitable, regardless of whether the partnership has an overall or cumulative profit, or a cumulative loss, on all its investments in the end (when the investment partnership wraps up or liquidates). The clawback provision has the effect that the carried interest pays out net or cumulative profits of the fund to the fund manager, but does not pay out if the fund is not cumulatively profitable. The clawback provision is therefore said to aid in aligning the economic interests of the fund manager with those of the investors in the fund.

A roughly similar result is achieved in hedge funds with the use of "high water mark" provisions. Under such a provision, distributions to the fund manager pursuant to the carried interest are suspended if the cumulative profitability of the fund at any point in time dips below a hurdle rate.

Management of the investment fund partnership and its assets is carried out by the general partner, the separate partnership of individuals with fund management expertise. The fund manager's carried interest may be subject to time and effort commitments and key person requirements with respect to the individual managers, designed to ensure that the individuals personally devote the necessary effort to fund management activities.7

There are variations on the structure of the income of fund managers. For example, with respect to management fees, some fund managers do not receive a management fee and instead receive only a carried interest. In such cases, the fund manager receives a larger carried interest than the manager would have otherwise received. In other cases, the fund manager is entitled to an annual management fee, but elects to defer receipt of the management fee until a later year, or to convert the fee to another arrangement, such as an interest in partnership gross (as opposed to net) income.8

Techniques for deferring the management fee are also used with respect to the fund manager's carried interest. Sometimes, in lieu of a carried interest, the fund manager's right to income is structured as a contractual right on the part of the fund manager to receive additional fees as opposed to an equity interest in the fund. Income received by the fund manager under this alternative, non-equity method of structuring the carried interest is ordinary income from the performance of services. When the non-equity method of structuring the carried interest is used, it is common for the fund manager to enter into a deferred compensation agreement with the fund with respect to the additional fee income. For example, if the carried interest is structured as a fee that is based on a percentage of the profits realized by the fund each year, the arrangement might further allow the fund manager to elect to defer the fees that are earned by the fund manager entity in a particular year to a later year.



Publicly Traded Partnership Investment Fund Structure




Recent news reports have publicized transactions in which partnerships involved in private equity, hedge fund, venture capital fund, and similar alternative asset management and financial advisory business activities have made their interests available on an exchange or market.9 The publicity surrounding these transactions, and their large dollar value, have drawn attention to issues relating to the tax rules governing the transactions and the manner in which amounts are paid out of these businesses. One example of a possible structure for a public offering of an investment management firm is illustrated in the above diagram.

The business that effectively goes public in these transactions is the fund manager (the general partner), rather than the investment fund itself. The public does not invest in the underlying fund, or directly in the fund manager entity, but rather, in a partnership that is established for the purpose of offering publicly traded partnership units and which owns, directly or indirectly, interests in one or more fund manager entities (possibly including other financial services operations). Thus, this structure permits public investors to acquire an interest in the fund manager, while permitting the private investors who are limited partners directly in the fund to retain those investments even while the fund manager goes public.10

While the details of the transactions differ, they generally involve a public offering of (or making a market for) units in a partnership. Following the public offering, partnership units are traded on an exchange, such as the New York Stock Exchange. The publicly traded partnership is a holding partnership which, through lower-tier partnerships and corporations, has an interest in operating entities that are the fund managers.11 Thus, the fund manager, but not the investment fund itself, goes public. The lower-tier partnerships and corporations serve to allocate income and, in the case of lower-tier corporations, to block a variety of types of income received and convert this income to dividends (or interest) when distributed.12 The operating entities conduct businesses involved in asset management and investment advisory activities with respect to funds such as private equity funds and hedge funds. The public investors have an indirect interest in the fund manager entity, and thus have an indirect interest in the fund manager's carried interests paid by the investment funds.



Federal tax issues

The Federal tax aspects of these arrangements raise several issues.13 A core question is whether a carried interest received by an asset management business should be viewed as a form of compensation for services, or whether it is more similar to a right to income or gain from capital. Carried interests and similar arrangements may also raise issues relating to the application of tax rules governing compensation, such as the rules governing the receipt of property for services and deferred compensation (which affect both the timing and the character of income). Valuing carried interests may be difficult in many situations. Some approaches to taxing carried interests may necessitate some mechanism for preventing double taxation of partnership income. These arrangements also raise issues relating to the application of employment or self-employment tax to amounts received under a carried interest if such amounts are considered compensation.

Federal tax issues are also raised with respect to the tax treatment of publicly traded partnerships and the implications of carried interests in that context. While partnerships are pass-through entities for tax purposes, corporations are subject to tax at the entity level. Publicly traded partnerships are generally subject to tax as corporations (with certain exceptions), because of concern over erosion of the corporate tax base. This issue is raised when businesses not previously conducted by publicly traded partnerships go public in partnership form. A related issue of stripping earnings from the corporate tax base arises to the extent income received by a publicly traded partnership is passed through a corporation that might substantially reduce or eliminate its corporate tax through the use of deductions or credits.



II. ECONOMIC DATA




In general

Many types of investment partnerships exist, including hedge funds and private equity funds (of which venture capital funds can be considered a subset). Hedge funds and private equity funds typically differ in their investment strategies. Hedge funds generally invest in very liquid assets and seek to profit from correcting inefficiencies (pricing mistakes) in capital markets. This is often referred to as "financial arbitrage." Private equity funds generally invest in highly illiquid assets, buying stakes in companies and seeking to restructure them. However, they are similar in many respects. Both typically collect large commitments of private capital from investors (often at least $1 million). Both typically compensate managers with a fixed fee component and some percentage of the fund's return. It is this percentage component that is referred to as a carried interest. However, there is a broader universe of contexts in which carried interests for managers may be used. This includes not only hedge funds and private equity funds but also real estate partnerships or any partnership engaged in any business activity, in which managers' interests are aligned with those of investors by sharing of returns from the activity.

Table 1 below provides data regarding partnerships generally. The remainder of the data in this section relate to the narrower group of hedge, private equity, and similar funds.



Partnership assets

In 2005 as part of tax return filing requirements, partnerships reported assets with book value of more than $13.7 trillion. Table 1 shows the tabulation by self-reported North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) industry code, and provides further detail for the finance and insurance and real estate industries. Together these two industries account for 57.3 percent of all partnership returns and 78.4 percent of all reported partnership assets, with securities, commodity contracts, and other financial investments partnerships representing the largest concentration.

Table 1.-Partnerships Assets by NAICS Code of Principal Business Activity, 2005

Assets in Millions of Dollars



_________________________________________________________________________________
Percent of
Total Total
Number of Assets Percent of Assets
Industry Returns Reported1 Returns Reported

_________________________________________________________________________________
Ag, Forestry, Fishing, and
Hunting 127,605 $110,982 4.6 0.8

_________________________________________________________________________________
Mining 28,205 $172,751 1.0 1.3

_________________________________________________________________________________
Utilities 2,897 $218,555 0.1 1.6

_________________________________________________________________________________
Construction 182,153 $270,316 6.6 2.0

_________________________________________________________________________________
Manufacturing 44,828 $421,831 1.6 3.1

_________________________________________________________________________________
Wholesale Trade 48,178 $122,503 1.7 0.9

_________________________________________________________________________________
Retail Trade 141,798 $108,370 5.1 0.8

_________________________________________________________________________________
Transportation & Warehousing 42,162 $132,050 1.5 1.0

_________________________________________________________________________________
Information 37,438 $543,831 1.4 4.0

_________________________________________________________________________________
Finance & Insurance 287,958 $7,658,566 10.4 55.8

_________________________________________________________________________________
Depository Credit
Intermediation 210 $10,739 * 0.1

_________________________________________________________________________________
Nondepository Credit
Intermediation 11,656 $211,267 0.4 1.5

_________________________________________________________________________________
Activities Related to Credit
Intermediation 3,068 $26,570 0.1 0.2

_________________________________________________________________________________
Securities, Commodity
Contracts, & Other Fin.
Investments 219,171 $6,493,379 7.9 47.3

_________________________________________________________________________________
Insurance Carriers & Related
Activities 11,354 $19,756 0.4 0.1

_________________________________________________________________________________
Funds, Trusts, & Other
Financial Vehicles 42,499 $896,855 1.5 6.5

_________________________________________________________________________________
Real Estate, Rental, and Leasing 1,295,948 $3,100,978 46.9 22.6

_________________________________________________________________________________
Real Estate 1,264,422 $2,992,558 45.8 21.8

_________________________________________________________________________________
Rental and Leasing Services 31,148 $98,227 1.1 0.7

_________________________________________________________________________________
Lessors of Nonfinacial
Intangible Assets (Except
Copyrights) 379 $10,192 * 0.1

_________________________________________________________________________________
Professional, Scientific, &
Technical Svcs. 170,245 $131,302 6.2 1.0

_________________________________________________________________________________
Management of Companies (Holding
Cos.) 24,966 $372,757 0.9 2.7

_________________________________________________________________________________
Admin and Support & Waste
Management & Remediation 48,069 $36,029 1.7 0.3

_________________________________________________________________________________
Educational Services 10,563 $3,352 0.4 *

_________________________________________________________________________________
Health Care and Social
Assistance 59,981 $79,166 2.2 0.6

_________________________________________________________________________________
Arts, Entertainment, and
Recreation 49,267 $65,870 1.8 0.5

_________________________________________________________________________________
Accommodation and Food Services 96,004 $169,545 3.5 1.2

_________________________________________________________________________________
Other Services 61,631 $14,535 2.2 0.1

_________________________________________________________________________________
Not Allocable 3,729 $967 0.1 *

_________________________________________________________________________________
All 2,763,625 $13,734,256 100.0 100.0

_________________________________________________________________________________
* Indicates less than 0.1 percent.

1 A partnership is generally required to report balance sheet information if it
has total receipts of $250,000 or more and total assets of $600,000 or more.

Source: IRS Statistics of Income tabulations by JCT Staff






Hedge funds



Historical background

Hedge funds are private pooled investment limited partnerships generally limited to high net worth individual investors or large institutional investors. Alfred W. Jones is credited with launching the first hedge fund in 1949.14 Jones earned a Ph.D. in sociology from Columbia University and joined the editorial staff of Fortune magazine. While conducting research for an article on market technical analysis, he started thinking about ways in which a fund could invest its capital in the markets while lowering its exposure to market fluctuations.15 He is credited with launching the first hedged fund, as he called it, when in 1949 with $100,000 he started using short sales and leverage to "hedge" the risk of long positions in the stock market.16 In 1952, Jones reorganized his fund as a limited partnership and established what has become the industry standard rule that the general partner would keep 20 percent of fund profits. By the mid-1950s, other funds started using short-selling strategies, although most did not focus on hedging market risk.17 By 1990, hedge funds assets under management amounted to less than $50 billion.18 In recent years, the industry has experienced rapid growth due to both the influx of new capital and market appreciation. As of the end of 2006, the industry had grown to an estimated $1.46 trillion in assets under management worldwide.19



Hedge fund investment strategies

In addition to the growth in size, hedge funds have expanded the scope of investment strategies to a wide array of strategies which vary in returns, volatility, and use of leverage. Because of the restriction to accredited investors, hedge funds are not subject to the same regulation as other entities and typically have more flexibility in the investment options available to them. Strategies may have a broad degree of exposure to market movements (directional), low correlation to overall market movements (market-neutral), attempt to profit from perceived pricing inefficiencies related to specific events (event-driven), or represent some combination of the above. This combination strategy is most common in the "fund of funds" segment of the industry, which includes closed-end registered investment companies that invest in other existing hedge funds. The fund of funds segment represents more than 36 percent of global hedge fund investments overall at the end of 2005, and about half of all institutional hedge fund investment.20





Industry size

While estimates vary, one commonly cited source estimates that hedge funds controlled an estimated $1.46 trillion in assets worldwide as of the end of 2006, up from an estimated $1.1 trillion at the end of 2005 and $973 billion at the end of 2004.21 The largest 100 funds alone managed $1 trillion, or 69 percent of the fund industry's assets compared with 65 percent in 2005 and 58 percent the previous year. The industry has experienced substantial growth; in 1990, hedge funds investments amounted to less than $50 billion.



Hedge fund capital by type of investor

Hedge funds raise capital from various sources: individuals, pension funds, endowments and foundations, corporations and other institutions, and other hedge funds (commonly referred to as "fund of funds"). Table 2 shows the share of global hedge funds' capital by source over the previous decade. High net worth individuals historically have contributed the greatest share of capital to hedge funds, though institutional investors have increased their contributions to achieve near parity with individuals. Pension funds have more than doubled their share of hedge fund capital, while endowments and foundations have nearly doubled their share, reflecting a large increase in 2006. Corporations and other institutions have remained nearly constant in their relative participation in hedge funds. After individuals and institutions, fund of funds provide the balance of capital and have become an increasingly important source of funding, representing approximately one-quarter of all investments in hedge funds in 2006.

Table 2.-Percentage Share of Global Hedge Funds by Source of Capital




__________________________________________________________________________________
Corporations Endowments
and and
Year Individuals Fund of funds Pension funds institutions foundations

__________________________________________________________________________________
1997 61 14 5 9 11

1998 54 18 10 8 10

1999 53 20 12 7 8

2000 54 17 14 7 8

2001 48 20 15 8 9

2002 42 27 15 7 9

2003 44 24 15 8 9

2004 44 24 15 8 9

2005 44 30 12 7 7

2006 40 23 11 8 18

__________________________________________________________________________________
Source: Hennessee Group LLC




The rise of the institutional hedge fund investor in the U.S. mirrors that seen in the global hedge fund market. As recently as 2000, U.S. institutions accounted for only 2 percent of net capital flows into hedge funds.22 By 2005, they accounted for 38 percent, and this figure is expected to increase to more than 50 percent by 2008 and more than 60 percent by 2010.

Pension funds are expected to drive demand to meet future pension obligations. The average long-term return assumptions of the 100 largest corporate defined benefit plans exceeds the forecasted return on a portfolio composed of 60 percent U.S. equities and 40 percent U.S. fixed income instruments by more than 275 basis points.23 Not only are pension funds expecting higher returns, but also they typically demand less volatility. These components have been features of the hedge fund industry. A widely used index of the hedge fund industry, the Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund index had an average annual return of 11.20 percent from January 1994 through June 2007, with a standard deviation of 7.53 percent.24 This compares to a return of 11.05 percent and volatility of 14.15 percent for the S&P 500.25

Estimates suggest that, worldwide, 15 percent of institutions globally invest in hedge funds, with holdings representing 2 percent of total global institutional assets at the end of 2005. In the U.S., half of all non-profit endowments, foundations, and hospitals invested in hedge funds. Approximately 10 percent of U.S. corporate defined benefit plans held hedge fund investments.26



Hedge funds use of leverage

Hedge funds have the ability to use leverage to make investments and to take short positions. Approximately two-thirds of hedge funds utilize at least some form of leverage.27 One measure of leverage is the gross market exposure (long positions plus short positions) as a percentage of hedge fund assets under management. According to one survey of hedge fund managers, gross market exposure has averaged 142 percent since 1997. After bottoming out in 2001, this measure of leverage has been rising steadily.

Another measure of leverage is the use of margin, that is, borrowing money to take long positions. A recent survey of hedge fund managers placed the average long exposure at 102 percent in 2004, suggesting the average fund was using margin for the first time since 1999 when average long exposure was 104 percent.28 This increased to 106 percent in 200529 and 109 percent in 200630 , indicating growing use of margin. By either measure, leverage in the hedge fund industry has increased to new highs in recent years.





Hedge fund performance

The literature on hedge funds' performance is relatively limited. Four main reasons have been suggested for this.31 First, hedge funds are not required to disclose their performance. Any available information is based on the sample of firms that voluntarily release information, and therefore, may not be representative of the industry as a whole. Second, performance should be adjusted for market exposure, which can vary tremendously over a short period of time. Monthly return data may not adequately reflect the true market risks of the fund. Third, hedge funds are often exposed to risks that have high incidence with low probability. While volatility in any given time frame may appear low, there might be a higher probability over time of the fund losing all its assets. Finally, hedge funds exhibit serial correlation, that is, the return of a fund during one month provides information about the return over the next month. This can arise if managers use their discretion to present a picture of low risk and consistent performance.32 The average monthly return for hedge funds in December is more than twice what it is for the rest of the year.33

A common way to deal with these concerns is to evaluate hedge fund investments based on their relative risk-adjusted performance. A widely used index of the hedge fund industry, the Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund index, had an average annual return of 10.8 percent from January 1994 through the middle of 2006. The Standard & Poor's 500 would have earned 10.3 percent. However, the hedge fund index is much less volatile (7.8 percent versus 14.5 percent) because of the hedging strategies of hedge funds. Consequently, an investor who could have invested in the hedge fund index would have done almost twice as well as the S&P 500 index investor, per unit of volatility. Research generally concludes that hedge fund managers deliver returns net of their fees that are at least as good on average as alternative investments with similar market risk exposure. The question is how much better they do and whether these returns persist.34



Private equity funds, including venture capital, buyout, and other types of funds



Private equity investment strategies

Private equity funds manage approximately $1 trillion of capital globally.35 The thirteen largest of these funds manage an estimated $374 billion in assets under management.36 These funds typically buy stakes in companies to restructure those companies' capital, management, and organization. Restructuring may be accomplished through a variety of financing alternatives including buyout, mezzanine capital, venture capital, growth capital, turnaround and/or recapitalization funds. A buyout fund typically contributes the equity portion of a heavily leveraged, or debt-financed, acquisition. Mezzanine capital is a broad term that refers to unsecured, high-yield, subordinated debt often coupled with an equity component. Venture capital funds generally provide cash in exchange for equity stakes in new companies whose limited operating history may restrict their access to other capital markets. However, venture capital funds may also make investments in companies at various stages of the business life cycle. Growth capital describes funds that provide financing for expansion beyond a certain critical mass. Funds that specialize in later stage investing may be known as turnaround or recapitalization funds.



Private equity fund raising and investments

Private equity funds typically operate by collecting capital commitments from investors. These are promises to make funds available for investment. These commitments may then be called upon to make investments when opportunities arise. The investments generally include leverage, which can increase the size of the investment beyond the amount of equity capital. Figure 3 below shows the aggregate commitments by investors to a sample of private equity funds by year the fund was established (vintage year).



Buyout funds constitute the largest segment of private equity funds, with nearly half of all investment commitments between 1991 and 2004. Buyout transactions can exceed partners' commitments of capital because buyout funds often assume substantial debt financing as well. This accompanying debt can leverage the investment of buyout equity funds to permit total investments several times this base. Venture capital funds are the other main type of private equity. Together buyout and venture capital funds represent about 70 percent of all private equity funds raised globally between 1991 and 2004.37 Table 3 contains estimates of the amount of private equity fundraising raised by each type of fund since 1998.

Table 3.-Trends in Private Equity Investing




_____________________________________________________________________________________
Venture Capital Funds Buyout Funds*


____________________________________________________________________
Millions of Millions of
Year No. Funds Dollars Raised No. Funds Dollars Raised

_____________________________________________________________________________________
1998 297 31,350.9 185 74,064.7

1999 459 61,910.7 172 70,500.3

2000 653 106,933.2 180 86,826.2

2001 331 40,713.0 147 59,821.0

2002 172 3,820.4 86 24,831.4

2003 146 10,707.8 91 28,952.8

2004 203 18,557.1 139 51,236.4

2005 214 28,001.8 178 96,087.4

2006 200 28,596.5 138 102,940.7

_____________________________________________________________________________________
Source: Thomson Financial/National Venture Capital Association

* This category also includes mezzanine, turnaround, and recapitalization funds.




Not all funds raised by private equity funds find suitable investment opportunities. To use the industry's terminology, not all capital commitments (funds raised) are called (invested). Thus, amounts raised will not equal actual investments made. Table 4 shows estimates on funds raised and amounts invested for global private equity funds. In any given year, funds committed in prior years may be called in subsequent years resulting in larger sums invested than raised (as in 2003), or funds committed that year may not find investments that year resulting in smaller sums invested than raised (as in 2005).

Private equity fund raising has continued to expand in recent years. Private equity fund raising in 2006 totaled $335 billion, while investments reached a record $365 billion globally. Buyout funds have garnered an increasing share of private equity investments in recent years, representing more than 80 percent of investments in 2006. These funds have grown faster than venture capital funds, which have seen their share of private equity investments decline.38

Table 4.-Global Private Equity




___________________________________________________________________________________
Funds Raised Investments
Year Billions of Dollars Billions of Dollars

___________________________________________________________________________________
1997 108 59

1998 133 70

1999 154 124

2000 262 192

2001 177 103

2002 93 86

2003 88 115

2004 133 110

2005 272 136

2006 335 364

___________________________________________________________________________________
Source: IFSL estimates based on EVCA/Thomson Financial/PwC, APER, NVCA, Private
Equity Intelligence and Dealogic data






Private equity capital by type of investor

Investors in private equity funds are varied. Data for 2006, shown in Figure 4, indicate that public pension funds are the largest source of private equity capital.39 Funds of funds are the second largest source with 13.9 percent of all capital. Total pension fund investment in private equity, including public, corporate, and union pension funds, represent over 40 percent of all capital committed to private equity in 2006. Other tax exempt investors include endowments and foundations at 7.7 percent. Taxable investors include wealthy individuals (10.1%), banks and financial services companies (9.8 percent), insurance companies (7.5 percent), and wealthy families investing through family offices (6.8 percent), which together supply more than one-third of all private equity capital. Other sources account for less than 4 percent of all private equity capital.





Venture capital by type of investor

For venture capital funds, a subset of private equity funds, data are also available on the sources of funds by type of investor. Data for 2003, shown in Figure 5, suggest that the largest sources of funding for venture capital funds are private and public pension funds, which are responsible for more than two-fifths of all commitments globally. Finance and insurance companies represent one-quarter of investment in all funds, followed closely by endowments and foundations. Individuals, including managers' own contributions are responsible for 10 percent of commitments. Non-pension corporate funds provide the balance of venture capital funding.





Carried interests in private equity

A recent study on a sample of 94 venture capital funds and 144 buyout funds estimates the present value of expected revenue to fund managers, both in the form of fixed management fees and the variable component including carried interests.40 In this sample, over 60 percent of expected revenue is derived from fixed management fees, while income from carried interests represents approximately one-third of the total revenue to the private equity funds' general partners.

These numbers represent the present value of what the general partners can expect to receive as a percentage of invested funds. For the venture capital firms, each $100 of invested funds will generate an estimated $8.98 in present value of carried interest and estimated total revenue of $23.78 in present value. The data above are expressed in present value terms. One reason for the greater percentage of revenue attributable to management fees is the timing of revenue. While various fees are earned over the lifetime of the fund, the payments under the carried interests are made generally towards the end of the life of the fund, as investment gains are realized.

Table 5 reports summary information for the estimates of carried interest from this sample. While buyout funds earn less per dollar invested relative to venture capital funds, they raise nearly four times the amount of capital on average to garner more carried interest and total revenue per partner.

Table 5.-Present Value of Partner Revenue




_____________________________________________________________________________________
Mean of 94 Mean of 144
Venture Buyout
Present Value of: Capital Funds Funds

_____________________________________________________________________________________
Carry per $100 invested ($) 8.98 5.41

Fees per $100 ($) 14.80 11.91

Total revenue per $100 ($) 23.78 17.37

Fund Size ($ Millions) 322.00 1,238.00

_____________________________________________________________________________________
Source: Calculations based on Metrick and Yasuda "The Economics of Private Equity
Funds." Detail may not add to total due to rounding.




Another study estimates the value created by private equity firms and the corresponding carried interests for a much larger sample of 1,016 funds over the period 1991 through 2006 for private equity funds with vintages from 1991 to 2004.41 These funds delivered total distributed and unrealized gains of $440 billion after fees and carry, and general partners earned a net carry of $78 billion, $24 billion in the prior 12 months alone.42

Carry is only paid to fund managers upon distributed gains; therefore, it is weighted towards older funds. Of the $78 billion of aggregate carried interests paid to date, only $18 billion has been received by managers of funds with vintages from 1999 onwards. Figure 5 below shows aggregate carry to date expressed as a percentage of this total by vintage year. For the older vintages, carry is nearly 25 percent of the total distributed and unrealized net gains to limited partners, as expected given the standard 20 percent carry share (20 percent being one-quarter of the remaining 80 percent). For newer funds, carry represents a smaller percentage of the total distributed and unrealized gains.



Only about 40 percent of funds generated carried interest for partners, as can be seen in Table 6. However, one might expect this number to grow as more funds mature. Nevertheless, looking at only mature funds with vintages from 1991 to 1997 (for whose partners the gains should largely be realized), 70 percent of the funds generated net gains for limited partners and carried interests for general partners, 10 percent generated net gains for limited partners but failed to meet the hurdle rate required to generate carried interests for general partners, and 20 percent failed to deliver net gains.

Among those funds that generated carried interests, amounts are concentrated in a small group of larger funds. Fewer than 10 percent of the funds (151 out of 1,673 in this study) have earned more than $100 million in total carry.

Table 6.-General Partner Carry Earned to Date




_________________________________________________________________________________
Number of Funds, Vintages 1991-2004

_________________________________________________________________________________
US Europe US Europe Real Other
Carry Earned ($) Venture Venture Buyout Buyout Estate Funds Total

_________________________________________________________________________________
0 385 97 185 85 92 167 1011

1-49 million 144 28 114 18 28 73 405

50 million to 99 million 27 3 38 6 11 21 106

100 million to 199
million 23 1 18 11 8 9 70

200 million to 499
million 10 1 35 12 5 6 69

500 million to 999
million 5 0 1 1 0 1 8

1 billion or more 3 0 0 0 0 1 4

_________________________________________________________________________________
Total 597 130 391 133 144 278 1673

_________________________________________________________________________________
Source: Private Equity Intelligence, Ltd. Value Creation & Carry in Private
Equity, 1991-2006






III. PRESENT LAW - CARRIED INTERESTS AND COMPENSATION OF INDIVIDUALS




A. Tax Rates Applicable to Ordinary Income, Capital Gains, and Dividends of Individuals




Ordinary income tax rates

An individual subject to Federal income tax generally pays tax at graduated rates on taxable income. The tax rate schedules are broken into several ranges of income, known as income brackets, and the marginal tax rate increases as a taxpayer's income increases. For 2007, the tax rates range from 10 percent to 35 percent.

In addition, under present law, individuals are liable for an alternative minimum tax to the extent the tentative minimum tax exceeds the regular tax liability. The tentative minimum tax is computed at rates of 26 and 28 percent on an expanded tax base.



Capital gains and dividends rates

In general, gain or loss reflected in the value of an asset is not recognized for income tax purposes until a taxpayer disposes of the asset. On the sale or exchange of a capital asset, any gain generally is included in income. Any net capital gain of an individual is taxed at maximum rates lower than the rates applicable to ordinary income. Net capital gain is the excess of the net long-term capital gain for the taxable year over the net short-term capital loss for the year. Gain or loss is treated as long-term if the asset is held for more than one year.

A capital asset generally means any property except (1) inventory, stock in trade, or property held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of the taxpayer's trade or business, (2) depreciable or real property used in the taxpayer's trade or business, (3) specified literary or artistic property, (4) business accounts or notes receivable, (5) certain U.S. publications, (6) certain commodity derivative financial instruments, (7) hedging transactions, and (8) business supplies. In addition, the net gain from the disposition of certain property used in the taxpayer's trade or business is treated as long-term capital gain.

Capital losses generally are deductible in full against capital gains. In addition, individual taxpayers may deduct capital losses against up to $3,000 of ordinary income in each year. Any remaining unused capital losses may be carried forward indefinitely to another taxable year.

A separate rate structure applies to capital gains and dividends. Under present law, for 2007, the maximum rate of tax on the adjusted net capital gain of an individual is 15 percent. In addition, any adjusted net capital gain otherwise taxed at a 10- or 15-percent rate is taxed at a five-percent rate. These rates apply for purposes of both the regular tax and the alternative minimum tax.

For 2007, dividends received by an individual from domestic corporations and qualified foreign corporations generally are taxed at the same rates that apply to adjusted net capital gain.



B. Tax Treatment of the Receipt of a Partnership Profits Interest for Services


A profits interest in a partnership is the right to receive future profits in the partnership but does not generally include any right to receive money or other property upon the immediate liquidation of the partnership. Although the Internal Revenue Code does not specifically address the treatment of the receipt of a profits interest in a partnership in exchange for the performance of services, a taxpayer receiving a profits interest for performing services generally has not been taxable upon the receipt of the partnership interest.43

In 1993, the Internal Revenue Service, referring to the results of cases it had litigated, specifically ruled that the receipt of a partnership profits interests for services generally is not a taxable event for the partnership or the partner.44 Under the ruling, this treatment does not apply, however, if: (1) the profits interest relates to a substantially certain and predictable stream of income from partnership assets, such as income from high-quality debt securities or a high-quality net lease; (2) within two years of receipt, the partner disposes of the profits interest; or (3) the profits interest is a limited partnership interest in a publicly traded partnership. A more recent ruling45 clarifies that this result applies provided the service partner takes into income his distributive share of partnership income, and the partnership does not deduct any amount either on grant or on vesting of the profits interest.46

By contrast, a partnership capital interest received for services is includable in the partner's income under generally applicable rules relating the receipt of property for the performance of services.47 A partnership capital interest for this purpose is an interest that would entitle the receiving partner to a share of the proceeds if the partnership's assets were sold at fair market value and the proceeds were distributed in liquidation.48

The character of partnership items passes through to the partners, as if the items were realized directly by the partners.49 Thus, for example, long-term capital gain of the partnership is treated as long-term capital gain in the hands of the partners.

A partner holding a partnership interest includes in income its distributive share (whether or not actually distributed) of partnership items of income and gain, including capital gain eligible for the lower income tax rates. A partner's basis in the partnership interest is increased by any amount of gain thus included and is decreased by losses. These basis adjustments prevent double taxation of partnership income to the partner, preserving the partnership's tax status as a passthrough entity. Amounts distributed to the partner by the partnership are taxed to the extent the amount exceeds the partner's basis in the partnership interest.



C. Tax Treatment of Property Transferred in Connection with the Performance of Services




In general

Section 83 governs the amount and timing of income and deductions attributable to transfers of property in connection with the performance of services. If property is transferred in connection with the performance of services, the person performing the services (the "service provider") generally must recognize income for the taxable year in which the property is first substantially vested (i.e., transferable or not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture). The amount includible in the service provider's income is the excess of the fair market value of the property over the amount (if any) paid for the property.

Under section 83(b), even if the property is not vested at the time of transfer, the service provider may nevertheless elect within 30 days of the transfer to recognize income for the taxable year of the transfer. Such an election is referred to as a "section 83(b) election." The service provider makes an election by filing with the IRS a written statement that includes the fair market value of the property at the time of transfer and the amount (if any) paid for the property. The service provider must also provide a copy of the statement to the service recipient.

Under section 83, a deduction is allowed to the person for whom such services are performed (the "service recipient") equal to the amount included in gross income by the service provider.50 The deduction is allowed for the taxable year of the service recipient in which or with which ends the taxable year for which the amount is included in the service provider's income.

A transfer of property occurs when a person acquires a beneficial ownership interest in such property. The term "property" is defined very broadly for purposes of section 83.51 Property includes real and personal property, but does not include money or an unfunded and unsecured promise to pay money in the future.

Property is subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture if the individual's right to the property is conditioned on the future performance of substantial services (such as full-time services for two years or more) or on the nonperformance of services (such as a noncompete requirement). In addition, a substantial risk of forfeiture exists if the right to the property is subject to a condition other than the performance of services, provided that the condition relates to a purpose of the transfer and there is a substantial possibility that the property will be forfeited if the condition does not occur. Risks that do not fall within this legal definition, such as the risk that the property will decline in value, do not result in a substantial risk of forfeiture. Whether a substantial risk of forfeiture exists depends on the facts and circumstances, including whether the service requirement or other condition will in fact be enforced. Property that is subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture is referred to as nonvested property; property that is not (or is no longer) subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture is referred to as vested property.

