Friday, December 28, 2007

Offer in Compromise - doubt as to liability
This is a poorly decided opinion. Section 6330(c)(2)(B) does not modifiy 6330 (c)(2)(A)(iii)

Dkt. No. 2826-06L , 129 TC --, No. 19, December 27, 2007.

[Appealable, barring stipulation to the contrary, to CA-6 --CCH.]

[Code Sec. 6330]

Collection Due Process hearing: Offer-in-compromise: Doubt as to liability: No abuse of discretion. --

An IRS settlement officer did not abuse her discretion when she issued a notice of determination without considering a married couple's offer-in-compromise (OIC) that was based only on doubt as to liability. Because the taxpayers received a notice of deficiency and had an opportunity to challenge the underlying tax liability, but failed to do so, they could not challenge the amount of the liability at the Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing. Such an OIC was a prohibited challenge to the underlying tax liability. The settlement officer also exercised discretion in a reasonable way by issuing a notice of determination that sustained the lien but postponed the collection by levy until other IRS employees considered the OIC and various late-filed returns.





Joe Alfred Izen, Jr., for petitioners; Wesley J. Wong, for respondent.



Bs received a notice of deficiency but filed no petition in this Court. R assessed the tax reported and then sent Bs CDP Notices that he had filed notices of federal tax lien and intended to collect the unpaid tax by levy. Bs requested a CDP hearing, at which they presented an offer-in-compromise based on doubt as to liability. R's officer who conducted the hearing issued a notice of determination sustaining the filing of the lien and postponing the levy but refused to consider Bs' proposed offer herself.



Held: R committed no abuse of discretion in issuing the notice of determination, because section 6330(c) bars taxpayers who've received a notice of determination from challenging their underlying tax liability, and an offer-in-compromise based only on doubt as to liability is a challenge to that underlying liability.





OPINION



HOLMES, Judge: The Code encourages taxpayers to settle their differences with the IRS by compromise rather than litigation. One type of compromise is a compromise based on doubt as to liability, and that's the kind that Peter and Karen Baltic offered to the IRS. But they made their offer just as the IRS was poised to begin seizing their property --and after they had had a chance to contest their liability in our court. Section 6330 1 says that taxpayers like the Baltics can't challenge their "underlying tax liability." The main question in this case --which we've apparently never quite squarely answered --is whether their making an offer-in-compromise based on doubt as to liability (an OIC-DATL) is a challenge to the "underlying tax liability."





Background



In February 2003, the Commissioner sent the Baltics a notice of deficiency saying they owed over $100,000 in income tax and penalties for 1999. The Baltics don't dispute that they received the notice, and don't dispute that they never filed a petition in this Court to challenge it. Since the Baltics didn't challenge the deficiency, the Commissioner assessed it. The Baltics didn't pay and so, in June 2004, the Commissioner sent them a notice under section 6320 that he had filed a federal tax lien against their property, and a notice under section 6330 that he intended to levy their property to collect the unpaid tax. The Baltics promptly requested a collection due process (CDP) hearing. Their request stated that "We disagree with the determination of taxes and additions owed, and the calculations of the amounts, if any." Before the hearing was scheduled, they submitted an OIC-DATL that covered not just 1999, but all tax years from 1997 through 2003, offering $18,699 to compromise their entire income tax liability for all those years. They also submitted amended tax returns for 1997-19992 and 2003, and original tax returns for the years 2000-2002.3



The settlement officer who held the CDP hearing told the Baltics that they couldn't challenge the amount or existence of their tax liability for 1999 because they had had a chance to challenge the liability when they received a notice of deficiency and hadn't done so. She also explained to them that, even though she herself couldn't consider the OIC-DATL as part of the CDP hearing, an Appeals officer within another part of the IRS would consider it and a revenue officer in yet a third part of the IRS would examine the Baltics' amended 1999 return in what is called an "audit reconsideration." The settlement officer then ended the CDP hearing, and sent the Baltics a notice in which she determined that collection by levy would be postponed until the IRS both decided whether to accept the OIC-DATL and finished its "audit reconsideration," but that the lien would be sustained. (Sustaining the lien protects the government's priority over other creditors.) The Baltics offered no other collection alternatives.



The Baltics now argue that the settlement officer's refusal to consider the OIC-DATL herself,4 or at least to wait before issuing the notice of determination until the other parts of the IRS finished looking at the OIC-DATL and amended return, was an abuse of discretion. The Commissioner moved for summary judgment, and the motion was argued during a trial session in Las Vegas.5





Discussion



Summary judgment is appropriate where it is shown that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that a decision may be rendered as a matter of law." Rule 121(b); Fla. Peach Corp. v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 678, 681 (1988). Summary judgment is proper here since the parties don't dispute the facts at all, but disagree only about the law: Did the settlement officer abuse her discretion by issuing the notice of determination without considering the Baltics' pending OIC-DATL or amended 1999 return?



Section 6330(c)(2)(B) allows a taxpayer to challenge the existence or amount of his underlying tax liability if he neither received a notice of deficiency nor otherwise had an opportunity to dispute it. The Baltics' first line of attack is that they should have been allowed to challenge their underlying liability because section 6330(c)(2)(B) --though it allows challenges to "the underlying tax liability for any tax period if the person did not receive any statutory notice of deficiency" --doesn't say that it allows such challenges "only if the person did not receive any statutory notice of deficiency."



This parsing has no support in any caselaw, as the Baltics' counsel admitted at oral argument. And we won't be creating any here: Congress used section 6330(c) --and only section 6330(c) --to describe how a CDP hearing would work. We find no authority elsewhere in the Code to read that section's command that the IRS allow challenges to liability in some situations to mean that the IRS must allow challenges to liability in all situations.



The Baltics' next sally looks more effective. They claim that making an OIC-DATL is not a challenge to their underlying liability. If it's not, then it should have been considered at the CDP hearing, because section 6330(c)(2)(A)(iii) lists OICs as a collection alternative that a taxpayer may raise at the hearing. We have, however, already come very close to holding that OIC-DATLs are a prohibited challenge to the underlying tax liability. In Hajiyani v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-198, we wrote in a footnote that an OIC-DATL "would address the merits of the underlying liability. Since petitioner is precluded from questioning the underlying liabilities, his offer would not provide him any relief...." But the Baltics are right in noting that Hajiyani --in the text --held that the Commissioner was justified in not considering an OIC-DATL because the taxpayers hadn't even submitted one before the notice of determination came out. The same is true of the taxpayers in Jones v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-142, and in Kindred v. Commissioner, 454 F.3d 688, 696 (7th Cir. 2006) (affirming an unpublished order granting the Commissioner summary judgment).



We've also held that the Commissioner didn't abuse his discretion in rejecting an OIC-DATL where the underlying tax liability was previously stipulated in a Tax Court decision, because a stipulated tax liability can't validly be considered a "doubtful liability" under the applicable regulation. Sec. 301.7122-1(b)(1), Proced. & Admin. Regs.; Oyer v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-178, affd. 97 Fed. Appx. 68 (8th Cir. 2004).



We recognize that the Baltics' case is a bit different. They plausibly distinguished their situation from cases like Hajiyani by having made sure that the IRS employee conducting their CDP hearing had an OIC-DATL sitting in front of her. And, though they didn't discuss Oyer , the Baltics could likewise distinguish that case from theirs by saying that they never signed a stipulated decision, but simply chose not to start a Tax Court case when they had a chance.



The Baltics also have one case, Siquieros v. United States, 94 AFTR 2d 2004-5518, 2005-1 USTC par. 50,244 (W.D. Tex. 2004), affd. 124 Fed. Appx. 279 (5th Cir. 2005), that they argue supports them. Or at least one sentence in that case that supports them: "Her [i.e., Siquieros's] offer based on doubt as to liability is not synonymous with a challenge to the underlying liability." Id. at 2004-5524, 2005-1 USTC par. 50,244, at 87,570.



The quote is accurate, but Siquieros remains the thinnest of supports for any general proposition that an OIC-DATL is not a challenge to an "underlying tax liability."6 It is, for one thing, a responsible-party, trust-fund case.7 And Siquieros was challenging underlying liability only in the sense that she was contesting her own responsibility for the tax, not in the sense of challenging the amount of that tax. Siquieros had not had an opportunity before her CDP hearing to challenge her responsibility for the unpaid tax; the Baltics did. And we conclude that that is an important --indeed decisive --difference. The word "liability" in section 6330(c)(2)(B) and section 301.7122-1(b)(1), Proced. & Admin. Regs., refers not just to an amount of tax owed for a particular period but also the amount owed by a particular person for a particular period. Section 6203, defining a tax assessment, states that an assessment is the formal recording of a taxpayer's tax liability, and the accompanying regulation requires the summary record of assessment to "provide identification of the taxpayer, the character of the liability assessed, the taxable period, if applicable, and the amount of the assessment." Sec. 301.6203-1, Proced. & Admin. Regs. Siquieros was arguing only that she herself shouldn't be liable for her employer's failure to pay over the taxes because she was only a secretary.



The Baltics are not arguing that the IRS is going after the wrong person. Neither Baltic, for example, is claiming innocent-spouse relief; they dispute only the amount of tax due. Which is, of course, exactly what they could have challenged by filing a petition when they got their notice of deficiency. We therefore unequivocally hold that a challenge to the amount of the tax liability made in the form of an OIC-DATL by a taxpayer who has received a notice of deficiency is a challenge to the underlying tax liability. Because the Baltics already had their chance to challenge that liability, section 6330(c)(2)(B) bars them from challenging it again.8



That leaves only the settlement officer's refusal to wait until the IRS reviewed the OIC-DATL and completed its audit reconsideration (which, we should note, no one doubts is a form of challenge to their underlying tax liability). The Baltics contend that the Commissioner's refusal was itself an abuse of discretion. We have already rejected this argument when a taxpayer urged waiting for an audit reconsideration. Jones v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-142. Adding a desire to wait for consideration of an OIC-DATL as well adds nothing to the argument: The settlement officer here was just heeding the exhortation of the applicable regulation to issue a notice of determination as expeditiously as possible. Sec. 301.6330-1(e)(3), Q&A-E9, Proced. & Admin. Regs.



The purpose of a CDP hearing is to balance the government's requirement for effective tax administration with the taxpayer's concern that collection be minimally intrusive. By deciding to hold off on collection by levy but preserve the government's lien priority while other employees of the IRS considered the Baltic's OIC-DATL and various late-filed returns, the Commissioner exercised discretion in a completely reasonable way, and so



An order and decision in favor of respondent will be entered.


1 Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.

2 As with the Baltics' 1999 tax year, the Commissioner had already assessed deficiencies for the Baltics' 1997 and 1998 tax years after they failed to respond to a notice of deficiency for those years.

3 The Baltics enclosed a cashier's check for the proposed settlement amount with their OIC-DATL, noting on it that cashing the check meant acceptance of the OIC. This is not how the IRS does business. An OIC is accepted only when the taxpayer is notified in writing. Sec. 301.7122-1(e)(1), Proced. & Admin. Regs. Cashing a check does not mean that the IRS has accepted the offer. Colebank v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1977-46; Howard v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1956-219. The Commissioner took the check and applied it to the 1998 tax debt that the Baltics owed and then sent them a letter explaining that partial payment doesn't defeat a tax lien. His reason for doing so is unclear --section 301.7122-1(h), Proced. & Admin. Regs., says the Commissioner should treat such checks as deposits, not payments; implying the Baltics should ultimately get the money refunded if their offer is rejected. (Section 7122(c)(1) was recently amended, Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-222, sec. 509, 120 Stat. 362, to require partial payment to be submitted with an OIC, but the amendment doesn't affect the Baltics, because they submitted their OIC before the amendment's effective date.)

4 Sec. 6133(k)(1) generally blocks the IRS from collecting taxes by levy (though not by lien) while an OIC is pending. The Baltics' very narrow challenge is not to the IRS's decision to collect by levy --any levy to collect taxes owed for any of the years covered by their OIC is postponed by sec. 6331(k)(1) --but to the settlement officer's decision that she herself would not consider their OIC-DATL as a collection alternative during the CDP process.

5 The Baltics were residents of Ohio when they filed their petition, though they chose Las Vegas as their place of trial. Unless the parties stipulate to the contrary, any appeal will go to the Sixth Circuit. Sec. 7482(b)(1)(A) and (2).

6 The court held that the IRS did not abuse its discretion in refusing to accept Siquieros's OIC. Siquieros , 94 AFTR 2d at 2004-5518, 2005-1 USTC at 87,570-87,571. It's in the court's discussion of why the rejection wasn't an abuse of discretion that it noted that an OIC-DATL wasn't synonymous with a challenge to the underlying liability. Neither side had actually disputed the point. Id.

7 Taxes that employers withhold from their employees' wages are known as "trust fund taxes" because they are deemed a special fund in trust for the United States under section 7501(a). Slodov v. United States, 436 U.S. 238, 243 (1978). One remedy that the Commissioner has against a business that fails to pay these withheld taxes is to collect them from a "responsible person" within the company; i.e., someone who was required to pay over the tax. Sec. 6672. A section 6672 penalty is payable on notice and demand, without issuance of a notice of deficiency. See sec. 6212(a). Our court therefore has no jurisdiction to review the penalty, Moore v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 171, 175 (2000), and a taxpayer must usually pay and sue for a refund to get judicial review. Sec. 6672(c)(2); Steele v. United States, 280 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1960). A key issue in such cases is often whether the person suing for a refund is a "responsible person" within the meaning of section 6672(a). See, e.g., McGlothin v. United States, 720 F.2d 6 (6th Cir. 1983).

8 The Baltics also argue that section 301.6330-1(e)(3), Q&A-E9, Proced. & Admin. Regs., grants discretion to IRS employees to consider challenges to liability despite section 6330(c)(2)(B) and ask us to review for abuse of discretion the decision by the settlement officer not to review their liability. We've already held that the Code itself limits the power of both the Commissioner and our Court to reconsider liability issues. Nichols v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-5. Here, the determination did not address the precluded issue of liability, and the Baltics' challenge amounts to nothing more than a roundabout effort to challenge what they're prevented from challenging on appeal.

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Thursday, December 27, 2007

IRS Examination - Gambling losses: Deduction: Substantiation. --
An individual could not deduct gambling losses beyond the amount conceded by the IRS due to her failure to provide any substantiation. The taxpayer argued that because she was in debt at the end of the year, her losses from playing slot machines must have exceeded her gains. Because the taxpayer presented no credible evidence to corroborate this theory, the Cohan rule was inapplicable, and the court did not estimate the taxpayer's gambling losses.



Kathleen Jackson v. Commissioner.

Dkt. No. 23959-06 , TC Memo. 2007-373, December 26, 2007.



[Code Secs. 61] and [165]



MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION

HAINES, Judge: Respondent determined a deficiency in petitioner's 2002 Federal income tax of $68,254.1 The issue for decision is whether petitioner is entitled to deduct gambling losses in excess of the $127,165 that respondent conceded for 2002.


FINDINGS OF FACT

Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found. The stipulation of facts and attached exhibits are incorporated herein by this reference. At the time she filed her petition, petitioner resided in Blaine, Minnesota.

Petitioner is a recreational gambler who played slot machines regularly in 2002. Petitioner visited the casino on a weekly basis and played the slots for hours at a time. When petitioner won a jackpot, she would often use her winnings to play at a higher stakes slot machine. Petitioner kept no diary, log, or record of any kind of her gambling winnings and losses.

In her 2002 Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, filed in April 2006, petitioner reported gambling winnings and losses of $21,051. Petitioner subsequently filed a Form 1040X, Amended U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, in which she reported gambling winnings and losses of $244,744. Petitioner now concedes that her total gambling winnings for 2002 were actually $265,795.

Respondent issued a notice of deficiency on October 6, 2006, disallowing $223,693 of petitioner's claimed $244,744 gambling losses due to lack of substantiation. Petitioner filed a timely petition with this Court, and a trial was held on September 25, 2007, in St. Paul, Minnesota. At trial, respondent conceded that petitioner had presented sufficient documentation to substantiate $127,165 in gambling losses.2


OPINION

Gross income includes all income from whatever source derived, including gambling. See sec. 61; McClanahan v. United States, 292 F.2d 630, 631-632 (5th Cir. 1961). In the case of a taxpayer not engaged in the trade or business of gambling, gambling losses are allowable as an itemized deduction, but only to the extent of gains from such transactions. Sec. 165(d); McClanahan v. United States, supra at 632 n.1 (citing Winkler v. United States, 230 F.2d 766 (1st Cir. 1956)). In order to establish entitlement to a deduction for gambling losses in this Court, the taxpayer must prove the losses sustained during the taxable year. Mack v. Commissioner, 429 F.2d 182 (6th Cir. 1970), affg. T.C. Memo. 1969-26; Stein v. Commissioner, 322 F.2d 78 (5th Cir. 1963), affg. T.C. Memo. 1962-19.

Petitioner failed to present credible evidence of gambling losses beyond those respondent conceded. Petitioner did not maintain a diary or any other contemporaneous record reflecting either her winnings or her losses from gambling during 2002. Further, petitioner's gambling income of $265,795 for 2002 was established only by an examination of her Forms W-2G, Certain Gambling Winnings, and petitioner appeared unaware of the specific figure until confronted by respondent. At trial, petitioner submitted no evidence to validate her claimed gambling losses, relying only on the theory that her losses must have equaled her earnings because she found herself in debt at the end of the year.3 We conclude that petitioner has failed to satisfy her burden of substantiating her losses.

As a general rule, if the trial record provides sufficient evidence that the taxpayer has incurred a deductible expense, but the taxpayer is unable to substantiate adequately the precise amount of the deduction to which he or she is otherwise entitled, the Court may estimate the amount of the deductible expense, and allow the deduction to that extent. Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540, 543-544 (2d Cir. 1930); Vanicek v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 731, 742-743 (1985); Sanford v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 823, 827-828 (1968), affd. per curiam 412 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1969); sec. 1.274-5T(a), Temporary Income Tax Regs., 50 Fed. Reg. 46014(Nov. 6, 1985). In these instances, the Court is permitted to make as close an approximation of the allowable expense as it can, bearing heavily against the taxpayer whose inexactitude is of his or her own making. Cohan v. Commissioner, supra at 544. However, in order for the Court to estimate the amount of an expense, the Court must have some basis upon which an estimate may be made. Vanicek v. Commissioner, supra at 742-743. Without such a basis, any allowance would amount to unguided largesse. William v. United States, 245 F.2d 559, 560-561 (5th Cir. 1957).

The record provides no satisfactory basis for estimating petitioner's gambling losses. See Stein v. Commissioner, supra. Unlike cases such as Doffin v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1991-114, where evidence of the taxpayer's lifestyle and financial position allowed this Court to approximate unsubstantiated gambling losses, petitioner has failed to produce any evidence to corroborate her story.4 Consequently, the Court will not apply the Cohan rule to estimate the amount of petitioner's gambling losses.

In reaching our holdings, we have considered all arguments made, and, to the extent not mentioned, we conclude that they are moot, irrelevant, or without merit.

To reflect the foregoing,

Decision will be entered under Rule 155.

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code, as amended, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. Amounts are rounded to the nearest dollar.

2 This documentation consisted of casino ATM receipts, canceled checks made payable to casinos, carbon copies of checks made payable to casinos, and credit card statements stating that cash was advanced at the casinos.

3 Petitioner testified that she determined her gambling losses were greater than her winnings because she took out a second mortgage on her house for $25,000 in 2002 and spent the money on slot machines. Petitioner claimed she was still $25,000 in debt at the end of 2002, and inferred that this was because her gambling expenditures outpaced her earnings.

4 Petitioner asserted at trial that the difference between her gambling income and the loss she substantiated was put back into slot machines. This testimony, standing by itself, does not constitute a basis which would allow us to approximate petitioner's gambling losses.

What Is Included in Gross Income: Gambling income, legal

A cash-method taxpayer who was required to receive a $26 million lottery jackpot in annual installments over a 20-year period did not constructively receive the winnings in the year the jackpot was hit. Rather, the taxpayer received annual installment payments over the payout period, resulting in taxable income for the tax year at issue. The taxpayer's inability to draw upon the jackpot at any time constituted a substantial limit or restriction on his control over the winnings and precluded application of the constructive receipt doctrine under Reg. §1.451-2(a). Even assuming the taxpayer could have sold his right to future payments, the constructive receipt doctrine was inapplicable because the lottery winner's ability to assign the prize did not accelerate the time in which the lottery is required to make the payment.

A.B. Jombo, CA-D.C., 2005-1 USTC ¶50,197.

A gambler's slot machine winnings for two years were includible in his gross income. The absence of withholding at the source did not affect the individual's obligation to report the winnings as income.

V. Lyszkowski, CA-3 (unpublished opinion), 96-1 USTC ¶50,170.

The amount of income received by the taxpayer for wagering on horses was determined for two tax years. A record book of gambling income and losses constituted adequate proof of the amount of the taxpayer's losses as well as the amount of winnings.

B.L. Dunnock, 41 TCM 146, Dec. 37,326(M), TC Memo. 1980-449.

The taxpayer's testimony established that he accurately reported his wagering income on his income tax return when he could not produce records of his gambling activities for that year because they had been lost. Similar records from a prior year that tied into gambling income reported on the prior year's return convinced the court that the taxpayer had properly reported his gambling income from the lost records.

M. Rockin, 41 TCM 145, Dec. 37,325(M), TC Memo. 1980-448.

Despite an absence of documentary evidence and of consistent testimony, the fact that the taxpayer engaged in gambling activities established that he did incur some gambling losses, but his court-determined gambling winnings still exceeded his losses and such excess constituted taxable income.

W.L. Wagoner, 54 TCM 1332, Dec. 44,387(M), TC Memo. 1987-614.

The taxpayer was required to include gambling winnings from horse races in his income, as reported on his return and which he denied at trial.

K.V. Hall, 44 TCM 256, Dec. 39,134(M), TC Memo. 1982-356.

Similarly.

D. Bodine, 47 TCM 1337, Dec. 41,081(M), TC Memo. 1984-143.

E. Whitman, 50 TCM 1322, Dec. 42,445(M), TC Memo. 1985-537.

G.B. Bauman, 65 TCM 2165, Dec. 48,928(M), TC Memo. 1993-112.

An individual's gambling winnings were includible in his taxable income even though he lost more than he won in the year in question. The taxpayer elected to take the standard deduction rather than claiming his gambling losses as an itemized deduction.

A.C. Ling, CA-9 (unpublished opinion), 97-2 USTC ¶50,902, aff'g an unreported Tax Court decision.

Although the IRS was able to demonstrate that a gambler had failed to report all of his racetrack winnings, the taxpayer proved that his gambling losses exceeded those allowed by the IRS and approximately equalled his unreported winnings.

K.A. Forman, 55 TCM 139, Dec. 44,589(M), TC Memo. 1988-64.

Lottery winnings are taxable income.

Ayoub, BTA Memo., Dec. 8453-B.

H.A. Lange, 90 TCM 69, Dec. 56,099(M), TC Memo. 2005-176.

Lottery winnings were includible in the winner's gross income for the year in which he received a check for payment and not in the year that the prize was won because the taxpayer could not exercise essentially unfettered control of the proceeds until the check arrived.

T.J. Paul, Jr., 64 TCM 955, Dec. 48,551(M), TC Memo. 1992-582.

Taxpayers had unreported wagering gains in excess of their losses as determined by the Tax Court and, thus, were not entitled to deduct the losses. The taxpayers failed to establish additional gambling losses greater than the unreported gambling income. In addition, because the taxpayers failed to keep adequate records, the burden of proof was not shifted to the IRS. Bank statements showing cash withdrawals and debit or credit card charges at the casinos did not substantiate actual gambling losses, nor did generalizations by casino employees citing the unfavorable long-term odds of beating a casino.

R.J. Lutz, Jr., 83 TCM 1446, Dec. 54,705(M), TC Memo.

The value of a house won in a raffle drawing for the benefit of a charitable organization was includible in the winner's gross income as gambling winnings. The winner was required to include the fair market value of the residence less the amount paid for the raffle ticket.

Rev. Rul. 83-130, 1983-2 CB 148.

See also ¶5704.2892, ¶5901.40 and ¶6204.01.

A debtor unsuccessfully challenged the IRS's proof of claim against his bankruptcy estate for taxes, penalties, and interest. His unreported gambling income for the tax year at issue was includible in full in his gross income. His contention that the winnings were nontaxable because he sustained a net gambling loss for the year was rejected. Gambling losses cannot be netted against winnings; instead, the taxpayer was required to report the receipt of the winnings and claim an itemized deduction for the losses, but he failed to do so. Also, he produced no evidence to refute the IRS's deficiency determination.

G.N. Berardi, 2002-2 USTC ¶50,736. Aff'd, CA-3 (unpublished opinion), 2003-2 USTC ¶50,648, 70 FedAppx 660.

Lottery winnings were included in gross income for purposes of the Code Sec. 469(i)(3) phase-out of the rental real estate loss deduction.

E.D. Hamilton, 88 TCM 12, Dec. 55,686(M), TC Memo. 2004-161.

Gambling winnings from slot machine jackpots are includible in gross income.

A. McQuarrie, 91 TCM 1127, Dec. 56,505(M), TC Memo. 2006-93.

The IRS has reminded poker tournament sponsors, including casinos, that they will be required to report winnings in excess of $5,000 to winners and the IRS starting on March 4, 2008. Tournament winners are reminded that, by law, they are required to report all their winnings on their federal income tax return, regardless of the amount and regardless of whether or not they receive a Form W-2G or any other information return. This is true both before and after the new reporting requirement goes into effect.

IRS News Release IR-2007-173.

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Wednesday, December 26, 2007

IRA rollover request for rulings - section 408(d)(3)

LTR Report Number 1608, December 26, 2007 IRS REF: Symbol: T:EP:RA:T4 [Code Sec. 408]

September 25, 2007

This is in response to your request dated January 26, 2006, as supplemented by additional correspondence dated August 29, 2007, submitted by your authorized representative, in which you request a waiver of the 60-day rollover requirement contained in section 408(d)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code (the Code).

The following facts and representations have been submitted under penalty of perjury in support of the ruling requested.

Taxpayer A, age 62, represents that he received a distribution on Date G from IRA X totaling Amount E, and Taxpayer B, age 58, spouse of Taxpayer A, represents that she also received a distribution on Date G from IRA Y totaling Amount F. Taxpayers A and B assert that their failure to accomplish rollovers within the 60-day period prescribed by section 408 (d)(3) of the Code was due to their medical conditions and also lack of knowledge of the IRA distribution rules because they are recent immigrants from *****. Taxpayers A and B represent that Amount E and Amount F have not been used for any other purpose.

Taxpayer A closed IRA X on Date G and received a distribution of Amount E while Taxpayer B closed IRA Y on the same date and received a distribution of Amount F. Taxpayers A and B were dissatisfied with the earnings on their investments with Company C, and were in the process of evaluating a number of other investments. On Date H Amounts E and F were deposited into their joint savings account at Bank D where such amounts remain. Within the last ten days of the 60-day rollover period, Taxpayer B underwent an operation that was completed on a one-day basis and did not require a hospital stay. A medical report issued by the hospital indicated that Taxpayer B could resume her normal work schedule within approximately one month following the operation. In addition, Taxpayer A suffered from an ongoing heart condition that eventually required surgery and hospitalization sometime after the expiration of the 60-day rollover period. As a result of these conditions and their lack of a full understanding of the tax rules pertaining to distributions from IRAs, Taxpayers A and B assert that they were not able to successfully complete IRA rollovers within the 60-day period prescribed by law. The total amount of the IRA distributions remains in Taxpayers A and B's joint savings account at Bank D.

Based on the above facts and representations, Taxpayers A and B request that the Service waive the 60-day rollover requirement with respect to the distribution of Amounts E and F.

Section 408(d)(1) of the Code provides that, except as otherwise provided in section 408(d), any amount paid or distributed out of an IRA shall be included in gross income by the payee or distributee, as the case may be, in the manner provided under section 72 of the Code.

Section 408(d)(3) of the Code defines, and provides the rules applicable to IRA rollovers.

Section 408(d)(3)(A) of the Code provides that section 408(d)(1) of the Code does not apply to any amount paid or distributed out of an IRA to the individual for whose benefit the IRA is maintained if: (i) the entire amount received (including money or any other property) is paid into an IRA for the benefit of such individual not later than the 60th day after the day on which the individual receives the payment or distribution; or (ii) the entire amount received (including money and any other property) is paid into an eligible retirement plan (other than an IRA) for the benefit of such individual not later than the 60th day after the date on which the payment or distribution is received, except that the maximum amount which may be paid into such plan may not exceed the portion of the amount received which is includible in gross income (determined without regard to section 408(d)(3)).

Section 408(d)(3)(B) of the Code provides that section 408(d)(3) does not apply to any amount described in section 408(d)(3)(A)(i) received by an individual from an IRA if at any time during the 1-year period ending on the day of such receipt such individual received any other amount described in section 408(d)(3)(A)(i) from an IRA which was not includible in gross income because of the application of section 408(d)(3).

Section 408(d)(3)(D) of the Code provides a similar 60-day rollover period for partial rollovers.

Section 408(d)(3)(l) of the Code provides that the Secretary of the Treasury may waive the 60-day requirement under sections 408(d)(3)(A) and (D) of the Code where the failure to waive such requirement would be against equity or good conscience, including casualty, disaster, or other events beyond the reasonable control of the individual subject to such requirement. Only distributions that occurred after December 31, 2001, are eligible for the waiver under section 408(d)(3)(l) of the Code.

Revenue Procedure 2003-16, 2003-4 I.R.B. 359, provides that in determining whether to grant a waiver of the 60-day rollover requirement pursuant to section 408(d)(3)(l), the Service will consider all relevant facts and circumstances, including: (1) errors committed by a financial institution; (2) inability to complete a rollover due to death, disability, hospitalization, incarceration, restrictions imposed by a foreign country or postal error; (3) the use of the amount distributed (for example, in the case of payment by check, whether the check was cashed); and (4) the time elapsed since the distribution occurred.

The information and documentation presented by Taxpayers A and B demonstrates that they took distribution of Amounts E and F from IRA X and IRA Y respectively because they were dissatisfied with the earnings on their investments. However, no evidence was presented to the Service as to how any of the factors outlined in Revenue Procedure 2003-16 affected their ability to timely rollover Amounts E and F. No documentation was submitted that the medical condition of either Taxpayer A or B was such as to prevent them from completing a timely rollover or that the failure to deposit Amounts E and F within the 60 day rollover period was beyond the control of Taxpayer A and B.

Therefore, the Service declines to waive the 60 day rollover requirement with respect to the distribution of Amounts E and F.

No opinion is expressed as to the tax treatment of the transaction described herein under the provisions of any other section of either the Code or regulations that may be applicable hereto.

This ruling is directed solely to the taxpayers who requested it. Section 6110(k)(3) of the Code provides that it may not be used or cited as precedent.

A copy of this ruling is being sent to your authorized representative in accordance with a power of attorney on file with this office.

If you have any questions regarding this ruling, you may contact ***** at *****

Sincerely yours, Donzell Littlejohn, Manager, Employee Plans, Technical Group 4.

cc: *****

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Friday, December 21, 2007

Treasury Report: to Improve the Competitiveness of the U.S. Business Tax System for the 21st Century

December 21, 2007

Treasury Department report: Business Tax System: Competitiveness. --


Approaches to Improve the Competitiveness of the U.S. Business Tax System for the 21st Century


Office of Tax Policy U.S. Department of the Treasury

December 20, 2007


Approaches to Improve the Competitiveness of the U.S. Business Tax System for the 21st Century



Table of Contents


Executive Summary

Chapter I: The U.S. Business Tax System Presents Challenges to U.S. Competitiveness
A. Introduction

B. Business tax reform and the economy

C. How business taxation in the United States compares with that of the United States' major trading partners

D. Summary

Chapter II: Replacing Business Income Taxes with a Business Activities Tax
A. Introduction

B. Description of a BAT

C. Economic effects of a broad-based BAT

D. Distributional issues

E. Border tax adjustments and international trade

F. Simplicity and enforceability

G. Implications for state and local governments

H. VATs in other countries

Chapter III: Business Tax Reform with Base Broadening/Reform of the U.S. International Tax Rules
A. Introduction

B. Broadening the business tax base and either lowering the business tax rate or permitting faster write-off of investment

C. Territorial tax systems

Chapter IV: Addressing Structural Problems with the U.S. Business Tax System
A. Multiple taxation of corporate profits

B. Tax bias that favors debt financing

C. Taxation of international income

D. Tax treatment of losses

E. Book-tax conformity

F. Illustrative areas to improve tax administration

Acknowledgements



Executive Summary

The global economy has changed markedly over the past half century. Trade and investment flow across borders in greater volume and with greater ease. Increasingly, the ability of U.S. companies to grow and prosper depends on their ability to do business globally.

As we look to the future of the U.S. economy and U.S. workers, we must look at our competitiveness through the lens of the global marketplace. There are many factors that affect the ability of U.S. workers and U.S. companies to compete globally, and issues as diverse as education, immigration, and trade policy have all been examined in this context. This paper examines the role of tax policy in affecting the global competitiveness of U.S. companies and U.S. workers.

In the 1960s, international trade and investment flows were much less important to the U.S. economy and the decisions of U.S. companies than they are today. Thus, the United States was free to make decisions about its tax system based primarily on domestic considerations. Moreover, our trading partners generally followed the U.S. lead in tax policy.

Globalization - the growing interdependence of countries resulting from increasing integration of trade, finance, investment, people, information, and ideas in one global marketplace - has resulted in increased cross-border trade and the establishment of production facilities and distribution networks around the globe. Businesses now operate more freely across borders, and business location and investment decisions are more sensitive to tax considerations than in the past.

As barriers to cross-border movement of capital and goods have been reduced, differences in nations' tax systems have become a greater factor in the success of global companies. Recognizing this, many nations have changed their business tax systems. During the past two decades, many of our major trading partners have lowered their corporate tax rates, some dramatically. The United States, which had a low corporate tax rate in the late 1980s as compared to other countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), now has the second highest statutory corporate tax rate among OECD countries. Moreover, other OECD countries continue to reduce their corporate income tax rates leaving the United States further behind.

As other nations modernize their business tax systems to recognize the realities of the global economy, U.S. companies increasingly suffer a competitive disadvantage. The U.S. business tax system imposes a burden on U.S. companies and U.S. workers by raising the cost of investment in the United States and burdening U.S. firms as they compete with other firms in foreign markets.

Taxing business income discourages investment by raising the cost of capital. The higher the cost of capital, the greater the disincentive to invest. The relatively high U.S. tax rate, compared to our trading partners, places a higher cost on investment. Business taxes play a particularly key role in the economy because they influence the incentive to acquire and use capital - the plants, offices, equipment, and software that corporations employ to produce goods and services. In general, an economy with more capital is more productive and ultimately attains a higher standard of living than economies that have accumulated less capital. Workers gain when businesses have more capital and, correspondingly, workers stand to lose when the tax system leads businesses to invest less and have a smaller capital stock.

On July 26, 2007, the Treasury Department hosted a conference on Global Competitiveness and Business Tax Reform that brought together distinguished leaders and experts to discuss how the U.S. business tax system could be improved to make U.S. businesses more competitive. The conference highlighted the need for the U.S. business tax system to be reformed to keep pace with the changing global economy and the changes in the business tax systems of other nations.

This report is a follow-up to the July 26th conference and, as with the conference, it seeks to advance an important dialogue on the key linkages between tax policy and American competitiveness in the global economy. Three broad approaches for reforming the U.S. business tax system are outlined: (1) replacing business income taxes with a business activities tax (BAT), a type of consumption tax, (2) eliminating special business tax provisions coupled with either business tax rate reduction or faster write-off of business investment, potentially combined with the exemption of active foreign earnings, and (3) implementing specific changes that focus on important structural problems within our business tax system. Rather than present a particular recommendation, this report examines the strengths and weaknesses of the various approaches. The various policy ideas discussed in this report represent just some of the approaches that could be considered. This report does not advocate any specific recommendation nor does it call for or advance any legislative package or regulatory changes.

The approaches discussed in this report would improve the competitiveness of the United States as compared to the current system for taxing U.S. businesses. Nevertheless, the approaches differ in a number of dimensions. The BAT described in Chapter II would possibly provide the largest benefit in terms of its effect on expanding the size of the economy - ultimately increasing output by roughly 2.0 percent to 2.5 percent - but raises a number of serious implementation and administrative issues.

Chapter III discusses base broadening, which could entail elimination of certain business tax provisions that make substantial contributions to economic growth, such as accelerated deprecation. Thus their elimination may offset some of the economic benefits of business tax rate reduction. While dramatically broadening the business tax base could finance a reduction of the business tax rate to 28 percent, retaining accelerated depreciation and maintaining revenue neutrality would only lower the business tax rate to 31 percent. Alternatively, base broadening and faster write-off of business investment (i.e., 35-percent expensing) would have a substantial effect on the size of the economy - ultimately increasing output by roughly 1.5 percent - but would have effects that may vary considerably across industries and sectors. Chapter III also discusses international taxation and considers issues regarding territorial tax systems.

Chapter IV focuses on specific areas of business income taxation that could be reformed separately or in the context of a broad-based reform. These include, for example, the multiple taxation of corporate profits, the tax bias favoring debt finance, the tax treatment of losses, and book-tax conformity. A comprehensive approach, however, is likely to be more effective in improving the competitiveness of the U.S. business tax system than addressing specific issues outside of broad-based business tax reform.

A fundamental question is the extent to which any of these approaches would markedly affect the competitiveness of U.S. businesses. Lowering the business tax rate to 31 percent would mean that instead of having the second highest statutory corporate tax rate among the thirty OECD countries, the United States would have the third highest tax rate, while with a 28-percent U.S. statutory corporate tax rate, the United States would have the fifth highest tax rate. Providing faster write-off of investment, either through partial expensing or replacing business income taxes with a BAT, may provide larger economic benefits, but would take the United States in a different policy direction.

Moreover, today's global landscape continues to shift as other countries contemplate further changes in their business tax systems. Thus, it remains unclear whether a revenue neutral reform would provide a reduction in business taxes sufficient to enhance the competitiveness of U.S. businesses.

In summary, because the role of the United States in the world economy is changing, because business taxes play an important role in economic decision-making by influencing the incentive to acquire and use capital, and because foreign competitors are reforming their business tax systems, now is the time for the United States to re-evaluate its business tax system to ensure that U.S. businesses and U.S. workers are as competitive as possible and Americans continue to enjoy rising living standards.



Chapter I: The U.S. Business Tax System Presents Challenges to U.S. Competitiveness



A. Introduction

Americans deserve a tax system that is simple, fair, and pro-growth - in tune with the nation's dynamic economy. The tax relief proposed by President Bush and enacted by Congress in the past few years has helped lay the foundation for considering ways to ensure that the U.S. tax system helps U.S. businesses compete in a global economy. In 2005, the President established the President's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform (the Tax Panel) to identify the major problems with the current tax system and to provide recommendations on making the tax code simpler, fairer, and better suited to the modern economy. The Tax Panel's report recommended two options for comprehensive overhaul of our federal income tax system - the Growth and Investment Tax plan and the Simplified Income Tax plan.1 These approaches differ somewhat, but both would reduce taxes on business and capital income.

In 2007, Secretary Paulson initiated a review of the nation's system for taxing businesses. On July 26, 2007, the Secretary hosted a conference on Global Competitiveness and Business Tax Reform, at which distinguished leaders and experts discussed how the current business tax system can be improved to make U.S. businesses more competitive in today's global economy. The conference highlighted the need for reform. The participants stressed that the business tax system has not kept pace with changes in the world economy. The United States has become increasingly linked to the world economy through trade and investment. Businesses operate more freely across borders and business location and investment decisions are more sensitive to tax considerations than in the past. Several countries have responded to the increasingly competitive environment by reforming their corporate incomes taxes and reducing corporate income tax rates. The conference participants expressed a conviction that in order for U.S. companies and U.S. workers to compete and thrive in today's global economic climate, the U.S. business tax system also must adapt to these changes.

The discussion at the conference emphasized that the global economy is very different today than it was in the 1960s, the time when many of our current tax rules regarding cross-border activities and investment were first enacted. The same is true of the U.S. role in the global economy. In the 1960s, international trade and investment flows were much less important to the U.S. economy than they are today. Thus, the United States was free to make decisions about its tax system based primarily on domestic considerations. Moreover, U.S. trading partners generally followed the U.S. lead in tax policy.

Circumstances have changed. Globalization - the growing interdependence of countries resulting from increasing integration of trade, finance, investment, people, information, and ideas in one global marketplace - has resulted in increased cross-border trade and the establishment of production facilities and distribution networks around the globe. Technology continues to accelerate the growth of the worldwide marketplace for goods and services. Advances in communications, information technology, and transport have dramatically reduced the cost and time required to move goods, capital, people, and information around the world. Firms in the global marketplace differentiate themselves by applying more cost-efficient technologies or innovating faster than their competitors.

The significance of globalization to the U.S. economy is apparent from the statistics on international trade and investment. In 1960, trade in goods to and from the United States represented just over 6 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Today, it represents over 20 percent of GDP, a three-fold increase, while trade in goods and services amounts to more than 25 percent of GDP.2

Cross-border investment, both inflows and outflows, also has grown dramatically since 1960. Cross-border investment represented just over 1 percent of GDP in 1960, but by 2006, it was more than 18 percent of GDP, representing annual cross-border flows of more than $2.4 trillion,3 with the aggregate cross-border ownership of capital valued at roughly $26 trillion.4 In addition, U.S. multinational corporations are now responsible for more than one-quarter of U.S. output and about 15 percent of U.S. employment.

The internationalization of the world economy has made it imprudent for the United States, or any other country, to enact tax rules that do not take into account what other countries are doing. The U.S. system for taxing businesses should not hinder the ability of U.S. businesses to compete on a global scale. Thus, maintaining the competitiveness of the U.S. economy requires that the United States re-evaluate the current business tax system and consider how it can be designed to ensure that the United States continues to attract and generate the investment and innovation necessary to further advance the living standards of U.S. workers.

This report follows up the Treasury Department's July 26th conference. It extends the discussion of business tax reform contained in the Tax Panel's report by focusing on the treatment of business and capital income, and it is shaped by the discussion at the conference on competitiveness. This report discusses three bold approaches for business tax reform: (1) a business activity tax (BAT) (a type of consumption tax), while retaining taxes on capital income through the individual income tax, (2) a broad-based, low-rate business income tax, potentially combined with the exemption of active foreign earnings, and (3) a broad-based business tax system with faster write-off of business investment, also potentially combined with the exemption of active foreign earnings. In addition, it provides ideas for other changes that could improve the current business income tax system.



B. Business tax reform and the economy

Since 1980, the United States has gone from a high corporate tax-rate country to a low-rate country (following the Tax Reform Act of 1986) and, based on some measures, back again to a high-rate country today because other countries recently have reduced their statutory corporate tax rates. Within the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the United States now has the second highest statutory corporate tax rate at 39 percent (including state corporate taxes) compared with the average OECD statutory tax rate of 31 percent.

Other countries continue to reduce their corporate tax rates. Germany will reduce its total corporate tax rate from 38 percent to 30 percent in 2008. The United Kingdom will reduce its corporate tax rate from 30 percent to 28 percent next year. France and Italy have signaled that they may also lower their corporate tax rates. Smaller countries among the OECD also have been particularly aggressive in cutting their corporate tax rates, with Iceland, Ireland, Hungary, Poland, the Slovak Republic, Greece, Korea, and Luxembourg reducing their corporate tax rates significantly in recent years.

Maximizing economic efficiency generally requires that a tax system raise a given amount of revenue with the least possible interference in economic decisions. The United States' current system for taxing businesses and multinational companies has been developed in a patchwork fashion spanning decades, resulting in a web of tax rules that are unlikely to promote maximum economic efficiency.

The U.S. tax system also disrupts and distorts business and investment decisions, leading to an inefficient level and allocation of capital through the economy. A smaller and poorly allocated stock of capital lowers the productive capacity of the economy and reduces living standards. Importantly, workers share in these economic losses because they have less productive capital with which to work, and thus earn lower wages.



Taxation of saving and investment

A key policy question is the appropriate level of tax on the return to saving and investment. Taxes on capital income discourage saving and capital formation. Reduced capital formation provides labor less capital with which to work, lowering labor productivity and, consequently, living standards. Moreover, with the continuing decline in corporate tax rates abroad, the United States may become a relatively less attractive location in which to invest, further reducing U.S. labor productivity and living standards.

The U.S. tax system also taxes investment income very unevenly across sectors, industries, asset types, and financing. Uneven taxation causes investment decisions to be based in part on tax considerations rather than on the fundamental economic merit of investment projects. For example, the United States taxes profits from an equity-financed investment in the corporate sector more heavily than the return earned on other investments. Corporate profits are heavily taxed because they are subject to multiple layers of tax: the corporate income tax, investor-level taxes on capital gains and dividends, and the estate tax.

The multiple taxation of corporate profits distorts a number of economic decisions important to a healthy economy. It distorts corporate financing choices by taxing interest earned on corporate bonds less heavily than corporate profits. As a result, corporations are induced to use more debt than they otherwise would. It distorts corporate distribution policy by taxing dividends more heavily than corporate earnings that are retained and later realized as capital gains (primarily due to the deferral of gains until sale and the opportunity for step-up of stock basis at death). As a result, it confounds market signals of a company's financial health and may have important implications for corporate governance. It also penalizes investment in the corporate form by taxing corporate income more heavily than other capital income. Consequently, it discourages investment in and through corporations in favor of investment in other less heavily taxed business forms (such as partnerships) or in non-business assets (such as owner-occupied housing). The double tax on corporate profits was reduced in 2003 with the enactment of lower tax rates on dividends and capital gains, although this relief, which focused primarily on equity-financed investment, did not completely remove the double tax.

In contrast to corporate profits, the U.S. tax system taxes the returns to many other important investments very lightly, if at all. For example, some business investment is eligible for special tax treatment, and the return earned on investment in residential housing typically is not taxed at all. In some cases, special tax provisions are so generous that they actually subsidize the investment by making the net tax burden negative. These special tax provisions can encourage over-investment in the tax-favored activity. Even where they do not encourage over-investment, they substantially narrow the tax base and drive other tax rates higher, which may distort choices elsewhere in the economy. In addition, special tax provisions add complexity to the tax system and contribute to a substantial business tax compliance burden on the economy, estimated at $40 billion annually for business taxpayers.5



Taxation of flow-through businesses

The individual income tax also is important to the taxation of businesses. The non-corporate business sector and certain corporations (i.e., flow-through entities such as sole proprietorships, partnerships, and S corporations) are subject to the individual income tax on the business income of the owners or partners. Many of these businesses are small and are an important source of innovation and risk taking in the economy. These businesses and their owners benefited from the 2001 and 2003 income tax rate reductions. According to estimates by the Treasury Department, roughly 30 percent of all business taxes are paid through the individual income tax on business income earned by the owners of flow-through entities. The importance of flow-through entities has grown substantially over time. This sector has more than doubled its share of all business receipts since the early 1980s, and plays a more important role in the U.S. economy as compared to other member countries of the OECD. Flow-through businesses account for one-third of salaries and wages and claim 27 percent of depreciation deductions. Moreover, flow-though income is concentrated in the top two tax brackets, with this group receiving over 70 percent of flow-through income and paying more than 80 percent of the taxes on this income.



Risk of standing still

It is important to consider the effects of leaving the system for taxing U.S. businesses unchanged while other nations reform their systems. In general, inaction would make the United States a less attractive place in which to invest, innovate, and grow. The impact of allowing the U.S. tax system to stagnate and fall behind relative to other countries would be modest at first. The United States would see less benefit from inflows of foreign capital and investment, and U.S. firms would face a higher cost of capital than foreign firms, making it more difficult to compete in foreign markets. In the short run, this would translate into slower growth, less productivity, and less employment.

Over the long run, however, the impact of the United States falling further behind its major trading partners is likely to become more dramatic. Industries that are relatively large producers or users of capital goods would be most affected. American manufacturers, for example, would find themselves especially disadvantaged by a tax code that causes them to face a higher cost of capital than their competitors in other countries. In a world of greater economic integration and increased trade and capital flows, a firm's decision about where to locate and expand its operations would be increasingly influenced by factors such as a country's corporate tax code and overall investment climate.6

The current U.S. tax system clearly is not optimal and likely discourages investment in the United States. A more disturbing possibility is that the U.S. tax system may also slow the pace of technological innovation. The pace of innovation is a key determinant of economic growth, and innovation tends to take place where the investment climate is best. For example, new technologies are often "embedded" in new types of capital - a firm does not benefit from an increase in computer processing speed, for example, unless it purchases a new computer that incorporates the faster chip. Thus, firms do not reap the benefits of technological advances until new capital is brought into production. Similarly, higher investment can spur innovation by raising the demand for new technologies. Given this interplay between innovation and capital accumulation, allowing U.S. corporate taxes to become more burdensome relative to the rest of the world could result in a cumulative effect in which U.S. firms fall increasingly behind those in other nations.

In addition, entrepreneurship would likely be more successful in an environment in which tax burdens are lower. Lower business tax rates are associated with increased business formation. The creation of new business enterprises is important in order to bring new ideas and new products to the market and, therefore, represents another channel by which business taxes can potentially influence innovation.

Reforming the U.S. business tax system would raise capital accumulation and ultimately lead to a higher level of GDP and higher living standards for Americans. Some of this improvement in living standards may result from other economic effects, including the effects of firms relocating their plant and equipment, the additional dynamic effects of bringing new, more effective techniques into production, and potential effects on entrepreneurship. As capital moves more freely across borders, and emerging countries begin to approach U.S. levels of education and training, advantages that the United States currently has will erode. Tax burden differentials may become more important going forward than they have been in the past and, right now, the United States is becoming less competitive in that regard.



C. How business taxation in the United States compares with that of the United States' major trading partners

In an increasingly global economy, the choices that the United States makes for business taxation affect the ability of its businesses to compete with foreign firms subject to different tax regimes. A comparison of the U.S. tax regime with those of the United States' major trading partners may provide important guidance to U.S. business tax reform.



International comparison of corporate and investor-level taxes



Statutory corporate income tax rates

Statutory corporate income tax (CIT) rates are the most common measure of the tax burden imposed on corporations. The first column of Table 1.1 shows total statutory CIT rates, incorporating sub-national taxes, where relevant, for OECD countries. The United States has the second highest statutory CIT rate (39 percent) in the OECD after Japan (40 percent). This compares with an average rate of 31 percent for the major industrialized economies.

The evolution of OECD corporate tax rates over the past two decades suggests that CIT rate setting is an interactive process subject to the pressures of international competition. Chart 1.1 shows the U.S. statutory CIT rate compared to the overall OECD rate weighted by GDP since 1982. In the early 1980s, the United States had a relatively high statutory CIT tax rate of nearly 50 percent (i.e., combined federal and average state CIT rate). The Tax Reform Act of 1986 lowered the U.S. federal CIT rate to 34 percent, and the U.S. combined CIT rate fell to 38 percent, well below the then prevailing OECD CIT rates. OECD rates trended steadily down over the ensuing decade, while the top U.S. federal CIT rate was increased to 35 percent in 1993. The average and median OECD statutory CIT rates fell below the U.S. CIT rate in the 1990s and have continued to decline. Now, the United States is once again a high corporate tax rate country. The decline in OECD corporate tax rates appears likely to continue. In 2008, Germany will reduce its CIT rate from 38 percent to 30 percent, and the United Kingdom will reduce its CIT rate from 30 percent to 28 percent, financed by base broadening. Italy's government has proposed lowering its corporate tax rate from 33 percent to 27.5 percent in 2008, and cutting corporate taxes is also part of the current French government's policy platform.7
Table 1.1: Statutory Corporate Income Tax Rates, Depreciation Allowances and Effective Marginal Tax Rates for Selected OECD Countries, 2005



__________________________________________________________________________________
Present
Discounted
Value of
Depreciation
Effective Effective
Statutory Allowance - Marginal Marginal
Corporate Tax Rate* Tax Rate*
Income Tax Equipment Equipment Equipment
Country Rate (Equity) (Equity) (Debt)

__________________________________________________________________________________
Percent

Australia 30 66 24 -23

Austria 25 66 20 -18

Belgium 34 75 22 -35

Canada 36 73 25 -37

Finland 26 73 17 -23

France 34 77 20 -36

United Kingdom 30 73 20 -28

Germany 38 71 29 -37

Greece 32 87 12 -40

Ireland 13 66 10 -8

Italy 37 82 19 -48

Japan 40 73 28 -40

Netherlands 32 73 21 -29

Norway 28 67 22 -21

Portugal 28 79 15 -29

Spain 35 78 21 -38

Sweden 28 78 16 -29

Switzerland 34 78 20 -36




United States 39 79 24 -46




Average (Unweighted) 31 75 20 -32




G-7 Average (Unweighted) 36 76 24 -39

__________________________________________________________________________________
*Effective Marginal Tax Rates (EMTRs) are discussed in the following section.

Source: Institute for Fiscal Studies, Corporate Tax Database, www.ifs.org.uk



[Graphic will be available December 24, 2007.-cch]

Several factors contribute to the increased competition in corporate tax rates. The rapid increase in international capital mobility over the past two decades has made corporate investment more sensitive to relative CIT rates. Capital market integration has been particularly pronounced within the European Union, whose members' ongoing CIT reductions are, to some degree, reacting to the low CIT rates in Eastern Europe. Increasingly sophisticated tax planning methods may also be contributing to increased tax competition among OECD countries.



Effective marginal tax rates (EMTRs)

Statutory corporate tax rates provide an incomplete picture of the corporate tax burden because they reflect neither the corporate tax base nor investor-level taxes. Depreciation allowances - the rate at which capital investment costs may be deducted from taxable income over time - are a key determinant of the corporate tax base and an important factor distinguishing the statutory CIT rate from the effective marginal CIT rate (EMTRs). The EMTR combines corporate tax rates, depreciation allowances, and other features of the tax system into a single measure of the share of an investment's economic income needed to cover taxes over its lifetime. This measure of the "tax wedge" between the before-tax and after-tax return on an investment is measured relative to the before-tax return.

The EMTR varies depending on the source of finance - debt or equity - because interest is generally deductible, but dividends are not. The required rate of return for debt-financed investment, therefore, is lower than the required return for equity-financed investment in proportion to the CIT rate. This lower discount rate also increases the present discounted value (PDV) of depreciation allowances for debt-financed investment. In fact, due to interest deductibility and accelerated depreciation, the corporate EMTR on debt-financed investment is negative for all OECD countries, implying a tax subsidy for debt-financed investment. (However, incorporation of individual-level taxes on interest income generally restores taxation of debt-financed investment to a positive rate.) Thus, in addition to affecting the allocation of capital across borders, the corporate tax also affects financing decisions, favoring the use of debt finance instead of equity finance.

Column 2 of Table 1.1 shows the importance of depreciation allowances for explaining differences in corporate tax bases (and EMTRs) for OECD countries. A PDV of one is equivalent to immediate write-off (expensing) of investment, while a PDV of zero means that investment is non-depreciable. If the rate of tax depreciation equals the rate of economic depreciation (and there is zero inflation), then the EMTR for equityfinanced investment equals the statutory CIT rate (and the EMTR on debt-financed investment equals zero). Most OECD countries offer accelerated depreciation for equipment investment, such that their equity EMTRs are lower than their statutory tax rates. In contrast to its high statutory CIT rate, the United States has relatively generous depreciation allowances for equipment, with a PDV of 79 percent. In the OECD, only Greece and Italy have more generous depreciation allowances.

The trend in OECD depreciation allowances over the past two decades has been toward slower depreciation, as countries have at least partially offset CIT rate cuts with corporate base broadening. According to the Institute for Fiscal Studies, the average PDV of OECD depreciation allowances fell from 82 percent in 1980 to 75 percent in 2005. Depreciation allowances among the G-7 also declined during the same period, but remained generally higher, falling from 85 percent to 76 percent.8

The corporate EMTRs for equity-financed and debt-financed equipment investment, respectively, for the OECD countries are shown in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 1.1. The U.S. EMTR for equity-financed equipment investment, 24 percent, is above the OECD average of 20 percent, but equal to the G-7 average. The U.S. EMTR for debtfinanced investment in equipment, -46 percent, is below average for both the G-7 (-39 percent) and the OECD (-32 percent). These figures illustrate the divergent influence of statutory CIT rates on equity and debt EMTRs. A higher CIT rate produces a higher equity EMTR but a lower debt EMTR because the value of the interest deduction increases with the corporate tax rate. The above-average U.S. statutory CIT rate thus contributes to a below-average debt EMTR. Indeed, the United States has the greatest disparity between debt and equity EMTRs in the OECD, possibly resulting in a more pronounced tax bias of financing decisions in the United States than in other OECD countries.

To gauge the net effect of statutory CIT rates and the size of the corporate tax base, empirical measures of the average corporate tax rate are sometimes considered, such as the ratio of corporate income tax revenues to gross domestic product (GDP). Over the period of 2000 through 2005, the average ratio of corporate income tax revenues to GDP for the OECD was 3.5 percent; for the United States, the average ratio was 2.2 percent. Thus, the high U.S. corporate tax rate does not result in higher corporate tax revenue relative to GDP due to the narrowness of the U.S. corporate tax base. The narrow corporate tax base results not only from accelerated depreciation allowances, but also from special tax provisions for particular business sectors (such as domestic production activities) as well as debt finance and tax planning.



Emerging market countries

Because U.S. corporations are increasingly investing in and competing with corporations in emerging markets, comparison of the U.S. corporate tax regime with those of major emerging market countries is also important. Table 1.2 shows statutory CIT rates, depreciation allowances, and corporate effective marginal tax rates for three large, emerging market U.S. trading partners - China, India, and Mexico. Their domestic statutory CIT rates are fairly close to the OECD average of 31 percent. However, both China and India have levied corporate tax on domestic and foreign investors at different rates. In China, while the total statutory CIT rate on domestic firms was 31 percent (equal to the OECD average), special low rates of 15 percent to 24 percent were accorded foreign corporations investing in particular sectors and geographic regions. Although China has recently passed legislation that will unify its domestic and foreign corporate tax rate at 25 percent - substantially below the OECD average - it will continue to offer special tax relief for investment in particular sectors and regions. India, conversely, taxes foreign investors more heavily than domestic firms. The statutory CIT rate faced by foreign corporations is more than 10 percentage points higher than the 34-percent rate levied on domestic firms. Mexico's statutory tax rate, 32 percent, is slightly above the OECD average.
Table 1.2: U.S. vs. Emerging Market Country Tax Rates, 2006



____________________________________________________________________________________
Country Statutory PDV of EMTR
Corporate Depreciation Equipment
Tax Rate Allowance - (Equity)
Equipment
(Equity)


______________________________
Domestic Foreign Domestic Domestic

____________________________________________________________________________________
Percent

China* 31 15-24 48 34

India 34 45 51 36

Mexico 32 32 53 33




United States 39 39 79 24

____________________________________________________________________________________
*Foreign investment in Chinese special enterprise zones is subject to a 15 percent
or 24 percent CIT rate. China has passed legislation to unify its domestic and
foreign corporate tax rates at 25 percent.

Source: International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (2007b).



Depreciation allowances in these three emerging market countries, which have an average PDV of 51 percent, are markedly less favorable than the OECD average of 75 percent. Despite having domestic statutory CIT rates roughly equal to the OECD average, these three countries' broad corporate tax bases result in equity EMTRs that, with an average rate of 34 percent, are well above the OECD average of 20 percent.



Individual-level taxation of corporate income

Firm-level taxation provides an incomplete picture of the tax burden on corporate investment because corporate profits distributed in the form of interest, dividends, and capital gains are often subject to a second level of tax at the investor level. Because interest is deductible by the corporation, debt-financed investment is subject to only a single layer of tax at the investor level. However, dividends and retained earnings (which produce capital gains) may not be deducted by the corporation, so that equity-financed investment is frequently subject to "double taxation" - it is taxed first under the corporate income tax and then again under the individual income tax when distributed to investors as dividends or retained by the corporation and realized by investors as capital gains.9

The importance of investor-level taxes for affecting investment decisions depends on the tax rate faced by the marginal investor. If the marginal corporate investor is taxexempt (such as a pension fund), then the corporate-level EMTR alone describes marginal investment incentives in the corporate sector. However, if the marginal investor is subject to taxes on corporate interest, dividends, and capital gains, then that layer also needs to be taken into account in calculating the EMTR on corporate investment. Typically, it is assumed that the marginal investor is a weighted average of business taxpayers that are tax-exempt and taxpayers who are subject to investor-level taxes.

Most countries offer some type of integration scheme to alleviate double taxation, which usually takes the form of either: (1) reduced tax rates on (long-term) capital gains and dividends, (2) a tax imputation system, which gives the investor credit for part or all of the tax paid at the corporate level, or (3) a dividend exclusion combined with basis adjustments for corporate income that is retained by the firm. Another increasingly popular method of capital income taxation, sometimes referred to as the "Scandinavian system," is to tax interest, dividends, and capital gains at a single rate well below the top marginal rate on earned income.

OECD countries offering partial or full imputation of dividend taxes include the United Kingdom, Canada, and Mexico. The United States, Japan, and India offer reduced tax rates on long-term capital gains (which the United States currently also applies to dividends), while Germany and France offer a 50-percent exclusion of dividend income. Countries that have adopted Scandinavian systems include Italy and China.10

Table 1.3 shows the top statutory tax rates levied on residents' receipts of interest, dividends, and capital gains for the G-7 countries. The United States has an aboveaverage tax rate on interest, a below-average tax rate on dividends, and an average tax rate on long-term capital gains. Table 1.4 shows the integrated EMTRs for the G-7 countries calculated for a taxable domestic investor in the top marginal income tax bracket. The United States has an above-average EMTR for equipment investment financed with debt or retained earnings, and a roughly average EMTR for investment financed with new share issues.
Table 1.3: Top Investor-Level Capital Income Tax Rates for the G-7, 2006



_____________________________________________________________________________________
Country Interest Dividend Capital Gains
Tax Rate Tax Rate Tax Rate

_____________________________________________________________________________________
Percent

Canada 46.4 30.0 23.2

France 27.0 23.0 26.0

Germany 47.5 23.7 23.7

Italy 12.5 12.5 20.0

Japan 16.3 30.0 10.0

United Kingdom 40.0 25.1 10.0




United States 37.9 18.8 18.8




Unweighted average 32.5 23.3 18.8

_____________________________________________________________________________________
Note: Where applicable, data include sub-national tax rates, dividend tax rates
incorporate integration allowances, and tax rates are for long-term, large-scale
investment.

Source: International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (2007a).





Worldwide vs. territorial systems

Another respect in which the U.S. corporate tax system differs from that of the majority of the United States' trading partners is in its taxation of corporations' worldwide earnings. U.S. corporations pay tax on the active earnings of their foreign subsidiaries when those earnings are paid out as dividends to their parent corporations (although credit is given for taxes paid on those earnings to foreign governments). The major alternative to a worldwide system is a territorial system in which the home country exempts all or a portion of foreign earnings from home-country taxation.

Although a predominantly worldwide approach to the taxation of cross-border income was once prevalent, Table 1.5 shows that it is now used by roughly less than onehalf of OECD countries. Instead, many of these countries now use predominantly territorial tax systems. To protect the integrity of investor-level taxes under the individual income tax system, however, countries with predominantly territorial systems typically do not exempt certain foreign earnings of foreign subsidiaries, including earnings generated from holding mobile financial assets, or certain payments that are deductible in the jurisdiction from which the payment is made, such as foreign source royalty payments.
Table 1.4: Integrated Effective Marginal Tax Rates for G-7 Countries, 2006



____________________________________________________________________________________
Country Debt New Shares* Retained Earnings**

____________________________________________________________________________________
Percent

Canada 51.8 63.4 51.8

France 12.6 49.9 43.7

Germany 56.8 64.0 58.7

Italy -29.7 29.0 28.3

Japan -49.0 49.9 25.3

United Kingdom 46.1 55.8 38.8




United States 31.0 51.8 46.1




Unweighted average 17.1 52.0 41.8

____________________________________________________________________________________
*The applicable tax rate for new share issues is the tax on dividends.

**The applicable tax rate for retained earnings is the tax on long-term capital
gains. The effective marginal tax rates on retained earnings assume 10 years of
deferral.

Source: International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (2007a).





Consumption taxes

Another respect in which the U.S. tax system differs markedly from that of the United States' major trading partners is the reliance on consumption taxes. Table 1.6 shows OECD countries' usage of taxes on goods and services11 and taxes on general consumption.12 It also shows the standard value-added tax (VAT) rate in OECD countries. The United States relies less heavily on taxes on goods and services than all other OECD countries, measured both as a percentage of GDP and as a share of total taxation.13 As a percentage of GDP, taxes on goods and services in 2005 were 4.8 percent in the United States compared with the OECD average of 11.4 percent. As a percentage of total taxation, taxes on goods and services were 17.4 percent in the United States compared with the OECD average of 31.9 percent. Japan was the only other OECD country that was similar to the United States using those measures - taxes on goods and services were 5.3 percent of GDP and 19.4 percent of total taxation.
Table 1.5: Territorial vs. Worldwide Treatment of Foreign Dividend Income by Country, 2005



____________________________________________________________________________________
Territorial Worldwide
(Exemption) (Foreign Tax Credit)

____________________________________________________________________________________
Australia* Czech Republic
Austria Ireland
Belgium Japan
Canada* Korea
Denmark Mexico
Finland New Zealand
France** Poland
Germany United Kingdom United States
Greece*
Hungary
Iceland
Italy**
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Norway
Portugal*
Slovak Republic
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey

____________________________________________________________________________________
*Exemption by treaty agreement.

**Exemption of 95 percent.

Source: President's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform (2005).



The United States also relies less heavily on general consumption taxes (such as VATs and general sales taxes) than all other OECD countries. As a percentage of GDP, general consumption taxes in 2005 were 2.2 percent in the United States compared with the OECD average of 6.9 percent. As a percentage of total taxation, general consumption taxes were 8.0 percent in the United States compared with the OECD average of 18.9 percent. Japan was the only other OECD country that was similar to the United States using those measures - general consumption taxes were 2.6 percent of GDP and 9.5 percent of total taxation. Finally, the United States is the only OECD country without a VAT, although most states impose retail sales taxes.
Table 1.6: Consumption Taxes among OECD Countries



_________________________________________________________________________________
Value-Added
Taxes on Goods and Taxes on General
Services* Consumption* Taxation**


____________________________________________________________
Country Percentage Percentage
of of
Percentage Total Percentage Total Standard
of GDP Taxation of GDP Taxation VAT Rate

_________________________________________________________________________________
Percent

Australia 8.6 27.8 4.1 13.4 10.0

Austria 12.0 28.4 7.9 18.9 20.0

Belgium 11.5 25.3 7.3 16.1 21.0

Canada 8.5 25.4 5.0 15.0 7.0

Czech Republic 11.8 31.3 7.2 19.2 19.0

Denmark 16.2 32.2 10.0 19.9 25.0

Finland 13.8 31.3 8.7 19.8 22.0

France 11.2 25.3 7.8 17.1 19.6

Germany 10.1 29.0 6.3 18.0 16.0

Greece 9.4 34.6 6.0 22.2 19.0

Hungary 14.8 39.7 10.5 28.1 20.0

Iceland 16.7 40.4 11.5 27.7 24.5

Ireland 11.6 37.8 7.7 25.1 21.0

Italy 10.8 26.4 6.0 14.6 20.0

Japan 5.3 19.4 2.6 9.5 5.0

Korea 8.8 34.3 4.5 17.5 10.0

Luxembourg 11.1 28.8 6.2 16.1 15.0

Mexico 11.3 56.7 3.8 19.1 15.0

Netherlands 12.4 31.7 7.6 19.5 19.0

New Zealand 12.1 32.1 9.0 23.8 12.5

Norway 12.2 27.9 7.9 18.1 25.0

Poland 12.6 36.7 7.7 22.5 22.0

Portugal 13.6 39.3 8.3 23.8 21.0

Slovak Republic 12.5 39.7 7.9 25.1 19.0

Spain 10.0 28.0 6.2 17.5 16.0

Sweden 13.2 26.1 9.4 18.5 25.0

Switzerland 7.0 23.6 4.0 13.4 7.6

Turkey 15.9 49.3 7.1 21.8 18.0

United Kingdom 11.1 30.3 6.8 18.6 17.5

United States 4.8 17.4 2.2 8.0 0.0

Unweighted Average 11.4 31.9 6.9 18.9 17.1

*Figures are for 2005.

**Figures are for 2006.

Source: OECD, Revenue Statistics (2007) and OECD Tax Database, www.oecd.org





D. Summary

The U.S business tax system has not kept pace with changes in the global economy. The tax reforms enacted by the United States in the 1980s were followed by reforms in other countries. The U.S. statutory corporate income tax rate is now the second highest among the OECD countries, and the U.S. corporate effective marginal tax rate is roughly average, discouraging both foreign direct investment and labor productivity.

The U.S. system for taxing businesses differs from those in other OECD countries in other important respects. The United States taxes corporations on their worldwide earnings, a once prevalent approach now used by less than one-half of OECD countries. Instead, many countries use predominantly territorial systems that exempt all or a portion of foreign active earnings from home-country taxation. In addition, the United States relies less heavily on consumption taxes than other OECD countries and is the only OECD country that does not have a VAT.

The current U.S. system for taxing businesses clearly is not optimal. It includes ad hoc policies and special tax provisions that narrow the tax base and create distortions that divert capital from its most efficient use. This lowers the productive capacity of the economy.

The U.S. business tax system needs to be designed to help U.S. companies and workers compete by taking into account the increasingly integrated global economy. With a view to future competitiveness, U.S. tax policy must respond to and anticipate changes in the global marketplace. The U.S. system for taxing businesses needs to be reevaluated to consider how it can be improved to attract and generate the investment and innovation necessary to advance the living standards of all Americans.

The remainder of this report discusses approaches that could be considered for reforming the taxation of business income. Chapter II examines an approach that would replace business income taxes with a BAT (a type of consumption tax), while retaining taxes on capital income through the individual income tax. Chapter III explores an approach that would broaden the income tax base and use the revenues either to lower business income tax rates or permit more rapid write-off of business investment, potentially combined with the exemption of foreign active earnings. Chapter IV discusses specific areas of business income taxation that could be reformed separately or in the context of a broad-based reform.


References


Altshuler, Rosanne H., Harry Grubert, and T. Scott Newlon. 2001. "Has U.S. Investment Abroad Become More Sensitive to Tax Rates? In International Taxation and Multinational Activity 2001, ed. J. Hines, 9-32. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

BNA Daily Tax Report. 2007. "Italian Tax Reform Embedded in Country's Budget Law for 2008," October 24, 2007. www.bna.com

Hodge, Scott A. and Chris Atkins. 2007. "U.S. Still Lagging Behind OECD Corporate Tax Trends." Tax Foundation Fiscal Fact No. 96.

Institute for Fiscal Studies, Corporate Tax Database, www.ifs.org.uk

International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation. 2007a. European Tax Handbook. Amsterdam: International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation.

International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation. 2007b. Taxes and Investment in Asia and the Pacific. Amsterdam: International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation.

International Monetary Fund. 2005. International Monetary Fund Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey.

Kahn, Gabriel and Luca di Leo. 2007. "Italy's Budget Targets Boosting Fiscal Order," Wall Street Journal October 1, 2007.

KPMG. 2007. KPMG's Corporate Tax Rate Survey, 2007.

