Friday, February 29, 2008

Offer in Compromise – section 7122 – Documenting Expenses Above the Schedules

Petitioner asserted generally that the published expense schedules do not adequately reflect the cost of living in greater Los Angeles. The Court does not doubt that living in southern California is expensive. However, the scheme of national and local expense standards employed by the Commissioner reasonably attempts to consider regional and local costs. Local standards, for example, cover two necessary expenses: Housing and transportation.5 Housing standards are established for each county within a State. Transportation standards include not only ownership costs based on nationwide figures for loan or lease payments but also operating costs determined by census region and metropolitan area. IRM pt. 5.15.1.7(4) (2004). A taxpayer seeking a deviation from the expense standards must substantiate that he has necessary expenses exceeding the standards and that those expenses are reasonable. IRM pt. 5.8.5.5.1.2 (2005). Petitioner failed to document or otherwise substantiate that he has such reasonable and necessary expenses in excess of the standards. We hold that his generalized assertion is insufficient to require a deviation.6


T.C. Summary Opinion 2008-21]
Lawrence Jay Russ v. Commissioner.

Docket No. 4899-06S . Filed February 28, 2008.

[Code Sec. 6330]
Tax Court: Summary opinion: Collection due process. --
An IRS Appeals officer's determinations rejecting an individual's offer-in-compromise and that a lien was an appropriate collection action were not an abuse of discretion. The fact that the same Appeals officer was considering both issues did not violate the requirement of Code Sec. 6330(b)(3) that a Collection Due Process hearing be conducted by an officer who has had no prior involvement with the unpaid tax at issue. -

[Code Sec. 7122]
Tax Court: Summary opinion: Collection potential: Necessary expenses. --
Rejection of an individual's offer-in-compromise was not an abuse of discretion where the taxpayer failed to demonstrate that the standard calculation of his reasonable collection potential was misleading. The taxpayer failed to provide evidence supporting his contention that the standard allowances understated the cost of living in Southern California or that minimum payments on his credit card debts were necessary for the production of income or for the health and welfare of the taxpayer and his family. --


PANUTHOS, Chief Special Trial Judge: This case was heard pursuant to the provisions of section 7463 of the Internal Revenue Code in effect at the time the petition was filed. Pursuant to section 7463(b), the decision to be entered is not reviewable by any other court, and this opinion shall not be treated as precedent for any other case. Unless otherwise indicated, subsequent section references are to the Internal Revenue Code, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.

Petitioner filed the petition in this case in response to a Notice of Determination Concerning Collection Action(s) Under Section 6320 and/or 6330. The only issue before the Court is whether respondent abused his discretion in sustaining the decision to file a Federal tax lien with respect to petitioner's income tax liabilities for the taxable years 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002 (years in issue).1


Background

Petitioner resided in California when he filed the petition in this case. The parties did not file a stipulation of facts.

Petitioner filed delinquent Federal income tax returns for the years in issue. Each return reported tax owed, but payment was not included with the returns. Respondent selected petitioner's 1999 Federal income tax return for examination and determined a deficiency for that year. Respondent issued a notice of deficiency, and petitioner timely petitioned this Court for redetermination. Petitioner and respondent executed a stipulated decision which was entered by the Court.2

Respondent assessed a deficiency for 1999 in accordance with the stipulated decision. In addition, respondent assessed unpaid taxes for 1998, 2000, 2001, and 2002 based on the balance due returns petitioner filed for those years, as well as interest and additions to tax for late filing.

Petitioner submitted an offer-in-compromise (OIC) with respect to his tax liabilities for the years in issue. Petitioner offered $5,320, paid over 24 months, to settle an aggregate liability that exceeded $32,000 for the 5 tax years (not including interest and additions to tax). Respondent considered the OIC, determined that petitioner could pay the entire liability over time, and rejected the OIC. Petitioner requested an administrative review of the rejection of his OIC.

Respondent filed a notice of Federal tax lien for the years in issue in Ventura County, California, on March 17, 2005. The notice listed petitioner's unpaid balance as:

Table 1: Unpaid Taxes by Year



Tax Year Tax Due

1998 $6,577.17

1999 11,003.93

2000 5,752.52

2001 6,053.45

2002 3,260.58

Total 32,647.65


In response to the notice of Federal tax lien Filing and Your Right to a Hearing Under IRC 6320 sent to him on March 24, 2005, petitioner timely submitted a Form 12153, Request for a Collection Due Process Hearing.

On September 15, 2005, after consulting with petitioner, respondent consolidated the two appeals (the appeal of the rejection of the OIC and the appeal of the Federal tax lien filing) with one Appeals Officer (AO). The AO scheduled a hearing with petitioner for October 5, 2005.

Before the hearing, the AO analyzed petitioner's financial situation and determined what expenses were allowable under Internal Revenue Manual (IRM) guidelines. Petitioner's central complaint with the rejection of his OIC was the exclusion of his monthly credit card payments from the expenses allowed in computing his income available to pay his outstanding tax liabilities.

At the face-to-face conference between petitioner and the AO on October 5, 2005, petitioner sought approval of his OIC and did not challenge the underlying tax liabilities. The AO explained that the IRS could not accept the OIC because: (1) Petitioner's OIC computation reduced his income available to pay taxes by his credit card payments, and (2) petitioner had the ability to pay the full liability over time. The AO offered an installment agreement as a collection alternative, with monthly payments designed to pay the entire liability. The proposed installment amount was $800 per month for 2006 and $1,210 per month beginning in January, 2007. Petitioner rejected the installment agreement, asserting that he could not afford the proposed monthly payments.

On October 7, 2005, the AO wrote petitioner a letter explaining his determination and enclosed an installment agreement form. The AO determined petitioner's income history as follows:

Table 2: Income Earned by Year



Tax Year Income

2000 $88,804

2001 80,004

2002 68,985

2003 77,635

2004 87,637


Petitioner, the OIC examiner, and the AO analyzed petitioner's income, expenses, and ability to pay his taxes as follows:

Table 3: Analysis of Ability To Pay Tax Liabilities



Petitioner
OIC AO

Monthly income $6,334 $6,324 $7,303

Necessary living expenses

National expense 1,037 953 953

Local housing & utilities 1,500 1,500 1,500

Local transportation1 The record
does not explain the discrepancy
between the local transportation
allowances used by the OIC examiner
and the AO.

833 353 553

Other allowable expenses

Health care 76 114 114

Taxes 2,088 2,085 2,522

Other - non-priority debt 1,112 -0- -0-

Total expenses 6,646 5,005 5,642

Income available to pay taxes -0- 1,319 1,661

Realizable equity in assets -0- 4,152 4,152

Reasonable collection potential2
Reasonable collection potential is
calculated by multiplying petitioner's
monthly income available to pay taxes
by 60 months and adding the realizable
equity in petitioner's assets to the
product.

-0- 83,292 103,812


On February 3, 2006, respondent issued a Notice of Determination Concerning Collection Action(s) Under Section 6320 and/or 6330. Petitioner filed a timely petition for lien or levy action (collection action) with this Court.

The Court calendared this case for trial at the trial session of the Court commencing October 3, 2006, in Los Angeles, California. Respondent filed a motion for summary judgment on September 5, 2006. When the case was called from the calendar, the parties advised the Court that they had reached a basis of settlement and expected to submit settlement documents within 90 days. The parties indicated that petitioner was prepared to concede the case and to enter an installment agreement with respondent. The Court granted respondent's oral motion to withdraw the motion for summary judgment and ordered the parties to submit a status report or decision documents within 90 days.

After the Court allowed additional time to submit the decision documents, the parties indicated that they had not been able to execute a settlement agreement. The Court again set the case for trial commencing June 18, 2007. Respondent filed another motion for summary judgment on June 4, 2007.

When this matter was called for trial, petitioner made several oral motions, including: (1) Motion for dismissal of tax penalties; (2) motion for reduction of taxes due; (3) motion to accept original offer-in-compromise; and (4) motion to dismiss taxes and penalties for tax years 2001 and 2002. The Court took petitioner's oral motions and respondent's motion for summary judgment, filed June 4, 2007, under advisement, and the case was deemed submitted.


Discussion

The parties dispute whether petitioner's minimum monthly payments on his credit card debt represent an allowable expense against income available to pay taxes in consideration of an offer-in-compromise. Petitioner argues that not allowing such expenses amounts to discrimination against taxpayers with unsecured debts. Respondent asserts that the Federal tax lien has priority over these debts and that credit card payments are not necessary expenses properly allowable under IRM guidelines. Finally, respondent contends that: (1) Petitioner's future income available to pay taxes (monthly gross income less necessary expenses, not including the credit card payments) is sufficient to pay his tax liability in full before the end of the statutory period for collections; (2) because petitioner can fully pay the tax liability, he is not eligible for an offer-in-compromise; and (3) it was not an abuse of discretion for the AO to confirm the rejection of the OIC, to propose an installment agreement as the available collection alternative, and to sustain the collection action.

Section 6321 imposes a lien in favor of the United States on all property and rights to property of a taxpayer when the Secretary demands payment of the taxpayer's tax liability and the taxpayer fails to pay those taxes. Such a lien arises when an assessment is made. Sec. 6322. Section 6323(a) requires the Secretary to file a notice of Federal tax lien if the lien is to be valid against any purchaser, holder of a security interest, mechanic's lienor, or judgment lien creditor. Lindsay v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-285, affd. 56 Fed. Appx. 800 (9th Cir. 2003).

Section 6320 provides that a taxpayer shall be notified in writing by the Secretary of the filing of a notice of Federal tax lien and provided with an opportunity for an administrative hearing. If timely requested, the Office of Appeals conducts an administrative hearing under section 6320 in accordance with the procedural requirements of section 6330.3 Sec. 6320(c). At the administrative hearing, a taxpayer is entitled to raise any relevant issue relating to the unpaid tax, including a spousal defense or collection alternatives such as an offer-in-compromise or an installment agreement. Sec. 6330(c)(2); sec. 301.6330-1(e)(1), Proced. & Admin. Regs. A taxpayer also may challenge the existence or amount of the underlying tax liability, including a liability reported on the taxpayer's original return, if the taxpayer "did not receive any statutory notice of deficiency for such tax liability or did not otherwise have an opportunity to dispute such tax liability." Sec. 6330(c)(2)(B); see also Urbano v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. 384, 389-390 (2004); Montgomery v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. 1, 9-10 (2004).

At the conclusion of the hearing, the AO must determine whether and how to proceed with collection. The AO must consider: (1) The Secretary's verification that the requirements of applicable law or administrative procedure have been met; (2) issues raised by the taxpayer at the hearing, including challenges to the appropriateness of the collection action and any collection alternatives proposed by the taxpayer; and (3) whether any proposed collection action balances the need for the efficient collection of taxes with the legitimate concern of the taxpayer that the collection action be no more intrusive than necessary. See sec. 6330(c)(3).

This Court has jurisdiction under section 6330 to review the Commissioner's administrative determinations. Sec. 6330(d); see Iannone v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. 287, 290 (2004). Where the underlying tax liability is properly at issue, we review the determination de novo. Goza v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 176, 181-182 (2000). Where the underlying tax liability is not at issue, we review the determination for abuse of discretion. Id. at 182.

Petitioner received a notice of deficiency for the tax year 1999 and thus may not dispute the underlying deficiency for that year.4 For the remaining tax years, petitioner had the opportunity at the section 6320 hearing to challenge the underlying tax liabilities but did not. "This statutory preclusion is triggered by the opportunity to contest the underlying liability, even if the opportunity is not pursued." Bell v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 356, 358 (2006); Goza v. Commissioner, supra at 182-183. Accordingly, we review respondent's determination for abuse of discretion.

Section 6159 authorizes the Secretary to enter into a written installment agreement with a taxpayer if such an agreement will facilitate the full or partial collection of the tax liability. Section 7122(a) permits the Secretary to compromise tax liabilities. Section 7122(c) requires the Secretary to prescribe guidelines for evaluating offers in compromise and to "develop and publish schedules of national and local allowances designed to provide that taxpayers entering into a compromise have an adequate means to provide for basic living expenses." Sec. 7122(c)(1) and (2)(A).

Regulations implementing section 7122 set forth three grounds for the compromise of a tax liability: (1) Doubt as to liability, (2) doubt as to collectibility, and (3) to promote effective tax administration. Sec. 301.7122-1(b), Proced. & Admin. Regs. Doubt as to liability is not an issue in this case.

Doubt as to collectibility exists in any case where the taxpayer's assets and income are less than the full amount of the liability. Sec. 301.7122-1(b)(2), Proced. & Admin. Regs. Where the reasonable collection potential of a case exceeds the taxpayer's liability, doubt as to collectibility is not a ground for compromise.

However, if collection of the full liability would cause the taxpayer economic hardship within the meaning of section 301.6343-1, Proced. & Admin. Regs., the Secretary may enter into a compromise on the ground of effective tax administration. Sec. 301.7122-1(b)(3), Proced. & Admin. Regs.; see also Murphy v. Commissioner, 125 T.C. 301, 310 (2005), affd. 469 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2006). Economic hardship is present when the taxpayer is unable to pay reasonable basic living expenses. Sec. 301.6343-1(b)(4), Proced. & Admin. Regs.

The Secretary has promulgated collection guidelines in IRM pt. 5.15. "Allowable expenses include those expenses that meet the necessary expense test." IRM pt. 5.15.1.7(1) (2004). "Necessary expenses" are defined as those necessary to provide for the production of income and/or for the health and welfare of the taxpayer and his family. Id. The sum of the necessary expenses establishes the minimum amount the taxpayer needs to live. Id.

A taxpayer's reasonable collection potential is determined, in part, using published guidelines for certain national and local allowances for basic living expenses. Income and assets in excess of those needed for basic living expenses are considered available to satisfy Federal income tax liabilities. This strict formulaic approach is disregarded, however, on a showing by the taxpayer of special circumstances including, but not limited to, advanced age, poor health, history of unemployment, disability, dependents with special needs, or medical catastrophe, that may cause an offer to be accepted notwithstanding that it is for less than the taxpayer's reasonable collection potential. Lemann v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-37.

Petitioner asserted generally that the published expense schedules do not adequately reflect the cost of living in greater Los Angeles. The Court does not doubt that living in southern California is expensive. However, the scheme of national and local expense standards employed by the Commissioner reasonably attempts to consider regional and local costs. Local standards, for example, cover two necessary expenses: Housing and transportation.5 Housing standards are established for each county within a State. Transportation standards include not only ownership costs based on nationwide figures for loan or lease payments but also operating costs determined by census region and metropolitan area. IRM pt. 5.15.1.7(4) (2004). A taxpayer seeking a deviation from the expense standards must substantiate that he has necessary expenses exceeding the standards and that those expenses are reasonable. IRM pt. 5.8.5.5.1.2 (2005). Petitioner failed to document or otherwise substantiate that he has such reasonable and necessary expenses in excess of the standards. We hold that his generalized assertion is insufficient to require a deviation.6

In contrast to necessary expenses, "conditional expenses" are those expenditures that do not meet the necessary expense test. IRM pt. 5.15.1.7(6) (2004). In general, the IRS expects a taxpayer to pay toward his liability the difference between his gross income and his necessary, allowable expenses. The Secretary instructs that installment agreements will be based on a taxpayer's maximum ability to pay; "i.e., how quickly a taxpayer can fully pay the tax liability." IRM pt. 5.15.1.2(6) (2004).

However, the "Five Year Rule" of IRM pt. 5.15.1.2(5) (2004), provides that excessive necessary and conditional expenses may be allowed if the expenses are reasonable and the tax liability, including projected accruals, will be fully paid within 5 years. Necessary expenses above the national and local standards are "excessive necessary" expenses. This flexibility is limited, however, to cases where the taxpayer will fully pay his liability within 5 years.7

IRM pt. 5.8 provides guidelines for offers in compromise. In evaluating an OIC, the IRS estimates the taxpayer's reasonable collection potential (RCP). The RCP is calculated by determining, then adding together: (1) The taxpayer's "net realizable equity"; i.e., quick sale value less amounts owed to secured lien holders with priority over Federal tax liens; and (2) the taxpayer's "future income"; i.e., the amount collectible from his expected future gross income after allowing for necessary living expenses. IRM secs. 5.8.5.3.1, 5.8.5.5 (2005). "Generally, the amount to be collected from future income is calculated by taking the projected gross monthly income less allowable expenses and multiplying the difference times the number of months remaining on the statutory period for collection." IRM pt. 5.8.5.5.5.1 (2005).

In a compromise, the Government will not collect the full amount of the tax. As a result, the conditional expenses rules for an OIC differ from the rules for installment agreements. IRM pt. 5.8.5.5.3.1 (2005). With respect to conditional expenses, such as credit card payments, "although the payment may be allowed in an installment agreement where the tax will be paid in full, it [the conditional expense] will not be allowed for computation of an acceptable offer amount because the Federal government has priority rights to the funds."8 IRM pt. 5.8.5.5.3.8 (2004).

The AO followed published guidelines in computing petitioner's future income and determined that petitioner's RCP exceeded $100,000.

Petitioner complains that the AO inappropriately increased petitioner's monthly income based on a year-end bonus that was not guaranteed. The record does not disclose the precise reason the AO determined that petitioner and the OIC examiner had understated petitioner's 2004 income. However, even the original OIC examiner determined that petitioner's RCP was more than $80,000. Both RCPs are substantially greater than petitioner's tax liability and both demonstrate that respondent determined that petitioner can pay his liability in full.

The record indicates that the AO determined that the requirements of applicable law and administrative procedure were satisfied. The AO considered petitioner's proposed OIC and confirmed the rejection of that OIC on the basis of a proper application of the IRM guidelines. Finally, the AO determined that the lien balanced the need for efficient collection against the taxpayer's concern that the collection action be no more intrusive than necessary. We conclude that respondent has not abused his discretion.



Petitioner's Motions
At trial the Court explained to petitioner that its jurisdiction in collection appeals cases is strictly limited by statute and that the Court can only review whether respondent abused his discretion. Petitioner asked the Court for various forms of relief, including dismissal of tax penalties, reduction of taxes due, acceptance of his original OIC, and dismissal of taxes and penalties for certain years.

The Tax Court is a court of limited jurisdiction, and we may exercise our jurisdiction only to the extent provided by Congress. See sec. 7442; see also GAF Corp. & Subs. v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 519, 521 (2000). Following a hearing under section 6320, section 6330(d)(1) permits the taxpayer to appeal the Commissioner's determination to the Tax Court. Iannone v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. at 290. However, as previously indicated, where, as here, the underlying tax liability is not at issue, the Tax Court's review is limited to determining whether the Commissioner abused his discretion when issuing the notice of determination. See Goza v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. at 181-182. The Court is not authorized to provide the relief petitioner requests. As a result, the Court will deny petitioner's motions.

An appropriate order and decision will be entered.

1 Respondent moved for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 121. Having called this case for trial and taken petitioner's testimony, we will deny respondent's motion for summary judgment and decide this case on the merits. Petitioner also made several oral motions at trial. For reasons discussed infra pp. 18-19, we will deny petitioner's motions.

2 Docket No. 2721-02, stipulated decision entered Jan. 9, 2003.

3 Sec. 6330(b)(3) ensures a measure of impartiality by requiring that, unless the taxpayer waives the requirement, the sec. 6330 hearing be conducted by an AO who has had no prior involvement with the unpaid tax at issue in the hearing. Murphy v. Commissioner, 125 T.C. 301, 324-325 (2005), affd. 469 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2006). Respondent filed the notice of Federal tax lien on Mar. 17, 2005, and assigned the administrative appeal of the OIC to an AO on Mar. 18, 2005. Respondent sent petitioner a Notice of Federal Tax Lien Filing and Your Right to a Hearing Under IRC 6320 dated Mar. 24, 2005. Respondent initially assigned petitioner's request for a sec. 6320 hearing, submitted Apr. 28, 2005, to a different AO. On Sept. 15, 2005, the OIC AO consulted with petitioner, took responsibility for both the OIC appeal and the sec. 6320 hearing, and scheduled a face-to-face hearing for Oct. 5, 2005. Sec. 6330(c)(2)(A)(III) requires the AO to consider collection alternatives raised by the taxpayer, which, in this case, include the reconsideration of the rejected OIC. Petitioner has not claimed that the AO's assignment to both the OIC appeal and the sec. 6320 hearing violated sec. 6330(b)(3). In any event, we conclude that it did not, because the OIC appeal and the sec. 6320 hearing were conducted simultaneously by an AO with no prior involvement with the unpaid taxes at issue.

4 Furthermore, petitioner already petitioned this Court for redetermination of the deficiency for 1999. As mentioned supra p. 3, that case resulted in a stipulated decision, and respondent assessed the deficiency stipulated in that decision.

5 National standards combine five necessary expenses: Four from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Expenditure Survey, namely food, housekeeping supplies, apparel and services, and personal care products and services; and a discretionary amount, categorized as miscellaneous, established by the Internal Revenue Service. IRM pt. 5.15.1.7(3) (2004).

6 Petitioner explains that his unemployment was the major cause of his unpaid taxes. However, the Court notes that the only period of unemployment reflected in the record occurred between approximately August 2001 and April 2002; yet most of petitioner's tax liability, more than 70 percent, results from unpaid taxes for tax years 1998, 1999, and 2000. See Table 1, supra p. 4. Petitioner has also not indicated that he anticipates future unemployment. Petitioner is an engineer working in the high-tech industry, as opposed to a seasonal worker subject to regular lay-offs, for example. On the record before the Court, we conclude that petitioner has not demonstrated a history of unemployment sufficient to require a deviation from the reasonable collection potential formula.

7 Given that the 60-month reasonable collection potentials calculated by the OIC examiner and by the AO both substantially exceed petitioner's aggregate tax liability, it appears that a 5-year installment plan may permit petitioner to make some payments toward his credit card debt. Excluding interest and penalties, the monthly installment amount required to pay the aggregate liability reflected on the notice of Federal tax lien filing in full over 5 years is $475. The installment agreement mailed to petitioner after the face-to-face hearing specified an initial monthly installment payment of $800. Both amounts are substantially smaller than petitioner's income available to pay taxes as determined by the OIC examiner ($1,319) and the AO ($1,661). See Table 3, supra p. 6.

8 If a taxpayer justifies and substantiates that expenses for unsecured debts like credit card minimum payments are necessary for either the production of income or for the health and welfare of the taxpayer and his family, those expenses are allowable. Lemann v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-37 n.13. Petitioner testified vaguely: (1) That some of his credit card debt resulted from the purchase of household items and living expenses; (2) that he did not remember what he purchased; and (3) that he used a credit card when he did not have sufficient cashflow, whether employed or unemployed. He did not remember whether he bought food with his credit cards. He may have charged dinners but not necessarily groceries. Petitioner does not specifically allege that his credit card debt resulted from necessary expenditures for the production of income or for his family's health and welfare. Accordingly, we conclude that this unsecured debt is not allowable as an expense in an offer-in-compromise. See id.

Labels:

Thursday, February 28, 2008

Offer in Compromise - section 7122

If an offer accepted for processing does not contain sufficient information to permit the IRS to evaluate whether the offer should be accepted, the IRS will request that the taxpayer provide the needed additional information. Sec. 301.7122-1(d)(2), Proced. & Admin. Regs.


William J. and Lois J. DiCindio v. Commissioner.

Dkt. No. 7029-03L , TC Memo. 2007-77, April 2, 2007.

[Appealable, barring stipulation to the contrary, to CA-3. --CCH.]

[Code Secs. 6330 and 7122]
Notice of Levy and right to hearing: Collection Due Process hearing: Abuse of discretion. --
The IRS's determination to reject a married couple's offer-in-compromise (OIC) and proceed with collection of tax liabilities was not an abuse of discretion. Returning the OIC for additional information was not arbitrary and capricious, and the decision not to process the OIC because the couple failed to provide additional requested information was consistent with the prescribed guidelines and was a reasonable exercise of the IRS's discretion. It was also not an abuse of discretion to reject the couple's OIC because they failed to submit additional information before the court ruled on their pending motion for reconsideration. An extension of any deadlines related to the IRS's processing of the OIC would not have changed the OIC's disposition. --CCH.





MEMORANDUM OPINION

COLVIN, Chief Judge: Respondent sent a Notice of Determination Concerning Collection Action(s) Under Section 6320 1 and/or 6330 to petitioners in which respondent determined that it was appropriate to sustain collection action with respect to petitioners' unpaid income taxes for 1985-89 and 1991-2001 (the years in issue).2 Thereafter petitioners timely filed a petition in which they requested our review of respondent's determination. The issue for decision is whether respondent's determination to reject petitioners' offer-in-compromise (OIC) and proceed with collection was an abuse of discretion. We hold that it was not.


Background

Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found. Petitioners are married and resided in Edison, New Jersey, at the time the petition was filed.

Respondent issued a Final Notice of Intent to Levy and Notice of Your Right to a Hearing to petitioners on September 5, 2002. Petitioners timely requested a collection due process hearing on October 1, 2002. Petitioners' outstanding tax liability is $463,496 plus statutory additions. Petitioners did not challenge the assessments or the underlying tax liabilities. A settlement officer (SO) from respondent's Appeals Office (Appeals) spoke on the telephone with petitioners' representative on February 4, 2003. The SO told petitioners' representative that collection alternatives such as an OIC or an installment agreement would not be considered because of petitioners' poor compliance record. Respondent issued the notice of determination on April 8, 2003, sustaining the levy.

In the petition, petitioners alleged errors in the notice of determination, specifically that Appeals failed to give them a fair hearing and that Appeals failed to act properly with regard to the collection activity. After the petition was filed, counsel for respondent requested that Appeals discuss collection alternatives with petitioners at a face-to-face hearing. Petitioner3 and respondent's SO met on September 9, 2003, and discussed collection alternatives. Petitioners submitted an OIC on November 6, 2003. On December 1, 2003, the SO sent petitioners a letter requesting that they complete missing items on the form and submit additional information.

This case was calendared for trial at the May 3, 2004, session of this Court in New York, New York. Petitioners filed a motion for continuance in which they stated that they would be submitting an OIC. The Court granted the motion. The case was then calendared for trial at the session of this Court beginning on January 24, 2005. Petitioners filed another motion for continuance in order to retain counsel. The Court granted the motion and ordered petitioners to submit an OIC to respondent no later than March 1, 2005. Petitioners filed a status report on March 1, 2005, stating that they had decided not to submit an OIC because they would have no way of paying the debt. Trial was held on September 19, 2005, in New York, New York.

Following trial, the Court ordered petitioners to provide counsel for respondent a complete Form 656, Offer in Compromise, and an updated Form 433-A, Collection Information Statement for Wage Earners and Self-Employed Individuals. Counsel for respondent received petitioners' OIC on November 15, 2005, and sent it to an offer specialist (OS) for consideration. In the following months, the OS requested that petitioners provide additional information by various deadlines. Petitioners did not meet any of these deadlines.

In April 2006, petitioners requested that the Court keep the pending OIC open for consideration until August 15, 2006, so that petitioner could file his 2005 income tax return. The Court denied petitioners' request. Thereafter, respondent returned the pending OIC to petitioners and closed their file because petitioners had failed to provide additional information necessary to determine the acceptability of their offer and they failed to verify their compliance with the estimated income tax requirements for 2005 and 2006.


Discussion

Petitioners contend that respondent's refusal to consider their offer-in-compromise submitted on November 15, 2005, for the years in issue was an abuse of discretion. We disagree. Section 7122(c)(1) provides that the Secretary shall prescribe guidelines for the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to use in determining whether to accept an OIC. The decision to accept or reject an OIC, as well as the terms and conditions to which the IRS agrees, is left to the discretion of the Secretary. Sec. 301.7122-1(c)(1), Proced. & Admin. Regs.

Petitioners contend that returning their OIC for additional information was arbitrary and capricious. We disagree.

If an offer accepted for processing does not contain sufficient information to permit the IRS to evaluate whether the offer should be accepted, the IRS will request that the taxpayer provide the needed additional information. Sec. 301.7122-1(d)(2), Proced. & Admin. Regs. On three separate occasions, respondent's OS contacted petitioners to request additional information. The OS explained that this additional information was necessary to account for discrepancies between petitioners' Form 433-A and the information they had previously submitted. Petitioners failed to provide the requested information. If the taxpayer does not submit the requested information to the IRS within a reasonable time after a request, the IRS may return the offer to the taxpayer. Id. The decision not to process petitioners' OIC on account of their failure to provide additional information was consistent with the prescribed guidelines and was a reasonable exercise of respondent's discretion.

Petitioners contend that respondent's rejection of their OIC while a motion for reconsideration was pending before the Court was an abuse of discretion. We disagree.

The granting of a motion to reconsider rests in the discretion of the Court. Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Commissioner [81-1 USTC ¶9212], 641 F.2d 435, 443-444 (6th Cir. 1981), affg. on this issue and revg. on other issues [Dec. 34,014] 66 T.C. 962 (1976); Estate of Halas v. Commissioner [Dec. 46,522], 94 T.C. 570, 574 (1990); Vaughn v. Commissioner [Dec. 43,183], 87 T.C. 164, 166-167 (1986). Motions to reconsider will not be granted unless unusual circumstances or substantial error is shown. Estate of Halas v. Commissioner, supra at 574; Vaughn v. Commissioner, supra at 167. Petitioners submitted their offer-in-compromise to respondent on November 15, 2005. However, they failed to respond to respondent's repeated requests for additional information. In April 2006, petitioners requested an extension until August 15, 2006, so that petitioner could file his 2005 income tax return. The Court was not persuaded that petitioners were entitled to an extension of any deadlines related to respondent's processing of the OIC and denied their motion. In the interim, respondent rejected petitioners' OIC.

We have no reason to believe that an extension to August would have changed the disposition of petitioners' offer-in-compromise. The reason for the requested extension was to file petitioner's 2005 income tax return. However, the filing of petitioner's 2005 income tax return was not a requirement of respondent's acceptance of the offer. The OS knew that petitioner had requested an extension for filing his 2005 taxes. The information that the OS needed, however, had to do with additional information to verify and confirm the data on the submitted OIC. Therefore, it was not an abuse of discretion to reject petitioners' OIC on account of their failure to submit additional information before the Court ruled on petitioners' pending motion for reconsideration.

We conclude that respondent may proceed with collection of petitioners' tax liabilities for 1985-89 and 1991-2001 because respondent's rejection of petitioners' offer-in-compromise was not an abuse of discretion.

Decision will be entered for respondent.

1 Unless otherwise indicated, section references are to the Internal Revenue Code as amended.

2 In the petition, petitioners also disputed the collection action for taxable year 1990. No notice of determination was issued to petitioners for that year. By separate order, the Court dismissed this case as it relates to taxable year 1990.

3 References to petitioner are to William J. DiCindio.


William J. DiCindio; Lois J. DiCindio, Appellants v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.

U.S. Court of Appeals, 3rd Circuit; 07-3476, February 20, 2008.

Unpublished opinion, vacating and remanding in part, affirming in part, per curiam, the Tax Court, Dec. 56,884(M); 93 TCM 1060; TC Memo. 2007-77.

[ Code Sec. 7122]

Notice of Levy and right to hearing: Collection Due Process hearing: Offers-in-compromise: Abuse of discretion. --
The IRS's determination to reject a married couple's offer-in-compromise (OIC) and proceed with collection of tax liabilities was not an abuse of discretion. The couple's OIC was rejected because they failed to provide additional requested information needed to evaluate the offer. Further, the couple had been given several opportunities and extensions of time to file their completed OIC. Moreover, they were not current with their estimated taxes.



Before: Ambro, Fuentes and Fisher, Circuit Judges.


OPINION


PER CURIAM: William and Lois DiCindio appeal the Tax Court's decision allowing the appellee to proceed with a collection action. The procedural history of this case and the details of the DiCindios' claims are well known to the parties, set forth in the Tax Court's thorough opinion, and need not be discussed at length. Briefly, the DiCindios filed a petition in the Tax Court challenging a notice of determination with respect to fourteen years of unpaid tax liabilities. The DiCindios did not challenge the amount of the taxes that they owe. During the Tax Court proceedings, appellee agreed to evaluate an offer in compromise from the DiCindios. The offer was returned to the DiCindios because they failed to provide the information needed to evaluate the offer. They had also not shown that they had paid estimated income tax for 2005 and 2006. The Tax Court upheld the notice of determination. The DiCindios filed a timely notice of appeal, and we have jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C. §7482(a)(1).

On appeal, the DiCindios argue that the Tax Court erred by not directing appellee to request and evaluate two offers in compromise. However, the offer specialist who evaluated the offer noted that she was overlooking the absence of two offers and other processing deficiencies because the offer had been submitted by order of the Tax Court. Moreover, the offer was rejected because the DiCindios failed to provide the necessary information to evaluate the offer, not because there were not two separate offers.

The DiCindios further argue that the appellee will not process an offer in compromise unless the taxpayers are current with their estimated taxes. Therefore, they contend that the Tax Court erred by denying their request to stay the case and their motion for a reconsideration because they had filed a request for an extension of time to pay their taxes. However, by filing a Form 4868, a taxpayer can only request an extension of time to file a return; filing the form does not entitle one to an extension of time to pay the taxes owed. See Deaton v. Commissioner, 440 F.3d 223, 224 (5th Cir. 2006). The DiCindios were given several opportunities and extensions of time to file their completed offer in compromise. Their arguments are without merit.

The DiCindios' final argument is that the appellee closed the file on their offer in compromise while their motion for reconsideration was still pending before the Tax Court. We agree with the Tax Court that this was not an abuse of discretion.

Appellee notes that a final notice of intent to levy was not sent for the tax years of 1988 and 2001 and that the Tax Court lacked jurisdiction over those years. Appellee requests that the case be remanded to the Tax Court for removal of those years from the decision. Accordingly, we will vacate the Tax Court decision in part and remand the matter with instructions to correct the decision to remove the tax years 1988 and 2001. In all other respects, we will affirm the decision of the Tax Court for the above reasons as well as those set forth by the Tax Court.

Labels:

Wednesday, February 27, 2008

Economic Substance

A taxpayer is not entitled to loss deductions pursuant to §165(c)(2) if his claimed losses stem from transactions that lack economic substance. See Iles v. C.I.R [ 93-2 USTC ¶50,525], 982 F.2d 163, 165 (6th Cir. 1992). Moreover, "when a taxpayer claims a deduction, it is the taxpayer who bears the burden of proving that the transaction has economic substance." Coltec Industries, Inc. v. United States [ 2006-2 USTC ¶50,389], 454 F.3d 1340, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2006).



Richard M. Nault v. United States of America.

U.S. District Court, Dist. N.H.; Civ. 04-cv-479-PB, February 9, 2007.

[ Code Sec. 165]

Sham transactions: Economic substance. --





MEMORANDUM AND ORDER


BARBADORO, District Judge: Richard Nault brings this action against the United States to recover income tax refunds for several tax years. Nault's claims stem from investments he made in several agriculture-based limited partnerships (collectively the "AMCOR Partnerships"). In 2001, the tax court entered orders resolving a claim by the United States that the AMCOR Partnerships were sham transactions lacking economic substance. The parties agree that Nault's entitlement to the refunds he now seeks depends upon the meaning and legal effect of the tax court orders.

The matter is before me on cross motions for summary judgment.


I. BACKGROUND


This case falls within the purview of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 ("TEFRA"). Accordingly, I begin by explaining TEFRA's legal framework. I then describe Nault's investments in the AMCOR Partnerships and the tax court litigation challenging the legitimacy of the partnerships' tax returns.



A. The TEFRA Framework 1

TEFRA establishes a "single unified procedure for determining the tax treatment of all partnership items at the partnership level, rather than separately at the partner level." Callaway [ 2000-2 USTC ¶50,744], 231 F.3d at 108. Whether an item is a partnership item or a nonpartnership item is the threshold inquiry under TEFRA. Id. Partnership items are "subject to TEFRA's centralized audit procedures," while "the treatment of nonpartnership items is determined at the level of the individual partner's return...." Id. Under TEFRA, taxpayers are not "permitted to raise nonpartnership items in the course of a partnership proceeding." Id. Correlatively, taxpayers cannot raise partnership items at partner level proceedings. Id.

TEFRA further mandates that a partner file "an income tax return that is consistent with the partnership return." Id. "The partner's distributive share of any partnership item must be reported in the same manner as on the partnership's information return ( i.e., it must have the same amount, the same characterization, the same timing)." Id. at 108-09 (citations omitted).

"The [Internal Revenue Service ("IRS")] may adjust partnership items only at the partnership level and only after following TEFRA procedures." Id. at 109. Specifically, "[t]o audit a partnership return, the IRS must send notice of the beginning of an administrative proceeding ('NBAP') to the partners entitled to notice (the 'notice partners')." 2 Id. "[A]ny partner has the right to participate in any administrative proceeding relating to the determination of partnership items at the partnership level." Id. (citing I.R.C. §6224(a)). "[I]f after completing its audit the IRS adjusts the partnership return, it must send the notice partners a notice of final partnership administrative adjustment ('FPAA')." Id. (citing I.R.C. §6223(a)(2), (d)(2)).

"Within 90 days of the date the IRS mails the FPAA notice, the partnership's 'tax matters partner' (TMP) 3 may contest the FPAA by filing a petition for readjustment in Tax Court, the Court of Federal Claims or the appropriate federal district court." Id. (citing I.R.C. §6226(a)). "If the TMP does not file a petition within this period, then any notice partner may file a petition for readjustment within the next 60 days. Id. (citing I.R.C. §6226(b)(1)). "Regardless whether the petition for judicial readjustment is filed by the TMP or by a notice partner, all other partners are treated as parties to the suit, provided that they have an ongoing interest in the outcome of the proceedings. Id. (citing I.R.C. §6226(c), (d)). "In this manner TEFRA allows all partners, if they choose, to litigate a dispute with the IRS in a single proceeding that binds all." Id.

"After the FPAA adjustments become final ( i.e., after they go unchallenged for 150 days or are judicially resolved in a section 6226 [tax court, district court, or Court of Federal Claims proceeding]), the IRS may assess partners with the tax which properly accounts for their distributive share of the adjusted partnership items, without notice, as a computational adjustment." Id. at 109-10 (citing I.R.C. §§6225(a), 6230(a) (1), 6231(a)(6)). "In certain cases, where no further factual determinations are necessary at the partner level, an assessment attributable to an 'affected item' may also be made by computational adjustment." Id. at 110. An "affected item" is "any item to the extent such item is affected by a partnership item. Id. In the event of an unfavorable court decision, the TMP, a notice partner, or a 5-percent group make seek appellate review in the appropriate forum. I.R.C. §6226(g).



B. Tax Treatment of Nault's Investments 4

Nault invested in the AMCOR Partnerships between 1984 and 1986. Each partnership reported significant losses in its first year of existence and comparatively smaller amounts of income in subsequent years. Nault took deductions based on his distributive share of partnership losses and paid taxes on his share of partnership income disbursements throughout the course of his investments. 5

In 1987, the IRS examined the AMCOR Partnerships' tax returns and issued FPAA notices disallowing deductions claimed by each partnership. In the FPAA notices, the IRS explained that the adjustments resulted from, inter alia, an IRS determination that the AMCOR Partnerships' activities constituted a series of sham transactions lacking economic substance.

Following the issuance of the FPAA notices, certain AMCOR partners --not including the TMP --filed Petitions for Readjustment of Partnership Items in the United States Tax Court pursuant to I.R.C. §6226. In July 1999, the TMP for each AMCOR Partnership intervened in each AMCOR tax court proceeding.

In 2001, after years of litigation, the IRS and the TMP entered into an agreement providing that the IRS would disallow approximately 72 percent of the AMCOR Partnerships' losses but allow the partnerships to retain all of their claimed Investment Tax Credits. The agreement also provided that the AMCOR partners would not file amended returns restating any reported income from the AMCOR Partnerships on which they had already paid income taxes.

The IRS ultimately filed Motions for Entry of Decision in the tax court, and the tax court entered decisions with respect to each AMCOR Partnership reflecting the terms of the settlement agreement. Each of the tax court decisions contained the following language:
ORDERED AND DECIDED:...[t]hat the foregoing adjustments to partnership income and expenses are attributable to transactions which lacked economic substance, as described in former I.R.C. §6621(c)(3)(A)(v), so as to result in a substantial distortion of income and expenses....

After the tax court litigation was resolved, the IRS issued adjustments to Nault's 1984, 1985, and 1986 income tax returns based on the disallowed deductions. Nault then paid the additional taxes resulting from the adjustments.

While the tax court litigation was ongoing, each of the AMCOR Partnerships terminated. Nault had no remaining basis in his partnership interests when the partnerships terminated apart from any "restored" basis he might be entitled to claim based upon the tax court's disallowance of his prior deductions.

In September 2002, Nault sought tax refunds by filing amended federal income tax returns for 1995, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2001. In the amended returns, Nault claimed an ordinary loss deduction in the year each partnership terminated as well as carryover adjustments for other years affected by the termination year losses. Along with his refund claims, Nault attached statements explaining why he was entitled to the refunds. Specifically, Nault asserted that the Tax Court's 2001 disallowance of 72 percent of the AMCOR Partnership deductions --and derivatively, his share of the deductions --resulted in a restoration of his basis in those partnerships by corresponding amounts. As a result of this adjustment to his basis, he argued, he was entitled to loss deductions in the exact amount of his previously disallowed deductions because the partnerships became worthless upon termination.

On December 18, 2002, the IRS denied Nault's refund claims. Nault timely filed this action on December 17, 2004.


II. STANDARD OF REVIEW


Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). "Cross-motions for summary judgment do not alter the basic Rule 56 standard, but rather simply require [the court] to determine whether either of the parties deserves judgment as a matter of law on facts that are not disputed." Adria Int'l Group, Inc. v. Ferre Dev., Inc., 241 F.3d 103, 107 (1st Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).


III. ANALYSIS


In claiming a loss deduction, Nault relies upon 26 U.S.C. §165(a), which permits individuals to take tax deductions for losses "not compensated for by insurance or otherwise." Another statutory provision --26 U.S.C. §165(c) --adds important limitations to such deductions. It provides:
In the case of an individual, the deduction under subsection (a) shall be limited to --

(1) losses incurred in a trade or business;

(2) losses incurred in any transaction entered into for profit, though not connected with a trade or business; and

(3) except as provided in subsection (h), losses of property not connected with a trade or business or a transaction entered into for profit, if such losses arise from fire, storm, shipwreck, or other casualty, or from theft.

Nault does not allege that he was involved in a trade or business in connection with the AMCOR Partnerships. Nor does he allege that his losses arose from fire, storm, shipwreck, or other casualty. Thus, Nault's claimed loss deductions can only be grounded in §165(c)(2): "a loss incurred in a transaction entered into for profit."

A taxpayer is not entitled to loss deductions pursuant to §165(c)(2) if his claimed losses stem from transactions that lack economic substance. See Iles v. C.I.R [ 93-2 USTC ¶50,525], 982 F.2d 163, 165 (6th Cir. 1992). Moreover, "when a taxpayer claims a deduction, it is the taxpayer who bears the burden of proving that the transaction has economic substance." Coltec Industries, Inc. v. United States [ 2006-2 USTC ¶50,389], 454 F.3d 1340, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2006). The government relies on these accepted principles in contending that Nault is not entitled to the deductions he seeks because, it argues, the tax court determined that the transactions on which Nault's deductions are based lacked economic substance.

Nault recognizes that he is not entitled to take deductions pursuant to §165(c)(2) unless he can establish that his claimed losses are attributable to transactions that had economic substance. He also agrees that the tax court orders are determinative on this issue. Thus, this case turns on how the tax court orders are construed.

The government offers a straightforward interpretation of the tax court orders. Its position is that the parties to the tax court proceeding settled their dispute by agreeing to the entry of court orders recognizing that the losses disallowed pursuant to the orders were "attributable to transactions which lacked economic substance." Because the orders clearly provide that the transactions on which Nault's claims are based lacked economic substance, the government argues, Nault cannot rely on the disallowed losses to "restore" his basis in his investments.

Nault focuses on the effect of the court orders rather than their specific terms in arguing that the tax court actually determined that the AMCOR Partnerships had economic substance. In making this argument, Nault relies primarily on the basic principle that "a transaction that lacks economic substance simply is not recognized for federal taxation purposes, for better or worse...." ACM P'ships v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue [ 98-2 USTC ¶50,790], 157 F.3d 231, 261 (3d Cir. 1998) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). He then reasons that if the tax court acted consistently with this principle, it must have determined that the AMCOR Partnerships had economic substance because the court allowed partners to retain their Investment Tax Credits and a portion of their partnership's losses and because the settlement agreement that gave rise to the orders barred partners from filing amended returns restating any reported income generated by the partnerships.

I am not convinced that courts are required to apply the economic substance doctrine in quite so inflexible a manner as Nault suggests. However, I need not delve into this complex issue to resolve this case because Nault fails to appreciate the significance of the fact that the orders on which his claims depend were issued pursuant to a settlement. The government argued in the tax court proceeding that the AMCOR Partnerships were sham transactions that were completely lacking in economic substance. The TMP disagreed. After extensive litigation, the parties compromised their claims by settlement and, in so doing, they agreed to the precise language that was used in the court orders that resolved the parties' dispute. That language plainly provides that the disallowed losses on which Nault's current claims are based were attributable to transactions that lacked economic substance. It is unsurprising and ultimately insignificant for our purposes that the settlement also represented something less than a complete victory for either side. All that matters here is that the settlement resulted in the issuance of court orders that plainly resolved the issue that is now before the court.

Accordingly, I hold that the tax court decisions determined that the disallowed deductions were attributable to transactions that lacked economic substance. Those decisions are binding on Nault in this proceeding. Thus, Nault has no claim to loss deductions resulting from a restored basis because transactions lacking economic substance cannot give rise to losses under §165(c).


IV. CONCLUSION


For the reasons set forth herein, I grant the government's motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 34) and deny Nault's crossmotion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 43). The clerk is instructed to enter judgment accordingly.

SO ORDERED.

1 In Callaway v. Comm'r, the Second Circuit provided a thorough and enlightening explanation of TEFRA. See [ 2000-2 USTC ¶50,744] 231 F.3d 106, 107-12 (2d Cir. 2000). I rely heavily on Callaway in explaining TEFRA's legal framework.

2 A notice partner is "a partner entitled to notice under section 6223(a)." Id. (citing I.R.C. §6231(a)(8)). "When a partnership has 100 or more partners, a notice partner is generally one who owns at least a one percent interest in the partnership." Id. (citing I.R.C. §6223(b)(1)). It is unclear from the record whether Nault was a notice partner in any of the AMCOR Partnerships.

3 The TMP is "the general partner designated in the partnership agreement to handle tax matters." Id. (citing I.R.C. §6231(a)(7)).

4 The facts in this section are drawn from the parties' Joint Statement of Background Facts and Background Discussion of Law Regarding Taxation of Partnership Interests (Doc. No. 31) and certain exhibits in the summary judgment record. The record is construed in the light most favorable to Nault.

5 Nault's reported income and loss amounts for the AMCOR Partnerships are represented in a chart appended to the parties' Joint Statement of Background Facts. A copy of the chart is included with this Memorandum and Order as Appendix A.


Richard M. Nault, Plaintiff, Appellant v. United States, Defendant, Appellee.

U.S. Court of Appeals, 1st Circuit; 07-1455, February 15, 2008.

Affirming a DC N.H. decision, 2007-1 USTC ¶50,326.

[ Code Sec. 165]

Loss deductions: Sham transactions: Economic substance. --


Before: Torruella and Lynch, Circuit Judges, and Stahl, Senior Circuit Judge.

STAHL, Senior Circuit Judge: Plaintiff-appellant Richard M. Nault appeals the district court's decision denying his motion for summary judgment and granting summary judgment in favor of the United States. Nault argues that the district court erred in its interpretation of several agreed judgments entered by the Tax Court ("the Tax Court decisions"), embodying the terms of a settlement between the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") and Frederick H. Behrens, as Tax Matters Partner ("TMP"), regarding the proper tax treatment of several agriculture-related limited partnerships organized by American Agri-Corp., Inc. ("AMCOR") 1 a California corporation (collectively the "AMCOR Partnerships" or "Partnerships"). For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.


I.


Nault allegedly invested approximately $1,230,000.00 in five AMCOR Partnerships between 1984 and 1986. In 1987, the IRS began scrutinizing the AMCOR Partnerships' tax returns and issued Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment Notices disallowing certain deductions on the basis that the Partnerships' activities constituted a series of sham transactions lacking economic substance. After years of litigation, the IRS and the TMP reached a settlement in which 72% of the Partnerships' deductions were disallowed, the government agreed not to disallow investment tax credits claimed by the partners, and the partners agreed not to file amended returns modifying any reported income from the Partnerships on which the partners had paid income taxes. Upon motion of the IRS, the Tax Court entered decisions with respect to each Partnership reflecting the terms of the settlement agreement.

Based upon the Tax Court decisions, the IRS issued adjustments to Nault's 1984, 1985, and 1986 income tax returns, and Nault paid the additional taxes resulting from the adjustments. Each of the Partnerships terminated during the lengthy Tax Court litigation, leaving Nault without any remaining basis in his partnership interests. In September 2002, Nault filed amended income tax returns for 1995, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2001, asserting that his basis in the Partnerships should be "restored" to a level inversely proportionate to the Tax Court decisions' disallowance of 72% of the Partnerships' loss deductions. Nault claimed that he was entitled to an ordinary loss deduction for the taxable basis that was "restored" to his then-worthless partnership interests.

On December 18, 2002, the IRS denied Nault's request for a refund. Nault filed a complaint in federal district court on December 17, 2004, seeking to recover his purported overpayment of income tax pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §7422 and 28 U.S.C. §1346(a)(1). On February 9, 2007, the district court ruled on the parties' cross motions for summary judgment, granting summary judgment in favor of the government and denying summary judgment to Nault. See Nault v. United States, Civil No. 04-cv-479, 2007 WL 465310 (D.N.H. Feb. 9, 2007). This appeal ensued.


II.


We review de novo a district court's grant of summary judgment based on contract interpretation. See John Hancock Life Ins. Co. v. Abbott Labs., 478 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2006). Summary judgment is appropriate where the evidence shows that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

The parties agree that tax deductions are not permitted for transactions that lack economic substance and that the inquiry at hand --whether the Partnerships or transactions relevant to this appeal lacked economic substance --is confined to interpretation of the Tax Court decisions implementing the settlement between the IRS and the TMP. Thus, a detailed recitation of the substantive law underlying the parties' dispute is unnecessary. See United States v. ITT Cont'l Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 233, 236-37 (1975) (explaining that settlements incorporated into judicial decisions are self-contained within their four corners and, consequently, are detached from the substantive law giving rise to the litigation).

In construing a settlement subsequently adopted by a court, we apply the same basic rules that govern the interpretation of ordinary contracts. See id. at 235-37; Rodi v. Ventetuolo, 941 F.2d 22, 28 (1st Cir. 1991); see also Smart v. Gillette Co. Long-Term Disability Plan, 70 F.3d 173, 178 (1st Cir. 1995) (explaining that federal common law requires us to be "guided by common-sense canons of contract interpretation" (citation omitted)). Interpretation of the terms of an unambiguous contract is a matter of law, subject to judicial resolution. See id. Quite simply, "[a]n unambiguous contract must be enforced according to its terms...." Senior v. NSTAR Elec. & Gas Corp., 449 F.3d 206, 219 (1st Cir. 2006). Moreover, terms within a contract are accorded their "plain, ordinary, and natural meaning." Filiatrault v. Comverse Tech., Inc., 275 F.3d 131, 135 (1st Cir. 2001).

A contract is ambiguous where the disputed terms are facially inconsistent or reasonably susceptible to multiple, plausible interpretations. See Smart, 70 F.3d at 178. If a contract is ambiguous, we will consider extrinsic evidence to give effect to the parties' intent in forming the contract. Id. "The question of whether a contract is ambiguous is generally a question of law for the judge...." Senior, 449 F.3d at 219.

Nault contends that the Tax Court decisions should not be interpreted to mean that the Partnerships or the underlying transactions lacked economic substance. In support, he asserts that the disputed language of the Tax Court decisions is ambiguous, that principles of construction favor his suggested interpretation, and that extrinsic evidence conclusively establishes that the parties intended to effectuate his interpretation. These arguments are not well-founded.

First, the plain language of the Tax Court decisions unambiguously favors the government's interpretation. Section II of each Tax Court decision states:
That the foregoing adjustments to partnership income and expense are attributable to transactions which lacked economic substance, as described in former I.R.C. §6621(c)(3)(A)(v), so as to result in a substantial distortion of income and expense, as described in I.R.C. §6621(c) (3)(A)(iv), when computed under the partnership's cash receipts and disbursements method of accounting; and

That liabilities [in varying amounts] lack economic substance.

The district court held that this language unmistakably signaled that the adjustments of the loss deductions were made because the underlying transactions lacked economic substance, thus preventing Nault from now claiming tax deductions. 2

To escape this seemingly inexorable conclusion, Nault asserts that the presence of the phrase "so as to result in a substantial distortion of income and expenses" generates ambiguity. He argues that this phrase indicates that the underlying transactions may not have entirely lacked in economic substance, but merely distorted the Partnerships' balance sheet. To buttress this conclusion, he points out that the very next sentence simply declares that "liabilities" in varying amounts lacked economic substance without any such qualifying language. Thus, Nault argues, the district court violated the time-honored maxim that variances in language should not be treated as superfluous.

Nault is mistaken. The reference to former 26 U.S.C. §6621(c)(v) (1988), which helps to define "tax motivated transactions," confirms that the transactions were "sham[s] or fraudulent transaction[s]," and therefore lacked economic substance. See, e.g., Durrett v. Comm'r, 71 F.3d 515, 517 (5th Cir. 1996). The phrase "so as to result in a substantial distortion of income and expense" simply tracks the language of the former 26 U.S.C. §6621(c)(3)(iv) (1988), which likewise helps to define "tax motivated transactions." Thus, each phrase independently establishes that the adjustments were attributable to the Partnerships' tax-motivated activities. Admittedly, Nault is correct that transactions that lack economic substance are treated differently from those that merely result in a substantial distortion of income. Compare Dewees v. Comm'r, 870 F.2d 21, 30-31 (1st Cir. 1989) (refusing to permit deductions for sham transactions), with Mantell v. Comm'r, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 697, 1993 WL 347409, at *10 (T.C. Sept. 13, 1993) (approving adjustments based on accounting methods that created a substantial distortion of income).

Nevertheless, the plain language of the Tax Court decisions still firmly establishes that the underlying transactions lacked economic substance. 3 Here, the greater implies the lesser --because the underlying transactions lacked economic substance, they necessarily resulted in a substantial distortion of income. Thus, the government's interpretation --that "[t]he decisions . .. state that the transactions resulted in a substantial distortion of income and expense because they lacked economic substance" --is by far the most natural reading of the disputed language. At the very least, it is logically consistent; Nault's proposed construction eviscerates the entire sentence. Under Nault's interpretation, the "substantial distortion" language must be read to modify the "lacked economic substance" language. We decline the invitation to mangle the English language by adopting an approach that defies basic rules of syntax and diction; the Tax Court clearly stated that the lack of economic substance "result[ed] in" the distortion of income, not the other way around.

Nault seeks additional support from the fact that the distortion language was not used in the next paragraph, which concerned the Partnerships' liabilities. The most obvious explanation for why this language was not used in reference to the Partnerships' liabilities is simply that the first paragraph referred to the underlying transactions themselves, while the second paragraph referred to the liabilities claimed by the Partnerships. Naturally, the erroneous liabilities themselves did not "result in a substantial distortion of income or expense." They simply lacked economic substance. Moreover, we will not declare perfectly clear language ambiguous merely because the Tax Court did not reiterate it verbatim in the very next sentence in dealing with a related, but not identical, matter.

Next, Nault argues that because the settlement "did not treat the Partnerships as lacking economic substance," the Tax Court decisions are ambiguous. 4 Nault's contention is based on a fundamentally erroneous conception of the Tax Court decisions, which approved a settlement. See Miller Tabak Hirsch & Co. v. Comm'r, 101 F.3d 7, 10 (2d Cir. 1996) (explaining that in a judicially-approved settlement parties are "free to settle the case in any manner not violative of law or public policy, regardless of what the result might have been had the parties gone to trial"). Parties to a settlement, almost by definition, eschew the possibility of obtaining some portion of what they would like in exchange for certain terms with which they can live. See Rodi, 941 F.2d at 27 (stating that a settlement "`normally embodies a compromise,' within the limits of which the litigants...must be prepared to live" (quoting United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681 (1971))). The fact that the IRS chose to settle rather than risk the hazards of litigation is no more a concession that the transactions at hand possessed economic substance than a defendant's decision to settle a dubious lawsuit for pennies on the dollar is a concession that the suit had merit. Indeed, there is little doubt that parties occasionally settle claims simply to avoid the hassle, uncertainty, and expense of litigation even where a favorable outcome seems all but certain.