Property is considered transferable if a person can transfer his or her interest in the property to anyone other than the transferor from whom the property was received. However, property is not considered transferable if the transferee's rights in the property are subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture. A temporary restriction on the transferability of property (called a "lapse" restriction) is disregarded in determining the value of the property for purposes of section 83. A permanent restriction on the transferability of property (a "nonlapse" restriction) is taken into account in determining the value of the property.



Compensatory stock

Stock may be granted to an employee (or other service provider) without restrictions in the sense that the stock is fully vested and transferable. In some cases, the employee is granted "restricted" stock in the sense that the stock must be forfeited or sold back to the company in certain circumstances. For example, an employee may receive stock that is subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture because of a requirement that the stock be forfeited if the employee terminates employment within five years. Stock that is subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture is referred to as nonvested stock; stock that is not (or is no longer) subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture is referred to as vested stock.

Stock that is granted to an employee (or other service provider) is subject to the rules that apply under section 83 to transfers of property in connection with the performance of services. Accordingly, if vested stock is transferred to an employee, the excess of the fair market value of the stock, over the amount, if any, the employee pays for the stock is includible in the employee's income for the year in which the transfer occurs. The amount includible in the income of the employee is generally deductible by the employer for the taxable year of the employer in which the employee's taxable year of inclusion ends.

If nonvested stock is transferred to an employee (or other service provider), no amount is includible in income as a result of the transfer unless the employee makes a section 83(b) election. Otherwise, the excess of the fair market value of the stock at the time of vesting, over the amount, if any, the employee pays for the stock is includible in the employee's income for the year in which vesting occurs.

In the case of an employee, the amount includible in income under section 83 is also subject to income tax withholding and to social security tax (subject to the social security wage base) and Medicare tax and must be reported on a Form W-2. In the case of an individual who is not an employee, the amount includible in income under section 83 must be reported on a Form 1099.



Compensatory stock options

A stock option is the right to purchase stock at a specified price (or at a price determined under a specified formula) at a specified time or during a specified period. Stock options granted to employees or other service providers are considered to be compensation for services. There are two general types of compensation-related stock options under the Code: nonqualified options (which are subject to section 83) and statutory options (which are subject to special tax rules under section 421). Statutory options include incentive stock options (described in section 422) and options provided under an employee stock purchase plan (described in section 423). Nonqualified options are any other options (other than statutory options) granted in connection with the performance of services.

The income taxation of a nonqualified option is determined under section 83 and depends on whether the option has a readily ascertainable fair market value when granted. A nonqualified option has a readily ascertainable fair market value if (1) the option is actively traded on an established market, or (2) the option is transferable, it is immediately exercisable in full, the option and the stock subject to the option are not subject to any restriction or condition that has a significant effect on the value of the option, and the fair market value of the option privilege is readily ascertainable. The option privilege is the opportunity to benefit from increases in the value of the stock during the option period without risking capital.

If an individual receives a nonqualified option that has a readily ascertainable fair market value at the time the option is granted (which is generally not the case), the excess of the fair market value of the option over the amount, if any, paid for the option is includible in the recipient's gross income as ordinary income in the first taxable year in which the option is either transferable or is not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture (or, if the taxpayer makes a section 83(b) election, in the taxable year in which the option is granted). When such an option is later exercised, no amount is includible in the gross income of the option recipient due to the exercise of the option.

If the nonqualified option does not have a readily ascertainable fair market value at the time of grant (which is generally the case), no amount is includible in the gross income of the recipient with respect to the option until the recipient exercises the option. The transfer of stock on exercise of the option is subject to the general rules of section 83. That is, if vested stock is received on exercise of the option, the excess of the fair market value of the stock over the option price is includible in the recipient's gross income as ordinary income in the taxable year in which the option is exercised. If the stock received on exercise of the option is not vested, the excess of the fair market value of the stock at the time of vesting over the option price is includible in the recipient's income for the year in which vesting occurs (unless the recipient elects to make a section 83(b) election).

In the case of an employee, the amount includible in income under section 83 with respect to nonqualified stock options is also subject to income tax withholding and to social security tax (subject to the social security wage base) and Medicare tax and must be reported on a Form W-2. In the case of an individual who is not an employee, the amount includible in income under section 83 must be reported on a Form 1099.

A compensation expense deduction equal to the amount of ordinary income included in the gross income of the option recipient is generally allowable to the employer for the taxable year of the employer in which the recipient's taxable year of inclusion ends.



Proposed regulations on compensatory transfer of a partnership interest

The Department of Treasury has issued proposed regulations regarding the application of section 83 to the compensatory transfer of a partnership interest.52 The proposed regulations provide that a partnership interest is "property" for purposes of section 83. Thus, a compensatory transfer of a partnership interest is includible in the service provider's gross income at the time that it first becomes substantially vested (or, in the case of a nonvested partnership interest, at the time of grant if a section 83(b) election is made).

However, the proposed regulations also contain a rule that permits a partnership and a partner to elect a safe harbor under which the fair market value of a compensatory partnership interest is treated as being equal to the liquidation value of that interest. Therefore, under the proposed regulations, the grant of a vested profits interest in a partnership (or, if a section 83(b) election is made, the grant of a nonvested profits interest) results in no income inclusion under section 83 because the fair market value of the property received by the service provider is zero. The proposed safe harbor is subject to a number of conditions. For example, the election cannot be made retroactively and must apply to all compensatory partnership transfers that occur during the period that the election is in effect.



D. Tax Treatment of Nonqualified Deferred Compensation53


Deferred compensation occurs when the payment of compensation to a service provider is deferred for more than a short period after the compensation is earned (i.e., the time when the services giving rise to the compensation are performed). Payment is generally deferred until some specified event, such as the service provider's death, disability, or other termination of services, or until a specified time in the future, such as five or ten years.

The Code provides tax-favored treatment for certain types of employer-sponsored deferred compensation arrangements that are designed primarily to provide employees with retirement income. These arrangements include qualified defined contribution and defined benefit pension plans (sec. 401(a)), qualified annuities (sec. 403(a)), tax-sheltered annuities (sec. 403(b)), savings incentive match plans for employees or "SIMPLE" plans (sec. 408(p)), simplified employee pensions or "SEPs" (sec. 408(k)), and eligible deferred compensation plans of State or local government employers (sec. 457(b)). For simplicity, these plans are referred to collectively here as "qualified employer plans." A nonqualified deferred compensation arrangement is generally any deferred compensation arrangement that is not one of these qualified employer plans.

Nonqualified deferred compensation arrangements are contractual arrangements between a service recipient (e.g., an employer or a hedge fund) and a service provider (e.g., an employee or a hedge fund manager) covered by the arrangement. Such arrangements are structured in whatever form achieves the goals of the parties; as a result, they vary greatly in design. Considerations that may affect the structure of the arrangement are the current and future income needs of the service provider, the desired tax treatment of deferred amounts, and the desire for assurance that deferred amounts will in fact be paid.

Section 409A of the Code provides specific rules governing the tax treatment of nonqualified deferred compensation.54 Prior to the enactment of section 409A, there were no rules that specifically governed the tax treatment of nonqualified deferred compensation. In determining the tax treatment of nonqualified deferred compensation prior to enactment of section 409A, a variety of tax principles and Code provisions were relevant, including the doctrine of constructive receipt, the economic benefit doctrine, the provisions of section 83 relating generally to transfers of property in connection with the performance of services, and provisions relating specifically to nonexempt employee trusts (sec. 402(b)) and nonqualified employee annuities (sec. 403(c)).55 Section 409A does not override these tax principles and Code provisions. Thus, they are relevant in determining the tax treatment of nonqualified deferred compensation. Section 409A does not prevent the inclusion of amounts in gross income under any provision or rule of law earlier than the time provided under its rules.

Under section 409A, all amounts deferred by a service provider under a nonqualified deferred compensation plan56 for all taxable years are currently includible in gross income to the extent not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture57 and not previously included in gross income, unless certain requirements are satisfied. Under section 409A, a nonqualified deferred compensation plan may not allow distributions other than upon the permissible distribution events and may not permit acceleration of a distribution. Section 409A also includes rules governing the timing of deferral elections. If the requirements of section 409A are not satisfied, in addition to current income inclusion, interest at the rate applicable to underpayments of tax plus one percentage point is imposed on the underpayments that would have occurred had the compensation been includible in income when first deferred, or if later, when not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture. The amount required to be included in income is also subject to a 20-percent additional tax.

Special statutory provisions govern the timing of the deduction for nonqualified deferred compensation.58 Under these provisions, the amount of nonqualified deferred compensation that is includible in the income of the service provider is deductible by the service recipient for the taxable year in which the amount is includible in the service provider's income.

With respect to employment taxes, in the case of an employee, nonqualified deferred compensation is generally considered wages both for purposes of income tax withholding and for purposes of taxes under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act ("FICA"), consisting of social security tax and Medicare tax. However, the income tax withholding rules and social security and Medicare tax rules that apply to nonqualified deferred compensation are not the same.

In the case of an employee, nonqualified deferred compensation is generally subject to income tax withholding at the time it is includible in the employee's income as discussed above. In general, nonqualified deferred compensation is subject to social security and Medicare tax when it is earned (i.e., when services are performed), unless the nonqualified deferred compensation is subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture. If nonqualified deferred compensation is subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture, it is subject to social security and Medicare tax when the risk of forfeiture is removed (i.e., when the right to the nonqualified deferred compensation vests). In the case of a self-employed individual, nonqualified deferred compensation amounts that are includible in income are also taken into account in determining net earnings from self-employment for social security and Medicare tax purposes unless an exception applies.



E. Self-Employment Tax Treatment of Partners


As part of the financing for Social Security and Medicare benefits, a tax is imposed on the wages of an individual received with respect to his or her employment under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act ("FICA").59 A similar tax is imposed on the net earnings from self-employment of an individual under the Self-Employment Contributions Act "SECA").60

The FICA tax has two components. Under the old-age, survivors, and disability insurance component ("OASDI"), the rate of tax is 12.40 percent, half of which is imposed on the employer, and the other half of which is imposed on the employee.61 The amount of wages subject to this component is capped at $97,500 for 2007. Under the hospital insurance component ("HI"), the rate is 2.90 percent, also split equally between the employer and the employee. The amount of wages subject to the HI component of the tax is not capped. The wages of individuals employed by a business in any form (for example, a C corporation) generally are subject to the FICA tax.62

The SECA tax mirrors the FICA tax, and the SECA rate is the combined employer and employee rate for FICA taxes. Thus, the SECA tax has two components. Under the OASDI component, the rate of tax is 12.40 percent and the amount of earnings subject to this component is capped at $97,500 (for 2007). Under the HI component, the rate is 2.90 percent, and the amount of self-employment income subject to the HI component is not capped.

For SECA tax purposes, net earnings from self-employment means the gross income derived by an individual from any trade or business carried on by the individual, less the deductions attributable to the trade or business that are allowed under the self-employment tax rules63 . Specified types of income or loss are excluded, such as rentals from real estate in certain circumstances, dividends and interest, and gains or loss from the sale or exchange of a capital asset or from timber, certain minerals, or other property that is neither inventory nor held primarily for sale to customers.

For an individual who is a partner in a partnership, the net earnings from self-employment generally include the partner's distributive share (whether or not distributed) of income or loss from any trade or business carried on by the partnership (excluding specified types of income, such as rents and dividends, as described above). This rule applies to individuals who are general partners. A special rule applies for limited partners of a partnership.64 In determining a limited partner's net earnings from self-employment, an exclusion is provided for his or her distributive share of partnership income or loss. The exclusion does not apply with respect to guaranteed payments to the limited partner for services actually rendered to or on behalf of the partnership to the extent that those payments are established to be in the nature of remuneration for those services.



IV. PRESENT LAW - TAXATION OF BUSINESS ENTITIES




A. Tax Treatment of Partnerships and Partners




Passthrough treatment

A partnership generally is not treated as a taxable entity (except for certain publicly traded partnerships), but rather, is treated as a pass-through entity. Income earned by a partnership, whether distributed or not, is taxed to the partners.65 The character of partnership items passes through to the partners, as if the items were realized directly by the partners.66 The items of income, gain, loss, deduction or credit of a partnership generally are taken into account by a partner as allocated under the terms of the partnership agreement (or in accordance with the partners' interests in the partnership if the agreement does not provide for an allocation), so long as the allocation has substantial economic effect.67



Basis in a partnership interest

A partner's basis in its partnership interest is separate from the partnership's basis in partnership property. The basis of a partnership interest acquired by a contribution of property (including money) to the partnership is equal to the sum of the amount of money and the contributing partner's adjusted basis for the property at the time of contribution, reduced by gain (if any) recognized by the contributing partner.68 The basis of a partnership interest acquired by transfer is generally its cost.69

Adjustments to the basis of a partnership interest are made to take account of the partner's distributive share of income and loss of the partnership, and to take account of distributions by the partnership to the partner, during the taxable year. The basis of the partnership interest is increased by the partner's distributive share of taxable and tax-exempt income of the partnership.70 The basis of the partnership interest is decreased by (1) the amount of money distributed to the partner and the partner's basis in property distributed, and (2) the partner's distributive share of partnership losses and of nondeductible expenditures that are not properly chargeable to capital account.71



Partnership's basis in its property; section 754 election

A partnership that acquires property by contribution from a partner has an adjusted basis in the property equal to the contributing partner's adjusted basis in the property.72 A partnership that acquires property by purchase generally has a cost basis in the property.

In the event of a transfer of a partnership interest by sale or exchange (or on the death of a partner), the basis of partnership property is adjusted if the partnership has a section 754 election in effect, or if the partnership has a substantial built-in loss73 immediately after the transfer.74 The partnership increases the adjusted basis of partnership property by the amount by which the transferee's basis in its partnership interest exceeds its proportionate share of the adjusted basis of partnership property. The partnership decreases the adjusted basis of partnership property by the amount by which the transferee's proportionate share of the adjusted basis of partnership property exceeds the transferee's basis in its partnership interest. These adjustments are made with respect to the transferee partner. They are intended to adjust the basis of partnership property to approximate the result of a direct purchase of the property by the transferee partner. Thus, the adjusted basis of partnership property generally is stepped up when a partner acquires a partnership interest by transfer at a price that exceeds the amount of its proportionate share of the adjusted basis of partnership property.



Partnership distributions generally tax-free

In the case of a distribution by a partnership, no gain or loss is recognized by the partnership on a distribution to a partner of property, including money.75 A partner generally is permitted to receive distributions of partnership property without recognition of gain or loss.76 Several exceptions to this partner nonrecognition rule apply. Gain is recognized by the distributee partner to the extent that any money (and the fair market value of marketable securities) distributed exceeds the partner's adjusted basis in its partnership interest immediately before the distribution. Loss is recognized by the distributee partner when only money and unrealized receivables and inventory are received in a liquidating distribution in which the amount of money and the adjusted basis of the receivables and inventory does not exceed the partner's adjusted basis in its partnership interest.77 Gain or loss may be recognized by the distributee partner in the case of certain disproportionate distributions involving inventory and unrealized receivables,78 or in the case of certain distributions relating to contributed property.79 In addition, if a partner engages in a transaction with a partnership other than in its capacity as a member of the partnership, the transaction generally is considered as occurring between the partnership and one who is not a partner.80



Contributions to a partnership generally tax-free

No gain or loss is recognized by a partnership, or by any of its partners, on the contribution of property to the partnership in exchange for an interest in the partnership.81 This rule of nonrecognition does not apply in the case of a partnership interest received in exchange for services (which are not considered property).



Transactions between partner and partnership

If a partner engages in a transaction with a partnership other than in his capacity as a member of the partnership, the transaction may be considered as occurring between the partnership and a person that is not a partner.82 In general, this rule applies if a partner performs services for a partnership, and there is a related direct or indirect allocation and distribution to the partner, and the performance of the services and the allocation and distribution (when viewed together) are properly characterized as a transaction occurring between the partnership and a partner acting other than in his capacity as a member of the partnership.83

A separate rule governs the tax treatment of guaranteed payments to partners. Under the rule for guaranteed payments, to the extent they are determined without regard to the income of the partnership, payments to a partner for services are considered as made to one who is not a member of the partnership, but only for purposes of inclusion of gross income and deduction of compensation expense (subject to capitalization rules).84



Dispositions of partnership interests taxable

In the case of a sale or exchange of an interest in a partnership, gain or loss is recognized. This is treated as gain or loss from the sale of a capital asset.85 However, the gain or loss is not treated as capital in nature to the extent it is attributable to unrealized receivables and inventory items.86 Unrealized receivables include rights (contractual or otherwise) to payment for (1) goods delivered, or to be delivered that do not give rise to capital gain or loss, and (2) services rendered, or to be rendered.87



B. Treatment of Publicly Traded Partnerships




Present Law


Under present law, a publicly traded partnership generally is treated as a corporation for Federal tax purposes (sec. 7704(a)). For this purpose, a publicly traded partnership means any partnership if interests in the partnership are traded on an established securities market, or interests in the partnership are readily tradable on a secondary market (or the substantial equivalent thereof).

An exception from corporate treatment is provided for certain publicly traded partnerships, 90 percent or more of whose gross income is qualifying income (sec. 7704(c)(2)). However, this exception does not apply to any partnership that would be described in section 851(a) if it were a domestic corporation, which includes a corporation registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 as a management company or unit investment trust.

Qualifying income includes interest, dividends, and gains from the disposition of a capital asset (or of property described in section 1231(b)) that is held for the production of income that is qualifying income. Qualifying income also includes rents from real property, gains from the sale or other disposition of real property, and income and gains from the exploration, development, mining or production, processing, refining, transportation (including pipelines transporting gas, oil, or products thereof), or the marketing of any mineral or natural resource (including fertilizer, geothermal energy, and timber). It also includes income and gains from commodities (not described in section 1221(a)(1)) or futures, options, or forward contracts with respect to such commodities (including foreign currency transactions of a commodity pool) in the case of partnership, a principal activity of which is the buying and selling of such commodities, futures, options or forward contracts.

The rules generally treating publicly traded partnerships as corporations were enacted in 1987 to address concern about long-term erosion of the corporate tax base. At that time, Congress stated, "[t]o the extent that activities would otherwise be conducted in corporate form, and earnings would be subject to two levels of tax (at the corporate and shareholder levels), the growth of publicly traded partnerships engaged in such activities tends to jeopardize the corporate tax base." (H.R. Rep. No. 100-391, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1065.) Referring to recent tax law changes affecting corporations, the Congress stated, "[t]hese changes reflect an intent to preserve the corporate level tax. The committee is concerned that the intent of these changes is being circumvented by the growth of publicly traded partnerships that are taking advantage of an unintended opportunity for disincorporation and elective integration of the corporate and shareholder levels of tax." (H.R. Rep. No. 100-391, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1066.)



C. Comparison to Corporations and to Other Business Entities




1. Tax treatment of corporations



Corporation is a taxable entity

Income of a corporation is subject to Federal income tax at the corporate level. The top statutory marginal rate of tax on income of a corporation is 35 percent. The rate of tax on corporate capital gains is the same as that for ordinary income.

A corporation is generally recognized as an entity separate from its investors, that may receive income from business or other activities and that may make distributions to investors in the form of dividends to its shareholders, or interest to holders of its indebtedness.



Distributions by a corporation to shareholders generally taxable

Amounts distributed by a corporation to its shareholders as a dividend out of the corporation's earnings and profits generally are taxable to shareholders and not deductible by the corporation. Currently, the individual income tax rate on dividends is the same as the rate of tax on capital gains, generally 15 percent for 2007, in the case of qualified dividends.

If the shareholder is itself a corporation, however, the dividend is eligible for a dividends-received deduction of 70 percent to 100 percent, depending on the percentage of the recipient corporation's ownership of the payor corporation.88 Distributions paid with respect to stock that exceed the amount of the paying corporation's current or accumulated earnings and profits are treated as nontaxable return of capital to the shareholders. To the extent such distributions exceed a shareholder's stock basis, the distribution is treated as capital gain.89 A distribution may also be treated as capital gain to a shareholder, such that the shareholder can recover its basis in the stock before realizing taxable income, if it is treated as a sale of the shareholder's stock, due to a termination, substantially disproportionate redemption (as defined), or other reduction in the shareholder's interest in the corporation that causes the transaction to be not essentially equivalent to a dividend.90

A distribution of appreciated property by a corporation to its shareholders is generally taxable to the corporation as if it had sold the property at fair market value and recognized taxable income from the sale.91 The shareholders are taxed on the amount realized based on the fair market value of the property distributed.



Contributions to a corporation generally tax-free

No gain or loss is recognized if property is transferred to a corporation solely in exchange for stock of the corporation, and immediately after the exchange, the contributing persons are in control of the corporation.92 For this purpose, control means the ownership of stock with at least 80 percent of the total combined voting power of all classes of voting stock, and at least 80 percent of the total number of shares of all other classes of the corporation's stock.93



Deductions against corporate income such as interest and amortization of intangibles

A corporation, like other business entities, may generally deduct amounts paid or accrued as interest on debt.94 A deduction is permitted for other ordinary and necessary business expenses, including compensation paid for services, rents or royalties for the use of tangible or intangible property. Like other business entities, a corporation is also entitled to deduct depreciation or amortization with respect to purchased property.95 Present law provides a deduction for 15-year straight-line amortization of goodwill and certain other intangible assets that are purchased by the taxpayer.96



2. Tax treatment of other business entities



In general

In addition to partnerships, the Code provides for several other types of entities that generally are not taxed at the entity level.97 However, those that allow public shareholders to invest in a vehicle that is not subject to entity-level tax generally are subject to restrictions regarding their structure, nature of income, nature of assets, and ownership of other entities. These limits reduce the potential for indirectly deriving non-permitted types of income through a related or controlled entity. Some of the restrictions limit the potential for extracting earnings of a taxable corporation as deductible amounts that reduce corporate-level tax when paid to the non-taxed entity.



S corporations

In general, an S corporation is not subject to corporate-level income tax on its items of income and loss. Instead, an S corporation passes through its items of income and loss to its shareholders. Each shareholder takes into account separately his or her pro rata share of these items on his or her individual income tax return. To prevent double taxation of these items, each shareholder's basis in the stock of the S corporation is increased by the amount included in income (including tax-exempt income) and is decreased by the amount of any losses (including nondeductible losses) taken into account.

Eligibility to elect S corporation status is limited. To elect, a corporation must be a domestic corporation which does not have (1) more than 100 shareholders; (2) as a shareholder, a person who is not an individual (other than certain trusts or estates and certain exempt organizations that, except for ESOPs, generally are taxable on their share of S corporation income); (3) a nonresident alien as a shareholder; or (4) more than one class of stock.



Trusts

Regulations governing the classification of entities as trusts or corporations provide that trusts generally do not have associates (for example, shareholders) or an objective to carry on business for profit. Thus, a trust cannot generally conduct an active business of any kind, nor can it engage in the purchase and sale of assets for profit.

A grantor trust is a trust whose grantor has retained the right to exercise certain powers over the trust. A grantor trust is not treated as a separate taxable entity. Instead, the grantor is treated as the owner of the trust's property and is subject to tax on trust income.



Regulated investment companies

A regulated investment company ("RIC") is an entity that receives most of its income from passive investments in stock and securities, currencies and similar instruments; in common parlance, a mutual fund. A RIC must be an electing domestic corporation that, at all times during the taxable year, is registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 as a management company or as a unit investment trust, or that has elected to be treated as a business development company under that Act. A RIC also is subject to specific requirements with respect to the source of its income and the nature of its assets.

A RIC is an untaxed entity because it deducts dividends paid to shareholders in computing its taxable income. The dividends generally are included in the RIC shareholders' income. Thus, distributed income of a RIC is taxed only at the shareholder level, not at the regulated investment company level. A RIC generally is required to distribute at least 90 percent of its income during the taxable year as dividends to shareholders. A RIC is subject to detailed restrictions on permitted assets and investments.98

If RIC stock is "stapled" to the stock of another entity (such that an interest in one changes hands together with the interest in the other) and if such "stapled" stock represents more than 50 percent in value of the beneficial ownership of each of the entities, then the two entities are treated as one.99 These rules limit the degree to which the shareholders of the RIC may derive income that would not be qualifying income for the RIC indirectly through a related entity, while retaining RIC status for the amounts of income that do qualify. These rules also provide a limit on the extent to which a RIC that is commonly owned with a taxable corporation might extract business income from the corporation in the form of interest or other deductible payments, or by causing the corporation to bear expenses of the RIC's operations.



Real estate investment trusts

A real estate investment trust ("REIT") is an entity that derives most of its income from passive real-estate-related investments. A REIT must satisfy a number of tests on an annual basis that relate to the entity's organizational structure, the source of its income, and the nature of its assets. If an electing entity meets the requirements for REIT status, the portion of its income that is distributed to its investors each year generally is treated as a dividend deductible by the REIT and includible in income by its investors. In this manner, the distributed income of the REIT is not taxed at the entity level. The distributed income is taxed only at the investor level. A REIT generally is required to distribute 90 percent of its income (other than net capital gain) to its investors before the end of its taxable year.

In order for an entity to qualify as a REIT, at least 95 percent of its gross income generally must be derived from certain passive sources (the "95-percent income test"). In addition, at least 75 percent of its income generally must be from certain real estate sources (the "75-percent income test"), including rents from real property (as defined) and gain from the sale or other disposition of real property. Amounts received as impermissible "tenant services income" are not treated as rents from real property.100 In general, such amounts are for services rendered to tenants that are not "customarily furnished" in connection with the rental of real property.

Rents from real property, for purposes of the 95-percent and 75-percent income tests, generally do not include any amount received or accrued from any person in which the REIT owns, directly or indirectly, 10 percent or more of the vote or value.101 An exception applies to rents received from a taxable REIT subsidiary ("TRS") if at least 90 percent of the leased space of the property is rented to persons other than a TRS or certain related persons, and if the rents from the TRS are substantially comparable to unrelated party rents.102 A TRS may conduct business or receive income from activities that would generate non-qualifying income if conducted by the REIT that owns the TRS securities. However, a REIT may hold no more than 20 percent of the value of its total assets in securities of a TRS.103 Transactions between a TRS and a REIT are subject to a number of specified rules that are intended to prevent the TRS (taxable as a separate corporate entity) from shifting taxable income from its activities to the non-taxed REIT, or from absorbing more than its share of expenses. Under one such rule, a 100-percent excise tax is imposed on rents, deductions, or interest paid by a TRS to a REIT, to the extent such items would exceed an arm's length amount as determined under section 482.104



Real estate mortgage investment conduits

A real estate mortgage investment conduit is an entity used for securitizing mortgages on real estate.105 A real estate mortgage investment conduit is not subject to tax at the entity level (except for a 100-percent excise tax on prohibited transactions, which include the receipt of compensation for services or other non-permitted income). Income or loss of the real estate mortgage investment conduit is taken into account by the holders of interests in the real estate mortgage investment conduit. Real estate mortgage investment conduits are subject to restrictions on organizational structure, income, assets, and permitted transactions.



Cooperatives

There are several types of cooperatives, including tax-exempt farmers' cooperatives and other corporations operating on a cooperative basis. In determining its taxable income, a cooperative does not take into account the amount of patronage dividends to patrons of the cooperative. The cooperative deducts other distributions, including dividends paid on capital stock, and amounts distributed on a patronage basis to patrons during the taxable year. Patrons of the cooperative include in their income the amount of patronage dividends and other distributions made on a patronage basis. Thus, these amounts are subject to tax in the hands of the patrons, but not in the hands of the cooperative. To this extent, a cooperative is treated as a passthrough entity.

A cooperative can be a publicly traded entity; however, only patrons are entitled to the benefits of the pass-through treatment through the dividends paid deduction. To the extent the earnings of the cooperative are allocated or distributed to public shareholders that are not dealing with the cooperative patrons, the cooperative is subject to corporate level tax.



V. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS IN THE 110TH CONGRESS




H.R. 2834 (introduced by Messrs. Levin, Rangel, Stark, McDermott, Lewis of Georgia, Neal, Pomeroy, Larson of Connecticut, Blumenauer, Kind, Pascrell, Frank of Massachussets, and Mrs. Jones of Ohio)

The bill generally treats net income from an investment services partnership interest as ordinary income for the performance of services. Thus, the bill recharacterizes the partner's distributive share of income from the partnership, regardless of whether such income would otherwise be treated as capital gain, dividend income, or any other type of income. Such income is taxed at ordinary income rates and is subject to self-employment tax.

Net income means, with respect to an investment services partnership interest, the excess (if any) of (1) all items of income and taken into account by the partner with respect to the partnership interest for the partnership taxable year, over (2) all items of deduction and loss taken into account by the partner with respect to the partnership interest for the partnership taxable year.

The bill provides that an investment services partnership interest is a partnership interest held by any person who provides (directly or indirectly), in the course of the active conduct of a trade or business, a substantial quantity of certain services to the partnership. The services are: (1) advising the partnership as to the value of a specified asset; (2) advising the partnership as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling any specified asset; (3) managing, acquiring, or disposing of any specified asset; (4) arranging financing with respect to acquiring specified assets; (5) any activity in support of any of the foregoing services.

For this purpose, specified assets means securities (as defined), real estate, commodities (as defined), or options or derivative contracts with respect to such securities, real estate, or commodities. A security for this purpose means a (1) share of corporate stock, (2) partnership interest or beneficial ownership interest in a widely held or publicly traded partnership or trust, (3) note, bond, debenture, or other evidence of indebtedness, (4) interest rate, currency, or equity notional principal contract, (5) interest in, or derivative financial instrument in, any such security or any currency (regardless of whether section 1256 applies to the contract), and (6) position that is not such a security and is a hedge with respect to such a security and is clearly identified. A commodity for this purpose means a (1) commodity that is actively traded, (2) notional principal contract with respect to such a commodity, (3) interest in, or derivative financial instrument in, such a commodity, and (4) position that is not such a commodity and is a hedge with respect to such a commodity and is clearly identified.

The bill provides an exception to recharacterization as ordinary income for performance of services in the case of the portion of the partner's distributive share of partnership items with respect to the partner's investedcapital. Invested capital means the fair market value at the time of contribution of any money or other property contributed to the partnership. The exception applies provided that the partnership makes reasonable allocation of partnership items between the portion of the partner's distributive share attributable to invested capital and the remaining portion. An allocation is not treated as reasonable if it would result in the allocation of a greater portion of income to invested capital than any other partner not providing services would have been allocated with respect to the same amount of invested capital.

The bill provides rules for the treatment of losses with respect to an investment services partnership interest, as well as for disposition of all or a portion of such a partnership interest and distributions of partnership property with respect to such a partnership interest. Consistently with the general rule providing that net income with respect to such a partnership interest is ordinary income for the performance of services, the bill provides that net loss with respect to such a partnership interest (to the extent not disallowed) is treated as ordinary loss. For this purpose, net loss means, with respect to an investment services partnership interest, the excess (if any) of (1) all items of deduction and loss taken into account by the partner with respect to the partnership interest for the partnership taxable year, over (2) all items of income and taken into account by the partner with respect to the partnership interest for the partnership taxable year. The net loss is allowed for a partnership taxable year, however, only to the extent that the loss does not exceed the excess (if any) of (1) aggregate net income with respect to the partnership interest for prior partnership taxable years, over (2) the aggregate net loss with respect to the partnership interest not disallowed for prior partnership years. Any net loss that is not allowed for the partnership taxable year is carried forward to the next partnership taxable year. Notwithstanding the present-law rule that the basis of a partnership interest generally is reduced by the partner's distributive share of partnership losses and deductions (sec. 705(a)(2)), the bill provides that no adjustment is made to the basis of a partnership interest on account of a net loss that is not allowed for the partnership taxable year. When any such net loss that is carried forward is allowed in a subsequent year, the adjustment is made to the basis of the partnership interest.