Market News International. 2007. "France Elections: Economic Platforms of Sarkozy and Royal," April 23, 2007. www.marketnews.com

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Tax Database, www.oecd.org

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 2007. Revenue Statistics 2007. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Forthcoming. Tax Effects on Foreign Direct Investment: Recent Evidence and Policy Analysis. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

President's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform. 2005. Simple, Fair and Pro-Growth: Proposals to Fix America's Tax System. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Slemrod, Joel. 2005. "The Costs of Tax Complexity," Presentation to the President's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform, March 3, 2005.

The Economic Times. 2007. "FM Hints at Tax Cuts, Yields to Area-Wise Incentives." August 1, 2007.

U.S. Department of Commerce. 2007. Bureau of Economic Analysis news release, November 2007. http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2007/pdf/gdp307p.pdf

U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Tax Analysis. 2006. A Dynamic Analysis of Permanent Extension of the President's Tax Relief. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Treasury, July 25, 2006. http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/treasurydynamicanalysisreporjjuly252 006.pdf

U.S. Department of the Treasury. 2007. Report on Foreign Portfolio Holdings of U.S. Securities. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Treasury, June 2007. http://www.treasury.gov/tic/shl2006r.pdf

U.S. Department of the Treasury. 2007. Treasury Conference on Business Taxation and Global Competitiveness: Background Paper. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Treasury, July 23, 2007. http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/07230%20r.pdf



Chapter II: Replacing Business Income Taxes with a Business Activities Tax



A. Introduction

This chapter examines replacing present U.S. business income taxes with a broadbased Business Activities Tax (BAT), which is a type of consumption tax. Assuming a very broad base, a BAT imposed at a rate of roughly 5 percent to 6 percent would replace the revenue from current U.S. business income taxes.

Under this approach the corporate income tax as well as the existing individual income taxes collected from pass-through entities (partnerships, sole proprietorships, and S corporations) would be replaced with a BAT. While business income taxes would be repealed and replaced by a BAT, the individual income tax that includes investor-level taxes on dividends and capital gains would be retained, and the tax treatment of interest received by individuals would be conformed to that for dividends and capital gains (i.e., taxed at the lower rates currently available for dividends and capital gains).

For two reasons, this approach is estimated to improve economic performance, ultimately increasing the size of the economy by roughly 2.0 percent to 2.5 percent. First, because a BAT does not tax the normal return to saving or investment,14 it is likely to stimulate additional saving and investment. Greater investment means businesses would have more capital, which increases workers' productivity, and ultimately improves living standards. Second, it would likely reduce a variety of tax distortions that arise under the current tax system due to the uneven treatment of investment and other economic activity.15

Because this approach entails repeal of the corporate income tax but retains the individual income tax, it could create incentives for individuals to accumulate passive investment income in the corporate form to defer or avoid paying individual investorlevel taxes on such income. It also could create incentives for business owners to minimize payments for their own labor services, which would not be deductible, to avoid income and payroll taxes. These issues could be addressed through special rules, which could create additional complexity. Other distortions may arise because a BAT base is unlikely to cover all consumer goods and services. For example, taxing consumer financial services under a BAT is difficult in practice and small businesses are often exempt from consumption taxes in other countries for administrative reasons.

The remainder of this chapter describes a BAT and discusses the economic effects of this approach in more detail. It also describes the main features of the similar valueadded taxes (VATs) typically imposed in other countries.

Replacing business income taxes with a BAT would be a bold reform. Indeed, it is a reform that has not been attempted in other countries. Nevertheless, it is possible to overemphasize the novelty of a BAT for the United States. Although perhaps not universally understood, the actual U.S. tax system is not a pure income tax, but a hybrid combination of an income tax and a consumption tax.16 The U.S. tax system already has important features that move in the direction of a BAT. For example, accelerated depreciation is a step toward the immediate deduction of the cost of an investment that would be allowed by a BAT. Further, certain investment costs, such as investments undertaken by certain small businesses and the costs of producing certain intangibles, are currently allowed an immediate deduction, the same treatment as under a BAT. Thus, while the BAT approach outlined in this chapter is a consumption tax, it is worth noting that the U.S. tax system currently has some features that are similar.



B. Description of a BAT

A BAT is a tax on goods and services sold to consumers. Under a BAT, the tax base for each firm is the gross receipts from the sales of goods and services minus purchases of goods and services (including purchases of capital goods) from other businesses. Wages and other forms of employee compensation (such as fringe benefits) are not deductible and, therefore, the effective tax rate on labor could be increased, as discussed below. Under a BAT, financial flows, such as interest and dividends (whether received or paid), would not enter into the tax base. For the economy as a whole, the tax base of a BAT is the sales of real goods and services to consumers, because sales from one business to another have been deducted from the tax base.

A BAT is similar to the VATs imposed in many countries around the world. These VATs, however, generally use a credit-invoice method. In contrast, a BAT uses a deduction or subtraction method for calculating the tax.17 In a credit-invoice method, a business is taxed on all receipts but receives a credit for the amount of tax paid by the seller on the business' purchases.18 A BAT is also similar to a broad-based retail sales tax.19



Calculation of a BAT

To understand how a BAT works, consider the illustration below (Table 2.1) of how bread produced by a farmer, miller, and baker would be taxed under a BAT with a 10-percent tax rate. In this example, the farmer grows wheat and sells it to the miller, who makes flour for sale to the baker. In turn, the baker uses the flour to make bread, which is then sold to consumers.
Table 2.1: Calculation of a BAT



__________________________________________________________________________________
Economic Activity Farmer Miller Baker Total

__________________________________________________________________________________
1. Sales $300 $700 $1,000

2. Purchases $0 $300 $700

3. Value added (lines 1-2) $300 $400 $300 $1,000

4. BAT (10% of line 3) $30 $40 $30 $100

__________________________________________________________________________________
Source: Department of the Treasury, Office of Tax Analysis.



A BAT is calculated by subtracting purchases from sales at each stage of the production and distribution process. The baker, for example, applies a 10-percent tax rate to the $300 difference between total bread sales and purchase of grain and owes $30 of BAT. The farmer and the miller calculate tax in the same way and the total BAT paid is $100. This is the same amount of total tax that would be paid under a 10-percent retail sales tax. The only difference is that the 10-percent retail sales tax would be levied only on the final $1,000 sale to consumers.



The BAT base

In principle, a BAT would tax a broad range of consumption goods and services. Most existing VATs, however, do not tax all consumption.20 Some goods are excluded for administrative reasons. Other goods are excluded, or taxed at preferentially low rates, in order to pursue policy or social objectives. Nevertheless, keeping the base of a BAT as broad as possible minimizes the distortions caused by the tax.

Total consumption is the broadest conceivable BAT base. However, taxing total consumption would be impractical, if not impossible, for several reasons. First, some goods and services could be difficult to value, such as consumer financial services and government-provided goods and services.21 Second, other goods and services, while perhaps easy to value, would raise difficult enforcement problems. For example, underreporting of sales by small businesses or casual service providers would be a problem under a BAT, as it is under our current tax system. Third, the taxation of some goods and services may raise measurement and bookkeeping challenges (e.g., spending that provides employees compensation that is nondeductible must be identified and separated from other business spending such as business meals). Of course, many of these issues represent significant challenges under our current tax system.

Some goods may be viewed as especially desirable because their consumption benefits society as a whole. Because they provide benefits to others, there may be a policy reason to reduce or eliminate the rate of tax on "merit goods," such as education, health care, welfare services, cultural activities, and religious and charitable activities. Other goods, such as necessities, may be taxed at a low rate in order to reduce the tax burden on the poor. These might include medical care, food, electricity, heating oil and gas, and clothing. A lower rate for necessities is generally viewed as an inefficient way to address perceived regressivity, however, because the wealthy typically consume more than the poor, including with respect to most "necessities." Moreover, such special treatment would require a higher BAT rate for other consumption.



C. Economic effects of a broad-based BAT

Replacing the present system of business taxes with a broad-based BAT would likely improve economic performance by eliminating features of the present income tax that create economic distortions such as the tax penalty on saving and investment and the uneven taxation of economic activity. The Treasury Department estimates that this approach would ultimately increase the size of the economy by roughly 2.0 percent to 2.5 percent.



Economic gains from replacing business taxes with a broad-based BAT

The economic gains have two primary sources. First, a BAT lowers the tax on the return to saving and investment. (Box 2.1 discusses the effect of a consumption tax on saving and investment.) Replacement of the existing tax on business income with a BAT would lower the effective marginal tax rate on investment from its current level of 17 percent to 8 percent overall, and from 25 percent to 15 percent in the business sector.22 The lower tax on saving and investment, which is likely to be quantitatively more important for producing economic gains than the more even taxation of economic activity, would increase capital formation, enhance labor productivity, and ultimately, increase living standards.



Box 2.1: The Incentive to Save and Invest Under a Consumption Tax 23

The key difference between an income tax and a consumption tax is that an income tax discourages savings while a consumption tax does not. Because a consumption tax imposes an equal tax on present and future consumption, it does not discourage saving for future consumption. In contrast, an income tax taxes the return to saving, thereby taxing consumption in the future more heavily than consumption today. An income tax discourages saving for the future by reducing the after-tax rate of return received by the investor below the pre-tax rate of return produced by the investment.

An important feature that distinguishes an income tax from a consumption tax lies in how each treats the cost recovery of capital goods (i.e., the tax treatment of investment). Under an income tax, the cost of capital goods is deducted over time through depreciation allowances as the capital goods wear out, which results in the investor's after-tax return falling below the pre-tax return. Under a consumption tax, the cost of capital goods is deducted fully in the year of purchase (i.e., capital is "expensed"), which results in the investor's after-tax return exactly equaling the pre-tax return. This occurs because, under a consumption tax, the value of the expensing deduction exactly offsets the tax on the return to the investment (in present value) for the marginal, or break-even, investment.24

These points are illustrated in the following simple example of a business' investment decision under a 20-percent income tax and a 20-percent consumption tax (Table 2.2). Consider a business that has earned $1,000 in profit. The business owner must decide whether to invest in a machine that will produce output next year that sells for 10 percent more than the machine's cost, after which the machine is totally worn out. If the business owner does not invest, he will pay $200 in tax on the $1,000 profit and will have $800 to spend on consumption - the same result under both the income tax and the consumption tax.

For each tax, we now enquire: How much consumption can the owner obtain in the second year if he foregoes this $800 of first-year consumption and instead invests? Under the income tax, if the business owner invests in the machine, he will still pay $200 in tax in the first year and can buy an $800 machine. In the next year, given the 10- percent pre-tax rate of return, the machine produces $880 of output, which is taxable. Because the business owner can deduct the full $800 cost of the machine as depreciation in the second year, his taxable income is $80. The tax on the income is $16, and he is left with $864 in cash to consume. The owner gives up $800 consumption in the first year to obtain $864 consumption in the second year. Thus, after taxes he earns a rate of return of 8 percent (($864-$800)/$800), which is less than the 10-percent pre-tax rate of return that the investment produces.

Under a consumption tax, the business owner who invests in the machine could deduct the full $1,000 cost of a machine when it is purchased. This means that the business owner can invest $1,000 in the first year. Compared to consuming the proceeds, investing gives him a first year tax savings of $200, which he invests in the machine. Given a 10-percent pre-tax rate of return, the $1,000 investment in the machine would be worth $1,100 in the next year. All of the $1,100 would be taxable, and there would be no deduction, so that the business owner would be left with $880 after taxes. This $880 leaves him with a 10-percent after-tax rate of return on his investment because the aftertax cost of the $880 in year 2 is the $800 of consumption he gave up in year 1. Under the consumption tax the after-tax rate of return and the pre-tax rate of return are exactly equal. Stated somewhat differently, the time value of money on the $200 in tax savings generated by the investment (i.e., $20 given the 10-percent rate of return) just offsets the tax on the investment's return that is paid in the second year ($20), which eliminates the net tax liability on the rate of return. In present value terms, consumption tax liability is the same regardless of when the business owner consumes.
Table 2.2: Comparison of Taxes on Investment under an Income Tax and a Consumption Tax



___________________________________________________________________________________
Consumption
Income
Tax Tax

___________________________________________________________________________________
Year 1 pre-tax income $1,000 $1,000




If income is consumed in year 1

Pre-tax income (= pre-tax consumption) $1,000 $1,000

Income tax (20%) $200 na

Consumption tax (20%) na $200

After-tax consumption (pre-tax income minus tax) $800 $800




If income is invested in year 1

Pre-tax income $1,000 $1,000

Less deduction for investment cost $0 $1,000

Income tax (20%) $200 na

Consumption tax (20% on pre-tax income minus na $0
investment)

Investment (pre-tax income minus tax) $800 $1,000

Memo: Taxpayer's cost for the investment $800 $800
(consumption given up)




Potential consumption in year 2

Pre-tax cash-flow (i = 10%) $880 $1,100

Less depreciation $800 $0

Income from the investment (pre-tax cash-flow minus $80 na
depreciation)

Income tax (20%) $16 na

Consumption tax (20%) na $220

After-tax consumption (pre-tax cash-flow minus $864 $880
tax)




After-tax rate of return on investment* 8% 10%

___________________________________________________________________________________
na = not applicable.

*The after-tax rate of return on investment is equal to: [(consumption in year
2/consumption forgone in year 1) - 1].

Source: U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Tax Analysis.

___________________________________________________________________________________


Because a BAT does not allow businesses to deduct labor compensation, a BAT would add several percentage points to the tax rate on labor income. Thus, the economic benefits of greater capital formation would be offset to some extent by the reduction in labor supply caused by the higher tax rate on labor income. After accounting for the wage-increasing effect of a larger stock of capital and the wage-decreasing effect of a higher tax rate on wages, on net, the after-tax wage rate falls slightly under a BAT in the Treasury Department simulations. However, the tax on the return to saving discourages working to finance future consumption, and so induces taxpayers to work too little. By lowering the tax on future consumption, a BAT's reduction in the tax rate on capital income could help to push down the overall lifetime tax burden on labor.

Second, a broad-based BAT would tax business activity more uniformly throughout the economy. The current taxes on business income distort the allocation of capital throughout the economy because they do not impose the same tax burden on all sources of capital. Tangible business capital (e.g., equipment, buildings) is unevenly taxed while owner-occupied housing and intangible capital (e.g., patents, trademarks) are generally not taxed at all or at very low effective rates. Current law's tax differentials encourage over-investment in low-tax assets and activities at the expense of more productive investments in high-tax assets. This reduces the value of the output produced with our nation's stock of capital because taxes, rather than economic fundamentals, affect investment choices.

The more uniform treatment under a broad-based BAT would reduce a number of existing tax distortions that interfere with efficient consumption and investment decisions. However, narrowing of a BAT base through various special tax provisions, such as exemptions for food and drugs, would undermine the economic benefits of a BAT by reintroducing tax distortions.

The current tax system also distorts a number of consumption choices. For example, the value of fringe benefits, such as employer-provided health care, is excluded from an employee's taxable income. In contrast, cash wages are generally taxable. The tax advantage of such fringe benefits over cash wages induces workers to over-consume fringe benefits and to under-consume other goods and services. Under a BAT, these tax distortions would be reduced because fringe benefits would not be deductible.

It is commonly noted that consumption taxes place a tax burden on the value of wealth that exists at the time the consumption tax is imposed. The tax on wealth is unavoidable and so does not distort economic decisions. The tax occurs because the expensing of investment under a consumption tax reduces the value of old capital relative to new investment. Once the consumption tax is in place, all old capital would be worth less than an equally productive amount of new investment. The intuition is that old capital has already received the tax benefit from expensing, and has had its tax basis reduced accordingly, but must compete with new capital that has not been expensed. Consequently, old capital is worth less than new capital.25 One particular aspect of the reduction in the value of old relative to new capital is that a consumption tax would reduce the value of assets in place at the time the consumption tax went into effect. Compared to a world without the consumption tax, the value of old capital, including capital in place at the time of the tax change, would be reduced in proportion to the consumption tax rate.

However, because under the BAT approach business income taxes would be replaced, the net effect on asset values must include not only the effects of the BAT, but also any effects from repealing business income taxes. It is important to note that current law business income taxes are not pure income taxes, which would have no effect on asset values. Instead, business income taxes under current law are hybrids of income and consumption taxes and have some degree of expensing that already reduces the value of old capital relative to new investment. Consequently, repealing business income taxes would raise the value of existing assets. The net effect on asset values depends on whether repealing business income taxes would raise asset values by a greater or lesser extent than imposing the BAT would lower asset values. Because the BAT tax rate is so low (roughly 5 percent to 6 percent), it seems likely that in some cases the net effect would be a negligible change or possibly an increase in value.26 Thus, it is not clear that the BAT approach discussed in this chapter would lower asset values, which might mitigate the need for transition relief to address the impact on the value of existing assets.

Nevertheless, in certain cases transition relief may be viewed as desirable to address possible windfall losses associated with the loss of existing tax attributes. For example, unused net operating losses or credits accumulated prior to enactment of a BAT could be phased out over a specified time period. Although transition relief can be provided with a view toward avoiding large changes in wealth, allowing transition relief would increase the cost of the approach and require a higher BAT rate, which would reduce a BAT's economic benefits. Nonetheless, it is important to note that if transition relief were financed by a higher BAT rate imposed over a fixed period of time (e.g., five or ten years), then transition relief would have no effect on the GDP and other benefits of a BAT in the long run.



Inefficiencies and distortions created by replacing business taxes with a BAT

Repealing business income taxes and imposing a BAT while retaining an individual income tax would create some inefficiencies and distortions. This section considers such inefficiencies and also potential distortions that would arise from a BAT that fails to cover all consumer goods and services, exempts small businesses and continues to require income to be calculated for certain purposes.

Repealing the corporate income tax while retaining the individual income tax creates an incentive for individual taxpayers to accumulate passive investment income in the corporate form to defer paying tax on dividends, capital gains, and interest. Special rules to deal with these situations, such as the personal holding company tax and the accumulated earnings tax under present law, may be necessary, but could also introduce complexity.27

Another issue is how the income of flow-though business entities, such as limited liability corporations, S corporations, partnerships, and sole proprietorships, would be treated under the BAT approach. Unlike C corporations,28 the income of flow-through entities would be taxable under the individual income tax when it is earned. To provide the same tax treatment for income earned by flow-through entities and income earned by C corporations, flow-through businesses could be treated as separate entities subject to the same rules as C corporations.

Alternatively, if flow-through businesses were not required to be treated as C corporations, flow-through entities with positive income would have an incentive to elect to be treated as C corporations for tax purposes, because they would be exempt from income tax until that income is paid to the owners and taxed at the individual level.29 However, flow-through businesses with losses from their business operations might choose to maintain their flow-through status. Because the individual income tax would be retained under the BAT approach, the business loss of a flow-through entity would be deductible from the owner's personal income (such as wages) in computing taxable income, as is the case under current individual income tax rules. In contrast, the owner of a C corporation is not allowed (nor would he be allowed under the BAT approach) to deduct the corporation's loss for individual income tax purposes. To help ensure the same treatment of operating losses for owners of flow-through businesses and C corporations, rules would be needed to prevent flow-through businesses that do not elect to be treated as C corporations from using business losses to offset ordinary income. Further, rules would be needed to determine how business losses would be treated for taxpayers with multiple business interests.

Under a BAT approach, business entities (C corporations and entities treated as C corporations) would have an incentive to minimize the compensation paid to an owner for his own labor services because the owner's labor income would be taxable when it is received at individual income tax rates, and the business entity would not be permitted to deduct compensation payments. To the extent labor income is characterized as capital income and deferred, the Social Security and Medicare Trust Funds also would be affected. Rules requiring reasonable labor compensation would need to be retained, or even strengthened, to address this issue.30

Additional issues arise from the imposition of a BAT.31 Although a BAT is intended to apply equally to sales of goods and services by all business entities, certain services provided to consumers, such as financial services, would be difficult to tax under a BAT. Member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) generally exempt financial services under their VATs because of the difficulty of determining the value added in financial intermediation. Although a BAT can be imposed on financial services that are fee-based, such as safety deposit boxes, it is much more difficult to impose tax when the charge for the service is contained in the margin between the return paid to lenders and the amount charged to borrowers. Taxing financial services on a cash-flow basis is one approach, but that would create considerable complexity by requiring a different set of rules for financial services.32 Further, a BAT would entail difficult line-drawing as corporations would have to distinguish between the value added of real and financial transactions that are coupled, such as the purchase of a car financed by the seller.

If only larger businesses are subject to a BAT (i.e., only businesses with sales above a certain threshold must charge BAT), then larger businesses might have an incentive to outsource work to exempt small businesses. Under a BAT, wages paid to employees would not be deductible, but fees paid to third parties, including possibly exempt small businesses, would be deductible, potentially leading to opportunities for tax planning. Rules to deal with this issue might be necessary and introduce additional complexity for businesses.

Replacing business income taxes with a BAT would impose new burdens on businesses without fully relieving them of pre-existing tax compliance burdens. The retention of investor-level taxes under the individual income tax would require businesses to continue to calculate income in order to distinguish between dividends and the return of the investor's capital, because dividends and capital gains would continue to be taxable at the individual shareholder level, whereas the return of capital would not be taxable. Moreover, businesses would also have to comply with the new BAT.



Concerns about growth of a BAT

Some have asserted that VATs, particularly if initially imposed at low rates, could be increased and, over time, lead to the growth in federal outlays as a share of GDP. This view is based, in part, on the following premises. First, because a VAT base is large, small increases in the VAT tax rate can generate large amounts of revenue. Second, depending on how a VAT is administered, it could be perceived as an invisible tax if collected from businesses rather the households.33 Third, because a VAT is a relatively economically efficient way to collect revenue, it is less costly to the economy to expand a VAT to finance a larger federal government.

There are relatively few empirical studies on the relationship between the adoption of a VAT and the growth of government spending.34 The empirical research, for example, has not been able to adequately address the direction of causality between the tax structure and the size of government. Casual empiricism suggests that countries without VATs, such as the United States, have smaller government sectors than countries with a VAT. More careful empirical work that controls for other factors that influence the relationship between the size of government and the presence of a VAT yield mixed results. The evidence is inconclusive on whether a VAT would facilitate the growth of government and well-known tax authorities disagree.35



D. Distributional issues

Broad-based consumption taxes, such as a VAT, are commonly criticized for being regressive. The extent to which this criticism is accurate depends on several factors including, for example, whether households are classified according to annual income, lifetime income, or annual consumption, assumptions regarding who bears the corporate income tax, and the extent to which economic behavior changes in response to imposing a VAT.

In distributional analyses, when households are classified as rich or poor according to a broad measure of annual income, a VAT is generally found to be regressive because annual consumption falls as a percentage of annual income as annual income increases.36 This method of classifying households' ability to pay is common because it is convenient and has intuitive appeal, and because determining alternative, simple, and explainable classifications has proven difficult. It is used in the Treasury Department's distributional analysis of a BAT that is discussed below. Nonetheless, it is important to keep in mind that using annual-income measures can provide an incomplete and perhaps somewhat misleading metric of whether a household is "rich" or "poor."37

A conceptually preferable alternative to annual income is lifetime income, which gives a comprehensive measure of an individual's ability to pay taxes over his entire economic life. A lifetime perspective is important because a household's income can change from year to year. For example, most individuals' or households' lifetime earnings histories follow a hump-shaped pattern. Households in the lower annual income brackets contain not only those who are perennially poor, but also those who are temporarily poor due to unemployment or illness, those who are young but have high potential lifetime earnings (e.g., those just entering the work force), and those who are retired and are wealthy but have low incomes. Moreover, households tend to smooth consumption between low and high earnings periods. Therefore, some studies use annual consumption as a measure of well being.38 Studies find that a VAT remains regressive when households are classified according to lifetime income, but the extent of the regressivity diminishes significantly.39

Most conventional distributional analyses of VATs also do not take into account that VATs continue to tax a significant portion of the return to investment - the supranormal return. Recognizing that both income taxes and VATs tax a significant portion of the return to investment can also change the distributional effects of a VAT in ways that are not considered in most distributional analyses, including those that the Treasury Department prepared for this report, and that are discussed in more detail in Box 2.2 below.

Another factor that influences the progressivity of replacing business income taxes with a BAT is one's view regarding who bears the burden of the corporate income tax and personal taxes imposed on business income.40 For decades it has been clearly understood that the corporate income tax is not borne exclusively by corporate shareholders, but is borne by households more generally. Consumers, workers, and owners of other types of capital all may bear the corporate income tax through higher prices, lower real wages, or lower returns, respectively. The extent to which the corporate tax is shifted from corporate equity owners to other economic actors depends on the details of the tax system, how the revenue from the tax is spent, the degree to which various economic actors respond to tax prices, the time frame of the analysis, and the details of the economy. Consequently, it has proven difficult to determine, precisely, who bears the burden of the corporate income tax.

Research dating back to the early 1960s suggested that the corporate income tax might primarily be borne by owners of capital as the corporate income tax lowers the returns to all types of capital, not just capital used in the corporate sector. Capital shifts out of the corporate sector in response to the lower after-tax return offered by corporations. This research, however, assumed a fixed capital stock reflecting the dominant position of the United States in world capital markets at the time. If the capital stock varies either because of international capital flows or a savings response, the corporate tax (and, more generally, business taxes) may more easily be shifted to labor.

While there remains uncertainty in this area of research, there is increasing evidence that suggests that the corporate income tax may be borne not entirely (or even principally) by owners of capital, but instead a substantial portion of the tax may be shifted onto workers, affecting their wages and living standards. Globalization plays a role. In an open economy, with mobile capital, but immobile labor, a source-based tax like the corporate income tax could well be paid in large part by domestic labor. The intuition is simple: the incidence of a tax will generally fall on the input that is least mobile. In an international setting, where capital increasingly flows freely across borders, but labor is considerably less mobile, much of the corporate income tax will be borne by labor through lower real wages. This occurs because as capital flows out of the country, capital formation declines. As labor has less capital with which to work, labor productivity falls, which translates into lower living standards than would otherwise have occurred.

The extent to which domestic labor bears a burden depends on the degree to which investment is internationally mobile and the extent to which the United States has the power to shift some of the corporate tax burden abroad by influencing the terms of international trade in its favor. One recent study, for example, finds that U.S. labor may bear as much as 70 percent of the corporate income tax burden when capital is perfectly mobile and the country lacks the ability to shift any of the burden abroad by improving the international terms of trade.41 That study and another recent study42 find that labor's burden is reduced when capital mobility is less than perfect or the United States has the power to affect the prices of traded goods and services produced in the corporate sectors.43

In several recent papers, empirical research focusing on the relationship between cross-country variation in corporate taxes and wages finds that labor bears a substantial portion of the corporate income tax.44 Again, the mechanism is less capital investment, which reduces labor productivity and, ultimately, living standards. While corporate tax rates change infrequently within a single country, many countries have had major corporate tax reforms over the last 25 years. These papers use these reforms to estimate the effects of corporate taxation. Whether these results, which may have been derived to some extent from the changes in tax rates among smaller economies, can be applied directly to the United States is an open question. Nevertheless, this empirical research suggests a link between corporate taxes and wages.

Even without international capital flows, prominent economic models suggest that changes in the level of domestic savings may also result in a shift of much of the burden of the corporate tax onto labor. In these models, the corporate tax lowers the return to saving, which causes households to save less, which lowers the capital stock, which in turn reduces labor productivity and real wages. Both of the most commonly used theoretical economic models of the effects of taxes on household decisions about working, saving, and consuming suggest that a large fraction of the corporate tax is likely shifted onto labor.45 Of course, the actual degree of shifting depends on the extent to which savings is responsive to changes in taxes, a subject on which there is considerable uncertainty.46 Nevertheless, these models are highly suggestive that the burden of the corporate income tax shifts in large part to labor.
Table 2.3: Distribution of the Federal Tax Burden Under Current Law and a Business Activities Tax With Two Assumptions on the Incidence of the Corporate Income Tax



_______________________________________________________________________________
Income Corporate Income Tax Borne by Labor Bears 70% of the
Percentile Owners of Capital Corporate Income Tax


___________________________________________________________________
Business Business
Administration's Activities Administration's Activities
Policy Baseline * Tax Policy Baseline * Tax

_______________________________________________________________________________
Percent of Federal Taxes Paid

First
Quintile 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.5

Second
Quintile 2.1 3.0 2.5 3.0

Third
Quintile 8.0 9.7 8.7 9.7

Fourth
Quintile 17.9 20.1 18.7 20.1

Fifth
Quintile 71.5 66.6 69.6 66.6




Bottom 50% 5.5 7.4 6.3 7.4

Top 10% 54.9 48.3 52.2 48.3

Top 5% 42.0 34.4 38.9 34.4

Top 1% 23.4 16.4 20.5 16.4

_______________________________________________________________________________
Note: Estimates of 2015 law at 2007 cash income levels. Quintiles begin at
cash income of: Second $13,310; Third $28,507; Fourth $50,448; Highest
$87,758; Top 10% $128,676; Top 5% $177,816; Top 1% $432,275; Bottom 50% below
$38,255.

*The Administration's policy baseline is similar to current law but assumes
permanent extension of the 2001 and 2003 tax relief.

Source: U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Tax Analysis.



To reflect these differing views and build on the recent research, the Treasury Department prepared two sets of distributional analyses for replacement of business income taxes with a BAT (Table 2.3). In the first set of distributional analysis (columns 1 and 2), the traditional assumption employed by the Treasury Department - that the corporate income tax is borne entirely by owners of capital - is used. In the second set of distributional analysis (columns 3 and 4), the Treasury Department prepared tables that assume labor bears 70 percent of the corporate income tax. This analysis is consistent with one recent study,47 but perhaps more conservative than the recent trio of empirical papers discussed above. In both analyses, the BAT is distributed to the income sources - capital and labor.

Two conclusions can be drawn from Table 2.3. First, replacing business income taxes with a BAT tends to reduce the share of federal taxes paid by higher income taxpayers regardless of how much of the corporate income tax is borne by labor. Second, replacing business income taxes with a BAT is substantially less regressive when the current corporate income tax is assumed to be borne substantially by labor. The increase in the share of federal taxes paid by the bottom four quintiles (i.e., families with incomes up to $87,758) is only 3.0 percentage points rather than 5.0 percentage points when labor is assumed to bear 70 percent of the current corporate income tax.



Box 2.2: Distributional Effects of Taxing Consumption

It is sometimes suggested that a consumption tax is less fair than an income tax because the benefit of not taxing capital income accrues disproportionately to those with higher incomes. As has been noted, consumption taxes are generally less regressive from a lifetime perspective than an annual perspective. Consumption taxes may also be less regressive than often thought because a consumption tax and income tax base both include key elements of capital income. This point runs counter to conventional distributional analyses of consumption taxes, which broadly conclude that the major difference between a consumption and income tax is that the former imposes no tax on capital income.

Capital income can be decomposed into four components: (1) the return to waiting (i.e., the opportunity cost of capital), (2) the return to risk taking (i.e., the risk premium for investing), (3) economic profit (i.e., the infra-marginal return to investing), and (4) the difference between expected and actual returns. The key to analyzing the different distributional effects of a consumption tax base and an income tax base is that a consumption tax exempts the first component of capital income - the return to waiting or opportunity cost of capital - from tax, while it is included under an income tax. The three remaining components - sometimes referred to as the "supra-normal" return - are taxed under both a consumption and income tax.

To understand how a consumption tax subjects to tax some capital income, it is useful to consider exactly how the tax treats investment expenditures. Under a BAT, for example, a firm expenses its capital purchases. A successful investment generates a series of future cash flows to the firm. These future cash flows will be subject to tax, but the present value of the expected future series of tax liabilities using the opportunity cost of funds (e.g., the Treasury bill rate) will exactly equal the tax value of expensing the capital expenditure. What is important to recognize is that to the extent the future cash flows from the investment exceed (in present value) the initial investment, the excess (or supra-normal return) will be subject to tax under either an income or consumption tax.

The general public can be viewed as a proportional shareholder in all enterprises - a co-investor - under both an income tax or consumption tax. The public, in effect, shares in the rewards and risks to the extent returns are unusually high or low. Only the return to waiting or what economists call the opportunity cost of capital is exempt from tax under a consumption tax. Whether this distinction is important depends critically on how large the opportunity cost of capital is in relation to total capital income and who tends to receive this component of capital income.

How important the appropriate conceptual treatment of supra-normal returns is to the distribution of the tax burden under a BAT is largely an empirical question. Gentry and Hubbard (1997) found that replacing the current income tax with a consumption tax would be considerably less regressive than conventional analysis would indicate when the analysis recognized that the consumption tax would collect tax on supra-normal returns. In contrast, Cronin, Nunns, and Toder (1996) found that accounting for supranormal returns made little difference.



E. Border tax adjustments and international trade

VATs (of which a BAT is one type) are typically levied on a destination basis, in which goods are taxed according to where they are consumed. Alternatively, a VAT can be levied on an origin basis, in which goods are taxed according to where they are produced.

An origin-based BAT taxes exports but not imports, and a destination-based BAT taxes imports but not exports. Border tax adjustments, which refund the accumulated BAT on goods that are exported and impose BAT on imports as if they were produced domestically, are needed to remove the tax on exports and impose the tax on imports under a destination-based BAT. Applying a BAT on a destination-basis and implementing border tax adjustments ensures that businesses may only claim deductions that are offset by corresponding inclusions. Closing the system in this way helps prevent tax evasion through cross-border transactions structured to generate tax deductions for payments to foreign parties.

Border tax adjustments are commonly perceived as providing a trade advantage, although many argue that adjustments do not improve the balance of trade in the aggregate.48 Any apparent cost advantage would be offset by differences in the real price level across nations as reflected through changes in exchange rates or in other prices. These price adjustments work over time to negate any permanent improvement in competitiveness. There could, however, be effects on specific sectors or industries within the economy.

To illustrate the argument that border tax adjustments do not improve the balance of trade, consider a simple example.49 Assume that the United States imposes a 25-percent origin-based tax and that it exports 100 of X-goods at $10 each and imports from Europe 100 of M-goods at $10 each. Trade is balanced, exports and imports equal $1,000, and the exchange rate is €1 per dollar. U.S. producers charge $10 for each X-good and clear $8 after tax. European producers charge €10 for each M-good exported to the United States and clear €10.

Assume that the United States decides to border-adjust its tax system and imposes a 25-percent tax on imports and rebates the 25-percent tax previously imposed on exports. With the border adjustment, exports are tax free. As a result, U.S. producers need to charge only $8 for each X-good to receive $8, while European producers need to charge €12.5 to receive €10 for each M-good exported to the United States. If exchange rates did not change, the lower price for U.S. exports would increase the number of Xgoods purchased abroad and the higher price for M-goods would reduce imports purchased by Americans. However, this situation cannot persist indefinitely because the number of dollars demanded by Europeans would have increased (because Europeans will desire more X-goods) while the number of dollars supplied by Americans would have fallen (because Americans will desire less M-goods).

To restore balance in the foreign exchange market, the value of the dollar must rise by 25 percent to €1.25. At the new exchange rate, the number of dollars demanded and supplied return to balance. U.S. producers charge $8 for X-goods, which translates to €10 at the new exchange rate and exports of X-goods stay at their original level. European producers charge €12.5 for M-goods sold in the United States, which translates to $10 at the new exchange rate, and U.S. imports remain at their original level. Absent flexible exchange rates, the real price level across nations would still adjust to achieve the same result, although the adjustment process might well take longer. Through the adjustment process, trade would ultimately be unaffected by the border adjustments.50



F. Simplicity and enforceability

Like other taxes, a BAT would impose compliance costs on businesses that are required to calculate and pay it and administrative costs on the federal government to operate and enforce it. Some countries have encountered significant cases of evasion or fraud in the operation of their VATs, particularly with respect to VAT refunds.51

Several studies have estimated the federal government's administrative costs and businesses' compliance costs for a hypothetical VAT in the United States. Administrative and compliance costs of a VAT depend heavily on design features, such as whether there are multiple rates and the sales threshold for registration. The Treasury Department has previously estimated that the administrative costs of a credit-method VAT would be about $700 million per year when fully phased in, while other studies indicate that the administrative costs may be as high as $2.3 billion.52

The Congressional Budget Office estimated that the annual cost for businesses of complying with a VAT with a $25,000 small business exemption would have been from $4 billion to $7 billion in 1988.53 About 90 percent of the cost would have been incurred by businesses with sales under $1 million.54 These estimates suggest that a BAT may have a large potential compliance cost saving compared to the present business income taxes, which are estimated to be roughly $40 billion annually.55 However, as noted above, the extent to which business compliance costs would decrease depends upon the particular features of a BAT. In addition, some of the apparent cost saving from replacing business income taxes with a BAT may not occur if states retain their business income tax systems.56

Further, as noted above, with a BAT that retains the individual income tax system, the benefits of replacing business income taxes with a single rate broad-based BAT would be counteracted to some extent because businesses would continue to have to determine income in order to distinguish between dividends and capital gains (which would be taxable at the individual level) from returns of the investor's capital (which would not be taxable).



G. Implications for state and local governments

Another effect of eliminating the federal corporate income tax would be the effect on the ability of states to administer their current business income taxes. Many states with business income taxes generally conform to the federal tax system and rely heavily on federal definitions of income and deductions. In addition, states build upon the federal structure of definitions and regulations, information reporting, and tax withholding. Without that structure, it would be extremely difficult for states to maintain their existing business income tax systems, and if they did maintain them, the simplicity gains from eliminating the federal business income taxes could be eroded.

State and local governments also would be faced with the prospect of conforming their tax bases to the federal base, including both their retail sales taxes and state corporate income taxes. Deviations from the federal base would increase firms' compliance costs. If state and local governments primarily raise revenue by piggybacking on a federal BAT, tax rates could rise to a level that would make enforcement more difficult. On the other hand, to the extent state and local governments conform to a federal BAT, enforcement difficulties could be reduced.



H. VATs in other countries

Over 140 countries have VATs. Twenty-nine of the 30 OECD countries have VATs. The United States is the exception, although most states impose a retail sales tax.

There are major differences in the rates and structures of the VATs in OECD countries (Table 2.4). The average standard VAT rate for OECD countries is 17.6 percent, but ranges from 5 percent (Japan) to 25 percent (Denmark, Norway, and Sweden). Six of the 29 OECD countries have standard VAT rates under 15 percent (Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, and Switzerland). The remaining 23 countries have standard rates between 15 percent and 25 percent. Many countries also have reduced rates or zero rates. Reduced rates generally apply to basic essentials (e.g., medical and hospital care, food and water supplies), certain utilities (e.g., public transport, postal services, and public television), and certain socially desirable activities (e.g., charitable services, culture, and sports). Under zero rates (such as for exports), no tax is levied on the good or service and credit for VAT paid is allowed.

In addition to reduced or zero rates, countries also provide VAT exemptions (i.e., sales are not taxed but VAT paid on purchases from other businesses is not recovered). Most OECD countries exempt sectors that are viewed as important for social reasons, such as health, education, and charities. Most countries also exempt certain sectors for practical reasons. Financial and insurance services are generally exempt because of the practical difficulties in determining the tax base. In addition, those services may be subject to specific taxes. Other activities that are sometimes exempt include postal services, letting of immovable property, and the supply of land and buildings.

Approximately two-thirds of OECD countries offer exemptions for small businesses to reduce administrative and compliance costs. Businesses with sales below a specified threshold generally are not required to register for the VAT (Table 2.4). The threshold for exemption varies considerably, ranging from approximately $2,400 (Iceland) to $93,700 (United Kingdom). Ten countries have thresholds below $25,000 (Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Luxembourg, Norway, and Poland), and nine countries have thresholds of $25,000 or more (Australia, Czech Republic, France, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, Slovak Republic, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom). Ten OECD countries report no general exemption threshold (Belgium, Hungary, Italy, Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Turkey).
Table 2.4: VAT Rates and Structure in OECD Countries*



____________________________________________________________________________________
Country Standard Reduced Domestic Threshold
Rate Rate Zero Rate ** $ U.S.

____________________________________________________________________________________
Australia 10.0 - yes 36,496

Austria 20.0 10.0 and 12.0 no 24,229

Belgium 21.0 6 and 12.0 yes -

Canada 7.0 - yes 23,622

Czech Republic 19.0 5 no 68,439

Denmark 25.0 - yes 5,910

Finland 22.0 8.0 and 17.0 yes 9,081

France 19.6 2.0 and 5.5 no 85,061

Germany 16.0 7 no 18,637

Greece 19.0 4.5 and 9.0 no 12,912

Hungary 20.0 5 and 15 no -

Iceland 24.5 14 yes 2,442

Ireland 21.0 4.8 and 13.5 yes 50,495

Italy 20.0 4.0 and 10.0 yes -

Japan 5.0 - no 75,188

Korea 10.0 - yes -

3.0, 6.0 and
Luxembourg 15.0 12.0 no 10,163

Mexico 15.0 yes -

Netherlands 19.0 6 no -

New Zealand 12.5 - yes 26,846

Norway 25.0 8.0 and 13.0 yes 5,274

Poland 22.0 7 yes 10,580

Portugal 21.0 5.0 and 12.0 no -

Slovak Republic 19.0 no 87,209

Spain 16.0 4.0 and 7.0 no -

Sweden 25.0 6.0 and 12.0 yes -

Switzerland 7.6 2.4 and 3.6 yes 42,373

Turkey 18.0 1.0 and 8.0 no -

United Kingdom 17.5 5 yes 93,700

Unweighted Average 17.6

____________________________________________________________________________________
*The standard rate applies to 2006. Information on reduced rates, domestic zero
rates and thresholds applies to 2005.

** Domestic zero rate means tax is applied at a rate of zero to certain domestic
sales. It does not include zero rated exports.




Sources: OECD, Consumption Tax Trends, 2006, and the OECD Tax Database at
www.OECD.org




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Bradford, David F. 1986. Untangling the Income Tax. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Casperson, Eric and Gilbert Metcalf. 1994. "Is a Value Added Tax Regressive? Annual Versus Lifetime Incidence Measures." National Tax Journal 47(4): 731-746.

Congressional Budget Office. 1992. Effects of Adopting a Value-Added Tax. Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office.

Cronin, Julie-Anne, James Nunns and Eric Toder. 1996. "Distributional Effects of Recent Tax Reform Proposals." Unpublished manuscript.

Feenberg, Daniel, Andrew Mitrusi and James Poterba. 1997. "Distributional Effects of Adopting a National Retail Sales Tax." In Tax Policy and the Economy, ed. James Porterba, Vol. 11, 49-89. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

Felix, R. Alison. 2007. "Passing the Burden: Corporate Tax Incidence in Open Economies." Chapter 1, Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Michigan.

General Accounting Office. 1993. Value-Added Tax: Administrative Costs Vary With Complexity and Number of Businesses. GAO/GGD-93-78. Washington, DC: General Accounting Office.

Gentry, William M. and R. Glenn Hubbard. 1997. "Distributional Implications of Introducing a Broad-Based Consumption Tax." NBER Working Paper No. 5832, Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.

Gravelle, Jane G. and Kent A. Smetters. 2006. "Does the Open Economy Assumption Really Mean That Labor Bears the Burden of a Capital Income Tax?" B.E. Journals in Economic Analysis and Policy: Advances in Economic Analysis and Policy 6(1): 1-42.

Grubert, Harry and James Mackie. 2000. "Must Financial Services Be Taxed Under a Consumption Tax?" National Tax Journal 53(1): 23-40.

Hassett, Kevin A. and Aparna Mathur. 2006. "Taxes and Wages." American Enterprise Insitute for Public Policy Research, Working Paper Number 128, June.

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Internal Revenue Service. 1993. Administrative Issues in Implementing a Federal Value Added Tax. Washington, DC: Internal Revenue Service.

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Joint Committee on Taxation. 1991. Factors Affecting the International Competitiveness of the United States. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Judd, Kenneth L. 2001. "The Impact of Tax Reform in Modern Dynamic Economies." In Transition Costs of Fundamental Tax Reform, eds. Kevin A. Hassett and R. Glenn Hubbard, 5-53. Washington, DC: AEI Press.

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Chapter III: Business Tax Reform with Base Broadening/Reform of the U.S. International Tax Rules



A. Introduction

The existing U.S. system of taxing capital income creates a number of distortions that interfere with the efficient and productive functioning of the U.S. economy. These distortions include: a tax disincentive to save and invest generally, caused by taxing the return earned on investment; a tax disincentive to invest in the corporate business sector, caused by the double tax on corporate profits; a tax incentive for corporations to finance with debt rather than with equity, caused by tax provisions that allow firms to deduct interest but not dividends; a tax incentive to engage in certain economic activities rather than others, caused by special tax provisions that are only selectively available; and a tax disincentive to repatriating foreign earnings. These distortions waste economic resources and lower the standard of living produced by the U.S. economy.57

This chapter discusses approaches for reform of business income taxation that would broaden the tax base and either lower the business tax rate or provide a faster write-off of the cost of investment. It also discusses an approach for reforming the U.S. international tax system by moving to a territorial tax system.

One approach for reforming the business tax system is to eliminate the various special business tax provisions in exchange for either lower business tax rates or faster write-off of business investment. This revenue-neutral approach would replace the vast array of special tax provisions, which are sometimes highly targeted to encourage particular economic activity, with broad tax relief for all businesses.

Lowering the tax rate on business income (including both the corporate income tax rate and the tax rate imposed on non-corporate businesses) would help to reduce all five of the distortions enumerated above. A lower tax rate would reduce the tax on the return to saving and investing in the U.S. economy, thereby promoting U.S. saving and capital formation. Importantly, a lower rate would benefit both U.S. citizens and foreign companies doing business in the United States and would make the United States a more attractive place in which to invest. Lowering the corporate tax rate, by lowering the tax rate on profits, would help to reduce the tax penalty on corporate investment and the tax incentive for corporations to finance with debt rather than with equity. A lower tax rate also would reduce the benefit conveyed by many special tax provisions, thereby reducing the economic distortions caused by these special tax provisions. Finally, a lower tax rate would reduce the residual tax on repatriated foreign earnings.

Rather than being used to lower the tax rate, the revenue from base broadening could be used to allow partial expensing. Partial expensing, by lowering the effective tax burden on business income, would in several respects have effects that are qualitatively similar to a reduction in the tax rate. Like a tax rate reduction, partial expensing would stimulate U.S. capital formation and reduce the tax penalty on business investment. Indeed, as a policy to encourage investment, partial expensing has an advantage over tax rate reduction. The benefits of partial expensing are generally limited to new investment, whereas tax rate reduction provides a tax benefit to the return earned on new and old capital alike. Thus, partial expensing would encourage more investment per dollar of revenue spent than a tax rate reduction. Expensing also would benefit both U.S. and foreign investors alike, generally making the United States a more attractive place to locate businesses. To the extent that partial expensing is generally available for a wide variety of business investments, it would provide uniform treatment that would not encourage some types of investment over others for tax reasons. In contrast to rate reduction, however, partial expensing is unlikely to reduce the tax incentive for corporations to finance with debt rather than with equity, nor would it reduce the tax disincentive to repatriating foreign earnings.

Broadening the tax base means repealing a wide variety of special tax provisions. Such repeal would help to remove taxes from investment decisions, allowing market fundamentals to drive investors' choices. By rationalizing the tax system, base broadening would add to the benefits of rate reduction. In another sense, however, base broadening works against a reduction in the tax rate or partial expensing because repeal of special tax provisions means a higher tax burden on those investments, and hence on average for all investments in the economy. This effect makes it less likely that the combination of base broadening and, in particular, rate reduction would dramatically increase the amount of capital used in the U.S. economy. Nonetheless, in other ways the revised tax system would generally be more efficient because it would have reduced to some extent distorting tax differences across sectors, assets, and financing. In other words, the tax system would be more neutral or uniform in its treatment of income earned on alternative investments.

The size of the economic benefits achieved by revenue-neutral business tax reform is an empirical matter. Results depend on how much rate reduction or partial expensing can be achieved and on the effects of repealing specific special business tax provisions. The Treasury Department estimates that broadening the business tax base by eliminating a broad range of special tax provisions would allow the top federal business tax rate to be lowered to 28 percent or, in the alternative, would allow 35 percent of new business investment to be expensed (written off immediately), in either case without any change in total federal revenues.58

In the Treasury Department's economic model, the economic benefit from such a revenue neutral rate reduction appears to be relatively modest, while the economic benefit of partial expensing is somewhat larger. As discussed more completely below, negligible or small gains seem especially likely when base broadening is used to finance a lower business tax rate. This raises the question of whether such a revenue-neutral reform would allow deep enough reductions in business taxes to improve the competitiveness of U.S. businesses.

A larger tax rate reduction or greater partial expensing could potentially achieve larger economic benefits, stemming from a larger inflow of capital into the United States than the Treasury Department's economic model suggests. Such a reform could not be financed by raising other taxes on business through base broadening, and so would have to be financed in some other way (e.g., by raising non-business taxes, by borrowing, or by cutting government spending). The net benefits would ultimately depend on how business taxes were reduced (rate reduction or partial expensing) and on the details of how the tax relief was financed.59 If financed by increased borrowing, for example, a reduction in business taxes, whether lower business tax rates or partial expensing, would at least partially be offset by the rise in interest rates as the extra government borrowing crowds out private investment. Nevertheless, the key point is that large reductions in U.S. business taxes (e.g., a 20-percent corporate tax rate or 65-percent expensing) could potentially produce larger economic benefits than the Treasury Department model suggests as the United States moves from its current position as a high-tax rate country to a low-tax rate country.

The tax disincentive to repatriating foreign earnings, the fifth distortion enumerated above, could be addressed by moving to a "territorial" tax system. Under current law, U.S. corporations are taxed on their worldwide income and are provided a tax credit for income taxes paid to foreign governments. This foreign tax credit is generally limited to the amount of U.S. tax that would have been incurred if the income had been earned in the United States. The foreign earnings of a subsidiary of a U.S. corporation with an active business abroad (such as a manufacturing operation) are taxed by the United States only when those active earnings are repatriated as a dividend. Under the type of territorial system used by many U.S. trading partners, some or all active overseas earnings of their businesses are exempt from taxation in the home country.

The present U.S. system for taxing the foreign source income of U.S. multinational corporations has several undesirable effects.60 The present system distorts economic behavior. For example, corporations may forgo U.S. investment opportunities to avoid U.S. taxes. The current system also distorts the choice of where to exploit intangible assets, such as patents, and the choice of where to locate income and expenses for tax purposes. Finally, the current system is very complex, and corporations may incur planning costs to restrict their dividend repatriations from abroad.

A type of territorial system often referred to as a "dividend exemption" system would have several advantages as compared to present law. United States multinational corporations would no longer have an incentive to forgo U.S. investment opportunities to avoid U.S. tax on repatriated foreign earnings. Nor would they have to engage in elaborate tax planning to restrict such dividend repatriations.

Such a system would, however, alter the U.S. tax treatment of royalties and certain other income subject to low foreign taxes. Under present law, foreign tax credits attributable to highly taxed dividends often shield royalty and other income from U.S. tax. As a result, U.S. multinational corporations may have an incentive to exploit a patent overseas rather than in the United States because the royalties paid to the U.S. parent may be largely exempt from U.S. tax.

A dividend exemption system also would raise several other concerns. U.S. multinational corporations could have a stronger incentive to shift income and assets abroad because such shifting may result in exempt foreign income. A dividend exemption system also would create incentives for tax planning to reduce allocations of expenses to exempt foreign source income. Further, although a dividend exemption system would reduce some of the complexity related to the current foreign tax credit rules, other complex provisions would remain (such as the rules for pricing transactions between related parties).

Another concern sometimes expressed about a dividend exemption system is that it would encourage investment in low-tax countries because dividends from those investments would be tax exempt in the United States. However, a dividend exemption system that eliminates the U.S. tax on dividends, but has full taxation of royalties and disallows the deduction of expenses allocated to exempt income, is likely to increase the effective tax rate on income from low-tax countries. Furthermore, lowering the tax on domestic investment income, either through rate reduction or partial expensing, would favor domestic investment over foreign investment.

In addition to addressing tax distortions, business tax reform must address U.S. competitiveness. Business tax reform discussions have frequently focused on two aspects of competitiveness: (1) the ability of U.S. companies operating abroad to compete with foreign companies, and (2) the attractiveness of the United States as a place to invest relative to other nations. Depending on their features, some types of territorial tax systems might help level the playing field between U.S. companies and their foreign competitors. However, absent any other change to the U.S. business tax system, such systems have the potential risk of making certain investments abroad more attractive in a low tax rate country relative to investment in the United States, such as an investment without significant intangibles.61 Thus, coupling a move towards a territorial system with other changes, such as a lower business tax rate or faster write-off of business investment, could provide an approach to business tax reform that both levels the playing field for U.S. businesses operating abroad and, at the same time, makes the United States a more attractive place to invest. However, the reduction in U.S. business taxes required to maintain the appropriate balance between these two objectives might not be sufficiently large under a revenue-neutral business tax reform.



B. Broadening the business tax base and either lowering the business tax rate or permitting faster write-off of investment

The current business tax base includes an array of special tax provisions that reduce taxes for particular types of activities, industries, and businesses. These provisions take the form of myriad exclusions and deductions from income, preferential tax rates, income deferral, and tax credits. Most of these provisions were enacted years ago and have evolved over many decades. These special provisions generally are intended to promote activities that are claimed to have spillover effects that benefit the economy. A prominent example is the research and experimentation (R&E) tax credit. Arguably, by raising an inventor's return, it helps to correct for the inability of the inventor to reap the full rewards of his invention because of the failure of patent and other legal protections to forestall completely others from using the new idea, product, or process.

Nonetheless, to the extent special tax provisions are not well targeted, are ill defined, or simply are not effective, they may have no economic effect. Worse yet, if the subsidies are effective, and if the activities do not produce the desired spillover benefits, then these provisions lead to a misallocation of investment that reduces the productivity of the nation's stock of capital because the special provisions encourage investment decisions based on taxes, rather than on economic fundamentals.

In summary, special provisions narrow the business tax base and require that business tax rates be higher to raise the same tax revenue. As shown in Table 3.1,62 these special business tax provisions, if repealed, would result in an additional $1.3 trillion in revenue over 10 years.63 As indicated above, repeal of all of these provisions would allow the top business tax rate (for both corporate and non-corporate businesses) to be lowered to 28 percent or, in the alternative, would allow 35 percent of new business investment, including equipment, structures, and inventories, to be written off immediately.
Table 3.1: Special Tax Provisions Subtantially Narrow the Business Tax Base



__________________________________________________________________________________
Revenue, 2008-2017 (FY)


____________________________________
Corporate Non-Corporate Total

__________________________________________________________________________________
$ billions

Major Special Business Tax Provisions

Deduction for U.S.
production/manufacturing activities 210 48 258

Research and experimentation (R&E) tax
credit 132 1 133

Low income housing tax credit 55 6 61

Exclusion of interest on life insurance
savings 30 0 30

Inventory property sales source rules 29 0 29

Deductibility of charitable contributions 28 0 28

Special ESOP rules 23 4 27

Exemption of credit union income 19 0 19

New technology credit 8 1 9

Special Blue Cross/Blue Shield deduction 8 0 8

Excess of percentage over cost depletion,
fuels 7 0 7

Other business preferences* 27 28 55




Total 576 88 664




Accelerated depreciation/expensing provisions 356 306 662

Total Revenue from Business Preferences 932 394 1,326

__________________________________________________________________________________
*None on the special business tax provisions in this category exceed $5 billion
over the 10 year budget window.

Source: U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Tax Analysis.



Although they distort certain investment decisions, a number of the provisions listed in Table 3.1 are likely to reduce the tax burden on new investments. These include the deduction for U.S. production/manufacturing, the R&E credit, and accelerated depreciation/expensing.64 Together, these three provisions account for about 80 percent of the revenue gain from business base broadening. Accelerated depreciation alone accounts for about 50 percent of the revenue gain. As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, repealing these provisions reduces the incentive to undertake new investments. This reduced incentive to invest can hurt labor productivity, which is central to higher living standards for workers in the long run.

Thus, in evaluating the base broadening illustrated by Table 3.1, it is important to recognize that the repeal of several provisions would discourage investment and have a detrimental effect on economic growth. Indeed, the Treasury Department estimates that the combined policy of base broadening and lowering the business tax rate to 28 percent might well have little or no effect on the level of real output in the long run because the economic gain from the lower corporate tax rate may well be largely offset by the economic cost of eliminating accelerated depreciation.

If instead the accelerated depreciation provisions were retained, the revenue gained from base broadening would fall to roughly $650 billion over 10 years, and would allow the federal business tax rate to be lowered only to 31 percent. While the reduction in the business tax rate would be more limited, the Treasury Department estimates that this approach would contribute somewhat more substantially to the growth of the economy with the level of real output in the long run rising by about 0.5 percent.

These estimates, however, do not completely account for the economic benefits of rate reduction. The economic benefits are measured as the change in national output in a model65 that accounts for the changes in the incentives to save and invest in the United States in general and also changes in incentives to invest in the corporate sector or, instead, in a non-corporate sector that includes businesses and owner-occupied housing. However, these estimates do not account for the economic benefits that would result from lowering the distortion between debt and equity financing that comes from a lower business tax rate or from smaller inter-asset distortions (e.g., between equipment and structures) that would result from base broadening or a lower business tax rate. In addition, these estimates assume that the base-broadening measures, other than repealing accelerated depreciation, do not affect marginal investment decisions.

While the Treasury Department's model allows for taxes to influence capital flows into and out of the United States, the assumed effect is relatively modest. To some extent, the reduction in business tax rates under the revenue-neutral approaches discussed here is not large. For example, lowering the business tax rate to 31 percent in 2008 would mean that instead of having the second highest statutory corporate tax rate among the 30 OECD countries, the United States would have the third highest tax rate, while with a 28-percent U.S. statutory corporate tax rate, the United States would have the fifth highest tax rate. The estimated effects for larger changes (e.g., a 20-percent corporate tax rate) may well be considerably more substantial than would be suggested by the Treasury Department model and may be necessary to make the United States more competitive.66

Instead of lowering the tax rate, the revenue from base broadening could be used to allow partial expensing of tangible capital beyond the limited accelerated depreciation and expensing currently permitted.67 The Treasury Department estimates that base broadening (including repeal of accelerated depreciation) would raise sufficient revenue ($1.3 trillion over 10 years) to allow partial expensing of 35 percent of business investment.68 Partial expensing is likely to do more than lowering the business tax rate to increase real output because partial expensing targets the tax benefits to new investment, while a reduction in the tax rate benefits the return from new investment and existing assets alike. Accordingly, the Treasury Department estimates that 35-percent expensing with no reduction of the business tax rate would increase real output in the long run by about 1.5 percent, well above the 0.5 percent increase that is estimated for a revenueneutral reduction in the business tax rate to 31 percent with the retention of accelerated depreciation.

An important advantage of lowering the business tax rate, relative to expensing, is that a lower rate would reduce the type of tax planning that takes advantage of differences in tax rates among countries. For example, a corporation in a high-tax country may attempt to shift income to an affiliate in a low-tax country. This type of tax planning is economically wasteful. The business incurs a direct cost in hiring expertise to structure such transactions and to avoid or resolve controversies with tax authorities. In addition, and perhaps more importantly, the business may alter its behavior in an inefficient way by structuring its operations and finances to shift income. Also, to the extent that an investment potentially located in the United States is expected to earn supra-normal returns when a foreign company is deciding whether to locate in the United States, then a lower tax rate can be a more effective inducement to locate in the United States than partial expensing.



Lowering the business tax rate on the non-corporate sector

As described above, base broadening and lowering the business tax rate would reduce the tax rate applied to business income in all sectors, not just the corporate sector. The non-corporate sector, consisting of flow-through businesses such as partnerships, S corporations, and sole proprietors, where owners pay tax on business profits, plays an important role in the U.S. economy. This sector is a critical source of innovation and risk-taking. Moreover, roughly 30 percent of all business taxes are paid by flow-through businesses through the individual income tax.69

Under the approach of base broadening coupled with a lower business tax rate, the lower tax rate would be applied to flow-through businesses by creating a special reduced business tax rate as part of the individual income tax. This reduced rate would equal the corporate rate of 28 percent or 31 percent depending on whether accelerated depreciation is retained.70

Keeping the corporate and non-corporate tax rates equal mirrors current law, where the top tax rates in the corporate and individual income taxes are 35 percent. Equality of the top rates helps to prevent certain types of tax avoidance. Nevertheless, equality of the top rates does not ensure that corporate and non-corporate business incomes are taxed at the same overall rate. Corporate income would still remain subject to a double tax on equity-financed investments because income earned in the corporate sector would first be taxed under the corporate income tax and then be taxed again when distributed to shareholders as dividends or realized as capital gains. If tax rates for individuals are higher than for businesses, individual taxpayers in the top individual income tax brackets would have an incentive to receive their earnings as profits from flow-through businesses, rather than as wages from corporations, in order to face the top rate on business income of 28 percent or 31 percent instead of the top individual rate of 35 percent.



Transition issues

One concern with the transition from the present system of business taxation to a new tax system that has a broad base and lower business tax rates is the potential onetime windfall loss that might be imposed on the owners of existing capital assets. For example, the reform approaches discussed in this chapter would disallow in whole or in part unused business tax credits carried over from the years prior to the enactment of the reform. The loss of these prepaid tax assets would reduce the value of the firms with such assets.71 Although the reform approach would continue to allow deductions for carryforwards of pre-enactment net operating losses, those deductions would be worth less if business tax rates were reduced.72

Other factors would mitigate the fall in the value of existing assets and businesses if base broadening were used to fund a reduction in the tax rate. Repealing business tax credits and repealing accelerated depreciation on new investment would raise the value of existing assets. Under current law, old capital has a lower value than the equivalent amount of new capital because existing assets already have received their tax credits and deductions, and are thus worth less than new assets that are entitled to new credits and accelerated deductions. Repealing accelerated depreciation and credits would eliminate the relative advantage enjoyed by new over old assets and thereby raise the value of existing (old) assets.

Reducing the business income tax rate would raise asset values by reducing deferred tax liabilities, such as those resulting from accelerated depreciation and the deferral of taxes on unrealized capital gains. A reduction in the business tax rate also would reduce deferred tax liabilities generated by unrepatriated foreign source income. The lower tax rate could increase the value of firms that earn substantial income from pure profits or economic returns. In addition, lowering the business tax rate would raise (at least temporarily) the after-tax return earned on existing investments, thereby offering a benefit that offsets any decline in asset values.

Base broadening could instead be used to provide partial expensing for the purchase of new business investments rather than to lower the tax rate. Replacing the existing capital cost recovery system with partial expensing raises some additional valuation effects.

For many assets, reforming the existing cost recovery system in favor of a system that combines 35-percent partial expensing with economic depreciation would lead to a reduction in the marginal effective tax rate. This reduction would occur because the combination of 35-percent expensing and economic depreciation would allow more accelerated tax deductions than those generally offered by the existing tax depreciation system. More accelerated depreciation allowances, while lowering the marginal effective tax rate, also would lower the value of existing assets because existing capital would not benefit from the accelerated depreciation deductions and would compete with new assets that do benefit (i.e., whose after-tax price is lowered by the accelerated deduction). In many cases, however, the fall in asset values would be modest because depreciation allowances on new investments would be only modestly accelerated and because the reform approach described here would permit business to continue to depreciate existing assets, essentially providing substantial transition relief.73

Thus, the approaches for reform discussed in this chapter have effects that both increase and decrease firm values. The net effect on the value of any particular firm would vary, depending upon the specific tax characteristics of the firm as well as on the specifics of the approach. Nevertheless, if additional transition relief is provided with a view toward avoiding large reductions in asset values, that relief would increase the cost of the approach, which would reduce the benefits if pursued on a revenue-neutral basis.



Distributional effects

As with the distributional analysis of the BAT discussed in Chapter II, two sets of distributional analyses were produced for the approach outlined above. In the first set, the traditional assumption employed by the Treasury Department - that the corporate income tax is borne by owners of capital - is used. In the second set, the Treasury Department prepared tables assuming that labor bears 70 percent of the corporate income tax. These distribution tables are intended to reflect the differing views on the incidence of the corporate income tax and to build on the increasingly common view that a substantial portion of the corporate income tax is borne by labor.

The analysis indicates, however, that the underlying burden assumptions make little difference in judging the distributional effects of these approaches. The basic conclusion drawn from Table 3.2 is that neither of these approaches for reform - either business tax rate reduction nor partial expensing coupled with base broadening - materially affects the distribution of the tax burden. This in part reflects the small size of the tax changes contemplated under these policies, relative to the total tax collected by the U.S. government. In addition, over the budget period, these approaches are revenue neutral on capital income and thus simultaneously raise some taxes and lower others. To the extent that all taxes on capital income are similarly distributed across income classes, it is no surprise that these policy changes would have little effect on the distribution of the tax burden.

The two alternative assumptions of the incidence of the corporate income tax do suggest that the federal tax system would be somewhat less progressive if the corporate income tax is borne primarily by labor. The top 20 percent of families ranked by income would pay 69.6 percent of total federal taxes rather than 71.5 percent if the corporate income tax is assumed to be borne primarily by labor.
Table 3.2: Distribution of the Federal Tax Burden Under Two Assumptions of the Incidence of the Corporate Income Tax



_________________________________________________________________________________
Corporate Income Tax Borne Labor Bears 70% of the
by Owners Corporate Income
of Capital Tax


__________________________________________________________
Income Base Broadening Base Broadening
Percentile


________________ ________________
Top 28% Top 28%

Administration'sBusiness Administration'sBusiness

Policy Tax 35% Policy Tax 35%
Baseline* Rate Expensing Baseline* Rate Expensing

_________________________________________________________________________________



Percent of Federal Taxes Paid




First Quintile 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4

Second Quintile 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.5 2.5 2.6

Third Quintile 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.7 8.7 8.8

Fourth Quintile 17.9 17.9 17.9 18.7 18.7 18.8

Fifth Quintile 71.5 71.4 71.6 69.6 69.4 69.4




Bottom 50% 5.5 5.6 5.5 6.3 6.4 6.4

Top 10% 54.9 54.8 55.1 52.2 52.1 52.0

Top 5% 42.0 41.9 42.2 38.9 38.8 38.6

Top 1% 23.4 23.3 23.7 20.5 20.5 20.3

_________________________________________________________________________________
Note: Estimates of 2015 law at 2007 cash income levels. Quintiles begin at cash
income of: Second $13,310; Third $28,507; Fourth $50,448; Highest $87,758; Top
10% $128,676; Top 5% $177,816; Top 1% $432,275; Bottom 50% below $38,255.

*The Administration's policy baseline is similar to current law but assumes
permanent extension of the 2001 and 2003 tax relief.

Source: U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Tax Analysis.





C. Territorial tax systems

The increased globalization of U.S. businesses and the decline in corporate tax rates abroad have focused attention on the U.S. corporate tax in an international context. Under current U.S. law, U.S. corporations are taxed on their worldwide income, with a limited tax credit for income taxes paid to foreign governments (see Box 3.1 for a more detailed discussion of the U.S. system for taxing international income). However, many U.S. trading partners currently use a "territorial" system, which exempts some or all of the overseas earnings of their businesses from taxation in the home country.

The U.S. system was developed at a time when the United States was the primary source of capital investment and dominated world markets. The global landscape has shifted considerably over the past several decades, with other countries challenging the U.S. position of economic preeminence. The United States is now a net recipient of foreign investment rather than the largest source.

This section considers the possibility of moving to a more territorial system under which active income that is derived from economic activity outside the United States would not be subject to U.S. corporate income tax. Similar to the practice of two-thirds of OECD countries, a company's active foreign income earned abroad would be excluded from the U.S. tax base, thus placing U.S. businesses operating abroad on a more even playing field relative to their foreign competitors.

Underlying this approach is the notion that U.S. multinational corporations provide important benefits to the U.S. economy by creating jobs and higher real wages for workers in the United States. Workers employed by firms that export earn 15 percent more than the average worker in the U.S. economy.74 Moreover, when a company expands overseas, jobs are created in the United States to support and manage the company's foreign operations. Between 1991 and 2001, U.S. multinational enterprises increased employment in their domestic parents by 5.5 million, nearly twice as much as they increased employment in their foreign affiliates.75 Moreover, the current U.S. tax system provides a tax disincentive to the repatriation of foreign earnings, which may cause U.S. multinational corporations to forgo U.S. investment.



Box 3.1: The U.S. System for Taxing International Income

Under current law, corporations formed in the United States are subject to tax on their worldwide income, meaning that they are subject to immediate U.S. tax on all of their direct earnings, whether earned in the United States or abroad. However, U.S. corporations with foreign subsidiaries generally are not taxed on the foreign subsidiaries' active business income (such as from manufacturing operations) until the income is repatriated. That is, until that active business income is returned to the United States, typically through a dividend to the parent corporation, U.S. tax is deferred. Not all foreign subsidiary income is subject to deferral, however. For example, U.S. tax is not deferred on passive or easily moveable income of foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations, under the so-called "subpart F" anti-deferral rules.

To prevent double taxation of income by both a foreign country and the United States, a U.S. corporation is allowed a foreign tax credit for foreign taxes paid by it and by its foreign subsidiaries on earnings the foreign subsidiaries repatriate. The foreign tax credit is claimed by a taxpayer on its U.S. tax return, and reduces U.S. tax liability on foreign source income.

The foreign tax credit rules are complicated and include several significant limitations. In particular, the foreign tax credit is applied separately to different categories of income (generally distinguishing between "active" and "passive" income). The total amount of foreign taxes within each category that can be credited against U.S. income tax cannot exceed the amount of U.S. income tax that is due on that category of net foreign income after deductions. In calculating the foreign tax credit limitation, the U.S. parent's expenses (such as interest) are allocated to each category of income to determine the net foreign income on which the credit can be claimed. The allocation of expenses to foreign income can increase U.S. tax by reducing the amount of foreign tax that can be credited that year.

This foreign tax credit limitation, however, does allow active income subject to high foreign taxes (usually active earnings of foreign subsidiaries distributed to U.S. parent corporations as dividends) to be mixed with active income subject to low foreign taxes (usually royalties or interest). Thus, if earnings repatriated by a foreign subsidiary have been taxed by the foreign country in excess of the U.S. rate, the resulting "excess" foreign tax (i.e., the amount of foreign tax on the earnings that exceeds the U.S. tax that would be owed on the dividend) may be used to offset U.S. tax on other, lower-taxed foreign source income in the appropriate category. This method of using foreign tax credits arising from high-taxed foreign source income to offset U.S. tax on low-taxed foreign source income is known as "cross crediting."



Worldwide tax systems

Although often described as a "worldwide" tax system, the U.S. system for taxing foreign source corporate income is more accurately described as a hybrid between a "pure" worldwide system for taxing foreign source income and a so-called "territorial" system. Under a pure worldwide system, all foreign earnings would be subject to tax by the home country as they are earned, even if earned by a foreign subsidiary. To prevent double taxation, a foreign tax credit could be allowed for all income taxes paid to foreign governments. Under a "pure" territorial system, on the other hand, only income earned at home would be subject to home-country tax.

Efficiency, competitiveness, considerations of fairness and administrability, and revenue concerns all influence international tax policy making and are sometimes in conflict. As a result, no country has a pure worldwide or pure territorial system. Various standards have been proposed to guide the formulation of international tax policy, as discussed in Box 3.2. None of the proposed standards, however, fits all cases and the tax system cannot feasibly be calibrated to have different rules for every conceivable case.

Accordingly, countries with predominantly worldwide systems do not subject all foreign source income earned by foreign subsidiaries of multinational corporations to immediate home-country taxation, largely so that home-based companies are not at a disadvantage in investing in countries with lower tax rates. Moreover, such countries do not provide an unlimited foreign tax credit, because doing so could reduce, or even eliminate, taxes on domestic source income.