Here, it was perfectly permissible for the IRS to insist upon language that declared the transactions to lack economic substance --perhaps anticipating claims plaintiffs such as Nault might make --while simultaneously making certain concessions to the taxpayers. It was incumbent upon the TMP to dispute any language that he did not wish included in the Tax Court decisions. See Rodi, 941 F.2d at 27 (admonishing that litigants must abide by terms of a settlement even where they prove more onerous than originally anticipated). In the end, therefore, Nault remains confined to the language agreed to in the settlement. See In re New Seabury Co. Ltd. P'ship, 450 F.3d 24, 31, 39 (1st Cir. 2006) (rejecting the district court's "functional analysis" of the parties' stipulation in favor of the bankruptcy court's analysis of its plain language).

Finally, Nault argues that, even if the plain language of the Tax Court decisions is unambiguous, the district court nevertheless erred by failing to consider extrinsic evidence. First, it is elementary that we do not ordinarily examine extrinsic evidence to alter or clarify the terms of an otherwise unambiguous contract. See Smart, 70 F.3d at 179. Nevertheless, "in the exceptional case, a latent ambiguity in seemingly clear contract language may require us to consider extrinsic evidence to determine the actual object of the parties' agreement." Coffin v. Bowater Inc., 501 F.3d 80, 97 (1st Cir. 2007).

This is not such a case. Nault's proposed interpretation of the Tax Court decisions is not merely strained, but flatly contradictory to the plain meaning of its terms. In essence, he "argue[s] that the [disputed] language does not mean what it says."Id. at 98. If the language of the Tax Court decisions does not comport with what the parties intended, then the TMP should have insisted upon different language.

Finally, we note that Nault dramatically overstates the persuasive force of the extrinsic evidence that he has proffered. It is by no means so conclusive as he suggests. 5 He directs our attention to a written summary regarding the settlement, prepared by the IRS, stating, inter alia, that each partner "may have a capital gain or loss upon his termination from the partnership" (emphasis added). This summary, however, was nonbinding, the specific section in question was designated as informational, the clause was permissive, and the provision referred only to the partner's capital contribution. Nault also points to a letter he received from the IRS indicating that the Service had made "[a] determination...that allow[ed] for capital treatment of these losses." This statement is certainly peculiar --and inconsistent with the IRS's current position. This letter, however, cannot serve as a definitive guide for our interpretation of Tax Court decisions executed more than a year previously. Additionally, the court notes that the same letter notified Nault of the IRS's rejection of his claims for a deduction for an ordinary loss related to his "restored" basis in the Partnerships.

In summary, Nault's arguments obfuscate what is, in reality, a very simple case. The plain language of the Tax Court decisions indicates that the disallowed loss deductions were based on transactions that lacked economic substance. We have no jurisdiction to determine whether the relevant transactions actually did have economic substance --the sole matter within our purview is determining what the Tax Court meant by its decisions. The Tax Court's determination, that the transactions lacked economic substance, is unambiguous.


III.


The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

1 For a partial history of AMCOR and the related litigation, see Crop Assocs.-1986 v. Comm'r, 80 T.C.M. (CCH) 56, 2000 WL 976792, at *1-7 (T.C. July 17, 2000).

2 Nault argues that the government has waived the position that the underlying transactions lacked economic substance, in favor of the position that the Partnerships themselves lacked economic substance. This contention is irrelevant. The district court unequivocally held that "the disallowed deductions were attributable to transactions that lacked economic substance." Nault, 2007 WL 465310, at *5 (emphasis added). We are not limited in our review by the fact that the district court rendered its decision on grounds that the government may or may not have urged below. Nault's position, if accepted, would confine the lower court to choosing between the rationales submitted by the parties. This is not the law. See Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99 (1991) (holding that a "court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties").

3 Albeit in dicta, the Court of Federal Claims has reached a similar conclusion about these decisions. See Keener v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 455, 457 & n.2 (Fed. Cl. 2007) (stating that the Tax Court found "the various partnership transactions to be sham transactions"); see also Howell v. Comm'r, 94 T.C.M. (CCH) 104, 2007 WL 2126593, at *1 (T.C. July 25, 2007) (stating that the IRS and TMP "stipulated that the partnerships entered into transactions that lacked economic substance and created substantial distortions of partnership income") (emphasis added).

4 Nault cites the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Fickling v. United States, 507 F.3d 1302 (11th Cir. 2007), as authority for this proposition. Nault, however, ignores a crucial factual distinction between the two cases. There is no indication that the disputed settlement discussed in Fickling contained any language labeling the transaction in question as lacking economic substance. Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit characterized the settlement in question as "noncommittal" concerning whether the underlying transaction was a sham. Id. at 1305.

5 In addition to noting the limited probative value of Nault's extrinsic evidence, we observe that the government likewise adduced extrinsic evidence --an affidavit from Margaret K. Hebert, an IRS attorney responsible for the AMCOR litigation --to buttress its own position. We need not discuss this evidence further, however, because it is unnecessary to our conclusion.

Transactions Entered Into for Profit: Economic substance

Despite the fact that the venture was rather risky and that tax savings were a critical element in investing in the venture, limited partners in a partnership formed to exploit a synthetic fuel process were able to claim their share of partnership losses. There was a business purpose behind the venture, investors had a reasonable possibility of realizing profit, and the venture "had practicable income effects other than the creation of tax losses."

D.B. Smith, CA-6, 91-2 USTC ¶50,326.

To the contrary.

A partnership that was to develop the market for a new way of harnessing energy was a sham devised to bring tax benefits to its investors, and deductions for a partner's share of partnership losses were denied.

J. Karr, CA-11, 91-1 USTC ¶50,113, 924 F2d 1018.

A partnership allegedly created to pursue production of an alternative energy source was not entitled to deductions for licensing fees and research and development fees. The partnership's activity lacked economic substance because of the amount and structure of the fees paid, the inexperience of the promoters, conflicts of interest among the promoters and the heavy emphasis placed on the tax benefits that would be gained by the partners.

Peat Oil and Gas Assoc., 100 TC 271, Dec. 48,944. Aff'd, sub nom. R. Ferguson, CA-2, 94-2 USTC ¶50,357.

Summary judgment against an investor was reversed because a material issue of fact existed concerning the economic substance of investment trades.

C.P. Brown, CA-7, 92-2 USTC ¶50,564, 976 F2d 1104.

Loss deductions claimed by investors in a corporation involved in the cattle business were disallowed. Regardless of whether the taxpayers had a profit motive, their expenditures to enter and stay in the cattle program, as well as their additional costs for the purchase of embryos and calves, were nondeductible because the program lacked economic substance. Even assuming that the investment constituted a bona fide business transaction, no showing was made that an investment loss or a theft loss was sustained during the tax years at issue.

R.E. Daoust, 67 TCM 2914, Dec. 49,832(M), TC Memo. 1994-203.

An individual was denied loss deductions relating to an alleged diamond mining venture because he did not own any rights in the venture.

G.M. Osserman, 71 TCM 2892, Dec. 51,319(M), TC Memo. 1996-205.

Investors in a limited partnership involved in oil and gas recovery were denied a loss deduction for their cash investment because the entity's activities and transactions lacked economic substance. They had agreed to be bound by the ruling in G.E. Krause, Dec. 48,383, affirmed sub nom. R.A. Hildebrand, CA-10, 94-2 USTC ¶50,305, a test case involving identical partnership transactions. Pursuant to that decision, loss deductions were disallowed because the entity did not engage in for-profit business transactions. Although the investors conceded that no profit objective existed at the partnership level, they contended that the profit-objective test should be measured only at the individual partner level. However, because the partnership's transactions lacked economic substance, their loss deduction was disallowed despite their individual profit objective in making the investment.

M.L. Marinovich, 77 TCM 2075, Dec. 53,399(M), TC Memo. 1999-179.

As to deductions claimed with respect to transactions lacking economic substance and a profit motive, see ¶12,177.59.

Corporations that acquired two debt instruments structured so that the value of one was expected to increase significantly at the same time that the value of the other one decreased significantly, could not recognize a current loss on the sale of the debt instrument that that decreased in value while not recognizing the gain on the other debt instrument.

Rev. Rul. 2000-12, 2000-1 CB 734.

The profit objectives of individuals who invested in enhanced oil recovery limited partnerships had to be measured at the partnership level because the parties' stipulation that the activities of the partnerships were not entered into with a profit objective did not affect the status of the partnerships for federal tax purposes. The finding that the partnerships' activities lacked profit motives was not tantamount to a holding that the investors intended to create entities other than partnerships. Rather, the partnerships entered into transactions, formed joint ventures, operated gas wells, and conducted themselves as partnerships.

A.C. Copeland, CA-5, 2002-1 USTC ¶50,420, 290 F3d 326.

A corporation's transfer of interests in multilayered leases of computer equipment and related trusts lacked economic substance and expense deductions claimed in relation to the transaction were denied. The transaction was solely motivated by tax considerations. There was no real obligation on behalf of the taxpayer or profit potential in connection with the transaction and the taxpayer's expert testimony as to the credibility of the transaction was inaccurate and unconvincing.

Nicole Rose Corp., 117 TC 328, Dec. 54,578.

Losses generated by claiming an inflated basis as the result of a transfer of assets in which the taxpayer becomes joint and severally liable for the transferor's indebtedness on the assets in excess of the fair market value of the assets lack economic substance. Although the basis of an asset is its fair market value or cost, including the amount of the transferor's liability assumed by the taxpayer-transferee, the inclusion of such liabilities into the basis of the asset is predicated on the assumption that the liabilities will be paid in full by the transferee.

Notice 2002-21, 2002-1 CB 730.

An equipment lease-financing company did not have a legitimate nontax business purpose for engaging in a lease-stripping transaction in which it claimed large rental expense deductions in exchange for an investment of less than one percent of the anticipated deductions. The taxpayer did not have a business reason for the transaction apart from tax consequences and there was no possibility of economic profit from the transaction. Deductions and losses claimed in connection with the transaction were disallowed.

CMA Consolidated, Inc., 89 TCM 701, Dec. 55,917(M), TC Memo. 2005-16.

An investor in several limited partnerships was not entitled to claim loss deductions because the disallowed deductions on which his claim was based lacked economic substance. The Tax Court's orders were binding on the individual because the government and the partnership's tax matters partners (TMP) compromised their claims by settlement and, in so doing, agreed to the precise language used in the court orders. Although the Tax Court disallowed a portion of the partnership deductions and allowed partners to retain their investment tax credits, the individual could not rely on the disallowed losses to restore his basis in his investments.

R.M. Nault, DC N.H., 2007-1 USTC ¶50,326.

Labels:

Tuesday, February 26, 2008

Section 7122 - Offer in Compromise and Bankruptcy
In a collection review proceeding, a taxpayer may raise challenges to the existence or amount of the underlying liability for any tax period if the person did not receive any statutory notice of deficiency for such tax liability or did not otherwise have an opportunity to dispute the underlying liability. Sec. 6330(c)(2)(B). Where a taxpayer has filed a bankruptcy action, and the Commissioner has submitted a proof of claim for unpaid Federal tax liabilities in a taxpayer's bankruptcy action, we have held that the taxpayer has had the opportunity to dispute the liabilities for purposes of section 6330(c)(2)(B). See Kendricks v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 69 (2005); Sabath v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-222. A bankruptcy court may consider the amount or legality of taxes, including penalties and interest. 11 U.S.C. sec. 505(a) (2000)

Claude E. and Dana L. Salazar v. Commissioner.

Dkt. Nos. 2203-05L ; 23547-06L , TC Memo. 2008-38, February 25, 2008.


[Code Sec. 7122]


The IRS's rejection of married taxpayers' two offers-in-compromise with respect to both income and employment taxes was not an abuse of discretion. The taxpayers had already filed for bankruptcy when they submitted their first offer-in-compromise (OIC), and the Appeals officer rejected the offer after determining that it was less than what the IRS expected to receive from the bankruptcy distribution and because accepting that offer would risk, if not extinguish, all claims the IRS had to the bankruptcy estate's assets. The IRS also did not abuse its discretion when rejecting the taxpayers' second OIC with respect to the husband's employment tax liabilities because the taxpayers' financial situation had improved by the time the second OIC was submitted and the IRS determined that the taxpayers could pay such liabilities in their entirety. In addition, the taxpayers did not present any argument or evidence to suggest that the rejection of the second OIC was an abuse of discretion.








MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION



GOEKE, Judge: These consolidated cases arise from petitions for judicial review of two notices of determination concerning collection action(s) under section 6320 and/or 6330.1 In response to a notice of intent to levy issued by respondent with respect to outstanding income tax liabilities, petitioners Claude and Dana Salazar (Mr. and Mrs. Salazar) submitted an offer-incompromise for all of their outstanding tax liabilities, which also included employment tax liabilities of Mr. Salazar. Petitioners also sought abatement of penalties for the period their bankruptcy petition was pending. After Mr. Salazar individually received a notice of intent to levy with respect to his employment tax liabilities, Mr. Salazar submitted a second offer-in-compromise and again challenged the assessment of penalties and interest during the pendency of petitioners' bankruptcy petition. Respondent issued separate notices of determination rejecting both offers-in-compromise and sustaining the proposed collection actions.



We have jurisdiction to review respondent's collection determination relating to the employment tax liabilities as well as the income tax liabilities under amended section 6330(d)(1) because respondent made his determination more than 60 days after August 17, 2006. See Callahan v. Commissioner, 130 T.C. __ (2008). Respondent has now admitted to assessing a penalty erroneously for petitioners' 1997 income tax year while their bankruptcy petition was pending and has agreed to correct this error. Because we find respondent did not abuse his discretion in rejecting petitioners' offers-in-compromise, and because we find that respondent did not otherwise erroneously assess penalties and interest, we sustain respondent's determinations.





FINDINGS OF FACT



Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found. The stipulations of facts and related exhibits are incorporated herein by this reference. At the time the petitions were filed, petitioners, husband and wife, resided in New York.



Previously, petitioners were residents of Nevada, where they owned and operated a retail art gallery named Artistic Nature. While operated by both petitioners, the gallery was organized as a sole proprietorship in the name of Mr. Salazar. The operation, and ultimately the failure, of Artistic Nature has led to the current proceedings. Respondent seeks collection of petitioners' outstanding Federal income taxes, penalties, and interest for taxable years 1997, 1998, and 1999. Respondent also seeks to collect the outstanding employment tax liabilities of Mr. Salazar related to Artistic Nature from 1998 through 2001.



On January 23, 2001, when Artistic Nature was failing, petitioners filed for chapter 13 bankruptcy protection in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Nevada. Petitioners captioned their bankruptcy petition as "Claude E. Salazar dba Artistic Nature and Dana Salazar dba Artistic Nature." The petition was later converted to a chapter 7 proceeding.



On February 1, 2001, respondent filed a proof of claim with the bankruptcy court, which respondent later amended. On respondent's last amendment to the proof of claim, filed on September 27, 2003, respondent listed a secured claim of $19,915.40, an unsecured priority claim of $43,673.45, and an unsecured general claim of $8,850.74. The secured claim related to a lien respondent had previously filed with respect to petitioners' 1997 and 1998 income tax liabilities, and it included penalties and interest. The unsecured priority claim also included interest. Petitioners, while represented by counsel, did not file an objection to respondent's claims. On July 25, 2002, petitioners received a discharge of debtor from all dischargeable debts. On August 22, 2005, the bankruptcy trustee disbursed $17,834.51 to respondent. The bankruptcy case was closed on March 30, 2006.



During the 2000, 2001, and 2002 tax years, petitioners allowed withholdings from income to exceed their income tax liabilities, which created overpayments totaling $15,814.91. On October 2, 2003, respondent applied these overpayments to petitioners' 1997 income tax liabilities. On October 6, 2003, respondent assessed $3,192.34 in interest and an additional $1,216.52 failure to file penalty for petitioners' taxable period ending December 31, 1997.



After petitioners received the discharge of debtor, respondent initiated collection on petitioners' liabilities. On October 27, 2003, respondent sent petitioners a separate letter for each of the outstanding liabilities stating that he intended to seek collection by levy. Respondent's notification of intent to levy indicated the following liabilities, including penalties and interest:





Tax From Form Period Ending Unpaid Balance

1040 12/31/1997 $437.21

1040 12/31/1998 5,923.33

1040 12/31/1999 6,923.71

941 12/31/1998 3,970.30

941 3/31/1998 6,248.92

941 6/30/1999 5,658.56

941 9/30/1999 7,000.45

941 12/31/1999 6,122.27

941 3/31/2000 5,006.08

941 6/30/2000 5,626.37

941 9/30/2000 6,575.15

941 12/31/2000 5,855.57

941 3/31/2001 5,118.99

941 6/30/2001 2,210.01





On or about December 6, 2003, respondent issued a final notice of intent to levy related to the income tax liabilities for 1997, 1998, and 1999. Respondent's notice of intent to levy did not include Mr. Salazar's employment tax liabilities. On December 16, 2003, petitioners submitted a Form 12153, Request for a Collection Due Process Hearing. Notwithstanding the fact the final notice of intent to levy pertained only to petitioners' income tax liabilities, petitioners indicated they were seeking collection review with respect to both their income and employment tax liabilities. Petitioners stated: "We declared Chapter 7 bankruptcy in January 2001. Discharge was July 2001 [sic] --there were assets --the bankruptcy is still open pending filing of final accounting report by the trustee. Calls to IRS and IRS bankruptcy Department have gone unanswered." Despite the request for a collection review hearing, respondent issued the levy. Upon realizing that he should have suspended the proposed levy action until after the hearing and any appeals, respondent released the levy. See sec. 6330(e)(1); Grover v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-176.



Petitioners' file was forwarded to Appeals Settlement Officer Bruce Conte. On May 14, 2004, Mr. Conte contacted petitioners to schedule a conference. At the same time, Mr. Conte contacted respondent's internal bankruptcy specialists. Mr. Conte received a fax from a specialist outlining petitioners' bankruptcy file and noting that "secured claims get paid first and then priority." Mr. Conte noted in his case record that there were also outstanding employment tax liabilities for petitioners and that final collection notices had not yet been issued with respect to those liabilities.



On or about May 24, 2004, petitioners submitted a completed Form 656, Offer in Compromise, to respondent seeking to resolve their outstanding employment and income tax liabilities for $9,024.25, to be paid within 90 days from notice of acceptance of the offer. Upon receipt of the offer-in-compromise, Mr. Conte contacted petitioners to seek additional financial information. Over the course of several months, Mr. Conte and petitioners corresponded on multiple occasions with respect to additional documents Mr. Conte needed in evaluating petitioners' offer-in-compromise. In one letter to Mr. Conte dated August 13, 2004, petitioners requested that "given that the Bankruptcy Court has failed to render a final accounting to date, the penalties attributable to the principal balance outstanding should be waived."



While he was attempting to obtain additional information about petitioners' economic situation, Mr. Conte was also attempting to determine what amount would be paid to respondent from petitioners' bankruptcy estate. Mr. Conte contacted respondent's internal bankruptcy specialists on numerous occasions. Following one such contact, Mr. Conte received an e-mail informing him that "Mr. Salazar owes: IMF $13,977.92 and BMF $62,786.01 for a total of $76,763.93. The amount that will come to IRS from the trustee's office * * * [$25,000 less trustee expenses] will not full-pay the account (less than 1/3 of balance due). Collection will not be withheld."2



According to his case record, Mr. Conte was concerned that accepting an offer-in-compromise while awaiting a final distribution from the bankruptcy might jeopardize respondent's claims to that distribution. Mr. Conte performed research, including reviewing the Internal Revenue Manual (IRM), to assist with his consideration of petitioners' offer-in-compromise. Mr. Conte noted the IRM's caution on accepting an offer-in-compromise while awaiting a distribution of assets from a bankruptcy. Mr. Conte also sought and received legal advice on the effect an offer-in-compromise would have on the pending bankruptcy distribution. Counsel from within the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) advised Mr. Conte that acceptance of the offer-in-compromise risked respondent's claim to the distribution and that the offer-in-compromise should be increased by the amount respondent expected to receive from the bankruptcy.



After receiving counsel's advice, on November 8, 2004, Mr. Conte sent petitioners a letter informing them that --



I have received guidance from our Counsel regarding the acceptance of an Offer in Compromise in an instance where the distribution of the assets of the bankruptcy has not been completed. This, as you may recall, was the primary issue surrounding your * * * request for an offer.



It is Counsel's opinion, as it is mine, that if the Service were to accept an offer in this instance, the Service would at that point no longer have a claim to any distribution of the bankruptcy proceeds.



It is also our opinion that the only way that an offer could be accepted under these circumstances, is for the Service to attempt to determine how much of the distribution we would be entitled to and add that to the amount of the offer.



Mr. Conte went on to reason that respondent would likely receive approximately $20,000 from the pending distribution. Accordingly, Mr. Conte informed petitioners that their offer-in-compromise would have to be increased by $20,000 before it could be accepted.



By letter dated November 22, 2004, petitioners responded that they could not pay the estimated $20,000 to respondent that was pending distribution without first receiving the distribution. As an alternative, petitioners offered to relinquish any rights they might have to the distribution for the benefit of respondent. Mr. Conte determined that this offer-in-compromise still risked respondent's forthcoming distribution and thus could not be accepted before receipt of the distribution from the bankruptcy estate. As part of his analysis in his closing memorandum, Mr. Conte noted that if the offer-in-compromise were accepted, any funds remaining after the bankruptcy trustee discharged petitioners' debts would go to other creditors or to petitioners. Mr. Conte concluded: "Based upon informal advice from Counsel and the taxpayer's response, it is Appeals' decision to reject the offer-in-compromise of $9,024.25 as insufficient due to the fact that a larger amount appears to be collectible."



On January 4, 2005, respondent's Appeals Office issued a Notice of Determination Concerning Collection Action(s) Under Section 6320 and/or 6330 sustaining the proposed levy action with respect to petitioners' 1997, 1998, and 1999 income tax liabilities. In a separate letter addressed only to Mr. Salazar, Mr. Conte indicated that the offer-in-compromise had also been rejected with respect to his outstanding employment tax liabilities.



On February 3, 2005, petitioners filed a petition with this Court seeking review of respondent's determination under docket No. 2203-05L. Petitioners allege that respondent's rejection of their offer to compromise both their outstanding income tax liabilities and Mr. Salazar's employment tax liabilities was an abuse of discretion. Petitioners' petition for docket No. 2203-05L did not seek to challenge the underlying income tax liabilities that respondent was seeking to collect.



Respondent moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction as to Mr. Salazar's employment tax liabilities on the grounds that respondent had never issued a notice of determination concerning a collection action under section 6330 with respect to the employment tax liabilities. In a Salazar v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-7, filed January 18, 2006, we found that no notice of determination for purposes of section 6330 had been issued with respect to petitioners' employment tax liabilities and granted respondent's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction with respect to Mr. Salazar's employment tax liabilities.3



In the interim, on June 20, 2005, the bankruptcy trustee submitted to the bankruptcy court a Trustee's Final Report and Application for Compensation and Reimbursement (the final report). In the final report, payment on respondent's secured claim of $19,915.40 was not allowed. Instead, payment on respondent's priority claim of $43,673.45 was allowed. On August 22, 2005, the bankruptcy trustee disbursed $17,834.51 to respondent.



On August 25, 2005, respondent applied the proceeds of the bankruptcy distribution to Mr. Salazar's outstanding employment tax liabilities for the taxable periods ending December 31, 1998, March 31, 1999, and June 30, 1999. However, the amounts that respondent applied to these taxable periods exceeded the priority claims for those periods. On April 24, 2007, respondent adjusted the application of the bankruptcy proceeds to also include partial payments for the taxable periods ending September 30, 1999, as well as December 31, 1999.



As of June 30, 2005, Mr. Salazar still had unpaid employment tax liabilities that included:





Period Ending Unpaid Balance

12/31/98 $2,636.81

3/31/99 5,281.02

6/30/99 4,067.44

9/30/99 5,904.60

12/31/99 5,158.55

3/31/00 4,219.10

6/30/00 4,729.82

9/30/00 5,522.11

12/31/00 4,670.33

3/31/01 4,097.97

6/30/01 1,752.20





On February 22, 2006, respondent issued a Final Notice of Intent to Levy and Notice of Your Right to a Hearing with respect to Mr. Salazar's employment tax liabilities.4 In response, Mr. Salazar submitted a second Form 12153 with respect to the proposed collection action on the employment tax liabilities. The new request for collection review was assigned to Appeals Settlement Officer Thomas Conley. In his initial correspondence with Mr. Conley, Mr. Salazar indicated that he did not intend to submit a new offer-in-compromise but instead sought reconsideration of petitioners' original offer-in-compromise of $9,024.25. Mr. Salazar also attempted to challenge the assessment of penalties and interest during the pendency of petitioners' bankruptcy as well as the manner in which respondent applied the bankruptcy proceeds.



On May 17, 2006, petitioners had an in-person hearing with Mr. Conley. On June 20, 2006, Mr. Salazar submitted a new offer-in-compromise. The basis of the new offer-in-compromise was again doubt as to collectibility, and the new offer included updated financial information. Mr. Salazar offered to compromise petitioners' then-outstanding income and employment tax liabilities for $19,547.13. By this time, Mrs. Salazar was working as an attorney and Mr. Salazar as a manager of a restaurant. Mr. Salazar had also begun collecting monthly Social Security benefits. Mr. Conley determined that petitioners' reasonable collection potential exceeded the outstanding liabilities and thus rejected the offer-in-compromise. Mr. Conley's determination did not, however, address Mr. Salazar's claims that respondent was seeking to collect penalties and interest assessed for the period while petitioners' bankruptcy petition was pending.



On October 18, 2006, respondent issued a Notice of Determination and Collection Action Under Section 6320 and/or 6330 to Mr. Salazar regarding his employment tax liabilities. Mr. Salazar then filed a second petition to this Court claiming error in respondent's determination to proceed with collection in the case at docket No. 23547-06L. The second petition does not allege any error with respect to respondent's rejection of Mr. Salazar's second offer-in-compromise. Instead, Mr. Salazar again alleges that respondent abused his discretion in failing to revisit and accept petitioners' original 2004 offer-in-compromise. Mr. Salazar also alleges error by respondent in not abating the penalties and interest assessed for the period while petitioners' bankruptcy petition was pending. Finally, Mr. Salazar alleges that it was an error for respondent to apply the bankruptcy proceeds to his individual employment tax liabilities instead of petitioners' joint income tax liabilities. The two petitions have been consolidated for trial, briefing, and opinion.





OPINION




I. Introduction


While this matter has developed in a manner that has made it more complicated than necessary, in the end it is a collection review case in which petitioners principally sought to resolve their outstanding income and employment tax liabilities through an offer-in-compromise. Petitioners offered to settle all of their outstanding liabilities, including the income tax liabilities and the employment tax liabilities, for $9,024.25. Respondent rejected the offer-in-compromise because he was likely to receive more from the petitioners' pending bankruptcy. Petitioners want the Court to determine that respondent's rejection was an abuse of discretion and that respondent be compelled to accept the offer-in-compromise with respect to both the income taxes and the employment taxes. We find that respondent did not abuse his discretion.



Section 6330 provides that no levy may be made on any property or right to property of a person unless the Secretary first notifies him in writing of the right to a hearing before the Appeals Office. At the hearing, the taxpayer may raise any relevant issues relating to the unpaid tax or the proposed levy, including appropriate spousal defenses, challenges to the appropriateness of collection actions, and collection alternatives. Sec. 6330(c)(2)(A). A taxpayer may contest the existence or amount of the underlying tax liability if the taxpayer failed to receive a notice of deficiency for the tax liability in question or did not otherwise have an earlier opportunity to dispute the tax liability. Sec. 6330(c)(2)(B); see also Sego v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 604, 609 (2000).



Following a hearing, the Appeals Office must make a determination whether the Secretary may proceed with the proposed collection action. We have jurisdiction to review the Appeals officer's determination. Sec. 6330(d)(1). Where the underlying tax liability is properly at issue, we review that determination de novo. Goza v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 176, 181-182 (2000). Where the underlying tax liability is not at issue, we review the determination for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 182.




II. Offers-in-Compromise


Petitioners first seek to compel respondent's acceptance of their offer-in-compromise. Petitioners suggest that the failure to accept their original offer-in-compromise was an abuse of discretion.



We do not conduct an independent review of what would be an acceptable offer-in-compromise. Murphy v. Commissioner, 125 T.C. 301, 320 (2005), affd. 469 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2006); Fowler v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-163. The extent of our review is to determine whether the Appeals officer's decision to reject the taxpayer's offer-in-compromise was arbitrary, capricious, or without sound basis in fact or law. Skrizowski v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-229; Fowler v. Commissioner, supra.



Section 7122(a) authorizes the Commissioner to compromise any civil or criminal case arising under the internal revenue laws. See Fargo v. Commissioner, 447 F.3d 706, 712 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that the authorization to compromise any civil or criminal case is discretionary), affg. T.C. Memo. 2004-13. Section 7122(c) provides that the Commissioner shall prescribe guidelines for evaluation of whether an offer-in-compromise should be accepted. See sec. 301.7122-1(c)(1), Proced. & Admin. Regs.



The section 7122 regulations set forth grounds for the compromise of a taxpayer's liability, including doubt as to collectibility. Sec. 301.7122-1(b), Proced. & Admin. Regs. Doubt as to collectibility exists in any case where the taxpayer's assets and income are less than the full amount of the liability. Sec. 301.7122-1(b)(2), Proced. & Admin. Regs. Generally, under the Commissioner's administrative pronouncements, an offer to compromise based on doubt as to collectibility will be acceptable only if it reflects the reasonable collection potential of the case; i.e., that amount, less than the full liability, that the IRS could collect through means such as administrative and judicial collection remedies. Rev. Proc. 2003-71, sec. 4.02(2), 2003-2 C.B. 517, 517. The offer-in-compromise must include all unpaid tax liabilities and periods for which the taxpayer is liable. 1 Administration, IRM (CCH), pt. 5.8.17, at 16,256.



If an offer-in-compromise is submitted where a taxpayer has also filed a bankruptcy petition, the Commissioner cautions against acceptance of the offer-in-compromise in the window between a taxpayer's discharge in bankruptcy and the time the final distribution is made because "it is uncertain whether the Service would still have a valid claim in bankruptcy if an offer is accepted." 1 Administration, IRM (CCH), pt. 5.8.10.2.3(2), at 16,368. Thus, the Internal Revenue Manual guidelines advise that "the amount acceptable for an offer should include the amount we reasonably expect to recover from the bankruptcy in addition to what can be collected from the taxpayer on non-discharged liabilities or from property outside the bankruptcy." Id.



It is clear from the administrative record that Mr. Conte was concerned that accepting petitioners' $9,024.25 offer-in-compromise would risk respondent's expected distribution from the bankruptcy. Mr. Conte had extended contact with respondent's bankruptcy specialists. He also performed his own research, including reviewing the IRM guidelines. Mr. Conte sought to determine the likely amount respondent would receive from the bankruptcy and the effect accepting a compromise would have on respondent's distribution. Ultimately, Mr. Conte concluded that respondent was likely to receive approximately $20,000 of the $25,000 remaining in the bankruptcy. Further, as advised by counsel, Mr. Conte concluded that accepting the offer-in-compromise risked respondent's claims in the bankruptcy estate. Thus, in accordance with the IRM and advice from counsel, Mr. Conte determined that petitioners' offer-in-compromise was inadequate because it was less than what respondent expected to receive from the bankruptcy trustee and because accepting that offer would place that distribution at risk.



Petitioners argue that respondent's rejection of the offer-in-compromise was based on an erroneous conclusion of law that the bankruptcy distribution was at risk. Petitioners argue that respondent's distribution from the bankruptcy was never at risk. If respondent's determination was based upon an erroneous conclusion of law, we must reject that view and find that respondent abused his discretion. See Swanson v. Commissioner, 121 T.C. 111, 119 (2003).



As respondent's counsel now explains, an offer-in-compromise must include all of the outstanding liabilities of the taxpayer. Further, section 6325(a) provides that the Commissioner "shall issue a certificate of release of any lien imposed with respect to any internal revenue tax" not later than 30 days after the liability for the amount has been fully satisfied. Thus respondent argues, if respondent were to accept an offer-in-compromise and the liabilities were thereby fully satisfied, he would jeopardize any secured claim to the bankruptcy distribution. Accordingly, as respondent's counsel argues, an offer-in-compromise will not be accepted while a bankruptcy is pending if the offer is less than the amount he reasonably stands to receive when the bankruptcy distribution occurs.



We believe, however, that respondent's risk, or at least his perceived risk, goes beyond simply the release of any secured claim he has to the bankruptcy distribution. If an offer-in-compromise must include all of the outstanding liabilities of the taxpayer, then acceptance and satisfaction of the offer would risk, if not extinguish, all claims the Commissioner had to the bankruptcy assets. The administrative record suggests it was this more generalized risk, to all of respondent's claims, that concerned Mr. Conte in evaluating petitioners' offer-incompromise. Nonetheless, petitioners fail to point to any authority to suggest that respondent's position that accepting an offer-in-compromise jeopardized the bankruptcy distribution was without legal basis, and the Court knows of none.



In furtherance of their argument that the bankruptcy distribution was not at risk, petitioners highlight their offer to relinquish any claim to the bankruptcy distribution for the benefit of respondent. While this offer would have reduced the risk that petitioners would receive a windfall from the bankruptcy by virtue of the offer-in-compromise, it did nothing to reduce respondent's risk with respect to other creditors. As Mr. Conte explained in his closing memorandum: if the offer-incompromise were accepted, any remaining funds in the bankruptcy "would go to other creditors or to the taxpayer." Petitioners again fail to present any authority to suggest that their other creditors would be precluded from objecting to any distribution to respondent after the acceptance of their offer-in-compromise.



Petitioners make two additional arguments on why respondent's determination was an abuse of discretion. First, petitioners suggest that respondent was announcing a bright-line rule and did not exercise discretion at all. Second, petitioners argue that respondent abused his discretion because he rejected the offer-in-compromise solely on the basis of the amount offered in contravention of section 7122(d)(3). We address each in turn.



Petitioners first take issue with Mr. Conte's requirement that their offer-in-compromise be increased by the amount of the expected distribution from the bankruptcy. The IRM guidelines instruct that an acceptable offer-in-compromise would have to include the amount that respondent expected to receive from the bankruptcy in addition to what respondent could collect from petitioners directly. Petitioners argue that by relying upon this provision of the IRM, the Appeals officer was not exercising discretion at all but instead enunciating a bright-line rule for all postdischarge bankruptcy cases where the Commissioner is waiting for a distribution. See Estate of Roski v. Commissioner, 128 T.C. 113 (2007) (holding that by requiring all estates to post a bond to make a section 6166 election regardless of the facts before him, the Commissioner was adopting a bright-line policy that trumped the exercise of his discretion).



Mr. Conte's use of the IRM was not, however, a de facto enunciation of a bright-line rule that trumped the exercise of discretion. In evaluating an offer-in-compromise under doubt as to collectibility, the Commissioner must first determine the reasonable collection potential on the amount owed. Rev. Proc. 2003-71, sec. 4.02(2). In the ordinary circumstance, the Commissioner calculates the reasonable collection potential by determining the excess of a taxpayer's assets and future income above certain allowances for basic living expenses. See Klein v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-325. The guidelines aid the Commissioner in this endeavor. Id.; see also, e.g., McDonough v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-234; Etkin v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-245; Schulman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-129. A pending bankruptcy petition changes this collection analysis because the taxpayer has surrendered his assets to the bankruptcy court. Thus, where a taxpayer has filed for bankruptcy, the Commissioner stands to collect as a creditor in the bankruptcy proceeding in addition to possibly collecting from the taxpayer directly from future income and assets not subject to the bankruptcy.



Thus, at first, the IRM instructs a settlement officer to consider the Commissioner's standing as a creditor in the bankruptcy and advises that an acceptable offer-in-compromise include the amount the Commissioner reasonably expects to recover from the bankruptcy. 1 Administration, IRM (CCH), pt. 5.8.10.2.3(2). In other words, the Appeals officer should not accept an offer of $5 when doing so will risk the likely receipt of $10 down the road. Second, the IRM instructs that an acceptable offer-in-compromise should also include the amount that "can be collected from the taxpayer on non-discharged liabilities or from property outside the bankruptcy." Id. Thus, if the Commissioner stands to receive $10 as a creditor in the bankruptcy and, in addition, $5 can be collected directly from the taxpayer, then the reasonable collection potential is not $5 or even $10, but more like $15.



Mr. Conte did not have to reach the second part of this analysis --the amount respondent could collect from petitioners outside of the bankruptcy. The $9,024.25 offer-in-compromise from petitioners was less than the $20,000 Mr. Conte expected respondent would receive from the bankruptcy, and he determined that acceptance of the offer would risk the receipt of that $20,000. We find that Mr. Conte was not enunciating a bright-line rule for all cases. Mr. Conte was simply applying respondent's guidelines on evaluating offers-in-compromise, including the reasonable collection potential, to the specifics of petitioners' offer.



Finally, petitioners argue that respondent abused his discretion by rejecting petitioners' offer-in-compromise solely on the basis of the amount offered. Section 7122(d)(3)(A) provides: "an officer or employee of the Internal Revenue Service shall not reject an offer-in-compromise from a low-income taxpayer solely on the basis of the amount of the offer". The regulations expand on this by stating that "No offer to compromise may be rejected solely on the basis of the amount of the offer without evaluating that offer under the provisions of this section and the Secretary's policies and procedures regarding the compromise of cases." Sec. 301.7122-1(f)(3), Proced. & Admin. Regs.



The administrative record makes clear that Mr. Conte did not reject petitioners' offer-in-compromise solely on the basis of the amount offered, $9,024.25. Mr. Conte used respondent's policies and procedures --the guidelines of the IRM as well as advice received from counsel --to evaluate the specifics of petitioners' offer in the light of what respondent could reasonably expect to collect on petitioners' liabilities. Mr. Conte concluded that respondent was likely to receive more in the distribution from the bankruptcy than from petitioners' offer-incompromise. Further, Mr. Conte determined that accepting petitioners' offer would risk this expected greater distribution. We find petitioners' offer-in-compromise was not rejected solely on the basis of the amount offered.



We are not unsympathetic to petitioners' situation as they ultimately had no control over when any distribution from the bankruptcy would be made. Since then, petitioners' financial outlook has improved dramatically. Mr. Salazar is now employed as a manager of a restaurant and has begun receiving Social Security benefits. Mrs. Salazar completed law school and now works as an attorney. Thus, while the $9,024.25 offer-in-compromise may have been the limit of what petitioners could pay in 2004, when Mr. Salazar submitted a second offer-in-compromise during the second collection review hearing with respect to his employment tax liabilities, respondent determined that Mr. Salazar was then in a position to pay the entirety of his outstanding employment tax liabilities. Petitioners have not presented any argument or evidence to the Court to suggest that respondent's rejection of this second offer-in-compromise was an abuse of discretion.



In sum, we find that respondent did not abuse his discretion in rejecting petitioners' offers-in-compromise.




III. Underlying Liability


To the extent the Court does not compel respondent to accept their original offer-in-compromise, petitioners argue in the alternative that respondent's assessment of penalties and interest while their bankruptcy petition was pending was erroneous. Petitioners also argue that respondent erroneously applied the bankruptcy proceeds to the individual employment tax liabilities of Claude Salazar instead of their joint income tax liabilities.



In a collection review proceeding, a taxpayer may raise challenges to the existence or amount of the underlying liability for any tax period if the person did not receive any statutory notice of deficiency for such tax liability or did not otherwise have an opportunity to dispute the underlying liability. Sec. 6330(c)(2)(B). Where a taxpayer has filed a bankruptcy action, and the Commissioner has submitted a proof of claim for unpaid Federal tax liabilities in a taxpayer's bankruptcy action, we have held that the taxpayer has had the opportunity to dispute the liabilities for purposes of section 6330(c)(2)(B). See Kendricks v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 69 (2005); Sabath v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-222. A bankruptcy court may consider the amount or legality of taxes, including penalties and interest. 11 U.S.C. sec. 505(a) (2000); Sabath v. Commissioner, supra.



In petitioners' bankruptcy proceeding, respondent submitted a proof of claim for petitioners' unpaid income tax and employment tax liabilities, including penalties and interest. Petitioners, while represented by counsel, did not file an objection to these tax liabilities. Accordingly, petitioners are precluded from challenging their underlying liabilities, including the penalties and interest. However, even if petitioners had raised the issue of whether respondent's assessment of penalties and interest during their bankruptcy proceeding was erroneous, to the extent that respondent has not conceded this issue, we would sustain his assessment of penalties and interest.



Section 6658(a) provides that "No addition to the tax shall be made under section 6651, 6654, or 6655 for failure to make timely payment of tax with respect to a period during which a case is pending under title 11 of the United States Code". Petitioners' bankruptcy was pending from the date they filed their petition until their case was closed on March 30, 2006. See Rev. Rul. 2005-9, 2005-1 C.B. 470.



Respondent admits having erroneously assessed a failure to pay penalty with respect to petitioners' 1997 income tax account on October 23, 2003, while petitioners' bankruptcy was pending. Respondent has agreed to correct this error. Petitioners did not present any evidence that respondent assessed penalties for their 1998 and 1999 income tax liabilities while their bankruptcy petition was pending. Further, a review of petitioners' income tax account transcripts for 1998 and 1999 confirms that respondent did not assess any additional penalty during the pendency of their bankruptcy.



With respect to the employment tax liabilities for Mr. Salazar under docket No. 23547-06L, petitioners again argue that additions to tax were sought for the period their bankruptcy was pending. However, section 6658 does not prevent respondent from assessing the additions to tax during the pendency of the bankruptcy related to employment taxes to the extent that they are withheld or collected from others. Sec. 6658(b); Kiesner v. IRS, 194 Bankr. 452, 458 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1996); see also S. Rept. 96-1035, at 51 (1980), 1980-2 C.B. 620, 646 ("These relief rules do not, however, apply with respect to liability for penalties for failure to timely pay or deposit any employment tax required to be withheld by the debtor or trustee."). Accordingly, we find no basis to suggest that the employment tax liabilities respondent seeks to collect include any erroneously assessed additions to tax.



Petitioners also argue for abatement of interest on both their income tax and employment tax liabilities. The Commissioner is not prevented from seeking interest for the period a taxpayer's bankruptcy proceeding is pending. Sec. 6658(a); see also, e.g., Woodward v. United States, 113 Bankr. 680, 684 (Bankr. D. Or. 1990). Under section 6404(a), the Commissioner is granted the discretion to abate the assessment of any tax or liability that is excessive in amount, assessed after the expiration of the period of limitation, or erroneously assessed. But see sec. 6404(b) ("No claim for abatement shall be filed by a taxpayer in respect of an assessment of any tax imposed under subtitle A or B."). Section 6404(e) authorizes the Commissioner to abate interest assessments that are attributable to errors or delays by the IRS.



Petitioners do not argue that the interest is excessive or was erroneously assessed under section 6404(a). Instead, petitioners argue for abatement of interest because of the delay in the distribution of funds from the bankruptcy. While in certain circumstances interest may be abated because of an unreasonable delay of the Commissioner, respondent was no more in control over the distribution of the bankruptcy proceeds than were petitioners. We find that the delay in the distribution of proceeds by the bankruptcy trustee is not grounds for the abatement of interest under section 6404 or for otherwise relieving petitioners from liability for the interest.



Finally, under docket No. 23547-06L,5 petitioners challenge respondent's application of the bankruptcy proceeds to the employment tax liabilities of Mr. Salazar instead of the joint tax liabilities of both petitioners. Because the distribution occurred after the bankruptcy proceeding was closed, and Mr. Salazar raised it during the hearing, we may review this issue.



At the time of the bankruptcy trustee's final report, respondent possessed: (1) A secured claim of $19,915.40 for petitioners' 1997 and 1998 tax liabilities; (2) an unsecured priority claim of $43,673.45 for petitioners' 1999 income tax liabilities and Mr. Salazar's 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2001 employment tax liabilities; and (3) an unsecured general claim of $8,850.74. However, only payment on respondent's $43,673.45 priority claim was allowed by the bankruptcy trustee.



Respondent applied the $17,834.51 that was ultimately disbursed by the bankruptcy trustee on August 22, 2005, to the employment tax liabilities of Mr. Salazar that made up part of respondent's priority claim. At first respondent applied the disbursement to the employment tax periods ending December 31, 1998, March 31, 1999, and June 30, 1999, in amounts that exceeded respondent's priority claims for those periods. Eventually, respondent corrected this application of the proceeds to also include partial payments on the priority claims for the periods ending September 30, 1999, and December 31, 1999.



Petitioners claim that respondent should have applied the disbursement to petitioners' joint income tax liabilities first instead of just Mr. Salazar's employment tax liabilities. Where a taxpayer makes voluntary payments to the IRS, he does have the right to direct the application of payments to whatever type of liability he chooses. See, e.g., Estate of Wilson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-221. However, where a taxpayer makes an involuntary payment, the IRS may allocate or reallocate the payment as it sees fit, regardless of a taxpayer's designation. As we have stated: "An involuntary payment of Federal taxes means any payment received by agents of the United States as a result of distraint or levy or from a legal proceeding in which the Government is seeking to collect its delinquent taxes or file a claim therefor." Amos v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 65, 69 (1966); see also United States v. Pepperman, 976 F.2d 123, 127 (3d Cir. 1992) (noting that most courts to have considered the issue have concluded that payments made in the bankruptcy context are involuntary). In the light of the involuntary nature of the bankruptcy distribution, we find no error in respondent's application of the proceeds to the employment tax liabilities of Mr. Salazar before the joint income tax liabilities of both petitioners. In any event, there is no evidence that petitioners specified in writing that the proceeds be applied to their income tax liability instead.



On the basis of the record before the Court, and with the exception of the failure to pay penalty for income tax year 1997 which respondent concedes, petitioners are liable for the taxes, additions to tax, and interest as determined by respondent. We further find that respondent did not abuse his discretion in rejecting petitioners' offers-in-compromise. Thus, respondent's determination that the Federal tax levies were appropriate in these cases is sustained.



To reflect the foregoing,



Decision in docket No. 2203-05L will be entered under Rule 155.



Decision in docket No. 23547-06L will be entered for respondent.


1 Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code, as amended, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.

2 "IMF" refers to respondent's Individual Master File for petitioners' income tax liabilities. "BMF" refers to respondent's Business Master File for Mr. Salazar's employment tax liabilities.

3 Respondent also moved to dismiss on the grounds that the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear any challenge to Mr. Salazar's employment tax liabilities. However, because respondent issued a notice of determination with respect to Mr. Salazar's employment tax liabilities on Oct. 18, 2006, respondent admits that we now have jurisdiction to review his determination under sec. 6330(d)(1). See Callahan v. Commissioner, 130 T.C. __ (2008).

4 Respondent's notice of intent to levy did not include the periods ending Dec. 31, 1998, or Mar. 31, 1999.

5 The trustee had not filed his final report nor had any disbursements been made at the time of petitioners' collection review hearing with respect to their joint liabilities.

Labels:

Monday, February 25, 2008

Section 1341 claim of right doctrine -Whether, as required by section 1341(a)(1), Taxpayers had an unrestricted right to the profits on the gain sales, subsequently required to be disgorged to Corporation pursuant to the settlement agreement, when Taxpayers included those profits in gross income.


IRS Letter Ruling 200808019

LTR Report Number 1617, February 27, 2008 IRS REF: Symbol: CC:ITA:B05:-POSTF-125260-07 [Code Sec. 1341]

November 13, 2007

DATE: November 13, 2007

TO: Patricia A. Donahue Area Counsel (Small Business/Self-Employed: Area 7)

FROM: William A. Jackson Chef, Branch 05, Income Tax & Accounting

SUBJECT: Section 1341 and Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934

This Chief Counsel Advice responds to your request for assistance. This advice may not be used or cited as precedent.




ISSUE


Under the facts of this case, does the "claim of wrong" exception prevent Taxpayers from claiming the tax benefits of section1 1341 for payments to settle alleged violations of section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b)?




CONCLUSION


Under the facts of this case, the "claim of wrong" exception does not apply to prevent Taxpayers from calculating their tax liability under section 1341.




FACTS


Taxpayers filed an Application for Tentative Refund (Form 1045) for Year 3 on which they claimed entitlement to an overpayment of tax under section 1341(b)(1) of $A. The Service paid that amount to Taxpayers as required by section 6411. The Service is examining that claim. Taxpayers consist of Executive and Spouse.

Executive founded Corporation of which Executive was a shareholder as well as its president and CEO. On Date 1, Corporation issued stock in an initial public offering. During Year 1, in return for annual annuity payments, Taxpayers transferred shares of Corporation stock that they owned to Entity 1 and Entity 2, with each Entity receiving A# shares. Entity 3 also purchased B# shares of Corporation stock from Taxpayers.

Taxpayers sold Corporation stock as follows: (1) C# shares on Date 2 for $C, (2) D# shares on Date 3 for $D, and (3) E# shares on Date 4 for $E (collectively the gain sales).

*****

During Period 3 Corporation stock split.

*****

On their Year 2 federal income tax return Taxpayers reported capital gain on line 13 in the amount of $B. That amount included long-term capital gain on their sales of Corporation stock for that year in the amount of $F. In computing gain on the sale of the Corporation stock Taxpayers reported basis in the shares of $G and $H. Nothing explains the source of that basis. Taxpayers' total reported tax liability for Year 2 was $I. Taxpayers reported no alternative minimum tax liability for Year 2.

*****

The settlement required Taxpayers to pay a total of $M. The settlement agreement received court approval on Date 6. Taxpayers have represented that on Date 7 and Date 8 they paid $N and $O respectively to Corporation.

Taxpayers filed a Form 1045 concurrently with their Form 1040 for Year 3. On the Form 1045 Taxpayers made application for a tentative refund under section 6411(d) of an alleged overpayment determined under section 1341(b)(1). On the Form 1045, Taxpayers computed their reduction in tax liability under section 1341(a)(5)(B) by excluding, for Year 2, some of the gain on the sale of Corporation Stock. Taxpayers computed a decrease in tax for Year 2 of $R. Taxpayers reported that decrease as a payment of tax for Year 3 resulting in an overpayment of tax under section 1341(b)(1) of $A ($R - $T (tax liability reported for Year 3)).




LAW AND ANALYSIS


Where it applies section 1341 allows a taxpayer to pay the lesser of: (1) the normal income tax for the year in which excess income is restored by the taxpayer with a deduction for the amount restored (section 1341(a)(4)) or, if less (2) a tax computed with a reduction in the amount that the tax for the year in which the taxpayer received the excess income would have been decreased if the amount restored had been excluded from income in that year (section 1341(a)(5)(A)-(B)). To qualify for the tax benefits of section 1341, the taxpayer must satisfy the following three requirements of section 1341(a):

(a)(1) the taxpayer must have included an item in gross income for a prior taxable year (or years) because it appeared that the taxpayer had an unrestricted right to the item, (a)(2) a deduction must be allowable to the taxpayer for the current taxable year because it was established after the close of the taxable year (or years) of income inclusion that the taxpayer did not have an unrestricted right to the item or portion thereof, and

(a)(3) the amount of the deduction must exceed $3,000.

The primary issue in this case concerns whether it appeared, as required by section 1341(a)(1), that Taxpayers had an unrestricted right to the profits on the gain sales, subsequently required to be disgorged to Corporation pursuant to the settlement agreement, when Taxpayers included those profits in gross income in Year 2.

To be entitled to the tax benefits of section 1341, a taxpayer must restore in the taxable year an item that was included in gross income under a claim of right in a prior taxable year. Treas. Reg. § 1.1341-1(a). Treas. Reg. § 1.1341-1(a)(2) defines "income included under a claim of right" as an item included in gross income because it appeared from all the facts available in the year of inclusion that the taxpayer had an unrestricted right to such item and "restoration to another" means a restoration resulting because it was established after the close of such prior taxable year that the taxpayer did not have an unrestricted right to such item (or portion thereof).

The taxpayer must have a bona fide claim to the item of income to qualify the income as included under a claim of right. Consequently, although one who embezzles funds must include those funds in gross income under section 61, such income is not included under a claim of right for purposes of section 1341(a). See e.g. Yerkie v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 388 (1976) [CCH Dec. 34,133 ]; McKinney v. United States, 574 F2d. 1240 (5th Cir. 1978) [78-2 USTC ¶9508 ], cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1072 (1979); Hankins v. United States, 403 F.Supp. 257 (N.D. Miss. 1975) [75-2 USTC ¶9746 ], aff'd without published opinion, 531 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1976); Rev. Rul. 65-254, 1965-2 CB 50. Likewise, this "claim of wrong" exception to the application of section 1341 has been applied in a variety of contexts involving intentional wrongdoing. See e.g. Perez v. United States, 553 F.Supp 558 (M.D. Fla. 1982) [83-1 USTC ¶9106 ] (income from kickback payments resulting in taxpayer's conviction of mail fraud) ; Culley v. United States, 222 F3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2000) [2000-2 USTC ¶50,662 ] (money obtained through bribery and kickback scheme and fraud in the sale of a business); O'Hagan v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1995-409 [Dec. 50,854(M) ] (lawyer improperly using client funds for personal purposes, convicted of theft by temporary control); Wang v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1998-389 [CCH Dec. 52,937(M) ], aff'd, 2002-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) P50443 [2002-1 USTC ¶50,443 ](9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 910 (2003) (taxpayer obtaining money illegally through selling insider information).

Although most "claim of wrong" cases have involved obtaining income through criminal wrongdoing, the exception is not limited to criminal cases. In Parks v. United States, 945 F.Supp. 865 (W.D. Pa. 1996) [96-2 USTC ¶50,645 ], the taxpayers sought section 1341 tax treatment for amounts they paid to settle civil fraud allegations. There was no judgment establishing that the taxpayers committed fraud. However, the court did not view the settlement in the civil action as precluding the government from proving fraud as a bar to the application of section 1341 in a federal tax proceeding. The court concluded that any income obtained through intentional wrongdoing failed to qualify for the tax benefits of section 1341:

If the taxpayer commits fraud to obtain income, this court would not accept that such conduct can create the appearance of an unrestricted right to an item of income. If one commits an intentional wrongdoing, one always does so at the risk of discovery and the potential for disgorgement, restitution, civil penalties, criminal liability, and the like. As argued elsewhere by the government in a section 1341 case, ill-gotten gains are never obtained by unrestricted right. [citing Perez].

Id. at 866.

In applying the claim of wrong exception in McKinney, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated:

The language of § 1341(a)(1), i.e. `because it appeared that the taxpayer had an unrestricted right to such item', must necessarily mean `because it appeared to the taxpayer [emphasis in original] that he had an unrestricted right to such item.'

574 F.2d at 1243. Likewise, in Perez, articulating its standard for applying the claim of wrong exception the district court stated:

This Court must therefore conclude that the reasoning and result in McKinney cannot be limited only to embezzlers; instead, the statute's `unrestricted right' language must be read to exclude from its coverage all those who receive earnings knowing themselves to have no legal right thereto.

553 F.Supp. at 561.

The above quotes raise the question of whether the claim of wrong exception is based on an objective standard or applies based on the taxpayer's subjective intent. That is, must the taxpayer actually be aware that the taxpayer is obtaining income through wrongful means for the exception to apply or can it be applied based on how a reasonable person would have viewed the behavior in question. In Wood v. United States , 863 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1989) [89-1 USTC ¶9143 ], a case involving the forfeiture of a portion of the proceeds from marijuana sales, this question was raised but not required to be resolved. However, in footnote 9 to Zadoff v. United States, 638 F.Supp 1240, 1244 (S.D. N.Y. 1986) [86-2 USTC ¶9567 ], a case involving kickbacks from a supplier to an employee of the supplier's customer, the court stated that "[a] mere unreasonable belief by a taxpayer that he has a right to income, without more, will not entitle the taxpayer to § 1341 treatment upon repayment."