On the disposition of an investment service partnership interest, gain is treated as ordinary income for the performance of services, notwithstanding the present-law rule that gain or loss from the disposition of a partnership interest generally is considered as capital gain or loss (sec. 741; except ordinary treatment applies to the extent attributable to inventory and unrealized receivables, sec. 751). Loss on the disposition of an investment service partnership interest is treated as ordinary loss, but only to the extent of the amount by which aggregate net income previously treated as ordinary exceeds aggregate net loss previously allowed as ordinary under the bill.

On the distribution of appreciated property by a partnership to a partner with respect to an investment services partnership interest, the present-law rule providing that no gain or loss generally is recognized to a partnership on a distribution to a partner of property or money does not apply. Rather, the partnership recognizes gain as if the partnership had sold the property at its fair market value at the time of the distribution. For this purpose, appreciated property means property with respect to which gain would be realized if sold by the partnership at the time of distribution.

Under the bill, net income from an investment services partnership interest is subject to self-employment tax. Net income from an investment services partnership interest is derived from the performance by a person of a substantial quantity of services to the partnership in the course of the active conduct of a trade or business. This income falls within the definition of net earnings from self-employment, which generally includes a partner's distributive share (whether or not distributed) of income or loss from any trade or business carried on by the partnership (sec. 1402(a)), with certain exclusions. Because net income from an investment services partnership is treated as ordinary income for the performance of services, the present-law exception for gain or loss from the sale or exchange of a capital asset does not apply, even though the net income from the investment service partnership interest might otherwise be characterized as capital gain. The bill also provides that, in the case of a limited partner, the present-law exclusion for limited partners does not apply to any income treated as ordinary income from an investment services partnership interest that is received by an individual who provides a substantial quantity of the specified services.

Under the bill, a publicly traded partnership, more than 10 percent of whose gross income consists of net income from an investment services partnership interest, is treated as a corporation for Federal tax purposes under section 7704. The present-law exception to corporate treatment for a publicly traded partnership, 90 percent or more of whose gross income is qualifying income within the meaning of section 7704(c)(2), does not apply, because net income from an investment services partnership interest is not qualifying income within the meaning of section 7704(c)(2).



S. 1624 (introduced by Senator Baucus and Senator Grassley)

The bill provides generally that the exception from corporate treatment for a publicly traded partnership, 90 percent or more of whose gross income is qualifying income, does not apply in the case of a partnership that directly or indirectly derives income from investment adviser services or related asset management services. Thus, such a partnership is treated as a corporation for Federal tax purposes and is subject to the corporate income tax.

Under the bill, the exception from corporate treatment for a publicly traded partnership does not apply to any partnership that, directly or indirectly, has any item of income or gain (including capital gains or dividends), the rights to which are derived from services provided by any person as an investment adviser, as defined in the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, or as a person associated with an investment adviser, as defined in that Act. Further, the exception from corporate treatment does not apply to a partnership that, directly or indirectly, has any item of income or gain (including capital gains or dividends), the rights to which are derived from asset management services provided by an investment adviser, a person associated with an investment adviser, or any person related to either, in connection with the management of assets with respect to which investment adviser services were provided. For purposes of the bill, these determinations are made without regard to whether the person is required to register as an investment adviser under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. In the absence of regulatory guidance as to the definition of a related person, it is intended that the definition of a related person in section 197(f)(9)(C)(i) apply.

For example, a publicly traded partnership that has income (including capital gains or dividend income) from a profits interest in a partnership, the rights to which income are derived from the performance of services by any person as an investment adviser, is treated as a corporation for Federal tax purposes under the bill. As a further example, a publicly traded partnership that receives a dividend from a corporation that receives or accrues income, the rights to which are derived from services provided by any person as an investment adviser, is treated as a corporation for Federal tax purposes under the bill.

Under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 definition, an investment adviser means any person who, for compensation, engages in the business of advising others, either directly or through publications or writings, as to the value of securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities, or who, for compensation and as part of a regular business, issues or promulgates analyses or reports concerning securities. Under this definition, exceptions are provided in the case of certain banks, certain brokers or dealers, as well as certain others, provided criteria specified in that Act are met. These exceptions apply for purposes of the bill. No inference is intended that income from activities described in the exceptions is qualifying income for purposes of section 7704.

The bill generally is effective for taxable years of a partnership beginning on or after June 14, 2007.

Under a transition rule for certain partnerships, the bill applies for taxable years beginning on or after June 14, 2012. The transition rule applies in the case of a partnership the interests in which on June 14, 2007, were traded on an established securities market, or were readily tradable on a secondary market (or the substantial equivalent thereof). In addition, the transition rule generally applies in the case of a partnership which, on or before June 14, 2007, filed a registration statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission under section 6 of the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. 77f) that was required solely by reason of an initial public offering of interests in the partnership. However, the transition rule does not apply if the registration statement is filed with respect to securities that are to be issued on a delayed or continuous basis (pursuant to Rule 415 under the Securities Act of 1933). Thus, a shelf registration on or before June 14, 2007, of interests in a partnership does not cause the partnership to be eligible for the transition rule. Rather, in the case of such a partnership, the bill is effective for taxable years of the partnership beginning on or after June 14, 2007.



H.R. 2785 (introduced by Mr. Welch)

The bill is the same as S. 1624, except that it is effective for taxable years of a partnership beginning after June 20, 2007 (the date of introduction).



VI. FEDERAL TAX ISSUES AND ANALYSIS




Tax issues relating to carried interests



In general

The use of carried interests in asset management businesses raises conceptual questions under the income tax rules. In these arrangements, the investment fund typically is a partnership. The investors are limited partners that contribute capital to acquire fund assets, and the fund manager is the general partner of the investment fund partnership. The general partner is itself a partnership of individuals with investment management expertise. The fund manager receives management fees along with a carried interest. The carried interest is generally a profits interest in the investment fund partnership.106 Because the character of a partnership's income passes through to partners, income from a carried interest may take the form of long-term or short-term capital gain realized by the underlying investment fund as the fund sells off investment assets.

Historically, labor income of individuals has generally been taxed at ordinary rates, while some forms of capital income107 have generally been taxed at lower rates.108 In addition, labor income generally is subject to employment tax (generally 2.9 percent for amounts over $97,500, in 2007). In 2007, for individuals generally, the top rate of tax on capital gain is 15 percent, while the top rate on ordinary income is 35 percent. When the employment tax is added, the top rate on ordinary compensation income is 37.9 percent. This rate differential is thought to be a motivating factor in taxpayers' choi ce to structure income as a carried interest that can give rise to capital gain rather than as fees or other ordinary compensation income. Carried interests may also be structured to achieve deferral of income compared to alternative structures.

The use of carried interests is not limited to asset management businesses, but can extend to any business in which investors desire to align the interests of managers with those of investors by using positive investment yield as the measure of managers' income (though the loss of fund capital does not usually require the manager to contribute capital to the fund). However, this discussion is focused on carried interests used in asset management businesses, a feature of which is that the business income may include income taxed at lower rates.



Capital income or compensation

The primary question is whether the carried interest is a form of compensation for services, or whether it is more similar to a right to income or gain from capital. Related questions involve the interaction of the tax situations of the fund manager and fund investors.109

In many cases, it is fairly clear whether money is paid for services rendered, on the one hand, or for the use of capital as equity or debt, on the other hand. This distinction can become more difficult in a business activity involving capital assets and individuals' investment expertise with respect to the capital assets. Issues relating to the distinction between gains and earnings from investment in property, on the one hand, and income from the performance of services or from other types of businesses, on the other hand, can be found in many areas other than the asset management and investment advisory business. The distinction has been a general source of complexity.110 Distinctions have been established legislatively for tax purposes in some instances, for example, a self-created copyright, which is treated as property that is not a capital asset.111

In the case of a fund manager's carried interest, it is argued that, regardless of the capital structure of an investment fund and its manager, the carried interest arrangement primarily involves the performance of services by individuals whose professional skill generates capital income for investors in the fund. While these individuals' economic interests are aligned with those of the fund investors to the extent their compensation is based on the positive investment yield of the fund, the individuals are nevertheless performing services. Therefore, the income should be taxed as ordinary compensation income.

In this connection, it is argued that common aspects of carried interest arrangements support compensation treatment. Time and effort clauses relating to the manager or to specific key persons arguably suggest that the fund manager is required to perform services under the carried interest arrangement. In the case of hedge funds, the income of which is often subject to ordinary rates as short-term gain or ordinary income, some point to the fact that the fund manager often receives a carried interest from the U.S. portion of the fund and receives a similar income stream denominated as compensation from the offshore portion of the fund, suggesting that both income streams are compensation for services. Similarly, some argue that clawback and hurdle rate restrictions on payment of carried interests give rise to an analogy to performance-based compensation; that is, the carried interest provides that amounts become payable only when the investment performance of the fund being managed surpasses a hurdle rate.112

This type of argument would suggest that income from a carried interest, in respect of which the investment manager contributes no capital to the fund, resembles compensation for services. This is the case even though income generated through the carried interest is otherwise capital gain and dividend income, for instance.113 Income from a carried interest can be distinguished from the service provider's separate return on any capital that the manager contributes to the business, under this view, and from the capital contributed by the limited partner investors, who are owners rather than mere financers of the mangers' capital.



Carried interest as implementing partners' shared tax reduction

A carried interest arrangement can alternatively be viewed as a sharing by the fund manager and the investors of favorable tax treatment in such a way as to minimize their aggregate tax.114 Under this analysis, if the investors and the manager were subject to tax at the same rates, and if the investors could fully deduct any compensation included in the manager's income, there would be no tax advantage to choosing to structure the arrangement as a partnership carried interest rather than as ordinary compensation. This result would follow because any Federal income tax benefit shifted to the fund manager would yield a precisely offsetting tax detriment to the investors. For example, to the extent the manager's income is treated as a share of overall partnership profits taxable at capital gains rates, rather than as compensation taxable to him at ordinary rates but deductible to the investors, the investors lose the compensation deduction.115

The carried interest arrangement is more tax-efficient than a deductible compensation arrangement, however, if the investors do not lose the tax benefit of the deduction when the manager's income is converted from ordinary income taxed at higher rates to capital gain (derived through a carried interest) that is taxed at lower rates.116 This arrangement could be viewed as a sharing of the tax benefit of the lower capital gain tax rate as between the manager and the investors. Alternatively, it could be viewed as a sharing of the tax benefit of the tax-favored status of a tax-exempt or foreign investor as between the manager and the investors. In either case, a question that is presented is whether it is appropriate to permit the general partner to have favorable tax treatment premised on an offsetting tax disadvantage to limited partners, when by virtue of the limited partners' tax status, no such disadvantage occurs.117

In addressing this question, it could be said that a rule designed to treat income from a partnership profits interest as ordinary only if other partners have a tax-favored status raises administrability concerns. It could also be argued that such a distinction is unnecessary, as taxpayers are motivated by economic self-interest to utilize the carried interest arrangement only when shared tax reduction of all the partners is maximized. Thus, market forces effectively narrow the use of fund managers' carried interests to this type of situation, so the tax law need not define and single out such situations.

Further, this approach fails to take into account the 2.9 percent employment tax for amounts over $97,000, which would still be a net tax detriment in the situation in which investors and fund managers subject to tax at the same rates include, and deduct, ordinary compensation to the manager. Another perspective is that the tax law already includes a number of rules that serve to limit the shifting of tax benefits, and arguably, the complexity added by another such limitation targeted to a narrow situation involving partners with specific tax attributes would outweigh any improved accuracy of income measurement. To the extent such a rule depends on the tax status of partners other than the fund managers, it could be said that such a rule does not address the basic question of whether the fund manager's income is compensatory in nature and should be treated as ordinary, nor does it address the horizontal equity concern that some fund managers' compensation for services can be structured to be taxed at lower rates, while other taxpayers' compensation for services is taxed at ordinary rates.



Non-taxation of imputed income

It may be argued that a carried interest of a fund manager represents a bundling of capital income and labor income, but in this situation these types of income are too closely intertwined for them to be practicably separated.118 Under this view, an analogy can be drawn to an individual investor who works to manage his own assets. Conceptually, the investor has imputed labor income from this work that the present-law rules do not separately tax. This is the case even though if the investor hired another person as his investment manager, the other person's income from the investment management activity would be separately taxed. Based on the analogy to non-taxation of imputed income from managing one's own assets, it is argued that the fund manager's income should not be taxed as labor income either.

A variant of this argument is that the general partner effectively is itself the investment fund, and the limited partners are simply providers of temporary or rented capital to the general partner. Alternatively, the carried interest arrangement is merely a financing by the other investors of the manager's large capital investment in the fund. The fund manager is conceptually the fund owner, and the investors can be viewed conceptually as lenders. Again, by analogy to the non-taxation of imputed income from managing one's own assets, the fund manager arguably should not be taxed on labor income.

Nevertheless, the fund manager does not have imputed income, but rather, has actual income from the carried interest, so that the analogy to imputed income may not be relevant. Moreover, for this analogy to work, it must be assumed that the capital in the investment fund is owned entirely by the fund manager, an unsustainable assumption. Such an assumption would be inconsistent with the idea that the fund manager has only a partnership profits interest, not a partnership capital interest.119 It would also be inconsistent with the passthrough to investors, as partners, of a share of long-term capital gain earned by the fund (rather than treating investors as lenders whose return consists of interest on capital loaned to the manager). Further, it is questionable whether the Internal Revenue Service and the courts would respect as debt (rather than limited partners' equity) an arrangement in which the limited partners loaned the entirety of their contributed capital to the fund manager on a nonrecourse basis, particularly if the taxpayers structure the transaction as limited partnership interests rather than as debt.

Furthermore, the bundling concept as applied to a carried interest could be questioned. Generally, a carried interest does not require a capital contribution to the partnership, nor does it provide rights to receive partnership assets on liquidation of the partnership;120 any capital that the fund manager general partner contributes can be separated from the carried interest. While the investors may demand that the fund manager contribute nominal or significant capital to the investment partnership and maintain a capital interest in the investment partnership, it is not part of the carried interest, which is a pure profits interest and not intrinsically bundled with any capital.



Risk taking

Another argument relates to risk-taking. It is argued that the fund manager takes risk by investing substantial time and effort in managing the fund, and receives economic returns on the carried interest only if the underlying investments are successful (not taking into account management fees). Particularly in the venture capital context, it is argued that the fund manager assumes socially desirable risk by financing and providing management services to fledgling businesses that, when successful, increase the size and productivity of the economy. Capital gain treatment is accorded when risk is taken, and therefore is appropriate in this situation.

The risk argument can be criticized, however, in that the capital gains rates apply to the disposition of capital assets, not to risk-taking in general that does not involve capital assets. Further, the capital gains tax rates apply to the disposition of capital assets that are not risky, or have little risk, such as the sale of U.S. Treasury debt with a yield close to the risk-free rate of return. Moreover, the capital gains tax rates do not apply to many types of income related to risk-taking. For example, capital gains rates do not apply to employee compensation that is performance-based, contingent on meeting sales targets or other performance measures. To the extent that the fund manager is risking his time and effort, but not his money, it is argued that the risk rationale for capital gains treatment does not apply.



Analogy to "sweat equity"

A related argument involves the analogy to other types of businesses in which the business owner contributes "sweat equity" by providing his labor in the business. The business owner is said to have a tax advantage, in that his ownership interest in the business gives rise to capital gain on sale.121 For example, the owner of a widget business, whose labor causes the business to increase in value, generally is entitled to capital gain treatment when he sells the widget business. Similarly, if a person in a service business, for example, a barber, sells the barbershop, he has capital gain on the sale. It is argued that the sweat equity of investment fund managers does not differ from other types of businesses, and that denying capital gain treatment in the case of the fund management business unfairly singles out one type of business activity for less favorable tax treatment.

A variant of this argument relates to "founder's equity." An individual entrepreneur --founder of a business --who starts up a new enterprise that is successful is generally entitled to capital gain treatment on the sale of the business. It is argued that the activity of a venture capital fund manager in financing and helping to manage startup businesses is the same type of activity, and should also be entitled to capital gain treatment. However, later-arriving owners of the business who did not participate in startup activities also are entitled to capital gain treatment, potentially weakening the analogy to founders or entrepreneurs. It may be observed that for purposes of capital gain treatment on sale of a business, present law does not distinguish among an individual who starts a business, an owner who resuscitates a failing business, an owner who labors in a successful business, and an owner who merely contributes capital passively to a business. Generally, capital gain treatment applies in all of these cases.

In response to the assertion that fund manager's carried interest resembles sweat equity or founder's equity and should be accorded capital gain treatment, some point out that this argument proves too much with respect to the operating income of the business. Generally, operating income of a business is taxed at ordinary rates as it is earned. For example, in a widget business, as widgets are manufactured and sold, the operating income of the business from inventory sales is subject to tax as ordinary income. Similarly, a barber has income as he takes payment for haircuts. In these situations, inventory income and services income are taxed currently. This current taxation of operating income at ordinary rates differs from treatment of fund managers' carried interests: deferral until the fund's portfolio assets are sold, and conversion of operating income from investment advisory services to capital gain.122

A related point is that the more appropriate analogy to sweat equity, in the case of a fund manager, is not to the ongoing income received through a carried interest, but rather, to the tax treatment on sale of a fund manager's interest in his fund management firm. This situation would arise if an individual who is a partner in a fund manager partnership sells his partnership interest to someone else. Any analogy to capital gain treatment should, it is argued, apply to that sale transaction, rather than to the income of the investment fund managed by that partner. Proponents of this view point out that present law provides that the sale or exchange of a partnership interest generally gives rise to capital gain, except to the extent that the amount realized is attributable to inventory or to accounts receivable, including rights to payment for services rendered or to be rendered. Thus, it may be argued that present law properly treats sweat equity of a fund manager --or any partner who is a service provider --as capital gain to the extent of his capital interest, but as ordinary compensation income to the extent of his right to payment for services.



Reduction in returns to pension funds and other institutional investors

Some have argued that taxing income from carried interests as ordinary would reduce the investment returns of pension funds and other investors in alternative investment funds. Under this argument, a change in the taxation of carried interests could lead management firms to increase the management fees and the carried interest percentages they charge their limited partner investors, with the ultimate effect that returns to workers and other individuals who are beneficiaries of the institutional investors in alternative investment funds would be reduced. Others respond that the commercial arrangements between management firms and the investors in the funds they manage are determined by market forces, and that if fund managers could demand a larger share of the yield of the investment fund, they would already have done so without regard to their tax liability.

A related argument is that, if tax rates on management firms rise, fewer individuals would pursue that career, and investment management charges would have to rise for that reason. Nevertheless, the opportunity for individuals with skills in asset management but little capital of their own to achieve high income would arguably ensure a sufficient supply of individuals to engage in this activity.



Income previously taxed

It is also argued that capital gain treatment is appropriate for carried interests of fund managers because the operating income of the underlying portfolio companies held by the fund has already been taxed as ordinary income at the portfolio company level. Thus, it is argued, all the income earned by a private equity fund has already borne corporate-level tax, so there is no reason to impose ordinary income tax again on the fund manager when it receives its profit share of the operating income of the fund (i.e., the profits the funds realizes on the sale of portfolio company stock).

On the other hand, this point conflates two different business activities: (1) the underlying business of the portfolio company in which the investment fund invests, and (2) the investment advisory service business of the management firm that is the general partner of the investment fund. The fact that the business profits of a portfolio company have been taxed to the portfolio company does not mean that the business profits of the investment advisory business should not also be taxed as ordinary income, according to this view.123 It could also be said that if taxing the portfolio company's business profits were equivalent to taxing the investment advisory firm's business profits, then the investment advisory firm should pay no tax, an argument that proves too much.



Additional complexity

It is said that characterizing income from carried interests as ordinary compensation income introduces significant additional complexity to the already complex tax law relating to partnerships. Such a rule may cause taxpayers to engage in tax-motivated restructuring of current and future business arrangements between fund managers and investors in the funds in order to avoid the tax cost of ordinary income treatment to the manager. It is also said that fund managers may be motivated to increase the carry percentage beyond the traditional 20 percent to a greater percentage to compensate for the cost of the tax change. The additional complexity and the tax-motivated behavioral responses to such a change in the tax rules create inefficiencies and distortions in the economy that reduce overall productivity.

Nevertheless, the preference for simplicity in the tax law must be balanced with fairness and accuracy of income measurement. It is said that the perception that taxpayers with income from different categories of personal services are taxed at disparate rates may increase noncompliance among taxpayers who believe that they are over-taxed or who believe that the tax system is inherently unfair. Such a result violates the principle of horizontal equity (the principle that similarly situated taxpayers should be subject to similar tax burdens). It is argued, for example, that low-income workers do not have the opportunity to structure their personal services income as capital gain, and must pay tax on compensation at a higher marginal rate than highly-paid fund managers. Thus, the detriment of additional complexity must be weighed against the benefit of increased accuracy of income measurement and an increased perception of fairness, necessary aspects of a self-assessing income tax system. The impact of the tax change relating to carried interests would arguably affect a relatively small number of high-income individuals, so that the detriment of any added complexity in the tax law would be more than offset by the benefits of increased accuracy of income measurement and an improved perception of fairness in the tax system.



Tax incentive for specific activities

Another way of viewing the issue is to ask whether or not the activities engaged in by fund managers should be given an incentive through the tax law in the form of preferential tax rates on their income. On the one hand, it can be argued that (depending on the investment strategy of the fund, and other factors), fund managers may be increasing the efficiency of the economy by restructuring businesses in which they invest so as to maximize their value, or for some types of funds, may be making financial markets more efficient. On the other hand, some might say that the funds' investment strategy as determined by the fund managers may serve to strip out value from the businesses in which the fund invests for the benefit of fund investors but without added value or increased productivity in the economy. A related point is that a tax incentive for carried interests in investment funds (which have historically been privately rather than publicly owned) tends to favor private over public ownership of businesses, whereas the tax law should be neutral and not prefer one over the other. It could also be said that, regardless of whether the activities of investment funds and their managers are desirable, no tax incentive is needed for the activity, and that any tax subsidy would be a windfall to persons who would conduct the activity regardless of whether a preferential tax rate applies.



Timing and valuation considerations

If the income from a carried interest is treated as compensation subject to tax as ordinary income, an important question is the timing and amount of the income. The Internal Revenue Service currently takes the position that the receipt of a partnership profits interest is not generally a taxable event to the partner or to the partnership unless unusual circumstances indicate the interest is easy to value and it is held for a relatively short time. As acknowledged by the Internal Revenue Service in taking this position, however, courts have reasoned that the value of the profits interest for services should be included in income on receipt.124 The Internal Revenue Service has proposed regulations attempting to mesh conceptually inconsistent present-law statutory rules that provide, on the one hand, that contributions of property to a partnership in exchange for a partnership interest are not taxable, and on the other hand, that property received for services is generally included in income at its fair market value.125

An obstacle to the practical application of the approach of taxation of profits interests on receipt has been that valuation of partnership profits interests has proved factually difficult. The valuation difficulty arises because the profits interest depends on the future profitability of a business which may be extremely speculative, where, as is often the case, there is no current public market for interests in the partnership that would aid valuation at the time the profits interest is granted.126 Difficulty of valuation would be an issue at the time a nonpublicly traded partnership profits interest is received by the partner, even if the partnership later goes public, establishing a market value for partnership interests at that later time.127 A further difficult aspect of this approach is that if a profits interest were taxed to a partner on receipt of the interest, the partnership rules would require addition of a potentially complex mechanism to prevent double taxation when profits are later realized.128

If, alternatively, the timing of the compensation is not considered to be at the time of receipt of the profits interest, but rather, as the partner's share of partners hip profits is realized, other issues arise. The idea that a partner's distributive share of capital gain and dividend income can be recharacterized as compensation could be viewed as inconsistent with the notion of a partnership as an aggregate of its partners. A partner should not be considered as an employee of the partnership, but rather, as a participant in a joint venture with the other partners, under this view. In response, it is argued that the partner is performing services measured by capital income, whether he is providing those services to a third party through a partnership in which he is a partner, or as an individual performing these services for a third party. The interposition of a partnership does not change the nature of the income as services income, under this view. It could also be argued that this approach avoids the practical obstacles to imposing tax on partnership profits interests on receipt.



Employment tax

A corollary issue relates to the employment tax treatment of payments of income received under a carried interest. Because capital gain income is not subject to employment taxes, the desire to avoid the application of the 2.9 percent hospital insurance tax (which is not subject to an income cap) may be one reason that taxpayers wish to structure payments as carried interests. However, to the extent such interests are viewed as payments for compensation, failing to subject them to employment taxes, while other compensation is subject to such taxes, can lead to distortion and economic inefficiency. Thus, if carried interests are viewed as properly characterized as compensation for services, it would be consistent with the general tax treatment of such compensation to apply employment taxes.



Loan approach to taxing carried interests

An alternative approach to the tax treatment of carried interests is to view the managers' carried interest as a loan of a percentage of the invested capital, made by the investors to the managers, and to consider the possibility that the parties might directly structure such a loan. One possible legislative approach has been suggested that would recharacterize the carried interest as such a loan and, to the extent that any interest charged by the investors for this loan, in the form of their preferred return rate, is below an "adequate" interest rate, would tax the non-charged interest as compensation to the managing partner. It is argued that that this approach would anticipate the possibility that if all the income from a manager's carried interest were taxed as ordinary income, the parties could restructure the carried interest to the form of a loan, claiming that the "borrowed" capital should be viewed as capital invested by the managing partner, and the return on it entitled to capital gain.129

One significant issue under such an approach is identifying an appropriate market interest rate against which to measure the "bargain" compensation element. It has been suggested that the applicable Federal rate ("AFR"), a U.S. Treasury debt-based rate, be used as a measure of "adequate" interest.130 Because the fund investments are frequently risky enough that very high rates of return are contemplated, the use of a Treasury debt rate, generally considered to be a "risk-free" rate, may not be appropriate. A managing partner that provided such a rate would avoid any ordinary income treatment. It could also be argued that the yield may be so much higher than the AFR that this return cannot be interest, but rather is some other form of earnings.

An additional conceptual issue relating to this approach is whether it is appropriate to treat an interest in a venture that is acquired with non-recourse debt from the venture or its investors, as an interest that was "purchased" at the time the debt was incurred.131



Alternatives to carried interests; application of deferred compensation rules

Alternatives to carried interests that provide economic benefits similar to partnership profits interests may also be used to provide compensation for fund managers. In considering the tax treatment of carried interests, it may be appropriate to consider the alternative arrangements and whether they are sufficiently comparable that similar tax treatment should apply to them.

One alternative in the corporate context is to seek to limit currently taxable compensation income by using two classes of stock with differing rights and, consequently, differing values (for example, common stock and convertible preferred stock). For example, in the context of specific buyout or venture capital transactions involving corporations, managers may make a small equity investment in exchange for stock said to have little immediate value but with a potential for participation in future appreciation, while investors take a different type of stock interest for their investment. The managers may then make an election to include the low or zero asserted value of its stock interest in income when received, leaving the upside to be taxed as capital gain. This may produce returns comparable to those of managers of and investors in private equity or venture capital partnerships, including the manager's right to participate in the upside of the investment.132

In some cases, as an alternative to the use of a partnership profits interest, fund managers' interests may be structured as a contractual arrangement to pay compensation based on the profits of the fund. In such cases, the issue of proper characterization of the income as capital or ordinary does not arise, as the income is compensation for services. In such cases, however, the compensation may be deferred (as may be the typical two percent up-front management fee where there is also a carried interest). Questions have been raised as to whether deferral of the compensation for management services is appropriate.133



Deferral and conversion of fees

In some circumstances, taxpayers may seek to convert management fees, which are generally subject to tax as ordinary income, to an arrangement that achieves deferral of income recognition, or conversion to capital gain treatment, or both. Under these arrangements, tax issues may be raised. Exchanging or relinquishing a right to a fee may raise issues under the rules requiring current inclusion of the value of property transferred in connection with the performance of services, if the person entitled to the fee receives a right constituting property in the exchange. In the partnership context, the transaction, and the arrangement in lieu of the fee, may implicate the guaranteed payment rules, or the rules treating services performed by a partner when there is a related direct or indirect allocation and distribution to the partner as a transaction between the partnership and a person who is not a partner.



Tax issues relating to publicly traded partnerships

Another question involves whether, as a matter of tax policy, a business that derives income from asset management and investment advisory services and that takes the form of a publicly traded partnership should be subject to tax as a corporation.134 In an income tax system with a corporate income tax, Congress has enacted rules limiting passthrough (and untaxed) entity treatment. Passthrough and untaxed entities (such as partnerships, S corporations, mutual funds, and real estate investment trusts) are subject to significant restrictions under the tax rules that either prohibit public tradeability of interests (or make it impracticable), or limit the permitted income, assets, structure, and activities of the entity while permitting its interests to be publicly traded. Publicly traded partnerships generally are subject to tax as corporations (with certain exceptions), because they are considered to resemble corporations in that both have access to capital markets through issuance of traded interests in the entity.

It can be said that an asset management business tends to generate income such as capital gains and dividend income that is treated as qualifying income of a publicly traded partnership, and thus falls within the bounds of the present-law exception to corporate treatment of publicly traded partnerships. Arguably, nothing in the rules or their legislative history specifically excludes this type of business, but rather, the types of qualifying income listed in the statute explicitly include these, without any requirement to look through lower-tier entities or to investigate the fundamental nature of the income.

On the other hand, it can be argued that, when the limitations on eligibility for passthrough treatment of publicly traded partnerships were enacted in 1987, only a few types of businesses had taken the form of publicly traded partnerships. The types of income that those businesses generated served to make up the listed qualifying income, without any intent to extend the publicly traded partnership form to other types of business. Rather, the concern was to limit the use of publicly traded partnerships so as to prevent disincorporation and erosion of the corporate tax base. Consequently, it may be inconsistent with the tax policy, and the purpose, of the publicly traded partnership tax rules to permit passthrough treatment to a publicly traded partnership with such income.



Tax issues relating to corporate earnings stripping

A related issue involves the inclusion in a partnership structure of corporations that receive income that is not qualifying income under the publicly traded partnership rules, and that distribute it in the form of qualifying income such as dividends or interest. For example, a publicly traded partnership may own a corporation that receives income in the form of management fees, and distributes income to the publicly traded partnership as dividends.135 Such a structure is not explicitly prohibited under the statutory rules, and may not be inconsistent with the purpose of the tax rules to prevent erosion of the corporate tax base if such income is subject to tax in the hands of the recipient corporation.

On the other hand, the arrangement may be inconsistent with the purpose of the publicly traded partnership rules if the income is subject to little or no tax at the corporate level, and is paid to a publicly traded partnership that is a passthrough entity. In this circumstance, the income is not subject to corporate income tax, even if its original character (management fees, in the above example) was not that of qualifying income for the publicly traded partnership. A corporation may be subject to little or no tax if it has substantial deductions to offset its income. There may be a potential for related party transactions such as interest paid to the partnership, or costs borne by the corporation that benefit the partnership, to reduce the corporate level tax.136 By comparison, other publicly-traded non-taxed entities such as RICs and REITs are subject to restrictions limiting the potential for such transactions.137 If untaxed (or lightly taxed) corporate income is distributed to a publicly traded partnership that is treated as a passthrough entity for tax purposes, concerns about stripping the corporate income are raised.

It can be said that a rule requiring identification of corporations which are lightly taxed, or even defining what it means to be lightly taxed, would be inadministrable or excessively complex. On the other hand, the concern could arguably be addressed by rules designed to prevent corporate earnings stripping applied only through corporations in which a publicly traded partnership has a substantial ownership interest, or from which the partnership receives a non-de minimis amount of such income.