Box 3.2: Alternative Criteria for Evaluating the Worldwide Allocation of Capital 76

Several standards have been proposed as guides to international tax policy, such as capital export neutrality, capital import neutrality, and capital ownership neutrality. Under the principle of capital export neutrality, foreign income should be taxed at the home-country tax rate so as not to distort a corporation's choice between investing at home or abroad.77 Under the principle of capital import neutrality, foreign income should be taxed only at the local rate so that U.S. corporations can compete with their foreign rivals.78 Under the principle of capital ownership neutrality, the tax system should not distort ownership patterns.79 Each of these criteria focuses on only a portion of the decision margins facing corporations making cross-border investments. For example, each criterion focuses on investment in tangible capital without considering the critical role of the location of intangible capital.

Capital export neutrality and capital import neutrality make assumptions for which there is very little empirical evidence. One assumption relates to the supply of capital available to U.S. multinational corporations. For example, capital export neutrality assumes that all investment by U.S. corporations comes from domestic saving - more specifically from a fixed pool of capital available to the U.S. corporate sector. Capital import neutrality and capital ownership neutrality assume that capital is supplied at a fixed rate by the integrated world capital market. All of these standards ignore the presence of intangible assets and how they affect the relationship between investments in different locations, or how opportunities for income shifting under alternative tax systems alter effective tax rates in different locations.

Therefore, even if the assumption that an integrated worldwide capital market offers financing to corporations on the same terms regardless of where they are based is accepted, that alone is not a sufficient basis for choosing the optimal policy. Consider a potential investment in a low-tax location. The question is - with what other investments in that or other locations does it compete? Various situations are possible. One example might be a locational intangible, like a fast-food trademark that requires that the corporation produce locally in order to supply its customers. In that case, all competitors compete in the same location and should bear the same (presumably local) tax burden. Another example is a mobile intangible, like the design of a computer chip that can be produced in various locations for the worldwide market. In that case, the competitors for the potential low-tax investment may be in high-tax locations including the United States. Capital import neutrality and capital ownership neutrality implicitly assume the first case, such as where capital ownership fits the case of various bidders for an existing asset with a given product and a circumscribed local market that will not be altered by the transaction. By contrast, capital export neutrality leans toward the second case, where all affiliate production substitutes for domestic U.S. production. None of the proposed standards fits all cases and tax policy cannot feasibly be calibrated to have different rules for different cases.

Although a predominantly worldwide approach to the taxation of cross-border income was once more prevalent, it is now used by fewer than half of the OECD countries. Instead, many of these countries now use predominantly territorial tax systems that exempt all or a portion of foreign earnings of foreign subsidiaries from home-country taxation. However, to prevent tax avoidance and to maintain government revenues, countries with predominantly territorial systems typically do not exempt certain foreign earnings of foreign subsidiaries, including earnings generated from holding mobile financial assets, or certain payments that are deductible in the jurisdiction from which the payment is made, such as foreign source royalty payments. In both predominantly worldwide and predominantly territorial systems, the rules that determine which types of foreign income are taxed, when the income is taxed, and what foreign tax credits are available to reduce that tax, are complex and can be the source of a great deal of tax planning.

Under the current U.S. system, taxpayers may be able to set up their operations either to avoid the deemed repatriation of foreign profits under anti-deferral rules, or to minimize, through the use of the foreign tax credits, U.S. tax on foreign profits actually repatriated to the United States. These approaches effectively can allow a corporation to engage in "self-help territoriality." For example, creditable foreign taxes associated with dividends paid from high-taxed foreign profits may shield foreign source royalties from U.S. tax, while low-taxed foreign profits may be left abroad, thereby deferring U.S. taxation on those low-taxed profits indefinitely. Depending on the type of predominantly territorial system chosen, current U.S. law may be more favorable to many U.S. corporate taxpayers than a predominantly territorial system.

In part because of self-help territoriality, the current U.S. system for taxing crossborder corporate income raises little revenue from the taxation of dividends. U.S. tax on all corporate foreign income was about $18.4 billion in 2004, the most recent year for which data are available. Importantly, a relatively small part of that revenue, at most 20 percent, was derived from dividends paid by foreign subsidiaries to their U.S. parents. Foreign source royalties, as well as foreign source interest and income from foreign subsidiaries not eligible for deferral under the current system, represent a much more substantial source of tax revenue than dividends.

In addition to raising little revenue, the present system also leads to distortions in economic behavior. For example, to avoid the residual U.S. tax on repatriated earnings, U.S. corporations may choose not to repatriate foreign earnings and thereby forgo U.S. investment opportunities. In addition, U.S. corporations engage in complex planning and incur significant planning costs to reduce the residual tax on repatriations.80



Territorial tax systems

More than half of OECD countries use a type of territorial system that exempts dividends from abroad from home-country tax. These systems, generally referred to as "dividend exemption" systems, have been proposed previously in the United States and could reduce some of the economic distortions imposed by the current U.S. tax system.

Although the details of a dividend exemption system can vary greatly, a "basic" dividend exemption system, discussed in greater detail in the next section, is likely to increase U.S. corporate income tax revenues. At the present 35-percent statutory corporate tax rate, the Treasury Department estimates that the revenue increase would be substantial, roughly $40 billion over a 10-year period. This revenue gain arises primarily from the elimination of foreign tax credits that, in effect, shield a considerable portion of low-taxed non-dividend foreign source income, such as certain royalties, from U.S. tax.81 In other words, because the basic dividend exemption system does not exempt many types of foreign source income and because the foreign tax credit otherwise arising from exempt dividends would be eliminated, low-taxed, non-exempt foreign income would be subject to U.S. tax with a much smaller available foreign tax credit, which would result in a large tax increase. In addition, the allocation of expenses to exempt foreign source income increases U.S. tax because such expenses are effectively disallowed.

One way to address the expected tax increase that would result from adopting a basic dividend exemption system would be to extend the exemption beyond foreign subsidiary dividends to include certain foreign source royalties. However, either a full or partial exemption for royalties might be viewed as providing a U.S. tax exemption for income that may have arisen from U.S. activities, such as U.S. research and development. Moreover, exempting royalties might lead to a double benefit with respect to this income, as the United States would be providing an exemption for payments that in most foreign jurisdictions would give rise to a deduction. On the other hand, moving to a dividend exemption system without providing some relief for royalties could exacerbate current issues with respect to the migration of a corporation's intangible assets and could also lead to the transfer of research and development activities outside the United States.

In any case, a dividend exemption system would reduce some of the complexity related to the current foreign tax credit regime, primarily because dividends would no longer give rise to foreign tax credits. Other complex provisions would need to remain, including those related to non-exempt income, such as foreign source royalties (assuming foreign source royalties remain subject to U.S. tax) and interest, as well as income inclusions resulting under the subpart F rules. Moreover, rules regarding the pricing of transactions between U.S. corporations and their foreign affiliates (the so-called "transfer pricing" rules) would come under increased pressure, as the move to a basic territorial system would increase the incentive to shift income and assets to low-taxed offshore jurisdictions. However, extending the exemption system to include additional forms of business income, such as royalties, could relieve some of that pressure and in addition allow for further simplification.



Types of territorial approaches:



Basic dividend exemption system

As noted above, more than half of the members of the OECD employ a dividend exemption system. Many U.S. territorial tax proposals to date, including those of the Joint Committee on Taxation and the President's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform, are of a dividend exemption variety. Unlike many foreign dividend exemption systems, however, U.S. territorial proposals to date have generally required the allocation to (and therefore the disallowance of) a significant amount of expenses to exempt foreign income. A system along the lines of these prior U.S. proposals is referred to here as a "basic" dividend exemption system. Several of the major features of a basic dividend exemption system are discussed below.

Treatment of active business income. Under a basic dividend exemption system, dividends paid by foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations would not be subject to U.S. tax, nor would foreign active business income earned directly by foreign branches of U.S. corporations. Gains from the sale of assets that generate exempt income, and gains from sales of foreign corporation shares generating exempt dividends, would also not be subject to tax while losses from the sale of such assets or stock would likewise be disallowed. Non-dividend payments from foreign subsidiaries to U.S. corporations, such as royalties and interest, would remain subject to U.S. tax. Businesses would not receive foreign tax credits for foreign taxes paid (including both subsidiary-level taxes and dividend withholding taxes) that are attributable to earnings repatriated as dividends (or attributable to foreign active business income earned through foreign branches) because this income would not be subject to tax in the United States. Under this system, foreign tax credits would continue to be available with respect to foreign taxes paid on nonexempt foreign income, such as royalties and interest.

Treatment of mobile income. Under a basic dividend exemption system, passive and easily moveable income - such as subpart F income under the current U.S. tax system (mobile income) - would continue to be subject to U.S. tax, either when earned directly or when earned by foreign subsidiaries (even if not repatriated). Mobile income could include interest, dividends, rents, and royalties arising from passive assets. Under this approach, a foreign tax credit would be available to offset foreign tax paid on mobile income.

Expense allocation. Because dividends paid by the foreign subsidiary would not be subject to U.S. tax when received by the U.S. corporate parent under a basic dividend exemption system, business expenses incurred by the U.S. parent attributable to those dividends would be disallowed, either in whole or in part, as a deduction against U.S. taxable income. In addition, expenses attributable to exempt foreign active business income earned directly by a foreign branch of a U.S. corporation would be disallowed. In particular, interest expense incurred by a U.S. corporation to earn exempt foreign earnings would be allocated to those earnings and would be nondeductible, as would an appropriate portion of general and administrative expenses. Because royalties would continue to be subject to U.S. tax, research and experimentation expenses could continue to be fully deductible. To achieve the proper allocation of expenses to taxable income, detailed expense allocation rules, similar to the current expense allocation rules, would be necessary and would inevitably introduce complexity to the system.

If expenses associated with foreign exempt income were disallowed as deductions, a dividend exemption system would create additional incentives for tax planning by multinational corporations to reduce the amount of expenses allocable to foreign income. Again, these pressures also exist under current law because expense allocations to foreign source income can restrict use of foreign tax credits. However, expense allocations would have much broader effects under a dividend exemption system because such expense allocations could directly reduce the deductions that could be taken by taxpayers, not solely restrict the use of foreign tax credits

Instead of disallowing deductions for expenses allocable to exempt foreign source income, some countries, such as France and Italy, exempt less than 100 percent of foreign subsidiary dividends and directly earned foreign active business income. The benefit of adopting this modification to a basic dividend exemption system is that it allows for the elimination of some relatively complex rules associated with expense allocation.

Transfer pricing. A basic dividend exemption system would also create additional incentives for multinational corporations to use transfer pricing to minimize taxable income generated by domestic operations and maximize income generated by active foreign business operations. These pressures also exist under current law, and a large body of rules has evolved to enforce "arm's length" transfer pricing among related parties. However, the pressures are more pronounced in a basic dividend exemption system because shifting income and assets overseas may result in exempt foreign source income, rather than produce income that is eligible merely for deferral of tax, as under the current U.S. system. To the extent that transfer pricing enforcement cannot withstand the increased pressures, significant abuse concerns might arise.

Revenue consequences of basic dividend exemption system. As noted above, adoption of a basic dividend exemption system by the United States would likely increase corporate income tax revenues. The Treasury Department estimates the 10-year revenue gain associated with a basic dividend exemption system such as outlined above (with no other changes to the U.S. international tax rules) to be approximately $40 billion at the present 35-percent statutory corporate tax rate. If the corporate tax rate were 28 percent, the 10-year estimate of the revenue gain would increase to $50 billion.82

The increase in corporate income tax revenues from adoption of a basic dividend exemption system is a result of two factors. First, the relatively small revenue loss from eliminating the U.S. tax on dividends is more than offset by the full taxation of royalties and other foreign source income still subject to tax. Approximately two-thirds of foreign source royalty payments are essentially exempt from U.S. tax because of cross-crediting with high-taxed dividends. Under a dividend exemption system, royalties would no longer be shielded from U.S. tax by such cross-crediting. Second, the allocation of expenses to exempt foreign source income increases U.S. tax because that allocation has greater negative consequences under a dividend exemption system (deduction disallowance) than under current law (decreased ability to use foreign tax credits).

Indeed, under a basic dividend exemption system, because of the continued full taxation of royalties and the disallowance of deductions for expenses attributable to exempt foreign income, the effective tax rate on investment in a low-tax location would increase, not decrease. Grubert and Mutti (2001) estimate that the effective tax rate for a typical investment in a low-tax affiliate would increase from about 5 percent under current law to about 9 percent under a basic dividend exemption.83 For an investment in intangible assets, the effective tax rate would increase from about 26 percent to 35 percent. These estimates do not take income shifting into account and, thus, may overestimate the actual burdens corporations may face in low-tax countries.



Alternative territorial approaches

A basic dividend exemption system might reduce economic distortions by addressing the problem of forgone domestic investment opportunities and eliminating certain tax avoidance costs. However, as discussed above, it would increase the overall tax burden on foreign source income of U.S. corporations primarily because of the greater tax on royalty income, which, in many cases, is currently shielded from U.S. tax through cross-crediting, would incur greater U.S. tax, and because the allocation of parent expenses to exempt foreign source income would result in disallowance of certain deductions. This higher level of tax may well affect a variety of business decisions including the location of investment.

The higher tax burden could be addressed by exempting other foreign source income in addition to dividends and active foreign source income earned through foreign branches, or by relaxing the current expense allocation rules. Such a system would potentially allow for additional simplification but, depending on the details of the system, could pose abuse and revenue-loss problems, including the loss of tax revenue generated from what is currently U.S. source income. For example, an approach that also exempts 50 percent of royalties and requires no disallowance of interest and general and administrative expenses would cost $75 billion over a 10-year period.

Alternative territorial approaches include:

Narrower definition of mobile income. Dividend exemption approaches generally assume that mobile income (which would be subject to immediate U.S. tax when earned either by foreign subsidiaries or directly by U.S. corporations) includes more than passive income earned by non-financial institutions. While the details vary, as a general matter, dividend exemption proposals tend to tax currently certain types of foreign active business income deemed to be easily moveable. Expanding the categories of exempt income could allow for simplification and would reduce the revenue gains associated with dividend exemption.

Extension of the exemption to certain foreign source royalties and interest. An alternative territorial approach could exempt, in whole or in part, royalties and interest received by U.S. corporations in the active conduct of a trade or business. Another alternative would be to treat income received by U.S. corporations from foreign subsidiaries in the form of royalties and interest as exempt income on a look-through basis. In other words, if such income were allocable to the active business income of the payor, it would be eligible for exemption.

As discussed above, exempting royalties could be controversial, as some may view it as providing a U.S. tax exemption for income that may have arisen from U.S. activities, such as U.S. research and development. On the other hand, moving to a dividend exemption system without providing some relief for royalties could exacerbate current issues with respect to intangible migration, and lead to the transfer of research and development activities outside the United States.

Reduce expense disallowance. Another alternative territorial system would limit exempt income to foreign source dividends and foreign active business income of foreign branches of U.S. corporations, but relax the rules disallowing a U.S. parent corporation's interest and general and administrative expenses attributable to exempt foreign income. This alternative would disallow only a fixed percentage of appropriately attributable expenses, thereby possibly allowing deductions of expenses attributable to foreign source income against U.S.-source income. Alternatively, all expenses could be fully deductible but only a percentage of foreign source dividends and directly earned foreign active business income would be exempt, similar to what France, Italy, and other countries do (see Box 4.2 for a discussion of dividend taxation by other countries).

If a portion of interest and general and administrative expenses are not allocated to exempt foreign source income (and, therefore, not disallowed), the effective tax rate on investment in low-tax countries could be negative (indicating that the investment has a higher return after taxes than before taxes) because the tax saving from the U.S. deduction could exceed the foreign tax on the income. This result might encourage multinational corporations to shift business activities abroad that otherwise would be conducted in the United States but for tax motives.

In sum, a basic dividend exemption system would remove the tax disincentive to the repatriation of foreign earnings. It would also reduce some of the complexity related to the current system with respect to foreign tax credits, primarily because dividends would no longer give rise to foreign tax credits. Nevertheless, other complex provisions would remain, for example, with respect to non-exempt income, such as foreign source royalties and interest as well as subpart F inclusions. As noted above, the transfer pricing rules may come under increased pressure, as the move to a basic dividend exemption system could increase the incentive to shift income and assets to low-tax offshore jurisdictions. Extending the foreign source income exemption to include other active business income, such as royalties, could allow for additional simplification, would eliminate the revenue raised by moving to a basic dividend exemption system, and could relieve some of the increased pressure on the transfer pricing rules, but could raise other issues and concerns.


References


Altshuler, Rosanne and Harry Grubert. 2001. "Where Will They Go if We Go Territorial? Dividend Exemption and the Foreign Location Decisions of U.S. Multinational Corporations." National Tax Journal 54(4): 787-809.

Altshuler, Roseanne and Harry Grubert. 2003. "Repatriation Taxes, Repatriation Strategies, and Multinational Financial Policy." Journal of Public Economics 87(1): 73-107.

Altshuler, Rosanne, Harry Grubert, and T. Scott Newlon. 2001. "Has U.S. Investment Abroad Become More Sensitive to Tax Rates?" In International Taxation and Multinational Activity 2001, ed. James R. Hines, Jr., 9-32. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Ault, Hugh J. 2003. "U.S. Exemption/Territorial System vs. Credit-Based System." Tax Notes International November 24: 725-729.

Desai, Mihir A. and James R. Hines Jr. 2003. "Evaluating International Tax Reform." National Tax Journal 56(3): 487-502.

Desai, Mihir A., C. Fritz Foley, and James R. Hines Jr. 2001. "Repatriation Taxes and Dividend Distortions." National Tax Journal 54(4): 829-851.

Gann, Hal and Roy Strowd. 1995. "Perspectives on Guidance: Deferred Tax Accounting For Tax Reform Proposals. Tax Notes, July 3, 1995.

Graetz, Michael, and Paul W. Oosterhuis. 2001. "Structuring an Exemption System for Foreign Income of U.S. Corporations." National Tax Journal 54(4): 771-786.

Grubert, Harry. 1998. "Taxes and the Division of Foreign Operating Income among Royalties, Interest, Dividends, and Retained Earnings." Journal of Public Economics 68(2): 269-290.

Grubert, Harry. 2001. "Enacting Dividend Exemption and Tax Revenue." National Tax Journal 54(4): 811-827.

Grubert, Harry and Roseanne Altshuler. Forthcoming. "Corporate Taxes in the World Economy: Reforming the Taxation of Cross-Border Income." In Fundamental Tax Reform: Issues, Choices and Implications, eds. John Diamond and George Zodrow. Cambridge: The MIT Press.

Grubert, Harry and John Mutti. 1991. "Taxes, Tariffs and Transfer Pricing in Multinational Corporation Decision Making." Review of Economics and Statistics 33: 285-293.

Grubert, Harry and John Mutti. 2001. Taxing International Business Income: Dividend Exemption versus the Current System. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute.

Hines, James R., Jr. and Eric Rice. 1994. "Fiscal Paradise: Foreign Tax Havens and American Business." Quarterly Journal of Economics 109: 149-182.

Joint Committee on Taxation. 2005. Options to Improve Tax Compliance and Reform Tax Expenditures, JCS-02-05.

Kleinbard, Edward D. 2007. "Throw Territorial Taxation from the Train." Tax Notes, February 5: 547-564.

Lyon, Andrew B. and Peter R. Merrill. 2001. "Asset Price Effects of Fundamental Tax Reform." In Transition Costs of Fundamental Tax Reform, eds. Kevin A. Hassett and R. Glenn Hubbard, 58-92. Washington, DC: AEI Press.

Musgrave, Peggy B. 1963. Taxation of Foreign Investment Income: An Economic Analysis. Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins Press.

Pearlman, Ronald A. 1996. "Transition Issues in Moving to a Consumption Tax: A Tax Lawyer's Perspective." In Economic Effects of Fundamental Tax Reform, eds. Henry J. Aaron and William G. Gale, 393-427. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.

The President's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform. 2005. Simple, Fair, and Pro-Growth: Proposals to Fix America's Tax System. Washington, DC: The U.S. Government Printing Office.

Slaughter, Matthew J. 2004. "Globalization and Employment by U.S. Multinationals: A Framework and Facts." Paper presented at the Tax Council Policy Institute Sixth Annual Tax Policy & Practice Symposium, February 10-11, 2005.

Sullivan, Martin A. 1995. Flat Taxes and Consumption Taxes: A Guide to the Debate. New York: American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.

U.S. Department of the Treasury. 2007. Treasury Conference on Business Taxation and Global Competitiveness: Background Paper. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Treasury.



Chapter IV: Addressing Structural Problems with the U.S. Business Tax System

In contrast with the previous chapters, this chapter considers several approaches that address specific areas of business income taxation that could be reformed separately or in the context of broad-based reform. A comprehensive approach, however, is likely to be more effective in improving the competitiveness of the U.S. business tax system than addressing specific issues outside of broad-based business tax reform. These approaches are presented as part of a fully informed public policy discussion.

The first section considers approaches to addressing the issue of tax cascading and multiple taxation of corporate income by changing the tax treatment of corporate capital gains and intercorporate dividends. Other sections consider approaches to address the tax bias that favors debt finance, the tax treatment of certain international income, the tax treatment of losses, book-tax conformity, and other illustrative areas regarding tax administration.



A. Multiple taxation of corporate profits

The current U.S. income tax system generally taxes corporate profits twice: first under the corporate income tax, and then again when profits are received as dividends or capital gains by individual investors. The U.S. corporate income tax can add additional layers of tax when one corporation owns stock in another corporation and is taxed on dividends received from that other corporation or on realized capital gains from selling the shares of stock of that other corporation. Intercorporate dividends receive relief from triple taxation by means of the dividends received deduction (DRD) for dividends received from a domestic corporation and by means of the foreign tax credit for dividends received from a foreign corporation. Nevertheless, the DRD is often less than 100 percent of dividends received and the foreign tax credit applies only in certain cases and may not entirely offset the additional layer of tax. Moreover, no such relief is available for corporate capital gains taxes from the sale of stock of a domestic corporation, although in certain cases the foreign tax credit is available upon the sale of stock of a foreign corporation. Some analyses consider the estate tax to be an additional potential layer of tax on corporate earnings. The additional layers of tax, sometimes referred to as tax cascading, raise the cost of capital and create a tax bias against intercorporate ownership structures.

Under an ideal income tax system, real (inflation-adjusted) corporate income, including capital gains, would be taxed as it accrues and losses would be deductible as they accrue. The double tax on corporate profits and any tax cascading would be eliminated through integration of the individual and corporate tax systems. Corporate income would be taxed at the same rates as income generated in other businesses, including partnerships and sole proprietorships.

In contrast, under the current tax system, capital gains of corporations are taxed only upon realization at rates up to 35 percent, with no allowance for inflation. Net capital losses of a corporation may not be deducted against ordinary income, but may be carried back up to three years or forward up to five years to offset capital gains. In certain cases, corporations can defer capital gains taxes by exchanging property for other property deemed to be like-kind property or engaging in other types of tax-free transactions. In contrast, capital gains realized directly by individuals and through noncorporate businesses are generally subject to a top tax rate of 15 percent.



1. Corporate capital gains

The current tax treatment of corporate capital gains, where tax is paid upon the disposition of an asset, discourages the sale of corporate assets. This "lock-in" effect can prevent business assets from being deployed to their best and highest use, thereby resulting in the misallocation of business assets and capital throughout the economy and reducing economic growth. In addition, even though corporate capital gains are nominally taxed at the same tax rate as regular corporate income, corporate capital gains from the sale of stock can result in multiple layers of tax and a heavy total tax burden. Finally, corporate capital gains are taxed much more heavily than capital gains realized in the non-corporate business sector, which encourages business activities that involve substantial capital gains to be conducted primarily in the non-corporate sector.

Lowering the corporate capital gains rate, which would restore tax treatment available prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, would reduce these tax distortions while reducing the overall tax rate on investment.84 Moreover, a lower corporate capital gains tax rate would be more in line with the tax treatment of corporate capital gains among the United States' major trading partners. For example, most G-7 countries provide an exclusion for sales of corporate holdings of stock that is comparable to the DRD in the United States. This exclusion limits the cascading of taxes.



Current capital gains rules create economic distortions

The current tax treatment of corporate capital gains distorts a number of business decisions in important ways.

Misallocation of corporate capital due to lock-in effects. Absent tax and competition considerations, corporations would sell assets when another firm could earn a higher rate of return on those assets. Because capital gains tax would have to be paid on realized capital gains, however, a potential buyer would have to expect to earn a sufficiently high rate of return to compensate the selling firm for its capital gains tax. Thus, many appreciated corporate assets may remain with their current owners even though other owners could make more productive use of those assets, resulting in inefficient use of economic resources.85

Misallocation of resources between corporate and non-corporate sectors. Corporate income is generally taxed at both the corporate and individual levels, resulting in double taxation. Cascading of tax can result when corporations owning stock in other corporations receive dividends or recognize capital gains from the sale of that stock.86 In contrast, business income from partnerships and other pass-through entities is subject only to a single layer of tax at the owner level.

The higher taxes on corporate capital gains discourage investment in the corporate sector resulting in the misallocation of capital between the corporate and non-corporate sectors. This shifting is particularly important for real estate and other economic sectors, where the periodic sale of assets is more common. This shifting is economically inefficient because the U.S. capital stock thereby earns a lower overall rate of return and non-corporate investments do not benefit from the greater access to capital and other advantages of the corporate form.

Bias against intercorporate investments . Intercorporate investments in the stock of other corporations are discouraged by the cascading of taxes on corporate income. Multi-tiered corporate structures may enhance corporate productivity by allowing businesses to create corporate joint ventures or meet state regulatory requirements in certain industries.87

International distortions. Several studies have argued that U.S. firms face higher corporate capital gains taxes than competitor firms in other countries. A recent analysis found that 16 of the 27 European Union (E.U.) countries, including all of the larger economies, provide partial or full exemption for the disposition of shares in other corporations, generally with a requirement of 5 percent or 10 percent ownership of the corporation in which the shares are disposed.88 While other corporate capital gains in these countries are generally taxed at the ordinary corporate tax rate, a number of E.U. countries have reduced their statutory corporate tax rates in recent years. In addition, rollover relief is generally available for corporate restructurings.

Distortion of transactions - tax rates on dividends versus capital gains. The high tax rate on corporate capital gains as compared to dividends, which generally benefit from the DRD, can distort the form of transactions. For example, a corporation may want to sell its stock in a domestic subsidiary, but doing so would result in a 35-percent tax rate on the capital gain. The corporation could convert the potential capital gains income into dividend income by having the subsidiary borrow money and pay a dividend back to the parent corporation.89 The selling price of the subsidiary and the capital gain would be reduced by the amount of the dividend. The high 35-percent corporate capital gains tax rate, as compared to the much lower effective tax rate on the dividend, creates a substantial tax penalty on transactions that yield capital gains.90

Distortion of transactions - selling a subsidiary's stock or its assets. The high corporate capital gains tax rate exacerbates tax planning issues associated with the sale of a domestic subsidiary and can lead to distortions in the form of the sale, the price received, and the identity of the ultimate buyer. If a corporation sells the stock of the subsidiary and an election (if available) is not made to treat the sale as an asset sale for tax purposes, the buyer takes over the selling corporation's basis of the depreciable property and other assets in the subsidiary. If the assets have been fully depreciated and no additional depreciation deductions can be claimed, the price a potential buyer would be willing to pay would reflect the lack of depreciation deductions. If the corporation instead sells the assets of the subsidiary, the basis of assets is stepped up to the market value (assuming that the fair market value is greater than the depreciated tax basis). Some potential buyers would be willing to pay a higher price because they could recover part of the purchase price by re-depreciating the assets like new assets. Thus, the selling corporation must consider the tax situations of potential buyers as well as its own tax situation in negotiating the selling price and the form of the sale.91 High corporate capital gains tax rates increase the consequences of tax-induced distortions of business decisions about how to sell a subsidiary, the price paid, and to whom the subsidiary is sold.

In some cases, corporations have structured transactions to defer or avoid capital gains taxes, resulting in complaints about tax abuses, lost federal revenues, and efforts by Congress and the Treasury Department to eliminate the use of specific types of avoidance transactions.

Transactions can sometimes be structured as non-taxable business reorganizations or, for certain tangible assets, as like-kind exchanges. As a result, stock or asset sales and spin-offs of subsidiaries can trigger capital gains taxes in some cases but not others. Alternatively, corporations can enter into monetizing transactions to defer capital gains taxes while reducing investment risk and possibly raising cash.92 For example, one study examined cases in which corporations issued securities to hedge an appreciated position, thereby raising cash and deferring capital gains taxation.93

Higher cost of capital. The corporate capital gains tax raises the cost of capital for corporations. While standard calculations generally ignore corporate capital gains taxes, calculations in one study show that corporate taxes on the sale of assets (including recapture of depreciation as ordinary income) could raise the cost of capital for equipment and software by 0.7 percent, assuming that the assets were sold after 10 years.94

Using recent estimates of the responsiveness of investment to the tax-adjusted cost of capital, the study estimated that the current corporate capital gains tax reduces investment in equipment and software by 0.35 percent to 0.70 percent, or $4 billion to $7 billion per year at current levels. The effect on investment in structures is larger because the longer useful life means there is more remaining value that can be sold. Thus, for investment in structures, the corporate capital gains tax raises the cost of capital by 9.3 percent if the investments are expected to be sold after 10 years and 4.5 percent if sold after 20 years.



Significance of corporate capital gains

In 2005, the latest year for which data are available, corporations reported $136 billion in corporate capital gains, representing about 12 percent of total corporate taxable income. Capital gains were a larger percentage of corporate taxable income during the late 1990s, reaching 23.2 percent of taxable income in 2000 (Table 4.1).

The main types of assets that generate corporate capital gains are: (1) investment assets such as stocks and bonds, (2) assets (including land) held for long-term investment rather than for ordinary business purposes, (3) self-created patents, (4) goodwill, and (5) real or depreciable assets.95 Corporate capital gains from the sale of business property, including machinery, equipment, structures, and other property used in the business, accounted for 35 percent of corporate capital gains,96 with the rest including capital gains from the sale of securities, interests in corporate and non-corporate businesses, and intangible assets such as patents.

The largest amounts of corporate capital gains are in manufacturing (22 percent), services (21 percent), and insurance (11 percent). Capital gains represent the largest shares of taxable income in real estate, agriculture, mining, and insurance. While manufacturing reported the largest dollar amount of corporate capital gains, this represented a lower than average percentage of taxable income.

While about 6 percent of all corporations realized capital gains, 45 percent of corporations with at least $1 billion in assets reported capital gains. The largest 100 firms (by assets) reporting capital gains accounted for 55 percent of total gains, and firms reporting at least $100 million in assets accounted for two-thirds of the total.
Table 4.1: Capital Gains of Corporations, 1992 - 2005



__________________________________________________________________________________
Capital Gains
Percent of as a
Number of Corporations Corporations Percent of
Corporation with Capital with Corporate Taxable
Year s Gains Capital Gains Capital Gains Income

__________________________________________________________________________________
(number of returns in thousands, dollar amounts in billions)




1992 2,077 138 6.6 50.7 13.5

1993 2,056 149 7.3 60.9 14.1

1994 2,311 155 6.7 49.4 10.1

1995 2,312 162 7.0 68.9 12.3

1996 2,317 168 7.3 73.2 11.8

1997 2,247 174 7.7 103.1 15.6

1998 2,249 171 7.6 117.7 18.5

1999 2,198 164 7.5 145.7 21.5

2000 2,172 159 7.3 171.4 23.2

2001 2,136 127 5.9 117.6 18.9

2002 2,099 104 5.0 75.2 13.0

2003 2,047 105 5.1 85.4 12.9

2004 2,027 114 5.6 102.9 12.6

2005 1,975 112 5.7 136.2 11.8

__________________________________________________________________________________
Note: Capital gains of S corporations, regulated investment companies, real
estate investment trusts, and personal service corporations are not included.

Source: IRS Statistics of Income, Corporate Income Tax Returns for 1992 through
2005.





Approaches regarding corporate capital gains 97



Reduce the corporate capital gains tax rate

The distortions created by the current high tax rates on corporate capital gains could be addressed by setting the corporate capital gains rate equal to the maximum tax rate on individual capital gains, currently 15 percent. More limited approaches, such as a 20 percent or 25 percent corporate capital gains rate, would, of course, provide smaller economic benefits.

A lower corporate capital gains rate would have three principal benefits: (1) reduce the lock-in effect, (2) reduce the uneven treatment of intercompany transactions in the form of dividends versus capital gains, and (3) reduce the uneven taxation of capital gains in the corporate and non-corporate sectors. Moreover, a lower corporate capital gains tax rate would also reduce somewhat the overall tax rate on investment.

As discussed above, the lock-in effect arises in cases where otherwise profitable and economically desirable asset sales are discouraged by the capital gains tax. By discouraging such sales, the lock-in effect prevents assets from flowing to their highest valued uses. Desai and Gentry (2004) found strong lock-in effects on the sale of corporate assets. They found that high corporate capital gains rates reduced the percentages of corporations selling both financial investments and tangible property, reduced the amounts of financial investments and tangible property sold by those corporations that did sell, and reduced the amounts of capital gains realized by corporations.

Using the results of this study, Desai (2006) recently estimated the benefits of reducing lock-in effects by lowering the corporate capital gains rate to 15 percent. Desai estimated that lowering the capital gains rate from 35 percent to 15 percent would permanently increase realized corporate capital gains by 52 percent or $67 billion from an assumed baseline of $128 billion.98

The substantial unlocking associated with lowering the corporate capital gains tax rate would reduce the revenue cost of lowering the corporate capital gains tax rate. Indeed, the Desai and Gentry research suggests that the revenue-maximizing rate - the tax rate above which the federal government would actually lose revenue from a higher capital gains tax rate because of the lock-in effect - is probably roughly 25 percent to 26 percent.99 The Treasury Department estimates that in the absence of any behavioral responses, lowering the corporate capital gains tax rate to 15 percent would cost roughly $220 billion over 10 years, but once the unlocking and other behavioral effects of a lower tax rate are incorporated, the revenue cost of the 15-percent rate would be only roughly $125 billion over 10 years. That is, the behavioral responses would offset about 43 percent of the static revenue cost of the lower tax rate.100

The second advantage of a lower corporate capital gains tax rate is reduced distortions in business decisions that arise from the differential between the taxation of dividends received by corporations (which typically receive a DRD of 70 percent or more if the payor is a domestic corporation) and capital gains on corporate stock (which are fully taxed in the case of a domestic corporation). A lower corporate capital gains tax rate would reduce tax planning associated with structuring transactions to obtain income in the form of dividends rather than capital gains. A lower corporate capital gains tax rate would also reduce tax-planning efforts to structure transactions to avoid or defer the capital gains tax through like-kind exchanges, monetizing transactions, and tax-free reorganizations.

Desai (2006) estimated that foregone realizations under the current 35-percent capital gains tax rate imposed efficiency costs on the economy of $20.4 billion per year, which is 46 percent of total revenues collected from the corporate capital gains tax.101 If the corporate capital gains tax rate were reduced to 15 percent, however, the efficiency cost would be reduced to $3.7 billion per year for a gain in economic efficiency of $16.7 billion per year, which is greater than Desai's estimated revenue cost of $15.6 billion per year. That is, the gain in economic efficiency would be about $1.07 per dollar of revenue loss. The high ratio of efficiency gain to tax revenue cost indicates that the capital gains tax is a very distortionary tax. It does not suggest, however, that cutting the tax rate from 35 percent to 15 percent would pay for itself entirely through greater realizations. According to Desai, the lower tax rate would reduce taxes by $15.6 billion.

The third primary advantage of a lower corporate capital gains rate is to reduce the uneven taxation of capital gains between the corporate and non-corporate sectors. Currently, capital gains realized by partnerships, S corporations and sole proprietorships are taxed at a maximum rate of 15 percent under the individual income tax as compared to the 35-percent rate under the corporate tax.102 A lower corporate capital gains tax rate would reduce the tax disadvantage of the corporate form. Currently, the total tax on intercorporate stock holdings is 64.1 percent, compared to 15 percent on individual capital gains from pass-through businesses. Reducing the corporate capital gains rate to 15 percent would reduce the total tax to 53.0 percent.103



Reduce corporate capital gains rates on intercorporate stock gains

A more limited approach to reduce the economic harm associated with the high corporate capital gains rate would be to reduce the tax rate for capital gains from the sale of intercorporate holdings of stock. Such an approach would, in effect, make the taxation of stock gains comparable to the DRD and focus the benefits on limiting tax cascading. Similar to the DRD, the taxation of stock gains could be structured as a percentage exclusion. Exclusions of 50 percent, 60 percent, or 70 percent would result in maximum tax rates of 17.5 percent, 14 percent, and 10.5 percent, respectively. While limiting a lower rate to intercorporate capital gains would reduce the revenue cost, it would leave the capital gains rate on sales of equipment and structures at 35 percent, thereby discouraging such sales.104



Reduce the corporate tax rate

The economic distortions created by the high corporate capital gains rate would also be mitigated by lowering the corporate tax rate, as discussed in Chapter III. A separate, lower corporate capital gains tax rate could still be warranted to place capital gains earned in the corporate and non-corporate sectors on a level playing field, although the need for such synchronization from a policy perspective would not be as great depending on the extent to which the corporate tax rate itself were lowered.



Box 4.1: How Corporate Capital Gains Are Taxed in Other Countries

While most G-7 countries typically tax corporate capital gains nominally at the same tax rates as other corporate income, they tend to provide exclusions for corporate capital gains resulting from the sale of corporate stock (Table 4.2). Also, the significance of taxing capital gains at the same nominal tax rates is diminished by the lower statutory tax rates generally imposed by other countries. By contrast, Canada provides a 50- percent exclusion that applies to all corporate capital gains.

The intercompany capital gains exclusions provided by most G-7 countries are generally limited to cases in which ownership of the stock holding exceeds some threshold percentage, commonly 5 percent or 10 percent. These provisions are intended to eliminate tax cascading - the multiple layers of tax occurring in transactions among chains of corporations. In addition, certain types of qualifying corporate group restructurings can be achieved on a tax-free basis by rolling over the gain rather than incurring a current tax.

Most, if not all, G-7 countries have a similar exclusion for intercorporate dividends. An important difference is that while most other G-7 countries have exclusions that apply to both intercorporate capital gains and dividends, the United States provides relief from tax cascading only for intercorporate dividends from a domestic corporation, thereby creating a tax bias favoring dividends over capital gains in the case of a domestic corporation. (In the case of dividends from a foreign corporation, a foreign tax credit may be available to reduce tax, and in the case of gain from the sale of foreign corporate stock, some or all of the gain may be treated as a dividend and a foreign tax credit thereby may be available).
Table 4.2: Corporate Capital Gains Taxes in G-7 Countries



_____________________________________________________________________________________
Special Rule for Sale of
Corporate Stock


__________________________________
Corporate
Corporate Capital Percent Percent
Tax Standard Gains Tax Rate Exemption on Ownership
Country Rate (%) (General) Gains Required

_____________________________________________________________________________________
Canada 36.1 50% exempt No special rule NA

France 34.4 standard rate 95 5

Germany 38.9 standard rate 95 0

Italy 33.0 standard rate 84 0

Japan 39.5 standard rate None NA

United Kingdom 30.0 standard rate 1 10

United States 39.3 standard rate None NA

_____________________________________________________________________________________
Note: Standard corporate rates include sub-national level taxes. The capital gain
exemption percentages on sale of shares in other corporations indicate the
percentages of capital gains on corporate shares that are exempt if required
participation conditions (minimum control, minimum holding period, industry, etc.)
are met. While Canada has no special exemption for sale of corporate stock, the
50-percent exclusion would apply. All countries provide rollover treatment for
certain types of corporate reorganizations that are considered non-taxable events.

Source: International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP.





2. Dividends received deduction

Corporations are generally allowed a DRD on dividends received from holdings of stock in other domestic corporations, but the DRD is incomplete for companies with less than an 80-percent interest. The DRD is 70 percent if a corporation owns less than 20 percent of the stock in another domestic corporation and 80 percent if the corporation owns 20 percent or more, but less than 80 percent of the stock.105

The system of partial taxation of intercorporate dividends was introduced into the tax law in 1935 to achieve certain tax policy and non-tax policy goals.106 Previously, all intercorporate dividends were exempt from the corporate income tax. Taxation of 10 percent (and later 15 percent) of intercorporate dividends through a 90-percent DRD was enacted to address concerns about complicated, multi-tiered corporate structures.

A partial DRD leads to tax cascading as corporate income flows through the different levels of corporate ownership. As noted above in the discussion of corporate capital gains, tax cascading discourages investment in the corporate form by raising the cost of capital. A partial DRD may also discourage multi-tiered corporate structures that would otherwise be desirable for business reasons. While dividends received from a foreign corporation are not generally eligible for a DRD, a domestic corporate recipient of the dividend may be able to claim a foreign tax credit that reflects the foreign taxes paid on the repatriated earnings. The foreign tax credit is available only in certain cases, however, and may not entirely offset the additional layer of tax.107



Economic distortions caused by a partial dividends received deduction

By failing to allow a full 100-percent deduction for all intercorporate dividends, the tax system can impose multiple layers of tax on intercorporate dividends, which leads to distortions in the allocation of investment by discouraging corporations from investments in other corporations that would be profitable in the absence of the cascading levels of taxes. Under the 70-percent DRD, an additional layer of tax of 10.5 percent is imposed on corporate earnings (30 percent of the 35-percent top corporate tax rate) paid to another corporation as intercompany dividends. Similarly, for an 80-percent DRD, the additional layer of tax is 7 percent. Tax cascading is fully eliminated only for intercorporate dividends within an affiliated group qualifying for the 100-percent DRD.

In addition, a partial DRD and the associated tax cascading may discourage tiered corporate structures that would otherwise be desirable to achieve business purposes such as meeting state or other regulatory requirements. Such potential intercorporate investments may include corporate joint ventures with other firms or venture capital investments in joint ventures with former employees of the firm.108 A partial DRD may also discourage the free flow of dividends among related companies. This may interfere with the ability of related companies to allocate their limited capital to the most productive investments.

Table 4.3 shows the ultimate effects on individual shareholders of the multiple layers of tax on intercorporate holdings, including the effects of the current 15-percent maximum tax rate on dividends received by individuals and what happens if this provision expires after 2010. With a 70-percent DRD, a corporate tax rate of 35 percent and an individual tax rate of 15 percent on dividends, the total taxes on dividends paid on intercorporate holdings are $50.55 on $100 of earnings in the initial corporation, leaving $49.45 for the corporate shareholder. This is calculated as follows: the first corporation's earnings of $100 are taxed at a 35-percent rate, leaving $65 available for dividends to be paid to the second corporation that owns shares in the first corporation. With a 70-percent DRD, the second corporation pays $6.83 of corporate tax on those dividends (6.83 = 0.35 * (65 - 0.70 * 65)) and pays out the remaining $58.18 to the individual shareholders. Individual shareholders then pay the 15-percent tax on qualified dividends, leaving $49.45 in after-tax income. The after-tax income of the individual shareholders would increase to $51.38 with an 80-percent DRD and to $55.25 with a 100- percent DRD. If the current 15-percent tax rate on dividends expires after 2010 and individuals are taxed at their regular income tax rates, taxes would total $64.86 where there is a 70-percent DRD, and an individual in the top income tax bracket would receive $35.14 in after-tax income.
Table 4.3: Multiple Layers of Tax on Dividends Paid on Intercorporate Stock Holdings



__________________________________________________________________________________
15% Individual Tax Rate 39.6% Individual Tax
on Rate on
Dividends with DRD of: Dividends with DRD of:


________________________________________________
Earnings, Dividends and Taxes 70% 80% 100% 70% 80% 100%

__________________________________________________________________________________
1st corporation's earnings 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00

1st corporate tax on earnings
(35%) 35.00 35.00 35.00 35.00 35.00 35.00

Dividends paid by 1st corporation 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00

Dividends received deduction -45.50 -52.00 -65.00 -45.50 -52.00 -65.00

2nd corporation's tax on
dividends (35%) 6.83 4.55 0.00 6.83 4.55 0.00

Dividends paid by 2nd corporation 58.18 60.45 65.00 58.18 60.45 65.00

Shareholder tax on dividends 8.73 9.07 9.75 23.04 23.94 25.74

After-tax dividends to individual
shareholders 49.45 51.38 55.25 35.14 36.51 39.26

Total tax - all levels 50.55 48.62 44.75 64.86 63.49 60.74

__________________________________________________________________________________
Source: U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Tax Analysis.



The example in Table 4.3 illustrates that with the 70-percent DRD, the additional layer of tax on intercorporate dividends adds $6.83 tax on $100 of corporate earnings. Increasing the DRD from 70 percent to 100 percent would add $6.83 per $100 of intercorporate dividends to the cash flow of corporations, which would be available for increasing investment. If the 15-percent maximum tax rate on dividends is allowed to expire after 2010, the after-tax income of the shareholder will be reduced by $14.31 (14.31 = 64.86 - 50.55), which leaves less capital for shareholders to reinvest in the economy.

Finally, the cascading of taxes, which results from a partial DRD, can discourage investment by increasing the cost of capital. A rough measure of this effect is provided by the portion of intercorporate dividends subject to tax, which was 6.3 percent of corporate taxable income in 2004 (the most recent data available).



Significance of intercorporate dividends and dividends received deductions

In 2004, 156,000 corporations, about 8 percent of all C corporations, reported $274 billion of gross intercorporate dividends (Table 4.4). About $82 billion of these were eligible for a 100-percent DRD.109 Another $125 billion of these dividends were eligible for foreign tax credits that would offset U.S. corporate tax to the extent of taxes paid to other countries. Nearly $17 billion in dividends were eligible for the 70-percent or 80-percent DRD, and $9 billion in dividends were eligible for a DRD under other provisions. The total amount of DRDs was $98 billion. After netting out the DRD and the dividends eligible for the foreign tax credit, it appears that about $51 billion in dividends were subject to potentially cascading levels of tax at the corporate level. Intercorporate dividends are highly concentrated among small numbers of firms. In 2004, 75 percent of the total was received by 427 firms with over $10 billion in assets, and 44 percent was received by manufacturing firms.
Table 4.4: Intercorporate Dividends and Dividend Received Deductions, 2004



____________________________________________________________________________________
Dividends Received Variable Amounts ($B)

____________________________________________________________________________________
Gross dividends 273.7

Dividends eligible for:

70-percent DRD 12.1

80-percent DRD 4.7

100-percent DRD 82.4

Other DRD 8.9

Foreign tax credit 125.0

Total 233.1

Other dividends, not eligible for DRD or foreign tax credit 40.6

Total DRD 97.7

Dividends subject to tax 51.0

Taxable income 813.9

Number of corporations receiving dividends 156,335

Total number of corporations 2,026,963

____________________________________________________________________________________
Note: The sample does not include S corporations, regulated investment companies,
and real estate investment trusts, which are pass-through entities for which the
DRD does not apply. Dividends eligible for the 100-percent DRD are estimated partly
based on Schedule M-1 and M-3 information because they have been netted out and
thus are not shown directly on all returns.




Source: IRS Statistics of Income, Corporate Income Tax File.





Box 4.2: How are Intercorporate Dividends Treated by Other Countries?

G-7 countries have either full or partial exclusions for intercorporate dividends (Table 4.5). Morck (2005) provides a list of 30 countries that fully exempted intercorporate dividends as of 1997. However, some of these countries now have some taxation of intercorporate dividends. In the case of E.U. countries this seems to be the result of E.U. directives to eliminate tax rules discriminating in favor of domestic as compared to foreign subsidiaries. In order to limit revenue losses, some countries have adopted modest taxation of both domestic and foreign intercorporate dividends. Some studies have noted that European companies tend to have much more complicated corporate structures with multiple layers of corporate ownership, and attribute this to the previous full exemption of intercorporate dividends.110
Table 4.5: Tax Treatment of Intercorporate Dividends in G-7 Countries



___________________________________________________________________________________
Dividends Received Deduction


_________________________________________
Corporate Tax Percent Ownership
Country Standard Rate Percent Deduction Required

___________________________________________________________________________________
Canada* 36.1 100 0

France* 36.1 95 5
2 year holding
period

Germany* 38.9 95 0

Italy* 33.0 95 0-49.9
100 50

Japan* 39.5 50 0

United Kingdom* 30.0 100 0

United States 39.3 70 Under 20
80 20-79.9
100 80

___________________________________________________________________________________
Note: Standard corporate rates include sub-national level taxes.

*Denotes countries cited in Morck (2005) as having no tax on intercorporate
dividends as of 1997.

Source: International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (2007).

___________________________________________________________________________________




Approaches for addressing tax cascading on intercorporate dividends 111



Increase DRD to 100 percent

Tax cascading within the corporate sector could be eliminated by increasing the DRD to 100 percent. This would eliminate the current tax bias against intercorporate investments and tiered corporate structures that would otherwise be desirable. A 100 percent DRD would improve the ability of related companies to allocate their limited capital to the most productive investments and for independent firms to undertake joint ventures in corporate form.

An increase in the DRD to 100 percent could encourage retention of otherwise uneconomic investments in the stock of other corporations unless corporate capital gains tax rates are also lowered, as discussed above. Without a change to corporate capital gains rates intercorporate dividends would be tax-free to the owner corporation, but sale of the stock would generally result in capital gains tax at a 35-percent rate.

To the extent that current dividend taxes, both those at the individual level and on intercorporate dividends, have already been capitalized into lower share prices, raising the DRD could provide gains to corporations currently holding stock in other corporations. Of course, any such gains would be subject to corporate capital gains taxes when the stock is sold, assuming no change to the taxation of corporate capital gains. Based on this capitalization effect, some have argued that a 100-percent DRD could distort stock ownership by favoring intercorporate ownership over individual ownership. Because taxation of dividends at the individual level would result in some reduction in the price of a dividend-paying stock, a corporation could purchase the stock at a reduced price reflecting the individual-level tax on dividends, but would not itself be subject to tax on dividends.

Because of concerns about tax avoidance and tax arbitrage schemes involving the ability to deduct interest expense and differential tax treatment of capital gains and dividend income, Congress has periodically enacted and strengthened provisions intended to prevent such schemes given the current DRD structure with partial taxation of intercorporate dividends. It is generally thought to have been largely successful, although there are still periodic controversies and court cases. An increase in the DRD to 100 percent might raise concerns that some previously uneconomic tax-arbitrage schemes would again become profitable so that further anti-abuse provisions would be needed.



Increase and simplify the current DRD

As an alternative to increasing the DRD to 100 percent, the current complex system of multiple DRD percentages could be greatly simplified. For example, the 70- percent DRD could be increased to 80 percent and some of the minor categories could also be changed to the same percentage. Overall, this could provide simplification as well as a modest reduction in tax cascading.



B. Tax bias that favors debt financing

The current U.S. tax code favors debt over equity forms of finance because corporations can deduct interest expense, but not the return on equity-financed investment. As noted in the previous section, the return on an equity-financed investment (i.e., corporate profit) is taxed twice, first under the corporate income tax and a second time under the individual income tax as a dividend or capital gain. In contrast, the corporation's ability to deduct interest eliminates the corporate-level tax on the return earned by a debt-financed investment, leaving only the single level of tax paid on interest income under the individual income tax. Even after accounting for the lower tax rates on dividends and capital gains relative to the tax rate on interest income under the individual income tax,112 and allowing for the ability to defer taxes on capital gains,113 there remains a strong tax bias in favor of debt over equity financing.114

Excessive reliance on debt financing imposes costs on investors because of the associated increased risk of financial distress and bankruptcy. Firms in financial difficulty may be denied sufficient access to credit, suffer key personnel losses, and endure a diversion of management time and energy away from productive activity. Other costs include legal and administrative expenses associated with bankruptcy, uncertainty regarding the ultimate size of those expenses, uncertainty regarding the marketable value of the firm's assets under partial or full liquidation, and risks regarding the ultimate settlement of competing claims on those assets.115



Marginal effective tax rates under debt and equity financing

The tax bias in favor of the use of debt over equity financing is reflected in estimates of the marginal effective tax rate for new corporate investment. The marginal effective tax rate is the hypothetical tax rate that, if applied to properly measured income, is equivalent to the tax burden imposed by various features of the tax system. It includes the effects of statutory tax rates at the company and the investor levels, tax depreciation rules, interest deductions, income measurement rules (such as the taxation of nominal capital gains on a realization basis and the taxation of nominal interest), and a given dividend payout policy.

Computed marginal effective tax rates by method of finance are shown in Table 4.6. Effective tax rate calculations are provided for a completely leveraged investment and for an investment where only equity is used. In order to highlight the tax differences, these estimates do not reflect differences in non-tax costs under the alternative financing methods. Table 4.6 clearly illustrates the strong tax bias towards debt under the current business tax system.
Table 4.6: The Current Tax System Heavily Favors Debt Finance



____________________________________________________________________________________
Marginal Effective Tax
Method of Finance Rates

____________________________________________________________________________________
Percent




Debt-Financed Investment -2.2

Equity-Financed Investment* 39.7

____________________________________________________________________________________
*The equity-financed investment is assumed to be partly financed with retained
earnings and partly with new equity, reflecting a historical dividend/earnings
payout percentage.

Source: U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Tax Analysis.





Approaches for addressing the tax bias that favors debt finance



Reduce the tax burden on equity

One way to level the playing field between debt and equity financing would be to reduce the tax burden on equity-financed investment by allowing a dividend exclusion.116 This approach would exempt shareholder-level dividends from tax. To the extent that the dividend tax, rather than the capital gains tax, burdens the return on corporate equityfinanced investment,117 this approach would dramatically reduce the tax differential between debt and equity.118



Reduce the tax advantage for corporate debt

An alternative and somewhat more far reaching approach would be to address the tax bias for debt financing by raising the tax burden on interest income produced in the corporate sector (i.e., the return on debt-financed investment) relative to the tax burdens on distributed and retained earnings (i.e., the return to equity-financed investment). This approach could involve:
 Elimination of the deductibility of interest by corporations (other than S corporations);

 Elimination of the taxation of interest received by corporations from other domestic corporations (other than interest received by S corporations);

 Allowance of a 100-percent DRD; and

 Reduction in the maximum personal tax rate on interest income to 15 percent (to synchronize the tax rate with the maximum rate imposed on dividends and capital gains).

By denying the deduction for interest, this approach would subject income from debtfinanced investments to the corporate income tax. It would also remove completely any taxation at the corporate level of interest and dividends received from other domestic corporations; the income represented by these payments would have already been taxed at the corporate level. As a result, both interest and corporate profits (whether retained or distributed) would be subjected to the same corporate tax burden.

Because of differences in taxation under the individual income tax, however, this approach would eliminate the tax bias between debt and equity under the corporate income tax only to the extent that the return to equity is taxed as a dividend. To the extent that the return to equity is taxed as a capital gain, and so benefits from deferral (and possibly the tax-free step-up in basis at death), equity would have a tax advantage over debt, whose return (i.e., interest) does not benefit from deferral. The extent of the tax bias, however, might well be smaller than the bias that exists under current law. By taxing interest at a lower rate, this approach would create a tax bias in favor of debt financing for non-corporate businesses.

Without further modification, this approach would increase the marginal effective tax rate on new investment because it would raise the tax burden on debt-financed corporate investment. In this way it differs fundamentally from the approach of allowing shareholders to exclude dividends, which would lower the marginal effective tax rate on new investment. This approach could, of course, be combined with other options to lower the effective tax rate on corporate investment, such as lowering the corporate tax rate or providing faster write-offs of investment. In addition, by lowering the tax rate on interest income, the approach would reduce somewhat the marginal effective tax rate on non-corporate business investment and on owner-occupied housing, to the extent that such investment is financed by borrowing. This would tend to increase the tax bias against investment in the corporate sector, but would also partially offset any increase in the overall economy-wide marginal effective tax rate.

This approach would create some compliance and administrative complexities. For example, corporations and tax authorities would need to distinguish between interest income received by corporations from other domestically taxed corporations and interest income received from other entities.119 In addition, interest would need to be carefully distinguished from rent or royalty income. Under current law, such rent and royalty income is taxed similarly to interest income. Under this approach, however, rents and royalties would be taxed at a higher rate (unless the recipient were tax-exempt), but they would be deductible expenses at the corporate level. Thus, the approach would put increased pressure on current rules designed to classify income correctly.

Financial institutions often earn substantial interest income from their holdings of corporate securities - interest that would not be taxed under this approach. This income would be used to pay non-deductible interest expense to depositors and other providers of borrowed funds, in addition to paying deductible wages and other costs associated with providing specific financial services. Under this approach, such firms could be left with a permanently negative tax base because of their non-interest expenses such as the cost of computers, utilities, and bank facilities. Existing tax rules allow operating losses to be carried backward or forward, but such a solution fails altogether if net taxable amounts are permanently negative. Such financial institutions could merge with other enterprises possessing positive tax liabilities in order to be able to obtain the tax value of the measured expenses - but such a solution means that merger activity would be tax-driven, and possibly inefficient. Financial institutions could also possibly recharacterize a portion of interest income received from corporate sources as taxable fees-for-services (which would be deductible to the payor corporations), but the extent to which this could or would occur is uncertain. Other self-help would be available in the form of substituting taxable credit market securities (i.e., Treasury bonds, home mortgages, and foreign corporate bonds) for domestic corporate debt securities.120



C. Taxation of international income

As discussed in Chapter III, the current U.S. system for taxing international income is a hybrid, containing elements of both worldwide and territorial systems. Generally, U.S. corporations are taxed on all their income whether earned in the United States or abroad; that is, corporations are taxed on their income on a worldwide basis. However, U.S. parent corporations with foreign subsidiaries are generally not taxed by the United States on the active business income of their foreign subsidiaries until such income is repatriated as a dividend. Until that time, U.S. tax on that foreign source income is generally deferred, subject to anti-deferral rules. To alleviate the double taxation of foreign income, the United States allows a credit against U.S. tax for foreign taxes paid. The foreign tax credit is generally limited to the U.S. tax liability on a taxpayer's foreign source income in a particular category.



1. Subpart F anti-deferral rules



Background

The deferral of U.S. taxation of the earnings of foreign subsidiaries is limited by certain anti-deferral regimes, such as subpart F (so named for its place in the Internal Revenue Code), which impose current U.S. taxation on certain types of income earned by certain foreign corporations.

The subpart F rules apply to controlled foreign corporations (CFCs) and their U.S. shareholders. Generally, a foreign corporation is a CFC if more than 50 percent of the vote or value of the corporation's stock is owned (directly, indirectly, or constructively) by U.S. persons that own at least 10 percent of the voting stock of the corporation (U.S. shareholders). Each U.S. shareholder must currently include in income for U.S. purposes its pro rata share of the CFC's subpart F income, regardless of whether the income is distributed by the CFC. Subpart F income generally includes passive and other types of highly mobile income, including so-called "foreign base company income," which includes dividends, interest, rents, and royalties, as well as income from certain sales and services transactions with related parties.



The changing economic context in which the anti-deferral rules operate

Subpart F was enacted in the early 1960s, at a time when U.S. policymakers became concerned that U.S. multinational corporations were shifting their operations offshore to defer, or even avoid, U.S. income tax. The dominant position of the United States in global markets at that time made competition between foreign multinationals and U.S.-based multinationals relatively unimportant in considering international tax policy.

Subpart F represented a compromise that eliminated deferral for passive investment income as well as income generated through so-called "foreign base companies" that were thought to shift income from manufacturing and selling products and from services out of the country in which the actual business activity took place to a lower-tax jurisdiction. In an environment where the United States was the world's globally dominant economic power, subpart F was enacted to prevent "deflection" of income to low-tax jurisdictions not only from the United States, but also from other hightax developed countries. Forty-five years after it was first enacted, subpart F remains the centerpiece of U.S. taxation of cross-border corporate income.

The emergence of a more integrated global economy and changes in the position of the United States within that global economy may have eroded the economic policy rationale for concern with deflection of income from high-tax developed countries to low-tax jurisdictions. The United States is less economically dominant today than it was when subpart F was enacted. In 1960, the United States accounted for 34 percent of worldwide output.121 In 2006, the United States accounted for only 27.4 percent of worldwide output. In 1960, 18 of the world's 20 largest companies ranked by sales were U.S. companies. By 2006, that number had fallen to 10. The U.S. share of total worldwide outbound foreign direct investment (FDI) fell from 36 percent in 1980 to 19 percent in 2006.122 By almost any measure, the United States today is less economically dominant than it was 45 years ago.

At the same time that the United States has become less economically dominant, U.S. prosperity has become increasingly tied to the success of U.S. business in the global economy. The U.S. economy is much more reliant on cross-border trade and investment today than it was 45 years ago, in large measure because of the growth of other economies around the world. U.S. multinational groups' sales and income from foreign operations have grown much more rapidly than sales and income from domestic operations over the last 20 years. According to the Bureau of Economic Analysis, between 1988 and 2004, U.S. multinational groups' sales made through majority-owned foreign affiliates increased from 33 percent to 47 percent of parent sales. Over this period, sales made through majority-owned foreign affiliates increased 254 percent, while parent sales increased only 147 percent.123 The reduced U.S. dominance in the world economy combined with the increase in international trade and increasing foreign share of sales of U.S. multinational groups mean that the importance of U.S. competitiveness to the well-being of' U.S. companies, workers, and investors has increased over time and likely will continue to increase.

In addition, in an environment where the most relevant competitors of U.S. multinational corporations are non-U.S. multinational corporations rather than other U.S. multinational corporations, U.S. international tax policy must take into account how non-U.S. multinational corporations operate and are taxed. Growing cross-border trade and investment have increased the legitimate need for multinational groups to manage their overseas activities through regional management and finance centers, and to move products, services, and funds across a global structure in a coordinated and efficient manner. Moreover, 1960s-era concerns about deflection of income from other high-tax countries to low-tax countries may now be less relevant for U.S. tax policy both because of the increased use by other countries of measures to combat income deflection and because of the increased competition U.S.-based multinational corporations face from non-U.S. multinational firms. Thus, it may be desirable to modify the subpart F rules so that U.S. companies may compete more effectively with foreign-based multinational corporations in the global economy.



Approaches for modifying subpart F anti-deferral rules



Amend the foreign base company sales and services rules for certain sales and services between CFCs and related parties

Under this approach, the foreign base company sales and services income definitions would be modified to exclude income from transactions between a CFC and a foreign related party. Thus, for example, a distribution company that purchases goods from a related party in a neighboring country and sells those goods to consumers located in third countries would no longer have foreign base company sales income as a result of those activities. This approach would allow U.S. multinational corporations to structure their overseas services and distribution networks more efficiently. The rules relating to foreign base company sales and services income would otherwise remain unchanged and thus the rules with respect to U.S.-to-foreign transactions would remain as a backstop to prevent the U.S. tax base from being shifted to low- or no-tax jurisdictions.



Make permanent the current temporary subpart F "look-through" rules for dividends, interest, rents, and royalties paid between related CFCs

Current law provides a temporary exception from certain foreign base company income rules for certain dividends, interest, rents, and royalties received or accrued by one CFC from another CFC that is a related person. The temporary "look-through" exception applies to taxable years of foreign corporations beginning after December 31, 2005, and before January 1, 2009, and to taxable years of U.S. shareholders with or within which such taxable years of the foreign corporations end. This approach would make the current temporary rule permanent, allowing U.S. multinational corporations to fund and to operate their overseas groups more efficiently.



Make permanent the current "active financing" exception for certain income earned in banking, financing, or insurance business

The "active financing" exception provides that qualified banking or financing income of an eligible CFC and qualified insurance income of a qualified CFC generally is not subpart F income. The exceptions apply to taxable years of foreign corporations beginning after December 31, 1998, and before January 1, 2009, and to taxable years of U.S. shareholders with or within which such taxable years of the foreign corporations end. This approach would make the temporary active financing exception permanent, giving U.S. financial services companies needed certainty.



2. Simplifying foreign tax rules for small businesses

Globalization brings more U.S. businesses into the global economy each year. As a result, provisions such as subpart F, which was originally intended to affect large multinational corporations almost exclusively, increasingly affect small and mediumsized U.S. businesses. Moreover, the complexity of the foreign tax credit and antideferral rules can create costly compliance and enforcement challenges. Notwithstanding the policy considerations that may continue to weigh in favor of maintaining a subpart F regime or foreign tax credit limitations, some relief may be appropriate for those U.S. businesses that incur relatively small amounts of foreign income and foreign tax, to lower the tax barriers that exist to entering global markets.



Approaches for simplifying foreign tax rules for small businesses



Increase the subpart F de minimis rule

Subpart F currently provides a rule to exempt businesses with a de minimis amount of certain foreign income. Specifically, subpart F provides that no part of a CFC's gross income for the taxable year is treated as foreign base company income or insurance income if the sum of the foreign base company income and insurance income for the taxable year is less than 5 percent of gross income or $1 million, whichever is lower (commonly referred to as the "subpart F de minimis rule"). Increasing the de minimis threshold would permit smaller companies to earn foreign base company income and insurance income without becoming subject to the complicated subpart F rules. Under this approach, the subpart F de minimis rule threshold would be increased to the lesser of 5 percent of gross income or $5 million.



Simplify the foreign tax credit rules for individuals and corporations that incur relatively small amounts of foreign tax on their active business income

This approach would permit individuals and corporations that incur no more than $5,000 in foreign tax on their foreign source income attributable to active business operations to credit those foreign taxes without limitation. This approach would allow a taxpayer to elect to eliminate the calculation of the foreign tax credit limitation if the taxpayer incurs small amounts of foreign tax on foreign source active business income. Individuals could continue to elect to eliminate the foreign tax credit limitation on their foreign passive income for which they paid a small amount of foreign tax.



3. Modifying the taxation of Americans who live and work outside the United States



Background

Under current law, qualified individuals may elect to exclude from gross income a limited amount of foreign earned income and housing costs. The maximum exclusion (the foreign earned income limit) is $87,500 for 2007 and is indexed for inflation. Complex rules apply for determining the maximum amount of the housing exclusion (housing cost limitation).

In order to qualify for the exclusion, an individual must have a tax home in a foreign country and be either: (i) a U.S. citizen who is a bona fide resident of a foreign country for an uninterrupted period that includes an entire taxable year, or (ii) a U.S. citizen or resident present overseas for 330 days out of any period of 12 consecutive months. Foreign earned income is generally compensation earned for personal services performed by the taxpayer. A taxpayer may not claim exclusions, deductions, or credits that are properly allocable or chargeable to amounts that are excluded from gross income under these rules.

U.S. individuals, like U.S. corporations, increasingly cross borders in the ordinary course of participating in the global economy. The current rules governing taxation of their earned income engender substantial complexity tied to the exact location where they work and reside. These rules also frequently result in U.S. individuals incurring a higher overall tax burden than do citizens of other countries, thereby raising the costs of hiring Americans who work overseas and providing an incentive for companies to hire non-U.S. workers. Simplifying and rationalizing these rules would make it easier for Americans working overseas to comply with the complex tax, filing, and payment rules, while also simplifying the administration of those rules by the government.



Approach for individuals living and working outside the United States



Simplify and modify the foreign earned income and housing cost exclusion

The approach would combine the current foreign earned income limitation and housing cost limitation into a new, higher overall limitation of $200,000 for both foreign earned income and housing costs (indexed for inflation). The approach would eliminate the complex rules for determining the housing cost limitation.



D. Tax treatment of losses

The U.S. tax system treats corporate income and losses asymmetrically. A corporation pays tax on its income, but does not receive a tax refund for the tax value of its losses. Subject to various limitations, losses generally can be carried back to obtain a refund of taxes paid in earlier years and carried forward to offset taxes in subsequent years. Because of the time value of money, losses carried forward to future years are worth less than losses that are claimed when they are incurred. As a result, a corporation that has a loss carryforward effectively receives only a partial deduction of its losses. Furthermore, some losses that are carried forward have no value because the corporation never generates sufficient income to use them, and they expire unused.

The current asymmetric treatment of loss and gains creates several economic distortions. It discourages entrepreneurial activity and risk taking because the government takes a full share of the income of a profitable investment, but restricts deductions of losses when the investment fails. Loss restrictions create inefficiencies in investment decisions by increasing uncertainties about the tax effects of new investments. For firms with large loss carryovers, the inability to benefit from deductions for accelerated depreciation reduces the incentive to invest compared to a taxpaying firm that can fully use all its deductions. On the other hand, firms with persistent loss carryovers face a low marginal tax rate on the returns from new profitable investments. Firms are unlikely to know their future tax rates and ability to use loss carryforwards with certainty and loss carryforwards may expire unused. The resulting uncertain tax environment and uneven playing field between firms with and without loss carryforwards may result in both lower total investment and an inefficient allocation of the investment that does occur. The current rules for losses (e.g., lack of refundability, limited carryover, character of income, no interest paid on carryovers) also undermine the effectiveness of the tax system as an automatic stabilizer during business cycles by not providing refunds in periods of low economic activity and lowering taxes during periods of high economic activity. Furthermore, the current rules for losses encourage taxpayers to arrange business transactions and to expend resources in tax planning to alter the character of losses and gains to avoid the loss restrictions.

Analysis of data from corporate income tax returns for 1993 to 2003 indicates the significance of loss restrictions. Those data show that: (1) 50 percent to 60 percent of tax losses are used over a 10-year period as a carryback refund or a loss carryforward; (2) 10 percent to 20 percent remain to be used; and (3) 25 percent to 30 percent are never used.124 Thus, many corporations incur a significant penalty from the present restrictions on tax losses due to their inability to use the loss carryovers in a timely manner.

The distortions created by the present restrictions on losses could be addressed by allowing losses to be refundable to monetize their value in the current year or to allow losses to be carried forward with interest to reflect the opportunity cost of funds and the erosion in real value. The interest payment on losses that are carried forward would offset the decline in the value of unused losses over time, assuming the interest payment equals the opportunity cost of the funds. However, these options might create problems with fraudulent refund claims. Further, eliminating or relaxing restrictions on capital losses would allow taxpayers to "cherry pick" by realizing capital losses but not capital gains, and provide other planning opportunities. Nevertheless, more limited and targeted changes to the current loss rules might help to reduce economic distortions in certain cases, without creating widespread administrative and enforcement problems.



The current tax treatment of losses

Current law provides different restrictions on the use of losses depending upon the character of the loss (i.e., whether the loss is an ordinary loss from business operations or a capital loss). An ordinary operating loss (usually referred to as a net operation loss (NOL)) typically occurs when a corporation's deductions exceed its gross income. A capital loss occurs when an asset is sold or exchanged for less than its tax basis, which is generally the original cost less any depreciation claimed.

A corporation that incurs an NOL generally is not entitled to a tax refund. Instead, the NOLs generally can be carried back two years prior to the loss year and carried forward 20 years, without interest, to offset taxable income in those years.125 Loss carrybacks essentially allow a corporation to recover in the loss year previously paid corporate income taxes, and loss carryforwards allow it to reduce future taxes. Thus, allowing losses to be carried back and forward provides a form of income averaging. After 20 years, unused NOL carryforwards expire.

Capital losses are treated differently from ordinary losses. Capital gains and losses are taxed upon realization (i.e., the gains or losses are included in the tax base only when the asset is sold). Because taxpayers can generally choose when to have capital gains and losses included in their taxable income, capital losses can only be deducted against capital gains (but not ordinary income). Otherwise, taxpayers would reduce their tax liability by realizing any capital losses each year, while postponing the realization of gains (referred to as "cherry-picking"). Corporations with net capital losses after subtracting capital losses from capital gains can carry the capital losses back to the three years prior to the loss year (provided the capital losses do not cause or increase a net operating loss in the carryback year) or forward for the subsequent five years to offset capital gains. After five years, any unused capital loss carryforwards expire.126

Because the realization of capital gains and losses is more discretionary than the recognition of ordinary income and loss, ordinary losses are allowed to offset capital gain income, but capital losses are not allowed to offset ordinary income.127



How are losses treated in G-7 countries?