Section 16(b) imposes liability on certain parties who derive profits from purchasing and selling or selling and purchasing certain equity securities within a period of less than six months. This provision imposes strict liability requiring neither negligence nor wrongdoing for its application. It is not necessary for us to resolve the issue of whether the claim of wrong exception could ever apply in the context of section 16(b). It is clear, however, that the exception does not apply under the facts of this case.

*****

Because there was a bona fide legal issue regarding Taxpayers' liability under section 16(b), Taxpayers had an appearance of an unrestricted right to the income in question. The claim of wrong exception does not apply here to prevent the application of section 1341 to the amounts at issue.



Additional Issues

A. Restoration

Taxpayers disgorged profits to Corporation rather than to the parties who purchased their Corporation stock. To qualify as a restoration for purposes of section 1341, the disgorgement of income need not be to the party who was the original payor of the income. It is only necessary that the taxpayer pay the disgorged income to its rightful owner. See Example at Treas. Reg. § 1.1341-(1)(h).

B. Settlement as Establishing Liability

Section 1341(a)(2) requires that a deduction be allowable because it was established after the close of the taxable year (or years) of income inclusion that the taxpayer did not have an unrestricted right to the item included in gross income. Pursuant to the establishment requirement, the deduction must arise because the taxpayer is under a legal obligation to disgorge the income. See Barrett v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 713 (1991) [CCH Dec. 47,346 ]; Kappel v. United States, 437 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir.) [71-1 USTC ¶9193 ], cert. denied, 404 U.S. 830 (1971). This legal obligation need not be established by a final judgment. See Rev. Rul. 58-456, 1958-2 C.B. 415. Under the facts of this case, the Trial Court judgment together with the settlement of that liability during the appeal process establishes Taxpayers legal obligation to disgorge the profits at issue for purposes of section 1341(a)(2). Cf. Barrett 2 (good faith arms-length settlement of civil suits seeking disgorgement of profits from option trading established liability for purposes of section 1341).

C. Exclusion of Interest

Even if Taxpayers are entitled to compute a reduction in tax under section 1341(a)(5)(B), the exclusion of gross income attributable to the restoration payment cannot include the portion of the settlement payment allocable to interest. Section 1341 only applies to the portion of the settlement payment that constitutes disgorged profits.

D. Attorney Fees

On their Year 3 Schedule D, Capital Gains and Losses, Taxpayers claimed $W of legal fees incurred in the section 16(b) litigation as a long-term capital loss. This treatment is in accord with the treatment allowed in Barrett. If the fees were paid in Year 3, the fees appear to be properly claimed as a long-term capital loss for that year. Legal fees incurred in contesting a liability to disgorge income that qualifies for the tax benefits of section 1341 do not themselves qualify for such benefits. Treas. Reg. § 1.1341-1(h).

E. Alternative Minimum Tax

In computing the reduction in tax for a prior taxable year under section 1341(a)(5)(B), the statute requires a computation of what the tax imposed under chapter 1 of the Code would have been if the disgorged income had not previously been included in gross income. The excess of the chapter 1 tax originally imposed over the recomputed chapter 1 tax, if any, is treated as a payment of tax for the taxable year of restoration. This amount does not affect the computation of either regular tax or alternative minimum tax liability for the taxable year of restoration. It is simply treated as one of the payments, like an estimated tax payment, applied against that liability which either reduces the amount due or constitutes an overpayment if in excess of that liability. However, because the tax imposed under chapter 1 of the Code includes both regular tax and alternative minimum tax, it is necessary to recompute both of these taxes for the prior taxable year when performing a section 1341(a)(5)(B) computation.

CASE DEVELOPMENT, HAZARDS AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

This writing may contain privileged information. Any unauthorized disclosure of this writing may undermine our ability to protect the privileged information. If disclosure is determined to be necessary, please contact this office for our views.

Please call (202) 622-4960 if you have any further questions.

1 With the exception of references to section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b), references to sections refer to sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 as applicable to the taxable years under discussion.

2 Although the Service issued a nonacquiescence in Barrett, see AOD 1992-08, this nonacquiescence was based on the deficiency of the record in that case rather than on the principle that a settlement agreement could never establish liability for section 1341(a)(2) purposes.

Labels:

Friday, February 22, 2008

IRS Lien Release - New Rebulations- Section 6325T.D. 9378, Correction

February 22, 2008

Code Sec. 6325

Code Sec. 6503

Code Sec. 7426

Practice and procedure : Tax liens : Release of encumbrance .



DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY



Internal Revenue Service

26 CFR Part 301

[TD 9378 ]

RIN 1545-BE35

Release of Lien or Discharge of Property; Correction

AGENCY: Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Treasury.

ACTION: Correcting amendments.

SUMMARY: This document contains corrections to final regulations (TD 9378 ) that were published in the Federal Register on Thursday, January 31, 2008 (73 FR 5741) relating to release of lien and discharge of property under sections 6325 , 6503 and 7423 of the Internal Revenue Code. These regulations update existing regulations and contain procedures for processing a request made by a property owner for discharge of a Federal tax lien from his property under section 6325(b)(4) . The regulations also clarify the impact of these procedures on sections 6503(f)(2) and 7426(a)(4) and (b)(5).

DATES: The correction is effective February 22, 2008.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Debra A. Kohn, (202) 622-7985 (not a toll-free number).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:



Background

The final regulations (TD 9378 ) that are the subject of the correction are under sections 6325 , 6503 and 7426 of the Internal Revenue Code.



Need for Correction

As published, final regulations (TD 9378 ) contain errors that may prove to be misleading and are in need of clarification.



List of Subjects in 26 CFR Part 301

Employment taxes, Estate taxes, Excise taxes, Gift taxes, Income taxes, Penalties, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.



Correction of Publication

Accordingly, 26 CFR part 301 is corrected by making the following amendments:



PART 301-PROCEDURE AND ADMINISTRATION

Paragraph 1. The authority citation for part 301 continues to read, in part, as follows:

Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805 * * *

Par. 2 Section 301.6325-1 is amended by revising the second sentence of paragraph (b)(2)(i) and first sentence of paragraph (b)(4)(ii) to read as follows:

§301.6025-1 Release of lien or discharge of property.

*****

(b) * * *

(2) * * *

(i) * * * In determining the amount to be paid, the appropriate official will take into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the case, including the expenses to which the government has been put in the matter. * * *

* * * * *

(4) * * *

(ii) * * * The appropriate official may, in his discretion, determine that either the entire unsatisfied tax liability listed on the notice of Federal tax lien can be satisfied from a source other than the property sought to be discharged, or the value of the interest of the United States is less than the prior determination of such value. * * *

* * * * *

LaNita Van Dyke,

Chief,

Publications and Regulations Branch,

Legal Processing Division,

Associate Chief Counsel (Procedure and Administration).


T.D. 9378 , filed with the Federal Register on January 31, 2008 (corrected 2/21/2008).

[ Code Secs. 6325, 6503 and 7426]


Practice and procedure: Tax liens: Release of encumbrance. --
Amendments of Reg. §§301.6325-1, 301.6503(f)-1 and 301.7426-1, related to release of lien and discharge of property under Code Secs. 6325, 6503 and 7426, are adopted. Back references: ¶38,166, ¶39,036 and ¶41,712.



AGENCY: Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Treasury.

ACTION: Final regulations and removal of temporary regulations.

SUMMARY: This document contains final regulations related to release of lien and discharge of property under sections 6325, 6503, and 7426 of the Internal Revenue Code (Code). These regulations update existing regulations and contain procedures for processing a request made by a property owner for discharge of a Federal tax lien from his property under section 6325(b)(4). The regulations also clarify the impact of these procedures on sections 6503(f)(2) and 7426(a)(4) and (b)(5). These regulations reflect the enactment of sections 6325(b)(4), 6503(f)(2), and 7426(a)(4) by the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998.

DATES: Effective Date: These regulations are effective January 31, 2008.

Applicability Date: These regulations apply to any release of lien or discharge of property that is requested after January 31, 2008.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Debra A. Kohn, (202) 622-7985 (not a toll-free number).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:



Background

This document contains final regulations that amend the Procedure and Administration Regulations (26 CFR part 301) under sections 6325, 6503, and 7426 of the Code. The IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Public Law 105-206 (112 Stat. 685) (RRA 1998), enacted sections 6325(b)(4), 6503(f)(2), 7426(a)(4), and 7426(a)(5) to provide a statutory mechanism for a person other than the person against whom the underlying tax was assessed, upon furnishing a deposit or bond, to obtain a discharge of the Federal tax lien from property owned by him, and for the IRS or the courts to determine the disposition of the deposit or bond amount. RRA 1998 thereby necessitated changes to the rules under sections 6325, 6503, and 7426.

On January 11, 2007, a notice of proposed rulemaking (REG-159444-04) relating to release of lien or discharge of property was published in the Federal Register (72 FR 1301-03). No comments were received and no public hearing was requested or held. Accordingly, the proposed regulations are adopted as amended by this Treasury decision. These final regulations generally retain the provisions of the proposed regulations but include one modification as explained in more detail below.



Explanation of Modification

The final regulations differ substantively in one respect from the version of the regulations set forth in the notice of proposed rulemaking. The proposed regulations interpret section 6325(b)(4)(D), which states that section 6325(b)(4)(A) is inapplicable "if the owner of the property is the person whose unsatisfied liability gave rise to the lien," as indicating that the procedures for obtaining a discharge of a Federal tax lien under section 6325(b)(4) are not available to a person who owns the subject property with the person whose tax liability gave rise to the lien (the taxpayer). Upon further consideration of this issue, it was decided that section 6235(b)(4)(D) should not be so interpreted, as that interpretation would unfairly leave some third-party property owners without a means to discharge Federal tax liens from their properties. Accordingly, the final regulations reflect an interpretation of section 6325(b)(4)(D) that makes the section 6325(b)(4) procedures available to a person who co-owns property with the taxpayer.



Special Analyses

It has been determined that this Treasury decision is not a significant regulatory action as defined in Executive Order 12866. Therefore, a regulatory assessment is not required. It also has been determined that section 553(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. chapter 5) does not apply to these regulations, and because these regulations do not impose collection of information on small entities, the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. chapter 6) does not apply. Pursuant to section 7805(f) of the Code, the notice of proposed rulemaking preceding these regulations was submitted to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration for comment on its impact on small business.



Drafting Information

The principal author of these regulations is Debra A. Kohn of the Office of the Associate Chief Counsel (Procedure and Administration).




List of Subjects

26 CFR Part 301

Employment taxes, Estate taxes, Excise taxes, Gift taxes, Income taxes, Penalties, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

26 CFR Part 401

Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Taxes.

Adoption of Amendments to the Regulations

Accordingly, under the authority of 26 U.S.C. 7805, 26 CFR parts 301 and 401 are amended as follows:

PART 301 --PROCEDURE AND ADMINISTRATION

Paragraph 1. The authority citation for part 301 continues to read, in part, as follows:

Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805 * * *

Par. 2. Section 301.6325-1 is amended as follows:

1. Paragraphs (a) and (b)(1)(i), (b)(2)(i), and (b)(2)(ii) and (b)(3) are revised.

2. Paragraph (b)(2)(iii) is redesignated as paragraph (b)(6) and revised.

3. Paragraph (b)(4) is redesignated as paragraph (b)(5) and revised.

4. A new paragraph (b)(4) is added.

5. Paragraphs (c)(1) and (c)(2) are amended by removing the language "district director" and adding the language "appropriate official" in its place, wherever it appears.

6. The first sentence of paragraph (d)(1) is amended by removing the language "A district director" and adding the language "The appropriate official" in its place, by removing the word "Code" and adding the language "Internal Revenue Code" in its place, and by removing the language "the district director" and adding the language "the appropriate official" in its place. The third sentence is amended by removing the language "a district director" and adding the language "the appropriate official" in its place, and removing the language "the district director" and adding "the appropriate official" in its place.

7. Paragraph (d)(2)(i) is amended by removing the language "A district director" and adding the language "The appropriate official" in its place, by removing the word "Code" and adding the language "Internal Revenue Code" in its place, and by removing the language "the district director" and adding the language "the appropriate official" in its place.

8. Paragraph (d)(2)(ii), Examples 1 through 4, are amended by removing the language "district director" and adding the language "appropriate official" in its place, wherever it appears.

9. Paragraphs (d)(3) and (d)(4) are amended by removing the language "district director" and adding the language "appropriate official" in its place, wherever it appears.

10. The first sentence of paragraph (e) is amended by removing the language "a district director" and adding the language "the appropriate official" in its place, and by removing the language "the district director" and adding the language "the appropriate official" in its place. The third and fourth sentences are amended by removing the language "district director" and adding the language "appropriate official" in its place.

11. Paragraphs (f)(1) and (f)(2)(i) are amended by removing the language "a district director" and adding the language "the appropriate official" in its place, paragraph (f)(2)(i)(b) is amended by removing the language "the district director" and adding the language "the appropriate official" in its place, and paragraph (f)(3) is amended by removing the word "Code" and adding the language "Internal Revenue Code" in its place.

12. Paragraphs (h) and (i) are added.

The revisions and additions read as follows:



§301.6325-1 Release of lien or discharge of property.

(a) Release of lien --(1) Liability satisfied or unenforceable. The appropriate official shall issue a certificate of release for a filed notice of Federal tax lien, no later than 30 days after the date on which he finds that the entire tax liability listed in such notice of Federal tax lien either has been fully satisfied (as defined in paragraph (a)(4) of this section) or has become legally unenforceable. In all cases, the liability for the payment of the tax continues until satisfaction of the tax in full or until the expiration of the statutory period for collection, including such extension of the period for collection as is agreed to.

(2) Bond accepted. The appropriate official shall issue a certificate of release of any tax lien if he is furnished and accepts a bond that is conditioned upon the payment of the amount assessed (together with all interest in respect thereof), within the time agreed upon in the bond, but not later than 6 months before the expiration of the statutory period for collection, including any agreed upon extensions. For provisions relating to bonds, see sections 7101 and 7102 and §§301.7101-1 and 301.7102-1.

(3) Certificate of release for a lien which has become legally unenforceable. The appropriate official shall have the authority to file a notice of Federal tax lien which also contains a certificate of release pertaining to those liens which become legally unenforceable. Such release will become effective as a release as of a date prescribed in the document containing the notice of Federal tax lien and certificate of release.

(4) Satisfaction of tax liability. For purposes of paragraph (a)(1) of this section, satisfaction of the tax liability occurs when --

(i) The appropriate official determines that the entire tax liability listed in a notice of Federal tax lien has been fully satisfied. Such determination will be made as soon as practicable after tender of payment; or

(ii) The taxpayer provides the appropriate official with proof of full payment (as defined in paragraph (a)(5) of this section) with respect to the entire tax liability listed in a notice of Federal tax lien together with the information and documents set forth in paragraph (a)(7) of this section. See paragraph (a)(6) of this section if more than one tax liability is listed in a notice of Federal tax lien.

(5) Proof of full payment. As used in paragraph (a)(4)(ii) of this section, the term proof of full payment means --

(i) An internal revenue cashier's receipt reflecting full payment of the tax liability in question;

(ii) A canceled check in an amount sufficient to satisfy the tax liability for which the release is being sought;

(iii) A record, made in accordance with procedures prescribed by the Commissioner, of proper payment of the tax liability by credit or debit card or by electronic funds transfer; or

(iv) Any other manner of proof acceptable to the appropriate official.

(6) Notice of a Federal tax lien which lists multiple liabilities. When a notice of Federal tax lien lists multiple tax liabilities, the appropriate official shall issue a certificate of release when all of the tax liabilities listed in the notice of Federal tax lien have been fully satisfied or have become legally unenforceable. In addition, if the taxpayer requests that a certificate of release be issued with respect to one or more tax liabilities listed in the notice of Federal tax lien and such liability has been fully satisfied or has become legally unenforceable, the appropriate official shall issue a certificate of release. For example, if a notice of Federal tax lien lists two separate liabilities and one of the liabilities is satisfied, the taxpayer may request the issuance of a certificate of release with respect to the satisfied tax liability and the appropriate official shall issue a release.

(7) Taxpayer requests. A request for a certificate of release with respect to a notice of Federal tax lien shall be submitted in writing to the appropriate official. The request shall contain the information required in the appropriate IRS Publication.

(b) Discharge of specific property from the lien --(1) Property double the amount of the liability. (i) The appropriate official may, in his discretion, issue a certificate of discharge of any part of the property subject to a Federal tax lien imposed under chapter 64 of the Internal Revenue Code if he determines that the fair market value of that part of the property remaining subject to the Federal tax lien is at least double the sum of the amount of the unsatisfied liability secured by the Federal tax lien and of the amount of all other liens upon the property which have priority over the Federal tax lien. In general, fair market value is that amount which one ready and willing but not compelled to buy would pay to another ready and willing but not compelled to sell the property.

* * * * *

(2) Part payment; interest of United States valueless --(i) Part payment. The appropriate official may, in his discretion, issue a certificate of discharge of any part of the property subject to a Federal tax lien imposed under chapter 64 of the Internal Revenue Code if there is paid over to him in partial satisfaction of the liability secured by the Federal tax lien an amount determined by him to be not less than the value of the interest of the United States in the property to be so discharged. In determining the amount to be paid, the appropriate official will take into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the case, including the expenses to which the government has been put in the matter. In no case shall the amount to be paid be less than the value of the interest of the United States in the property with respect to which the certificate of discharge is to be issued.

(ii) Interest of the United States valueless. The appropriate official may, in his discretion, issue a certificate of discharge of any part of the property subject to the Federal tax lien if he determines that the interest of the United States in the property to be so discharged has no value.

(3) Discharge of property by substitution of proceeds of sale. The appropriate official may, in his discretion, issue a certificate of discharge of any part of the property subject to a Federal tax lien imposed under chapter 64 of the Internal Revenue Code if such part of the property is sold and, pursuant to a written agreement with the appropriate official, the proceeds of the sale are held, as a fund subject to the Federal tax liens and claims of the United States, in the same manner and with the same priority as the Federal tax liens or claims had with respect to the discharged property. This paragraph does not apply unless the sale divests the taxpayer of all right, title, and interest in the property sought to be discharged. Any reasonable and necessary expenses incurred in connection with the sale of the property and the administration of the sale proceeds shall be paid by the applicant or from the proceeds of the sale before satisfaction of any Federal tax liens or claims of the United States.

(4) Right of substitution of value --(i) Issuance of certificate of discharge to property owner who is not the taxpayer. If an owner of property subject to a Federal tax lien imposed under chapter 64 of the Internal Revenue Code submits an application for a certificate of discharge pursuant to paragraph (b)(5) of this section, the appropriate official shall issue a certificate of discharge of such property after the owner either deposits with the appropriate official an amount equal to the value of the interest of the United States in the property, as determined by the appropriate official pursuant to paragraph (b)(6) of this section, or furnishes an acceptable bond in a like amount. This paragraph does not apply if the person seeking the discharge is the person whose unsatisfied liability gave rise to the Federal tax lien. Thus, if the property is owned by both the taxpayer and another person, the other person may obtain a certificate of discharge of the property under this paragraph, but the taxpayer may not.

(ii) Refund of deposit and release of bond. The appropriate official may, in his discretion, determine that either the entire unsatisfied tax liability listed on the notice of Federal tax lien can be satisfied from a source other than the property sought to be discharged, or the value of the interest of the United States is less than the prior determination of such value. The appropriate official shall refund the amount deposited with interest at the overpayment rate determined under section 6621 or release the bond furnished to the extent that he makes this determination.

(iii) Refund request. If a property owner desires an administrative refund of his deposit or release of the bond, the owner shall file a request in writing with the appropriate official. The request shall contain such information as the appropriate IRS Publication may require. The request must be filed within 120 days after the date the certificate of discharge is issued. A refund request made under this paragraph neither is required nor is effective to extend the period for filing an action in court under section 7426(a)(4).

(iv) Internal Revenue Service's use of deposit if court action not filed. If no action is filed under section 7426(a)(4) for refund of the deposit or release of the bond within the 120-day period specified therein, the appropriate official shall, within 60 days after the expiration of the 120-day period, apply the amount deposited or collect on such bond to the extent necessary to satisfy the liability listed on the notice of Federal tax lien, and shall refund, with interest at the overpayment rate determined under section 6621, any portion of the amount deposited that is not used to satisfy the liability. If the appropriate official has not completed the application of the deposit to the unsatisfied liability before the end of the 60-day period, the deposit will be deemed to have been applied to the unsatisfied liability as of the 60th day.

(5) Application for certificate of discharge. Any person desiring a certificate of discharge under this paragraph (b) shall submit an application in writing to the appropriate official. The application shall contain the information required by the appropriate IRS Publication. For purposes of this paragraph (b), any application for certificate of discharge made by a property owner who is not the taxpayer, and any amount submitted pursuant to the application, will be treated as an application for discharge and a deposit under section 6325(b)(4) unless the owner of the property submits a statement, in writing, that the application is being submitted under another paragraph of section 6325 and not under section 6325(b)(4), and the owner in writing waives the rights afforded under paragraph (b)(4), including the right to seek judicial review.

(6) Valuation of interest of United States. For purposes of paragraphs (b)(2) and (b)(4) of this section, in determining the value of the interest of the United States in the property, or any part thereof, with respect to which the certificate of discharge is to be issued, the appropriate official shall give consideration to the value of the property and the amount of all liens and encumbrances thereon having priority over the Federal tax lien. In determining the value of the property, the appropriate official may, in his discretion, give consideration to the forced sale value of the property in appropriate cases.

* * * * *

(h) As used in this section, the term appropriate official means either the official or office identified in the relevant IRS Publication or, if such official or office is not so identified, the Secretary or his delegate.

(i) Effective/applicability date. This section applies to any release of lien or discharge of property that is requested after January 31, 2008.

Par. 3. Section 301.6503(f)-1 is amended as follows:

1. The section heading is revised.

2. The undesignated paragraph is designated as paragraph (a), a paragraph heading is added, and a new sentence is added immediately prior to the Example.

3. In newly designated paragraph (a), the language "a district director" is removed and the language "the appropriate official" is added in its place, the language "the district director" is removed and the language "the appropriate official" is added in its place, and in the Example the language "district director" is removed and the language "appropriate official" is added in its place, wherever it appears.

4. Paragraphs (b), (c), and (d) are added.

The revisions and additions read as follows:



§301.6503(f)-1 Suspension of running of period of limitation; wrongful seizure of property of third-party owner and discharge of lien for substitution of value.

(a) Wrongful seizure. * * * The following example illustrates the principles of this section:

* * * * *

(b) Discharge of wrongful lien for substitution of value. If a person other than the taxpayer submits a request in writing for a certificate of discharge for a filed Federal tax lien under section 6325(b)(4), the running of the period of limitations on collection after assessment under section 6502 for any liability listed in such notice of Federal tax lien shall be suspended for a period equal to the period beginning on the date the appropriate official receives a deposit or bond in the amount specified in §301.6325-1(b)(4)(i) and ending on the date that is 30 days after the earlier of --

(1) The date the appropriate official no longer holds, or is deemed to no longer hold, within the meaning of paragraph (b)(4)(iv) of this section, any amount as a deposit or bond by reason of taking such actions as prescribed in sections 6325(b)(4)(B) and (C); or

(2) The date the judgment secured under section 7426(b)(5) becomes final.

(c) As used in this section, the term appropriate official means either the official or office identified in the relevant IRS Publication or, if such official or office is not so identified, the Secretary or his delegate.

(d) Effective/applicability date. This section applies to any request for a certificate of discharge made after January 31, 2008.

Par. 4. In §301.7426-1, paragraphs (a)(4), (b)(5), and (d) are added.



§301.7426-1 Civil actions by persons other than taxpayers.

(a) * * *

(4) Substitution of value. A person who obtains a certificate of discharge under section 6325(b)(4) with respect to any property may, within 120 days after the day on which the certificate is issued, bring a civil action against the United States in a district court of the United States for a determination of whether the value of the interest of the United States (if any) in such property is less than the value determined by the appropriate official. A civil action under this provision shall be the exclusive judicial remedy for a person other than the taxpayer who obtains a certificate of discharge for a filed notice of Federal tax lien.

(b) * * *

(5) Substitution of value. If the court determines that the determination by the appropriate official of the value of the interest of the United States in the property exceeds the actual value of such interest, the court may grant a judgment ordering a refund of the amount deposited, or a release of the bond, to the extent that the aggregate of those amounts exceeds the value as determined by the court.

* * * * *

(d) Paragraphs (a)(4) and (b)(5) of this section apply to any request for a certificate of discharge made after January 31, 2008.

PART 401 --[REMOVED]

Par. 5. Part 401 is removed.

Linda E. Stiff,

Deputy Commissioner for Services and Enforcement.

Approved: January 9, 2008.

Eric Solomon,

Assistant Secretary of the Treasury (Tax Policy).

Labels:

Installment Agreement – Tax Compliance Required

Garfield Allan Rodger, Plaintiff v. United States of America, Defendant.

U.S. District Court, No. Dist. Texas, Dallas Div.; Civil Action No. 3:05-CV-2406-D, February 5, 2008.

[ Code Sec. 6330]

Levy: Trust fund penalties: Collection Due Process hearing: Installment plan request: Non-compliant status: Abuse of discretion. --
The IRS did not abuse its discretion by not allowing an individual to make delinquent employment tax trust fund penalty payments under an installment plan. The Appeals officer's decision to reject the proposed installment plan and proceed with levy actions was primarily based on the individual's continued failure to timely file tax returns and deposit taxes. Such an inability to remain current on tax obligations was a proper basis for rejecting a proposed collection alternative.




MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER


FITZWATER, CHIEF JUDGE: In this suit challenging an Internal Revenue Service Appeals Office ("IRS Appeals") determination to sustain levy actions against plaintiff Garfield Allan Rodger ("Rodger"), defendant United States of America ("the government") moves for summary judgment. The dispositive question presented is whether IRS Appeals abused its discretion by refusing to grant Rodger a requested installment plan to pay delinquent employment tax trust fund penalties. Concluding that IRS Appeals did not abuse its discretion, the court grants the motion and dismisses this case with prejudice.


I


Rodger brings this action against the government seeking a redetermination of a tax levy issued by IRS Appeals following a collection due process proceeding. The IRS assessed employment tax trust fund penalties against Rodger for the third quarter of 2000 through the third quarter of 2002. To collect these penalties, the IRS issued levy notices to Rodger. Rodger requested a collection due process hearing with IRS Appeals. Rodger discussed the contemplated levy action with Christopher Darling ("Darling"), the IRS Appeals Officer assigned to the case. The discussions primarily revolved around Rodger's request to enter into a $4,000 per month installment plan. Darling agreed to consider the request, but stated that such an installment plan would be granted only if certain conditions were met, including, inter alia, that Rodger's businesses were currently in compliance with their tax obligations. Darling addressed these conditions in a letter. In response, Rodger provided several employment tax and corporate income tax returns that Darling had requested. Rodger did not, however, provide proof that all of his businesses were timely depositing employment taxes. IRS Appeals required this information because IRS transcripts showed that two of Rodger's businesses were not making timely deposits. Based on Rodger's inability to keep his businesses in current tax compliance, IRS Appeals issued a determination letter sustaining the levy actions. Rodger alleges that IRS Appeals abused its discretion by denying his request to enter into an installment agreement.


II



A


The government contends that IRS Appeals rationally decided not to grant the requested installment plan based on Rodger's continued failure to timely file tax returns and deposit taxes. Because the penalties underlying the levy actions originated from Rodger's history of non-compliance, the government argues that it was not an abuse of discretion for IRS Appeals to condition the requested installment plan on Rodger's ability to stop accruing new delinquencies.

Roger does not contest that his businesses were non-compliant with their tax obligations at the time of the appeal, nor does he disagree that this fact was a basis for IRS Appeals' decision. Instead, Roger contends that the decision was based in large part on "speculative, unfounded assumptions." P. Br. 7. He argues that there are genuine issues of material fact as to several of the factors described in the determination letter as the basis for the denial of the installment plan request. 1 For example, the letter concluded on the basis of certain tax returns that the value of the interest owned by Rodger's wife in one of his businesses seemed greater than the value reported on certain business forms. Roger contends that it is improper for IRS Appeals to base its determination on speculation about this issue. He also points to the part of the letter that considers whether some of the businesses paid for the personal expenses of Rodger and his wife, and it concludes that "[s]ome of these questions will need to be explored in-depth before [the IRS Appeals Officer is] comfortable approving an installment agreement." Id. Rodger contends that IRS Appeals failed to explore these issues before making its determination. Rodger also argues that IRS Appeals failed to substantiate its opinion that he had not "displayed sufficient financial discipline and fiscal management skills." Id. at 8. In sum, Rodger contends that the decision to reject the proposed installment plan was based on a "gut feeling," and, as such, it does not satisfy the government's burden of establishing that the determination was rational as a matter of law. 2


B


Where, as here, the underlying tax liability is not at issue, the court reviews IRS Appeals' decision under an abuse of discretion standard. See Christopher Cross, Inc. v. United States, 461 F.3d 610, 612 (5th Cir. 2006) (adopting de novo standard of review for underlying tax liability issues and abuse of discretion standard for all other decisions). The court holds that IRS Appeals did not abuse its discretion when it decided not to allow Rodger to make the unpaid tax payments under an installment plan.

Section 6330(c) of the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 instructs IRS Appeals to consider the following three factors in its collection determinations: first, verification of IRS compliance with all applicable law and administrative procedures; second, issues raised by the taxpayer; and third, whether the proposed collection action balances "the need for the efficient collection of taxes with the legitimate concern of the person that any collection action be no more intrusive than necessary." 26 U.S.C. §6330(c). The determination letter discusses each of these three factors. Rodger's complaint concerns only the second factor ----whether IRS Appeals adequately considered the installment plan proposal (the only taxpayer issue raised in the IRS Appeals proceeding).

The appeals case memorandum devotes most of its reasoning to this specific issue, and it ultimately rejects the proposal based on a combination of factors. The government contends that the primary basis for the rejection was Rodger's non-compliant status. Although the letter does not explicitly state that this factor was dispositive, it is clear that it was the primary reason for IRS Appeals' determination. The first three of the five factors cited as the basis for not accepting the proposed installment plan relate to non-compliance issues. Further, the record of conversations between Darling and Rodger also places primary emphasis on this factor. See D. App. 16 (describing compliance as the first factor that needs to be addressed in the installment plan determination).

Several courts have concluded that a taxpayer's inability to remain current on his tax obligations is a proper basis for rejecting collection alternatives that the taxpayer proposes. See Stop 26-Riverbend, Inc. v. United States, 2003 WL 1908747, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 12, 2003) (affirming IRS Appeals decision not to extend installment plan on the basis that company was not current on its tax obligations); Jon H. Berkey, P.C. v. Dep't of the Treasury, 2001 WL 1397680, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 20, 2001) ("A proposed installment agreement may properly be rejected by the IRS where the taxpayer...has a history of non-compliance with payroll tax laws."); AJP Mgmt. v. United States, 2000 WL 33122693, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2000) ("The Court finds that [the appeals officer] did not abuse his discretion to reject the proposed collection alternatives for past liabilities when the plaintiff was not meeting its current payroll tax obligations."). Rodger has not established that IRS Appeals abused its discretion in how it evaluated his non-compliant status at the time of the appeal, nor does he argue that non-compliance cannot of itself be reason to deny a proposed installment plan.

Rodger's argument focuses instead on the speculative nature of the two final factors cited in the determination letter as the basis for the denial of the installment plan. These two factors, which the court discusses above, do not appear to have been dispositive, however, in IRS Appeals' determination, and do not diminish the primary reliance on the non-compliance considerations. Considering the emphasis placed on the non-compliance factors, Rodger has not shown, based on the secondary, somewhat speculative considerations, that IRS Appeals abused its discretion in determining to sustain the levy actions.


IV


Rodger requests that the court deny the government's motion or, alternatively, hold it in abeyance for at least 60 days after a Tax Court rules on his pending lawsuit in that forum. Rodger requests this abeyance so that he can continue to negotiate a resolution with the IRS of both lawsuits. The court declines to grant this request. Although this court frequently stays dispositive rulings when both sides seek such relief so that they can pursue settlement negotiations, it does not do so based on a unilateral request. Moreover, the court does not discern ----and Rodger does not explain ----a basis on which a ruling of the Tax Court on a different matter would affect the question presented in this case. It appears that he is simply interested in a global settlement of issues he has with the IRS. The court will not delay its decision on this basis.


* * *


Accordingly, the court grants the government's August 30, 2007 summary judgment motion and dismisses this action with prejudice by judgment filed today.

SO ORDERED .

1 Because the question whether IRS Appeals abused its discretion is a question a law, the existence of such fact issues, if any, does not preclude the court from deciding this case on motion for summary judgment.

2 Rodger also submits with his response brief evidence of recent payments and other actions undertaken to bring his businesses into compliance. Rodger contends that the government fails to take note of these facts. Because these actions occurred subsequent to the IRS Appeals' decision, they are irrelevant in determining whether IRS Appeals abused its discretion. Accordingly, the court will not consider this information in deciding the government's summary judgment motion. See, e.g., Kitchen Cabinets, Inc. v. United States, 2001 WL 237384, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 6, 2001) (Lynn, J.) (holding that evidence of payment of taxes accruing after notice of determination is irrelevant to court's review of decision of appeals officer).

Labels:

Thursday, February 21, 2008

Gross income includes all income from whatever source derived, including gambling income. See sec. 61; Jackson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-373. The jackpots that petitioners received constitute gambling income. A taxpayer in the trade or business of gambling may deduct wagering losses to the extent allowable in computing adjusted gross income. A taxpayer who was not in the trade or business of gambling may deduct wagering losses only to the extent allowable as an itemized deduction to compute taxable income. See Calvao v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-57.
Docket No. 20323-06S . Filed February 20, 2008.

[Code Secs. 61 and 6662]


Tax Court: Summary opinion: Individual: Gross income: Gambling winnings: Losses. --
.

RUWE, Judge: This case was heard pursuant to the provisions of section 7463 1 of the Internal Revenue Code in effect when the petition was filed. Pursuant to section 7463(b), the decision to be entered is not reviewable by any other court, and this opinion shall not be treated as precedent for any other case.

Respondent determined a $4,190 deficiency in petitioners' Federal income tax for 2004 and an $838 accuracy-related penalty under section 6662 due to negligence.

The issues for decision are whether petitioners are entitled to net their gambling losses against their gambling winnings in computing adjusted gross income and whether they are liable for a section 6662(a) accuracy-related penalty due to negligence.


Background

Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found. The stipulation of facts and the attached exhibits are incorporated by this reference. Petitioners resided in Williamstown, New Jersey, at the time they filed their petition.

During 2004, petitioner Thomas Dawson was employed full time as a building inspector, and petitioner Christine Dawson was employed full time as a registered nurse.

During 2004, petitioners gambled at casinos in Atlantic City, New Jersey. Most of petitioners' gambling consisted of playing $5- or $10-pull slot machines. Neither petitioner was a professional gambler. Their combined jackpots received from Atlantic City casinos in 2004 totaled $208,420; however, their combined gambling losses for 2004 exceeded the $208,420 jackpots that they won. In other words, petitioners' gambling activities during 2004 resulted in a net loss.

On their 2004 Federal income tax return, petitioners reported adjusted gross income of $145,694 which did not include any of the jackpots. Petitioners did not claim deductions on their 2004 return for any of their gambling losses. Petitioners did not report their gambling jackpots and losses because their gambling activities failed to produce net winnings in 2004.

After examining petitioners' 2004 return, respondent determined that petitioners' casino jackpots were gambling winnings and increased petitioners' adjusted gross income by $208,420. Respondent also determined that petitioners were entitled to itemized deductions for gambling losses of $208,420.

While respondent allowed itemized deductions for gambling losses in the same amount that he increased petitioners' adjusted gross income, the increase in adjusted gross income triggered certain limitations on other deductions. As a result, respondent disallowed a $490 tuition deduction, disallowed job-related and miscellaneous expenses of $4,178, decreased total itemized deductions by $6,267, and disallowed a $6,200 deduction for personal exemptions. These adjustments, based on respondent's adjustment to petitioners' adjusted gross income, are computational adjustments required by law.

In their petition, petitioners claim that it makes no sense to increase their adjusted gross income because their gambling activities produced a net loss for 2004. Petitioners are contesting only the propriety of increasing their adjusted gross income. They have not contested the accuracy of the computational adjustments that flow from increasing their adjusted gross income.


Discussion

Gross income includes all income from whatever source derived, including gambling income. See sec. 61; Jackson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-373. The jackpots that petitioners received constitute gambling income. A taxpayer in the trade or business of gambling may deduct wagering losses to the extent allowable in computing adjusted gross income. A taxpayer who was not in the trade or business of gambling may deduct wagering losses only to the extent allowable as an itemized deduction to compute taxable income. See Calvao v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-57. Petitioners were not professional gamblers and were not in the trade or business of gambling. Therefore, their gambling losses were not deductible in arriving at adjusted gross income, and respondent's determination to increase petitioners' adjusted gross income by the amount of jackpots received in 2004 was correct. Since that resolves the only issue petitioners raised regarding the tax deficiency, respondent's deficiency determination of $4,190 is sustained.

With regard to respondent's determination that petitioners are liable for the accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a) due to negligence, petitioners argue that when they prepared their 2004 return, they concluded that since their gambling activity produced a net loss, they had no gambling income to report. Petitioner Thomas Dawson testified that this was the way petitioners had filed returns in prior years and that he was not aware of the previously stated rules that precluded the netting of gambling winnings and losses in determining adjusted gross income. He explained that he used simple logic in determining that petitioners' gambling activity did not produce income.

Section 6662(c) defines negligence as "any failure to make a reasonable attempt to comply with the provisions" of the Code. After hearing the testimony presented, we conclude that petitioners made an honest attempt to comply with their reporting requirements. Petitioners do not purport to be tax experts and when preparing their returns concluded that they did not have to report gambling income because their nonbusiness gambling activity resulted in a net loss. While their conclusion was incorrect, we do not think that their error negates the reasonableness of their attempt to comply with their reporting requirements. We hold that petitioners are not liable for the section 6662 penalty due to negligence.

Decision will be entered for respondent as to the deficiency and for petitioners as to the accuracy-related penalty.

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code (Code) in effect for the year in issue.

Labels:

Trust fund penalty – section 6672

There are two conditions before liability can be imposed under section 6672: (1) the individual must be a "responsible person," and (2) his or her failure to pay the tax must be "willful." See generally Greenberg at 242-43. There is binding precedent on each point:


Responsibility is a matter of status, duty, or authority, not knowledge. While a responsible person must have significant control over the corporation's finances, exclusive control is not necessary.In determining whether an individual is a person responsible for paying over withholding taxes, courts consider the following factors: (1) contents of the corporate bylaws, (2) ability to sign checks on the company's bank account, (3) signature on the employer's federal quarterly and other tax returns, (4) payment of other creditors in lieu of the United States, (5) identity of officers, directors, and principal stockholders in the firm, (6) identity of individuals in charge of hiring and discharging employees, and (7) identity of individuals in charge of the firm's financial affairs. It is not necessary that an individual have the final word on which creditors should be paid in order to be subject to liability under section 6672; a person may be treated as "responsible" for purposes of the statute if he has significant control over the disbursement of corporate funds.






Jack M. Horovitz, Plaintiff v. The United States (Internal Revenue Service), Defendant v. Jack T. Constantino, Third-Party Defendant.

U.S. District Court, West. Dist. Pa.; 2:06-cv-279, February 11, 2008.

[ Code Sec. 6672]

Failure to pay taxes: Responsible person: Substantial authority: Willfulness: Preference to other creditors. --
The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) of a trucking company were both responsible persons who were jointly and severally liable for the trust fund recovery penalties in connection with the company's failure to pay its federal employment tax obligations. Both officers exercised significant control over the disbursement of company's funds with active day-to-day involvement in the business, had the ability to hire and fire employees, and had full authority to sign checks and Form 941 tax returns. Further, both officers acted willfully when they made numerous voluntary and intentional payments to creditors despite having knowledge that the employment taxes were unpaid. The CEO could not avoid liability by delegating responsibility for payment to a subordinate. He was aware of the company's tax liability problem but displayed reckless indifference by failing to investigate or correct the mismanagement.


MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER




Factual and Procedural History

The issue in this case is whether Horovitz and/or Constantino are liable as "responsible persons" for the failure of CDS Lines, Inc. ("CDS") to pay its federal employment tax obligations for the tax periods ending 9/30/98, 12/31/98 and 3/31/99 (the "periods at issue"). Horovitz and Constantino each try to escape liability by arguing strenuously that the other was the sole "responsible person."

CDS was a trucking company based in Canonsburg, Pennsylvania. Constantino founded CDS in 1981, owned 80% of the company, and served as its Chief Executive Officer, President and Treasurer at an annual salary of $232,000. Horovitz owned 20% of CDS, and served as its Chief Financial Officer, Vice President and Secretary at an annual salary of $180,000. Constantino had hiring and firing authority for all of CDS. Horovitz managed the accounting department and could hire and fire employees in the accounting department. Both Constantino and Horovitz had signature authority for the corporate bank accounts at Mellon Bank and West Banco Bank. Horovitz signed the Form 941 payroll tax returns for the periods at issue.

Horovitz advised Constantino on at least one occasion in December 1998, that CDS was failing to pay its federal employment tax obligations. Both Horovitz and Constantino were aware that CDS was struggling financially and had previously failed to pay federal tax obligations from 1995-1997. Constantino did not do anything to check up to make sure that the taxes were paid. Constantino caught wind of the issue again in February 1999 when an agent came to the office. Horovitz signed approximately 400 checks totalling approximately $1.8 million to creditors other than the IRS after learning that CDS was not paying its federal employment taxes.

On March 19, 2002, the IRS assessed a trust fund recovery penalty against both Horovitz and Constantino in the amount of $774,745.66 for the periods at issue. Payments totalling $12,890.10 were credited toward the assessment. Statutory additions for interest and penalties have accrued. The United States' Counterclaim against Horovitz asserts that as of April 3, 2006, Horovitz owed $941,328.34. The United States' Third-Party Complaint against Constantino asserts that $842,018.43, plus statutory interest and penalties, remains due and owing 1 . In this litigation, Horovitz and Constantino seek a judgment that they bear no liability for this assessment and Horovitz seeks a refund of amounts paid. The United States seeks the entry of a judgment against Horovitz and Constantino, jointly and severally, for the full tax liability.



Standard of Review
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure reads, in pertinent part, as follows:

[Summary Judgment] shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

In interpreting Rule 56(c), the United States Supreme Court has stated:
The plain language...mandates entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be "no genuine issue as to material fact," since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-323 (1986).

An issue of material fact is genuine only if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The court must view the facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, and the burden of establishing that no genuine issue of material fact exists rests with the movant. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The "existence of disputed issues of material fact should be ascertained by resolving all inferences, doubts and issues of credibility against the moving party." Ely v. Hall's Motor Transit Co., 590 F.2d 62, 66 (3d Cir. 1978) ( quoting Smith v. Pittsburgh Gage & Supply Co., 464 F.2d 870, 874 (3d Cir. 1972)). Final credibility determinations on material issues cannot be made in the context of a motion for summary judgment, nor can the district court weigh the evidence. Josey v. John R. Hollingsworth Corp., 996 F.2d 632 (3d Cir. 1993); Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1993).

When the non-moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party's burden can be "discharged by `showing' --that is, pointing out to the District Court --that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. If the moving party has carried this burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party, who cannot rest on the allegations of the pleadings and must "do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets, 998 F.2d at 1230. When the nonmoving party's evidence in opposition to a properly supported motion for summary judgment is "merely colorable" or "not significantly probative," the court may grant summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-250.



Legal Analysis

Employers must withhold federal social security and income taxes from the wages of their employees. 26 U.S.C.A. §§3102, 3401. The taxes withheld constitute a special fund held "in trust" for the benefit of the United States. 26 U.S.C. §7501(a). The Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. §6672, creates a powerful mechanism for the IRS to ensure proper withholding of employment taxes by imposing personal liability on "responsible persons":
Any person required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over any tax imposed by this title who willfully fails to collect such tax, or truthfully account for and pay over such tax, or willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any such tax or the payment thereof, shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be liable to a penalty equal to the total amount of the tax evaded, or not collected, or not accounted for and paid over. . ..

As an initial matter, in cases challenging an assessment under 26 U.S.C. §6672, there is a presumption that the IRS assessment is correct and the burden of proof and production rests with the taxpayer. Psaty v. United States, 442 F.2d 1154, 1159-60 (3d Cir. 1971). Moreover, and of particular relevance to this case:
the definition of `responsible person' is not limited to the person with the final say on which bills get paid, but includes others as well. See Quattrone, 895 F.2d at 927; see also United States v. Vespe, 868 F.2d 1328, 1332 (3rd Cir.1989) ("More than one individual may be a responsible [p]erson for a given employer.")

Greenberg v. United States, 46 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 1994) (Nygaard, J., dissenting).

There are two conditions before liability can be imposed under section 6672: (1) the individual must be a "responsible person," and (2) his or her failure to pay the tax must be "willful." See generally Greenberg at 242-43. There is binding precedent on each point: 2
Responsibility is a matter of status, duty, or authority, not knowledge. While a responsible person must have significant control over the corporation's finances, exclusive control is not necessary.In determining whether an individual is a person responsible for paying over withholding taxes, courts consider the following factors: (1) contents of the corporate bylaws, (2) ability to sign checks on the company's bank account, (3) signature on the employer's federal quarterly and other tax returns, (4) payment of other creditors in lieu of the United States, (5) identity of officers, directors, and principal stockholders in the firm, (6) identity of individuals in charge of hiring and discharging employees, and (7) identity of individuals in charge of the firm's financial affairs. It is not necessary that an individual have the final word on which creditors should be paid in order to be subject to liability under section 6672; a person may be treated as "responsible" for purposes of the statute if he has significant control over the disbursement of corporate funds.

Id. at 242-43 (citations omitted). Instructions from a superior to not pay the taxes do not take an otherwise "responsible person" out of that category. Id. at 244.
Under section 6672(a), willfulness is a voluntary, conscious and intentional decision to prefer other creditors over the Government. A responsible person acts willfully when he pays other creditors in preference to the IRS knowing that taxes are due, or with reckless disregard for whether taxes have been paid. In order for the failure to turn over withholding taxes to be willful, a responsible person need only know that the taxes are due or act in reckless disregard of this fact when he fails to remit to IRS. Reckless disregard includes failure to investigate or correct mismanagement after being notified that withholding taxes have not been paid. The taxpayer need not act with an evil motive or bad purpose for his action or inaction to be willful. Any payment to other creditors, including the payment of net wages to the corporation's employees, with knowledge that the employment taxes are due and owing to the Government, constitutes a willful failure to pay taxes.

Id. at 244 (citations omitted). Thus, the standard that must be met to demonstrate liability under section 6672 is not onerous. In Greenberg, a corporate controller was determined at the summary judgment stage to be a "responsible person" even though Greenberg received assurances from his superior that the tax would be paid, believed that he would be fired immediately if he paid the withholding tax, and resigned his position when he realized that the tax liability would not be paid.

Even construing the record in this case in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, a reasonable factfinder must conclude that Horovitz was a "responsible person." Horovitz exercised "significant" control over the disbursement of CDS funds, as evidenced by his ability to hire and fire employees, full authority to sign checks, signature on the Form 941 tax returns, and status as a corporate officer and 20% owner. The assertion by Horovitz that Constantino regarded him as incompetent and stripped him of all authority except for the ministerial function of writing checks is not borne out by the record. Constantino did testify that Dave Basl relieved Horovitz of certain responsibilities, but then immediately clarified that Horovitz had not been "phased out." Constantino Deposition at 198. Basl testified that Horovitz remained the company's chief financial officer and controlled the money, paid the bills and made the decisions with respect to paying vendors during the periods in question. It is undisputed that Horovitz continued to receive his $180,000 annual salary. Assuming arguendo that Constantino instructed Horovitz to "keep the trucks running" rather than pay the employment taxes, even the threat of immediate termination "does not excuse a responsible person from the obligation to pay IRS." Greenberg, 46 F.3d at 243 n.2 (rejecting similar argument that controller's check-writing function was merely ministerial). It is not necessary that an individual have the final word as to which creditors will be paid. Id. at 243. That Horovitz acted "willfully," as defined in the case law, is also beyond reasonable dispute. He made numerous voluntary and intentional payments to creditors, including the payment of wages to himself and Constantino after having knowledge that the employment taxes were unpaid. In sum, Horovitz is a "responsible person" and as such, is subject to liability under Section 6672.

Constantino is also liable as a "responsible person." There is no material dispute of fact that Constantino exercised significant control over all operations of CDS. He invested several million dollars to start the company, owned 80% of CDS, had unlimited hiring/firing and check-writing authority, and served as chief executive officer with active day-to-day involvement in the business. Constantino exercised the authority to assign Horovitz duties and certainly could have personally written the appropriate checks to the IRS to ensure that the employment taxes were paid. In sum, he was a "responsible person." Constantino's conduct was also "willful." Constantino concedes that Horovitz informed him of the unpaid employment taxes in December 1998. Moreover, Constantino was aware of the tax liability problem from 1995-1997. At a minimum, Constantino displayed reckless indifference by failing to investigate or correct mismanagement after being notified that the taxes had not been paid. Id. at 244. Constantino was aware of payments to other creditors (including his own substantial salary) during the relevant periods. It is no excuse to argue, as Constantino does, that Horovitz was responsible for all financial matters at CDS. A "responsible person" cannot avoid liability by delegating responsibility for payment to a subordinate. See the numerous cases cited in the United States' Brief in Support of Summary Judgment (Document No. 30) at 19-20. In sum, Constantino is a "responsible person" and as such, is subject to liability under Section 6672. Accordingly, the United States' motion for summary judgment will be granted and the motions filed by Horovitz and Constantino will be denied. The United States shall submit a proposed final judgment order on or before February 18, 2008. Horovitz and Constantino shall file any responses thereto on or before February 25, 2008.

In response to the summary judgment briefs, Horovitz filed a MOTION TO SELL REAL PROPERTY located at 2170 Washington Road, Canonsburg, Pennsylvania. Apparently, the motion is designed to demonstrate that Horovitz lacked the requisite control to be considered a "responsible party." Constantino responded to the motion, correctly noting the lack of legal authority for such a sale and pointing out that the real property is owned by Route 19 Canonsburg Associates, which is not a party to this action. For the reasons set forth above, Horovitz and Constantino are both "responsible persons" pursuant to Section 6672 due to the significant control each of them exercised over the ability of CDS to pay the outstanding employment taxes. Whether or not Horovitz and/or Constantino had the authority to sell the real property is irrelevant to that analysis. Accordingly, the MOTION TO SELL REAL PROPERTY (Document No. 40) filed by Horovitz is DENIED.

An appropriate order follows.


ORDER


AND NOW, this 11 day of February, 2008, in accordance with the foregoing th Memorandum Opinion, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Document No. 27) filed by Jack M. Horovitz is DENIED; the UNITED STATES' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Document No. 28) is GRANTED; and the MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Document No. 31) filed by third-party defendant Jack T. Constantino is DENIED. The United States shall submit a proposed final judgment order on or before February 18, 2008. Horovitz and Constantino shall file any responses thereto on or before February 25, 2008.

The MOTION TO SELL REAL PROPERTY (Document No. 40) filed by Horovitz is DENIED. BY THE COURT:

1 The date used by the United States to determine this amount is unclear. The Third-Party 1 Complaint was filed on May 10, 2006. The proposed judgment submitted by the United States seeks entry of judgment against Constantino in the amount of $792,868.25 plus interest accruing from January 31, 2005.

2 Accordingly, the citation by Horovitz and Constantino to cases from other circuits is 2 unavailing.

Labels:

Wednesday, February 20, 2008

Attorney liens - "Congress has given 'superpriority' to ... attorneys' liens on judgments, such that they trump a federal tax lien even when they arise and become choate after the tax is assessed." Montavon v. United States, 864 F. Supp. 519, 522 (E.D. Va. 1994) (citing § 6323(b)(8)). Specifically, § 6323(b)(8) provides that a federal tax lien will not be valid:

North Carolina Joint Underwriting Association, Plaintiff v. Dwight C. Long, et. al., Defendants.

U.S. District Court, East. Dist. N.C., So. Div.; 7:06-CV-28-WW, January 31, 2008.

[ Code Sec. 6013]

Tax liens: Insurance policy: Joint and several liability: Agency relationship. --
The wife of a delinquent taxpayer was jointly and severally liable for the tax liens attached to the couple's rights under a hazard insurance policy obtained for their residence. The couple had filed joint returns for the years at issue. Furthermore, a state court consent judgment was not relevant because the IRS was not a party to the judgment and the state court did not have authority to determine federal tax liability.



[ Code Sec. 6321]

Tax liens: Insurance policy: Property right: New California law. --
A couple's rights under a hazard insurance policy obtained for their residence constituted a state-created property right to which an IRS tax lien attached. Once the lien was perfected, it attached to all of the couple's personal property, including the proceeds of the insurance policy. When the couple's residence was destroyed by fire, their rights under the insurance policy ripened into a "chose in action," which, under state (North Carolina) law, was personal property.



[ Code Secs. 6323 and 6501]

Tax liens: Priority on liens: Insurance policy: Property right: First in time rule: Attorney's lien: Statute of limitations. --
Two attorneys' liens had priority over the IRS's liens on a couple's insurance proceeds. The attorneys were responsible for procuring the insurance fund; thus, they had a charging lien against the funds and satisfied the requirements of Code Sec. 6323 (b)(8). Furthermore, their contingency fees were reasonable under state (North Carolina) law. Finally, the tax liens were valid and enforceable because the IRS timely filed notices of assessment and re-filed the tax liens within the stipulated deadlines.




ORDER


WEBB, U.S. Magistrate Judge: This Cause comes before the Court on the Defendants' Cross Motions for Summary Judgment [DE-64, 65, 67, 70, 75, & 76] and Judgment on the Pleadings [DE-62] pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 56 and 12 (c). The underlying dispute in this case arises from competing claims to insurance proceeds owned by Defendants Dwight C. Long and Kathy Y. Long. The following Defendants assert claims against the proceeds: the United States Internal Revenue Service, which holds a tax lien against all of the Longs' real and personal property; Ennis and Jeffrey Lewis, secured creditors against Mr. Long's one-half interest in the residential property; International Loss Services, a public adjusting company with a contractual assignment of the proceeds, and attorneys Thomas S. Hicks and John A. High (through Hill & High L.L.P) who both seek to recover attorney's fees for their assistance in procuring the insurance proceeds. For the reasons detailed below, the Internal Revenue Service's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [DE-64 & 77] is GRANTED, the Lewises Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [DE-62] is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part, Kathy Y. Long's and Hill & High's Motion for Summary Judgment [DE-65] is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part, International Loss Services' Motion for Summary Judgment [DE-67], is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part, and International Loss Services', Thomas S. Hicks', and Dwight C. Long's Motions for Summary Judgment [DE-70, 75, & 76 ] are DENIED in part and GRANTED in part.


Statement of the Case


Dwight C. Long and Kathy Y. Long (hereinafter "the Longs") owned residential property located in Bladen County, North Carolina. [DE-71, pgs. 1-2]. For several years, the Longs failed to pay their federal income taxes and, as a result, on September 29, 1997, the Internal Revenue Service (hereinafter "the IRS") filed notice of a lien on all of the Longs' real and personal property. Id. at 2. After filing the lien, the Longs settled a property dispute with Ennis and Jeffrey Lewis (hereinafter "the Lewises") by which the Longs acquired their residential property as tenants in common. Id. at 3. In addition, in order to satisfy an outstanding debt, the settlement also required Mr. Long to execute a deed of trust with the Lewises as beneficiaries. Id. This deed of trust was recorded on July 2, 2003 with a principal sum of $62,702.91. [DE-63, pgs. 4, 5].

Under the terms of the deed of trust, Mr. Long was required to insure his one-half interest in the residential property for the benefit of the Lewises. [DE-65-6, p. 2]. Thus, on September 12, 2003, Mr. Long applied for a hazard insurance policy with the North Carolina Underwriting Association (hereinafter "the NCJUA") covering the property from fire, wind, and hail. [DE-71, p.3]; [DE-72, Ex. 7]. However, he failed to list the Lewises as the "loss payees" in the contract; thereby breaching the terms of their agreement. [DE-71, p. 4]; [DE-63, p. 10]. Several months later, on March 7, 2004, the residence was destroyed by fire. [DE-71, p. 4].