1 This document may be cited as follows: Joint Committee on Taxation, "Present Law and Analysis Relating to Tax Treatment of Partnership Carried Interests and Related Issues, Part I," (JCX-62-07), September 4, 2007. This document is available on the internet at www.house.gov/jct.

2 That document may be cited as follows: Joint Committee on Taxation, "Present Law and Analysis Relating to Tax Treatment of Partnership Carried Interests and Related Issues, Part II", (JCX-63-07), September 4, 2007. The document is available on the internet at www.house.gov/jct.

3 These types of funds have differing investment strategies. These are briefly described in the Economic Data section of this document.

4 Lynnley Browning, "A Hamptons for Hedge Funds: Offshore Tax Breaks Lure Money Managers," New York Times, July 1, 2007.

5 As income is earned by the partnership but is not yet distributed to the partner with the profits interest, the partner's share of these earnings is credited to his capital account. However, the capital account is debited when the earnings are distributed to the partner. Thus, the partner does not have rights in liquidation of the partnership once his profit share is distributed to him.

6 The Federal income tax treatment of partnership profits interests for services (of which carried interests can be an example) has evolved through litigation and Internal Revenue Service positions. This is discussed in the section of this document entitled Tax Treatment of the Receipt of a Partnership Profits Interest for Services.

7 For example, if a fund manager receives both an annual fee and a carried interest, an annual fee based on a percentage of the assets of a very large fund can provide substantial income regardless of profitabilility of the fund, potentially mitigating the incentive effect of the carried interest. Investors seeking to align the fund manager's economic interest with their own by means of a manager's carried interest might therefore negotiate time and effort and key person commitments on the part of the fund manager.

8 Lee Sheppard, "Carried Away: Management Fee Conversion," 116 Tax Notes 532, August 13, 2007.

9 Reuters, "Blackstone I.P.O. in June," New York Times, June 13, 2007; Jenny Anderson, "Scrutiny on Tax Rates that Fund Managers Pay," New York Times, June 13, 2007; Jenny Anderson, "Blackstone Founders Prepare to Count their Billions," New York Times, June 12, 2007; Michael J. de la Merced, "Fortress Goes Public, a First for Hedge Funds Inside U.S.," New York Times, Feb. 9, 2007; Bloomberg, "Hedge Fund is Planning Public Offering," New York Times, Nov. 9, 2006; Randall Smith, "Goldman Takes 'Private' Equity to a New Level," Wall Street Journal, May 24, 2007; "Oaktree to List on New Goldman Market, Reports Say," New York Times, May 11, 2007; Tom Petruno, "A Market for Private Stock Sales," Los Angeles Times, May 11, 2007.

10 In contrast to the transaction in which the fund manager goes public, some investment funds have sought a source of permanent capital (distinct from the capital provided by limited partners) by offering interests on exchanges in Europe. See Ben White and James McIntosh, "Lehman plans Euronext Listing," Financial Times, May 31, 2007; James McKinnon, "Companies UK: Fund Managers Hedge Bets on Ability to Raise 'Permanent Capital' for Listing,"Financial Times, November 29, 2006; Peter Smith, "Companies UK: Private Equity Seeds Public Vehicles," Financial Times, June 12, 2006; Peter Smith, "KKR Beats Target with $5bn Raised for Investment Vehicle," Financial Times, May 2, 2006.

11 The individual managers may retain a substantial interest (e.g., 75 percent) in the second tier fund management partnerships through limited partnership interests, while the publicly traded partnership holds the remaining portion (e.g., 25 percent) through intermediate holding entities. The individual managers' limited partnership interests may be exchanged at a later time for interests in the publicly traded partnership. The individual managers may hold operational control of the publicly traded partnership, while the public investors' interests give the public the right to substantially all of its income. Through this means, the public investors share indirectly in the carried interests held by the second tier partnerships.

12 The going-public transaction may also involve the establishment of a tax receivables agreement. Under this agreement, goodwill or other intangible assets of the asset management business that are amortizable for tax purposes are transferred to a lower-tier partnership, or sold to a lower-tier corporation possibly using proceeds of the public offering of partnership units. As the goodwill or other intangibles are amortized, generating tax deductions, typically 85 percent of the tax savings attributable to the deductions is paid to the contributors of the management business.

13 These issues are addressed in the Federal Tax Issues and Analysis section of this document. Additional issues are addressed in the Issues and Analysis section of the related document, Joint Committee on Taxation, "Present Law and Analysis Relating to Tax Treatment of Partnership Carried Interests and Related Issues, Part II", (JCX-63-07), September 4, 2007.

14 A. W. Jones, History of the Firm, http://www.awjones.com/historyofthefirm.html

15 Peter Landau, "The Hedge Funds: Wall Street's New Way to Make Money,"New York Magazine, 1:29, October 21, 1968, pp. 19-24.

16 Short sales involve the sale of a borrowed security that the seller does not own, usually with the expectation that the security will drop in price. If so, the short seller makes money by buying the security at the lower price to pay off the borrowed shares. A long position is one in which the investor owns the security outright.

17 Isaac Ruiz-Carus, Varun Bhat, and Emily Marriott, "What is a Hedge Fund?", The University of Iowa Center for International Finance and Development, available at http://www.uiowa.edu/ifdebook/faq/Hedge.shtml

18 Rene M. Stulz, "Hedge Funds: Past, Present, and Future." Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21, Spring 2007, pp. 175-194.

19 Hedge Fund Research in Britt Erica Tunick "Hedge Fund 100" AlphaMagazine.com, June 12, 2007, available at http://www.alphamagazine.com/article.aspx?articleID=1372539.

20 International Financial Services, London, Hedge Fund: City Business Series, April 2007, available at http://www.ifsl.org.uk/uploads/CBS_Hedge_Funds_2007.pdf.

21 Hedge Fund Research in Britt Erica Tunick "Hedge Fund 100" AlphaMagazine.com, June 12, 2007, available at http://www.alphamagazine.com/article.aspx?articleID=1372539. Treasury Assistant Secretary for Financial Markets, Anthony Ryan, placed the amount at $1.4 trillion in remarks before the Managed Funds Association Conference, June 11, 2007, available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp450.htm. Jickling and Marples, "Taxation of Hedge Fund and Private Equity Managers," July 5, 2007 put the number at $1.2 trillion. Rene M. Stulz, "Hedge Funds: Past, Present, and Future." Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21, Spring 2007, pp. 175-194, notes that larger estimates exist of up to $2.17 trillion as of 2005 from a survey by Hedgefundmanager and Advent. Hedgefund.net estimates the assets at $2.401 trillion as of the end of the first quarter of 2007, up from $2.154 trillion at the end of 2006. Hedgefund.net, "HFN Hedge Fund Industry Asset Flow/Performance Report, First Quarter Ending March 31, 2007," sample pages available at http://www.hedgefund.net/reports/Q1_2007_Asset_Flow_Report_sample.pdf

22 The Bank of New York and Casey, Quirk & Acito, "Institutional Demand for Hedge Funds: New Opportunities and New Standards," September 2004, available at http://www.fundadmin.com/Publications/WP1.pdf

23 The Bank of New York and Casey, Quirk & Associates, "Institutional Demand for Hedge Funds 2: A Global Perspective," Thought Leadership Series White Paper, October 2006, available at http://www.fundadmin.com/Publications/hedge_funds_2.pdf

24 Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund Index Monthly Performance Overview as of June 30, 20007, available at http://www.hedgeindex.com/hedgeindex/en/hedgperformance.aspx?cy=U.S.D

25 Calculations based on Standard & Poor's S&P 500 historical returns, available at http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/xls/index/MONTHLY.xls

26 Bank of New York and Casey, Quirk & Associates, supra.

27 International Financial Services, London supra.

28 Hennessee Group, LLC, 11th Annual Hedge Fund Manager Survey Press Release, May 31, 2005, available at http://www.hennesseegroup.com/releases/release20050531.html

29 Hennessee Group, LLC, 12th Annual Hedge Fund Manager Survey Press Release, December 5, 2006, available at http://www.hennesseegroup.com/releases/release20061205.html

30 Hennessee Group, LLC 13th Annual Hedge Fund Manager Survey Press Release, May 1, 2007, available at http://www.hennesseegroup.com/releases/release20070501.html

31 Stulz, "Hedge Funds: Past, Present, and Future."

32 Mila Getmansky, Andrew W. Lo, and Igor Makarov, "An Econometric Model of Serial Correlation and Illiquidity in Hedge Fund Returns," Journal of Financial Economics, 74, 2004, pp. 529-609.

33 Vikas Agarwal, Nicole M. Boyson, and Narayan Y. Naik, "Why is Santa so Kind to Hedge Funds? The December Return Puzzle!" available at Social Science Resource Network: http://ssrn.com/abstract=891621.

34 A more detailed discussion is available in Stulz, "Hedge Funds: Past, Present and Future."

35 Andrew Metrick and Ayako Yasuda, "The Economics of Private Equity Funds," (July 1, 2007). Available at Social Science Research Network: http://ssrn.com/abstract=996334. The Congressional Research Service places the figure at over $1 trillion raised in the last 10 years. Mark Jickling and Donald J. Marples, "Taxation of Hedge Fund and Private Equity Managers," July 5, 2007.

36 "Who's Who in Private Equity," The Wall Street Journal Online, http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/info-pequity0607-12.html?printVersion=true

37 Private Equity Intelligence, Ltd. 2006 "Value Creation and Carry Review", available at http://www.preqin.com/carry.aspx

38 International Financial Services, London, Hedge Fund: City Business Series, August 2007, available at http://www.ifsl.org.uk/uploads/CBS_Private_Equity_2007.pdf.

39 Private Equity Council, Public Value: A Primer on Private Equity, 2007, available at http://www.privateequitycouncil.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/pec_primer_layout_final.pdf.

40 Metrick and Yasuda, "The Economics of Private Equity Funds." Because funds make investments and partners earn revenue spread out over the typical ten-year lifetime of the fund, Metrick and Yasuda express all outlays in present value terms, as of the inception date of the fund using a discount rate of five percent.

41 Private Equity Intelligence, Ltd. (2006), supra.

42 Estimates of total distributed and unrealized gains for limited partners and carry earned by general partners to date are based on the most recent data available for these funds. Most funds in this study report data as of March 31, 2006.

43 Only a handful of cases have ruled on this issue. Though one case required the value to be included currently, where value was easily determined by a sale of the profits interest soon after receipt (Diamond v. Commissioner, 56 T. C. (1971), aff'd 492 F. 2.2d 286 (7th Cir, 1974)), a more recent case concluded that partnership profits interests were not includable on receipt, because the profits interests were speculative and without fair market value (Campbell v. Commissioner (943 F. 2d. 815 (8th Cir. 1991)).

44 Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-2 C.B. 343, citing the Diamond and Campbell cases, supra.

45 Rev. Proc. 2001-43 (2001-2 C.B. 191).

46 A similar result would occur under the 'safe harbor" election of proposed regulations regarding the application of section 83 to the compensatory transfer of a partnership interest. REG-105346-03, 70 Fed. Reg. 29675 (May 24, 2005). These proposed regulations are described in the section of this document entitled Tax Treatment of Property Transferred in Connection with the Performance of Services.

47 Secs. 61 and 83; Treas. Reg. sec. 1.721-1(b)(1)); see U.S. v. Frazell, 335 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1964), cert denied, 380 U.S. 961 (1965).

48 Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-2 C.B. 343.

49 Section 702.

50 Sec. 83(h).

51 Treas. Reg. sec. 1.83-3(e). This definition in part reflects previous IRS rulings on nonqualified deferred compensation.

52 70 Fed. Reg. 29675 (May 24, 2005).

53 This section summarizes applicable Federal tax rules. A more detailed explanation of present-law rules applicable to nonqualified deferred compensation is set forth in Present Law and Analysis Relating to Tax Treatment of Partnership Carried Interests and Related Issues, Part II (JCX-63-07), September 4, 2007. This document is available on the internet at www.house.gov/jct.

54 Section 409A was added by The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (Pub. L. No. 108-357) and generally applies to amounts deferred after December 31, 2004.

55 Under general tax principles, if the nonqualified deferred compensation arrangement is unfunded, then the compensation is generally includible in income when it is actually or constructively received under section 451 (unless earlier income inclusion applies under section 409A). If an arrangement is funded, then income is includible under section 83 for the year in which the individual's rights are transferable or not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture.

56 A plan includes an agreement or arrangement, including an agreement or arrangement that includes one person. Amounts deferred also include actual or notional earnings.

57 As under section 83, the rights of a person to compensation are subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture if the person's rights to such compensation are conditioned upon the performance of substantial services by any individual.

58 Secs. 404(a)(5), (b) and (d) and sec. 83(h).

59 See Chapter 21 of the Code.

60 Sec. 1401.

61 Secs. 3101 and 3111.

62 S corporation shareholders who are employees of the S corporation are subject to FICA taxes. A considerable body of case law has addressed the issue of whether amounts paid to S corporation shareholder-employees are reasonable compensation for services and therefore are wages subject to FICA tax or are properly characterized as another type of income (typically, dividends) and therefore not subject to FICA tax.

63 For purposes of determining net earnings from self-employment, taxpayers are permitted a deduction from net earnings from self-employment equal to the product of the taxpayer's net earnings (determined without regard to this deduction) and one-half of the sum of the rates for OASDI (12.4 percent) and HI (2.9 percent), i.e., 7.65 percent of net earnings. This deduction reflects the fact that the FICA rates apply to an employee's wages, which do not include FICA taxes paid by the employer, whereas a self-employed individual's net earnings are economically the equivalent of an employee's wages plus the employer share of FICA taxes. The deduction is intended to provide parity between FICA and SECA taxes. In addition, self-employed individuals may deduct one-half of self-employment taxes for income tax purposes (sec. 164(f)).

64 Sec. 1402(a)(13). For this purpose, limited partner status is determined under State law. Issues have arisen under present law as to the proper SECA tax treatment of individuals who may be limited partners under State law but who participate in the management and operation of the partnership.

65 Section 701.

66 Section 702.

67 Section 704(a) and (b).

68 Sections 705(a) and 722.

69 Sections 742 and 1012.

70 Section 705(a)(1). The basis is also increased by the excess of deductions for depletion over the basis of the property subject to depletion, if the partnership has an interest in such property.

71 Sections 705(a)(2) and 733. The basis is also decreased (but not below zero) by certain depletion deductions (sec. 705). Special rules may apply under regulations in the case of a partnership termination (sec. 705(b)).

72 Section 723.

73 For this purpose, a substantial built-in loss exists if the partnership's adjusted basis in partnership property exceeds by more than $250,000 the fair market value of the property (sec. 734(d)). An alternative rule providing for loss deferral for the transferee partner applies in the case of an electing investment partnership that would otherwise be treated as having a substantial built-in loss (sec. 734(e)).

74 Sections 743 and 754. Similar rules apply with respect to adjustments to the basis of partnership property in the case of a distribution of partnership property to a partner (sec. 734).

75 Section 731(b). Adjustments to the basis of the partnership's property in the event of a distribution may be required if the partnership has made a section 754 election or if there is a substantial basis reduction with respect to the distribution (sec. 734).

76 Section 731(a)(1) and (c).

77 Section 731(a)(2).

78 Section 751(b).

79 Sections 704(c) and 737.

80 Section 707.

81 Section 721. This nonrecognition rule does not apply to the transfer of property to a partnership that would be an investment company if it were a corporation (sec. 721(b)). If, in connection with the contribution to the partnership, there is a related direct or indirect transfer of money or other property by the partnership to a partner, the transfers may be treated as a taxable sale or exchange between partners or between the partnership and one who is not a partner (sec. 707).

82 Section 707(a).

83 Section 707(a)(2)(A). A similar rule applies in the case in which a partner transfers property to the partnership.

84 Section 707(c). A similar rule applies in the case of guaranteed payments for the use of capital.

85 Section 741.

86 Section 751.

87 Section 751(c). Unrealized receivables also include certain items generating ordinary income or gain under specified tax rules.

88 In general, the dividends-received deduction is 70 percent if the corporate shareholder owns less than 20 percent of the stock of the distributing corporation; 80 percent if the corporate shareholder owns at least 20 percent and less than 80 percent of the stock of the distributing corporation; and 100 percent if the corporate shareholder owns 80-percent or more of the stock of the distributing corporation and the dividend is paid out of earnings and profits of a year or years when such ownership requirement was met. Section 243.

89 Section 301(c).

90 Section 302.

91 Section 311.

92 Sections 351.

93 Section 368(c).

94 Section 163.

95 Section 167. Section 1239 requires that the sale of depreciable assets that would otherwise produce capital gain to the seller will result in ordinary income if the sale is directly or indirectly between related parties (as defined).

96 Section 197. Under anti-churning rules, no amortization deduction is allowed for assets that are acquired from a related party that held or used them within a specified time period prior to enactment of this deduction in 1993, and that were previously nonamortizable. Sec. 197(f)(9). Sales of these intangibles are also subject to the related party sale rules of section 1239.

97 The mechanisms for eliminating tax at the entity level differ among the types of entities. The entities are referred to here generally as "non-taxed" entities. They do not all pass through the character of the income received; and some are subject to corporate level tax to the extent they do not either distribute their income or designate undistributed income as currently taxable to their beneficial interest holders.

98 At least 50 percent of the assets of a RIC must consist of (i) cash and cash items, Government securities, securities of other RICs, and (ii) any other securities, provided that for purposes of this 50-percent calculation, they must be securities as to which the RIC owns not more than 10 percent of the outstanding voting securities of any one issuer and that are not greater in value than 5 percent of the assets of the RIC. Not more than 25 percent of RIC assets may be invested in (i) the securities of any one issuer (other than certain government securities or securities of other RICs), (ii) securities (other than of other RICs) of two or more issuers which the taxpayer controls (defined as 20 percent of the voting power or value of the issuer) and that are engaged in the same or similar lines of business, or (iii) securities of one or more qualified publicly traded partnerships.

99 Section 269B. These stapled stock restrictions also generally apply to real estate investment trusts (REITs).

100 A REIT is not treated as providing services that produce impermissible tenant services income if such services are provided by an independent contractor from whom the REIT does not derive or receive any income. An independent contractor is defined as a person who does not own, directly or indirectly, more than 35 percent of the shares of the REIT. Also, no more than 35 percent of the total shares of stock of an independent contractor (or of the interests in net assets or net profits, if not a corporation) can be owned directly or indirectly by persons owning 35 percent or more of the interests in the REIT.

101 Sec. 856(d)(2)(B).

102 Sec. 856(d)(8).

103 Section 856(c)(4)(B)(ii).

104 If the excise tax applies, then the item is not reallocated back to the TRS under section 482.

105 Section 860A.

106 As described in the Background section of this document, generally a partnership profits interest generally gives the partner a right to receive a percentage of a partnership's profits without an obligation to contribute to partnership capital and without a right to partnership assets on liquidation.

107 In general, capital income taxed at lower rates has historically included capital gain. Qualifying dividend income of individuals has been taxed at the same maximum rate as capital gain since 2003. This treatment is scheduled to expire at the end of 2010, as are the current maximum rates for both ordinary income and capital gain. However, during the 1970's, income from services was taxed at a maximum rate of 50 percent while investment income, including dividends, but not including capital gain, was taxed at a higher maximum rate of 70 percent. As an exception to the generalization that capital gains have historically been taxed at a rate lower than labor income, for taxable years beginning in 1988, 1989, and 1990, the maximum tax rates of individuals on all income, ordinary as well as capital gain, was 28 percent.

108 When labor income and capital income are taxed at the same rates, then issues of the character of income (i.e., whether capital or ordinary) are much less significant. Some distinctions between capital and ordinary income would remain, however, even if the tax rate differential were eliminated. Unlike ordinary income treatment, capital gain treatment entitles investors to tax-free return of basis to the extent of basis in the asset. Another difference between ordinary and capital gain treatment is that capital losses are subject to a limitation on deductibility against ordinary income. Issues of timing (i.e., when income is taxed) are not affected by setting capital and ordinary income rates at the same level.

109 For example, the structure of a particular investment vehicle can depend in part on tax issues for investors such as unrelated business income tax on tax-exempt investors, imposition of U.S. income tax, return filing obligations, and withholding on foreign investors, and deduction limitations for U.S. taxable investors. The potential for deferral of manager compensation raises additional issues. These issues are discussed in Present Law and Analysis Relating to Tax Treatment of Partnership Carried Interests and Related Issues, Part II (JCX-63-07), September 4, 2007. This document is available on the internet at www.house.gov/jct.

110 See, e.g., Comm'r v. Jose Ferrer, 304 F.2d 125 (2d Cir, 1962), rev'g 35 T.C. 617 (1961), involving a disputed distinction between compensation for acting services, on the one hand, and capital gain from the disposition of property rights in the resulting productions, on the other. See also Bittker and Lokken, Federal Income Taxation of Income, Estates, and Gifts, (Third Edition, 1999) p. 3-73.

111 See, e.g., section 1221(a)(3)(A), providing that certain copyrights and other property in the hands of a taxpayer whose personal efforts created the property are not a capital asset and thus are not eligible for capital gain treatment; section 751 (gain on sale of a partnership interest is not capital gain to extent it reflects certain unrealized receivables, including certain rights to payment for services); section 7701(e)(1) (providing for recharacterization of a services contract as a lease in certain situations).

112 It has also been pointed out that in registration statements filed with the Securities Exchange Commission when fund management firms go public, it is asserted that the fund manager's business is the performance of investment advisory services, for purposes of whether or not the entity going public is subject to the Investment Company Act of 1940. See Victor Fleisher, "Blackstone IPO: Analysis of the Tax Risk," March 25, 2007, http://www.theconglomerate.org/2007/03/blackstone_ipo_.html

113 Capital gain and dividend income of a partnership retains its character as such for tax purposes in the hands of the partners, i.e., the individual managers. This passthrough treatment is described in the section of this pamphlet entitled Tax Treatment of Partnerships and Partners.

114 See Chris William Sanchirico, "The Tax Advantage to Paying Private Equity Fund Managers with Profit Shares: What is it? Why is it bad?," Institute for Law and Economics, University of Pennsylvania Law School Research Paper No. 07-14, August 19, 2007, http://ssrn.com/abstract_996665.

115 The manager's carried interest, unlike deductible compensation, reduces the investors' shares of overall partnership income by shifting a share of overall partnership income from them to the manager. The carried interest is economically equivalent to deductible compensation, but the tax impact of the two arrangements may be different if the partners' tax rates or tax situations differ.

116 This situation can arise if the investors were never entitled to the deduction, such as investors that are tax-exempt or foreign persons not subject to U.S. tax, or are not entitled to a full compensation deduction on a current basis. For example, such an investor might be a taxable corporation with NOLs (reducing the current value of the deduction to it), or an individual subject to a deduction limitation (such as the alternative minimum tax, the 2-percent floor on miscellaneous itemized deductions, or the overall limitation on itemized deductions). Other limitations, such as the $1 million cap on deductible employee compensation fur public corporations, or the rules matching the timing of the deduction for compensation that is deferred, could also tend to have this effect.

117 A corollary question stemming from the same factual analysis of the partners' mutual tax situations is whether the tax treatment of carried interests should be changed because they are facilitating avoidance of deduction limitations such as the alternative minimum tax, the 2-percent floor on miscellaneous itemized deductions, or the overall limitation on itemized deductions. On the other hand, it could be said that the tax policy issue of whether these deduction limitations are avoidable is distinct from the tax policy issue of whether carried interests of fund managers resemble compensatory interests or not, and that these distinct tax policy issues should be addressed separately rather than being conflated.

118 Some transactions that bundle together labor income and capital income are not unbundled for Federal tax purposes. Trying to impute separate income streams in the absence of any cash flows between taxpayers would be needlessly complex, difficult to understand, and time-consuming for taxpayers and the tax administrator, and probably would not materially change the taxpayers' net tax consequences if their tax rates are similar or the same. An example of this might be a "free" checking account held by a business at a commercial bank. This could be analyzed as if the checking account owner deposits money that earns overnight rates of interest, and the bank provides financial services (honoring and clearing checks) in return for compensation equal to the interest. As a practical matter, this transaction is not unbundled into these components.

119 Receipt of a partnership capital interest for services is a taxable event under present law (see the section of this document on Tax Treatment of the Receipt of a Partnership Profits Interest for Services). This is a less favorable tax result than if the partner held only a partnership profits interest.

120 As described in the Background section of this document, the partner does not have rights in liquidation of the partnership once his profit share is distributed to him.

121 See Victor Fleisher, "Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in Private Equity Funds," Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper no. 06-27, March 11, 2007, revised June 12, 2007.

122 It could be argued that a rule treating gain or loss from sale or disposition of a fund manager's partnership profits interest as ordinary compensation is inconsistent with the present-law treatment of sweat equity on sale of a business as capital gain. On the other hand, if current income under a carried interest is taxed as ordinary compensation, but gain on sale of the interest is capital gain, and income deferral is an acceptable or desirable outcome, then ordinary income treatment on the sale of the profits interest is arguably a necessary anti-avoidance rule, even though it might appear inconsistent with taxing "sweat equity" on sale of a business as capital gain.

123 It is possible, particularly in some types of funds with particular investment strategies, such as buyout, turnaround or distressed business investment funds, that some portfolio companies may themselves pay little or no tax on a current basis due to poor previous economic performance or high leverage.

124 This is described in the section of this document entitled Tax Treatment of the Receipt of a Partnership Profits Interest for Services.

125 This is described in the section of this document entitled Tax Treatment of Property Transferred in Connection with the Performance of Services.

126 Courts and the Internal Revenue Service have acknowledged the difficulty of valuing partnership profits interests; see the section of this document entitled Tax Treatment of a Partnership Interest Received for Services.

127 The recent going public transactions have generally involved formation of new entities to hold carried interests that were established in earlier years. While some have argued that valuation techniques have been created that help to determine value in the absence of market value, it is also argued that these valuation techniques are subject to volatility and other assumptions and may not be particularly accurate. See Lee A. Sheppard, "Blackstone Proves Carried Interests Can Be Valued," Tax Notes, June 25, 2007, 1236.

128 Presumably, the value of a partnership profits interest depends on the size and timing of the expected future income stream from the profits interest. Under an approach taxing the value of a profits interest on receipt, this value would be the amount realized by the partner upon grant. The partner would be taxed again on his distributive share of subsequent partnership income as it is earned by the partnership, whether or not the income is distributed to him. Partnership distributions generally are not taxed, except, for example, if money distributed to a partner exceeds the partner's adjusted basis in its interest. Thus, adding to the partner's basis the amount realized on a taxable receipt of a profits interest would not fully prevent double taxation of the partner's share of later-realized partnership income. Rather, a more complex concept of previously taxed income would probably be necessary.

129 Victor Fleischer, "Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in Private Equity Funds," Legal Research Paper Series, Working Paper Number 06-27 (March, 2006, revised June 12, 2007). The paper refers to this approach as the "Cost of Capital" approach. The paper does not conclude that this approach should be adopted legislatively. However, the paper considers the possibility of self-help adoption of such an approach, which it considers "perfectly acceptable from a tax policy viewpoint."

130 Id. Section 7872 uses the AFR as the rate against which to measure when stated interest is inadequate in certain situations, with the result that additional interest will be imputed if it has not been stated. However, section 7872 only imputes interest at the AFR.

131 Compare Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.83-3(a)(2), which states: "[I]f the amount paid for the transfer of property is an indebtedness secured by the transferred property, on which there is no personal liability to pay all or a substantial part of such indebtedness, such transaction may be in substance the same as the grant of an option."

132 See Ronald J. Gilson and David M. Schizer, "Understanding Venture Capital Structure: A Tax Explanation for Convertible Preferred Stock," Practicing Law Institute, Tax and Estate Planning Course Handbook Series, Tax Law and Practice, No. 9062 (2006). There may be disadvantages to applying this structure to replicate an investment partnership that would make multiple investments through a single entity.

133 See Present Law and Analysis Relating to Tax Treatment of Partnership Carried Interests and Related Issues, Part II (JCX-63-07), September 4, 2007. This document is available on the internet at www.house.gov/jct.

134 This analysis applies whether the business derives any income from these activities, or alternatively, derives more than a certain portion of its income from these activities. Under present law, an exception to corporate treatment of publicly traded partnerships applies if at least 90 percent of the partnership's income is qualifying income, including su ch income as dividends, interest, and capital gain, but does not include compensation for services.

135 Such a corporation is known as a "blocker" corporation, for blocking non-qualifying income from the upper-tier entity (in this case, the publicly traded partnership). This document does not address the use of blockers in contexts other than by publicly traded partnerships.

136 In the case of an asset management business with substantial goodwill or other intangibles, such intangibles can be transferred to the corporation so that the deductions for amortization of goodwill can offset management fee income received by the corporation. In this situation, the corporation's tax on the management fee income may be reduced by deductions for amortizable intangibles.

137 See discussion in the section of this document entitled Comparison to Corporations and Other Business Entities.

PRESENT LAW AND ANALYSIS RELATING TO TAX TREATMENT OF PARTNERSHIP CARRIED INTERESTS AND RELATED ISSUES, PART II


Scheduled for a Public Hearing Before the HOUSE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS on September 6, 2007

Prepared by the Staff of the JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION

September 4, 2007

JCX-63-07



CONTENTS


Page

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

I. BACKGROUND

II. ECONOMIC DATA

III. PRESENT LAW


A. Present Law and Background of the Unrelated Business Income Tax and Debt-Financed Income

B. Overview of U.S. International Tax Rules

C. Overview of Ways to Defer Services Income

IV. ISSUES AND ANALYSIS


A. Issues and Analysis Relating to the Unrelated Business Income Tax and Debt-Financed Income

B. Issues and Analysis Relating to U.S. International Tax Rules

C. Issues and Analysis Relating to Nonqualified Deferred Compensation



INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY


The Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives has scheduled a public hearing on September 6, 2007, on the Federal tax issues in connection with partnership carried interests and related issues. This document,1 prepared by the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, includes a description of present law and analysis of Federal tax issues relating to partnership carried interests and related issues particularly involving the use of offshore entities.

Part One of this document provides background information about offshore structures for private equity, hedge fund, venture capital fund, and similar alternative asset management and financial advisory business activities. Part One also provides background information about tax-exempt investors and unrelated business income tax, foreign individual investors and income effectively connected to a trade or business, and deferral of income of managers. Part Two describes geographic distribution of hedge funds and private equity funds. Part Three describes present law and history of the law relating to unrelated business income tax and debt-financed income, an overview of U.S. international tax rules, and an overview of ways to defer services income under present law. Part Four provides a discussion of issues and analysis of Federal tax issues relating to these areas.

A companion document2 relating to the Ways and Means Committee hearing on September 6, 2007, prepared by the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, provides a description of present law and analysis of Federal tax issues relating to partnership carried interests in general.

Part One of the companion document provides background information about carried interests and going-public transactions of partnerships involved in private equity, hedge fund, venture capital fund, and similar alternative asset management and financial advisory business activities. Part Two provides economic data relating to partnerships, and to private equity, venture capital, and hedge funds, and certain carried interests. Part Three describes present law relating to Federal tax rates for individuals, tax treatment of partnership profits interests for services, and tax rules relating to compensation and employment tax. Part Four describes present law relating to taxation of partners and partnerships, including publicly traded partnerships, and compares the tax treatment of taxable corporations and of passthrough and untaxed entities. Part Five describes recent legislative proposals. Part Six provides a description and analysis of Federal tax issues relating to carried interests.



I. BACKGROUND




In general

Over the past several decades, private equity funds, venture capital funds, hedge funds, and similar alternative investment vehicles3 have attracted large amounts of capital investment from institutional investors such as pension funds and educational and charitable institution endowments, as well as from wealthy individual investors. These investors become limited partners in the funds, which are generally structured as partnerships. Some of the funds are established in offshore jurisdictions.4 The assets invested in the funds generally are managed by groups of individuals who contribute a relatively small amount of capital to the fund (in relation to amounts of capital contributed by the investors) and who provide investment expertise in selecting, managing, and disposing of fund assets.

Investors in the funds have historically (though not exclusively) been of three general types: high net-worth individuals who are subject to U.S. tax; foreign persons who are not otherwise subject to U.S. tax; and U.S. institutional investors (such as charities and private and government pension funds) that are tax-exempt under U.S. tax rules.5 These types of investors have differing U.S. tax situations, and therefore, have differing tax issues arising from investing in investment funds such as hedge funds and private equity funds. In general, high net-worth individuals may be concerned about limitations on deductions, such as the 2-percent floor on miscellaneous itemized deductions, the overall limitation on itemized deductions, and the alternative minimum tax. They may prefer to let the fund manager's carried interest serve to reduce their distributive share of partnership income as it is earned, rather than having a higher share of partnership income along with a deduction for manager compensation that may not be fully or currently usable because of a deduction limitation. Tax-exempt organizations and foreign persons not subject to U.S. tax may be even more indifferent to deductions. Instead, tax-exempt organizations may be concerned about becoming subject to unrelated business income tax. Foreign individuals may be concerned about becoming subject to U.S. tax and about U.S. withholding tax and the possibility of being required to file a U.S. income tax return (even if no tax is ultimately due).

Funds have been structured to accommodate these various concerns. In addition, the structures may serve to maximize aggregate tax savings with respect to all the parties (investors and fund managers). These arrangements may be based on the "master-feeder" structure in which a single fund is held by separate domestic and foreign entities through which different types of investors invest.6 The structure may include the interposition of a payor foreign corporation between the investment fund and certain of its investors, typically the fund's foreign and tax-exempt investors, which serves to block types of income received that could be subject to U.S. tax in their hands, and to convert this income to dividends (or interest) when distributed to them. The foreign corporation may also serve as an income deferral mechanism for individual fund managers in the case of management fees.



Investment Fund Structure with Foreign Feeder Corporation






Offshore entities



In general

An initial question involves what aspects of the structure and business activities of hedge funds and private equity funds and their managers are offshore. The inquiry involves whether (1) the investment fund itself is established in a foreign jurisdiction rather than in the U.S., (2) the assets of the investment fund are foreign or U.S. assets, (3) the individuals who are engaged in managing the investment fund reside outside the U.S., work outside the U.S., or conduct management activities through an entity established outside the U.S., and (4) intermediate entities through which investors (typically tax-exempt and foreign) invest in the fund are established in an offshore jurisdiction or in the U.S. Use of intermediate foreign corporations is relatively common, and sometimes the investment fund itself is established offshore.7

Interests in investment funds may be held through offshore corporations established in low-tax or zero-tax foreign jurisdictions for a variety of U.S. tax reasons. In general, a foreign corporation in such a jurisdiction may be viewed as preferable to a U.S. corporation because it is subject to little or no corporate income tax, whereas a U.S. corporation generally is subject to U.S. corporate-level income tax.



Tax-exempt investors and unrelated business income tax

One reason for investing in alternative asset funds through a foreign corporation relates to the imposition of unrelated business income tax ("UBIT") on tax-exempt organizations under present law. The assets of alternative asset funds often are ones that, if owned directly by a tax-exempt organization, would produce income that is subject to UBIT, because, for example, the assets are active business assets that are unrelated to the organization's exempt purpose, or the assets are debt-financed.

If tax-exempt organizations hold such investments through a partnership, a lookthrough rule applies, potentially subjecting the tax-exempt investors' returns to UBIT. By contrast, if tax-exempt organizations hold potentially UBIT-producing investments through a corporation, the corporation's separate existence generally is respected for Federal tax purposes so that the lookthrough rule does not apply, and dividends paid by the corporation to the tax-exempt investors generally are excluded from the investors' unrelated business taxable income. Tax-exempt organizations thus may have an incentive to invest in alternative asset funds through corporate entities, sometimes referred to as "UBIT blockers" or "blocker corporations." Such corporations may be established offshore in low-tax or zero-tax jurisdictions to avoid corporate tax at the blocker corporation level.



Foreign individual investors and income effectively connected with a U.S. trade or business

In addition, foreign individuals may find it attractive to invest in an alternative asset fund through an offshore corporation rather than directly because by doing so, the individuals may avoid the direct imposition of U.S. tax on income effectively connected with a U.S. trade or business and the related requirement to file a U.S. tax return. Foreign individuals may also hold the view that it is preferable to invest through a foreign corporation in order to interpose an additional non-U.S. entity between themselves and U.S. taxing jurisdiction.

To the extent, however, that a foreign individual would have effectively connected income if the individual invested in a fund directly rather than through an offshore corporation, the foreign corporation itself has effectively connected income. Investment in a fund through an offshore corporation therefore generally does not reduce the aggregate U.S. tax liability of foreign individual investors. Some of the business activities of alternative asset funds may give rise to taxable U.S. effectively connected income for foreign individual investors or offshore feeder corporations. However, these funds generally rely on the trading safe harbors of section 864(b) to avoid U.S. trade or business status and resulting effectively connected income. In this connection, it has been questioned whether the section 864(b) trading safe harbors do or, as a policy matter, should protect foreign investors from having a U.S. trade or business that is subject to U.S. taxation in the context of these types of investment funds.

The United States generally taxes the worldwide income of its residents, and anti-deferral rules generally restrict the ability to defer U.S. taxation by deriving income through foreign corporations. Thus, U.S. resident individuals generally do not have a U.S. tax reason for relocating abroad to manage alternative asset funds. Similarly, U.S. resident individuals generally have no U.S. tax incentive to invest in alternative asset funds through foreign corporations.



Deferral of income of managers

The desire of certain investors to make their investments through an offshore corporation presents fund managers with a tax deferral opportunity that is generally not available through a U.S. corporation or partnership.8 A foreign corporation provides the fund managers a structure that is conducive to deferring tax on compensation. The tax deferral opportunity is possible only if the fund manager structures its carried interest as a contractual right to compensation as opposed to a profits interest in the investment fund. Provided that present-law U.S. tax rules relating to nonqualified deferred compensation are satisfied, current income taxation on the fund manager's compensation and amounts earned on such deferred compensation can be postponed. In the case of an onshore investor who is subject to U.S. tax, structuring the carried interest as deferred compensation is not desirable as a tax planning matter because the payor's deduction is postponed under U.S. tax law until the amount is included in income by the fund manager. In the case of a U.S. taxpayer, this deferral of the deduction creates a tension which, in theory, may limit the amount of compensation that is deferred. This tension is not present in the case of fund managers in offshore arrangements, either because funds are established in offshore jurisdictions and do not pay a corporate-level tax in the United States, or because investors are tax exempt or otherwise not subject to U.S. tax and are indifferent as to the timing of a tax deduction for compensation.

If the carried interest is structured as nonqualified deferred compensation, all amounts received by the fund manager pursuant to the carried interest are taxable as ordinary income. In contrast, if the carried interest is structured as a partnership profits interest in the fund, the fund manager's distributive share of the fund's income and loss items retains the character that those items had at the fund level under present law. Thus, to the extent the fund's income constitutes long-term capital gain or qualifying dividends eligible for the preferential capital gain tax rate, the consensus understanding of current law is that the fund manager's share of that income is eligible for the preferential capital gain tax rate. However, in the case of funds (such as hedge funds) whose investment strategy involves relatively rapid turnover of assets, income generated by the fund is generally not eligible for the long-term capital gain tax rate, but rather, is generally subject to income tax at the same rate as ordinary compensation income.9 In this situation, where preferential long-term capital gains tax rates are not available, the tax benefit of deferred compensation to the recipient may be substantial.



Quantifying the tax benefit of deferral of compensation

The principal advantage of deferral is the ability to retain earnings in the foreign corporation and invest them such that they are not subject to tax on an annual basis, i.e., invest them on a pre-tax basis. Suppose that a taxpayer in the 35 percent bracket earns $100 of compensation today and defers it for five years, such that the foreign corporation can invest the money and earn a 10 percent return per year. The taxpayer would then have $161.05 and pay tax of $56.37, for an after-tax income of $104.68. Suppose there is another taxpayer who cannot defer compensation, but has access to the same investment opportunity. This taxpayer receives $100 in compensation today, pays tax of $35, and has only $65 to invest. He invests that amount at an after-tax rate of 6.5 percent, i.e. a 10 percent pretax rate less 35 percent tax on the earnings each year. At the end of five years, he will only have $89.06. The $15.62 ultimate difference in economic wealth between the taxpayer who could defer the compensation income for five years (whose deferred income in turn compounded at 10 percent per year), compared to the otherwise identically-situated taxpayer who was required to pay tax on the compensation income immediately (whose after-tax income compounded at 6.5 percent per year), can be analyzed as follows.

In the deferral case, the employee can be understood at a conceptual level (by virtue of her agreement with her employer under which her deferred compensation grows at 10 percent per year) as if she also received $100 in cash compensation (but in her case not taxable income) immediately, and then set aside $35 of that $100 to fund her entire tax liability (which $35 in turn also was invested at 10 percent). Of course the employee did not actually receive cash upfront, but the effect of her agreement with her employer was to put her in the same economic position as if she did receive that cash and immediately invested it at a 10 percent rate. Each year the $100 (and therefore the employee's ultimate tax bill) would notionally grow at 10 percent, but so would the $35 component of that amount set aside to fund the employee's future tax bill. As a result, the $35 notionally set aside by the employee in the first period would be sufficient to pay her taxes at the end of the fifth year. This means that the employee's total after-tax wealth at the end of the fifth year would equal $65 (the portion of the $100 notionally received at the start that was not needed to fund her tax liability) compounded at the full pretax rate of 10 percent, or $104.68.

In other words, the incremental value of deferring income in this example is equivalent to the difference between investing $65-the after-tax value of the compensation-at the pre-tax interest rate (10 percent), rather than the after-tax rate (6.5 percent), for the five-year life of the deferral. More generally, any deferral of income can be analyzed in the same way: the value of deferral is equivalent to the value of investing the after-tax amount of the income over the period of the deferral at the pre-tax rate of return.10 It is as if the taxpayer who can defer her income must pay tax currently on the deferred amount, but then can invest the after-tax proceeds on a tax-exempt basis.11



II. ECONOMIC DATA




In general

As mentioned above, alternative investment funds have been structured to accommodate the various tax concerns of their investors. One element of this structure is the decision to register the fund onshore, offshore, or in a structure with parallel onshore and offshore components. While other business reasons may exist for a fund to locate offshore, tax considerations may provide one reason for alternative investment funds to register offshore. This section provides data on the geographic distribution of two broad categories of alternative investment funds: hedge funds and private equity funds. The data relate to whether the fund is onshore --meaning for this purpose, registered in the country where the fund is based --or offshore --meaning for this purpose, registered in a country other than where the fund is based.



Geographic distribution of hedge funds

As of January 2006, nearly 55 percent of global hedge funds were registered offshore, that is, in a country other than where the fund is based.12 The vast majority, 92 percent, of offshore funds are registered in the British overseas territories of the Cayman Islands (63 percent), the British Virgin Islands (13 percent), Bermuda (11 percent), and the Bahamas (5 percent). The U.S. was the most popular onshore site, (with funds mostly registered in Delaware), home to 48 percent of those funds registered in onshore locations, followed by Ireland with 7 percent of all onshore funds. That is, U.S. based and registered funds represented 48 percent of all funds that were both registered in and based out of the same country.

The U.S. is the primary location for the management of hedge fund assets, as determined by the location of the hedge fund manager. The U.S. accounted for 63 percent of all assets under management in 2006, down from 82 percent in 2002. Europe and Asia have seen their shares of global hedge fund assets rise from 12 percent to more than 25 percent and from 5 percent to 8 percent, respectively, over that time.

Nearly half of all U.S. domiciled hedge fund managers are based in New York, managing a third of global hedge fund assets, down from 45 percent in 2002. California is home to 15 percent of the number of U.S. managers, followed by Connecticut, Illinois, and Florida with approximately 6 percent each. London is the world's second largest center for hedge fund managers with 21 percent of global assets under management in 2006. Other important European centers include France, Spain, and Switzerland. For Asia-Pacific funds, Australia leads with one-quarter of the region's hedge funds' $140 billion in assets under management as of the end of 2006. Following are the U.S. (with 23 percent), Japan (20 percent), U.K. (16 percent) and Hong Kong (14 percent).



Geographic distribution of private equity funds

One study estimates that U.S. venture and buyout funds launched between 1991 and 2004 represented 59 percent (988 out of 1,673) of the total number of private equity funds worldwide during that time. European venture and buyout funds were home to nearly 16 percent of all funds (263). Just over one quarter of funds were either real estate funds without a location identified (144) or were located elsewhere in the world (278).13

This geographic distribution is confirmed by more recent data.14 For 2006, the U.S. accounted for approximately 60 percent of global private equity investments with more than $220.4 billion, down from 67 percent in 2000. The U.S. share of funds raised declined from 69 percent to 47 percent over this period. The U.K. was the second largest market for private equity investments, attracting $51.4 billion for 14 percent of global investments. Other European countries attracting significant global private equity investment include France with 4 percent of all investments, Sweden with 2 percent, and Germany, Spain, and the Netherlands, with approximately 1 percent each. Europe as a whole represents 24 percent of the private equity investment market, up from 21 percent in 2000. The most significant growth for Europe has been as a source of private equity funds raised, increasing its share from 21 percent in 2000 to 44 percent in 2006.

The Asia-Pacific region has also attracted an increasing share of investments, growing from a 6 percent share in 2000 to a 14 percent share in 2006, even as its importance as a source of funds raised remained relatively constant, rising only modestly from 7 percent to 8 percent. Separate estimates show the Middle East Gulf Cooperation Council economies of Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman, increased their presence in private equity fundraising. These countries raised $10 billion in 2006, up from $5.7 billion in 2005. The entire Middle East and North Africa region accounted for approximately twice this amount.15

Seven of the top 10 private equity firms ranked by amount of capital raised for direct private equity investment between 2001 and 2006 are headquartered in the United States, including all of the top 5 firms. Three of these 7 firms are headquartered in New York, with one each in Washington, DC, Fort Worth, TX, Boston, MA, and Providence, RI. The other 3 firms in the top 10 are headquartered in London.16



III. PRESENT LAW




A. Present Law and Background of the Unrelated Business Income Tax and Debt-Financed Income




Present law of the unrelated business income tax and debt-financed property rules



Overview of the unrelated business income tax

The Code imposes a tax, at ordinary corporate rates, on the income that a tax-exempt organization obtains from an "unrelated trade or business ... regularly carried on by it."17 Most exempt organizations are subject to the tax.18 Generally, "unrelated trade or business" is "any trade or business the conduct of which is not substantially related ... to the exercise or performance by such organization of its charitable, educational, or other purpose."19 The Code thus sets up a three-part test for determining whether income from an activity is subject to the unrelated business income tax: (1) the activity constitutes a trade or business; (2) the activity is regularly carried on; and (3) the activity is not substantially related to the organization's tax-exempt purposes. An organization that is subject to the unrelated business income tax and that has $1,000 or more of gross unrelated business taxable income must report that income on Form 990-T (Exempt Organization Business Income Tax Return).

Passive income, such as dividends, interest, royalties, certain rents, and certain gains and losses from the sale or exchange of property, is exempt from the unrelated business income tax.20 In general, the exemption for such passive income applies unless the income is derived from debt-financed property21 or is in the form of certain payments from certain 50-percent controlled subsidiaries.22 Other exemptions from the unrelated business income tax are provided for activities in which substantially all the work is performed by volunteers, for income from the sale of donated goods, and for certain activities carried on for the convenience of members, students, patients, officers, or employees of a charitable organization. In addition, special unrelated business income tax provisions exempt from tax certain activities of trade shows and State fairs, income from bingo games, and income from the distribution of certain low-cost items incidental to the solicitation of charitable contributions. Organizations liable for tax on unrelated business taxable income may be liable for alternative minimum tax determined after taking into account adjustments and tax preference items.



Overview of the debt-financed property rules

In general, income of a tax-exempt organization that is produced by debt-financed property is treated as unrelated business income in proportion to the acquisition indebtedness on the income-producing property. Special rules apply in the case of an exempt organization that owns an interest in a partnership (or a pass-through entity taxed as a partnership) that holds debt-financed property.23 In general, in such cases, if the partnership incurs acquisition indebtedness with respect to property that, if held directly by the exempt organization, would not qualify for an exception from the debt-financed property rules, the receipt of income by the exempt organization with respect to such property may result in recognition of unrelated debt-finance income.

Acquisition indebtedness generally means the amount of unpaid indebtedness incurred by an organization to acquire or improve the property and indebtedness that would not have been incurred but for the acquisition or improvement of the property.24 Acquisition indebtedness does not include, however, (1) certain indebtedness incurred in the performance or exercise of a purpose or function constituting the basis of the organization's exemption, (2) obligations to pay certain types of annuities, (3) an obligation, to the extent it is insured by the Federal Housing Administration, to finance the purchase, rehabilitation, or construction of housing for low and moderate income persons, or (4) indebtedness incurred by a qualified organization to acquire or improve real property (the "real property exception").25



Exception for debt-financed real property investments by qualified organizations

For purposes of the real property exception, a qualified organization is: (1) an educational organization described in section 170(b)(1)(A)(ii)26 and its affiliated supporting organizations; (2) a qualified trust described in section 401(a) (hereinafter "pension funds"); (3) a title holding company described in section 501(c)(25) (insofar as it holds shares of organizations described in (1) or (2)27 ); or (4) a retirement income account described in section 403(b)(9).28 To qualify for the real property exception, an acquisition or improvement by the qualified organization must meet several requirements. These include: (1) a requirement generally that the price of the property is a fixed amount determined as of the date of the acquisition or completion of the improvement; (2) restrictions against payment of the indebtedness of the arrangement being dependent upon the revenue, income, or profits derived from the property; (3) restrictions concerning sale-leaseback arrangements; and (4) in general, a prohibition against seller financing.29

Additional requirements must be met for the real property exception to apply where the real property is held by a partnership in which a qualified organization is a partner. To qualify for the real property exception, the partnership must meet all of the above-described general requirements and must meet one of the following three requirements: (1) all of the partners of the partnership are qualified organizations; (2) each allocation to a partner of the partnership which is a qualified organization is a qualified allocation (within the meaning of section 168(h)(6)); or (3) the partnership satisfies a rule prohibiting disproportionate allocations.30

The disproportionate allocation rule requires two things: first, that the organization satisfy what commonly is referred to as the "fractions rule," and second, that each allocation with respect to the partnership have substantial economic effect within the meaning of section 704(b)(2).31 Under the fractions rule, the allocation of items to any partner that is a qualified organization cannot result in such partner having a share of the overall partnership income for any taxable year greater than such partner's share of overall partnership loss for the taxable year for which such partner's loss share will be the smallest.32 A partnership generally must satisfy the fractions rule on an actual basis and on a prospective basis for each taxable year of the partnership in which it holds debt-financed property and has at least one partner that is a qualified organization.33 The fractions rule generally is intended to prevent the shifting of disproportionate income or gains to tax-exempt partners of the partnership or the shifting of disproportionate deductions, losses, or credits to taxable partners.



Legislative history of the unrelated business income tax and debt-financed property rules



Business and debt-financed income prior to 1950

Until the introduction of the unrelated business income tax in 1950, exempt organizations enjoyed a full exemption from Federal income tax. There was no statutory limitation on the amount of business activity an exempt organization could conduct so long as the earnings from the business were used for exempt purposes. In court decisions, tax-exemption was extended to organizations that did not conduct any charitable programs, but rather operated commercial businesses for the benefit of a charitable organization. Tax exemption for such so called "feeder" organizations was recognized, for example in Roche's Beach, Inc. v. Commissioner,34 and C.F. Mueller Co. v. Commissioner.35

In addition to the use of feeder corporations as a source of revenue, another common practice of exempt organizations in the years before 1950 was the acquisition of real estate with borrowed funds. In a typical transaction, a tax-exempt organization would borrow the entire purchase price of real property, lease the property back to the seller under a long-term lease, and service the loan with tax-free rental income from the lease.36



Revenue Act of 1950

As a response to these practices, in the Revenue Act of 1950 Congress subjected charitable organizations (not including churches), and certain other exempt organizations to tax on their unrelated business income.37 The legislative history of the 1950 Act provides that "the problem at which the tax on unrelated business income is directed here is primarily that of unfair competition."38 Congress decided not to deny or revoke tax-exempt status solely because the organization carried on unrelated active business enterprises, but instead "merely [imposed] the same tax on income derived therefrom as is borne by their competitors."39 The Congress excluded from the tax certain passive forms of income, concluding that such passive income was "not likely to result in serious competition for taxable businesses having similar income"40 and "should not be taxed where it is used for exempt purposes because investments producing incomes of these types have long been recognized as proper for educational and charitable organizations."41

The 1950 Act also taxed as unrelated business income certain rents received in connection with the leveraged sale and leaseback of real estate.42 Here, Congress cited three objections to such transactions: (1) "the tax-exempt organization is not merely trying to find a means of investing its own funds at an adequate rate of return but is obviously trading on its exemption since the only contribution it makes to the sale and lease is its tax exemption"; (2) unchecked, such transactions could result in exempt organizations owning "the great bulk of the commercial and industrial real estate in the country ... lower[ing] drastically the rental income included in the corporate and individual income tax bases"; and (3) the "possibility ... that the exempt organization has in effect sold part of its exemption ... by ... paying a higher price for the property or by charging lower rentals than a taxable business could charge."43 This provision was a precursor to the present-law tax on unrelated debt-financed income.



Tax Reform Act of 1969

In the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Congress extended the unrelated business income tax to all exempt organizations described in section 501(c) and 401(a) (except United States instrumentalities).44 In addition, the 1969 Act expanded the tax on debt-financed income. The provision enacted in 1950 to tax income from certain leveraged sale-leaseback transactions involving real estate had proved ineffective, as taxpayers succeeded in structuring transactions that escaped the reach of the statute.45

The Supreme Court considered one such transaction in the Clay Brown case.46 In Clay Brown, a corporate business was sold to a charitable organization, which made a small or no down payment and agreed to pay the balance of the purchase price to the former shareholders out of profits from the property. The charity liquidated the corporation and leased the business assets back to the sellers, who formed a new corporation to operate the business. The newly formed corporation paid a large portion of its business profits as deductible "rent" to the charity, which then paid most of these receipts back to the original owners as installment payments on the initial purchase price. The Supreme Court agreed with the taxpayer's characterization of the transaction. The original owners thereby succeeded in converting business income that would have been taxable at ordinary income rates to capital gains, while the exempt organization acquired the ownership of a business largely or wholly without the investment of its own funds. Thus, under the 1950 legislation, exempt organizations continued to be able to leverage exempt status to buy businesses and investments on credit, often at more than market price, without contributing much if anything to the transaction other than tax exemption.47

Citing principally to cases such as Clay Brown and the ability of taxable parties to convert ordinary income into capital gain through leveraged sale-leaseback transactions with tax-exempt organizations,48 the Congress in 1969 expanded the unrelated debt-financed income rules to cover not only certain rents from debt-financed acquisitions of real property, but to tax in addition other debt-financed income such as interest, dividends, other rents, royalties, and certain gains and losses from any type of property. The 1969 Act provided for certain limited exceptions to the tax on debt-financed income, such as where the debt-financed property is related to the organization's exempt functions.



Enactment of the real property exception

In the Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1980, Congress enacted an exception to the debt-financed income rules for certain real property investments by qualified pension trusts (the progenitor of the real property exception, described above). The exception did not apply, however, if any of five situations were present: (1) the acquisition price is not a fixed amount on the acquisition date; (2) the amount of indebtedness is dependent on the revenue, income, or profits derived from the debt-financed property; (3) the property is leased back to the seller (or a related party); (4) the property is acquired from or leased to a related person of the trust; and (5) the seller or person related to the trust provides nonrecourse financing, and the debt is subordinate to any other indebtedness on the property or the debt bore an interest rate significantly lower than that provided by unrelated parties.49

Congress believed that such an exception was warranted because "the exemption for investment income of qualified retirement trusts is an essential tax incentive which is provided to tax-qualified plans in order to enable them to accumulate funds to satisfy their exempt purpose --the payment of employee benefits."50 Real estate investments are attractive "for diversification and to offset inflation. Debt financing is common in real estate investments." In addition, the exemption provided to pension trusts was appropriate because, unlike other exempt organizations, the assets of such trusts eventually would be "used to pay taxable benefits to individual recipients whereas the investment assets of other [exempt] organizations ... are not likely to be used for the purpose of providing benefits taxable at individual rates." In other words, the exemption for qualified trusts generally resulted only in deferral of tax; unlike the exemption for other organizations. Congress also believed that the five limitations placed upon use of the exception would "eliminate the most egregious abuses addressed by the 1969 legislation."

In the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Congress extended the real property exception to educational organizations, finding that "educational organizations generally were unable to avoid taxation on income from real property acquired for investment purposes because few institutions had sufficient assets to purchase property not subject to debt."51 At the same time, Congress layered on additional conditions, including an absolute bar on seller financing and an anti-abuse rule in the case of qualified organizations that were partners in partnerships investing in debt-financed real property. The new restrictions were needed because prior law was "inadequate to prevent the shifting of tax benefits between tax-exempt organizations and taxable entities."52

Between 1986 and 1988, Congress introduced and modified rules requiring that investments through a partnership satisfy a prohibition on disproportionate allocations, i.e., the requirements that each partnership allocation have substantive economic effect and that the partnership satisfy the "fractions rule."53

In 1993, Congress relaxed some of the conditions required to meet the real property exception. In general, leasebacks to the seller (or a disqualified person) are allowed if no more than 25 percent of the leasable floor space in a building is leased back and the lease is on commercially reasonable terms.54 Seller financing is permitted if the financing is on commercially reasonable terms.55 In addition, the fixed price restriction and the requirement that indebtedness not be paid out of revenue, income, or profits of the acquired property are relaxed for certain sales by financial institutions.56



B. Overview of U.S. International Tax Rules




Tax treatment of foreign activities of U.S. persons



In general

The United States employs a worldwide tax system under which U.S. citizens, residents, and corporations (collectively, "U.S. persons") generally are taxed on all income, whether derived in the United States or abroad. If a U.S. person is a shareholder of a foreign corporation, the U.S. person generally is subject to U.S. tax on its share of the corporation's income only when that income is distributed as a dividend to the U.S. person. Until that repatriation, the U.S. tax on the income generally is deferred. Certain anti-deferral regimes, however, may cause the U.S. person to be taxed on a current basis in the United States on certain categories of passive or highly mobile income derived by a foreign corporation, regardless of whether the income has been distributed as a dividend. The main anti-deferral regimes are the controlled foreign corporation rules of subpart F57 and the passive foreign investment company ("PFIC") rules.58 These regimes are described below.

Subject to certain limitations, a foreign tax credit generally is available to offset, in whole or in part, the U.S. tax owed on foreign-source income, whether the income is earned directly by the domestic corporation, repatriated as an actual dividend, or included in the domestic parent corporation's income under one of the anti-deferral regimes.59



Anti-deferral regimes

In general. --Generally, income derived indirectly by a U.S. person through a foreign corporation is subject to U.S. tax only when the income is distributed to the U.S. person because corporations generally are treated as separate taxable entities for Federal tax purposes. This deferral of U.S. tax is limited by anti-deferral regimes that impose current U.S. tax on certain types of income derived by certain corporations. These anti-deferral rules are intended to prevent taxpayers from avoiding U.S. tax by shifting passive or other highly mobile income into low-tax jurisdictions. Deferral of U.S. tax is considered appropriate, on the other hand, for most types of active business income earned abroad.

Subpart F. --Subpart F60 applies when five or fewer U.S. persons control a foreign corporation. A controlled foreign corporation generally is defined as any foreign corporation if U.S. persons own (directly, indirectly, or constructively) more than 50 percent of the corporation's stock (measured by vote or value), ta king into account only those U.S. persons that own at least 10 percent of the stock (measured by vote only).61 Under the subpart F rules, the United States generally taxes the U.S. 10-percent shareholders of a controlled foreign corporation on their pro rata shares of certain income of the controlled foreign corporation (referred to as "subpart F income"), without regard to whether the income is distributed to the shareholders.62

Subpart F income generally includes passive income and other income that is readily movable from one taxing jurisdiction to another. Subpart F income consists of foreign base company income,63 insurance income,64 and certain income relating to international boycotts and other violations of public policy.65 Foreign base company income consists of foreign personal holding company income, which includes passive income such as dividends, interest, rents, and royalties, and a number of categories of income from business operations, including foreign base company sales income, foreign base company services income, and foreign base company oil-related income.66

In effect, the United States treats the U.S. 10-percent shareholders of a controlled foreign corporation as having received a current distribution out of the corporation's subpart F income.

The U.S. 10-percent shareholders of a controlled foreign corporation also are required to include currently in income for U.S. tax purposes their pro rata shares of the corporation's earnings invested in certain items of U.S. property.67 This U.S. property generally includes tangible property located in the United States, stock of a U.S. corporation, an obligation of a U.S. person, and certain intangible assets, such as patents and copyrights, acquired or developed by the controlled foreign corporation for use in the United States.68 There are specific exceptions to the general definition of U.S. property, including for bank deposits, certain export property, and certain trade or business obligations.69

Passive foreign investment companies. --The Tax Reform Act of 1986 established an anti-deferral regime for passive foreign investment companies. A passive foreign investment company generally is defined as any foreign corporation if 75 percent or more of its gross income for the taxable year consists of passive income, or 50 percent or more of its assets consists of assets that produce, or are held for the production of, passive income.70 Alternative sets of income inclusion rules apply to U.S. persons that are shareholders in a passive foreign investment company, regardless of their percentage ownership in the company. One set of rules applies to passive foreign investment companies that are "qualified electing funds," under which electing U.S. shareholders currently include in gross income their respective shares of the company's earnings, with a separate election to defer payment of tax, subject to an interest charge, on income not currently received.71 A second set of rules applies to passive foreign investment companies that are not qualified electing funds, under which U.S. shareholders pay tax on certain income or gain realized through the company, plus an interest charge that is attributable to the value of deferral.72 A third set of rules applies to passive foreign investment company stock that is marketable, under which electing U.S. shareholders currently take into account as income (or loss) the difference between the fair market value of the stock as of the close of the taxable year and their adjusted basis in such stock (subject to certain limitations), often referred to as "marking to market."73

Coordination. --Detailed rules for coordination among the anti-deferral regimes are provided to prevent U.S. persons from being subject to U.S. tax on the same item of income under multiple regimes. For example, a corporation generally is not treated as a passive foreign investment company with respect to a particular shareholder if the corporation is also a controlled foreign corporation, and the shareholder is a U.S. shareholder under section 951(b). Thus, subpart F is allowed to trump the passive foreign investment company rules.