No G-7 country offers a refund for losses or provides interest on loss carryforwards (Table 4.7). All of the G-7 countries, with the exception of Italy, allow ordinary losses to be carried back for at least one year. For the G-7 countries that allow carryback, the number of carryback years ranges from one to three years.128 Three G-7 countries allow ordinary losses to be carried forward indefinitely. While a loss that can be carried back may create a refund in the year the loss is incurred, losses that can be carried forward for 20 years or more without interest have a reduced value.

There is considerable variation in the treatment of capital losses among the G-7 countries reflecting differences in their tax and financial institutions. Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States do not allow capital losses to reduce ordinary income. France, Germany, Italy, and Japan generally treat capital gains and losses the same as ordinary income and losses, and thus ordinary income and capital gains and losses can be offsetting. However, three of these countries (France, Germany, and Italy) do not allow deduction of capital losses from the disposition of qualifying share holdings because these countries provide a large exemption for any capital gains from such sales.
Table 4.7: Tax Treatment of Corporate Losses in G-7 Countries



___________________________________________________________________________________
Ordinary Losses Capital Losses


______________________________________________________________
Can
Capital
Losses
Carryback Offset
Carryforward Ordinary Carryback Carryforward
Period Period Income? Period Period

___________________________________________________________________________________
Canada a 3 years 20 years No 3 years Indefinite

France b 3 years Indefinite Yes 3 years Indefinite

Germany c 1 year Indefinite Yes 1 year Indefinite

Italy d None 5 years Yes None 5 years

Japan e 1 year 7 years Yes 1 year 7 years

United Kingdom f 1 year Indefinite No None Indefinite

United States 2 years 20 years No 3 years 5 years

___________________________________________________________________________________
Note: Most countries have restrictions on the use of losses from acquired firms.

a Only 50 percent of capital gains (losses) are includible (deductible) from
income. Capital losses can only be used to reduce capital gains not ordinary
income, unless the loss is attributable to shares or debt of a small business
corporation. A small business corporation is a Canadian controlled private
corporation that uses substantially all its assets in an active business carried
on primarily in Canada.

b The operating loss carryback does not result in a direct refund of the tax
payable in earlier years. Instead, the company is granted a tax credit that can be
set off against corporate income tax payable in the five years following the
loss-making year; any balance is then refunded to the company. Capital losses are
generally treated as ordinary losses. Under the participation exemption, 95
percent of the gains derived from the disposition of qualifying shares are exempt
from tax. Capital losses arising on the sale of a shareholding qualifying for a
participation exemption are not deductible.

c Losses may only be offset against positive taxable income, to €1million without
limitation per year. A positive taxable income exceeding €1million in a year may
only be offset against existing tax-loss carryforwards in the amount of 60
percent. Capital gains are, in general, treated as ordinary income and taxed at
ordinary rates (except gains from the sale of shares). Capital gains from the sale
of shareholdings between corporations are tax-exempt in Germany. Capital losses
arising on the sale of shareholdings are not deductible.

d If a loss is derived in the first 3 tax years from the beginning of the
company's business activity, it may be carried forward indefinitely. Capital gains
are generally treated as ordinary income. Capital gains derived from the sale of
participations, however, are taxed at a reduced rate. Capital losses arising on
the sale of a shareholding qualifying for a participation exemption are not
deductible.

e Capital gains are treated as ordinary income.

f Major changes in the activities of the company may lead to there being a new
trade. Any loss carryforward is set off against the earliest available trading
profits. Alternatively, a trading loss may be offset against the other income of
the company of the same or preceding year and against capital gains of the same
year. The set-off against capital gains is restricted to the amount that cannot be
set off against the taxpayer's income of that year. Terminal losses may be carried
back for 3 years and set off against profits of any description. Any other
non-trading income losses cannot be set off against trading profits.

Source: IBFD (2006) and IBFD (2007).



Restricting the use of losses increases the effective tax rate on a new investment, which raises the cost of capital relative to a system that features refundable losses. For example, a start-up corporation may have significant capital expenditures but little initial revenue. If the corporation faces the prospect of a long period of losses before it becomes profitable, the tax benefits from expensing or accelerated depreciation of capital investments would be substantially delayed. The current tax system discourages corporations from undertaking projects that are expected to have many years of losses before they become profitable.129

A tax system without refundability also leads to the unequal tax treatment of investment decisions across corporations. Corporations that have loss carryforwards have a low marginal tax rate, and might have a greater incentive to invest than would a taxable corporation facing a higher marginal tax rate. However, the inability to use accelerated tax depreciation deductions can raise the cost of capital and reduce a loss corporation's incentive to invest compared to a corporation that can fully use all deductions. The difference in investment incentives between loss and profit corporations depends on the size and expected duration of the loss carryforward and the degree of acceleration of tax depreciation.130

The current rules for losses also undermine the effect of the tax system as an automatic stabilizer, by not providing refunds during periods of low economic activity and lowering taxes during periods of high economic activity.131 Corporations are more likely to be faced with losses during periods of low economic activity. Allowing loss refundabililty would increase loss corporations' cash flow during downturns and reduce national tax payments. Under current law, corporations are more likely to use loss carryforwards during periods of high economic activity, reducing their tax liability. Loss refundability would eliminate the system of loss carryfowards and thereby lead to an increase in tax payments during peak economic activity. Allowing loss refundability would increase the stabilizing effect of the tax system.

Loss restrictions also can encourage uneconomic mergers, as corporations combine to secure income against which losses can be deducted as a way to monetize the tax value of the losses.132 In addition, they can encourage taxpayers to expend resources to plan and arrange business transactions in ways that alter the character of losses, for example, to allow losses to be characterized as ordinary losses, rather than capital losses, to offset ordinary income. Taxpayers with unused capital losses may have an incentive to engage in tax planning that generates income characterized as capital gains. The use of complicated tax strategies to avoid loss restrictions also makes it more difficult for the government to administer and enforce the tax rules.



Approaches for addressing the distortions caused by loss restrictions

The economic distortions caused by the current tax rules regarding the use of losses could be addressed by allowing losses to be refundable. Alternatively, the economic distortions could be reduced by relaxing the restrictions on the use of losses, such as by allowing interest on loss carryforwards or lengthening the time periods for loss carrybacks and carryforwards.133



Allow refundability of losses

Allowing losses to be refundable would increase investment in risky ventures and encourage entrepreneurship, provide more uniform investment incentives, and allow fewer resources to be wasted in efforts to plan around the existing rules. Allowing refundability of losses, however, would raise significant administrative and tax policy concerns. The current rules help to reduce the incentive for taxpayers to claim inappropriate tax refunds by overstating losses.134 In addition, loss restrictions help to limit taxpayer manipulation of the realization-based system for assessing taxes on capital gains.

A potential argument against refundability is that it would encourage unprofitable or inefficient businesses. This argument is weak on several grounds. The current tax system does not prevent the use of losses from inefficient or uneconomic business activities as long as the taxpayer has positive income from other sources. This argument also ignores the fact that most businesses encounter negative cash flow in the initial phases of an investment, regardless of their overall profitability over time. Any measure of revenues and expenses for a one-year period is unlikely to be an appropriate indicator of a corporation's profitability and of its long-run viability. Finally, refundability by itself does not encourage uneconomic business operations indefinitely because the tax refunds would always be less than the amount of the corporation's pre-tax losses.

Lack of refundability is sometimes justified as a way to limit losses that arise from the use of tax preferences. Loss restrictions, however, are a complicated and inefficient way to limit tax preferences.

The revenue cost of reforms that move toward refundability of losses could be substantial. For example, the current stock of available NOLs is estimated to be over $1 trillion.135 Nevertheless, to the extent that losses would otherwise be used, the effect on tax revenues would largely be reflected in the timing of payments. The cost of moving to refundability could be reduced by limiting the refunds to losses that occur after enactment and the incentive effects would not be reduced by imposing such a limit.



Alternative approaches to full refundability



Provide interest on loss carryforwards

Under this approach, a corporation would increase the amount of loss carried forward each year by a stated interest rate. Allowing interest on loss carryforwards would mitigate the effect that loss restrictions have on new investments. For losses that eventually are realized, the payment of interest would reduce the tax penalty on risky investments created by the existing loss restrictions because the interest payment would compensate the taxpayer for waiting to realize his loss.

Providing interest on losses, however, does not alleviate the risk of losing carryforwards entirely if a corporation goes out of business. More importantly, under a realization-based system there is a fundamental inconsistency in paying interest on realized losses while not charging interest on deferred gains. This inconsistency could be exploited by taxpayers who cherry-pick losses and engage in other tax planning designed to generate tax losses and would lead to disputes between the taxpayers and the government.



Allow losses to be deducted regardless of the character of income

While current law allows ordinary NOLs to offset capital gains income, capital losses cannot be used to offset ordinary income. Thus, a business with overall losses taking into account both net operating income and capital losses can still end up paying income tax. One approach would be to allow capital losses to offset ordinary income under certain circumstances.

A major reason that current law does not allow capital losses to offset ordinary income is that the realization of capital gains and capital losses is largely discretionary. Thus, taxpayers could reduce taxes paid by realizing only capital losses, while capital gains on assets that had appreciated in value would not be realized, and the tax liability could be deferred, sometimes for indefinite periods. Corporations could structure such transactions so as to reduce corporate taxes substantially. To lessen such tax planning, a limited deduction of capital losses against ordinary income could be provided. Allowing a modest amount of capital losses to offset ordinary income, such as $25,000 or $50,000, would be comparable to the deduction of up to $3,000 in capital losses allowed for individuals against ordinary income, and would provide simplification benefits for small corporations with small amounts of capital losses.



Lengthening carryback and carryforward periods

A more attractive approach may be to lengthen the carryback and carryforward periods. Under current law, a significant amount of corporate capital losses expire undeducted because the carryforward period is only five years. The deduction of NOLs is often deferred because the carryback period is only two years.136 Both issues could be addressed by providing a uniform carryback period of three to five years and a carryforward period of 20 years that would apply for both capital losses and NOLs.137 This approach would improve the ability of corporations to deduct losses and would not appear to raise significant administrative problems.



E. Book-tax conformity

Using book income as the basis for measuring taxable business income is frequently cited as a remedy for the complexity of the current corporate tax regime. Tax rules have diverged from financial accounting rules over time due to differing goals for each system. Accounting rules attempt to represent income fairly for investors and creditors, while the tax law seeks to raise revenue while balancing equity and efficiency concerns. Maintaining different reporting systems requires corporations to incur substantial costs to keep two sets of books and reconcile between the two. In addition, many advocates assert that simply changing the tax base to book income could result in a significant revenue-neutral reduction in the tax rate. This section considers the benefits and risks of adopting a single book system for both financial and tax reporting purposes.



Book and tax income measures and their differences

Book-tax differences have existed for as long as the corporate income tax has existed. To a large extent, these differences reflect the fundamentally different goals of the two income measurement systems. The primary goal of financial accounting is to provide useful information to management, shareholders, and creditors, and the major responsibility of the financial regulators is to protect these parties from being misled through the overstatement of income. The primary goal of the income tax system, in contrast, is the equitable and efficient collection of revenue, and the major responsibility of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is to protect the public fisc. In carrying out that responsibility, the IRS is particularly concerned with the understatement of income. It is quite apparent, then, that the goals of the financial regulators and those of the IRS are not always compatible.

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has the authority to prescribe accounting and other reporting standards for publicly traded firms, but it has generally ceded rulemaking to the private sector, through the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), which was established in 1973 to set accounting standards. Statements of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 1 and No. 2 require that financial accounting provide information useful to investors and creditors in making investment and other decisions about firms.

In contrast to many tax measures, financial accounting does not require uniformity across firms. While managers may have discretion in reporting book income in certain circumstances, recent legislation and pronouncements have limited the discretion granted to firms in an effort to provide better consistency across industries.138 Nonetheless, managers of firms within the same industry still retain some discretion and may recognize different amounts of revenue or expense to provide more complete information on their firms' unique circumstances to their respective shareholders. Similarly, there can be significantly different treatments across industries. Although the tax system also allows different methods of accounting, financial accounting may allow greater variances when it comes to choosing methods of accounting.

Financial accounting requires more evidence and certainty for recognizing gain contingencies than for recognizing loss contingencies. Once revenues are recognized for book purposes, however, accounting rules seek to match all expenses against the revenue they generate in the current period. As such, even contingent losses are recorded when they are probable and estimable. The accounting principles that require businesses to accrue losses sooner than they can recognize gains could permit taxpayers to use their discretion to decrease the tax base.

In contrast, the primary objective of the tax code is to collect revenues to fund governmental expenditures. To enable the IRS to monitor compliance and collection, the tax law allows fewer choices of accounting methods to determine taxable income than are available to determine financial reporting income. For example, the tax law does not allow certain expenses to be deducted when they are estimated for financial accounting, such as reserves for warranty claims and bad debts. Likewise, the tax law does not permit the deferral of income on certain types of sales that have a right-to-return or price protection. Unlike the broad standards for accounting consistency, the tax code requires uniformity across firms.

While the primary purpose of tax law is to raise government revenue, it has also become a means for providing economic incentives to engage in activities deemed to be economically or socially desirable. Thus, the tax law has rules that intentionally reduce net income in certain cases.



Recent evidence on book-tax differences

Book-tax differences dramatically increased during the 1990s (Chart 4.1).139 A number of factors - the strong economy, the increasing use of stock options that provided large tax deductions without book expensing, and the combination of tax shelters and special purpose entities driving a wedge between book and tax expenses and income - all contributed to a steady growth in the book-tax disparity by the late 1990s. However, recent evidence suggests that this disparity varies substantially from year to year. Thus, although in the late 1990s it appeared that large amounts of book income were not included in the U.S. tax base, recent variability and institutional changes make it far less certain whether the measures used to estimate the book-tax disparity provide an accurate picture of a forward-looking book-income base as described below.

[Graphic will be available December 24, 2007.-cch]



Potential benefits and costs of measuring income using financial accounting rules

A significant benefit of using book income as the tax base is that corporations would no longer have to keep a second set of books for tax purposes. Eliminating this requirement could save corporations substantial recordkeeping costs and decrease the role of tax legislation and the costs of enforcement.

Going forward the government could build on the massive investment that has been made in measuring corporate income according to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). The expanded apparatus now in place following the Sarbanes-Oxley Act represents a huge societal investment in producing a reliable measure of corporate income. Although the audit failures and reporting errors related to Enron and WorldCom initially focused attention on overstated earnings, the auditing changes imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board also require more complete audit evidence to support reserves. These changes to improve reliability should make earnings manipulation in either direction more difficult. Sufficient experience does not yet exist to evaluate how resistant book income will be to manipulation under these new rules. As the accounting and tax communities become familiar with reported earnings under these auditing rules, the opportunities for incremental increases in conformity between book and tax income could be explored.

Under a conformed system, a manager's incentive to report more book income to investors is in conflict with the incentive to pay less tax. As such, a conformed system could temper the incentives to engage in aggressive tax planning, including the types of corporate tax shelters that currently purport to generate tax losses without book losses. A conformed system also could temper managers' incentives to overstate income in reports to shareholders, thereby discouraging some of the corporate-governance problems that led to the collapse of Enron and other large corporations.140

It is unclear, however, whether the SEC is in a position to protect the tax base from eroding as effectively as it protects shareholders and creditors from overstated earnings. Many corporations might respond to a book income tax base by seeking to decrease book income. Managers might find ways other than official income measures to communicate profitability to investors. If so, new costs might arise related to communicating free cash flow and other pro-forma earnings to analysts, market participants, and creditors. So while tax and book income might be formally conformed, in practice there could be two reporting regimes, one of which will effectively have no formal rules. Thus, it is possible that taxing book income could impair the competitiveness of the flagship financial reporting system that makes the U.S. capital market the strongest in the world, without leading to an increase in tax collections. Indeed, certain evidence from European countries suggests that conformity between book and tax income measures has reduced the reliability of book reporting in these countries.141

Moreover, financial accounting has increasingly moved from historical cost accounting toward accrual accounting for assets and liabilities based on their fair market values, with increases and decreases in values recorded as income and expense. Fair value accounting seeks relevance even at the risk of some reliability and certainty. As such, fair value accounting is in stark contrast to tax accounting, which emphasizes certainty and so is based on historical values and the realization principle. Valuation is a judgment call, and the SEC generally does not challenge a firm's valuation if there is a reasonable basis for the value. Using unchallenged financial accounting valuations may place government tax revenues at risk.

Financial accounting also requires more evidence and certainty for recognizing gain contingencies than for recognizing loss contingencies. This rule would tend to reduce tax collections. The accounting principles that require accruing losses sooner than gains also would permit corporate taxpayers to use management discretion to decrease the tax base.

Furthermore, taxing book income would be a fundamental change in how businesses are taxed. As such, there are significant difficulties and uncertainties in developing and moving to such a system. A regulatory and enforcement system for nonpublic firms would need to be developed. Even more importantly, the relationship between FASB/SEC, the Congress, the Treasury Department/IRS, and the federal courts would have to be determined. For example, under a book-tax regime, Congress presumably would no longer have authority over the income tax system other than to set tax rates. In addition, presumably the Treasury Department and the IRS would not have authority to interpret the tax laws, but would cede that responsibility to the FASB and the SEC. It is likely that the process of determining lines of authority and review would be difficult and lengthy. It also seems plausible that over time Congress would gradually reassert itself in the tax policy process, regardless of how clean the break might have been initially. This reassertion raises the possibility that the tax system would then begin to deviate from the financial accounting system, reducing the benefits of conformity.



Revenue-neutral tax rate for a book income tax regime

In aggregate, book income has exceeded taxable income by 20 percent to 30 percent in recent years. This disparity has led a number of commentators to argue that conforming taxable income to book rules should allow a large reduction in the corporate tax rate while raising the same revenue. Former IRS Commissioner Charles Rossotti suggested that the corporate tax rate could be lowered to 25 percent under such a conformed book-tax system.142 While a rate of 25 percent seems possible based on simple tabulations of the late 1990s, for several reasons these calculations do not hold up to closer scrutiny. In fact, the forward looking revenue-neutral tax rate would be substantially higher than 25 percent.

Taking the data that underlies the 25-percent figure above in order to calculate the implied tax rate on book income necessary to match the revenue from a 35-percent tax on net income, results in a rate that would vary between 18 percent and 43 percent over the 1990 to 2005 period. The average rate over this 16-year period is 29 percent.143 While reflective of recent history, this value may not be informative of a prospective tax on book income. To reflect the anticipated future better, several adjustments are necessary to this 29-percent rate.144

First, to forecast future tax revenue, it is necessary to control for aberrations in the historical data. Both bonus depreciation and stock options reduced taxable income without reducing book income. Because bonus depreciation was a temporary policy, it should not be considered part of the baseline tax system. In addition, accounting rules for options have changed so that they now reduce book income like any other labor compensation.145 Consequently, the historical difference in the treatment of stock options also should not be considered in a forward-looking estimate of the revenue potential of a book-tax base. Controlling for these effects moves the tax and book income measures closer and increases the revenue-neutral tax rate by 3 to 4 percentage points.

Second, book-income measures have been more cyclical historically than taxincome measures. Because of this volatility, estimates are very sensitive to the time period selected for analysis and the composition of the sample of firms. With a long-time series of firms representative of the entire corporate tax filing population, the 1990s do not appear to be representative in terms of the proportion of firms in a loss position. Relative to an aggregate measure of book income, simulations of how losses will offset positive income imply that the revenue-neutral tax rate on book income needs to be increased by another 1 or 2 percentage points.

Thus, if book income were to become the tax base, the revenue-neutral rate would be between 32 percent and 35 percent, even before considering behavioral responses. It is reasonable to expect, however, that if book income were adopted as the basis for taxation, then reported income would fall for some firms. Most firms currently have incentives to report higher rather than lower book incomes. But once such income is taxed, firms would be expected to use any discretion available to reduce their reported income to lower tax payments and hence increase their after-tax cash flow. While the opportunity and incentives for manipulating book income are uncertain, evidence in the academic literature is consistent with behavior that would require the revenue-neutral tax rate to be increased by a couple of percentage points.

This analysis suggests that the revenue-neutral book-income tax regime would require a tax rate that is not much different from the current tax rate of 35 percent. This system would no longer have accelerated depreciation, tax credits, or any of the other myriad tax incentives of the current system. The recent Treasury Department background paper on business taxation shows that these preferences cost the equivalent of about 8 percentage points of the corporate tax rate.146 Thus, adding these preferences to a book-income regime could force the revenue-neutral rate to be higher than the current rate of 35 percent.

In summary, the risks from adopting book income as the basis for taxation appear to be substantial. While full conformity might not be an appealing template for business tax reform, policymakers should keep in mind the potential simplification benefits of more targeted conformity.



F. Illustrative areas to improve tax administration

Whether or not major reform of the corporate income tax is accomplished, many specific provisions of the current corporate income tax could be reformed so as to reduce complexity and costs of compliance with the tax system. While this chapter discusses a number of potential areas for reform, this section examines two additional areas for consideration, the corporate alternative minimum tax and simplified cash accounting for small business.



1. Corporate alternative minimum tax

Corporations must calculate their tax liability by applying two sets of rules. Corporations compute their tax liability under the regular tax rules, compute their tentative AMT liability under the AMT rules, and pay whichever is greater. The corporate AMT rules have a broader definition of income and a less generous set of deductions than the regular tax rules. Additionally, the corporate AMT may be credited against future regular tax liability, but the credit may not be used to reduce regular tax liability below the tentative minimum AMT.

The corporate AMT is largely a function of timing. Through the rules under the corporate AMT, a corporation's tax liability is increased currently, but it will likely receive the delayed tax benefits at a future time through the AMT credit mechanism. As a result, the corporate AMT largely results in the deferral, but not elimination, of certain favorable tax benefits.



Corporate AMT tax payments

In 2004, corporate AMT payments were $3.4 billion. In contrast, total corporate income tax liability net of credits was $199.3 billion. The total amount of unused AMT credits available equaled $18.8 billion (Table 4.8). The AMT credit figure does not include unallowed nonconventional source fuel credits and unallowed qualified electric vehicle credits, which can be added to a corporation's total available AMT credits. Including these credits, the total amount of available AMT credits in 2004 equaled $29.4 billion (Table 4.9).147

Table 4.9 also shows the amount of AMT credits available by industry in 2004, including unallowed nonconventional fuel credits and unallowed qualified vehicle credits. The industries with the largest amount of AMT credits available in 2004 were manufacturing ($9.9 billion) and finance and insurance ($6.2 billion).
Table 4.8: AMT Credit Use, 1987-2004*



_________________________________________________________________________________
AMT AMT Net AMT AMT Credits
Year Payments Credits (after credits) Balance

_________________________________________________________________________________
$ billions


________________________________________________________________
1987 2.2 - 2.2 2.2

1988 3.4 0.5 2.9 5.1

1989 3.5 0.8 2.7 7.8

1990 8.1 0.7 7.4 15.2

1991 5.3 1.5 3.8 19.0

1992 4.9 2.3 2.6 21.6

1993 4.9 3.1 1.8 23.4

1994 4.5 3.3 1.2 24.6

1995 4.3 4.8 -0.5 24.1

1996 3.8 4.7 -0.9 23.2

1997 3.9 4.1 -0.2 23.0

1998 3.3 3.4 -0.1 22.9

1999 3.0 3.4 -0.4 22.5

2000 3.9 5.2 -1.3 21.2

2001 1.8 3.3 -1.5 19.7

2002 2.5 2.0 0.5 20.2

2003 2.3 3.4 -1.1 19.1

2004 3.4 3.7 -0.3 18.8

Total 69.0 50.2 18.8 -

_________________________________________________________________________________
Note: Data exclude S corporations, regulated investment companies, and real
estate investment trusts.

*Does not include unallowed nonconventional source fuel credit and unallowed
qualified electric vehicle credit.

Source: Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income, Corporate Tax Returns,
1993-2004.



A study of firms in the period from 1995 to 2002 showed that almost 50 percent of the firms paid higher taxes due to the AMT in at least one year, either through direct AMT payments or through limits on the use of tax credits due to the AMT rules. These firms accounted for over 70 percent of all corporate cases examined in this period.148
Table 4.9: Total Corporate AMT Credits Outstanding by Industry in 2004*



____________________________________________________________________________________
Industry Total AMT
Credits
Outstanding
at End of
Year
$
millions

____________________________________________________________________________________
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and Hunting 50

Mining 2,382

Utilities 3,824

Construction 235

Manufacturing 9,931

Wholesale and Retail Trade 1,888

Transportation and Warehousing 1,820

Information 1,070

Finance and Insurance 6,153

Real Estate and Rental and Leasing 529

Professional, Scientific and Technical Services 294

Management of Companies (Holding Companies) 467

Administrative and Support and Waste Management and Remediation
Services 285

Education Services 6

Health Care and Social Assistance 95

Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation 52

Accommodation and Food Services 342

Other Services 18

Total 29,441

____________________________________________________________________________________
Note: Data exclude S corporations, regulated investment companies, and real estate
investment trusts.

*Includes unallowed nonconventional source fuel credit and unallowed qualified
electric vehicle credit.

Source: Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income Corporate Tax Returns, 2004.





Economic effects of the corporate AMT

In addition to its financial effects, the corporate AMT may reduce a firm's investment incentives. In general, deductions for investment projects are taken at a slower rate under the AMT, increasing a firm's cost of capital.149 The AMT might also lessen investment by reducing a firm's cash flow, thereby forcing some corporations to finance investment with costly external funds. The after-tax cost of debt financing is also increased when a firm is paying AMT since interest is deducted at a lower rate than for regular tax purposes. In addition, the AMT reduces the ability of a firm to claim most business tax credits, such as the research and experimentation credit, and may restrict the firm's ability to claim NOL deductions and foreign tax credits. These restrictions may cause the benefit of these credits to be lost permanently if they cannot be used during the carryforward period.

Moreover, the corporate AMT is pro-cyclical. It tends to impose an increased tax burden during an economic downturn, which may result in deeper and prolonged economic weakness by reducing business activity. A study of the AMT found that the odds of a corporation being affected by the AMT increase when the economy slows down. For a 1-percentage point decrease in GDP growth, the odds of being affected by the AMT increase by 7 percent or 0.5 percentage points.150

A company that hires more workers is also likely to increase its chances of being an AMT taxpayer during periods of low profitability. Any activity that reduces net income (such as keeping employees on the payroll during periods of low demand or increasing investment) increases the likelihood of paying AMT because AMT adjustments and preferences become larger relative to the company's net income.

Some may argue that the corporate AMT ensures that corporations pay their fair share of taxes and do not receive disproportionate benefits from special tax provisions. Without the corporate AMT, some corporations would pay no corporate income tax. A study of 2002 tax data, for example, revealed that about 47 percent of firms with positive AMT payments were in a loss situation for regular tax purposes.151 Reductions in tax preferences, however, would be a preferable approach to limit the ability of firms to avoid taxes through special provisions. The corporate AMT is an unnecessarily complex approach for reducing the effects of tax preferences and can affect overall corporate competitiveness.152

The corporate AMT makes corporations perform the expensive and burdensome task of complying with two separate tax systems without raising any significant revenue.153 In 2002, over 13,000 corporations had their taxes increased by the AMT. These 13,000 companies account for a significant amount of total business activity, and they held almost 24 percent of all corporate assets. Even those firms not directly affected by the AMT incurred the extra costs of calculating their tax liability and planning for investments under both the regular tax system and the AMT system. At the same time, the corporate AMT, net of AMT credits claimed for prior year AMT, has raised virtually no revenue over the past several years.

The corporate AMT (unlike the individual AMT) is no longer a significant source of revenue and would be unnecessary as part of a broad tax reform that eliminated the various special business tax provisions. In 2004, corporate AMT receipts equaled $3.4 billion while AMT credits equaled $3.7 billion. Annual net minimum taxes (AMT payments minus AMT credits) have been positive only once since 1995. However, in 2004 there were $29.4 billion in AMT credits that were carried forward to 2005. These carryover credits would have to be addressed as part of any major change to the business tax system.



2. Simplified cash accounting for small businesses

Studies of the tax-compliance burden imposed on business consistently find that small firms bear a larger burden relative to their size than do larger firms.154 One approach for simplifying the recordkeeping burden imposed on small taxpayers without encouraging tax avoidance and causing revenue losses would be to permit simpler accounting methods such as the limited use of "simplified cash accounting" by small business taxpayers. Simplification could also permit full expensing of depreciable property, other than buildings, for certain small businesses. Such simplification would go well beyond the current cash-accounting rules in reducing the burden of tax compliance on many small businesses.



Compliance burden of small businesses

Research on the tax-compliance costs of small, medium, and large firms have at least two findings in common: (1) total costs of compliance rise with the size of the business, but (2) costs relative to size (e.g., per employee or as a percentage of assets) fall as size increases. With a significant amount of fixed costs, the compliance burden, therefore, is sometimes described as being "regressive."

As an example of these findings, Table 4.10 provides results from a study of small partnerships, S corporations, and C corporations (under $10 million in assets) in 2003 and 2004, the only systematic study of tax compliance costs of small businesses in the United States.155 The table presents results for the authors' "high" and "low" estimates of annual time and money burden, and an aggregate estimate with time monetized at $25 per hour. Both average time and money spent on tax compliance rise with the size of the firm. However, relative to assets, both money burden and total burden with time monetized fall as asset size increases. These qualitative conclusions are robust with other measures of size examined, and other monetization rates. The authors interpret the results as suggesting that "small businesses face significant fixed compliance costs combined with decreasing marginal costs as the business grows."156 This suggestion is bolstered by the authors' survey results, which show that the vast majority of time burden (85 percent) is spent in recordkeeping activities, of which accounting is a part.
Table 4.10: Tax Compliance Burden by Asset Size, 2003 and 2004: Annual Average and as Percent of

Assets (High and Low Estimates)


___________________________________________________________________________
Time Burden Money Burden Money Burden Time and
Money
Burden (Time

Monetized at

Size of Total Assets $25/hr)


____________________________________________________
Average Average Percent of Percent of
(Hours) (Dollars) Assets Assets

Low - High Low - High Low - High Low - High

___________________________________________________________________________
$0 or Less 199- 233 1,301- 1,430 n.a.- n.a. n.a.- n.a.

Less than $10,000 168- 203 1,325- 1,651 35.1- 43.7 146.6- 178.3

$10,000 - $20,000 156- 159 1,694- 1,767 11.6- 12.1 38.3- 39.3

$20,000 - $50,000 200- 229 1,715- 1,897 5.0- 5.5 19.6- 22.2

$50,000 to $100,000 206- 212 1,991- 2,131 2.7- 2.9 9.8- 10.2

$100,000 - $500,000 258- 262 2,142- 2,237 0.9- 0.9 3.6- 3.7

$500,000 -$1 million 249- 263 2,996- 3,295 0.4- 0.5 1.3- 1.4

Over $1 million 419- 439 4,025- 4,486 0.1- 0.1 0.4- 0.5




All Businesses 236- 255 2,068- 2,266 0.4- 0.5 1.6- 1.8

___________________________________________________________________________
Note: Based on a representative sample of tax returns filed by
corporations and partnerships with assets under $10 million in 2003 and
2004.




Source: DeLuca et al . 2007. Tables 10 and 13.



In addition to being a burden on taxpayers, recordkeeping and accounting are compliance problems for the IRS. Compliance data from the National Research Program (NRP) for 2001 show, for example, an error rate on cost of goods sold for sole proprietorships of over 50 percent, one of the highest error rates for items on the Schedule C (the sole proprietorship tax return).157 The NRP data do not indicate why errors were made - whether they reflect intentional noncompliance or inadvertent errors that could result from any number of factors, including tax law complexity, poor recordkeeping, or inadequate accounting skills. Nor do the error rates indicate whether amounts were placed on the wrong line because of confusion or lack of attention on the part of the taxpayer. At a minimum, however, a high error rate on cost of goods sold suggests a compliance challenge for both the IRS and the taxpayer.



Current law accounting by small businesses

At present, most unincorporated small businesses are eligible to use the cash receipts and disbursements method of accounting for income and expenses ("cash accounting"). Corporations (other than S corporations) and partnerships with a corporation as a partner can use the cash accounting method only if they have $5 million or less in average gross receipts.158 Under the cash method, amounts are generally included in gross income in the taxable year in which they are actually or constructively received. Generally, allowable expenses (except certain expenditures such as inventories and capital expenditures) are taken into account in the taxable year in which they are paid.

Accounting for inventories must conform as nearly as possible to the best accounting practice in the taxpayer's trade or business, and the method must clearly reflect income. For manufacturers, both direct and indirect production costs must be taken into account in the computation of inventory costs. In addition, so-called uniform capitalization rules require that additional indirect costs be capitalized into inventory. A number of exceptions exist for small businesses, however. For example, a taxpayer with property for resale with $10 million or less in average gross receipts who acquires personal property for resale is not required to capitalize labor and overhead costs under the uniform capitalization rules. Also, certain small businesses may use a simplified method of inventory accounting.159 Under this method, the costs of raw materials purchased for use in producing finished goods and the costs of merchandise purchased for resale are capitalized when purchased. Such costs are generally deducted in the year the finished goods or merchandise are sold. The costs of direct production labor and all indirect costs are deducted when paid.

The costs of property used in a trade or business must, as a general rule, be capitalized and recovered through specified depreciation deductions. However, many small businesses are allowed to deduct up to $125,000 (in 2007) of the cost of equipment, including computer software and most tangible depreciable property other than buildings, in the taxable year the property is placed in service. (This is known as section 179 small business expensing.) The $125,000 limitation is reduced by the amount by which the taxpayer's annual cost of eligible property exceeds $500,000.160



Simplified cash accounting for small business

Less burdensome alternatives to the current law accounting requirements on small business would allow many of them to use "simplified cash accounting," such as was advanced by the President's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform in 2005.161 Under this approach (sometimes referred to as "checkbook accounting"), income for most small businesses would simply equal cash receipts minus cash business expenses, and this would apply to inventories, materials, supplies, and depreciable property other than buildings. Taxpayers would no longer have to calculate and keep track of beginning and ending inventories for tax purposes. Expenses of creating or purchasing inventories would be deducted when the cash flows out of the firm, and sales of inventories would be recorded as income when cash is received. Small business taxpayers would no longer have to defer the cost of certain materials and supplies until used. They also would no longer have to capitalize expenditures for depreciable property (except for buildings).

Simplified cash accounting would reduce the amount of tax-related recordkeeping required of many small businesses. Rather than having to keep one or sometimes two sets of often complicated books solely for tax purposes, small businesses could use the records that they use for business purposes - mainly their bank accounts - for tax purposes as well. By reducing the compliance burden imposed on small businesses, this approach would encourage these small firms and entrepreneurs to use their resources in more productive ways. It might also improve their compliance since simpler rules reduce unintended noncompliance.

Simplified cash accounting could be made available to a wide or narrow set of taxpayers. For those using cash accounting for non-tax purposes, wider eligibility would provide greater relief from burdensome accounting requirements and more resources would be released for more productive activities, possibly contributing to improved competitiveness. On the other hand, more limited eligibility would result in less revenue loss from taxpayers able to accelerate the recognition of expenses, and fewer opportunities for taxpayer abuse would arise. Also, smaller businesses that use "checkbook accounting" for non-tax purposes are most likely to benefit from simplified cash accounting. There would be little or no burden reduction (but potential for tax deferral) for taxpayers using accrual accounting for financial purposes.

Table 4.11 illustrates these tradeoffs. It provides information on the accounting choices under current law of taxpayers who could benefit from simplified cash accounting, those who report either cost of goods sold or beginning or end of year inventories, by gross receipts.162 It shows that, of the 8.2 million business taxpayers with cost of goods sold or inventories, the vast majority (72.1 percent in column 3, or 5.9 million taxpayers) use the current-law cash method of accounting, including 78.4 percent of those with gross receipts under $1 million. However, the volume of economic activity, such as the amount of cost of goods sold, is highly concentrated among the largest taxpayers. To put this table in context, 80 percent (or $12.9 trillion) of the cost of goods sold by all taxpayers is generated by the largest 0.5 percent of taxpayers with cost of goods sold (those with over $25 million in assets). Overall, taxpayers using the cash method of accounting generate only 5.8 percent of all cost of goods sold (column 5); those with less than $1 million in gross receipts only 2.1 percent, and those with less than $10 million in receipts only 4.6 percent of all cost of goods sold. This suggests that extending simplified cash accounting to taxpayers with limited amounts of gross receipts would make the benefit widely available but would limit the likely revenue cost.
Table 4.11: Taxpayers Reporting Cost of Goods Sold (CGS) or Beginning or Ending Inventories and the Use

of Cash Accounting, By Gross Receipts, 2005


_________________________________________________________________________________
Size of Gross Number of Percent Amount of CGS on Returns Using
Receipts Returns Using Cash CGS Cash
Accounting Accounting


____________________________________
($ in ($ in % of Total
billions) billions) CGS

_________________________________________________________________________________
$1 -<100,000 4,226,829 84.9 51.4 42.4 0.3

$100,000-<500,000 2,209,410 70.6 257.2 168.4 1.0

$500,000-< 1 million 674,542 62.9 254.7 123.2 8.0

$1 million-< 5
million 802,006 33.4 1,072.7 313.9 1.9

$5 million-< 10
million 130,351 40.5 635.2 102.7 0.6

$10 million-< 25
million 88,549 13.1 997.1 106.0 0.7

$25 million +up 64,598 4.5 12,902.1 88.8 0.5




Total with positive
gross receipts 8,196,285 72.1 16,170.0 945.4 5.8




Under $1 million 7,110,781 78.4 563.4 334.0 2.1

Under $10 million 8,043,138 73.3 2,271.3 750.6 4.6

_________________________________________________________________________________
Note: Taxpayers include corporations, partnerships, sole proprietorships. Data
for corporations are preliminary.

Source: Office of Tax Analysis, based on unpublished data from Internal Revenue
Service, Statistics of Income.





Approaches for accounting simplification



Taxpayers under $1 million in average annual gross receipts

Provide full simplified cash accounting. Income would equal cash receipts minus cash business expenses, where expenses include the cost of inventories, materials, supplies, and depreciable property (other than buildings). At 2005 levels of activity, simplified cash accounting for inventories, materials and supplies would have benefited as many as 7.1 million taxpayers.163 Simplified cash accounting of capital expenditures, including expensing of depreciable property (other than buildings), would benefit approximately 1.9 million more taxpayers (in addition to the 7.1 million that could benefit from simplified inventory accounting).164

Extend simplified cash accounting, except for certain capital expenditures. Alternatively, full simplified cash accounting could be permitted, while the treatment under current law would continue with respect to depreciable property. (Such costs would be depreciated unless eligible for section 179 expensing). As noted above, this approach would benefit as many as 7.1 million taxpayers.



Taxpayers under $10 million in average annual gross receipts

Provide full simplified cash accounting. This approach is the same as above except with a higher gross receipts threshold of $10 million. Such an expansion would increase the number of positively affected taxpayers, 7.1 million in the first approach above with a gross receipts threshold of $1 million, to as many as 8 million taxpayers who would benefit from simplified treatment of inventories, materials, and supplies.165 Another 85,000 taxpayers (in addition to the 1.9 million above) would benefit from expensing of depreciable property (other than buildings).166

Extend simplified cash accounting, except for certain capital expenditures. As an alternative, the simplified cash-accounting approach could be expanded to taxpayers with up to $10 million in average annual gross receipts, while retaining the treatment under current law with respect to depreciable property. Such costs would be depreciated unless eligible for section 179 expensing. This variation of the approach would benefit as many as 8 million taxpayers.

Extend current law cash accounting for income and expenses, and provide simplified inventory accounting. An additional alternative would permit cash accounting to be available for taxpayers with no more than $10 million in average annual gross receipts. Such taxpayers would also be allowed to use simplified inventory accounting. Direct costs of labor and overhead for inventories would be deducted when paid. Costs of materials and supplies used to produce finished goods, and costs of merchandise purchased for resale, would be capitalized and deducted when the finished goods and merchandise are sold. The treatment of depreciable property under current law would continue. This approach would provide simplification to about half a million inventoryintensive small businesses and to C corporations and certain partnerships with average gross receipts between $5 million and $10 million.



Administrative issues with simplified cash accounting

Besides the basic question of the size of businesses eligible for simplification, there are several administrative issues that would need to be considered. Many of these administrative issues already exist under current law. For example, under the approaches outlined above, there would need to be rules for firms that move from one side of the size threshold to the other - can a firm move onto and off of simplified accounting year by year, or once a firm is over the threshold, would it be required to stay off the simplified method forever or for at least a certain number of years? If a firm can change to simplified cash accounting, what does it do with existing inventories? In addition, aggregation rules would be needed to prevent large businesses from creating smaller units to take advantage of the simplified treatment.


References


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Ali, A. and L. Hwang. 2000. "Country-Specific Factors Related to Financial Reporting and the Relevance of Accounting Data." Journal of Accounting Research 38(1): 1-21.

Altshuler, Rosanne and Alan Auerbach. 1990. "The Significance of Tax Law Asymmetries: An Empirical Investigation." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 105(1): 61-86.

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Acknowledgements


This study was prepared by the Treasury Department's Office of Tax Policy to present broad approaches for reforming the U.S. business tax system in the context of making the United States more competitive in an increasingly global economy

Special appreciation is expressed to various staff members within the Office of Tax Policy and the Office of Economic Policy for their contributions to this study. Gerald Auten, Geraldine Gerardi, Karen Gilbreath Sowell, John Harrington, James Mackie, Michael Mundaca, and Phillip Swagel oversaw many aspects of the study's preparation. Traci Altman and Pamela Dewland helped prepare the document for publication. The principal contributors to various portions of the study include:


Deena Ackerman Matthew Knittel

Gerald Auten James Mackie

David Brazell Thornton Matheson

Curtis Carlson John McClelland

Michael Cooper Ralph Monaco

Marc Countryman Susan Nelson

Julie-Anne Cronin James Pearce

John Eiler Laura Power

Geraldine Gerardi Jeremy Rudd

Itai Grinberg Jerry Silverstein

Harry Grubert William Strang

Craig Johnson Gordon Wilson

Donald Kiefer




Eric Solomon Robert Carroll

Assistant Secretary (Tax Policy) Deputy Assistant Secretary (Tax Analysis)



1 The President's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform (2005).

2 U.S. Department of Commerce (2007).

3 U.S. Department of the Treasury (2007).

4 International Monetary Fund (2005).

5 Slemrod (2005).

6 See Altshuler, Grubert, and Newlon (2001).

7 BNA, Daily Tax Report (2007), Market News International (2007).

8 Institute for Fiscal Studies, Corporate Tax Database, www.ifs.org.uk

9 The return to these investments may be taxed again under the estate tax.

10 OECD, Tax Database, www.oecd.org

11 Taxes on goods and services include all taxes and duties levied on the production, extraction, sale, transfer, leasing or delivery of goods, and the rendering of services, and certain other taxes.

12 General consumption taxes include value-added taxes, sales taxes and multi-stage cumulative taxes.

13 The tax levied in the United States on goods and services is imposed by most states in the form of retail sales taxes.

14 See Box 2.2 below for a description of the normal return to saving or investment.

15 The estimate of the improvement in economic performance includes the effect of reducing distortions among investments in different sectors (such as the distortion between investment in the corporate sector and investment in owner-occupied housing), but does not include the effect of reducing distortions in the treatment of investment in different assets within the business sector (such as distortion in the treatment of investment in equipment and investment in buildings).

16 Auerbach (1996).

17 Japan, however, operates a VAT with many subtraction method features. The Japanese VAT uses an annual accounting period, and taxpayers subject to the Japanese VAT derive the amount of their applicable credit for the VAT paid based on their total purchases from domestic entities, rather than based on the VAT paid as shown in a credit-invoice method. See Schenk (1995) and Japanese Ministry of Finance, Tax Bureau (2005). A BAT would have similarities to the current U.S. business tax system by having an annual tax period and a tax return submitted by businesses to the taxing authority.

18 In some countries, the credit-invoice VAT is referred to as a Goods and Services Tax (GST).

19 Sales taxes levied by state and local governments differ considerably from the ideal retail sales tax for many reasons, including the fact that some apply to many business-to-business sales that would not be taxed under an ideal retail sales tax or involve substantially narrow tax bases that exempt certain sales.

20 See chapter III in Congressional Budget Office (1992).

21 The annual consumption flows from the existing stock of owner-occupied housing and other consumer durables (e.g., automobiles) also would be difficult to value under a BAT. New housing and consumer durables could be taxed on a pre-payment basis. Tax would be imposed on the purchase price, which is equivalent in present value to a tax on the annual consumption flow. For a detailed explanation, see Bradford (1986).

22 The effective marginal tax rate combines corporate tax rates, depreciation allowances, and other features of the tax system into a single measure of the share of an investment's economic income needed to cover taxes over its lifetime. This measure of the "tax wedge" between the before-tax and after-tax returns on an investment is measured relative to the before-tax return.

23 For a detailed discussion, see Slemrod and Bakija (1996).

24 The full deduction in the year of purchase will offset (in present value) what economists call the expected normal return. Supra-normal returns would continue to be taxed under this type of consumption tax.

25 Focusing on capital in place at the time of the tax change, this effect is perhaps most clearly seen by noting that this stock of capital is not allowed to be expensed (assuming no transition relief), but nonetheless the taxpayer has a zero basis. If the asset were sold, say for $100, the full proceeds would be subject to tax, so that the business owner would be left with only $80 after taxes, assuming a 20 percent consumption tax rate. For a new asset, the tax savings from expensing would offset in present value the tax paid on the investment's cash flow (including any tax paid on the sale of the asset). So the old asset would be worth 20 percent less that an equivalently productive new asset.

26 Indeed, some rough estimates suggest that a BAT actually could raise the value of assets in aggregate. For example, Auerbach (1996) estimates that the consumption tax aspects of current law cause corporate assets to sell at about an 8 percent discount relative to new assets and non-corporate assets to sell at about a 6 percent discount. If these estimates proved accurate, a BAT at a 5 percent or 6 percent rate would cause a small net increase in asset values in the aggregate.

27 The personal holding company tax was enacted when the highest corporate tax rate was lower than the highest individual income tax rate. This provision of current law is intended to prevent individuals from establishing a corporation to receive and hold investment income so that it would not be taxed at higher individual income tax rates. The tax is 15 percent of undistributed personal holding company income. The accumulated earnings tax applies if a corporation is formed or used to avoid personal income tax on its shareholders by accumulating earnings and profits rather than distributing them. The accumulated earnings tax rate is 15 percent of the accumulated earnings. These taxes are in addition to any regular income tax.

28 C corporations are entities that are subject to the corporate income tax under current law.

29 Under the existing "check the box" regulations, entities other than corporations are generally allowed to elect corporate tax treatment. Business entities that are sole proprietorships, partnerships or limited liability companies under state law are allowed to be treated as C corporations (and subject to an entity level tax) or, if they meet the eligibility criteria, as S corporations (not subject to an entity level tax).

30 Under current law, reasonable compensation rules are in place to prevent S corporations from paying owner-employees too little as wages in order to avoid payroll taxes. The rules are also in place to prevent C corporations from paying owner-employees too much compensation in order to reduce corporate income taxes.

31 Note that these issues may also arise if, instead of replacing the corporate income tax, a BAT were added to the current income tax system.

32 For a more detailed discussion of the treatment of financial intermediaries under a VAT, see Barham, Poddar and Whalley (1987), Poddar and English (1997), and Zee (2005).

33 Of course, sales receipts to consumers could be required to separately list the VAT collected on the sale.

34 See, for example, Becker and Mulligan (2003).

35 Tait (1988), Stockfisch (1985) suggest that a VAT would not increase the size of the government sector, but McClure (1983) suggests that it would increase the size of the government sector.

36 For example, see Congressional Budget Office (1992). See also Feenberg, Mitrusi and Poterba (1997) and Mieszkowski and Palumbo (2002).

37 See, for example, Poterba (1989).

38 When ability to pay is measured by annual consumption, then by definition the burden of a broad-based VAT is proportional.

39 Casperson and Metcalf (1994).

40 This issue is particularly relevant to an approach that entails replacing current business income taxes with a BAT.

41 Randolph (2006).

42 Gravelle and Smetters (2006).

43 Analyses of the incidence of the corporate tax that focus on international capital flows often assume that other countries do not change their corporate taxes in response to a change in the U.S. corporate tax. Under that assumption, for example, if the United States reduced its corporate tax rate and other countries did not change their corporate tax rates, the United States would attract more capital and labor would benefit from higher wages. However, if other countries responded to the U.S. rate reduction by reducing their tax rates, capital inflows might be more modest and capital would be likely to bear more of the corporate income tax.

44 Arulampalam, Devereux, and Maffini (2007), Hassett and Mathur (2006), and Felix (2007).

45 Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) and Judd (2006).

46 Bernheim (2002).

47 Randolph (2006).

48 Congressional Budget Office (1992) and Joint Committee on Taxation (1991).

49 See Viard (2004).

50 This conclusion depends on all goods and services being taxed equally. If exemptions are introduced, the impact on the trade balance will depend on tax rates applied to the imported or exported goods and services.

51 Decisions regarding BAT exemptions, thresholds, and zero-rating would affect the likelihood of fraudulent claims (Keen and Smith (2007)).

52 U.S. Department of the Treasury (1984). The Congressional Budget Office (1992) estimated that the administrative costs would have been about $750 million to $1.5 billion in 1988. The General Accounting Office (1993) estimated that the administrative costs of a broad-based VAT would be $1.8 billion per year when fully phased in. These costs were estimated to decrease to $1.4 billion per year with a $25,000 small business exemption, and $1.2 billion per year with a $100,000 exemption. The IRS (1993) estimated that the administrative cost of a VAT with a $100,000 exemption would be $2.3 billion in the second year of full implementation.

53 Congressional Budget Office (1992).

54 In addition to these U.S. studies, a recent study for the United Kingdom estimated that the burden of preparing and filing VAT returns costs £170 per registered business (£120 million per year for 1.8 million registered businesses). See HM Revenue and Customs (2006).

55 This compliance cost estimate includes both corporate and non-corporate businesses.

56 Slemrod and Bakija (1996).

57 Several of these distortions are discussed in more detail in the U.S. Department of the Treasury (2007).

58 Lowering the top federal business tax rate to 28 percent would reduce the combined U.S. federal-state tax rate from 39 percent to 33 percent.

59 For example, a 20-percent corporate tax rate or 65-percent expensing for all new business investment could be obtained at a net revenue cost of about $1.2 trillion over 10 years.

60 For a detailed discussion, see Grubert and Mutti (2001), Grubert and Altshuler (forthcoming), and U.S. Department of the Treasury (2007).

61 As discussed below, a dividend exemption system that includes full taxation of royalties and disallowance of expenses allocated to exempt income would increase the effective tax rate for a typical investment in a low-tax country.

62 The table itemizes each special tax provision that, if eliminated, would raise more than $5 billion over a 10-year period, assuming business income taxes would have a comprehensive income base with the same statutory tax rates as the current system. The estimates assume no transition rules except for accelerated depreciation, which is assumed to be repealed only for investments made beginning in 2008. Unlike the analysis included in the earlier Treasury Department study, see U.S. Department of the Treasury (2007), the estimates in Table 3.1 include the effect of eliminating these special tax provisions for both corporations and flow-through businesses such as partnerships, S corporations, and sole proprietorships. The estimate for the repeal of the R&E tax credit assumes that it is a permanent provision in the baseline.

63 Repeal of other tax provisions, such as last-in first-out (LIFO) method and the cash method of accounting, also would potentially broaden the tax base. However, those changes have not been considered here for several reasons. Repeal of the LIFO method would include inflationary gains in the value of inventories in the tax base, which is inconsistent with proper income measurement and, more importantly, would disadvantage investment in inventories relative to other forms of investment. Repeal of cash accounting would significantly increase compliance costs, particularly for small businesses. A more detailed discussion of simplified accounting for small businesses is contained in Chapter IV.

64 This includes repeal of provisions that allow the immediate write-off of an investment's costs (i.e., section 179, which currently allows limited expensing for small businesses).

65 The same model is used to estimate the economic benefits of the other tax changes discussed in this report.

66 Effects on capital inflows would also need to consider the possibility that other countries might lower their corporate tax rates in response to a reduction in the U.S. business income tax rate. If other countries responded to a U.S. rate reduction by reducing their tax rates, capital inflows might be more modest and the economic benefits of the rate reduction might be dampened.

67 It is sometimes noted that if considerably faster write-off of investment were allowed, the deductibility of interest (and the inclusion of interest income in the business tax base) would also need to be reconsidered. The concern is that tangible investment that is debt-financed, where the interest expense would be deductible, might face a substantial negative effective marginal tax rate. Of course, the effective marginal tax rate would also depend on the tax treatment of debt holders. The degree of partial expensing contemplated for this approach (i.e., 35 percent) is likely not large enough to warrant a substantial change to the tax treatment of interest, which would raise other issues, such as the appropriate tax treatment of financial services. Note that in the discussion of a BAT approach in Chapter II, which would provide full expensing, interest would be completely removed from the tax base. A more detailed discussion of the tax treatment of interest is provided in the section, "Tax bias that favors debt financing," in Chapter IV.

68 For depreciable assets, this approach would allow for 35 percent of new investment to be expensed and 65 percent to be recovered based on economic depreciation. Existing stocks of equipment and structures would be depreciated as under current law. Partial expensing also would be extended to purchases of inventories, but without transition relief. Extending the benefits of partial expensing to inventories helps to promote uniformity in the taxation of the income earned by alternative investments, thereby encouraging efficient investment decisions that are guided by economic fundamentals rather than by tax considerations.

69 U.S. Department of the Treasury (2007).

70 Administratively, the lower rate for income received by owners of flow-through businesses would operate similar to the lower tax rates currently in place for dividends and capital gains.

71 Pearlman (1996).

72 Carryover tax credits, if retained, would have the same value before and after reform because $1 of tax credit would reduce taxes by $1 either way.

73 In addition, churning of assets - sales made in order to take advantage of more accelerated depreciation deductions - could offset to some degree the decline in value for certain investments.

74 Slaughter (2004).

75 Id.

76 U.S. Department of the Treasury (2007). See also Grubert and Altshuler (forthcoming).

77 Musgrave (1963).

78 Musgrave (1963).

79 Capital ownership neutrality has been proposed by Desai and Hines (2003). These standards (capital export neutrality, capital import neutrality, and capital ownership neutrality) assume worldwide efficiency as the goal. Another standard, national neutrality, assumes that home governments cannot obtain reciprocal concessions necessary to approximate worldwide efficiency.

80 See, for example, the transactions addressed in IRS Notices 2006-85 and 2007-48, involving foreign subsidiary purchases of U.S. parent stock intended to repatriate funds to the United States without U.S. tax. Also, see the discussion in Altshuler and Grubert (2003) and Desai and Hines (2003).

81 Currently, foreign source royalties are commonly shielded from U.S. taxation by the taxpayer's crosscrediting between high-taxed dividends and low-taxed royalties.

82 Lowering the U.S. corporate tax rate to 28 percent generally would increase the amount of foreign tax credits potentially available from high-taxed dividends to shield, through cross-crediting, foreign source royalties and interest from U.S. tax. Under a basic dividend exemption system, however, taxes on exempt dividends could no longer be used in such cross-crediting. The effective elimination of this additional amount of foreign tax credits, and ensuing loss of cross-crediting, accounts for the increased revenue gain from adopting basic dividend exemption under a lower corporate tax rate.

83 Based on Commerce Department data, these estimates assume that the investment abroad is comprised of 85 percent tangible assets and 15 percent intangible assets and is financed with a mix of debt (U.S. and local) and equity. The effective tax rate is a weighted average of the rates, derived from the Treasury Department's tax files. The affiliate is assumed to be located in a country with a statutory tax rate of 7 percent, which in turn is assumed to equal the local effective tax rate on net equity. The effective tax rate estimates include the estimated efficiency loss from deferred repatriations based on Grubert and Mutti (2001).

84 Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, corporate capital gains were taxed at a 28-percent rate while the top rate on regular corporate income was 46 percent.

85 This distortion, sometimes called the "lock-in" effect, arises as a result of taxing capital gains when realized rather than as they accrue. Attempting to tax capital gains as they accrue, however, would create significant valuation issues with respect to valuing property such as specialized equipment and intangibles and could create cash flow problems for businesses by requiring them to pay tax when no income has been realized.

86 A triple tax can also arise. If corporation A owns stock in corporation B, the three layers of tax would be: (1) the corporate income tax on the earnings of corporation B that increase the value of its shares, (2) the corporate capital gains tax on corporation A if it sells shares of corporation B, and (3) the individual income tax on shareholders of corporation A if they recognize the income of corporation A by receiving dividends or realizing capital gains from selling their shares. Some analyses consider the estate tax as an additional potential layer of tax on corporate earnings.

87 Morck (2005) attributes the greater prevalence of complex corporate structures and intercorporate holdings of stock in Europe in part to their partial or full exemption of intercorporate income.

88 Hare (2007).

89 Certain waiting period provisions in the tax code, as well as certain judicial doctrines, are intended to limit the ability of corporations to accomplish this type of income conversion.

90 For example, if the corporation owned less than 20 percent of the stock of a domestic corporation, the DRD would be 70 percent, and the effective tax rate on the dividend would be 10.5 percent as compared to a 35-percent rate on a capital gain. If the corporation owned 20 percent or more, but less than 80 percent of the stock, the DRD would be 80 percent, and the effective tax rate would be 7 percent. If the corporation owned 80 percent or more of the stock, the DRD would be 100 percent and there would be no tax on the dividend. If the stock were stock of a foreign corporation, a DRD would generally not be available for dividends paid on the stock, but a foreign tax credit may be available to reduce tax on the dividend. Gain on the sale of foreign corporate stock could be recharacterized as a dividend pursuant to section 1248, however, and a foreign tax credit may thereby be available.

91 Section 338(h)(10) allows the parties to elect to treat a stock sale as an asset sale in certain situations. Section 338(g) also permits the buyer to obtain asset sale treatment, while the seller's stock sale would still be respected for tax purposes and the subsidiary could incur tax on the deemed sale of its assets.

92 Section 1259 treats certain monetizing transactions as taxable dispositions of the monetized assets.

93 Gentry and Schizer (2003).

94 Hassett and Viard (2007).

95 All or a portion of gains from the sale of certain types of depreciable property are recharacterized from capital gain to ordinary income in order to recapture prior depreciation deductions that offset ordinary income. Section 1245 generally requires the recapture of the full amount of prior depreciation deductions with respect to personal property and most other tangible property (other than a building) used in a business. Section 1250 generally applies to depreciable real property, and generally only requires the recapture of the excess of the amount of accelerated depreciation deductions over the amount of depreciation determined under the straight-line method. For sales of equipment and business personal property, any gain resulting from previous depreciation deductions is recaptured as ordinary income. Most gains on structures and other real property are taxed as capital gains because there is effectively no recapture for gains on such assets. Recapture would apply to the excess of accelerated deprecation over straight-line depreciation, but residential and non-residential structures are now depreciated using the straight-line method. Section 291(a) currently recaptures 20 percent of the amount of section 1250 gain that would be recaptured if the property were subject to section 1245. This provision tends to eliminate churning incentives for most structures. Buyers of used depreciable property can claim depreciation deductions on the same basis as buyers of new property.

96 Most of the gains from the sale of business property appears to be capital gains from the sale of machinery, equipment, vehicles, and other tangible property used in manufacturing and other types of businesses.

97 The approaches described in this chapter are not intended to address sales of stock of foreign corporations. Such transactions are addressed by the territorial approach discussed in Chapter III.

98 Desai's simulation uses an elasticity of -0.75 for the long-run increase in capital gains from reductions in the corporate capital gains rate. Using alternative assumptions, Desai estimated long-run increases in realizations between $44 billion and $80 billion. Note that the Desai and Gentry (2004) and Desai (2006) analyses suggest that the response in the first few years of this approach is likely to be considerably larger because the total elasticity, including both short-run and long-run responses, is -1.11.

99 This estimate is based on Equation 6 in Table 3 of Desai and Gentry (2004), which Desai (2006) cites as the preferred equation. The revenue-maximizing rate in this equation is 25.4 percent, calculated as 0.254 = 1/3.9293, where 3.9293 is the coefficient on the tax rate variable in the equation.

100 In addition to revenue increases from the unlocking effects of a lower tax rate, this estimate also includes other behavioral responses such as conversion of ordinary income into capital gains that may reduce revenues.

101 While the Desai (2006) calculations are based on a stylized approach to measuring distortions produced by high tax rates, such distortions include inefficiencies associated with productive assets being owned by less efficient businesses, and corporations being prevented from selling assets and stock holdings where the proceeds could be deployed more effectively in higher priority uses.

102 Under current law, the maximum individual capital gains tax rate is scheduled to increase to 20 percent in 2011.

103 See also Table 4.3.

104 When equipment and structures are sold directly, basis is stepped up to fair market value, and this higher amount can be depreciated by the buyer. This step-up in basis partly offsets the higher rate.

105 In addition to the three basic DRD percentages, a number of special computations apply in certain specific situations. These include intercorporate dividends on debt-financed stock, certain dividends not eligible for a DRD, and a separate deduction for dividends paid on certain preferred stock of public utilities.

106 Treasury Department testimony to the Senate Finance Committee discussed problems with auditing pyramidal corporate structures and related problems of tax avoidance by shifting income among related companies. Other concerns were the use of leverage and pyramidal structures to allow control of large amounts of assets with little equity and the role that the collapse of such structures played in the stock market crash of 1929. See Morck (2005), Becht and DeLong (2005), and Mundstock (1988) for discussion of the adoption of partial taxation of intercorporate dividends.

107 In order to claim a foreign tax credit for foreign corporate income taxes paid on the earnings repatriated, the U.S. corporation must own at least 10 percent of the voting stock of the foreign corporation, and in addition satisfy other limitations.

108 Some high-tech and pharmaceutical firms, for example, have formed joint ventures with key scientific and technical employees to provide the employees an opportunity and the capital to pursue certain projects, while offering the parent corporation an opportunity to profit from the venture. Such investments are discouraged by cascading dividend taxes as well as high corporate capital gains tax rates.

109 Some intercorporate dividends were netted out in processing the returns. This amount includes an estimate of dividends eligible for the 100 percent DRD but netted out of the reported data. The estimate is based on information reported on Schedules M-1 and M-3.

110 Morck (2005) and La Porta et al. (1999).

111 The approaches described in this chapter are not intended to address dividends from foreign corporations. The tax treatment of dividends from foreign corporations is addressed in this report by the territorial approach discussed in Chapter III.

112 In general, dividends and capital gains received by individuals (directly or through pass-through businesses) are currently taxed at a maximum rate of 15 percent, while interest is taxed as ordinary income at rates up to 35 percent.

113 Because of the time value of money, the ability to defer taxes lowers the real cost. It is customary to assume that deferral reduces the effective burden on the capital gains tax rate by about one-half.

114 An additional tax advantage accrues to debt-financed investment because the tax system does not adjust interest flows for the effects of inflation. See the discussion in Mackie (2002).

115 See Gordon and Malkiel (1981) for a discussion of the costs of increased risk of financial distress and bankruptcy.

116 See U.S. Department of the Treasury (1992), chapter 2, for a detailed discussion of a dividend exclusion proposal.

117 There are two prominent views on the extent to which the dividend tax burdens the return on a marginal corporate equity-financed investment. Under the traditional view, the dividend tax acts as a heavy burden on marginal investment. In contrast, under the new view, the dividend tax acts to reduce the value of corporate shares, rather than to reduce the tax incentive to invest, and so imposes little, if any, burden on marginal corporate investment. It is unclear which view most accurately represents the tax incentives faced by the typical corporation. Available empirical evidence suggests that some firms might operate on each margin (Auerbach and Hassett, 2003).

118 This approach would reverse the existing tax difference between dividends and capital gains on retained earnings. It also is likely to reduce the size of the difference, thereby reducing the tax penalty on dividends (under the traditional view) and on new share issues (under the new view).

119 Interest received by corporations from the U.S. government, homeowners, non-corporate businesses, S corporations, and foreign corporations without effectively connected U.S. income would continue to be taxed at the corporate level under this approach.

120 These issues regarding financial institutions also arise in the context of instituting a value-added tax or other consumption-based taxes. See Chapter II.

121 Thomas (2001) reported that the United States accounted for half of the world's total gross national product in 1947, and that this percentage declined to 34 percent in 1960.

122 The U.S. share of world output is from the World Bank website. The largest companies are from the Forbes website "Forbes 2000" list of largest companies. Data on the U.S. share of FDI are from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) website.

123 See http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/international/mnc/mncnewsrelease.htm

124 Cooper and Knittel (2006).

125 The corporate alternative minimum tax (AMT) rules provide that a taxpayer's NOL deduction cannot reduce alternative minimum taxable income (AMTI) by more than 90 percent of the AMTI. Temporary economic stimulus provisions applying to NOLs originating in 2001 and 2002 generally allowed a longer five year carryback period and waived the AMT limitation on NOL use.

126 For individuals, capital losses can be deducted against capital gains and do not expire.

127 Individuals may also use excess losses to offset up to $3,000 of ordinary income.

128 Donnelly and Young (2002) report that eight OECD countries allow businesses to carry losses back to offset prior payments. All OECD countries allow corporations to carry tax losses forward with about twothirds allowing a 5- to 10-year carryforward, and the remainder allowing losses to be carried forward indefinitely.

129 Mintz (1988) finds that partial refundability in the sense of only allowing offsets to past or future income can cause non-taxable start-up firms to face much higher effective tax rates compared to their taxable counterparts.

130 Gendron et al. (2003) find that investment behavior of Canadian firms is sensitive to the firm's tax status. Auerbach and Poterba (1986) find that the presence of loss carryforwards can have a dramatic effect on investment incentives for cyclical industries such as airlines and manufacturers. Cummins et al. (1994) find that U.S. firms without loss carryforwards are responsive to changes in the user cost of capital, while firms with loss carryforwards are not. Altshuler and Auerbach (1990) find that partial refundability of tax losses (and credits) causes substantial persistence in non-taxable status and creates marginal effective tax rate disparities between taxable and non-taxable firms.

131 The corporate AMT exacerbates this effect. The AMT's limitation on the use of net operating losses make it more likely that corporations will pay additional tax under the AMT.

132 Certain tax provisions limit the ability of firms to use the prior losses of acquired firms (e.g., section 382).

133 Because capital gains and losses are taxed only upon realization, the voluntary recognition of such gains and losses means that it would not be feasible to allow net capital losses to offset ordinary income in most cases. It may be feasible to allow capital gains and losses subject to mark-to-market treatment to offset ordinary income.

134 The experience in OECD countries with refunds on value-added taxes on exports is not encouraging as such refunds have been an important source of fraudulent claims.

135 Cooper and Knittel (2006).

136 The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 reduced the net operating loss carryback period from three years to two years, while lengthening the carryforward period to 20 years.

137 The carryback period for NOLs was temporarily extended to five years for losses incurred in 2001 and 2002 by the Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002.

138 See, for example, SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin 101, Revenue Recognition in Financial Statements; FASB Interpretation No. 48, Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes; and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745).

139 For more detail on the measurement of book-tax differences see Boynton et al. (2005).

140 Desai (2005) provides an extensive discussion of these issues.

141 Ali and Hwang (2000) and Alford et al. (1993) find that book earnings are less informative in explaining equity returns in countries with book-tax conformity than in the United States.

142 Rossotti (2006).

143 Whitaker (2005) provides an alternative calculation of such a revenue-neutral rate.

144 McClelland and Mills (2007) provide a more detailed discussion of the necessary adjustments.

145 Prior to the implementation of Financial Accounting Standard No. 123(R) in 2005, firms could use two methods to expense stock options: (1) intrinsic value accounting under Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 25 or (2) fair value accounting under FAS 123. Most stock options that vested over a period of time were typically subject to intrinsic value accounting, which had the effect of the firms not needing to recognize any compensation expense. Due to FAS 123(R), companies generally must now recognize a compensation cost equal to the fair value of the equity award on the date of grant. The cost is typically amortized over the vesting period of the award. The fair value of such awards is determined by using an asset-pricing model such as the Black-Scholes model.

146 U.S. Department of the Treasury (2007).

147 Prior to passage of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, if a taxpayer was unable to claim the nonconventional fuel credit solely because it would reduce regular tax liability below the taxpayer's AMT, the unused credit increased the taxpayer's AMT credit.

148 See Carlson (2005a).

149 However, revenue generated by an investment by a firm subject to AMT is taxed at a 20-percent rate rather than the top 35-percent rate under the regular tax. The reduced rate of taxation on the additional revenue reduces the cost of capital. The net effect on the firm's cost of capital for marginal investment projects is ambiguous without a detailed calculation of the magnitude of these two effects. Whether a firm is in tax-profit status or tax-loss status will also have an effect on the cost of capital. Relative to tax-loss status of equal duration, the AMT cost of capital can be either higher or lower.

150 See Carlson (2005a).

151 See Carlson (2005a).

152 In addition, some argue that there is little to support the idea that corporations should necessarily be required to pay some minimum amount of taxes for reasons of fairness. For a detailed discussion, see Lyon (1997).

153 Researchers have found that being subject to the corporate AMT raises compliance costs by about 11 percent to 17 percent. See Slemrod and Ventakash (2002) and Slemrod (1997).

154 Slemrod and Venkatesh (2004), and Moody (2002).

155 DeLuca et al. (2007).

156 DeLuca et al. (2007), p. 27.

157 The error rate is the number of returns with errors on a particular item (in this case, the cost of goods sold) divided by the number of returns on which the item should have been reported. The statistics are taken from unpublished preliminary data from the IRS.

158 Average gross receipts are computed using the taxpayer's gross receipts reported in the immediately preceding three taxable years. For a member of a controlled group, the group's gross receipts must be taken into account. Tax shelters are also not allowed to use the cash method of accounting for income and expenses.

159 These small businesses include (1) taxpayers with $1 million or less in average gross receipts, and (2) taxpayers with $10 million or less in average gross receipts whose principal business activity is not a specified "inventory-intensive" activity (such as retail or manufacturing).

160 The $125,000 limit is indexed for inflation for taxable years beginning after 2007 and before 2011, but falls to a non-indexed $25,000 thereafter. The $500,000 threshold is indexed for inflation for taxable years beginning after 2007 and before 2011, but falls to a non-indexed $200,000 thereafter. Computer software is not eligible property for taxable years beginning after 2010. The amount of the deduction also may not exceed net business income.

161 President's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform (2005). See in particular p. 95.

162 The gross receipts measure used in this case is for one year only, whereas gross-receipts limits in the tax code generally use a three-year average.

163 See column 1 of Table 4.11, "Under $1 million." As under current law, some taxpayers eligible for simplified cash accounting would presumably continue to choose accrual or other methods of accounting.

164 The 1.9 million represents taxpayers (without cost of goods sold or inventories) who would be able to expense more property than they are currently expensing under section 179. Source: Office of Tax Analysis calculations.

165 See Column 1, Table 4.11. The increase of 900,000 equals the number of taxpayers with more than $1 million in assets but less than $10 million, and cost of goods sold or inventories.

166 The 1.9 million represents taxpayers (without cost of goods sold or inventories) who would be able to expense more property than they are currently expensing under section 179. Source: U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Tax Analysis calculations.

Labels:

Thursday, December 20, 2007

Tax Problem - Sham Trust - A business trust was disregarded for tax purposes. The arrangement was a sham that lacked economic substance. Although the trusts were valid under the state (Ohio) law, they could not be regarded as legitimate for federal income tax purposes.

Homer L. Richardson v. Commissioner; Gloria M. Richardson v. Commissioner.

Dkt. Nos. 16794-03 , 16795-03 , TC Memo. 2006-69, April 11, 2006.

[Appealable, barring stipulation to the contrary, to CA-6. --CCH.]

[Code Secs. 61, 274, 6501 and 6663]


Economic substance doctrine: Income: Deductions: Substantiation: Statute of limitations: Penalties: Fraud. --

[Code Sec. 1211 and 6662]
Economic substance doctrine: Deductions: Substantiation: Penalties: Negligence. --
A tiered business trust arrangement was disregarded for tax purposes because it was a sham that lacked economic substance. However, the taxpayers were not allowed to claim a capital loss on the sale of stock held in the name of one of the trusts because they failed to establish any basis in the shares or how the loss was derived. As a result, the husband was found liable for negligence penalty.

[Code Sec. 6015


Innocent spouse relief. --
A taxpayer was not entitled to innocent spouse relief for tax liabilities arising from tiered business trusts that were disregarded because they lacked economic substance. The taxpayer was a director/trustee of the trusts in question. She executed documents establishing and operating the entities, attended all board meetings and signed meeting minutes. Thus, she was fully aware of and condoned the aggressive tax positions taken by use of the trusts. --CCH.

Ps established a tiered trust arrangement and transferred to the entities their assets, including their personal residence and lifetime services.

Held: The trusts implemented and used by Ps during 1996 and 1997 should be disregarded for tax purposes as sham entities lacking in economic substance, with resultant inclusion by Ps of income reported by the trusts, recomputation of business deductions allowable to Ps, and liability for self-employment taxes.

Held, further, Ps are not entitled to capital loss amounts claimed for both years and must recognize a capital gain in 1997.

Held, further, P H is liable for civil fraud penalties pursuant to sec. 6663, I.R.C., for 1996 and 1997.

Held, further, P H is liable for an accuracy-related penalty pursuant to sec. 6662(a), I.R.C., with respect to that portion of the deficiency for 1996 that is not attributable to fraud.

Held, further, the statute of limitations does not bar assessment of liabilities for 1996 and 1997.

Held, further, P W is not entitled to relief pursuant to sec. 6015, I.R.C., for the years 1996 and 1997.


MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION

WHERRY, Judge: Respondent determined the following deficiencies and penalties with respect to
The principal issues for decision in these consolidated cases are:

(1) Whether trusts implemented and used by petitioners during 1996 and 1997 should be disregarded for tax purposes as sham entities lacking in economic substance, with resultant (a) inclusion by petitioners of income reported by the trusts; (b) recomputation of business deductions allowable to petitioners; and (c) liability for self-employment taxes and entitlement to corresponding deductions.

(2) Whether petitioners' reported capital loss for both tax years should be adjusted.

(3) Whether there exist underpayments due to fraud for 1996 and 1997 such that petitioner Homer L. Richardson (Mr. Richardson) is liable for civil fraud penalties pursuant to section 6663.

(4) Whether Mr. Richardson is liable for an accuracy-related penalty pursuant to section 6662(a) with respect to that portion of the deficiency for 1996 that is not attributable to fraud.

(5) Whether the statute of limitations bars assessment of liabilities for 1996 and 1997.

(6) Whether petitioner Gloria M. Richardson (Mrs. Richardson) is entitled to relief pursuant to section 6015 for the years 1996 and 1997.

Certain additional adjustments to petitioners' Social Security income and personal exemptions are computational in nature and will be resolved by our holdings on the foregoing issues.


FINDINGS OF FACT

Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found. The stipulations of the parties, with accompanying exhibits, are incorporated herein by this reference. At all relevant times throughout the years in issue, at the time the petitions in these cases were filed, and at the time of trial, petitioners resided at 758 Quailwoods Drive, Loveland, Ohio 45140.



Personal Background
Petitioners are husband and wife and have four adult children: Laura Morris, Karen Cahill, Susan Richardson, and Barton Richardson. Mrs. Richardson is trained as an x-ray technician. In the past she worked as a medical assistant but apparently ceased her employment in or about 1997 in conjunction with undergoing chemotherapy treatments for cancer.

Mr. Richardson graduated from the University of Missouri in 1958, earning a 4-year business degree in marketing. In connection with obtaining that degree, Mr. Richardson completed two courses in accounting. Since graduating, Mr. Richardson has been engaged in a number of business ventures. He was employed for 12 years in a supervisory capacity over several Super-X drug stores located across Ohio, Indiana, and Kentucky. In approximately 1979, he founded a tool and die business, which he ran for about 3 years. Mr. Richardson obtained licenses to sell insurance and mutual funds in around 1983 and maintained those licenses until allowing them to expire sometime in the 1996 to 1998 timeframe. Each license required Mr. Richardson to attend approximately 40 hours of classes and to pass an examination. From 1993 to 1996, Mr. Richardson was self-employed as an insurance salesman, operating through a sole proprietorship under the name Benefit Planning Services.



Trust Implementation and Operation
In 1995, petitioners met with representatives from the Aegis Company (Aegis), an entity that promoted both domestic and foreign trust packages.2 Michael Vallone was the executive director of Aegis, Robert Hopper was the managing director, and Edward Bartoli (Mr. Bartoli)3 was the legal director. Petitioners purchased a multitrust package from Aegis in 1996 for $5,000. In June of 1996, Mr. Richardson applied for and received from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) two employer identification numbers, one under the name of HG Asset Management Trust and the other under the name of HG Richardson Charitable Trust (HGRCT). Each application stated that the respective business was started or acquired on April 1, 1996. Also in 1996, Mr. Richardson ceased operations under the name Benefit Planning Services and thereafter conducted any sole proprietorship activities under the name Asset Protection Services.

On August 7, 1996, Mrs. Richardson transferred all of her assets, real and personal, as well as her right to receive future income and "exclusive use of my lifetime services (exception being that of an employee situation)", to Mr. Richardson, in exchange for $10. On August 8, 1996, petitioners purportedly transferred their personal residence on 758 Quailwoods Drive to HG Asset Management Company (HGAMC).4 Petitioners continued to reside at that location following the transfer.

By a trust instrument dated August 17, 1996, James Quay (Mr. Quay) as creator, Mr. Richardson as investor, and Mr. Quay and Mrs. Richardson as acceptors and initial directors established HGAMC as a "Common Law Business Organization". Mr. Quay was an attorney whom Mr. Richardson had met at an Aegis training presentation earlier in the year and who apparently prepared the trust documents. The directors were given broad authority to deal with trust property in their discretion for the benefit of HGAMC. The trust instrument further provided: "A Minute of Resolutions of the Board of Directors authorizing what they determine to do or have done shall be evidence that such an act is within their power."

Also on August 17, 1996, a management contract was entered between HGAMC and Mr. Richardson's sole proprietorship Asset Protection Services. The agreement called for HGAMC to provide management services to the sole proprietorship, through the services of Mr. Richardson, in return for a "One time set up fee" of $40,000, a "Monthly management fee" of $12,000, and a charge for "Strategic and Tactical Planning for 1997" of $10,000. The agreement was executed by Mr. Richardson on behalf of Asset Protection Services and by both Mr. and Mrs. Richardson as directors of HGAMC.5 The majority of the stated fees were never paid. The contract was renewed on its anniversary in both 1997 and 1998 for compensation to be paid to HGAMC of $5,000 annually.

Initial actions undertaken by HGAMC were memorialized in the minutes of the entity's first board meeting on August 17, 1996. The trust instrument and the minutes reflect and reference the intended conveyance by Mr. Richardson to HGAMC of real and personal property as well as the exclusive use of all his lifetime services. The minutes also show that the directors were authorized to seek an employer identification number for HGAMC by substituting the word "Trust" for "Company" in the entity's name. On August 19, 1996, petitioners opened two checking accounts at Fifth Third Bank, one in the name of Asset Protection Services and one in the name of HGRCT. At some time prior to August of 1996, a checking account at Fifth Third Bank had been opened in the name of HGAMC. Petitioners held sole signatory authority over all three of these accounts.

A second meeting of the HGAMC board was held on August 20, 1996. On that date, Mr. Richardson transferred to HGAMC all of his assets, real and personal, as well as his right to receive future income and the exclusive use of his lifetime services ("exception being that of an employee status"). The conveyance expressly included all that he had received from Mrs. Richardson under her August 7, 1996, assignment. HGAMC then issued to Mr. Richardson a certificate representing all of the beneficial interest; i.e., 100 units, in HGAMC. On the same August 20, 1996, date, Mr. Richardson returned the certificate to HGAMC, asking the directors to cancel it and to reissue the units as follows: 40 units to Mr. Richardson; 50 units to Mrs. Richardson; and 10 units to HGRCT. New certificates were issued to that effect. According to the terms of the certificates, benefits conveyed by the units "[consisted] solely of the distributions of income from the earnings of the assets as distributed by the action of The Directors and nothing more."

Also at the August 20 meeting, Mr. Richardson was appointed a director of HGAMC and was given the title of Executive Director. Mrs. Richardson was appointed as Executive Secretary of HGAMC. HGAMC contracted for the services of petitioners in those executive roles, in exchange for living accommodations, expenses incident to company business (e.g., transportation, office, entertainment, and meeting expenses), life and medical insurance, and consultant fees.

By a trust instrument likewise dated August 20, 1996, HGAMC created HGRCT. Petitioners executed the document both as directors of HGAMC and as trustees of HGRCT. Petitioners did not obtain section 501(c)(3) status for HGRCT.

On August 23, 1996, Mr. Quay submitted, and petitioners in their capacities as directors of HGAMC accepted, his resignation as a director of HGAMC. On August 29, 1996, petitioners conducted board meetings for both HGAMC and HGRCT. At the HGAMC meeting, petitioners' four children were named as successor directors, in the order listed, and as successors in equal shares to petitioners' beneficial interests. At the HGRCT meeting, HGRCT received 10 units of beneficial interest in HGAMC and in exchange issued to HGAMC all units of beneficial interest; i.e., 100, in HGRCT. At a second meeting of the HGRCT on September 1, 1996, Mr. Richardson was appointed as Executive Trustee, and Mrs. Richardson was appointed as Executive Secretary.

Petitioners thereafter opened several additional bank accounts with respect to the various entities discussed above, all at Lebanon Citizens National Bank. For example, between September of 1996 and November of 1997, accounts were established under the following names: (1) HG Asset Management Co., c/o of Homer Richardson; (2) Homer Richardson d.b.a. Aegis Co., later renamed HG Asset Management Co. d.b.a. Aegis Co.; (3) Homer Richardson d.b.a. Asset Protection Co.; and (4) HG Richardson Charitable Trust. Petitioners had signatory authority over each of these accounts, and in a few instances one of their children was given signatory authority as well. Records also show that certain of the accounts previously established at Fifth Third Bank were closed in October of 1996.

Minutes from numerous HGAMC board meetings from August of 1996 through May of 2000 reflect activities of the entity authorized by petitioners in their capacities as directors. Mrs. Richardson participated in each of these meetings along with her husband and signed the minutes and resolutions so generated. Several of the matters garnering the board's attention involved petitioners' transportation and residence. On October 14, 1996, the directors approved the purchase by HGAMC of a 1996 Mercury Grand Marquis for $19,950 "to be provided to the Executive Director". Mr. Richardson testified that the car was acquired with funds from an account held in the name of HGAMC but was titled in his name.

From their respective inceptions, Mr. Richardson's sole proprietorships, HGAMC, and HGRCT were operated out of petitioners' residence on Quailwoods Drive. Resolutions specified that particular business operations of HGAMC would be conducted at its "headquarters" on Quailwoods Drive and required the presence of the Executive Director at the site to oversee maintenance and security. In addition, through a series of resolutions, HGAMC was authorized to, and did, contract for the remodeling of the company headquarters.

With respect to business conducted elsewhere, minutes show that the directors "were authorized to travel to Nashville, Indiana for purposes of looking at different land investment opportunities." Later, a director's meeting attended by petitioners' four children was held at Mike Fink's Restaurant in Covington, Kentucky, "for the purpose of discussing duties of successor directors with those appointed as successor directors". At that meeting, "It was dedided [sic] that more time should be devoted to training & that a two (2) day meeting should be scheduled for Brown County State Park in the future". The tab for the meal was $247.38.

Matters related to tax issues, from administrative functions related to preparation of the entities' returns to intentions or positions on tax topics, were likewise addressed at board meetings. As an example of the latter, minutes of the HGAMC board meeting held on June 27, 1997, read as follows:

The Executive Director, Homer L. Richardson as instructed by the Board of Directors made available to the Board of Directors research from the Aegis Company, Court Cases and legal opinions regarding IRS Notice 97-24.

Mr. Richardson provided a report from the Aegis Company that addressed each paragraph of IRS Notice 97-24 in which it was pointed out that Notice 97-24 was concerned with I.R.C. Sec 671-679 as it pertains to grantor trusts and that when a person attempts to apply business trust procedures of tax reduction to an "ordinary trust" the trust is labeled by the IRS as an "abusive trust". The report concluded that 97-24 is not addressing legitimate business trusts.

Mr. Richardson also provided a copy of American Jurisprudence Second Edition volume 13 Business Trusts, Excerpts from Executive's Business Law Section regarding Business Trusts, a report from George M. Turner, M.S. J.D. regarding the legal foundation of the Business Trust and taxation of a Business Trust and a report from the Yale law [sic] Journal titled the trust as an instrument of Commerce.

The materials supplied, the legal opinions and the research conducted regarding business trusts do not support the position that the Aegis business trust is the kind of trust that is addressed in IRS Notice 97-24.

In addition to personally implementing an Aegis multitrust package, Mr. Richardson also became involved in the promotion and sale of the Aegis system. Beginning in 1996, Mr. Richardson sold Aegis trust packages through Asset Protection Services, and it was this business that was managed by HGAMC under the contractual arrangement detailed above. Generally, HGAMC would retain a percentage of the sales price of a trust package as a commission from Aegis. Mr. Richardson took a 3-day training course from Mr. Bartoli of Aegis in connection with these activities. The record contains several examples from the 1998 to 1999 time period of announcements for trust workshops that reflect the nature of Mr. Richardson's promotional efforts in this regard.

For instance, in a 1999 letter addressed to agents working for State Farm Insurance encouraging them to attend workshops scheduled for New Orleans, Louisiana; and Mobile, Alabama; Mr. Richardson introduced himself and his business as set forth below:

My name is Homer Richardson, and for the past five years, as a representative of the Aegis Company, I have been conducting workshops throughout the country teaching State Farm Agents, doctors, dentists, and other self employed individuals, how to protect their assets from lawsuit judgments and dramatically reduce their income taxes.

This workshop is not open to the general public and is by invitation only. We teach self employed individuals how to operate a business using a special kind of trust. This special trust is a business device that has several names. It has been referred to as a Blind Trust, an Unincorporated Business Organization, a Contractual Business Organization, and a Common Law Business Organization, just to name a few. We refer to this special trust as a CBO. However, the IRS refers to all of these entities as Business Trusts.

This and similar announcements for the introductory workshop directed toward self-employed professionals consistently tout as benefits of the business trust system the ability to: Legally reduce Federal and State income taxes "70% or More"; eliminate Federal estate taxes no matter the size of the estate; sell a business or other assets and pay no capital gain taxes; and protect personal assets from lawsuit judgments.

Mr. Richardson participated as a featured speaker at various of these events. For example, with respect to workshops to be conducted in 1999 in Lexington, Kentucky; Indianapolis, Indiana; Toledo, Ohio; and Cincinnati, Ohio; the invitation highlighted as speakers:

Wilson Graham: Former State Farm Insurance employee, conducted audits and tax reports for Corporate Office. Mr. Graham also was a controller and vice-president for a large insurance company in Ohio. for [sic] the past 19 years Graham & Associates has provided tax planning and accounting services for hundreds of State Farm Insurance Agents and other self-employed individuals in several states. For the past four years, Mr. Graham has conducted Tax Workshops and provided supporting tax services.

Homer L. Richardson: Mr. Richardson, as Executive Director of the HG Asset Management Company, specializes in asset protection, tax engineering, and wealth accumulation. For the past seven year [sic], Mr. Richardson has conducted Business Trust workshops throughout the country teaching people how to protect their assets from lawsuit judgments and reduce taxes. Mr. Richardson is extremely knowledgeable regarding Business Trusts and is a highly sought after speaker. His workshops are in high demand and filled with information about the Business Trust and their [sic] financial advantages.

These announcements generally direct that registrations be sent, and checks made payable, to HGAMC, or Trust Management Services (further explained below).

The record also contains an example of an announcement for an advanced business trust workshop sponsored by HGAMC in Ohio in 1999.6 Mr. Richardson sent out an invitation stating:

I am writing to let you know about an ADVANCED BUSINESS TRUST WORKSHOP that HG Asset Management Company is sponsoring. This workshop will be conducted by Mike Vallone, the Executive Director of Aegis. It will be three full days from 9 a.m. until 5 p.m. each day devoted to the complete CBO System. This workshop goes beyond what you may have learned at the Basic CBO Workshop given by Homer Richardson and Wil Graham. You will study how to properly move money through the system, and how you should operate the charitable trust. We will show you how Offshore entities, such as offshore trusts, and International Business Companies can be used in connection with this system to get incredible tax advantages, as well as even greater privacy and protection from the IRS. In fact, we will show you how to create a CBO that has NO tax reporting requirements in the U.S.

To provide ongoing support to clients who purchased trust packages, petitioners as directors of HGAMC at a December 29, 1998, board meeting affirmed and ratified the creation of a department within HGAMC to provide management services, to be known as Trust Management Services. A bank account had been opened in the name of HG Asset Management Co. d.b.a. Trust Management Services on June 29, 1998, at Lebanon Citizens National Bank, over which petitioners had signatory authority.

Subsequently, in February of 2000, the structure of petitioners' entities was again altered with the creation of Atlantis Management Services LLC. HGAMC obtained a 59-percent membership interest. Other members included Barton Richardson and Mr. Richardson, who served as the managing member. A second limited liability company, Apache LLC, was created at some point not identified in the record. HGAMC received a membership interest in this entity of approximately 90 percent, and Mr. Richardson again served as the managing member. Aegis sent a letter to clients in June of 2000 recommending that an LLC structure be implemented to "take your future trust returns 'off the radar screen' for audit."

On January 10, 1997, and January 22, 1998, the board of directors of HGAMC approved charitable donations to be made to HGRCT of $259,888 for the 1996 year and $51,299 for the 1997 year. During calendar years 1996 and 1997, HGRCT made no charitable distributions. On January 27, 1998, the HGRCT board approved charitable contributions totaling $12,994 to be made to the American Cancer Society, Berea College, the Wellness Community, Young Life, the Salvation Army, and New Richmond Elementary School. Acknowledgments from each of these organizations confirm that donations were received in 1998, although the amount in one instance appears to be $500 greater than that initially approved by the board. A similar pattern of contributions continued in 1999 through 2002.

Throughout the years in issue and continuing to the present, Mr. Richardson made all of the day-to-day investment decisions with respect to, controlled all of the assets being held by, and had complete supervisory control over HGAMC and HGRCT.



Tax Reporting
For each of the years in issue, petitioners filed: (1) A joint Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, for themselves and including a Schedule C, Profit or Loss From Business, for Asset Protection Services; (2) a Form 1041, U.S. Income Tax Return for Estates and Trusts, for HGAMC; and (3) a Form 990-PF, Return of Private Foundation or Section 4947(a)(1) Nonexempt Charitable Trust Treated as a Private Foundation, for HGRCT. Wilson M. Graham (Mr. Graham) of Graham & Associates signed each of the foregoing returns, except the 1996 Form 1040, as preparer. Mitchell Graham, also of Graham & Associates and Mr. Graham's son, signed the 1996 Form 1040.7 As indicated by the workshop announcements quoted above, Mr. Graham was involved in promotion of the Aegis trust system. The 1996 Form 1040 was filed on April 15, 1997, and the 1997 Form 1040 was filed on September 23, 1998.

On their 1996 Form 1040, petitioners reported adjusted gross income of $11,069, which amount incorporated a $1,920 loss from Schedule C, a $3,000 capital loss, and $4,552 of other income. An attached statement showed that the other income comprised two "DIRECTORS FEES" of $1,500 each and two "PERSONAL USE OF AUTO" amounts of $881 and $671. The Schedule C loss for Asset Protection Services was computed by subtracting $135,088 in expenses from gross income of $133,168. Taxable income is shown as zero and total tax as $212 (on account of self-employment tax).

The 1997 Form 1040 similarly reflected adjusted gross income of $9,694, including $1,006 in business income from Schedule C, a $3,000 capital loss, and other income of $8,190. The other income included two "DIRECTORS FEES" of $3,000 each and two "PERSONAL USE OF AUTO" amounts of $1,095 each. The Schedule C income of $1,006 was derived from $8,127 in gross income and $7,121 of expenses. Petitioners' taxable income was shown as zero and total tax as $990.

On the Forms 1041 filed on behalf of HGAMC for 1996 and 1997, respectively, petitioners reported interest income ($74 and $2,497) and business income from an attached Schedule C ($262,806 and $54,902) and deducted therefrom principally fiduciary fees ($3,000 and $6,000) and charitable deductions to HGRCT ($259,880 and $51,299), to arrive at taxable income of zero. The Schedule C business income amounts were computed as follows:



1996 1997

Gross income $516,309 $455,750

Expenses

Advertising 0 356

Car and truck 9,970 11,472

Commissions and fees 224,250 326,940

Depreciation 3,504 4,507

Insurance 1,665 2,273

Mortgage 1,738 4,860

Office 213 11,142

Repairs and maintenance 1,832 8,768

Taxes and licenses 2,519 2,420

Travel 4,086 14,326

Meals and entertainment 256 1,937

Utilities 1,214 3,724

Other 2,256 8,123

Total expenses 253,503 400,848

Net profit 262,806 54,902


The other expenses for 1996 comprised solely meeting expenses, while the other expenses listed for 1997 included bank service charges of $486, directors' meetings of $1,058, education of $2,164, and medical expenses of $4,415.

The amounts reported as gross receipts represented payments made by customers for Aegis trust packages sold by Mr. Richardson and deposited into accounts over which petitioners had signatory authority. The car and truck expenses related to the 1996 Mercury. The expenses claimed for depreciation, insurance, mortgage, repairs and maintenance, taxes and licenses, and utilities were all attributable in significant part to the Quailwoods Drive residence. The insurance expense also included a component for life insurance for Mr. Richardson, and the medical expenses pertained to healthcare for petitioners.

Mr. Richardson signed each of the Forms 1041 as a fiduciary of HGAMC. An attachment to the 1996 return contained the following: "The Fiduciary of this Trust hereby elects to treat contributions made this year and the next subsequent tax year as paid during this tax year as provided for by IRC Secion [sic] 642 (c)(1)". A substantially identical statement was attached to the 1997 return. The attachments further provided that the contributions for the next year to be treated as paid during 1996 and 1997 were $259,880 and $51,299, respectively.

Concerning HGRCT, the Form 990-PF for 1996 reflected no revenue (including contributions), expenditures, assets, or liabilities of any kind. The return listed both petitioners as trustees and indicated that each devoted 2 hours per week to his or her position. Mr. Richardson executed the return as a trustee.

The Form 990-PF for 1997 showed contributions received of $259,880, interest income of $85, operating and administrative expenses of $198, and contributions made of $12,994. Resultant excess of revenue over expenses and disbursements, as well as net assets, was $246,773. Petitioners were again listed as the trustees with an average of 2 hours apiece per week devoted to their work for HGRCT, and Mr. Richardson again signed the return as trustee.



Examination
On July 13, 1999, the IRS mailed to each petitioner, with respect to the 1996 and 1997 taxable years, a letter advising as follows:

The Internal Revenue Service has information indicating that you may be involved in a trust arrangement used for tax avoidance purposes. This letter is to inform you of the Internal Revenue Service's position regarding abusive trust arrangements. It is the government's position that trusts will be disregarded for tax purposes and the income will be taxed to the person who controls the trust, if the trust lacks economic substance or has been structured for tax avoidance purposes.

In addition to disregarding the trust entity, the government may pursue civil and/or criminal penalties against taxpayers and promoters who attempt to use trusts to avoid income tax liability.

If you are a participant in a trust scheme that has any of the abusive elements described in Notice 97-24 attached, you have the option of correcting your income tax filings to reflect the proper income and expenses on your personal, corporate and partnership returns, as applicable. Any trust returns previously filed should also be corrected to eliminate income and expenses reported.

The letters went on to request that petitioners provide documentation with respect to the trust (presumably HGAMC) in the event that they determined that their position was appropriate under Notice 97-24, 1997-1 C.B. 409.

Petitioners responded with a letter dated July 21, 1999, communicating that they had been assured by their legal counsel and tax accountant that their trust was "NOT an 'abusive trust' as described in your material." They indicated that they would not be filing an amended return and then proceeded with several pages questioning the authority of the IRS to request documentation with respect to the trust. On August 10, 1999, the IRS sent letters to petitioners notifying that their Forms 1040 and HGAMC's Forms 1041 for 1996 and 1997 had been selected for examination. Petitioners were asked to meet with the examining agent on September 7, 1999, and to provide books, records, and documents related to the returns. Neither petitioner responded to the letters or attended the requested meeting.

David Morgason (Mr. Morgason) was the principal IRS employee responsible for conducting the examination of petitioners' returns. When petitioners failed to provide any information, Mr. Morgason sought to obtain records from third parties through issuance of administrative summonses. One or more such summons was sent to Lebanon Citizens National Bank, and Mr. Richardson responded upon learning of the matter with two letters dated September 22, 1999, one to the IRS and one to the bank. The letter to the IRS asserted that the agent had violated various laws and policies and threatened legal action. The letter to the bank directed the bank not to disclose any of the information requested by summons until presented with a court order to do so.

Mr. Morgason later issued additional summonses to Lebanon Citizens National Bank, and petitioners on February 11, 2000, responded by filing a petition to quash with the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. The Government filed a motion to dismiss the petition to quash, and the District Court granted the motion on July 20, 2000. Meanwhile, after reviewing the information received to date, Mr. Morgason in the spring of 2000 referred petitioners' case to the IRS Criminal Investigation Division. Work on the civil case, other than an unsuccessful attempt to solicit from petitioners an extension of the statute of limitations, ceased.

At some point between late 1999 and early 2001, Mr. Richardson was contacted by Missy Vaselaney, an Ohio attorney specializing in tax and estate matters.8 Ms. Vaselaney had become aware of the Aegis trust plan through communications with State Farm Insurance agents. (Ms. Vaselaney's husband was apparently an attorney who did work with State Farm. Ms. Vaselaney expressed to Mr. Richardson some concerns about the legality of the Aegis system and suggested that he cooperate with her in working with the IRS. Mr. Richardson declined. In the words of one State Farm agent and former client of Mr. Richardson, Todd Young (Mr. Young), Ms. Vaselaney assisted a group of State Farm agents, including Mr. Young, to "get out" of the Aegis system and to resolve their tax audit matters.

While the criminal investigation was ongoing, the IRS also commenced an investigation of Mr. Richardson under section 6700, which imposes a civil penalty for the promotion of abusive tax shelters. Petitioners were formally notified of the investigation, likewise conducted by Mr. Morgason, in or about September of 2002. Mr. Richardson attended an initial conference in connection with the section 6700 investigation on November 8, 2002, and both spouses attended a closing conference on December 17, 2002. Mr. Richardson raised various frivolous arguments at those conferences, including challenges to the authority of the IRS, and while he provided documents, he declined to provide any of the documentation requested by Mr. Morgason.

Following the December meeting, the IRS referred the section 6700 case to the Department of Justice. On February 5, 2003, the United States filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio against Mr. Graham, individually and doing business as Graham & Associates, and against Mr. Richardson, individually and doing business as HGAMC. United States v. Graham, No. 1:03cv96 (S.D. Ohio filed Feb. 5, 2003).9 The Government sought injunctive relief against the defendants with respect to promotion of alleged abusive trust schemes. Id. On June 23, 2005, the District Court entered an opinion and order to, inter alia, "preliminarily enjoin Defendants from promoting the sales of abusive trusts under the name of Aegis, Heritage, or any other name, or from engaging in any other activities which are subject to penalty under 26 U.S.C. §§ 6700 and 6701", based principally on findings and recommendations made by a magistrate judge in November of 2003 and February of 2004. Id.

The civil examination of petitioners' returns resumed in approximately April of 2003. The Government made a jeopardy assessment with respect to petitioners' 1996 and 1997 taxes on May 14, 2003, after an adviser with whom they had invested $450,000 attempted to transfer the funds to a Swiss bank account. The notices of deficiency underlying the cases at bar were then issued on July 10, 2003, to Mr. Richardson and on July 10 or 11, 2003, to Mrs. Richardson.10


OPINION




I. Evidentiary Matter
After briefs were filed in these cases, petitioners filed a motion requesting judicial notice pursuant to rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (hereinafter Fed. R. Evid. 201). The motion recites: "In the Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. Smith [2005-2 USTC ¶50,565], 424 F.3d 992, 1010 (9th Cir. September 13, 2005), the IRS conceded that in some situations, the business trust could report income on its Form 1041 but could alternatively, report the income on the individual's Form 1040 as long as it was reported." Petitioners then quote two phrases from the referenced case and attach a copy of the complete opinion. The phrases are taken from the following two paragraphs, set forth in full with the quoted language emphasized by boldface type:

Smith argues that the particular 1040 personal returns or 1065 partnership tax returns were not false for omitting income or revenue that should have been reported on a separate 1041 trust return. However, IRS Agent Brown testified that although revenue in a business trust such as a UBO would typically be reported on a form 1041, as a default the income could also be reported on a 1040 personal income tax return. In any event, the income had to be reported on some IRS form. Thus, the under-reporting of income on the clients' personal returns, that could have been but was not reported elsewhere, made the personal returns "false" or "fraudulent."

* * * * * * *

Smith argues that the evidence was insufficient to show that he acted willfully "with specific intent to defraud the government in the enforcement of its tax laws." Salerno, 902 F.2d at 1432. While there is nothing "inherently unlawful with an UBO," and the government told the jury during closing argument to assume UBOs are "legitimate," the government provided ample evidence that Smith gave advice to unlawfully use UBOs to file false or fraudulent tax returns (or not to file at all). [United States v. Smith [2005-2 USTC ¶50,565], 424 F.3d 992, 1010 (9th Cir. 2005); boldface added.]

Fed. R. Evid. 201 provides in relevant part:

Rule 201. Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts

(a) Scope of rule. This rule governs only judicial notice of adjudicative facts.

(b) Kinds of facts. A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.

Although the rule does not expressly define "adjudicative facts", the Advisory Committee Notes accompanying the rule explains that they are:

those which relate to the parties, or more fully: When a court or an agency finds facts concerning the immediate parties --who did what, where, when, how, and with what motive or intent --the court or agency is performing an adjudicative function, and the facts are conveniently called adjudicative facts. [Advisory Committee's Note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 204; internal quotations omitted.]

See also United States v. Amado-Nunez, 357 F.3d 119, 121 (1st Cir. 2004) (defining adjudicative facts as "facts about the parties or events involved in the case").

With respect to then ascertaining whether particular adjudicative facts are capable of accurate and ready determination, this Court has previously noted that "under rule 201, records of a particular court in one proceeding commonly are the subject of judicial notice by the same and other courts in other proceedings", and "Also generally subject to judicial notice under rule 201 is the fact that a decision or judgment was entered in a case, that an opinion was filed, as well as the language of a particular opinion." Estate of Reis v. Commissioner [Dec. 43,482], 87 T.C. 1016, 1027 (1986). In a similar vein, we have observed: "Records of court proceeding are commonly the subject of judicial notice. * * * Although we may take notice of matters that cannot reasonably be questioned, the truth of assertions or findings (as distinguished from the fact that the assertions or findings were made) is ordinarily not properly the subject of judicial notice." Steiner v. Commissioner [Dec. 50,537(M)], T.C. Memo. 1995-122 n.10.

Given these standards, the situation at hand appears to present a somewhat atypical scenario. While taking judicial notice of the opinion by the Court of the Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and the fact that certain statements were made by Government agents in the course of the underlying proceeding would generally comply with the dictates of Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2), it is debatable whether the foregoing are in reality adjudicative facts for purposes of the instant litigation. Petitioners seem to be attempting to employ a motion for judicial notice in a manner more akin to a supplemental brief. Their motion essentially calls to the Court's attention an unrelated case that they feel is pertinent and supportive of their position.

However, even leaving aside for the moment procedural complications and considering the case as we would any other cited precedent, the Court notes that the quoted statements from United States v. Smith, supra at 1010, do not assist petitioners here. Considered in context, the alleged concessions simply stand for the unremarkable proposition that there can exist legitimate unincorporated business entities, the income of which may be properly reported on Forms 1041. The question before us is whether HGAMC and HGRCT were such legitimate entities or whether they were part of a sham arrangement designed to avoid taxes and should be disregarded for tax purposes. This is an inquiry that we resolve infra based on all the facts and circumstances of petitioners' particular situation. The fact that in an unrelated case decided nearly a decade after the transactions here at issue Government agents made certain relatively generic legal statements would not affect our analysis. Petitioners' motion will be denied as moot.



II. Income Tax Deficiencies - Unreported Income
The Internal Revenue Code imposes a Federal tax on the taxable income of every individual. Sec. 1. Section 61(a) defines gross income for purposes of calculating taxable income as "all income from whatever source derived". Respondent has determined that petitioners were required to include in their gross income, and failed to report on their Forms 1040, the receipts they instead attributed to HGAMC.

A. Burden of Proof

As a general rule, the Commissioner's determinations are presumed correct, and the taxpayer bears the burden of proving error therein. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering [3 USTC ¶1164], 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). Although section 7491(a) may shift the burden to the Commissioner with respect to factual issues where the taxpayer introduces credible evidence, the provision operates only where the taxpayer establishes that he or she has complied with all substantiation requirements, has maintained all required records, and has cooperated with reasonable requests for witnesses, information, documents, meetings, and interviews. Here, as indicated above, petitioners were not forthcoming during the examination of their returns. Section 7491(a) therefore effects no shift of burden in the instant cases.

However, an additional limitation on the general rule potentially bears upon the cases at bar. Various Courts of Appeals, including that for the Sixth Circuit to which appeal in the instant cases would normally lie, have indicated that before the Commissioner may rely on the presumption of correctness in unreported income scenarios, the determination must be supported by at least a "minimal" factual predicate or foundation of substantive evidence linking the taxpayer to income-generating activity or to the receipt of funds. United States v. Walton [90-2 USTC ¶50,429], 909 F.2d 915, 918-919 (6th Cir. 1990); see also, e.g., Palmer v. United States [97-2 USTC ¶50,550], 116 F.3d 1309, 1313 (9th Cir. 1997); Portillo v. Commissioner [91-2 USTC ¶50,304], 932 F.2d 1128, 1133 (5th Cir. 1991), affg. in part, revg. in part, and remanding [Dec. 46,373(M)] T.C. Memo. 1990-68; Anastasato v. Commissioner [86-2 USTC ¶9529], 794 F.2d 884, 886-887 (3d Cir. 1986), vacating and remanding [Dec. 41,925(M)] T.C. Memo. 1985-101; Weimerskirch v. Commissioner [79-1 USTC ¶9359], 596 F.2d 358, 361-362 (9th Cir. 1979), revg. [Dec. 34,214] 67 T.C. 672 (1977).

To the extent that those decisions might be on point here, and as will be shown in greater detail below, respondent has introduced sufficient evidence connecting petitioners to the income-producing activities attributed to HGAMC and to the receipt of financial benefits therefrom. For instance, Mr. Richardson's services were paramount in generating the underlying sales, and both petitioners received distributions, directly or indirectly, out of the funds received.

The Court is satisfied that the totality of the record is sufficient to meet any pertinent burden of production placed on respondent with respect to the adjustments related to the income tax deficiencies and concomitant unreported income at issue here. The burden of showing error in these determinations by respondent remains with petitioners.11

B. Economic Substance of the Trusts

Respondent's principal basis for concluding that petitioners are liable for deficiencies was that HGAMC and HGRCT were sham entities with no economic substance and, consequently, should be disregarded for Federal tax purposes. As a result, all income earned and allowable expenses incurred under the names of HGAMC and HGRCT would be reported on petitioners' personal income tax returns. Petitioners dispute these sham characterizations. They argue that HGAMC was a legitimate business trust under the laws of Ohio created to operate the new business of selling and servicing Aegis trusts. It is likewise their position that HGRCT was a proper nonexempt charitable trust treated as a private foundation under section 4947(a)(1).

The overarching principles that guide analysis of trust legitimacy are of long provenance. As summarized by this Court in oft-cited language:

It is well established that a taxpayer has the legal right to minimize his taxes or avoid them totally by any means which the law permits. Gregory v. Helvering [35-1 USTC ¶9043], 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935). However, this right does not bestow upon the taxpayer the right to structure a paper entity to avoid tax when that entity does not stand on the solid foundation of economic reality. When the form of the transaction has not, in fact, altered any cognizable economic relationships, we will look through that form and apply the tax law according to the substance of the transaction. Markosian v. Commissioner [Dec. 36,858], 73 T.C. 1235 (1980), citing Furman v. Commissioner [Dec. 27,805], 45 T.C. 360 (1966), affd. per curiam [67-2 USTC ¶9589] 381 F.2d 22 (5th Cir. 1967). This rule applies regardless of whether the entity has a separate existence recognized under State law (Furman v. Commissioner, supra at 365), and whether, in form, it is a trust, a common law business trust, or some other form of jural entity. * * * [Zmuda v. Commissioner [Dec. 39,468], 79 T.C. 714, 719-720 (1982), affd. [84-1 USTC ¶9442] 731 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir. 1984); fn. ref. omitted.]

In ascertaining whether a trust has no economic substance apart from tax considerations, the Court has identified four pertinent factors: (1) Whether the taxpayer's relationship, as grantor, to the property ostensibly transferred to the trust differed materially before and after the trust's formation; (2) whether the trust had a bona fide independent trustee; (3) whether an economic interest in the trust passed to other beneficiaries; and (4) whether the taxpayer felt bound by any restrictions imposed by the trust itself or the law of trusts. Markosian v. Commissioner [Dec. 36,858], 73 T.C. 1235, 1243-1244 (1980); Gouveia v. Commissioner [Dec. 55,799(M)], T.C. Memo. 2004-256; Norton v. Commissioner [Dec. 54,768(M)], T.C. Memo. 2002-137; Castro v. Commissioner [Dec. 54,338(M)], T.C. Memo. 2001-115; Muhich v. Commissioner [Dec. 53,413(M)], T.C. Memo. 1999-192 (addressing the Heritage/Aegis multitrust system), affd. [2001-1 USTC ¶50,199] 238 F.3d 860 (7th Cir. 2001); Buckmaster v. Commissioner [Dec. 52,055(M)], T.C. Memo. 1997-236; Hanson v. Commissioner [Dec. 38,447(M)], T.C. Memo. 1981-675, affd. [83-1 USTC ¶9150] 696 F.2d 1232 (9th Cir. 1983).

As to the first factor, addressing change in relationship to trust property, the Court as a threshold matter looks to the economic realities of the arrangement to ascertain the true grantor, settlor, or creator, notwithstanding mere nominal designations as such in the trust documents. Zmuda v. Commissioner, supra at 720-721; Gouveia v. Commissioner, supra; Buckmaster v. Commissioner, supra. Here, the trust instrument for HGAMC names Mr. Quay as the creator and a director; however, he functioned as nothing more than a temporary "straw man" under the precedent just cited.

Mr. Richardson testified that he had just met Mr. Quay at an Aegis training convention in May or June of 1996, a few months before the HGAMC documents were executed, and had no contact with him after 1997. Mr. Richardson further testified that having an attorney named as creator and a director of the entity was a condition imposed by Aegis on the purchase of the trust package. Any drafting work would also likely have been minimal, given that, as a mass-marketed trust "package", the Aegis system involved distribution to multiple purchasers of similar, standardized documents. Mr. Quay contributed no assets to HGAMC, never had signatory authority over any of HGAMC's accounts, received no compensation for his duties as director, and resigned after only 6 days. Hence, it is clear that Mr. Quay's role, and a transient one at that, existed on paper only. All stake in establishing HGAMC patently came from petitioners alone. Economic realities thus point to petitioners as the true grantors of HGAMC.

In this connection, we further note that in situations where one spouse first transfers his or her property to the other spouse, who in turn transfers the received property along with his or her own to the entity, courts typically ignore the first conveyance when considering questions of grantor. E.g., Neely v. United States [85-2 USTC ¶9791], 775 F.2d 1092, 1095 (9th Cir. 1985); Schulz v. Commissioner [82-2 USTC ¶9485], 686 F.2d 490, 496 (7th Cir. 1982), affg. [Dec. 37,498(M)] T.C. Memo. 1980-568; Kooyers v. Commissioner [Dec. 55,826(M)], T.C. Memo. 2004-281. Either of two rationales counsels this approach. The conveyance is ignored (1) because substance predominates over form in tax matters and/or (2) because the parties themselves did not treat the conveyance as either a sale or a gift. Neely v. United States, supra at 1095; Schulz v. Commissioner, supra at 496; Kooyers v. Commissioner, supra. Here, the record in any event shows a scenario akin to a so-called step transaction where Mrs. Richardson's transfer was only the first in a series of preplanned steps, such that intermediary maneuvers should be ignored in favor of substance.

On a related point, we likewise are satisfied that petitioners should be considered the true grantors of HGRCT. Although according to the documentation HGAMC purportedly created HGRCT, this Court in considering the first of the four factors in the context of multitiered trust arrangements has made no such distinction. See Castro v. Commissioner, supra; Muhich v. Commissioner, supra; see also Kooyers v. Commissioner, supra ("Because petitioners are grantors of the * * * [first-tier] Trust, they are also grantors of the * * * [second-tier] Trust and any other trust for which * * * [those] trusts are grantors."); Dahlstrom v. Commissioner [Dec. 47,401(M)], T.C. Memo. 1991-264 ("Petitioners were instrumental in the creation of all the trusts involved in their multitiered arrangement."), affd. without published opinion 999 F.2d 1579 (5th Cir. 1993).

Having determined that petitioners should be viewed as the grantors of HGAMC and HGRCT, we turn to whether their relationship to property ostensibly transferred to these entities differed materially before and after the trusts' formation. Here, the record reflects that the relationship of petitioners to both their physical assets and their income-producing activities remained essentially unchanged. Notably, petitioners continued to live in and operate their residence with no restriction on their personal use of that property or any other of their tangible assets. The only apparent difference stemming from the transfer is that petitioners thereafter sought to deduct substantial personal living expenses incurred in connection with the property, such as insurance, repairs, maintenance, and utilities. They even commenced a remodeling project at the Quailwoods location, and nothing in the record indicates that the resulting improvements did not enhance petitioners' personal use of the property for residential purposes. Attempts to legitimize deductions of this nature through designation of the property as HGAMC's "headquarters" are unavailing. A passing reference by petitioners on brief to a home office likewise does nothing to aid their cause. Deductions related to business use of a residence are strictly circumscribed by the rules of section 280A and would require petitioners to show, at minimum and as relevant here, that some portion of the home was "exclusively used on a regular basis" for business. Sec. 280A(c)(1). The evidence before the Court does not even so much as suggest that to be the case.

As regards income-producing activities, again no truly material change appears to have been worked by implementation of the trust system. Petitioners' primary contention in arguing for a changed relationship centers on this aspect and is summarized on brief as follows:

The allegation that the taxpayers' relationship as grantor to the property did not differ materially before and after the creation of the trusts is ludicrous. There was no substantial trust property (aside from the Richardsons' home) before the creation of the trust. The trusts were created to operate a brand-new business. This new business of selling and servicing Aegis Trusts is the primary property of the trusts. Additionally, the creation and use of a business management trust for such a purpose is a codified creation of the law of the State of Ohio.

At the outset, we stress again that the legitimacy of an entity under State law as a business trust or any other recognized form has no bearing on an economic substance analysis and will not be discussed further. See Zmuda v. Commissioner [Dec. 39,468], 79 T.C. at 720, and cases following. More importantly, petitioners' remonstrance concerning a new business is on these facts a distinction without a difference, not to mention factually suspect.

The HGAMC trust instrument and the annual contracts between HGAMC and Asset Protection Services reflect an arrangement where the sole proprietorship, not HGAMC, conducted the underlying business of selling Aegis trusts. HGAMC in turn was purportedly engaged to manage Asset Protection Services through the provision of Mr. Richardson's services to his own sole proprietorship. This structure is corroborated by the descriptions identifying the nature of HGAMC's business on certain of its Forms 1041 as "MANAGEMENT SERVICES".

Mr. Richardson earned his livelihood as a self-employed salesman of insurance policies from 1993 through 1996. Thus, at the time the instruments establishing HGAMC were executed, Mr. Richardson had been employed for several years in selling financial management products aimed at protecting assets and/or addressing contingencies that might arise in the face of death or other hardship. As he began to focus more of his efforts on promoting Aegis trusts, he continued to be engaged, through a sole proprietorship, in selling financial management products aimed at protecting assets and/or addressing contingencies that might arise in the face of death or other hardship. Aegis trust packages were advertised as tools to: Legally reduce Federal and State income taxes "70% or More"; eliminate Federal estate taxes no matter the size of the estate; sell a business or other assets and pay no capital gain taxes; and protect personal assets from lawsuit judgments. Mr. Richardson testified:

A * * * Asset Protection Services was to provide asset protection. That's basically what it says, and that would be insurance basically and provide trying to sell trusts as well. Yes.

Q Okay. So your sole proprietorship was to sell both insurance and Aegis trusts.

A That's correct.

Q You had been selling insurance for several years before 1996. Is that correct?

A Right.

Q Back to at least 1992? A 1992 or '93.

Q Before 1996 you called your sole proprietorship Benefit Planning Services.

A That's correct.

Mr. Richardson also testified that he first received a referral fee from Aegis in March of 1996 for bringing an individual to meet with, and introducing him to, Mr. Bartoli in Chicago.

The record is nebulous at best on the genesis of any activity on the part of HGAMC. The Form SS-4, Application for Employer Identification Number, stated that business started on April 1, 1996. The instrument that by its terms "created and established" HGAMC is dated August 17, 1996. Petitioners' signatures on many of the documents pertaining to HGAMC and dated in August were notarized on December 3, 1996. Mr. Richardson's testimony on this point was confused, if not contradictory, and in the midst of an unsuccessful colloquy attempting to reconcile various dates, he was able only to offer that HGAMC was "operated" before August 17, 1996.

Given these circumstances, it cannot be said that the record bears out petitioners' attempts to portray the establishment of HGAMC as working some sort of clean break in Mr. Richardson's ongoing business activities, in terms of either the nature of those activities or the timeframe for their occurrence. The Court thus is unable to perceive that the entity's existence engendered any material change in petitioners' relationship to the property allegedly transferred thereto. Furthermore, since the only property contributed to HGRCT was 10 units of beneficial interest in HGAMC, creation of this second tier likewise produced no material changes.

The second factor investigates the presence of any bona fide independent trustee over the entity in question. A nominal trustee will not withstand scrutiny under this factor absent a meaningful role in; i.e., an exercise of control over, the operation of the trust. Gouveia v. Commissioner [Dec. 55,799(M)], T.C. Memo. 2004-256; Norton v. Commissioner [Dec. 54,768(M)], T.C. Memo. 2002-137; Castro v. Commissioner [Dec. 54,338(M)], T.C. Memo. 2001-115.

With respect to HGAMC, which employed the term "director" as opposed to "trustee", Mr. Quay was initially named as such. Nonetheless, his brief, 6-day stint is devoid of meaning for reasons akin to those discussed above in connection with his role as creator. In particular, his lack of even nominal signatory authority over any of the financial accounts opened in the entity's name belies any true oversight or control. As regards HGRCT, petitioners were from inception designated as the trustees, and no third party was named to the position. The facts thus reveal that petitioners were the sole individuals with operational control over HGAMC and HGRCT, and that their discretion was unfettered by any independent trustee.

The third factor looks at whether a genuine economic interest in the trust passed to any beneficiaries other than petitioners. The 100 units of beneficial interest in HGAMC were divided between Mr. Richardson, Mrs. Richardson, and HGRCT. The 100 units of beneficial interest in HGRCT were in turn held by HGAMC. Hence, the pertinent documents did not even purport to give any third party an economic interest in these entities.

The fourth and final factor considered is whether petitioners felt bound by any restrictions imposed by the trusts or the law of trusts. In the case of HGAMC, the authority granted to petitioners as directors was so broad as to impose no meaningful restrictions. Any fiduciary duties under relevant law would also be illusory for all practical purposes in that the circular arrangement of entities utilized left petitioners as the only true beneficiaries.

Concerning HGRCT, the trust instrument on its face prohibits transactions that would "in the opinion of the trustees, jeopardize the federal income tax exemption of this trust pursuant to section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code". However, petitioners never even obtained section 501(c)(3) status for HGRCT. This failure to implement what would seem to be a basic, foundational premise for the trust's operation leads us to conclude that HGRCT's existence and purported charitable character (as well as contribution activities in years subsequent to those in issue) were hardly more than a facade or window dressing that did little to bind petitioners' use of their assets.12

Although petitioners make multiple references on brief to HGRCT as an "IRC §4947(a) non-exempt charitable trust", these appellations smack of a dubious and belated attempt to reframe the scenario and lend legitimacy to HGRCT. More importantly, the characterizations do nothing to alter the fact that petitioners were not bound by the paper structure they created but chose to function under an alternative arrangement. In any event, when considering a factual scenario and claims virtually indistinguishable from those at hand, this Court saw no reason to afford credence to the purported charitable trust. Muhich v. Commissioner [Dec. 53,413(M)], T.C. Memo. 1999-192. The persuasive power of the record here is no greater.

To summarize, the factors typically considered by this Court in assessing the economic reality of a trust structure counsel that HGAMC and HGRCT do not warrant recognition for tax purposes. The Court therefore concludes that the income and allowable expenses attributable to HGAMC and HGRCT are taxable to petitioners.

Specifically, because HGAMC and HGRCT were shams, petitioners are required to include in their income for 1996 and 1997 business gross income and interest income reported by HGAMC and interest income reported by HGRCT. In this connection, petitioners at certain junctures have contended that the amounts of business income reported on the various returns germane to this calculation were overstated on account in some instances of double reporting and in other instances of reporting gross receipts from the sales of Aegis trusts as opposed to merely the proper commission income on those sales.

The record, however, contains no documentary evidence whatsoever that would support or corroborate an alternative computation. Furthermore, we observe that petitioners, and not Aegis, had unfettered control and signatory authority over relevant accounts into which the sales proceeds were deposited. In these circumstances, we cannot relieve petitioners of the implied concessions worked by their and their entities' filed returns. See Waring v. Commissioner [69-2 USTC ¶9495], 412 F.2d 800, 801 (3d Cir. 1969), affg. [Dec. 29,018(M)] T.C. Memo. 1968-126; Estate of Hall v. Commissioner [Dec. 45,484], 92 T.C. 312, 337-338 (1989).

As regards expenses, respondent determined that petitioners were entitled to deduct on their returns a portion of the business expenses claimed by HGAMC for each year and disallowed the remainder. Respondent also disallowed a portion of the expense for commissions and fees claimed by petitioners in 1996 on the Schedule C for Asset Protection Services.

Deductions are a matter of "legislative grace", and "a taxpayer seeking a deduction must be able to point to an applicable statute and show that he comes within its terms." New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering [4 USTC ¶1292], 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934); see also Rule 142(a). As a general rule, section 162(a) authorizes a deduction for "all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business". An expense is ordinary for purposes of this section if it is normal or customary within a particular trade, business, or industry. Deputy v. du Pont [40-1 USTC ¶9161], 308 U.S. 488, 495 (1940). An expense is necessary if it is appropriate and helpful for the development of the business. Commissioner v. Heininger [44-1 USTC ¶9109], 320 U.S. 467, 471 (1943). Section 262, in contrast, precludes deduction of "personal, living, or family expenses."

The breadth of section 162(a) is tempered by the requirement that any amount claimed as a business expense must be substantiated, and taxpayers are required to maintain records sufficient therefor. Sec. 6001; Hradesky v. Commissioner [Dec. 33,461], 65 T.C. 87, 89-90 (1975), affd.[76-2 USTC ¶9703] 540 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1976); sec. 1.6001-1(a), Income Tax Regs. When a taxpayer adequately establishes that he or she paid or incurred a deductible expense but does not establish the precise amount, we may in some circumstances estimate the allowable deduction, bearing heavily against the taxpayer whose inexactitude is of his or her own making. Cohan v. Commissioner [2 USTC ¶489], 39 F.2d 540, 543-544 (2d Cir. 1930). There must, however, be sufficient evidence in the record to provide a basis upon which an estimate may be made and to permit us to conclude that a deductible expense, rather than a nondeductible personal expense, was incurred in at least the amount allowed. Williams v. United States [57-2 USTC ¶9759], 245 F.2d 559, 560 (5th Cir. 1957); Vanicek v. Commissioner [Dec. 42,468], 85 T.C. 731, 742-743 (1985).

Furthermore, business expenses described in section 274 are subject to rules of substantiation that supersede the doctrine of Cohan v. Commissioner, supra. Sanford v. Commissioner [Dec. 29,122], 50 T.C. 823, 827-828 (1968), affd. [69-2 USTC ¶9491] 412 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1969); sec. 1.274-5T(a), Temporary Income Tax Regs., 50 Fed. Reg. 46014 (Nov. 6, 1985). Section 274(d) provides that no deduction shall be allowed for, among other things, traveling expenses, entertainment expenses, gifts, and expenses with respect to listed property (as defined in section 280F(d)(4) and including passenger automobiles, computer equipment, and cellular telephones) "unless the taxpayer substantiates by adequate records or by sufficient evidence corroborating the taxpayer's own statement": (1) The amount of the expenditure or use; (2) the time and place of the expenditure or use, or date and description of the gift; (3) the business purpose of the expenditure or use; and (4) in the case of entertainment or gifts, the business relationship to the taxpayer of the recipients or persons entertained. Sec. 274(d).

On this issue, petitioners neither at trial nor on brief offered evidence or argument directed towards the deductibility of any of the specific expenses disallowed by respondent. Respondent's determinations therefore are sustained as to those adjustments.13

In addition, respondent determined that petitioners were liable for self-employment taxes, and entitled to corresponding self-employment tax deductions, on business income attributed to them from HGAMC in 1996 and 1997. Section 1401 imposes an additional tax on the self-employment income of every individual, both for old age, survivors, and disability insurance and for hospital insurance. The term "self-employment income" denotes "net earnings from self-employment". Sec. 1402(b). "Net earnings from self-employment", in turn, means "the gross income derived by an individual from any trade or business carried on by such individual, less the deductions allowed by this subtitle which are attributable to such trade or business". Sec. 1402(a).

Again, petitioners have offered no evidence or argument pertaining to the self-employment tax. The Court has concluded that HGAMC should be disregarded, and the record supports that Mr. Richardson's personal services were the prime driver of the receipts attributed to the entity. Hence, to the extent that we have sustained respondent's determinations with respect to business income, we likewise sustain the imposition of corresponding self-employment tax thereon.



III. Capital Gain and/or Loss
On their Forms 1040 for each of the years 1996 and 1997, petitioners claimed a $3,000 capital loss and indicated that these losses were carried forward from prior years. Respondent disallowed the amounts claimed, and petitioners have never explained or substantiated their genesis. Respondent further determined that in 1997 petitioners sold stock in a company called Next Level Systems that was held in the name of HGAMC. Proceeds in the amount of $8,614 were apparently received on the sale and were not reported on petitioners' return or that of HGAMC. As petitioners had not established any basis in the shares, respondent determined that the full amount constituted capital gain.

As a general rule, a taxpayer is required on the disposition of property to report as capital gain the excess of the amount realized on disposition over his or her adjusted basis in the property. Sec. 1001. Alternatively, a taxpayer (other than a corporation) may claim losses on the sale or exchange of capital assets to the extent of the lesser of $3,000 ($1,500 if married filing separately) or the excess of such capital losses over capital gains. Sec. 1211(b).

Once more, in what is becoming a familiar refrain, the record is devoid of evidence on this matter. The Court therefore sustains respondent's determinations.



IV. Section 6663 Fraud Penalties
Section 6663(a) provides for the imposition of a penalty in "an amount equal to 75 percent of the portion of the underpayment which is attributable to fraud." In addition, section 6663(b) specifies that, if any portion of the underpayment is attributable to fraud, the entire underpayment is treated as attributable thereto, except and to the extent that the taxpayer establishes some part is not due to fraud.

Respondent bears the burden of proving the applicability of the civil fraud penalty by clear and convincing evidence. Sec. 7454(a); Rule 142(b). To sustain this burden, respondent must establish by this level of proof both (1) that there was an underpayment of tax for each taxable year in issue and (2) that at least some portion of such underpayment was due to fraud. DiLeo v. Commissioner [Dec. 47,423], 96 T.C. 858, 873 (1991), affd. [92-1 USTC ¶50,197] 959 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1992); Petzoldt v. Commissioner [Dec. 45,566], 92 T.C. 661, 699 (1989).

A. Underpayments of Tax

The first prong of the above fraud test mandates that respondent prove the existence of an underpayment of tax for each year. In doing so, respondent may not simply rely on the taxpayer's failure to prove error in the deficiency determination. DiLeo v. Commissioner, supra at 873; Otsuki v. Commissioner [Dec. 29,807], 53 T.C. 96, 106 (1969). Here, the evidence leaves no doubt that substantial taxable income was generated through Mr. Richardson's efforts in selling Aegis trusts. The totality of the record also clearly establishes that the entities that petitioners attempted to interpose between themselves and those receipts were not worthy of credence. Petitioners failed to include that income on their 1996 and 1997 returns and, as a result, underpaid their taxes. Petitioners' quibbles over various details and amounts notwithstanding, respondent has in any event shown by clear and convincing evidence the essential elements of the scenario which led to underpayments of tax.

B. Fraudulent Intent

The second prong of the fraud test requires respondent to show that a portion of the underpayment is attributable to fraud. Fraud for this purpose is defined as intentional wrongdoing on the part of the taxpayer, with the specific purpose of avoiding a tax believed to be owed. Stoltzfus v. United States [68-2 USTC ¶9499], 398 F.2d 1002, 1004 (3d Cir. 1968); Webb v. Commissioner [68-1 USTC ¶9341], 394 F.2d 366, 377 (5th Cir. 1968), affg. [Dec. 27,918(M)] T.C. Memo. 1966-81; Powell v. Granquist [58-1 USTC ¶9223], 252 F.2d 56, 60 (9th Cir. 1958). Stated differently, imposition of the civil fraud penalty is appropriate upon a showing that the taxpayer intended to evade taxes believed to be owing by conduct designed to conceal, mislead, or otherwise prevent the collection of taxes. DiLeo v. Commissioner, supra at 874.

The existence of fraud is a question of fact to be resolved upon consideration of the entire record. Id.; Gajewski v. Commissioner [Dec. 34,088], 67 T.C. 181, 199 (1976), affd. without published opinion 578 F.2d 1383 (8th Cir. 1978). Fraud will never be presumed. Recklitis v. Commissioner [Dec. 45,154], 91 T.C. 874, 909-910 (1988); Beaver v. Commissioner [Dec. 30,380], 55 T.C. 85, 92 (1970). However, because direct proof of a taxpayer's intent is seldom available, fraud may be established by circumstantial evidence. Spies v. United States [43-1 USTC ¶9243], 317 U.S. 492, 499-500 (1943); DiLeo v. Commissioner, supra at 874. In this connection, courts have developed a nonexclusive list of circumstantial indicia, or "badges", of fraud that may support a finding of fraudulent intent.

Among the badges of fraud that can be distilled from case law are the following: (1) Understatement of income; (2) maintenance of inadequate records; (3) failure to file tax returns; (4) implausible or inconsistent explanations of behavior; (5) concealment of income or assets; (6) failure to cooperate with tax authorities; (7) engaging in illegal activities; (8) dealing in cash; (9) failure to make estimated tax payments; and (10) filing false documents. Spies v. United States, supra at 499-500; Douge v. Commissioner [90-1 USTC ¶50,186], 899 F.2d 164, 168 (2d Cir. 1990); Bradford v. Commissioner [86-2 USTC ¶9602], 796 F.2d 303, 307-308 (9th Cir. 1986), affg. [Dec. 41,615(M)] T.C. Memo. 1984-601; Recklitis v. Commissioner, supra at 910. In examining these factors, this and other courts have further noted that the taxpayer's background, his or her level of education and prior history of filing proper returns, and the context of the events in question are relevant to the inquiry. Plunkett v. Commissioner [72-2 USTC ¶9541], 465 F.2d 299, 303 (7th Cir. 1972), affg. [Dec. 30,349(M)] T.C. Memo. 1970-274; Sowards v. Commissioner [Dec. 55,195(M)], T.C. Memo. 2003-180; Temple v. Commissioner [Dec. 54,104(M)], T.C. Memo. 2000-337, affd. [2003-1 USTC ¶50,411] 62 Fed. Appx. 605 (6th Cir. 2003).

Applying these considerations here, the Court concludes that Mr. Richardson fraudulently intended to underpay tax for each of the years in issue. Because matters of background and context speak especially loudly in these unique circumstances, several features are worthy of emphasis at the outset. As regards personal background, Mr. Richardson was not unsophisticated. He had passed accounting courses, possessed a business degree in marketing, and had years of experience in business in general and the sale of financial products in particular. Respondent's concession that petitioners filed correct returns prior to 1996 also speaks to an awareness of tax obligations.

With respect to context for the events in question, perhaps the most salient feature that must inform any analysis of the questions raised by this litigation comes to light. Mr. Richardson was not a mere participant in or purchaser of a mass-market trust scheme; he was an active promoter. He traveled throughout a multistate area lending his prestige and expertise to and conducting seminars on the Aegis system. He thus was necessarily intimately acquainted with the details of the program and the intended benefits. The advertising materials make clear that tax reduction was emphasized above all other advantages. This was amply corroborated by the credible testimony of Mr. Young, who attended a number of seminars involving Mr. Graham and Mr. Richardson and who purchased first a trust package from Aegis and later additional management services from Mr. Richardson. In his words, "the main thrust was to save money on your taxes as much as 70 percent." Mr. Richardson's demeanor at trial and disingenuous attempts to distance himself from the Aegis organization, on the other hand, were singularly unconvincing.

The preeminence of tax considerations in Mr. Richardson's implementation of the Aegis system is likewise corroborated by materials contained in the minutes of HGAMC board meetings. The quantity of statements addressing tax matters is telling. Even more revealing is the specific content of the June 27, 1997, minutes. This document shows that within a few weeks of filing his 1996 return and long before the 1997 return was filed, Mr. Richardson was aware of and expressly opposing the challenges raised by respondent to similar trust arrangements.

Against this backdrop, a number of the traditional "badges" of fraud should be considered as well. As regards understatement of income, consistent failure to report substantial amounts of income over a number of years is highly persuasive evidence of fraudulent intent. Kurnick v. Commissioner [56-1 USTC ¶9470], 232 F.2d 678, 681 (6th Cir. 1956), affg. [Dec. 20,858(M)] T.C. Memo. 1955-31; Temple v. Commissioner, supra. Petitioners reported gross income of less than $15,000 and taxable income of less than $1,000 on their Forms 1040 for each 1996, 1997, and 1998. They did so during a period when Mr. Richardson generated receipts totaling more than $1.5 million over the 3 years from selling Aegis trusts and related services. Petitioners avoided reporting those funds by intentionally diverting such amounts to returns of other entities that the Court has held to be devoid of economic substance. This pattern weighs heavily in favor of a conscious intent to evade tax.

With respect to record maintenance, petitioners at no time throughout the administrative or litigation process produced documentary records to substantiate business income or expenses. Possible inferences are that they either failed to keep such records or elected to conceal them to further obfuscate their activities. Neither is favorable to petitioners.

Concerning explanations for behavior, petitioners, other than offering a few broad, general statements, have made little attempt to justify or illuminate the rationale underlying their association with the Aegis system. Certain inconsistencies, however, give us pause. Mr. Richardson at trial testified that he had consulted with several independent tax professionals before purchasing the Aegis trust package, but in response to a previous interrogatory from respondent requesting identification of persons from whom advice was secured prior to creation of the trusts had listed only individuals connected with Aegis. Mr. Richardson's testimony that he became uncomfortable in late 1999 or 2000 with arguments being asserted by Aegis in conjunction with challenges to the trust structure and began to disengage from those positions is likewise suspect. Mr. Morgason's description of Mr. Richardson's behavior during the 2002 section 6700 investigation is to the contrary and is corroborated by audio recordings of conferences conducted pursuant thereto.

Concealment of income and assets is at the crux of this litigation and requires little further discussion. The establishment of a trust structure without economic substance, to which income and assets are transferred for tax avoidance purposes, has been considered by this Court to be an affirmative indicium of fraud. Mason v. Commissioner [Dec. 55,790(M)], T.C. Memo. 2004-247; Dunlap v. Commissioner [Dec. 49,011(M)], T.C. Memo. 1993-187; Brittain v. Commissioner [Dec. 48,216(M)], T.C. Memo. 1992-277. As a related point, petitioners' use of the trust arrangement to claim business deductions for personal expenses, especially items related to their personal residence, likewise bolsters the impression of a concerted effort to avoid taxation.

Failure to cooperate with tax authorities is another particularly noteworthy badge on these facts. Petitioners not only declined to cooperate in the examination of their returns but also sought actively to impede the audit. Petitioners did not provide any substantive information in response to Mr. Morgason's requests. They then went so far as to prevent respondent from obtaining data from third parties by, for instance, discouraging compliance with summonses and even filing a petition to quash.

The badge pertaining to illegal activities is germane here as well. Mr. Richardson was in the business of promoting and selling abusive trust arrangements, which created revenue issues for respondent and for countless purchasers. Moreover, as pointed out by the District Court in the section 6700 proceeding against Mr. Richardson and Mr. Graham, "whether before or after Muhich I or its affirmance by the Seventh Circuit, the trust scheme in which they engaged was, and ought to have been known to be, illegal." United States v. Graham, No. 1:03cv96 (S.D. Ohio June 23, 2005). The very business income concealed in petitioners' trust structure was generated through sales of an illegal product.

Mr. Richardson's failure to heed warnings with respect to the improper nature of the Aegis trust structure and analogous schemes likewise has bearing on his state of mind and intentions at the time he chose to purchase and use the package. Specifically, the failure suggests that the legality of the arrangement was of little concern to Mr. Richardson. Mr. Richardson was aware of Notice 97-24, 1997-1 C.B. 409, by June of 1997. He was contacted by Ms. Vaselaney between late 1999 and early 2001. The magistrate judge in the section 6700 proceeding initially recommended a preliminary injunction, based on Mr. Richardson's participation in what was characterized as an "illogical and illegal" scheme, in November of 2003. United States v. Graham, No. 1:03cv96, 2003 WL 23169851, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 19, 2003). In the face of all these warnings, it would seem that an individual truly interested in a legitimate arrangement would have at least sought out an independent evaluation, rather than continuing to align him- or herself with insiders, many of whom had questionable qualifications.

In summary, the majority of the badges of fraud considered by this and other courts are present here. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the circumstantial indicia revealed by the record in these cases establish by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Richardson intended through his use of the Aegis trust system to evade taxes known to be owing. Respondent has shown that at least some part of the underpayment for each 1996 and 1997 is attributable to fraud. Furthermore, because Mr. Richardson has failed to show that any portion of the underpayments upon which the section 6663 penalty was computed was not due to fraud, respondent is sustained as to this issue with respect to both years.



V. Section 6662 Accuracy-Related Penalty
Subsection (a) of section 6662 imposes an accuracy-related penalty in the amount of 20 percent of any underpayment that is attributable to causes specified in subsection (b). Subsection (b)(1) of section 6662 then provides that among the causes justifying imposition of the penalty is negligence or disregard of rules or regulations.

"Negligence" is defined in section 6662(c) as "any failure to make a reasonable attempt to comply with the provisions of this title", and "disregard" as "any careless, reckless, or intentional disregard." Caselaw similarly states that "'Negligence is a lack of due care or the failure to do what a reasonable and ordinarily prudent person would do under the circumstances.'" Freytag v. Commissioner [Dec. 44,287], 89 T.C. 849, 887 (1987) (quoting Marcello v. Commissioner [67-2 USTC ¶9516], 380 F.2d 499, 506 (5th Cir. 1967), affg. on this issue [Dec. 27,043] 43 T.C. 168 (1964) and [Dec. 27,048(M)] T.C. Memo. 1964-299), affd. [90-2 USTC ¶50,381] 904 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1990), affd. [91-2 USTC ¶50,321] 501 U.S. 868 (1991). Pursuant to regulations, "'Negligence' also includes any failure by the taxpayer to keep adequate books and records or to substantiate items properly." Sec. 1.6662-3(b)(1), Income Tax Regs.

An exception to the section 6662(a) penalty is set forth in section 6664(c)(1) and reads: "No penalty shall be imposed under this part with respect to any portion of an underpayment if it is shown that there was a reasonable cause for such portion and that the taxpayer acted in good faith with respect to such portion."

Regulations interpreting section 6664(c) state:

The determination of whether a taxpayer acted with reasonable cause and in good faith is made on a case-by-case basis, taking into account all pertinent facts and circumstances. * * * Generally, the most important factor is the extent of the taxpayer's effort to assess the taxpayer's proper tax liability. * * * [Sec. 1.6664-4(b)(1), Income Tax Regs.]

Reliance upon the advice of a tax professional may, but does not necessarily, demonstrate reasonable cause and good faith in the context of the section 6662(a) penalty. Id.; see also United States v. Boyle [85-1 USTC ¶13,602], 469 U.S. 241, 251 (1985); Freytag v. Commissioner, supra at 888. Such reliance is not an absolute defense, but it is a factor to be considered. Freytag v. Commissioner, supra at 888.

In order for this factor to be given dispositive weight, the taxpayer claiming reliance on a professional must show, at minimum: "(1) The adviser was a competent professional who had sufficient expertise to justify reliance, (2) the taxpayer provided necessary and accurate information to the adviser, and (3) the taxpayer actually relied in good faith on the adviser's judgment." Neonatology Associates, P.A. v. Commissioner [Dec. 53,970], 115 T.C. 43, 99 (2000), affd. [2002-2 USTC ¶50,550] 299 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2002); see also, e.g., Charlotte's Office Boutique, Inc. v. Commissioner [2005-2 USTC ¶50,593], 425 F.3d 1203, 1212 & n.8 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting verbatim and with approval the above three-prong test), affg. [Dec. 55,254] 121 T.C. 89 (2003); Westbrook v. Commissioner [95-2 USTC ¶50,587], 68 F.3d 868, 881 (5th Cir. 1995), affg. [Dec. 49,515(M)] T.C. Memo. 1993-634; Cramer v. Commissioner [Dec. 49,299], 101 T.C. 225, 251 (1993), affd. [95-2 USTC ¶50,491] 64 F.3d 1406 (9th Cir. 1995); Ma-Tran Corp. v. Commissioner [Dec. 35,134], 70 T.C. 158, 173 (1978); Pessin v. Commissioner [Dec. 31,796], 59 T.C. 473, 489 (1972); Ellwest Stereo Theatres v. Commissioner [Dec. 51,074(M)], T.C. Memo. 1995-610.

As regards burden of proof, section 7491(c) provides that "the Secretary shall have the burden of production in any court proceeding with respect to the liability of any individual for any penalty, addition to tax, or additional amount imposed by this title." The Commissioner satisfies this burden of production by "[coming] forward with sufficient evidence indicating that it is appropriate to impose the relevant penalty" but "need not introduce evidence regarding reasonable cause, substantial authority, or similar provisions." Higbee v. Commissioner [Dec. 54,356], 116 T.C. 438, 446 (2001). Rather, "it is the taxpayer's responsibility to raise those issues." Id.

The notice of deficiency issued to Mr. Richardson asserted applicability of the section 6662(a) penalty on account of negligence or disregard with respect to the portion of the underpayment attributable to disallowance of the $3,000 capital loss claimed by petitioners for 1996. We conclude that respondent has met the section 7491(c) burden of production as to this matter. The evidence adduced in these cases reveals a complete absence of adequate records and substantiation for the reported loss. With this threshold showing, the burden shifts to Mr. Richardson to establish that he acted with reasonable cause and in good faith as to this item.

Petitioners did not mention the capital loss or how it was derived either at trial or on brief, nor have they offered any specific arguments directed to the section 6662 penalty. The Court therefore is unable to offer relief from the determined amount.



VI. Statute of Limitations
As a general rule, section 6501(a) provides that any tax must be assessed within 3 years of the date on which the pertinent tax return was filed. However, an exception exists in the case of "a false or fraudulent return with the intent to evade tax", under which exception tax may be assessed "at any time." Sec. 6501(c)(1). The Commissioner bears the burden of proving fraud in this context as well, but again, it is sufficient for avoidance of the statue of limitations to establish only that some portion of the deficiency is due to fraud. Sec. 7454(a); Rule 142(b); Jackson v. Commissioner [67-2 USTC ¶9557], 380 F.2d 661, 664 (6th Cir. 1967), affg. [Dec. 27,090(M)] T.C. Memo. 1964-330.

Furthermore, it must be noted that it is the false or fraudulent return that holds the statute open. Ballard v. Commissioner [84-2 USTC ¶9733], 740 F.2d 659, 663 (8th Cir. 1984), affg. in part and revg. in part on another ground [Dec. 39,266(M)] T.C. Memo. 1982-466; Allen v. Commissioner [Dec. 42,956(M)], T.C. Memo. 1986-125. As a result, this and other courts have long held that where a joint return is filed, fraud by one spouse will serve to lift the statute of limitations as to, and permit assessment against, both spouses. E.g., Ballard v. Commissioner, supra at 663; Carsendino v. Commissioner [Dec. 49,689(M)], T.C. Memo. 1994-79; Dahlstrom v. Commissioner [Dec. 47,401(M)], T.C. Memo. 1991-264; Allen v. Commissioner, supra.

Because respondent here has by clear and convincing evidence proven fraud on the part of Mr. Richardson for the reasons explained above, assessment of petitioners' 1996 and 1997 tax liabilities is not barred by the statute of limitations. Petitioners' intonations at various junctures that Mrs. Richardson is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on statute of limitations grounds are without legal basis or merit.



VII. Relief From Joint and Several Liability
Notwithstanding the Court's rulings on the foregoing issues, petitioners assert that Mrs. Richardson is in any event entitled to relief from joint and several liability under section 6015(b)(1). As a general rule, section 6013(d)(3) provides that "if a joint return is made, the tax shall be computed on the aggregate income and the liability with respect to the tax shall be joint and several." An exception to such joint and several liability exists, however, for spouses able to satisfy the statutory requirements for relief set forth in section 6015.

Section 6015 authorizes three types of relief. Subsection (b) provides a form of relief available to all joint filers and similar to, but less restrictive than, that previously afforded by former section 6013(e). Subsection (c) permits a taxpayer who has divorced or separated to elect to have his or her tax liability calculated as if separate returns had been filed. Subsection (f) confers discretion upon respondent to grant equitable relief, based on all facts and circumstances, in cases where relief is unavailable under subsection (b) or (c). Mrs. Richardson here explicitly makes her appeal under subsection (b)(1), the requisite elements of which are as follows:

SEC. 6015(b). Procedures for Relief From Liability Applicable to All Joint Filers. --

(1) In general. --Under procedures prescribed by the Secretary, if --

(A) a joint return has been made for a taxable year;

(B) on such return there is an understatement of tax attributable to erroneous items of 1 individual filing the joint return;

(C) the other individual filing the joint return establishes that in signing the return he or she did not know, and had no reason to know, that there was such understatement;

(D) taking into account all the facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the other individual liable for the deficiency in tax for such taxable year attributable to such understatement; and

(E) the other individual elects (in such form as the Secretary may prescribe) the benefits of this subsection not later than the date which is 2 years after the date the Secretary has begun collection activities with respect to the individual making the election,

then the other individual shall be relieved of liability for tax (including interest, penalties, and other amounts) for such taxable year to the extent such liability is attributable to such understatement.

The burden rests on Mrs. Richardson to establish that she has met each of five elements enumerated above. Alt v. Commissioner [Dec. 54,961], 119 T.C. 306, 311 (2002), affd. [2004-1 USTC ¶50,279] 101 Fed. Appx. 34 (6th Cir. 2004). Respondent has conceded that the first and fifth requirements are satisfied; thus, the second, third, and fourth requirements remain in dispute.

At the outset, we highlight a few difficulties created by the state of the record on this issue. Mrs. Richardson did not testify at trial, so the Court has had no opportunity to assess her demeanor and credibility, nor has respondent had a chance to solicit information on cross-examination. In fact, there is a notable dearth of evidence directed specifically to this issue. What data can be gleaned about Mrs. Richardson's involvement in the trust scheme must therefore be drawn principally from minutes of board meetings for HGAMC and HGRCT and from a few comments made by Mr. Richardson at trial. Neither of these sources is particularly supportive of petitioners' position.

Turning to the particular requirements of section 6015(b) in dispute here, we note that cases interpreting former section 6013(e) remain instructive in our analysis of the parallel requisites of section 6015(b). Butler v. Commissioner [Dec. 53,869], 114 T.C. 276, 283 (2000). Section 6015(b)(1)(B) mandates that the understatement of tax be attributable to erroneous items of the nonrequesting spouse. A similar attribution provision was contained in former section 6013(e)(1)(B) and has been construed by this and other courts. As regards the pertinent legal standard, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has stated: "where omitted income is generated by the performance of substantial services by one spouse, that income should be attributed to that spouse for purposes of section 6013(e)(1)." Allen v. Commissioner [75-2 USTC ¶9540], 514 F.2d 908, 913 (5th Cir. 1975), affg. in part, revg. in part on another ground, and remanding [Dec. 32,202] 61 T.C. 125 (1973). This Court has since applied the foregoing principle in cases under both 6013(e)(1) and 6015(b)(1). E.g., Ishizaki v. Commissioner [Dec. 54,573(M)], T.C. Memo. 2001-318; Grubich v. Commissioner [Dec. 49,020(M)], T.C. Memo. 1993-194.

The understatements for 1996 and 1997 in these cases flowed in large part from petitioners' failure to include receipts generated by sales of Aegis trusts and related services. As suggested by the preceding findings and discussion, the totality of the record, while leaving much to be desired, indicates that it was Mr. Richardson who engaged in the underlying selling operations. Petitioners would thus seem to have a colorable argument with respect to at least a portion of the understatements being attributable to erroneous items of Mr. Richardson. Nonetheless, it is unnecessary for the Court to reach a definitive conclusion as to this requirement in light of the conjunctive nature of the criteria and the following.

Section 6015(b)(1)(C) specifies that the requesting spouse have had neither knowledge nor reason to know of the understatement at the time the return was signed. A requesting spouse is considered to have reason to know in this context if a reasonably prudent taxpayer in his or her position, at the time the return was signed, could be expected to know that the return contained an understatement or that further investigation was warranted. Butler v. Commissioner, supra at 283. Hence, the spouse seeking relief may have a "duty of inquiry". Id. at 284. In applying the foregoing "reason to know" standard, factors considered relevant include:

(1) The alleged innocent spouse's level of education;

(2) the spouse's involvement in the family's business and financial affairs; (3) the presence of expenditures that appear lavish or unusual when compared to the family's past income levels, income standards, and spending patterns; and (4) the culpable spouse's evasiveness and deceit concerning the couple's finances. [Id.; citation omitted]

Here, the degree of involvement suggested by the documentary record, in the absence of any credible countervailing testimony by Mrs. Richardson, is fatal to her claim. Mrs. Richardson was a director of HGAMC and a trustee of HGRCT. She executed each of the documents involved in establishing and operating the entities, including the agreements between HGAMC and Asset Protection Services pertaining to Mr. Richardson's services. She signed the minutes for each of the dozens of board meetings, which recounted in notable detail purported activities of the entities. Perhaps even more importantly, Mr. Richardson testified at trial that Mrs. Richardson attended all of the meetings where those matters were discussed. The Forms 990-PF claim that Mrs. Richardson devoted 2 hours per week to her work as trustee for HGRCT. Mrs. Richardson also possessed signatory authority over entity bank accounts. There is no indication of any evasiveness toward Mrs. Richardson on Mr. Richardson's part; rather, Mrs. Richardson was apparently welcomed as a participant in the HGAMC and HGRCT arrangement.

Despite the above evidence, petitioners contend on brief that Mrs. Richardson "was undergoing treatment for cancer and was unable to work for the entire 1997 tax year. She is 69 years old, works as a medical assistant and has a high school education." They also make reference to her being "unschooled in tax matters" and relying on the accountant who prepared the returns.

Although the Court is not unsympathetic as regards medical difficulties encountered by Mrs. Richardson, the record contains no evidence to corroborate any specifics regarding her illness or level of incapacity during the relevant 1996 to 1997 period. In fact, the record conflicts with any allegation that her involvement in HGAMC or HGRCT was materially curtailed. Furthermore, with respect to tax matters and reliance on a professional, the Court in other contexts and as previously explained has required the taxpayer to show, at minimum: "(1) The adviser was a competent professional who had sufficient expertise to justify reliance, (2) the taxpayer provided necessary and accurate information to the adviser, and (3) the taxpayer actually relied in good faith on the adviser's judgment." Neonatology Associates, P.A. v. Commissioner [Dec. 53,970], 115 T.C. at 99.

Here, a defense of justifiable reliance rings hollow in light of Mr. Graham's connection to the Aegis scheme and the complete absence of evidence to show that Mrs. Richardson made any attempt to review the returns in a meaningful way, ask questions, etc. After all, in light of Mrs. Richardson's extensive involvement, including attendance at the June 27, 1997, meeting addressing Notice 97-24, 1997-1 C.B. 409, and at a later section 6700 conference with the IRS, it is equally likely on the record presented that she was well aware of and condoned the aggressive tax positions advocated by her husband and Mr. Graham.

On brief, petitioners repeatedly reference the quote: "Mere knowledge that the spouse has invested in a tax shelter resulting in substantial tax savings is accordingly, without more, insufficient to establish constructive knowledge of a substantial understatement". Friedman v. Commissioner [95-1 USTC ¶50,235], 53 F.3d 523, 531 (2d Cir. 1995), affg. in part and revg. in part [Dec. 49,421(M)] T.C. Memo. 1993-549. The comparison simply is not apt. Not only is the premise factually distinguishable on the record before us revealing extensive involvement, the case is also legally distinguishable in that it addresses the standard in an erroneous deduction context and expressly highlights that different rules apply for an omission of income situation. Id. at 530. Furthermore, petitioners chose not to quote the court's statement that "an innocent spouse is one who despite having made reasonable efforts to investigate the accuracy of the joint return remains ignorant of its illegitimacy." Id. at 525. As just mentioned, the evidence here is silent on any such efforts.

On this record, petitioners have failed to establish that Mrs. Richardson did not have reason to know of the understatement. Accordingly, Mrs. Richardson is not entitled to relief under section 6015(b)(1), as the requisites of that provision are stated in the conjunctive. Nonetheless, for the sake of completeness, a few comments are in order with respect to the remaining disputed element.

Section 6015(b)(1)(D) demands that, taking into account all facts and circumstances, it be inequitable to hold the requesting spouse liable for the deficiency. Here, however, the particulars of petitioners' situation recounted above do not persuade the Court that the necessary inequities would ensue from joint liability. Petitioners are still married and residing together, the record documents extensive involvement by Mrs. Richardson in the HGAMC and HGRCT arrangement, and both petitioners benefited jointly from the improvements in their financial status engendered by avoiding taxation on Mr. Richardson's personal service income and deducting personal expenses (including expenditures related to their residence, vehicles, healthcare, etc.) through HGAMC.

In this connection, petitioners ask us to hold in Mrs. Richardson's favor because she did not benefit beyond normal support, directly or indirectly, from the alleged understatement. The record, however, is bereft of evidence to support this contention. The documents chronicle the financial engineering just described, and petitioners have not offered any evidence pertaining to their lifestyle before or after implementation of the Aegis scheme to show that no attendant perks were realized thereby. Furthermore, all indications are that such attendant benefits would have been shared equally between the spouses. Hence, the scenario at bar simply does not present the type of disadvantage and unfairness contemplated by the section 6015(b) criteria. To reiterate, Mrs. Richardson does not qualify for relief from joint and several liability under section 6015(b)(1). As a final note, Mrs. Richardson does not seek equitable relief under section 6015(f).

To reflect the foregoing,

Appropriate orders and decisions for respondent will be entered.

1 Unless otherwise indicated, section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the years in issue, and Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.

2 Use of "trust", "trustee", "beneficiary", and related appellations is for convenience only and is not intended to impart any legal significance with respect to characterization for Federal tax purposes.

3 The parties do not dispute that Mr. Bartoli, although formerly admitted to practice law in Illinois, was disbarred subsequent to the years in issue in these cases.

4 The parties stipulated this fact, but because no documents dated Aug. 8, 1996, related to the transfer are contained in the record, any specifics and/or incongruities remain unexplained.

5 The Court notes that as of Aug. 17, 1996, Mr. Richardson had not been appointed as a director of HGAMC.*

6 An apparently similar seminar conducted in 1998 was approved by the Ohio Supreme Court Commission on Continuing Legal Education for 19.5 hours of CLE credit.

7 Mr. Graham was formerly licensed as a certified public accountant in the State of Ohio, but his license was revoked in 1994. No evidence reflects that Mitchell Graham was at any time licensed as a C.P.A., and testimony indicated that he was not.

8 Mr. Richardson first testified that this contact occurred in late 1999 but later testified that the conversation took place between the middle part of February and the middle part of March in 2001.

9 See infra discussion regarding judicial notice.

10 Copies of the notice contained in the record bear different dates.

11 The parties' respective burdens as to issues concerning penalties, the statute of limitations, and spousal relief, will be discussed infra in connection with the Court's analysis of those matters.

12 Mr. Young explained the understanding of the Aegis trust structure that he formed through attendance at a seminar or seminars conducted by Mr. Graham and Mr. Richardson and review of Aegis materials as follows:

The way you would save money on your taxes is you'd set up an asset management company, and then you'd set up a charitable trust, so you would put your money into an asset management company, and then you'd pay your expenses out of that for your house and for your living expenses.

* * * * * * *

But anyway, the charitable trust was something that you put your excess money into it was told to me, and you had to pay out the five percent each year to a charity, but then it was explained to me that you essentially would become your own charity, and that was to be our retirement plan.

13 The Court further notes that although petitioners would generally be entitled to deduct substantiated charitable contributions on their personal returns in accordance with our disregard of the trusts, all donations by HGRCT were made in calendar year 1998 or thereafter. Petitioners are calendar year taxpayers, and the years before the Court are 1996 and 1997.




James S. Sparkman; Mercury Solar PTO, Amanda McKeough, Petitioners-Appellants v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent-Appellee.

U.S. Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit; 06-71476, December 10, 2007.

Affirming the Tax Court, Dec. 56,054(M); 89 TCM 1418; TC Memo. 2005-136.

[ Code Sec. 61]

Business income: Sham trust: Income attributable to beneficiary. --
The Tax Court properly determined that the income of an unincorporated business "trust" was attributable to the individual who set up the trust because the trust was a sham. The entity lacked economic substance even after the purported transfer of the individual's business and its assets to the trust because the individual's relationship to the business remained unchanged. The trust had no independent trustee and the individual continued to have day-to-day control over the business. Also, the business continued to use the individual's business license..



[ Code Sec. 6001]

Records requirement: Unsubstantiated deductions. --
Depreciation and charitable deductions claimed by the individual were properly disallowed. The self-serving documentary evidence produced by the individual three weeks before trial was not credible. Thus, the individual failed to substantiate the claimed amounts..



[ Code Sec. 6662]

Penalties, civil: Negligence penalty. --
The negligence penalty was properly imposed on an individual who failed to report income earned by his sham trust. There was a substantial understatement of tax and the taxpayer failed to provide any reasonable cause for his failure to report the income or substantiate the claimed deductions.


Paul J. Sulla, Jr., for the petitioners-appellants; Eileen J. O'Connor, Assistant Attorney General; Jonathan S. Cohen, Michelle B. Smalling, Department of Justice, for the respondent-appellee.

Before: O'Scannlain, Wallace, Tashima, and Smith, Jr., Circuit Judges.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT. FOR PUBLICATION. No. 06-71476. Tax Ct. Nos. 8400-03, 8650-03. Appeal from a Decision of the United States Tax Court. Submitted November 7, 2007 * Honolulu, Hawaii. Filed December 10, 2007. Opinion by Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr.

Before: Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain, J. Clifford Wallace A. Wallace Tashima, and Milan D. Smith, Jr., Circuit Judges.


.


OPINION


SMITH, JR., Circuit Judge: Petitioner-Appellant James Sparkman appeals the decision of the Tax Court upholding the Commissioner's notice of deficiency with respect to tax years 1996 through 2000. See Sparkman v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo 2005-136 (2005). He objects to the Tax Court's ruling that one of his business entities, Mercury Solar PTO, lacked economic substance and should be disregarded for income tax purposes. He contends that the Tax Court improperly excluded his amended 1997 and 2000 tax returns from evidence admitted, erred in holding that he had not substantiated several depreciation and charitable deductions, and erred in calculating his income for 1996, 1997, and 1999. Finally, he argues that the Tax Court erred in imposing accuracy-related penalties under § 6662(a) of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.). 1 We reject each argument, and affirm the decision of the Tax Court.


I. Facts and Procedural History


James Sparkman has sold solar water heating systems to homeowners since 1983. Until 1993, Sparkman operated his business as a sole proprietorship, under the registered trade name "Mercury Solar."


A. Hawaii Environmental Holdings (HEH)


In 1993, Sparkman purported to create and transfer his business to Hawaii Environmental Holdings ("HEH"), styled in its formation document an "Unincorporated Business Organization." The formation document, entitled "Contract and Declaration of Unincorporated Business Organization," provides that Sparkman (identified as the "Exchanger or Exchangers") will convey the Mercury Solar business to HEH in exchange "for twenty-five dollars of silver, Certificates comprising a total of one hundred units, and other full and adequate consideration." The formation documents also provide for a "Trustee" who will be responsible for the "exclusive management and control of [HEH's] property and business affairs without any consent of Certificate holders." The original such "Trustee" was "Lee Allan Hansen," who is not otherwise identified in the record. The trustee immediately appointed Sparkman as "Agent" and "President" of HEH, with authority "to open bank accounts, act as the official authorized signature on said bank accounts and to operate the company to the same extent as if he were the owner." Two months later, Hansen appointed Amanda Porter, 2 at the time Sparkman's wife, to be trustee. In 1996, Porter was removed as trustee, and Hansen appointed Sparkman himself and Cynthia McNeff as trustees. McNeff was removed as trustee the following year, and in 1999, Hansen was removed, leaving Sparkman as the sole trustee of HEH.


B. Mercury Solar PTO


In 1994, HEH purported to transfer its interest in the Mercury Solar business to Mercury Solar PTO, styled in its formation documents a "Pure Trust Organization," in exchange for units in Mercury Solar. Except for designating Mercury Solar a "Pure Trust Organization" and entrusting "exclusive management and control" of the entity with a "Fiduciary Owner" rather than a "Trustee," the formation documents are in almost all respects identical to those of HEH. "J. Clark Atkinson," also not otherwise identified in the record, was initially named as "Fiduciary Owner," but in 1998 Porter was appointed "Trustee," and Atkinson resigned as Fiduciary Owner.

The precise ownership of Mercury Solar PTO is unclear and disputed. The formation documents call for 100 beneficial units, which were initially given to HEH in return for the Mercury Solar business. These appear to have been immediately transferred to Sparkman. The record, stipulated to by both parties, contains a "Certificate Record" that records the assignment of one share each to William Bright, William Montgomery, and Myron Thompson. In testimony before the Tax Court, Porter described the first two entries of assignment as "administrational error[s]" but testified that the assignment to Thompson, an employee of Mercury Solar, was valid. According to Porter, 50 units are owned by HEH, 49 by Sparkman, and one by Thompson. When Thompson himself was asked during testimony whether he was "aware that [he] had a share," he responded, "I am now," but said that he did not know "what happened to the share."


C. Operation of Mercury Solar and HEH


During the years at issue, HEH purported to sell to customers solar energy produced by solar water heating components on the customer's property. It would purchase this equipment from Mercury Solar PTO, and hire Mercury Solar to install it. In addition to the solar service energy contract with HEH, each customer also received a "beneficiary certificate" entitling him to a beneficial ownership interest in HEH. The HEH trustee would thereby have the discretion to pass through solar energy tax credits to the customer, and such credits would be reflected on Schedules K-1 distributed to its "beneficiary"-customers. See generally Hvidding v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo 2003-151 (describing more fully the transaction in the case of a customer claiming a tax credit for the energy purchased); Richter v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 2002-90 (same). As Thompson testified:
Mercury Solar is really just a contractor, it's a solar contractor. It basically was contacted to put solar panels and hot water heaters in homes and that kind of thing. So that's what our function was. HEH had another function of contracting Mercury Solar to do that for the purposes of selling energy and things like that.

HEH had no employees and shared a common office space with Mercury Solar. Mercury Solar did not have a solar contractor's license in its own name, but rather used Sparkman's.


D. HECO Payments


According to the parties' stipulation, in 1999 the Hawaii Electric Company (HECO) issued a Form 1099 NEC (Non-Employee Compensation) reporting $195,275 in income earned by Mercury Solar. Regarding these payments, Sparkman later testified:
I do know that Mercury Solar in its transaction with Hawaiian Electric Company wanted to be paid faster.

... [W]henever someone installs a solar system via the Hawaiian Electric company rebate program either the contractor or the homeowner is entitled to an $800 cash subsidy. However, through its bureaucratic process Hawaiian Electric sometimes doesn't pay anywhere between 120 to 60 --six months.

Mercury ... sought out a factoring company that would take that receivable and pay it in cash ... . And how it worked was Mercury submitted invoices that it was owed by Hawaiian Electric Company to ABA Funding and ABA Funding took a percentage of the $800 rebate ... and then HECO sent ABA funding a check made payable to Mercury Solar which ABA Funding cashed ... .

And apparently mid-1999 ABA Funding or Mercury Solar or HEH decided they wanted the funds directed into the Hawaii Environmental Holdings account instead of the Mercury Solar account.


E. Procedural History


In 2003, the IRS issued Sparkman a notice of deficiency with respect to the years 1996 to 2000, inclusive. It identified Mercury Solar PTO as "a sham with no economic substance" and accordingly attributed Mercury Solar's income to Sparkman directly. Because the income was attributable as selfemployment income to him personally, Sparkman was assessed self-employment tax. The Service adjusted his income to include the $195,275 HECO payment, asserting it to be attributable entirely to Mercury Solar, and hence to Sparkman. 3 It disallowed losses flowing through from HEH to Sparkman as unsubstantiated. Finally, it assessed both late filing ( I.R.C. § 6651(a)(1)) and negligent underpayment ( I.R.C. § 6662) penalties.

The Tax Court conducted a trial, summarizing the issues for decision as follows:
(1) Whether Mercury Solar PTO should be disregarded as an entity separate from Sparkman for Federal tax purposes and its net income attributed to Sparkman for the years at issue; (2) whether in 1999 Mercury Solar PTO (and hence Sparkman) had unreported income resulting from certain rebate payments from Hawaii Electric Company (HECO); (3) whether for the years at issue Sparkman is liable for self-employment tax on his earnings from Mercury Solar PTO; (4) whether for the years at issue Sparkman is entitled to claimed losses from a purported business trust, Hawaii Environmental Holdings (HEH); (5) whether Sparkman is entitled to additional itemized deductions, allegedly not claimed on his Federal income tax returns, for interest or charitable contributions; and (6) whether petitioners are liable for additions to tax and penalties.

It admitted into evidence a stipulation by the parties and attached exhibits (including Sparkman's amended returns for 1996 and 1999), and heard testimony from Porter, Sparkman, Thompson, and Joe Miskowiec, identified as a salesman for HEH. When Sparkman tried to enter into evidence his 1997 and 2000 amended returns, the Tax Court excluded them as irrelevant, but encouraged him to attempt to substantiate their contents through relevant evidence. After trial, the Tax Court decided in favor of the Commissioner on all the issues identified above and entered judgment upholding the Service's amended calculation of the deficiency and denying Sparkman's claim for additional deductions. Sparkman appealed to this court.


II. Economic Substance of Mercury Solar PTO


[1] "It has long been the law that a transaction with no economic effects, in which the underlying documents are a device to conceal its true purpose, does not control the incidence of taxes." Sacks v. Comm'r, 69 F.3d 982, 986 (9th Cir. 1995); see Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935). Sparkman contends that Mercury Solar PTO was not a sham organization, but a "legitimate business enterprise." If Mercury Solar PTO has an independent existence, that would mean that the income Sparkman received from it would not constitute self-employment income, and, accordingly, that Sparkman would not owe self-employment taxes on that income. 4

In reviewing the Tax Court's determination that a transaction lacks economic substance, we review the factual determinations for clear error, and we review de novo the correctness of the legal standards applied by the Tax Court and the application of the legal standards to the facts found. Sacks, 69 F.3d at 986. Under the clear error standard, we will reverse the Tax Court's findings only when we are "left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Wolf v. Comm'r, 4 F.3d 709, 712 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)).

In evaluating whether Mercury Solar PTO had economic substance, the Tax Court employed a four-factor test derived from Markosian v. Comm'r, 73 T.C. 1235, 1243-44 (1980), asking:
(1) whether the taxpayer's relationship to the transferred property differed materially before and after the trust's creation; (2) whether the trust had an independent trustee; (3) whether an economic interest passed to other trust beneficiaries; and (4) whether the taxpayer respected the restrictions placed on the trust's operation as set forth in the trust documents.

Sparkman does not contest these criteria as probative of economic substance, and the precedent from which they derive has been cited with approval in this circuit. See Zmuda v. Comm'r, 731 F.2d 1417, 1421 (9th Cir. 1984); Hansen v. Comm'r, 696 F.2d 1232, 1234 (9th Cir. 1983). This court reviews the Tax Court's application of these factors for plain error. Sacks, 69 F.3d at 986.

[2] The Tax Court concluded that Sparkman's formation of Mercury Solar PTO and HEH did little to change his relationship to the Mercury Solar business. As "Agent" and "President" of both HEH and Mercury Solar PTO, Sparkman was empowered "to operate the company to the same extent as if he were the owner." As Porter testified, he continued to have day-to-day control of the Mercury Solar business, except during the period when Thompson was operation manager. The business continued under the same name, and even continued doing business under Sparkman's contracting license.

[3] The Tax Court next determined that Mercury Solar PTO had no independent trustee. From Sparkman's failure to call Atkinson, the first named "Fiduciary Owner" of Mercury Solar PTO, the Tax Court properly inferred that Atkinson's testimony would not favor Sparkman. 5 Similarly, the Tax Court's finding that Porter was not an independent trustee was not due to confusion regarding the proper role of trustees and agents in a corporate trust, as Sparkman contends. Rather, the Tax Court found that "she had no meaningful role" whatsoever. That Porter testified otherwise does not, in itself, establish that the Tax Court committed clear error. The Tax Court, describing Porter's testimony as "vague, contrived, and noncredible," plainly did not believe her, and "the Tax Court, like any other court, 'may disregard uncontradicted testimony by a taxpayer where it finds that testimony lacking in credibility.'" Conti v. Comm'r, 39 F.3d 658, 664 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting Lerch v. Comm'r, 877 F.2d 624, 631 (7th Cir. 1994)); see also Demkowicz v. Comm'r, 551 F.2d 929, 931 (3d Cir. 1977) (holding the Tax Court "not bound to accept taxpayer's uncontradicted testimony if it found the testimony to be improbable, unreasonable, or questionable"); Wood v. Comm'r, 338 F.2d 602, 605 (9th Cir. 1964).

[4] Next, the Tax Court determined that, in reality, Sparkman was the sole owner of Mercury Solar PTO. The Tax Court was free to disregard the self-serving testimony of Sparkman and Porter, especially in the light of contradictory documentary evidence, consider Thompson's apparent admission that he was unaware that he had a share until the trial itself, and Sparkman's own testimony, in a prior unrelated proceeding, that he "believed" that he was the sole beneficiary of the trust.

[5] Finally, the Tax Court found that Sparkman failed to respect the trust form. The record reflects several inconsistencies in form: Porter was named "Trustee" rather than "Fiduciary Owner" (the position's title in Mercury Solar PTO's formation documents); the "Certificate Record" showing ownership of the trust is, by the parties' own admission, entirely false; and there are two proffered dates when Thompson was allegedly granted his one unit.

[6] In light of the cumulative weight of this evidence, we conclude that the Tax Court did not commit clear error in finding that Mercury Solar PTO lacks economic substance. We therefore affirm the Tax Court's decision with respect to self-employment taxes. 6


III. The Tax Court's Exclusion of Sparkman's 1996 and 1997 Amended Returns


During his direct examination, Sparkman attempted to enter his 1997 and 2000 amended returns into evidence, which he had filed with the IRS shortly before trial. The Tax Court rejected them as not probative. The Tax Court's evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion and will not be reversed absent a showing of prejudice. Sacks v. Comm'r, 82 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 1996).

[7] A tax return, even though signed under penalty of perjury, is not per se evidence of the income, deductions, credits, and other items claimed therein. Mays v. United States, 763 F.2d 1295, 1297 (11th Cir. 1985); Lunsford v. Comm'r, 212 F.2d 878, 883 (5th Cir. 1954); Wilkinson v. Comm'r, 71 T.C. 633, 639 (1979) ; Halle v. Comm'r, 7 T.C. 245, 247-50 (1946), aff'd, 175 F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1949). As the Tax Court noted, Sparkman retained the opportunity to substantiate the contents of his returns with testimony and documentary evidence. Because Sparkman's amended returns did not "hav[e] any tendency to make the existence" of those underlying items "more probable or less probable than it would be without" them, Fed. R. Evid. 401, the Tax Court was correct in declining to admit the returns into evidence.

[8] Even if the returns were somehow relevant, however, the Tax Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit them. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 allows even relevant evidence to be excluded if its admission would result in "needless presentation of cumulative evidence." In this case, an amended tax return filed only a few days before trial merely demonstrates that Sparkman now contends he had a different level of income than was reflected on his original return --a contention that Sparkman presented in oral testimony immediately after the returns were rejected. Sparkman has not demonstrated what the returns would have added to his own testimony that same day. Because the returns were at best cumulative, and at worst irrelevant, we hold that the Tax Court did not abuse its discretion in declining to accept them into evidence.


IV. Attribution of HECO Payments


Among the parties' pre-trial stipulations was the following:
8. For the year 1999, Hawaiian Electric Company (HECO) issued a Form 1099, Non-Employee Compensation, to Mercury Solar in the amount of $195,275. The statutory notices issued to Sparkman and Mercury Solar both contain an adjustment in the amount of $195,275 labeled "1099 NEC" that is based on the Form 1099 issued by HECO.

At trial, Sparkman contradicted this stipulation and claimed that he never received the form. He conceded, however, that HECO did make those payments, and contended only that $113,354 of those payments should be attributed to HEH, not to Mercury Solar PTO. He renews his objection on appeal.

Sparkman argues that the Tax Court incorrectly treated the stipulation as an admission that the HECO payments were attributable to Sparkman. But the Tax Court based its attribution of the payments not on an admission in the stipulation, but rather on basic assignment-of-income principles and Sparkman's own admission in testimony. Whether assignment-of-income principles apply is a mixed question of fact and law. Mixed questions are reviewed de novo unless the question is primarily factual. Hood v. Encinitas Union Sch. Dist., 486 F.3d 1099, 1104 (9th Cir. 2007).

[9] Under assignment-of-income principles, "income must be taxed to him who earns it." Comm'r v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 739-40 (1940); see also Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930). Sparkman was clear in his testimony that it was Mercury Solar, as the installing contractor, which earned the money, even if HEH received some of it. He stated that "I do know that Mercury Solar in its transaction with [HECO] wanted to be paid faster" and that "Mercury submitted invoices that it was owed by [HECO] to" the factor for payment (emphases added). Instead, "apparently mid-1999 ... the funds [were] directed into the Hawaii Environmental Holdings account instead of the Mercury Solar account." Sparkman has pointed to no evidence in the record that contradicts this interpretation of his testimony --that the money was earned by Mercury Solar, and the proceeds merely directed to HEH.

[10] No matter where the funds are "directed," they are taxed where they are earned. Kochansky v. Comm'r, 92 F.3d 957, 958 (9th Cir. 1996). Any attempt to reattribute income through redirection of payments by a factor can only be described as an "arrangement by which the fruits are attributed to a different tree from that on which they grew," and disregarded for income tax purposes. Lucas, 281 U.S. at 114. 7 For this reason, we affirm the Tax Court's holding that the entire HECO payment should be attributed to Mercury Solar PTO, and hence to Sparkman.


V. Tax Court's Calculation of 1996 and 1997 Income


Before trial, the Commissioner stipulated that Sparkman's income from Mercury Solar PTO for 1996 and 1997 "did not exceed" $74,985 and $70,062, respectively, figures drawn from Sparkman's original income tax returns. Sparkman now contends that these returns were in error, that a portion of each is properly characterized as a "return of principal," and that the real amounts of income, reflected on Mercury Solar PTO's amended form K-1 for those years, are $45,788 and $54,727, respectively.

[11] The Commissioner contends that Sparkman failed to raise this issue properly in the Tax Court below. Absent exceptional circumstances, this court will not consider an argument that was not first raised in the Tax Court. Comm'r v. Ewing, 439 F.3d 1009, 1014 (9th Cir. 2006); Monetary II Ltd. P'ship v. Comm'r, 47 F.3d 342, 347 (9th Cir. 1995). "Generally, in order for an argument to be considered on appeal, the argument must have been raised sufficiently for the trial court to rule on it." A-1 Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. County of Monterey, 90 F.3d 333, 338 (9th Cir. 1996).

The only reference to this alleged bookkeeping error in the Tax Court came in Sparkman's testimony, when he testified:
A: Well, one of the major problems Mercury Solar has had is finding a competent accountant, bookkeeper and CPA. And these initial years they reported repayment of my principal as income that I put into Mercury Solar. And in preparing for the audit ... this mistake was found. And it was corrected to reflect my actual income as separate from my return of principal. So they reduced my distribution from Mercury Solar from I don't know what it was originally but it was 70, something 70,000 to 45,000.

...

Q: Okay. Well, have you likewise had to amend your tax returns?

A: Yes, I had to. I had to amend my 1996, '97 and '98 returns to reflect the change in the income.

No reference to the error, or any required adjustment from the sum the Commissioner sought, appeared in Sparkman's opening or answering briefs to the Tax Court. The only other mention of this adjustment in income appears in Sparkman's Computation for Entry of Decision filed pursuant to Tax Ct. R. 155: 8
Sparkman's 1996 (Ex 64-P) and 1997 (Ex 67-P) tax returns were amended to comply with the Mercury amended 1996 (Ex 12-J) and 1997 (Ex 13-J) tax returns that was [sic] filed in September 2003 and based upon the amended K-1 issued to Sparkman for those years.

In that filing, Sparkman made no reference to his testimony regarding the reason for the amendment.

[12] On these facts, we hold that Sparkman did not properly raise this issue before the Tax Court. Because Sparkman failed to raise this matter in his briefs to the Tax Court, and made only one reference to it in testimony, it is difficult to see how that court could have ruled on it. 9 This circuit has held that it may, at its discretion, hear appeals on issues not raised before the Tax Court if the issue "is purely one of law and either does not depend on the factual record developed below, or the pertinent record has been fully developed." Bolker v. Comm'r, 760 F.2d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 1985). In this case, however, the record is far from developed --we can only guess what led to the recalculation by Sparkman and his accountants, or the precise character of the "return of principal" (proceeds from sale of assets? Repayment of loan principal?) that his accountants are supposed to have discovered. 10 Because Sparkman did not properly address the issue before the Tax Court, we deem the issue waived.


VI. Unsubstantiated Deductions


"[A]n income tax deduction is a matter of legislative grace and ... the burden of clearly showing the right to the claimed deduction is on the taxpayer." New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 US 435, 440 (1934); Boyd Gaming Corp. v. Comm'r, 177 F.3d 1096, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). Taxpayers are required to keep sufficient records to substantiate deductions. I.R.C. § 6001; Treas. Reg. § 1.6001-1(a). This Court reviews for clear error the Tax Court's factual determination that a taxpayer has failed to produce sufficient evidence to substantiate a deduction. Maciel v. Comm'r, 489 F.3d 1018, 1028 (9th Cir. 2007).


A. Depreciation Deductions from HEH


[13] The Commissioner disallowed in full the depreciation losses, allegedly attributable to depreciating solar water heating equipment, that HEH had allocated to Sparkman on his Schedules K-1. The Tax Court agreed, stating that the "only evidence introduced at trial in support of the claimed HEH losses consists of self-serving figures listed in the HEH returns (prepared, signed, and filed by Sparkman less than 3 weeks before trial) ... , and Sparkman's returns for the years at issue," which the Tax Court declined to accept because they were not credible. The only other document in the record cited by Sparkman is a document, produced by HEH and given to HEH's "beneficiary"-customers, purporting to allocate to them a portion of the cost of the equipment as a tax credit, similar to schemes rejected by the Tax Court in Hvidding, T.C. Memo 2003-151, and Richter, T.C. Memo. 2002-90. The Tax Court did not commit clear error in declining to accept such a document at face value.

[14] Sparkman now contends that, instead of disallowing the losses in full, the Tax Court ought to have approximated the correct amount of the depreciation losses. Sparkman cites Cohan v. Comm'r, 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930), to support his contention. 11 This circuit's precedents adopting the Cohan rule, however, are clear that the rule does not obviate the need for some proof of entitlement to a deduction in the first place. The finding of the Tax Court that Sparkman failed to establish such an entitlement eliminates the requirement that the Tax Court estimate what those losses were. See Edelson v. Comm'r, 829 F.2d 828, 831 (9th Cir. 1987) (summarizing Cohan as standing for the proposition that "a court should allow the taxpayer some deductions if the taxpayer proves he is entitled to the deduction but cannot establish the full amount claimed" (emphasis added)); see also Norgaard v. Comm'r, 939 F.2d 874, 879 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that, under the Cohan rule, the trial court "may not be compelled to guess or estimate ... even though such an estimate, if made, might have been affirmed").

Reviewing the evidence does not give the panel "the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed," Wolf, 4 F.3d at 712, required to reverse the Tax Court under the clear error standard.


B. Charitable Donation Deductions


Sparkman claims that he is entitled to additional deductions, arising out of charitable donations made in 1997 and 2000, which he did not claim on his original tax returns for that year. He testified that he intentionally did not claim all the charitable deductions he was entitled to because the depreciation deductions he was claiming through HEH had reduced his adjusted gross income such that he could not take the full amount of charitable deductions. See I.R.C. § 170(b)(1) (limiting the charitable contribution deduction to 50% of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income). If his depreciation deductions are disallowed, and his adjusted gross income correspondingly increased, he argues in the alternative that he should be allowed the charitable deductions.

The record contains five receipts from charitable organizations. Four are from United States IAS Members' Trust, acknowledging donations made in the years 1997 to 2000. The third is from the Church of Scientology, acknowledging a donation made in 2000. All are addressed to Sparkman. As Sparkman himself admitted in testimony, however, in the past he had donated to these organizations personally, through Mercury Solar PTO, and through HEH --but the receipts were always sent to Sparkman. Sparkman contends that the 1997 and 2000 donations should be attributed to him personally, but that the 1998 and 1999 donations were properly attributable to HEH.

[15] Sparkman has produced no evidence that the funds referred to in any of these receipts were drawn on his personal funds, as opposed to HEH's, apart from his own testimonial insistence that "the ones I have claimed are definitely attributable to me." Neither the Commissioner nor the Tax Court was required to accept Sparkman's testimony as a substitute for the documentary substantiation I.R.C. § 6001 requires.

[16] For these reasons, we hold that the Tax Court did not commit plain error in finding that Sparkman has failed to substantiate his depreciation and charitable deductions.


VII. § 6662 Negligent Underpayment Penalty


[17] I.R.C. § 6662 imposes a 20% penalty on any portion of an underpayment of tax that is attributable to, inter alia, "[n]egligence or disregard of rules or regulations." I.R.C. § 6662(b)(1). "Negligence" is defined as "any failure to make a reasonable attempt to comply with the provisions" of the Internal Revenue Code. I.R.C. § 6662(c). The Commissioner's determination of a penalty is presumptively correct, and the taxpayer has the burden of proving that his underpayment was not the result of negligence or disregard. Pahl v. Comm'r, 150 F.3d 1124, 1131 (9th Cir. 1998). The Tax Court's determination on a negligence penalty is reviewed for clear error. Wolf, 4 F.3d at 715 (9th Cir. 1993).

[18] While it is a defense to show that there "was a reasonable cause for such [underpayment] and that the taxpayer acted in good faith," I.R.C. § 6664(c)(1), Sparkman does not seek refuge in the good faith exception in his appeal. Rather, he contends simply that his "returns were not inaccurate in any way," and that there was no underpayment to penalize. Having affirmed the Tax Court's determination that there was a substantial underpayment of taxes, we uphold as well the Tax Court's imposition of § 6662 penalties.

AFFIRMED.

* The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, title 26 of the United States Code, as amended, and as in effect during the years at issue.

2 During the period in question, Amanda Porter used a number of other names, including Amanda McKeough, Amanda J. McKeough-Porter, Amanda Jane Porter, Mandy Wildman, Mandy Porter, Amanda Jane Howat, and Amanda Sparkman. For simplicity's sake, we will follow the convention adopted in the Tax Court's opinion of referring to her as "Porter."

3 The Commissioner later conceded that $81,921 of that sum had already been reported on Mercury Solar PTO's 1999 income tax return, leaving only $113,354 at issue.

4 Sparkman has not separately challenged his liability for selfemployment taxes.

5 Where the burden of production rests on a party, a court may, at its discretion, presume or infer from that party's failure to call a witness that the testimony the witness would have offered would not favor that party. See, e.g., Underwriters Labs. Inc. v. NLRB, 147 F.3d 1048, 1054 (9th Cir. 1998); Simon v. Comm'r, 830 F.2d 499, 506 (3d Cir. 1987); Wichita Terminal Elevator Co. v. Comm'r, 6 T.C. 1158, 1165 (1946), aff'd, 164 F.2d 513 (10th Cir. 1947).

6 Sparkman also argues that the Tax Court erred by failing to classify Mercury Solar as a "business trust" within the meaning of Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4(b), and hence as a partnership. Sparkman's argument fails because the question of whether an entity has economic substance necessarily underlies how to classify that entity. Cf. Lerman v. Comm'r, 939 F.2d 44, 52 (3d Cir. 1991) ( "Economic substance is a prerequisite to the application of any Code provisions allowing deductions."). By definition, to be a "business entity" (and hence a business trust), an entity must be an "entity recognized for federal tax purposes." Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a). An entity without economic substance, whether a sham partnership or a sham trust, is a sham either way and hence is not recognized for federal tax law purposes.

7 Sparkman now contends that his assignment of the income from the HECO rebates constituted a "transfer of property rights." Such an arrangement also makes assignment-of-income principles no less relevant: one can no more escape taxation by assigning the gain from the sale of property than one can by assigning income from services.

8 Tax Court Rule 155(b) allows litigants to "file with the Court a computation of the deficiency, liability, or overpayment believed by such party to be in accordance with the Court's findings and conclusions." The Tax Court has held that this rule "does not allow arguments as to any other issues beyond the issues litigated in respect of the ultimate bottom-line deficiency, liability, or overpayment for the years at issue." Bankamerica Corp. v. Comm'r, 109 T.C. 1, 10 (1997) (second emphasis added).

9 Even if Sparkman's reference to his 1996 and 1997 returns contained in his Rule 155 Recalculation filing had been more specific, it would have been too late to litigate the question. "Ordinarily, arguments not timely presented are deemed waived." Boardman v. Estelle, 957 F.2d 1523, 1535 (9th Cir. 1992).

10 Needless to say, the Commissioner had no opportunity to respond to any such arguments.

11 In Cohan, the taxpayer, a theater producer, was unable to substantiate his entertainment deductions, and the Commissioner sought to disallow them entirely. The circuit court reversed, ordering that "the Board should make as close an approximation as it can" of the losses to which Cohan was entitled. 39 F.2d at 543.

Labels:

Wednesday, December 19, 2007

Tax help - dependency exemption deduction under section 151(c).


IRS Notice 2008-5

December 19, 2007

Code Sec. 152

Definitions: Qualifying child: Qualifying relative.



Part III - Administrative, Procedural, and Miscellaneous



Qualifying Relative for Purposes of Section 152(d)(1)



Notice 2008-5



PURPOSE

This notice provides guidance under section 152(d) of the Internal Revenue Code for determining whether an individual is a qualifying relative for whom the taxpayer may claim a dependency exemption deduction under section 151(c). Section 152(d)(1)(D) provides that an individual is not a qualifying relative of the taxpayer if the individual is a qualifying child of any other taxpayer. This notice clarifies that an individual is not a qualifying child of "any other taxpayer" if the individual's parent (or other person with respect to whom the individual is defined as a qualifying child) is not required by section 6012 to file an income tax return and (i) does not file an income tax return, or (ii) files an income tax return solely to obtain a refund of withheld income taxes.



BACKGROUND

Section 151 allows a taxpayer a deduction for each individual who is a dependent (as defined in section 152) of the taxpayer for the taxable year. Section 152(a) provides that the term "dependent" means a "qualifying child" (as defined in section 152(c)) or a "qualifying relative" (as defined in section 152(d)). The terms "qualifying child" and "qualifying relative" were added to section 152 by section 201 of the Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004 (WFTRA), Pub. L. No. 108-311, 118 Stat. 1169, effective for taxable years beginning after December 31, 2004. WFTRA established a uniform definition of a "qualifying child" pursuant to section 152(c) for determining whether a taxpayer may claim certain child-related tax benefits, namely head of household filing status, the earned income credit, child tax credit, the child and dependent care credit, and the dependency exemption deduction. See §§2(b), 32, 24, 21, 152. WFTRA also established the term "qualifying relative" to identify individuals (other than a qualifying child) for whom a dependency exemption deduction may be allowed.



Definition of a "qualifying child" and "qualifying relative"

Section 152(c)(1) defines a "qualifying child" of a taxpayer as an individual who: (A) bears a certain relationship to the taxpayer, (B) has the same principal place of abode as the taxpayer for more than one-half of the taxable year, (C) meets certain age requirements, and (D) has not provided over one-half of his or her own support for the calendar year.

Section 152(d)(1) provides, in part, that to be a "qualifying relative" of a taxpayer, an individual must: (A) bear a certain relationship to the taxpayer, (B) have gross income for the calendar year that is less than the exemption amount (as defined in section 151(d)), and (C) derive over one-half of his or her support for the calendar year from the taxpayer. In addition, section 152(d)(1)(D) requires that the individual not be a qualifying child of the taxpayer or of "any other taxpayer" for the taxable year. Section 152(d)(2)(H) provides that a qualifying relative may include an individual who has the same principal place of abode as the taxpayer and who is a member of the taxpayer's household.



Requests for guidance

Commentators have indicated that section 152(d)(1)(D) may lead to unintended tax consequences that differ from the tax consequences under prior law. For example, commentators cite an example of a taxpayer who supports as members of her household two minor orphans who are brother and sister. The commentators question whether the children are qualifying children of "any other taxpayer" (i.e., one another), thus making the taxpayer ineligible to claim dependency exemption deductions for the children. Commentators have requested that the Service issue written guidance under section 152(d)(1)(D).

Prior to amendment by WFTRA, under sections 151 and 152 a taxpayer could claim a dependency exemption deduction for an unrelated child who was a member of the taxpayer's household for the entire year, provided all relevant requirements of section 151 and 152 were satisfied. WFTRA generally permits taxpayers to continue to apply the dependency exemption rules of present law to claim a dependency exemption for a qualifying relative who does not satisfy the qualifying child definition. See H.R.Conf. Rep. 696, 108\th/ Cong., 2d Sess. at 56, 62, and 64 (2004). The Service, therefore, concludes that a taxpayer otherwise eligible to claim a dependency exemption deduction for an unrelated child is not prohibited by section 152(d)(1)(D) from claiming the deduction if the child's parent (or other person with respect to whom the child is defined as a qualifying child) is not required by section 6012 to file an income tax return and (i) does not file an income tax return, or (ii) files an income tax return solely to obtain a refund of withheld income taxes. See Rev. Rul. 54-567, 1954-2 C.B. 108, aff'd Rev. Rul. 65-34, 1965-1 C.B. 86.



APPLICATION

For purposes of section 152(d)(1)(D), an individual is not a qualifying child of "any other taxpayer" if the individual's parent (or other person with respect to whom the individual is defined as a qualifying child) is not required by section 6012 to file an income tax return and (i) does not file an income tax return, or (ii) files an income tax return solely to obtain a refund of withheld income taxes.



EXAMPLES



Example 1.

A supports as members of his household for the taxable year an unrelated friend, B, and her 3-year-old child, C. B has no gross income, is not required by section 6012 to file an income tax return, and does not file an income tax return for the taxable year. Accordingly, because B does not have a filing requirement and did not file an income tax return, C is not treated as a qualifying child of B or any other taxpayer, and A may claim both B and C as his qualifying relatives, provided all other requirements of sections 151 and 152 to qualify for the deduction are met.



Example 2.

Same facts as Example 1, except that B has earned income of $1,500 during the taxable year 2006, had income tax withheld from her wages, and is not required by section 6012 to file an income tax return. With one qualifying child, B may claim the earned income credit (EIC) in the amount of $519 for the taxable year. B files an income tax return solely to obtain a refund of withheld income taxes and does not claim the EIC. Accordingly, because B does not have a filing requirement and filed only to obtain a refund of withheld income taxes, C is not a qualifying child of B or any other taxpayer, and A may claim both B and C as his qualifying relatives, provided all other requirements of sections 151 and 152 to qualify for the deduction are met.



Example 3.

Same facts as Example 1, except that B has earned income of $8,000 during the taxable year 2006, had income tax withheld from her wages, and is not required by section 6012 to file an income tax return for the taxable year. With one qualifying child, B may claim the EIC in the amount of $2,729 for the taxable year. B files an income tax return for the taxable year to obtain a refund of withheld income taxes, and B claims the EIC on the return. Accordingly, because B filed an income tax return to obtain the EIC, and not solely to obtain a refund of withheld income taxes, C is a qualifying child of another taxpayer, B, and A may not claim C as a qualifying relative.



EFFECTIVE DATE

This notice applies to taxable years beginning after December 31, 2004.



DRAFTING INFORMATION

The principal author of this notice is Christina Glendening of the Office of Associate Chief Counsel (Income Tax & Accounting). For further information regarding this notice, contact Ms. Glendening at (202) 622-4920.

Labels:

Tuesday, December 18, 2007

IRS Examination - section 162(a)(2) "away from home" travel expenses.


Michael L. and Ann Burski

Docket No. 14505-04S . Filed December 17, 2007

[Code Sec. 162]
Tax Court: Summary opinion: Traveling expenses: Temporary v. indefinite employment: Location of tax home. --
A military consultant who worked exclusively for a company for 16 years was not entitled to deduct meal, lodging, and car expenses related to traveling between his residence in one state and his business office at the company's corporate headquarters in another. His relationship with the company as an independent contractor was indefinite, rather than temporary. Consequently, his tax home was at the company's headquarters, and the disputed expenses were not incurred while traveling away from home. --CCH.

PURSUANT TO INTERNAL REVENUE CODE SECTION 7463(b),THIS OPINION MAY NOT BE TREATED AS PRECEDENT FOR ANY OTHER CASE.


Michael L. and Ann Burski, pro se. Michele A. Yates, for respondent.

DAWSON, Judge: This case was heard pursuant to the provisions of section 7463 of the Internal Revenue Code in effect when the petition was filed.1 Pursuant to section 7463(b), the decision to be entered is not reviewable by any other court, and this opinion shall not be treated as precedent for any other case.

The trial was conducted by Special Trial Judge Carleton D. Powell, who died after the case was submitted. The parties have declined the opportunity for a new trial or for supplementation of the record and have expressly consented to the reassignment of the case for opinion and decision.

Respondent determined deficiencies in petitioners' Federal income taxes of $10,755 for 2001 and $5,546 for 2002. Following concessions,2 we must decide whether petitioners may deduct travel expenses under section 162(a)(2).3 This requires that we decide whether Michael L. Burski (petitioner) was "away from home" when he incurred the expenses.


Background

Some of the facts have been stipulated, and they are so found. We incorporate by reference the parties' stipulation of facts and accompanying exhibits.



A. Petitioners' Income-Producing Activities and Their 2001 and 2002 Income Tax Returns
Petitioners resided in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, when they filed the petition. Ann Burski (Mrs. Burski) works in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, as a self-employed property manager. Petitioner retired from the Air Force in 1987 and receives a pension and other retirement benefits.

When petitioner retired from the Air Force, he started a business. He later moved to Lancaster to work for International Signal and Control. Since then, petitioners have continuously maintained their personal residence in Lancaster.

In 1989, petitioner began working as a consultant for several different companies and Government agencies, including the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA). Petitioner contracted with IDA to provide services part time as a military consultant/analyst. IDA has its headquarters in Alexandria, Virginia, and does not have an office or facility in or around Lancaster, Pennsylvania. IDA paid petitioner at an hourly rate for the hours he worked and reimbursed him for all of his expenses relating to his trips between Lancaster and Alexandria.

Over a period of 16 years, petitioner consulted with IDA on a series of specialized projects that frequently required him to work with classified information accessible only in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area. IDA provided petitioner with work space and support staff in Alexandria throughout the entire working relationship. Petitioner performed some of his work for IDA from his home in Pennsylvania, where he was able to connect through his laptop computer to IDA's computer network to access nonsecure information.

Over the years, petitioner steadily increased the hours he worked for IDA. He eventually stopped accepting consulting work for other companies and Government agencies and, since 1995, has worked exclusively for IDA. By 1995, petitioner was working more than 1,000 hours in each 6-month period. Because of the number of hours petitioner worked for IDA, IDA was prohibited from paying petitioner for the expenses he incurred for his trips between Lancaster and Alexandria. In 1995, IDA began treating petitioner as an employee; IDA treated petitioner's compensation as wages, paid the employer's portion of the employment taxes, and issued petitioner Forms W-2, Wage and Tax Statement, instead of Forms 1099-MISC, Miscellaneous Income. IDA also stopped reimbursing him for the expenses he incurred for his trips between Lancaster and Alexandria.

During 2001, petitioner rented an apartment in Washington, D.C., where he stayed when he was working in Alexandria. During 2002, petitioner stayed in hotels when he was working in Alexandria.

Petitioners timely filed their Federal income tax returns for 2001 and 2002. IDA issued petitioner Forms W-2 reporting that IDA paid him compensation of $92,166 in 2001 and $85,918 in 2002. Petitioner reported his compensation from IDA as wages, salaries, tips, etc. on line 7 of the returns but claimed deductions for expenses he incurred in the course of performing services for IDA on Schedules C, Profit or Loss From Business (Sole Proprietorship). On the Schedules C, petitioner reported no gross receipts and claimed deductions for the following expenses:



Expense 2001 2002

Car and truck $4,830 $3,362

Depreciation 518 5,913

Insurance 527 871

Legal and professional 104 85

Office expenses 57 75

Repairs and maintenance 1,446 -0-

Supplies 324 152

Travel 23,532 4,385

Meals and entertainment 3,103 3,810

Utilities 785 1,334

Other expenses 407 785





B. Notice of Deficiency and Concessions by the Parties
In the notice of deficiency, respondent treated petitioner as an employee of IDA consistent with his reporting the compensation from IDA as wages, salaries, tips, etc. on the returns. Respondent disallowed all deductions petitioner claimed on Schedules C, explaining that deductions for these amount were not allowed because petitioner had not established that he incurred, or if he incurred, paid these amounts for ordinary and necessary business purposes and that any amount qualifies as a business expense as specified under the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. Respondent, however, allowed petitioners to deduct the following expenses as unreimbursed employee expenses on Schedules A, Itemized Deductions:



Expense 2001 2002

Depreciation $518 -0-

Insurance 527 $827

Legal and professional 104 85

Office expenses 57 75

Supplies 324 152

Utilities -0- 1,334

Other expenses 407 785


Respondent did not allow petitioners any deduction for the following expenses:



Expense 2001 2002

Car and truck $4,830 $3,362

Depreciation -0- 5,913

Insurance -0- 44

Repairs and maintenance 1,446 -0-

Travel 23,532 4,385

Meals and entertainment 3,103 3,810

Utilities 785 -0-


Petitioners timely filed a petition in this Court seeking redetermination of the deficiencies.

Petitioners concede that they are not entitled to deduct the $1,446 claimed for repairs and maintenance expenses in 2001.

Respondent concedes that petitioners are entitled to deduct the $44 insurance expense disallowed for 2002.

Respondent concedes that Mrs. Burski is entitled to deduct $3,139 of the depreciation disallowed for 2002. The remaining $2,774 of depreciation disallowed for 2002 is depreciation petitioner claimed for using his car in driving between Lancaster and Alexandria. The disallowed car and truck expenses were petitioner's costs of driving between Lancaster and Alexandria, including gas, car repairs, insurance, registration, inspection, washing, and oil changes. The disallowed travel expenses and utilities were the rent and utilities expenses petitioner paid for his Washington, D.C., apartment in 2001 and the costs of his hotel rooms where he stayed when he worked in Alexandria in 2002. The disallowed meals and entertainment expenses are the costs of meals and entertainment petitioner incurred when he stayed in Alexandria.


Discussion

We must decide whether petitioner may deduct the travel expenses he incurred during 2001 and 2002 while working in Alexandria away from his personal residence in Lancaster.

A taxpayer may not deduct personal, living, or family expenses. Sec. 262(a). An individual may deduct all ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on a trade or business. See sec. 162(a). Services performed by an employee constitute a trade or business for purposes of section 162(a).4 O'Malley v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 352, 363-364 (1988).

In general, expenses incurred for a taxpayer's daily meals and lodging and for commuting between the taxpayer's residence and the taxpayer's place of business are nondeductible personal expenses. Sec. 262(a); see, e.g., United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299 (1967); Commissioner v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465, 472-473 (1946); Barry v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1210, 1214 (1970), affd. per curiam 435 F.2d 1290 (1st Cir. 1970); see also secs. 1.162-2(e), 1.262-1(b)(5), Income Tax Regs. By contrast, traveling expenses, including amounts expended for meals and lodging, may be deducted if they are incurred while away from home5 in the pursuit of a trade or business. Secs. 162(a)(2), 262. To deduct a travel expense, the taxpayer must show that (1) he or she was away from home when he or she incurred the expense, (2) the expense is reasonable and necessary, and (3) the expense was incurred in pursuit of a trade or business. Commissioner v. Flowers, supra at 470.

For income tax purposes, the term "home" in section 162(a)(2) means a taxpayer's principal place of business and not where the taxpayer's personal residence is located, if different from the principal place of business. Barone v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 462, 465 (1985), affd. without published opinion 807 F.2d 177 (9th Cir. 1986); Mitchell v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 578, 581 (1980); Daly v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 190, 195 (1979), affd. 662 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1981); Kroll v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 557, 561-562 (1968). An exception to the rule exists when a taxpayer accepts work away from the taxpayer's personal residence and the work is temporary rather than indefinite. Peurifoy v. Commissioner, 358 U.S. 59, 60 (1958). Under this exception, a taxpayer's tax home becomes the vicinity of the taxpayer's primary personal residence in a real and substantial sense. Id. ; see Deamer v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1984-63, affd. 752 F.2d 337 (8th Cir. 1985); Rohr v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1982-117.

Work is temporary if it is foreseeable that the work will be terminated within a short period. Mitchell v. Commissioner, supra at 581. Conversely, work is indefinite if the prospects are that the work will continue for an indefinite or substantially long period. Wright v. Hartsell, 305 F.2d 221, 224 (9th Cir. 1962); Harvey v. Commissioner, 283 F.2d 491, 495 (9th Cir. 1960), revg. 32 T.C. 1368 (1959). Work that starts as temporary can later become indefinite, in which case the location of the taxpayer's work becomes his or her tax home. Chimento v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 1067, 1073 (1969), affd. 438 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1971); Kroll v. Commissioner, supra at 562. The taxpayer will not be treated as being temporarily away from home during any period of work if such period lasts more than 1 year. Sec. 162(a).

It is presumed that a taxpayer will generally choose to live near his or her principal place of business. See Frederick v. United States, 603 F.2d 1292, 1295 (8th Cir. 1979). The purpose of the deduction for expenses incurred away from home is to alleviate the burden on the taxpayer whose business needs require him or her to maintain two homes and therefore incur duplicate living expenses. Kroll v. Commissioner, supra at 562. Where the taxpayer maintains two residences for his own convenience, however, such cost would be considered personal and not deductible. Sec. 262; Commissioner v. Flowers, supra at 474.

The requirement that the travel expense be incurred in the pursuit of a trade or business means that the "exigencies of business rather than the personal conveniences and necessities of the traveler must be the motivating factors." Commissioner v. Flowers, supra at 474. Thus, the taxpayer must have some business justification to maintain the first residence, beyond purely personal reasons, to be entitled to deduct expenses incurred while temporarily away from that home. Id. Where a taxpayer has no business connections with the area of primary residence, there is no compelling reason to maintain that residence and incur substantial, continuous, and duplicative expenses elsewhere. See Henderson v. Commissioner, 143 F.3d 497, 499 (9th Cir. 1998), affg. T.C. Memo. 1995-559; Deamer v. Commissioner, supra. In that situation, the expenses incurred while temporarily away from that residence are not deductible. Bochner v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 824, 828 (1977); Tucker v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 783, 787 (1971).

Respondent asserts that, in 2001 and 2002, petitioner's employment with IDA was indefinite, not temporary, and his tax home was Alexandria. Respondent concludes, therefore, that petitioner is not entitled to deduct expenses incurred in driving between Lancaster and Alexandria or for meals and lodging expenses incurred while staying in Alexandria.

Petitioner contends that respondent made no determination in the notice of deficiency that Alexandria was his tax home and did not raise the issue until a few days before the trial.

Petitioners do not explicitly contend that respondent's argument is new matter on which respondent bears the burden of proof. See, e.g., Shea v. Commissioner, 112 T.C. 183 (1999). Rather, petitioners appear to argue that respondent should be precluded from asserting that Alexandria was petitioner's tax home because respondent's delay in relying upon petitioner's tax home is unfair and prejudicial to petitioners. Nevertheless, because petitioners represented themselves in these proceedings without benefit of counsel and because we conclude petitioners implicitly alleged that respondent's tax home argument was new matter, we shall address both arguments.

Respondent discussed petitioner's status as an employee and the location of his tax home in the trial memorandum respondent submitted before the trial. Before the trial, respondent conceded that petitioner was an independent contractor, and the only issue remaining to be tried was the location of petitioner's tax home. Petitioner was on notice before the trial that respondent was contending that Alexandria was petitioner's tax home. The tax home issue was tried by consent of the parties and is properly before the Court. See Rule 41(b). Petitioners were not prejudiced by respondent's argument that petitioner's tax home was in Alexandria.

If the location of petitioner's tax home is "new matter" within the meaning of Rule 142(a),6 respondent must bear the burden of proof. A new theory that is presented to sustain an adjustment made in the notice of deficiency is treated as new matter when it either alters the original deficiency or requires the presentation of different evidence. Wayne Bolt & Nut Co. v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 500, 507 (1989). A new theory that merely clarifies or develops the original determination is not new matter. Id.

In the notice of deficiency, respondent treated petitioner as an employee of IDA consistent with his reporting the compensation from IDA as wages, salaries, tips, etc. on the returns. Consequently, respondent disallowed all deductions petitioner claimed on Schedule C for each year but allowed petitioner to deduct some of the items as unreimbursed employee expenses on Schedule A. The notice of deficiency explained that deductions were not allowed on Schedule C because petitioner had not established that he incurred, or if he incurred, paid the amounts for ordinary and necessary business purposes and that any amount qualifies as a business expense as specified under the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.

The notice of deficiency raised two issues that are relevant here. The first is whether petitioner was an independent contractor entitled to fully deduct allowable expenses on Schedule C or an employee of IDA entitled to deduct the expense on Schedule A, subject to the 2-percent limitation under section 67. The second is whether any of the travel expenses for which respondent did not allow any deduction were incurred for ordinary and necessary business purposes in the course of petitioner's carrying on a trade or business as either an independent contractor or an employee of IDA.

Although section 162(a) is not mentioned in the notice, its provisions are implicit in respondent's explanation that petitioner failed to establish that he incurred or paid the disallowed amounts for ordinary and necessary business purposes and that any amount qualifies as a business expense as specified under the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. The notice alerted petitioner to respondent's challenge to the bona fides of the disallowed amounts as travel expenses. The factual bases and rationale required to establish that the amounts petitioner paid for driving between Lancaster and Alexandria and for lodging and meals while working in Alexandria were ordinary and necessary business expenses incurred in his business of providing services to IDA as an independent contractor are identical to the factual bases and rationale necessary to establish that they were ordinary and necessary business expenses incurred in the business of providing services to IDA as an employee. In either case petitioner must show that (1) he was away from home when he incurred the expense, (2) the expense is reasonable and necessary, and (3) the expense was incurred in pursuit of a trade or business. Commissioner v. Flowers, 326 U.S. at 470. The issue of the location of petitioner's tax home is not new matter under Rule 142(a).

Moreover, regardless of who bears the burden of proof, the record establishes that petitioner's tax home for the years at issue was in Alexandria. Beginning in 1995, petitioner worked exclusively for IDA on a series of specialized projects that frequently required petitioner to work with classified information accessible only in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area. IDA provided petitioner with work space and support staff in Alexandria throughout the entire working relationship. Most of the time petitioner conducted his activities for IDA in Alexandria. Often he could only perform his services in Alexandria, e.g., when he needed access to classified information. Although petitioner performed some of his work for IDA from his home in Lancaster, he could access nonsecure information only through his connection to IDA's computer network. The record is devoid of any evidence that business exigencies ever required him to perform any of his services for IDA in Lancaster. Petitioner worked for IDA for 16 years and exclusively for IDA beginning in 1995. Petitioner's relationship with IDA was indefinite and not temporary, and he had only personal reasons for maintaining his residence in Lancaster. Petitioner's tax home for the years at issue was Alexandria, Virginia.

The car and truck expenses and any claimed depreciation for using his car were petitioner's personal expenses for driving between his residence in Lancaster and his work in Alexandria. The travel expenses and utilities were for his lodging when he stayed in Alexandria, and the meals and entertainment expenses were his costs of meals and entertainment incurred when he stayed in Alexandria. Petitioner did not incur the disallowed expenses while away from his tax home in the course of his trade or business.

We hold that petitioners are not entitled to deduct the disputed items.

To reflect the foregoing and the parties' concessions,

Decision will be entered under Rule 155.

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all subsequent section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the taxable years in issue. All Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.

2 Respondent concedes that, for the taxable years 2001 and 2002, Michael L. Burski (petitioner) was an independent contractor. Petitioner concedes that income he received from the Institute for Defense Analyses is included in gross receipts reported on Schedule C, Profit or Loss From Business (Sole Proprietorship), and that his Schedule C income is subject to self-employment tax. Petitioners concede that they had additional capital gain of $5,000 and dividends of $83 in 2002.

3 The only other issues remaining are computational.

4 An employee is allowed to deduct unreimbursed employee expenses as miscellaneous itemized deductions on Schedule A, subject to the 2-percent limitation under sec. 67.

5 For a taxpayer to be considered "away from home" within the meaning of sec. 162(a)(2), the taxpayer must be on a trip that requires the taxpayer to stop for sleep or a substantial period of rest. United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299 (1967); Strohmaier v. Commissioner, 113 T.C. 106, 115 (1999).

6 Rule 142 provides in part:

(a) General: (1) The burden of proof shall be upon the petitioner, except as otherwise provided by statute or determined by the Court; and except that, in respect of any new matter, increases in deficiency, and affirmative defenses, pleaded in the answer, it shall be upon the respondent. As to affirmative defenses, see Rule 39.

Labels:

Monday, December 17, 2007

TAX ATTORNEY- PLANNING WARNING - A proposal to codify the economic substance doctrine is contained in the recent H.R. 4351 House-passed AMT Relief Bill of 2007. The House Ways and Means Committee explained in a statement that the economic substance doctrine would be satisfied only if:

(1) The transaction changes in a meaningful way (apart from federal income tax consequences) the taxpayer's economic position; and

(2) The taxpayer has a substantial non-federal tax purpose for entering into such transaction.

HR 4351 would also impose a 20-percent penalty on understatements attributable to a transaction lacking economic substance. The penalty would jump to 40 percent for transactions for which the relevant facts affecting the tax treatment of the transaction are not adequately disclosed.


AMT Relief Act of 2007, as Passed by the House on December 12, 2007

December 14, 2007

110th Congress

HR 4351 EH



110th CONGRESS



1st Session



,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE, ETC.

(a) Short Title- This Act may be cited as the `AMT Relief Act of 2007'.

TITLE II --REVENUE PROVISIONS


Subtitle B --Codification of Economic Substance Doctrine

Sec. 211. Codification of economic substance doctrine.

Sec. 212. Penalties for underpayments.



TITLE I --INDIVIDUAL TAX RELIEF


SEC. 211. CODIFICATION OF ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE DOCTRINE.

(a) In General- Section 7701 is amended by redesignating subsection (p) as subsection (q) and by inserting after subsection (o) the following new subsection:

`(p) Clarification of Economic Substance Doctrine-

`(1) APPLICATION OF DOCTRINE- In the case of any transaction to which the economic substance doctrine is relevant, such transaction shall be treated as having economic substance only if --

`(A) the transaction changes in a meaningful way (apart from Federal income tax effects) the taxpayer's economic position, and

`(B) the taxpayer has a substantial purpose (apart from Federal income tax effects) for entering into such transaction.

`(2) SPECIAL RULE WHERE TAXPAYER RELIES ON PROFIT POTENTIAL-

`(A) IN GENERAL- The potential for profit of a transaction shall be taken into account in determining whether the requirements of subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph (1) are met with respect to the transaction only if the present value of the reasonably expected pre-tax profit from the transaction is substantial in relation to the present value of the expected net tax benefits that would be allowed if the transaction were respected.

`(B) TREATMENT OF FEES AND FOREIGN TAXES- Fees and other transaction expenses and foreign taxes shall be taken into account as expenses in determining pre-tax profit under subparagraph (A).

`(3) STATE AND LOCAL TAX BENEFITS- For purposes of paragraph (1), any State or local income tax effect which is related to a Federal income tax effect shall be treated in the same manner as a Federal income tax effect.

`(4) FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING BENEFITS- For purposes of paragraph (1)(B), achieving a financial accounting benefit shall not be taken into account as a purpose for entering into a transaction if such transaction results in a Federal income tax benefit.

`(5) DEFINITIONS AND SPECIAL RULES- For purposes of this subsection --

`(A) ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE DOCTRINE- The term `economic substance doctrine' means the common law doctrine under which tax benefits under subtitle A with respect to a transaction are not allowable if the transaction does not have economic substance or lacks a business purpose.

`(B) EXCEPTION FOR PERSONAL TRANSACTIONS OF INDIVIDUALS- In the case of an individual, paragraph (1) shall apply only to transactions entered into in connection with a trade or business or an activity engaged in for the production of income.

`(C) OTHER COMMON LAW DOCTRINES NOT AFFECTED- Except as specifically provided in this subsection, the provisions of this subsection shall not be construed as altering or supplanting any other rule of law, and the requirements of this subsection shall be construed as being in addition to any such other rule of law.

`(D) DETERMINATION OF APPLICATION OF DOCTRINE NOT AFFECTED- The determination of whether the economic substance doctrine is relevant to a transaction shall be made in the same manner as if this subsection had never been enacted.

`(6) REGULATIONS- The Secretary shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of this subsection. Such regulations may include exemptions from the application of this subsection.'.

(b) Effective Date- The amendments made by this section shall apply to transactions entered into after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 212. PENALTIES FOR UNDERPAYMENTS.

(a) Penalty for Underpayments Attributable to Transactions Lacking Economic Substance-

(1) IN GENERAL- Subsection (b) of section 6662 is amended by inserting after paragraph (5) the following new paragraph:

`(6) Any disallowance of claimed tax benefits by reason of a transaction lacking economic substance (within the meaning of section 7701(p)) or failing to meet the requirements of any similar rule of law.'.

(2) INCREASED PENALTY FOR NONDISCLOSED TRANSACTIONS- Section 6662 is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

`(i) Increase in Penalty in Case of Nondisclosed Noneconomic Substance Transactions-

`(1) IN GENERAL- To the extent that a portion of the underpayment to which this section applies is attributable to one or more nondisclosed noneconomic substance transactions, subsection (a) shall be applied with respect to such portion by substituting `40 percent' for `20 percent'.

`(2) NONDISCLOSED NONECONOMIC SUBSTANCE TRANSACTIONS- For purposes of this subsection, the term `nondisclosed noneconomic substance transaction' means any portion of a transaction described in subsection (b)(6) with respect to which the relevant facts affecting the tax treatment are not adequately disclosed in the return nor in a statement attached to the return.

`(3) SPECIAL RULE FOR AMENDED RETURNS- Except as provided in regulations, in no event shall any amendment or supplement to a return of tax be taken into account for purposes of this subsection if the amendment or supplement is filed after the earlier of the date the taxpayer is first contacted by the Secretary regarding the examination of the return or such other date as is specified by the Secretary.'.

(3) CONFORMING AMENDMENT- Subparagraph (B) of section 6662A(e)(2) is amended --

(A) by striking `section 6662(h)' and inserting `subsection (h) or (i) of section 6662', and

(B) by striking `GROSS VALUATION MISSTATEMENT PENALTY' in the heading and inserting `CERTAIN INCREASED UNDERPAYMENT PENALTIES'.

(b) Reasonable Cause Exception Not Applicable to Noneconomic Substance Transactions, Tax Shelters, and Certain Large Corporations- Subsection (c) of section 6664 is amended --

(1) by redesignating paragraphs (2) and (3) as paragraphs (3) and (4), respectively,

(2) by striking `paragraph (2)' in paragraph (4), as so redesignated, and inserting `paragraph (3)', and

(3) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following new paragraph:

`(2) EXCEPTION FOR NONECONOMIC SUBSTANCE TRANSACTIONS, TAX SHELTERS, AND CERTAIN LARGE CORPORATIONS- Paragraph (1) shall not apply --

`(A) to any portion of an underpayment which is attributable to one or more tax shelters (as defined in section 6662(d)(2)(C)) or transactions described in section 6662(b)(6), and

`(B) to any taxpayer if such taxpayer is a specified large corporation (as defined in section 6662(d)(2)(D)(ii)).'.

(c) Application of Penalty for Erroneous Claim for Refund or Credit to Noneconomic Substance Transactions- Section 6676 is amended by redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (d) and inserting after subsection (b) the following new subsection:

`(c) Noneconomic Substance Transactions Treated as Lacking Reasonable Basis- For purposes of this section, any excessive amount which is attributable to any transaction described in section 6662(b)(6) shall not be treated as having a reasonable basis.'.

(d) Special Understatement Reduction Rule for Certain Large Corporations-

(1) IN GENERAL- Paragraph (2) of section 6662(d) is amended by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:

`(D) SPECIAL REDUCTION RULE FOR CERTAIN LARGE CORPORATIONS-

`(i) IN GENERAL- In the case of any specified large corporation --

`(I) subparagraph (B) shall not apply, and

`(II) the amount of the understatement under subparagraph (A) shall be reduced by that portion of the understatement which is attributable to any item with respect to which the taxpayer has a reasonable belief that the tax treatment of such item by the taxpayer is more likely than not the proper tax treatment of such item.

`(ii) SPECIFIED LARGE CORPORATION-

`(I) IN GENERAL- For purposes of this subparagraph, the term `specified large corporation' means any corporation with gross receipts in excess of $100,000,000 for the taxable year involved.

`(II) AGGREGATION RULE- All persons treated as a single employer under section 52(a) shall be treated as one person for purposes of subclause (I).'.

(2) CONFORMING AMENDMENT- Subparagraph (C) of section 6662(d)(2) is amended by striking `Subparagraph (B)' and inserting `Subparagraphs (B) and (D)(i)(II)'.

(e) Effective Date- The amendments made by this section shall apply to taxable years beginning after the date of the enactment of this Act.

Subtitle C --Other Provisions

Labels:

Friday, December 14, 2007

Closing Agreemengt, including an Offer in Compromise, can be set aside for fraud


Barry J. Jewell, Plaintiff v. United States of America, Defendant.

U.S. District Court, East. Dist. Ark., West. Div.; 4:06-cv-684-RSW, November 19, 2007.

[ Code Secs. 401 and 7121]

Retirement plans: Employer benefit prototype plans: Closing agreement: Fraud: Malfeasance: Amendments: Late amenders: Penalty. --
A closing agreement with the IRS entered into by a law firm was set aside because the agreement was induced by fraud or malfeasance. The IRS agents left the law firm with no choice but to accept the closing agreement and pay a penalty or subject the firm's clients to evaluations of their employee benefit plans because they allegedly did not timely amend the plans to comply with new law. However, the amended plan documents were timely submitted to the IRS within the extended remedial amendment period. Since the amended plans' initial submissions were substantially correct and were made in good faith, the IRS could not request minor corrections, and then declare the plans late when the IRS-requested corrections were submitted. Therefore, an attorney whose clients were covered by the closing agreement was entitled to a refund of the penalty he paid for the allegedly late submissions.




Memorandum Opinion and Order


WEBB, District Judge, United States District Court: The parties have filed cross motions for summary judgment under Fed R. Civ. P. 56. The parties agree on the material facts but disagree on the legal significance of those facts. Because Plaintiff has proven as a matter of law the IRS's actions were improper and incorrect, the Court GRANTS his motion for summary judgment and DENIES the United States' motion.



I. Facts

Jewell was a shareholder in the law firm of Jewell, Moser, Fletcher & Holleman, P.A. ("JMFH"). JMFH was the sponsor of four employee-benefit prototype plan documents ("the prototype plans"), which it provided to its clients. After legislation from 1994 to 2000 commonly referred to as "GUST," 1 JMFH was required to amend the prototype plans to comply with GUST. Although no concrete deadline to amend prototype plans was set, the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") granted an extension of the remedial amendment period for employer plans as long as the employer adopted a prototype plan that was amended by December 31, 2000. Rev. Proc. 2000-20, 2000-6 I.R.B. 553. The IRS set the remedial amendment period for employer plans as February 28, 2002, or the last day of the first plan year beginning on or after January 1, 2001, whichever occurred last. See Rev. Proc. 2000-27, 2000-26 I.R.B. 1272; Rev. Proc. 2001-55, 2001-49 I.R.B. 552. JMFH submitted its amended prototype plans on February 5, 2002. The IRS requested corrections on July 25, 2002. Jewell alleges the corrections were not substantive. He made the corrections and resubmitted the prototype plans on July 26, 2002.

On July 26, JMFH stopped conducting regular business --the day Scott Fletcher left the firm (doc. # 16). Shortly after, the other attorneys, Jewell, Keith Moser, and John Holleman also left the firm, and each began their own practice. A Pulaski County Circuit Court order entered in JMFH's state dissolution proceeding indicates that each attorney took their own client files and accounts receivable, leaving the JMFH firm with very few assets (doc. # 16). This dissolution proceeding is ongoing.

On October 4, 2002, the IRS responded with additional questions regarding the prototype plans. Jewell made those corrections on October 7. On October 9, the IRS issued opinion letters, approving the prototype plans. The letters state, "Because you submitted this plan for approval after December 31, 2000, the remedial amendment extension period of section 15 of Rev. Proc. 2000-20, 2000-6 I.R.B. 553 is not applicable." (doc. #20-4).

Prior to the IRS's requests for changes, JMFH began submitting individual employer plans for determination letters. Jewell's clients adopted the prototype plans before or within two and a half months of their plan year end, and Jewell submitted them to the IRS for favorable determination letters. At oral argument on the summary judgment, the United States conceded these initial employer plans were timely submitted within the remedial amendment period. After the IRS issued its opinion letters for the prototype plans, Jewell updated his employer plans and resubmitted an adoption agreement incorporating the updated prototype plans. The United States contends that this re-submission proves the earlier filed employer plans did not comply with GUST and thus made the plans "late amenders."

In 2003, two IRS agents, Lori Kay and Rick Parker, began reviewing the employer plans for determination letters. Compl. Exh. A-2. Kay contacted Jewell and informed him they were "late amenders" because of the deficiencies noted in the prototype plans and included in the employer plans. Id. Jewell contested the allegation but discussed the possibility of an umbrella closing agreement that would protect the employers from any interruption of their plans. Compl. Exh. A-3. Jewell's and Kay's correspondence was heated at best, and although a closing agreement was negotiated, no agreement seemed likely.

On December 4, 2003, Moser and Holleman filed an IRS Form 2848 power of attorney with the IRS and "revoked" Jewell's authority to negotiate with the IRS. 2 Compl. Exh. A-13. Moser and Fletcher then negotiated a closing agreement ("the agreement") with the IRS under 26 U.S.C. § 7121 on behalf of JMFH and Fletcher's solo firm. Under the agreement, JMFH would pay a penalty of $26,800 and the prototype plans would be considered filed prior to December 31, 2000, thus availing the employer plans to the extension allowed under Revenue Procedure 2000-20 and making the employer's filing timely. The agreement stated it was a final agreement except in the event of fraud, malfeasance, or misrepresentation of material fact. Compl. Exh. A-20. According to Jewell, Kay and Parker threatened that if Jewell removed his clients from consideration under the agreement and did not pay his share of the agreement, the IRS would not enter into the agreement with JMFH, Jewell could face lawsuits from Moser's and Fletcher's clients, and the IRS would conduct individual investigations of each of Jewell's employer plans. Jewell concluded he had no choice but to pay his portion. Moser and Fletcher executed the agreement on behalf of JMFH. Jewell did not sign the agreement. The penalty was paid with three certified checks: Moser & Associates paid $8,933.34, Fletcher Law Firm P.A. paid $8,933.33, and Jewell personally paid $8,933.33. In the cover letter that Jewell attached to his check and sent to Moser, Jewell stated he paid the penalty under protest. Compl. Exh. A-17. After the penalty was paid, Jewell brought this refund suit for $8,933.33.



II. Discussion



a. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A fact is "material" if it might affect the outcome of a case, and a factual dispute is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The non-movant "must show there is sufficient evidence to support a jury verdict in [his] favor." Nat'l Bank of Commerce v. Dow Chem. Co., 165 F.3d 602, 607 (8th Cir. 1999). The court views the facts and the inferences to be drawn from the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).



b. Standing

The Court has previously addressed standing in its order to the United States' motion for dismissal (doc. # 21). While the closing agreement was negotiated for JMFH and while a shareholder does not usually have standing to claim a corporation's cause of action, this case presents the unique situation where the firm had gone through a de facto dissolution and distribution, and Jewell was forced to personally pay the penalty. He was a taxpayer who suffered a direct harm. Therefore, under Arkansas law, he has standing to challenge the United States' actions.



c. Timeliness and Fraud, Malfeasance, or Misrepresentation

In order to prevail on his summary judgment motion, Jewell must prove two things:
1. The agreement was induced by fraud, malfeasance, or misrepresentation of material fact; and

2. His employer plans were timely filed.

Both parties agree on the facts. Therefore, this case is ripe for the Court to conclude the legal significance of those facts.

First, Jewell must prove the agreement was induced by fraud, malfeasance, or misrepresentation of material fact. Under 26 U.S.C. § 7121(b), closing agreements are the final resolution of the dispute and may be reopened only in certain cases of fraud, malfeasance, or misrepresentation of a material fact:
(a) Finality. --If such agreement is approved by the Secretary (within such time as may be stated in such agreement, or later agreed to) such agreement shall be final and conclusive, and, except upon a showing of fraud or malfeasance, or misrepresentation of a material fact --

(1) the case shall not be reopened as to the matters agreed upon or the agreement modified by any officer, employee, or agent of the United States, and

(2) in any suit, action, or proceeding, such agreement, or any determination, assessment, collection, payment, abatement, refund, or credit made in accordance therewith, shall not be annulled, modified, set aside, or disregarded.

In cases of misrepresentation of a material fact, the misrepresentation must go to "the essence of the agreement." In re Miller, 174 B.R. 791, 796 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994). Mistakes of fact or law, no matter if unilateral, mutual, or how material, are insufficient to establish a misrepresentation. Id. at 797 (citing Andrews v. United States, 805 F. Supp. 126, 130 (W.D.N.Y.1992)). In general, "malfeasance" is a "wrongful or unlawful act; esp. wrongdoing or misconduct by a public official." Black's Law Dictionary 946 (8th ed. 2004).

Jewell suggests seven allegations of fraud, malfeasance, or misrepresentation of material fact. The Court is persuaded by only one: the alleged threat Agent Kay made regarding the employers. In her letter of May 23, 2003, after suggesting it may be to Jewell's benefit to negotiate an umbrella closing agreement, Kay stated that if a closing agreement was rejected or unsuccessfully negotiated, the IRS would proceed with an individual determination letter process for each employer as late amenders (Compl. Exh. A-2). Agent Parker, in his letter on behalf of Agent Kay dated August 22, 2003, discussed the proposed penalty and noted it would avoid "the harsh tax consequences of plan disqualification that would potentially be incurred by hundreds of employers, most of whom are very small entities ...." (Compl. Exh. A-6). Thus, the IRS presented Jewell and JMFH with a Hobson's choice: either accept the closing agreement and pay a penalty or subject its clients to individual plan evaluations as "late amenders," submitting them to the harsh consequences of disqualification, penalty, or both. As a law firm, JMFH had an ethical obligation to act in its clients' best interests, or in other words, accept a closing agreement and pay a penalty, whether rightfully deserved or not. The lack of any true options took away any negotiation position Jewell and JMFH may have had. This conduct is extortionary, deplorable, and wrong. Our government cannot be allowed to act in this manner. Kay's and Parker's conduct amounts to fraud or malfeasance and justifies the setting aside of the closing agreement.

Having proven fraud or malfeasance by the IRS, the Court now moves to the issue of timeliness. Jewell calculated the end of the plan year, which is also the fiscal year end, for each employer and most employers adopted an amended JMFH plan within two and a half months of the plan-year end (docs. # 33, #37). See 26 C.F.R. § 1.401(b)-1(d)(2) (the remedial amendment period ends the latest of the time prescribed by law for filing the employer's income tax return or the end of the plan year); Rev. Proc. 2000-27, 2000-26 I.R.B. 1272 (setting the GUST remedial amendment period as the last day of the first plan year beginning on or after January 1, 2001); Rev. Proc. 2001-55, 2001-49 I.R.B. 552 (extending the first day of the remedial amendment period to February 28, 2007). At oral argument, the United States conceded Jewell timely submitted his initial employer plans for determination letters. The United States has partially retreated from this concession through a supplemental declaration of Agent Kay that the Court requested (doc. #37). Both supplemental exhibits the parties submitted indicate a great majority of the plans were timely (doc. #33, #37). Most of those plans that seem to have been late were late by only a few days. However, as the Court discusses further below, the plans that were submitted, whether late or not, were substantially correct. This good faith, quality submission mitigates the need for an IRS imposed penalty.

The United States also contends Jewell's filings became untimely when he filed a second adoption agreement for each employer plan incorporating the changes that led to the October 9, 2002, prototype plan opinion letters. It argues that filing a second adoption agreement proves the employer plans did not comply with GUST.

Jewell argues that the first plans filed were a bona fide, good faith, submission to comply with GUST, noting language from a later revenue procedure that again extended the GUST remedial amendment period, and that he should not be punished for making minimal changes the IRS requested. Revenue Procedure 2003-72 states the IRS will allow employers to change their plans after the remedial amendment period ends as long as their first submission was "a bona fide effort to comply with the requirements of GUST ...."
.01 A plan satisfies the timely amendment requirements of this section 5 if the plan is amended to comply with GUST within the plan's GUST remedial amendment period. For this purpose, a plan will be treated as having been amended to comply with GUST within the plan's GUST remedial amendment period if plan amendments that represent a bona fide effort to comply with the requirements of GUST have in fact been adopted (that is, they are not in proposed form) by the end of the plan's GUST remedial amendment period (determined without regard to § 1.401(b)-1(e)(3)).

.02 For purposes of this section, bona fide amendments that are adopted by the end of the GUST remedial amendment period that are made contingent on the receipt of a favorable determination letter will be considered adopted by that date, provided such amendments become effective (or would become effective, but for the Service's request for changes to the amendments or additional amendments) upon receipt of a favorable determination letter without further action by the plan sponsor.

.03 The Service recognizes that employers may discover, after the expiration of the GUST remedial amendment period, that changes to their amendments or other amendments may be needed. Similarly, the Service may request changes to amendments that employers submit or additional amendments in connection with determination letter applications. The fact that, in connection with the determination letter process, the employer adopts or submits in proposed form, or the Service requests, such changes or such additional amendments will not mean that the amendments the employer adopted by the end of the GUST remedial amendment period did not represent a bona fide effort to comply with the requirements of GUST.

Rev. Proc. 2003-72 § 5, 2003-38 I.R.B. 578 (emphasis added).

The United States argues Jewell cannot rely on that revenue procedure because Jewell could not take advantage of the extension allowed under it. While the United States is correct that the technical extension under Rev. Proc. 2003-72 did not apply to Jewell, the revenue procedure also makes a logical statement of IRS policy. An employer may submit a plan to the IRS, believing it complies with GUST. However, the IRS may notice minor items that need correcting, and the IRS justifiably may ask the employer to make changes. However, that does not mean the plan was so deficient or late that it should be disregarded or subjected to a hefty penalty. The employer has fulfilled its duty to submit a good-faith plan it believes complied with GUST. The IRS's position as final grader does not mean the employer's plan was late if minor mistakes are found.

The situation is similar to a law-school student who submits a writing assignment to her professor by the due date. The professor, while grading the paper, notices some grammar and citation mistakes. The professor also disagrees with some of the legal analysis. While the mistakes may effect the student's overall grade, the paper is not late.

Furthermore, the United States' argument that Jewell cannot rely on Revenue Procedure 2003-72 is somewhat illogical. Revenue Procedure 2003-72 extended the remedial amendment period again and added a bona fide policy for certain employers who had fourth-quarter plan years. In essence, the IRS extended lenity to some employers but punished Jewell's employer clients even though they had submitted a basic and nearly complete plan. What common sense supports this conclusion? It is an illogical and inequitable conclusion that cannot stand.

This bona fide amendment policy is not new to the IRS. After the Tax Reform Act of 1986, prototype plan sponsors and employers had to make similar large scale amendments to their plans. In setting the remedial amendment period for the Tax Reform Act, the IRS allowed for employers to make bona fide plan submissions that may have to be later changed:
(2) An employer will satisfy the requirement in section 4.02(1)(b) provided the amendments adopted by the end of the TRA '86 remedial amendment period represent a bona fide effort to comply with all of the requirements of TRA '86. Further, bona fide amendments that are adopted by the end of the TRA '86 remedial amendment period that are made contingent on the receipt of a favorable determination letter will be considered adopted by that date, provided such amendments become effective (or would become effective, but for the Service's request for changes to the amendments or additional amendments) upon receipt of a favorable determination letter without further corporate action.

(3) The Service recognizes that employers may discover, after the expiration of the TRA '86 remedial amendment period, that changes to their amendments or other amendments may be needed to satisfy TRA '86. This might occur, for example, in the process of preparing (or analyzing data for) the determination letter application. Similarly, the Service may request changes to amendments that employers submit or additional amendments in connection with determination letter applications. The fact that, in connection with the determination letter process, the employer adopts or submits in proposed (unadopted) form, or the Service requests, such changes or such additional amendments will not mean that the amendments the employer adopted by the end of the TRA '86 remedial amendment period did not represent a bona fide effort to comply with all of the requirements of TRA '86.

Rev. Proc. 95-12 §4.02, 1995-3 I.R.B. 24.

Furthermore, this policy is reflected in the IRS's acknowledgment it has received a determination letter request. In the IRS's responsive correspondence, the IRS informs filers, "If additional information is required, or if other changes or plan amendments are needed, an Employee Plans Specialist will fax, phone, or write you .... You may typically expect to receive a determination letter after additional information and/or amendments are submitted." (doc. # 33, p. 20). This acknowledges the IRS may ask for changes but says nothing about these changes making the submission untimely. The IRS cannot be allowed to accept timely adoptions, ask for minor changes to those adoptions, and then declare the plan late and demand a penalty when the employer makes the IRS-requested changes.

During oral argument, the United States conceded that the employer plans Jewell submitted were a bona fide effort to comply with GUST. In fact, one of the changes the IRS requested (numbered 2B in the briefs) was its own fault because of inaccurate advice given to Jewell earlier. These good-faith submissions entitle these employers to rely on their timely submission after the IRS requested changes. Therefore, Jewell's plans were timely submitted and made in good faith. Jewell and his clients should not be punished for making minor changes the IRS requested. The majority of the plans were not "late amenders," and Jewell should not be subjected to a penalty.

The United States argues any bona fide efforts to comply with GUST can only be considered when examining the amount of the penalty under the Correction on Audit Program ("Audit CAP"). This ignores the IRS's own policy discussed above that changes made at the IRS's request will be treated as being timely filed.

Put simply, this case presents a hyper-technical issue of timeliness. Most of the employer plans in danger in this case are long standing and a good-faith submission amending the plan was made, giving the IRS the basic plan with only a few errors. No common-sense or legal purpose is served by disqualifying or punishing employers or sponsors who had complied in good faith with the IRS's request. While Jewell should have been more diligent in amending JMFH's prototype plans so he could avoid this concern altogether, his clients and JMFH should not have been subjected to a penalty.



III. Conclusion

No genuine issues of material fact exist in this case. Jewell's motion for summary judgement is GRANTED, and the clerk of district court is ordered to enter judgment in favor of Jewell for $8,933.33, his portion of the penalty paid. Jewell is also awarded pre-judgment interest from the date of the payment of his portion of the penalty (December 22, 2003) until the date of judgment at the appropriate rate for tax refund suits, post-judgment interest at the established federal rate on the date of judgment, and costs. The parties shall bear their own attorney's fees. The United States' cross motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

1 "GUST" refers to the following legislation:
1. The Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. 103-465 ( "GATT");

2. The Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-188 ( "SBJPA") (including § 414(u) of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) and the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-353 (USERRA));

3. The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. 105-34 ( "TRA '97"); and

4. The Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206 ( "RRA").

2 Jewell contends this action was a violation of Arkansas corporate law regarding shareholder meetings. Compl. Exh. A-16. The Court does not believe this issue is relevant to address the case and will not decide it.


Closing Agreements: Fraud in execution of agreement

There was substantial evidence to support the finding that a closing agreement should be set aside for fraud where the taxpayer failed to disclose his income from sales of beer in violation of the National Prohibition Act.

J. Kehoe, SCt, 40-1 USTC ¶9264, 309 US 277.

A closing agreement between a corporation and the Revenue Service may not be set aside because of fraud committed by an officer against the corporation.

Rev. Rul. 72-486, 1972-2 CB 644.

Johnston, CA-9, 3 USTC ¶875, 55 F2d 1068.

Representations by revenue agent relating to matters of procedure in Internal Revenue Service are not equivalent to a showing of fraud or misrepresentation.

Basch, DC Ohio, 4 USTC ¶1342.

The IRS's subpoena of a taxpayer's attorney to testify as to the presence of fraud in the execution of a settlement agreement was quashed. The IRS presented no evidence to support its theory that the attorney counseled the taxpayer not to disclose the transfer of a stock interest to his wife. Further, a memorandum submitted by the IRS as evidence that the attorney counseled the taxpayer to fraudulently reduce his stipulated salary in order to elude income thresholds specified in a collateral agreement was too sparse to support a reasonable inference of fraud.

C. McCorkle, DC Ill., 94-2 USTC ¶50,450.

Taxpayers' claim with respect to their refund suit that they signed a Form 906 closing agreement under duress and intimidation was rejected because they did not offer any evidence that the IRS engaged in fraud, malfeasance or misrepresentation in connection with the agreement.

P. Juhasz, DC Mich., 99-2 USTC ¶50,802. Motion for reconsideration denied, DC Mich., 2000-1 USTC ¶50,198. Aff'd on another issue, CA-6 (unpublished opinion), 2002-2 USTC ¶50,526, 38 FedAppx 307.

Summary judgment was not granted to the IRS because there existed a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the IRS agents made an oral agreement that fraudulently induced the taxpayers to sign a closing agreement. Although neither side could be bound to oral agreements not reflected in written closing agreements, the closing agreement could be set aside and the parties relieved of the written terms if fraud or misrepresentation of a material fact could be demonstrated.

E.G. Bennett, 56 TCM 796, Dec. 45,206(M), TC Memo. 1988-557.

Labels: , ,

Thursday, December 13, 2007

IRS ABUSE OF DISCRETION STANDARD – COLLECTION DUE PROCESS - 6320 -6330

Carl R. Wagenknecht, Plaintiff v. United States, Internal Revenue Service, et al., Defendants.

U.S. District Court, No. Dist. Ohio; 1:06 CV 0726, May 30, 2006.

[ Code Secs. 6330 and 6702

Jurisdiction: Collection Due Processing hearing: Notice of determination: Income tax liabilities: Penalties, civil: Frivolous returns. --
A federal district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over an individual's request for redetermination of an IRS notice of determination issued after his Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing. The Tax Court had exclusive jurisdiction because the CDP hearing involved income tax liabilities. The taxpayer was also subject to frivolous return penalties. He offered no evidence to the contrary, and he had not challenged the penalties during his CDP hearing.




MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

A DAMS, District Judge: On March 30, 2006, plaintiff Carl R. Wagenknecht filed this action pro se against the Internal Revenue Service (I.R.S.), the Commissioner of the I.R.S. and I.R.S. Appeals Team Manager Lawrence Phillips. Mr. Wagenknecht is seeking a `redetermination' of the Notice of Determination ("Determination") issued by the I.R.S. Office of Appeals (Appeals Office) on March 1, 2006. He asserts that the findings and conclusions of the I.R.S. are invalid, null and void for reasons outlined in his complaint. For the reasons set forth below, this action is dismissed.


Factual and Procedural Background


Mr. Wagenknecht states that he filed a tax return with the I.R.S. on April 15, 1995 for tax year 1994. 1 Some time after this return was filed the I.R.S. initiated an audit of his income taxes. During the course of this process, Mr. Wagenknecht's "POA,"James Richie, allegedly offered $15,000.00 to I.R.S. agent Linda Vornhagen as a settlement for tax year 1994. The offer was not accepted. Mr. Richie then orally requested an appeal from Ms. Vornhagen regarding tax year 1994. A "timely" written request was also personally presented to Ms. Vornhagen by Jacqueline J. Miller-Wagenknecht; however, "[t]he 1994 Appeal has never taken place."

On October 15, 1997, Mr. Wagenknecht filed a tax return for tax year 1996. 2 And, he adds, the "Assessment Statutory Expiration Date (ASED) for 1996 was October 15, 2000." (Compl. at 6.) Without disclosing when or the manner in which he was contacted, Mr. Wagenknecht claims that I.R.S. agent Maureen Lippert asked him to sign a "waiver" to extend the ASED for tax year 1996 from October to June 30, 2001. He declined to honor her request. Ms. Lippert then served him with a "Third Party Record Keepers Administrative Summons" on July 6, 2000.

A Complaint/Petition to Quash Summons was filed by Mr. Wagenknecht in this court on July 25, 2000. See Wagenknecht v. United States, et al., No. 1:00cv1890 (filed July 25, 2000, J. Oliver). Two additional summonses were hand-delivered to Mr. Wagenknecht by Ms. Lippert on September 12, 2000. In response, he filed another Complaint/Petition to Quash Summons in this court in October 2000. See Wagenknecht v. United States, et al., No. 1:00cv2510 (filed Oct. 2, 2000, J. Gaughan). 3 The I.R.S. allegedly withdrew its July 6, 2000 summonses on October 23, 2000. As a consequence, the United States moved to dismiss the complaint as moot. Judge Oliver granted the motion and the case was dismissed on October 31, 2000.

A meeting between Mr. Wagenknecht and the I.R.S. was scheduled for December 29, 2000. It was Mr. Wagenknecht's belief that the meeting would provide an opportunity for him to "appeal tax year 1994." Instead, he complains, the I.R.S. "arbitrarily" changed the meeting to a "tax reconsideration for the year 1994, [as] opposed to the appeal that had been requested." (Compl. at 8.) Although Mr. Wagenknecht's POA was continuously in contact with the I.R.S. before and after the scheduled meeting, "[a]s of this time and date the I.R.S. has failed, refused and/or neglected to schedule the appeal." (Compl. at 8.)

On February 26, 2001, Judge Gaughan dismissed the complaint filed by Mr. Wagenknecht and he appealed her judgment on March 22, 2001. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision and Mr. Wagenknecht filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court. The Court denied his petition on June 24, 2002.

A Final Notice, Notice of Intent to Levy and Notice of Your Right to a Hearing, dated March 31, 2004, was sent to Mr. Wagenknecht by certified mail-return receipt. The notice, signed by I.R.S. Revenue Officer Kathi Rebellino, advised that his federal taxes had still not been paid, and in spite of prior requests to pay the amount owed the I.R.S. had not received payment. As such, the I.R.S. expressed its intent to levy under IRC §633, as well as his right to receive Appeals consideration pursuant to IRC §6330. At the bottom of the second page of the notice, Ms. Rebellino outlined the amount Mr. Wagenknecht owed, as follows:





______________________________________________________________________
Form Tax Unpaid Amount Additional Additional AMOUNT
Number Period from YOU OWE
Prior Notices Penalty Interest

______________________________________________________________________
1040 12/31/1994 $11644.72 $2043.25 $6994.62 $20682.59

CIVPEN 12/31/1994 $500.00 $0.00 $28.75 $528.75

CIVPEN 12/31/1995 $500.00 $0.00 $28.55 $528.75

1040 12/31/1996 $281160.39 $15134.95 $17430.62 $313725.96

CIVPEN 12/31/1996 $502.55 $0.00 $38.78 $541.33




Total: $336007.38




(Pl.'s Ex. B, at 2.) Mr. Wagenknecht exercised his right to an Appeal pursuant to §6330 and submitted a Request for a Collection Due Process (CDP) Hearing (Form 12153) for tax years 1994, 1995 and 1996, only. The I.R.S. received his request on April 29, 2004.

A review of the attachments indicates that the I.R.S. sent a letter dated August 22, 2005 to Mr. Wagenknecht advising him to set forth in writing "the legitimate issues you would discuss relevant to paying you tax liability." (Pl.'s Ex. A, at 2.) He was also "asked to submit a completed Form 433A, Collection Information Statement and file Forms 1040 for 1997 through 2004 with the Settlement Officer prior to the scheduled telephone conference for September 26, 2005, if you would like us to consider any collection alternatives such as an installment agreement or offer in compromise." (Pl.'s Ex. A, at 2.) After receiving a lengthy document from Mr. Wagenknecht, dated October 12, 2005, the I.R.S. Settlement Officer extended the date of the CDP hearing to November 21, 2005, by mutual consent.

The CDP Hearing was conducted by telephone on November 21, 2005. At no time prior to the CDP hearing did Mr. Wagenknecht raise any issues relative to the civil penalties which were at issue. The I.R.S. further advised that he "did not raise any relevant issues relating to the civil penalties in your correspondence we received October 12, 2005." (Pl.'s Ex. A.at 2.) Instead, Mr. Wagenknecht explained during the hearing that he would have discussed collection alternatives `but for' the fact that the I.R.S. failed to ever establish his underlying income tax liability.

A Notice of Determination, dated March 1, 2006, was issued by Lawrence Phillips, I.R.S. Appeals Team Manager, and addressed directly to Mr. Wagenknecht. Mr. Phillips noted that the Determination covered the collection due process hearing held on November 21, 2005 regarding Mr. Wagenknecht's civil penalties for the 1994, 1995 and 1996 tax periods. Separate levy notices were mailed on March 31, 2004 alerting Mr. Wagenknecht that civil penalties were assessed for the 1994, 1995 and 1996 tax periods. The Determination concluded that the proposed levy action for the applicable periods should be sustained, and that the I.R.S. complied with applicable laws and procedures. In support of the Determination, some of the following facts were outlined:
 the assessment was made on the applicable Collection Due Process notice periods per IRC §6702

 IRC §6321 provides for a statutory lien when a taxpayer neglects or refuses to pay a tax liability after notice and demand.

 IRC §6303 requires notice and demand be given with 60 days after making assessment of a tax....Transcripts show this notice was sent to you via regular mail for each period.

 There was a balance due when the Collection Due Process notice was issued per IRC §§6322 and 6331(a).


* * *

 IRC §6330(a) provides that no levy may be made unless the Service notifies a taxpayer of the opportunity for a hearing with Appeals. A FINAL NOTICE-NOTICE OF INTENT TO LEVY AND YOUR RIGHT TO A HEARING was sent to you be certified mail on March 31, 2004. Transcripts show that this notice was mailed to you.

 The statute for collection has been suspended since April 29, 2004 , while this appeal has been pending.

 You were given the opportunity to raise any relevant issues relating to the unpaid tax or the proposed levy at the hearing in accordance with IRC §6330(c).

(Pl. Ex. A-3, emphasis in original).

It is from this Determination that Mr. Wagenknecht now seeks relief from this court pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §6330(d)(1)(B). He sets forth the following:
i. The I.R.S. issued time-barred Notices of Deficiency for tax years 1994 and 1996. Therefore, any actions taken as a result of these Notices are null and void.

ii. The I.R.S. erred when it issued a Notice of Deficiency for tax year 1994 "while still in examination." (Comp. at 16.)

iii. The I.R.S. erred when it refused to accept payment for taxes allegedly owed for 1994 and/or 1996.

iv. The I.R.S. erred when it stated he did not file for years 1997 through the present because he did comply with IRC 6011 for each of the before mentioned years.

v. Defendant erred when it stated that "we have not received your income tax returns,...we were unable to consider any collection alternative,...you failed to demonstrate that the proposed collection is overly intrusive or that a better collection alternative is available." (Compl. at 18.)

vi. Defendant erred when it alleged he refused to provide requested financial information.

vii. Defendant erred in inferring that Plaintiff did not consider innocent spouse relief.

viii. Defendant erred when Defendant determined that IRC sections 6201, 6321, 6303, 6322, 6331, 6330, and 6702 applied to Plaintiff.

ix. Defendant erred when Defendant determined that IRC sections 6201, 6321, 6303, 6322, 6331, 6330, and 6702 gave jurisdiction over Plaintiff.

x. Defendant erred when Defendant did not issue a separate "Final Notice/Notice of Intent to Levy and Notice of Your Right To a Hearing but included the Civil Penalties in the "Final Notice/Notice of Intent to Levy and Notice of Your Right To a Hearing" dated March 31, 2004.

Mr. Wagenknecht asks this court to discharge any debt for alleged taxes and penalties he owes for tax years 1994, 1995 and 1996 because the I.R.S. refused to accept payment when it was offered.


Analysis


The court cannot ignore several conclusory pronouncements that thread through the body of this complaint. Namely, that "[f]or Tax Years 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004 Plaintiff is in compliance with IRC 6011." 4 (Compl. at 13.) If, in fact, Mr. Wagenknecht filed his tax returns in compliance with the Code then his declaration that "the term `return' is not defined in the Internal Revenue Code" is contradictory. To add further incongruity, he then concludes that he has "paid more to the I.R.S. than the I.R.S. alleged Plaintiff owed [and]...[is] entitled to a return of monies for each of the before mentioned years." (Compl. at 14.) He further concludes that he has "zero tax liability and I.R.S. lacks jurisdiction" because the I.R.S. has never challenged his declarations.

As an aside, Mr. Wagenknecht notes that "[t]here is a question as to whether or not petitioner and J. J. Miller-Wagenknecht a.k.a. Jacqueline J. Miller-Zuercher a.k.a. J. J. Miller-Zuercher a.k.a. Jacqueline J. Zuercher were legally married when join tax returns for 1994, 1995, and 1996 were made. It has recently been discovered that Jacqueline J. Miller was legally married to LaRue Zeurcher on or about October 1983 and as of this time and date there is no evidence to support that the marriage was legally dissolved." 5 (Compl. at 15.)


Law and Analysis


Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) ( per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), a "district court may, at any time, sua sponte dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil procedure when the allegations of a complaint are totally implausible, attenuated, unsubstantial, frivolous, devoid of merit or no longer open to discussion." Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 1999); see Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1974) (citing numerous Supreme Court cases for the proposition that patently frivolous claims divest the district court of jurisdiction); In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290, 300 (6th Cir. 1988) (recognizing that federal question jurisdiction is divested by obviously frivolous and unsubstantial claims).



I. Standard of Review

In the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (RRA 1998), Pub.L. 105-206, sec. 3401, 112 Stat. 685, 746, Congress enacted two new sections; namely 6320 (pertaining to liens) and 6330 (pertaining to levies) to provide due process protections for taxpayers in tax collection matters. Under section 6330 the I.R.S. cannot proceed with the collection of taxes by way of a levy on a taxpayer's property until that taxpayer has been provided notice of and the opportunity for an administrative review of the matter. This is accomplished through an Appeals Office due process hearing, or Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing. And, if the taxpayer is dissatisfied, he is entitled to judicial review of the administrative determination. See 26 U.S.C. §6330.

There is no prescribed standard of review set forth in §6330 that a court must apply in reviewing the I.R.S.'s administrative determinations. However, the legislative history of the provision does address this issue, as follows:
Judicial review. The conferees expect the appeals officer will prepare a written determination addressing the issues presented by the taxpayer and considered at the hearing. . .. Where the validity of the tax liability was properly at issue in the hearing . . . [t]he amount of the tax liability will in such cases be reviewed by the appropriate court on a de novo basis. Where the validity of the tax liability is not properly part of the appeal, the taxpayer may challenge the determination of the appeals officer for abuse of discretion.

H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 105-599, at 266 (1998); see Sego v. Commissioner [ CCH Dec. 53,938], 114 T.C. 604 (2000) (setting out the same standard); see also Carroll v. United States [ 2002-2 USTC ¶50,500], 217 F.Supp.2d 852, 855 (W.D.Tenn.2002) ("district courts within the circuit have adopted the abuse of discretion standard in I.R.S. cases citing the legislative history of §6330(d)"). Thus, in cases where the validity of the underlying tax liability is properly at issue, the matter is reviewed de novo. Otherwise, when the underlying tax liability is not properly before the court, "a determination will be affirmed unless the court determines with a `definite and firm conviction' that a clear error of judgment has been committed." Carroll [ 2002-2 USTC ¶50,500], 217 F.Supp.2d at 856 (quoting Cincinnati I.N.S. Co. v. Byers, 151 F.3d 574, 578 (6th Cir.1998)).



II. Underlying Tax Liabilities for 1994-96

The issues that can be discussed during a CDP hearing are limited to:(i) appropriate spousal defenses; (ii) challenges to the appropriateness of collection actions; and (iii) offers of collection alternatives, which may include the posting of a bond, the substitution of other assets, an installment agreement, or an offer- in-compromise. 26 U.S.C. §6330(c)(2)(A). The taxpayer may also raise "challenges to the existence or amount of the underlying tax liability for any tax period if the person did not receive any statutory notice of deficiency for such tax liability or did not otherwise have an opportunity to dispute such tax liability." 26 U.S.C. §6330(c)(2)(B).

Mr. Wagenknecht contends that during the CDP hearing he was precluded from challenging the §6702 civil penalties assessed by the I.R.S. because he still disputes the existence of any income tax liability for 1994-96. While he also makes vague arguments questioning the jurisdictional reach of the I.R.S. over him, the question of whether he is required to pay income tax was asked and answered long before he filed the tax returns at issue. Wages are income, see 26 U.S.C. §61, upon which one owes a tax, see 26 U.S.C. §1, and courts --including the Sixth Circuit --have found arguments to the contrary to be bromidic and frivolous. See, e.g., Sisemore v. United States [ 86-2 USTC ¶9576], 797 F.2d 268, 270 (6th Cir.1986); Coleman v. Commissioner [ 86-1 USTC ¶9401], 791 F.2d 68, 70 (7th Cir.1986); Sullivan v. United States [ 86-1 USTC ¶9343], 788 F.2d 813, 815 (1st Cir.1986); Olson v. United States [ 85-1 USTC ¶9401], 760 F.2d 1003, 1005 (9th Cir.1985); In re Hopkins, 192 B.R. 760, 762-63 (D.Nev.1995).

Moreover, the Sixth Circuit has held that "[t]he Tax Court has jurisdiction over income tax issues and liabilities . . . [t]hus, if the §6330 proceeding involves income tax issues, the district court does not have jurisdiction to consider the case." Diefenbaugh v. White [ 2000-2 USTC ¶50,839], No. 00-3344, 2000 WL 1679510, at *1 (6th Cir. Nov. 10, 2000). Thus, even if Mr. Wagenknecht properly challenged his income tax liability this court lacks jurisdiction to address that issue. 6



III. 26 U.S.C. §6702 - Civil Penalties

This court does have subject matter jurisdiction over any challenge to civil penalties assessed under §6702. This section imposes a penalty if a person files an income tax return that "does not contain information on which the substantial correctness of the self-assessment may be judged," or appears on its face to be "substantially incorrect," which is due to the taxpayer taking a position that is "frivolous" or a "desire (which appears on the purported return) to delay or impede the administration of Federal income tax laws." 26 U.S.C. §6702(a)(1), (2) (2006).

In a frivolous return penalty case, a person "must bring suit in district court to determine his liability for [a section 6702] penalty." 26 U.S.C. §6703(c)(2). See Colton v. Gibbs [ 90-1 USTC ¶50,262], 902 F.2d 1462 (9th Cir. 1990); Reinhart v. I.R.S., 2002 WL 1095351 at *4 (E.D. Cal. May 24, 2002) ("[i]n the case of a frivolous return penalty under 26 U.S.C. §6702, the district court is the proper reviewing court."). Therefore, Mr. Wagenknecht has appropriately raised his civil penalty challenges in this court.

As noted above, Mr. Wagenknecht cannot refuse to pay civil penalties based simply on his belief that I.R.S. tax codes do not apply to him, or that he is not required to pay income taxes as a general rule. At no point in his pleading or in any attachments to the complaint does he dispute the fact that the I.R.S. challenged the tax returns he filed in 1994, 1995, and 1996. Section 6702 applies to all tax returns, including amended returns. See Branch v. I.R.S. [ 88-1 USTC ¶9317], 846 F.2d 36, 37 (8th Cir.1988) ( per curiam); Sisemore v. United States [ 86-2 USTC ¶9576], 797 F.2d 268, 270 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 849 (1986). Mr. Wagenknecht has not set forth a single allegation to support his claim that the I.R.S. was not justified in imposing separate $500 penalties for tax years 1994, 1995, and 1996, or that it was required to give notice before doing so. See 26 U.S.C. §6703(b) ("Subchapter B of chapter 63 (relating to deficiency procedures) shall not apply with respect to the assessment or collection of the penalties provided by sections 6700, 6701, and 6702".) Accordingly, Mr. Wagenknecht is not entitled to the relief he seeks.

Based on the foregoing, the I.R.S. properly assessed civil penalties pursuant to §6702 for tax years 1994,1995 and 1995 and his claims regarding those penalties are dismissed on the merits. However, the court finds that it does not have subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's income tax liability or procedural due process claims arising under 26 U.S.C. §6330. Because the tax court has jurisdiction over these claims, they are dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1406. Mr. Wagenknecht shall have thirty (30) days from the date of entry of this Memorandum and the accompanying Order to appeal the IRS Appeals Office determination with the Tax Court, pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §6330(d)(1)(B).The court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith. 7



IT IS SO ORDERED.

1 He notes that the "Assessment Statutory Expiration Date (ASED) for 1994 was April 15, 1998. The Collection Statutory Expiration Date (CSED) for 1994 was June 5, 2005." (Compl. at 5.) He claims that he never signed a waiver to extend either the ASED or the CSED.

2 Mr. Wagenknecht does not state when or if he filed a tax return for tax year 1995.

3 The complaint was filed by Carl Wagenknecht and Jacqueline J. Miller-Wagenknecht. They asserted the court's jurisdiction pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §7609(h) and challenged, as overly broad, the summonses issued to them by the I.R.S. for Ohio Savings Bank and Third Federal Savings and Loan.

4 The relevant statute states:

When required by regulations prescribed by the Secretary any person made liable for any tax imposed by this title, or with respect to the collection thereof, shall make a return or statement according to the forms and regulations prescribed by the Secretary. Every person required to make a return or statement shall include therein the information required by such forms or regulations.

26 U.S.C. §6011(2006)

5 The court cannot presuppose that the surname of LaRue Zeurcher is mispelled.

6 This would include his attack on the timeliness of the Notices of Deficiency. Although he cites the I.R.S.'s noncompliance with 26 U.S.C. §7609, the general rules regarding the limitations period on the assessment and collection of income taxes are set forth in 26 U.S.C. §6501(e).

7 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(3) provides:

An appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies that it is not taken in good faith.

Labels:

Wednesday, December 12, 2007

IRS tax lien appeal



Hailu Yohannes Awlachew v. Commissioner.
Dkt. No. 23914-05L , TC Memo. 2007-365, December 11, 2007.



[Code Sec. 6330]
Collection action: Liens and levies: Procedures. --
An individual who failed to pay his total tax liabilities for two tax years could not challenge the underlying tax liabilities or challenge the IRS's filing of a lien to collect the unpaid taxes. Although the individual argued that he was entitled to offset his unpaid tax liabilities with alternative minimum tax (AMT) that he had already paid, he did not claim the appropriate credit on his returns and did not present information to the IRS that he was entitled to the credit. In addition, the IRS settlement officer did not abuse her discretion by determining that the lien on the taxpayer's property was appropriately filed and would remain in effect until his tax liabilities were satisfied. The individual did not demonstrate that any of the collection alternatives he proposed were appropriate and that the IRS erred by rejecting them. --CCH.





MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION



MARVEL, Judge: Pursuant to section 6330(d),1 petitioner seeks review of respondent's determination sustaining the filing of a notice of Federal tax lien with respect to petitioner's unpaid 2000 and 2001 Federal income tax liabilities.





FINDINGS OF FACT



Some of the facts have been stipulated. We incorporate the stipulated facts into our findings by this reference. Petitioner resided in Cambridge, Massachusetts, when his petition in this case was filed.



Petitioner timely filed Forms 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, for 2000 and 2001. On his 2000 tax return, petitioner reported a total tax liability of $105,934, which included an alternative minimum tax (AMT) liability of $64,675 attributable to his exercise of incentive stock options during that year.2 Petitioner reported tax due of $72,576 for 2000 and sent a $10,000 payment with his 2000 return. On his 2001 tax return, petitioner reported a total tax liability of $77,579 and a tax due of $70,258. The ordinary income reported on petitioner's 2001 return included income from his disposition of incentive stock options during 2001.3



On June 4, 2001, respondent assessed the tax reported on petitioner's 2000 tax return as well as statutory interest and a section 6651(a)(2) addition to tax. That same day, respondent issued to petitioner a statutory notice of balance due. On June 26, 2001, petitioner made another $10,000 payment toward his unpaid 2000 tax liability.



On July 20, 2001, petitioner entered into an installment agreement with respondent. The record does not disclose the details of the agreement, but beginning on September 20, 2001, petitioner began making monthly payments to respondent. Between September 20, 2001, and January 27, 2003, petitioner made payments totaling $52,600 toward his unpaid 2000 tax liability. Petitioner did not make any voluntary payments toward his 2000 tax liability after January 27, 2003.



On October 18, 2002, respondent assessed the tax reported on petitioner's 2001 tax return, as well as statutory interest and sections 6651(a)(2) and 6654 additions to tax. The record does not disclose whether petitioner made any payments toward his 2001 tax liability.



On or around May 29, 2003, petitioner submitted an offer-in-compromise to respondent. The record does not disclose the details of petitioner's offer. On July 29, 2003, respondent rejected petitioner's offer.



On September 13, 2003, respondent issued to petitioner a Final Notice, Notice of Intent to Levy and Notice of Your Right to a Hearing (levy notice), in which respondent announced his intention to levy to collect petitioner's unpaid 2000 and 2001 tax liabilities. The levy notice also advised petitioner of his right to a hearing with respondent's Appeals Office. Petitioner received the levy notice on or about September 22, 2003, but he did not request a hearing with respondent.



On or around September 17, 2003, petitioner submitted a second offer-in-compromise. The record does not disclose the details of petitioner's second offer. On December 22, 2003, respondent rejected petitioner's second offer-in-compromise.



On March 19, 2004, petitioner submitted a third offer-in-compromise. The record does not disclose the details of petitioner's third offer.



On July 14, 2004, respondent issued to petitioner a Notice of Federal Tax Lien Filing and Your Right to a Hearing Under IRC 6320 (lien notice). The lien notice informed petitioner that he had a right to request a hearing to appeal the collection action and to discuss optional payment methods. The lien notice also advised petitioner how to request a hearing and how to obtain a release of the Federal tax lien.



On or about August 16, 2004, petitioner mailed to respondent a Form 12153, Request for a Collection Due Process Hearing (Request). In his Request, petitioner stated that he had lost all of the value of the stock from which his tax liability originated and that the loss was beyond his control because it resulted from a downturn in the economy. Petitioner also claimed that his job security was uncertain, that he was in debt, and that he was a loyal taxpayer. Petitioner asked respondent not to place a lien on his property because of his precarious financial condition.



By letter dated November 10, 2004, respondent's Appeals Office informed petitioner that his Request had been received and that a telephone hearing had been scheduled for December 9, 2004. On November 24, 2004, respondent received a letter from petitioner requesting a face-to-face hearing. Petitioner attached to his request a Form 433-A, Collection Information Statement for Wage Earners and Self-Employed Individuals, and documentation to substantiate the figures on his Form 433-A. On his Form 433-A, petitioner reported assets of $16,000 ($6,000 in cash and $10,000 in investments), $18,500 in credit card debt, and a monthly net income of $2,230.4



On December 14, 2004, petitioner participated in a face-to-face hearing with a settlement officer. Petitioner and the settlement officer also communicated through correspondence. By letter dated January 25, 2005, the settlement officer informed petitioner that she was sustaining the previous rejection of petitioner's most recent offer-in-compromise.5 The settlement officer offered petitioner the opportunity to enter into an installment agreement requiring a monthly payment of $1,215. Petitioner rejected the settlement officer's offer, complaining that the amount was too high. By letter dated February 10, 2005, the settlement officer provided petitioner a copy of his previously submitted Form 433-A and a blank Form 433-A and informed petitioner that he had until February 25, 2005, to submit any additional information to assist her in making her determination.



By letter dated February 24, 2005, petitioner again requested relief from the additions to tax and interest that had been assessed for 2000 and 2001 because of his precarious job and financial situations. Petitioner also submitted an updated Form 433-A showing $13,000 in assets ($2,000 in cash and $11,000 in investments), $18,500 in credit card debt, and monthly net income of approximately $355.



By letter dated March 16, 2005, the settlement officer informed petitioner that she had adjusted his monthly expenses to meet the national standard for one person.6 As a result, the settlement officer determined that petitioner was able to make monthly payments of $1,475. The settlement officer also denied petitioner's request for abatement of interest and for relief from the additions to tax. The settlement officer gave petitioner until March 30, 2005, to accept the proposed installment agreement.



By letter dated March 27, 2005, petitioner rejected the proposed installment agreement. Petitioner disputed the settlement officer's adjustments to his monthly expenses as reported on his updated Form 433-A, and he inquired whether any of the AMT that he had paid could be used to offset his unpaid tax liabilities. By letter dated July 21, 2005, the settlement officer offered petitioner a reduced installment agreement with monthly payments of $1,250. She gave petitioner until August 5, 2005, to respond.



By letter dated August 3, 2005, petitioner rejected the installment agreement and once again requested relief based on the poor economy, his lack of knowledge of the tax law, and his fear of losing his job. Petitioner requested guidance on obtaining an abatement of interest and relief from the additions to tax. By letter dated August 9, 2005, the settlement officer detailed the requirements for a request for relief from additions to tax,7 informed petitioner that respondent was required by statute to assess interest in his case and that the interest could not be abated, and referred petitioner to the Internal Revenue Manual for further information. By letter dated August 29, 2005, petitioner once again requested the abatement of interest and relief from the additions to tax because of the downturn in the economy and his lack of knowledge regarding the tax implications of employee stock options.



On November 18, 2005, respondent issued to petitioner a Notice of Determination Concerning Collection Action(s) Under Section 6320 and/or 6330 (notice of determination). The notice of determination stated that respondent had verified that all statutory and administrative requirements had been met, that respondent had addressed all of petitioner's arguments raised at the face-to-face hearing, and that respondent had determined that the lien appropriately balanced the Government's need for the efficient collection of taxes and petitioner's concern that the action not be more intrusive than necessary in light of petitioner's circumstances.



On December 19, 2005, petitioner's petition contesting respondent's determination was filed. The case was scheduled for trial, and a trial was held on October 23, 2006.





OPINION



All property and rights to property of a taxpayer become subject to a lien in favor of the United States on the date a tax liability is assessed against the taxpayer, if the taxpayer fails to meet the Commissioner's demand for payment of the tax liability. Secs. 6321 and 6322. Until a lien notice is filed, a lien is without validity and priority against certain persons, such as judgment lien creditors of the taxpayer. Sec. 6323(a). After the Secretary files the lien notice, the Secretary must provide the taxpayer with written notice of the filing, informing the taxpayer of the right to request an administrative hearing on the matter. Sec. 6320(a)(1), (3)(B). Section 6320(c) requires that the administrative hearing be conducted pursuant to section 6330(c), (d) (other than paragraph (2)(B) thereof), and (e).



At the hearing, a taxpayer may raise any relevant issue, including appropriate spousal defenses, challenges to the appropriateness of the collection action, and collection alternatives, such as an offer-in-compromise. Sec. 6330(c)(2)(A). Additionally, at a hearing, a taxpayer may contest the existence and amount of the underlying tax liability if the taxpayer did not receive a notice of deficiency for the tax liability in question or did not otherwise have an opportunity to dispute the tax liability. Sec. 6330(c)(2)(B); see also Sego v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 604, 609 (2000).



Following the hearing, the Appeals Office is required to issue a notice of determination regarding the disputed lien notice. In so doing, the Appeals Office is required to take into consideration the verification presented by the Secretary, the issues raised by the taxpayer, and whether the proposed collection action appropriately balances the need for efficient collection of taxes with the taxpayer's concerns regarding the intrusiveness of the proposed collection action. Sec. 6330(c)(3). The taxpayer may petition the Tax Court for judicial review of the Appeals Office's determination. Sec. 6330(d).



If the taxpayer files a timely petition for judicial review, the applicable standard of review depends on whether the underlying tax liability is at issue. The phrase "underlying tax liability" includes the tax deficiency, any penalties and additions to tax, and statutory interest. Katz v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 329, 339 (2000). If the underlying tax liability is properly at issue, the Court reviews any determination regarding the underlying tax liability de novo. Sego v. Commissioner, supra at 610. The Court reviews all other administrative determinations for abuse of discretion. Id.




I. Petitioner's Challenge to the Underlying Tax Liabilities


Section 6330(c)(2)(B) provides that a taxpayer may dispute the existence or amount of his unpaid tax liability if he did not receive a notice of deficiency or otherwise have an opportunity to dispute such tax liability. The "opportunity to dispute such tax liability" includes a conference with the Appeals Office that was offered either before or after the tax liability was assessed. Sec. 301.6320-1(e)(3), Q&A-E2, Proced. & Admin. Regs.



Most of petitioner's arguments are directed to collection alternatives and do not raise challenges to the underlying tax liabilities for 2000 and 2001. However, during the administrative proceeding, petitioner inquired about the possibility of offsetting his unpaid liabilities with the AMT that he had paid. The record contains no evidence that the settlement officer specifically answered his inquiry. In this proceeding, petitioner has again raised the question of whether he can reduce his unpaid tax liabilities by the amount of AMT he paid. Although his argument is very unclear, we interpret it as an assertion that he is entitled to a credit under section 53.



Section 53 authorizes a taxpayer to claim a credit for net minimum tax paid in prior years, adjusted for specified items. The minimum tax credit allowable under section 53 is the excess if any of the adjusted net minimum tax imposed for all prior taxable years beginning after 1986, over the amount allowable as a credit under section 53(a) for such prior taxable years. Sec. 53(b). The section 53 credit, however, is limited to the amount by which a taxpayer's regular tax liability for the year the credit is claimed, less allowable credits, exceeds his tentative minimum tax for the year. Sec. 53(c).



Petitioner did not claim a section 53 credit on either his 2000 or 2001 income tax return, and he did not present any information to the settlement officer that he was entitled to claim such a credit. His inquiry about the possibility of a credit, which he made in one of his letters to the settlement officer during his section 6320/6330 hearing, was insufficient to demonstrate either that he was claiming a section 53 credit for 2000 and/or 2001 or that he was entitled to such a credit.



In addition, even if we treat petitioner's inquiry as a claim for a section 53 credit, petitioner is precluded from pursuing his claim by the fact that he had an earlier opportunity to assert his claim and he did not do so. Petitioner received the September 13, 2003, levy notice, but he did not request a hearing under section 6330 regarding the levy notice. Petitioner's failure to do so precludes him from asserting his claim in this proceeding. See sec. 301.6320-1(e)(3), Q&A-E7, Proced. & Admin. Regs.; see also Bell v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 356 (2006); Castleman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-143.



Because petitioner had an earlier opportunity to dispute his underlying tax liability by asserting a claim for a credit under section 53, his underlying tax liability was not properly at issue before the settlement officer considering the lien, and it is not properly before us now.8




II. Petitioner's Challenge to Respondent's Determination To File a Lien


Although petitioner's arguments are not clear, petitioner appears to argue that respondent erred by rejecting collection alternatives he raised and by offering petitioner an installment agreement requiring monthly payments of $1,215. Petitioner appears to argue that his financial condition is so dire that he cannot afford to pay his 2000 and 2001 tax liabilities.



Although section 6330(c) requires respondent to consider relevant issues properly raised by petitioner, including a claim that a collection alternative such as an installment agreement or offer-in-compromise is more appropriate, respondent is not required to offer petitioner a collection alternative acceptable to petitioner before determining that a lien is an appropriate collection tool. In this case, petitioner had the burden of demonstrating that a collection alternative was appropriate and that respondent abused his discretion by rejecting the collection alternative.



On the record before us, we cannot conclude that the settlement officer abused her discretion in determining that the lien was appropriate to safeguard respondent's collection of petitioner's unpaid taxes. Petitioner did not argue at his hearing or at trial that respondent should have accepted one or more of his three offers-in-compromise, and he did not introduce the offers into evidence at trial. Petitioner made payments for approximately a year and a half of about $1,000 per month. After 2 full years of nonpayment, petitioner submitted several Forms 433-A showing net monthly income ranging from more than $2,000 per month to $355 per month. The settlement officer finally determined that petitioner could pay $1,250 per month.9 Petitioner did not establish that the settlement officer's determination was an abuse of discretion. We hold, therefore, that the settlement officer did not abuse her discretion by determining that the lien on petitioner's property was appropriately filed and would remain in effect until petitioner's 2000 and 2001 tax liabilities were satisfied.



To reflect the foregoing,



Decision will be entered for respondent.


1 Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect at all relevant times. Some monetary amounts are rounded to the nearest dollar.

2 Secs. 421 and 422 provide for deferred tax treatment of the qualifying exercise of an incentive stock option. However, the favorable tax treatment does not apply for AMT calculation purposes. Sec. 56(b)(3).

3 Deferred tax treatment under secs. 421 and 422 is not available on the exercise of an incentive stock option if the taxpayer disposes of the share of stock received pursuant to the option within 2 years of the grant of the option or within 1 year of receipt of the share. Sec. 422(a)(1). Petitioner admits that he disposed of shares received as a result of the exercise of his incentive stock options before he had held them for 1 year.

4 On his Form 433-A, petitioner reported monthly income from salaries of $6,280 and monthly expenses of $4,050. Petitioner's monthly expenses included other expenses of $1,500.

5 We assume that this was a rejection of petitioner's third offer-in-compromise (submitted in March 2004).

6 Respondent informed petitioner that he could claim expenses for only himself because he did not claim his spouse's income. Petitioner never argued that his spouse was unemployed or that he was otherwise supporting his spouse. However, he did testify that he was supporting two aging parents and an ill niece. The record does not disclose any detail of petitioner's support of these individuals.

7 The settlement officer used the term "penalties" in the letter, but she was referring to additions to tax.

8 In a posttrial conference call with this Court, petitioner raised a question regarding whether the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 (TRHCA), Pub. L. 109-432, 120 Stat. 2922, authorizes petitioner to claim a refundable credit under sec. 53 (as amended by TRHCA) that he could then apply against his unpaid tax liabilities for 2000 and 2001. By order, we gave the parties time to explore the effect of TRHCA on this case and to file a joint written status report summarizing their positions. In a joint status report filed on June 1, 2007, respondent stated that TRHCA has no impact on this case, and he explained why. Petitioner simply asserted that he has an AMT credit that he has never used and that he will use any refundable credit he may receive under the new law to pay his 2000 and 2001 tax liabilities.

9 Although petitioner subsequently submitted a revised Form 433-A showing monthly net income of $355, we are satisfied that the settlement officer did not abuse her discretion in concluding that petitioner could pay $1,250 per month. Petitioner estimated his expenses and did not apply the applicable national and local standards promulgated by respondent for use in calculating a taxpayer's allowable expenses.

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Monday, December 10, 2007

IRS Audit – section - 213(a) IRS Guidance Released on Medical Expense Deductions
The IRS has issued guidance regarding the deductibility of amounts paid by individuals for diagnostic and similar procedures, including certain devices, not compensated by insurance or otherwise, as medical care expenses under Code Sec. 213(a). In each of the three scenarios presented, the amounts paid by taxpayers were expenses for medical care deductible under Code Sec. 213(a), subject to the limitations of that section including the seven and a half percent floor on deductibility.

Under Code Sec. 213(d)(1)(A), medical care expenses include amounts paid related to the diagnosis, mitigation, treatment, cure or prevention of disease, or any condition affecting any structure or function of the body, including obstetrical services. Diagnosis includes the determination of the absence of disease, and may involve testing for changes in the function of the body unrelated to disease. The guidance clarifies that (1) Code Sec. 213 does not limit the deduction to amounts paid for the least expensive form of medical care applicable, and (2) a physician's recommendation, while often important to determine whether certain expenses are for medical or personal reasons, is unnecessary when the expenditures are for items wholly medical in nature and that serve no other function.

In the first scenario, money spent for an annual physical examination qualified as an expense for medical care, even though the taxpayer was not experiencing any symptoms of illness. In the second scenario, a taxpayer who was not experiencing any symptoms of illness paid for a full-body electronic scan at a clinic without having obtained a physician's recommendation for this procedure. Because the procedure served no non-medical purpose, it, too, qualified as an expense for medical care. In addition, neither the high cost of the procedure nor the possibility of less expensive alternative diagnostic tests barred the deductibility of the expense. Finally, in the third scenario, the expense of a self-administered pregnancy test kit qualified as an expense for medical care, even though it tested the healthy functioning of the body rather than attempted to detect disease.




Medical expenses: Diagnosis: Physician's recommendation. --
The IRS has issued guidance regarding the deductibility of amounts paid by individuals for diagnostic and similar procedures, including certain devices, not compensated by insurance or otherwise, as medical care expenses under Code Sec. 213(a). In three scenarios presented, the amounts paid by taxpayers were expenses for medical care deductible under Code Sec. 213(a), subject to the limitations of that section. The guidance clarifies that: (1) Code Sec. 213 does not limit the deduction to amounts paid for the least expensive form of medical care applicable, and (2) a physician's recommendation, while often important for determining whether certain expenses are for medical or personal reasons, is unnecessary when the expenditures are for items wholly medical in nature that serve no other function.





ISSUE

Are amounts paid by individuals for diagnostic and certain similar procedures and devices, not compensated by insurance or otherwise, medical care expenses deductible under § 213(a) of the Internal Revenue Code?



FACTS

In the situations described below, the costs paid by the taxpayers are not compensated by insurance or otherwise, and the taxpayers are not experiencing any symptoms of illness.



Situation 1

Taxpayer A undergoes an annual physical examination, which is performed by a physician. A pays for the physician's services and laboratory tests.



Situation 2

Taxpayer B pays for a full-body electronic scan, a relatively high-cost procedure, performed by a technician at a clinic. The scan examines the condition of B's internal organs and may identify disease or other abnormalities. B has not consulted a physician before undergoing the procedure, which can be obtained without a physician's direction, or determined if less expensive alternatives are available.



Situation 3

Taxpayer C buys a test kit and uses it to determine whether she is pregnant.



LAW

Section 213(a) allows a deduction for expenses paid during the taxable year, not compensated for by insurance or otherwise, for medical care of the taxpayer, spouse, or dependent, to the extent that the expenses exceed 7.5 percent of adjusted gross income. Medical care includes amounts paid for the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or for the purpose of affecting any structure or function of the body. Section 213(d)(1)(A).

Medical care includes X-rays and laboratory and other diagnostic services. Amounts paid for obstetrical services are deemed to be for the purpose of affecting a structure or function of the body and therefore are paid for medical care. Section 1.213-1(e)(1)(ii) of the Income Tax Regulations.

"Diagnosis" is the determination of a medical condition, such as a disease, by physical examination or study of symptoms. Black's Law Dictionary (8 th ed., 2004). A diagnosis may encompass a determination that disease is absent. The determination of a medical condition may include testing for changes in the functions of the body, such as those resulting from pregnancy, that are unrelated to disease.

In determining whether an expense is for either medical or personal reasons, the recommendation of a physician is important. Havey v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 409, 412 (1949). However, this determination is unnecessary in the case of expenses for items that are wholly medical in nature and serve no other function in everyday life. Stringham v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 580, 584 (court reviewed), aff'd 183 F.2d 579 (6 th Cir. 1950).

The amount of the deduction under § 213 is not limited by a ceiling and, although additional costs for personal convenience are not allowable, § 213 does not limit the deduction to amounts paid for the least expensive form of medical care available. Ferris v. Commissioner, 582 F.2d 1112, 1116 (7 th Cir. 1978).



ANALYSIS

In Situation 1, the amount A pays for the annual physical examination is for diagnosis and qualifies as an expense for medical care even though A is not experiencing any symptoms of illness.

In Situation 2, the amount B pays for the full-body scan is for diagnosis and qualifies as an expense for medical care even though B is not experiencing symptoms of illness and has not obtained a physician's recommendation before undergoing the procedure. The procedure serves no non-medical function and the expense is not disallowed because of the high cost or possible existence of less expensive alternatives.

In Situation 3, the amount C pays for the pregnancy test qualifies as an expense for medical care even though its purpose is to test the healthy functioning of the body rather than to detect disease.

Therefore, the amounts paid by Taxpayers A, B, and C for the physical examination, the full-body scan, and the pregnancy test kit are deductible under § 213(a), subject to the 7.5 percent floor.



HOLDING

Amounts paid by individuals for diagnostic and certain similar procedures and devices, not compensated by insurance or otherwise, are medical care expenses deductible under § 213(a), subject to the limitations of that section.



DRAFTING INFORMATION

For further information regarding this revenue ruling, contact Dan Cassano at (202) 622-7900 (not a toll-free call).

Labels:

Friday, December 7, 2007

Third-party summons: 7602


To obtain enforcement of a summons, the IRS must first establish its `good faith' by showing that the summons: (1) is issued for a legitimate purpose; (2) seeks information relevant to that purpose; (3) seeks information that is not already within the IRS' possession; and (4) satisfies all administrative steps required by the United States Code. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57-58, 85 S. Ct. 248, 254-55 (1964).

"[t]he fact that an investigation for the purpose of determining tax liability is deemed likely to produce evidence warranting criminal prosecution does not make the use of summons an improper use." United States v. Hayes, 408 F.2d 932, 936 (7th Cir. 1969).

Petition to quash: Enforcement: Legitimate purpose: Justice Department referral: Burden of proof: Prima facie case. --

A taxpayer's petition to quash IRS third-party summons issued to a bank requesting his bank statements, deposit records and copies of canceled checks was denied, and the summons was ordered enforced. The IRS established a prima facie case for enforcement by showing that the investigation had a legitimate purpose, the inquiry was relevant to that purpose, the information sought was not already in its possession, all requisite administrative steps had been followed and no Justice Department referral had been made. Moreover, the taxpayer did not provide any evidence to support his argument that the summons was issued for an improper purpose, was too broad and violated notice and hearing requirements.

Steven Krsulic, Petitioner v. Alan Keene, IRS Revenue Agent, et al., Defendant.

U.S. District Court, East. Dist. Calif.; 06-MC-00071 MCE GGH, June 18, 2007.

[ Code Sec. 7602]






ORDER


ENGLAND, JR., UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE: On April 2, 2007, the magistrate judge filed findings and recommendations herein which were served on the parties and which contained notice that any objections to the findings and recommendations were to be filed within ten days. No objections were filed.

Accordingly, the court presumes any findings of fact are correct. See Orland v. United States, 602 F.2d 207, 208 (9th Cir. 1999). The magistrate judge's conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. See Britt v. Simi Valley Unified School Dist., 708 F.2d 452, 454 (9th Cir. 1983).

The Court has reviewed the applicable legal standards and, good cause appearing, concludes that it is appropriate to adopt the Findings and Recommendations in full.

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that:

1. The Findings and Recommendations filed April 2, 2007, are ADOPTED; and

2. The petition to quash IRS summons filed by Steven Krsulic on June 26, 2006, is DENIED, the United States' petition for enforcement of the IRS summons at issue in this case, filed November 14, 2006, is GRANTED, and the summons is enforced.


FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS


HOLLOWS, United States Magistrate Judge: Petitioner has filed a petition to quash IRS summons. The United States filed an opposition and counterclaim to enforce the tax summons against third party Placer Sierra Bank.

The Ninth Circuit has summarized the well established and frequently referred to requirements for enforcement of an IRS summons:
To obtain enforcement of a summons, the IRS must first establish its `good faith' by showing that the summons: (1) is issued for a legitimate purpose; (2) seeks information relevant to that purpose; (3) seeks information that is not already within the IRS' possession; and (4) satisfies all administrative steps required by the United States Code. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57-58, 85 S. Ct. 248, 254-55 (1964). The government's burden is "a slight one" and typically is satisfied by the introduction of the sworn statement of the revenue agent who issued the summons declaring that the Powell requirements have been met. United States v. Dynavac, Inc., 6 F.3d 1407, 1414 (9th Cir.1993); United States v. Gilleran, 992 F.2d 232, 233 (9th Cir.1993). Once a prima facie case is made a `heavy' burden is placed on the taxpayer to show an `abuse of process' or `the lack of institutional good faith.' Dynavac, 6 F.3d at 1414.

Fortney v. United States, 59 F.3d 117, 119 (9th Cir.1995); Ponsford v. United States 771 F.2d 1305, 1307, 1308 (9th Cir.1985); Liberty Financial Services v. United States, 778 F.2d 1390, 1392 (9th Cir.1985).

Petitioner claims that the IRS has labeled him a tax protester and as a result has abandoned a civil tax determination in order to prosecute him criminally, thereby attempting to circumvent the traditional grand jury role and impermissibly gathering evidence to aid in prosecution. Petitioner also argues that forcing disclosure of his personal bank records violates his right to privacy under the Constitution. He further claims that the summons is too broad, is defective on its face, violates the notice and hearing requirements, and was issued for the improper purpose to harass petitioner. In order to meet his burden to disprove a valid civil tax purpose, petitioner claims to need discovery.

Revenue Agent Keene states that the purpose of the summons at issue is to conduct an investigation of Steven Krsulic to determine federal income tax liabilities for the 2003 and 2004 tax years. The summons issued to Placer Sierra Bank requests bank statements, deposit records and copies of canceled checks for Krsulic between the period January 1, 2003 to December 31, 2004. Such an investigation is a legitimate use of the summons power of §7602. 1 Respondents have also demonstrated a prima facie showing that the inquiry may be relevant to that purpose, that the information sought is not already within the Commissioner's possession, and that the administrative steps required by the Code have been followed. Keene Decl., ¶¶7, 10, 5. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57-58 (1964).

The burden of coming forward therefore has shifted to petitioner. Although petitioner's petition claims he is filing an affidavit and "summary of authorities" to support his aforementioned arguments, he has not done so. IRS Agent Keene states that this case has not been referred to the Department of Justice as a criminal proceeding. Keene Decl. ¶11. Furthermore, it is well established that "[t]he fact that an investigation for the purpose of determining tax liability is deemed likely to produce evidence warranting criminal prosecution does not make the use of summons an improper use." United States v. Hayes, 408 F.2d 932, 936 (7th Cir. 1969). While it may be the law that an agency may not use a civil summons solely to prepare for a criminal case, see United States v. LaSalle National Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 98 S. Ct. 2357 (1978), called into doubt by statute as stated in United States v. Cahill, 920 F.2d 421, 428 (7th Cir.1990), the Service may pursue civil and criminal investigations simultaneously prior to referring the matter to the Department of Justice. Jones v. United States, 791 F. Supp. 760, 762 (E.D. Ark. 1992). Petitioner has failed to demonstrate any facts which suggest he has a reasonable belief he will be prosecuted, that the summonses in the instant cases were issued for an improper purpose, that the summons is too broad, that it is defective, that it violates the notice and hearing requirements, or that it was issued for an improper purpose. Therefore, petitioner has not met his burden.

Based on the foregoing principles, and an examination of the United States' opposition, the Verification of Revenue Agent Alan Keene, and the entire record in this case the Court finds as follows:

1. The United States has established its case for enforcement of the IRS summons issued to Placer Sierra Bank;

2. The summons was issued for a legitimate purpose, it seeks information that may be relevant to that purpose, and seeks information not already in the government's possession;

3. The summons was issued in conformation with the administrative steps required by the Internal Revenue Code;

4. The United States' opposition and counterclaim to enforce the IRS summons in this matter, along with the verification of Revenue Agent Alan Keene were served on petitioner Steven Krsulic and Placer Sierra Bank.

Accordingly, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the petition to quash IRS summons filed by Steven Krsulic on June 26, 2006, be DENIED, the United States' petition for enforcement of the IRS summons at issue in the case, filed November 14, 2006, be GRANTED, and that the summons be enforced.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(l). Within twenty days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned "Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations." Any reply to the objections shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

1 Even a secondary purpose by the Service in seeking the requested material does not 1 defeat the Service's assertions. Tiffany Fine Arts, Inc. v. United States, 469 U.S. 310, 105 S. Ct. 725 (1985) (dual purpose); United States v. La Salle National Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 98 S. Ct. 2357 (1978) (even an illegitimate secondary purpose will not preclude enforcement in light of a legitimate purpose).

Thursday, December 6, 2007

IRS examination - substantiation with secondary evidence

Robert K. and Cheryl Hardwick v. Commissioner.

Dkt. No. 3189-06 , TC Memo. 2007-359, December 5, 2007.

[Appealable, barring stipulation to the contrary, to CA-11. --CCH.]

[Code Sec. 165]
Deductions: Cohan rule: Gambling losses: Recreational gambler. --
A married couple was denied a portion of their gambling loss deduction because they failed to properly substantiate that portion of the loss and the court declined to apply the "Cohan rule." The couple, who were recreational gamblers, argued that under Doffin, 61 TCM 2157; Dec. 47,231(M), TC Memo. 1991-114, the "Cohan rule" should be used to estimate the unsubstantiated portion of their gambling loss. However, the court rejected this argument because in Doffin, the gambling involved pull tabs, which cost a fixed amount and, taken together with the taxpayer's financial status and lifestyle, provided a basis for an approximation. Here, the couple primarily played slots at varying amounts and failed to provide any other basis for an approximation. --CCH.





Mark E. Hoffman, for petitioners; Horace Crump, for respondent.



R disallowed a portion of Ps' claimed gambling loss deduction for 2002, due to a lack of substantiation, and determined a tax deficiency.



Held: R's tax deficiency determination is sustained.





MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION



WHERRY, Judge: This case is before the Court on a petition for a redetermination of a deficiency. After concessions by petitioners,1 the issue for decision is whether petitioners are entitled to deduct gambling losses in excess of the $170,215 that respondent allowed for their 2002 taxable year.2





FINDINGS OF FACT



Some of the facts have been stipulated by the parties. The stipulations, with accompanying exhibits, are incorporated herein by this reference. At the time the petition was filed, petitioners resided in Birmingham, Alabama.



Robert K. Hardwick (Mr. Hardwick) is president and part owner of Hardwick Company, Inc. (Hardwick Co.), which is a heavy steel fabricating company. Petitioners are recreational gamblers and began playing slot machines regularly in 1997. In 2002, they made at least eight trips to Mississippi to play slot machines at various casinos. Mr. Hardwick normally played the high stakes slots ($20 or $30 per pull).



Petitioners had a line of credit at the casinos they visited regularly in Tunica and Biloxi, Mississippi, of approximately$30,000 to $35,000. Petitioners would travel with $1,000 to $4,000 in cash on each of their gambling trips, which they would spend before they used markers against their lines of credit.



When petitioners had spent all of their cash, they would utilize markers, which are self-generated checks from the patron to the casino representing the patron's draws against a line of credit with the casino. The marker is paid to the patron in either cash or casino chips. Petitioners would obtain markers in $2,000 or $2,500 increments. Approximately 40 to 45 days after obtaining a marker, the dollar amount of the marker would be debited from petitioners' Equity Line of Credit at Compass Bank of Decatur, Alabama (line of credit). In 2002, $50,500 in markers was withdrawn from petitioners' line of credit. However, that dollar amount does not include markers that petitioners paid off with gambling winnings or other available cash before they exited a casino.



Mr. Hardwick kept a log of petitioners' gambling winnings and losses during 2002 that consisted of one, lined yellow, piece of notebook paper containing his notations.3



The log also includes gambling winnings and losses from 2001 and the beginning of 2003, as well as Mississippi and Louisiana State tax refunds for 2002. The log reflects Mr. Hardwick's personal record, prepared within 2 to 3 days of returning from each gambling trip, of the net amount petitioners won or lost over a given gambling weekend. The computations are based on his comparison of the amount of cash he remembered petitioners took to the casinos and the amount they returned home with, reduced by the dollar amount of any outstanding markers generated during the trip. According to Mr. Hardwick's running tally of petitioners' net gambling winnings and losses, petitioners had a net loss in the amount of $31,180 for 2002.4



Notably, there was at least one occasion where Mr. Hardwick failed to include petitioners' gambling winnings in his log. Mr. Hardwick testified that he won $24,000 on Sunday, June 9, 2002, at the Grand Casino Tunica, yet his log does not include a notation for this win. Also, it appears that Mr. Hardwick may have carried over to the 2002 taxable year a net $50,580 gambling loss from 2001.5 Taking into account this possible carryover, it appears, although the odds of winning on a casino's slot machines after a large number of plays is statistically improbable, that based on Mr. Hardwick's log, petitioners may have had net gambling winnings for 2002.6



Petitioners received win-loss statements from the Grand Casino Biloxi and the Grand Casino Tunica. A win-loss statement is generated from a Players' Club card, which is a magnetically encoded card that patrons of a casino may use when playing slot machines. The Players' Club card enables the casino to track a patron's gambling activities by date and time, slot machine winnings and losses, and may provide free "comped" room, drink, and food for "high rollers", or points that may be exchanged by the patron for food, drink, or merchandise. However, for at least two of petitioners' gambling trips, on March 2 and April 6 and 7, 2002, there are no win-loss statements for their Players' Club cards. In exchange for their patronage as established by using Players' Club cards, petitioners received free food in casinos, free rooms at the casino hotels, and free room service (except for gratuities).



The Grand Casino Biloxi win-loss statement for Mr. Hardwick reflects that he won $93,822, and lost $94,775, for a net loss of $953 for 2002. The Grand Casino Biloxi win-loss statement for Cheryl Hardwick (Mrs. Hardwick) reflects that she had no winnings and had a net loss of $14,141 for 2002. The Grand Casino Tunica win-loss statement for Mr. Hardwick reflects that he won $21,320, and lost $6,420, for net winnings of $14,900 for 2002. Overall, the win-loss statements reflect that petitioners had a net loss of $194 for 2002 for gambling activity recorded by their Players' Club cards.



On their 2002 joint Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, which was prepared by petitioners' accountant, Ben Shillaci, petitioners reported total gambling winnings of $308,400. Petitioners now concede that their total gambling winnings for 2002 were actually $322,500. See supra note 1. Petitioners' gambling winnings consisted of $26,500 from the Beau Rivage Resort, Inc., $80,350 from the Grand Casino Tunica, and $215,6507 from the Grand Casino Biloxi. In addition, petitioners had gambling winnings in excess of the amounts reported on Forms W-2G issued by the casinos, as only jackpots in excess of $1,200 were reported on Forms W-2G in 2002. Neither petitioners' tax records, nor petitioners, specifically recorded or otherwise accounted for petitioners' slot machine winnings below $1,200. Petitioners claimed gambling losses of $308,400 on their 2002 joint Federal income tax return, the exact amount of their reported gambling winnings.



The notice of deficiency was issued to petitioners on November 9, 2005, and reflected a deficiency of $58,945 for 2002. Respondent disallowed $138,185 of petitioners' claimed $308,400 gambling losses due to lack of substantiation. Petitioners filed with this Court a timely petition, and a trial was held on November 3, 2006, in Birmingham, Alabama.8





OPINION




I. Burden of Proof


Deductions are a matter of legislative grace, and the taxpayer must maintain adequate records to substantiate the amounts of any deductions or credits claimed. Sec. 6001; INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); sec. 1.6001-1(a), Income Tax Regs. As a general rule, the Commissioner's determination of a taxpayer's liability in the notice of deficiency is presumed correct, and the taxpayer bears the burden of proving that the determination is improper. See Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). However, pursuant to section 7491(a)(1), the burden of proof on factual issues that affect the taxpayer's tax liability may be shifted to the Commissioner where the "taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to * * * such [factual] issue". The burden will shift only if the taxpayer has, inter alia, complied with substantiation requirements pursuant to the Internal Revenue Code and "cooperated with reasonable requests by the Secretary for witnesses, information, documents, meetings, and interviews". Sec. 7491(a)(2). Petitioners did not comply with the substantiation requirements, and failed to present credible evidence at trial. Accordingly, the burden remains on petitioners.




II. Gambling


Gross income includes all income from whatever source derived, including gambling. See sec. 61; McClanahan v. United States, 292 F.2d 630, 631-632 (5th Cir. 1961). In the case of a taxpayer not engaged in the trade or business of gambling, gambling losses are allowable as an itemized deduction, but only to the extent of gains from such transactions. See sec. 165(d); McClanahan v. United States, supra at 632 n.1 (citing Winkler v. United States, 230 F.2d 766 (1st Cir. 1956)).



Taxpayers have the burden of showing that they are entitled to a gambling loss deduction. Norgaard v. Commissioner, 939 F.2d 874, 878 (9th Cir. 1991), affg. in part, revg. in part on another ground T.C. Memo. 1989-390. Generally, a claimed expense (other than those subjected to heightened scrutiny under section 274) may be deductible even where the taxpayer is unable to fully substantiate it, if there is an evidentiary basis for doing so. Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540, 543-544 (2d Cir. 1930); Vanicek v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 731, 742-743 (1985); Sanford v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 823, 827-828 (1968), affd. per curiam 412 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1969); sec. 1.274-5T(a), Temporary Income Tax Regs., 50 Fed. Reg. 46014 (Nov. 6, 1985). In these instances, the Court is permitted to make as close an approximation of the allowable expense as it can, bearing heavily against the taxpayer whose inexactitude is of his or her own making. Cohan v. Commissioner, supra at 544.



Petitioners rely on Doffin v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1991-114, in claiming that the Court should estimate their gambling losses pursuant to the rule of Cohan. However, this Court has declined to apply the rule of Cohan to gambling loss deduction cases that differ factually from Doffin . See Donovan v. Commissioner, 359 F.2d 64 (1st Cir. 1966), affg. T.C. Memo. 1965-247; Stein v. Commissioner, 322 F.2d 78, 83 (5th Cir. 1963), affg. T.C. Memo. 1962-19; Schooler v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 867, 871 (1977); Lutz v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-89.



In Doffin , the taxpayer had pull tab winnings of $46,240 and $32,571 for 1986 and 1987, respectively. The taxpayer did not keep contemporaneous records of his daily winnings and losses and did not retain any losing tickets to substantiate his losses. The Commissioner allowed the taxpayer a deduction for gambling losses in the amount of $494 for 1986, which was based on the $2 per pull tab cost of the taxpayer's 247 winning pull tabs for that year. Pursuant to the rule of Cohan, the Court allowed the taxpayer to deduct additional losses of $39,000 and $26,000 for 1986 and 1987, respectively. The Court's approximation of the taxpayer's gambling losses pursuant to the rule of Cohan was based on the Court's finding that it was highly improbable that the taxpayer purchased only winning tickets, and that the taxpayer's lifestyle and financial position indicated no accessions to wealth commensurate with the amount of net gambling winnings determined by the Commissioner. The taxpayer lived in a mobile home, had little income and few assets, and even sold assets and borrowed money during the years at issue to support his gambling habit.



Unlike Doffin , this is not a case where the petitioners have few assets and no income apart from gambling. Mr. Hardwick is president and part owner of Hardwick Co. Petitioners reported $391,546 in taxable income for 2002 aside from their $308,400 reported gambling winnings.9 Further, respondent has allowed petitioners a $170,215 deduction for gambling losses for 2002 based on their submitted records, which is far more generous than the $494 deduction the Commissioner allowed the taxpayer in Doffin . The Court notes that the losses reported by the casinos as recorded on petitioners' Players' Club cards total $115,336.



The records that petitioners presented at trial are incomplete. The win-loss statements issued by the Grand Casino Biloxi and the Grand Casino Tunica do not include at least two gambling trips that petitioners made to Mississippi on March 2 and April 6 and 7, 2002. Mr. Hardwick's log does not include at least one substantial win by petitioners in the amount of $24,000, and appears to carry over a net gambling loss from 2001 to 2002. See supra note 4. Additionally, the Forms W-2G issued by the casinos do not include winnings under $1,200, which winnings petitioners failed to keep track of and record on their own. Petitioners' line of credit statements reflect that $50,500 in markers was debited in 2002. However, the mere fact of borrowing, represented here by marker debit transactions, does not substantiate actual losses of those borrowed funds on gambling. Schooler v. Commissioner, supra at 870.



Overall, there does not appear to be a correlation between the win-loss statements, petitioners' Forms W-2G, Mr. Hardwick's log, and petitioners' bank account statements. Notably, the win-loss statements reflect that petitioners had gambling winnings totaling $115,142, while the Forms W-2G provide that petitioners had total gambling winnings of $322,50010 . Petitioners have not accounted for the $207,358 difference in gambling winnings between the win-loss statements and Forms W-2G. At trial, Mr. Hardwick was unsure of petitioners' total dollar amount of gambling winnings or losses, explaining that he only kept track of their net amount won or lost.



Petitioners' bank account statements reflect that petitioners had large sums of money being deposited and withdrawn on a monthly basis, and there does not appear to be a correlation between petitioners' monthly bank account balance and any substantial gambling win or loss in 2002. For example, according to Mr. Hardwick's log, petitioners lost $25,000 in February 2002, yet their bank account balance increased by approximately $33,000 for the month of February. This might reflect the 30 to 45 day float delay in covering markers, but there was no credible evidence explaining these discrepancies.



The record provides no satisfactory basis for estimating petitioners' gambling losses in excess of the $170,215 allowed by respondent. See Stein v. Commissioner, supra. There are too many omissions and discrepancies among the documents petitioners have presented as substantiation. Consequently, the Court will not apply the Cohan rule to estimate the amount of petitioners' gambling losses. Petitioners could have avoided this result by keeping complete records of their gambling activities or perhaps by simply using their Players' Club cards to track their slot machine play on each of their gambling trips.



The Court has considered all of petitioners' contentions, arguments, requests, and statements. To the extent not discussed herein, the Court concludes that they are meritless, moot, or irrelevant.



To reflect the foregoing,



Decision will be entered under Rule 155.


1 Petitioners concede that the $12,400 they won in 2003 at the Pearl River Resort casino was not properly includable in their taxable income for taxable year 2002. Petitioners concede that the $26,500 that they won from the Beau Rivage Resorts, Inc., casino in 2002 was properly includable in their 2002 taxable income. Petitioners concede that the net increase in their taxable income for 2002 was $14,100.

2 Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended and in effect for the year in issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.

3 The log, which appears to contain some mathematical errors, including the last notation for 2001, which according to the Court's calculation should have been a $50,530 loss instead of a $50,580 loss, provides the following notations pertinent to 2002 (the Court has numbered the log entries by line as follows in the far left hand column for ease of reference):



[1] 2001 ($50,580)
[2] +19000
[3] -18000
[4] -25000 Feb 02 BILOXI FEB
[5] 76480 74580 [both numbers are crossed out]
[6] -1100 TUNICA APRIL
[7] +14000 BILOXI MAY (MEMORIAL DAY)
[8] +8800 MS TAX REFUND [the number is crossed out]
[9] + 2300 LA TAX REFUND [the number is crossed out]
[10] -50580 50080 [both numbers are crossed out]
[11] + 500
[12] -26000 JULY BILOX
[13] +40000 LABOR DAY 2002
[14] -35580 -20000
[15] -35000
[16] 2002 ($31,180)



4 See supra note 3 log entry No. 16. Mr. Hardwick's total appears to be the result of mathematical errors. The Court believes the numbers total $36,030 (based on a $50,530 loss for 2001 instead of the $50,580 as calculated by Mr. Hardwick). See supra note 3. The record does not explain how petitioner got from his apparent $35,580 total, shown as log entry No. 14, to ($31,180), the total for 2002 shown as log entry No. 16.

5 The fourth notation for 2002 is "76480" and/or "74580" (log entry No. 5) which according to Mr. Hardwick's testimony is a "running total". Although there is no indication that the $76,480/$74,580 dollar amount is a net loss, it appears to be consistent with the rest of the document. According to Mr. Hardwick's notations, his yellow notebook log sheet reflects that petitioners had a net gambling loss of $50,580 for 2001 (see log entry No. 1). Taking into account petitioners' $19,000 winnings (log entry No. 2), $18,000 loss (log entry No. 3), and $25,000 loss in Feb. 2002 (log entry No. 4), the $76,480/$74,580 "running total" incorporates petitioners' $50,580 loss from 2001. The next "running total" listed is "-50580" and/or "50080" (log entry No. 10), which appears to be an approximate result after taking into consideration a $1,100 loss (log entry No. 6), winnings of $14,000 (log entry No. 7), and tax refunds of $8,800 and $2,300 (log entries No. 8 and No. 9).

6 The Court notes that according to Mr. Hardwick's notations that relate specifically to gambling winnings and losses for 2002, it appears that petitioners may, after removing the $50,580 loss from 2001 (log entry No. 1), have had net gambling winnings of $3,400 [$19,000 (log entry No. 2) - $18,000 (log entry No. 3) - $25,000 (log entry No. 4) - $1,100 (log entry No. 6) + $14,000 (log entry No. 7) + $500 (log entry No. 11) - $26,000 (log entry No. 12) + $40,000 (log entry No. 13)], even without including any portion of the $24,000 jackpot from the Grand Casino Tunica on Sunday, June 9, 2002.

7 The parties stipulated that petitioners had gambling winnings of $215,650 from the Grand Casino Biloxi for 2002. However, the 2002 Form W-2G, Certain Gambling Winnings, issued by the Grand Casino Biloxi that was admitted into evidence as exhibit 11-R, reflects that petitioners had $200,250 in gambling winnings. It is possible that petitioners stipulated gambling winnings from the Grand Casino Biloxi in excess of the amount shown on the 2002 Form W-2G, and that the $215,650 stipulated amount includes multiple jackpot winnings that were less than $1,200 (and therefore not reflected on the Form W-2G).

The $322,500 amount that petitioners concede is the total amount of their gambling winnings for 2002 appears to be based on the stipulated $215,650 amount, and not on the $200,250 amount reflected on the Grand Casino Biloxi 2002 Form W-2G. It is possible that the $322,500 amount reflects the net increase of $14,100 in petitioners' gambling winnings over the $308,400 they reported on their 2002 joint Form 1040. See supra note 1.

8 At trial, and on brief, respondent objected to the expert testimony of petitioner's accountant as the proper procedure required by Rule 143(f) and the pretrial order were not followed, and to the admission into evidence of substantiation documents that were prepared by the accountant and Mr. Hardwick in anticipation of trial. The Court sustained the objection and did not permit the accountant to testify as an expert, but allowed various numerical summary documents that Mr. Hardwick and his accountant had prepared to be introduced.

9 Petitioners reported total taxable income of $699,946 on their 2002 Federal income tax return, of which $308,400 was their reported gambling winnings.

10 This amount is based on the parties' stipulations. See supra note 7.

Labels:

Wednesday, December 5, 2007

Statute of Limitations on an IRS levy - section 6502

The amendment to Code Sec. 6502 by the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-508), which replaced the six-year limitations period with a ten-year period, extended the collection period with respect to a married couple whose tax collection waiver agreement specified an earlier cut-off date. Notice of assessment and demand for payment had been sent to the taxpayers prior to amendment of the statute, but within the former six-year limitations period. The terms of the taxpayers' waiver did not preclude the application of the ten-year period because the waiver was not a contract. The IRS was not barred from making a collection after the date specified in the waiver.

R. Behren, CA-11, 96-1 USTC ¶50,254.

The mailing of a deficiency notice to a taxpayer's former address did not begin tolling the statute of limitations for collecting the tax deficiency. The notice was abated by the IRS, based upon a reasonable belief that it was invalid, two years before the IRS mailed a second deficiency notice to the taxpayer at her correct address. The Tax Court proceeding against the taxpayer arose out of the second notice, which was mailed within the limitations period.

E.K. Taylor, CA-10 (unpublished opinion), 95-1 USTC ¶50,042.

The 10-year statute of limitations applied to a partnership, even though the six-year statute of limitations would have expired prior to the effective date of the 10-year statute, because the general partners of the partnership signed consents to extend the limitations period. The consents extended the last day for collection to a date beyond the effective date of the 10-year limitations period. In addition, levies against the partners' bank accounts were properly commenced within the limitations period because the partners' received sufficient notice of the levies through bank statements and IRS notices.

E. Kaggen, CA-2, 95-1 USTC ¶50,304. Confirmed, CA-2, 95-2 USTC ¶50,635.

Similarly, as to an individual.

L.B. Foutz, CA-10, 96-1 USTC ¶50,029.

Similarly with respect to an offer in compromise.

A. Hussein, CA-2, 99-1 USTC ¶50,565.

Complaint for collection must be filed no later than 5 years and 365 days after assessment (excluding any period during which the statute is suspended during consideration of an offer in compromise). Elapsed days must be cumulated in determining the expiration date of the limitations period.

H.J. Tyrrell, CA-7, 64-1 USTC ¶9328, 329 F2d 341.

IRS tax liens, which attached more than six but less than ten years previously to married debtors' property that was transferred to a realty trust of which the wife was the sole beneficiary, were still in existence because the collection period had been statutorily extended from six to ten years. However, the IRS was required to file new notices of the liens but failed to do so prior to the expiration of the refiling period. Thus, the IRS's claims lost their priority status with respect to existing mortgages as well as the bankruptcy trustee.

G.C. Cole, BC-DC Mass., 97-2 USTC ¶50,794.

Successive offers in compromise, which tolled the limitations period for collecting 1981 assessments, also had the effect of extending the collection period for an additional ten years due to the enactment of the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-508). Thus, a 1997 complaint to collect the 1981 assessment was still timely. The taxpayer offered no evidence for his claim that the government had acted in bad faith by enticing him to make offers of compromise and then failing to consider them.

C.W. Georgi, DC Mich., 98-1 USTC ¶50,406.

An action to foreclose tax liens on real property was not barred by the limitations period because the action to reduce the assessments to judgment had been timely filed.

J.C. Dunkel, DC Ill., 98-2 USTC ¶50,610.

An IRS action to foreclose tax liens on property which the taxpayer fraudulently conveyed to her daughter was timely brought within ten years after the taxes were assessed. The action to collect the fraudulently conveyed property from the daughter was not governed by the six-year statute of limitations under the Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act of 1990 because that Act does not limit the federal government's right to collect taxes. Although the IRS's right to set aside the conveyance was based on state (Florida) fraudulent conveyance law, the IRS was not bound by any state statute of limitations.

D.D. Fitzgerald, DC Fla., 97-1 USTC ¶50,238.

The statutory amendment that changed the statute of limitations on collection actions from six years to ten years and applied the change retroactively was not unconstitutional. The amendment did not give rise to a due process claim because its purpose, to raise revenue without imposing additional prospective tax liabilities, was rational and reasonable. Moreover, the extended limitations period did not abrogate any rights of or create any new liabilities for a partner. The taxpayer did not rely on the expiration of the six-year limitations period to avoid the tax, and the length of the retroactivity was not inappropriate given the purpose of the statute. The amendment did not give rise to an equal protection claim because the classification purportedly created by its retroactive application was rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.

M. Rocanova, DC N.Y., 96-2 USTC ¶50,494. Aff'd, per curiam, CA-2, 97-1 USTC ¶50,300. Cert. denied, 10/6/97.

An action to collect taxes that were assessed prior to the date of amendment to Code Sec. 6502 (March 21, 1986) was timely commenced exactly ten years after the date of assessment (March 21, 1996). The 10-year period applied because the original six-year period for collection had not yet expired as of the date of the amendment (November 5, 1990).

R.C. MacElvain, DC Ala., 97-1 USTC ¶50,248.

Taxes timely assessed in 1988 could be collected by the IRS any time within ten years after the date of assessment. The three year limitation period for assessments under Code Sec. 6501 does not govern collections.

R. Black, DC Mich., 97-1 USTC ¶50,153.

The statute of limitations for enforcing a levy against two consulting firms that failed to surrender funds owed to a bankrupt company was suspended as long as the company was in bankruptcy proceedings and for six months thereafter. The firms' argument that the limitations period should not have been tolled because the IRS could have sued the firms or the bank to which the funds were paid once they surrendered the funds to the bank was rejected.

Giffels Assocs., DC Mich., 96-1 USTC ¶50,253.

The government was not barred from making further levies merely because previous levies on an individual's salary had been released. The statute of limitations on collection of the taxes owing remained open. The taxpayer's argument that the government was barred from collecting the taxes under the doctrine of laches because the original assessment was made 12 years earlier was rejected because there had been no laches on the part of the government. Moreover, the court noted that efforts by the IRS to collect the taxes were delayed by the taxpayer's actions.

M. Humer, DC Fla., 95-2 USTC ¶50,515.

The ten-year statute of limitations for collection properly applied in a case where the six-year limitations period, in effect before its amendment by Congress in 1990, had not expired as of November 5, 1990. Although an initial District Court order stated that the IRS had six years from the date of assessment to collect the taxes, a subsequent opinion issued in the same proceeding by a successor judge properly revised the limitations period to reflect the newly enacted ten-year period. The "law if the case" doctrine did not prevent the successor judge from amending the order to reflect the longer period of limitations because, at the time the order was entered, the change did not prejudice the taxpayer. Under either limitations period, the IRS was not time-barred from collecting the assessed taxes as of the time the order was entered. Moreover, collateral estoppel prevented the taxpayer from rearguing the limitations period. The taxpayer had ample opportunity at his prior District Court proceeding to argue that the six-year limitations period should apply.

R.E. Cleveland, DC Ill., 95-2 USTC ¶50,530.

The extension by new law of the collection period from six to ten years extended the collection period even though the taxpayer and the IRS had executed an offer in compromise with a waiver setting the end of the limitations period at a certain date. Since the effective date of the extension from six to ten years fell within the extended limitations period provided for in the offer, the 10-year period applied.

D.C. Simons, CA-10, 97-2 USTC ¶50,945.

An action by the federal government to reduce assessed taxes to judgment and to foreclose tax liens was not subject to the six-year statute of limitations contained in the Federal Debt Collection Act (FDCA) (28 USC §3001 et seq.). The FDCA does not apply to the collection of taxes by the United States. Rather, the 10-year period for collection after assessment, as set forth in Code Sec. 6502(a)(1), was applicable in this case.

W. Werner, DC N.Y., 94-2 USTC ¶50,345.

The IRS's enforcement action to collect an individual's unpaid taxes was time barred because the IRS failed to levy on the taxpayer's property within six years after the liability assessment. Although the applicable statute was later amended to extend the time period for levying on an assessment, the amendment did not apply to the levy at issue because the amendment went into effect after the IRS's right to levy expired. Thus, the levy was unenforceable.

R.E. Hillyer, DC Pa., 94-1 USTC ¶50,187. Aff'd, CA-3 (unpublished opinion), 95-1 USTC ¶50,155.

An action to foreclose tax liens was governed by the 10-year federal statute of limitations and not the six-year state (Minnesota) statute of limitations governing fraudulent conveyances.

L. Scherping, DC Minn., 92-2 USTC ¶50,345.

The IRS's failure to meet the 60-day mailing deadline for giving notice and demand of payment of tax did not void the otherwise valid assessments. The court concluded that the purpose of the 60-day notice requirement was to allow the taxpayer an opportunity to make voluntary payments of tax before the IRS could use its lien and collection powers. Thus, the IRS's failure in this case resulted only in the removal of its nonjudicial collection powers. The taxpayer remained liable for the amounts assessed. Further, the IRS's counterclaim to reduce to judgment the assessments made for two of the years at issue was not barred by the statute of limitations as a result of its not meeting the 60-day deadline for notice and assessment.

L. Blackston, DC Md., 91-2 USTC ¶50,507, 778 FSupp 244.

The court determined that the assessments were timely made and, accordingly, the action was timely filed. Even by assuming that the sixty-day period (during which the statute of limitations was suspended) and the date that the assessments could be made commenced on the first date that a stipulation was entered into between the taxpayer and the IRS, allowing the IRS to make the assessments, the 60th day fell on a Saturday, thereby making the assessments on the following Monday timely.

J.A. Ashton, DC Pa., 87-2 USTC ¶9616, 678 FSupp 561.

Liens for taxes did not lapse with the passage of time inasmuch as (1) the administrative procedure of collecting the assessment did not have to be completed within six years after the tax lien was perfected, and (2) an action was instituted within the statutory period of six years.

Valley Bank of Nevada, DC, 82-1 USTC ¶9122, 528 FSupp 907.

The IRS complied with the six-year statute of limitations in an action to enforce tax liens because the assessment date of April 17, 1964 was excluded from, and the date the original complaint was filed, April 17, 1970, was included in, the computation of time. Although the complaint was filed at 6:12 p.m., this did not result in a filing after the termination of the business day.

J. Besase, DC, 70-2 USTC ¶9626, 319 FSupp 1064.

Suit begun May 21, 1938 was begun within the six-year statutory collection period (assessment, May 21, 1932), and not one day late.

Barber, DC, 38-2 USTC ¶9478, 24 FSupp 229.

Genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment as to whether the statute of limitations barred the government's collection efforts. The parties agreed that the taxpayer submitted a Form 656, Offer in Compromise, but it was apparently destroyed before trial pursuant to regular IRS procedures. The taxpayer claimed that the offer was not a valid agreement to extend the collections period because he manually crossed out language on the form that provided for the extension, and because his offer was not accepted and signed by an IRS representative. The government countered that it accepted the taxpayer's offer and would not have done so if he had removed the limitations extension language.

J.D. Schurz, DC Ind., 99-1 USTC ¶50,116. Motions for reconsideration denied, DC Ind., 99-2 USTC ¶50,692.

A tax judgment in favor of the IRS against a debtor remained enforceable because the IRS was not subject to state-imposed limits on enforceability. Because the judgment was rendered within the 10-year limitations period, it was enforceable under the terms of the Federal Debt Collection Procedure Act. The statutory language of Code Sec. 6502 does not waive the IRS's immunity from state statutes of limitations.

J.A. Hill, DC Tex., 99-2 USTC ¶50,821. Aff'd, per curiam, CA-5 (unpublished opinion), 2000-2 USTC ¶50,570, 224 F3d 766. Cert. denied, 4/2/2001.

A tax shelter investor's contention that the IRS was barred by the 10-year statute of limitations from seizing his assets was without merit. The IRS timely assessed the tax liability determined by the Tax Court in earlier proceedings within the extended assessment period agreed to by the taxpayer. He was precluded from arguing that the agreement was invalid because he failed to raise that argument during the Tax Court proceedings and did not appeal the Tax Court's determination. The IRS properly made its assessment less than 150 days after the Tax Court issued its final decision.

J.B. Evseroff, DC N.Y., 2000-2 USTC ¶50,807. Aff'd on another issue, CA-2 (unpublished opinion), 2001-2 USTC ¶50,486.

Similarly.

J.B. Evseroff, DC N.Y., 2001-2 USTC ¶50,783.

The government was entitled to the portion of proceeds from the sale of a delinquent, insolvent individual's property that were attributable to fraudulent enhancement of the property. Although a 6-year limitations period applied at the time the IRS assessed the taxpayer's unpaid liabilities, it was subsequently changed to 10 years. Because the 6-year limitations period had not expired at the time of the amendment and the government's fraudulent enhancement claim was within the 10-year limitations period, it was timely.

S.L. Craft, CA-6, 2000-2 USTC ¶50,860, 233 F3d 358. Rev'd and Rem'd on another issue, SCt, 2002-1 USTC ¶50,361.

A court order to foreclose and sell business property fraudulently conveyed by a husband to his wife to satisfy their tax debt was not barred by the two-year statute of limitations prescribed in section 3306(b) of the Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act of 1990. Because the district court had jurisdiction pursuant to Code Sec. 7402, the use of the longer limitation period under Code Sec. 6502 was proper.

L.S. Brown, CA-10 (unpublished opinion), 2002-1 USTC ¶50,116.

The government's collection action was timely filed when begun within ten years after the assessment of the tax. The prior-law, six-year statute of limitations did not apply since this assessment was made well after the November 5, 1990, effective date of the ten-year limitation rule.

T.M. Bidegary, DC Nev., 2004-2 USTC ¶50,315.

The statute of limitations did not bar the government's suit to reduce assessments to judgment. The ten-year statute of limitations on collection was extended for the period the taxpayer was in bankruptcy and for six months thereafter. Consequently, the ten-year period did not expire until ten days after the government filed its suit to reduce the assessments to judgment.

J.A. Frein, DC Fla., 2005-1 USTC ¶50,253.

The IRS was granted summary judgment regarding an individual's unpaid tax liability, interest and penalties for one tax year the government has ten years after making an assessment to begin collection proceedings. Since the government instituted its action four days before the expiration of the ten-year period, it was not barred by the statute of limitations.

P. Lavi, DC N.Y., 2006-1 USTC ¶50,208. Aff'd, CA-2 (unpublished opinion), 2006-1 USTC ¶50,209

IRS collection actions against an individual were timely because the statute of limitations had not run on its ability to pursue the collection of unpaid taxes. The interaction of the amendments relating to offers in compromise made to Code Sec. 6502 by the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (P.L. 105-206), the Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-554) and the Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-147) did not cause the collection action to be untimely. Also, the doctrine of laches did not bar the enforcement of government tax claims.

J.C. Ryals, DC Fla., 2006-1 USTC ¶50,293. Aff'd, per curiam, CA-11, 2007-1 USTC ¶50,397.

The IRS's collection action against an individual was timely even though it was filed more than ten years after the taxes were assessed. The statute of limitations on collection was tolled during the taxpayer's two bankruptcies and during the time his offers-in-compromise were pending. The individual's offers ceased to be pending on the date of the IRS letters stating that the offers were withdrawn, not on the date of the taxpayer's letters to the IRS withdrawing the offers. Moreover, under the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (P.L. 105-206), the limitation period expired on December 31, 2002, plus an extension for the period of the taxpayer's bankruptcies.

R.D. Elton, DC N.Y., 2006-1 USTC ¶50,335.

An IRS levy on an individual's wages to collect his unpaid tax liability was timely because the 10-year limitations period for collection was extended for the period of time that his two installment agreement requests were under consideration. Since the taxpayer failed to contradict the government's evidence that the installment agreements were requested, the government's calculation of the length of time the requests were considered, and the limitations period extended, was accepted.

B. Seagrave, CA-7 (unpublished opinion), 2007-1 USTC ¶50,479, aff'g an unreported District Court decision.

A married couple did not have a meritorious defense against the government's claim relating to their tax liability. The husband's tax liability was not negated by the government's late filing of its suit to collect taxes because the government filed its complaint within the 10-year limitations period set forth in Code Sec. 6502(a).

A. Goldstein, CA-2 (unpublished summary order), 2007-1USTC ¶50,372, aff'g an unreported District Court decision.

The IRS's action to enforce tax assessments against an individual for income taxes, penalties and interest was timely. Even though it was originally filed in a different jurisdiction, the government's complaint to reduce the assessments to judgment was a "proceeding in court," and it was timely because the original filing was made within 10 years from the date of the assessment. The statutory 10-year limitations period was extended because the last day of the limitations period fell on a Sunday that was followed by a legal holiday.

R.B. Shacklette, DC Fla., 2007-2 USTC ¶50,742.

Labels:

Tuesday, December 4, 2007

Tax Fraud - 26 U.S.C. § 6531(6), a six-year statute of limitations period is imposed for violations of 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a), with the period running from the date on which the last overt act was committed. United States v. Carlson, 235 F.3d 466, 470-71 (9th Cir. 2000).




United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Patrick J. Dain, Defendant-Appellant.

U.S. Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit; 06-50446, November 27, 2007.

Unpublished opinion affirming an unreported DC Calif., decision.

[ Code Sec. 6531]

Crimes: Conviction: Sentence: Filing false returns: Interference with administration: Statute of limitations: Six-year period: Jury instructions. --
A trial court did not commit plain error by failing to instruct a jury on an unraised statute of limitations defense. An individual was properly convicted and sentenced for filing false tax returns and corruptly endeavoring to obstruct and impede the due administration of the tax laws even though the jury was not instructed that at least one act should fall within the limitations period. The outcome of the trial was not affected because several of the acts occurred within the limitations period and the jury relied on those acts when convicting the individual.



[ Code Sec. 7206]

Crimes: Conviction: Sentence: Filing false returns: Sufficiency of evidence. --
The evidence adduced at trial sufficiently supported an individual's conviction and sentence for filing false tax returns. An IRS agent's testimony presented by the government supported the jury's finding that the individual's failure to report his actual wages for the years at issue was material to prosecute him for filing false returns. Moreover, the government was not required to prove intent to defraud to support a conviction under Code Sec. 7206(1).



[ Code Sec. 7212]

Crimes: Conviction: Sentence: Filing false returns: Interference with administration: Statute of limitations: Six-year period: Jury instructions: Multiplicitous indictment. --
An individual was properly convicted and sentenced for filing false tax returns and corruptly endeavoring to obstruct and impede the due administration of the tax laws. The trial court did not commit plain error by failing to instruct the jury on an unraised statute of limitations defense. The individual was properly convicted and sentenced even though the jury was not instructed that at least one act should fall within the limitations period. The outcome of the trial was not affected because several of the acts occurred within the limitations period and the jury relied on those acts when convicting the individual. Further, the individual was properly sentenced to a maximum sentence of three years since the jury's guilty verdict showed that the individual acted "corruptly". The trial court's additional finding that a threat of violence occurred did not raise the maximum sentence but merely allowed the court to determine the applicable guideline range under the advisory guidelines.



Before: Bybee, M. Smith, Circuit Judges, and Mills, District Judge.


MEMORANDUM *


Before: BYBEE and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and MILLS, ** District Judge.

A jury convicted Defendant Patrick Dain ("Dain") of multiple counts of making false statements under penalty of perjury in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1) for filing false tax returns and one count of obstruction in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a). Dain appeals his convictions and sentence. The facts and the rest of the procedural history are familiar to the parties, and we do not repeat them here.


ANALYSIS




A. Challenges to Obstruction Charge

1. Statute of Limitations Defense

Dain first asserts that many of the actions alleged in support of the obstruction charge were barred by the statute of limitations and that the trial court erred by failing to give jury instructions on this limitations defense.

Under 26 U.S.C. § 6531(6), a six-year statute of limitations period is imposed for violations of 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a), with the period running from the date on which the last overt act was committed. United States v. Carlson, 235 F.3d 466, 470-71 (9th Cir. 2000). Since not all of the acts underlying the obstruction charge fell within the six-year period, 1 Dain argues that he was entitled to a jury instruction explaining that at least one of them must fall within the limitations period before he could be convicted. See United States v. Fuchs, 218 F.3d 957, 961 (9th Cir. 2000). The government, however, points out that Defendant failed to raise the limitations issue at trial and urges this court to deem the arguments waived.

Since Dain has recast his statute of limitations argument as a failure to instruct the jury, and because he failed to raise this issue at trial, we review for plain error. See Carlson, 235 F.3d at 470. In order to prevail under the plain error standard, an appellant must show that there was (1) an error, (2) that the error was "plain," meaning that it was "clear and obvious," Fuchs, 218 F.3d at 962 (citation omitted), and (3) that the error "affect[ed] substantial rights," United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). "An error prejudices substantial rights of a defendant when it affect[s] the outcome of the proceedings." Fuchs, 218 F.3d at 962 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations and internal quotations omitted).

First, while an error occurred, it was not "clear and obvious" because Dain failed to alert the court to any possible limitations defense. Cf. Fuchs, 218 F.3d at 962 (limitations instruction clearly required where defendants had raised statute of limitations defense earlier in the proceedings). Second, and more significantly, no substantial rights were prejudiced, because the outcome of the trial was not affected. Dain concedes that several of the acts alleged were within the statute of limitations period. Many of these non-barred acts overlap with the false return counts on which Dain was convicted, showing that the jury did not rely exclusively on actions outside of the statute of limitations. See United States v. DeGeorge, 380 F.3d 1203, 1215-16 (9th Cir. 2004); Carlson, 235 F.3d at 471. As such, the trial court did not commit plain error in failing to instruct the jury on an unraised statute of limitations defense.

2. Double Jeopardy/Multiplicity Claim

Dain next argues that the government violated the Double Jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment by charging and sentencing him under both § 7212(a), for obstruction, and § 7206(1), for filing a false tax return. Specifically, Dain asserts that two of the nine acts alleged in support of the obstruction count were identical to the actions providing the basis for the false tax return charges and were, therefore, multiplicious.

The test for multiplicity is "whether each separately violated statutory provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not." United States v. Vargas-Castillo, 329 F.3d 715, 719 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations and internal quotations omitted). Comparing the elements of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1) and § 7212(a), it is clear that a false filing violation under § 7206(1) requires a signed writing under penalties of perjury, whereas an obstruction charge under § 7212(a) does not. Conversely, the obstruction charge requires that defendant corruptly obstruct or impede United States officers or the administration of the IRC, whereas the false filing statute does not mandate such a showing. Therefore, the indictment did not violate the Double Jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment.

3. Sufficiency of Evidence in Absence of Oath

Dain claims the trial court erred in refusing to force the government to produce the IRS agents' oaths of office taken pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §§ 3331 and 3332. He claims that this alleged wrong proves that the evidence does not support a conviction for corruptly impeding a United States officer or employee. This argument fails.

First, the jury may have convicted Dain for obstructing the due administration of the IRC, rather than the alternative theory of conviction for intimidating a federal officer or employee. See Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 47, 59-60 (1991) (upholding jury's guilty verdict where the evidence on one ground was inadequate but sufficient on another ground). Second, even if the oath requirement were not met, the government's witnesses would still be officers or employees of the government. The language of the statute itself specifically states that an "officer" must file the oath 30 days "after" appointment, implying that he or she is and remains an officer even if the condition is not met. 5 U.S.C. § 3332. See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 78 F.3d 1307, 1312 (8th Cir. 1996) ("The use of the word 'after' [in § 3332] expressly negates the claim that the filing of the affidavit is a condition precedent to [the] execution" of an officer's duties.). Further, the oath filing statute covers only "officers," 5 U.S.C. § 3332, whereas the contempt statute covers both officers and employees, 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a). No argument can be made that the IRS agents in this case were not employees. Therefore, this court will not overturn Dain's conviction for a lack of evidence.

4. Obstructive Conduct Challenges

Dain next attacks various portions of the indictment. First, relying primarily upon United States v. Kassouf, 948 F. Supp. 36 (N.D. Ohio 1996), aff'd, 144 F.3d 952 (6th Cir. 1998), Dain claims that the government could not bring an obstruction charge against him based on actions relating to tax years not subject to any pending IRS action. We have previously held, however, that "[t]he law of this circuit establishes that the government need not prove that the defendant was aware of an ongoing tax investigation to obtain a conviction under § 7212(a)...." United States v. Massey, 419 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). As such, Dain's claim is utterly devoid of merit.

Second, Dain, without citing any supporting case law, claims that his statement to an IRS agent that he would have her arrested if she came on his property could not, standing alone, support a conviction for a violation of § 7212(a), because his statement was an accurate assessment of his legal rights and thus could not have been made "corruptly." In this case, however, the statement appeared in the indictment merely as one piece of evidence which, coupled with other similar threats and obstructive acts, supported the permissible legal theory that Dain intended to impede IRS agents.



B. Challenge to Counts II - VIII: Sufficiency of the Evidence

Dain makes two sufficiency of evidence arguments: (1) that listing his wages as "0" on his tax return was not "material" and (2) that the government failed to prove an intent to defraud. Evidence is sufficient where "after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in original).

First, Dain asserts that since he included his W-2s with his tax returns, his failure to report his actual wages for the years 1994-2000 was immaterial. Materiality is a mixed question of law and fact for the jury to decide. United States v. Uchimura, 125 F.3d 1282, 1286 (9th Cir. 1997). In this case, the government presented the testimony of an IRS agent who explained that correct wage and income amounts were necessary in order to determine the amount of tax due. This testimony alone, if believed, supports a jury finding of materiality.

Second, Dain claims that the government should have had to prove an intent to defraud and, since it did not prove such an intent, insufficient evidence remained to support a conviction for false filing. Intent to defraud, however, is not an element under § 7206(1), and thus the government had no duty to offer proof on this issue.

Therefore, we conclude that the evidence adduced at trial sufficiently supports Dain's § 7206(1) convictions.



C. Jury Instructions

Dain next argues that the trial court erred in denying many of his jury instructions. "[W]hether the district court's instructions adequately presented the defendant's theory of the case is reviewed de novo," but if those instructions "fairly and adequately covered the elements of the offense ... we review the instruction's precise formulation for an abuse of discretion." United States v. Somsamouth, 352 F.3d 1271, 1274 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations and internal quotations omitted).

Dain's challenges fail because in every case the instruction the district court denied was either duplicative, otherwise adequately covered by other instructions given, or an inaccurate statement of the law. See United States v. Lopez-Alvarez, 970 F.2d 583, 597 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that the court need not give duplicative instructions); United States v. Martinez-Martinez, 369 F.3d 1076, 1083 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that it is not reversible error to reject a defendant's proposed jury instruction on his theory of the case if other instructions adequately cover the defense theory).



D. Equitable Estoppel

Dain also argues for application of equitable estoppel because, he claims, the government induced him to file the false returns and then reneged on its promise to negotiate with him after he filed. Applying equitable estoppel against the government is disfavored, and the record suggests no facts giving rise to such a claim in this case.



E. Sentencing Claims

Finally, Dain alleges that his sentence was imposed in violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), because the trial court impermissibly found facts that subjected him to a higher sentence, and in violation of Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999), because those facts constituted an element of the § 7212(a) offense. Specifically, Dain objects to the trial judge's finding that he threatened to cause physical injury to a revenue officer's family, which resulted in a 36 month sentence on the obstruction charge. Neither Jones nor Apprendi, however, is violated here, because the jury made the relevant findings to subject Dain to a three-year maximum sentence.

Section 7212(a) may be violated (1) corruptly (by corrupt actions), (2) by force, or (3) by threats of force. § 7212(a). While the former two violations may be punished with a three year sentence, the third type of violation, standing alone, carries only a one year maximum sentence. Id. The jury was instructed that a conviction under § 7212(a) required a finding that Dain acted "corruptly." Since the jury is presumed to follow instructions, United States v. Heredia, 483 F.3d 913, 923 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc), its guilty verdict shows that they did indeed find that Dain acted "corruptly," thus subjecting him to a maximum sentence of three years. The trial judge's additional finding that a threat of violence occurred did not raise the maximum sentence but merely allowed him to determine the pertinent guideline range within the statutory maximum as allowed under the advisory guidelines. See United States v. Dupas, 419 F.3d 916, 919 (9th Cir. 2005).


CONCLUSION


For the reasons stated above, this court affirms Dain's convictions and sentence AFFIRMED.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

** The Honorable Richard Mills, United States District Judge for the Central District of Illinois, sitting by designation.

1 Because the indictment was filed on June 1, 2005, acts occurring prior to June 1, 1999, fall outside this period and are not, standinFraud and False Statements: Evidence

Defendant's records, voluntarily produced to revenue agents in investigation of his income tax liability, were not suppressible as evidence in proving assistance in the preparation of fraudulent returns for others. There was no evidence that the records were obtained by misrepresentation.

J.P. Dupont, DC, 59-1 USTC ¶9204, 169 FSupp 572.

Motion to suppress evidence of wilfully preparing false returns was denied.

Alvin S. Brown, Esq.
Tax Attorney
www.irstaxattorney.com
703 425-1400

To provide IRS transparency, upload your IRS experiences to www.irsforum.org

Monday, December 3, 2007

IRS AUDIT – Proof of Assessment - IRS's tax assessments are presumptively correct and the taxpayer bears the burden of proving any error. See United States v. Fior D'Italia, Inc., 536 U.S. 238, 242-43 (2002); Janis v. United States, 428 U.S. 433, 440 (1976); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). The presumption of correctness "can help the Government prove its case against a taxpayer in court." Fior D'Italia, 536 U.S. at 242. A certified transcript (Form 4340) reflecting an assessment is presumptive proof of the taxpayer's liability and establishes the Government's prima facie case. See Brounstein v. United States, 979 F.2d 952, 954 (3d Cir. 1992). A certified transcript may provide a sufficient basis for summary judgment. See United States v. Guerriero, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3473, at *2-3 (D. N.J. Jan. 30, 2006). The certified transcripts are selfauthenticating and need no extrinsic evidentiary support as a predicate to admissibility. See Fed. R. Evid. 902.



Joseph A. Buaiz, Jr., Plaintiff v. United States of AmericA, Defendant.

U.S. District Court, D.C.; Civ. 06-1312 (RMC) , November 26, 2007.



[ Code Sec. 6203]

Tax assessments: Method of assessment: Form 4340: Presumption of correctness. --
An individual failed to prove that the government's Forms 4340, Certificate of Assessments and Payments, were invalid. The forms constituted presumptive evidence that federal tax assessments were properly made against him for income tax, penalties, and interest that he owed. The forms were properly prepared, signed and presented to the court and the individual's opposing evidence was hearsay that could not rebut the presumptively correct tax assessments.




MEMORANDUM OPINION


COLLYER, United States District Judge: Plaintiff Joseph A. Buaiz, Jr., failed to file Form 1040 federal income tax returns for 1993 and 1994, despite having taxable income in each of those years. Mr. Buaiz sued the United States Government, seeking money damages for alleged wrongful collection activities by the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"). The IRS filed counterclaims against Mr. Buaiz. The United States now seeks summary judgment on its counterclaims for income taxes for 1993 and 1994 and civil penalties for 1989 through 1994. Mr. Buaiz opposes the motion, asserting that the United States has submitted falsified documents to the Court. Having considered the entire record and the law, the Court will grant the motion for summary judgment.


I. BACKGROUND


Mr. Buaiz failed to file a Form 1040 federal income tax return for 1993 and, on March 17, 1997, a delegate of the Secretary of the Treasury assessed income tax, interest, and penalties against him, totaling $8,834.30 for 1993. He has not paid the amount due. As of July 16, 2007, Mr. Buaiz owed the United States income tax, penalties, and interest totaling $15,375.68 for 1993. Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment ("Def.'s Mem."), Exh. 14.

Mr. Buaiz failed to file a Form 1040 federal income tax return for 1994 and, on March 24, 1997, a delegate of the Secretary of the Treasury assessed income tax, interest, and penalties against Mr. Buaiz totaling $9,500.19 for 1994. He has not paid the amount due. As of July 16, 2007, Mr. Buaiz owed the United States income tax, penalties, and interest totaling $15,995.66 for 1994. Id., Exh. 15.

Instead of filing Form 1040 tax returns, Mr. Buaiz filed estate and trust income tax returns (Form 1041) for the years 1989 through 1994 1 . He was warned that such filings constituted frivolous tax returns but did not respond with an appropriate Form 1040. A delegate of the Secretary of the Treasury assessed civil penalties against Mr. Buaiz, under 26 U.S.C. §6702, for filing frivolous tax returns. He has not paid the penalties. As of July 16, 2007, Mr. Buaiz owed the United States civil penalties and interest for 1989 through 1994 totaling $6,944.64. Id., Exhs. 16-21.


II. LEGAL STANDARD


Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment must be granted when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986); see also Diamond v. Atwood, 43 F.3d 1538, 1540 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Moreover, summary judgment is properly granted against a party who "after adequate time for discovery and upon motion...fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must draw all justifiable inferences in the nonmoving party's favor and accept the nonmoving party's evidence as true. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. A nonmoving party, however, must establish more than "the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence" in support of its position. Id. at 252. In addition, the nonmoving party may not rely solely on allegations or conclusory statements. Greene v. Dalton, 164 F.3d 671, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Rather, the nonmoving party must present specific facts that would enable a reasonable jury to find in its favor. Id. If the evidence "is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (citations omitted).


III. ANALYSIS


It has long been held that the IRS's tax assessments are presumptively correct and the taxpayer bears the burden of proving any error. See United States v. Fior D'Italia, Inc., 536 U.S. 238, 242-43 (2002); Janis v. United States, 428 U.S. 433, 440 (1976); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). The presumption of correctness "can help the Government prove its case against a taxpayer in court." Fior D'Italia, 536 U.S. at 242. A certified transcript (Form 4340) reflecting an assessment is presumptive proof of the taxpayer's liability and establishes the Government's prima facie case. See Brounstein v. United States, 979 F.2d 952, 954 (3d Cir. 1992). A certified transcript may provide a sufficient basis for summary judgment. See United States v. Guerriero, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3473, at *2-3 (D. N.J. Jan. 30, 2006). The certified transcripts are selfauthenticating and need no extrinsic evidentiary support as a predicate to admissibility. See Fed. R. Evid. 902.

The United States has introduced such presumptive proof of Mr. Buaiz's liabilities in the form of certified transcripts for each of the tax years in question. Def.'s Opp. to Motion for Prelim. Inj., Exhs. 4 & 5. In response, Mr. Buaiz alleges that "the United States' certified transcripts were intentionally falsified specifically for purposes of litigation." Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment ("Pl.'s Opp.") at 2. Mr. Buaiz offers no proof in support of this contention and, as he bears the burden of proof, his argument must fail.

First, Mr. Buaiz suggests that the assessments are invalid because the transcripts contain a "Legal Suits Pending" notation for litigation that never occurred. Pl.'s Opp. at 3. The 1994 transcript contains a "Legal Suit Pending" notation for October 19, 2005 - the day that Mr. Buaiz filed a request for an administrative hearing. Def.'s Opp. to Motion for Prelim. Inj., Exh. 4 at 4-5. More importantly, whether the notation was correct or in error, the transcripts are certified public records and cannot be rebutted by speculative argument. Whether a legal suit was pending or not has no impact on the assessments against Mr. Buaiz and the presumption that the certified records are correct.

Second, Mr. Buaiz attacks the credibility of the Certification of Ms. Jane Lethco, IRS Revenue Officer, who certified under penalty of perjury concerning the amounts of the assessments and civil penalties owed by Mr. Buaiz. The focal point of his attack is his assertion that Ms. Lethco's real name is Mary Jane Lethco. He argues that she used a "false and fictitious name `Jane Lethco' " and that her certification is therefore "inherently worthless." Pl.'s Opp. at 3 & Exh. 8. 2 Whether Ms. Lethco professionally uses the name "Mary Jane" or "M. Jane" or "Jane" is unimportant. Her certification is prepared properly, signed properly, and presented to the Court properly. Mr. Buaiz's argument to the contrary is totally without merit.

Third, Mr. Buaiz attaches Form 1040 income tax returns for the 1989 through 1994 tax years that he may have filed on or about April 13, 2007. The IRS has not confirmed that these returns were actually filed. As exhibits, however, the untimely returns are hearsay documents, see Blodgett v. C.I.R., 394 F.3d 1030, 1040 (8 Cir. 2005), which cannot rebut the presumptively correct th tax assessments. See Mays v. United States, 763 F.2d 1295, 1297 (11 Cir. 1985) (to overturn an th assessment a taxpayer must offer "something other than tax returns,...uncorroborated oral testimony,...or self-serving statements").

Finally, Mr. Buaiz insists that summary judgment is premature because "discovery directed at defendant's use of Ms. Lethco's falsified certification and the fact that the United States has not yet produced a single piece of admissible evidence to support its claim is underway." Pl.'s Opp. at 3. The Court has already determined that Ms. Lethco's certification was not "falsified" in any way and that the United States has submitted properly certified documents that reflect the outstanding assessments, civil penalties, and interest that must be paid by Mr. Buaiz. The discovery he seeks need not prevent summary judgment.


IV. CONCLUSION


The Court will grant summary judgment to the United States on its counterclaims. As of July 16, 2007, Mr. Buaiz owed for the 1993 and 1994 tax years income taxes, penalties, and interest totaling $31,371.34. As of July 16, 2007, Mr. Buaiz owed civil penalties and interest for 1989 through 1994 totaling $6,944.64. Judgment for the United States and against Mr. Buaiz will be entered in the amount of $38,315.98, plus interest. A memorializing order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

1 On February 20, 2007, the United States submitted certified transcripts of Mr. Buaiz's income tax and civil penalty liabilities in opposition to Mr. Buaiz's motion for a preliminary injunction. See Def.'s Opp. to Motion for Prelim. Inj. [Dkt. # 20], Exhs. 7-12. The certified transcripts reflect two penalty assessments for each tax year because Mr. Buaiz filed frivolous returns in multiple locations.

2 The exhibit appears to be from the Federal Election Commission's website. Not only is it irrelevant, it is not authenticated and, therefore, inadmissible.


SEC. 6203. METHOD OF ASSESSMENT.
The assessment shall be made by recording the liability of the taxpayer in the office of the Secretary in accordance with rules or regulations prescribed by the Secretary. Upon request of the taxpayer, the Secretary shall furnish the taxpayer a copy of the record of the assessment


Alvin S. Brown, Esq.
Tax Attorney
703 425-1400
www.irstaxattorney.com

To provide IRS transparency, upload your IRS experiences to www.irsforum.org

Labels:

Saturday, December 1, 2007

Collection Due Process Appeal Section 6330 – IRS collection action cannot be no more intrusive than necessary." 26 U.S.C. §6330 c 3 c.




Dr. James G. Hood, D.D.S., M.S., P.S., a Washington corporation, Plaintiff v. United States of America, Defendant.


U.S. District Court, East. Dist. Wash.; CV-06-0296-LRS, November 21, 2007.

[ Code Sec. 6330]

Judicial review: IRS Levy: Proposed repayment plan: Failure to pay taxes: IRS Appeals officer: Abuse of discretion. --
An IRS Appeals officer did not abuse his discretion when he sustained a notice of intent to levy issued to an individual to collect unpaid employment taxes. The Appeals officer effectively balanced the need for efficient collection of the taxes against the legitimate concerns of the individual that the collection action be no more intrusive than necessary. The individual failed to show that he was current with respect to his tax liabilities and that he timely filed all tax returns and deposits. His argument that embezzlement by his bookkeeper caused him not to be current with his tax liabilities was rejected because it did not constitute reasonable cause for his failure to pay his tax liabilities. Further, the individual's proposed lengthy repayment plan was not a feasible alternative to levy because it required bankruptcy court approval. Moreover, the individual did not make any installment payments on his past due taxes as was required to qualify for an installment plan option.

.


ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT


SUKO, District Judge: BEFORE THE COURT is the United States of America's motion for summary judgment( Ct. Rec. 19). With the benefit of a detailed examination of the pleadings and declarations submitted by all parties as well as the relevant case law, this Court finds that the United States is entitled to summary judgment dismissal of Dr. Hood's appeal.


I. BACKGROUND


The Internal Revenue Service sent Plaintiff a Notice of Intent to Levy Plaintiff's unpaid employment taxes for the years 2000 through 2005, which amounted to a sum of $210,470.03, 1 on March 2, 2006. Along with that notice, Dr. Hood was sent a notice of his right to a hearing concerning the Notice of Intent to Levy. Dr. Hood filed a timely appeal challenging the Intent to Levy on the following grounds: 1) Dr. Hood's bookkeeper embezzled money on or before October 12, 2005, which caused the tax payments to be delinquent; 2) there was a collection alternative to the levy; and 3) the execution of a levy would have an adverse impact on Dr. Hood's ability to obtain financing or make other arrangements to pay the tax liabilities and his other bills.

As noted above, Dr. Hood appealed the Notice of Intent to Levy by timely requesting a due process hearing. Plaintiff listed three reasons for requesting the hearing: 1) other collection actions were available; 2) employees had embezzled from Plaintiff in 2005; and 3) a levy would create financial hardship. IRS Appeals Officer Jim Kolokotrones presided over the hearing. In preparation for the hearing, Dr. Hood was asked to provide updated financial documents including tax returns in order to demonstrate that he was current with his tax liabilities. Plaintiff did not possess documents showing that he was current with respect to his tax liabilities nor could he show that he had filed all tax returns and/or provide proof that federal tax deposits had been timely made. On September 26, 2006, the Appeals Office issued Dr. Hood a Notice of Determination Concerning Collection Action under 26 U.S.C. §6320 and 26 U.S.C. §6330, which notified Plaintiff that the hearing officer sustained the levy.

Plaintiff began this current lawsuit under 26 U.S.C. §6330(d)1 seeking judicial review of the IRS's decision to sustain the levy. Dr. Hood argues that 1) no tax levy be made against him; 2) he should be allowed sufficient time to determine the extent of damage caused by an employee's embezzlement in 2005; and that 3) the IRS agree to a payment plan from which Dr. Hood could repay his debts. In a Request for a Collection Due Process Hearing (CDP) case in which the amount of the underlying tax liability is not at issue, the trial court and the court of appeals review the determination of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) appeals officer for abuse of discretion. 26 U.S.C.A. §6330. 2

The sole issue before the court at bar is whether the IRS Appeals Officer abused his discretion when he sustained the IRS administrative levy. He did so on the grounds that plaintiff's proposed collection alternative of having a majority of the corporation's shareholders who are in bankruptcy ask for permission from the bankruptcy court to make a substantial but less than full payment to the IRS was not a feasible alternative, that Dr. Hood failed to make timely federal tax deposits, and that additional employment tax liabilities were being incurred. For the reasons described below, this Court finds that the hearing officer did not abuse his discretion. Therefore, the Appeals Officer's finding stands, and this case against the IRS is dismissed.


II. DISCUSSION




A. Legal Standards

1. Summary Judgment Standard

Under Rule 56C), summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56c). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment the evidence of the non-movant must be believed, and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-movant's favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2513 (1986). However, when confronted with a motion for summary judgment, a party who bears the burden of proof on a particular issue may not rest on its pleading, but must affirmatively demonstrate, by specific factual allegations, that there is a genuine issue of material fact which requires trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). The party must do more than simply "show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586(1986) (footnote omitted). "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no 'genuine issue for trial.' "Id. at 587.

This court's function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. There is no issue for trial "unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. Summary judgment must be granted "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.

2. Collection Due Process Hearings (CDPs)

As part of the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub.L. 105-206, §3401, 112 Stat. 685, 746, Congress enacted Code sections 6320 (pertaining to lien notices) and 6330 (pertaining to levies) to provide due process protection for taxpayers in collection matters.

26 U.S.C. §6330(a) generally requires the IRS to provide written notice to the taxpayer of its intent to levy on the taxpayer's property at least 30 days prior to the levy. The IRS also must inform the taxpayer of his right to a hearing with the Appeals Office, which must be requested within 30 days from the date of the notice. 26 U.S.C. §§6330(a)(3)(B) and 6330(b). An appeal hearing shall be held before an IRS Appeals Officer who is impartial and has had no prior involvement with the case. 26 U.S.C. §§6330(b)(1) and (b)(3).

26 U. S. C. §6330(c) details the matters that may be raised by a taxpayer at an Appeals Office due process hearing. In general, the taxpayer may raise at the collection due process hearing "any relevant issue relating to the unpaid tax or the proposed levy," including "challenges to the appropriateness of collection actions" and "offers of collection alternatives," such as installment payment agreements and offers in compromise. 26 U.S.C. §§6330(c)(2)(A)(ii) and (iii). The taxpayer, may challenge "the existence or amount of the underlying tax liability" only "if he did not receive any statutory notice of deficiency for such tax liability or did not otherwise have an opportunity to dispute such tax liability." 26 U.S.C. §6330(c)(2)(B).

While conducting the CDP hearing the Appeals Officer is required to obtain verification that "the requirements of any applicable law or administrative procedure have been met under 26 U.S.C. §6330 c 1." The final determination Appeals Officer shall take into consideration the following: verification that applicable law and applicable administrative procedures have been met, the issues raised by the taxpayer in his defense, and "whether any proposed collection action balances the need for efficient collection of taxes with the legitimate concern of the person that the collection action be no more intrusive than necessary." 26 U.S.C. §6330 c 3 c.



B. Dr. Hood's Case

In the case at bar, it is clear that the due process requirements of the notice and hearing were met. Dr. Hood does not dispute that he received adequate notice of the intended levy, that he requested a due process hearing within the proper time limits, and that such a hearing was held before an appeals officer who did not have prior knowledge of the case before the hearing. Instead, Dr. Hood disagrees with the Appeal Officer's conclusions sustaining the IRS levy arguing that embezzlement caused him not to be current with his tax liabilities, and therefore, he is not responsible for failing to file. However, case law demonstrates that embezzlement or delegating the responsibility to file taxes to another does not constitute reasonable cause for failing to pay tax liabilities. See Huffman v. Carter, 317 F.Supp.2d 816, 820 (S.D. Ohio 2004). See also U.S. v. Boyle [ 85-1 USTC ¶13,602], 469 U.S. 241, 252 (1985). In Boyle, the Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the IRS upholding imposition of the penalties. In so doing, the high Court held that a taxpayer's "failure to make a timely filing of a tax return is not excused by the taxpayer's reliance on an agent, and such reliance is not reasonable cause for a late filing under §6651(a)(1)." Id at 252.

Next, Dr. Hood argues that the Appeal Officer erred by not accepting Plaintiff's alternative to a levy, which consisted of refinancing his personal residence to pay the tax liabilities. The Hearing Officer rejected this option because Plaintiff's majority shareholders have filed for bankruptcy. See Complaint at ¶4.2. Therefore, in order to refinance the personal property interests, the shareholders would have to receive permission from the bankruptcy court to obtain post-petition financing. Because the option required bankruptcy court approval, this was not a feasible alternative to a levy in Dr. Hood's case. In addition, at the time of the CDP hearing, Dr. Hood was not currently making installment payments on the past due taxes as is required by IRS regulations to qualify for an installment plan option. Therefore, a lengthy repayment plan, which is what Dr. Hood proposed during the collection due process hearing, was not a feasible alternative, either. See Reid & Reid Inc v. United States, 366 F.Supp.2d 284 (D. Maryland 2005). In addition, Dr. Hood was also falling behind in his current taxes, as well as his past due taxes, a situation known as "pyramiding." When this occurs, a repayment plan is not advised.

Dr. Hood's last argument is that the execution of an IRS levy would adversely impact Plaintiff's ability to obtain financing or make other arrangements to pay his tax and other liabilities. However, the Appeals Officer is not required to take this into account when deciding whether to sustain a levy. See Medlock v. United States, 325 F.Supp.2d 1064 (C.D. Calif. 2003).

Reviewing the record in its entirety, this Court agrees with the IRS that the Appeals Officer effectively balanced the need for efficient collection of the taxes with the legitimate concerns held by Dr. Hood that the collection action not be anymore intrusive than necessary. For these reasons, the Court affirms the Appeals Officer determination set forth in the September 26, 2006 Notice of Determination.

IT IS SO ORDERED. The District Court Executive is directed to file this Order and provide copies to counsel, ENTER JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE IRS, and CLOSE THE FILE.

DATED this 21st day of November, 2007.

1 Plaintiff argues that approximately $171,112.19 of this amount has been paid by third party insurance companies. Ct. Rec. 23 at 8. Even using Plaintiff's figure, this Court upholds the IRS levy.

2 Plaintiff further argues in opposition to the IRS's motion for summary judgment that the declaration and records submitted by Kara Larson, the government's attorney is inadmissible hearsay. Ct. Rec. 23 at 1-3. The Court rejects this argument, noting that the documents are properly authenticated by the trial attorney assigned to the case.


Alvin S. Bkrown, Esq.
tax attorney
www.irstaxattorney.com
703 425-1400

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