After the fire, Mr. Long hired International Loss Services (hereinafter "ILS") to provide public adjusting services in preparation of his claim against the NCJUA. Id. Mr. Long's contract with ILS stipulated that if Mr. Long prevailed, ILS would receive twelve percent (12%) of the loss payable under the insurance claim. Id. In addition to ILS, Mr. Long also retained attorney Thomas S. Hicks to handle any legal issues that arose in the course of resolving his insurance claim. Id. It was agreed that Mr. Hicks would deduct his hourly fee from the insurance proceeds. Id. at 4-5. However, after investigating Mr. Long's claim, the NCJUA sent Mr. Long a notice that it would not make any payments to cover his loss. Id. at 5.

After Mr. Long notified his wife that the NCJUA would not reimburse them for their loss, Mrs. Long hired the law firm Hill & High L.L.P., to represent her interest in the fire insurance proceeds for her former marital residence. [DE-66, p. 4]. Both Mr. Hicks and Hill & High appealed the NCJUA's decision and appeared during a hearing conducted before the board of directors regarding their clients' claims to the insurance proceeds. Id. In August 2005, the NCJUA sent a letter to both parties indicating that their board of directors unanimously voted to reverse the decision voiding their insurance policy. Id. at 4-5; [DE-71, p. 5]. The policy limits were $200,000 for the structure coverage and $38,000 for the content coverage. [DE-66, p. 5]. To determine which parties were entitled to receive priority of the insurance proceeds, an interpleader action was filed in the North Carolina state court in Bladen County on February 9, 2006. Id. at 5. After the IRS received notice of the action, it removed the case to federal court. [DE-1]. In addition, the NCJUA deposited the insurance proceeds with the Court on July 18, 2007. [DE-46]. Each Defendant has asserted arguments as to why their claim is entitled to priority over the other Defendants. The Court will address these arguments below.


Standard of Review


Summary judgment is appropriate when there exists no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). 1 The party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of initially coming forward and demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Ross v. Commc'ns Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 364 (4th Cir. 1985). The moving party can bear his burden either by presenting affirmative evidence, or by demonstrating that the non-movant's evidence is insufficient to establish his claim. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 331 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Once the moving party has met its burden, the non-moving party must then affirmatively demonstrate that there is a genuine issue which requires trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). As a general rule, the non-movant must respond to a motion for summary judgment with affidavits, or other verified evidence, rather than relying on his complaint or other pleadings. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; see also, Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 823 (4th Cir. 1991).

In the summary judgment determination, the facts and all reasonable inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. It is well-established that any analysis of the propriety of summary judgment must focus on both the materiality and genuineness of the fact issues. Ross, 759 F.2d at 364. The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat a motion for summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48. A fact is material only when its resolution affects the outcome of the case. Id. at 248. A trial judge faced with a summary judgment motion "must ask himself not whether he thinks the evidence unmistakably favors one side or the other, but whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented." Id. at 252. The Court is guided by this analysis in the consideration of the Defendants' claims.


Analysis




I. State Created Property Rights

On September 29, 1997, the IRS recorded a tax lien against the Longs in the amount of $61,330.64 pursuant to the Federal Tax Lien Act ("FTLA"), 26 U.S.C. § 6321 et. seq. [DE-64, Ex. A]. Federal tax liens expire ten years and thirty days after the date of the assessment unless they are timely re-filed; thus, the IRS re-filed its notice of the lien on July 14, 2006 in the principal amount of $52,595.34. 2 See § 6323 (g); [DE-64, Ex. B]. The accrued interest on this principal is $69,955.77, for a total of $122,551.11. [DE-82, Ex. A]. Section 6321 provides:
If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same after demand, the amount (including any interest, additional amount, addition to tax, or assessable penalty, together with any costs that may accrue in addition thereto) shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such person.

Id.

"[I]n all cases where the Federal Government asserts its tax lien ... [the court must first determine] to what extent the taxpayer had 'property' or 'rights to property' to which the tax lien could attach." Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509, 512 (1960). Notably, § 6321 does not create property rights "but merely attaches consequences, federally defined, to rights created under state law ... .'" Id. at 513 (quoting United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51, 55 (1958)). Therefore, "once the tax lien has attached to the taxpayer's state-created interests, ... federal law ... determines the priority of competing liens asserted against the taxpayer's 'property' or 'rights to property.'" Aquilino, 363 U.S. at 513-14.

In this case, the central question is whether the hazard insurance proceeds constitute "property" or "rights to property" to which the IRS's lien can attach. Under North Carolina law, "the definition of 'personal property'... embraces 'choses in action ... .'" Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Wolfe, 91 S.E.2d 246, 251 (N.C. 1956) (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 12-3 (6)). A "chose in action" is defined as "a personal right not reduced into possession, but recoverable by a suit at law." 63C Am. Jur. 2d Property § 22 (2007); id. ("Choses in action are personal property and, although intangible, are property subject to encumbrances."). Although the term itself is comprehensive, a "chose in action" can include the right to receive contract payments under an insurance policy. Id. at § 23.

On September 12, 2003, Mr. Long obtained hazard insurance for his residence. [DE-71, p. 3, ¶ 9]. Mr. Long's insurance policy is considered a bilateral contract between himself and the insurance company. 1-2 North Carolina Contract Law §2-10 (2004). Under the contract, the insurance company, "... assumed specified risks and ... agreed to pay money to the ... insured upon the happening of certain events." Forsyth County v. Plemmons, 163 S.E.2d 97, 99 (N.C. Ct. App. 1968). The IRS perfected its tax lien against all of the Longs' real and personal property at least six years before Mr. Long obtained hazard insurance. [DE-64, Ex. A]. Once the fire destroyed the Longs' residence on March 7, 2004 3 , the Longs' rights under the insurance policy ripened into a "chose in action." Because North Carolina law embraces a "chose in action" as personal property, the IRS's lien automatically attached to the insurance policy.



II. Priority Among the Defendants

After establishing that the insurance proceeds are a state-created property right to which the IRS's tax lien attached, this Court must look to federal law to determine the priority of the Defendants to receive a portion of the insurance fund. Aquilino, 363 U.S. at 513-14. "Federal tax liens do not automatically have priority over all other liens. Absent provision to the contrary, priority for purposes of federal law is governed by the common-law principle that 'the first in time is the first in right.'" United States by & Through IRS v. McDermott, 507 U.S. 447, 449 (1993) (quoting United States v. New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 85 (1954)). Thus, the determination of the priority of state-created liens, "depend[s] on the time [the lien] attached to the property in question and became choate." New Britain, 347 U.S. at 86. A lien is considered "perfected" or "choate" when there is nothing more to be done; specifically when, (1) the identity of the lienor; (2) the property subject to the lien; and (3) the amount of the lien are all well established. Id. at 84; see also, McDermott, 507 U.S. at 449.

Once the IRS filed notice of its lien on September 29, 1997, it acquired a perfected lien in all of the Longs' real and personal property. §§ 6321, and 6323. As a result, the IRS is entitled to priority over all of the Defendants based on the "first in time" rule except for the attorneys who were responsible for procuring the insurance fund. The arguments for each of the Defendants' claims will be addressed below.



A. Attorney's Lien

Within months of the fire that destroyed their home in March 2004, Mr. Long hired attorney Thomas S. Hicks and Mrs. Long hired attorney John A. High to represent them in their claim against the NCJUA. [DE-71, p. 4, ¶ 16 & DE-70-3 ]. Both attorneys contend that because of their efforts, the NCJUA reversed its decision to void the underlying insurance policy, which created the insurance proceeds at issue. [DE-66, p. 21, DE-76-2, p. 7]. As a result, they now assert that they have priority over the IRS's tax lien based on the attorneys' lien exception in 26 U.S.C. § 6323 (b)(8).

"Congress has given 'superpriority' to ... attorneys' liens on judgments, such that they trump a federal tax lien even when they arise and become choate after the tax is assessed." Montavon v. United States, 864 F. Supp. 519, 522 (E.D. Va. 1994) (citing § 6323(b)(8)). Specifically, § 6323(b)(8) provides that a federal tax lien will not be valid:
With respect to a judgment or other amount in settlement of a claim or of a cause of action, as against an attorney who, under local law, holds a lien upon or a contract enforceable against such judgment or amount, to the extent of his reasonable compensation for obtaining such judgment or procuring such settlement ... .

Id.

The purpose behind this exception is evident. "Without superpriority, an attorney would have less incentive to represent a client subject to an unsatisfied tax lien, for even if the client had a valid claim and eventually recovered a judgment [or settlement], the IRS would take the entire amount under its lien, leaving the attorney with nothing for her efforts." Montavon, 864 F. Supp. at 523. Thus, even if a federal tax lien is "first in time," and has been previously recorded, it will be subordinate to attorneys' liens that meet the requirements of § 6323 (b)(8).

In this case, both attorneys satisfy the requirements under § 6323 (b)(8) because they have a charging lien against the insurance proceeds. "[A] charging lien is an equitable lien which gives an attorney the right to recover his fees from a fund recovered by his aid. The charging lien attaches not to the cause of action, but to the judgment [or settlement] at the time it is rendered." Howell v. Howell, 365 S.E.2d 181, 183 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988) (internal citation omitted). Therefore, both attorneys' liens have priority over the IRS's lien.

Although the IRS concedes the attorneys' priority to its tax lien, it disputes the "reasonableness" of Mrs. Long's contingency fee agreement with Hill & High, which would allow it to recover thirty percent (nearly $40,000) of her interest in the insurance proceeds. [DE-77, p. 10]. However, the IRS has not cited any authority that suggests contingency fee agreements are per se unreasonable. Id. Instead, it simply alleges that because Hill & High only represented Mrs. Long for one month before procuring the insurance proceeds, the contract is not considered "reasonable compensation" under § 6323 (b)(8). Id. This argument must fail. The "reasonableness" of a contingency fee contract is governed by State law. 4 Rule 1.5 (c) of the North Carolina Rules for Professional Conduct discusses the parameters and requirements for contingency fee contracts. Nothing in this rule casts doubt on the contingency fee agreement at issue. See also, Robinson, Bradshaw & Hinson, P.A. v. Smith, 498 S.E.2d 841, 847 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998) (stating "North Carolina has approved the use of contingency fee contracts to compensate attorneys except when the fee contract is in direct violation of the public policy of this State.") In addition, the IRS has acknowledged that "there appears to be sufficient insurance proceeds to pay the federal tax liens regardless of the [sic] whether H & H is awarded full contingency (approximately $40,000) or a lesser amount." [DE-77, p. 11, n.6]. 5 Accordingly, both attorneys have priority over the IRS's tax liens.



B. Deed of Trust

On October 21, 2002, a state court Consent Order ("the Order") stated that Mr. Long was personally indebted to Jeffrey and Ennis Lewis ("the Lewises") in the amount of $58,556.97 together with taxes the Lewises paid on the Long property and interest of 6% on the unpaid balance of the debt. [DE-65-4]. To secure the debt, the Order required Mr. Long to execute a deed of trust with the Lewises as beneficiaries. Id. 6 This deed of trust was recorded on July 2, 2003. [DE-63, p. 4]. The Lewises now assert a claim in the amount of $81,513.78 against Mr. Long's one-half interest in the insurance proceeds. 7 Id. at 5. They contend that their claim has priority over that of the IRS based on the "first in time" rule in two respects. Id. at 8, 10. First, the Lewises allege that the IRS's filing in September 1997 was insufficient to attach to the insurance proceeds. Id. at 8. Second, they contend that their claim is superior because of their perfected deed of trust and equitable lien against the insurance policy. Id. at 10. For the reasons stated below, the undersigned concludes that these arguments are without merit.



1. Filing Requirements for Personal Property

The Lewises' deed of trust is considered a "security interest" as defined by § 6323 (h)(1) of the FTLA. The definition of a "security interest" encompasses "any interest in property acquired by contract for the purpose of securing payment or performance of an obligation ... ." Id. This interest only exists when "it is perfected under local law and only 'to the extent that ... the holder [of the purported security interest] has parted with money or money's worth'" United States v. 3809 Crain Ltd. P'ship, 884 F.2d 138, 142 (4th Cir. 1989) (citing § 6323(h)(1)). It is undisputed that the Lewises' deed of trust was perfected under North Carolina law on July 2, 2003 8 , and that they parted with "money or money's worth" evidenced by Mr. Long's antecedent debt in the amount of $62,702.91. 9 Therefore, their "security interest" is protected by the filing requirements of the FTLA.

In order for the lien "imposed by section 6321 to be valid as against any purchaser, holder of a security interest, mechanic's lienor, or judgment lien creditor," the IRS must file notice of the lien pursuant to subsection (f). §6323(a). Subsection (f)(1) mandates that the IRS file notice of its lien according to the laws of the State where the property is located. North Carolina's Uniform Federal Lien Registration Act requires that notices of federal liens for personal property be filed in the county where the taxpayer resides. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 44-68.12 (c)(2) (2007). The Internal Revenue Code deems the taxpayer's personal property to be situated at the taxpayer's residence at the time the notice of the lien is filed. In re Eschenbach, No. 00-45215-BJH-13, 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 1216, *at 4 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Sept. 14, 2001) (citing §6323(f)(2)(B)).

While the IRS properly filed notice of its 1997 lien in Bladen County, North Carolina where the Longs then resided, [DE-64, Ex. A] the Lewises claim that under § 6323, "the insurance proceeds have never been located at the residence of the taxpayers;" therefore, the IRS's lien did not attach to the proceeds until it filed notice of its levy on November 30, 2005. [DE-63, p. 8]. This argument misinterprets the notice provisions of the FTLA. Once the IRS filed notice of its lien based on the requirements of North Carolina's Uniform Federal Lien Registration Act, the lien attached to all of the Longs' personal property everywhere, not just the property that was located at their residence. See In re Eschenbach, 2001 Bankr. LEXIS, *at 6. As a result, the IRS's lien was fully perfected on September 29, 1997 and remains attached to all of the Longs' personal property until their tax liability is extinguished. 10



2. Perfected Deed of Trust

The Lewises next allege that because they have a perfected security interest through their deed of trust, they have priority over the IRS's lien based on the exception under § 6323 (b)(1)(B). [DE-63, p. 12]. However, the Lewises' citation of § 6323 (b)(1)(B) ignores the plain language of the statute. Section §6323(b)(1)(B) provides:
(b) Protection for certain interests even though notice filed. Even though notice of a lien imposed by section 6321 has been filed, such lien shall not be valid-

(1) Securities. With respect to a security (as defined in subsection (h)(4)) -

(B) as against a holder of a security interest in such security who, at the time the interest came into existence, did not have actual notice or knowledge of the existence of such lien.

Id.

Under § 6323(h)(4) a "security" is defined as:
any bond, debenture, note, or certificate or other evidence of indebtedness, issued by a corporation or a IRS or political subdivision thereof, with interest coupons or in registered form, share of stock, voting trust certificate, or any certificate of interest or participating in, certificate of deposit for receipt for, temporary or interim certificate for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing; negotiable instrument; or money.

Id.

The Lewises' perfected deed of trust does not qualify as a "security" as defined by the FTLA and they have cited no authority to prove that it does. Instead, their deed of trust is considered a "security interest," as discussed supra Section II, C, 1. Security interests are protected by the filing requirement under § 6323 (a). This Court has already concluded that the IRS has priority over the Lewises' security interest because it filed notice of its lien before the interest existed. see supra Section II, C, 1. Therefore, this argument is without merit.



3. Contractual Equitable Lien

In their final argument, the Lewises allege that they have priority over the IRS based on their equitable lien on the underlying insurance policy. [DE-63, pgs. 11-12]. However, the crux of this argument erroneously assumes that the IRS's lien on the insurance proceeds was not perfected until November 2005. Id. at 8, 12. This Court has already concluded that the September 1997 lien was perfected in and remained attached to all of the Longs' personal property. see supra Section II, C, 1. Therefore, this argument is without merit.

Although the Lewises' equitable lien will not defeat the IRS's priority, discussion of the lien is relevant to their priority over ILS's contractual assignment. Specifically, under the terms of the deed of trust, Mr. Long was required to "purchase and maintain insurance on his one-half undivided interest in the real estate for the benefit of the debt held by the Lewises." [DE-63, pgs. 10-11]. However, although Mr. Long "purchased and maintained" insurance on his property, he failed to list the Lewises as the "loss payees" on the policy contract. Id. at 11. The Lewises now assert that they have an equitable lien on the insurance proceeds.

The general rule is that unless a mortgagee is named as the "loss payee" in a fire insurance policy contract, it will have no right to receive the insurance proceeds under that contract. 11 In re Moore, 54 B.R. 781, 783 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1985); see also, Wayne Nat'l Bank v. Nat'l Bank, 147 S.E. 691, 692 (N.C. 1929). However, "where the mortgagor is charged with the duty of taking out insurance for the benefit of the mortgagee, as between the parties to the contract the mortgagee is entitled to an equitable lien on the proceeds of the policy obtained by the mortgagor." Wayne Nat'l Bank, 147 S.E. at 692 . In addition, principles of equity will reform the terms of the contract to "treat the mortgagor as holding the policy in trust for the mortgagee." Fitts v. A.F Messick Grocery Co., 57 .S.E. 164, 167 (N.C. 1907). Reformation of the contract allows the mortgagee to receive the insurance proceeds to the extent of the mortgagor's debt. 44A Am. Jur. 2d Insurance § 1704 (2007); see also, Wayne Nat'l Bank, 147 S.E. at 693 (stating that "[t]he insurance money received by the mortgagee takes the place of the mortgaged property, and the mortgagee would receive it, if the debt was due and unpaid, as he would receive the mortgaged property which it represented to reasonably account for its use").

Because the deed of trust required Mr. Long to insure his property for the benefit of the Lewises, his failure to do so created an equitable lien on the insurance proceeds. However, ILS asserts that it has priority over the Lewises' claim because it has a perfected "ownership interest" in the proceeds that arose prior to the Lewises' "inchoate equitable lien." [DE-69, pgs. 8-10]. This argument must fail for two reasons. First, contrary to ILS's assertion, Mr. Long's contractual assignment of the insurance proceeds created an equitable lien in favor of ILS, not an "ownership interest." See 51 Am. Jur. 2d Liens § 40 (2007) (indicating that an agreement to assign property that a party does not yet own creates an equitable lien on the assignment contract). In addition, this was ILS's position in its motion: "[t]he contract that assigned the proceeds of the insurance policy to International Loss Services, Ltd., was sufficient to create an equitable lien to the extent of the fee earned by the public adjuster." [DE-75-2, p. 6] (emphasis added) .

Second, although both the Lewises and ILS have an equitable lien on the insurance proceeds, "such a lien relates back, for priority purposes, to the time it was created by the conduct of the parties." 51 Am. Jur. 2d Liens § 72 (2007). In this case, equity reformed the insurance contract to include the Lewises on the loss payable clause at the time the contract was made on September 12, 2003. [DE-71, p. 3]. Therefore, the Lewises had an equitable lien on the proceeds several months before Mr. Long agreed to the assignment with ILS on March 20, 2004. see supra Section II, B, 3. Accordingly, the Lewises' equitable lien is superior to ILS's contractual assignment.



C. International Loss Services

On March 20, 2004, Mr. Long hired ILS to assist him in preparing his claim against NCJUA. [DE-69, p. 4]. Their written contract stipulated that ILS would receive "twelve percent (12%) of the loss payable, which sum is equivalent to $28,560.00." Id. ILS now claims that it has priority over the IRS's tax lien based on three legal theories. 12 Id. at 5. Each is addressed below:



1. Assessment of Taxes

First, ILS contends that the IRS failed to timely assess the Longs' taxes for certain time periods according to the requirements of 26 U.S.C. § 6501(a). 13 [DE-69, pgs. 5-6]. Specifically, ILS argues that "[t]here has been no showing that Defendants Dwight and Kathy Long did not file a tax return for the periods addressed in the lien, thus Int'l Loss asserts the Court must assume that a tax return was timely filed for these periods." [DE-69, p. 5]. Based on this reasoning, ILS concludes that the IRS's tax lien against the insurance proceeds is unenforceable. [DE-69, pg. 6].

Section 6501(a) provides that "the amount of any tax imposed by this title shall be assessed within 3 years after the return was filed ... ." In support of its motion, the IRS submitted an affidavit from Ralph Thompson, an Advisor with the Internal Revenue Service in their Greensboro, North Carolina Office. [DE-77, Ex. B, p. 1]. In his affidavit, Mr. Thompson affirms that he is familiar with the facts of this case and has reviewed the Longs' tax records and transcripts for the relevant time periods. Id. Based on his review, Mr. Thompson stated that the Longs' tax returns for the tax years 1990, 1991, 1992, and 1994 were not received by the IRS until August 2, 1996. [DE-77, Ex. B, p. 1]. The demand for payment and notice of assessment for these years was made on December 2, 1996, 4 months after the date of which the Longs filed their taxes. Id. In addition, Mr. Thompson also affirmed that the Longs' tax return for 1993 was not received until August 9, 1994. Id. at 2. The demand for payment and notice of assessment for this year was made on February 3, 1997, which is 2 years and 6 months after the date of which the Longs filed their taxes. Id. Based on this evidence, it is the clear that the IRS timely filed its notices of assessment against the Longs. Thus, the ILS's argument must fail.



2. IRS Liens Released

ILS next alleges that the IRS's tax lien for the years 1989 through 1994 have been released because of its failure to timely re-file the lien by the stipulated deadlines. [DE-69, pgs. 6-7]. See the chart below 14 :


___________________________________________________________________________________
Tax Year Assessment Date Refile Deadline

___________________________________________________________________________________
12/31/1989 06/24/1991 07/24/2001

___________________________________________________________________________________
12/31/1990 12/02/1996 01/01/2007

___________________________________________________________________________________
12/31/1991 12/26/1996 01/25/2007

___________________________________________________________________________________
12/31/1992 12/02/1996 01/01/2007

___________________________________________________________________________________
12/31/1993 02/03/1997 03/05/2007

___________________________________________________________________________________
12/31/1994 09/30/1996 10/30/2006

___________________________________________________________________________________


However, the IRS timely re-filed its liens for the tax years 1990-1994 on July 14, 2006. 15 See [DE-64, Ex. B]. Therefore, this argument is without merit.



3. IRS Liens for 1995-2003

Finally, ILS argues that the IRS's liens for the years 1995 through 2003 were not docketed until after Mr. Long assigned his rights to the insurance proceeds to ILS. However, the IRS has already conceded this argument. [DE-77, p. 13]. As a result, this argument will not be addressed further.

ILS makes a corollary argument that it has priority over the other Defendants based on the doctrine of unjust enrichment. [DE-69, pgs. 12-13]. Specifically, ILS contends that but for their efforts, there would be no insurance proceeds to which the other Defendants' liens could attach. Id. at 13. "Where one person has officiously conferred a benefit upon another, the other is enriched but is not considered to be unjustly enriched. The recipient of a benefit voluntarily bestowed without solicitation or inducement is not liable for their value." Rhyne v. Sheppard, 32 S.E.2d 316, 318 (N.C. 1944). In this case, the other Defendants did not contract for ILS's services, the Longs did. As a result, although the Defendants indirectly received the benefit of ILS's services, they were not unjustly enriched and are entitled to their priority in the insurance funds.



III. Distribution of the Insurance Proceeds

In addition to determining the priority among the Defendants, the Court must also decide how the funds should be distributed. Specifically, Defendant Kathy Long asserts several arguments as to why her share of the insurance proceeds should not be reduced by the claims of the other Defendants. [DE-66, pgs 9-19]. For example, with regards to the IRS's lien, she alleges that the amount of the lien should not be deducted from her portion of the proceeds for two reasons. First, she claims that the IRS failed to properly refile its notice of its lien based on her change in residency. Second, she contends that a state court consent judgment (hereinafter "judgment") already determined that her ex-husband, Dwight C. Long, was responsible for payment of the delinquent taxes. [DE-66, pgs . 9-16]. In addition, Mrs. Long also disclaims financial responsibility for the services performed by ILS. [DE-66, p. 4]. For the reasons stated below, the undersigned concludes that these arguments are without merit.



1. Tax Liability



a. Change in Residence

Mrs. Long contends that her rights to the insurance proceeds did not arise until after the fire occurred on March 4, 2004, during which time she had moved from Bladen County, North Carolina to Robeson County, North Carolina. [DE-66, p.16 & DE-65, Ex. N]. As a result, she now asserts that because the IRS refiled the notice of its lien in Bladen County on July 14, 2006, the lien was not perfected in her share of the proceeds since she no longer resided in that county. [DE-66, pgs. 15-16]. 16

This Court concluded that on September 29, 1997, the IRS properly filed notice of its lien on all of the Longs' personal property in accordance with North Carolina's Uniform Federal Lien Registration Act. see supra Section II, C, 1. "[O]nce properly filed, the lien ... remains valid even if the debtor leaves the residence." In re Eschenbach, 2001 Bankr. LEXIS, at 6. This result comports with the purpose behind the Internal Revenue Code.
The Internal Revenue Code does not require the IRS to file a tax lien in every county to which a taxpayer could carry personal property. 'To hold otherwise, would be to overlook the practical necessities of the situation and would require the Collector to file tax liens in every jurisdiction to which the taxpayers may at any time remove the property.' Similarly, by providing that the lien attaches to all property 'belonging to' the taxpayer, for the period until paid, with the property deemed situated at the taxpayer's residence at the time the notice of lien is filed, the Internal Revenue Code eliminates any need for the IRS to file tax liens in every jurisdiction to which a taxpayer may move and acquire new property.

In re Eschenbach, 2001 Bankr. LEXIS at 7-8 (internal citations omitted).

Therefore, because the IRS was not required to refile its tax lien based on Mrs. Long's change in residence, its lien remained perfected in and attached to all of her personal property. 17



b. State Court Judgment

Mrs. Long next alleges that a state court consent judgment has already determined that Mr. Long is responsible for the payment of the delinquent taxes. [DE-66, p.18]; [DE-65-4]. Specifically, Mrs. Long cites language from the judgment that states "Dwight C. Long and Kathy Y. Long shall each be responsible for their individual income tax liabilities, both with the State of North Carolina and the Internal Revenue Service and shall hold the other party harmless from the same." [DE-65, Ex. C, p. 3]. She believes that because Mr. Long's social security number is listed as the identifying number on the notices of the federal tax liens, she is not liable. [DE-66, p. 18]. To that end, she concludes that this Court is precluded from deciding this issue based on the doctrine of collateral estoppel. [DE-66, pgs. 17-19].

"[C]ollateral estoppel ... bars relitigation of issues that in the prior action were actually litigated, squarely addressed, and specifically decided." 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 493 (2007). 18 This doctrine only applies where there is a second action between the same individuals who were parties to the original action. Id. at § 491. In this case, none of these elements apply.

First, it should be noted that the IRS was not a party to the state court judgment, which means it is not bound that decision. See In re Cooper, 83 B.R. 544, 545 n.1 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1988) (noting that because the IRS was not a party to the spousal separation agreement that obligated one spouse to pay the delinquent taxes, it was free to go after either spouse or both for the unpaid taxes). Second, the state court did not have the authority to determine or alter the nature and extent of the Longs' federal tax liability. See Ridgeway v. Ridgeway, 546 U.S. 46, 55 (holding that the Supremacy Clause requires "state divorce decree[s] [to] ... give way to clearly conflicting federal enactments"). Third, Mrs. Long incorrectly concludes that because the "identifying number" on the notice of the liens listed Mr. Long's social security number, she is not liable. [DE-66, p. 18]. However, for the relevant tax years at issue, the Longs filed joint tax returns, which means that both spouses are jointly and severally liable for the delinquent tax liens. [DE-79, p. 2]; See 26 U.S.C. § 6013 (d)(3) (stating "if a joint return is made, the tax shall be computed on the aggregate income and the liability with respect to the tax shall be joint and several"). In addition, listing Mr. Long's social security number is not dispositive evidence of Mrs. Long's liability because "it is the routine practice of the IRS to use the social security of only one spouse on the Federal tax lien notices." [DE-79, p. 3]; [DE-79-2].

Furthermore, notwithstanding the above, this Court's jurisdiction is limited to determining the priority of the interpleaded Defendants and ordering the disposition of the insurance proceeds; not assessing the Longs' tax liability. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Click, No. 3:92-0917, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18518, *at 3 (S.D. W. Va. Dec. 8, 1994) (holding that the taxpayer defendant could not use the interpleader action to collaterally attack the amount of his tax assessment). Therefore, even though Mrs. Long disputes her responsibility to pay the IRS's lien, she must "pay first and litigate later." Id. at 4. Accordingly, the IRS's lien will deducted equally from the Longs' interests in the insurance proceeds.



2. Financial responsibility for services performed by ILS

In addition to disputing her liability for the IRS's lien, Mrs. Long also contends that she was never a party to the contract with ILS; thereby disclaiming financial responsibility for their services. [DE-66, p. 4]. 19 However, in an affidavit from Mr. Long, he affirms that Mrs. Long ratified the contract by "communicat[ing] her agreement for International Loss Services to collect its fee and perform the public adjusting work on the fire loss in a letter from her attorney James E. Hill, Jr. ... ." [Affidavit of Dwight C. Long, p. 5, ¶ 17]. 20 Mr. Long is correct.

In a letter dated August 17, 2004, Mrs. Long's attorney, James E. Hill, explicitly stated:
Ms. Long will pay for all reasonable out of pocket to Loss Services of Wilmington for the clean up expenses which are incurred and actually paid directly through the courthouse or Loss Services to the third party. In addition, she agrees to pay Loss of Services a fee of twelve (12%) percent of all payments on their behalf as contracted.

[DE-73, Ex. 9].

The general rule is that even though an individual is not a party to a contract, they can become liable on a contract through the creation of an agency relationship. An agency relationship is created when a principal manifests his or her consent that an agent act on his or her behalf and be subject to his or her control. 3 Am. Jur. 2d Agency § 1 (2007). "The attorney-client relationship is based upon principles of agency;"the client is the principal, and the attorney is the agent. Harris v. Ray Johnson Constr. Co., 534 S.E.2d 653, 655 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000). As a result, a client will be held liable on a contract made by her attorney with a third person when "(1) the [attorney] acts within the scope of his actual authority; (2) when the contract, although unauthorized, has been ratified, [and] (3) when the [attorney] acts within the scope of his apparent authority ... ." Inv. Prop. of Asheville, Inc. v. Allen, 196 S.E.2d 262, 267 (N.C. 1973).

Actual authority is authority that an attorney reasonably believes he possesses. Harris, 534 S.E.2d at 655. This authority can be implied from the words or conduct of the client as well as the particular circumstances of the attorney-client relationship. Id. On the other hand, ratification occurs when the client adopts his attorney's actions, or accepts the benefits of his attorney's efforts, even though the attorney lacked the authority to act. Trollinger v. Fleer, 72 S.E. 795, 797-98 (N.C. 1911); see also, Hooper v. Merchant's Bank & Trust Co., 130 S.E. 49, 52 (N.C. 1925) (stating "[r]atification is based upon the plain principle of honesty that a party cannot retain the benefits and escape the burdens of an act done by an unauthorized agent"). Both principles affirm the presumption in North Carolina that in general, an attorney has the authority to act for the client he professes to represent. Harris, 534 S.E.2d at 654.

In this case, Mr. Hill was acting as Mrs. Long's agent when he wrote the letter to Mr. Long's attorney, thus, it is reasonable to assume that Mr. Hill was acting within the scope of his actual authority. However, even if Mr. Hill exceeded his authority, Mrs. Long has not provided any evidence to rebut the presumption that Mr. Hill had the authority to bind her to the ILS contract. See Harris, 534 S.E.2d at 655 (holding "[o]ne who challenges the actions of an attorney as being unauthorized has the burden of rebutting [the] presumption and proving lack of authority to the satisfaction of the court"). Instead, she simply argues that she should receive the benefit of ILS's services, which was partly responsible in procuring the insurance proceeds, but not the burden paying their fee. This argument must fail. Mr. Hill's letter effectively bound Mrs. Long to the terms of the ILS contract. In addition, when two or more people undertake a joint obligation, it is considered a joint contract. 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 421 (2007). "Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-72 ([2007)], joint obligors on a contract are jointly and severally liable." McInnis & Assoc., Inc. v. Hall, 333 S.E.2d 544, 546 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 349 S.E.2d 552 (N.C. 1986); see also, Rufty v. Claywell, Powell & Co., 93 N.C. 306, 308 (N.C. 1885). As a result, because the Longs agreed to be jointly responsible for the ILS contract, if Mr. Long cannot pay his portion, Mrs. Long is jointly and severally liable for the unpaid balance. 21 Accordingly, ILS is entitled to receive its fee from Mrs. Long's share of the insurance proceeds subject to the claims of the other Defendants.

In conclusion, the Longs are entitled to an equal share of the insurance proceeds; $119,000 each. However, the insurance proceeds will be distributed based on the claimants' priority as determined above:

1) Thomas S. Hicks will receive $5,150.03 from Mr. Long for his legal services and Hill & High L.L.P. will receive $39,666.66 from Mrs. Long for its legal services. [DE-70-3, p. 3, ¶ 11]; [DE-66, p. 25].

2) The IRS will receive $122,551.11 for its tax lien plus accrued interest, which will be deducted equally from the Longs' portions of the proceeds ($61, 275.55 each). [DE-64, p. 7 & DE-77, p. 14, DE-82, pgs. 1-2].

3) The Lewises will receive $52,574.42 for their equitable lien from the remaining portion of Mr. Long's interest in the insurance proceeds. [DE-63, p. 5]. This will exhaust the insurance proceeds payable to Mr. Long.

4) ILS will receive $18,057.79 for its equitable lien from the remaining portion of Mrs. Long's interest in the insurance proceeds. This will exhaust the insurance proceeds payable to Mrs. Long.


Conclusion


The Internal Revenue Service's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [DE-64 & 77] is GRANTED, the Lewises Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [DE-62] is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part, Kathy Y. Long's and Hill & High's Motion for Summary Judgment [DE-65] is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part, International Loss Services' Motion for Summary Judgment [DE-67], is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part, and International Loss Services', Thomas S. Hicks', and Dwight C. Long's Motions for Summary Judgment [DE-70, 75, & 76 ] are DENIED in part and GRANTED in part. The Clerk is directed to close this case.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Raleigh, North Carolina this 31st day of January, 2008.

1 The Lewises are the only Defendants that filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings instead of a Motion for Summary Judgment. [DE-62]. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (c), a party may move for Judgment on the Pleadings after the pleadings are closed, but before the eve of trial. Although procedurally different, both motions share distinct similarities. For example, "[w]hen reviewing a Rule 12(c) motion the court must construe the allegations in the complaint in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. A district court may grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings when no genuine issues of material fact remain and the case can be decided as a matter of law." Hamm v. Canal Ins. Co., 10 F. Supp. 2d 539, 541 (M.D.N.C. 1998). Therefore, the Defendants' Motion will be treated the same as a Motion for Summary Judgment in this case.

2 Both tax liens were filed in the Clerk of Superior Court, Bladen County, North Carolina where the taxpayers resided at the time. [DE-64, pgs 5-6]. In addition, the different lien amounts reflect the expiration of the 6/24/1991 assessment and a reduction in the other liens. [DE-64, Exs. A-B].

3 It should be noted that several different dates are given for when the fire occurred, however, none of the dates will effect the outcome of the case.

4 Although the IRS failed to cite any authority in support of its argument, at least one federal court has concluded "26 U.S.C. § 6323 (b)(8) protects the attorney to the extent of a reasonable fee, as long as it is protected by local law, for efforts in obtaining and collecting the judgment or amount." Dunn & Black v. United States, 366 F. Supp.2d 1008, 1028 (E.D. Wash. 2005), vacated, remanded by, 492 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added). Therefore, as long as the attorney's compensation is protected by local law, than the agreement will be upheld.

5 In a footnote, the IRS also addresses Hill & High's alleged contention that their continued legal representation in this interpleader action would fall under the attorneys' lien exception in § 6323(b)(8). [DE-77, p. 10, n.5]; See [DE-66, p. 22]. Hill & High's contingency fee contract was limited to the reversal of the NCJUA's decision, and recovery of the proceeds either by negotiation, settlement, or court action. [DE-66, p. 20]. Thus, their attorney's fee for their effort in procuring the fund is covered by the exception; their continued representation of Mrs. Long is not.

6 The North Carolina Deed of Trust was executed by Mr. Long for the principal sum of $62, 702.91 on November 7, 2002. [DE-65-6, Ex. A].

7 The Order stated that the interest on Mr. Long's debt would be 6% from October 21, 2002 until the debt was paid in full. [DE-65-4, p. 2]. The Order also declared that Mr. Long was responsible for "the gross amount of the taxes that Ennis W. Lewis has paid on the said property from the date of the payment until paid at the rate of six (6%) percent." Id. The Lewises claim that no payments have been made on the note and as of November 7, 2007, Mr. Long owes them $81,513.78. [DE-63, p. 5]. In his affidavit, Mr. Long "disputes the amount of the debt, but does not dispute that there is a lien on his property." [DE-71, p. 3, ¶ 8].

8 A deed of trust is perfected by filing in the Office of the County Register of Deeds. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47-20 (LexisNexis 2007). "On [July 2, 2003,] a deed of trust was executed by Dwight C. Long, a separated person to Alan I. Maynard, Trustee for the Lewises was recorded in Book 522, page 131 of the Bladen County Registry ... ." [DE-63, P. 4]; [DE-65-6].

9 See [DE-65-6, Ex. A].

10 The Lewises, and the other claimants, wrongly conclude that the IRS's lien did not attach to the proceeds until the levy on November 30, 2005. [DE-63, p. 8]; [DE-75-2, pgs. 7-8]. However, "[a] levy is merely one instrument with which the United States can enforce a lien. The Supreme Court has determined that the relevant date for determining priority of a federal lien is the date of notice of the lien, not the levy." Safemasters Co. v. D'Annunzio & Circosta, No. K-93-3883, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10560, *at 12 (D. Md. July 18, 1994) (citing McDermott, 507 U.S. 447) (emphasis in the original). Therefore, the date for determining the IRS's priority is September 29, 1997 when it filed its lien; not November 30, 2005 when it gave notice of its levy.

11 North Carolina is a title theory state, which means that "mortgages normally take the form of deeds of trust." 1-13 Webster's Real Estate Law in North Carolina § 13-1 (2006). Therefore, although deeds of trust use different terms (i.e. grantor, trustee, and beneficiary instead of mortgagor and mortgagee), they are practically the same as mortgages, which means the same rule applies.

12 ILS filed four Motions for Summary Judgment. [DE-69, 70, 75, 76]. The arguments in each motion have been consolidated and addressed above.

13 The IRS questions ILS's standing to challenge the validity and timeliness of the tax assessments against the Longs. [DE-77, p. 12, n.8]. Because the IRS's lien will be fully satisfied based on its priority, the Court will not address this issue.

14 Chart was compiled from [DE-64, Ex. A].

15 The deadline for the 1989 tax assessment did expire, but "the IRS has made no effort to secure payment under the 1989 assessed taxes" evidenced by the reduction of the lien. [DE-77, p. 13, n.10]; See [DE-64, Ex. A]

16 Mrs. Long also argues that the assessment for the 1989 tax year was released because the IRS failed to timely refile notice of its lien. [DE-66, P. 15]. However, the IRS has already conceded this argument by explicitly stating that it is not seeking to recover the delinquent taxes for the 1989 assessment. [DE-77, p. 9].

17 In addition, to the extent that Mrs. Long alleges that "no demand was actually made by the Internal Revenue Service," for the delinquent and thus "there is no lien in favor of the United States,"[DE-66, p. 13] this argument is without merit. Mr. Thompson's affidavit affirms the dates when notices and demands for payment were sent to the Longs. see supra Section II, C, 1; [DE-77, Ex. B].

18 An issue is "actually litigated" when it is properly raised in the pleadings or otherwise submitted for determination and in fact determined. Id. at § 494.

19 ILS has requested 12% of the insurance proceeds for the work it performed, which is $28,560. [DE-73, Ex. 14].

20 In addition, in his motion for summary judgment Mr. Long argues, "[a]lthough Kathy Long was not a party to the contract [with ILS], the latter ratified same and agreed to payment being made." [DE-76-2, p. 6].

21 While ILS contests Mrs. Long's right to receive the portion of the insurance proceeds that covered the personal property destroyed by the fire, they do so solely to establish the priority of their fee. [DE-69, pgs. 11-12]; see also, [DE-66, pgs. 8-9] (Mrs. Long argues that she and her ex-husband own all of the insurance proceeds as tenants in common since they owned the residential property as tenants in common; thus they are both entitled to $119,000). However, Mr. Long, who presumably owned most of the personal property, has not raised any similar objections and the Court will interpose any for him. Accordingly, the insurance proceeds will be divided equally between the Longs; both are entitled to $119,000 subject to the claims of the other Defendants.

Labels:

Tuesday, February 19, 2008

Claim for Refund - section 6511

Bob J. McAdams, Plaintiff v. The United States, Defendant.

U.S. Court of Federal Claims; 07-164T, February 1, 2008.

Unpublished opinion.

[ Code Secs. 6511 and 7422]

Refund claims: Jurisdiction: Statute of limitations: Two-year period. --


The Court of Federal Claims lacked subject matter jurisdiction over an individual's tax refund claims because his claims were filed after the two-year statute of limitations under Code Sec. 6511(a) had lapsed. The individual claimed refunds of amounts the IRS had levied and applied to trust fund recovery penalties assessed against him as a responsible person for two corporations. However, he filed his claims more than two years after the last levy and, therefore, his refund claims were barred by the limitations period in Code Sec. 6511.





Bob J. McAdams, Nplaintiff, pro se; Richard T. Morrison, Acting Assistant Attorney General, David Gustafson, Chief, Court of Federal Claims Section, Jennifer P. Wilson, Department of Justice and G. Robson Stewart, for defendant.





OPINION


MARGOLIS, Senior Judge, U.S. Court of Federal Claims: This matter comes before the Court on defendant's motion to dismiss, filed November 16, 2007, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff, Bob J. McAdams, claims the defendant owes him $104,482.42 plus interest as a tax refund. By order dated November 27, 2007, plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was stayed pending disposition of defendant's motion to dismiss. Defendant, the United States, claims this Court lacks jurisdiction because the plaintiff filed a tax refund claim after the statutory time period to file a claim lapsed. After reviewing the briefs and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, this Court does not have jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim. Accordingly, defendant's motion to dismiss is GRANTED .




I. FACTS


The Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") assessed three separate Trust Fund Recovery Penalties ("TFRP") under 26 U.S.C. §6672 against the plaintiff for unpaid taxes, as the responsible officer for two different corporations. Section 6672 states that "any person required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over any tax" will be personally liable if the person "willfully fails to collect such tax, or truthfully account for and pay over such tax, or willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any such tax or the payment thereof." 26 U.S.C. §6672(a). The first TFRP was assessed on January 23, 1990 in the amount of $93,775.55 for unpaid taxes associated with B.J. McAdams, Inc. for the taxable quarter ending September 30, 1989. On March 26, 1990, the IRS again assessed a TFRP against the plaintiff in the amount of $172,082.96, for unpaid taxes associated with B.J. McAdams, Inc. for the taxable quarter ending December 31, 1989. The last TFRP was assessed against the plaintiff on July 1, 1991 in the amount of $395,398.33 for unpaid taxes associated with Drivers Services, Inc. for the taxable quarter ending September 30, 1989.

B.J. McAdams, Inc. filed for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas on March 28, 1990. The IRS filed claims against B.J. McAdams, Inc. in the bankruptcy proceeding totaling $1,110,089.34 and are primarily related to employment tax liabilities.

Prior to B.J. McAdams, Inc. filing for bankruptcy, the plaintiff had individual income tax overpayments for the 1988 through 1990 tax years totaling, with interest, $81,873.80. Plaintiff's individual income tax overpayments were applied to the TFRP assessments. In 1994, the IRS applied three levy payments (totaling approximately $29,000) to the accumulated TFRP total. The last levy payment of $4,547.93 applied to the TFRP assessment was on October 28, 1994. Def. Ex. 1 at US 0267.

On November 19, 1996, the plaintiff filed a Form 843, Claim for Refund, requesting a tax refund in the amount of $104,843.42, plus interest. Def. Ex. 8 at US 0007. Enclosed with the Form 843 the plaintiff included a document titled "Explanation of Claim." The attachment explained that the bankruptcy trustee, in the Chapter 7 proceedings of B.J. McAdams, Inc., would pay the entire amount of the TFRP, including interest and penalties.

In response to the plaintiff's letter and attached explanation, the IRS in February 5, 1997 letter, explained that his refund request was premature. Subsequently, in November 2001, the bankruptcy court determined that the IRS had a secured claim of $1,104,717.31 and that the IRS had secured collateral in the amount of $1,173,219.53. The difference, $68,502.22, was awarded to the IRS as post-petition interest. The bankruptcy court noted that previously the IRS had received $985,585.65 on the secured claims, but the IRS was still owed $187,633.88. As a result of these findings, the bankruptcy court ordered the bankruptcy trustee to make a final distribution of $187,633.88 to the IRS.

On January 22, 2005, the plaintiff again requested a refund from the IRS. On March 17, 2005, the IRS disallowed the plaintiff's refund request. The plaintiff appealed the disallowance of the tax refund, and the appeal was denied on December 8, 2006.




II. DISCUSSION





A. Jurisdiction


When adjudicating a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 12(b)(1) of the Rules of the Court of Federal Claims this Court must "assume all factual allegations to be true and draw all reasonable inferences in plaintiff's favor." Hall v. United States, 74 Fed. Cl. 391, 393 (2006) (quoting Henke v. United States, 60 F.3d 795, 797 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).

For this Court to have jurisdiction over a tax refund claim, the taxpayer must have duly filed a refund claim. 26 U.S.C. §7422. For a claim to be "duly filed" under 26 U.S.C. §7422, the claim must comply with the statutorily prescribed timing requirement of 26 U.S.C. §6511(a). Specifically, under 26 U.S.C. §6511(a) a taxpayer's


[c]laim for credit or refund of an overpayment of any tax imposed by this title in respect of which tax the taxpayer is required to file a return shall be filed by the taxpayer within 3 years from the time the return was filed or 2 years from the time the tax was paid, whichever of such periods expires the later, or if no return was filed by the taxpayer, within 2 years from the time the tax was paid.


26 U.S.C. §6511(a).

Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court, in United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 602 (1990), has emphasized that compliance with the statutorily prescribed timing requirement is a prerequisite for any court to have jurisdiction over a tax refund claim. Specifically, Dalm held that "unless a claim for refund of a tax has been filed within the time limits imposed by §6511(a) , a suit for refund, regardless of whether the tax is alleged to have been erroneously, illegally, or wrongfully collected. . .may not be maintained in any court." United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. at 602 (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted). Specifically, 26 U.S.C. §6511(b)(1) states that "[n]o credit or refund shall be allowed or made after the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed in subsection (a) for the filing of a claim for credit or refund, unless a claim for credit or refund is filed by the taxpayer within such period."




B. Plaintiff's Refund Claim


The defendant asserts that the plaintiff has not complied with the "duly filed" requirement of §7422 because the two-year statute of limitations requirement of §6511(a) lapsed before the plaintiff filed the refund claim. The plaintiff's levy payment on October 28, 1994 was the last payment applied to the TFRP. Therefore, the plaintiff was required to file a refund claim by October 28, 1996 pursuant to §6511(a). The plaintiff filed two refund claims- November 19, 1996 and January 22, 2005 -both outside the two-year limitation in §6511. Therefore, pursuant to statutes and Supreme Court precedent, this Court does not have jurisdiction to hear plaintiff's refund claims because the claims were filed after the statute of limitations period lapsed.




C. Plaintiff's Additional Claim


Plaintiff cites 26 U.S.C. §§1311, 1312, 1314 as authority for tolling the statute of limitations in the request for refund filed on November 19, 1996. Def. Ex. 8 at US 0007. The cited sections fall under Subchapter Q, "Readjustment of Tax Between Years and Special Limitations." Section 1311 focuses on "Correction of error;" §1312 relates to "Circumstances of adjustment;" and §1314 deals with "Amount and method of adjustment." None of the provisions cited by the plaintiff tolls the statute of limitations in §6511.

Additionally, plaintiff contends that this case is controlled by McCarty v. United States, 437 F.2d 961 (Ct. Cl. 1971). In McCarty, the IRS agreed not to collect taxes owed by a corporation and instead allowed the corporation to continue performance on a contract the corporation had with the U.S. Navy. McCarty, 437 F.2d at 974. Because the IRS made this agreement with the corporation, the IRS was precluded from seeking the payment of the taxes by the corporation's responsible officers. Id. Unlike McCarty, the corporations in this case have made no such agreement with the IRS. Therefore, McCarty, is inapposite to the facts of this case.




III. CONCLUSION


Defendant's motion to dismiss is GRANTED . The Clerk will enter judgment for the defendant and dismiss this case. Each party shall pay their own costs.

Labels:

Monday, February 18, 2008

Section 408(d)(3) of the Code defines and provides the rules applicable to IRA rollovers.Section 408(d)(3)(A) of the Code provides that section 408(d)(1) of the Code does not apply to any amount paid or distributed out of an IRA to the individual for whose benefit the IRA is maintained if

(i) the entire amount received (including money and any other property) is paid into an IRA for the benefit of such individual not later than the 60th day after the day on which the individual receives the payment or distribution; or

(ii) the entire amount received (including money and any other property) is paid into an eligible retirement plan (other than an IRA) for the benefit of such individual not later than the 60th day after the date on which the payment or distribution is received, except that the maximum amount which may be paid into such plan may not exceed the portion of the amount received which is includible in gross income (determined without regard to section 408(d)(3)).

Section 408(d)(3)(c)(i) of the Code provides, in summary, that the rollover rules of section 408(d)(3) do not apply to inherited IRAs.

Section 408(d)(3)(c)(ii) of the Code provides that the term "inherited IRA" means an IRA obtained by an individual, other than the IRA owner's spouse, as a result of the death of the IRA owner. Thus, under circumstances that conform with the requirements of Code section 408(d)(3), a surviving spouse who acquires a decedent's IRA after, and as a result of, the death of an IRA owner will be able to roll over the decedent's IRA into an IRA set up and maintained in the name of the surviving spouse.



IRS Letter Ruling 200807025

LTR Report Number 1616, February 20, 2008 IRS REF: Symbol: T:EP:RA:T3 [Code Sec. 408]

November 23, 2007

This is in response to correspondence dated October 23, 2006, as supplemented by correspondence dated May 8, August 20, and September 26, 2007, submitted on your behalf by your authorized representative, in which you requested a ruling under section 408(d) of the Internal Revenue Code (Code).

The following facts and representations have been submitted under penalty of perjury in support of the ruling requested:

Individual A was born on September 6, ***** and died on February 28, ***** at age 67. Individual B was married to Individual A, and both resided in State C, on the date of his death. On the date of his death, Individual A maintained an Individual Retirement Arrangement (IRA) from which no distributions had been made. Individual A had not named a beneficiary for this IRA and under State C law his estate became the beneficiary.

Individual A died testate and under his Last Will and Testament (Will) left the residue of his estate, following dispositive provisions for the real and personal tangible property in his estate, to Trust A. Trust A was established by and is governed by the terms of Trust Agreement A. Trust A is a grantor trust and is irrevocable. The residue of his estate includes his IRA.

Article Four of Trust Agreement A provides for disposition of the Trust A assets following the death of Individual A. Paragraph 4.1 of Trust Agreement A provides for the distribution of specific cash amounts. Paragraph 4.2 provides for division of the remainder of the Trust A estate into four separate sub-trusts to be established, including a Marital Trust and a Non-Marital Trust. Under Paragraph 4.3(a) of Trust Agreement A, Individual B is entitled to the entire principal and income of the Marital Trust during her lifetime. She has, under State C law and the express terms of Trust Agreement A, the unfettered right to withdraw all or a portion of the assets of the Marital Trust and request payment thereof to herself as beneficiary, or for her benefit, without regard to the interests of any remainder beneficiary. Paragraph 4.4(a) of Trust Agreement A provides that in the event the assets of the Marital Trust are exhausted, Individual B may benefit from principal and income distributions from the Non-Marital Trust, subject to normal restrictive standards.

Individual A named himself as trustee of Trust A and provided that upon his death, Individual B and Individual C should serve as successor co-trustees. As co-trustees of Trust A, Individuals B and C propose to take certain actions.

First, pursuant to Article Five of Trust Agreement A, by means of a trustee-to-trustee transfer, the Trust A co-trustees will transfer an amount of the assets of Individual A's IRA to a separate IRA, to be called IRA X. IRA X will be set up and maintained in the name of Individual A. IRA X will include an allocation of all post-death investment gains and losses.

Next, pursuant to Article Four, paragraph 4.2 of Trust Agreement A, Individuals B and C will create four separate sub-trusts, including a Marital Trust. In accordance with the provisions of Trust Agreement A, the Marital Trust will be the nominal beneficiary of IRA X. Individuals B and C will then distribute to Individual B the entire principal of the Marital Trust pursuant to the personal request of Individual B, as permitted in paragraph 4.3(a) of Trust Agreement A. It is anticipated that the assets of the Marital Trust will consist of Taxpayer B's rights to IRA X, as beneficiary of the Marital Trust created under the provisions of Trust A, plus such other assets as will fully fund the Marital Trust. Individual B and C will then, pursuant to Article 7 of Trust Agreement A, terminate the Marital Trust. Individual B will then roll over the amounts held in IRA X into an IRA established as her own IRA rather than as a beneficiary IRA. This will take place no later than 60 days following Individual B's receipt of the distribution of IRA X.

Based on the facts and representations, the following rulings were requested:

1. That portion of Individual A's IRA which will be transferred, by means of a trustee-to-trustee transfer, into a separate IRA entitled IRA X, will not be treated as an inherited IRA within the meaning of section 408(d) of the Code with respect to Individual A's surviving spouse, Individual B.

2. Individual B will not be required to include in her gross income for federal tax purposes the undistributed assets of IRA X, that will be created by means of a trustee-totrustee transfer from Individual A's IRA to IRA X.

3. Individual B will be entitled to elect to receive a total distribution from IRA X and roll over this distribution into her own IRA, as long as the rollover is accomplished not later than the 60th day after the date on which Individual B receives the distribution.

With respect to your ruling requests, section 408(d)(1) of the Code provides that, except as otherwise provided in section 408(d), any amount paid or distributed out of an IRA shall be included in gross income by the payee or distributee, as the case may be, in the manner provided under section 72 of the Code.

Section 408(d)(3) of the Code defines and provides the rules applicable to IRA rollovers.

Section 408(d)(3)(A) of the Code provides that section 408(d)(1) of the Code does not apply to any amount paid or distributed out of an IRA to the individual for whose benefit the IRA is maintained if

(i) the entire amount received (including money and any other property) is paid into an IRA for the benefit of such individual not later than the 60th day after the day on which the individual receives the payment or distribution; or

(ii) the entire amount received (including money and any other property) is paid into an eligible retirement plan (other than an IRA) for the benefit of such individual not later than the 60th day after the date on which the payment or distribution is received, except that the maximum amount which may be paid into such plan may not exceed the portion of the amount received which is includible in gross income (determined without regard to section 408(d)(3)).

Section 408(d)(3)(c)(i) of the Code provides, in summary, that the rollover rules of section 408(d)(3) do not apply to inherited IRAs.

Section 408(d)(3)(c)(ii) of the Code provides that the term "inherited IRA" means an IRA obtained by an individual, other than the IRA owner's spouse, as a result of the death of the IRA owner. Thus, under circumstances that conform with the requirements of Code section 408(d)(3), a surviving spouse who acquires a decedent's IRA after, and as a result of, the death of an IRA owner will be able to roll over the decedent's IRA into an IRA set up and maintained in the name of the surviving spouse.

The Preamble to the Final Income Tax Regulations promulgated under Code section 401(a)(9) (see 67 Federal Register 18988 (April 17, 2002)) (Regulations) provides, in relevant part, that a surviving spouse who actually receives a distribution from a deceased spouse's IRA is permitted to roll that distribution over into his/her own IRA even if the spouse is not the sole beneficiary of the deceased's IRA as long as the rollover is accomplished within the requisite 60-day period. A rollover may be accomplished even if IRA assets pass through a trust.