Foreign earned income and housing cost exclusions

A U.S. citizen or resident living abroad may be eligible to exclude from U.S. taxable income certain foreign earned income and foreign housing costs.74 This exclusion applies regardless of whether any foreign tax is paid on the foreign earned income or housing costs. To qualify for these exclusions, an individual (a "qualified individual") must have a tax home in a foreign country and must be either (1) a U.S. citizen75 who is a bona fide resident of a foreign country or countries for an uninterrupted period that includes an entire taxable year, or (2) a U.S. citizen or resident present in a foreign country or countries for at least 330 full days in any 12-consecutive-month period. The foreign earned income exclusion generally is available for a qualified individual's non-U.S. sour ce earned income attributable to personal services performed by that individual during the period of foreign residence or presence described above. The maximum exclusion amount for 2007 is $85,700. A qualified individual also is allowed a deduction or an exclusion from gross income for the excess of reasonable foreign housing expenses paid or incurred by or on behalf of the individual over a base amount. The maximum amount of the housing exclusion in 2007 generally is $11,998 (computed as (1) 30 percent of the maximum foreign earned income exclusion amount less (2) a base amount equal to 16 percent of the maximum foreign earned income exclusion). Under guidance issued by the Treasury Department, the maximum housing cost exclusion amount has been increased for housing in many locations.76



Tax treatment of U.S. activities of foreign persons



In general

The United States asserts taxing jurisdiction over nonresident alien individuals and foreign corporations ("foreign persons") only with respect to income that has a sufficient nexus to the United States. Foreign persons are subject to net-basis U.S. tax on income that is effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business in the United States. Partners in a partnership and beneficiaries of an estate or trust are treated as engaged in the conduct of a trade or business within the United States if the partnership, estate, or trust is so engaged.77 Effectively connected income generally is taxed in the same manner and at the same rates as the income of a U.S. person.78

With a few exceptions, foreign persons are subject to a gross-basis U.S. tax at a 30-percent rate on certain categories of non-effectively-connected income derived from U.S. sources (interest, dividends, rents, royalties, and other similar types of income).79 One major exception is that certain types of interest (for example, interest from certain bank deposits and from certain portfolio obligations) are not subject to the tax.80 A foreign person's income from notional principal contracts (that is, swaps) also generally avoids U.S. tax because the source of the income generally is determined by the residence of the recipient of the income.81 U.S.-source capital gains generally are not subject to gross-basis U.S. tax. The 30-percent tax generally is collected by means of withholding by the person making the payment to the foreign person receiving the income.82 This gross-basis withholding tax may be reduced or eliminated by a bilateral income tax treaty between the United States and another country.

In general, every foreign person engaged in a U.S. trade or business during a taxable year is required to file an income tax return for that year even if the person does not have effectively connected income or U.S.-source income.83



Trading safe harbors

Detailed rules govern whether trading in stocks or securities or commodities constitutes the conduct of a U.S. trade or business.84 Under these rules (sometimes referred to as "trading safe harbors"), trading in stock or securities or commodities by a foreign person through an independent agent such as a resident broker generally is not treated as the conduct of a U.S. trade or business if the foreign person does not have an office or other fixed place of business in the United States through which the trading is effected. Trading in stock or securities or commodities for the foreign person's own account, whether by the foreign person or the foreign person's employees or through a resident broker or other agent (even if that agent has discretionary authority to make decisions in effecting the trading) also generally is not treated as the conduct of a U.S. business provided that the foreign person is not a dealer in stock or securities or commodities.



Branch profits tax

A foreign corporation that is engaged in a U.S. trade or business through a branch (rather than through a separate corporate subsidiary) generally is subject to U.S. tax on amounts of U.S. earnings and profits that are shifted out of, or amounts of interest deducted by, the U.S. branch of the foreign corporation.85 These branch level taxes are comparable to the second-level withholding taxes that generally would be imposed when a U.S. subsidiary of a foreign corporation paid interest or dividends to the foreign parent corporation. Income tax treaties may reduce or eliminate the branch profits tax.



FIRPTA

Special U.S. tax rules apply to foreign persons' gains attributable to dispositions of interests in U.S. real property.86 A foreign person's gain or loss from the disposition of a U.S. real property interest is taken into account for U.S. tax purposes as if the gain or loss were effectively connected with a trade or business within the United States during the taxable year.87 Accordingly, foreign persons generally are subject to U.S. tax on any gain from a disposition of a U.S. real property interest at the same rates that apply to similar income received by U.S. persons.



Earnings stripping

The Code includes certain rules, known as "thin capitalization" rules, intended to prevent foreign corporations from eliminating or inappropriately reducing the income of their U.S. subsidiaries through excessive interest deductions. Those rules provide, in part, that the interest paid or accrued by a domestic corporation is nondeductible if it is paid or accrued to a related party, no tax is imposed on the payment, and the domestic corporation has a debt-equity ratio exceeding 1.5 to one. The amount that is nondeductible generally is limited to the excess of the domestic corporation's net interest expense --that is, interest expense less interest income - over its taxable income (with certain adjustments).88



C. Overview of Ways to Defer Services Income




1. Qualified plans



In general

Deferred compensation occurs when the payment of compensation to a service provider is deferred for more than a short period after the compensation is earned (i.e., the time when the services giving rise to the compensation are performed). Payment is generally deferred until some specified event, such as the service provider's death, disability, or other termination of services, or is deferred for a specified period of time, such as five or ten years.

The Code provides tax-favored treatment for certain types of employer-sponsored deferred compensation arrangements that are designed primarily to provide employees with retirement income. These arrangements include qualified defined contribution and defined benefit pension plans (sec. 401(a)), qualified annuities (sec. 403(a)), tax-sheltered annuities (sec. 403(b)), savings incentive match plans for employees or "SIMPLE" plans (sec. 408(p)), simplified employee pensions or "SEPs" (sec. 408(k)), and eligible deferred compensation plans of State or local governmental employers (sec. 457(b)). These plans are referred to as qualified retirement plans.

In the case of a qualified retirement plan, employees do not include contributions in gross income until amounts are distributed, even though the arrangement is funded and benefits are nonforfeitable. In the case of a taxable employer, the employer is entitled to a current deduction (within limits) for contributions even though the contributions are not currently included in an employee's income. Contributions to a qualified plan, and earnings thereon, are held in a tax-exempt trust.

Present law imposes a number of requirements on qualified retirement plans that must be satisfied in order for the plan to be qualified and for favorable tax treatment to apply. These requirements include nondiscrimination rules that are intended to ensure that a qualified retirement plan covers a broad group of employees. The nondiscrimination requirements are designed to ensure that qualified retirement plans benefit an employer's rank-and-file employees as well as highly compensated employees.89 Under a general nondiscrimination requirement, the contributions or benefits provided under a qualified retirement plan must not discriminate in favor of highly compensated employees.90 Treasury regulations provide detailed and exclusive rules for determining whether a plan satisfies the general nondiscrimination requirement. For example, under the regulations applicable to qualified defined contribution plans and qualified defined benefit plans, the amount of contributions or benefits provided under the plan and the benefits, rights and features offered under the plan must be tested.91

Limits also apply on the amount of contributions that can be made to qualified plans and, in the case of defined benefit plans, on the amount that is payable annually from the plan. Limits also apply to the amount of an employer's deduct ion for contributions to qualified plans.

Qualified employer plans are also generally subject to the requirements of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). For example, ERISA generally requires that the assets of a pension plan be held in a trust established for the exclusive purpose of providing plan benefits.



Qualified cash or deferred arrangements (section 401(k) plans)

Under present law, many defined contribution plans include a qualified cash or deferred arrangement (commonly referred to as a "401(k) plan"), under which employees may elect to receive cash or to have contributions made to the plan by the employer on behalf of the employee in lieu of receiving cash. Contributions made to the plan at the election of the employee are referred to as elective deferrals. The maximum annual amount of elective deferrals that can be made by an individual for any taxable year is $15,500 (for 2007). In applying this limitation, elective deferrals under 401(k) plans, tax-sheltered annuities, SEPs, and SIMPLE plans are aggregated. An individual who has attained age 50 before the end of the taxable year may also make catch-up contributions to a section 401(k) plan. As a result, the dollar limit on elective deferrals is increased for an individual who has attained age 50 by $5,000 (for 2007). An employee's elective deferrals must be fully ve sted. A special nondiscrimination test applies to elective deferrals under a 401(k) plan.



Tax-sheltered annuities (section 403(b) annuities)

A tax-sheltered annuity is also permitted to allow a participant to elect to have the employer make payments as contributions to the plan or to the participant directly in cash. As discussed above, the $15,500 annual limit on elective deferrals applies to elective deferral contributions to a tax-sheltered annuity. As with a 401(k) plan, special rules permit catch-up contributions to be made to a tax-sheltered annuity in the case of certain individuals, and special rules apply for purposes of nondiscrimination testing.



Eligible deferred compensation plans of State and local governments (section 457 plans)

Compensation deferred under a section 457 plan of a State or local governmental employer is includible in income when paid. The maximum annual deferral under such a plan generally is the lesser of (1) $15,500 (for 2007) or (2) 100 percent of compensation. A special, higher limit applies for the last three years before a participant reaches normal retirement age (the "section 457 catch-up limit"). In the case of a section 457 plan of a governmental employer, a participant who has attained age 50 before the end of the taxable year may also make catch-up contributions up to a limit of $5,000 (for 2007), unless a higher section 457 catch-up limit applies. Only contributions to section 457 plans are taken into account in applying these limits; contributions made to a qualified retirement plan or section 403(b) plan for an employee do not affect the amount that may be contributed to a section 457 plan for that employee. Thus, for example, a State or local government employee covered by both a section 457 plan and a section 401(k) or 403(b) plan can contribute up to $15,500 (for 2007) to each plan for a total of $31,000. In the case of a plan that fails to meet the dollar limitations or any other requirement of section 457 (an "ineligible plan"), compensation is includible in income for the first taxable year in which there is no substantial risk of forfeiture.92



2. Nonqualified deferred compensation



In general

A nonqualified deferred compensation arrangement is generally any deferred compensation arrangement that is not a qualified retirement plan. Nonqualified deferred compensation arrangements are contractual arrangements between a service recipient (e.g., an employer or a hedge fund) and a service provider (e.g., an employee or an entity that operates as a hedge fund manager) covered by the arrangement. Such arrangements are structured in whatever form achieves the goals of the parties; as a result, they vary greatly in design. Considerations that may affect the structure of the arrangement are the current and future income needs of the service provider, the desired tax treatment of deferred amounts, and the desire for assurance that deferred amounts will in fact be paid.

ERISA contains exemptions from its requirements for certain nonqualified deferred compensation arrangements. Most nonqualified deferred compensation arrangements are designed to fall within these ERISA exemptions. Thus, nonqualified deferred compensation arrangements are generally not subject to the protections of ERISA. For example, there is no requirement that a nonqualified deferred compensation arrangement be funded by a trust established for the exclusive purpose of providing plan benefits.

The Code and ERISA do not limit the amount that can be deferred by a service provider under a nonqualified deferred compensation arrangement.



Tax treatment of service provider



In general

The American Jobs Creation Act of 200493 added section 409A to the Code which provides specific rules governing the tax treatment of nonqualified deferred compensation.94 Prior to section 409A, there were no rules that specifically governed the tax treatment of nonqualified deferred compensation. In determining the tax treatment of nonqualified deferred compensation prior to enactment of section 409A, a variety of tax principles and Code provisions were relevant, including the doctrine of constructive receipt, the economic benefit doctrine, the provisions of section 83 relating generally to transfers of property in connection with the performance of services, and provisions relating specifically to nonexempt employee trusts (sec. 402(b)) and nonqualified employee annuities (sec. 403(c)). Section 409A does not override these tax principles and Code provisions. Thus, they are relevant in determining the tax treatment of nonqualified deferred compensation and are discussed below. Section 409A does not prevent the inclusion of amounts in gross income under any provision or rule of law earlier than the time provided under its rules.

Under section 409A, unless certain requirements are satisfied, amounts deferred under a nonqualified deferred compensation plan are currently includible in income to the extent not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture. The requirements imposed under section 409A affect the way that nonqualified deferred compensation arrangements are now commonly structured.



General income inclusion rules

In the case of a cash-basis taxpayer, if the nonqualified deferred compensation arrangement is unfunded, then the compensation is generally includible in income when it is actually or constructively received under section 451 (unless earlier income inclusion applies under section 409A).95 Income is constructively received when it is credited to an individual's account, set apart, or otherwise made available so that it may be drawn on at any time.96 Income is not constructively received if the taxpayer's co ntrol of its receipt is subject to substantial limitations or restrictions. A requirement to relinquish a valuable right in order to make withdrawals is generally treated as a substantial limitation or restriction.

In general, an arrangement is considered funded if there has been a transfer of property under section 83. Section 83 provides rules for the tax treatment of property transferred in connection with the performance of services and generally applies to a funded nonqualified deferred compensation arrangement.97

The economic benefit doctrine is based on the broad definition of gross income in the Code (sec. 61), which includes income in whatever form paid. Under the economic benefit doctrine, if an individual receives any economic or financial benefit or property as compensation for services, the value of the benefit or property is includible in the individual's gross income. For example, courts have applied the economic benefit doctrine to the receipt of stock options or the receipt of an interest in a trust.98 A concept related to economic benefit is the cash equivalency doctrine.99 Under this doctrine, if the right to receive a payment in the future is reduced to writing and is transferable, such as in the case of a note or a bond, the right is considered to be the equivalent of cash and the value of the right is includible in gross income.100



Section 409A

In general. --Under section 409A, all amounts deferred by a service provider under a nonqualified deferred compensation plan101 for all taxable years are currently includible in gross income to the extent not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture102 and not previously included in gross income, unless certain requirements are satisfied. If the requirements of section 409A are not satisfied, in addition to current income inclusion, interest at the rate applicable to underpayments of tax plus one percentage point is imposed on the underpayments that would have occurred had the compensation been includible in income when first deferred, or if later, when not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture. The amount required to be included in income is also subject to a 20-percent additional tax.

Under regulations, the term "service provider" includes an individual, corporation, subchapter S corporation, partnership, personal service corporation (as defined in sec. 269A(b)(1)), noncorporate entity that would be a personal service corporation if it were a corporation, or qualified personal service corporation (as defined in sec. 448(d)(2)) for any taxable year in which such individual or entity accounts for gross income from the performance of services under the cash receipts and disbursements method of accounting.103 Section 409A does not apply to a service provider that provides significant services to at least two service recipients that are not related to each other or the service provider. This exclusion does not apply to a service provider who is an employee or a director of a corporation (or similar position in the case of an entity that is not a corporation).104 In addition, the exclusion does not apply to an entity that operates as the manager of a hedge fund or private equity fund. This is because the exclusion does not apply to the extent that a service provider provides management services to a service recipient. Management services for this purpose means services that involve the actual or de facto direction or control of the financial or operational aspects of a trade or business of the service recipient or investment management or advisory services provided to a service recipient whose primary trade or business includes the investment of financial assets, such as a hedge fund.105

For purposes of section 409A, a nonqualified deferred compensation plan is any plan that provides for the deferral of compensation other than a qualified employer plan106 or any bona fide vacation leave, sick leave, compensatory time, disability pay, or death benefit plan.

The regulations also provide that certain other types of plans are not considered deferred compensation, and thus are not subject to section 409A. For example, if a service recipient transfers property to a service provider, there is no deferral of compensation merely because the value of the property is either not includible in income under section 83 by reason of the property being substantially nonvested or is includible in income because of a valid section 83(b) election.107 Another exception applies to amounts that are not deferred beyond a short period of time after the amount is no longer subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture.108 Under this exception, there generally is no deferral for purposes of section 409A if the service provider actually or constructively receives the amount on or before the last day of the applicable 21/2 month period. The applicable 21/2 month period is the period ending on the later of the 15th day of the third month following the end of: (1) the service provider's first taxable year in which the right to the payment is no longer subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture; or (2) the service recipient's first taxable year in which the right to the payment is no longer subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture. Special rules apply in the case of stock options.109

The regulations provide exclusions from the definition of nonqualified deferred compensation for individuals who participate in certain foreign plans, including plans covered by an applicable treaty and broad-based foreign retirement plans.110 In the case of a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent alien, nonqualified deferred compensation does not include a broad-based foreign retirement plan, but only with respect to the portion of the plan that provides for nonelective deferral of foreign earned income and subject to limitations on the annual amount deferred under the plan or the annual amount payable under the plan. In general, foreign earned income refers to amounts received by an individual from sources within a foreign country that constitutes earned income attributable to services.

Permissible distribution events. --Under section 409A, distributions from a nonqualified deferred compensation plan may be allowed only upon separation from service (as determined by the Secretary), death, a specified time (or pursuant to a fixed schedule), change in control of a corporation (to the extent provided by the Secretary), occurrence of an unforeseeable emergency, or if the participant becomes disabled. A nonqualified deferred compensation plan may not allow distributions other than upon the permissible distribution events and, except as provided in regulations by the Secretary, may not permit acceleration of a distribution. In the case of a specified employee who separates from service, distributions may not be made earlier than six months after the date of the separation from service or upon death. Specified employees are key employees111 of publicly-traded corporations.

Deferral elections. --Section 409A requires that a plan must provide that compensation for services performed during a taxable year may be deferred at the participant's election only if the election to defer is made no later than the close of the preceding taxable year, or at such other time as provided in Treasury regulations. In the case of any performance-based compensation based on services performed over a period of at least 12 months, such election may be made no later than six months before the end of the service period. The time and form of distributions must be specified at the time of initial deferral. A plan may allow changes in the time and form of distributions subject to certain requirements.

Back-to-back arrangements. --Back-to-back service recipients (i.e., situations under which an entity receives services from a service provider such as an employee, and the entity in turn provides services to a client) that involve back-to-back nonqualified deferred compensation arrangements (i.e., the fees payable by the client are deferred at both the entity level and the employee level) are subject to special rules under section 409A. For example, the final regulations generally permit the deferral agreement between the entity and its client to treat as a permissible distribution event those events that are specified as distribution events in the deferral agreement between the entity and its employee. Thus, if separation from employment is a specified distribution event between the entity and the employee, the employee's separation is a permissible distribution event for the deferral agreement between the entity and its client.112



Timing of the service recipient's deduction

Special statutory provisions govern the timing of the deduction for nonqualified deferred compensation, regardless of whether the arrangement covers employees or nonemployees and regardless of whether the arrangement is funded or unfunded.113 Under these provisions, the amount of nonqualified deferred compensation that is includible in the income of the service provider is deductible by the service recipient for the taxable year in which the amount is includible in the service provider's income.114



Employment taxes and reporting

In the case of an employee, nonqualified deferred compensation is generally considered wages both for purposes of income tax withholding and for purposes of taxes under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act ("FICA"), consisting of social security tax and Medicare tax. However, the income tax withholding rules and social security and Medicare tax rules that apply to nonqualified deferred compensation are not the same.

In the case of an employee, nonqualified deferred compensation is generally subject to income tax withholding at the time it is includible in the employee's income as discussed above. In addition, amounts includible in income are required to be reported on the employee's Form W-2 for the year includible in income. Income tax withholding and Form W-2 reporting are required even if the employee has already terminated employment. Income tax withholding and Form W-2 reporting are required when amounts are includible in income even if no actual payments are made to the employee.115

In the case of a service provider who is not an employee, nonqualified deferred compensation amounts includible in income generally are required to be reported on a Form 1099 for the year includible in income. Income tax withholding generally does not apply to such amounts.

The Code provides special rules for applying social security and Medicare taxes to nonqualified deferred compensation of employees.116 In general, nonqualified deferred compensation is subject to social security and Medicare tax when it is earned (i.e., when services are performed), unless the nonqualified deferred compensation is subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture. If nonqualified deferred compensation is subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture, it is subject to social security and Medicare tax when the risk of forfeiture is removed (i.e., when the right to the nonqualified deferred compensation vests). This treatment is not affected by the timing of income inclusion.

In the case of a self-employed individual, nonqualified deferred compensation amounts that are includible in income are also taken into account in determining net earnings from self-employment for social security and Medicare tax purposes unless an exception applies.

The Code requires annual reporting to the IRS of amounts deferred even if such amounts are not currently includible in income for that taxable year.117 The IRS has postponed the effective date of the statutory requirement and announced that an employer (or other payor) is not required for 2005 and 2006 to report amounts deferred during the year under a nonqualified deferred compensation plan subject to section 409A.118



Offshore arrangements



In general

The requirements under section 409A apply in the case of deferred compensation of a U.S. person participating in offshore operations such as a hedge fund located outside of the U.S. The general requirements of section 409A (i.e., the rules relating to elections, distributions and no acceleration of benefits) apply similarly to U.S. persons whether their activities are conducted in the United States or abroad.119



Foreign trusts

Section 409A requires current income inclusion in the case of certain offshore funding of nonqualified deferred compensation. Under section 409A, in the case of assets set aside (directly or indirectly) in a trust (or other arrangement determined by the Secretary) for purposes of paying nonqualified deferred compensation, such assets are treated as property transferred in connection with the performance of services under section 83 (whether or not such assets are available to satisfy the claims of general creditors) at the time set aside if such assets (or trust or other arrangement) are located outside of the United States or at the time transferred if such assets (or trust or other arrangement) are subsequently transferred outside of the United States. Any subsequent increases in the value of, or any earnings with respect to, such assets are treated as additional transfers of property.

Interest at the underpayment rate plus one percentage point is imposed on the underpayments that would have occurred had the amounts set aside been includible in income for the taxable year in which first deferred or, if later, the first taxable year not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture. The amount required to be included in income is also subject to an additional 20-percent tax.

The provision does not apply to assets located in a foreign jurisdiction if substantially all of the services to which the nonqualified deferred compensation relates are performed in such foreign jurisdiction. The Secretary has authority to exempt arrangements from the provision if the arrangements do not result in an improper deferral of U.S. tax and will not result in assets being effectively beyond the reach of creditors.



IV. ISSUES AND ANALYSIS




A. Issues and Analysis Relating to the Unrelated Business Income Tax and Debt-Financed Income




Use of offshore corporations to "block" unrelated business income tax

As discussed previously, the Code imposes a tax (the unrelated business income tax, or "UBIT"), at ordinary corporate rates, on an exempt organization's unrelated business taxable income ("UBTI"). An organization's UBTI includes the organization's unrelated debt-financed income.

In the absence of planning, exempt organizations that invest in an investment partnership may have adverse tax consequences from the partnership's receipt (directly or through one or more partnerships) of certain items of income related to the partnership's portfolio investments. However, the IRS has concluded in a series of private letter rulings that, where UBTI-producing assets are owned by a corporation, or an entity that elects to be treated as a corporation for Federal tax purposes, and an exempt organization invests directly or indirectly in such corporation or entity, the exempt organization generally will not recognize UBTI as a result of the investment. Under such circumstances, the separate existence of the corporation or entity generally will be respected, and the exempt organization generally will be treated as receiving only passive dividend income that is excluded from the organization's UBTI. When such entities are interposed between an exempt organization investor and assets that would give rise to UBTI if owned by the exempt organization directly (or through a pass-through entity) they commonly are referred to as "UBIT blockers" or "blocker corporations." Because the assets of hedge funds and private equity funds frequently are debt-financed, exempt organizations that invest in such funds often use UBIT blockers to avoid attribution of the funds' acquisition indebtedness to the exempt organization and thereby to avoid recognition of UBTI.

UBIT blockers may be established offshore in tax haven jurisdictions to avoid or minimize tax at the blocker corporation level.120 Most hedge funds and other alternative investment vehicles organize their affairs to comply with the securities trading "safe harbor" of section 864(b), so that little if any of the income is subject to U.S. net income tax in the hands of an offshore blocker corporation or any other foreign investor. An offshore blocker corporation in turn may be a PFIC for U.S. tax purposes, but income from a PFIC is not UBTI in the hands of a U.S. tax-exempt organization.121

Some argue that the use of offshore UBIT blockers creates inequities, because it allows for avoidance of UBIT by sophisticated organizations that can afford complex tax planning, whereas less sophisticated organizations that wish to invest in debt-financed or other UBTI-producing property must pay tax or not make the investment. Others argue that the ability to block UBIT by investing through blocker corporations established in tax haven jurisdictions results in the investment of capital offshore rather than domestically, and that this result is undesirable.

On the other hand, some argue that recognition of the separate legal existence of a corporate entity, even if established offshore, is a bedrock principle of U.S. tax law and should not be modified in the UBIT context. In the context of debt-financed assets, some also argue that where an exempt organization investor is not liable for acquisition indebtedness incurred by a blocker corporation (or an entity in which the blocker corporation holds an interest), such indebtedness should not be attributed to the exempt organization and thereby give rise to UBTI.



The unrelated debt-financed income rules

The unrelated debt-financed income rules were expanded in 1969 to tax not only certain rents from debt-financed acquisitions in real property, but to tax in addition other debt-financed income such as interest, dividends, other rents, royalties, and certain gains and losses from any type of property. Some argue that, in enacting the broader debt-financed income rules in 1969, the Congress appeared to have been reacting principally to certain specific sale-leaseback arrangements involving the sale of assets by taxable persons to exempt organizations that were perceived to be abusive. They argue, for example, that the rules were an overbroad reaction to a specific problem, do not have a sound policy basis, and either should be repealed or substantially modified.122 Others, however, argue that in enacting the debt-financed income rules, the Congress believed that the rules were necessary to prevent exempt organizations from using debt to leverage tax-exempt status.123 For example, in testimony before the Senate Finance Committee in 1982, the Treasury Department, opposing a proposed exception to the unrelated debt-financed income rules, argued that the rules help prevent unintended tax benefits from tax-exempt status, including the shifting of benefits of exempt status to taxable parties.124

Another argument sometimes made in opposition to the debt-financed income rules is that the rules may in certain cases treat similar transactions differently, because an exempt organization may be able to replicate the economic consequences of acquisition indebtedness through a derivative investment that would not be treated as debt under the debt-financed income rules. As a result, the rules have been described as creating "'traps for the unwary' and opportunities for the well-advised."125



The real property exception to the unrelated debt-financed income rules

The unrelated debt-financed income rules include an exception for certain investments in real property by qualified organizations.

When the real estate exception first was enacted for qualified pension trusts in 1980, the Treasury Department did not oppose its enactment. Consistent with Congress' rationale for limiting the real property exception to pension funds, the Treasury Department testified that an exception limited to pension funds could be justified, because exempting investment income was a primary reason for such funds' exemption from income tax.126 However, the Treasury Department opposed the subsequent extension of the real property exception to schools. The Treasury Department argued, for example, that providing an exception for investments by section 501(c)(3) schools would result in permanent exemption from income, whereas the exception for investments by pension funds results only in deferral of income recognition, because the income generally will be taxed to individuals upon receipt of distributions. In addition, the Treasury Department argued that there is no basis for providing an exception for schools but not for other section 501(c)(3) organizations, and likened such an exception to "piecemeal" repeal of the unrelated debt-financed income rules.127 Finally, the Treasury Department cautioned that expansion of the real property exception could lead others to seek exceptions for investments in other types of property.128 Commentators similarly have argued that there is no principled basis for providing an exception for investments in real property by section 501(c)(3) schools, while not providing such an exception for investments by other charitable organizations or for investments in other types of property.

Some also argue that the mechanics of the real property exception, in particular the fractions rule, are overly complex and impose unfair burdens on qualified organizations.129 They argue, for example, that the requirement that the fractions rule be satisfied hypothetically on a prospective basis for future years of a partnership creates hardships in structuring what ordinarily would be routine real-estate investment transactions. Others, however, argue that qualified organizations today regularly structure investments that satisfy the fractions rule, and that the rule is necessary to prevent the inappropriate shifting of benefits from tax-exempt partners to taxable partners.



B. Issues and Analysis Relating to U.S. International Tax Rules




Tax rules applicable to U.S. persons



Investment in alternative investment vehicles

Taxable U.S. persons that invest in alternative investment vehicles may have little or no reason for investing in those vehicles through non-U.S. entities (referred to below as "foreign feeders" or "foreign feeder corporations"). The United States generally taxes U.S. persons on a worldwide basis. Although a U.S. person's income derived through a foreign corporation generally is not subject to U.S. tax until the income is distributed as a dividend, anti-deferral rules may impose current U.S. tax or may eliminate the benefit of deferral. More specifically, either the PFIC or the subpart F rules are likely to apply if U.S. persons invest in alternative investment vehicles through foreign feeder corporations. Foreign feeder corporations may be PFICs because they have primarily passive income or assets or may be controlled foreign corporations if they are majority owned by a small number of U.S. persons.

Taxable U.S. persons also may be discouraged from organizing foreign feeder corporations because those corporations may be subject to U.S. corporate-level taxes on U.S.-source income.130 These U.S. corporate-level taxes may constitute an added layer of tax if the alternative to investing in an alternative investment vehicle through a foreign feeder is to do so directly or through a partnership.

It has been suggested that a U.S. individual investor in a hedge fund could seek to avoid limits on the deductibility of management fees paid to investment managers by investing in the vehicle through a foreign feeder corporation that would be treated as a PFIC.131 The advantages of avoiding the deductibility limits would need to be compared with the disadvantages of being subject to the PFIC rules.



Management of alternative investment vehicles

Taxable U.S. individuals who manage alternative investment vehicles also may find it difficult to move the income from that management business offshore. First, individual U.S. taxpayers pay federal income tax on their worldwide incomes. Relocating abroad by itself generally would not, apart from the foreign earned income exclusion allowed by section 911, reduce the federal tax liability of a U.S. individual employee of, or a partner in, an investment management firm. Second, organizing the management firm as a foreign corporation generally would not reduce the federal tax liability of that entity or its owners to the extent that the entity's employees and activities are in the United States. In many circumstances, a foreign corporation with employees and activities in the United States would be considered to have a trade or business in the United States if the corporation's activities did not satisfy the requirements of the trading safe harbors of section 864(b), and that trade or business could give rise to income subject to tax on a net basis by the United States. Moreover, for U.S. owners of a foreign corporation, the PFIC rules generally eliminate the benefit of deferral of U.S. tax if the corporation has primarily passive income or assets. Similarly, under the subpart F rules U.S. owners of a foreign corporation that is a controlled foreign corporation generally lose the benefit of deferral of U.S. federal tax on passive or highly mobile income.

Although taxable U.S. managers of alternative investment vehicles may find it difficult to avoid U.S. tax on the income of that management business, there may be a U.S. tax advantage to organizing an active public company as a foreign entity. A U.S. corporation that operates abroad through foreign entities may have difficulty avoiding net-basis U.S. income tax if it moves earnings from one foreign entity to another or if earnings are distributed from a foreign entity to the U.S. corporation. If instead the parent corporation is organized in a foreign jurisdiction, this net-basis U.S. income tax can be avoided (assuming the parent corporation is not itself a controlled foreign corporation).



Tax rules applicable to foreign persons



In general

Foreign persons that invest in U.S.-based alternative investment vehicles often do so through foreign feeder corporations. In the absence of planning, a foreign investor in a U.S.-based investment partnership with U.S.-source income might have U.S. effectively connected income from various sources, including its share of the U.S. trade or business income of an operating partnership; income from the investment partnership's sale of a U.S. real property interest; and fee income related to management services provided to operating companies by the investment partnership. As described below, however, hedge funds and similar vehicles generally rely on the section 864(b) trading safe harbors to avoid creating U.S. effectively income for foreign investors. To the extent effectively connected income cannot be avoided, use of a foreign feeder may allow a foreign investor to avoid U.S. tax return filing obligations and becoming subject to U.S. tax directly (but not, as described immediately below, indirectly) on U.S. effectively connected income.

Although a foreign investor in a U.S.-based investment partnership may avoid direct imposition of U.S. tax on effectively connected income by investing through a foreign feeder, the overall U.S. tax burden related to the investment may not be reduced. To the extent the foreign investor would have had effectively connected income had the investor invested directly (or through a partnership), the foreign feeder corporation itself generally will have effectively connected income. In particular, a foreign feeder corporation may have effectively connected income from various fees received by fund managers for services related to a fund's portfolio company holdings.132 Moreover, a foreign corporation, unlike a foreign individual, may be subject to branch profits tax on certain amounts. Gross-basis withholding tax on dividend and other payments apply whether payments are made to foreign individual investors or to foreign feeders. The rate of withholding tax on these payments may vary if a foreign feeder corporation is organized in a different jurisdiction from the jurisdiction in which a foreign investor is a resident because the rate may be governed by different tax treaties or may be 30 percent if no treaty is available in a particular case.

As a practical matter, hedge funds and similar vehicles in many cases may avoid withholding tax by holding notional principal contracts the income of which is treated as foreign source if derived by a foreign person. It has been reported that the IRS is investigating whether financial instruments that taxpayers have treated as notional principal contracts instead should be characterized as securities lending transactions that produce U.S.-source dividend income subject to gross-basis withholding tax.133

Even if the aggregate U.S. tax burden is not reduced when a foreign investor makes an investment in a U.S.-based vehicle through a foreign feeder corporation rather than directly or through a partnership, arranging the investment through a corporation may allow the investor to avoid the obligation to file a U.S. tax return. The investor would have this obligation if it invested directly or through a partnership in a U.S.-based vehicle and were engaged, directly or through the partnership or tiers of partnerships, in a U.S. trade or business.



Trading safe harbors

Although in theory foreign investors and foreign feeder corporations may have U.S. effectively connected income from certain management fees, gains from U.S. real property sales, and operating partnership income derived by hedge funds and similar investment vehicles, these funds generally rely on the section 864(b) trading safe harbors to avoid creating effectively connected income related to U.S.-based financial transactions. Under these safe harbors, hedge fund partnerships, feeder corporations, and, by extension, foreign investors are not treated as engaged in a U.S. trade or business, and therefore avoid effectively connected income, if their U.S. activities are restricted to trading in securities or commodities through the fund's management company. Some commentators have argued, however, that hedge funds that engage in lending activities (as opposed or in addition to securities and commodities trading) should not, as a policy matter and under a reasonable interpretation of case law and Treasury regulations, satisfy the trading safe harbor requirements.134



C. Issues and Analysis Relating to Nonqualified Deferred Compensation




In general

Nonqualified deferred compensation is a common form of executive compensation. From the executive's perspective, the desire to defer taxes is generally the key motivating factor behind deferred compensation. Individuals may want to defer compensation to a future date because they believe that their rate of tax will be lower in the future than it is currently, thus resulting in payment of lower taxes than if the compensation had been received currently. To the extent that the deferral is credited with earnings, an additional advantage is the pre-tax compounding of such earnings. Individuals may defer compensation in order to provide a future income stream in retirement. ERISA's exemptions for nonqualified deferred compensation arrangements allow great flexibility in designing plans and individual arrangements.

As discussed, fund managers' interests may be structured as a contractual arrangement to pay compensation based on the profits of the fund (as opposed to an ownership interest in the fund). In such cases, the compensation may be deferred. Questions have been raised as to whether deferral of the compensation for management services is appropriate in the case of an offshore structure.135



Magnitude of deferrals

Some argue that nonqualified deferred compensation is merely an avoidance of current income taxation and that any amount of deferral should be prohibited. Others point to the amount of compensation that is deferred in certain cases as raising tax or social policy concerns. Much attention has been focused on the large amounts of compensation deferred offshore. While many would view this as inappropriate, it may be argued that the deferral opportunities for fund managers offshore are no different than for other individuals or entities providing services, such as key corporate executives. Nonqualified deferred compensation is a common compensation arrangement for executives in all types of industries, regardless of whether the executive's employer is a U. S. or foreign entity.

As discussed above, neither the Code nor ERISA limit the amount of nonqualified deferred compensation. Because the service recipient (e.g., the employer or the investment fund) is denied a deduction for deferred compensation until the service provider (e.g., the employee or the fund manager) includes the compensation in income, in the case of a payor that is a U.S. taxpayer, there is often said to be a tension between the interests of the service provider and the service recipient that will result in an appropriate limit on deferred compensation. It is argued that this tension is not present in the case of offshore deferrals by hedge fund managers because the deferral agreement is between the fund manager and a foreign feeder corporation. The foreign feeder corporation is an entity that is not a U.S. taxpayer and the shareholders of which are either U.S. tax-exempt entities or are not U.S. taxpayers. As a result, the foreign feeder corporation and its shareholders are indifferent to the availability of a U.S. tax deduction for compensation. In contrast, deferral agreements are not typically entered into between the fund manager and the domestic feeder fund or the master investment fund. This is because U.S. taxpayers, directly or indirectly, hold interests in these entities, which typically are organized as partnerships, and these U.S. taxpayers are sensitive to the deduction timing issue.

Many believe that it is inappropriate to allow deferral of income in cases in which the deferral of the payor's deduction has no consequence(e.g., in the case of an entity that pays no U.S. tax). Present law recognizes that different rules may be appropriate when the payer is not a taxable entity. For example, the Code provides more restrictive rules for deferred compensation plans of governmental and tax-exempt employers than for taxable entities.136 Some believe that allowing deferral of income is only appropriate when a corresponding deduction is also deferred. Of course, this issue is not unique to hedge funds or other investment management firms. A U.S. citizen working for a foreign employer may be permitted to defer compensation even though the foreign entity does not forego or postpone a deduction under its applicable tax laws.

Some believe that the theoretical tension between the employer's interest in a current tax deduction and the employee's interest in deferring tax has little, if any, effect on the amount of compensation deferred by executives. It is pointed out that the tension in the corporate context is often more theoretical than real, because many corporations have net operating losses and do not currently pay taxes, there may be a business purpose to allow the deferral (such as the desire to provide a retention incentive), and because the employer may wish to accommodate the desire of the employee for deferral in order to attract and retain qualified executives.137

As previously discussed, the rules under section 409A provide requirements as to elections and permissible distribution events. Section 409A was enacted to address concerns relating to inappropriate access of executives to amounts deferred and does not limit the amount of compensation that can be deferred. Some believe that deferrals under an offshore hedge fund arrangement are not inappropriate as long as the deferrals satisfy the requirements of section 409A. Others believe that section 409A generally should be broadened to restrict the amount of compensation that can be deferred. They believe that a limit on the amount that can be deferred is appropriate given the relatively low limits that are imposed on amounts deferred under a qualified retirement plan. For example, rank and file employees who participate in a section 401(k) plan can defer no more than $15,500 in 2007, while executives in a nonqualified deferred compensation plan can defer an unlimited amount. Some also believe that additional restrictions on nonqualified deferred compensation are appropriate as such plans are free of most of the restrictions that apply to qualified employer plans (e.g., nondiscrimination rules).

While some argue that allowing unlimited amounts of deferral through an offshore entity is inappropriate, it may be possible that the tax benefits that are achieved by deferring compensation paid by an offshore entity can also be achieved through other structures. For example, a foreign corporation could grant the fund managers options in the foreign corporation which could defer recognition of ordinary income until the options are exercised. However, if the corporation is a passive foreign investment company, the tax advantages of deferral may be negated.138



Compliance issues/reporting

Some have raised the issue that there may be compliance issues under section 409A in the fund manager context, especially if there are foreign payors of nonqualified deferred compensation. On the other hand, the significant consequences of failing to comply with section 409A (current income inclusion, plus an additional 20-percent tax, plus interest) may provide sufficient incentive for compliance, at least if there is a belief that detection of noncompliance by the IRS is reasonably likely.

Present law requires annual reporting of amounts deferred under a nonqualified deferred compensation plan even if amounts are not currently includible in income. The implementation of this requirement has been delayed by the Treasury Department. Final regulations issued by the Department of Treasury do not address the reporting requirements applicable to service recipients providing nonqualified deferred compensation covered by section 409A. Under Notice 2006-100, 2006-51 I.R.B. 1109, the IRS announced that an employer (or other payor) is not required for 2005 and 2006 to report amounts deferred during the year under a nonqualified deferred compensation plan subject to section 409A. Many believe that requiring reporting of amounts deferred to the IRS, even if the taxpayer takes the position that such amounts are not currently includible in income, could provide the IRS greater information regarding such arrangements. In most cases, the IRS does not have any information reported to it regarding amounts deferred, and therefore, no indication that a particular arrangement should be examined.139 This argument is present in the fund manager context as the IRS has little information as to such arrangements. Many believe that the reporting requirement under present law could provide the IRS with information necessary to better examine such arrangements and that the Treasury Department should require compliance with the statutory requirement.



Offshore trusts

As previously discussed, section 409A provides for income inclusion in the case that assets restricted to deferred compensation are set aside in an offshore trust or similar arrangement. This provision was specifically intended to apply to foreign trusts and arrangements that effectively shield from the claims of general creditors any assets intended to satisfy nonqualified deferred compensation arrangements. This provision would not be triggered in the case of an offshore nonqualified deferred compensation arrangement so long as the amounts deferred are not set aside in an offshore trust or similar arrangement.

Some believe that a fund manager's offshore deferred compensation should be treated as an arrangement similar to an offshore trust, even if the arrangement is not technically funded by a trust. Others believe that treatment as an offshore trust is not appropriate merely because the payor of the deferred compensation is a foreign person. Such persons argue that additional factors are necessary for offshore trust treatment, such as whether the creditors of the offshore fund are effectively shielded from access to the fund's assets in the event of default or whether the creditors of the fund are limited primarily to the fund's investors.

1 This document may be cited as follows: Joint Committee on Taxation, "Present Law and Analysis Relating to Tax Treatment of Partnership Carried Interests and Related Issues, Part II", (JCX-63-07), September 4, 2007. This document is available on the internet at www.house.gov/jct.

2 That document may be cited as follows: Joint Committee on Taxation, "Present Law and Analysis Relating to Tax Treatment of Partnership Carried Interests and Related Issues, Part I", (JCX-62-07), September 4, 2007. The document is available on the internet at www.house.gov/jct.

3 These types of funds have differing investment strategies. These are briefly described in the Economic Data section of Present Law and Analysis Relating to Tax Treatment of Partnership Carried Interests and Related Issues, Part I (JCX-62-07), September 4, 2007. This document is available on the internet at www.house.gov/jct.

4 Lynnley Browning, "A Hamptons for Hedge Funds: Offshore Tax Breaks Lure Money Managers," New York Times, July 1, 2007.

5 There are also other types of investors, including corporations subject to U.S. tax, and funds of funds. See the Economic Data section of Present Law and Analysis Relating to Tax Treatment of Partnership Carried Interests and Related Issues, Part I (JCX-62-07), September 4, 2007. This document is available on the internet at www.house.gov/jct.

6 A variant involves the use of parallel U.S. and foreign funds with substantially similar investments. The master-feeder structure is described in the Background section of Present Law and Analysis Relating to Tax Treatment of Partnership Carried Interests and Related Issues, Part I (JCX-62-07), September 4, 2007. This document is available on the internet at www.house.gov/jct.

7 In some cases, the offshore investment fund is one of two parallel investment funds, the other of which is established in the United States.

8 For a discussion of the typical compensation structures of hedge funds, see David A. Sussman and Daniel A. Kalosieh, "Hedge Funds, Deferrals, and Taxes," Investment Advisor, November 2003 (article was published before the enactment of section 409A).

9 Situations exist in which hedge funds are subject to ordinary income rates (e.g., if the fund makes a mark-to-market election under section 475(f). In general, compensation income is subject to employment tax (2.9 percent for amounts over $97,500 for 2007), however, while short-term capital gain is not. See the Present Law section of Present Law and Analysis Relating to Tax Treatment of Partnership Carried Interests and Related Issues, Part I (JCX-62-07), September 4, 2007. This document is available on the internet at www.house.gov/jct.

10 The proposition assumes that tax rates remain constant.

11 This principle can also be understood as a special case of the well-known "Cary Brown theorem," which holds that, assuming constant tax rates, permitting an immediate deduction for the cost of a marginal asset that ordinarily would be purchased with after-tax dollars is equivalent to exempting the yield from the asset from tax. Cary Brown, "Business-Income Taxation and Investment Incentives," in Income, Employment and Public Policy: Essays in Honor of Alvin H. Hansen 300 (1948). In the income deferral case, the analog of the purchase price of an asset is the taxpayer's after-tax income, because in the base case assets are purchased with after-tax dollars. The value of income deferral then becomes the tax exemption of the yield from that after-tax income amount for the life of the deferral.

12 International Financial Services, London, Hedge Fund: City Business Series, April 2007, available at http://www.ifsl.org.uk/uploads/CBS_Hedge_Funds_2007.pdf.

13 Private Equity Intelligence, Ltd. 2006 "Value Creation and Carry Review", available at http://www.preqin.com/carry.aspx

14 International Financial Services, London, Private Equity 2007: City Business Series, August 2007, available at http://www.ifsl.org.uk/uploads/CBS_Private_Equity_2007.pdf.

15 Ithmar Capital and Dow Jones Private Equity, The Impact of Private Equity on the GCC: Edition I, 2007, available at http://www.ithmar.com/pdf/thought_leadership_reports.pdf

16 International Financial Service, London, Private Equity 2007 (supra).

17 Secs. 512(a)(1), 511(a)(1).

18 Organizations subject to the unrelated business income tax include all organizations described in section 501(c) (except for U.S. instrumentalities and certain charitable trusts), qualified pension, profit-sharing, and stock bonus plans described in section 401(a), and certain State colleges and universities. Sec. 511(a)(2).

19 Sec. 513(a).

20 Sec. 512(b)(1)-(3), (5).

21 Sec. 512(b)(4).

22 Sec. 512(b)(13).

23 Sec. 512(c).

24 Sec. 514(c)(1).

25 Sec. 514(c).

26 This Code section generally describes an educational organization that operates as a school (i.e., "an educational organization which normally maintains a regular faculty and curriculum and normally has a regularly enrolled body of pupils or students in attendance at the place where its educational activities are regularly carried on").

27 Sec. 514(c)(9)(C) & (F).

28 Sec. 514(c)(9)(C).

29 Sec. 514(c)(9)(B)(i)-(v).

30 Sec. 514(c)(9)(B)(vi) & (E).

31 Sec. 514(c)(9)(B)(E)(i).

32 Sec. 514(c)(9)(B)(E)(i)(I).

33 Treas. Reg. sec. 1.514(c)-2(b)(2)(i).

34 96 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1938) (holding that a bathing beach business that turned its profits over to a charitable organization was exempt).

35 190 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1951) (upholding the exempt status of a corporation that acquired the C.F. Mueller pasta company, on the ground that the pasta company's profits were destined for the New York University School of Law's exempt programs).

36 H.R. Rep. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 38-39 (1950); S. Rep. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 31-32 (1950).

37 Revenue Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-814, sec. 301. In 1951, Congress extended the unrelated business income tax to the income of State colleges and universities. Sec. 511(a)(2)(B).

38 H.R. Rep. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1950); S. Rep. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1950). The Supreme Court has stated that the "undisputed purpose" of the unrelated business income tax is "to prevent tax-exempt organizations from competing unfairly with businesses whose earnings were taxed." United States v. American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 114 (1986); United States v. American College of Physicians, 475 U.S. 834, 838 (1986) ("Congress perceived a need to restrain the unfair competition fostered by the tax laws.").

39 H.R. Rep. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1950); S. Rep. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1950).

40 S. Rep. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 30-31 (1950).

41 H.R. Rep. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1950); S. Rep. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1950).

42 There was an exception for rental income from a lease of five years or less.

43 H.R. Rep. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 38-39 (1950); S. Rep. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 31-32 (1950).

44 The tax also applies to certain State colleges and universities and their wholly owned subsidiaries. Sec. 511(a)(2)(B).

45 Joint Committee on Taxation, General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 (JCS-16-70), December 3, 1970, at 62.

46 Commissioner v. Clay B. Brown, 380 U.S. 563 (1965).

47 Joint Committee on Taxation, General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 (JCS-16-70), December 3, 1970, at 62.

48 S. Rep. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 62-63; H.R. Rep. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 44-46; Joint Committee on Taxation, General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 (JCS-16-70), December 3, 1970, at 62.

49 Compare sec. 514(c)(9)(B)(i)-(v).

50 S. Rep. No. 96-1036, 96st Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1980).

51 Joint Committee on Taxation, General Explanation of the Revenue Provisions of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (JCS-41-84), December 31, 1984, at 1151.

52 Id. In the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Congress provided exempt status for certain title holding companies (section 501(c)(25)) and at the same time extended the real property exception to such companies.

53 Sec. 514(c)(9)(B)(vi) & (E).

54 Sec. 514(c)(9)(G)(i).

55 Sec. 514(c)(9)(G)(ii).

56 Sec. 514(c)(9)(H).

57 Secs. 951-964.

58 Secs. 1291-1298.

59 Secs. 901, 902, 904, 960, 1291(g).

60 Secs. 951-964.

61 Secs. 951(b), 957, 958.

62 Sec. 951(a).

63 Sec. 954.

64 Sec. 953.

65 Sec. 952(a)(3)-(5).

66 Sec. 954.

67 Secs. 951(a)(1)(B), 956.

68 Sec. 956(c)(1).

69 Sec. 956(c)(2).

70 Sec. 1297.

71 Secs. 1293-1295.

72 Sec. 1291. This interest charge is imposed when a shareholder receives an excess distribution, which in general is a distribution in excess of 125 percent of the average amount received during the three preceding taxable years.

73 Sec. 1296.

74 Sec. 911.

75 Generally, only U.S. citizens may qualify under the bona fide residence test. A U.S. resident alien who is a citizen of a country with which the United States has a tax treaty may, however, qualify for the section 911 exclusions under the bona fide residence test by application of a nondiscrimination provision of the treaty.

76 Notice 2006-87, 2006-43 I.R.B. 766; Notice 2007-25, 2007-12 I.R.B. 760.

77 Sec. 875.

78 Secs. 871(b) and 882.

79 Secs. 871 and 881.

80 Secs. 871(h)-(i), 881(c)-(d).

81 Treas. Reg. sec. 1.863-7(b)(1).

82 Secs. 1441, 1442.

83 Treas. Reg. sec. 1.6012-1(b), -2(g).

84 Sec. 864(b)(2).

85 Sec. 884.

86 The rules governing the imposition and collection of tax on foreign persons' dispositions of U.S. real property are included in a series of provisions that were enacted in 1980 and that are collectively referred to as the Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax Act ("FIRPTA") (secs. 897, 1445, 6039C, and 6652(f)).

87 Sec. 897(a).

88 Sec. 163(j).

89 For purposes of the nondiscrimination requirements, an employee is treated as highly compensated if the employee (1) was a five-percent owner of the employer at any time during the year or the preceding year, or (2) either (a) had compensation for the preceding year in excess of $100,000 (for 2007) or (b) at the election of the employer had compensation for the preceding year in excess of $100,000 (for 2007) and was in the top 20 percent of employees by compensation for such year (sec. 414(q)). A nonhighly compensated employee is an employee other than a highly compensated employee.

90 Secs. 401(a)(4), 403(b)(12), 404(a)(2), and 408(k)(3). A qualified retirement plan of a governmental employer is not subject to the nondiscrimination requirements. Special rules apply in the case of a SIMPLE plan to ensure that a broad group of employees are covered by the plan. Sec. 408(p)(2) and (4).

91 See Treas. Reg. sec. 1.401(a)(4)-1.

92 Sec. 457(f).

93 Pub. L. No. 108-357 (2004).

94 Section 409A generally applies to amounts deferred after December 31, 2004.

95 In contrast, if the taxpayer uses an accrual method of accounting, compensation is includible in gross income when all events have occurred which fix the right to receive such compensation and the amount thereof can be determined with reasonable accuracy. Treas. Reg. secs. 1.451-1 and 1.451-2.

96 Compensation that is constructively received is includible in income regardless of whether the requirements of section 409A are met.

97 Special rules apply under the Code in the case of nonexempt employee trusts and nonqualified employee annuities (i.e., trusts and annuities not meeting the requirements applicable to qualified retirement plans and annuities). Secs. 402(b) and 403(c). These provisions apply rules similar to those under section 83. Although these Code provisions predate the enactment of section 83 in 1969, they were amended at that time to reflect the enactment of section 83.

98 Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U.S. 177 (1945); E.T. Sproull v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 244 (1951), aff'd per curiam, 194 F.2d 541 (1952).

99 In the case of nonqualified deferred compensation arrangements, these doctrines have largely been codified in the Code provisions discussed herein. However, because many of the legal precedents related to nonqualified deferred compensation predate these Code provisions, the economic benefit and cash equivalency doctrines are sometimes considered in analyzing the tax treatment of nonqualified deferred compensation.

100 See, e.g., Cowden v. Commissioner, 289 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1961).

101 A plan includes an agreement or arrangement, including an agreement or arrangement that includes one person. Amounts deferred also include actual or notional earnings.

102 As under section 83, the rights of a person to compensation are subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture if the person's rights to such compensati on are conditioned upon the performance of substantial services by any individual.

103 Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.409A-1(f)(1).

104 Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.409A-1(f)(2).

105 Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.409A-1(f)(2)(iv).

106 A qualified employer plan means a qualified retirement plan, tax-deferred annuity, simplified employee pension, and SIMPLE. A qualified governmental excess benefit arrangement (sec. 415(m)) is a qualified employer plan. An eligible deferred compensation plan (sec. 457(b)) is also a qualified employer plan. A tax-exempt or governmental deferred compensation plan that is not an eligible deferred compensation plan is not a qualified employer plan.

107 Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.409A-1(b)(6).

108 Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.409A-1(b)(4).

109 Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.409A-1(b)(5).

110 Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.409A-1(a)(3).

111 Key employees are defined in section 416(i) and generally include officers (limited to 50 employees) having annual compensation greater than $145,000 (in 2007), five percent owners, and one percent owners having annual compensation from the employer greater than $150,000.

112 Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.409A-3(i)(6).

113 Secs. 404(a)(5), (b) and (d) and sec. 83(h).

114 In the case of a publicly held corporation, no deduction is allowed for a taxable year for remuneration with respect to a covered employee to the extent that the remuneration exceeds $1 million. Code sec. 162(m). The Code defines the term "covered employee" in part by reference to Federal securities law. In light of changes to Federal securities law, the Internal Revenue Service interprets the term covered employee as the principal executive officer of the taxpayer as of the close of the taxable year or the 3 most highly compensated employees of the taxpayer for the taxable year whose compensation must be disclosed to the taxpayer's shareholders (other than the principal executive officer or the principal financial officer). Notice 2007-49, 2007-25 I.R.B. 1429. For purposes of the deduction limit, remuneration generally includes all remuneration for which a deduction is otherwise allowable, although commission-based compensation and certain performance-based compensation are not subject to the limit. Remuneration does not include compensation for which a deduction is allowable after a covered employee ceases to be a covered employee. Thus, the deduction limitation often does not apply to deferred compensation that is otherwise subject to the deduction limitation (e.g., is not performance-based compensation) because the payment of the compensation is deferred until after termination of employment.

115 The required income tax withholding is accomplished by withholding income taxes from other wages paid to the employee in the same year.

116 Because nonqualified deferred compensation arrangements generally cover only highly paid employees, the other compensation paid to the employee during the year generally exceeds the social security wage base. In that case, nonqualified deferred compensation amounts are subject only to Medicare tax.

117 Sec. 6051(a)(13).

118 Notice 2006-100, 2006-51 I.R.B. 1109.

119 As discussed above, exceptions apply in the case of certain foreign plans.

120 There may be methods by which an exempt organization can "block" UBIT without investing through an offshore corporation and without incurring an entity-level tax, such as by making certain investments in REITs.

121 If a blocker corporation were subject to U.S. corporate tax on income that would be UBTI if derived directly by a tax-exempt organization, the use of the blocker corporation may not reduce the total U.S. tax liability attributable to an investment. In that case, avoidance of the administrative burdens of complying with the UBTI rules and similar concerns, rather than reduction of total tax liability, may be a principal reason for use of a blocker corporation. See Robert D. Blashek & Scot A. McLean, Investments in 'Pass-Through' Portfolio Companies by Private Equity Partnerships: Tax Strategies and Structuring, 704 Practicing Law Institute/Tax 689 (June 2006), p. 789.

122 See, e.g., Suzanne Ross McDowell, Taxation of Unrelated Debt-Financed Income, The Exempt Organization Tax Review (Vol. 34, No. 2), November 2001, at 210.

123 H.R. Rep. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 38-39 (1950); S. Rep. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 31-32 (1950).

124 Statement of William McKee, Tax Legislative Counsel, Department of the Treasury, 1981-92 Miscellaneous Tax Bills, XVI: Hearing on S. 2498 before the Subcommittee on Taxation and Debt Management of the Senate Finance Committee, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1982).

125 McDowell, supra, at 212 (arguing that well-advised organizations oftentimes can structure leveraged investments that are not treated as debt-financed under the unrelated debt-financed income rules, but which have similar economic consequences to investments that, if made, would be treated as debt-financed).

126 Statement of Daniel I. Halperin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, Five Miscellaneous Tax Bills: Hearings on S. 650 before the Subcommittee on Taxation and Debt Management of the Senate Finance Committee, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 298 (1980).

127 Statement of William McKee, Tax Legislative Counsel, Department of the Treasury, 1981-92 Miscellaneous Tax Bills, XVI: Hearing on S. 2498 before the Subcommittee on Taxation and Debt Management of the Senate Finance Committee, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 54-55 (1982).

128 Statement of Robert G. Woodward, Acting Tax Legislative Counsel, Department of the Treasury, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Taxation and Debt Management of the Senate Finance Committee, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 88-89 (1983).

129 See William H. Weigel, Unrelated Debt-Financed Income: A Retrospective (and a Modest Proposal), 50 Tax Lawyer 3 (1996-1997), at 632-635; see generally Arthur A. Feder & Joel Scharfstein, Leveraged Investment in Real Property through Partnerships by Tax Exempt Organizations after the Revenue Act of 1987 --A Lesson in How the Legislative Process Should Not Work, 42 Tax Lawyer 55 (Fall 1988).

130 These taxes could include net-basis income tax on income effectively connected with a U.S. trade or business; branch profits tax on U.S. earnings and profits shifted out of, and interested deducted by, a U.S. branch; and gross-basis withholding tax on payments of certain U.S.-source amounts such as dividends.

131 Andrew W. Needham & Christian Brause, Hedge Funds, BNA Tax Management Portfolio 736 at VIII.A.2.

132 To avoid creating effectively connected fee income for foreign investors, many funds provide fee offset arrangements under which all fee income is segregated at the level of the fund manager in exchange for reductions in the management fee or carried interest distributions payable to the manager. An issue is whether these fee offset arrangements should be disregarded under the assignment of income doctrine or related substance-over-form arguments. See Andrew W. Needham & Anita Beth Adams, Private Equity Funds, BNA Tax Management Portfolio 735 at VII.C.3.

133 Anita Raghavan, "IRS Probes Tax Goal of Derivatives,"Wall Street Journal, July 19, 2007; p. C1.

134 E.g., Lee A. Sheppard, "Neither a Dealer Nor a Lender Be, Part 2: Hedge Fund Lending," Tax Notes, Aug. 15, 2005, p. 729.

135 See Jenny Anderson, "Managers Use Hedge Funds as Big I.R.A.'s," New York Times, April 17, 2007. See also section 536 of H.R. 1591 (An act making emergency supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2007, and for other purposes), as passed by the Senate, which contains a provision that would generally impose a $1 million annual limit on nonqualified deferred compensation.

136 Sec. 457(f).

137 Additionally, in the case of a publicly traded corporation, the section 162(m) limit on the deductibility of remuneration paid to a covered employee provides an incentive for the corporation and covered employee to structure compensation in excess of the limit as deferred compensation since such compensation is not subject to the deduction limit.

138 Proposed Treasury regulations under section 1291 provide that (1) an option to acquire stock in a passive foreign investment company is treated as stock for purposes of applying the excess distribution rules to the disposition of the option and (2) the holding period of a share of passive foreign investment company stock acquired by the exercise of an option includes the period the option was held. Section 1291(a)(2) provides that gain recognized on the sale of stock of a passive foreign investment company is treated as an excess distribution. Accordingly, under the tax-plus-interest rules of section 1291 and the accompanying proposed regulations, the sale of an option or the exercise of an option followed by the immediate sale of the underlying stock generally would trigger an interest charge computed based on the taxpayer's option and stock holding period.

139 Securities and Exchange Commission regulations require disclosure in public filings of certain information related to nonqualified deferred compensation. See e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(i).

Alvin S. Brown
Tax attorney
703.425.1400
www.irstaxattorney.com

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Back Taxes: Offer in Compromise - abuse of discretion issue

Taxpayer argued that the IRS (1) Erroneously took into account as potential sources of payment, certain assets previously transferred to petitioner's former spouse;5 and (2) failed to take into account the vagaries of petitioner's income.

The Tax Court did not go into any of these issues. For example, if the prior transfer of assets to a former wife was a gift or part of a divorce settlement, it would not be an asset of Taxpayer to be taken into account by the IRS. And if his income was irregular, Taxpaer wanted the court to consider an "average" level of income in order to avoid a distorted evaluation of his income.

THE TAX COURT WOULD NOT EVEN CONSIDER TAXPAYER'S FACTS OR ARGUMENT and merely said that the IRS has the discretion to make its determination.

The Tax Court apparently believes that the law is unimportant and the facts are unimportant.

The Tax Court stated that there were "other sources of income" to pay for Taxpayer's tax debt but did not bother to identify that source of income. In making that statement the Court contradicted itself by stipulating that the Taxpayer might be correct on his irregular source of income.

This case reflects a Tax Court that is not interested either in the facts or the law.





Nicholas D. Newton v. Commissioner.


Dkt. No. 16911-05L , TC Memo. 2007-264, September 4, 2007.



[Code Sec. 6330]

Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing: Hearing procedures: Abuse of discretion: Offer in compromise. --



Nicholas D. Newton, pro se; William J. Gregg, for respondent.



MEMORANDUM OPINION


CARLUZZO, Special Trial Judge: In a Notice of Determination Concerning Collection Action(s) Under Section 6320 and/or 6330,1 dated August 15, 2005, respondent concluded that it was appropriate to collect by levy petitioner's outstanding 1981, 1983, and 1996 Federal income tax liabilities (petitioner's outstanding tax liabilities). Neither the existence nor the amounts of those liabilities have been placed in dispute.2 What has been placed in dispute is respondent's rejection of an offer-in-compromise submitted by petitioner as a collection alternative to respondent's proposed levy. According to petitioner, his offer-in-compromise should have been accepted, and respondent's determination to collect by levy the outstanding tax liabilities is an abuse of discretion. Respondent disagrees, and, for the following reasons, so do we.



Background


Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found. At the time the petition was filed, petitioner resided in Vermont.

Because the existence or the amounts of petitioner's outstanding tax liabilities are not in dispute, we see little point in burdening this opinion with the history of how those liabilities arose. Suffice it to say that as of July 2004, when the relevant offer-in-compromise (the 2004 offer) was submitted to respondent, those liabilities, including interest, penalties and additions to tax, exceeded $600,000.

From time to time, over the years, petitioner submitted several other offers-in-compromise with respect to his outstanding tax liabilities. On January 8, 1997, a Notice of Federal Tax Lien was filed with respect to petitioner's outstanding 1981 Federal income tax liability, which at the time, exceeded $260,000. On September 4, 1997, respondent accepted petitioner's $66,000 offer-in-compromise with respect to petitioner's 1981 income tax liability, but within months petitioner defaulted on the payment plan that formed the basis for that offer. Before making the 2004 offer, petitioner made several other offers-in-compromise (the prior offers), each in an amount substantially more than the 2004 offer. Respondent rejected all of the prior offers upon the ground that the offers did not adequately reflect petitioner's ability to pay.

By letter dated May 25, 2004, respondent advised petitioner that his outstanding tax liabilities were subject to collection by levy. That letter also advised petitioner of his right to request an administrative hearing in order to dispute the proposed collection activity. Petitioner did so in a timely fashion, and on July 8, 2004, during the course of the administrative hearing, petitioner submitted the 2004 offer as a collection alternative to the proposed levy with respect to his outstanding tax liabilities. In the 2004 offer, petitioner proposed to pay $1,000.

In response to the 2004 offer, respondent's settlement officer considered petitioner's financial situation, determined that the 2004 offer of $1,000 did not reflect petitioner's ability to pay his outstanding tax liabilities, rejected that offer-in-compromise, and caused the above-referenced notice of determination to be issued.



Discussion


At the administrative hearing, petitioner challenged the appropriateness of respondent's proposed collection activity and offered a collection alternative. See sec. 6330(c)(2)(A)(ii) and (iii). Needless to say, respondent is entitled to levy in order to collect a taxpayer's tax liability. See sec. 6331.3 Furthermore, as he was required to do, the settlement officer considered the collection alternative proposed by petitioner during the administrative hearing.4 See sec. 6330(c)(3)(B).

The record establishes that the settlement officer proceeded in the manner contemplated by section 6330, and other than as relates to the settlement officer's rejection of petitioner's 2004 offer, petitioner does not suggest otherwise.

Nevertheless, as petitioner views that matter, respondent's determination to collect his outstanding tax liabilities by levy is an abuse of discretion because the settlement officer improperly rejected petitioner's proposed collection alternative. Specifically, petitioner argues that in rejecting the 2004 offer, the settlement officer: (1) Erroneously took into account as potential sources of payment, certain assets previously transferred to petitioner's former spouse;5 and (2) failed to take into account the vagaries of petitioner's income.

Assuming, without finding, that petitioner is correct on both points, it remains that other sources of payment included in the settlement officer's analysis support the settlement officer's conclusion that the 2004 offer did not reflect petitioner's ability to pay his outstanding tax liabilities.6 After all, it doesn't take much of a financial structure to support a payment in excess of $1,000.

Taking into account all of the facts and circumstances, we are satisfied that respondent's determination to collect by levy petitioner's outstanding tax liabilities is supported in law and in fact. It follows that the determination is not an abuse of discretion, see Freije v. Commissioner, 125 T.C. 14 (2005), and respondent may proceed with collection as proposed in the above-referenced notice of determination.

To reflect the foregoing,

Decision will be entered for respondent.

1 Unless otherwise indicated, subsequent section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, in effect for the relevant period.

2 Consequently, we review respondent's proposed collection activity for abuse of discretion. Sego v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 604, 610 (2000).

3 In general and subject to various conditions that need not be discussed here, that section provides that if any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay such tax within 10 days after notice and demand for payment, the Commissioner is authorized to collect such tax by levy on the person's property.

4 The settlement officer invited petitioner to make an offer-in-compromise commensurate with the amount that the settlement officer determined petitioner's financial situation would allow. Petitioner now attacks the settlement officer's proposal. We focus on the settlement officer's consideration and rejection of the 2004 offer, not on the appropriateness of the settlement officer's proposal.

5 The parties dispute whether those assets are subject to the Federal tax lien that arose prior to the transfer. See sec. 6321. Petitioner takes the position that the lien does not attach, and, not surprisingly, respondent takes the position that it does. Petitioner expected that this Court in this proceeding would determine whether the lien did or did not attach to those assets. Under the circumstances, we need not consider the point. Furthermore, we note that issues regarding whether respondent's tax lien has attached to those assets may be cognizable in a variety of other types of legal actions. See, e.g., secs. 7403, 7425, 7426; see also 28 U.S.C. sec. 2410 (2000).

6 For example, the parties stipulated that at the time the 2004 offer was under consideration by the settlement officer, petitioner "had a savings certificate of deposit with an account balance of $28,000".Nevertheless, as petitioner views that matter, respondent's determination to collect his outstanding tax liabilities by levy is an abuse of discretion because the settlement officer improperly rejected petitioner's proposed collection alternative. Specifically, petitioner argues that in rejecting the 2004 offer, the settlement officer: (1) Erroneously took into account as potential sources of payment, certain assets previously transferred to petitioner's former spouse;5 and (2) failed to take into account the vagaries of petitioner's income.

Alvin S. Brown, Esq.
Tax attorney
703.425.1400
www.irstaxattorney.com

To provide IRS "transparency" you should upload your IRS experiences to www.irsforum.org

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Tuesday, September 4, 2007

Tax Help: Sentencing guildelines for tax fraud [ Code Sec. 7206]

A lawyer and former federal prosecutor's sentence for tax fraud was substantially and procedurally reasonable. Although the individual failed to report as income bribes he received from city vendors while the Mayor of Atlanta, the trial court imposed the minimum sentence recommended by the sentencing guidelines.

The court followed the "Booker" procedures to calculate the sentence; first establishing the base level of the offense by estimating the government's tax loss and then enhancing the base level for use of sophisticated means of concealment and obstruction of justice. The two-level enhancement for sophisticated schemes was proper because the individual used campaign accounts and other people's credit cards to hide his tax fraud. The trial court's two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice was also proper. The evidence clearly indicated that the individual intended to conceal evidence that was material to the government's investigation of his tax fraud. The individual failed to show that his public service was so extraordinary as to justify a downward departure from the sentencing guidelines. Since the sentence imposed (30 months in prison and a $6,000 fine) was less than the maximum sentence allowed by Code Sec. 7206 (three years and $100,000 fine) it was not excessive.




United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. William C. Campbell, Defendant-Appellant. U.S. Court of Appeals, 11th Circuit; 06-13548, July 13, 2007.




Before: Dubina and Black, Circuit Judges, and Restani, Judge.

Before DUBINA and BLACK, Circuit Judges, and RESTANI, * Judge.

DUBINA, Circuit Judge: Appellant William C. Campbell appeals his convictions and sentences for tax fraud. On appeal, Campbell raises the following issues: (1) whether the district court abused its discretion and violated Campbell's Sixth Amendment right to counsel when it disqualified his counsel of choice; and (2) whether the 30-month concurrent prison sentences Campbell received were unreasonable. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the convictions and sentences.




I. BACKGROUND


From 1994 to 2002, Campbell served as mayor of the City of Atlanta, Georgia ("City"). Approximately two and a half years after Campbell left office, a federal grand jury issued an indictment charging him with (1) having conducted City affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity, in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2000) (count one); (2) accepting cash payments with the intent to be influenced and rewarded in connection with City business transactions, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 666(a)(1)(B) and 2 (2000) (counts two through four); and (3) tax fraud, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1) (2000) (counts five through seven).

According to the indictment, while in office, Campbell solicited and accepted undocumented payments of money from individuals and businesses seeking to do business with the City and treated favorably those who paid. One of the more notable transactions involved $55,000 Campbell received in exchange for an award of lucrative contracts concerning the City's computer systems. Another involved payments Campbell received from a night club owner with the understanding that Campbell would approve the owner's application for a liquor license. Among other things, the indictment also accused Campbell of hiring an assistant on the City payroll to tend to his personal needs, including collecting corrupt payments on Campbell's behalf.

The indictment further charged that Campbell actively sought to conceal the payments he received, which included supposed campaign contributions that he utilized for frivolous personal expenses. In carrying out his corrupt activities, Campbell committed mail and wire fraud. Furthermore, he under-reported his income to the IRS from tax years 1997 through 1999.

It is difficult to overemphasize the breadth and depth of the corruption underlying the case against Campbell. At the time of Campbell's sentencing, five high-level officials in his former administration and five businessmen were ensnared in the government's investigation of Campbell and either pled guilty or were convicted of charges similar to those Campbell faced. All but two received prison sentences. Others charged with wrongdoing, including one businessman who admitted bribing Campbell, struck deals with the government to avoid prosecution.

Early in the proceedings leading to Campbell's trial, after already having secured legal representation, Campbell sought to retain an additional attorney, Craig A. Gillen ("Gillen"). The government quickly opposed Gillen's representation because Gillen's law partner, Wilmer Parker ("Parker"), had represented businessman George Greene on corruption charges related to those Campbell faced. The government intended to call Greene ("Greene"), who had pled guilty and been sentenced to 15 months in prison, as a witness in its case against Campbell. Therefore, the government argued, Gillen's representation would create a conflict of interest. The district court agreed and disqualified Gillen.

Following a trial, the jury acquitted Campbell of the RICO and bribery charges but found Campbell guilty of the tax fraud charges. 1 After a sentencing hearing, the district court sentenced Campbell to 30 months in prison and 12 months on supervised release, in addition to a fine of $6,000. Campbell then perfected this appeal.




II. DISCUSSION




A. Gillen's Disqualification

Campbell contends that the district court's decision to disqualify Gillen violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel of his choice. Specifically, Campbell contends that a court's interest in maintaining public confidence in the criminal justice system is insufficient in general and was not sufficiently at risk in this case to justify disqualifying Gillen when (1) Gillen had not represented Greene; (2) Gillen possessed no confidential information about Greene; and (3) Campbell had knowingly and voluntarily waived any potential conflict of interest. Campbell also contends that the district court erroneously failed to consider alternatives to disqualification.

"A trial court's decision to disqualify the defendant's counsel is reviewed for abuse of discretion." United States v. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507, 1522 (11th Cir. 1994) (citing Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 163-64, 108 S. Ct. 1692, 1699-1700 (1988)). In applying the abuse of discretion standard, we recognize that a district court has a "a range of choice[,] ... and so long as its decision does not amount to a clear error of judgment we will not reverse even if we would have gone the other way had the choice been ours to make." McMahan v. Toto, 256 F.3d 1120, 1128 (11th Cir. 2001).

The Sixth Amendment guarantees that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. Const. amend. VI. "[A]n essential part of that right is the accused's ability to select the counsel of his choice." Ross, 33 F.3d at 1522. "Thus, a criminal defendant has a presumptive right to counsel of choice." Id.

Nevertheless, "while the right to ... be represented by one's preferred attorney is comprehended by the Sixth Amendment, the essential aim of the Amendment is to guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal defendant rather than to ensure that a defendant will inexorably be represented by the lawyer whom he prefers." Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159, 108 S. Ct. at 1697. Thus, a defendant's right to the counsel of his choice is not absolute. Id. (noting some of the circumstances in which the right to counsel of choice is "circumscribed"); see also Ross, 33 F.3d at 1523.

"The need for fair, efficient, and orderly administration of justice overcomes the right to counsel of choice where an attorney has an actual conflict of interest, such as when he has previously represented a person who will be called as a witness against a current client at a criminal trial." Id. Emphasizing the judiciary's interest in ensuring and maintaining the integrity of our judicial system, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Wheat that "where a court justifiably finds an actual conflict of interest, there can be no doubt that it may decline a proffer of waiver ...." 486 U.S. at 162, 108 S. Ct. at 1698 (emphasis added). 2 Importantly, for the purpose of the instant case, "if one attorney in a firm has an actual conflict of interest, we impute that conflict to all the attorneys in the firm, subjecting the entire firm to disqualification." Ross, 33 F.3d at 1523 (citing United States v. Kitchin, 592 F.2d 900, 904 (5th Cir. 1979)). 3

Because we are dealing here with an imputed conflict, it is not necessary to decide whether Gillen himself had a direct conflict of interest. We inquire instead whether Gillen's law partner, Parker, would have had an actual or serious potential conflict of interest had Campbell retained him.


In deciding whether the actual or potential conflict warrants disqualification, we examine whether the subject matter of the first representation is substantially related to that of the second. Kitchin, 592 F.2d at 904; see United States v. James, 708 F.2d 40, 46 (2d Cir. 1983). Our goal is to discover whether the defense lawyer has divided loyalties that prevent him from effectively representing the defendant. See United States v. Moscony, 927 F.2d 742, 750 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1211, 111 S. Ct. 2812, 115 L. Ed. 2d 984 (1991). If the conflict could cause the defense attorney improperly to use privileged communications in cross-examination, then disqualification is appropriate. Indeed, it is also true that disqualification is equally appropriate if the conflict could deter the defense attorney from intense probing of the witness on cross-examination to protect privileged communications with the former client or to advance the attorney's own personal interest. In short, the court must protect its independent interest in ensuring that the integrity of the judicial system is preserved and that trials are conducted within ethical standards.


Ross, 33 F.3d at 1523 (emphasis added).

We are faced in the instant case with the same concerns we discussed in Ross, which upheld the district court's decision to disqualify the criminal defendant's counsel of choice. Id. at 1523-24. Without doubt, Parker, who defended Greene against criminal charges arising from the same corruption charges leveled against Campbell, would have had an actual conflict of interest that would warrant disqualification. See id.; see also Wheat, 486 U.S. at 163-64, 108 S. Ct. at 1699-1700 (upholding a district court's decision to disqualify an attorney who had represented a co-conspirator whom the government intended to call as a witness). Indeed, Campbell does not argue otherwise. Consequently, Gillen, too, suffered from the same conflict of interest. 4

While it is true that Campbell was free to waive the conflict, the district court was not required to accept his waiver. Ross, 33 F.3d at 1524. 5 Unlike in Ross, where all of the relevant co-defendants waived any potential conflict, Greene refused to waive the attorney-client privilege, which means that the instant case presents a stronger justification for disqualification than even Ross. By disqualifying Gillen, the district court chose to avoid a situation in which the fairness of Campbell's trial undoubtedly and quite legitimately would have been called into account, whether by Campbell or by Greene. Wheat and Ross make it clear that such a choice is within the district court's discretion. 6

Campbell also contends that the district court failed to properly consider alternatives to disqualification that may have remedied the conflict of interest. The record does not support Campbell's argument. The district court clearly and carefully considered Campbell's proposed measures, and its decision not to implement them was well-reasoned. Assuming, without deciding, that the district court was required to consider alternatives in these circumstances, the district court undoubtedly satisfied its obligation to do so. Therefore, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it disqualified Gillen.



B. Campbell's Sentences

Following Campbell's trial, the district court held a sentencing hearing at which, after receiving evidence, the district court sentenced Campbell to 30 months in prison (30 months on each count to run concurrently) and 12 months on supervised release, in addition to a $6,000 fine. To clarify the rationale supporting the sentences, the district court issued a detailed sentencing order.

After explicitly addressing and disposing of Campbell's numerous objections to the U.S. Probation Office's pre-sentence investigation report, the district court turned its attention to the U.S. Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual ("U.S.S.G." or "the Guidelines"). Relying on the 1998 edition of the Guidelines, which correlates the relevant base offense level to the amount of tax loss to the government, the district court determined that Campbell's base offense level was 13. See U.S.S.G. § 2T1.1(a)(1). 7 The court then added a total of six levels: two for failing "to report or to correctly identify the source of income exceeding $10,000 in any year from criminal activity," see U.S.S.G. § 2T1.1(b)(1); two for utilizing "sophisticated means" to impede discovery of the existence or extent of his fraud, see U.S.S.G. § 2T1.1(b)(2); and two for obstruction of justice, see U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. The district court declined the government's requests for an increase in the base offense level for abuse of a position of trust, see U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3, and disruption of governmental function, see U.S.S.G. § 5K2.7. However, the district court also denied Campbell's request for a downward departure based on his public service. See U.S.S.G. § 5H1.11 (stating that public service is "not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a departure is warranted"). Thus, the district court determined that Campbell's offense level was 19 and that Campbell fell within criminal history category I, the lowest of the criminal history categories. Consequently, the Guidelines recommended prison sentences ranging from 30 to 37 months.

Following its assessment of the Guidelines range, the district court expressly considered the additional factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2000), though it limited its detailed discussion to those factors found to be "of particular importance." United States v. Campbell, No. 1:04-CR-0424-RWS, slip op. at 25 (N.D. Ga. June 15, 2006) (sentencing order). The district court found that Campbell had publicly sought to "minimize his crimes" and "his culpability for the crimes" for which he was convicted and noted the need to deter public officials in particular from criminal conduct. Id. at 25-27. Nevertheless, the district court imposed only the minimum sentences recommended by the Guidelines. At the sentencing hearing, the district court acknowledged Campbell's accomplishments as mayor and his devotion to his children. The district court's sentencing order clearly indicates that the district court also considered "sentences imposed upon other defendants who were prosecuted as part of this same investigation," the circumstances surrounding the related convictions, and "sentences that are generally imposed for tax offenses." Id. at 27.

Campbell challenges several aspects of the sentences imposed by the district court. First, Campbell contends that the district court committed several errors in calculating the appropriate Guidelines range and settling on the sentences ultimately issued. Thus, Campbell contends, his sentences are procedurally unreasonable. Lastly, Campbell contends that the circumstances of this case render his sentences substantively unreasonable.

"We review the sentence imposed by the district court for reasonableness." United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 785 (11th Cir. 2005). "Review for reasonableness is deferential. We must evaluate whether the sentence imposed by the district court fail to achieve the purposes of sentencing stated in section 3553(a)." Id. at 788. "We do not apply the reasonableness standard to each individual decision made during the sentencing process; rather, we review the final sentence for reasonableness." United States v. Winingear, 422 F.3d 1241, 1245 (11th Cir. 2005). "[T]he party who challenges the sentence bears the burden of establishing that the sentence is unreasonable in the light of both th[e] record and the factors in section 3553(a)." Talley, 431 F.3d at 788.

We do not in this circuit presume reasonable a sentence within the properly calculated Guidelines range. See United States v. Hunt, 459 F.3d 1180, 1185 (11th Cir. 2006). Recently, however, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld other circuits' decisions affording such a presumption, noting that a sentence, independently calculated by the district court in accordance with Booker, that falls within the properly calculated Guidelines range "significantly increases the likelihood that the sentence is a reasonable one." Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. ___, slip op. at 8 (June 21, 2007). 8

"After Booker, a sentence may be reviewed for procedural or substantive unreasonableness." Hunt, 459 F.3d at 1182 n.3; see also United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005) . A sentence may be procedurally unreasonable if "it is the product of a procedure that does not follow Booker's requirements, regardless of the actual sentence." Id. 9 "Additionally, a sentence may be substantively unreasonable, regardless of the procedure used." Id.



1. Procedural Unreasonableness

Campbell first contends that the district court's reliance on conduct forming the basis of criminal charges on which he had been acquitted was unconstitutionally excessive. Campbell does not contend that the evidence was insufficient to support the district court's relevant factual findings. Furthermore, Campbell concedes that our precedents have consistently upheld district courts' use of such relevant conduct when determining an appropriate sentence. See, e.g., United States v. Duncan, 400 F.3d 1297, 1304 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing cases in this circuit extending as far back as 1991). Campbell contends nonetheless that the extent of the district court's reliance on his acquitted conduct violated his constitutional rights.

"We review de novo constitutional challenges to a sentence." United States v. Cantellano, 430 F.3d 1142, 1144 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1034, 126 S. Ct. 1604 (2006).

Campbell argues that in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's holdings in Booker and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), there must exist limits on a district court's ability to rely on acquitted conduct, and the district court exceeded those limits in this case. We do not quibble with Campbell's premise that the Constitution limits courts' ability to calculate a prison sentence in part on the basis of acquitted conduct. Indeed, we acknowledged as much in Duncan when we noted that "Booker does not suggest that the consideration of acquitted conduct violates the Sixth Amendment as long as the judge does not impose a sentence that exceeds what is authorized by the jury verdict." 400 F.3d at 1304 (emphasis added). Campbell has failed to cite, and we are independently unaware of, controlling authority establishing additional limits, assuming the conduct relied upon is relevant. 10 Campbell's reliance on Blakely and Booker is misplaced. Our opinion in Duncan was issued subsequent to both Blakely and Booker, and we then held that "nothing in Booker erodes our [relevant] binding precedent." 400 F.3d at 1304-05. 11

Campbell was convicted on three counts of tax fraud, as that offense is defined in 26 U.S.C. § 7206 (2000). Section 7206 provides for a maximum three-year prison sentence and $100,000 fine. Campbell's concurrent 30-month prison sentences and $6,000 fine do not exceed the maximum "authorized by the jury verdict;" therefore, we conclude that the district court's reliance on acquitted conduct did not violate Campbell's constitutional rights. On the contrary, given the circumstances of this case, the district court's decision to allow Campbell's three sentences to run concurrently and to impose a fine of only $6,000 demonstrates considerable leniency and restraint. See, e.g., United States v. Tafoya, 757 F.2d 1522, 1530 (5th Cir.) (upholding a sentence totaling six years on two counts of tax fraud), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 921, 106 S. Ct. 252 (1985).

Campbell further argues that the district court failed to properly consider the central mandate of the key sentencing statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2000), as well as the factors addressed in § 3553 that are independent of the Guidelines. Finally, Campbell contends that the district court erroneously calculated the Guidelines range. We begin our analysis with the district court's calculation of the Guidelines range.

"We review for clear error the district court's findings of fact regarding whether a defendant should receive an enhanced sentence under the ... Guidelines." United States v. Clay, 376 F.3d 1296, 1300 (11th Cir. 2004). We review de novo the "district court's interpretation of the Guidelines and its application of the Guidelines to the facts." United States v. McGill, 450 F.3d 1276, 1278 (11th Cir. 2006).

In a footnote in his brief, Campbell contends that the district court incorrectly determined the amount of tax loss that led to the base offense level. Campbell's argument, however, is nothing more than an assignment of error. He cites to no authority, legal or otherwise, for his parenthetical suggestion that the district court's tax loss calculation was not "a reasonable estimate." (Appellant's Br. at 51 (citing U.S.S.G. § 2T1.1, commentary (n.1).) Therefore, Campbell has failed to raise this argument in a manner sufficient to allow for appellate review. Gupta, 463 F.3d at 1195.

Campbell also contends that the evidence did not demonstrate that he utilized sophisticated means to conceal the crime for which he was convicted. The district court found that Campbell utilized campaign accounts and credit cards issued to other people to conceal cash expenditures in "a deliberate attempt to impede the discovery of both the existence and extent of his tax fraud." Campbell suggests that the evidence demonstrates merely "unusual spending patterns." (Appellant's Br. at 52, n.20.) In light of the evidence before the district court, we believe it was reasonable for the district court to conclude that Campbell engaged in his "unusual spending patterns" to conceal his fraud on the government. See United States v. Barakat, 130 F.3d 1448, 1457 (11th Cir. 1997) (agreeing with the district court's determination that the defendant's practice of filtering funds through his attorney's trust account constituted a sophisticated means of concealing tax evasion). 12 Furthermore, Campbell's deceptive practices were at least as sophisticated as the practice at issue in Barakat. The fact that Campbell did not use offshore bank accounts or transactions through fictitious business entities is unavailing. See U.S.S.G. § 2T1.1, commentary (n.4) (providing a nonexclusive list of examples of sophisticated means of concealment). In terms of the sophistication of the concealment, we see no difference between "hiding assets or transactions ... through the use of fictitious entities, corporate shells, or offshore financial accounts," id., and hiding assets or transactions through the use of a straw man or campaign fund.

Finally, with respect to the district court's Guidelines calculation, Campbell contends that the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that he willfully obstructed justice. See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. We disagree. At the sentencing hearing, the district court heard testimony from Gabe Pascarella ("Pascarella"), a person of interest to the government during its investigation of Campbell. Pascarella testified that he had notified Campbell of the government's intention to interview him, and, together, they planned to have Pascarella surreptitiously record the interview. Following the government's interview, Campbell met with Pascarella, and the two discussed the interview as well as a subpoena the government had issued to Pascarella requiring him to produce documents related to the investigation. Pascarella informed Campbell that he possessed relevant records that would, inter alia, evidence Campbell's use of Pascarella's credit card to pay personal expenses. At Campbell's request, Pascarella turned some of the records over to him. The government did not become aware of the records Pascarella gave Campbell until after the trial.

The only evidence rebutting Pascarella's testimony at the sentencing hearing was an affidavit from Campbell stating that he had not taken any records. The district court chose to believe Pascarella's testimony, however, which, unlike Campbell's sworn statement, was subject to cross-examination, and Campbell has failed to argue that its decision to do so was clearly erroneous. Given the district court's unchallenged credibility determination, we conclude that the evidence upon which the district court relied was sufficient to demonstrate that Campbell took the records from Pascarella with the intent to "conceal[] ... evidence that is material to an official investigation." See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, commentary (n.4(d)) (providing examples of conduct that qualifies as obstruction of justice). Therefore, the district court's decision to add two levels to the base offense level for obstruction of justice was not error.

We conclude that the remainder of Campbell's arguments regarding procedural reasonableness are lacking in merit. It is clear not only that the district court adequately considered the § 3553 factors, but also that the sentences handed down were the product of conscientious deliberation. While we remain uncertain whether the sentences are "sufficient ... to comply with the purposes" of sentencing, considering as we must the factors set forth in § 3553, we are certain that they are "not greater than necessary." See 18 U.S.C. § 3553. Therefore, the district court adhered to the relevant aspect of § 3553's central mandate. 13

In conclusion, we hold that the district court properly followed the procedures outlined in Booker. Therefore, Campbell's sentences are not procedurally unreasonable.



2. Substantive Unreasonableness

Campbell asks this court to overturn his sentences due to (1) his status as a "first offender with an exceptional personal history who cannot be considered likely to commit further crimes," (2) his service to the public, and (3) statistics that indicate that Campbell's sentences greatly exceed the average sentences imposed upon those convicted of tax crimes. We decline to do so.

That Campbell has been convicted only once does not make him a first offender. He was convicted on three separate counts of tax fraud, which he engaged in on three separate occasions over the course of three years. He sought to conceal his crimes and willfully impeded the government's efforts to prosecute him. Moreover, the fact that Campbell, a lawyer and former federal prosecutor, committed his crimes while mayor of a major metropolitan city, knowing as he must have that his actions would be publicly and deeply scrutinized, belies his assertion that he "cannot be considered likely to commit further crimes." Further, Campbell has failed to direct this court to evidence that his public service was so extraordinary as to justify deviating from the standard application of the Guidelines, which generally precludes consideration of public service. U.S.S.G. § 5H1.11. Finally, the statistics Campbell cites are bare numbers without context and, therefore, do not persuade us that his sentences are unreasonable.

Briefly, we address Campbell's contention that his sentences reflect disrespect for the jury trial system. Obviously and mistakenly equating acquittal to innocence, 14 Campbell contends that the district court circumvented the jury's decision to acquit him with respect to the more egregious charges by "essentially convict[ing] Campbell of corruption and sentenc[ing] him as if the jury's acquittal was of no moment." (Reply Br. at 17.) As the district court noted, the record evidences Campbell's failure or refusal to seriously acknowledge his wrongdoing or the potential consequences arising therefrom, not only to himself but also to the people of the City of Atlanta. In light of the evidence that Campbell did what the government says he did, his belief that he is currently imprisoned for acquitted criminal charges further underscores his failure to recognize the gravity of his situation. Had he been convicted of one of the bribery charges, Campbell would have faced up to 10 years in prison. 18 U.S.C. § 666(a) (2000). Had he been convicted of one of the RICO charges, Campbell would have faced up to 20 years in prison. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (2000). And, had the government charged him separately for mail fraud, of which the jury did find Campbell guilty, he likewise would have faced up to 20 years in prison. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000). Campbell's sentences, which are considerably less than the maximum allowed for the crimes for which he was convicted, do not amount to sentences for the crimes for which he was not convicted.

We have thoroughly reviewed the record on appeal and have considered all of the applicable factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553, as did the district court. After careful consideration, we conclude that Campbell's sentences are substantively reasonable.




III. CONCLUSION


We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it disqualified Campbell's counsel. Further, Campbell's sentences are both procedurally and substantively reasonable. Accordingly, we affirm Campbell's convictions and sentences.

AFFIRMED.

* Honorable Jane A. Restani, Chief Judge, United States Court of International Trade, sitting by designation.

1 Notably, in addressing the RICO charge on the verdict form, the jury indicated that it found Campbell guilty of the predicate act of mail fraud in connection with solicitation of campaign contributions. The indictment had not charged Campbell separately for that crime, however.

2 Campbell's assertions to the contrary notwithstanding, United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. ____, 126 S. Ct. 2557 (2006), did not deflate the Wheat opinion's emphasis on the need to balance the right to counsel of choice with the need to ensure the integrity of the criminal justice system and the public appearance of fairness. In fact, Gonzalez-Lopez expressly reemphasized the point and stated, "Nothing we have said today casts any doubt or places any qualification upon our previous holdings that limit the right to counsel of choice ...." 548 U.S. at ___, 126 S. Ct. at 2565. The Court further noted that "[n]one of these limitations on the right to choose one's counsel is relevant here." Id. at 2566.

3 This court adopted as binding precedent all Fifth Circuit decisions issued prior to October 1, 1981. Bonner v. City of Prichard, Ala., 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) ( en banc).

4 Campbell's arguments to some extent conflate the existence of a direct or indirect conflict with the existence of an actual or potential conflict. The fact that an imputed conflict is, by definition, an indirect conflict does not mean that an imputed conflict is somehow merely a potential conflict. In the instant case, as a matter of law, Parker's actual conflict was imputed to and, therefore, became Gillen's actual conflict. See Freund v. Butterworth, 165 F.3d 839, 863 n.33 (11th Cir. 1999) (noting that a conflict of one member of a law firm "imputes equally" to the rest of the law firm). Consequently, Campbell's reliance on our opinion in In re Paradyne Corp., 803 F.2d 604 (11th Cir. 1986), to the extent that Paradyne addressed potential, as opposed to actual, conflicts is misplaced.

Bayshore Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co. ( "Bayshore"), 380 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 2004), on which Campbell also relies, is inapposite as well. In Bayshore, we dealt with an allegation of a conflict arising from dual representation, but the attorney promptly withdrew from representing one of the parties, whom he had previously represented only in "unrelated matters." Id. at 1338 (emphasis added).

5 Although dicta in Paradyne may leave the impression that Gillen's conflict may be resolvable with a waiver from Campbell, see 803 F.2d at 610, n.18, the scope of the district court's discretion to disqualify an attorney under these circumstances simply was not at issue in Paradyne. See generally id. The opinions expressed by the U.S. Supreme Court and this court in Wheat and Ross, respectively, both of which were issued after Paradyne, control the outcome in this case.

6 The Wheat Court relied on rules governing attorney conduct to establish the relevant "standards of the profession." 486 U.S. at 160, 108 S. Ct. at 1698. Therefore, we note that our holding in this case is entirely consistent with the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. See Ga. Rules of Prof'l Conduct 1.9, 1.10 (addressing, respectively, conflicts arising from the representation of a former client and imputation of conflicts of interest).

7 Citations refer to the 1998 edition of the Guidelines.

8 We recognize that the Court's rationale in Rita calls into question our reasons for not affording a presumption of reasonableness. Contrast Rita, 551 U.S. ___, slip op. at 7-16, with Hunt, 459 F.3d at 1185.

9 Booker requires courts to consider the sentence recommended by the Guidelines as one of several factors mentioned in 18 U.S.C. § 3553. 543 U.S. at 264-65, 125 S. Ct. at 767-68; see also Hunt, 459 F.3d at 1184-85.

10 To the extent that Campbell's brief could possibly be interpreted as arguing that the conduct upon which the district court relied was not sufficiently relevant to the charge for which he was convicted (Appellant's Br. at 41), his assignment of error, which is implicit at best, is insufficient for the purpose of appellate review. See, e.g., United States v. Gupta, 463 F.3d 1182, 1195 (11th Cir. 2006) (deeming waived an appeal that lacked argument and citation to legal authority), cert. denied, 75 U.S.L.W. 3585 (May 21, 2007) (No. 06-1388).

11 The U.S. Supreme Court in Rita reaffirmed our view that Booker and Blakely do not limit the district courts' ability to consider for sentencing purposes facts proven to the judge by a preponderance of the evidence so long as the sentence imposed does not exceed the maximum permitted by the jury verdict. Rita, 551 U.S. ___, slip op. at 13, 14 (discussing parenthetically the relevant holdings in Booker and Blakely).

12 In Barakat, we vacated the defendant's sentence because it was not clear whether the district court had applied a sophisticated means enhancement to the base offense level with respect to the tax evasion conviction, which we determined would not have been clear error, or with respect to the mail fraud charge, which we concluded would have been error. 130 F.3d at 1457-58.

13 The government did not file a cross-appeal of Campbell's sentences. Therefore, we need not decide whether the sentences are sufficient to comply with the purposes of sentencing as set forth in § 3553.

14 "[A]n acquittal on criminal charges does not prove that the defendant is innocent; it merely proves the existence of a reasonable doubt as to his guilt." United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 361, 104 S. Ct. 1099, 1104 (1984), quoted in United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 155, 117 S. Ct. 633, 637 (1997).

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