Revenue Ruling 78-406, 1978-2 C.B. 157 provides that the direct transfer of funds from one IRA trustee to another IRA trustee, even if at the behest of the IRA holder, does not constitute a payment or distribution to a participant, payee, or distributee as those terms are used in Code section 408(d). Furthermore, such a transfer does not constitute a rollover distribution.

Revenue Ruling 78-406 is applicable if the trustee-to-trustee transfer is directed by the beneficiary of an IRA after the death of the IRA owner as long as the transferee IRA is set up and maintained in the name of the deceased IRA owner for the benefit of the beneficiary. The beneficiary accomplishing such a post-death trustee-to-trustee transfer need not be the surviving spouse of a deceased IRA holder.

In this case, although Individual A had not named a beneficiary for his IRA, under State C law his estate became the beneficiary. Pursuant to his Will, Individual A left the residue of his estate, including his IRA, to Trust A. Individual B is a co-trustee of Trust A and Individual A's surviving spouse. As co-trustee, Individual B will transfer, by means of a trustee-to-trustee transfer, an amount of the assets in Individual A's IRA to a separate IRA, to be called IRA X. IRA X will be set up and maintained in the name of Individual A. In accordance with the provisions of Trust Agreement A, the Marital Trust, a sub-trust to be established under paragraph 4.2 of Trust Agreement A, will be the nominal beneficiary of IRA X. As surviving spouse, Individual B is the sole beneficiary of the Marital Trust. Pursuant to paragraph 4.3(a) of Trust Agreement A and the request of Individual B, the Trust A co-trustees will then distribute to Individual B the entire principal of the Marital Trust, including amounts in IRA X. Individual B will then roll over the amounts distributed from IRA X into an IRA established as her own IRA no later than 60 days following her receipt of the distribution from IRA X.

Generally, if the proceeds of a decedent's IRA are payable to a trust, and are paid to the trustee of the trust who then pays them to the decedent's surviving spouse as the beneficiary of the trust, the surviving spouse shall be treated as having received the IRA proceeds from the trust and not from the decedent. Accordingly, such surviving spouse, in general, shall not be eligible to roll over the distributed IRA proceeds into her own IRA.

However, the general rule will not apply in a case where the surviving spouse is the sole trustee of the decedent's trust and has the sole authority and discretion under trust language to pay the IRA proceeds to herself. The surviving spouse may then receive the IRA proceeds and roll over the amounts into an IRA set up and maintained in her name.

In this case, the surviving spouse, Individual B, is not the sole trustee of Individual A's trust, Trust A. Pursuant to the Preamble to the Final Regulations however, if Individual B, as Individual A's surviving spouse, actually receives a distribution from an IRA set up and maintained in the name of Individual A, she is permitted to roll over that distribution into her own IRA even though she is not the sole beneficiary of Individual A's IRA as long as the rollover is accomplished within the requisite 60-day period. This rollover may be accomplished even though the IRA assets pass through a trust.

Additionally, a trustee-to-trustee transfer, as described in Revenue Ruling 78-406, does not constitute a distribution or payment as those terms are defined for purposes of section 408(d) of the Code. Furthermore, a trustee-to-trustee transfer from one IRA to another IRA may be accomplished after the date of death of an IRA owner by a beneficiary of said IRA owner as long as the transferee IRA remains in the name of the decedent.

In this case, Trust A was the beneficiary of Individual A's IRA pursuant to State C law and Individual A's Will. Trust A was established by Individual A, was valid under the laws of State C, and became irrevocable at the death of Individual A.

Individual B, and her Trust A co-trustee, intend to accomplish a trustee-to-trustee transfer of a portion of the IRA held by Individual A at his death into IRA X, another IRA maintained in the name of Individual A. Individual B will then request payment of the amounts held in IRA X as beneficiary of the Marital Trust created under the terms of Trust Agreement A, which Marital Trust is the beneficiary of IRA X. Upon receipt of the IRA X distribution, Individual B will then roll over the IRA X distribution into an IRA set up and maintained in her name. Said rollover will be made within the time frame stated in Code section 408(d)(3)(A)(i). Based on the above, the Service will treat Individual B as a surviving spouse who is eligible to roll over her above-described IRA X interest into an IRA set up and maintained in her name.

Therefore, with respect to your ruling requests, we conclude as follows:

1. That portion of Individual A's IRA which will be transferred, by means of a trustee-totrustee transfer, into a separate IRA entitled IRA X, will not be treated as an inherited IRA within the meaning of section 408(d) of the Code with respect to Individual A's surviving spouse, Individual B.

2. Individual B will not be required to include in her gross income for federal tax purposes the undistributed assets of IRA X, that will be created by means of a trustee-totrustee transfer from Individual A's IRA to IRA X.

3. Individual B will be entitled to elect to receive a total distribution from IRA X and roll over this distribution into her own IRA, as long as the rollover is accomplished not later than the 60th day after the date on which Individual B receives the distribution.

In accordance with section 408(d)(3)(E) of the Code, this ruling does not authorize the rollover of amounts that were required to be distributed by section 401-(a)(9) of the Code, made applicable to an IRA pursuant to Code section 408(a)(6) (if any).

No opinion is expressed as to the tax treatment of the transaction described herein under the provisions of any other section of either the Code or regulations which may be applicable thereto.

This letter assumes that Individual A's IRA is and was qualified under section 408 of the Code at all times relevant thereto. It also assumes that IRA X and any rollover IRA established by Individual B will also meet the requirements of section 408 at all times relevant thereto.

This letter is directed only to the taxpayer who requested it. Section 6110(k)(3) of the Code provides that it may not be used or cited as precedent.

Pursuant to a power of attorney on file with this office, a copy of this ruling letter is being sent to your authorized representative. If you wish to inquire about this ruling, please contact *****, I.D. # *****, at (*****). Please address all correspondence to *****.

Sincerely yours, Frances V. Sloan, Manager, Employee Plans, Technical Group.

Labels:

Friday, February 15, 2008

Section 6694 - IRS Chief Counsel Attorney Recognizes Complications In Implementing New Preparer Penalty Rules


The practical application of the interim guidance on Code Sec. 6694 preparer penalties recently issued by the IRS has raised questions that postponement of full application of the rules does not avoid, concluded participants at a February 14 D.C. Bar luncheon program in Washington, D.C. Panel members included Matthew Cooper, attorney, IRS Chief Counsel, and Ronald Buch, former attorney with IRS Chief Counsel.


Background


The Small Business and Work Opportunity Tax Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-28) expanded the scope of Code Sec. 6694 to all tax returns, raised the standard of conduct for preparers and increased the dollar amount of the penalty for understatements due to unreasonable positions and willful or reckless conduct. The IRS has issued guidance in the form of several notices (Notice 2008-11, I.R.B. 2008-3, 279; Notice 2008-12, I.R.B. 2008-3, 280; Notice 2008-13, I.R.B. 2008-3, 282.


Reasonable Belief


According to Cooper, under Code Sec. 6694(a) an unreasonable position on a return is one for which the tax return preparer did not have a reasonable belief that the position was more-likely-than-not be sustained on its merits. Although Buch acknowledged that the standard is objective, he also noted that it has a subjective element as well. "Reasonable belief is based, at least in part, on what the preparer believes," Buch explained. "How is the IRS going to determine what the preparer believed?" he questioned.


Mismatched Standards


The new rules require a preparer to advise his or her clients about the preparer's need to disclose a position on the return that the client would not need to disclosed when the client (taxpayer) has substantial authority for the same position. There is an ethical dilemma because the preparer, by suggesting that his or her client make such disclosures, is placing his interest above that of his client in order to avoid penalties, Buch stated. Buch referred to the disparity between the standards as the "disclosure red zone."


Disclosure Complications


Buch pointed out that the new rules place pressure on the attorney-client privilege. It would appear that an attorney is allowed to disclose privileged information obtained from his or her client to avoid preparer penalties, he observed. He specifically referred to the District of Columbia Rules of Professional Conduct, which permit a lawyer to use or reveal client confidences or secrets to the extent necessary to respond to allegations concerning the lawyer's representation of the client.


Input Requested


Cooper urged all interested participants at the luncheon to provide input to the IRS on the tax return preparer penalty regime. He reported that the IRS intends to issue new regulations under Code Sec. 6694 by the end of 2008.

Thursday, February 14, 2008

Accepted Offer in Compromise can be revoked. Under the "material breach of contract" analysis applied in Robinette v. Commissioner, 123 T.C. 85, 108 (2004), revd. 439 F.3d 455 (8th Cir. 2006), "If * * * [petitioners'] breach is material and sufficiently serious, * * * [respondent's] obligation to perform may be discharged. * * * Not so, however, if * * * [petitioners'] breach is comparatively minor." On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit noted that the failure to comply with an express condition of an OIC is itself grounds for the Commissioner to revoke the OIC, regardless of materiality. Robinette v. Commissioner, 439 F.3d at 462.

John E. and Sandra L. West v. Commissioner.

Dkt. No. 5376-06L , TC Memo. 2008-30, February 13, 2008.


[Code Secs. 6330 and 7122]

Collection: Notice of intent to levy: Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing : Terminated offer-in-compromise: Abuse of discretion. --
The IRS Appeals office did not abuse its discretion by sustaining a levy against a married couple whose repeated violations of the terms of their offer-in-compromise (OIC) resulted in the offer's termination. The couple's argument that their failure to timely file tax returns and to pay taxes during the OIC's compliance period was not a material breach of the OIC and, therefore, did not justify the termination of the OIC was rejected. The couple's failure to keep their tax obligations current during the compliance period was a significant and material breach of the OIC. Moreover, the IRS sent the couple a number of notices alerting them to the possibility of a default and giving them an opportunity to correct the problem. However, the couple had moved to a new address and failed to notify the IRS. Further, the IRS's failure to send copies of correspondence to the couple's representative did not provide a basis to reject the collection action. Notices are generally valid as long as they are properly mailed to the taxpayer and the notices were sent to the couple's last know address. --CCH.



MEMORANDUM OPINION

SWIFT, Judge: Under section 6330, petitioners challenge respondent's notice of determination sustaining respondent's levy notice.

Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.

The primary issue for decision is whether respondent's Appeals Office abused its discretion in sustaining a notice of intent to levy relating to petitioners' outstanding 1993 Federal income taxes.


Background

The facts of this case have been submitted fully stipulated under Rule 122 and are so found.

At the time the petition was filed, petitioners resided in Orange County, California.

Petitioners have a history of failing to timely pay estimated Federal income taxes due and failing to timely file their Federal income tax returns.

On April 24, 1998, petitioners and respondent agreed on an offer-in-compromise (OIC) on the grounds of doubt as to collectibility relating to approximately $148,350 in petitioners' unpaid 1993 Federal income taxes.1 Among other things, respondent's acceptance of petitioners' OIC was contingent on petitioners': (1) Paying, within 60 days of respondent's acceptance of the OIC, to respondent $10,000 (OIC amount); (2) timely filing Federal income tax returns that became due during the 5-year period subsequent to their entering into the OIC or until the OIC amount was paid in full, whichever was longer (5-year compliance period); and (3) timely paying the taxes reported due on their Federal income tax returns filed during the 5-year compliance period. Specifically, paragraph (d) on petitioners' Form 656, Offer in Compromise, stated: "I/We will comply with all provisions of the Internal Revenue Code relating to filing my/our returns and paying my/our required taxes for 5 years from the date the IRS accepts the offer".

Under the express terms of the OIC, if petitioners failed to meet any of the express conditions of the OIC, respondent had the right to revoke the OIC and to attempt to collect from petitioners the full amount of petitioners' unpaid 1993 Federal income taxes.

On May 7, 1998, petitioners paid to respondent the $10,000 OIC amount. Petitioners' 5-year compliance period thus began when respondent accepted the OIC on April 24, 1998.

During the 5-year compliance period, petitioners, among other things, failed to pay estimated taxes, failed to timely file their tax returns, and/or failed to timely pay taxes reported due on their filed Federal income tax returns, as follows:



Year Petitioners Failed To

______________ ______________________________________________________

1998 Timely file their return

Timely pay the tax liability stated on the return

1999 Timely pay estimated taxes

Timely pay the tax liability stated on the return

2000 Timely pay the tax liability stated on the return

2001 Timely file their return

Timely pay the tax liability stated on the return

2002 Timely pay estimated taxes

Timely pay the tax liability stated on the return


In April 2000, petitioners moved to a new address, but petitioners did not notify respondent of their change of address. Before this move, petitioners filed with respondent IRS Form 2848, Power of Attorney and Declaration of Representative, in which petitioners directed respondent to send to petitioners' representative copies of any correspondence sent to petitioners.

Petitioners' 2000, 2001, and 2002 Federal income tax returns filed with respondent continued to show petitioners' old address and did not show the new address to which petitioners moved in April 2000. Petitioners did not otherwise notify respondent of their new address until sometime after March 2004.

From November 2002 through January 2004, respondent sent to petitioners (at the old address shown on petitioners' 2000, 2001, and 2002 Federal income tax returns; namely, 23382 Via Chirpia, Mission Viejo, CA) at least seven notices relating to various late filing and late payment additions to tax and penalties that respondent had assessed against petitioners relating to petitioners' 2000, 2001, and 2002 Federal income tax returns and warning petitioners of the potential for default on the OIC that had been entered into if petitioners did not pay the various additions to tax and penalties that had been assessed against them.

Specifically, in November 2003, respondent mailed to petitioners at their Via Chirpia, Mission Viejo, address a notice alerting petitioners that the OIC was subject to likely termination if petitioners' outstanding additions to tax and penalties for 2001 and 2002 were not paid.

In January 2004, respondent mailed to petitioners (at the Via Chirpia, Mission Viejo, address) a notice of default on the OIC, informing petitioners that the OIC was terminated.

On June 18, 2005, respondent mailed to petitioners a notice of intent to levy and a notice of petitioners' right to a hearing relating to the approximate $148,350 balance of petitioners' unpaid 1993 Federal income taxes.

On July 21, 2005, petitioners filed a Form 12153, Request for a Collection Due Process Hearing, with regard to respondent's notice of intent to levy, in which petitioners requested that respondent reinstate the OIC.

On January 6, 2006, an Appeals Office hearing was held by telephone conference among respondent's Appeals Office, petitioners, and petitioners' attorney.

On February 8, 2006, respondent's Appeals Office issued to petitioners a notice of determination sustaining respondent's levy notice.

In the notice of determination, respondent's Appeals Office indicated that because petitioners had defaulted on the OIC and because petitioners had not provided any financial or other information applicable to other collection alternatives, respondent's levy notice was sustained.


Discussion

Because the underlying tax liability is not in dispute, we review the actions of respondent's Appeals Office for abuse of discretion. See Goza v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 176, 182 (2000). Abuse of discretion occurs where the actions of the Commissioner's Appeals Office are arbitrary or capricious, lack sound basis in law, or are not justifiable in light of the facts and circumstances. Woodral v. Commissioner, 112 T.C. 19, 23 (1999).

Pursuant to section 6330(c)(3), respondent's Appeals Office must verify that the requirements of applicable law and administrative procedure have been met, consider issues raised by petitioners, and consider whether the proposed collection action balances the need for the efficient collection of taxes with petitioners' legitimate concern that respondent's collection be no more intrusive than necessary.

In reviewing whether respondent's Appeals Office abused its discretion in sustaining respondent's notice of intent to levy, our analysis is governed by "general principles of contract law." See Dutton v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. 133, 138 (2004).

Under the "material breach of contract" analysis applied in Robinette v. Commissioner, 123 T.C. 85, 108 (2004), revd. 439 F.3d 455 (8th Cir. 2006), "If * * * [petitioners'] breach is material and sufficiently serious, * * * [respondent's] obligation to perform may be discharged. * * * Not so, however, if * * * [petitioners'] breach is comparatively minor."

On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit noted that the failure to comply with an express condition of an OIC is itself grounds for the Commissioner to revoke the OIC, regardless of materiality. Robinette v. Commissioner, 439 F.3d at 462.

Generally, for purposes of section 6330, a notice mailed to the taxpayer's "last known address" is proper and sufficient. Tadros v. Commissioner, 763 F.2d 89, 91 (2d Cir. 1985); Buffano v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-32. In determining petitioners' last known address, unless otherwise notified respondent may rely upon petitioners' most recently filed return. See Abeles v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 1019, 1025 (1988); Brown v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 215, 219 (1982).

Petitioners argue that petitioners' failure timely to file tax returns, to pay estimated taxes, and to pay the various additions to tax and penalties assessed against them during the 5-year compliance period did not constitute a material breach of the OIC and did not justify respondent's revocation of the OIC and therefore that respondent's Appeals Office abused its discretion in sustaining respondent's notice of intent to levy.

We disagree. The numerous instances of petitioners' failure to keep their tax obligations current during the 5-year compliance period constitute, under any standard, a significant and material breach of the requirements of the OIC.

We need not address different standards that, in other cases, might be considered and that might be applicable. See Ng v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-8.

Respondent mailed to petitioners a number of notices alerting petitioners to the potential for default on the OIC and giving petitioners opportunity to bring current their tax and other payments due.

Although petitioners moved to a new address, petitioners failed to apprise respondent of their new address, and respondent cannot now be faulted for mailing the notices to the address shown on petitioners' tax returns. Petitioners, not respondent, must bear the consequences of petitioners' failure to properly file their tax returns with, or otherwise apprise respondent of, petitioners' new address.

Petitioners argue that respondent should have, but did not, mail to petitioners' representative a copy of the various dunning letters. Failure of respondent to mail to petitioners' representative a copy of a notice that was mailed to petitioners provides no basis to reject respondent's collection action in this case. See Amsler v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1993-114 (notice generally will be valid even when a copy is not mailed to a taxpayer's representative so long as properly mailed to the taxpayer); Foster v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1982-115 (citing Houghton v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 656, 661 (1967)).

Because of petitioners' repeated violations of the conditions of the OIC, respondent's Appeals Office did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the notice of intent to levy. Other arguments petitioners make herein have been considered and rejected.

To reflect the foregoing,

Decision will be entered for respondent.

Wednesday, February 13, 2008

Sec. 301.6330-1(e)(3), Q&A-E2, Proced. & Admin. Regs. Section 6330(c)(2)(B) indicates that receipt of the notice of deficiency by the taxpayer is required. See Sego v. Commissioner, supra at 610-611; see also Sapp v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-104; Calderone v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-240; Tatum v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-115. The Court may conclude that the receipt requirement of section 6330(c)(2)(B) is met if the taxpayer deliberately refused delivery of the notice. See Sego v. Commissioner, supra at 611 ("taxpayers cannot defeat actual notice by deliberately refusing delivery of statutory notices of deficiency").

Salvatore A. D'Onofrio v. Commissioner.

Dkt. No. 23592-05L , TC Memo. 2008-25, February 12, 2008.



[Code Sec. 6330]


Notice of levy: Collection Due Process hearing: Right to a hearing: Issues raised at hearing: Hearing procedures. --
The IRS properly determined to proceed with collection of an individual's tax liability for four tax years. Although the taxpayer explicitly declined to accept delivery of the deficiency notices, the receipt requirement of Code Sec. 6330(c)(2)(B) is presumptively met in such circumstances. Since the taxpayer received deficiency notices for the tax years at issue, he was prohibited from challenging his underlying tax liabilities for those years. Moreover, his argument that he was improperly denied a face-to-face Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing was rejected. He was offered an in-person hearing if he could identify legitimate, relevant and nonfrivolous issues for discussion; however, he failed to respond. In addition, the taxpayer was offered a telephone hearing, but chose not to participate. -



MEMORANDUM OPINION

MARVEL, Judge: This matter is before the Court on respondent's motion for partial summary judgment filed under Rule 121.1


Background

This is an appeal from respondent's determination to proceed with the collection of petitioner's 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, and 1999 Federal income tax liabilities.2 Petitioner resided in Redondo Beach, California, when his petition was filed.

Petitioner failed to file Federal income tax returns for 1990, 1991, 1992, and 1993. Respondent prepared substitutes for returns under section 6020(b) for 1990, 1991, 1992, and 1993. Respondent subsequently determined a deficiency in petitioner's tax liability for each of these years.

On April 14, 1995, respondent mailed to petitioner a notice of deficiency for 1990 and 1991. Respondent sent the notice to the following address: S. A. D'ONOFRIO, ORANGE COUNTY, C/O 676 CATALINA, AKA LAGUNA BEACH, CALIFORNIA. Petitioner refused to accept delivery of the notice, and on April 20, 1995, respondent received the returned notice of deficiency with the words "Refused for Cause UCC 3-501" handwritten on the envelope. On April 20 and September 13, 1995, respondent received letters from petitioner marked "REFUSAL FOR CAUSE UCC 3-501 Without Dishonor" in which petitioner raised various frivolous arguments regarding his refusal to accept delivery of correspondence from respondent.3 On October 9, 1995, respondent assessed additional tax, additions to tax, and interest against petitioner for 1990 and 1991.

On February 16, 1996, respondent mailed to petitioner a notice of deficiency for 1992 and 1993. Respondent sent the notice to the following address: Salvatore A. D'Onofrio, 676 Catalina Street, Laguna Beach, CA 92651-2545. Petitioner again refused to accept delivery of the notice, and on February 23, 1996, respondent received the returned notice of deficiency with the words "Refused for Cause UCC 3-501 Without Dishonor" handwritten on the envelope.

Petitioner failed to petition this Court with respect to the April 14, 1995, and February 16, 1996, notices of deficiency.

On June 1, 2005, respondent sent petitioner a Final Notice of Intent to Levy and Notice of Your Right to a Hearing for 1990, 1991, 1992, and 1993. In response, petitioner timely submitted a Form 12153, Request for a Collection Due Process Hearing. Petitioner indicated that he disagreed with the proposed levy and requested an audiotaped face-to-face hearing. Petitioner did not provide a phone number in his request.

On September 27, 2005, respondent's Appeals Office sent a letter to petitioner explaining that a face-to-face hearing would not be granted because petitioner raised only frivolous or groundless arguments. The Appeals Office scheduled a telephone hearing for October 27, 2005, at 8:30 a.m. and instructed petitioner to call the phone number provided in the letter at the given time.

In a letter dated October 6, 2005, petitioner argued that he never received a notice of deficiency for 1999 and disputed his tax liability for that year, but he stated that he did not want a hearing for 1990 through 1993. Petitioner also failed to call the Appeals officer on the scheduled hearing date, and the Appeals officer was unable to contact petitioner because petitioner failed to provide his phone number.

On November 8, 2005, the Appeals officer issued to petitioner a Notice of Determination Concerning Collection Action(s) Under Section 6320 and/or 6330, in which the Appeals officer sustained the proposed collection action for 1990, 1991, 1992, and 1993.

On December 6, 2005, petitioner mailed a letter to the Court that was received and filed on December 12, 2005, as an imperfect petition. The Court ordered petitioner to submit a proper amended petition because his original imperfect petition did not conform with the Rules. On February 6, 2006, the Court received and filed petitioner's amended petition. In his amended petition, petitioner argues that respondent improperly denied him a face-to-face section 6330 hearing.


Discussion




I. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is a procedure designed to expedite litigation and avoid unnecessary, time-consuming, and expensive trials. Fla. Peach Corp. v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 678, 681 (1988). Summary judgment may be granted with respect to all or any part of the legal issues presented "if the pleadings, answers to interrogatories, depositions, admissions, and any other acceptable materials, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that a decision may be rendered as a matter of law." Rule 121(b); Sundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 518, 520 (1992), affd. 17 F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 1994); Zaentz v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 753, 754 (1988). The moving party bears the burden of proving that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and factual inferences will be drawn in a manner most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. Dahlstrom v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 812, 821 (1985); Jacklin v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 340, 344 (1982). The nonmoving party, however, cannot rest upon the allegations or denials in his pleadings but "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Rule 121(d); Dahlstrom v. Commissioner, supra at 820-821.



II. Determination To Proceed With Collection
Section 6330(a) provides that no levy may be made on any property or right to property of any person unless the Secretary has notified such person in writing of the right to a hearing before the levy is made. If the person makes a request for a hearing, a hearing shall be held before an impartial officer or employee of the Internal Revenue Service Office of Appeals. Sec. 6330(b)(1), (3). At the hearing, a taxpayer may raise any relevant issue, including appropriate spousal defenses, challenges to the appropriateness of the collection action, and collection alternatives. Sec. 6330(c)(2)(A).

Following a hearing, the Appeals Office must make a determination whether the proposed levy action may proceed. In so doing, the Appeals Office is required to take into consideration (1) the verification presented by the Secretary that the requirements of applicable law and administrative procedures have been met, (2) the relevant issues raised by the taxpayer, and (3) whether the proposed levy action appropriately balances the need for efficient collection of taxes with a taxpayer's concerns regarding the intrusiveness of the proposed levy action. Sec. 6330(c)(3).

Section 6330(d)(1) grants the Court jurisdiction to review the determination made by the Appeals officer at the hearing. Where the validity of the underlying tax liability is properly at issue, the Court will review the matter de novo. Sego v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 604, 610 (2000). Where the underlying tax liability is not properly at issue, the Court will review the administrative determination of the Appeals Office for abuse of discretion. Lunsford v. Commissioner, 117 T.C. 183, 185 (2001); Sego v. Commissioner, supra at 610; Goza v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 176, 182 (2000).

A taxpayer is precluded from contesting the existence or amount of his underlying tax liability at his section 6330 hearing unless the taxpayer failed to receive a notice of deficiency for the tax in question or did not otherwise have an earlier opportunity to dispute the tax liability. Sec. 6330(c)(2)(B); see also Sego v. Commissioner, supra at 609. For purposes of section 6330(c)(2)(B), receipt of a notice of deficiency means receipt in time to petition this Court for redetermination of the deficiency asserted in such notice. Sec. 301.6330-1(e)(3), Q&A-E2, Proced. & Admin. Regs. Section 6330(c)(2)(B) indicates that receipt of the notice of deficiency by the taxpayer is required. See Sego v. Commissioner, supra at 610-611; see also Sapp v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-104; Calderone v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-240; Tatum v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-115. The Court may conclude that the receipt requirement of section 6330(c)(2)(B) is met if the taxpayer deliberately refused delivery of the notice. See Sego v. Commissioner, supra at 611 ("taxpayers cannot defeat actual notice by deliberately refusing delivery of statutory notices of deficiency").

Petitioner asserts various frivolous arguments relating to his underlying tax liabilities for 1990-93. However, petitioner is precluded from contesting his underlying tax liabilities for those years because petitioner deliberately refused delivery of the notices of deficiency mailed by respondent.4 The record reflects that petitioner received the envelopes containing the notices of deficiency but returned the notices to respondent with "Refusal for Cause UCC 3-501" and "Refused for Cause UCC 3-501 Without Dishonor" handwritten on the envelopes. Petitioner later sent letters further referencing UCC 3-501 asserting numerous frivolous arguments as to why he refused delivery of the notices of deficiency. Because the undisputed facts establish that petitioner explicitly declined to accept delivery of the notices of deficiency, we conclude that petitioner received effective notice despite his refusal to accept delivery. See id. Petitioner is therefore prohibited from challenging his underlying tax liabilities for 1990 through 1993.

With respect to the validity of the section 6330 hearing, petitioner argues that respondent improperly denied him a face-to-face section 6330 hearing. We disagree. Although a hearing may consist of a face-to-face meeting, a proper section 6330 hearing may also occur by telephone or by correspondence under certain circumstances. See Katz v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 329, 337-338 (2000); sec. 301.6330-1(d)(2), Q&A-D6, Proced. & Admin. Regs. Petitioner was offered a telephone hearing but chose not to participate. In addition, petitioner was offered a face-to-face hearing if he would identify legitimate, relevant, and nonfrivolous issues he intended to discuss. Petitioner did not respond. The only correspondence petitioner sent respondent after the Form 12153 hearing request indicated that petitioner no longer wanted a section 6330 hearing for 1990 through 1993. Under these circumstances, we conclude that it is neither necessary nor productive to remand this case for a face-to-face hearing. See Lunsford v. Commissioner, supra.

If a taxpayer has been given a reasonable opportunity for a hearing and has failed to avail himself of that opportunity, this Court has approved the Commissioner's determination to proceed with collection on the basis of an Appeals officer's review of the case file. See, e.g., Bean v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-88; Ho v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-41; Leineweber v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-17. Petitioner was given the opportunity for a hearing and failed to take advantage of it. We conclude, therefore, that there is no genuine issue of material fact requiring a trial, that the undisputed facts in the record establish that respondent did not abuse his discretion in determining that the proposed collection action could proceed, and that respondent is entitled to a summary disposition upholding his proposed collection action with respect to petitioner's unpaid tax liabilities for 1990 through 1993.

We shall grant respondent's motion for partial summary judgment.

An appropriate order will be issued.

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure, and all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code.

2 Respondent's motion for partial summary judgment pertains only to tax years 1990 through 1993. Respondent concedes that petitioner did not have a prior opportunity to contest his underlying tax liability for 1999. Accordingly, respondent concurrently filed a motion for continuance so that he could have an opportunity to resolve petitioner's 1999 liability. On Feb. 5, 2007, we granted respondent's motion for continuance.

3 In the letters, petitioner argued that he did not have an "address" but listed a mailing location at which he could be reached: "Salvatore A. D'Onofrio, Non Domestic Mail, c/o 676 Catalina, Laguna Beach, California".

4 Petitioner does not dispute that he deliberately refused delivery of the notices of deficiency, nor does he deny that he wrote on the envelopes containing the notices.

Labels:

Offers in compromise: Rejection. – Section 7122
The IRS did not abuse its discretion in rejecting an offer-in-compromise (OIC) from a businessman who filed tax returns but failed to pay the taxes due over a period in excess of ten years. The OIC, submitted based on doubt as to collectibility, was returned as not processable because the businessman was noncompliant as to his current year return.



Robert M. Scharringhausen v. Commissioner.

Dkt. No. 4427-06L , TC Memo. 2008-26, February 12, 2008.


Tax liens: Release of lien: Validity and priority against third parties: Evidence. --
The IRS did not abuse its discretion in refusing to withdraw a notice of federal tax lien filed against a businessman who filed tax returns but failed to pay the taxes due over a period in excess of ten years. The notice of lien was not filed prematurely or in violation of any IRS procedures, there was no installment agreement nor any indication that withdrawal would facilitate collection, and there was no evidence that withdrawal would be in the best interests of both parties. --CCH.







MEMORANDUM OPINION

HOLMES, Judge: Robert Scharringhausen files income tax returns but does not always pay the tax due, a habit that finds him owing more than $30,000 for the tax years 2001-03. The Commissioner assessed the amount due, and filed a notice of federal tax lien (NFTL) to protect the government's interest against the many other creditors Scharringhausen has accumulated. Scharringhausen offered to compromise his tax bill for $750, but the IRS returned his offer because he hadn't paid his 2004 tax bill either. His main argument is that this was an abuse of discretion.


Background

Scharringhausen's history of not paying his taxes reaches back at least to the early '90s --there is an outstanding judgment against him for nearly $500,000 for unpaid income taxes for 1991 and 1992, and for trust-fund-recovery-penalty taxes for 1990 and 1991.1 He and some of the firms he controlled also had other problems, and later in the decade he served a short sentence for bankruptcy fraud. After being released, he went back into business, but failed to file returns in 1999 and 2000. See Scharringhausen v. United States, 91 AFTR 2d 651, 2003-1 USTC par. 50,224 (S.D. Cal. 2003) (enforcing summons for records of offshore credit card use).

In 2001 he filed an untimely return showing that he owed no tax, but the Commissioner later assessed a deficiency for that year of slightly more than $1000. For 2002 and 2003, Scharringhausen filed timely returns that showed tax due, but he had not made estimated tax payments and did not pay the taxes with the return. The Commissioner assessed the tax shown on the returns for those years along with additions and interest for a total balance of over $30,000. For his 2004 year, Scharringhausen again filed a return --this one showing more than $16,000 owed --but again made no estimated tax payments and no payment with the return.

About the same time he filed his 2004 return, Scharringhausen offered to settle his 2001-03 tax debt for a mere $750, citing "doubt as to collectibility." The Commissioner returned this offer as "nonprocessable" because Scharringhausen was "noncompliant" in that he had failed to pay his 2004 taxes. After rejecting the compromise offer, the Commissioner filed an NFTL for the years 2001-03. Scharringhausen received a Collection Due Process (CDP) Notice of the NFTL and then timely requested a CDP hearing. He also submitted a new offer-incompromise (OIC), offering to settle his unpaid 2004 tax bill as well, again on grounds of doubtful collectibility. This time he submitted a Form 433-A Collection Information Statement for Wage Earners and Self-employed Individuals reflecting 21 creditors' judgments against him totaling nearly $1.3 million. But he refused to have the settlement officer conducting the CDP hearing consider this new offer, preferring to have it "worked on" by the IRS Appeals office in Tennessee to which he had sent it.

This left the settlement officer conducting the hearing with nothing to do but review Scharringhausen's IRS records and the transcripts reflecting the IRS's rejection of Scharringhausen's first offer (for 2001-03), verify whether all applicable legal and administrative requirements had been met, and consider Scharringhausen's contention that the tax lien was improperly filed and should be withdrawn. She concluded the hearing by sustaining the lien and issuing a notice of determination.

Scharringhausen, a resident of California when he filed his petition, appeals. The parties stipulated the facts and submitted the case for decision without trial under Rule 122.


Discussion

Once a taxpayer fails to pay taxes after the IRS has sent him a demand for payment, his tax liability becomes a lien in favor of the United States against all of his real and personal property. Sec. 6321. Filing a notice of that lien is nevertheless important because it gives the lien priority against later-filing competing creditors. See sec. 6323(a); Behling v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 572, 575 (2002). It also opens a short window of time during which a taxpayer may demand a hearing to check whether the Commissioner properly filed the lien, and take a second look at whether the filing should be sustained. This hearing is also a taxpayer's chance to raise an innocent-spouse defense, offer collection alternatives, or demonstrate that the Government's collection effort is overly intrusive even after taking into account the need to efficiently collect taxes.

Scharringhausen isn't challenging his underlying tax liability, so we review the Commissioner's determination to see if he abused his discretion. See Sego v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 604, 610 (2000); Goza v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 176, 182 (2000). Courts generally hold that a decisionmaker abuses his discretion "when [he] makes an error of law * * * or rests [his] determination on a clearly erroneous finding of fact * * * [or] `applies the correct law to facts which are not clearly erroneous but rules in an irrational manner'." United States v. Sherburne, 249 F.3d 1121, 1125-26 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Friedkin v. Sternberg, 85 F.3d 1400, 1405 (9th Cir. 1996)); see also Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 402-03 (1990) (same).

We can distill Scharringhausen's objections to the notice of determination into two: that the Commissioner didn't follow correct procedures in filing the lien, and that the Commissioner should have accepted his first offer to compromise the taxes involved.



A. Was the Lien Properly Filed?
The federal tax lien is imposed automatically once the assessment is made. Sec. 6321. No one disputes that the Commissioner properly assessed Scharringhausen's 2001-03 taxes before the NFTL's filing in May 2005, that he mailed notice-anddemand letters to Scharringhausen within 60 days of each assessment's date, and that the taxes remain unpaid. Thus the settlement officer correctly found that the NFTL was not filed prematurely, or in violation of IRS procedures. Scharringhausen (as best we can tell) argues that the NFTL was nevertheless procedurally improper because section 6323(j)(1) gives discretion to the Commissioner to withdraw a lien if, for example, it would facilitate tax collection. Sec. 6323(j)(1)(C). This is a true statement, but we're hard pressed to see how withdrawing the NFTL could possibly help collect the tax, given that Scharringhausen had over $1 million in other outstanding judgments against him.

Nor did Scharringhausen satisfy the other provision of section 6323 that he cited in the record --section 6323(j)(1)(D) --which allows the NFTL to be withdrawn if doing so would be in the best interests of the taxpayer and the United States. Though we don't doubt that the withdrawal of the lien would benefit Scharringhausen, we're equally hard pressed to see how it would benefit the United States, since the 21 judgment liens already in place against Scharringhausen make it much more likely that withdrawing the lien would simply cause the government to lose its priority status against other creditors.2



B. Was It an Abuse of Discretion Not To Reconsider Rejection of Scharringhausen's First OIC?
Scharringhausen also contends that his offer to compromise his 2001-03 taxes was improperly returned as "nonprocessable" because he failed to pay his 2004 taxes. He cites Chavez v. United States, 93 AFTR 2d 2004-2386, at 2004-2391 (W.D. Tex. 2004) to support his contention that a "blanket" refusal to process an OIC for noncompliance is an abuse of discretion. We, however, have held that "reliance on a failure to pay current taxes in rejecting a collection alternative does not constitute an abuse of discretion." Giamelli v. Commissioner, 129 T.C. 107, 111-12 (2007). And at least the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits agree with us. Christopher Cross, Inc., v. United States, 461 F.3d 610, 613 (5th Cir. 2006); Orum v. Commissioner, 412 F.3d 819, 821 (7th Cir. 2005), affg. 123 T.C. 1 (2004); Living Care Alternatives of Utica, Inc. v. United States, 411 F.3d 621, 630-31 (6th Cir. 2005).

In Orum v. Commissioner, 412 F.3d at 821, Judge Easterbrook explained:

It would not do the Treasury any good if taxpayers used the money owed for 2004 to pay taxes due for 1998, the money owed for 2005 to pay taxes for 1999, and so on. That would spawn more collection cycles yet leave a substantial unpaid balance. The Service's goal is to reduce and ultimately eliminate the entire tax debt, which can be done only if current taxes are paid while old tax debts are retired. * * *

Scharringhausen nevertheless claims that the Commissioner violated his own Internal Revenue Manual (IRM) procedures in not reconsidering the rejection of his OIC. The IRM, however, has no force of law and gives no rights to taxpayers. Fargo v. Commissioner, 447 F.3d 706, 713 (9th Cir. 2006), affg. T.C. Memo. 2004-13; Thoburn v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. 132, 141 (1990). And we are puzzled by Scharringhausen's insistence that the lien was improperly sustained because his 2001-03 OIC was improperly rejected, when he refused to have his 2001-04 offer considered as a collection alternative. It is no abuse of discretion not to consider what a taxpayer asks not to be considered.

Scharringhausen's final argument is that "[t]he IRS'[s] current processes continue to prevent taxpayers from utilizing the Offer in Compromise by imposing barriers to entry and unnecessarily returning offers." This is not reason for finding an abuse of discretion in this case --establishing a general procedure for deciding when to accept OIC and when to proceed by lien or levy is, as Judge Easterbrook concluded, "the sort of decision committed to executive officials." Orum, 412 F.3d at 821. That the IRS has exercised that discretion by limiting compromises based on doubt as to collectibility to those taxpayers suffering from real financial hardship, rather than to those trying to give the IRS tsuris by making multiple lowball offers and frustrating efforts to chase assets that have possibly moved offshore is perfectly reasonable.

Because there are no grounds on which to overturn the filing of the NFTL, it is sustained and

Decision will be entered for respondent.

1 Taxes that employers withhold from their employees' wages are known as "trust fund taxes" because they are deemed a special fund in trust for the United States under section 7501(a). Slodov v. United States, 436 U.S. 238, 243 (1978). The Commissioner may collect unpaid employment taxes from a "responsible person" within the company; i.e., someone who was required to pay over the tax. The money that's collected is called a trust-fund-recovery-penalty tax. Sec. 6672. (Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code and Regulations for the years at issue, and the one Rule reference is to Rule 122 of the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.)

2 The two other reasons for granting relief from the filing of a NFTL are that the IRS didn't follow proper procedures, sec. 6323(j)(1)(A), and that the taxpayer involved is current on an installment agreement, sec. 6323(j)(1)(B). The first is not present here --the settlement officer reviewed the procedural checklist and found the IRS had done its job correctly; the second doesn't apply because Scharringhausen had no installment agreement.

Labels:

Tuesday, February 12, 2008

Primer on Substantiation

If a taxpayer establishes that deductible expenses were incurred but has not established the exact amounts, the Court may estimate the amounts allowable in some circumstances (the Cohan rule). See Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540, 543-544 (2d Cir. 1930). The Court can estimate the amount of a deductible expense only when the taxpayer provides evidence sufficient to establish a rational basis for making the estimate. Vanicek v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 731, 743 (1985). Where a taxpayer fails to provide adequate evidence of his expenses, the Court may uphold the Commissioner's determination denying the deduction for medical and dental expenses. See Davis v. Commissioner, supra (citing Hunter v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-249, and Nwachukwu v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-27).

Theodore L. Sizelove, Sr. and Elaine J. Sizelove v. Commissioner.

Docket No. 21996-06S . Filed February 11, 2008.

[Code Sec. 166]

Tax Court: Summary opinion: Deductions: Lack of substantiation: Bad debt deduction.
-
[Code Sec. 170]


Tax Court: Summary opinion: Deductions: Lack of substantiation: Charitable deduction. --

A married couple was not entitled to deduct as charitable contributions the otherwise disallowed deductions for the business use of their home and the vehicle expenses attributable to a nonprofit activity. The portion of the rent attributable to the second bedroom that the husband purportedly used as a home office for the operation of the nonprofit activity could not be deducted as a charitable contribution because it did not constitute the taxpayers' entire interest in the property. In addition, the taxpayers could not deduct the utility expenses attributable to the nonprofit activity since such expenses were not properly substantiated. Finally, the portion of the vehicle expenses for depreciation, repairs and auto insurance attributable to the nonprofit activity could not be claimed as a charitable contribution at all, and the mileage deduction was disallowed for lack of evidence. --


[ Code Sec. 213 ]

Tax Court: Summary opinion: Deductions: Lack of substantiation: Deduction for medical and dental expenses. --
A married couple's deduction for medical and dental expenses was properly disallowed because the taxpayers substantiated only $2,551 of the total of $8,460.38 in medical and dental expenses they claimed on the their return, and the substantiated amount did not exceed 7.5 percent of their adjusted gross income.


[ Code Sec. 274 ]

Tax Court: Summary opinion: Deductions: Lack of substantiation: Vehicle expenses. --
A married couple's deduction for vehicle expenses incurred in the operation of the husband's employment and nonprofit activity was properly denied for lack of substantiation. Because the Tax Court determined that the husband was not an employee of the nonprofit organization, the taxpayers were not entitled to a deduction for the portion of the vehicle expenses attributable to the organization. The taxpayers also could not deduct the portion of the vehicle expenses related to the husband's employment at a liquor store because they did not present any evidence to substantiate the amount of expenditures or business mileage.


[ Code Sec. 280A ]

Tax Court: Summary opinion: Deductions: Lack of substantiation: Business use of home. --

A married couple's deduction for the business use of their home attributable to the operation of a nonprofit activity was properly denied. Although the husband was the president of a nonprofit organization and used the second bedroom of the house as a home office, he never received a compensation from the organization and failed to establish that he expected to derive a profit in his capacity as the organization's president. Because the husband was not considered as engaged in the trade or business of being an employee of the organization, the taxpayers failed to show that a portion of their residence was exclusively used on a regular basis as a principal place of business for any trade or business.



PURSUANT TO INTERNAL REVENUE CODE SECTION 7463(b), THIS OPINION MAY NOT BE TREATED AS PRECEDENT FOR ANY OTHER CASE.





Theodore L. Sizelove, Sr., and Elaine J. Sizelove, pro sese. Kelley A. Blaine, for respondent.



DEAN, Special Trial Judge: This case was heard pursuant to the provisions of section 7463 of the Internal Revenue Code in effect when the petition was filed. Pursuant to section 7463(b), the decision to be entered is not reviewable by any other court, and this opinion shall not be treated as precedent for any other case. Unless otherwise indicated, subsequent section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the year in issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.



Respondent determined a $1,813 deficiency in petitioners' 2004 Federal income tax. The issues for decision are whether petitioners are entitled to claim: (1) A bad debt deduction for a "loan" they provided to their son; (2) a deduction for medical and dental expenses; (3) a deduction for the business use of their home that is attributable to the operation of a nonprofit activity; and (4) a miscellaneous itemized deduction for vehicle expenses incurred in the operation of a nonprofit activity and in Mr. Sizelove's employment.





Background



Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found. The stipulation of facts and the exhibits received into evidence are incorporated herein by reference. At the time the petition was filed, petitioners resided in California.



On their timely filed 2004 joint Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, petitioners claimed a $10,000 bad debt deduction for a "loan" made to their son and his new wife during 2004 and an $8,460.38 deduction for medical and dental expenses (before application of the 7.5-percent floor). Petitioners substantiated $2,551 in medical expenses, consisting of payments to Medicare and their health insurance provider, Teamsters Benefit Trust.



During 2004, Mr. Sizelove was employed as a liquor store clerk and served as the president of a nonprofit social organization from which he derived no salary. Petitioners claimed a $1,200 deduction (based on $100 per month) for the business use of their home. Mr. Sizelove used a second bedroom as a home office for the club and to store its artifacts and records.



Additionally, petitioners claimed a $4,441.15 deduction for vehicle expenses attributable to the club and Mr. Sizelove's employment with the liquor store. The $4,441.15 figure consists of $2,619.43 in actual vehicle expenses based on a 38-percent "percentage of business use" and a $1,821.72 depreciation deduction. The $2,619.43 in actual vehicle expenses includes 38 percent of the $2,099.24 claimed as expenditures for gas, repairs, and insurance1 plus $1,821.72 in depreciation. Petitioners claimed the same depreciation deduction twice.





Discussion




1. Burden of Proof


The Commissioner's determinations in a notice of deficiency are presumed correct, and the taxpayer has the burden to prove that the determinations are in error. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). But the burden of proof on factual issues that affect a taxpayer's tax liability may be shifted to the Commissioner where the "taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to * * * such issue." Sec. 7491(a)(1). The burden will shift only if the taxpayer has complied with the substantiation requirements and has cooperated with the Commissioner's reasonable requests for witnesses, information, documents, meetings, and interviews. Sec. 7491(a)(2). And the taxpayer must keep records sufficient to establish the amount of the items required to be shown on his Federal income tax return. See sec. 6001; sec. 1.6001-1(a), (e), Income Tax Regs.



Petitioners have not alleged or proven that section 7491(a) applies; accordingly, the burden remains on petitioners to show that they are entitled to the deductions. See INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992) (stating that deductions are strictly a matter of legislative grace, and taxpayers bear the burden of proving that they are entitled to claim the deduction).




2. Bad Debt Deduction


Section 166 allows an individual a deduction from ordinary income for any business debt that becomes wholly or partially worthless during the taxable year. See sec. 166(a), (d)(1)(A). To deduct a business bad debt, the taxpayer must establish, among other requirements, that he was engaged in a trade or business, and the acquisition or worthlessness of the debt was proximately related to the conduct of the trade or business. United States v. Generes, 405 U.S. 93 (1972); sec. 1.166-5(b)(2), Income Tax Regs. For a debt to be considered a business debt, it must have a proximate relation to the taxpayer's trade or business. United States v. Generes, supra at 96. In determining whether a proximate relationship exists, the proper measure is the taxpayer's dominant motivation for incurring the debt. Id. at 103.



The term "nonbusiness debt" is defined as a debt other than a debt created or acquired in connection with the taxpayer's trade or business or a loss from the worthlessness of a debt that is incurred in the taxpayer's trade or business. See sec. 166(d)(2). The loss from a nonbusiness bad debt that becomes wholly worthless within the year is treated as a loss arising from the sale or exchange of a capital asset held for less than 1 year and is deductible subject to certain limitations. See sec. 166(d)(1); sec. 1.166-5(a)(2), Income Tax Regs.



Only a bona fide debt qualifies for the bad debt deduction. Sec. 1.166-1(c), Income Tax Regs. A bona fide debt is one that arises from a debtor-creditor relationship based upon a valid, enforceable obligation to pay a fixed or determinable sum of money. Id.; see also Estate of Van Anda v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 1158, 1162 (1949), affd. 192 F.2d 391 (2d Cir. 1951). Factors indicative of a bona fide debt include whether: (1) Evidence of indebtedness exists; i.e., a note; (2) any security is requested; (3) there has been a demand for repayment; (4) the parties' records reflect the transaction as a loan; (5) any payments have been made; and (6) any interest was charged.



A gift is not considered a debt for purposes of section 166. Sec. 1.166-1(c), Income Tax Regs.; see also Calumet Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. 257, 285 (1990). Purported "loans" between family members are subject to rigid scrutiny and are presumed to be gifts. Estate of Van Anda v. Commissioner, supra at 1162. The presumption may be rebutted by proving that at the time of the transaction there existed a real expectation of repayment and an intent to enforce collection of the "debt". See id. (and cases cited thereat).



In a letter attached to petitioners' joint return, Mr. Sizelove stated that he lent $10,000 to help his son and his new wife, he did not expect to recover this $10,000 "Gift" nor the $10,000 "Gift" in 2003, and therefore, he was deducting it as a "Non-Recoverable Loan or Bad Debt."



At trial, Mrs. Sizelove testified: "it wasn't a gift, it was a loan. And if he ever comes into money, we will get that money back." She also claimed to have received a promissory note containing provisions for interest and a sum certain; however, the note was not introduced into evidence or shown to respondent before trial.



Petitioners have not proven that the $10,000 "loan" to their son was a bona fide debt. Petitioners have not shown that the loan was proximately related to the conduct of a trade or business. Petitioners have not shown that the loan became wholly or partially worthless during the taxable year. Therefore, respondent's determination denying petitioners' $10,000 deduction for a bad debt is sustained.




3. Deduction for Medical and Dental Expenses


Petitioners claim to have incurred $8,460.38 in medical and dental expenses in 2004 before subtracting 7.5 percent of their adjusted gross income (AGI).



Respondent concedes that petitioners have substantiated $2,551 in medical and dental expenses. Respondent contends, however, that petitioners are not entitled to a $2,551 deduction for medical and dental expenses because the amount does not exceed the 7.5-percent floor.



Section 213(a) allows a deduction for medical and dental expenses paid during the year that are not compensated for by insurance or otherwise but only to the extent that the expenses exceed a floor of 7.5 percent of AGI.



To substantiate medical and dental expenses, the taxpayer must furnish the name and address of each payee, the amount, and the date paid. See sec. 1.213-1(h), Income Tax Regs.; see also Davis v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-272. If requested by the Commissioner, the taxpayer must furnish an itemized invoice from the payee that identifies the patient, the type of service rendered, the specific purpose of the expense, the amount paid, the date paid, and any other information the Commissioner deems necessary. See sec. 1.213-1(h), Income Tax Regs.; see also Davis v. Commissioner, supra; Cotton v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-333.



If a taxpayer establishes that deductible expenses were incurred but has not established the exact amounts, the Court may estimate the amounts allowable in some circumstances (the Cohan rule). See Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540, 543-544 (2d Cir. 1930). The Court can estimate the amount of a deductible expense only when the taxpayer provides evidence sufficient to establish a rational basis for making the estimate. Vanicek v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 731, 743 (1985). Where a taxpayer fails to provide adequate evidence of his expenses, the Court may uphold the Commissioner's determination denying the deduction for medical and dental expenses. See Davis v. Commissioner, supra (citing Hunter v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-249, and Nwachukwu v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-27).



Mrs. Sizelove testified that petitioners had other medical and dental expenses, but she did not know why she failed to provide evidence of the expenditures to respondent. Mrs. Sizelove also testified that they "guesstimated" their medical and dental expenses for the year using recurring expenditures (i.e., amounts of copayments and medical supplies for her diabetic husband).



Petitioners failed to provide any evidence showing that they actually made payments of $5,909.38 for medical and dental expenses in 2004. See sec. 213(a). Petitioners also have not provided documentation that satisfies the additional requirements imposed by section 1.213-1(h), Income Tax Regs. See Davis v. Commissioner, supra; Cotton v. Commissioner, supra. Finally, petitioners failed to provide sufficient evidence as to their recurring expenditures, i.e., amounts of copayments and supplies, for the Court to make a reasonable estimate. See Vanicek v. Commissioner, supra. The Court finds that petitioners have not substantiated the $5,909.38 in medical and dental expenses that respondent has not conceded.



In order to have a deductible amount, petitioners must show medical and dental expenses exceeding $6,191.18 ($82,549 (AGI) x 7.5 percent).2 The $2,551 in medical and dental expenses that respondent has conceded does not exceed the 7.5-percent floor.



Accordingly respondent's determination denying petitioners' deduction for medical and dental expenses is sustained.




4. Deduction for the Business Use of the Home


Expenses for the business use of a taxpayer's residence are deductible only in very limited circumstances. The taxpayer must show that a portion of the residence was exclusively used on a regular basis as his principal place of business for any trade or business of the taxpayer; and in the case of an employee, the exclusive use must be for the employer's convenience. See sec. 280A(c)(1). If the taxpayer uses the dwelling unit as a residence, the deduction is limited to the excess of the gross income derived from such business use over the sum of certain deductions. Sec. 280A(c)(5).



It is well established that an individual may be in the trade or business of being an employee and that ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in a trade or business are deductible. See sec. 162(a); Primuth v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 374 (1970); Christensen v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1456 (1952). But it is also well established that a genuine profit motive must exist before an activity constitutes a trade or business. See Brydia v. Commissioner, 450 F.2d 954 (3d Cir. 1971), affg. per curiam T.C. Memo. 1970-147; Hirsch v. Commissioner, 315 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1963), affg. T.C. Memo. 1961-256; Kurkjian v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 862, 869 (1976).



On an attachment to petitioners' return, Mr. Sizelove stated that he was the president of a nonprofit social organization, he derived no salary from it, and he used a second bedroom as a home office and to store the club's artifacts and records.



Mrs. Sizelove testified that Mr. Sizelove never received compensation from the club.



Mr. Sizelove was not compensated by the club, and petitioners did not establish that he expected to derive a profit in his capacity as the club's president. Therefore, the Court finds that Mr. Sizelove was not engaged in the trade or business of being an employee of the club. See Kurkjian v. Commissioner, supra at 869 (stating that when services are rendered gratuitously and are motivated by personal and charitable impulses, the individual is not in the trade or business of being an employee of the charitable organization). Accordingly, petitioners are not entitled to a deduction for the business use of their home since Mr. Sizelove failed to show that a portion of his residence was exclusively used on a regular basis as his principal place of business for his trade or business.3 See sec. 280A(c)(1)(A).




5. Vehicle Expenses as Employee Business Expenses


Pursuant to section 274(d), the Court cannot estimate a taxpayer's expenses with respect to certain items. See Sanford v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 823, 827 (1968), affd. per curiam 412 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1969). Section 274(d) provides that no deduction is allowable with respect to "listed property" unless the taxpayer complies with certain strict substantiation requirements. The term "listed property" is defined to include passenger automobiles and other property used as a means of transportation. Sec. 280F(d)(4)(A)(i) and (ii).



In order to substantiate the amount of an automobile expense, the taxpayer must prove the following: (1) The amount of the expenditure (i.e., cost of maintenance, repairs, or other expenditures); (2) the amount of each business use and the amount of its total use by establishing the amount of its business mileage and total mileage; (3) time (i.e., the date of the expenditure or use); and (4) the business purpose for the expenditure or use. See sec. 1.274-5T(b)(6)(i) through (iii), Temporary Income Tax Regs., 50 Fed. Reg. 46016 (Nov. 6, 1985). The taxpayer may substantiate the amount of mileage by adequate records or sufficient evidence that corroborates his statements. See sec. 274(d). A record of the mileage made at or near the time of the automobile's use that is supported by documentary evidence has a high degree of credibility not present with a subsequently prepared statement. See sec. 1.274-5T(c)(1) through (3), Temporary Income Tax Regs., 50 Fed. Reg. 46016 (Nov. 6, 1985). If the amount is not substantiated by adequate records or sufficient corroborative evidence, then it is disallowed. Sec. 274(d).



Petitioners did not submit any evidence to substantiate the amounts of the expenditures or business mileage. At trial, Mrs. Sizelove testified that respondent "brought to my attention that we deducted the depreciation [twice, which Mr. Sizelove guesstimated, and] the only thing I can say is * * * we did everything honest and above-board".



Because the Court has determined that Mr. Sizelove was not an employee of the club, it follows that petitioners are not entitled to a deduction for the portion of the vehicle expenses attributable to the club. As to the portion of the vehicle expenses related to Mr. Sizelove's employment at the liquor store, petitioners did not provide any evidence that satisfies the strict substantiation requirements of section 274(d), and therefore, they are not entitled to deduct it. Accordingly, respondent's determinations denying the deduction for vehicle expenses with respect to both activities are sustained.




6. Charitable Contributions


Although the issue was not raised by the parties, the Court has considered the possibility that the deduction for the business use of petitioners' home and the vehicle expenses attributable to the nonprofit activity might be deductible as charitable contributions.



Taxpayers are allowed a deduction for any "charitable contribution * * * payment of which is made within the taxable year" subject to certain limitations. See sec. 170(a)(1). A charitable contribution includes a contribution or gift to or for the use of an organization described in section 170(c) (a qualified recipient). A deduction for the "contribution" of services is not allowed, but unreimbursed expenditures made incident to the rendition of services, i.e., transportation expenses, may be deductible as a charitable contribution. See sec. 1.170A-1(g), Income Tax Regs.



It is not clear from the record whether the club is a qualified recipient.4 Assuming that the club is a qualified recipient, the expenditures nevertheless are not deductible as a charitable contribution. Petitioners cannot deduct the $100 per month for the portion of the rent attributable to the second bedroom since the "contribution" consists of less than petitioners' entire interest in the property. See sec. 170(f)(3); sec. 1.170A-7(a)(1), Income Tax Regs.; Logan v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-445 (classifying the donee's "rent-free" use of the taxpayer's real property (a garage) as a mere right to use property and disallowing a deduction for its fair rental value as a charitable contribution under section 170(f)(3)). Petitioners cannot deduct as a charitable contribution the expenses for utilities connected with their residence that are attributable to the club since the expenditures were not properly substantiated.5 See sec. 6001; sec. 1.170A-13(b), Income Tax Regs.; cf. Stussy v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-232. Petitioners cannot deduct the portion of the $75 per month for the gas connected with Mr. Sizelove's vehicle that is attributable to the nonprofit activity as a charitable contribution because the expenditures were not substantiated. See sec. 6001; sec. 1.170A-13(b), Income Tax Regs. The portion of the vehicle expenses attributable to the nonprofit activity for depreciation, repairs, and auto insurance is not deductible as a charitable contribution. See Orr v. United States, 343 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1965) (disallowing deductions for depreciation as charitable contributions since depreciation does not constitute a payment, for repairs on account of the failure to show that the charitable use of the vehicle caused the repairs and it was used for both charitable and other purposes, and for insurance premiums since the taxpayer failed to show that the donee was the sole beneficiary of the policy). Petitioners may not otherwise claim a deduction for mileage under section 170(i) since there is no evidence as to the amount of the mileage they accumulated in their charitable endeavors.



To reflect the foregoing,



Decision will be entered for respondent.


1 Petitioners listed the following expenditures on an attachment to their Form 2106, Employee Business Expenses:



Gas $75 per month x 12 $900.00
Repairs per year 587.24
Insurance per year 612.00
Total 2,099.24



2 Petitioners reported AGI of $82,548.94, and respondent rounded it to the nearest dollar; i.e., $82,549.

3 Even if the Court were to find that Mr. Sizelove's tenure as the club's president constituted a trade or business, the deduction would be limited by sec. 280A(c)(5) to $0. See Cousino v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1981-19, affd. 679 F.2d 604 (6th Cir. 1982).

4 Respondent represents that the "activity appears to involve holding fundraisers for college-bound youth."

5 On the attachment to their return, Mr. Sizelove stated that the $100 per month included utilities. No documentation was provided to substantiate the amounts actually expended for utilities.

Labels:

Friday, February 8, 2008

26 U.S.C. §7203 criminalizes the willful non-filing of federal tax returns. The willfulness element of §7203 can be negated by a "good-faith misunderstanding of the law or a good-faith belief that one is not violating the law." Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199-202, 111 S. Ct. 604, 609-11 (1991). To show willful action, the government must demonstrate that the defendant intentionally violated a known legal duty. United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10, 12, 97 S. Ct. 22, 23 (1976).


United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Joey K. Lansing, Defendant-Appellant.

U.S. Court of Appeals, 11th Circuit; 06-16564, February 1, 2008.


[ Code Sec. 7203]

Crimes: Conviction and sentence: Willful failure to file returns: Conspiracy to defraud: Evidence: Instructions to jury: Good faith defense: Enhanced sentence. --
.

PER CURIAM: Joey K. Lansing appeals his conviction and 51-month prison sentence for one count of conspiracy to defraud the government, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §286, and three counts of failing to file federal income tax returns, in violation of 26 U.S.C. §7203. Lansing worked for a company called American Tax Consultants, which filed tax returns for its clients claiming no tax liability under the theory that paying taxes was voluntary on the ground that almost everyone is a non-resident alien. ATC also filed fraudulent returns with the IRS in an attempt to obtain tax refunds for its clients for taxes paid in previous years.


I.


Lansing contends that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions for conspiring to defraud the government and for failing to file federal income tax returns.

We review de novo sufficiency of the evidence claims. United States v. Anderson, 289 F.3d 1321, 1325 (11th Cir. 2002). This "standard of review is stacked in the government's favor." United States v. Moore, 504 F.3d 1345, 1348 (11th Cir. 2007); see also United States v. Robertson, 493 F.3d 1322, 1329 (11th Cir. 2007) ("We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and resolve all reasonable inferences and credibility evaluations in favor of the jury's verdict. The evidence need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence or be wholly inconsistent with every conclusion except that of guilt, provided that a reasonable trier of fact could find that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).


A.


Lansing argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal on the conspiracy to defraud the government charge because the government did not show that there was an agreement between Lansing and any co-conspirator to defraud the government. At most, according to Lansing, the government showed that there was an agreement to defraud ATC's clients.

To establish that a defendant has conspired to defraud the United States, the government must prove: (1) the existence of an agreement to defraud the United States by obtaining payment of a false claim; and (2) the defendant's knowing and voluntary participation in the conspiracy. United States v. Gupta, 463 F.3d 1182, 1194 (11th Cir. 2006). "Conspiracy may be proven by circumstantial evidence and the extent of participation in the conspiracy or extent of knowledge of details in the conspiracy does not matter if the proof shows the defendant knew the essential objective of the conspiracy." Id. at 1194 (internal punctuation and citation omitted).

In United States v. Adkinson, 158 F.3d 1147, 1155 (11th Cir. 1998), we addressed the issue of whether the government had presented sufficient evidence of intent to defraud the IRS, as opposed to only the defendants' customers, in the context of 18 U.S.C. §371. We noted that an intent to impede the IRS must be a purpose of the conspiracy, not just a collateral effect of the agreement. Id. However, a conspiracy may have multiple objectives, and if a minor one is to defraud the government, the offense is proven even if there is a larger, primary objective. Id. We concluded that the bank fraud conspiracy charged in the indictment, which involved a money-laundering scheme, was the focus of the conspiracy, and we reversed the defendants' convictions on the tax fraud count because the government did not prove a "tax purpose" necessary to support a conviction for tax fraud. Id. at 1156, 1159.

Here, the district court did not err in denying Lansing's motions for acquittal on the charge of defrauding the government because the evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the government, established that ATC's clients did not pay federal taxes and routinely filed returns in an attempt to obtain refunds for payment of previous years' taxes. This shows that defrauding the government was at least a minor objective of the larger conspiracy to defraud ATC's clients, which is sufficient to sustain Lansing's conviction.


B.


Lansing also argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal on the failure to file tax returns charge because he claims to have relied on the advice of a CPA who told him not to file and asserts, without support, that the testimony of the IRS agent, who established that Lansing made enough income to require the filing of a tax return, was not based on a recognized legitimate accounting technique.

26 U.S.C. §7203 criminalizes the willful non-filing of federal tax returns. The willfulness element of §7203 can be negated by a "good-faith misunderstanding of the law or a good-faith belief that one is not violating the law." Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199-202, 111 S. Ct. 604, 609-11 (1991). To show willful action, the government must demonstrate that the defendant intentionally violated a known legal duty. United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10, 12, 97 S. Ct. 22, 23 (1976). Where, as is the case here, the defendant testifies, the jury is free to disbelieve that testimony and it "may be considered as substantive evidence of the defendant's guilt." United States v. Brown, 53 F.3d 312, 314 (11th Cir. 1995).

We conclude that the district court did not err in denying Lansing's motion for acquittal on the willful non-filing of tax returns counts because the evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the government, established that Lansing's income during the years in question far exceeded the threshold amounts that require a citizen to file a return. The jury was free to reject Lansing's testimony and decide that he knew that he had to file tax returns for those years.


II.


Lansing next contends that the district court erred in giving the pattern instruction on his good faith defense where, as here, the IRS is the alleged victim, because the instruction allowed the jury to convict him of conspiring to defraud the IRS if the jury found he defrauded third party taxpayers with regard to a "business venture."

We review de novo jury instructions "to determine whether they misstate the law or mislead the jury to the prejudice of the objecting party." Brochu v. City of Riviera Beach, 304 F.3d 1144, 1155 (11th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). "Under this standard, we will only reverse if we are left with a substantial and eradicable doubt as to whether the jury was properly guided in its deliberations." United States v. Puche, 350 F.3d 1137, 1148 (11th Cir. 2003). "When the jury instructions, taken together, accurately express the law applicable to the case without confusing or prejudicing the jury, there is no reason for reversal even though isolated clauses may, in fact, be confusing, technically imperfect, or otherwise subject to criticism." United States v. Beasley, 72 F.3d 1518, 1525 (11th Cir. 1996). We presume that jurors follow the instructions given to them. United States v. Chandler, 996 F.2d 1073, 1088 (11th Cir. 1993).

The district court's instructions do not justify reversal of Lansing's convictions because even if the specific clause mentioning a "business venture" was confusing to the jury, the instructions, taken as a whole, accurately express the law. Lansing has not clearly articulated how the instruction that he focuses on, even if it should not have been given to the jury in light of the evidence presented at trial, prejudiced him in any way. Because Lansing has not shown prejudice, and because the rest of the instructions the district court gave accurately described the law, we are not left with the "substantial and eradicable doubt" necessary to order a new trial. See Puche, 350 F.3d at 1148.


III.


Lansing also contends that the district court erred in failing to dismiss the indictment against him due to a violation of Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 92 S. Ct. 1653 (1972), on the ground that the evidence at trial left some confusion regarding whether tapes of conference calls that were relied upon by the government before the grand jury were part of a proffer Lansing had made under an agreement to cooperate with the government.

We review Kastigar claims deferentially and affirm the district court's decision unless it is clearly erroneous. United States v. Nyhuis, 8 F.3d 731, 741 (11th Cir. 1993). Under clear error review, we will affirm the district court's decision so long as it "plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety." Merrill Stevens Dry Dock Co. v. M/V Yeocomico II, 329 F.3d 809, 816 (11th Cir. 2003).

When the government prosecutes a witness who previously has given selfincriminating testimony pursuant to a grant of immunity, it must establish that the evidence is derived from a legitimate source that is independent of the compelled testimony. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460, 92 S. Ct. at 1665. However, when the United States has reserved the right to make derivative use of statements and information provided by the defendant in the cooperation agreement, as it did in Lansing's case, such use does not violate the defendant's rights. United States v. Pielago, 135 F.3d 703, 709-10 (11th Cir. 1998). Here, the district court did not clearly err in refusing to dismiss Lansing's indictment because the government showed that the tape was delivered to the IRS by another witness and was, therefore, not part of Lansing's original proffer to the government. Accordingly, there was no Kastigar violation.


IV.


Finally, Lansing contends that the district court improperly applied an 18-level enhancement to his sentence because the government did not show that there was any intended loss to the IRS, only to the clients of ATC.

We review the district court's determination of the amount of loss for clear error. United States v. Hernandez, 160 F.3d 661, 666-67 (11th Cir. 1998). Under United States Sentencing Guidelines §2B1.1(b)(1) (Nov. 2006), the defendant's offense level is enhanced if the loss exceeded $5,000, with the extent of the enhancement determined by the amount of the loss. For these purposes, the loss is either the actual loss or the intended loss, whichever is greater. U.S.S.G. §2B1.1(b)(1) cmt. n.3(A). An intended loss includes "intended harm that would have been impossible or unlikely to occur." U.S.S.G. §2B1.1(b)(1) cmt. n.3(A)(ii). Although an intended loss must be determinable to a reasonable certainty, it may be an estimate. Hernandez, 160 F.3d at 666. An 18-level enhancement is appropriate where the intended loss is greater than $2.5 million, but less than $7 million. U.S.S.G. §2B1.1(b)(1)(J), (K).

The district court did not err in its determination that there was an intended loss of more than $2.5 million because the government established that ATC's clients had sent in returns claiming over $5 million in refunds. This finding was based on testimony presented at trial and at the sentence proceeding showing that ATC had flooded IRS offices with multiple fraudulent returns on behalf of its clients. Although most of the clients received no refund from the IRS, at least a few did, and ATC's agreement with its client entitled it to a share of any refund received. On the basis of that evidence, it was reasonable for the district court to find that ATC intended to cause a substantial loss, even if the likelihood of succeeding in its endeavor was small.

AFFIRMED.

Labels:

Thursday, February 7, 2008

Standards for claiming a business loss rather than a hobby. This case provides good guidance for avoiding a hobby determination by the IRS. The regulations under section 183 provide a nonexclusive list of factors to be considered in determining whether an activity is engaged in for profit. The factors include: (1) The manner in which the taxpayer carries on the activity; (2) the expertise of the taxpayer or his or her advisers; (3) the time and effort the taxpayer expended in carrying on the activity; (4) the expectation that assets used in the activity may appreciate in value; (5) the taxpayer's success in carrying on other activities; (6) the taxpayer's history of income or loss with respect to the activity; (7) the amount of occasional profits, if any, which are earned; (8) the taxpayer's financial status; and (9) whether elements of personal pleasure or recreation are involved. Sec. 1.183-2(b), Income Tax Regs.; see Golanty v. Commissioner, supra at 426. No single factor, nor the existence of even a majority of the factors, is controlling, but rather an evaluation of all the facts and circumstances is necessary. Golanty v. Commissioner, supra at 426-427.


T.C. Summary Opinion 2008-12]
Docket No. 24370-05S . Filed February 6, 2008.

Robert A. Eder v. Commissioner.

[Code Sec. 183]

Tax Court: Summary opinion: Nonprofit activities: Direct marketing business: Distributorships. --

An individual did not engage in direct marketing activity for profit. The taxpayer had no previous direct marketing experience, conducted the activity on a part-time basis, had no formal budget or business plan, and failed to keep records that would allow him to evaluate the activity's profitability or lack thereof. Moreover, he has never realized a profit from his direct marketing activity and failed to provide any evidence that he expected to make a profit in the future. In addition, he used the products and the ability to purchase the products at a discount benefited him. --CCH.

THORNTON, Judge: This case was heard pursuant to the provisions of section 7463 of the Internal Revenue Code in effect at the time the petition was filed.1 Pursuant to section 7463(b), the decision to be entered is not reviewable by any other court, and this opinion shall not be treated as precedent for any other case.

Respondent determined a $3,172 deficiency in petitioner's 2002 Federal income tax. The issue for decision is whether during 2002 petitioner engaged in his Reliv International marketing activity for profit within the meaning of section 183.

Background

The parties have stipulated many facts, which are so found. When he petitioned the Court, petitioner resided in Indiana.

Petitioner is single, having divorced in 1994. He holds a master's degree in civil engineering. In 1991, he began working as an engineer at Abbott Laboratories (Abbott). During 2002, he worked for Abbott 9 hours a day, 5 days a week, receiving wages of $85,064.84.

In 1997, while employed at Abbott, petitioner met a couple at his gymnasium. They convinced him to become an independent distributor for Reliv International (Reliv), a network marketing company that sells health care products. Petitioner had no previous experience in network marketing or retail sales.

According to petitioner, he can make a profit on sales of Reliv products, which he orders directly from Reliv. He regards any profits from direct sales, however, as incidental to the supposedly more lucrative goal of "sponsoring" other people in the Reliv marketing program, which he says would enable him to earn commissions on their Reliv sales.

As it happens, since he became involved in Reliv marketing in 1997, petitioner's only customers have been family members. Likewise, the only two people he has sponsored as Reliv distributors have been family members--his son and his brother, both of whom became distributors to take advantage of the distributor's discounts on Reliv products. The son did not last long in the business; he quit in 1999, the same year he started.

During 1998, petitioner advertised Reliv in a weekly paper called Pennysaver. He discontinued this advertising in 1999. Since then, he has not advertised in any newspaper. Similarly, during 1998 petitioner posted bulletin board flyers in laundromats and grocery stores but likewise discontinued this practice in 1999. Although Reliv sponsors Web sites for its distributors, petitioner has never had a Web site for his Reliv activity.

Petitioner commuted 80 miles, one-way, to his job at Abbott. On certain days, he would stop at commuter train stations or shopping malls along his commuting route and place "drop cards" on car windshields. These cards proclaimed "The Opportunity of a Lifetime" and gave his phone number but generally did not mention the Reliv name. Petitioner has never received any response to any of these drop cards.

In 2000, petitioner began sending out direct mail information, promoting Reliv products and the opportunity to become "healthy & rich". Some of these direct mail materials indicated that petitioner had been using Reliv products for many months and that they had reduced his symptoms of various chronic illnesses and contributed to his "overall feeling of good health."

Using an Internet database at his local public library, petitioner secured names and addresses of women in the northwest Indiana area to whom he would send the direct mail information. Each week, petitioner selected names and addresses of about 48 women to whom he would mail postcards. Petitioner would follow up the first postcard with a second and a third and then attempt to telephone some of these women. Each month, he would talk to several of them on the telephone for 15 or 20 minutes, making his Reliv pitch. On rare occasions, petitioner would meet with one of these women at the local library to give them Reliv materials. As far as the record reveals, none of these contacts ever resulted in petitioner's making any Reliv sales or sponsoring any Reliv distributors.

On Tuesday evenings and Saturday mornings, petitioner attended Reliv meetings approximately 10 miles from his home. During 2002, petitioner attended national Reliv conferences in Reno, Nevada, and St. Louis, Missouri.

In 1998, petitioner prepared a "Reliv Cold Marketing Budget", listing anticipated expenditures but showing no projected receipts or profits. He reused this "budget" for each succeeding year. For 2002, this "budget" showed total expenses of $11,145 but no receipts or profits. Until preparing for this trial, petitioner had never prepared a business plan for his Reliv activity, nor had he calculated a break-even point showing how much future profit he would need to recoup his past losses. Petitioner maintained no organized record-keeping system.

On Schedules C, Profit or Loss From Business, of Forms 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, for taxable years 1997 through 2005, petitioner reported net losses from his Reliv marketing activity as follows:



Operating
Tax Year Gross Income Expenses Net Losses

1997 $233.00 ($2,925.00) ($2,692.00)

1998 688.00 (9,431.00) (8,743.00)

1999 376.08 (9,350.11) (8,974.03)

2000 732.02 (8,833.54) (8,101.52)

2001 1,003.13 (9,967.82) (8,964.69)

2002 1,123.68 (12,894.71) (11,771.03)

2003 1,221.16 (11,629.79) (10,408.63)

2004 1,633.18 (11,834.31) (10,201.13)

2005 1,616.02 (1,616.02) --


In the notice of deficiency, with respect to petitioner's 2002 taxable year, respondent determined that petitioner was not engaged in the Reliv activity for profit and that consequently he was entitled to claim itemized deductions for operating expenses only to the extent of the $1,124 of reported gross income.2

Discussion

Under section 183(b)(2), if an individual engages in an activity not for profit, deductions relating thereto are allowable only to the extent gross income derived from the activity exceeds deductions that would be allowable under section 183(b)(1) without regard to whether the activity constitutes a for-profit activity. See Allen v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 28, 32-33 (1979).

The taxpayer generally bears the burden of establishing that his or her activities were engaged in for profit. Rule 142(a).3 The relevant question is whether the taxpayer had a "good faith expectation of profit". Burger v. Commissioner, 809 F.2d 355, 358 (7th Cir. 1987), affg. T.C. Memo. 1985-523; see Dreicer v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 642, 645 (1982), affd. without opinion 702 F.2d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The taxpayer's expectation, however, need not be reasonable. Burger v. Commissioner, supra at 358; Golanty v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 411, 425 (1979), affd. without published opinion 647 F.2d 170 (9th Cir. 1981); sec. 1.183-2(a), Income Tax Regs. Whether the taxpayer has the requisite profit objective is a question of fact, to be resolved on the basis of all relevant circumstances, with greater weight being given to objective factors than to mere statements of intent. Dreicer v. Commissioner, supra; Golanty v. Commissioner, supra at 426.

The regulations under section 183 provide a nonexclusive list of factors to be considered in determining whether an activity is engaged in for profit. The factors include: (1) The manner in which the taxpayer carries on the activity; (2) the expertise of the taxpayer or his or her advisers; (3) the time and effort the taxpayer expended in carrying on the activity; (4) the expectation that assets used in the activity may appreciate in value; (5) the taxpayer's success in carrying on other activities; (6) the taxpayer's history of income or loss with respect to the activity; (7) the amount of occasional profits, if any, which are earned; (8) the taxpayer's financial status; and (9) whether elements of personal pleasure or recreation are involved. Sec. 1.183-2(b), Income Tax Regs.; see Golanty v. Commissioner, supra at 426. No single factor, nor the existence of even a majority of the factors, is controlling, but rather an evaluation of all the facts and circumstances is necessary. Golanty v. Commissioner, supra at 426-427.

1. Manner in Which Petitioner Carried On His Reliv Activity

Petitioner has stipulated that he had not prepared a business plan for his Reliv activity before preparing for this trial. He prepared no formal budget, contemporaneous profit projections, or break-even analyses.4 He maintained no organized record-keeping system that might have enabled him periodically to evaluate his profitability (or more accurately, the extent of his nonprofitability). To the contrary, the manner in which petitioner carried on his Reliv activity strongly suggests that he was not primarily concerned about realizing a profit. This conclusion is buttressed by petitioner's stipulation that he "will not stop his Reliv activities until he runs out of money to finance the activity."

We conclude that petitioner did not operate his Reliv activity in a businesslike manner. This factor weighs heavily in respondent's favor.

2. Expertise of Petitioner

Before becoming involved with Reliv, petitioner had no sales or network marketing experience. He read some books and consulted with other persons involved with Reliv, whom he concedes were not experts, but there is no evidence that he sought the expertise of qualified, disinterested third parties. This factor favors respondent.

3. Time and Effort Expended in Carrying On the Activity

Time and effort expended in carrying on an activity may be indicative of a profit objective, particularly in the absence of substantial personal or recreational elements associated with the activity. Sec. 1.183-2(b)(3), Income Tax Regs. A taxpayer's withdrawal from another occupation to devote most of his energies to the activity may evidence a profit objective. Id. Petitioner spends several hours each week on his Reliv activity. As discussed elsewhere in this opinion, we are not convinced that there are no personal elements in this activity, especially considering that all of his customers have been family members. Moreover, petitioner pursued his Reliv activity while continuing to work full time at Abbott, 5 days a week. This factor favors respondent.

4. Expectation That Assets May Appreciate in Value

Petitioner does not contend and the record does not suggest that there are any assets involved with petitioner's Reliv activity that may appreciate in value. We view this factor as neutral.

5. Success in Carrying On Similar Activities

Insofar as the record reveals, petitioner has engaged in no other activities similar to his Reliv activity, by which we might evaluate his success in those other activities. We view this factor as neutral.

6. History of Income or Losses

Petitioner has never realized a profit from his years of Reliv activity. Rather, for the year at issue and the preceding 5 years, petitioner's claimed operating expenses for his Reliv activity exceeded his revenues therefrom by factors ranging from about 10 to 24. Petitioner suggests that these losses are due to his Reliv activity's being in a startup phase; he suggests that it is in the nature of the Reliv business to experience a dramatic profit spike at some point. Petitioner offered no concrete information, however, to convince us that his expectation of a future revenue spike is more than wishful thinking. This factor favors respondent.

7. Amount of Occasional Profits, If Any

Petitioner has never generated any profit from his Reliv activity. Petitioner contends that he will begin to realize substantial profits only upon sponsoring other Reliv distributors. Over some 10 years, however, he has sponsored only his brother and (fleetingly) his son, with minimal effect on profitability. This factor favors respondent.

8. Taxpayer's Financial Status

Substantial income from sources other than the activity may indicate lack of a profit objective, particularly if: (1) Losses from the activity generate substantial tax benefits, and (2) personal or recreational elements are involved. Sec. 1.183-2(b)(8), Income Tax Regs.

For the year at issue and all prior years, petitioner earned substantial income from his full-time employment as an engineer at Abbott. For 2002, petitioner sought to offset a portion of this wage income with a claimed net loss from his Reliv activity. The claimed net loss is attributable in significant part to claimed travel expenses which, if allowed, would effectively permit petitioner to deduct a portion of his otherwise nondeductible commuting expenses by the expedient of placing drop cards along his commuting route. His persistence in placing these drop cards without ever receiving a single response to them is indicative of a lack of profit objective. This factor favors respondent.

9. Elements of Personal Pleasure or Recreation

Personal or recreational aspects of an activity may indicate that the activity was not conducted with a profit objective. McKeever v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-288; sec. 1.183-2(b)(9), Income Tax Regs. The mere fact that a taxpayer derives pleasure from an activity, however, does not show a lack of a profit objective if the activity is, in fact, conducted for profit as evidenced by other factors. Sec. 1.183-2(b)(9), Income Tax Regs.; see also Jackson v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 312, 317 (1972).

As previously discussed, we believe there were some personal or recreational aspects to petitioner's Reliv activity, such as attending weekly meetings and contacting family members. In addition, as a Reliv distributor, petitioner presumably would enjoy a discount for Reliv products, similar to the discount that motivated his brother and his son to become involved as Reliv distributors. The record indicates that petitioner was a long-time user of Reliv products. It would appear that the ability to purchase Reliv products at a discount was a significant personal benefit to petitioner. This factor favors respondent.

Conclusion

On the basis of all the evidence, we conclude that during 2002 petitioner did not engage in the Reliv activity with a good faith expectation of profit. Accordingly,

Decision will be entered for respondent.

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code (Code) in effect for the year at issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.

2 The $12,894.71 of expenses claimed on petitioner's 2002 Schedule C bears little similarity to the expenses listed on his 2002 "budget". For instance, the largest claimed expense on his 2002 Schedule C was $6,144.41 for car and truck expenses; by contrast, his 2002 "budget" lists $2,300 for "transportation" and "travel" expenses including tolls, parking, and meals. The largest single item on his 2002 "budget" was for $3,000 to "Purchase product". By contrast, on his Schedule C, petitioner reported no purchases or inventory.

3 In certain cases, the burden of proof shall be on the Commissioner if, in any court proceeding, the taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the liability of the taxpayer for any tax imposed by subtit. A or B of the Code. Sec. 7491(a)(1). Because we decide this case on the preponderance of the evidence, rather than by reference to the placement of the burden of proof, we do not decide whether petitioner has met the requirements under sec. 7491 to shift the burden of proof to respondent.

4 At trial, petitioner presented a purported plan for recouping his past losses. That plan appears premised in part on an assumption that at some indefinite point petitioner will be earning commissions on sales by at least 120 Reliv distributors that he will have sponsored. At trial, petitioner conceded that this projection lacked any "concrete justification". When we consider that over his nearly 10-year involvement with the Reliv activity, petitioner's only sponsorees have been his brother and his son (who quickly quit the activity), a financial plan predicated on a projection of 120 sponsorships appears wildly optimistic.

Labels:

CDP appeal - 6330 - the Appeal Officer must be impartial

Louis A. Cox; Christine Cox, Petitioners-Appellants, v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent-Appellee.

U.S. Court of Appeals, 10th Circuit; 06-9004, January 30, 2008.

Reversing the Tax Court, Dec. 56,506; 126 TC 237.

[ Code Sec. 6330]

Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing: Appeals officers: Disqualification: Prior involvement: Abuse of discretion. --
An IRS Appeals officer was disqualified from conducting a Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing regarding a married couple's tax liabilities for two tax years because the Appeals officer considered those liabilities during a CDP hearing for a prior year. Code Sec. 6330(b)(3) clearly and unambiguously provides that an Appeals officer conducting a CDP hearing shall have "no prior involvement" with respect to the unpaid tax specified on the CDP Notice. Although the Appeals officer did not determine the taxpayers' correct tax liability for the subsequent years during the prior-year CDP hearing, he did formulate opinions about the taxpayers' ability to pay those liabilities. His consideration of those liabilities was a material factor in his decision and constituted prior involvement within the meaning of Code Sec. 6330(b)(3).



Before: Kelly, Seymour and Murphy, Circuit Judges.

KELLY, Circuit Judge.: This appeal considers whether an Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") appeals officer was disqualified by statute, I.R.C. § 6330(b)(3), from conducting a Collection Due Process ("CDP") hearing regarding the taxpayers' 2001 and 2002 tax liabilities, when he had previously considered those liabilities during a CDP hearing involving a prior year's (2000) tax liability. 1 Exercising jurisdiction under I.R.C. § 7482(a)(1), we reverse the tax court's decision which held that disqualification was unnecessary.


Background


After receiving from the IRS a "Final Notice - Notice of Intent to Levy and Notice of Your Right to a Hearing" regarding their unpaid 2000 tax liability, taxpayers (Louis A. Cox and Christine Cox) requested a CDP hearing pursuant to I.R.C. § 6330, seeking a less intrusive collection method. 2 Appeals officer Bruce Skidmore ("AO Skidmore") was assigned. He informed the taxpayers that to be considered for collection alternatives, they needed to file all tax returns for which they were liable and be in current compliance; to qualify for an installment agreement they needed to document their ability to pay their current taxes and the delinquency in a reasonable period of time (defined as the statutory period for collection plus up to five additional years); and to qualify for an offer-incompromise they needed to demonstrate their offer equaled their net assets plus an amount that could be collected from future disposable income.

AO Skidmore held a CDP hearing on August 12, 2003 regarding the taxpayers' 2000 tax liability. Although the taxpayers had not submitted all requested information by that date, they ultimately filed tax returns for 2001 and 2002, reporting liabilities for each year with unpaid balances. They also submitted financial information and requested that their account be placed in "currently uncollectible status" because they had "insufficient income to meet necessary allowable expenses." ROA Ex. 3-J at 70. 3

After reviewing this information, AO Skidmore concluded that he could not recommend an alternative to a levy. As part of his review, he considered the 2001 and 2002 tax returns and was concerned that the taxpayers reported a 2002 tax liability of $146,460 but only made $1,000 in estimated payments, notwithstanding the fact that they earned almost $100,000 in net income during the first seven months of 2003. Aplt. App. at 152. He ultimately concluded taxpayers had the ability to make payments toward their outstanding tax liability, which included tax years 1999-2002 and that they were not eligible for an installment agreement or offer-in-compromise because they were not in current compliance regarding estimated taxes for 2003. Id. at 153-54.

On November 25, 2003, the Appeals Office issued a Notice of Determination holding that the proposed levy for 2000 was appropriate. Id. at 115. The Appeals Office determined that the taxpayers were ineligible for collection alternatives as their financial information showed an ability to make payments toward the unpaid tax over the next few years and they did not demonstrate a levy would be overly intrusive. Id. at 114.

Meanwhile, because taxpayers filed their 2001 and 2002 tax returns without payment, the IRS issued to them a "Final Notice - Notice of Intent to Levy and Notice of Your Right to a Hearing" with respect to these liabilities. ROA Ex. 6-J at 16-17. As before, taxpayers requested a CDP hearing and AO Skidmore was assigned to their case. They requested that AO Skidmore recuse himself, because of his prior involvement in the 2000 CDP hearing. Aplt. App. at 158. Although AO Skidmore believed he was not "technically excluded from hearing these new periods, since [he] ha[d] no 'prior involvement' on these new periods," he agreed to postpone the hearing to confirm his conclusion with his supervisor. Id. He consulted with his team manager who agreed that there was "no compelling reason to make a reassignment since it was not technically required" and "would do nothing but create delay." Id.

After being so informed, taxpayers continued to protest AO Skidmore's involvement, claiming that the resolution of their prior case involved discussion of their 2001 and 2002 liabilities. After receiving the taxpayers' letter, AO Skidmore wrote in his notes that:
(a) I had noted the 2001 & 2002 returns were delinquent when I had the case on 1999 & 2000, (b) I solicited the returns and they were filed through me, (c) I considered current financials which would pertain to all periods of the taxpayers, but (d) I at no time was involved with either a consideration of the correct tax liability for 2001 & 2002 nor was I in any way involved in any consideration of collection action for such liabilities.

ROA Ex. 5-J at 2.

AO Skidmore held a CDP hearing on June 22, 2004, and later concluded that taxpayers did not qualify for a collection alternative. The Appeals Office subsequently issued a Notice of Determination concluding that the proposed levy for 2001 and 2002 was appropriate. Aplt. App. at 163. The notice explained that the financial information taxpayers submitted did not support their being placed in uncollectible status, no procedural errors were found in connection with that determination, and a levy would not be overly intrusive. Id.

Taxpayers filed petitions for review of both Appeals Office determinations in tax court, requesting that their delinquent tax liabilities be placed in currently uncollectible status. The cases were consolidated and submitted fully stipulated. The taxpayers argued that the Appeals Office failed to keep an adequate record of the administrative proceedings preventing "adequate judicial review," they did not receive a fair CDP hearing for 2001 and 2002 by an impartial Appeals Officer with no prior involvement in the case as required by I.R.C. § 6330(b)(3), and AO Skidmore failed to properly evaluate the merits of their case. Aplt. App. at 21-22. The tax court rejected each of these arguments and affirmed the Appeals Office determinations. See Cox v. Comm'r, 126 T.C. 237, 261 (2006).

On appeal, taxpayers raise only one issue: whether the tax court erred in holding that AO Skidmore, who conducted the CDP hearing for tax year 2000, was not disqualified by I.R.C. § 6330(b)(3) from conducting the CDP hearing for tax years 2001 and 2002. 4


Discussion


We review tax court decisions "in the same manner and to the same extent as decisions of the district courts in civil actions tried without a jury." I.R.C. § 7482(a)(1). Accordingly, we review the tax court's findings of fact under a clearly erroneous standard while questions of law are reviewed de novo. ABC Rentals of San Antonio, Inc. v. Comm'r, 142 F.3d 1200, 1203 (10th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). We do not defer to the tax court's statutory interpretations. Scanlon White, Inc. v. Comm'r, 472 F.3d 1173, 1175 (10th Cir. 2006). In contrast, we defer to the Commissioner's regulatory interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code so long as it is reasonable, Cottage Sav. Ass'n v. Comm'r, 499 U.S. 554, 560-61 (1991), meaning that "the regulation harmonizes with the plain language of the statute, its origin, and its purpose." Nat'l Muffler Dealers Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979). "A regulation may have particular force if it is a substantially contemporaneous construction of the statute by those presumed to have been aware of congressional intent." Id. "But this general principle of deference, while fundamental, only sets 'the framework for judicial analysis; it does not displace it.'" United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 24 (1982) (quoting United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 550 (1973)). "The framework for analysis is refined by consideration of the source of the authority to promulgate the regulation at issue." Id. Treasury regulations promulgated under the Commissioner's general authority under 26 U.S.C. § 7805(a) to "prescribe all needful rules and regulations" are owed "less deference than a regulation issued under a specific grant of authority to define a statutory term or prescribe a method of executing a statutory provision." Rowan Cos., Inc. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 253 (1981); see also McKinney v. Comm'r, 732 F.2d 414, 417 (10th Cir. 1983).

Applying these standards, we analyze I.R.C. § 6330(b)(3) and the Treasury Regulation implementing it, Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(d)(2). Section 6330, entitled "Notice and opportunity for hearing before levy," was added to the Internal Revenue Code as part of the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (the "RRA") as part of Congress' effort to provide taxpayers with more due process protection in connection with IRS collection actions. See Pub. L. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685 (1998). Under section 6330, the IRS is required to notify a taxpayer in writing (the "CDP Notice") at least 30 days prior to a proposed levy regarding a specified tax period that the taxpayer may request a hearing before the IRS Office of Appeals, known as a CDP hearing, to challenge the levy action. If the taxpayer requests a CDP hearing, the IRS may not levy on the taxpayer's property while the hearing is pending. Id. § 6330(e)(1).

At the CDP hearing, the taxpayer may raise any relevant issue related to the unpaid tax or proposed levy, challenge the appropriateness of the collection action, and request collection alternatives, such as installment payments and offers in compromise. Id. § 6330(c). The taxpayer may not challenge the existence or amount of the tax liability unless the taxpayer did not receive a timely statutory notice of deficiency or otherwise have the opportunity to dispute the tax liability. Id. At the hearing, the appeals officer must (1) obtain verification from the Treasury Secretary that applicable legal and procedural requirements have been met; (2) consider any challenges to collection, defenses, or offers of collection alternatives raised by the taxpayer; and (3) determine whether the "proposed collection action balances the need for the efficient collection of taxes with the legitimate concern of the [taxpayer] that any collection action be no more intrusive than necessary." Id. The determination of the Appeals Office, issued in a "Notice of Determination," Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(e)(3) (A-E8), is subject to judicial review by the tax court. I.R.C. § 6330(d). Our jurisdiction to review the tax court's decision arises under I.R.C. § 7482(a)(1).

The focus of this appeal concerns section 6330's requirement that taxpayers receive a fair hearing conducted by an impartial appeals officer. Id. § 6330(b)(3). 5 An impartial appeals officer is "an officer or employee who has had no prior involvement with respect to the unpaid tax specified in [the CDP Notice] before the first hearing under this section or section 6320." 6 Id. § 6330(b)(3).

The Code does not define the term "no prior involvement." Pursuant to his general authority under 26 U.S.C. § 7805(a), the Commissioner has promulgated regulations interpreting the term's meaning, see Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(d)(2) (2004). Using a question and answer format, the regulations define prior involvement as follows:
Q-D4. What is considered to be prior involvement by an employee or officer of Appeals with respect to the tax and tax period or periods involved in the hearing?

A-D4. Prior involvement by an employee or officer of Appeals includes participation or involvement in an Appeals hearing (other than a CDP hearing held under either section 6320 or section 6330) that the taxpayer may have had with respect to the tax and tax periods shown on the CDP Notice.

Id. 7

The tax court held that AO Skidmore's consideration of taxpayers' 2001 and 2002 liabilities during the CDP hearing for tax year 2000 did not constitute prior involvement under this statutory and regulatory language. Cox, 126 T.C. at 253. The tax court focused on the plain language and legislative history of section 6330(b)(3), Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(d)(2), and practical concerns related to conducting CDP hearings. Id. at 250-53. On appeal, the Commissioner essentially argues that we should affirm the decision of the tax court on similar grounds. We have not had occasion to interpret section 6330(b)(3) and we are aware of no cases from other courts that discuss its meaning, other than to repeat and apply its language without analysis. See, e.g., Herip v. United States, 106 F. App'x 995, 999 (6th Cir. 2004); Carlson v. United States, 394 F. Supp. 2d. 321, 327 (D. Mass 2005); Hardy v. United States, 2003 WL 21541358, * 4 (N.D. Ala. Jun. 3, 2003); Sapp v. Comm'r, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) 1177 (2006). In analyzing section 6330(b)(3), we conclude that we must reverse the decision of the tax court.

The best indicator of a statute's meaning should be the language itself, see McGraw v. Barnhart, 450 F.3d 493, 498 (10th Cir. 2006), and section 6330(b)(3) clearly and unambiguously provides that an appeals officer conducting a CDP hearing shall have had "no prior involvement" with respect to the unpaid tax specified on the CDP Notice. The tax court and Commissioner interpret this term to mean only that an appeals officer has not previously conducted a hearing (other than a section 6330 or 6320 hearing) for the taxpayer regarding the collection of the same unpaid tax, essentially limiting section 6330's meaning to the language of Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(d)(2). However, "we assume that in drafting legislation, Congress says what it means." Sundance Assoc., Inc. v. Reno, 139 F.3d 804, 809 (10th Cir. 1998). An agency may not read ambiguity into a statute in order to reach a practical result. Id. While interpreting section 6330(b)(3) narrowly makes it less likely that appeals officers will have to recuse themselves from hearing taxpayers' cases and easier for Appeals Officers to assign officers to CDP hearings, we find no legal support for doing so. By using the term "involvement," Congress deliberately implemented a broad restriction on IRS appeals officers to ensure their impartiality. To be sure, Congress never stated any intent to narrow the meaning of "prior involvement" to prior involvement in a hearing, let alone one specifically regarding the tax liability listed on the CDP Notice. A review of section 6330(b)(3)'s legislative history reveals that Congress' only statement regarding that provision is that it authorizes "a taxpayer [to] demand a hearing to take place before an appeals officer who has had no prior involvement in the taxpayer's case," confirming Congress' broad intent. S. Rep. 105-174, at 68 (1998). In fact, Congress expressly contemplated only one scenario where an appeals officer with prior involvement in the taxpayer's case could conduct a subsequent CDP hearing, namely that the same appeals officer can conduct a pre-levy CDP hearing pursuant to I.R.C. § 6330 and a pre-lien CDP hearing pursuant to I.R.C. § 6320 regarding the same unpaid liability. See I.R.C. § 6330(b)(3); H.R. Rep. No. 105-599, at 266 (1998) (Conf. Rep.). 8 Congress did not provide for other exceptions, 9 nor did it express any intent that additional exceptions could be provided by the Commissioner.

Our conclusion is further supported by the purpose of section 6330, which is to provide taxpayers with similar due process protection "in dealing with the IRS that ... they would have in dealing with any other creditor." S. Rep. No. 105-174, at 67. Central to that purpose is the taxpayer's fundamental right to an impartial appeals officer, no different than the right to an impartial decision maker in any other due process context. See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46-47 (1975) ("[A] fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process. This applies to administrative agencies which adjudicate as well as to courts. Not only is a biased decisionmaker constitutionally unacceptable but our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness.") (citations and internal quotations omitted). Limiting the definition of "no prior involvement" to Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(d)(2) impermissibly narrows that protection. Indeed, one need look no further than the facts of this case to illustrate our point. Although AO Skidmore claimed he "at no time was involved with ... a consideration of the correct tax liability for 2001 & 2002," ROA Ex. 5-J at 2, his letter to taxpayers following the CDP hearing for 2000 indicates otherwise. AO Skidmore wrote,
The 2002 return had a liability of $146,460 but only a ridiculously low $1,000 paid as an estimated payment. In light of 2002's unjustified "optimism" that there would be no significant tax liability, and the established fact that significant income has been earned this year, I cannot credit the idea that this year's decision to make no estimated tax payments is based on a sound financial analysis... . You have not paid your taxes for the last four years (1999-2002) and it looks like you are now adding a fifth. ... Nothing I have been provided removes the big picture of high income taxpayers who did not pay their taxes during the fat years and now facing leaner years you wish to maintain a high standard of living and continue to have the government fund business through unpaid taxes. You already have an involuntary loan from the government of $514,000 and we are unwilling to loan more, in fact, we are going to collect some overdue payments by levy if voluntary payments are not made. I don't really expect you can come up with $300K in cash to make full payment on 1999 & 2000 ( or the $514,000 to pay all liabilities) ... .

Aplt. App. at 152, 154 (emphasis added). From these statements, it appears that even though AO Skidmore was not technically involved in a determination regarding whether the 2001 and 2002 liabilities were correct or subject to levy prior to the CDP hearing for 2001 and 2002, he did previously formulate opinions about the taxpayers' ability to pay those liabilities, opinions section 6330(b)(3) was enacted to prevent. We thus reject the Commissioner's claim that "the very notion of 'involvement' by an 'officer or employee' of the Appeals Office has no meaning if the specified tax and tax period have never previously been the subject of collection activity within the purview of Appeals." Aplee Br. at 30-31.

In any event, it is not relevant to our inquiry whether AO Skidmore was biased by his prior involvement with the taxpayers' 2001 and 2002 liabilities, all that is required for his recusal is that he in fact did have prior involvement with those liabilities. His consideration of those liabilities during the CDP hearing for 2000 was a material factor in his decision and constitutes prior involvement within the meaning of I.R.C. § 6330(b)(3). Thus, the taxpayers are entitled to a collection due process hearing before an impartial appeals officer in accordance with the statute. 10

The dissent takes issue with our reading of section 6330(b)(3)'s plain language, arguing that "Congressional use of the word 'involvement' in conjunction with the phrase 'with respect to the unpaid tax' demonstrates the statute requires actual participation by the appeals officer in matters centered on the unpaid tax at issue" in order to disqualify the officer from conducting a subsequent CDP hearing regarding the same unpaid tax. Dissent at 2. Thus, the dissent essentially adopts the conclusion reached by the tax court and the position of the Commissioner that "no prior involvement" means no actual participation in a prior hearing or matter regarding the unpaid tax. However, the statute does not say "no prior participation in a hearing or matter with respect to the unpaid tax," it simply says "no prior involvement with respect to the unpaid tax." Therefore, we do not find support for the dissent's reading of the statute.

Further, we find no support for the dissent's conclusion that AO Skidmore's involvement with the 2001 and 2002 liabilities constituted "[m]ere knowledge of the existence of a self-reported an unpaid tax liability or [a] tangential consideration of any such conceded liability." Dissent at 2. As noted earlier, although AO Skidmore had not previously officially determined the correct tax or penalty owed for 2001 and 2002 or whether such liabilities were collectible, he nonetheless was able to formulate his own opinion about whether such tax was collectible by virtue of his prior involvement with those liabilities. That opinion, as even the dissent acknowledges, was a material factor in his decision regarding taxpayers' 2000 liability. If that is so, surely that opinion was, or at least could have been, material to his decision regarding the 2001 and 2002 liabilities. The dissent's insistence that an Appeals Officer is not required to recuse himself pursuant to section 6330(b)(3) unless he has previously made an official determination about whether a liability is accurate or collectible adds a requirement not found in the statute's language. We think that once an Appeals Officer has substantive and material involvement with a taxpayer's liability, regardless of whether the liability is the liability currently under official review by the Appeals Officer, he has had prior involvement with respect to that liability within the meaning of section 6330(b)(3).

REVERSED. The Commissioner's motion to permit levy pending appeal with respect to year 2000 is granted.

Cox v. Comm'r, No. 06-9004

MURPHY, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

I respectfully disagree with the majority's conclusion that AO Skidmore had prior involvement with respect to Taxpayers' unpaid 2001 and 2002 income taxes before he conducted the CDP hearing for those tax years.

When AO Skidmore determined that Taxpayers' delinquent 2000 tax liability should not be placed in currently uncollectable status, he was aware Taxpayers had self-reported a $33,686 individual income tax liability for 2001 and a $147,542 individual income tax liability for 2002, both of which were delinquent. The majority concludes that AO Skidmore's awareness of Taxpayers' 2001 and 2002 tax liabilities, and his consideration of those liabilities when he evaluated their eligibility for collection alternatives as part of the 2000 CDP hearing, constitutes prior involvement, thereby disqualifying him from conducting the 2001/2002 CDP hearing.

Section 6330(b)(3) prohibits an appeals officer conducting a CDP hearing from having "prior involvement with respect to the unpaid tax" that is the subject of the CDP hearing. 26 U.S.C. § 6330(b)(3) (emphasis added). Although the term "prior involvement" is not defined in § 6330(b)(3), the common definition of "involvement" includes "the state or fact of being involved." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1191 (1993). "Involve" means "to draw in as a participant." Id.

Congressional use of the word "involvement" in conjunction with the phrase "with respect to the unpaid tax" demonstrates the statute requires actual participation by the appeals officer in matters centered on the unpaid tax at issue before the officer is deemed disqualified from conducting a CDP hearing with respect to that tax. See Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 145 (1995) (holding the plain meaning of a statutory term can be gleaned from "its place and purpose in the statutory scheme"). Mere knowledge of the existence of a selfreported and unpaid tax liability or tangential consideration of any such conceded liability during an independent CDP hearing does not implicate any matter centered on the unpaid tax liability.

In conjunction with the 2000 CDP hearing, Taxpayers submitted financial information in compliance with Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(e). That information included Taxpayers' 2001 and 2002 individual income tax returns. AO Skidmore considered the 2001 and 2002 unpaid tax liabilities only in the context of evaluating whether Taxpayers had a current ability to pay their 2000 tax liability or qualify for collection alternatives. AO Skidmore did not process Taxpayers' 2001 and 2002 individual income tax returns. He was not involved in the determination of the correct tax or penalty owed for those years. 1 He did not participate in pre-levy collection actions and he did not conduct a prior CDP hearing with respect to the 2001 or 2002 tax liabilities. Consideration of the 2001 and 2002 tax liabilities during the 2000 CDP hearing did not encompass any issue that involved those unpaid tax liabilities. Thus, under the plain meaning of "prior involvement," as that term is used in § 6330(b)(3), AO Skidmore was not disqualified from conducting the 2001/2002 CDP hearing.

The majority concludes that AO Skidmore's "consideration of [the 2001 and 2002] liabilities during the CDP hearing for 2000 was a material factor in his decision and constitutes prior involvement within the meaning of I.R.C. § 6330(b)(3)." Majority Opinion at 15. I have no quarrel with the conclusion that AO Skidmore's consideration of Taxpayers' self-reported tax liabilities for 2001 and 2002 was a factor in the decisions he made with respect to the 2000 CDP hearing and Taxpayers' 2000 tax liabilities. Section 6330(b)(3), however, prohibits him from conducting the 2001/2002 CDP hearing only if he had prior involvement with respect to Taxpayers' 2001 and 2002 taxes. Simply considering Taxpayers' self-reported 2001 and 2002 tax liabilities as part of the 2000 CDP hearing does not constitute "prior involvement" in the unpaid taxes for 2001 and 2002. It is only such prior involvement that the statute prohibits.

The majority's conclusory and unsubstantiated belief that the opinion AO Skidmore formed about the collectability of the 2001 and 2002 taxes liabilities when he conducted the 2000 CDP hearing "was, or at least could have been, material to his decision regarding the 2001 and 2002 liabilities," is both conjectural and irrelevant to the issue of statutory construction before this panel. Under the majority's reading of the statute, consideration of the conceded 2001 and 2002 tax liabilities at the 2000 CDP hearing for purposes of determining Taxpayers' ability to pay their 2000 tax liability disqualifies AO Skidmore from conducting the subsequent CDP hearing. Section 6330(b)(3), however, does not prohibit AO Skidmore from conducting the 2001/2002 CDP hearing merely because he conducted Taxpayers' 2000 hearing or was aware of the financial information submitted by Taxpayers in connection with that hearing. Thus, it is only AO Skidmore's consideration of the 2001 and 2002 tax liabilities that gives rise to his disqualification. This is true even though, under the majority's reasoning, prior opinions he formed about Taxpayers' ability to pay their other debts and obligations may have also been material to his opinion about the collectability of the 2001 and 2002 taxes. That does not make sense.

Because I would hold AO Skidmore had no prior involvement in the unpaid taxes that were the subject of the 2001/2002 CDP hearing, I would affirm the Tax Court on this issue.

1 Internal Revenue Code section 6330(b) is entitled "Right to fair hearing," and subsection (b)(3) provides:

Impartial officer.- The hearing under this subsection shall be conducted by an officer or employee who has had no prior involvement with respect to the unpaid tax specified in subsection (a)(3)(A) before the first hearing under this section or section 6320. A taxpayer may waive the requirement of this paragraph.

2 Taxpayers are husband and wife and for the years at issue have jointly filed their tax returns.

3 As part of the record on appeal, the Commissioner has submitted exhibits from the tax court's record in No. 14693-04L.

4 Although taxpayers previously claimed "that prejudice engendered by AO Skidmore's prior dealings with them prevented him from taking an unbiased look at their 2001 and 2002 years," Cox, 126 T.C. at 250, they do not raise that argument on appeal. They argue only that I.R.C. § 6330(b)(3) precluded AO Skidmore from conducting the CDP hearing for 2001 and 2002, given his prior involvement with those liabilities during the CDP hearing for 2000.

5 Although this requirement may be waived by the taxpayer, id., the taxpayers have not done so here.

6 Section 6320 is a related provision included in the RRA that entitles a taxpayer to similar protections after the IRS issues a notice of lien.

7 The 2004 version of the regulation applies to this case. On November 16, 2006, the regulation was amended as follows:

Q-D4. What is considered to be prior involvement by an employee or officer of Appeals with respect to the tax and tax period or periods involved in the hearing?

A-D4. Prior involvement by an Appeals officer or employee includes participation or involvement in a matter (other than a CDP hearing held under either section 6320 or section 6330) that the taxpayer may have had with respect to the tax and tax period shown on the CDP Notice. Prior involvement exists only when the taxpayer, the tax and the tax period at issue in the CDP hearing also were at issue in the prior non-CDP matter, and the Appeals officer or employee actually participated in the prior matter.

Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(d)(2) (2006).

8 The tax court found that this exception supports reading section 6330 as setting forth a permissive standard because it claims the harm that could result from the same appeals officer conducting a taxpayer's section 6330 and 6320 hearing is no different than that which could result in cases like the instant case. See Cox, 126 T.C. at 250, 252. We disagree. Congress created the 6330/6320 exception because it recognized that the IRS frequently combines notices of intent to lien with notices of intent to levy, and thus anticipated that the same appeals officer would hear the taxpayer on both lien and levy issues regarding the same unpaid tax, either in multiple hearings or to the extent practicable, in a single hearing. See H.R. Rep. No. 105-599, at 266 (1998) (Conf. Rep.). More importantly, the facts and issues regarding whether a particular unpaid tax is collectible are the same in both a 6330 and 6320 hearing. Id. at 255. In contrast, the problem presented by the instant case is that an appeals officer could allow his prior evaluation of the unpaid tax to bias his determination that the tax is now collectible.

9 Indeed, when it wants to do so, Congress knows how to provide specific circumstances that render a decisionmaker impartial. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b) (when judicial disqualification is mandatory).

10 We hold only that the tax court's application of the 2004 version of Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(d)(2) in this case was invalid. On its face, the regulation does not restrict the definition of "no prior involvement" to that used by the tax court and therefore is not invalid per se. However, by implication our holding invalidates the 2006 version of the regulation as that version provides that prior involvement "exists only when the taxpayer, the tax and the tax period at issue in the CDP hearing also were at issue in the prior non-CDP matter." Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(d)(2) (2006).

1 The record demonstrates the 2001 and 2002 returns were processed by Revenue Officer Linda Andrews who sent Taxpayers a Notice of Intent to Levy on October 20, 2003, when the amounts owed were not paid in full.

Labels:

Wednesday, February 6, 2008

Due Process determinations: Challenges to underlying liability: Frivolous return penalties: Summary judgment. The Tax Court had jurisdiction to review a Collection Due Process (CDP) determination upholding the imposition of frivolous return penalties against a married couple. Under Code Sec. 6330(d)(1), as amended by the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-280), the Tax Court has jurisdiction to review CDP determinations regardless of the type of underlying tax involved. Frivolous argument was not clear.

For 2003, Ps submitted Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, and Form 843, Claim for Refund and Request for Abatement, to R. R assessed a frivolous return penalty under sec. 6702, I.R.C., on account of both Ps' 2003 Form 1040 and their 2003 Form 843. After receiving a final notice of intent to levy, Ps requested a hearing under sec. 6330, I.R.C. During their hearing Ps challenged the assessment of the penalties. R's Appeals officer issued a notice of determination denying relief from the penalties.

Held: Under sec. 6330(d)(1), I.R.C., as amended by the Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-280, sec. 855, 120 Stat. 1019, we have jurisdiction to review R's notice of determination when the underlying tax liability consists of frivolous return penalties.

Held, further: Ps may challenge their underlying tax liability, i.e., the frivolous return penalties, before this Court.

Held, further: R has failed to carry his burden of proving that he is entitled to summary judgment.


OPINION

HAINES, Judge: This case is before the Court on respondent's motion for summary judgment filed pursuant to Rule 121.1 The issues for decision are:

(1) Whether we have jurisdiction to review respondent's determination issued under section 6330 when the underlying tax liability consists of frivolous return penalties. We hold that we do;

(2) whether in reviewing respondent's determination under section 6330, we may consider petitioners' challenges to two section 6702 frivolous return penalties. We hold that we may;

(3) whether respondent is entitled to summary judgment. We hold that he is not.


Background

Petitioners Dudley Joseph Callahan and Myrna Dupuy Callahan (husband and wife) resided in Plaquemine, Louisiana, at the time the petition was filed.

On October 13, 2004, petitioners filed a Form 843, Claim for Refund and Request for Abatement, with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) seeking "Every penny you collected from us, plus interest" for 2003. Petitioners also claimed a refund of penalties along with millions of dollars in damages plus interest attributable to respondent's alleged violations of the law, violations of their "civil rights and inhumane harassment", as protected by "Congress' Taxpayer's Bill of Rights, III".

On October 19, 2004, petitioners filed with the IRS a joint Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, for 2003. The return reported adjusted gross income of $71,363, tax due of $6,016, Federal income tax withheld of $13,813, and additional payments of $9,600. Petitioners wrote in the margin that the payments, totaling $23,413, are "Illegal Garnishments". Petitioners included petitioner husband's pay stubs showing a $9,600 levy from his wages.2 Petitioners claimed a refund of $17,352.

On September 19 and 26, 2005, respondent, on the basis of their Form 1040 and Form 843, assessed two $500 penalties against petitioners for filing a frivolous income tax return for 2003. On April 24, 2006, respondent sent petitioner husband a Final Notice of Intent to Levy and Notice of Your Right to a Hearing. On May 11, 2006, petitioners timely submitted to respondent a Form 12153, Request for a Collection Due Process Hearing, for taxable years 1979 through 2003. Petitioners attached a four-page letter to the request. Respondent treated the request as a request for a hearing for 2003, the only year addressed by the final notice of intent to levy.

In their request petitioners made numerous arguments including that the period of limitations on collection for 2003 had expired, respondent illegally offset their income tax refunds against the unfair frivolous return penalties, and the frivolous return penalties are unreasonable.

On August 17, 2006, respondent's Appeals officer sent each petitioner a letter offering to discuss their case by telephone and inviting them to send correspondence with respect to the issues of their appeal. On August 22 and November 1, 2006, petitioners sent letters to the Appeals officer raising various arguments, most of which are unrelated to the frivolous return penalties and include various allegations of illegality and impropriety by respondent. With respect to the frivolous return penalties, petitioners allege that they were improperly charged with two penalties for 2003 and that the penalties are unreasonable.

On February 6, 2007, respondent issued petitioners a notice of determination, denying petitioners relief from the penalties. Petitioners timely filed a petition with this Court. On November 8, 2007, respondent filed a motion for entry of order that undenied allegations in the answer be deemed admitted as provided in Rule 37(c). On December 10, 2007, we granted respondent's motion. Therefore, petitioners are deemed to have admitted that the frivolous return penalties for 2003 were timely assessed before the expiration of the 3-year period for assessment applicable under section 6501(a).


Discussion




A. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is intended to expedite litigation and avoid unnecessary and expensive trials. Fla. Peach Corp. v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 678, 681 (1988). The Court may grant summary judgment when there is no genuine issue of material fact and a decision may be rendered as a matter of law. Rule 121(b); Sundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 518, 520 (1992), affd. 17 F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 1994); Zaentz v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 753, 754 (1988). The moving party bears the burden of proving that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Dahlstrom v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 812, 821 (1985); Naftel v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 527, 529 (1985). The Court will view any factual material and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Dahlstrom v. Commissioner, supra at 821; Naftel v. Commissioner, supra at 529.



B. Our Jurisdiction Under Section 6330
Before the Commissioner may levy on any property or property right, the taxpayer must be provided written notice of the right to request a hearing during the 30-day period before the first levy. Sec. 6330(a). If the taxpayer requests a hearing, an Appeals officer of the Commissioner must hold the hearing. Sec. 6330(b)(1). Within 30 days of the issuance of the Appeals officer's determination, the taxpayer may seek judicial review of the determination. Sec. 6330(d)(1).

On August 17, 2006, the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (the PPA), Pub. L. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780, was enacted. PPA sec. 855(a), 120 Stat. 1019, amended section 6330(d)(1), which provides our jurisdiction to review notices of determination issued pursuant to section 6330. Before the passage of the PPA, section 6330(d)(1) provided:

SEC. 6330(d). Proceeding After Hearing. --

(1) Judicial review of determination. --The person may, within 30 days of a determination under this section, appeal such determination --

(A) to the Tax Court (and the Tax Court shall have jurisdiction with respect to such matter); or

(B) if the Tax Court does not have jurisdiction of the underlying tax liability, to a district court of the United States. [Emphasis added.]

Under that version of section 6330(d)(1) we held that we lack jurisdiction to review a notice of determination when the underlying tax liability consists solely of frivolous return penalties under section 6702.3 Johnson v. Commissioner, 117 T.C. 204, 208 (2001); Van Es v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 324, 329 (2000); Dunbar v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-184 (dismissing the portion of the petition related to frivolous return penalties for lack of jurisdiction, but not the portion related to income tax); Henderson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-36. But see Wagenknecht v. United States, 509 F.3d 729 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding when the underlying tax liability consists of income tax as well as section 6702 penalties, only the Tax Court has jurisdiction to hear the entire appeal).

As we did not have jurisdiction to redetermine frivolous return penalties assessed pursuant to section 6702, see sec. 6703(b) and (c), we lacked jurisdiction to hear a challenge to collection of the outstanding amounts for the frivolous return penalties and related interest, Van Es v. Commissioner, supra at 328-329; Henderson v. Commissioner, supra; see also Yuen v. United States, 290 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1223 (D. Nev. 2003) (holding that the U.S. District Court had jurisdiction to consider a frivolous return penalty issue in the context of a section 6330 hearing); Loofbourrow v. Commissioner, 208 F. Supp. 2d 698, 706 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (appeal lies to the District Court where frivolous return penalty was challenged at a section 6330 hearing). We interpreted section 6330(d)(1)(A) and (B) as not expanding the Court's jurisdiction beyond the types of taxes over which the Court has jurisdiction. Serv . Employees Intl. Union v. Commissioner, 125 T.C. 63, 67 (2005); Moore v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 171 (2000).

However, the PPA amended section 6330(d)(1), expanding this Court's jurisdiction to include review of the Commissioner's collection activity regardless of the type of underlying tax involved.4 Perkins v. Commissioner, 129 T.C. 58, 63 n.7 (2007). Section 6330(d)(1) now provides:

SEC. 6330(d). Proceeding After Hearing. --

(1) Judicial review of determination. --The person may, within 30 days of a determination under this section, appeal such determination to the Tax Court (and the Tax Court shall have jurisdiction with respect to such matter).

The Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, General Explanation of Tax Legislation Enacted in the 109th Congress (JCS-1-07), at 507 (J. Comm. Print 2007), explains the amendment to section 6330(d)(1): "The provision modifies the jurisdiction of the Tax Court by providing that all appeals of collection due process determinations are to be made to the United States Tax Court." We, therefore, have jurisdiction to review a notice of determination issued under section 6330 where the underlying tax liability consists of frivolous return penalties.



C. Matters Considered at Hearing
Section 6330(c) prescribes the matters that a person may raise at the hearing. Section 6330(c)(2)(A) provides that a person may raise collection issues such as spousal defenses, the appropriateness of the Commissioner's intended collection action, and possible alternative means of collection. See Montgomery v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. 1, 5 (2004); Sego v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 604, 609 (2000); Goza v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 176, 181-183 (2000). In addition, section 6330(c)(2)(B) establishes the circumstances under which a person may challenge the existence or amount of the underlying tax liability. Section 6330(c)(2)(B) provides:

(2) Issues at hearing. --

*******

(B) Underlying liability. --The person may also raise at the hearing challenges to the existence or amount of the underlying tax liability for any tax period if the person did not receive any statutory notice of deficiency for such tax liability or did not otherwise have an opportunity to dispute such tax liability. [Emphasis added.]

We have interpreted the phrase "underlying tax liability" as including any amounts a taxpayer owes pursuant to the tax laws that are the subject of the Commissioner's collection activities. Katz v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 329, 338-339 (2000); Van Es v. Commissioner, supra. In Van Es, we determined that the "underlying tax liability" was the frivolous return penalties. Id. at 328; see also Wagenknecht v. United States, supra (section 6702 penalties are the "underlying tax liability"; Yuen v. United States, supra at 1224 (the "underlying tax liability" as used in section 6330(c)(2)(B) was the frivolous return penalties). The frivolous return penalties in this case are owed by petitioners pursuant to section 6702 and are the subject of respondent's collection activities. Therefore, petitioners may challenge the existence or the amount of the frivolous return penalties at the hearing if they did not receive a statutory notice of deficiency or otherwise have an opportunity to dispute the liability. Lewis v. Commissioner, 128 T.C. 48 (2007); sec. 301.6330-1(e)(3), Q&AE2, Proced. & Admin. Regs.

Respondent argues that although petitioners did not have an opportunity to dispute the liability, "section 6330(c)(2)(B) applies only when a taxpayer is challenging a liability asserted by the Service that differs in the amount from the taxpayer's self-determination." Respondent's argument that the frivolous return penalties are self-determined is strained at best; simply put, frivolous return penalties are determined and assessed by the Commissioner. Nevertheless, even if we are to accept respondent's argument that the penalties are self-determined, petitioners would not be barred from challenging the underlying liability, i.e., the frivolous return penalties, during a section 6330 hearing. Section 6330(c)(2)(B) permits taxpayers to challenge the existence or amount of the tax liability reported on their original tax return. Montgomery v. Commissioner, supra at 10. U.S. District Courts have also held that a taxpayer may challenge the frivolous return penalty in the context of a section 6330 hearing. See Yuen v. United States, supra at 1224.

Petitioners did not receive a notice of deficiency with respect to the frivolous return penalties because the statutory deficiency procedures, sections 6211-6216, do not apply to frivolous return penalties under section 6702.5 Sec. 6703(b); Yuen v. United States, supra at 1224. Petitioners also have not disputed the penalties during a prior conference with respondent's Appeals Office. See Lewis v. Commissioner, supra. As petitioners have not otherwise had an opportunity to dispute the imposition of the frivolous return penalties, they may contest the penalties both at their section 6330 hearing and before this Court.



D. Whether Respondent Is Entitled to Summary Judgment
Where, as in this case, the validity of the underlying tax liability is properly at issue, we will review the matter de novo.6 Sego v. Commissioner, supra at 610; Goza v. Commissioner, supra at 181. Where the validity of the underlying tax liability is not properly at issue, however, we will review the Commissioner's determination for an abuse of discretion. Sego v. Commissioner, supra at 610; Goza v. Commissioner, supra at 181.

Respondent assessed a frivolous return penalty for both petitioners' 2003 Form 1040 and Form 843. Respondent argues that "Even if the Court finds that the petitioners may challenge the frivolous return penalties based on their self-filed returns, respondent is still entitled to summary judgment."

Under section 6702, as applicable in this case, a $500 civil penalty may be assessed against a taxpayer if three requirements are met.7 First, the taxpayer must file a document that purports to be an income tax return. Sec. 6702(a)(1). Second, the purported return must lack the information needed to judge the substantial correctness of the self-assessment or contain information indicating the self-assessment is substantially incorrect. Id. Third, the taxpayer's position must be frivolous or demonstrate a desire (which appears on the purported return) to delay or impede the administration of Federal income tax laws. Sec. 6702(a)(2). We generally look to the face of the documents to determine whether a taxpayer is liable for a frivolous return penalty as a matter of law.8 See Yuen v. United States, 290 F. Supp. 2d at 1224.

Petitioners' Form 1040 is an income tax return. Petitioners appear to have reported all income from their Forms W-2, Wage and Tax Statement, and Forms W-2G, Certain Gambling Winnings, on their Form 1040. They calculated a total tax due of $6,016. Petitioners had $13,813 withheld from their wages and gambling income, and they requested the difference be refunded. Petitioners also reported that they made additional payments of $9,600 and that these were illegal garnishments from petitioner husband's wages. They requested a refund of that amount as well.

Petitioners' 2003 Form 1040 is substantially incorrect in that they cannot claim a refund of levied amounts related to a previous tax year on their 2003 Form 1040. Petitioners will therefore be liable for the frivolous return penalty if the return is based on a frivolous position or reflects a desire to delay or impede the administration of Federal income tax laws.

The frivolous return penalty has been imposed upon taxpayers who have taken one or more of a variety of positions. For example, the frivolous return penalty has been imposed on taxpayers who argue: (1) No provision of the Internal Revenue Code makes a person liable for tax, e.g., Yuen v. United States, supra at 1224; (2) wages are not income, or provide inaccurate or no financial information, e.g., id.; Tornichio v. United States, 263 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (N.D. Ohio 2002); (3) general constitutional objections or refuse to pay tax on general constitutional grounds, e.g., Miller v. United States, 868 F.2d 236 (7th Cir. 1989); Leogrande v. United States, 811 F.2d 147 (2d Cir. 1987); (4) the return violates the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination, Kloes v. United States, 578 F. Supp. 270 (W.D. Wis. 1984); and (5) moral or religious objections to the payment of taxes which go toward military spending, e.g., McKee v. United States, 781 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1986); Franklet v. United States, 578 F. Supp. 1552 (N.D. Cal. 1984), affd. 761 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1985).

Petitioners' Form 1040 does not provide a reason that the garnishments are illegal other than petitioners' statement that they were "over-assessed".9 Petitioners' Form 1040 contains handwritten notations in various sections, which explain the entries, ask questions about certain items, and request additional credits for which they qualify. These notations make the return difficult to understand. Petitioners attached many unnecessary pages to their return including a list of nontaxable amounts received, allegations related to a civil suit against the IRS, and updated depreciation schedules related to deductions that were claimed in prior years.

Although petitioners' Form 1040 is confusing and unorthodox, their arguments are not substantially similar to positions previously held to be frivolous or those that display a desire to delay or impede the administration of Federal income tax laws. Although not binding in this case, respondent has compiled a list of 40 frivolous positions under section 6702(c) which are applicable to submissions made after March 15, 2007. Notice 2007-30, 2007-14 I.R.B. 883. Petitioners' arguments are not substantially similar to any of those positions. Petitioners appear to dispute respondent's collection activities related to 2003 as well as prior years, and they make allegations related to those disputes on their 2003 Form 1040. Until the record is better developed, we cannot say as a matter of law that petitioners have taken a frivolous position or that they desired to delay or impede the administration of Federal income tax laws.

We next turn to petitioners' 2003 Form 843. Petitioners do not claim that the Form 843, which is a claim for refund, is not an income tax return. Nevertheless, we note that documents that are filed to obtain a refund of tax have consistently been held to be purported returns. Kelly v. United States, 789 F.2d 94, 97 (1st Cir. 1986); Sullivan v. United States, 788 F.2d 813, 815 (1st Cir. 1986); Davis v. United States, 742 F.2d 171, 173 (5th Cir. 1984); see Farenga v. United States, 93 AFTR 2d 1775, 2004-1 USTC par. 50,240 (N.D.N.Y. 2004) (a collection review proceeding in U.S. District Court in which the Commissioner imposed the frivolous return penalty on account of both a Form 1040 and a Form 843).

Petitioners' Form 843 requests a refund of "every penny you collected from us plus interest." There is little explanation of the amounts collected, or why that collection was improper. They also claim a refund for all interest, penalties, and over-assessments the IRS made each year. They further claim interest, and "damages at twice the total amount as directed by Congress' Taxpayer Bill of Rights III, part IV." The Form 843 clearly does not contain information on which the substantial correctness of petitioners' refund claim may be judged.

However, like their Form 1040, petitioners' Form 843 does not contain arguments substantially similar to arguments previously held to be frivolous or those that demonstrate a desire to delay or impede the administration of Federal income tax laws. Rather, petitioners appear to dispute respondent's collection activities related to 2003 and prior years. Without more information, we cannot say as a matter of law that petitioners have taken a frivolous position or that they desired to delay or impede the administration of Federal income tax laws.

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that respondent has failed to carry his burden of showing that there are no material facts in dispute and that he should prevail as a matter of law.

To reflect the foregoing,

An appropriate order will be issued denying respondent's motion for summary judgment.

1 Unless otherwise indicated section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect at the time the petition was filed. Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. Amounts are rounded to the nearest dollar.

2 Petitioners did not include on the Form 1040 the year or years to which the garnishments relate. Furthermore, neither respondent's motion for summary judgment nor petitioners' response states the year or years to which the garnishments relate.

3 The frivolous return penalty is in addition to any other penalty provided by law. Sec. 6702(b). It is assessed without a notice of deficiency first being sent to the taxpayer, thus generally depriving this Court of jurisdiction over the penalty. Sec. 6703(b).

4 The amendment to sec. 6330(d)(1) is effective only for determinations made after Oct. 16, 2006. Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-280, sec. 855(b), 120 Stat. 1019.

5 Sec. 6212 authorizes the Commissioner to send notices of deficiency.

6 This standard of review comports with the standard of review used by the U.S. District Courts in sec. 6330 hearings where the underlying tax liability was a frivolous return penalty. See, e.g., Yuen v. United States, 290 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1224 (D. Nev. 2003); Danner v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1171 (E.D. Wash. 2002) (citing Sego v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 604, 610 (2000).

7 Sec. 6702 has been amended by the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-432, div. A, sec. 407(a), 120 Stat. 2960. The amendment is effective for submissions made and issues raised after the date on which the Secretary first prescribes a list of frivolous positions under sec. 6702(c). That list was announced on Mar. 15, 2007, in Notice 2007-30, 2007-14 I.R.B. 883. Petitioners' 2003 Form 1040 and Form 843 were submitted in 2004; therefore, the amendment is not applicable to this case. Sec. 6702 as applicable to this case provides:

Sec. 6702(a). Civil Penalty. --If --

(1) any individual files what purports to be a return of the tax imposed by subtitle A but which --

(A) does not contain information on which the substantial correctness of the self-assessment may be judged, or

(B) contains information that on its face indicates that the self-assessment is substantially incorrect; and

(2) the conduct referred to in paragraph (1) is due to --

(A) a position which is frivolous, or

(B) a desire (which appears on the purported return) to delay or impede the administration of Federal income tax laws, then such individual shall pay a penalty of $500.

8 As we lack jurisdiction to hear a claim for refund in situations where a notice of deficiency has not been issued, see secs. 6512(b), 7422, we make no judgment as to the validity of petitioners' claims for refund made on their Form 843 and Form 1040.

9 Petitioners vaguely expand upon their argument in their petition, arguing that because they have a case pending before a Court of Appeals, it is illegal to garnish wages under Congress's Taxpayer Bill of Rights.

Labels:

Tuesday, February 5, 2008

Section 165(c)(2)- non-business loss may be taken when incurred in a transaction entered into for profit the expenses incurred in the unsuccessful attempt to acquire a specific business.
-
REV-RUL, Losses; attempted acquisition of business., Rev. Rul. 77-254, 1977-2 CB 63, (Jan. 01, 1977)
Rev. Rul. 77-254, 1977-2 CB 63


Section 165.--Losses

26 CFR 1.165-1: Losses.

(Also Sections 263, 461; 1.263(a)-1, 1.461-1.)

[IRS Headnote] Losses; attempted acquisition of business.--
An individual may deduct, in accordance with section 165(c)(2) of the Code, expenses incurred in the unsuccessful attempt to acquire a specific business, such as legal expenses incurred in drafting purchase documents. However, expenses incurred in the course of a general search for or preliminary investigation of a business, such as expenses for advertisements and travel to search for a new business, are not deductible. Rev. Rul. 57-418 amplified.


[Text]



Advice has been requested whether, under the circumstances described below, a deduction in accordance with section 165(c)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 is allowable to a taxpayer for a loss that was not compensated for by insurance or otherwise.


An individual taxpayer began to search for a business to purchase. The individual placed advertisements in several newspapers and traveled to various locations throughout the country to investigate various businesses that the individual learned were for sale. The individual commissioned audits to evaluate the potential of several of these business. Eventually, the individual decided to purchase a specific business and incurred expenses in an attempt to purchase this business. For example, the individual retained a law firm to draft the documents necessary for the purchase. Because of certain disagreements between the individual and the owner of the business that developed after this decision was made, the individual abandoned all attempts to acquire the business.


Section 165(a) of the Code allows as a deduction any loss sustained during the taxable year that is not compensated for by insurance or otherwise. Section 165(c) provides that, in the case of individuals, the deduction is limited to (1) losses incurred in a trade or business, (2) losses incurred in any transaction entered into for profit, though not connected with a trade or business, and (3) losses of property not connected with a trade or business, if such losses arise from fire, storm, shipwreck or other casualty, or from theft.


Rev. Rul. 57-418, 1957-2 C.B. 143, holds that losses incurred in the search for a business or investment are deductible only when the activities are more than investigatory and the taxpayer has actually entered a transaction for profit and the project is later abandoned.


In Seed v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 880 (1969), acq., 1970-2 C.B. xxi, the United States Tax Court allowed a deduction for expenses incurred by a taxpayer during an unsuccessful attempt to secure a charter to operate a savings and loan association. The court found that the taxpayer's extensive activities in the venture qualified as a transaction entered into for profit. Following the decision in Seed the court has continued to find that a taxpayer has entered a transaction for profit in cases in which the facts indictate that the taxpayer has gone beyond a general search and focused on the acquisition of a specific business or investment. See Price v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1971-323; Domenie v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1975-94.


In view of the decision in Seed, Rev. Rul. 57-418 is amplified to provide that a taxpayer will be considered to have entered a transaction for profit if, based on all the facts and circumstances, the taxpayer has gone beyond a general investigatory search for a new business or investment to focus on the acquisition of a specific business or investment.


Expenses incurred in the course of a general search for or preliminary investigation of a business or investment include those expenses related to the decisions whether to enter a transaction and which transaction to enter. Such expenses are personal and are not deductible under section 165 of the Code. Once the taxpayer has focused on the acquisition of a specific business or investment, expenses that are related to an attempt to acquire such business or investment are capital in nature and, to the extent that the expenses are allocable to an asset the cost of which is amortizable or depreciable, may be amortized as part of the assert's cost if the attempted acquisition is successful. If the attempted acquisition fails, the amount capitalized is deductible in accordance with section 165(c)(2). The taxpayer need not actually enter the business or purchase the investment in order to to obtain the deduction.


Accordingly, in the present case, the individual may deduct as losses incurred in a transaction entered into for profit the expenses incurred in the unsuccessful attempt to acquire a specific business. Thus, the individual's expenses in retaining a law firm to draft the purchase documents and any other expenses incurred in the attempt to complete the purchase of the business are deductible. The expenses for advertisements, travel to search for a new business, and the cost of audits that were designed to help the individual decide whether to attempt an acquisition were investigatory expenses and are not deductible.


Rev. Rul. 57-418 is amplified.

Labels:

Monday, February 4, 2008

New Regulations under section 7216. Section 7216 imposes criminal penalties on tax return preparers who knowingly or recklessly make unauthorized disclosures or uses of information furnished to them in connection with the preparation of an income tax return. In addition, tax return preparers are subject to civil penalties under section 6713 for disclosure or use of this information unless an exception under the rules of section 7216(b) applies to the disclosure or use.

T.D. 9375 , filed with the Federal Register on January 4, 2008.

[ Code Sec. 7216]


Tax preparers: Disclosure and use of return information: Taxpayer's consent: Criminal penalties. --
Reg. §301.7216-0 and amendments of Reg. §§301.7216-1, 301.7216-2 and 301.7216-3, regarding the disclosure and use of tax return information by tax return preparers, are adopted.



AGENCY: Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Treasury.

ACTION: Final regulations.

SUMMARY: This document contains regulations to update the rules regarding the disclosure and use of tax return information by tax return preparers. Among other things, the regulations finalize rules for taxpayers to consent to the disclosure or use of their tax return information by tax return preparers.

DATES: Effective Date: These regulations are effective January 7, 2008.

Applicability Date: The regulations apply to disclosures or uses of tax return information occurring on or after January 1, 2009.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:



Background

This document contains amendments to the Regulations on Procedure and Administration (26 CFR Part 301) under section 7216 of the Internal Revenue Code. These regulations strengthen taxpayers' ability to control their tax return information by requiring that tax return preparers give taxpayers specific information, including who will receive the tax return information and the particular items of tax return information that will be disclosed or used, to allow taxpayers to make knowing, informed, and voluntary decisions over the disclosure or use of their tax information by their tax return preparer.

Section 7216 imposes criminal penalties on tax return preparers who knowingly or recklessly make unauthorized disclosures or uses of information furnished to them in connection with the preparation of an income tax return. In addition, tax return preparers are subject to civil penalties under section 6713 for disclosure or use of this information unless an exception under the rules of section 7216(b) applies to the disclosure or use.

Section 7216 was enacted by section 316 of the Revenue Act of 1971, Public Law 92-178 (85 Stat. 529). In 1988, Congress modified the section by limiting the criminal sanction to knowing or reckless, unauthorized disclosures. Public Law 100-647 (102 Stat. 3749). At the same time, Congress enacted the civil penalty that is now found in section 6713. Public Law 100-647, § 6242(a) (102 Stat. 3759). In 1989, Congress further modified section 7216, directing the Treasury Department to issue regulations permitting disclosures of tax return information for quality or peer reviews. Public Law 101-239, § 7739(a) (103 Stat. 3759).

The Treasury Department and the IRS proposed regulations under section 7216 on December 20, 1972 (37 FR 28070). Final regulations were issued on March 29, 1974 (39 FR 11537). These regulations are divided into three parts: §301.7216-1 for general provisions and definitions; §301.7216-2 for disclosures and uses that do not require formal taxpayer consent; and §301.7216-3 for disclosures and uses that require formal taxpayer consent. Since the regulations were adopted in 1974, the Treasury Department and the IRS have amended §301.7216-2 on occasion, but §§301.7216-1 and 301.7216-3 have remained unchanged.

A notice of proposed rulemaking (REG-137243-02) was published in the Federal Register (70 FR 72954) on December 8, 2005. Concurrently with publication of the proposed regulations, the IRS published Notice 2005-93, 2005-52 I.R.B. 1204 (December 07, 2005), setting forth a proposed revenue procedure that would provide guidance to tax return preparers regarding the format and content of consents to disclose and consents to use tax return information under §301.7216-3.

Written comments were received in response to the notice of proposed rulemaking. A public hearing was held on April 4, 2006. Commentators appeared at the public hearing and commented on the notice of proposed rulemaking.

All comments were considered and are available for public inspection upon request. This preamble summarizes most of the comments received by the IRS and Treasury Department. After consideration of the written comments and the comments provided at the public hearing, the proposed regulations under section 7216 are adopted as revised by this Treasury decision.

Concurrently with publication of these regulations, the IRS is publishing a revenue procedure and an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking. The revenue procedure provides guidance on the format and content of consents to disclose or use tax return information under §301.7216-3 for taxpayers filing a return in the Form 1040 series, e.g., Form 1040, Form 1040NR, Form 1040A, or Form 1040EZ. The revenue procedure also provides specific guidance for electronic signatures when a taxpayer filing a return in the Form 1040 series executes an electronic consent to the disclosure or use of the taxpayer's tax return information.

The advanced notice of proposed rulemaking requests comments regarding a proposed rule under §301.7216-3 that a tax return preparer may not obtain a consent to disclose or use tax return information for the purpose of the tax return preparer soliciting, or the taxpayer obtaining, a refund anticipation loan (RAL) or certain other products.



Summary of Comments



1. Preamble.

Some commentators recommended that the final regulations specify the existing revenue rulings, notices, and other guidance under section 7216 that continue to have effect under the final regulations. While the final regulations do not identify all guidance that has continuing effect, the section of this Treasury decision entitled "Effect on Other Documents" specifies guidance that Treasury and the IRS have determined as contrary to the regulations.

One commentator requested that the preamble of the regulations clarify whether a tax return preparer may offer for sale an insurance policy that will reimburse the taxpayer additional tax the taxpayer is required to pay under certain circumstances involving errors by the tax return preparer. Section 7216 and the regulations thereunder govern only a tax return preparer's disclosure or use of tax return information. To the extent that a tax return preparer offers a product, such as insurance, where the offer is based on the disclosure of tax return information to a third-party, or where use of such tax return information serves as the basis for making the offer, section 7216 and the regulations thereunder only govern whether use or disclosure of the tax return information requires taxpayer consent.



2. §301.7216-1 Penalty for Disclosure or Use of Tax Return Information.



A. Statutory provisions.

Some commentators recommended that Treasury and the IRS seek legislative changes to section 7216. More specifically, these commentators recommended that the amount of the section 7216 criminal penalty be increased, that the amount of the section 6713 civil penalty be increased, and that the Code be amended to provide a private right of action against tax return preparers. Another commentator recommended amending section 7216 to provide a means to abate the penalty in cases where reasonable cause and good faith is established. This commentator also recommended that Treasury and the IRS not attempt to regulate the disclosure or use of tax return information in the context of a criminal statute, section 7216, but that only civil penalties should apply.

Requests for statutory changes to sections 7216 and 6713 are outside of the scope of these regulations. Section 7216 expressly provides for Treasury to promulgate regulations to exempt certain disclosures or uses of information from the statute's criminal sanction. Although Treasury and the IRS do not have the regulatory authority to provide for a reasonable cause exception under section 7216, the criminal penalty provided for by that statute is premised on a finding of knowing or reckless conduct.



B. Tax return preparer.

One commentator requested expanding the definition of tax return preparer to include clerical staff involved in preparation of a tax return. Because the definition of tax return preparer in the regulations already encompasses clerical staff involved in the preparation of a return, no change is needed to address this comment.

While approving of the generally broad scope of the term "tax return preparer," one commentator expressed concern that the term did not cover employees of tax return preparers who do not personally assist in the preparation of tax returns or the provision of auxiliary services. That commentator recommended that section 7216 should nonetheless apply to any employee. This comment was not adopted. The statute applies only to persons "engaged in the business of preparing, or providing services in connection with the preparation of, returns." The regulations, however, do not permit disclosure by one employee of a tax return preparer to another employee of the tax return preparer on the basis of employment status alone. See Treas. Reg. §301.7216-2(c).

Based on recent amendments to section 7701(a)(36) of the Code (which post-amendment applies more generally to tax return preparers other than income tax returns), the final regulations were revised to omit the language in the proposed regulations pertaining to the lack of uniformity of the definition of tax return preparer provided in section 7701(a)(36) and the definition of tax return preparer for purposes of section 7216.



C. Tax return information.

Some commentators expressed concern that the definition of tax return information encompasses an overly broad amount of information. One commentator recommended that a taxpayer's name, address, telephone number, e-mail address, and identification number should not be treated as tax return information. Another commentator recommended that a taxpayer's name, address, and other contact information should be available for a tax return preparer to use to provide the taxpayer with any information that the tax return preparer believes may be of interest to the taxpayer. These recommendations regarding tax return information were not adopted because information revealing the identity of, or how to contact, a person is information central to one's privacy and deserving of treatment as tax return information when submitted for, or in connection with, the preparation of a tax return. Section 301.7216-2(n), however, permits tax return preparers to make limited use of taxpayer's contact information to offer tax information or additional tax return preparation services to previous customers.

One commentator recommended eliminating language from the regulations providing that information maintained in a form that is associated with the tax return preparation becomes tax return information regardless of how the information was initially obtained. The commentator questioned whether non-tax return information could become tax return information as a result of the manner in which it is stored and maintained by the tax return preparer. Treasury and the IRS agree that section 7216 protects only information furnished to a tax return preparer for, or in connection with, the preparation of a return and that information does not become tax return information merely by the method in which the information is stored. The language in the proposed regulations that is the subject of the comment was included to recognize that the protections of section 7216 may extend to information furnished by persons other than the taxpayer, including information furnished by one person within a firm to a tax return preparer employed by the same firm. In that situation, the information in the hands of the tax return preparer would be tax return information even if the person furnishing the information had obtained it other than in connection with the preparation of a tax return. Because this rule is evident from other provisions of the regulations, and the language commented upon may create confusion, the language has been removed from these regulations.

One commentator expressed concern that the proposed regulations improperly expand upon section 7216 by defining "tax return information" to include information derived or generated from tax return information. The commentator commented that section 7216 protects only information furnished to tax return preparers, and data that a tax return preparer derives from that information should not be considered data furnished to the tax return preparer. The commentator, therefore, recommended removing this language from the regulations.

The commentator's recommendation was not adopted. Information that a tax return preparer would typically derive from other information furnished in connection with the preparation of a return could include information on the taxpayer's entitlement to deductions, credits, losses or gains, the amounts thereof, and the amount of tax due. It would frustrate the purpose of the statute not to protect this information when a taxpayer has furnished the tax return preparer the means to derive it.

Similarly, the same commentator stated that the proposed regulations improperly expand upon the statute by defining "tax return information" to include "information received by the tax return preparer from the IRS in connection with the processing of such return." The commentator recommended eliminating this language from the regulations. This recommendation was not adopted. The statute protects information furnished to a tax return preparer for, or in connection with, preparation of a return and does not require that the taxpayer have furnished the information.

Some commentators approved of the proposed regulations' definition of tax return information, but expressed concern that Example 1 in §301.7216-1(b)(3)(ii) suggests that information supplied to register tax preparation software is not tax return information unless the tax return preparer states during the registration process that it will provide updates to registrants. These commentators, therefore, recommended deleting that fact from the example. This recommendation was adopted to explicitly provide that all information furnished to register tax return preparation software is tax return information.

Some commentators expressed concern that if information furnished to register tax return preparation software was treated as tax return information, then tax return preparers would be required to obtain consent from taxpayers prior to updating the tax return preparation software. To address this concern, section 301.7216-2(c) of the regulations has been revised.



D. Disclosure and use.

One commentator stated that the definition of "use" is overly broad. The commentator proposed that the "use" of tax return information should not include tax return preparers informing taxpayers of the availability of products and services that tax return preparers offer that could benefit taxpayers. As an example, the commentator stated that informing a taxpayer about the availability of a refund anticipation loan based on the taxpayer's tax return information should not be a "use" of tax return information. This recommendation was not adopted. The regulations require consents for tax return preparers to use tax return information so that taxpayers themselves determine whether they want additional information regarding products and services that might benefit them. The potential uses of tax return information should be clearly described by tax return preparers and the potential uses must be consented to by taxpayers before such uses occur.

Two commentators recommended that tax return preparers should be responsible for subsequent disclosures or uses of tax return information by third parties to whom tax return preparers made an authorized disclosure of tax return information. This recommendation was not adopted because section 7216 does not apply to third parties who are not tax return preparers.



E. Providing auxiliary services.

Section 301.7216-1(b)(2)(iii) of the proposed regulations provides that a person is engaged in the business of providing auxiliary services in connection with the preparation of tax returns as described in paragraph (b)(2)(i)(B) of that section if, in the course of the person's business, the person holds himself out to tax return preparers or to taxpayers as a person who performs auxiliary services, whether or not providing the auxiliary services is the person's sole business activity and whether or not the person charges a fee for the auxiliary services. One commentator recommended broadening the definition of auxiliary services to include analysis of data for purposes of monitoring the tax return preparer's business for fraud prevention and provision of data storage services. These services as well as similar services are typical of the types of auxiliary services that can be provided to tax return preparers as contemplated by §301.7216-1(b)(2)(iii) and are already covered by the broad definition of auxiliary services in the regulations. The same commentator also recommended broadening the definition of auxiliary services to include the analysis of customer activity to improve services and assistance in connection with preparation for taxpayer audits. These services are already addressed in other parts of the regulations. See §§301.7216-2(o) and 301.7216-2(k).



F. Exclusions under §301.7216-1(b)(2)(v).

One commentator recommended that the express exclusion under §301.7216-1(b)(2)(v) of the proposed regulations of certain persons from the definition of tax return preparer should be extended to include persons who provide "a broad range of financial products and services ... to customers of tax return preparers, including savings, transaction, and retirement accounts." The commentator's recommendation was not adopted as the regulations do not provide an exhaustive list of the persons identified as excluded from the definition of tax return preparer. To the extent the service providers suggested to be excluded by the commentator provide services only incidentally related to the preparation of the return, these persons would be excluded under the regulation.



G. Hyperlinks.

One commentator recommended that the regulations should not treat as a disclosure by a tax return preparer the situation where a taxpayer is transferred from the tax return preparer's website to a different website and the taxpayer separately enters information on the different website. This recommendation was not adopted because the regulations already do not treat this fact pattern as a disclosure by the tax return preparer.



3. §301.7216-2 Permissible Disclosures or Uses Without Consent of the Taxpayer.



A. Disclosures to the IRS.

Section 301.7216-2(b) of the proposed regulations provides that tax return preparers may disclose to the IRS any tax return information the IRS requests to assist in the administration of electronic filing programs. One commentator requested limiting this rule to "specific necessary purposes, such as compliance by electronic return originators." This recommendation was not adopted. Return information in the hands of the IRS is already protected from unauthorized disclosure. See, e.g., section 6103.

Other commentators expressed concern regarding whether §301.7216-2(b) permitted disclosures of tax return information to the IRS in general. Because the purpose of these regulations is to protect taxpayers from the unauthorized uses and disclosures by tax return preparers, and because tax return information in the hands of the IRS is already protected from unauthorized disclosure, §301.7216-2(b) has been modified to clarify that return preparers may disclose any tax return information to the IRS for any purpose.



B. Use by tax return preparer for purposes of updating software.

Section 301.7216-2(c)(1) of the final regulations has been revised to provide that if a tax return preparer provides software to a taxpayer that is used in connection with the preparation or filing of a tax return, the tax return preparer may use the taxpayer's tax return information to update the taxpayer's software for the purpose of addressing changes in IRS forms, e-file specifications and administrative, regulatory and legislative guidance or to test and ensure the software's technical capabilities without obtaining the taxpayer's consent under §301.7216-3.



C. Disclosure to a tax return preparer within the same firm located outside of the United States.

Section 301.7216-2(c) of the proposed regulations generally provides that an officer, employee, or member of a tax return preparer in the United States may disclose tax return information to another officer, employee, or member of the same tax return preparer located within the United States. Section 301.7216-2(c)(1) of the proposed regulations provides that the taxpayer must give consent under §301.7216-3 prior to any disclosure of tax return information by an officer, employee, or member of a tax return preparer in the United States to an officer, employee, or member of the same tax return preparer located outside of the United States or any territory or possession of the United States. One commentator expressed concern that this rule was too strict with respect to multinational companies and employees on assignment outside of the United States. This commentator stated that such taxpayers anticipate that their tax return information will be disclosed outside of the United States. This commentator recommended that consent under §301.7216-3 should not be required with respect to disclosures when the taxpayer is a multinational company or an individual taxpayer employed or on assignment outside of the United States and that an engagement letter explaining potential circumstances involving disclosures overseas ought to be permitted in these situations.

This recommendation was not adopted. As explained in the preamble to the proposed regulations, the Treasury Department and IRS believe that a separate explanation is required under these circumstances in order to advise taxpayers that their tax return information is being disclosed to tax return preparers located outside the United States. The final regulations, however, address the commentator's request for additional flexibility with respect to the form and manner of the consent for taxpayers other than individuals. For tax return preparers providing tax return preparation services to taxpayers who do not file an income tax return in the Form 1040 series, e.g., Form 1040, Form 1040NR, Form 1040A, or Form 1040EZ, a consent to disclose tax return information outside the United States may be in any format, including an engagement letter to a client, as long as the consent provides sufficient information to enable the taxpayer to provide informed consent. For tax return preparers providing tax return preparation services to taxpayers who file an income tax return in the Form 1040 series, the regulations provide that the Secretary may issue guidance, by publication in the Internal Revenue Bulletin, proscribing the form and manner of the consent to disclose tax return information, including disclosure of return information outside the United States. This rule is consistent with the general rule adopted by these final regulations with respect to a tax return preparer's request for consent to disclose tax return information. See section 301.7216-3(a)(3).

Additionally, one commentator recommended that, rather than provide limitations on the disclosure of tax return information by a tax return preparer within the United States to another tax return preparer of the same firm who is located outside of the United States, the regulations should instead permit such disclosures without consent if the tax return preparer of the same firm outside of the United States consents to adhere to the rules of section 7216. This recommendation was not adopted because it does not inform taxpayers that their tax return information will be disclosed outside of the United States or allow taxpayers to control the decision whether their information is disclosed overseas.



D. Disclosures to other tax return preparers.

Section 301.7216-2(d) of the proposed regulations provides that disclosures between tax return preparers are authorized when the disclosures (i) assist in the preparation of a return; (ii) the services provided by the recipient of the disclosure are not substantive determinations or advice affecting a taxpayer's reported tax liability; and (iii) the disclosure is to a tax return preparer located in the United States. Two commentators expressed concern that the phrase "substantive determinations or advice" is a vague standard and recommended the use of examples in the regulations that adequately define the phrase. The final regulations clarify the meaning of substantive determinations and provide an example to illustrate the operation of this rule.

One commentator recommended adopting the professional ethics rules of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) on outsourcing in lieu of §301.7216-2(d) of the proposed regulations. Rule 102 of the AICPA Code of Professional Conduct requires that, prior to sharing confidential client information (such as a tax return) with a third-party service provider, an AICPA member must inform the client, preferably in writing, that the member may use a third-party service provider when providing professional services to the client. Unlike the rules in the regulations, the AICPA Code of Professional Conduct does not require that the client consent to the disclosure of tax return information when substantive determinations or advice are sought from third parties. Under the AICPA rules, AICPA members who use third-party service providers remain responsible for the work done by the service providers and they must contract with the third-party service provider for the service provider to monitor the confidentiality of the client's information to the third-party Service provider. The commentator's recommendation that the regulations adopt only the protections of the AICPA ethics rules was not adopted. The Treasury Department and the IRS are concerned that taxpayers and tax return information would not be adequately protected if a tax return preparer could disclose tax return information to any third-party service provider without taxpayer consent to that disclosure.

One commentator recommended modifying §301.7216-2(d) of the proposed regulations to allow disclosures between franchisors and franchisees in the tax return preparation business according to the terms of their franchise agreement. The commentator's recommendation was not adopted because the existence of a written franchise agreement should not affect the confidentiality of a taxpayer's tax return information.

One commentator critiqued §301.7216-2(d) because it will limit the benefits tax return preparation firms may enjoy from using foreign outsourcing. Foreign outsourcing is not prohibited by the final regulations, which permit the disclosure of tax return information outside of the United States if the taxpayer consents to such disclosure. One commentator recommended that tax return preparers should be allowed to disclose tax return information to third-party service providers subject to the requirements of the privacy provisions of Title V of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Public Law 106-102 (113 Stat. 1338) (GLBA). Specifically, the commentator proposed that the regulations should permit tax return preparers to: (1) execute a written contract with a service provider limiting the service provider's disclosure or use of tax return information; (2) select and retain service providers that are capable of safeguarding tax return information; and (3) implement contractual provisions requiring service providers to develop and maintain appropriate information safeguards. This recommendation was not adopted. While the requirements of section 7216 and these regulations do not override any requirements or restrictions of the GLBA, the sensitivity of tax return information justifies affording tax return information stronger protections than other information subject to the GLBA.



E. Disclosure pursuant to an order of a court, or an administrative order, demand, request, summons or subpoena which is issued in the performance of its duties by a Federal or State agency, the United States Congress, a professional association ethics committee or board, or the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board

One commentator recommended that the title of proposed §301.7216-2(f) be revised to add the word "request" following the word "demand," to align the subsection's title with the regulation's language in §301.7216-2(f)(5). This recommendation was adopted in the final regulation.

One commentator recommended replacing the phrase "professional ethics board" in proposed §301.7216-2(f) with the phrase "certain professional association ethics committees or boards." The commentator noted that this change would avoid confusion as to whether the reference to professional ethics boards means governmental entities that control licensing for CPAs or whether the phrase would include professional associations that have boards or committees that discipline their members, such as the AICPA or state and local bar associations. This recommendation was adopted, in part, by changing the phrase "professional ethics board" to "professional association ethics committee or board." Section 301.7216-2(f)(4)(ii) separately addresses disclosures to government entities charged with licensing, registration, or regulation of tax return preparers.

One commentator recommended permitting disclosure of tax return information without taxpayer consent pursuant to disclosures required by Federal or State laws and administrative rules, but did not identify any specific rule or law that required a disclosure in circumstances contrary to either the preexisting regulations or the proposed regulations. Preexisting regulations already permitted disclosures pursuant to an order of a court or a Federal or State agency. These final regulations permit disclosures pursuant to an order of a court or an administrative order, demand, summons or subpoena that is issued in the performance of its duties by a Federal or State agency, the United States Congress, a professional association ethics committee or board, or the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. The protections offered by limiting disclosures to responses to specific governmental or quasi-governmental requests provide appropriate protection for taxpayer privacy.

One commentator expressed concern about proposed §301.7216-2(f)(5) and the safeguarding of tax return information received by a professional association board or committee conducting an ethics investigation. The commentator recommended revising §301.7216-2(f)(5) to expressly prohibit professional associations from publishing as part of any resulting professional disciplinary determination the tax return information of a taxpayer furnished to them during an ethics investigation of a preparer unless the taxpayer provides consent. This recommendation was not adopted because section 7216 does not provide for penalties against third parties who receive tax return information in this context.

One commentator recommended rewording proposed §301.7216-2(f)(6) to provide the following: "A written request from the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) in connection with an inspection under section 104 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. 7214, or an investigation under section 105 of such Act, 15 U.S. 7215, for use in accordance with such Act." The commentator noted that this wording describes more clearly the situations in which disclosures to the PCAOB are permitted, and to permit registered firms and their associated persons to comply with their disclosure obligations under the Act. This recommendation was adopted.

One commentator expressed concern that permitting the disclosure of tax return information pursuant to a subpoena issued by the United States Congress is inconsistent with the rules regarding disclosures by the IRS to Congress under section 6103(f). The commentator stated that the regulations may provide a method to avoid the specific disclosure rules of section 6103(f), which are designed to protect taxpayers and prevent Congressional abuse of returns or return information. Another commentator recommended eliminating the term "demand" in §301.7216-2(f)(4)(i) because the commentator believes the term is too broad and could permit any Federal agency to simply ask for tax return information even if the agency does not have authority to issue "formal legal orders" compelling the disclosure. These recommendations were not adopted. Both Congress and Federal agencies are presumed to act in accordance with the law and there are other limitations on their abilities to seek tax return information.



F. Disclosure for use in securing legal advice, Treasury investigations, or court proceedings.

Final section 301.7216-2(g) has been revised to confirm that a tax return preparer may disclose tax return information to an attorney for purposes of the preparer securing legal advice.



G. Tax return preparers working for the same firm.

Section 301.7216-2(h)(1)(ii) provides that a tax return preparer's law or accounting firm does not include any related or affiliated firms. Some commentators expressed concern that this rule reduces the application of the §301.7216-2 exceptions for tax return preparers that are structured as separate legal entities, but are closely related. One commentator recommended that the regulations be revised to provide that the "same firm" standard be determined in a manner similar to the rules for qualified employee plans for a single employer. This recommendation was not adopted. Taxpayers should have a clear understanding with whom they are dealing. Adopting this recommendation would require that a taxpayer understand complex rules about which separate legal entities are part of the "same firm" as their tax return preparer to be able to understand who might receive their tax return information. Additionally, a tax return preparer has the ability to obtain consent from a taxpayer to disclose tax return information to a related or affiliated firm.



H. Disclosure or use of tax return information in preparation for audit.

One commentator recommended that a tax return preparer should be permitted to disclose tax return information to another tax return preparer so that the second tax return preparer can provide assistance in connection with the audit of a return under the law of any State or political subdivision thereof, the District of Columbia, or any territory or possession of the United States. This comment was not adopted because §301.7216-2(k) already permits such disclosures.



I. Payment for tax preparation services.

Section 301.7216-2(l) provides that a tax return preparer may disclose and use, without the taxpayer's written consent, tax return information that the taxpayer provides to the tax return preparer to pay for tax preparation services to the extent necessary to process the payment. One commentator recommended applying this rule to the collection of payments. This recommendation was adopted. The exception under §301.7216-2(l) for the collection of payments is subject to the same limitations as the rule for processing payments. Only tax return information that the taxpayer provided to the tax return preparer to pay for tax return preparation services may be used to collect payment. This limitation precludes tax return preparers from using any other tax return information to collect on delinquent payments.



J. Lists for solicitation of tax return business.

Section 301.7216-2(n) of the proposed regulations provides that a tax return preparer may compile and maintain a separate list containing solely the names, addresses, e-mail addresses, and phone numbers of taxpayers whose tax returns the tax return preparer has prepared or processed. The proposed regulations also state that this list may be used by the compiler solely to contact the taxpayers on the list for the purpose of offering tax information or additional tax return preparation services. One commentator recommended adding that no mention of services or products other than those related to tax preparation services may be made. Treasury and the IRS agree that the prohibition on using the list to solicit business other than tax return preparation services could be strengthened, and have modified §301.7216-2(n) to address the commentator's concern.



K. Producing statistical information in connection with tax return preparation business.

Section 301.7216-2(o) of the proposed regulations permits a tax return preparer to use tax return information to prepare anonymous statistical compilations for limited purposes related to management or support of the tax return preparer's business. Two commentators recommended that the disclosure or use of tax return information in statistical compilations should be limited to "internal management" because "support" might be read to allow a tax return preparer to target specific customers with advertising. This recommendation was not adopted because §301.7216-2(o) specifically prohibits the disclosure or use of statistical compilations in connection with, or in support of, businesses other than tax return preparation, and use of lists to solicit additional tax return preparation business is specifically governed, and limited, by §301.7216-2(n).

One commentator recommended that statistical compilations of tax return information that do not identify taxpayers should not be considered "tax return information" for purposes of section 7216. The commentator stated that if statistical information is treated as "tax return information," such a rule could prevent tax return preparers (especially tax return preparers that are publicly traded) from reporting essential data to financial regulators or to market participants to provide an accurate picture of the tax return preparer's performance and financial condition. In response to the concern raised by the commentator, the final regulation was modified to provide that the compiler of the statistical compilation may not disclose the compilation, or any part thereof, to any other person unless the disclosure of the statistical compilation is made in order to comply with financial accounting or regulatory reporting requirements or occurs in conjunction with the sale or other disposition of the compiler's tax return preparation business.

One commentator recommended that tax return preparers located within the same firm should be permitted, without obtaining consent, to use tax return information for "the management, support or maintenance of the tax return preparer's business." This recommendation was not adopted. Because the regulations already permit a tax return preparer to use tax return information to prepare statistical compilations for limited purposes related to management or support of the tax return preparer's business, it is unclear how the commentator's recommendation would further aid in the management or support of a tax return preparer's business.

One commentator recommended that the regulations require that "taxpayer identifying" data, such as names and social security numbers, be redacted from statistical information. This recommendation was not adopted. The regulations already require that statistical compilations must be "anonymous."



L. Quality or peer reviews.

Section 301.7216-2(p) of the proposed regulations provides that a quality or peer review may be conducted only by attorneys, certified public accountants, enrolled agents, and enrolled actuaries who are eligible to practice before the Internal Revenue Service. Some commentators recommended that this subsection of the proposed regulations should be revised to permit other professionals to participate in quality or peer reviews. This recommendation was not adopted. The restriction helps to prevent unauthorized disclosures of tax return information by limiting participation in such reviews to those persons subject to Circular 230, 31 C.F.R. Part 10.



M. Extraction of tax return information within software only for the purposes of reducing repetitive data entry.

One commentator recommended that the use of computer software designed to assist with the preparation of an income tax return should be allowed without consent to "extract" certain tax return information once entered, such as the taxpayer's name and address, and reprint such information in required fields on the same return in order to eliminate repetitive data entry. This comment was not adopted because the regulations do not prohibit such a use of tax return information where the information is being used for the permitted purpose of preparing the taxpayer's tax return.



4. Proposed §301.7216-3: Disclosures and Uses Authorized by Taxpayer Consent.



A. Consent to disclose tax return information.

Some commentators expressed concern that the proposed regulations authorize the IRS to make available for sale to third parties its internal records and data containing tax return information. This concern reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the proposed regulations. The proposed regulations do not address any disclosure of tax return information by the IRS; the proposed regulations address only the disclosure and use of tax return information by tax return preparers. Separate laws, including section 6103, strictly protect the confidentiality of returns and return information in the hands of IRS employees and others.

Some commentators expressed concern that the proposed regulations would loosen the current rules regarding a tax return preparer's ability to disclose a client's tax return information. This concern is based on a misunderstanding of the purpose and content of the proposed and preexisting regulations. Section 301.7216-3(a)(1) of the proposed regulations provides that, unless section 7216 or §301.7216-2 authorizes the disclosure of tax return information, a tax return preparer may not disclose a taxpayer's tax return information prior to obtaining consent from the taxpayer. Since 1974, section 301.7216-3(a)(2) has provided that, "[i]f a tax return preparer has obtained from a taxpayer a consent ..., he may disclose the tax return information of such taxpayer to such third persons as the taxpayer may direct." Thus, the proposed regulations contained the same substantive rule that has been in place for over 30 years. Throughout the long-standing existence of former §301.7216-3(a)(2), there has been no objection to the provision that allowed taxpayers to provide informed consent to tax return preparers disclosing tax return information to third parties.

Nonetheless, commentators criticized the proposed rule, stating that it could allow tax return preparers to induce clients into providing unknowing or inadvertent consents to sell or otherwise disclose tax return information. Furthermore, they argue that disclosure to third parties could result in identity theft. Thus, one solution these commentators recommend is to prohibit taxpayers from ever consenting to the disclosure of their tax return information.

The Treasury Department and IRS did not adopt the commentators' recommendation. Rather, the final regulations retain the general rule that has been in place for more than 30 years recognizing that taxpayers should have control over their own tax return information and that taxpayers should, with appropriate limits and safeguards, be able to direct tax return preparers to disclose tax return information as taxpayers see fit. This rule parallels the statutory rule in section 6103(c) that allows taxpayers to consent to the IRS disclosing returns or return information to third parties of the taxpayer's choosing.

In addition, this rule is consistent with the privacy protection regime in the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), Public Law 104-191 (110 Stat. 1936). HIPAA permits health care providers and health plans to disclose information about health status, provision of health care, or payment to a third-party if they have obtained authorization from the individual patient.

While identity theft is a significant concern, Treasury and the IRS do not believe a generalized concern regarding the potential for criminal activity by third parties should preclude taxpayers from being able to direct the disclosure of tax return information to third parties for legitimate reasons of the taxpayer's own choosing, particularly in the absence of any evidence that disclosure of tax return information by tax return preparers has been a source of identity theft problems.

While the idea of a complete prohibition on consent to disclosure was rejected, Treasury and the IRS did revise §301.7216-3(b)(5), based on several factors. These factors include: 1) the fact that it is not necessary for tax return preparers to disclose certain taxpayer identifying information to other tax return preparers who are assisting them in preparing a return; 2) the important role a social security number (SSN) plays in the tax administration process, and the heightened potential for misuse when an SSN is readily associated with confidential information, such as tax return information; and 3) the heightened concern about the theft of an individual's confidential information resulting from disclosures outside the United States. Section 301.7216-3(b)(4) now provides that a tax return preparer located within the United States, including any territory or possession of the United States, may not obtain consent to disclose a taxpayer's SSN to a tax return preparer located outside of the United States or any territory or possession of the United States. Thus, if a tax return preparer located within the United States obtains consent from a taxpayer to disclose tax return information to another tax return preparer located outside of the United States, as provided under §§301.7216-2(c) and 301.7216-2(d), the tax return preparer located in the United States may not disclose the taxpayer's SSN, and the tax return preparer must redact or otherwise mask the taxpayer's SSN before the tax return information is disclosed outside of the United States. If a tax return preparer located within the United States initially receives or obtains a taxpayer's SSN from another tax return preparer located outside of the United States, however, the tax return preparer within the United States may, without consent, retransmit the taxpayer's SSN to the tax return preparer located outside the United States that initially provided the SSN to the tax return preparer located within the United States. Where a taxpayer-client requests that a tax return preparer within the United States transfer the return preparation engagement to a tax return preparer located outside the United States, the preparer must still redact or otherwise mask the taxpayer's SSN before the information is disclosed and, in this situation, it will be incumbent upon the taxpayer to provide the SSN directly to the tax return preparer located abroad.

Some commentators recommended that the regulations provide taxpayers with the ability to informally initiate a request for the disclosure of tax return information from their tax return preparers without formally following the consent rules of §301.7216-3. This recommendation was not adopted. As a practical matter, it would be difficult to distinguish when a taxpayer informally initiates a request for the disclosure of tax return information and when tax return preparers merely claim that a taxpayer initiated the request for disclosure. Additionally, tax return preparers are always free to provide taxpayers their own returns and taxpayers may disclose tax return information to others directly.

Other commentators recommended that the regulations should prohibit disclosure to third-party solicitors and not allow taxpayers to consent to disclosures for the purpose of receiving solicitations because the risks to the taxpayer of providing consent inadvertently are too great in comparison to the benefit of receiving solicitations from third parties. This recommendation was not adopted because it denies taxpayers the ability to control and direct the disclosure of their own tax return information. If taxpayers do not wish to receive offers or solicitations from third parties, they can simply refuse to provide the consent needed for third parties to receive their tax return information. If a tax return preparer obtains written consent under circumstances that make the consent unknowing or uninformed, the consent would be invalid under the requirements of the regulations.



B. Consent to use of tax return information.

Section 301.7216-3 of the preexisting regulations provides that a consent to use tax return information does not apply for purposes of facilitating the solicitation of the taxpayer's use of any services or facilities furnished by a person other than the tax return preparer, unless the other person and the tax return preparer are members of the same affiliated group of corporations within the meaning of section 1504. The proposed regulations removed this "affiliated group" limitation because the affiliated group concept has little application in the context of modern return preparation businesses. The proposed regulations also reflected a determination by the IRS and Treasury Department that a taxpayer's ability to consent to a preparer's use of tax return information to solicit additional business should not be limited by arbitrary factors largely beyond the taxpayer's knowledge or control, such as the size, diversity, or organizational structure of the tax return preparer. Some commentators expressed concern that removal of the "affiliated group" limitation would make it easier for tax return preparers to disclose tax return information to third parties for marketing purposes. This comment reflects a misunderstanding of the nature of a consent governing a tax return preparer's use of tax return information. Use consents are limited to what a tax return preparer can do with tax return information in the tax return preparer's own hands; use consents cannot be used in connection with disclosures to third parties. Thus, identity theft or other abuses by third parties could not arise from taxpayers providing use consents to tax return preparers.

Further, prohibiting the commercial use of tax return information outright would result in no longer allowing legitimate uses of tax return information that have evolved over time as standard commercial practices. For example, tax return preparers could not use tax return information to advise taxpayers of strategies that may positively affect the taxpayers' finances such as individual retirement accounts or qualified tuition programs, or of the taxpayers' eligibility to participate in government benefit programs, such as food stamps.



C. Prohibit tax return preparers from disclosing tax return information for any reason unrelated to the preparation of a tax return.

Many commentators recommended prohibiting tax return preparers from disclosing tax return information for any purpose unrelated to the preparation of tax returns. This recommendation was not adopted because there are many legitimate purposes for the disclosure of tax return information identified in §301.7216-2, such as the disclosure of tax return information for the reporting of a crime or for an ethics investigation. Similarly, there are legitimate purposes, other than tax return preparation, when a taxpayer would choose to consent to the tax return preparer's disclosure of tax return information.

As an alternative, some commentators recommended that the regulations prohibit or greatly restrict the use or disclosure of tax return information for marketing purposes. They specifically recommended banning tax return preparers from disclosing tax return information in association with taxpayers seeking refund anticipation loans (RALs) and similar products. Treasury and the IRS did not adopt this recommendation because it was not contained in the proposed regulations and could have a significant impact on existing business practices. Concurrently with the publication of these final regulations, however, Treasury and the IRS are requesting comments on a proposed rule that, if ultimately adopted as final, would prohibit tax return preparers from using or disclosing tax return information for the purpose of soliciting, or the taxpayer obtaining, a RAL or certain other products.

Commentators also recommended that disclosure of tax return information by tax return preparers should be conditioned upon the existence of an agreement by third parties receiving the information that the tax return information will not be used for any purpose other than the purpose for which the information was provided. This recommendation was not adopted because policing agreements by third parties is outside the scope of section 7216. Section 7216 governs only the actions of tax return preparers.



D. Obtaining consent through engagement letters.

Some commentators recommended that when the regulations require consent to disclose or use tax return information, tax return preparers should be permitted to obtain such consent from "large taxpayers," such as large corporations, through an engagement letter. These commentators observed that it is ordinary business practice for tax return preparers and large taxpayers to negotiate and set the terms of the provision of services, including the preparation of income tax returns, in an engagement letter. This recommendation was adopted. Treasury and the IRS agree that requiring multiple, separate consents would impose a significant burden and could frustrate these taxpayers' ability to comply with tax laws and other regulatory and reporting requirements. Section 301.7216-3(a)(3) has been modified to provide a set of requirements regarding the format and content of consents to disclose and use tax return information with respect to taxpayers filing income tax returns in the Form 1040 series, e.g., Form 1040, Form 1040NR, Form 1040A, or Form 1040EZ, and a separate set of requirements regarding the format and content of consents to disclose and use tax return information with respect to taxpayers filing all other tax returns. Under §301.7216-3(a)(3)(iii), for tax return preparers providing tax return preparation services to taxpayers who do not file an income tax return in the Form 1040 series, a consent to use or a consent to disclose may be in any format, including an engagement letter to a client, as long as the consent complies with the requirements of §301.7216-3(a)(3)(i).



E. Conditioning services on consent.

Section 301.7216-3(a)(1) provides that a consent to use or disclose tax return information must be knowing and voluntary. Section 301.7216-3(a)(1) has been modified to clarify that to condition the provision of services on the taxpayer's consent will make the consent involuntary and invalid unless §301.7216-3(a)(2) applies.

Section 301.7216-3(a)(2) provides that a tax return preparer may condition its provision of preparation services upon a taxpayer's consenting to disclosure of the taxpayer's tax return information to another tax return preparer for the purpose of performing services that assist in the preparation of, or provide auxiliary services in connection with the preparation of, the tax return of the taxpayer. One commentator requested a clarification regarding whether a tax return preparer with offices within and outside of the United States is permitted to condition its provision of tax preparation services to a taxpayer outside of the United States on the taxpayer consenting to disclosure. The final regulations permit a tax return preparer with offices within and outside of the United States to condition its provision of tax preparation services to a taxpayer on the taxpayer's consenting to disclosure to a return preparer located outside the United States. An example was added to the final regulations to clarify this rule.

Other commentators recommended that the regulations should prohibit tax return preparers from conditioning the provision of any services upon consent. This recommendation was adopted by inserting the word "any" before "services" in §301.7216-3(a)(1), to which §301.7216-3(a)(2) provides the only exception.



F. Requests to consent after completed tax return provided to taxpayer.

Proposed section 301.7216-3(b)(2) provides that a tax return preparer may not request a taxpayer's consent to disclose or use tax return information after the tax return preparer provides a completed tax return to the taxpayer for signature. Commentators suggested that there may be legitimate circumstances where a request to consent is necessary in light of taxpayer preferences and is part of client service provided by the preparer. Specifically, the commentators gave the example of a taxpayer requesting that his or her tax return preparer disclose the past three years of the taxpayer's tax returns to his or her attorney for purposes of preparing the client's estate plan. Under the proposed regulation, a request for consent to disclose would be untimely in this situation, even though the taxpayer requests the disclosure as part of the client service provided by the tax return preparer. As indicated by the provisions regarding solicitation of other business that were included in the previous final regulations, the Treasury Department and IRS believe that taxpayers should not be the subject of repetitive solicitation requests for business made by tax return preparers after the tax preparation engagement has ended. Consistent with previous final regulations, the final regulation in section 301.7216-3(b)(2) has been modified to state that a tax return preparer may not request a taxpayer's consent to disclose or use tax return information for purposes of solicitation of business unrelated to tax return preparation after the tax return preparer provides a completed tax return to the taxpayer for signature. Under the final regulations, the preparer would not be precluded from requesting consent to disclose the past three years of the taxpayer's tax returns to his or her attorney for purposes of preparing the client's estate plan according to the example provided by commentators.



G. Prohibition on multiple requests for consent.

Proposed section 301.7216-3(b)(3) provides that if a taxpayer declines to provide consent to a disclosure or use of tax return information, a tax return preparer cannot make another request for consent. Some commentators recommended that the regulations permit a tax return preparer to clarify the purpose and extent of the consent if necessary after the taxpayer declines to provide consent, and that such a clarification should not be treated as a second request by the tax return preparer to obtain a consent. Another commentator stated that tax return preparers should be permitted to request consent whenever they wish so long as the consent properly describes the nature of, and reasons for, potential disclosures or uses. The commentators' recommendations were based upon the recognition that there may be legitimate reasons for the preparer to more thoroughly explain the request for consent and how the consent relates to the tax preparation engagement. However, Treasury and the IRS are concerned that lack of restrictions regarding multiple requests for consent regarding the same or similar request may cause undue pressure to consent where there are repetitious requests. In light of these concerns, section 301.7216-3(b)(3) has been modified to provide that, for purposes unrelated to a tax preparation engagement, if a taxpayer declines a request for consent to the disclosure or use of tax return information, the tax return preparer may not solicit from the taxpayer another consent for a purpose substantially similar to that of the rejected request. Under this rule, there is no prohibition regarding the taxpayer independently asking the tax return preparer about a disclosure or use of the taxpayer's same tax return information after a declined consent request.



H. Multiple disclosures or multiple uses within a single consent form.

Section 301.7216-3(c)(1) of the proposed regulations provides that a taxpayer may consent to multiple disclosures within the same written document, or multiple uses within the same written document. One commentator recommended permitting taxpayers to consent to multiple disclosures and multiple uses with the same form. Another commentator recommended prohibiting a taxpayer from consenting to multiple disclosures within the same written document, or multiple uses within the same written document, in order to avoid potential taxpayer confusion. These recommendations were not adopted.

The proposed rule was intended to emphasize that disclosure and use are two distinct concepts, and a taxpayer may consider consenting to one and not the other. The comments to the proposed regulations demonstrated that there is potential for confusion regarding the distinction between disclosure and use. Treasury and the IRS believe it is appropriate to require separate consents in situations where there is a probability that the taxpayer could become confused over the distinction between use and disclosure. Section 301-7216-3(c)(1) of the final regulations provides that for taxpayers who are filers of returns in the Form 1040 series, the proposed rule is retained. The rule requiring separate consents is limited to individuals because use or disclosure of that tax return information involves situations where confusion is most likely to occur.



I. Disclosure of all information contained within a return.

Section 301.7216-3(c)(2) of the proposed regulations provides that a consent authorizing the disclosure of all information contained within a return must set forth an explanation of the reason why a consent authorizing a more limited disclosure of tax return information is unsatisfactory for the purpose of the consent. Some commentators characterized this requirement as burdensome in certain situations and recommended eliminating this requirement. Commentators reasoned that a third party service provider, such as the taxpayer's attorney, may request a copy of the return and the requirement to provide an explanation would interject the preparer between the requirements imposed by the third party service provider and the taxpayer. In light of these concerns, section 301.7216-3(c)(2) of the final regulations modifies this provision to provide that where a consent authorizes the disclosure of a copy of the taxpayer's tax return or all information contained within a return, the consent must provide that the taxpayer has the ability to request a more limited disclosure of tax return information as the taxpayer may direct.

Some commentators concerned with marketing of tax return information recommended that disclosure of the entire tax return should not be permitted under any circumstances. The commentators' rationale was that disclosure of the entire return is never necessary for marketing purposes. This recommendation was not adopted because, in general, taxpayers should have control over their own tax return information and they should be able to direct tax return preparers to disclose tax return information as the taxpayers see fit.



J. Duration of consent.

Section 301.7216-3(b)(5) of the proposed regulations provides that no consent to the disclosure or use of tax return information may be effective for a period longer than one year from the date the taxpayer signed the consent. Some commentators expressed concern that the duration of consent may need to be effective for a period greater than one year. One commentator observed that when preparing expatriate tax returns, there may be circumstances when the due date for a foreign tax return or other related document is more than one year after the taxpayer signs the consent. Some commentators recommended that taxpayers should be permitted to establish the duration of consent, and the one-year period should apply only if the taxpayer fails to specify a different duration of consent. This recommendation was adopted in the final regulations.



K. Consents read aloud.

Some commentators recommended that §301.7216-3 require that consents be read aloud by audio output. This recommendation was not adopted. This recommendation would impose a burdensome rule that is outside the norm of standard practices for obtaining consent.



5. General Comments.

Several commentators recommended rejecting all of the provisions of the proposed regulations under section 7216. The recommendations to reject the proposed regulations were not adopted. The proposed regulations were finalized to provide updates relating to uses and disclosures of tax return information in the electronic return preparation context and create an environment that allows taxpayers to make informed decisions regarding the disclosure or use of their tax return information.



Effect on Other Documents

The following publication is obsolete on or after January 1, 2009: Rev. Rul. 79-114, 1979-1 C.B. 441 (1979).



Special Analyses

It has been determined that this Treasury decision is not a significant regulatory action as defined in Executive Order 12866. Therefore, a regulatory assessment is not required. It also has been determined that section 553(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. chapter 5) does not apply to these regulations, and, because these regulations do not impose a collection of information on small entities, the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. chapter 6) does not apply. Pursuant to section 7805(f), the notice of proposed rulemaking preceding these regulations was submitted to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration for comment on its impact on small business.



Drafting Information

The principal author of these regulations is Dillon Taylor, formerly of the Office of the Associate Chief Counsel (Procedure and Administration). For further information regarding these regulations contact Lawrence Mack of the Office of the Associate Chief Counsel (Procedure and Administration) at 202-622-4940 (not a toll-free call).




List of Subjects in 26 CFR Part 301

Employment taxes, Estate taxes, Excise taxes, Gift taxes, Income taxes, Penalties, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.



Amendment to the Regulations

Accordingly, 26 CFR part 301 is amended as follows:



PART 301 --PROCEDURE AND ADMINISTRATION

Paragraph 1. The authority citation for part 301 continues to read, in part, as follows:

Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805 * * *

Par. 2. Section 301.7216-0 is added to read as follows:



§301.7216-0 Table of contents.

This section lists captions contained in §§301.7216-1 through 301.7216-3.



§301.7216-1 Penalty for disclosure or use of tax return information.

(a) In general.

(b) Definitions.

(c) Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.

(d) Effective date.



§301.7216-2 Permissible disclosures or uses without consent of the taxpayer.

(a) Disclosure pursuant to other provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.

(b) Disclosures to the IRS.

(c) Disclosures or uses for preparation of a taxpayer's return.

(d) Disclosures to other tax return preparers.

(e) Disclosure or use of information in the case of related taxpayers.

(f) Disclosure pursuant to an order of a court, or an administrative order, demand, request, summons or subpoena which is issued in the performance of its duties by a Federal or State agency, the United States Congress, a professional association ethics committee or board, or the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board.

(g) Disclosure for use in securing legal advice, Treasury investigations or court proceedings.

(h) Certain disclosures by attorneys and accountants.

(i) Corporate fiduciaries.

(j) Disclosure to taxpayer's fiduciary.

(k) Disclosure or use of information in preparation or audit of State or local tax returns or assisting a taxpayer with foreign country tax obligations.

(l) Payment for tax preparation services.

(m) Retention of records.

(n) Lists for solicitation of tax return business.

(o) Producing statistical information in connection with tax return preparation business.

(p) Disclosure or use of information for quality or peer reviews.

(q) Disclosure to report the commission of a crime.

(r) Disclosure of tax return information due to a tax return preparer's incapacity or death.

(s) Effective date.



§301.7216-3 Disclosure or use permitted only with the taxpayer's consent.

(a) In general.

(b) Timing requirements and limitations.

(c) Special rules.

(d) Effective date.

Par. 3. Section 301.7216-1 is revised to read as follows:



§301.7216-1 Penalty for disclosure or use of tax return information.

(a) In general. Section 7216(a) prescribes a criminal penalty for tax return preparers who knowingly or recklessly disclose or use tax return information for a purpose other than preparing a tax return. A violation of section 7216 is a misdemeanor, with a maximum penalty of up to one year imprisonment or a fine of not more than $1,000, or both, together with the costs of prosecution. Section 7216(b) establishes exceptions to the general rule in section 7216(a) prohibiting disclosure and use. Section 7216(b) also authorizes the Secretary to promulgate regulations prescribing additional permitted disclosures and uses. Section 6713(a) prescribes a related civil penalty for disclosures and uses that constitute a violation of section 7216. The penalty for violating section 6713 is $250 for each prohibited disclosure or use, not to exceed a total of $10,000 for a calendar year. Section 6713(b) provides that the exceptions in section 7216(b) also apply to section 6713. Under section 7216(b), the provisions of section 7216(a) will not apply to any disclosure or use permitted under regulations prescribed by the Secretary.

(b) Definitions. For purposes of section 7216 and §§301.7216-1 through 301.7216-3:

(1) Tax return. The term tax return means any return (or amended return) of income tax imposed by chapter 1 of the Internal Revenue Code.

(2) Tax return preparer- -(i) In general. The term tax return preparer means:

(A) Any person who is engaged in the business of preparing or assisting in preparing tax returns;

(B) Any person who is engaged in the business of providing auxiliary services in connection with the preparation of tax returns, including a person who develops software that is used to prepare or file a tax return and any Authorized IRS e-file Provider;

(C) Any person who is otherwise compensated for preparing, or assisting in preparing, a tax return for any other person; or

(D) Any individual who, as part of their duties of employment with any person described in paragraph (b)(2)(i)(A), (B), or (C) of this section performs services that assist in the preparation of, or assist in providing auxiliary services in connection with the preparation of, a tax return.

(ii) Business of preparing returns. A person is engaged in the business of preparing tax returns as described in paragraph (b)(2)(i)(A) of this section if, in the course of the person's business, the person holds himself out to tax return preparers or taxpayers as a person who prepares tax returns or assists in preparing tax returns, whether or not tax return preparation is the person's sole business activity and whether or not the person charges a fee for tax return preparation services.

(iii) Providing auxiliary services. A person is engaged in the business of providing auxiliary services in connection with the preparation of tax returns as described in paragraph (b)(2)(i)(B) of this section if, in the course of the person's business, the person holds himself out to tax return preparers or to taxpayers as a person who performs auxiliary services, whether or not providing the auxiliary services is the person's sole business activity and whether or not the person charges a fee for the auxiliary services. Likewise, a person is engaged in the business of providing auxiliary services if, in the course of the person's business, the person receives a taxpayer's tax return information from another tax return preparer pursuant to the provisions of §301.7216-2(d)(2).

(iv) Otherwise compensated. A tax return preparer described in paragraph (b)(2)(i)(C) of this section includes any person who- -

(A) Is compensated for preparing a tax return for another person, but not in the course of a business; or

(B) Is compensated for helping, on a casual basis, a relative, friend, or other acquaintance to prepare their tax return.

(v) Exclusions. A person is not a tax return preparer merely because he leases office space to a tax return preparer, furnishes credit to a taxpayer whose tax return is prepared by a tax return preparer, furnishes information to a tax return preparer at the taxpayer's request, furnishes access (free or otherwise) to a separate person's tax return preparation website through a hyperlink on his own website, or otherwise performs some service that only incidentally relates to the preparation of tax returns.

(vi) Examples. The application of §301.7216-1(b)(2) may be illustrated by the following examples:

Example 1. Bank B is a tax return preparer within the meaning of paragraph (b)(2)(i)(A) of this section, and an Authorized IRS e-file Provider. B employs one individual, Q, to solicit the necessary tax return information for the preparation of a tax return; another individual, R, to prepare the return on the basis of the information that is furnished; a secretary, S, who types the information on the returns into a computer; and an administrative assistant, T, who uses a computer to file electronic versions of the tax returns. Under these circumstances, only R is a tax return preparer for purposes of section 7701(a)(36), but all four employees are tax return preparers for purposes of section 7216, as provided in paragraph (b) of this section.

Example 2. Tax return preparer P contracts with department store D to rent space in D's store: D advertises that taxpayers who use P's services may charge the cost of having their tax return prepared to their charge account with D. Under these circumstances, D is not a tax return preparer because it provides space, credit, and services only incidentally related to the preparation of tax returns.

(3) Tax return information- -(i) In general. The term tax return information means any information, including, but not limited to, a taxpayer's name, address, or identifying number, which is furnished in any form or manner for, or in connection with, the preparation of a tax return of the taxpayer. This information includes information that the taxpayer furnishes to a tax return preparer and information furnished to the tax return preparer by a third party. Tax return information also includes information the tax return preparer derives or generates from tax return information in connection with the preparation of a taxpayer's return.

(A) Tax return information can be provided directly by the taxpayer or by another person. Likewise, tax return information includes information received by the tax return preparer from the IRS in connection with the processing of such return, including an acknowledgment of acceptance or notice of rejection of an electronically filed return.

(B) Tax return information includes statistical compilations of tax return information, even in a form that cannot be associated with, or otherwise identify, directly or indirectly, a particular taxpayer. See §301.7216-2(o) for limited use of tax return information to make statistical compilations without taxpayer consent and to use the statistical compilations for limited purposes.

(C) Tax return information does not include information identical to any tax return information that has been furnished to a tax return preparer if the identical information was obtained otherwise than in connection with the preparation of a tax return.

(D) Information is considered "in connection with tax return preparation," and therefore tax return information, if the taxpayer would not have furnished the information to the tax return preparer but for the intention to engage, or the engagement of, the tax return preparer to prepare the tax return.

(ii) Examples. The application of this paragraph (b)(3) may be illustrated by the following examples:

Example 1. Taxpayer A purchases computer software designed to assist with the preparation and filing of her income tax return. When A loads the software onto her computer, it prompts her to register her purchase of the software. In this situation, the software provider is a tax return preparer under paragraph (b)(2)(i)(B) of this section and the information that A provides to register her purchase is tax return information because she is providing it in connection with the preparation of a tax return.

Example 2. Corporation A is a brokerage firm that maintains a website through which its clients may access their accounts, trade stocks, and generally conduct a variety of financial activities. Through its website, A offers its clients free access to its own tax preparation software. Taxpayer B is a client of A and has furnished A his name, address, and other information when registering for use of A's website to use A's brokerage services. In addition, A has a record of B's brokerage account activity, including sales of stock, dividends paid, and IRA contributions made. B uses A's tax preparation software to prepare his tax return. The software populates some fields on B's return on the basis of information A already maintains in its databases. A is a tax return preparer within the meaning of paragraph (b)(2)(i)(B) of this section because it has prepared and provided software for use in preparing tax returns. The information in A's databases that the software accesses to populate B's return, i.e., the registration information and brokerage account activity, is not tax return information because A did not receive that information in connection with the preparation of a tax return. Once A uses the information to populate the return, however, the information associated with the return becomes tax return information. If A retains the information in a form in which A can identify that the information was used in connection with the preparation of a return, the information in that form is tax return information. If, however, A retains the information in a database in which A cannot identify whether the information was used in connection with the preparation of a return, then that information is not tax return information.

(4) Use --(i) In general. Use of tax return information includes any circumstance in which a tax return preparer refers to, or relies upon, tax return information as the basis to take or permit an action.

(ii) Example. The application of this paragraph (b)(4) may be illustrated by the following example:

Example. Preparer G is a tax return preparer as defined by paragraph (b)(2)(i)(A) of this section. If G determines, upon preparing a return, that the taxpayer is eligible to make a contribution to an individual retirement account (IRA), G will ask whether the taxpayer desires to make a contribution to an IRA. G does not ask about IRAs in cases in which the taxpayer is not eligible to make a contribution. G is using tax return information when it asks whether a taxpayer is interested in making a contribution to an IRA because G is basing the inquiry upon knowledge gained from information that the taxpayer furnished in connection with the preparation of the taxpayer's return.

(5) Disclosure. The term disclosure means the act of making tax return information known to any person in any manner whatever. To the extent that a taxpayer's use of a hyperlink results in the transmission of tax return information, this transmission of tax return information is a disclosure by the tax return preparer subject to penalty under section 7216 if not authorized by regulation.

(6) Hyperlink. For purposes of section 7216, a hyperlink is a device used to transfer an individual using tax preparation software from a tax return preparer's webpage to a webpage operated by another person without the individual having to separately enter the web address of the destination page.

(7) Request for consent. A request for consent includes any effort by a tax return preparer to obtain the taxpayer's consent to use or disclose the taxpayer's tax return information. The act of supplying a taxpayer with a paper or electronic form that meets the requirements of a revenue procedure published pursuant to §301.7216-3(a) is a request for a consent. When a tax return preparer requests a taxpayer's consent, any associated efforts of the tax return preparer, including, but not limited to, verbal or written explanations of the form, are part of the request for consent.

(c) Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. Any applicable requirements of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Public Law 106-102 (113 Stat. 1338), do not supersede, alter, or affect the requirements of section 7216 and §§301.7216-1 through 301.7216-3. Similarly, the requirements of section 7216 and §§301.7216-1 through 301.7216-3 do not override any requirements or restrictions of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, which are in addition to the requirements or restrictions of section 7216 and §§301.7216-1 through 301.7216-3.

(d) Effective/applicability date. This section applies to disclosures or uses of tax return information occurring on or after January 1, 2009.

Par. 4. Section 301.7216-2 is revised to read as follows:



§301.7216-2 Permissible disclosures or uses without consent of the taxpayer.

(a) Disclosure pursuant to other provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. The provisions of section 7216(a) and §301.7216-1 shall not apply to any disclosure of tax return information if the disclosure is made pursuant to any other provision of the Internal Revenue Code or the regulations thereunder.

(b) Disclosures to the IRS. The provisions of section 7216(a) and §301.7216-1 shall not apply to any disclosure of tax return information to an officer or employee of the IRS.

(c) Disclosures or uses for preparation of a taxpayer's return --(1) Updating Taxpayers' Tax Return Preparation Software. If a tax return preparer provides software to a taxpayer that is used in connection with the preparation or filing of a tax return, the tax return preparer may use the taxpayer's tax return information to update the taxpayer's software for the purpose of addressing changes in IRS forms, e-file specifications and administrative, regulatory and legislative guidance or to test and ensure the software's technical capabilities without the taxpayer's consent under §301.7216-3.

(2) Tax return preparers located within the same firm in the United States. If a taxpayer furnishes tax return information to a tax return preparer located within the United States, including any territory or possession of the United States, an officer, employee, or member of a tax return preparer may use the tax return information, or disclose the tax return information to another officer, employee, or member of the same tax return preparer, for the purpose of performing services that assist in the preparation of, or assist in providing auxiliary services in connection with the preparation of, the taxpayer's tax return. If an officer, employee, or member to whom the tax return information is to be disclosed is located outside of the United States or any territory or possession of the United States, the taxpayer's consent under §301.7216-3 prior to any disclosure is required.

(3) Furnishing tax return information to tax return preparers located outside the United States. If a taxpayer initially furnishes tax return information to a tax return preparer located outside of the United States or any territory or possession of the United States, an officer, employee, or member of a tax return preparer may use tax return information, or disclose any tax return information to another officer, employee, or member of the same tax return preparer, for the purpose of performing services that assist in the preparation of, or assist in providing auxiliary services in connection with the preparation of, the tax return of a taxpayer by or for whom the information was furnished without the taxpayer's consent under §301.7216-3.

(4) Examples. The following examples illustrate this paragraph (c):

Example 1. Preparer P provides tax return preparation software to Taxpayer T for T to use in the preparation of its 2009 income tax return. For the 2009 tax year, and using T's tax return information furnished while registering for the software, P would like to update the tax return preparation software that T is using to account for last minute changes made to the tax laws for the 2009 tax year. P is not required to obtain T's consent to update the tax return preparation software. P may perform a software update regardless of whether the software update will affect T's particular return preparation activities.

Example 2. T is a client of Firm, which is a tax return preparer. E, an employee at Firm's State A office, receives tax return information from T for use in preparing T's income tax return. E discloses the tax return information to P, an employee in Firm's State B office; P uses the tax return information to process T's income tax return. Firm is not required to receive T's consent under §301.7216-3 prior to E's disclosure of T's tax return information to P because the tax return information is disclosed to an employee employed by the same tax return preparer located within the United States.

Example 3. Same facts as Example 2 except T's tax return information is disclosed to FE who is located in Firm's Country F office. FE uses the tax return information to process T's income tax return. After processing, FE returns the processed tax return information to E in Firm's State A office. Because FE is outside of the United States, Firm is required to obtain T's consent under §301.7216-3 prior to E's disclosure of T's tax return information to FE.

Example 4. T, Firm's client, is temporarily located in Country F. She initially furnishes her tax return information to employee FE in Firm's Country F office for the purpose of having Firm prepare her U.S. income tax return. FE makes the substantive determinations concerning T's tax liability and forwards T's tax return information to FP, an employee in Firm's Country P office, for the purpose of processing T's tax return information. FP processes the return information and forwards it to Partner at Firm's State A office in the United States for review and delivery to T. Because T initially furnished the tax return information to a tax return preparer outside of the United States, T's prior consent for disclosure or use under §301.7216-3 was not required. An officer, employee, or member of Firm in the United States may use T's tax return information or disclose the tax return information to another officer, employee, or member of Firm without T's prior consent under §301.7216-3 as long as any disclosure or use of T's tax return information is within the United States. Firm is required to receive T's consent under §301.7216-3 prior to any subsequent disclosure of T's tax return information to a tax return preparer located outside of the United States.

(d) Disclosures to other tax return preparers- -(1) Preparer-to-preparer disclosures. Except as limited in paragraph (d)(2) of this section, an officer, employee, or member of a tax return preparer may disclose tax return information of a taxpayer to another tax return preparer (other than an officer, employee, or member of the same tax return preparer) located in the United States (including any territory or possession of the United States) for the purpose of preparing or assisting in preparing a tax return, or obtaining or providing auxiliary services in connection with the preparation of any tax return, so long as the services provided are not substantive determinations or advice affecting the tax liability reported by taxpayers. A substantive determination involves an analysis, interpretation, or application of the law. The authorized disclosures permitted under this paragraph (d)(1) include one tax return preparer disclosing tax return information to another tax return preparer for the purpose of having the second tax return preparer transfer that information to, and compute the tax liability on, a tax return of the taxpayer by means of electronic, mechanical, or other form of tax return processing service. The authorized disclosures permitted under this paragraph (d)(1) also include disclosures by a tax return preparer to an Authorized IRS e-file Provider for the purpose of electronically filing the return with the IRS. Authorized disclosures also include disclosures by a tax return preparer to a second tax return preparer for the purpose of making information concerning the return available to the taxpayer. This would include, for example, whether the return has been accepted or rejected by the IRS, or the status of the taxpayer's refund. Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this section, a tax return preparer may not disclose tax return information to another tax return preparer for the purpose of the second tax return preparer providing substantive determinations without first receiving the taxpayer's consent in accordance with the rules under §301.7216-3.

(2) Disclosures to contractors. A tax return preparer may disclose tax return information to a person under contract with the tax return preparer in connection with the programming, maintenance, repair, testing, or procurement of equipment or software used for purposes of tax return preparation only to the extent necessary for the person to provide the contracted services, and only if the tax return preparer ensures that all individuals who are to receive disclosures of tax return information receive a written notice that informs them of the applicability of sections 6713 and 7216 to them and describes the requirements and penalties of sections 6713 and 7216. Contractors receiving tax return information pursuant to this section are tax return preparers under section 7216 because they are performing auxiliary services in connection with tax return preparation. See §301.7216-1(b)(2)(i)(B) and (D).

(3) Examples. The following examples illustrate this paragraph (d):

Example 1. E, an employee at Firm's State A office, receives tax return information from T for Firm's use in preparing T's income tax return. E makes substantive determinations and forwards the tax return information to P, an employee at Processor; Processor is located in State B. P places the tax return information on the income tax return and furnishes the finished product to E. E is not required to receive T's prior consent under §301.7216-3 before disclosing T's tax return information to P because Processor's services are not substantive determinations and the tax return information remained in the United States at Processor's State B office during the entire course of the tax return preparation process.

Example 2. Firm, a tax return preparer, offers income tax return preparation services. Firm's contract with its software provider, Contractor, requires Firm to periodically randomly select certain taxpayers' tax return information solely for the purpose of testing the reliability of the software sold to Firm. Under its agreement with Contractor, Firm discloses tax return information to Contractor's employee, C, who services Firm's contract without providing Contractor or C with a written notice that describes the requirements of and penalties under sections 7216 and 6713. C uses the tax return information solely for quality assurance purposes. Firm's disclosure of tax return information to C was an impermissible disclosure because Firm failed to ensure that C received a written notice that describes the requirements and penalties of sections 7216 and 6713.

Example 3. E, an employee of Firm in State A in the United States, receives tax return information from T for use in preparing T's income tax return. After E enters T's tax return information into Firm's computer, that information is stored on a computer server that is physically located in State A. Firm contracts with Contractor, located in Country F, to prepare its clients' tax returns. FE, an employee of Contractor, uses a computer in Country F and inputs a password to view T's income tax information stored on the computer server in State A to prepare T's tax return. A computer program permits FE to view T's tax return information, but prohibits FE from downloading or printing out T's tax return information from the computer server. Because Firm is disclosing T's tax return information outside of the United States, Firm is required to obtain T's consent under §301.7216-3 prior to the disclosure to FE. As provided in §301.7216-3(b)(5), however, Firm may not obtain consent to disclose T's social security number (SSN) to a tax return preparer located outside of the United States or any territory or possession of the United States.

Example 4. A, an employee at Firm A, receives tax return information from T for Firm's use in preparing T's income tax return. A forwards the tax return information to B, an employee at another firm, Firm B, to obtain advice on the issue of whether T may claim a deduction for a certain business expense. A is required to receive T's prior consent under §301.7216-3 before disclosing T's tax return information to B because B's services involve a substantive determination affecting the tax liability that T will report.

(e) Disclosure or use of information in the case of related taxpayers. (1) In preparing a tax return of a second taxpayer, a tax return preparer may use, and may disclose to the second taxpayer in the form in which it appears on the return, any tax return information that the tax return preparer obtained from a first taxpayer if --

(i) The second taxpayer is related to the first taxpayer within the meaning of paragraph (e)(2) of this section;

(ii) The first taxpayer's tax interest in the information is not adverse to the second taxpayer's tax interest in the information; and

(iii) The first taxpayer has not expressly prohibited the disclosure or use.

(2) For purposes of paragraph (e)(1)(i) of this section, a taxpayer is related to another taxpayer if they have any one of the following relationships: husband and wife, child and parent, grandchild and grandparent, partner and partnership, trust or estate and beneficiary, trust or estate and fiduciary, corporation and shareholder, or members of a controlled group of corporations as defined in section 1563.

(3) See §301.7216-3 for disclosure or use of tax return information of the taxpayer in preparing the tax return of a second taxpayer when the requirements of this paragraph are not satisfied.

(f) Disclosure pursuant to an order of a court, or an administrative order, demand, request, summons or subpoena which is issued in the performance of its duties by a Federal or State agency, the United States Congress, a professional association ethics committee or board, or the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. The provisions of section 7216(a) and §301.7216-1 will not apply to any disclosure of tax return information if the disclosure is made pursuant to any one of the following documents:
(1) The order of any court of record, Federal, State, or local.

(2) A subpoena issued by a grand jury, Federal or State.

(3) A subpoena issued by the United States Congress.

(4) An administrative order, demand, summons or subpoena that is issued in the performance of its duties by --

(i) Any Federal agency as defined in 5 U.S.C. 551(1) and 5 U.S.C. 552(f), or

(ii) A State agency, body, or commission charged under the laws of the State or a political subdivision of the State with the licensing, registration, or regulation of tax return preparers.

(5) A written request from a professional association ethics committee or board investigating the ethical conduct of the tax return preparer.

(6) A written request from the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board in connection with an inspection under section 104 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. 7214, or an investigation under section 105 of such Act, 15 U.S.C. 7215, for use in accordance with such Act.

(g) Disclosure for use in securing legal advice, Treasury investigations or court proceedings. A tax return preparer may disclose tax return information --

(1) To an attorney for purposes of securing legal advice;

(2) To an employee of the Treasury Department for use in connection with any investigation of the tax return preparer (including investigations relating to the tax return preparer in its capacity as a practitioner) conducted by the IRS or the Treasury Department; or

(3) To any officer of a court for use in connection with proceedings involving the tax return preparer (including proceedings involving the tax return preparer in its capacity as a practitioner), or the return preparer's client, before the court or before any grand jury that may be convened by the court.

(h) Certain disclosures by attorneys and accountants. The provisions of section 7216(a) and §301.7216-1 shall not apply to any disclosure of tax return information permitted by this paragraph (h).

(1) (i) A tax return preparer who is lawfully engaged in the practice of law or accountancy and prepares a tax return for a taxpayer may use the taxpayer's tax return information, or disclose the information to another officer, employee or member of the tax return preparer's law or accounting firm, consistent with applicable legal and ethical responsibilities, who may use the tax return information for the purpose of providing other legal or accounting services to the taxpayer. As an example, a lawyer who prepares a tax return for a taxpayer may use the tax return information of the taxpayer for, or in connection with, rendering legal services, including estate planning or administration, or preparation of trial briefs or trust instruments, for the taxpayer or the estate of the taxpayer. In addition, the lawyer who prepared the tax return may disclose the tax return information to another officer, employee or member of the same firm for the purpose of providing other legal services to the taxpayer. As another example, an accountant who prepares a tax return for a taxpayer may use the tax return information, or disclose it to another officer, employee or member of the firm, for use in connection with the preparation of books and records, working papers, or accounting statements or reports for the taxpayer. In the normal course of rendering the legal or accounting services to the taxpayer, the attorney or accountant may make the tax return information available to third parties, including stockholders, management, suppliers, or lenders, consistent with the applicable legal and ethical responsibilities, unless the taxpayer directs otherwise. For rules regarding disclosures outside of the United States, see §301.7216-2(c) and (d).

(ii) A tax return preparer's law or accounting firm does not include any related or affiliated firms. For example, if law firm A is affiliated with law firm B, officers, employees and members of law firm A must receive a taxpayer's consent under §301.7216-3 before disclosing the taxpayer's tax return information to an officer, employee or member of law firm B.

(2) A tax return preparer who is lawfully engaged in the practice of law or accountancy and prepares a tax return for a taxpayer may, consistent with the applicable legal and ethical responsibilities, take the tax return information into account, and may act upon it, in the course of performing legal or accounting services for a client other than the taxpayer, or disclose the information to another officer, employee or member of the tax return preparer's law or accounting firm to enable that other officer, employee or member to take the information into account, and act upon it, in the course of performing legal or accounting services for a client other than the taxpayer. This is permissible when the information is, or may be, relevant to the subject matter of the legal or accounting services for the other client, and consideration of the information by those performing the services is necessary for the proper performance of the services. In no event, however, may the tax return information be disclosed to a person who is not an officer, employee or member of the law or accounting firm, unless the disclosure is exempt from the application of section 7216(a) and §301.7216-1 by reason of another provision of §§301.7216-2 or 301.7216-3.

(3) Examples. The application of this paragraph may be illustrated by the following examples:

Example 1. A, a member of an accounting firm, renders an opinion on a financial statement of M Corporation that is part of a registration statement filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission. After the registration statement is filed, but before its effective date, B, a member of the same accounting firm, prepares an income tax return for N Corporation. In the course of preparing N's income tax return, B discovers that N does business with M and concludes that the information given by N should be considered by A to determine whether the financial statement opined on by A contains an untrue statement of material fact or omits a material fact required to keep the statement from being misleading. B discloses to A the tax return information of N for this purpose. A determines that there is an omission of material fact and that an amended statement should be filed. A so advises M and the Securities and Exchange Commission. A explains that the omission was revealed as a result of confidential information that came to A's attention after the statement was filed, but A does not disclose the identity of the taxpayer or the tax return information itself. Section 7216(a) and §301.7216-1 do not apply to B's disclosure of N's tax return information to A and A's use of the information in advising M and the Securities and Exchange Commission of the necessity for filing an amended statement. Section 7216(a) and §301.7216-1 would apply to a disclosure of N's tax return information to M or to the Securities and Exchange Commission unless the disclosure is exempt from the application of section 7216(a) and §301.7216-1 by reason of another provision of either this section or §301.7216-3.

Example 2. A, a member of an accounting firm, is conducting an audit of M Corporation, and B, a member of the same accounting firm, prepares an income tax return for D, an officer of M. In the course of preparing the return, B obtains information from D indicating that D, pursuant to an arrangement with a supplier doing business with M, has been receiving from the supplier a percentage of the amounts that the supplier invoices to M. B discloses this information to A who, acting upon it, searches in the course of the audit for indications of a kickback scheme. As a result, A discovers information from audit sources that independently indicate the existence of a kickback scheme. Without revealing the tax return information A has received from B, A brings to the attention of officers of M the audit information indicating the existence of the kickback scheme. Section 7216(a) and §301.7216-1 do not apply to B's disclosure of D's tax return information to A, A's use of D's information in the course of the audit, and A's disclosure to M of the audit information indicating the existence of the kickback scheme. Section 7216(a) and §301.7216-1 would apply to a disclosure to M, or to any other person not an employee or member of the accounting firm, of D's tax return information furnished to B.

(i) Corporate fiduciaries. A trust company, trust department of a bank, or other corporate fiduciary that prepares a tax return for a taxpayer for whom it renders fiduciary, investment, or other custodial or management services may, unless the taxpayer directs otherwise --

(1) Disclose or use the taxpayer's tax return information in the ordinary course of rendering such services to or for the taxpayer; or

(2) Make the information available to the taxpayer's attorney, accountant, or investment advisor.

(j) Disclosure to taxpayer's fiduciary. If, after furnishing tax return information to a tax return preparer, the taxpayer dies or becomes incompetent, insolvent, or bankrupt, or the taxpayer's assets are placed in conservatorship or receivership, the tax return preparer may disclose the information to the duly appointed fiduciary of the taxpayer or his estate, or to the duly authorized agent of the fiduciary.

(k) Disclosure or use of information in preparation or audit of State or local tax returns or assisting a taxpayer with foreign country tax obligations. The provisions of paragraphs (c) and (d) of this section shall apply to the disclosure by any tax return preparer of any tax return information in the preparation of, or in connection with the preparation of, any tax return of the taxpayer under the law of any State or political subdivision thereof, of the District of Columbia, of any territory or possession of the United States, or of a country other than the United States. The provisions of section 7216(a) and §301.7216-1 shall not apply to the use by any tax return preparer of any tax return information in the preparation of, or in connection with the preparation of, any tax return of the taxpayer under the law of any State or political subdivision thereof, of the District of Columbia, of any territory or possession of the United States, or of a country other than the United States. The provisions of section 7216(a) and §301.7216-1 shall not apply to the disclosure or use by any tax return preparer of any tax return information in the audit of, or in connection with the audit of, any tax return of the taxpayer under the law of any State or political subdivision thereof, the District of Columbia, or any territory or possession of the United States.

(l) Payment for tax preparation services. A tax return preparer may use and disclose, without the taxpayer's written consent, tax return information that the taxpayer provides to the tax return preparer to pay for tax preparation services to the extent necessary to process or collect the payment. For example, if the taxpayer gives the tax return preparer a credit card to pay for tax preparation services, the tax return preparer may disclose the taxpayer's name, credit card number, credit card expiration date, and amount due for tax preparation services to the credit card company, as necessary, to process the payment. Any tax return information that the taxpayer did not give the tax return preparer for the purpose of making payment for tax preparation services may not be used or disclosed by the tax return preparer without the taxpayer's prior written consent, unless otherwise permitted under another provision of this section.

(m) Retention of records. A tax return preparer may retain tax return information of a taxpayer, including copies of tax returns, in paper or electronic format, prepared on the basis of the tax return information, and may use the information in connection with the preparation of other tax returns of the taxpayer or in connection with an examination by the Internal Revenue Service of any tax return or subsequent tax litigation relating to the tax return. The provisions of paragraph (n) of this section regarding the transfer of a taxpayer list also apply to the transfer of any records and related papers to which this paragraph applies.

(n) Lists for solicitation of tax return business. A tax return preparer may compile and maintain a separate list containing solely the names, addresses, e-mail addresses, and phone numbers of taxpayers whose tax returns the tax return preparer has prepared or processed. This list may be used by the compiler solely to contact the taxpayers on the list for the purpose of offering tax information or additional tax return preparation services to such taxpayers. The compiler of the list may not transfer the taxpayer list, or any part thereof, to any other person unless the transfer takes place in conjunction with the sale or other disposition of the compiler's tax return preparation business. A person who acquires a taxpayer list, or a part thereof, in conjunction with a sale or other disposition of a tax return preparation business is subject to the provisions of this paragraph with respect to the list. The term list, as used in this paragraph (n), includes any record or system whereby the names and addresses of taxpayers are retained. The provisions of this paragraph (n) also apply to the transfer of any records and related papers to which this paragraph (n) applies.

(o) Producing statistical information in connection with tax return preparation business. A tax return preparer may use, for the limited purpose specified in this paragraph (o), tax return information to produce a statistical compilation of data described in §301.7216-1(b)(3)(i)(B). The purpose and use of the statistical compilation must relate directly to the internal management or support of the tax return preparer's tax return preparation business. The tax return preparer may not disclose or use the tax return information in connection with, or in support of, businesses other than tax return preparation. The compiler of the statistical compilation may not disclose the compilation, or any part thereof, to any other person unless disclosure of the statistical compilation is made in order to comply with financial accounting or regulatory reporting requirements or occurs in conjunction with the sale or other disposition of the compiler's tax return preparation business. A person who acquires a compilation, or a part thereof, in conjunction with a sale or other disposition of a tax return preparation business is subject to the provisions of this paragraph (o) with respect to the compilation as if the acquiring person had compiled it.

(p) Disclosure or use of information for quality or peer reviews. The provisions of section 7216(a) and §301.7216-1 shall not apply to any disclosure for the purpose of a quality or peer review to the extent necessary to accomplish the review. A quality or peer review is a review that is undertaken to evaluate, monitor, and improve the quality and accuracy of a tax return preparer's tax preparation, accounting, or auditing services. A quality or peer review may be conducted only by attorneys, certified public accountants, enrolled agents, and enrolled actuaries who are eligible to practice before the Internal Revenue Service. See Department of the Treasury Circular 230, 31 CFR part 10. Tax return information may also be disclosed to persons who provide administrative or support services to an individual who is conducting a quality or peer review under this paragraph (p), but only to the extent necessary for the reviewer to conduct the review. Tax return information gathered in conducting a review may be used only for purposes of a review. No tax return information identifying a taxpayer may be disclosed in any evaluative reports or recommendations that may be accessible to any person other than the reviewer or the tax return preparer being reviewed. The tax return preparer being reviewed will maintain a record of the review including the information reviewed and the identity of the persons conducting the review. After completion of the review, no documents containing information that may identify any taxpayer by name or identification number may be retained by a reviewer or by the reviewer's administrative or support personnel. Any person (including administrative and support personnel) receiving tax return information in connection with a quality or peer review is a tax return preparer for purposes of sections 7216(a) and 6713(a).

(q) Disclosure to report the commission of a crime. The provisions of section 7216(a) and §301.7216-1 shall not apply to the disclosure of any tax return information to the proper Federal, State, or local official in order, and to the extent necessary, to inform the official of activities that may constitute, or may have constituted, a violation of any criminal law or to assist the official in investigating or prosecuting a violation of criminal law. A disclosure made in the bona fide but mistaken belief that the activities constituted a violation of criminal law is not subject to section 7216(a) and §301.7216-1.

(r) Disclosure of tax return information due to a tax return preparer's incapacity or death. In the event of incapacity or death of a tax return preparer, disclosure of tax return information may be made for the purpose of assisting the tax return preparer or his legal representative (or the representative of a deceased tax return preparer's estate) in operating the business. Any person receiving tax return information under the provisions of this paragraph (r) is a tax return preparer for purposes of sections 7216(a) and 6713(a).

(s) Effective/applicability date. This section applies to disclosures or uses of tax return information occurring on or after January 1, 2009.

Par. 5. Section 301.7216-3 is revised to read as follows:



§301.7216-3 Disclosure or use permitted only with the taxpayer's consent.

(a) In general --(1) Taxpayer consent. Unless section 7216 or §301.7216-2 specifically authorizes the disclosure or use of tax return information, a tax return preparer may not disclose or use a taxpayer's tax return information prior to obtaining a written consent from the taxpayer, as described in this section. A tax return preparer may disclose or use tax return information as the taxpayer directs as long as the preparer obtains a written consent from the taxpayer as provided in this section. The consent must be knowing and voluntary. Except as provided in paragraph (a)(2) of this section, conditioning the provision of any services on the taxpayer's furnishing consent will make the consent involuntary, and the consent will not satisfy the requirements of this section.

(2) Taxpayer consent to a tax return preparer furnishing tax return information to another tax return preparer. (i) A tax return preparer may condition its provision of preparation services upon a taxpayer's consenting to disclosure of the taxpayer's tax return information to another tax return preparer for the purpose of performing services that assist in the preparation of, or provide auxiliary services in connection with the preparation of, the tax return of the taxpayer.

(ii) Example. The application of this paragraph (a)(2) may be illustrated by the following example:

Example. Preparer P, who is located within the United States, is retained by Company C to provide tax return preparation services for employees of Company C. An employee of Company C, Employee E, works for C outside of the United States. To provide tax return preparation services for E, P requires the assistance of and needs to disclose E's tax return information to a tax return preparer who works for P's affiliate located in the country where E works. P may condition its provision of tax return preparation services upon E consenting to the disclosure of E's tax return information to the tax return preparer in the country where E works.

(3) The form and contents of taxpayer consents --(i) In general. All consents to disclose or use tax return information must satisfy the following requirements --

(A) A taxpayer's consent to a tax return preparer's disclosure or use of tax return information must include the name of the tax return preparer and the name of the taxpayer.

(B) If a taxpayer consents to a disclosure of tax return information, the consent must identify the intended purpose of the disclosure. Except as provided in §301.7216-3(a)(3)(iii), if a taxpayer consents to a disclosure of tax return information, the consent must also identify the specific recipient (or recipients) of the tax return information. If the taxpayer consents to use of tax return information, the consent must describe the particular use authorized. For example, if the tax return preparer intends to use tax return information to generate solicitations for products or services other than tax return preparation, the consent must identify each specific type of product or service for which the tax return preparer may solicit use of the tax return information. Examples of products or services that must be identified include, but are not limited to, balance due loans, mortgage loans, mutual funds, individual retirement accounts, and life insurance.

(C) The consent must specify the tax return information to be disclosed or used by the return preparer.

(D) If a tax return preparer to whom the tax return information is to be disclosed is located outside of the United States, the taxpayer's consent under §301.7216-3 prior to any disclosure is required. See §301.7216-2(c) and (d).

(E) A consent to disclose or use tax return information must be signed and dated by the taxpayer.

(ii) The form and contents of taxpayer consents with respect to taxpayers filing a return in the Form 1040 series - guidance describing additional requirements for taxpayer consents with respect to Form 1040 series filers. The Secretary may issue guidance, by publication in the Internal Revenue Bulletin (see §601.601(d)(2)(ii)(b) of this chapter), describing additional requirements for tax return preparers regarding the format and content of consents to disclose and use tax return information with respect to taxpayers filing a return in the Form 1040 series, e.g., Form 1040, Form 1040NR, Form 1040A, or Form 1040EZ.

(iii) The form and contents of taxpayer consents with respect to all other taxpayers. A consent to disclose or use tax return information with respect to a taxpayer not filing a return in the Form 1040 series may be in any format, including an engagement letter to a client, as long as the consent complies with the requirements of §301.7216-3(a)(3)(i). Additionally, the requirements of §301.7216-3(c)(1) are inapplicable to consents to disclose or use tax return information with respect to taxpayers not filing a return in the Form 1040 series. Solely for purposes of a consent issued under §301.7216-3(a)(3)(iii), in lieu of identifying specific recipients of an intended disclosure under §301.7216-3(a)(3)(i)(B), a consent may allow disclosure to a descriptive class of entities engaged by a taxpayer or the taxpayer's affiliate for purposes of services in connection with the preparation of tax returns, audited financial statements, or other financial statements or financial information as required by a government authority, municipality or regulatory body.

(iv) Examples. The application of §301.7216-3(a)(3)(iii) may be illustrated by the following examples:

Example 1. Consistent with applicable legal and ethical responsibilities, Preparer Z sends its client, a corporation, Taxpayer C, an engagement letter. Part of the engagement letter requests the consent of Taxpayer C for the purpose of disclosing tax return information to an investment banking firm to assist the investment banking firm in securing long term financing for Taxpayer C. The engagement letter includes language and information that meets the requirements of §301.7216-3(a)(3)(i), including: (I) Preparer Z's name, Taxpayer C's name, and a signature and date line for Taxpayer C; and (II) a statement that "Taxpayer C authorizes Preparer Z to disclose the portions of Taxpayer C's 2009 tax return information to the firm retained by Taxpayer C necessary for the purposes of assisting Taxpayer C secure long term financing." The engagement letter satisfies the requirements of §301.7216-3(a)(3) for the disclosure of the information provided therein for the specific purpose stated.

Example 2. Consistent with applicable legal and ethical responsibilities, Preparer N sends its client, a corporation, Taxpayer D, an engagement letter. Part of the engagement letter requests the consent of Taxpayer D for the purpose of disclosing tax return information to Preparer N's affiliated firms located outside of the United States for the purposes of preparation of Taxpayer D's 2009 tax return. The engagement letter includes language and information that meets the requirements of §301.7216-3(a)(3)(i), including: (I) Preparer N's name, Taxpayer D's name, and a signature and date line for Taxpayer D; (II) a statement that "Taxpayer D authorizes Preparer N to disclose Taxpayer D's 2009 tax return information to Preparer N's affiliates located outside of the United States for the purposes of assisting Preparer N prepare Taxpayer D's 2009 tax return"; and (III) a statement that, in providing consent, Taxpayer D acknowledges that its tax return information for 2009 will be disclosed to tax return preparers located abroad. The engagement letter satisfies the requirements of §301.7216-3(a)(3) for the disclosure of the information provided therein for the specific purpose stated.

(b) Timing requirements and limitations --(1) No retroactive consent. A taxpayer must provide written consent before a tax return preparer discloses or uses the taxpayer's tax return information.

(2) Time limitations on requesting consent in solicitation context. A tax return preparer may not request a taxpayer's consent to disclose or use tax return information for purposes of solicitation of business unrelated to tax return preparation after the tax return preparer provides a completed tax return to the taxpayer for signature.

(3) No requests for consent after an unsuccessful request. With regard to tax return information for each income tax return that a tax return preparer prepares, if a taxpayer declines a request for consent to the disclosure or use of tax return information for purposes of solicitation of business unrelated to tax return preparation, the tax return preparer may not solicit from the taxpayer another consent for a purpose substantially similar to that of the rejected request.

(4) No consent to the disclosure of a taxpayer's social security number to a return preparer outside of the United States. A tax return preparer located within the United States, including any territory or possession of the United States, may not obtain consent to disclose the taxpayer's social security number (SSN) to a tax return preparer located outside of the United States or any territory or possession of the United States. Thus, if a tax return preparer located within the United States (including any territory or possession of the United States) obtains consent from a taxpayer to disclose tax return information to another tax return preparer located outside of the United States, as provided under §§301.7216-2(c) and 301.7216-2(d), the tax return preparer located in the United States may not disclose the taxpayer's SSN, and the tax return preparer must redact or otherwise mask the taxpayer's SSN before the tax return information is disclosed outside of the United States. If a tax return preparer located within the United States initially receives or obtains a taxpayer's SSN from another tax return preparer located outside of the United States, however, the tax return preparer within the United States may, without consent, retransmit the taxpayer's SSN to the tax return preparer located outside the United States that initially provided the SSN to the tax return preparer located within the United States.

(5) Duration of consent. A consent document may specify the duration of the taxpayer's consent to the disclosure or use of tax return information. If a consent agreed to by the taxpayer does not specify the duration of the consent, the consent to the disclosure or use of tax return information will be effective for a period of one year from the date the taxpayer signed the consent.

(c) Special rules --(1) Multiple disclosures within a single consent form or multiple uses within a single consent form. A taxpayer may consent to multiple uses within the same written document, or multiple disclosures within the same written document. A single written document, however, cannot authorize both uses and disclosures; rather one written document must authorize the uses and another separate written document must authorize the disclosures. Furthermore, a consent that authorizes multiple disclosures or multiple uses must specifically and separately identify each disclosure or use. See §301.7216-3(a)(3)(iii) for an exception to this rule for certain taxpayers.

(2) Disclosure of entire return. A consent may authorize the disclosure of all information contained within a return. A consent authorizing the disclosure of an entire return must provide that the taxpayer has the ability to request a more limited disclosure of tax return information as the taxpayer may direct.

(3) Copy of consent must be provided to taxpayer. The tax return preparer must provide a copy of the executed consent to the taxpayer at the time of execution. The requirements of this paragraph (c)(3) may also be satisfied by giving the taxpayer the opportunity, at the time of executing the consent, to print the completed consent or save it in electronic form.

Labels: