Wednesday, April 30, 2008

26 U.S.C. §6325(b)(2)(B) . 26 C.F.R. §301.6325-1(b)(2) provides for removal of an IRS lien from an affected property simply upon a showing by the taxpayer that no equity exists in the affected property. The partial discharge provision is discretionary with the Secretary of the IRS, although perhaps a denial of discharge by the Secretary is subject to review under a deferential abuse of discretion standard. See, for example, United States v. Polk 822 F.2d 871, 874 (9 th Cir. 1987).
In re Kirk G. Johnson, Debtor; Kirk G. Johnson, Plaintiff v. The Internal Revenue Service of the Department of the Treasury of the United States of America and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Labor and Industry, Defendants.

U.S. Bankruptcy Court, West. Dist. Pa.; 05-35220 TPA, April 16, 2008.

[ Code Secs. 6321 and 6871]

Bankruptcy: Tax liens: Real and personal property: Avoidance of liens: Strip-off:

Debtor's equity. --

A federal tax lien did not attach to a debtor's real property because higher priority liens exceeded the fair market value of the property. The IRS's argument that its lien attached to all of the debtor's real and personal property and that the debtor could not determine to which property the lien attached was rejected. Debtors possess the authority under the Bankruptcy Code to limit secured claims to the value of the collateral. Moreover, lien stripping is engrained in the reorganization process of a Chapter 11 case and to find that lien stripping is not permitted would ignore the existence of this right. Further, there is nothing in Code Sec. 6321 that would protect the IRS from lien stripping. Under the regulations, the "single lien" created by Code Sec. 6321 can be treated as separate liens on separate properties and discharged as to those properties that are valueless because they are subject to liens with a higher priority. Back references: ¶38,136.34 and ¶40,630.107.







MEMORANDUM OPINION


AGRESTI, United States Bankruptcy Judge: Kirk G. Johnson ("Debtor "), who operates a business proprietorship known as "KJ Transit," filed a voluntary Chapter 11 petition on October 10, 2005 . Among the secured creditors listed on Schedule D accompanying the Debtor's Petition are the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") and the Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry ("Labor") based on their statutory lien positions involving a federal tax lien and a lien for state unemployment compensation taxes, respectively.

The Debtor initiated this adversary proceeding on February 20, 2007 by filing a Complaint to Determine Validity, Priority, and Extent of Liens of the Internal Revenue Service and Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry Against the Debtor's Assets ("Complaint"), essentially alleging that two higher priority liens, one a purchase money mortgage and the other for county real estate tax, in combination, exceed the fair market value of the Debtor's residence such that there is no equity in the residence to which the IRS and Labor liens can attach. The Debtor seeks relief under 11 U.S.C. §506 to the effect that his residence is free and clear of the IRS and Labor liens. The IRS has filed an answer and the Parties have stipulated to all material factual issues, leaving the case ripe for decision as to the legal issue presented. 1 For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant the Debtor the relief he seeks. 2




FACTS


The following is gleaned from the Parties' stipulations of fact. The Debtor owns and resides at real property located at 4008 Turnwood Lane, Coraopolis, Pa. ( "the Real Property"). The Real Property possessed a fair market value of $279,000 as of the date the bankruptcy petition was filed. As of that same date, the Real Property was subject to a purchase money first mortgage lien in the amount of $279,440 held by Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("the MERS Mortgage") and a county real estate tax lien in the amount of $215.61 ("the County Lien"). The MERS Mortgage and the County Lien therefore collectively exceed the fair market value of the Real Property and both of them predate any lien held by the IRS.

The Debtor also owns various items of personal property with a total fair market value of $53,595.83 ("the Personal Property"). Other than the lien of the IRS, the only item of the Personal Property subject to a lien is a 2002 Lincoln Navigator. As of the Petition date, the fair market value of that vehicle was $18,675. At that time the vehicle was subject to a security interest in favor of M.& T. Credit Services, LLC in the amount of $12,221 ("the M&T Lien") superior to the lien of the IRS. Again, leaving aside for the moment the lien of the IRS, the Parties agree that because of the $6,454 of Debtor's equity in this vehicle, as of the Petition date, the Debtor's total equity in all of the Personal Property was $41,374.88.

On February 17, 2006, the IRS filed an Amended Proof of Claim asserting a secured claim in the amount of $178,673.05 against the Debtor and an unsecured priority claim of $2,374.71, for a total claim of $181,047.76. On March 31, 2006, Labor filed a proof of claim asserting a secured claim against the Debtor in the amount of $1,035.59. The Debtor's Amended Chapter 11 Plan was confirmed on May 3, 2007.




Relief Sought by the Debtor


The Debtor seeks a determination that the IRS lien does not attach to the Real Property because there is no equity in that property. The Debtor also asks the Court to find that the IRS possesses a secured claim of only $41,374.88 in the Personal Property (the value of the Personal Property less the amount of the M&T Lien) and that the balance of the IRS claim is unsecured. With respect to the latter request, the matter has been partially resolved. In its portion of the Combined Pre-trial Narrative Statement, the IRS states:


The Internal Revenue Service acknowledges that the amount of its lien exceeds the value of debtor's assets. Accordingly, the Service is willing to stipulate that its claim be allowed as follows: a secured claim of $ 41,374.83, an unsecured priority claim of $ 30,592.52, and a general unsecured claim of $109,079.00.


Combined Pre-Trial Narrative Statement at 3, Document No. 14. The Debtor has accepted this proposed stipulation. See Plaintiff's Brief on Whether a Federal Tax Lien can be Avoided Under Section 506 of the Bankruptcy Code in a Chapter 11 Proceeding at 1, n. 1, Document No. 18. Thus, by voluntary action of the IRS, the IRS lien, and therefore the amount of its secured claim, has been "stripped-down" to $41,374.83 and the Court need not consider that issue further. The remaining question therefore is whether the IRS lien encumbers both the Personal and Real Property, or only the Personal Property.




DISCUSSION


In the bankruptcy setting, the phrase "lien stripping" refers to the process of reducing a secured claim to reflect the value of the underlying collateral. Variants of this phrase are a "stripdown" wherein an undersecured creditor's lien is reduced to the equity value held by the Debtor in the collateral (after the amount of any superior lien is deducted from the fair market value of the collateral), and, a "strip- off" wherein a wholly-unsecured creditor's lien is removed from collateral in which there is no equity value.

In this case, the Debtor was originally seeking a combination of both forms of lienstripping relief. He asked that the IRS tax lien be stripped off the Real Property because there is no equity in that property, and, that the IRS tax lien be stripped down on the Personal Property to the level of available equity in that property, i.e., $41,374.88. As indicated, the IRS has conceded that its secured claim is reduced to $41,374.88 and therefore the latter request is no longer at issue.

The statutory basis for "stripping off" a lien arises from the combination of 11 U.S.C. §§ 506(a) and (d). 3 First, by operation of Section 506(a) an undersecured creditor's allowed claim is bifurcated into secured and unsecured portions. Then, with certain exceptions not applicable here, pursuant to Section 506(d) the lien securing the claim is voided to the extent that it is not an allowed secured claim, effectively stripping the lien "off" to that extent. Although the lien stripping process seems straightforward based on the statutory language, there are two issues that must be considered in making the determination whether the Debtor should be granted relief. First, does Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992), preclude the Court from granting the requested relief in this Chapter 11 case? Second, if that hurdle is cleared, is there some reason why an IRS tax lien should be treated any differently than other liens?




Lien Stripping in Ch. 11-Dewsnup


The Court must first consider whether the decision in Dewsnup, the foremost Supreme Court decision on lien stripping, dictates the outcome in this case. 4 In Dewsnup the Court held that a lien on real property could not be stripped-down in a Chapter 7 case. The Dewsnup Court construed the statutory language of Sections 506(a) and (d) in such a manner as to give effect to the pre-Bankruptcy Code rule in liquidation cases that liens pass through a bankruptcy unaffected. The Court did so because it was not convinced that Congress had intended to depart from that rule when it adopted the Bankruptcy Code. See 502 U.S. at 417. Importantly, however, the Dewsnup Court was careful to limit the holding of the case to the situation squarely before it, i.e., an attempt to strip a lien in a Chapter 7 liquidation case. The Court stated:


Hypothetical applications that come to mind and those advanced at oral argument illustrate the difficulty of interpreting the statute in a single opinion that would apply to all possible fact situations. We therefore focus upon the case before us and allow other facts to await their legal resolution on another day.


Id.

As a result of this limiting language, it is clear that the Dewsnup Court left open the question as to whether the same result would be reached in different circumstances, for instance, in a case under a different chapter of the Bankruptcy Code. Based on this "opening," courts and commentators have examined whether Dewsnup also establishes the rule on the availability of lien stripping in Chapter 11 and 13 cases. A great majority of the courts that have considered the issue in reorganization cases have concluded that the holding in Dewsnup should be limited to Chapter 7 cases and should not prevent lien stripping in reorganization cases. See 4-506 Collier on Bankruptcy, 15 th ed. Rev. ¶506.06[1][c] (2007); Sapos v. Provident Inst. of Savs. in the Town of Boston, 967 F.2d 918, 925 (3 d Cir. 1992) ( Dewsnup Court's interpretation of Section 506 in a Chapter 7 liquidation does not apply in a Chapter 13 reorganization); Wade v. Bradford, 38 F.3d 1126 (10 th Cir. 1994) (Chapter 11 debtors could strip down lien on residence notwithstanding Dewsnup); Harmon v. U.S. Through Farmers Home Admin., 101 F.3d 574 (8 th Cir. 1996) (allowing lien stripping in Chapter 12); In re Jones, 152 B.R. 155, 173 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1998) (categorically prohibiting lien stripping in Chapter 11 would disrupt established pre-Code law).

Many of the courts so limiting the Dewsnup holding have noted that a general prohibition against lien stripping in reorganization cases would be inconsistent with pre-Bankruptcy Code law, and would conflict with key provisions and principles applicable in the reorganization chapters of the Bankruptcy Code. This Court agrees with the majority view and concludes that the holding in Dewsnup does not extend to cases filed under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. 5

The Court reaches this conclusion for a number of reasons, all of them related to the significant differences between liquidations and reorganization proceedings. Quite simply, the possibility of lien stripping has been a long-standing aspect of reorganization cases, one that pre-dates the adoption of the current Bankruptcy Code in 1978. See Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 418-19 (recognizing that pre-Code law permitted involuntary reduction of the amount of the creditor's lien in reorganization proceedings, and citing as examples former 11 U.S.C. §§616(1) and (10) (1976 ed.)) Thus, the Dewsnup Court's stated reluctance to interpret the Bankruptcy Code in such a manner as to effect a major change in pre-Code practice by permitting lien stripping in liquidation cases (without clear evidence of Congressional intent for such a change) is not implicated in a reorganization setting because permitting lien stripping in a reorganization is consistent with pre-Code practice.

Furthermore, the process of lien stripping is ingrained in the reorganization provisions of the Bankruptcy Code to such an extent that any attempt to extend the holding in Dewsnup to Chapter 11 cases would require that numerous provisions of the statute be ignored or construed in a very convoluted manner to achieve that result. For instance, Congress has provided a mechanism under 11 U.S.C. §1111(b) for undersecured creditors to opt out of the claim bifurcation process that would otherwise occur under Section 506(a) and instead be treated as fully secured to the extent of their allowed claims. 6 The very fact that this Section 1111(b) election exists at all presumes that debtors possess the authority under the Bankruptcy Code to limit secured claims to the value of the collateral. To find that lien stripping is not permitted in Chapter 11would thus be to ignore the existence of Section 1111(b) . See In re 680 5 th Ave Assocs., 156 B.R. 726, 731 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993), decision affirmed 169 B.R. 22 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), judgment affirmed 29 F.3d 95 (2d Cir.1994).

Another example of Congress specifically recognizing and approving the existence of lien stripping in Chapter 11 cases surfaced when it passed the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394. Section 206 of that Act amended the Code by adding current 11 U.S.C. §1123(b)(5) which permits a Chapter 11 plan to "modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a claim secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence." This brought Chapter 11 into conformity with Chapter 13, which includes a similar provision to permit the modification of secured claims generally while preventing the modification of home mortgages. 7 Clearly, Section 1123(b)(5) represents an explicit Congressional approval of lien stripping in Chapter 11 cases, subject only to the home mortgage exception. What is most significant for present purposes is the timing of the enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 which included this provision when it was passed two years after Dewsnup was decided. To hold that Dewsnup prevents lien stripping in Chapter 11 cases would be to ignore this clear Congressional intent, something the Court cannot do.

It is also instructive to consider the particular feature of liquidations that seemed to cause the Court in Dewsnup to have concerns about whether lien stripping should be permitted in Chapter 7 cases. The Court noted that the "practical effect" of finding that lien stripping was allowed in Chapter 7 would be that a creditor's interest would be frozen at the judicially determined property valuation, leaving the creditor to lose the benefit of any increase in the value of the property that might occur between then and the time of a foreclosure sale. Instead, the debtor would enjoy the benefit of any such increase-a result some might view as a windfall. See 502 U.S. at 417. The Dewsnup case can thus be interpreted to stand for the proposition that there can be no lien stripping without payment of the debt secured by the lien, and upon failure to so provide, allowing the creditor to purchase the property by credit bid and enjoy any appreciation in value. See In re Dever, 164 B.R. 132, 135 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1994). By contrast, in reorganization cases any lien stripping is coupled with payments under the plan and ownership of the property being vested in the debtor. This has led courts and commentators to note that creditors in reorganization cases thus receive something in exchange for the voiding of their liens, i.e., payment obligations under a plan of reorganization, so that principle of Dewsnup is not violated. See In re Bowen, 174 B.R. 840, 855 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1994); Baxter Dunaway, Law of Distressed Real Estate §29.72 (2007).

To sum up, lien stripping is a fundamental aspect of reorganization proceedings. To bar lien stripping in cases under the reorganization chapters would:


... [I]n essence, gut the sum and substance of the reorganization and rehabilitation of debt concept under the Bankruptcy Code. In such cases, the Debtor would propose a plan for repayment of creditors to the extent of the value of the property securing the creditor's claim, but would still owe the unsecured portion of the claim, post-confirmation, in order to obtain a release of the lien on said property. This would require all plans filed under Chapters 11, 12 and 13 to pay all creditors one hundred percent of their claims in order for the debtor to emerge from bankruptcy with a true "fresh start." Clearly, this has never been the purpose contemplated for Section 506(d).


In re Butler, 139 B.R. 258, 259 (Bankr. E.D. Okl. 1992).

The Court therefore concludes that, in general, lien stripping is permitted in Chapter 11 cases, notwithstanding the decision in Dewsnup. That leads to a question of whether there is something special about an IRS tax lien that would prohibit lien stripping, creating an exception to this process in favor of the IRS. The Court now turns to that issue.




Lien Stripping and the Nature of the IRS Lien


Having concluded that Dewsnup does not preclude lien stripping in a Chapter 11 case, the Court must next consider whether the very nature of an IRS tax lien somehow precludes that from being done in these particular circumstances. In so doing, the Court will operate from the presumption that the IRS lien should be treated the same as any other lien unless there is some contrary statutory law or provision of decisional law requiring different treatment.

The lien of the IRS arises pursuant to a statute which provides:


If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same after demand, the amount (including any interest, additional amount, addition to tax, or assessable penalty, together with any costs that may accrue in addition thereto) shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such person.


26 U.S.C. §6321 . There is nothing apparent from this statutory language which would protect an IRS lien from lien stripping treatment. Furthermore, the Debtor has pointed to a number of cases in which courts have permitted IRS liens to be avoided. For instance, in In re Dever, supra, after a long and thoughtful discussion on various aspects of lien stripping, the court noted that Section 506 does not distinguish between voluntary and involuntary liens. It held that if a voluntary lien is avoidable by a strip down in Chapter 11, then so too should an involuntary one, like an IRS lien. 164 B.R. at 144. The Dever court further stated:


Nothing in Sections 506 or 1129 suggests that IRS liens or claims are totally immune from avoidance or modification. Under the Bankruptcy Code, the IRS is the beneficiary of several specific provisions that reflect Congressional desire to protect the federal fisc. For example, Congress required that all tax obligations must be paid under a Chapter 11 plan within six years of assessment date. Section 1129(a)(9)(C). Certain tax obligations are entitled to priority under Section 507(a)(7). Section 523(a)(1) makes some tax debts nondischargeable. Although none of the obligations here are alleged to be nondischargeable, most debtors facing IRS liens would not be able to walk out of bankruptcy court in complete defiance of their tax obligations. The granting of IRS priorities and the nondischargeable nature of many such obligations are strong evidence that Congress provided an alternative method of realizing on such claims. Reading an IRS exception into Section 506 to prevent avoidance of the liens here is unnecessary and inappropriate.


164 B.R. at 145. See also In re Bowen, supra; In re Butler, supra.

The IRS offers precious little in response to convince the Court otherwise. It argues that the nature of its lien is such that it attaches to all of the Debtor's property, real and personal, and that there "is nothing in the Bankruptcy Code, the Internal Revenue Code, or case law which permits the debtor to determine which of his property is subject to the lien, once the value of that lien has been determined." Defendant Internal Revenue Service's Response to Plaintiff's Brief on Whether a Federal Tax Lien can be Avoided Under 11 U.S.C. §506 in a Chapter 11 Proceeding at 2-3, Document No. 21.

The only case cited by the IRS in support of its position is In re Hoekstra, 255 B.R. 285 (E.D. Va. 2000). In that case, the debtors brought an adversary proceeding seeking to avoid junior tax and homeowners' association liens against their townhouse because the two superior liens against the property already exceeded its value. The bankruptcy court had found in favor of the debtors, distinguishing the case from Dewsnup because in that case the property at issue did have some equity, whereas in Hoekstra there was no equity in the townhouse. The bankruptcy court concluded that Dewsnup prohibited only a "strip-down" of an undersecured claim, not a "strip off" of a wholly-unsecured claim. On appeal, the District Court reversed, agreeing with the IRS that Dewsnup governed the outcome of the case, but concluding that the "indivisible" nature of the IRS federal tax lien made what the bankruptcy court had done more analogous to a prohibited strip-down rather than a permitted strip-off . As the Hoekstra court explained:


The bankruptcy court... [ treated] Creditor's federal tax lien as distinct and individual liens as to each component of property underlying the lien. The [bankruptcy] court concluded that "for the purpose of lien avoidance, each item of collateral must be viewed individually... The avoidance of the lien as to that particular parcel does not affect or impair the lien of Creditor as to any other property to which it may have attached." In re Hoekstra 253 B.R. 193, 195. However, the Internal Revenue Code and case law make clear that a federal tax lien is not divisible in this context.



...



Debtors here seek to avoid a portion of a lien where a component of the collateral has no value but other components of collateral have value. The Dewsnup Court's clear prohibition against "stripping down" liens leads this Court to reverse the bankruptcy court's judgment voiding Creditor's lien against the Townhouse.


255 B.R. at 290, 292.

For a number of reasons, this Court does not find Hoekstra to be particularly relevant or persuasive on the issue presented in the case before it. Perhaps most significantly, Hoekstra was decided in the context of a Chapter 7 liquidation proceeding. As such, the court in Hoekstra was faced with the clearly applicable precedent of Dewsnup and was required to analyze what the debtors were seeking to accomplish in light of that compelling precedent. In sharp contrast, the present case is a reorganization under Chapter 11 and as noted above, the majority view which is now also adopted by this Court, is that Dewsnup does not apply to lien stripping occurring in a reorganization.

The Court is also left unpersuaded by the Hoekstra court's view of the "nature" of the IRS lien. The Hoekstra court stated that the language of 26 U.S.C. §6321 makes clear that there is but a single lien created; not separate liens upon a debtor's real and personal property. 255 B.R. at 290 - 91. It is from this aspect of the Hoekstra decision that the IRS draws its sole decisional support for the position it takes here, that is, because of its "unitary nature", the IRS lien cannot be stripped off the Real Property.

The IRS admits that, other than the Hoekstra decision and the language of Section 6321 itself, it has no other support for its view that the IRS lien is inviolable so long as there is equity value in any of the collateral subject to the lien. In its brief and again at the time of argument, the IRS provided no in depth public policy analysis or Dewsnup-extension argument to support its position under these facts. It simply steadfastly maintained that the language of 28 U.S.C. §6321 required such a result. If this lien inviolability were a consistently held view and practice of the IRS, it might cause the Court pause before ordering relief that runs contrary to such a settled norm. However, the admitted, normal customs of the IRS, carried out pursuant to an enabling statute and regulation, reveals that even the IRS does not treat federal tax liens in the monolithic and indivisible manner that it urges this Court to follow.

26 U.S.C. §6325(b) , which allows for the discharge of property subject to a federal tax lien, provides in relevant part:


(2) Part payment; interest of United States valueless. --Subject to such regulations as the Secretary may prescribe, the Secretary may issue a certificate of discharge of any part of the property subject to the lien if --...



(B) the Secretary determines at any time that the interest of the United States in the part to be so discharged has no value.



In determining the value of the interest of the United States in the part to be so discharged, the Secretary shall give consideration to the value of such part and to such liens thereon as have priority over the lien of the United States.


26 U.S.C. §6325(b)(2)(B) . The IRS has issued regulations which mirror this provision of the Internal Revenue Code. See 26 C.F.R. §301.6325-1(b)(2) . As admitted by the IRS at the time of argument, this statutory provision provides the mechanism for removal of an IRS lien from an affected property simply upon a showing by the taxpayer that no equity exists in the affected property. The Court understands that the weight of authority holds that this partial discharge provision is discretionary with the Secretary of the IRS, although perhaps a denial of discharge by the Secretary is subject to review under a deferential abuse of discretion standard. See, for example, United States v. Polk 822 F.2d 871, 874 (9 th Cir. 1987). However, the Court finds it highly significant that the statute and accompanying regulations contemplate that the alleged "single lien" created by 26 U.S.C. §6321 can, in effect, be treated as separate liens on separate items of property and discharged as to those items of property which are valueless to the United States because they are subject to other lien(s) with priority. Also at the oral argument, Counsel for the IRS represented that it was common practice for the IRS to actually discharge a federal tax lien as against an item of property that has no value. 8 Given this reality, it would make no sense to deny the Debtor relief in this case based solely on a fiction the IRS itself does not consistently follow, that is, that the IRS lien is so indivisible in nature that a Bankruptcy Court cannot strip it off real property that has no equity value while allowing it to remain on personalty that does have value.




CONCLUSION


It is axiomatic that a central purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is to provide a procedure by which the debtor can "reorder his affairs, make peace with his creditors, and enjoy 'a new opportunity in life with a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of pre-existing debt'." In re Alston, 297 B.R. 410, 417 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2003) (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934)). In reorganization cases that central purpose can often only be accomplished by lien stripping. As the court in Dever observed:


Modifying the rights and interests of secured creditors is at the heart of most reorganizations.... very few Chapter 11 plans seek merely to stretch out or reduce payments to unsecured creditors. Most debtors are currently entering Chapter 11 with their assets fully encumbered, which means that their plans must restructure the secured debt in order to make a meaningful difference in their financial well-being.


164 B.R. at 143. That is certainly the case with the Debtor in the present case. Unless the Court removes the IRS lien from his residence, that lien will remain an anchor dragging him down from achieving the fresh start envisioned by the Code.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds in favor of the Debtor on the matters set forth in his Complaint and will issue an appropriate order.

Case Administrator to serve:

Phillip Simon, Esq.

Gary W. Short, Esq.

Gerald A. Role




ORDER


AND NOW, this 16 th day of April, 2008 , upon consideration of the Complaint to Determine Validity, Priority and Extent of Liens of the Internal Revenue Service and Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry Against the Debtor's Assets filed by Plaintiff, Kirk G. Johnson t/d/b/a "KJ Transit" at Document No. 1 ("Complaint") and the Answer filed by the Internal Revenue Service of the Department of the Treasury of the United States of America ("Internal Revenue Service") at Document No. 6, for the reasons stated in the foregoing Memorandum Opinion, pursuant to Fed.R.Bankr.P. 7052, after notice and hearing and consideration of the stipulations and argument of Counsel,

It is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the relief requested by the Debtor in his Complaint is GRANTED.

It is FURTHER ORDERED that:

(1) All of the Internal Revenue Service's tax liens against the Debtor's real estate known as 408 Turnwood Lane, Coraopolis, PA 15108 are declared NULL, VOID and REMOVED , the legal description for said real property being found in the Deed recorded in the Office of Recorder of Deeds of Allegheny County at Deed Book Volume 11686, page 585, and more further described as follows:


ALL THAT CERTAIN lot or piece of ground situate in the Township of Moon, County of Allegheny and Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, being Lot No. 915 in the Whispering Woods Plan of Lots, Phase IX, as recorded in the Recorder's Office of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, in Plan Book Volume 198, pages 63-66. BEING designated as Block 925-G, Lot No. 12 in the Deed Registry Office of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania. UNDER AND SUBJECT to easements, rights of way, oil and gas leases, restrictions, reservations, exceptions, agreements and coal and mining rights as set forth in prior instruments of record. ("Real Property")


(2) The Internal Revenue Service's tax liens against the Debtor's personal property are declared NULL, VOID and REMOVED from said personal property to the extent said liens exceed $41,374.88;

(3) Pursuant to Section 507(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code the Internal Revenue Service possesses an allowed unsecured, priority claim in the amount of $30,595.00;

(4) The Internal Revenue Service possesses a general unsecured, nonpriority claim in the amount of $109,079.88; and,

(5) The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Labor and Industry's tax liens against the Debtor's assets, both the Real Property and the personal property, are declared NULL, VOID and REMOVED from said property.

1 Labor was properly served with the Complaint but it has not filed an answer or otherwise responded. Counsel for the Debtor has submitted a letter and e-mail from counsel for Labor indicating that Labor has consented to the relief being sought by the Debtor. Based on Labor's default and the further evidence of its consent, the Debtor will be granted the relief he seeks as against Labor and Labor's claim will be deemed wholly unsecured.

2 The Court's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§157 and 1334 was not at issue. This is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§157(b)(2)(K) and (O). This Opinion constitutes the Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Fed.R.Bankr.P. 7052.

3 Section 506(a) provides:

(a)


(1) An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the estate has an interest, or that is subject to setoff under section 553 of this title, is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such property, or to the extent of the amount subject to setoff, as the case may be, and is an unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such creditor's interest or the amount so subject to setoff is less than the amount of such allowed claim. Such value shall be determined in light of the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of such property, and in conjunction with any hearing on such disposition or use or on a plan affecting such creditor's interest.



(2) If the debtor is an individual in a case under chapter 7 or 13, such value with respect to personal property securing an allowed claim shall be determined based on the replacement value of such property as of the date of the filing of the petition without deduction for costs of sale or marketing. With respect to property acquired for personal, family, or household purposes, replacement value shall mean the price a retail merchant would charge for property of that kind considering the age and condition of the property at the time value is determined.


Section 506(d) provides:

(d) To the extent that a lien secures a claim against the debtor that is not an allowed secured claim, such lien is void, unless --


(1) such claim was disallowed only under section 502(b)(5) or 502(e) of this title; or



(2) such claim is not an allowed secured claim due only to the failure of any entity to file a proof of such claim under Section 501 of this title.


4 The willingness of the IRS to stipulate to a substantial reduction of its lien down to the amount of the Debtor's equity value in the Personal Property would seem to signal its acknowledgment that Dewsnup has no application here and does not restrict the Court's ability to act. Indeed, the IRS has not even made the argument that Dewsnup applies. Nevertheless, the Court does not wish to rest solely on that premise but will independently examine the issue.

5 The courts adopting this majority view have not all arrived at their conclusion by the same route. Some have concluded that the Dewsnup court's limiting construction of Sections 506(a) and (d) is applicable only in the Chapter 7 setting, leaving Section 506 available as a vehicle to permit lien stripping in the reorganization chapters. See, e.g., In re Dever, 164 B.R. 132 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1994). Other courts, however, conclude that the Dewsnup construction of Section 506 must apply in all bankruptcy settings. In this view, Dewsnup does not hold that Section 506(d) prohibits lien stripping in Chapter 7, it holds only that Section 506(d) does not itself provide the authority for a debtor to strip a lien. See, e.g., In re Virello, 236 B.R. 199, 204 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1999). Thus, in this view, Dewsnup does not prevent lien stripping in reorganization cases because, unlike Chapter 7, those chapters of the Bankruptcy Code do contain provisions that permit lien stripping. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §1123(b)(5) , discussed infra. at 9-11.

In the present case, the Debtor has invoked Section 506 as the basis for relief in his Complaint, which is consistent with the first judicial approach discussed above. (It should also be noted that the IRS has never objected that Section 506 is not a proper vehicle to bring the issue before the Court). However, even if this Court were to follow the second judicial approach it would not deny the Debtor the relief he seeks solely because the Complaint refers only to Section 506 because that would elevate form over substance. The Court would instead treat the matter as tried by consent pursuant to Fed.R.Bankr.P. 7015(b)(2) or grant the Debtor leave to file an amended Complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Bankr.P. 7015 (a)(2). Thus, either way, the Debtor should be granted the relief he seeks.

6 In the context of this case, the IRS never exercised that option. In determining whether an 1111(b) election had occurred in this matter, not only did the Court review the docket of the within Adversary Proceeding but also the main case filings as well. During the course of its review of the main case docket, the Court identified a "Stipulation and Agreement" between the Debtor and the IRS dated April 17, 2007 and filed at Document No. 112 ( "Stipulation") and approved by the Court by Order entered on April 23, 2007 at Document No. 115. Paragraph 3 of the Stipulation states in part:

To the extent that any federal tax liens attach to any property owned by the Debtor as of the date of the filing of the Petition in this case, such property shall remain subject to such federal tax liens until such time as the amount of such liens has been fully satisfied.

Neither of the Parties in the Adversary Proceeding has ever referenced the existence of the Stipulation as an impediment to this Court's ability to grant the relief sought by the Debtor. The Court can only conclude that the Parties agree the Stipulation was not intended to have any effect with respect to the pending Adversary Proceeding, and in particular, was not intended to be a defense available to the IRS. This conclusion is further supported by the language of the Confirmed, Amended Plan subsequently approved by the Court which contains language apparently allowing for the filing of the Complaint in this matter and its ultimate resolution by the Court. See Amended Chapter 11 Plan at ¶ 2.02, filed May 1, 2007 at Document No. 125. In the alternative, Fed.R.Bankr.P. 7012(b) requires every defense to a claim for relief in any pleading to be asserted in the responsive pleading if one is required, as was the case here. Affirmative defenses such as res judicata or waiver, must also be affirmatively pled. Fed.R.Bankr.P. 7008(b). The failure to plead a defense means it has been waived. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h) made applicable in this proceeding pursuant to Fed.R.Bankr.P. 7012(b); In re Hankerson, 133 B.R. 711, 713, n. 1 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991). The IRS, having failed to raise any defense arising from the Stipulation in any of the pleadings (including its Pretrial Narrative Statement and Consolidated Pretrial Narrative Statement) or brief filed in the Adversary Proceeding, has therefore waived any such defense it may otherwise have had related to the Stipulation.

7 See 11 U.S.C. §1322(b)(2) . Note also that the home mortgage exception does not apply to the present case because a "security interest" does not include a statutory tax lien. See 11 U.S.C. §101(51) ; In re Marfin Ready Mix Corp., 220 B.R. 148, 158 n. 10 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1998).

8 At the oral argument the Court inquired why the IRS would not be willing to voluntarily "discharge" the lien as against the Real Property in this case. Counsel for the IRS admitted it frequently does just that in other, non-bankruptcy contexts. The IRS could offer no compelling response to that rather straightforward question other than to note that it wished a legal ruling on the matter.

Labels:

Tuesday, April 29, 2008

Offer in Compromise "reasonable collection potential" under section 7122 does not include "special circumstances." The showing by the taxpayer of special circumstances that may cause an offer to be accepted notwithstanding that it is for less than the taxpayer's reasonable collection potential, e.g., the taxpayer is incapable of earning a living because of a long-term illness, and it is reasonably foreseeable that the taxpayer's financial resources will be exhausted providing for care and support during the course of the condition. Sec. 301.7122-1(b)(3), (c)(3), Proced. & Admin. Regs.; 1 Administration, Internal Revenue Manual (CCH), pt. 5.8.11.2.1, at 16,375, sec. 5.8.11.2.2, at 16,377.

William G. Schwartz and Jacqueline R. Schwartz v. Commissioner.

Dkt. No. 12530-06L , TC Memo. 2008-117, April 28, 2008.



[Code Sec. 7122]

Collection: Notice before levy: Offer-in-compromise. --
The IRS did not abuse its discretion when it rejected multiple offers-in-compromise submitted by a married couple; therefore, a proposed levy and filing of a federal tax lien were appropriate. The offers contained a number of defects with regard to the taxpayers' reasonable collection potential, which was largely based on the amount they could realize from the equity in their home. The IRS found that their initial offer used outdated appraisals for the home and questioned the validity of a second mortgage on the property held by husband's father, which was recorded shortly before the filing of the notice of federal tax lien. The taxpayers' second offer, based on a recommendation by an IRS Appeals officer, was also insufficient. The IRS's Engineering Group had found that the market value of the taxpayers' home could be 30 percent to 40 percent higher than that stated in the second offer.







MEMORANDUM OPINION



JACOBS, Judge:1 The petition in this case was filed in response to a Notice of Determination Concerning Collection Action(s) Under Section 6320 and/or 6330 (notice of determination).2 The issue for decision is whether respondent abused his discretion in rejecting as inadequate petitioners' offer-in-compromise to satisfy their unpaid income taxes for tax years 1996, 1997, 1998, 2000, and 2001.





Background



This case was submitted fully stipulated pursuant to Rule 122. The stipulation of facts and the attached exhibits are incorporated herein by this reference. Petitioners resided in Pennsylvania at the time they filed their petition.



Petitioners filed income tax returns for the years at issue as follows:





Date
Return Adjusted
Due Gross Self
(After Date Income Income Employment
Extensions) Return per Tax per Tax per
Year Filed Return Return Return

Oct. Jan. 7,
1996 15, 1997 1999 N/A $136,155 N/A

Oct. Aug. 6,
1997 15, 1998 1999 $185,713 63,354 $ 5,610

Oct. Oct.
1998 15, 1999 28, 1999 117,963 32,906 11,831

Aug. Aug. 7,
2000 15, 2001 2001 55,953 15,193 12,124

Oct. Oct.
2001 15, 2002 17, 2002 104,836 26,569 13,525





Respondent assessed the tax shown on each return. As of November 10, 2003, the date respondent issued a Letter 1058, Final Notice of Intent to Levy and Notice of Your Right to a Hearing (final notice of intent to levy), for tax years 1996 through 2001, the unpaid balance of petitioners' tax liabilities (after taking into account withholding credits, payments, additions to tax, and interest) totaled $287,523.10.3



The final notice of intent to levy was followed on November 17, 2003, by a Notice of Federal Tax Lien with respect to petitioners' outstanding tax liabilities for 1996 through 2001 and a Letter 3172, Notice of Federal Tax Lien Filing and Your Right to a Hearing Under IRC 6320 (notice of tax lien filing), for tax years 1996 through 2001. In response to respondent's final notice of intent to levy and notice of tax lien filing, petitioners, in December of 2003, requested hearings under sections 6320 and 6330. Petitioners' hearing under section 6320 was held in conjunction with their hearing under section 6330 and was conducted by correspondence and telephone conversations with a succession of four officers in respondent's Office of Appeals.



At their hearing petitioners sought to compromise their tax liability. In the course of exploring this collection alternative, the parties disagreed as to the amount of petitioners' reasonable collection potential, which in turn largely depends upon the net amount petitioners could realize from their equity in their home, their main asset.4 This disagreement forms the basis of petitioners' claim that respondent placed a value on petitioners' home greater than that which could be realized and thus abused his discretion in rejecting petitioners' offer-in-compromise.



The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) refused to process petitioners' first ($29,124) offer-in-compromise, claiming that as of the date of the offer-in-compromise (June 2004) petitioners were not current with regard to tax deposits for their business employees. After clarifying that they did not have business employees for the period in question, in September 2004 petitioners resubmitted their $29,124 offer-in-compromise, which was accepted for processing. Before respondent took action on that offer-in-compromise other than to request additional information, petitioners submitted an amended offer-in-compromise for $7,452 on November 17, 2004, followed by a second amended offer-in-compromise for $65,525 on November 26, 2004. Respondent accepted petitioners' $65,525 offer-in-compromise for processing.



In support of their $65,525 offer-in-compromise, petitioners submitted a written appraisal for their home, dated March 10, 2003, which represented that the home had a "quick sale", "as is" value of $400,000.



In evaluating the $65,525 offer-in-compromise, respondent's Appeals officer requested an opinion as to the offer's legal sufficiency from respondent's Office of Chief Counsel. In March 2005 respondent's Office of Chief Counsel responded that the $65,525 offer-in-compromise was legally insufficient because, among other things, (1) the appraisal of petitioners' home was by then more than 2 years old, and (2) because the appraisal was based on comparable sales made on or before the summer of 2002, the appraisal did not accurately reflect the value of the property at the time the $65,525 offer-in-compromise was submitted.



Petitioners claimed that they had little or no equity in their home because it was encumbered by two mortgages, one of which was held by a savings bank in the approximate amount of $280,000. Respondent's Office of Chief Counsel did not contest the bona fides of that mortgage but did question the bona fides of a $125,000 "open end mortgage" held by William G. Schwartz's father which was recorded shortly before the filing of respondent's notice of tax lien.



Upon receiving the response from respondent's Office of Chief Counsel, respondent's Appeals officer requested additional information from petitioners, including a new appraisal of their home. Accordingly, on August 3, 2005, petitioners provided an appraisal as of November 1, 2004, which was prepared by the same appraiser who had prepared the first appraisal. It showed an "as is" value for the home of $400,000. On October 11, 2005, petitioners submitted yet another appraisal as of October 5, 2005. That appraisal was prepared by a different appraiser and showed an "as is" value of $430,000. On October 21, 2005, petitioners provided respondent's Appeals officer with an inspection report, dated July 19, 2005.



Respondent's Appeals officer independently investigated the value of petitioners' home and identified a number of problems with petitioners' appraisals. For example, the Appeals officer discovered that three smaller properties in the same area were for sale for $500,000 to $650,000, but were not reflected in petitioners' appraisals. Additionally, a November 2004 sale of a smaller property in the same area for $780,000 was omitted. Furthermore, it appeared that property values in the area had increased by more than 70 percent in recent years, whereas petitioners' most recent appraisal reflected a much smaller increase, even though it appeared that petitioners had made major improvements on their property. The Appeals officer's report detailed the weaknesses of petitioners' appraisals.5



On November 3, 2005, respondent's Appeals officer advised petitioners that she could recommend acceptance of an amended offer-in-compromise for $129,361. The Appeals officer wrote: "Once you have returned the amended Offer form, I will forward the case to our Chief Counsel office for concurrence." Petitioners duly signed and submitted an amended offer-incompromise.6 Thereafter, the Appeals officer requested an opinion from respondent's Office of Chief Counsel as to the legal sufficiency of petitioners' $129,361 offer.



On March 26, 2006, respondent's Office of Chief Counsel responded to the Appeals officer that it was unable to determine whether petitioners' $129,361 offer-in-compromise was legally sufficient because the reasonable collection potential of petitioners' home had not been adequately determined. The Appeals officer was advised to request assistance from respondent's Engineering Group.7 The Appeals officer then forwarded all three of petitioners' appraisals to respondent's Engineering Group to ascertain whether the valuations were reasonable. On May 1, 2006, a member of respondent's Engineering Group, holding an MAI designation,8 informed the Appeals officer by letter that the current market value of petitioners' home might be 30 to 40 percent greater than that stated in petitioners' appraisals. Before reaching this conclusion, the Engineering Group member had reviewed additional sales in the subject market area.



Respondent's Office of Appeals rejected petitioners' $129,361 offer-in-compromise as inadequate and notified petitioners of this rejection on June 6, 2006. On the same date, respondent issued a notice of determination sustaining both the proposed levy and the filing of a Federal tax lien for the tax years in issue.



Petitioners timely filed their petition seeking our review of respondent's determination. Petitioners contend that: (1) Respondent rejected their $65,525 and $129,351 offers-incompromise "out of hand, without basis or reason" and (2) because petitioners submitted a certified appraisal supporting their valuation, respondent's Engineering Group likewise should have prepared a certified appraisal supporting its conclusions. Petitioners further claim that respondent should have continued to negotiate an acceptable offer-in-compromise, and respondent's failure to do so constituted an abuse of discretion.





Discussion



Section 6321 imposes a lien in favor of the United States on all property and property rights of a person who is liable for, and fails to pay, taxes after demand for payment has been made. The lien arises when assessment is made and continues until the assessed liability is paid or becomes unenforceable by lapse of time. Sec. 6322. For the lien to be valid against certain third parties, the Secretary must file a notice of Federal tax lien, and within 5 business days thereafter the Secretary must provide written notice to the taxpayer. Secs. 6320(a), 6323(a). The taxpayer may then request an administrative hearing before an Appeals officer. Sec. 6320(b)(1).



Section 6331(a) authorizes the Secretary to levy upon property and property rights of a taxpayer liable for taxes who fails to pay those taxes within 10 days after notice and demand for payment. Section 6331(d) provides that the levy authorized in section 6331(a) may be made with respect to any unpaid tax only after the Secretary has notified the person in writing of his intention to make the levy at least 30 days before any levy action is begun. Section 6330 elaborates on section 6331 and provides that upon a timely request a taxpayer is entitled to a collection hearing before respondent's Office of Appeals. Sec. 6330(a)(3)(B) and (b)(1). A request for a collection hearing must be made within the 30-day period commencing on the day after the date of the section 6330 notice. Sec. 6330(a)(3)(B),(2); sec. 301.6330-1(b)(1), Proced. & Admin. Regs.



If a hearing under section 6320 or 6330 is requested, the hearing is to be conducted by respondent's Office of Appeals, and, at the hearing, the Appeals officer conducting it must verify that the requirements of any applicable law or administrative procedure have been met. Secs. 6320(b)(1), (c), 6330(b)(1),(c)(1). To the extent practicable, a hearing under section 6320 is to be held in conjunction with a hearing under section 6330, and the conduct of the hearing is to be in accordance with the relevant provisions of section 6330. Sec. 6320(b)(4),(c). The taxpayer may raise at the hearing any relevant issue relating to the unpaid tax or the proposed levy. Secs. 6320(c), 6330(c)(2)(A).



At the conclusion of the hearing, the Appeals officer must determine whether and how to proceed with collection and take into account: (i) The relevant issues raised by the taxpayer, (ii) challenges to the underlying tax liability by the taxpayer, where permitted, and (iii) whether any proposed collection action balances the need for the efficient collection of taxes with the legitimate concern of the taxpayer that the collection action be no more intrusive than necessary. Secs. 6320(c), 6330(c)(3).



Section 7122(a) permits the Secretary to compromise any civil case arising under the internal revenue laws. Section 7122(c) requires the Secretary to prescribe guidelines for officers and employees of the IRS to determine whether an offer-in-compromise is adequate and should be accepted to resolve a dispute. Sec. 7122(a),(c)(1). Section 7122(b) provides that if the Secretary makes a compromise exceeding $50,000, an opinion of the General Counsel for the Department of the Treasury or his delegate shall be placed on file in the office of the Secretary. Sec. 301.7122-1(e)(6), Proced. & Admin. Regs.



The contemplated guidelines and schedules pertaining to evaluating offers-in-compromise on the basis of collectibility have been published in the regulations interpreting section 7122. See sec. 301.7122-1(c)(2), Proced. & Admin. Regs.; 1 Administration, Internal Revenue Manual (CCH), pt. 5.8.4.4, at 16,306. Under this administrative guidance, the Secretary will generally compromise a liability on the basis of doubt as to collectibility only if the liability exceeds the taxpayer's reasonable collection potential. Cf. Murphy v. Commissioner, 125 T.C. 301, 308-310 (2005), affd. 469 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2006). Furthermore, an offer to compromise based on doubt as to collectibility will be acceptable only if the offer reflects the taxpayer's reasonable collection potential; i.e., that amount, less than the full liability, that the IRS could collect through means such as administrative and judicial collection remedies. Id. at 309; Rev. Proc. 2003-71, sec. 4.02(2), 2003-2 C.B. 517, 517. The Secretary has no duty to negotiate with a taxpayer before rejecting the taxpayer's offer-in-compromise. Fargo v. Commissioner, 447 F.3d 706, 713 (9th Cir. 2006), affg. T.C. Memo. 2004-13; Catlow v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-47.



A taxpayer's reasonable collection potential is determined, in part, using the published guidelines for certain national and local allowances for basic living expenses and essentially treating income and assets in excess of those needed for basic living expenses as available to satisfy Federal income tax liabilities. See 2 Administration, Internal Revenue Manual (CCH), exh. 5.15.1-3, at 17,668, exh. 5.15.1-8, at 17,686, exh. 5.15.1-9, at 17,742.



The aforementioned formulaic approach is disregarded, however, upon a showing by the taxpayer of special circumstances that may cause an offer to be accepted notwithstanding that it is for less than the taxpayer's reasonable collection potential, e.g., the taxpayer is incapable of earning a living because of a long-term illness, and it is reasonably foreseeable that the taxpayer's financial resources will be exhausted providing for care and support during the course of the condition. Sec. 301.7122-1(b)(3), (c)(3), Proced. & Admin. Regs.; 1 Administration, Internal Revenue Manual (CCH), pt. 5.8.11.2.1, at 16,375, sec. 5.8.11.2.2, at 16,377. Petitioners do not allege, and it does not appear, that any such special circumstances are present.



Where, as here, the underlying tax liability is not at issue, we review respondent's determination for abuse of discretion.9 Sego v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 604, 610 (2000). This standard does not require us to decide what we think would be an acceptable offer-in-compromise. Murphy v. Commissioner, supra at 320. Rather, our review is to determine whether respondent's rejection of petitioners' offer-in-compromise was arbitrary, capricious, or without sound basis in fact or law. Id.



Petitioners do not suggest, and it does not appear from this record, that respondent failed to follow his own procedures in evaluating petitioners' offers-in-compromise or that those procedures were defective. Petitioners claim that respondent summarily refused to accept the values shown in the appraisals they submitted and consequently miscalculated their reasonable collection potential. That miscalculation, according to petitioners, led respondent to reject both their $65,525 offer-in-compromise, evaluated by respondent's Office of Chief Counsel in March of 2005, and their $129,361 offer-in-compromise, evaluated by respondent's Engineering Group in May of 2006, and constituted an abuse of discretion.



Respondent's Office of Chief Counsel identified a number of defects in petitioners' $65,525 offer-in-compromise, such as the outdated appraisals submitted in support of the claimed value of petitioners' home, the validity of an encumbrance placed on the mortgage by a member of petitioners' family, and the consequent value of petitioners' equity in the home. The Appeals officer also identified several problems with the more recent appraisals that petitioners then submitted.



Admittedly, the reviewing member of respondent's Engineering Group expressed her opinion concerning the value of petitioners' home in a letter to the Appeals officer, as opposed to a formal appraisal report. However, we do not believe that such an appraisal report was required.



The Engineering Group member reviewing petitioners' appraisals held an MAI designation. Her letter to the Appeals officer makes clear that she reached her conclusion after reviewing petitioners' appraisals10 and by conducting her own investigation with respect to other property sales in the subject market area.



The record shows that from the time petitioners submitted their first offer-in-compromise, a substantial divergence of opinion existed as to the value of petitioners' home. Respondent alerted petitioners to the fact that their appraisals were problematic, beginning with the first appraisal dated March 10, 2003. The bases of respondent's objections to the appraisals were explained.



Upon a review of the record, we cannot say that respondent's objections to petitioners' appraisals were arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or without sound basis in fact or law. Nor can we agree with petitioners that respondent's Engineering Group and/or Office of Appeals summarily rejected "out of hand" petitioners' valuation. Moreover, contrary to petitioners' assertion, respondent was under no obligation "to negotiate a new offer-incompromise figure" once respondent determined that petitioners' $129,361 offer-in-compromise was inadequate.



We hold that respondent did not abuse his discretion in rejecting petitioners' offer-in-compromise as inadequate. Consequently, we sustain respondent's determination that the proposed levy and filing of a Federal tax lien were appropriate.



To reflect the foregoing, Decision will be entered for respondent.


1 This case was submitted to Judge James S. Halpern on Nov. 26, 2007. The Chief Judge reassigned this case to Judge Julian I. Jacobs on Mar. 14, 2008.

2 Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code as amended, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.

3 This amount includes $4,629.93 owed for tax year 1999. Petitioners paid some of the taxes due after respondent issued the final notice of intent to levy. As a consequence, no tax is owed and respondent does not seek to collect any amount with respect to 1999.

4 As discussed infra, the reasonable collection potential with respect to the tax debt of a taxpayer is defined as the amount that can be collected from all available means and is generally calculated using: (1) The values of assets, (2) future income, (3) amounts collectible from third parties, and (4) assets and/or income that are available to the taxpayer but beyond the reach of the Government (e.g., assets to which a lien will not attach because they are outside the country). 1 Administration, Internal Revenue Manual (CCH), pt. 5.8.4.4.1, at 16,307.

5 The Appeals Officer's report identified other items requiring adjustment that are no longer at issue. For example, the Appeals officer adjusted the amount petitioners claimed as equity in their pension plans. In addition, the Appeals officer disregarded the "open end mortgage" held by William G. Schwartz's father, but made a $54,000 allowance for amounts from the father that had been used to pay a portion of petitioners' tax liabilities.

6 At that time petitioners' tax liability approximated $315,930.

7 Respondent's Engineering Group consists of experts who provide technical advice for field investigations.

8 MAI is a designation awarded to qualifying members of the Appraisal Institute (the body that resulted from the merger of the American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers and the Society of Real Estate Appraisers). Within the real estate appraisal community MAI is viewed as the highest regarded appraisal designation. See Estate of Auker v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-185.

9 Secs. 301.6320-1(f)(2), A-F5, and 301.6330-1(f)(2), A-F5, Proced. & Admin Regs., provide that in seeking Tax Court review of a notice of determination, the taxpayer can ask the Court to consider only an issue that was raised in the taxpayer's sec. 6320 and/or 6330 hearing. See Giamelli v. Commissioner, 129 T.C. 107, 113 (2007); Magana v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 488, 493 (2002). Petitioners raised various issues pertaining to their underlying tax liabilities in their requests for a hearing under secs. 6320 and 6330 but did not pursue those claims at the hearing, or at any time thereafter.

10 It is not clear from this record whether petitioners' appraisers held MAI designations. An MAI designation does not appear after their names on their appraisals, although petitioners refer to their "certified MIA appraisals" on brief.

Labels:

Monday, April 28, 2008

Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) Report: Fiscal Year 2008 Statutory Review of Compliance With Legal Guidelines When Issuing Levies (Reference Number: 2008-30-097)

April 28, 2008

Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) report : IRS levies : Compliance with IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 .




TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION





Fiscal Year 2008 Statutory Review of Compliance With Legal Guidelines When Issuing Levies





April 15, 2008





Reference Number: 2008-30-097





This report has cleared the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration disclosure review process and information determined to be restricted from public release has been redacted from this document.


Phone Number 202-622-6500

Email Address inquiries@tigta.treas.gov

Web Site http://www.tigta.gov




April 15, 2008


MEMORANDUM FOR COMMISSIONER, SMALL BUSINESS/SELF-EMPLOYED DIVISION

FROM: (for) Michael R. Phillips /s/ Margaret E. Begg


Deputy Inspector General for Audit


SUBJECT: Final Audit Report - Fiscal Year 2008 Statutory Review of Compliance With Legal Guidelines When Issuing Levies (Audit # 200830003)

This report presents the results of our review to determine whether the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has complied with 26 United States Code (U.S.C.) Section (§) 6330, Notice and Opportunity for Hearing Before Levy.1 This audit is statutorily required in each fiscal year.



Impact on the Taxpayer

The IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 19982 requires the IRS to notify taxpayers at least 30 calendar days before initiating any levy action to give taxpayers an opportunity to formally appeal the proposed levy. We determined the IRS is complying with the legal guidelines and protecting taxpayer rights.



Synopsis

This is the tenth annual report the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration has issued in compliance with the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 requirement to determine whether the IRS is complying with legal guidelines over the issuance of levies. Our prior reports have recognized that the IRS has implemented tighter controls related to systemically generated levies. This was due primarily to the development of systemic controls in both the Automated Collection System3 and the Integrated Collection System4 to prevent levies from being generated unless there were at least 30 calendar days between the date taxpayers received notice of their appeal rights and the date of the proposed levies. Our reviews for the past 5 years disclosed no weaknesses in the Automated Collection System and the Integrated Collection System systemic levy processes. Based on these results, we considered the systemic controls strong and concentrated this year's audit efforts on manual levies only. We did not test systemic levies.

Since Fiscal Year 2005, we have reported that revenue officers in field offices and Automated Collection System function customer service representatives properly notified taxpayers of their appeal rights when issuing manual levies.5 Our review this year of 30 Integrated Collection System and 30 Automated Collection System manual levies issued between July 1, 2006, and June 30, 2007, showed revenue officers and customer service representatives continued to properly inform taxpayers of their rights at least 30 calendar days prior to issuing the levies.

During last fiscal year's audit, we reported that the IRS did not always contact taxpayers or send reminder notices about potential enforcement actions when more than 180 calendar days had passed since the date of the notification letters. The IRS implemented program changes in the Automated Collection System to correctly address this issue. We tested the effectiveness of these changes and determined that the IRS appropriately sent reminders or had contacted taxpayers within 180 calendar days of levy for all cases in our sample.



Recommendations

We made no recommendations in this report. However, key IRS management officials reviewed it prior to issuance and agreed with the facts and conclusions presented.

Copies of this report are also being sent to the IRS managers affected by this report. Please contact me at (202) 622-6510 if you have questions or Margaret E. Begg, Acting Assistant Inspector General for Audit (Small Business and Corporate Programs), at (202) 622-8510.




Table of Contents




Background



Results of Review

Employees Properly Notified Taxpayers of Their Appeal Rights Prior to Issuing Manual Levies



Appendices

Appendix I - Detailed Objective, Scope, and Methodology

Appendix II - Major Contributors to This Report

Appendix III - Report Distribution List

Appendix IV - Example of Levy (Form 668-B)


Abbreviations



ACS Automated Collection System

ICS Integrated Collection System

IRS Internal Revenue Service

U.S.C. United States Code







Background


The Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration is required to annually verify whether the IRS is complying with the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 requirement to notify the taxpayer at least 30 calendar days before initiating a levy action.

When taxpayers do not pay delinquent taxes, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has the authority to work directly with financial institutions and other third parties to seize taxpayers' assets. This action is commonly referred to as a "levy" (see Appendix IV for an example of a Levy (Form 668-B)). The IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 19986 requires the IRS to notify the taxpayer at least 30 calendar days before initiating a levy action to give the taxpayer an opportunity to formally appeal the proposed levy.

The IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 also requires the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration to annually verify whether the IRS is complying with the provisions. This is the tenth year in which we have evaluated the controls over levies.

Two operations within the IRS issue levies to collect delinquent taxes:


Ÿ The Automated Collection System (ACS), through which customer service representatives contact delinquent taxpayers by telephone to collect unpaid taxes and secure tax returns.



Ÿ The Collection Field function, where revenue officers contact delinquent taxpayers in person as the final step in the collection process. Field contact becomes necessary when the ACS function does not resolve the tax matter. Delinquent cases assigned to revenue officers in the field offices are controlled and monitored with the automated Integrated Collection System (ICS).


Both operations issue two types of levies: systemically generated levies and manual levies. Virtually all levies issued by customer service representatives are generated through the ACS. To comply with requirements in the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, the ACS contains a control that prevents a levy from being generated if there are fewer than 30 calendar days between the date the taxpayer was notified of the pending levy and the date requested for the actual issuance of the levy. This control is designed to ensure that taxpayers have been notified at least 30 calendar days prior to issuance of the levies and have been informed of their appeal rights for any systemically generated levies. In addition, managers approve all levy actions. Even when an employee manually generates the request for a levy (as opposed to the system generating the request), the systemic controls of at least 30 calendar days' notice and managerial approval are in place.

The ICS includes a control-similar to the control in the ACS-that prevents revenue officers from issuing levies unless taxpayers have received 30 calendar days' notice and have been informed of their appeal rights. If fewer than 30 calendar days have elapsed since the final notice date, the ICS will not generate a levy.

Previous Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration audit reports7 have recognized that the IRS has significantly improved controls over the issuance of systemically generated levies, primarily due to the development of these systemic controls in both the ACS and ICS. Our reviews for the past 5 fiscal years disclosed no weaknesses in the ACS and ICS systemic levy processes. Based on these results, we consider the controls to be strong. Therefore, we concentrated this year's audit efforts on manual levies only and did not test systemic levies.

There is a higher risk when revenue officers issue manual levies because they request these levies outside of the systemic controls that exist and there is no managerial approval required. Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration audit reports issued prior to Fiscal Year 2005 reported that additional controls were needed over manual levies issued by revenue officers.8 The IRS issued an ICS Alert on March 5, 2004, reminding employees to ensure that taxpayer rights are protected whenever a manual levy is issued. Since our Fiscal Year 2005 report,9 we have reported that revenue officers properly notified taxpayers of their right to a hearing when issuing manual levies. However, we consider the risk higher and continued to test the manual levies.

Because the ICS is not generating the levies, we cannot be assured that there is a complete automated trail for manual levies. Therefore, it is impossible to reliably determine the exact number of manual levies issued by revenue officers during our review period. However, we estimate that customer service representatives manually generated about 22 percent of all levies issued through the ACS during our audit period. We estimate that revenue officer requests for manual levies totaled less than 1 percent of all levies requested by revenue officers.

This review was performed at the Small Business/Self-Employed Division National Headquarters in the Collection office in New Carrollton, Maryland, during the period August 2007 through January 2008. We conducted this performance audit in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective. Detailed information on our audit objective, scope, and methodology is presented in Appendix I. Major contributors to the report are listed in Appendix II.




Results of Review




Employees Properly Notified Taxpayers of Their Appeal Rights Prior to Issuing Manual Levies

Although the ACS function primarily issues levies systemically, customer service representatives may also request manual levies under certain circumstances, such as levies on Individual Retirement Arrangements and in jeopardy situations.10 Manual levies require the same advance notification to the taxpayer as systemic levies, except in cases involving jeopardy situations. IRS procedures require that manual levies issued by customer service representatives be reviewed and approved by a manager prior to the levies being issued. We consider this managerial review to be an effective control.

We analyzed the case histories for ACS function cases to identify any manual levies issued between July 1, 2006, and June 30, 2007. Because there is no automated audit trail produced for manual levies, we used employee and action codes11 as the basis to identify any potential manual levies issued by ACS function employees. Our review of 30 manual levies issued by customer service representatives showed the IRS adequately protected taxpayers' appeal rights.

Our review of 30 ACS function and 30 ICS manual levies determined the IRS protected taxpayers' appeal rights in these cases.

Revenue officers issue levies systemically through the ICS in most cases. They are also authorized to issue a manual levy on any case as needed. While managerial approval is mandatory for manual levies issued by the ACS function, no review or approval is required when revenue officers issue manual levies. We believe there is a high risk associated with manual levies because no review is required.

We analyzed the ICS case inventory assigned to revenue officers to identify any manual levies issued between July 1, 2006, and June 30, 2007. Because no automated audit trail is produced for manual levies, we analyzed case history comments for any reference to a manual levy. Using this methodology, we identified cases in which a manual levy was issued to seize taxpayers' assets and reviewed a sample of 30 cases. In all 30 cases, taxpayers received proper notification of their rights.



The ACS is sending reminder notices to taxpayers when 180 calendar days have passed since issuance of the notification letters

IRS guidelines state that, if a notice of intent to levy is more than 180 calendar days old, it is legally sufficient to support consequent collection action by levy. However, the IRS has administratively determined that the taxpayer will get a new warning of enforcement action before a notice of levy is issued. This warning can be given orally through contact with the taxpayer or in writing through issuance of an ACS letter. During last fiscal year's audit, we reported that this was not always being done in the ACS function. The IRS implemented programming changes to correct this. During this audit, we followed up to determine if those programming changes were effective.

We evaluated the effectiveness of program changes to the ACS for sending reminder notices to taxpayers about potential enforcement actions when more than 180 calendar days had passed since the date of the notification letters and there had been no taxpayer contact. Our review of 30 manual levies issued more than 180 calendar days after the original notices of intent to levy had been sent showed the ACS function sent appropriate reminder letters if there had been no other contacts with taxpayers within 180 calendar days of the date of the notices.



Appendix I




Detailed Objective, Scope, and Methodology


The overall objective of this review was to determine whether the IRS has complied with 26 United States Code (U.S.C.) Section (§) 6330, Notice and Opportunity for Hearing Before Levy.12 To accomplish our objective, we:

I. Determined whether manual levies issued by both revenue officers and ACS13 function customer service representatives complied with legal guidelines in 26 U.S.C. §6330.


A. Identified any references to manual levies issued between July 1, 2006, and June 30, 2007, by querying the history narrative text field of the ICS14 open case inventories. We identified and reviewed a judgmental sample of 30 manual levies from the open ICS cases. We used judgmental sampling because we could not identify the population of manual levies issued.



B. By using the employee and action codes15 on the ACS, identified 433,523 employee-requested levies on the ACS between July 1, 2006, and June 30, 2007, and randomly selected a sample of 30 manual levies.



C. Requested case history files for all cases containing references to manual levies identified in Steps I.A. and I.B.



D. Reviewed case history documentation and identified whether a revenue officer or an ACS function customer service representative had issued a manual levy.



E. Analyzed Master File16 transcripts and ACS and ICS history files to determine whether taxpayers were provided at least 30 calendar days' notice prior to any levy actions initiated by the IRS.



F. Validated data from the ACS and ICS by relying on Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration Data Center Warehouse17 site procedures that ensure that data received from the IRS are valid. The Data Center Warehouse performs various procedures to ensure that it receives all the records in the ACS, ICS, and IRS databases. In addition, we scanned the data for reasonableness and are satisfied that the data are sufficient, complete, and relevant to the review. All the levies identified are in the appropriate period, and the data appear to be logical. This data validation also applied to Step II.


II. Determined the effectiveness of program changes on the ACS for sending reminder notices to taxpayers about potential enforcement actions when more than 180 calendar days have passed since the date of the notification letters and there has been no taxpayer contact.


A. Identified one levy per taxpayer issued more than 180 calendar days from the date of the notification letter between June 1, 2007, and June 30, 2007, by querying the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration Data Center Warehouse ACS database using the codes for levies and letters. We selected 1 month of levies due to the large volume of data. We identified a population of 20,037 levies and randomly selected 30 levies.



B. Reviewed Master File, ACS, and Desktop Integration18 histories and action codes to determine whether reminder notices had been sent or contacts with taxpayers had been made within 180 calendar days of the levy.




Appendix II




Major Contributors to This Report


Margaret E. Begg, Acting Assistant Inspector General for Audit (Small Business and Corporate Programs)

Carl Aley, Director

Lynn Wofchuck, Audit Manager

Pillai Sittampalam, Lead Auditor

Christina Dreyer, Senior Auditor



Appendix III




Report Distribution List


Commissioner C

Office of the Commissioner - Attn: Acting Chief of Staff C

Deputy Commissioner for Services and Enforcement SE

Deputy Commissioner, Small Business/Self-Employed Division SE:S

Director, Campus Compliance Services, Small Business/Self-Employed Division SE:S:CCS

Director, Collection, Small Business/Self-Employed Division SE:S:C

Director, Collection Policy, Small Business/Self-Employed Division SE:S:C:CP

Chief Counsel CC

National Taxpayer Advocate TA

Director, Office of Legislative Affairs CL:LA

Director, Office of Program Evaluation and Risk Analysis RAS:O

Office of Internal Control OS:CFO:CPIC:IC

Audit Liaison: Commissioner, Small Business/Self-Employed Division SE:S



Appendix IV




Example of Levy (Form 668-B)


The form was removed due to its size. To see the form, please go to the Adobe PDF version of the report on the TIGTA Public Web Page.

1 26 U.S.C. §6330 (Supp. IV 1998) as amended by the Trade Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, 116 Stat. 933; the Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-147, 116 Stat. 21 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.); the Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-134, 115 Stat. 2427 (2002); and the Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763.

2 Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 5 U.S.C. app., 16 U.S.C., 19 U.S.C., 22 U.S.C., 23 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C., 38 U.S.C., and 49 U.S.C.).

3 A telephone contact system through which telephone assistors collect unpaid taxes and secure tax returns from delinquent taxpayers who have not complied with previous notices.

4 An automated system used to control and monitor delinquent cases assigned to revenue officers in the field offices.

5 Taxpayer Rights Are Being Protected When Levies Are Issued (Reference Number 2005-30-072, dated June 2005); Fiscal Year 2006 Statutory Review of Compliance With Legal Guidelines When Issuing Levies (Reference Number 2006-30-101, dated August 4, 2006); and Fiscal Year 2007 Statutory Review of Compliance With Legal Guidelines When Issuing Levies (Reference Number 2007-30-070, dated April 20, 2007).

6 Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 5 U.S.C. app., 16 U.S.C., 19 U.S.C., 22 U.S.C., 23 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C., 38 U.S.C., and 49 U.S.C.).

7 The Internal Revenue Service Does Not Have Controls Over Manual Levies to Protect the Rights of Taxpayers (Reference Number 2003-40-129, dated June 2003); The Internal Revenue Service Has Improved Controls Over the Issuance of Levies, But More Should Be Done (Reference Number 2002-40-176, dated September 2002); The Internal Revenue Service Complied With Levy Requirements (Reference Number 2001-10-113, dated July 2001); and The Internal Revenue Service Has Significantly Improved Its Compliance With Levy Requirements (Reference Number 2000-10-150, dated September 2000).

8 Additional Efforts Are Needed to Ensure Taxpayer Rights Are Protected When Manual Levies Are Issued (Reference Number 2004-30-094, dated April 2004) and The Internal Revenue Service Does Not Have Controls Over Manual Levies to Protect the Rights of Taxpayers (Reference Number 2003-40-129, dated June 2003).

9 Taxpayer Rights Are Being Protected When Levies Are Issued (Reference Number 2005-30-072, dated June 2005); Fiscal Year 2006 Statutory Review of Compliance With Legal Guidelines When Issuing Levies (Reference Number 2006-30-101, dated August 4, 2006); and Fiscal Year 2007 Statutory Review of Compliance With Legal Guidelines When Issuing Levies (Reference Number 2007-30-070, dated April 20, 2007).

10 A jeopardy situation occurs when the IRS is concerned that the taxpayer may attempt to hide or dispose of assets to prevent enforced collection actions.

11 The action code shows what action was taken, such as levy. The employee code shows whether there was a system-generated action or an employee-generated action.

12 26 U.S.C. §6330 (Supp. IV 1998) as amended by the Trade Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, 116 Stat. 933; the Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-147, 116 Stat. 21 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.); the Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-134, 115 Stat. 2427 (2002); and the Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763.

13 A telephone contact system through which telephone assistors collect unpaid taxes and secure tax returns from delinquent taxpayers who have not complied with previous notices.

14 An automated system used to control and monitor delinquent cases assigned to revenue officers in the field offices.

15 The action code shows what action was taken, such as levy. The employee code shows whether there was a system-generated action or an employee-generated action.

16 The IRS database that stores various types of taxpayer account information. This database includes individual, business, and employee plans and exempt organizations data.

17 A centralized storage and administration of files that provides data and data access services of IRS data.

18 The IRS system that provides multiple system interfaces using only one computer terminal. Users can access various IRS data systems through one computer.

Labels:

Friday, April 25, 2008

Section 6694 contact information

Chief Counsel Notice CC-2008-013

April 25, 2008

Code Sec. 6694

Chief Counsel Notice : Tax return preparer penalties : Understatement of tax liability .



Department of the Treasury



Internal Revenue Service



Office of Chief Counsel



Notice CC-2008-013



April 11, 2008

Subject: Coordination of Section 6694 Penalty

Cancel Date : Effective Until Further Notice



PURPOSE

This Notice instructs Chief Counsel attorneys on how to advise the Internal Revenue Service regarding the tax return preparer penalty provisions under section 6694 of the Internal Revenue Code and the related definitional provisions, as amended by the Small Business and Work Opportunity Tax Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-28, 121 Stat. 190.



COORDINATION OF SECTION 6694 PENALTY

Section 8246 of the Act amended several provisions of the Code to extend the application of the income tax return preparer penalties to all tax return preparers, alter the standards of conduct that must be met to avoid imposition of the section 6694(a) penalty for preparing a return which reflects an understatement of liability, and increase applicable penalties under section 6694(a) and (b). The amendments to section 6694 are effective for tax returns and claims for refund prepared after May 25, 2007. The Department of Treasury and IRS issued Notice 2008-13, which provides interim guidance regarding implementation of the tax return preparer penalty provisions until final regulations are published. Notice 2008-13 also solicited public comments regarding the revision of the regulatory scheme governing tax return preparer penalties. The Treasury Department and the IRS intend to finalize the revision of the tax return preparer regulations by the end of 2008.

Until the revised tax return preparer penalty regulations are issued, Chief Counsel attorneys must consult with the Office of the Associate Chief Counsel (Procedure and Administration) on any issues under section 6694 and the related definitional provisions as amended by the Act.

Questions regarding this Notice should be directed to Procedure & Administration Branch 1 at (202) 622-4910 or Branch 2 at (202) 622-4940.

Deborah A. Butler

Associate Chief Counsel

(Procedure & Administration)

Labels:

Back dated stock options

The practice of granting options with a discounted exercise price can have adverse tax consequences for the corporation issuing the option. Generally, IRC section 162(m) provides a $1 million annual limit on the deduction allowed for compensation paid to each of the CEO and four other highest compensated officers in a publicly traded corporation. Treasury Regulations section 1.162-27(e)(2)(vi) provides a "qualified performance based compensation" exception to the $1 million deduction limit for compensation attributable to option exercises if the option exercise price equals or exceeds the per share value on the grant date and certain other requirements are met. A failure to satisfy this requirement may cause compensation attributable to the option exercise to be subject to the $1 million deduction limit. Treasury Regulations section 1.162-27(e)(2)(vii), Example 9.


Large and Mid Size Business Division Industry Directive on Backdated Stock Options Directive #2

April 25, 2008

Code Sec. 422

Internal Revenue Service : Large and Mid Size Business Division : Backdated stock options : Industry directive : Tier II designation .



Internal Revenue Service



United States Department of the Treasury



Industry Director Directive on Backdated Stock Options Directive #2

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20224



Large and Mid-Size Division



LMSB Control No. 4-0308-017



Impacted IRM 4.51.5



April 22, 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR: INDUSTRY DIRECTORS
DIRECTOR, PREFILING AND TECHNICAL GUIDANCE

DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL COMPLIANCE STRATEGY AND

POLICY

FROM: Laura M. Prendergast / s / Laura M. Prendergast
Director, Field Specialists

SUBJECT: Tier I Issue - Backdated Stock Options Directive #2

The Backdated Stock Option (BSO) Issue has been removed from Tier I status and will be designated as a Tier II issue.



Change of Status

The BSO issue was originally designated as Tier I due to intense public and Congressional interest. The level of importance for maintaining Tier I status has diminished as field personnel are now better equipped to identify and examine this issue. Based on the progress of BSO examinations, this issue no longer requires Tier I monitoring and has been moved into Tier II status. Tier II will allow the Issue Management Team (IMT) to assist ongoing examinations through completion and continue to provide field support for the issues.

This directive amends the Tier status and reporting requirements outlined in Directive #1.



Examination Guidance

Issue guidance and support will continue through the LMSB Executive Compensation Technical Advisors and the IMT. Reporting requirements will be eased and no additional BSO Tier I cases will be assigned to the field by the IMT. The following changes will be implemented for the Tier I cases assigned to the field:
1. Monthly reporting by the case agent will be eliminated after submission of the April 10, 2008 report.

2. A closing report continues to be required upon completion of the examination of the issues.

3. Non assertion of penalties continues to require IMT approval prior to any penalty discussion with the taxpayer.

4. UIL, Project and Tracking Codes continue to be mandatory and will conform to those outlined in Directive #1.

These requirements will remain in place until all cases assigned to the field have been completed or such time as the Issue Owner Executive issues a directive eliminating these actions.



Contact:

If examiners need further assistance, they should contact the Executive Compensation Technical Advisors.

This Directive is not an official pronouncement of law or the position of the Service and can not be used, cited, or relied upon as such.

cc: Commissioner, LMSB

Deputy Commissioner, Operations

Deputy Commissioner, International

Division Counsel, LMSB

Commissioner, SBSE

Chief, Appeals

Directors, Field Operations

Director, Performance, Quality, Audit Assistance and Service

2007ARD 135-7 IRS Large and Mid-Size Business Division (LMSB) Industry Directive on Backdated Stock Options July 13, 2007
Backdated stock options: Internal Revenue Service: Large and Mid-Size Business Division.



Industry Director Directive on Backdated Stock Options Directive #1

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20224

Large and Mid-Size Division



LMSB Control No. 04-0407-036



Impacted IRM 4.51.5

June 15, 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR INDUSTRY DIRECTORS
DIRECTOR, PREFILING AND TECHNICAL GUIDANCE

DIRECTOR, INTERNATONAL COMPLIANCE STRATEGY AND POLICY

FROM: Walter Harris /s/ Walter L. Harris
Director, Field Specialists

SUBJECT: Tier I Issue - Backdated Stock Options Directive # 1

The Backdated Stock Options Issue has been designated as an LMSB Tier I issue. Laura M. Prendergast, Deputy Director, Field Specialist has been named as Issue Owner Executive for this Tier I issue and will be responsible for ensuring that the issue is identified, developed and resolved in a consistent manner.

Background/Strategic Importance:

This issue was identified from media reports of a practice among some publicly traded companies to backdate stock option exercise prices to a date that provides a lower cost to acquire the underlying stock. This issue also exists for stock options described as discounted, mis-priced, mis-dated, or in-the-money, and may arise from clerical or other errors in addition to deliberate backdating. Over one hundred companies have confirmed backdating stock options in SEC filings and press releases. Many are the subject of investigations by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and/or the Department of Justice (DOJ).

Stock options provide the right to purchase company stock on a future date at a set price (the exercise or strike price), and this right is normally exercised when the per share stock value is above the exercise price. Typically, when options are granted, the exercise price is set at the per share value on the grant date so that the option holder will profit from the option only if the stock price increases after the grant date. A backdated option provides the holder with a "built-in" profit on the option at the time of grant, which may result in the company having to accrue a charge against its earnings for financial accounting purposes.

The practice of granting options with a discounted exercise price can have adverse tax consequences for the corporation issuing the option. Generally, IRC section 162(m) provides a $1 million annual limit on the deduction allowed for compensation paid to each of the CEO and four other highest compensated officers in a publicly traded corporation. Treasury Regulations section 1.162-27(e)(2)(vi) provides a "qualified performance based compensation" exception to the $1 million deduction limit for compensation attributable to option exercises if the option exercise price equals or exceeds the per share value on the grant date and certain other requirements are met. A failure to satisfy this requirement may cause compensation attributable to the option exercise to be subject to the $1 million deduction limit. Treasury Regulations section 1.162-27(e)(2)(vii), Example 9.

This practice can also have adverse tax consequences for an individual taxpayer. First, such options will not qualify as "incentive stock options" under IRC section 422. As a result, if a discounted option was intended to be an incentive stock option, the issuing corporation may have an obligation to withhold and pay income and employment taxes when the option is exercised and the individual taxpayer may owe additional taxes at the time of exercise. Second, options granted with a discounted exercise price may be subject to IRC section 409A, relating to nonqualified deferred compensation. Section 409A generally does not apply to options granted before January 1, 2005, but it does apply to discounted options that were not earned and vested as of December 31, 2004, and to discounted options that were materially modified after October 3, 2004. Under the transition rules, taxpayers generally may amend options until December 31, 2007 to avoid problems under section 409A. However, for options granted to a person who, as of the date of grant, was subject to the disclosure requirements of section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, transition relief generally is available only if the option was amended by December 31, 2006. Notice 2005-1, 2005-2 I.R.B. 274, Q&A 4(d); Preamble to Proposed Regulations §1.409A, 70 Fed. Reg. 57956 (October 4, 2005); Notice 2006-79, 2006-43 IRB 763; Notice 2006-100, 2006-51, IRB 1109; T.D. 9321 Final Regulations §1.409A 72 FR 19234 (April 17, 2007). If a taxpayer fails to comply with section 409A, the taxpayer would be required to include the deferred income under the option in taxable income, pay an additional 20% tax, and an additional tax calculated by reference to interest on the taxes the executive saved by not reporting the deferred income in earlier years.

Issue Tracking:

To better identify and analyze patterns, trends and the compliance impact of the Backdated Stock Options Issue, the following issue tracking procedures are now required on all open examinations in which this issue has been identified.
1. On ERCS, Tracking Code 0537 and/or Project Code 0537 is required to be manually input on all Backdated Stock Option issues at the examination level.

2. On IMS, examiners need to accurately identify the proper UIL code.

 UIL Codes used to track issue on IMS for cases input after April 1, 2007:

o 162.40-00 - Compensation Limitation due to the backdating or discounting of Stock options for covered employees (162(m))

o 422.06-00 - Conversion of incentive stock options to nonstatutory options due to backdating or discounting of the option

o 409A.01-00 - Conversion of incentive stock options to nonstatutory options due to backdating or discounting of exercised stock options.

Planning and Examination Guidance:

The determination as to the existence of any Backdated Stock Option Issues should be addressed at the beginning of each examination to ensure proper statute control procedures are in place to address this issue at the individual level.

When addressing backdated stock options issues, examiners must follow the issued guidance including this Industry Directive. If assistance is needed, examiners should contact one of the Executive Compensation Technical Advisors. An information document request (IDR) should be issued early in the examination.

Planning and Examination Risk Analysis:

This is a Tier I Compliance Issue and therefore is a mandatory examination item for taxpayers with backdated stock option grant and/or exercise prices. The field should address issues including section 162(m), section 422, section 409A and other relevant issues and challenge arguments by taxpayers who have not complied with the provisions of these Code sections. Examination results should be reported to the Issue Owner Executive.

Audit Techniques:

Section 162(m) Audit Technique Guide

Section 422 Stock Based Compensation Audit Technique Guide

Section 409A - Refer to section 409A guidance noted above for this issue. The Final Regulations and the Notices are available on http://www.irs.gov/.

Contact:

If examiners need further assistance, they should contact one of the Executive Compensation Technical Advisors.

This Directive is not an official pronouncement of law or the position of the Service and can not be used, or cited, or relied upon as such.

Attachment

cc: Commissioner, LMSB
Deputy Commissioner, LMSB

Labels:

Thursday, April 24, 2008

§§704, 734 and 743 under AJCA prevent taxpayers from shifting a built-in loss from a tax indifferent party to a U.S. taxpayer through the use of a partnership. The IRSW e DAT variation of the transaction as a listed transaction under §1.6011-4(b)(2) for transactions that are entered into after October 22, 2004.


IRS Memorandum: Distressed Asset Trust (DAT) Transaction; Designation as Coordinated Issue

April 24, 2008

Large and Mid-Size Business Division (LMSB) : Coordinated issue : Distressed asset trust (DAT) transaction .



Coordinated Issue for All Industries: Distressed Asset Trust (DAT) Transaction



LMSB-04-0308-012



April 16, 2008



MEMORANDUM FOR COMMISSIONER, SMALL BUSINESS/SELF-EMPLOYED


DIVISION



LMSB INDUSTRY AND FIELD SPECIALISTS DIRECTORS



DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL COMPLIANCE, STRATEGY



AND POLICY




FROM: Frank Y. Ng /s/ Frank Y. Ng


Commissioner, Large and Mid-Size Business Division




SUBJECT: Coordinated Issue for All Industries: Distressed Asset Trust (DAT)



Transaction

Pursuant to IRM 4.51.2.5, the transaction described in Notice 2008-34 (Distressed Asset Trust Transaction) should be treated as a coordinated issue effective February 27, 2008.

Notice 2008-34 (attached) describes a transaction in which a tax indifferent party, directly or indirectly, contributes one or more distressed assets (for example, a creditor's interests in debt) with a high basis and low fair market value to a trust (Main Trust) and/or series of trusts and/or sub-trusts, and a U.S. taxpayer (Taxpayer) acquires an interest in the trust (and/or series of trusts and/or sub-trusts) for the purpose of shifting a built-in loss from the tax indifferent party to the Taxpayer that has not incurred the economic loss.


Ÿ The notice alerts taxpayers and their representatives that these transactions are tax avoidance transactions and identifies these transactions, and substantially similar transactions, as listed transactions for purposes of Treas. Reg. §1.6011-4(b)(2) and IRC §§6111 and 6112, effective February 27, 2008.



Ÿ The notice also alerts persons involved with these transactions to certain responsibilities that may arise from their involvement with these transactions.



Ÿ The notice provides that the Service may assert one or more arguments that may include, but are not limited to the following:



(1) The Taxpayer's transfer of cash or a note to Main-Trust (and/or series of trusts and/or sub-trusts) in exchange for certificates of beneficial interest is a transfer of the distressed assets under IRC §1001;



(2) The Main-Trust does not meet the trust requirements of Treas. Reg. §301.7701-4;



(3) The Main-Trust is not a taxable trust;



(4) One or more of the entities is properly classified for Federal tax purposes as a partnership subject to IRC §§704(c)(1)(C), 734(b) and 743;



(5) The claimed loss deduction under IRC §165 was not incurred in a transaction undertaken for profit;



(6) The judicial doctrines, including substance over form, lack of economic substance, and step transaction, and



(7) In the case of distressed debt, the distressed debt was worthless under IRC §166 at the time of contribution to Main-Trust (and/or any series of trust and/or sub-trusts).


If this transaction surfaces during an examination, it must be raised as an issue following the guidance position set forth in the listing notice. Examiners should contact the Technical Advisor listed below and provide the name of the taxpayer, taxable period(s) involved, type of listed transaction, and the name of the promoter, if known. LMSB examiners should include the names and phone numbers of the Team Manager and Team Coordinator. SB/SE examiners should include the name and phone number of their Group Manager. The initial contact may be via e-mail (utilizing secure messaging), fax or telephone.

In addition, examiners should consult with the Technical Advisor and local assigned DAT Counsel on the development of the issue. Examiners must secure the concurrence of the Technical Advisor if their examination deviates from any mandated specific examination techniques proposed for issue development, or their proposal for adjustment deviates from any stated legal positions. Examiners must also consult with and secure the concurrence of the Technical Advisor and Counsel before proposing any resolution other than full concession of the issue by the taxpayer. No proposals can be made without the concurrence of the Issue Champion listed below.

The Issue Champion and technical contacts for this issue are:


Ÿ Issue Champion: Larry Barnes



Director Field Operations (East)



Heavy Manufacturing & Transportation



(732) 452-8103



Ÿ Technical Advisor: Patricia Ugorowski



Partnership



Phone: (517) 324-7909



FAX: (517) 324-7910



e-mail: patricia.ugorowski@irs.gov



Ÿ Associate Area Counsel: John Guarnieri



(215) 597-3442


This memorandum is not a Coordinated Issue Paper within the meaning of IRM 4.51.2.4 and should not be cited as such.

If you have any questions, please contact me, or a member of your staff may contact Patricia Ugorowski, Partnership Technical Advisor, at (517) 324-7909.

Attachment



Internal Revenue Bulletin: 2008-12



March 24, 2008



Notice 2008-34



Distressed Asset Trust (DAT) Transaction



Table of Contents


Ÿ Background



Ÿ FACTS



Ÿ DISCUSSION



Ÿ DRAFTING INFORMATION


The Internal Revenue Service (Service) and the Treasury Department are aware of a type of transaction, described below, in which a tax indifferent party, directly or indirectly, contributes one or more distressed assets (for example, a creditor's interest in debt) with a high basis and low fair market value to a trust or series of trusts and sub-trusts, and a U.S. taxpayer acquires an interest in the trust (and/or series of trusts and/or sub-trusts) for the purpose of shifting a built-in loss from the tax indifferent party to the U.S. taxpayer that has not incurred the economic loss. This notice alerts taxpayers and their representatives that this transaction (referred to as a distressed asset trust or DAT transaction) is a tax avoidance transaction and identifies this transaction, and substantially similar transactions, as listed transactions for purposes of §1.6011-4(b)(2) of the Income Tax Regulations and §§6111 and 6112 of the Internal Revenue Code. This notice also alerts persons involved with these transactions to certain responsibilities that may arise from their involvement with these transactions.



BACKGROUND

The Service and Treasury Department are aware that, prior to October 23, 2004, taxpayers used partnerships improperly to engage in variations of the distressed asset transaction described in this notice. The Coordinated Issue Paper, "Distressed Asset/Debt Coordinated Issue Paper," LMSB-04-0407-031 (Apr. 18, 2007) describes the variation of the distressed asset transaction involving partnerships (DAD). The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Public Law 108-357 (118 Stat. 1418) (AJCA), amended §§704, 734 and 743 effective after October 22, 2004, for contributions of built-in loss property to a partnership, for basis adjustment rules in the case of a distribution for which there is a substantial basis reduction, and for basis adjustment rules in the case of a transfer of a partnership interest for which there is a substantial built-in loss. The revisions to §§704, 734 and 743 generally (1) require that a built-in loss may be taken into account only by the contributing partner and not other partners, and (2) make the basis adjustment rules mandatory in cases with a substantial basis reduction or substantial built-in loss. Thus, the statutory changes to §§704, 734 and 743 under AJCA prevent taxpayers from shifting a built-in loss from a tax indifferent party to a U.S. taxpayer through the use of a partnership. The Service and Treasury Department have learned that a variation of the distressed asset transaction using a trust is being promoted in an attempt to avoid these revisions made by AJCA. Consequently, this notices identifies the DAT variation of the transaction as a listed transaction under §1.6011-4(b)(2) for transactions that are entered into after October 22, 2004.



FACTS

In a DAT transaction, a tax indifferent party creates a trust (Main-Trust) with X as trustee. The tax indifferent party contributes distressed assets directly or indirectly (through a partnership or otherwise) to Main-Trust, and is described as the grantor and beneficiary of Main-Trust.

A U.S. taxpayer (Taxpayer) transfers cash or a note to Main-Trust in exchange for certificates evidencing units of beneficial interest in Main-Trust. The cash or note approximately equals the fair market value of the distressed assets. Under the terms of the Main-Trust agreement, Taxpayer thereby becomes a beneficiary of Main-Trust.

The parties contend that Main-Trust is a trust for tax purposes with the stated purpose of preserving and protecting assets. Thus, the parties contend that Main-Trust is to be taxed as a trust under the Internal Revenue Code, and not as a business entity described in §301.7701-2 of the Procedure and Administration Regulations. As a result, the parties contend that under §1015(b), Main-Trust's basis in the distressed assets is the same as the grantor's basis in the distressed assets (in this case, the tax indifferent party's basis).

Under the Main-Trust agreement, X, the trustee, is permitted to establish one or more sub-trusts of Main-Trust, each for a separate beneficiary of Main-Trust who will then be the sole beneficiary of that sub-trust. The Main-Trust agreement further provides that each sub-trust for a beneficiary constitutes a separate and distinct sub-trust of Main-Trust with beneficial interest certificates issued and separate records maintained for each sub-trust.

As permitted under the Main-Trust agreement, the trustee creates a separate sub-trust (Sub-Trust), transfers certificates evidencing units of beneficial interest in Sub-Trust (Sub-Trust Certificates) to Taxpayer, and allocates the distressed assets to Sub-Trust for the sole benefit of the beneficiary of the Sub-Trust. The Main-Trust agreement entitles the holder of Sub-Trust Certificates to various rights including the right to direct the trustee to vest the holder's ratable share of the corpus or the income of Sub-Trust in the holder. The Taxpayer contends that the existence of these rights causes the Taxpayer to be considered the owner of Sub-Trust under §678, and that Sub-Trust is a grantor trust. As a result of being treated as the owner of Sub-Trust, the Taxpayer takes into account those items of income, deductions, and credits against tax, which are attributable to Sub-Trust, to the extent that such items would be taken into account in computing taxable income or credits against the tax of an individual. Section 671. The Taxpayer contends that Sub-Trust's basis in the distressed assets is the same as the grantor's basis in the distressed assets (in this case Main-Trust's basis). Section 1015(b). Within a short period of time, the distressed assets held by the Sub-Trust are written off as wholly worthless under §166. Alternatively, the distressed assets are sold, and Taxpayer claims a deduction under §165.



DISCUSSION

The transaction described in this notice attempts to shift built-in losses from a tax indifferent party to a U.S. taxpayer who has not incurred an economic loss so that the U.S. taxpayer may claim a deduction of the built-in losses from the distressed assets. The built-in loss purportedly transferred to Main-Trust and Sub-Trust and improperly shifted to the Taxpayer is not an allowable loss for the Taxpayer. The Service may assert one or more arguments that may include, but are not limited to, asserting that the Taxpayer's transfer of cash or a note to Main-Trust in exchange for certificates of beneficial interest is a transfer of the distressed assets under §1001; asserting that Main-Trust does not meet the trust requirements of §301.7701-4; asserting that Main-Trust is not a taxable trust; asserting that one or more of the entities is properly classified for Federal tax purposes as a partnership subject to §§704(c)(1)(C), 734(b) and 743; asserting that the claimed loss deduction under §165 was not incurred in a transaction undertaken for profit; asserting the judicial doctrines, including substance over form, lack of economic substance, and step transaction; and asserting that, in the case of distressed debt, the distressed debt was worthless under §166 at the time of contribution to Main-Trust and Sub-Trust.

Transactions that are the same as, or substantially similar to, the transaction described in this notice that are entered into after October 22, 2004, are identified as "listed transactions" for purposes of §1.6011-4(b)(2) and §§6111 and 6112 effective February 27, 2008, the date this notice was released to the public. Independent of their classification as listed transactions, transactions that are the same as, or substantially similar to, the transaction described in this notice may already be subject to the requirements of §6011, §6111, §6112, or the regulations thereunder. However, the variations of this transaction described in the Coordinated Issue Paper, "Distressed Asset/Debt Coordinated Issue Paper," LMSB-04-0407-031 (Apr. 18, 2007), that are subject to the AJCA changes to §§704, 734 and 743 are not being identified as "listed transactions" for purposes of this notice, §1.6011-4(b)(2), §6111 and §6112.

Persons required to disclose these transactions under §1.6011-4 who fail to do so may be subject to the penalty under §6707A, which applies to returns and statements due after October 22, 2004. Persons required to disclose these transactions under §1.6011-4 who fail to do so may be subject to an extended period of limitations under §6501(c)(10). Persons required to disclose these transactions under §6111 who fail to do so may be subject to the penalty under §6707(a). Persons required to maintain lists of investors under §6112 who fail to do so (or who fail to provide such lists when requested by the Service) may be subject to the penalty under §6708(a). In addition, the Service may impose other penalties on persons involved in these transactions or substantially similar transactions, including the accuracy-related penalty under §6662 or §6662A.

A person that is a tax-exempt entity within the meaning of §4965(c), or an entity manager within the meaning of §4965(d), may be subject to excise tax, disclosure, filing or payment obligations under §4965, §6033(a)(2), §6011, and §6071. Some taxable entities may be subject to disclosure obligations under §6011(g), that apply to "prohibited tax shelter transactions" as defined by §4965(e) (including listed transactions).

The Service and Treasury recognize that some taxpayers may have filed tax returns taking the position that they were entitled to the purported tax benefits of the type of transaction described in this notice. These taxpayers should take appropriate corrective action and ensure that their transactions are disclosed properly.



DRAFTING INFORMATION

The principal author of this notice is Eric Ingala of the Office of Associate Chief Counsel (Passthroughs and Special Industries). For further information regarding this notice, contact Mr. Ingala at (202) 622-3070 (not a toll-free call).

Labels:

Tax Lien - Section 6323 proposed regulations

Proposed Amendments of Regulations (REG-141998-06) , published in the Federal Register on April 17, 2008.


Amendments of Reg. §§301.6323(b)-1, 301.6323(c)-2, 301.6323(f)-1, 301.6323(g)-1 and 301.6323(h)-1, relating to the validity and priority of federal tax liens against certain persons under Code Sec. 6323, are proposed.

AGENCY: Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Treasury.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.

SUMMARY: This document contains proposed regulations related to the validity and priority of the Federal tax lien against certain persons under section 6323 of the Internal Revenue Code (the Code). The proposed regulations update the corresponding Treasury Regulations in various respects. The proposed regulations reflect the adjustment within section 6323(b) of certain dollar amounts as well as the amendment of section 6323(b)(10) by the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (RRA 1998). In addition, the proposed regulations amend the existing regulations under section 6323(c), (g), and (h) to reflect that a notice of Federal tax lien (NFTL) is not treated as meeting the filing requirements until it is both filed and indexed in the office designated by the state (in the case of real property located in a state where a deed is not valid against a purchaser until the filing of such deed has been entered and recorded in the public index); the lien will be extinguished if an NFTL contains a certificate of release and the NFTL is not timely refiled; and current law provides the IRS with a 10-year period to collect an assessed tax. The proposed regulations also make changes to the existing regulations under section 6323(f) to clarify the IRS's authority to file NFTLs electronically. Finally, the proposed regulations make incidental changes throughout the existing regulations under section 6323 to make the dates in the examples more contemporaneous with the present and to remove language deemed no longer necessary.

DATES: Written or electronic comments and requests for a public hearing must be received by [ INSERT DATE 60 DAYS AFTER DATE OF PUBLICATION OF THIS DOCUMENT IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER].

ADDRESSES: Send submissions to CC:PA:LPD:PR (REG-141998-06), room 5203, Internal Revenue Service, POB 7604, Ben Franklin Station, Washington, DC 20044. Submissions may be hand-delivered Monday through Friday between the hours of 8 a.m. and 4 p.m. to CC:PA:LPD:PR (REG-141998-06), Courier's Desk, Internal Revenue Service, 1111 Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington, DC, 20224, or via the Federal eRulemaking Portal at www.regulations.gov (IRS-141998-06).

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Concerning the regulations, Debra A. Kohn at (202) 622-7985; concerning submissions of comments and the hearing, Regina Johnson at (202) 622-7180 (not toll-free numbers).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:



Background

This document contains proposed amendments to the Procedure and Administration Regulations (26 CFR part 301) under section 6323 of the Code. If any person liable for tax neglects or refuses to pay after demand, the amount of that tax is a lien in favor of the United States against all property and rights to property of such person under section 6321. Section 6323 provides that a Federal tax lien is only valid against certain persons if an NFTL is filed and addresses generally the validity and priority of the Federal tax lien against such persons. Section 6323(b) and (c) addresses the protection of certain interests even though an NFTL has been filed. Section 6323(f) prescribes the place for filing and the form of an NFTL. Section 6323(g) addresses the refiling of an NFTL. Section 6323(h) contains definitions of certain terms used throughout section 6323.

Since 1976, there have been numerous amendments to section 6323 that are not reflected in the existing regulations. Section 6323(b)(10) has been amended by RRA 1998. In addition, several subsections of section 6323(b) have been amended to increase the dollar amounts these sections reference. Also, section 6323(f)(4) was amended by the Revenue Act of 1978 to provide that an NFTL does not meet the filing requirements with respect to real property until the filing is entered and recorded in a public index maintained by the state if the laws of the state provide that a deed is not valid against a purchaser unless it is recorded in a public index. Moreover, section 6502, the statute that governs the period the IRS has to take collection action (referenced in various places throughout §301.6323(g)-1(c)), was amended by the Revenue Act of 1990 to change the period from six years to 10 years.

There have also been several changes to IRS practice that are not reflected in the existing regulations. Section 301.6323(f)-1(d)(2) of the existing regulations provides that an NFTL may be filed electronically if the state in which it is being filed permits electronic filing. Whether a state "permits" electronic filing of NFTLs has been subject to varying interpretations, thus casting doubt on the validity of NFTLs filed electronically in jurisdictions that do not specifically provide for electronic filing. However, the requirements for proper filing of liens are a matter of Federal, not state, law. United States v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 368 U.S. 291, 82 S. Ct. 349, 7 L. Ed. 2d 294 (1961). Thus, the IRS already possesses the authority to dictate the form and content of its NFTLs. The proposed regulations remove the "permits" language so that they correctly reflect the IRS's authority to file NFTLs electronically.

Section 301.6323(g)-1(a)(3) and (4) of the existing regulations states that the IRS may refile an NFTL once the filing period has elapsed and that failure to refile within the specified period does not affect the existence of the lien. The existing regulations also provide that failure to refile during the specified period does not affect the NFTL with respect to property that is the subject matter of a suit or that was levied upon prior to the expiration of the required refiling period. These provisions concerning the effect of a failure to refile are, to some extent, inconsistent with current IRS practice. Most filed NFTLs now contain a certificate of release that automatically releases the lien as of the date the NFTL prescribes, which is the date at the end of the required refiling period. Therefore, if the IRS does not refile an NFTL within the specified period, the certificate of release contained in the NFTL extinguishes the lien. The proposed regulations update the regulations under section 6323 to reflect these changes in IRS practice.

The Code currently provides a 10-year period for instituting a proceeding in court or serving a levy to collect an assessed tax liability, while §301.6323(g)-1(c) of the existing regulations references the 6-year period that existed until 1990. The proposed regulations update §301.6323(g)-1(c) to reflect this change in the law.

The proposed regulations also update the regulations under section 6323(h) to reflect changes made by the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). Section 9-312(a) of the UCC, as adopted by most states in 2001, now provides that a security interest in chattel paper, negotiable documents, instruments, or investment property may be perfected by filing.

The proposed regulations also make various incidental changes throughout the §301.6323 regulations.



Explanation of Provisions



I. Adjustment of Dollar Amounts

Under section 6323(b) of the Code, a Federal tax lien is not valid against certain interests even though an NFTL has been filed.

Section 6323(b)(4) includes, as one such interest, certain tangible personal property purchased in a casual sale. In 1976, the purchase price of such property was required to be less than $250. The limit of $250 is reflected in §301.6323(b)-1(d)(1) and in examples 1 and 3 contained in §301.6323(b)-1(d)(3). This limit has been raised in the most recent amendment to section 6323(b)(4) to $1,000. The statutory limit is indexed annually for inflation. After indexing, the amount for 2008 is $1,320.

Section 6323(b)(7) protects a mechanic's lienor with respect to residential property subject to the mechanic's lien. In 1976, the protection extended to such property was limited to an amount not more than $1,000. The limit of $1,000 is reflected in §301.6323(b)-1(g)(1) and in the examples contained in §301.6323(b)-1(g)(2). This amount was raised to $5,000 in the most recent amendment to section 6323(b)(7). The statutory limit is indexed annually for inflation. After indexing, the amount for 2008 is $6,600. The proposed regulations update §301.6323(b)-1(d) and (g) to make the dollar limits consistent with those applicable under the current version of section 6323(b)(4) and (7).

Section 301.6323(b)-1(d)(3), Example 3, references a $500 limit on household goods exempt from levy, citing Treas. Reg. §301.6334-1(a)(2). Section 301.6334-1(a)(2) is the regulation under I.R.C. § 6334(a)(2). The amount reflected in section 6334(a)(2) as set forth in the most recent version of the Code is $6,250. The amounts in both section 6334(a)(2) and the corresponding regulation are indexed annually for inflation. After indexing, the applicable amount for 2008 is $7,900. Accordingly, §301.6323(b)-1(d)(3), Example 3, is amended to make the reference to the limit on household goods exempt from levy consistent with the amounts applicable in section 6334(a)(2) and §301.6334-1(a)(2).



II. Removal of Protection for Passbook Loans

Section 6323(b)(10) currently protects from a Federal tax lien certain institutions holding deposit-secured loans, to the extent of any loan made without actual notice or knowledge of the Federal tax lien. Prior to the enactment of RRA 1998, section 6323(b)(10) was entitled "passbook loans" and protected from a Federal tax lien an institution granting a loan without actual notice or knowledge of the Federal tax lien, if the loan was secured by an account evidenced by a passbook and if the lending institution was continuously in possession of the passbook from the time the loan was made. Section 301.6323(b)-1(j) reflects this language and, in addition, includes both a definition of "passbook" and an example of the provision's operation.

The amendment of section 6323(b)(10) renders the language in the regulations pertaining to passbook accounts obsolete. Because leaving §301.6323(b)-1(j) in place is misleading and unnecessary in light of the amendment of section 6323(b)(10), the proposed regulations remove §301.6323(b)-1(j).



III. Clarification of Language Authorizing IRS to File NFTLs Electronically

Section 301.6323(f)-1(d)(2) sets forth a definition of a Form 668, the form that, when filed, serves as an NFTL. This section includes NFTLs filed by electronic or magnetic media "if a state in which [an NFTL] is filed permits a notice of Federal tax lien to be filed by the use of an electronic or magnetic medium."

Most local recording offices now have the technological capability to accept electronically-filed NFTLs. The proposed regulations amend §301.6323(f)-1(d)(2) to provide that a Form 668 may be filed either in paper form or electronically. In addition, the proposed regulations specifically define transmission by fax and e-mail as electronic, as opposed to paper, filings. The regulations as amended reflect the IRS's authority to file NFTLs electronically in all situations and allow the IRS to work with local jurisdictions to receive electronically-filed NFTLs if they have the capacity to do so without obtaining permission from the state.



IV. Revision of Language on Late Refiling of NFTLs

Section 301.6323(g)-1(a) sets forth general principles pertaining to refiling NFTLs. Section 301.6323(g)-1(a)(1) provides in part that if two or more NFTLs are filed with respect to a particular tax assessment, the failure to refile during the specified period in respect to one of the notices does not affect the effectiveness of the refiling of any other NFTL. Section 301.6323(g)-1(a)(3) states in part that the failure to refile an NFTL during the required filing period does not affect the effectiveness of the notice with respect to property that is the subject matter of a suit or that has been levied upon prior to the expiration of the filing period. Section 301.6323(g)-1(a)(4), as well as several of the examples in §301.6323(g)-1(b)(3) and (c)(3), suggest that a lien may continue to exist when an NFTL is not refiled. These provisions are, to some extent, inconsistent with current IRS practice. Most NFTLs now contain a certificate of release that automatically becomes effective on the date prescribed in the NFTL, which is the date the required refiling period ends. Therefore, if an NFTL that contains a certificate of release is not timely refiled in each jurisdiction where it was originally filed, the lien self-releases and is extinguished in all jurisdictions. See I.R.C. §6325(f)(1)(A). The extinguishment of the lien invalidates NFTLs filed in other jurisdictions and requires the IRS to file certificates of revocation, as well as new NFTLs, in each jurisdiction where NFTLs were previously filed.

The proposed regulations amend these provisions to provide that, with respect to an NFTL that includes a certificate of release, failure to timely refile the NFTL in any jurisdiction where it was originally filed extinguishes the lien, and that when an NFTL is filed in more than one jurisdiction, certificates of revocation as well as new NFTLs must be filed in all the jurisdictions for the lien to be reinstated.



V. Revision of References to 6-Year Collection Period

Section 6502 generally affords a 10-year period for instituting a proceeding in court or serving a levy to collect a properly assessed tax. The period section 6502 allowed for taking these collection actions was, until 1990, six years. The existing regulations under section 6323(g) do not reflect this change. Instead, subsections (b) and (c) of §301.6323(g)-1, which addresses refiling of NFTLs, imply that the applicable period for collection is six years. Example 5 of §301.6323(g)-1(b)(3) references the 6-year period. In addition, several references to a 6-year collection period occur in §301.6323(g)-1(c)(1), and additional references to the 6-year period occur in Example 1 in §301.6323(g)-1(c)(3). The proposed regulations update §301.6323(g)-1(c) to reflect this change in the law.



VI. Incidental updates

Various references and dates contained in the regulations under section 6323 have been rendered obsolete since 1976. The proposed regulations update various provisions throughout the §301.6323 regulations to make dates more contemporaneous with the present and remove language deemed no longer necessary. In addition, the proposed regulations remove all references to Internal Revenue Service district directors, as these positions were eliminated by the Internal Revenue Service reorganization implemented pursuant to RRA 1998.



Proposed Effective Date

These regulations are proposed to generally apply with respect to any NFTL filed on or after the date that these regulations are published as final regulations in the Federal Register.



Special Analyses

It has been determined that this notice of proposed rulemaking is not a significant regulatory action as defined in Executive Order 12866. Therefore, a regulatory assessment is not required. It also has been determined that section 553(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. chapter 5) does not apply to these regulations, and because these regulations do not impose collection of information on small entities, the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. chapter 6) does not apply. Pursuant to section 7805(f) of the Code, this notice of proposed rulemaking has been submitted to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration for comment on its impact on small business.



Comments and Requests for Public Hearing

Before these proposed regulations are adopted as final regulations, consideration will be given to any written comments (a signed original and eight (8) copies) or electronic comments that are timely submitted to the IRS. The IRS and Treasury Department request comments on the clarity of the proposed rules and how they may be made easier to understand. All comments will be available for public inspection and copying. A public hearing will be scheduled if requested in writing by any person that timely submits written comments. If a public hearing is scheduled, notice of the date, time, and place for the public hearing will be published in the Federal Register.



Drafting Information

The principal author of these regulations is Debra A. Kohn of the Office of the Associate Chief Counsel (Procedure and Administration).



List of Subjects in 26 CFR Part 301

Employment taxes, Estate taxes, Excise taxes, Gift taxes, Income taxes, Penalties, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.



Proposed Amendments to the Regulations

Accordingly, 26 CFR part 301 is proposed to be amended as follows:



PART 301 --PROCEDURE AND ADMINISTRATION

Paragraph 1. The authority citation for part 301 continues to read in part as follows:

Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805 * * *

Par. 2. Section 301.6323(b)-1 is amended as follows:

1. Paragraph (d)(1) is revised.

2. Paragraphs (d)(3) Example 1 and Example 3 are revised.

3. Paragraphs (g)(1), and (g)(2) Example 1 through Example 3 are revised.

4. Paragraphs (i)(1)(iii) and (j) are revised.

The revisions read as follows:



§301.6323(b)-1 Protection for certain interests even though notice filed.

* * * * *

(d) Personal property purchased in casual sale --(1) In general. Even though a notice of lien imposed by section 6321 is filed in accordance with §301.6323(f)-1, the lien is not valid against a purchaser (as defined in §301.6323(h)-1(f)) of household goods, personal effects, or other tangible personal property of a type described in §301.6334-1 (which includes wearing apparel, school books, fuel, provisions, furniture, arms for personal use, livestock, and poultry (whether or not the seller is the head of a family); and books and tools of a trade, business, or profession (whether or not the trade, business, or profession of the seller)), purchased, other than for resale, in a casual sale for less than $1,320, effective for 2008 and adjusted each year based on the rate of inflation (excluding interest and expenses described in §301.6323(e)-1).

* * * * *

(3) * * *

Example 1. A, an attorney's widow, sells a set of law books for $200 to B, for B's own use. Prior to the sale a notice of lien was filed with respect to A's delinquent tax liability in accordance with §301.6323(f)-1. B has no actual notice or knowledge of the tax lien. In addition, B does not know that the sale is one of a series of sales. Because the sale is a casual sale for less than $1,320 and involves books of a profession (tangible personal property of a type described in §301.6334-1, irrespective of the fact that A has never engaged in the legal profession), the tax lien is not valid against B even though a notice of lien was filed prior to the time of B's purchase.

* * * * *

Example 3. In an advertisement appearing in a local newspaper, G indicates that he is offering for sale a lawn mower, a used television set, a desk, a refrigerator, and certain used dining room furniture. In response to the advertisement, H purchases the dining room furniture for $200. H does not receive any information which would impart notice of a lien, or that the sale is one of a series of sales, beyond the information contained in the advertisement. Prior to the sale a notice of lien was filed with respect to G's delinquent tax liability in accordance with §301.6323(f)-1. Because H had no actual notice or knowledge that substantially all of G's household goods were being sold or that the sale is one of a series of sales, and because the sale is a casual sale for less than $1,320, H does not purchase the dining room furniture subject to the lien. The household goods are of a type described in §301.6334-1(a)(2) irrespective of whether G is the head of a family or whether all such household goods offered for sale exceed $7,900 in value.

* * * * *

(g) Residential property subject to a mechanic's lien for certain repairs and improvements --(1) In general. Even though a notice of a lien imposed by section 6321 is filed in accordance with §301.6323(f)-1, the lien is not valid against a mechanic's lienor (as defined in §301.6323(h)-1(b)) who holds a lien for the repair or improvement of a personal residence if --

(i) The residence is occupied by the owner and contains no more than four dwelling units; and

(ii) The contract price on the prime contract with the owner for the repair or improvement (excluding interest and expenses described in §301.6323(e)-1) is not more than $6,600, effective for 2008 and adjusted each year based on the rate of inflation.

(iii) For purposes of paragraph (g)(1)(ii) of this section, the amounts of subcontracts under the prime contract with the owner are not to be taken into consideration for purposes of computing the $6,600 prime contract price. It is immaterial that the notice of tax lien was filed before the contractor undertakes his work or that he knew of the lien before undertaking his work.

(2) * * *

Example 1. A owns a building containing four apartments, one of which he occupies as his personal residence. A notice of lien which affects the building is filed in accordance with §301.6323(f)-1. Thereafter, A enters into a contract with B in the amount of $800, which includes labor and materials, to repair the roof of the building. B purchases roofing shingles from C for $300. B completes the work and A fails to pay B the agreed amount. In turn, B fails to pay C for the shingles. Under local law, B and C acquire mechanic's liens on A's building. Because the contract price on the prime contract with A is not more than $6,600 and under local law B and C acquire mechanic's liens on A's building, the liens of B and C have priority over the Federal tax lien.

Example 2. Assume the same facts as in Example 1, except that the amount of the prime contract between A and B is $7,100. Because the amount of the prime contract with the owner, A, is in excess of $6,600, the tax lien has priority over the entire amount of each of the mechanic's liens of B and C, even though the amount of the contract between B and C is $300.

Example 3. Assume the same facts as in Example 1, except that A and B do not agree in advance upon the amount due under the prime contract but agree that B will perform the work for the cost of materials and labor plus 10 percent of such cost. When the work is completed, it is determined that the total amount due is $850. Because the prime contract price is not more than $6,600 and under local law B and C acquire mechanic's liens on A's residence, the liens of B and C have priority over the Federal tax lien.

* * * * *

(i) * * * (1) * * *

(iii) After the satisfaction of a levy pursuant to section 6332(b), unless and until the Internal Revenue Service delivers to the insuring organization a notice (for example, another notice of levy, a letter, etc.) executed after the date of such satisfaction, that the lien exists.

* * * * *

(j) Effective/applicability date. This section applies to any notice of Federal tax lien filed on or after the date these regulations are published as final regulations in the Federal Register.

Par. 3. Section 301.6323(c)-2 is amended as follows:

1. Paragraph (d), Example 1 through Example 5, is revised.

2. Paragraph (e) is added.

The revisions and addition read as follows:



§301.6323(c)-2 Protection for real property construction or improvement financing agreements.

* * * * *

(d) * * *

Example 1. A, in order to finance the construction of a dwelling on a lot owned by him, mortgages the property to B. The mortgage, executed January 4, 2006, includes an agreement that B will make cash disbursements to A as the construction progresses. On February 1, 2006, in accordance with §301.6323(f)-1, a notice of lien is filed and recorded in the public index with respect to A's delinquent tax liability. A continues the construction, and B makes cash disbursements on June 15, 2006, and December 15, 2006. Under local law B's security interest arising by virtue of the disbursements is protected against a judgment lien arising February 1, 2006 (the date of tax lien filing) out of an unsecured obligation. Because B is the holder of a security interest coming into existence by reason of cash disbursements made pursuant to a written agreement, entered into before tax lien filing, to make cash disbursements to finance the construction of real property, and because B's security interest is protected, under local law, against a judgment lien arising as of the time of tax lien filing out of an unsecured obligation, B's security interest has priority over the tax lien.

Example 2. (i) C is awarded a contract for the demolition of several buildings. On March 3, 2004, C enters into a written agreement with D which provides that D will make cash disbursements to finance the demolition and also provides that repayment of the disbursements is secured by any sums due C under the contract. On April 1, 2004, in accordance with §301.6323(f)-1, a notice of lien is filed with respect to C's delinquent tax liability. With actual notice of the tax lien, D makes cash disbursements to C on August 13, September 13, and October 13, 2004. Under local law D's security interest in the proceeds of the contract with respect to the disbursements is entitled to priority over a judgment lien arising on April 1, 2004 (the date of tax lien filing) out of an unsecured obligation.

(ii) Because D's security interest arose by reason of disbursements made pursuant to a written agreement, entered into before tax lien filing, to make cash disbursements to finance a contract to demolish real property, and because D's security interest is valid under local law against a judgment lien arising as of the time of tax lien filed out of an unsecured obligation, the tax lien is not valid with respect to D's security interest in the proceeds of the demolition contract.

Example 3. Assume the same facts as in Example 2 and, in addition, assume that, as further security for the cash disbursements, the March 3, 2004, agreement also provides for a security interest in all of C's demolition equipment. Because the protection of the security interest arising from the disbursements made after tax lien filing under the agreement is limited under section 6323(c)(3) to the proceeds of the demolition contract and because, under the circumstances, the security interest in the equipment is not otherwise protected under section 6323, the tax lien will have priority over D's security interest in the equipment.

Example 4. (i) On January 3, 2006, F and G enter into a written agreement, whereby F agrees to provide G with cash disbursements, seed, fertilizer, and insecticides as needed by G, in order to finance the raising and harvesting of a crop on a farm owned by G. Under the terms of the agreement F is to have a security interest in the crop, the farm, and all other property then owned or thereafter acquired by G. In accordance with §301.6323(f)-1, on January 10, 2006, a notice of lien is filed and recorded in the public index with respect to G's delinquent tax liability. On March 3, 2006, with actual notice of the tax lien, F makes a cash disbursement of $5,000 to G and furnishes him seed, fertilizer, and insecticides having a value of $10,000. Under local law F's security interest, coming into existence by reason of the cash disbursement and the furnishing of goods, has priority over a judgment lien arising January 10, 2006 (the date of tax lien filing and recording in the public index) out of an unsecured obligation.

(ii) Because F's security interest arose by reason of a disbursement (including the furnishing of goods) made under a written agreement which was entered into before tax lien filing and which constitutes an agreement to finance the raising or harvesting of a farm crop, and because F's security interest is valid under local law against a judgment lien arising as of the time of tax lien filing out of an unsecured obligation, the tax lien is not valid with respect to F's security interest in the crop even though a notice of lien was filed before the security interest arose. Furthermore, because the farm is property subject to the tax lien at the time of tax lien filing, F's security interest with respect to the farm also has priority over the tax lien.

Example 5. Assume the same facts as in Example 4 and in addition that on October 2, 2006, G acquires several tractors to which F's security interest attaches under the terms of the agreement. Because the tractors are not property subject to the tax lien at the time of tax lien filing, the tax lien has priority over F's security interest in the tractors.

(e) Effective/applicability date. This section applies with respect to any notice of Federal tax lien filed on or after the date these regulations are published as final regulations in the Federal Register.

Par. 4. Section 301.6323(f)-1 is amended as follows:

1. Paragraph (d)(2) is revised.

2. Paragraph (f) is added.

The revision and addition read as follows:



§301.6323(f)-1 Place for filing notice; form.

* * * * *

(d) * * *

(2) Form 668 defined. The term Form 668 means either a paper form or a form transmitted electronically, including a form transmitted by facsimile (fax) or electronic mail (e-mail). A Form 668 must identify the taxpayer, the tax liability giving rise to the lien, and the date the assessment arose regardless of the method used to file the notice of Federal tax lien.

* * * * *

(f) Effective/applicability date. This section applies with respect to any notice of Federal tax lien filed on or after the date these regulations are published as final regulations in the Federal Register.

Par 5. Section 301.6323(g)-1 is amended as follows:

1. Paragraphs (a)(1), (a)(4), (b)(3) Example 1, (b)(3) Example 5, and (c)(1) are revised.

2. Paragraphs (a)(3), (a)(3)(i), and (a)(3)(ii) are redesignated as paragraphs (a)(3)(i), (a)(3)(i)(A), and (a)(3)(i)(B), respectively.

3. The undesignated text following newly-designated paragraph (a)(3)(i)(B) is designated as paragraph (a)(3)(ii).

4. Newly-designated paragraph (a)(3)(i) introductory text is revised.

5. Newly-designated paragraph (a)(3)(i)(A) is revised.

6. Newly-designated paragraph (a)(3)(ii) is revised.

7. Paragraph (c)(2) is removed.

8. Paragraph (c)(3) is redesignated as paragraph (c)(2) and revised.

9. Paragraph (d) is added.

The revisions and addition read as follows:



§301.6323(g)-1 Refiling of notice of tax lien.

(a) In general-(1) Requirement to refile. In order to continue the effect of a notice of lien, the notice must be refiled in the place described in paragraph (b) of this section during the required filing period (described in paragraph (c) of this section). If two or more notices of lien are filed with respect to a particular tax assessment, and each notice of lien contains a certificate of release that releases the lien when the required refiling period ends, the failure to comply with the provisions of paragraphs (b)(1)(i) and (c) of this section in respect to one of the notices of lien releases the lien and renders ineffective the refiling of any other notice of lien.

* * * * *.

(3) Effect of failure to refile. (i) If the Internal Revenue Service fails to refile a notice of lien in the manner described in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section, the notice of lien is not effective, after the expiration of the required filing period, as against any person without regard to when the interest of the person in the property subject to the lien was acquired. If a notice of lien contains a certificate of release that releases the lien at the end of the required refiling period and the notice of lien is not refiled during this period, the lien is extinguished and the notice of lien is ineffective with respect to --

(A) Property which is the subject matter of a suit, to which the United States is a party, commenced prior to the expiration of the required filing period; and

* * * * *

(ii) However, if a notice of lien does not contain a certificate of release that releases the lien at the end of the required refiling period, the failure to refile during the required refiling period will not affect the existence of the lien nor the effectiveness of the notice with respect to property which is the subject matter of a suit commenced prior to the expiration of the required refiling period, or property which has been levied upon prior to the expiration of such period.

(4) Filing of new notice. If a notice of lien is not refiled, and the notice of lien contains a certificate of release that automatically releases the lien when the required refiling period ends, the lien is released as of that date and is no longer in existence. The Internal Revenue Service must revoke the release before it can file a new notice of lien. This new filing must meet the requirements of section 6323(f) and §301.6323(f)-1 and is effective from the date on which such filing is made.

(b) * * *

(3) Examples. The following examples illustrate the provisions of this section:

Example 1. A, a delinquent taxpayer, is a resident of State M and owns real property in State N. In accordance with §301-6323-f(1), notices of lien are filed in States M and N. The notices of lien contain certificates of release that release the lien at the end of the required refiling period. In order to continue the effect of the notice of lien filed in either M or N, the IRS must refile, during the required refiling period, the notice of lien with the appropriate office in M as well as with the appropriate office in N.

* * * * *

Example 5. D, a delinquent taxpayer, is a resident of State M and owns real property in States N and O. In accordance with §301.6323(f)-1, the Internal Revenue Service files notices of lien in M, N, and O States. Nine years and 6 months after the date of the assessment shown on the notice of lien, D establishes his residence in P, and at that time the Internal Revenue Service receives from D a notification of his change in residence in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (b)(2) of this section. On a date which is 9 years and 7 months after the date of the assessment shown on the notice of lien, the IRS properly refiles notices of lien in M, N, and O which refilings are sufficient to continue the effect of each of the notices of lien. The Internal Revenue Service is not required to file a notice of lien in P because D did not notify the Internal Revenue Service of his change of residence to P more than 89 days prior to the date each of the refilings in M, N, and O was completed.

* * * * *

(c) Required filing period --(1) In general. For the purpose of this section, except as provided in paragraph (c)(2) of this section, the term required filing period means --

(i) The 1-year period ending 30 days after the expiration of 10 years after the date of the assessment of the tax; and

(ii) The 1-year period ending with the expiration of 10 years after the close of the preceding required refiling period for such notice of lien.

(2) Examples. The following examples illustrate the provisions of this paragraph:

Example 1. On March 10, 1998, an assessment of tax is made against B, a delinquent taxpayer, and a lien for the amount of the assessment arises on that date. On July 10, 1998, in accordance with §301.6323(f)-1, a notice of lien is filed. The notice of lien filed on July 10, 1998, is effective through April 9, 2008. The first required refiling period for the notice of lien begins on April 10, 2007, and ends on April 9, 2008. A refiling of the notice of lien during that period will extend the effectiveness of the notice of lien filed on July 10, 1998, through April 9, 2018. The second required refiling period for the notice of lien begins on April 10, 2017, and ends on April 9, 2018.

Example 2. Assume the same facts as in Example 1, except that the Internal Revenue Service fails to refile a notice of lien during the first required refiling period (April 10, 2007, through April 9, 2008). A notice of lien is filed on June 9, 2009, in accordance with §301.6323(f)-1. This notice is ineffective if the original notice contained a certificate of release, as the certificate of release would have had the effect of extinguishing the lien as of April 10, 2008. The Internal Revenue Service could revoke the release and file a new notice of lien, which would be effective as of the date it was filed.

(d) Effective/applicability date. This section applies with respect to any notice of Federal tax lien filed on or after the date these regulations are published as final regulations in the Federal Register.

Par. 6. Section 301.6323(h)-1 is amended as follows:

1. Paragraphs (a)(2)(ii) and (a)(3) are revised.

2. A new paragraph (h) is added.

The revisions and addition read as follows:



§301.6323(h)-1 Definitions.

(a) * * *

(2) * * *

(ii) The following example illustrates the application of paragraph (a)(2):

Example. (i) Under the law of State X, a security interest in certificated securities, negotiable documents, or instruments may be perfected, and hence protected against a judgment lien, by filing or by the secured party taking possession of the collateral. However, a security interest in such intangible personal property is considered to be temporarily perfected for a period of 20 days from the time the security interest attaches, to the extent that it arises for new value given under an authenticated security agreement. Under the law of X, a security interest attaches to such collateral when there is an agreement between the creditor and debtor that the interest attaches, the debtor has rights in the property, and consideration is given by the creditor. Under the law of X, in the case of temporary perfection, the security interest in such property is protected during the 20-day period against a judgment lien arising, after the security interest attaches, out of an unsecured obligation. Upon expiration of the 20-day period, the holder of the security interest must perfect its security interest under local law.

(ii) Because the security interest is perfected during the 20-day period against a subsequent judgment lien arising out of an unsecured obligation, and because filing or the taking of possession before the conclusion of the period of temporary perfection is not considered, for purposes of paragraph (a)(2)(i) of this section, to be a requisite action which relates back to the beginning of such period, the requirements of this paragraph are satisfied. Because filing or taking possession is a condition precedent to continued perfection, filing or taking possession of the collateral is a requisite action to establish such priority after expiration of the period of temporary perfection. If there is a lapse of perfection for failure to take possession, the determination of when the security interest exists (for purposes of protection against the tax lien) is made without regard to the period of temporary perfection.

(3) Money or money's worth. For purposes of this paragraph, the term money or money's worth includes money, a security (as defined in paragraph (d) of this section), tangible or intangible property, services, and other consideration reducible to a money value. Money or money's worth also includes any consideration which otherwise would constitute money or money's worth under the preceding sentence which was parted with before the security interest would otherwise exist if, under local law, past consideration is sufficient to support an agreement giving rise to a security interest. A firm commitment to part with money, a security, tangible or intangible property, services, or other consideration reducible to a money value does not, in itself, constitute a consideration in money or money's worth. A relinquishing or promised relinquishment of dower, curtesy, or of a statutory estate created in lieu of dower or curtesy, or of other marital rights is not a consideration in money or money's worth. Nor is love and affection, promise of marriage, or any other consideration not reducible to a money value a consideration in money or money's worth.

* * * * *

(h) Effective/applicability date. This section applies as of the date these regulations are published as final regulations in the Federal Register.
Linda E. Stiff

Deputy Commissioner for Services and Enforcement.

[FR Doc. 2008-8082 Filed 04/16/2008 at 8:45 am; Publication Date: 04/17/2008]

Labels:

Wednesday, April 23, 2008

Secs. 162(a)(2), 274(d).
Expenses incurred by an individual for meals and lodging are normally considered nondeductible personal or living expenses. Sec. 262(a). On the other hand, expenses paid or incurred for meals and lodging, if properly substantiated, are deductible if paid or incurred by an individual while traveling away from home in pursuit of the individual's trade or business. Secs. 162(a)(2), 274(d). In this regard, the reference to the individual's trade or business includes the trade or business of being an employee, O'Malley v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 352, 363-364 (1988), and the reference to the individual's home means the individual's tax home, Henderson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-559, affd. 143 F.3d 497 (9th Cir. 1998).

T.C. Summary Opinion 2008-41]
Eric D. Walker and Lynn Walker v. Commissioner.

Docket No. 7566-06S . Filed April 22, 2008.

[Code Sec. 162]

Tax Court: Summary opinion: Business travel expenses: Tax home. --



[ Code Sec. 6662]

Tax Court: Summary opinion: Penalties, civil: Substantial understatement of tax. --
An electrician whose meals and lodging expenses were denied was liable for an accuracy-related penalty for his substantial understatement of income tax. The underpayment of tax exceeded $5,000 and the taxpayer failed to show that he had reasonable cause and acted in good faith with respect to the underpayment. --CCH.



PURSUANT TO INTERNAL REVENUE CODE SECTION 7463(b),THIS OPINION MAY NOT BE TREATED AS PRECEDENT FOR ANY OTHER CASE.





Eric D. Walker, pro se. Brian A. Pfeifer, for respondent.



CARLUZZO, Special Trial Judge: This case was heard pursuant to the provisions of section 7463.1 Pursuant to section 7463(b), the decision to be entered is not reviewable by any other court, and this opinion shall not be cited as precedent for any other case.



In a notice of deficiency issued to petitioners on January 19, 2006, respondent determined a $5,975 deficiency in and a $1,195 section 6662(a) accuracy-related penalty with respect to petitioners' 2002 Federal income tax.



The issues for decision are: (1) Whether petitioners are entitled to certain trade or business expense deductions, some claimed on a Schedule A, Itemized Deductions, and some claimed on a Schedule C, Profit or Loss From Business; and (2) whether petitioners are liable for the accuracy-related penalty.





Background



Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found. Petitioners married on March 31, 2002. They filed a timely joint Federal income tax return for that year. At the time the petition was filed, they resided in Florida.



Eric D. Walker (petitioner) is an electrician who at all times relevant was a member of Local 613 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW). Local 613 is located in Atlanta, Georgia, but petitioner did not work within the jurisdiction of Local 613, or anywhere within the State of Georgia, during 2002. Instead, he traveled repeatedly up and down the east coast from Massachusetts to Florida in search of or in connection with available union-based employment opportunities. IBEW procedures required that he announce his availability for employment in any given location by visiting the local chapter of the IBEW and signing whatever paperwork was required. This procedure had to be repeated periodically as long as petitioner was unemployed, which he was during part of 2002, and continued to look for jobs.



Although he actively sought employment using the process described above throughout 2002, petitioner was employed only from time to time from May 1 through November 1, 2002, and only for various employers in New Jersey. While working in New Jersey petitioner stayed in a YMCA or in a rented house. Petitioner spent 216 days in New Jersey during 2002, including those days when he was present there either working or looking for work.



Following his marriage in March, petitioner spent only 3 days in Georgia. Lynn Walker lived with her mother in Florida during 2002, both before and after petitioners were married. Petitioner spent a fair amount of time in Florida during that year.2 As of the end of November 2002, petitioner considered that his residence was in Florida.



Petitioners' 2002 self-prepared, joint Federal income tax return was timely filed. That return includes a Schedule C and a Schedule A. The Schedule C identifies the business as "Spinal Connection Rehab and Wellness" and shows the proprietor as Lynn Walker. There is no income reported on the Schedule C, and various deductions totaling $9,087 result in a net loss in that amount which is claimed as a deduction on petitioners' 2002 return. As relevant here, on the Schedule A, petitioners claimed a $32,525 unreimbursed employee business expense deduction, most of which is attributable to meals and lodging expenses.



Petitioners also claimed a $15,218 loss from an S corporation on their 2002 return. That loss is identified as a "nonpassive loss from [a] Schedule K-1" issued to petitioners by Spinal Connection Rehab and Wellness.



In the above-referenced notice of deficiency, respondent: (1) Disallowed the deduction for the net loss reported on the Schedule C; (2) disallowed a portion of the unreimbursed employee business expense deduction claimed on the Schedule A; (3) allowed the standard deduction applicable to petitioners' filing status as the remaining itemized deductions respondent allowed totaled less than the standard deduction;3 and (4) imposed an accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a) upon the ground that, among other reasons, the underpayment of tax required to be shown on petitioners' 2002 return is a substantial understatement of income tax. Other adjustments made in the notice of deficiency are computational or have been agreed upon by the parties.





Discussion




1. Deduction for Net Loss Claimed on the Schedule C


Petitioners now agree that they are not entitled to a deduction for the net loss shown on the Schedule C. Although less than certain, it appears that the expenses that generated the loss might have been duplicated in the loss claimed from the above-referenced S corporation. That loss has not been disallowed.




2. Disallowed Portion of the Employee Business Expense Deduction


According to the notice of deficiency, the portion of the employee business expenses deduction attributable to "travel, meals and lodging" was disallowed because respondent determined that those expenses, if paid or incurred, were not paid or incurred while petitioner was traveling away from home in pursuit of his employment. According to respondent, petitioner maintained "no fixed place of abode or business locality," consequently, "each place where * * * [petitioner worked became his] principal place of business and * * * tax home." According to petitioner, his residence and tax home, at least until the end of November 2002, was in Stockbridge, Georgia, where he lived with his brother in his brother's house. Petitioner now acknowledges that amounts claimed on his 2002 return for lodging were overstated, but claims entitlement to: (1) A portion of the claimed deduction for lodging; and (2) the entire claimed deduction for meals.



Expenses incurred by an individual for meals and lodging are normally considered nondeductible personal or living expenses. Sec. 262(a). On the other hand, expenses paid or incurred for meals and lodging, if properly substantiated, are deductible if paid or incurred by an individual while traveling away from home in pursuit of the individual's trade or business. Secs. 162(a)(2), 274(d). In this regard, the reference to the individual's trade or business includes the trade or business of being an employee, O'Malley v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 352, 363-364 (1988), and the reference to the individual's home means the individual's tax home, Henderson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-559, affd. 143 F.3d 497 (9th Cir. 1998).



In general, the location of an individual's tax home is the location of his or her principal place of employment. Daly v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 190, 195 (1979), affd. 662 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1981). If, during the taxable year, the individual has no principal place of employment, this Court considers the individual's permanent place of residence to be his or her tax home. Rambo v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 920, 923-925 (1978). If an individual has no principal place of employment or permanent residence during the taxable year, then this Court considers that individual to have no tax home from which the individual can be away from for purposes of deducting meals and lodging expenses otherwise deductible under section 162(a)(2). Wirth v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 855, 859 (1974).



Petitioner's profession and status as an IBEW member required that he seek and/or accept employment on a temporary basis in various locations during 2002. He had no principal place of business during that year.4 Whether petitioner had a permanent place of residence during 2002 is questionable. If he did, then it was at his brother's house only up until the date of his wedding on March 31, and it was in Florida at some point starting in November. The meals and lodging expense deductions here in dispute relate to the period between those dates, and the record does not support a finding that he paid or incurred any living expense in connection with his brother's house or any other "permanent place of residence" while at the same time he was present and working in New Jersey or elsewhere. See Kroll v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 557, 562 (1968) (noting that the purpose of section 162(a)(2) is to "mitigate the burden of the taxpayer who, because of the exigencies of his trade or business, must maintain two places of abode and thereby incur additional and duplicate living expenses").



Because petitioner had neither a principal permanent place of residence nor a principal place of employment during the period to which the deductions for meals and lodging expenses relate, he is not considered to have a tax home for that period. Because the deductions for meals and lodging expenses relate to a period for which petitioner had no tax home, he is not entitled to those deductions. Respondent's disallowance of the portion of the employee business expense deduction attributable to amounts for meals and lodging is sustained.



Respondent acknowledges that petitioner is entitled to tolls and vehicle expenses incurred in connection with his search for employment during 2002. The amounts already allowed for such expenses exceed the amounts petitioners substantiated and, when taken into account with other itemized deductions allowed or not challenged, do not exceed the $7,850 standard deduction applicable to petitioners' filing status. See sec. 63(b) and (c). It is unnecessary, therefore, to consider petitioners' entitlement to such deductions any further, and respondent's allowance of the standard deduction in lieu of the itemized deductions otherwise claimed and not disallowed is sustained.




3. The Section 6662(a) Accuracy-Related Penalty


Section 6662(a) imposes an accuracy-related penalty of 20 percent of any portion of an underpayment of tax, if among other reasons, the underpayment is attributable to a substantial understatement of income tax. Sec. 6662(b)(2), (d). An understatement of income tax is a substantial understatement of income tax if it exceeds the greater of $5,000 or 10 percent of the tax required to be shown on the taxpayer's return.5 Sec. 6662(d)(1). Ignoring conditions not relevant here, for purposes of section 6662 an understatement is defined as the excess of the amount of the tax required to be shown on the taxpayer's return over the amount of the tax which is shown on the return. Sec. 6662(d)(2)(A). In this case the understatement of income tax is computed in the same manner as and is equal to the deficiency in dispute; that is, $5,975. See secs. 6211, 6662(d)(2).



Under section 7491(c) respondent has the burden of production with respect to the accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a). To meet that burden, respondent must come forward with sufficient evidence to show that imposition of the penalty is appropriate. See Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 446 (2001). We have sustained, or petitioners have conceded, the adjustments in the notice of deficiency that give rise to the deficiency. Respondent has satisfied his burden of production under sec. 7491(c) with respect to the accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a) determined in the notice of deficiency because the underpayment of tax exceeds $5,000.



The accuracy-related penalty does not apply to any part of an underpayment of tax if it is shown the taxpayer acted with reasonable cause and in good faith. Sec. 6664(c)(1). The determination of whether a taxpayer acted in good faith is made on a case-by-case basis, taking into account all the pertinent facts and circumstances. Sec. 1.6664-4(b)(1), Income Tax Regs. Petitioners bear the burden of proving that they had reasonable cause and acted in good faith with respect to the underpayment. See Higbee v. Commissioner, supra at 449. This they have failed to do. Respondent's imposition of the section 6662(a) accuracy-related penalty is sustained.



To reflect the foregoing,



Decision will be entered for respondent.


1 Unless otherwise indicated, section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, in effect for the relevant period.

2 Petitioner was in Florida 25 days during January; 7 days during February; 12 days during March; 9 days during April; 3 days during June; 6 days during September; 8 days during November; and all of December.

3 The itemized deductions otherwise allowed are: (1) Taxes --$972; (2) Gifts to Charity --$745; and (3) Miscellaneous deductions, including unreimbursed employee business expenses --$5,498, before the application of sec. 67(a).

4 We disagree with the suggestion made in the notice of deficiency that New Jersey was petitioner's tax home during 2002. His employment there was clearly temporary. This distinction, however, makes no difference to whether petitioner is entitled to deduct expenses for meals and lodging while working in New Jersey.

5 Ten percent of the tax required to be shown on petitioners' 2002 return is $892.50.

Labels: ,

Tuesday, April 22, 2008

§7482(a)(1))- penalty for tax protestor argument



Chester E. Richards, Petitioner-Appellant v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent-Appellee.

U.S. Court of Appeals, 10th Circuit; 07-9007, April 8, 2008.

Unpublished opinion affirming an unreported Tax Court decision.

[ Code Secs. 6651 and 6673]

Returns: Penalties, civil: Frivolous arguments. --


[Fed. R. App. Proc. 38]

Frivolous appeal: Sanctions. --







Before: Lucero, Hartz and Holmes, Circuit Judges.




ORDER AND JUDGMENT *


LUCERO, Circuit Judge: Chester E. Richards, proceeding pro se, appeals from a decision of the United States Tax Court finding that he: (1) had a $6,754 income-tax deficiency for the 2001 tax year, (2) should be assessed a $1,582 penalty for filing a late return, and (3) should be required to pay a $2,000 penalty to the United States as a sanction for making frivolous and groundless arguments to the court. Exercising jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C. §7482(a)(1), we AFFIRM . Additionally, because Richards has maintained a frivolous appeal before this court, we GRANT the motion for sanctions filed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue ("Commissioner") but limit the requested award to $4,000.




I


Richards worked as an electrician in 2001 and earned $48,104 for his services. In late October 2003, he filed a Form 1040 applicable to the 2001 tax year in which he reported these earnings but deducted an equivalent amount in itemized expenses. As a result, he reported zero taxable income and zero income tax for the 2001 tax year. In a Form 8275 Disclosure Statement attached to his Form 1040, Richards offered a litany of explanations for why his income was not taxable, including assertions that he was entitled to "common law immunity" from taxation and that he had "a private right to [his] labor."

In early 2005, the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") notified Richards that he was subject to an $11,882 tax deficiency for the 2001 tax year and a $2,864 penalty for filing a late return. In response to the IRS notification, Richards petitioned the United States Tax Court for relief from the amounts alleged to be due. Among other things, he claimed that the IRS had miscalculated the amount of the deficiency, that Congress could not tax human labor, that tax returns are not mandatory, and that the Sixteenth Amendment "must be struck down as unconstitutional." Because Richards asserted in his petition that the IRS had miscalculated the amount of the tax due, the tax court denied a motion to dismiss from the Commissioner and set the case over for a bench trial. The court did, however, warn Richards that its ruling on the Commissioner's motion to dismiss "should not lead [him] to the conclusion that [he] may have real issues...with respect to exclusion or nontaxability of 1099 income or wage income...."

Prior to trial, Richards entered into a stipulation with the IRS in which he admitted that, if the court rejected his arguments related to the lawfulness of the federal income tax and concluded that his 2001 earnings were subject to federal taxation, he would owe a $6,754 tax deficiency for 2001. Richards also submitted a pretrial memorandum in which he reiterated many of the arguments contained in his petition. He also claimed that Form 1040 was illegal because it failed to comply with requirements from the Office of Management and Budget, that he was not required to file a Form 1040, and that he was not subject to taxation because he lived outside of a "federal zone."

At the bench trial, Richards sought leave of the court to permit his "law clerk" to sit with him at the counsel table as well as to help elicit Richards' direct testimony. The court denied these requests, and Richards testified to the court in narrative form. Richards reiterated several of the arguments in his filings and indicated that he does not plan to file any more tax returns unless "he find[s] out some way that [he is] liable to pay a tax." At the conclusion of trial, the Commissioner moved the court to impose sanctions, contending that Richards' arguments were frivolous and were intended to delay the proceedings.

The court sustained the stipulated deficiency. It also concluded that Richards was liable for a $1,582 penalty because he had failed to timely file his 2001 return, and an additional $2,000 penalty because Richards had "assert[ed] nothing but frivolous and groundless arguments...[as a] protest against the Federal income tax system." Richards thereafter unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration of the court's decision, and this timely appeal followed.




II


In his appeal to this court, Richards challenges the merits of the tax court's determinations that he is liable for an income tax deficiency and a late-filing penalty. He also disputes the tax court's decision to impose a $2,000 penalty against him, as well as the court's refusal to allow his "law clerk" to assist him at trial. We reject each of his challenges.

"We review tax court decisions in the same manner and to the same extent as decisions of the district courts in civil actions tried without a jury." Kurzet v. Comm'r, 222 F.3d 830, 833 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting 26 U.S.C. §7482(a)(1)). "We review the Tax Court's factual findings under the clearly erroneous standard and review its legal conclusions de novo." Anderson v. Comm'r, 62 F.3d 1266, 1270 (10th Cir. 1995).




A


Richards focuses the gravamen of his appeal on the same patently frivolous arguments that he presented to the tax court. He primarily contends that there is no law that makes him liable for filing an income tax return and that the tax court therefore erred in finding him liable for a tax deficiency. We have previously rejected this same tax-protestor argument, and all of the related contentions Richards has raised as to why he should not pay federal income taxes, and we do so again today. See, e.g., United States v. Chisum, 502 F.3d 1237, 1243-44 (10th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1290 (2008); United States v. Collins, 920 F.2d 619, 629-31 (10th Cir. 1990); Lonsdale v. United States, 919 F.2d 1440, 1448 (10th Cir. 1990); Casper v. Comm'r, 805 F.2d 902, 904 (10th Cir. 1986); Charczuk v. Comm'r, 771 F.2d 471, 472-73 (10th Cir. 1985); cf. United States v. Ford, 514 F.3d 1047 (10th Cir. 2008).

As to the tax court's decision to impose a penalty for Richards' untimely filing of his 2001 return, we uphold its conclusion. Section 6651(a)(1) of Title 26 unambiguously provides for a five percent penalty per month for the failure "to file any return...on the date prescribed." Richards does not dispute the factual basis underlying the imposition of this addition, and we fail to discern any error in the tax court's determination that this penalty was warranted under the terms of the statute.

Richards' remaining challenge to the merits of the decision below relates to the tax court's conclusion that a $2,000 penalty was warranted based on Richards' frivolous arguments. We review the tax court's decision to impose sanctions for an abuse of discretion. Fox v. Comm'r, 969 F.2d 951, 953 (10th Cir. 1992). Under 26 U.S.C. §6673(a)(1), the tax court may impose sanctions of $25,000 or less when it appears that the taxpayer has instituted or maintained proceedings primarily for purposes of delay, or when the taxpayer's position in the proceeding is frivolous or groundless. See also Fox, 969 F.2d at 953. Richards appears to argue that the penalty assessed by the tax court in this case was inappropriate because the final tax deficiency assessed was less than what the IRS initially alleged he owed, and that his case therefore was not frivolous. This contention lacks merit. By the time of trial, the amount of the deficiency pursued by the Commissioner was no longer an issue --Richards and the IRS had already stipulated to the amount of the deficiency. The only remaining questions for the court to decide, under the terms of the stipulation, related to Richards' arguments that he was not subject to the federal income tax laws. As indicated above, Richards' contentions in that regard were patently frivolous. The tax court therefore did not abuse its discretion in ordering him to pay a $2,000 penalty.




B


In his final argument related to the proceedings below, Richards claims that the district court erred in excluding his "law clerk" from counsel's table and from "use in court." On this score, the court did not err. Although a pro se taxpayer may be assisted in tax court by a nonlawyer who has filed an application, passed a written exam, and been sponsored by at least two tax-court practitioners, see Tax Court Rule 200, there is nothing in the record that would indicate that Richards' "law clerk" satisfied this rule. 1




III


Lastly, the Commissioner moves for sanctions under 28 U.S.C. §1912, Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38, and 26 U.S.C. §7482(c)(4), arguing that the instant appeal is frivolous. Richards' response to the motion for sanctions generally rehashes the discredited arguments contained within his opening brief, including his assertions that "there is no statutorily-imposed duty to file, to pay when filing, or to withhold the income of a natural person." The Commissioner requests sanctions in the amount of $8,000, stating that the government expends an average of $11,000 in attorney salaries and other costs to defend against a frivolous tax appeal.

Rule 38 and 28 U.S.C. §1912 allow a court of appeals "to award just damages and single or double costs if the court determines that an appeal is frivolous or brought for purposes of delay." Kyler v. Everson, 442 F.3d 1251, 1253 (10th Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted). Similarly, 26 U.S.C. §7482(c)(4) authorizes a court of appeals "to require the taxpayer to pay...a penalty in any case where the decision of the Tax Court is affirmed and it appears that the appeal was instituted or maintained primarily for delay or that the taxpayer's position in the appeal is frivolous or groundless." This court may award sanctions against a pro se litigant such as Richards because "pro se litigants are subject to the same minimum litigation requirements that bind all litigants and counsel before all federal courts." Kyler, 442 F.3d at 1253. We have consistently recognized that "[a]n appeal is frivolous when the result is obvious, or the appellant's arguments of error are wholly without merit." Braley v. Campbell, 832 F.2d 1504, 1511 (10th Cir. 1987) (quotation omitted).

Given Richards' insistence on pursuing meritless legal arguments throughout this appeal, we conclude that a sanction is warranted. 2 Nevertheless, because this appeal involves only a few relatively straightforward issues, the Commissioner has not adequately justified the $8,000 sum requested. In our discretion we therefore reduce the requested sanction amount to $4,000.




IV


The judgment of the United States Tax Court is AFFIRMED . The Commissioner's motion for sanctions is GRANTED but the amount is limited to $4,000. The mandate for sanctions shall issue forthwith.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.

1 To the extent that Richards' pro se opening brief can be read to assert additional procedural irregularities in the tax court's conduct of the bench trial, we summarily reject his claims.

2 We harbor no doubt that Richards appreciates the meritless nature of his arguments. He admitted to this court in his opening brief that "the threads that wind through the many civil and criminal tax cases" support the decision the tax court reached in this case.

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Monday, April 21, 2008


During a CDP hearing, the taxpayer may raise any relevant issue related to the unpaid tax or proposed lien, including offers of collection alternatives. 26 U.S.C. § 6330(c)(2)(A). However, the taxpayer may only challenge the underlying tax liability at the CDP hearing if the individual did not previously have an opportunity to dispute such tax liability. 26 U.S.C. § 6330(c)(2)(B).



Brian V. Musto, Plaintiff v. Internal Revenue Service, Defendant.

U.S. District Court, Dist. N.J., Camden Vicinage; Civ. 06-3253 (RBK), March 3, 2008.

d opinion.

[ Code Sec. 6330]

Collection: Tax liens: Collection Due Process hearing: Judicial review. --





OPINION


KUGLER, United States District Judge: This matter comes before the Court upon motion by the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") for summary judgment against Brian V. Musto ("Plaintiff") on his action for redetermination pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6330(d). Plaintiff seeks to challenge the IRS Appeals Office's determination that a lien against Plaintiff's property is warranted to collect certain unpaid employment taxes. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant the IRS's motion.



I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff formerly owned a now-dissolved entity called Brian V. Musto & Associates. (Compl. ¶ 5.) On April 15, 1997, the IRS informed Plaintiff of a proposed trust fund recovery penalty assessment against him for the period ending September 30, 1996 for unpaid payroll taxes of Brian V. Musto & Associates, Inc. (Voysest Decl. Ex. 4.) On June 26, 1997, the IRS notified Plaintiff of a similar assessment for the period ending December 31, 1996 for additional payroll taxes owed by Brian V. Musto & Associates, Inc. ( Id. Ex. 5.) These notices informed Plaintiff of his ability to contest the proposed assessments; however, he did not do so.

On September 30, 2005, the IRS wrote Plaintiff a letter notifying him of its intent to impose a lien against his property in an effort to collect the trust fund recovery penalty assessments. ( Id. Ex. 1.) The letter also apprised Plaintiff of his right to request a collection due process hearing ("CDP hearing") to dispute the imposition of the lien. ( Id.) Plaintiff timely requested such a hearing, which was held before Appeals Officer Voysest on May 9, 2006. ( Id. ¶ 7.)

At the hearing, Plaintiff disputed his personal responsibility for the taxes, arguing instead that Brian V. Musto & Associates, Inc. owed the outstanding taxes. ( Id. ¶ 10; Compl. ¶ 7.) Appeals Officer Voysest refused to entertain that argument, however, because Plaintiff had forfeited the opportunity to challenge the proposed assessments when he failed to respond to the initial notification in 1997. ( See Voysest Decl. ¶ 7.) Following the hearing, the Appeals Office issued a Notice of Determination that the imposition of the lien against Plaintiff was proper. ( Id. Ex. 6.) Plaintiff sought review of this determination by filing a complaint with this Court on July 18, 2006 pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6330(d). On June 29, 2007, the IRS filed the motion for summary judgment now before the Court. Plaintiff did not oppose the motion.



II. STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Summary judgment is appropriate where the Court is satisfied that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 330 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists only if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). When the Court weighs the evidence presented by the parties, "[t]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Id. at 255.

The burden of establishing the nonexistence of a "genuine issue" is on the party moving for summary judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 330. The moving party may satisfy this burden by either (1) submitting affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim; or (2) demonstrating to the Court that the nonmoving party's evidence is insufficient to establish an essential element of the nonmoving party's case. Id. at 331.

Once the moving party satisfies this initial burden, the nonmoving party "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). To do so, the nonmoving party must "do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Rather, to survive summary judgment, the nonmoving party must "make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of [every] element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.

Because Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is unopposed, this Court will "treat all facts properly supported by the movant to be uncontroverted." Brandon v. Warden, No. State Prison, 2006 WL 1128721, *3 (D.N.J. Apr. 27, 2006) (citations omitted). Here, the moving party is also the party bearing the burden of proof, so the Court must determine "that the facts specified in or in connection with the motion entitle the moving party to judgment as a matter of law." Anchorage Assoc. v. Virgin Islands Bd. of Tax Rev., 922 F.2d 168, 176 (3d Cir. 1990).



III. DISCUSSION

The IRS argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff's action for redetermination improperly attempts to challenge the tax liability underlying the imposition of the lien, which he is precluded from doing by the Internal Revenue Code. The IRS argues further that it is entitled to summary judgment because the Appeals Officer Voysest did not abuse its discretion in this matter.

Section 6330 outlines the rights and procedures associated with the imposition of a tax lien. Under § 6330, a taxpayer is entitled to written notice of the IRS's intent to issue a lien, as well as written notice of the right to a CDP hearing before the IRS Appeals Office prior to the imposition of any such lien. See 26 U.S.C. § 6330(a)(1). During the CDP hearing, the taxpayer may raise any relevant issue related to the unpaid tax or proposed lien, including offers of collection alternatives. 26 U.S.C. § 6330(c)(2)(A). However, the taxpayer may only challenge the underlying tax liability at the CDP hearing if the individual did not previously have an opportunity to dispute such tax liability. 26 U.S.C. § 6330(c)(2)(B).

In turn, the IRS Appeals Officer must verify that all applicable laws and procedures have been followed, and he must consider any relevant arguments or challenges raised by the taxpayer. 26 U.S.C. § 6330(c)(3). The Appeals Officer must then weigh "whether any proposed collection action balances the need for the efficient collection of taxes with the legitimate concern of the person that any collection action be no more intrusive than necessary." 26 U.S.C. § 6330(c)(3)(C). Based on these considerations, the Appeals Officer will issue a final determination regarding a proposed tax lien.

Section 6330 also provides for judicial review of the final determination of the Appeals Officer by bringing an action for redetermination in federal district court. 26 U.S.C. § 6330(d). A district court only has jurisdiction to review matters that were properly before the Appeals Officer during the CDP hearing. The standard of review of a CDP hearing is de novo when the underlying tax liability is properly raised at the hearing. Gardner v. United States, No. Civ. A. 04-2686, 2005 WL 1155728 (D.N.J. April 5, 2005) (citing Allglass Sys. v. Commissioner, 330 F. Supp. 2d 540, 543 (E.D. Pa. 2004)). Where the underlying tax liability is not contested during the hearing, however, the reviewing court must use an abuse of discretion standard. Id.

As an initial matter, this Court lacks jurisdiction to review Plaintiff's underlying tax liability since that issue was not properly before Appeals Officer Voysest during the CDP hearing. Plaintiff first received notice of the IRS's proposed trust fund recovery penalty assessment against him for the period ending September 30, 1996 via letter dated April 15, 1997. (Voysest Decl. Ex. 4.) On June 26, 1997, the IRS sent Plaintiff a second notice concerning a proposed trust fund recovery penalty assessment for the period ending December 31, 1996. ( Id. Ex. 5.) Both notices informed Plaintiff of his right to contest the proposed assessments; however, Plaintiff failed to take any action. ( Id. ¶ 7.) As a result, Appeals Officer Voysest refused to entertain Plaintiff's challenges to the underlying tax liability at the CDP hearing pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6330(c)(2)(B). ( See id.) Since this Court's jurisdiction extends only to those matters properly before the Appeals Officer at the CDP hearing, the Court can only review whether Appeals Officer Voysest abused his discretion in finding that the lien against Plaintiff's property was proper.

Under the abuse of discretion standard, a court "'must consider whether the decision was based on consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment.... Although this inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one. The court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.'" AllGlass Sys., Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d at 544 (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971)).

The Court finds that Appeals Officer Voysest did not abuse its discretion by finding the lien appropriate. First, at the CDP hearing, Appeals Officer Voysest, who had no prior involvement with Plaintiff's case, obtained verification from the Secretary that the requirements of any applicable law or administrative procedure had been met. (Voysest Decl. ¶ 10.) Additionally, Plaintiff did not suggest any collection alternatives. ( Id.) Finally, Appeals Officer Voysest determined that the issuance of the lien by the IRS balanced the need for efficient tax collection with the legitimate concern that any collection action be no more intrusive than necessary. ( Id. ¶ 12.) At the hearing Plaintiff did not make any arguments regarding the satisfaction of applicable law and administrative procedure, collection alternatives, or intrusiveness. ( Id. ¶ 11.) The only challenge Plaintiff raised was whether or not he owed the tax. ( Id.) As a result, this Court finds no basis to conclude that Appeals Officer Voysest abused his discretion in upholding the validity of the lien.



IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the IRS's motion for summary judgment will be granted. An accompanying order shall issue today.

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Saturday, April 19, 2008

H.R. 5719 (House Bill) Taxpayer Assistance and Simplification Act of 2008

April 18, 2008

110th Congress

110th CONGRESS

2d Session

H. R. 5719

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to conform return preparer penalty standards, delay implementation of withholding taxes on government contractors, enhance taxpayer protections, assist low-income taxpayers, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

April 8, 2008

Mr. Rangel (for himself, Mr. McDermott, Mr. Lewis of Georgia, Mr. Pomeroy, Mr. Emanuel, Mr. Blumenauer, Mr. Kind, Ms. Berkley, Mr. Crowley, Mr. Meek of Florida, Mr. Ellison, Ms. Giffords, Mr. Hall of New York, Mr. Mahoney of Florida, Mr. Walz of Minnesota, Mr. Welch of Vermont, and Mrs. Jones of Ohio) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means

A BILL

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to conform return preparer penalty standards, delay implementation of withholding taxes on government contractors, enhance taxpayer protections, assist low-income taxpayers, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,



SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE, ETC.

(a) Short Title. --This Act may be cited as the "Taxpayer Assistance and Simplification Act of 2008".

(b) Amendment of 1986 Code. --Except as otherwise expressly provided, whenever in this Act an amendment or repeal is expressed in terms of an amendment to, or repeal of, a section or other provision, the reference shall be considered to be made to a section or other provision of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.

(c) Table of Contents. --The table of contents of this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title, etc.

Sec. 2. Modification of penalty on understatement of taxpayer's liability by tax return preparer.

Sec. 3. Removal of cellular telephones (or similar telecommunications equipment) from listed property.

Sec. 4. Delay of application of withholding requirement on certain governmental payments for goods and services.

Sec. 5. Elderly and disabled individuals receiving in-home care under certain government programs not subject to employment tax provisions.

Sec. 6. Referrals to low-income taxpayer clinics permitted.

Sec. 7. Programs for the benefit of low-income taxpayers.

Sec. 8. EITC outreach.

Sec. 9. Prohibition on IRS debt indicators for predatory refund anticipation loans.

Sec. 10. Study on delivery of tax refunds.

Sec. 11. Extension of time for return of property for wrongful levy.

Sec. 12. Individuals held harmless on wrongful levy, etc., on individual retirement plan.

Sec. 13. Taxpayer notification of suspected identity theft.

Sec. 14. Repeal of authority to enter into private debt collection contracts.

Sec. 15. Clarification of IRS unclaimed refund authority.

Sec. 16. Prohibition on misuse of Department of the Treasury names and symbols.

Sec. 17. Substantiation of amounts paid or distributed out of health savings account.

Sec. 18. Increase in information return penalties.

Sec. 19. Increase in penalty for failure to file partnership returns.

Sec. 20. Increase in penalty for failure to file S corporation return.

Sec. 21. Time for payment of corporate estimated tax.



SEC. 2. MODIFICATION OF PENALTY ON UNDERSTATEMENT OF TAXPAYER'S LIABILITY BY TAX RETURN PREPARER.

(a) In General. --Subsection (a) of section 6694 (relating to understatement due to unreasonable positions) is amended to read as follows:

"(a) Understatement Due to Unreasonable Positions. --

"(1) In general. --If a tax return preparer --

"(A) prepares any return or claim of refund with respect to which any part of an understatement of liability is due to a position described in paragraph (2), and

"(B) knew (or reasonably should have known) of the position,

such tax return preparer shall pay a penalty with respect to each such return or claim in an amount equal to the greater of $1,000 or 50 percent of the income derived (or to be derived) by the tax return preparer with respect to the return or claim.

"(2) Unreasonable position. --

"(A) In general. --Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, a position is described in this paragraph unless there is or was substantial authority for the position.

"(B) Disclosed positions. --If the position was disclosed as provided in section 6662(d)(2)(B)(ii)(I) and is not a position to which subparagraph (C) applies, the position is described in this paragraph unless there is a reasonable basis for the position.

"(C) Tax shelters and reportable transactions. --If the position is with respect to a tax shelter (as defined in section 6662(d)(2)(C)(ii)) or a reportable transaction to which section 6662A applies, the position is described in this paragraph unless it is reasonable to believe that the position would more likely than not be sustained on its merits.

"(3) Reasonable cause exception. --No penalty shall be imposed under this subsection if it is shown that there is reasonable cause for the understatement and the tax return preparer acted in good faith.".

(b) Effective Date. --The amendment made by this section shall apply --

(1) in the case of a position described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of section 6694(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (as amended by this section), to returns prepared after May 25, 2007, and

(2) in the case of a position described in subparagraph (C) of such section (as amended by this section), to returns prepared for taxable years ending after the date of the enactment of this Act.



SEC. 3. REMOVAL OF CELLULAR TELEPHONES (OR SIMILAR TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT) FROM LISTED PROPERTY.

(a) In General. --Subparagraph (A) of section 280F(d)(4) (defining listed property) is amended by inserting "and" at the end of clause (iv), by striking clause (v), and by redesignating clause (vi) as clause (v).

(b) Effective Date. --The amendment made by subsection (a) shall apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 2008.



SEC. 4. DELAY OF APPLICATION OF WITHHOLDING REQUIREMENT ON CERTAIN GOVERNMENTAL PAYMENTS FOR GOODS AND SERVICES.

(a) In General. --Subsection (b) of section 511 of the Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005 is amended by striking "December 31, 2010" and inserting "December 31, 2011".

(b) Report to Congress. --Not later than 6 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury shall submit to the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the Senate a report with respect to the withholding requirements of section 3402(t) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, including a detailed analysis of --

(1) the problems, if any, which are anticipated in administering and complying with such requirements,

(2) the burdens, if any, that such requirements will place on governments and businesses (taking into account such mechanisms as may be necessary to administer such requirements), and

(3) the application of such requirements to small expenditures for services and goods by governments.



SEC. 5. ELDERLY AND DISABLED INDIVIDUALS RECEIVING IN-HOME CARE UNDER CERTAIN GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS NOT SUBJECT TO EMPLOYMENT TAX PROVISIONS.

(a) In General. --Chapter 25 (relating to general provisions relating to employment taxes) is amended by adding at the end the following new section:



"SEC. 3511. ELDERLY AND DISABLED INDIVIDUALS RECEIVING IN-HOME CARE UNDER CERTAIN GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS.

"(a) In General. --In the case of amounts paid under a home care service program to a home care service provider by the fiscal administrator of such program --

"(1) the home care service recipient shall not be liable for the payment of any taxes imposed under this subtitle with respect to amounts paid for the provision of services under such program, and

"(2) the fiscal administrator shall be so liable.

"(b) Definitions. --For purposes of this section --

"(1) Home care service program. --The term `home care service program' means a State or local government program --

"(A) any portion of which is funded with Federal funds, and

"(B) under which domestic services are provided to elderly or disabled individuals in their homes.

Such term shall not include any program to the extent home care service recipients make payments to the home care service providers for such in-home domestic services.

"(2) Home care service provider. --The term `home care service provider' means any individual who provides domestic services to a home care service recipient under a home care service program.

"(3) Home care service recipient. --The term `home care service recipient' means any individual receiving domestic services under a home care service program.

"(4) Fiscal administrator. --The term `fiscal administrator' means any person or governmental entity who pays amounts under a home care service program to home care service providers for the provision of domestic services under such program.

"(c) Returns by Fiscal Administrator. --For purposes of this section --

"(1) In general. --Returns relating to taxes imposed or amounts required to be withheld under this subtitle shall be made under the identifying number of the fiscal administrator.

"(2) Identification of service recipient. --The fiscal administrator shall, to the extent required under regulations prescribed by the Secretary, make a return setting forth --

"(A) the name, address, and identifying number of each home care service recipient for whom amounts are paid by such fiscal administrator under the home care services program, and

"(B) such other information as the Secretary may require.

"(d) Regulations. --The Secretary may prescribe such regulations or other guidance as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this section, including requiring deposits of any tax imposed under this subtitle.".

(b) Service Recipient Identification Return Treated as Information Return. --Paragraph (3) of section 6724(d) is amended by striking "and" at the end of subparagraph (C)(ii), by striking the period at the end of subparagraph (D)(ii) and inserting ", and", and by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:

"(E) any requirement under section 3511(c)(2).".

(c) Clerical Amendment. --The table of sections for chapter 25 is amended by adding at the end the following new item:



"Sec. 3511. Elderly and disabled individuals receiving in-home care under certain government programs.".

(d) Effective Date. --The amendments made by this section shall apply to amounts paid after December 31, 2008.



SEC. 6. REFERRALS TO LOW-INCOME TAXPAYER CLINICS PERMITTED.

(a) In General. --Subsection (c) of section 7526 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

"(6) Treasury employees permitted to refer taxpayers to qualified low-income taxpayer clinics. --Notwithstanding any other provision of law, officers and employees of the Department of the Treasury may refer taxpayers for advice and assistance to qualified low-income taxpayer clinics receiving funding under this section.".

(b) Effective Date. --The amendment made by this section shall apply to referrals made after the date of the enactment of this Act.



SEC. 7. PROGRAMS FOR THE BENEFIT OF LOW-INCOME TAXPAYERS.

(a) Volunteer Income Tax Assistance Programs. --Chapter 77 (relating to miscellaneous provisions) is amended by inserting after section 7526 the following new section:



"SEC. 7526A. VOLUNTEER INCOME TAX ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS.

"(a) In General. --The Secretary may, subject to the availability of appropriated funds, make grants to provide matching funds for the development, expansion, or continuation of volunteer income tax assistance programs.

"(b) Volunteer Income Tax Assistance Program. --For purposes of this section, the term `volunteer income tax assistance program' means a program --

"(1) which does not charge taxpayers for its return preparation services,

"(2) which operates programs to assist low and moderate- income (as determined by the Secretary) taxpayers in preparing and filing their Federal income tax returns, and

"(3) in which all of the volunteers who assist in the preparation of Federal income tax returns meet the requirements prescribed by the Secretary.

"(c) Special Rules and Limitations. --

"(1) Aggregate limitation. --Unless otherwise provided by specific appropriation, the Secretary shall not allocate more than $10,000,000 per year (exclusive of costs of administering the program) to grants under this section.

"(2) Other applicable rules. --Rules similar to the rules under paragraphs (2) through (6) of section 7526(c) shall apply with respect to the awarding of grants to volunteer income tax assistance programs.".

(b) Increase in Authorized Grants for Low-Income Taxpayer Clinics. --Paragraph (1) of section 7526(c) (relating to aggregate limitation) is amended by striking "$6,000,000" and inserting "$10,000,000".

(c) Clerical Amendments. --

(1) Section 7526(c)(5) is amended by striking the last sentence by inserting "qualified" before "low-income".

(2) The table of sections for chapter 77 is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 7526 the following new item:



"Sec. 7526A. Volunteer income tax assistance program.".

(d) Effective Date. --The amendments made by this section shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act.



SEC. 8. EITC OUTREACH.

(a) In General. --Section 32 (relating to earned income) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

"(n) Notification of Potential Eligibility for Credit and Refund. --

"(1) In general. --To the extent possible and on an annual basis, the Secretary shall provide to each taxpayer who --

"(A) for any preceding taxable year for which credit or refund is not precluded by section 6511, and

"(B) did not claim the credit under subsection (a) but may be allowed such credit for any such taxable year based on return or return information (as defined in section 6103(b)) available to the Secretary,

notice that such taxpayer may be eligible to claim such credit and a refund for such taxable year.

"(2) Notice. --Notice provided under paragraph (1) shall be in writing and sent to the last known address of the taxpayer.".

(b) Effective Date. --The amendment made by this section shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act.



SEC. 9. PROHIBITION ON IRS DEBT INDICATORS FOR PREDATORY REFUND ANTICIPATION LOANS.

(a) In General. --Subsection (f) of section 6011 (relating to promotion of electronic filing) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

"(3) Prohibition on irs debt indicators for predatory refund anticipation loans. --

"(A) In general. --In carrying out any program under this subsection, the Secretary shall not provide a debt indicator to any person with respect to any refund anticipation loan if the Secretary determines that the business practices of such person involve refund anticipation loans and related charges and fees that are predatory.

"(B) Refund anticipation loan. --For purposes of this paragraph, the term `refund anticipation loan' means a loan of money or of any other thing of value to a taxpayer secured by the taxpayer's anticipated receipt of a Federal tax refund.

"(C) IRS debt indicator. --For purposes of this paragraph, the term `debt indicator' means a notification provided through a tax return's acknowledgment file that a refund will be offset to repay debts for delinquent Federal or State taxes, student loans, child support, or other Federal agency debt.".

(b) Effective Date. --The amendment made by this section shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act.



SEC. 10. STUDY ON DELIVERY OF TAX REFUNDS.

(a) In General. --The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the National Taxpayer Advocate, shall conduct a study on the feasibility of delivering tax refunds on debit cards, prepaid cards, and other electronic means to assist individuals that do not have access to financial accounts or institutions.

(b) Report. --Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury shall submit a report to Congress containing the results of the study conducted under subsection (a).



SEC. 11. EXTENSION OF TIME FOR RETURN OF PROPERTY FOR WRONGFUL LEVY.

(a) Extension of Time for Return of Property Subject to Levy. --Subsection (b) of section 6343 (relating to return of property) is amended by striking "9 months" and inserting "2 years".

(b) Period of Limitation on Suits. --Subsection (c) of section 6532 (relating to suits by persons other than taxpayers) is amended --

(1) in paragraph (1) by striking "9 months" and inserting "2 years", and

(2) in paragraph (2) by striking "9-month" and inserting "2-year".

(c) Effective Date. --The amendments made by this section shall apply to --

(1) levies made after the date of the enactment of this Act, and

(2) levies made on or before such date if the 9-month period has not expired under section 6343(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (without regard to this section) as of such date.



SEC. 12. INDIVIDUALS HELD HARMLESS ON WRONGFUL LEVY, ETC., ON INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT PLAN.

(a) In General. --Section 6343 (relating to authority to release levy and return property) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

"(f) Individuals Held Harmless on Wrongful Levy, etc. on Individual Retirement Plan. --

"(1) In general. --If the Secretary determines that an individual retirement plan has been levied upon in a case to which subsection (b) or (d)(2)(A) applies, an amount equal to the sum of --

"(A) the amount of money returned by the Secretary on account of such levy, and

"(B) interest paid under subsection (c) on such amount of money,

may be deposited into such individual retirement plan or any other individual retirement plan (other than an endowment contract) to which a rollover from the plan levied upon is permitted. An amount may not be deposited into a Roth IRA under the preceding sentence unless the individual retirement plan levied upon was a Roth IRA at the time of such levy.

"(2) Treatment as rollover. --If amounts are deposited into an individual retirement plan under paragraph (1) not later than the 60th day after the date on which the individual receives the amounts under paragraph (1) --

"(A) such deposit shall be treated as a rollover described in section 408(d)(3)(A)(i),

"(B) to the extent the deposit includes interest paid under subsection (c), such interest shall not be includible in gross income, and

"(C) such deposit shall not be taken into account under section 408(d)(3)(B).

For purposes of subparagraph (B), an amount shall be treated as interest only to the extent that the amount deposited exceeds the amount of the levy.

"(3) Refund, etc., of income tax on levy. --If any amount is includible in gross income for a taxable year by reason of a levy referred to in paragraph (1) and any portion of such amount is treated as a rollover under paragraph (2), any tax imposed by chapter 1 on such portion shall not be assessed, and if assessed shall be abated, and if collected shall be credited or refunded as an overpayment made on the due date for filing the return of tax for such taxable year.

"(4) Interest. --Notwithstanding subsection (d), interest shall be allowed under subsection (c) in a case in which the Secretary makes a determination described in subsection (d)(2)(A) with respect to a levy upon an individual retirement plan.".

(b) Effective Date. --The amendment made by this section shall apply to amounts paid under subsections (b), (c), and (d)(2)(A) of section 6343 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 after the date of the enactment of this Act.



SEC. 13. TAXPAYER NOTIFICATION OF SUSPECTED IDENTITY THEFT.

(a) In General. --Chapter 77 (relating to miscellaneous provisions) is amended by adding at the end the following new section:



"SEC. 7529. NOTIFICATION OF SUSPECTED IDENTITY THEFT.

"If, in the course of an investigation under the internal revenue laws, the Secretary determines that there was or may have been an unauthorized use of the identity of the taxpayer or a dependent of the taxpayer, the Secretary shall, to the extent permitted by law --

"(1) as soon as practicable and without jeopardizing such investigation, notify the taxpayer of such determination, and

"(2) if any person is criminally charged by indictment or information with respect to such unauthorized use, notify such taxpayer as soon as practicable of such charge.".

(b) Clerical Amendment. --The table of sections for chapter 77 is amended by adding at the end the following new item:



"Sec. 7529. Notification of suspected identity theft.".

(c) Effective Date. --The amendments made by this section shall apply to determinations made after the date of the enactment of this Act.



SEC. 14. REPEAL OF AUTHORITY TO ENTER INTO PRIVATE DEBT COLLECTION CONTRACTS.

(a) In General. --Subchapter A of chapter 64 is amended by striking section 6306.

(b) Conforming Amendments. --

(1) Subchapter B of chapter 76 is amended by striking section 7433A.

(2) Section 7811 is amended by striking subsection (g).

(3) Section 1203 of the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring Act of 1998 is amended by striking subsection (e).

(4) The table of sections for subchapter A of chapter 64 is amended by striking the item relating to section 6306.

(5) The table of sections for subchapter B of chapter 76 is amended by striking the item relating to section 7433A.

(c) Effective Date. --

(1) In general. --Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, the amendments made by this section shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act.

(2) Exception for existing contracts, etc. --The amendments made by this section shall not apply to any contract which was entered into before July 18, 2007, and is not renewed or extended on or after March 1, 2008.

(3) Unauthorized contracts and extensions treated as void. --Any qualified tax collection contract (as defined in section 6306 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as in effect before its repeal) which is entered into on or after July 18, 2007, and any extension or renewal on or after March 1, 2008, of any qualified tax collection contract (as so defined) shall be void.



SEC. 15. CLARIFICATION OF IRS UNCLAIMED REFUND AUTHORITY.

Paragraph (1) of section 6103(m) (relating to tax refunds) is amended by inserting ", and through any other means of mass communication," after "media".



SEC. 16. PROHIBITION ON MISUSE OF DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY NAMES AND SYMBOLS.

(a) In General. --Subsection (a) of section 333 of title 31, United States Code, is amended by inserting "Internet domain address," after "solicitation," both places it appears.

(b) Penalty for Misuse by Electronic Means. --Subsections (c)(2) and (d)(1) of section 333 of such Code are each amended by inserting "or any other mass communications by electronic means," after "telecast,".

(c) Effective Date. --The amendments made by this section shall apply with respect to violations occurring after the date of the enactment of this Act.



SEC. 17. SUBSTANTIATION OF AMOUNTS PAID OR DISTRIBUTED OUT OF HEALTH SAVINGS ACCOUNT.

(a) In General. --Paragraph (1) of section 223(f) (relating to amounts used for qualified medical expenses) is amended by inserting "(and substantiated in a manner similar to the substantiation required for flexible spending arrangements)" after "account beneficiary".

(b) Reports. --Subsection (h) of section 223 (relating to reports) is amended --

(1) by redesignating paragraphs (1) and (2) as subparagraphs (A) and (B), respectively,

(2) by moving the text of subparagraphs (A) and (B) (as so redesignated) and the last sentence 2 ems to the right,

(3) by striking "(h) Reports. --The Secretary may require --" and inserting the following:

"(h) Reports. --

"(1) In general. --The Secretary may require --", and

(4) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

"(2) Relating to substantiation. --Not later than January 15 of each calendar year, the trustee of a health savings account shall make a report regarding such account to the Secretary and the account beneficiary setting forth --

"(A) the name, address, and identifying number of the account beneficiary, and

"(B) the amount paid or distributed out of such account for the preceding calendar year not substantiated in accordance with subsection (f)(1).".

(c) Effective Date. --The amendments made by this section shall apply with respect to amounts paid or distributed out of health savings accounts after December 31, 2008.



SEC. 18. INCREASE IN INFORMATION RETURN PENALTIES.

(a) Failure To File Correct Information Returns. --

(1) In general. --Subsections (a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and (b)(2)(A) of section 6721 are each amended by striking "$50" and inserting "$100".

(2) Aggregate annual limitation. --Subsections (a)(1), (d)(1)(A), and (e)(3)(A) of section 6721 are each amended by striking "$250,000" and inserting "$1,500,000".

(b) Reduction Where Correction Within 30 Days. --

(1) In general. --Subparagraph (A) of section 6721(b)(1) is amended by striking "$15" and inserting "$25".

(2) Aggregate annual limitation. --Subsections (b)(1)(B) and (d)(1)(B) of section 6721 are each amended by striking "$75,000" and inserting "$250,000".

(c) Reduction Where Correction on or Before August 1. --

(1) In general. --Subparagraph (A) of section 6721(b)(2) is amended by striking "$30" and inserting "$60".

(2) Aggregate annual limitation. --Subsections (b)(2)(B) and (d)(1)(C) of section 6721 are each amended by striking "$150,000" and inserting "$500,000".

(d) Aggregate Annual Limitations for Persons With Gross Receipts of Not More Than $5,000,000. --Paragraph (1) of section 6721(d) is amended --

(1) by striking "$100,000" in subparagraph (A) and inserting "$500,000",

(2) by striking "$25,000" in subparagraph (B) and inserting "$75,000", and

(3) by striking "$50,000" in subparagraph (C) and inserting "$200,000".

(e) Penalty in Case of Intentional Disregard. --Paragraph (2) of section 6721(e) is amended by striking "$100" and inserting "$250".

(f) Failure To Furnish Correct Payee Statements. --

(1) In general. --Subsection (a) of section 6722 is amended by striking "$50" and inserting "$100".

(2) Aggregate annual limitation. --Subsections (a) and (c)(2)(A) of section 6722 are each amended by striking "$100,000" and inserting "$1,500,000".

(3) Penalty in case of intentional disregard. --Paragraph (1) of section 6722(c) is amended by striking "$100" and inserting "$250".

(g) Failure To Comply With Other Information Reporting Requirements. --Section 6723 is amended --

(1) by striking "$50" and inserting "$100", and

(2) by striking "$100,000" and inserting "$1,500,000".

(h) Effective Date. --The amendments made by this section shall apply with respect to information returns required to be filed after December 31, 2008.



SEC. 19. INCREASE IN PENALTY FOR FAILURE TO FILE PARTNERSHIP RETURNS.

Section 6698 is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

"(e) Modifications. --In the case of any return required to be filed after December 31, 2008, the dollar amount in effect under subsection (b)(1) shall be increased by $15.".



SEC. 20. INCREASE IN PENALTY FOR FAILURE TO FILE S CORPORATION RETURN.

Section 6699 is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

"(e) Modifications. --In the case of any return required to be filed after December 31, 2008, the dollar amount in effect under subsection (b)(1) shall be increased by $15.".



SEC. 21. TIME FOR PAYMENT OF CORPORATE ESTIMATED TAX.

The percentage under subparagraph (C) of section 401(1) of the Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005 in effect on the date of the enactment of this Act is increased by 0.25 percentage points.

Taxpayer Bill of Rights Act of 2008

April 18, 2008

110th Congress

110th CONGRESS

2d Session

H. R. 5716

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide taxpayer protection and assistance, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

April 8, 2008

Mr. Becerra (for himself, Mr. Doggett, and Mr. Pascrell) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means, and in addition to the Committee on Financial Services, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

A BILL

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide taxpayer protection and assistance, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,



SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; AMENDMENT OF 1986 CODE.

(a) Short Title. --This Act may be cited as the "Taxpayer Bill of Rights Act of 2008".

(b) Amendment of 1986 Code. --Except as otherwise expressly provided, whenever in this Act an amendment or repeal is expressed in terms of an amendment to, or repeal of, a section or other provision, the reference shall be considered to be made to a section or other provision of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.



SEC. 2. STATEMENT OF TAXPAYER RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS.

(a) In General. --Chapter 77 (relating to miscellaneous provisions) is amended by adding at the end the following new section:



"SEC. 7529. STATEMENT OF TAXPAYER RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS.

"(a) In General. --The Secretary, in consultation with the National Taxpayer Advocate, shall publish a summary statement of rights and obligations arising under this title. Such statement shall provide citations to the main provisions of this title which provide for the right or obligation (as the case may be). This statement of rights and obligations does not create or confer any rights or obligations not otherwise provided for under this title.

"(b) Statement of Rights and Obligations. --The statement of rights and obligations is as follows:

"(1) Taxpayer rights. --

"(A) Right to be informed (including adequate legal and procedural guidance and information about taxpayer rights).

"(B) Right to be assisted.

"(C) Right to be heard.

"(D) Right to pay no more than the correct amount of tax.

"(E) Right of appeal (administrative and judicial).

"(F) Right to certainty (including guidance, periods of limitation, no second exam, and closing agreements).

"(G) Right to privacy (including due process considerations, least intrusive enforcement action, and search and seizure protections).

"(H) Right to confidentiality.

"(I) Right to appoint a representative in matters before the Internal Revenue Service.

"(J) Right to fair and just tax system (offer in compromise, abatement, assistance from the Office of the Taxpayer Advocate under section 7803(c), apology, and other compensation payments).

"(2) Taxpayer obligations. --

"(A) Obligation to be honest.

"(B) Obligation to be cooperative.

"(C) Obligation to provide accurate information and documents on time.

"(D) Obligation to keep records.

"(E) Obligation to pay taxes on time.". (b) Clerical Amendment. --The table of sections for chapter 77 is amended by adding at the end the following new item:



"Sec. 7529. Statement of taxpayer rights and obligations.".

(c) Effective Date. --The amendments made by this section shall take effect 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.



SEC. 3. PROGRAMS FOR THE BENEFIT OF LOW-INCOME TAXPAYERS.

(a) Volunteer Income Tax Assistance Plus. --Chapter 77 (relating to miscellaneous provisions) is amended by inserting after section 7526 the following new section:



"SEC. 7526A. VOLUNTEER INCOME TAX ASSISTANCE PLUS.

"(a) In General. --The Secretary may, subject to the availability of appropriated funds, make grants to provide matching funds for the development, expansion, or continuation of qualified return preparation programs.

"(b) Definitions. --For purposes of this section --

"(1) Qualified return preparation program. --

"(A) In general. --The term `qualified return preparation program' means a program --

"(i) which does not charge taxpayers for its return preparation services,

"(ii) which operates programs which assist low-income taxpayers in preparing and filing their Federal income tax returns, including schedules reporting sole proprietorship or farm income, and

"(iii) in which all of the volunteers who assist in the preparation of Federal income tax returns meet the training requirements prescribed by the Secretary.

"(B) Assistance to low-income taxpayers. --For purposes of subparagraph (A), a program is treated as assisting low-income taxpayers if at least 90 percent of the taxpayers assisted by the program have incomes which do not exceed 250 percent of the poverty level, as determined in accordance with criteria established by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget.

"(2) Program. --The term `program' includes --

"(A) a program at an institution of higher education which --

"(i) is described in section 102 (other than subsection (a)(1)(C) thereof) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1088), as in effect on the date of the enactment of this section, and which has not been disqualified from participating in a program under title IV of such Act, and

"(ii) satisfies the requirements of paragraph (1) through student assistance of taxpayers in return preparation and filing,

"(B) an organization described in section 501(c) and exempt from tax under section 501(a) which satisfies the requirements of paragraph (1);

"(C) a regional, State or local coalition (with one lead organization, which meets the eligibility requirements, acting as the applicant organization);

"(D) a county or municipal government agency;

"(E) an Indian tribe, as defined in section 4(12) of the Native American Housing Assistance and Self- Determination Act of 1996 (25 U.S.C. 4103(12), and includes any tribally designated housing entity (as defined in section 4(21) of such Act (25 U.S.C. 4103(21)), tribal subsidiary, subdivision, or other wholly owned tribal entity;

"(F) a section 501(c)(5) organization;

"(G) a State government agency if no other eligible organization is available to assist the targeted population or community;

"(H) a Cooperative Extension Service office if no other eligible organization is available to assist the targeted population or community; and

"(I) a nonprofit Community Development Financial Institution (CDFI) and federally- and State-charted credit union that qualifies for a tax exemption under sections 501(c)(1) and 501(c)(14), respectively.

"(c) Special Rules and Limitations. --

"(1) Aggregate limitation. --Unless otherwise provided by specific appropriation, the Secretary shall not allocate more than $10,000,000 per year (exclusive of costs of administering the program) to grants under this section.

"(2) Use of grants for overhead expenses prohibited. --No grant made under this section may be used for the overhead expenses that are not directly related to any program or that are of any institution sponsoring such program.

"(3) Other applicable rules. --Rules similar to the rules under paragraphs (2) through (6) of section 7526(c) shall apply with respect to the awarding of grants to qualified return preparation programs.

"(4) Promotion of clinics. --The Secretary is authorized to promote the benefits of and encourage the use of qualified VITA Plus through the use of mass communications, referrals, and other means.".

(b) Low-Income Taxpayer Clinics. --

(1) Increase in authorized grants. --Paragraph (1) of section 7526(c) (relating to aggregate limitation) is amended by striking "$6,000,000" and inserting "$10,000,000".

(2) Use of grants for overhead expenses prohibited. --

(A) In general. --Section 7526(c) (relating to special rules and limitations) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

"(6) Use of grants for overhead expenses prohibited. --No grant made under this section may be used for the overhead expenses that are not directly related to the clinic or that are of any institution sponsoring such clinic.".

(B) Conforming amendments. --Section 7526(c)(5) is amended --

(i) by inserting "qualified" before "low-income", and

(ii) by striking the last sentence.

(3) Promotion of clinics. --Subsection (c) of section 7526 (relating to special rules and limitations), as amended by paragraph (2), is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

"(7) Promotion of clinics. --The Secretary is authorized to promote the benefits of and encourage the use of qualified low- income taxpayer clinics through the use of mass communications, referrals, and other means.".

(4) IRS referrals to clinics. --Subsection (c) of section 7526 (relating to special rules and limitations), as amended by the preceding provisions of this subsection, is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

"(8) IRS referrals. --The Secretary may refer taxpayers to low-income taxpayer clinics receiving funding under this section.".

(c) Clerical Amendment. --The table of sections for chapter 77 is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 7526 the following new item:



"Sec. 7526A. Volunteer income tax assistance plus.".

(d) Effective Date. --The amendments made by this section shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act.



SEC. 4. REGULATION OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX RETURN PREPARERS.

(a) In General. --Section 330(a)(1) of title 31, United States Code, is amended by inserting "(including tax return preparers of Federal tax returns, documents, and other submissions)" after "representatives".

(b) Promulgation of Regulations. --The Secretary of the Treasury shall prescribe regulations under section 330 of title 31, United States Code, to regulate those tax return preparers not otherwise regulated under regulations promulgated under such section on the date of the enactment of this Act to carry out the provisions of, and amendments made by, this section.

(c) Requirements. --Such regulations shall provide guidance on the following:

(1) Examination. --

(A) In general. --In promulgating the regulations under paragraph (1), the Secretary shall approve and oversee an eligibility examination designed to test --

(i) the technical knowledge and competency of each tax return preparer to prepare Federal tax returns, including individual and business income tax returns, and

(ii) the knowledge of each such tax return preparer regarding such ethical standards for the preparation of such returns as determined appropriate by the Secretary.

(B) Grandfather. --The Secretary is authorized to accept an individual as meeting the eligibility examination requirement of this section if, in lieu of the eligibility examination under this section, the individual passed an exam comparable to the eligibility examination described in subparagraph (A) if such exam was administered within 5 years of the issuance of the regulations under this section.

(2) Suitability standards. --The Secretary shall provide suitability standards for practicing as a tax return preparer, including personal compliance with the requirements of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.

(3) Continuing eligibility. --

(A) In general. --The regulations under paragraph (1) shall require a renewal of eligibility every 3 years and shall set forth the manner in which a tax return preparer must renew such eligibility.

(B) Continuing professional education requirements. --As part of the renewal of eligibility, such regulations shall require that each such tax return preparer show evidence of completion of such continuing education or testing requirements as specified by the Secretary.

(C) Nonmonetary sanctions. --

(i) The regulations under this section shall provide for the denial, suspension or termination of such eligibility in the event of any failure to comply with the requirements promulgated hereunder.

(ii) Under such regulations, the Secretary shall establish procedures for the appeal of any determination under this paragraph.

(d) Penalty for Unauthorized Preparation of Returns. --

(1) In promulgating the regulations pursuant to subsection (b), the Secretary shall impose a penalty of $1,000 for each Federal tax return, document, or other submission prepared by a tax return preparer who is not in compliance with the regulations promulgated under this section or who is suspended or disbarred from practice before the Department of the Treasury under such regulations. Such penalty shall be in addition to any other penalty which may be imposed.

(2) No penalty may be imposed under paragraph (1) with respect to any failure if it is shown that such failure is due to reasonable cause.

(e) Definition of Tax Return Preparer. --For purposes of this section, the term "tax return preparer" has the meaning given by section 7701(a)(36), and includes any person requiring the purchase of services, a financial product or goods in lieu of or in addition to direct monetary payment.

(f) Public Awareness Campaign. --The Secretary shall conduct a public information and consumer education campaign, utilizing paid advertising --

(1) to encourage taxpayers to use for Federal tax matters only professionals who establish their competency under the regulations promulgated under section 330 of title 31, United States Code, and

(2) to inform the public of the requirements that any compensated preparer of tax returns, documents, and submissions subject to the requirements under the regulations promulgated under such section must sign the return, document, or submission prepared for a fee and display notice of such preparer's compliance under such regulations.

(g) Effective Dates. --

(1) In general. --The amendment made by this section shall take effect on the date of the enactment of the Act.

(2) Regulations. --The regulations required by section 330(d) of title 31, United States Code, shall be prescribed not later than 2 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(3) Full implementation. --The Secretary, taking into consideration the complexity and magnitude of the requirements set forth under this Act, may delay full implementation of the regulations promulgated herein not later than the fifth filing season after the enactment of this Act.



SEC. 5. REFUND ANTICIPATION LOANS.

(a) In General. --Chapter 77 (relating to miscellaneous provisions), as amended by section 2, is amended by adding at the end the following new section:



"SEC. 7530. REFUND ANTICIPATION LOANS.

"(a) Registration. --

"(1) In general. --The Secretary shall by regulation require each refund loan facilitator to register annually with the Secretary.

"(2) Registration requirements. --A registration shall under paragraph (1) shall include --

"(A) the name, address, and TIN of the refund loan facilitator, and

"(B) the fee schedule of the facilitator for the year.

"(3) Display of registration certificate. --The certificate of registration under paragraph (1) shall be displayed in the facility of the refund loan facilitator in the manner required by the Secretary.

"(b) Disclosure Requirements. --

"(1) In general. --Each refund loan facilitator registered with the Secretary shall be subject to the requirements of paragraphs (2) through (5).

"(2) Taxpayer education. --The requirements of this paragraph are that the refund loan facilitator makes available to consumers an informational pamphlet that --

"(A) sets forth options available for receiving tax refunds, presented from least expensive to most expensive, and

"(B) discusses short-term credit alternatives to utilizing refund loans.

"(3) Nature of the transaction. --The requirements of this paragraph are that, at the time of application for the refund loan, the refund loan facilitator specifically state in writing --

"(A) that the applicant is applying for a loan based on the applicant's anticipated income tax refund,

"(B) the expected time within which the loan will be paid to the applicant if such loan is approved,

"(C) the time frame in which income tax refunds are typically paid based upon the different filing options available to the applicant,

"(D) that there is no guarantee that a refund will be paid in full or received within a specified time period, and that the applicant is responsible for the repayment of the loan even if the refund is not paid in full or has been delayed, and

"(E) that the applicant may file an electronic return without applying for a refund loan and the fee for filing such an electronic return.

"(4) Fees, interest and amounts received. --The requirements of this paragraph are that, at the time of application for the refund loan, the refund loan facilitator discloses to the applicant all amounts to be received in connection with a refund loan. Such disclosure shall include --

"(A) a copy of the fee schedule of the refund loan facilitator,

"(B) the typical fees and interest rates (using annual percentage rates as defined by section 107 of the Truth in Lending Act (15 U.S.C. 1606)) for several typical amounts of such loans and of other types of consumer credit,

"(C) that the loan may have substantial fees and interest charges that may exceed those of other sources of credit, and the applicant should carefully consider --

"(i) whether such a loan is appropriate for the applicant, and

"(ii) other sources of credit.

"(D) typical fees and interest charges if a refund is not paid or delayed,

"(E) the amount of a fee (if any) that will be charged if the loan is not approved, and

"(F) administrative costs and any other amounts.

"(5) Other information. --The requirements of this paragraph are that the refund loan facilitator discloses any other information required to be disclosed by the Secretary.

"(6) Disclosure requirement. --A disclosure under any of the preceding paragraphs of this subsection shall not be treated as meeting the requirements of the respective paragraph unless the disclosure is written in a manner calculated to be understood by the average consumer of refund anticipation loans and provides sufficient information (as determined in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary) to allow the consumer to understand such options and credit alternatives.

"(c) Penalty. --

"(1) In general. --There is hereby imposed a penalty on any refund loan facilitator who fails to register with the Secretary pursuant to subsection (a) or fails to meet a disclosure requirement under subsection (b).

"(2) Amount of penalty. --The amount of the penalty imposed by paragraph (1) shall be the greater of --

"(A) $1,000, and

"(B) three times the amount of the refund loan and refund loan facilitator-determined fees charged with respect to each refund loan provided by the refund loan facilitator during the period in which the failure described in paragraph (1) occurred.

"(3) Waiver by secretary. --In the case of a failure which is due to reasonable cause and not to willful neglect, the Secretary may waive part or all of the penalty imposed by paragraph (1) to the extent that the payment of such penalty would be excessive or otherwise inequitable relative to the failure involved.

"(d) Conduct. --

"(1) Rules of conduct. --The Secretary shall prescribed rules of conduct for refund loan facilitators which are similar to the rules applicable to federally authorized tax practitioners (as defined by section 7525(a)(3)(A)) under part 10 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations.

"(2) Limitation on approval as refund loan facilitator. --For such period as the Secretary (in his discretion) determines reasonable, the Secretary may not register any person as a refund loan facilitator under subsection (a) who the Secretary determines has engaged in any conduct that would warrant disciplinary action under the rules of conduct prescribed under paragraph (1) or under part 10 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations.

"(e) Other Limitations Relating to Refund Anticipation Loans. --In any case in which a taxpayer has consented to the release of the taxpayer's debt indicator to a refund loan facilitator, the Secretary may only provide information related to the debt indicator to a refund loan facilitator who is registered under subsection (a). For purposes of the preceding sentence, the term `debt indicator' means a notification provided through a tax return's acknowledgment file that a refund will be offset to repay debts for delinquent Federal or State taxes, student loans, child support, or other Federal agency debt.

"(f) Definitions. --For purposes of this section --

"(1) Refund loan facilitator. --

"(A) In general. --The term `refund loan facilitator' includes any electronic filing service provider who --

"(i) solicits for, processes, receives, or accepts delivery of an application for a refund anticipation loan, or

"(ii) facilitates the making of a refund anticipation loan in any other manner.

"(B) Electronic filing service provider. --The term `electronic filing service provider' includes any person who is an electronic return originator, intermediate service provider, or transmitter.

"(C) Electronic return originator. --The term `electronic return originator' includes a person who originates the electronic submission of income tax returns for another person.

"(D) Intermediate service provider. --The term `intermediate service provider' includes a person who assists with processing return information between an electronic return originator (or the taxpayer in the case of online filing) and a transmitter.

"(E) Transmitter. --The term `transmitter' includes a person who sends the electronic return data directly to the Internal Revenue Service.

"(2) Refund loan. --The term `refund loan' includes any loan of money or any other thing of value to a taxpayer in connection with the taxpayer's anticipated receipt of a Federal tax refund. Such term includes a loan secured by the tax refund or an arrangement to repay a loan from the tax refund.

"(g) Regulations. --

"(1) In general. --The Secretary may prescribe such regulations as necessary to carry out this subchapter.

"(2) Burden of registration. --In promulgating such regulations, the Secretary shall minimize the burden and cost on the registrant.".

(b) Public Awareness Campaign. --The Secretary of the Treasury shall conduct a public information and consumer education campaign, utilizing paid advertising, to educate the public on making sound financial decisions with respect to refund loans (as defined by section 7529 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986), including --

(1) the need to compare the rates and fees of such loans with the rates and fees of conventional loans,

(2) the need to compare the amount of money received under the loan after taking into consideration such costs and fees with the total amount of the refund, and

(3) where and how taxpayers may lodge complaints concerning refund loan facilitators.

(c) Clerical Amendment. --The table of sections for chapter 77 is amended by adding at the end the following new item:



"Sec. 7530. Refund anticipation loans.".

(d) Effective Dates. --

(1) In general. --The amendments made by this section shall take effect on the date of the enactment of the Act.

(2) Regulations. --The regulations required by section 7530(g) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 shall be prescribed not later than 2 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(3) Full implementation. --The Secretary of the Treasury, taking into consideration the complexity and magnitude of the requirements set forth under this Act, may delay full implementation of the regulations promulgated under such section not later than 5 years after the enactment of this Act.



SEC. 6. PREPARER PENALTIES WITH RESPECT TO PREPARATION OF RETURNS AND OTHER SUBMISSIONS.

(a) Inclusion of Other Submissions in Penalty Provisions. --

(1) Understatement of taxpayer's liability. --

(A) In general. --Section 6694 (relating to understatement of taxpayer's liability by tax return preparer) is amended by striking "return or claim of refund" each place it appears and inserting "return, claim of refund, or other submission".

(B) Conforming amendments. --Section 6694, as amended by paragraph (1), is amended by striking "return or claim" each place it appears and inserting "return, claim, or other submission".

(2) Other assessable penalties. --

(A) In general. --Section 6695 (relating to other assessable penalties with respect to the preparation of tax returns for other persons) is amended by striking "return or claim of refund" each place it appears and inserting "return, claim of refund, or other submission".

(B) Conforming amendments. --Section 6695, as amended by paragraph (1), is amended by striking "return or claim" each place it appears and inserting "return, claim, or other submission".

(b) Increase in Certain Other Assessable Penalty Amounts. --

(1) In general. --Subsections (a), (b), and (c) of section 6695 (relating to other assessable penalties with respect to the preparation of income tax returns for other persons) are each amended by striking "$50" and inserting "$1,000".

(2) Removal of annual limitation. --Subsections (a), (b), and (c) of section 6695 are each amended by striking the last sentence thereof.

(c) Review by the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration. --Subparagraph (A) of section 7803(d)(2) is amended by striking "and" at the end of clause (iii), by striking the period at the end of clause (iv) and inserting ", and", and by adding at the end the following new clause:

"(v) a summary of the penalties assessed and collected during the reporting period under sections 6694 and 6695 and under the regulations promulgated under section 330 of title 31, United States Code, and a review of the procedures by which violations are identified and penalties are assessed under those sections,".

(d) Additional Certification on Documents Other Than Returns. --

(1) Identifying number required for all submissions to the irs by tax return preparers. --The first sentence of paragraph (4) of section 6109(a) is amended by striking "return or claim for refund" and inserting "return, claim for refund, or other document".

(2) Effective date. --The amendment made by paragraph (1) shall apply to documents filed after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(e) Coordination With Section 6060(a). --The Secretary of the Treasury shall coordinate the requirements under the regulations promulgated under section 330 of title 31, United States Code, with the return requirements of section 6060 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.

(f) Effective Date. --The regulations required by this section shall be prescribed not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act.



SEC. 7. CLARIFICATION OF ENROLLED AGENT CREDENTIALS.

Section 330 of title 31, United States Code, as amended by section 4, is amended --

(1) by redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (f), and

(2) by inserting after subsection (d) the following new subsection:

"(e) Any enrolled agents properly licensed to practice as required under rules promulgated under subsection (a) shall be allowed to use the credentials or designation as `enrolled agent', `EA', or `E.A.'.".



SEC. 8. PUBLIC AWARENESS.

(a) In General. --Section 6103(k) (relating to disclosure of certain returns and return information for tax administration purposes) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

"(10) Disclosure of recognized, certified, or registered persons; revocation of registration. --The Secretary shall furnish to the public --

"(A) the identity of any person who --

"(i) is an enrolled agent or is an attorney or certified public accountant who either has a power of attorney on file with the Internal Revenue Service or notifies the Internal Revenue Service of their status as a preparer of Federal tax returns,

"(ii) is certified under section 330(d) of title 31, United States Code, as a tax return preparer, or

"(iii) is registered as a refund loan facilitator pursuant to section 7529, and

"(B) information as to whether or not any person who is otherwise suspended or disbarred is no longer so recognized, certified, or registered (as the case may be).".

(b) Effective Date. --The amendment made by subsection (a) shall take effect not later than two years after the date of enactment of this Act.



SEC. 9. IMPROVED SERVICES FOR TAXPAYERS.

(a) In General. --It is the sense of Congress that the Internal Revenue Service should within 5 years --

(1) reduce the time between receipt of an electronically filed return and issuance of a refund,

(2) provide free filing and preparation to low-income taxpayers,

(3) expand assistance to low-income taxpayers,

(4) allocate resources to assist low-income taxpayers in establishing accounts at financial institutions that receive direct deposits from the United States Treasury,

(5) deliver tax refunds on debit cards, prepaid cards, and other electronic means to assist individuals that do not have access to financial accounts or institutions, and

(6) establish a pilot program for mobile tax return preparation offices.

(b) Location of Service. --

(1) In general. --The mobile tax return filing offices should be located in communities that the Secretary determines have a high incidence of taxpayers claiming the earned income tax credit, particularly in locations with few community volunteer tax preparation clinics.

(2) Indian reservation. --At least one mobile tax return filing office should be on or near an Indian reservation (as defined in section 168(j)(6) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986).



SEC. 10. TAXPAYER ACCESS TO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.

(a) Establishment of Program. --The Secretary of the Treasury may award demonstration project grants (including multiyear awards) to eligible entities to provide accounts to individuals who currently do not have an account with a financial institution. The account would be held in a federally insured depository institution.

(b) Priority. --Priority shall be given to demonstration project proposals that provide accounts at low or no cost and --

(1) that utilize new technologies such as the prepaid product to expand access to financial services, in particular for persons without bank accounts, with low access to financial services, or low utilization of mainstream financial services,

(2) that promote the development of new financial products and services that are adequate to improve access to wealth building financial services, which help integrate more Americans into the financial mainstream,

(3) that promote education for these persons and depository institutions concerning the availability and use of financial services for and by such persons, and

(4) that include other such activities and projects as the Secretary may determine are consistent with the purpose of this section.

(c) Eligible Entities. --

(1) In general. --An entity is eligible to receive a grant under this section if such an entity is --

(A) an organization described in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and exempt from tax under section 501(a) of such Code,

(B) a federally insured depository institution,

(C) an agency of a State or local government,

(D) a community development financial institution,

(E) an Indian tribal organization,

(F) an Alaska Native Corporation,

(G) a Native Hawaiian organization,

(H) an organization described in 501(c)(5), and exempt from tax under section 501(a), of such Code,

(I) a nonbank financial service provider, or

(J) a partnership comprised of 1 or more of the entities described in the preceding subparagraphs.

(2) Definitions. --For purposes of this section --

(A) Federally insured depository institution. --The term "federally insured depository institution" means any insured depository institution (as defined in section 3 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1813)) and any insured credit union (as defined in section 101 of the Federal Credit Union Act (12 U.S.C. 1752)).

(B) Community development financial institution. --The term "community development financial institution" means any organization that has been certified as such pursuant to section 1805.201 of title 12, Code of Federal Regulations.

(C) Alaska native corporation. --The term "Alaska Native Corporation" has the same meaning as the term "Native Corporation" under section 3(m) of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (43 U.S.C. 1602(m)).

(D) Native hawaiian organization. --The term "Native Hawaiian organization" means any organization that --

(i) serves and represents the interests of Native Hawaiians, and

(ii) has as a primary and stated purpose the provision of services to Native Hawaiians.

(E) Labor organization. --The term "labor organization" means an organization --

(i) in which employees participate,

(ii) which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work, and

(iii) which is described in section 501(c)(5) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.

(F) Nonbank financial service provider. --The term "nonbank financial service provider" mean an entity that engages in financial services activities, as authorized under the Federal Reserve Board, 12 Code of Federal Regulations Part 225, Regulation Y.

(d) Application. --An eligible entity shall submit an application to the Secretary of the Treasury in such form and containing such information as the Secretary may require.

(e) Evaluation and Report. --For each fiscal year in which a grant is awarded under this section, the Secretary of the Treasury shall submit a report to Congress containing a description of the activities funded, amounts distributed, and measurable results, as appropriate and available.

(f) Power and Authority of the Secretary. --

(1) Assistance. --Subject to appropriations, the Secretary of the Treasury may provide financial and technical assistance to awardees for expanding the distribution of financial services, including through financial services electronic networks.

(2) Research and development. --The Secretary of the Treasury may conduct or support such research and development as the Secretary considers appropriate in order to further the purpose of this section, including the collection of information about access to financial services.

(3) Regulations. --The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to promulgate regulations to implement and administer the program under this section.

(g) Study on Delivery of Tax Refunds. --

(1) In general. --The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the National Taxpayer Advocate, shall conduct a study on the payment opportunities of delivering tax refunds on debit cards prepaid cards, and other electronic means to assist individuals that do not have access to financial accounts or institutions.

(2) Report. --Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury shall submit a report to Congress containing the result of the study conducted under subsection (a).

Labels:

Wednesday, April 16, 2008

HR 5719 "Taxpayer Assistance and Simplification Act of 2008".


April 10, 2008

110th Congress


Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 5719 Offered by Mr. Rangel of New York


Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following:



section 1. short title, etc.

(a) Short Title. --This Act may be cited as the "Taxpayer Assistance and Simplification Act of 2008".

(b) Amendment of 1986 Code. --Except as otherwise expressly provided, whenever in this Act an amendment or repeal is expressed in terms of an amendment to, or repeal of, a section or other provision, the reference shall be considered to be made to a section or other provision of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.

(c) Table of Contents. --The table of contents of this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title, etc.

Sec. 2. Modification of penalty on understatement of taxpayer's liability by tax return preparer.

Sec. 3. Removal of cellular telephones (or similar telecommunications equipment) from listed property.

Sec. 4. Delay of application of withholding requirement on certain governmental payments for goods and services.

Sec. 5. Elderly and disabled individuals receiving in-home care under certain government programs not subject to employment tax provisions.

Sec. 6. Referrals to low income taxpayer clinics permitted.

Sec. 7. Programs for the benefit of low-income taxpayers.

Sec. 8. EITC outreach.

Sec. 9. Prohibition on IRS debt indicators for predatory refund anticipation loans.

Sec. 10. Study on delivery of tax refunds.

Sec. 11. Extension of time for return of property for wrongful levy.

Sec. 12. Individuals held harmless on wrongful levy, etc., on individual retirement plan.

Sec. 13. Taxpayer notification of suspected identity theft.

Sec. 14. Repeal of authority to enter into private debt collection contracts.

Sec. 15. Clarification of IRS unclaimed refund authority.

Sec. 16. Prohibition on misuse of Department of the Treasury names and symbols.

Sec. 17. Substantiation of amounts paid or distributed out of health savings account.

Sec. 18. Certain domestically controlled foreign persons performing services under contract with United States Government treated as American employers.

Sec. 19. Time for payment of corporate estimated tax.



sec. 2. modification of penalty on understatement of taxpayer's liability by tax return preparer.

(a) In General. --Subsection (a) of section 6694 (relating to understatement due to unreasonable positions) is amended to read as follows:

"(a) Understatement Due to Unreasonable Positions. --


"(1) In general. --If a tax return preparer --



"(A) prepares any return or claim of refund with respect to which any part of an understatement of liability is due to a position described in paragraph (2), and



"(B) knew (or reasonably should have known) of the position,



such tax return preparer shall pay a penalty with respect to each such return or claim in an amount equal to the greater of $1,000 or 50 percent of the income derived (or to be derived) by the tax return preparer with respect to the return or claim.



"(2) Unreasonable position. --



"(A) In general. --Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, a position is described in this paragraph unless there is or was substantial authority for the position.



"(B) Disclosed positions. --If the position was disclosed as provided in section 6662(d)(2)(B)(ii)(I) and is not a position to which subparagraph (C) applies, the position is described in this paragraph unless there is a reasonable basis for the position.



"(C) Tax shelters and reportable transactions. --If the position is with respect to a tax shelter (as defined in section 6662(d)(2)(C)(ii)) or a reportable transaction to which section 6662A applies, the position is described in this paragraph unless it is reasonable to believe that the position would more likely than not be sustained on its merits.



"(3) Reasonable cause exception. --No penalty shall be imposed under this subsection if it is shown that there is reasonable cause for the understatement and the tax return preparer acted in good faith.".


(b) Effective Date. --The amendment made by this section shall apply --


(1) in the case of a position described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of section 6694(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (as amended by this section), to returns prepared after May 25, 2007, and



(2) in the case of a position described in subparagraph (C) of such section (as amended by this section), to returns prepared for taxable years ending after the date of the enactment of this Act.




sec. 3. removal of cellular telephones (or similar telecommunications equipment) from listed property.

(a) In General. --Subparagraph (A) of section 280F(d)(4) (defining listed property) is amended by inserting "and" at the end of clause (iv), by striking clause (v), and by redesignating clause (vi) as clause (v).

(b) Effective Date. --The amendment made by subsection (a) shall apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 2008.



sec. 4. delay of application of withholding requirement on certain governmental payments for goods and services.

(a) In General. --Subsection (b) of section 511 of the Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005 is amended by striking "December 31, 2010" and inserting "December 31, 2011".

(b) Report to Congress. --Not later than 6 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury shall submit to the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the Senate a report with respect to the withholding requirements of section 3402(t) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, including a detailed analysis of --


(1) the problems, if any, which are anticipated in administering and complying with such requirements,



(2) the burdens, if any, that such requirements will place on governments and businesses (taking into account such mechanisms as may be necessary to administer such requirements), and



(3) the application of such requirements to small expenditures for services and goods by governments.




sec. 5. elderly and disabled individuals receiving in-home care under certain government programs not subject to employment tax provisions.

(a) In General. --Chapter 25 (relating to general provisions relating to employment taxes) is amended by adding at the end the following new section:



"sec. 3511. elderly and disabled individuals receiving in-home care under certain government programs.

"(a) In General. --In the case of amounts paid under a home care service program to a home care service provider by the fiscal administrator of such program --


"(1) the home care service recipient shall not be liable for the payment of any taxes imposed under this subtitle with respect to amounts paid for the provision of services under such program, and



"(2) the fiscal administrator shall be so liable.


"(b) Definitions. --For purposes of this section --


"(1) Home care service program. --The term 'home care service program' means a State or local government program --



"(A) any portion of which is funded with Federal funds, and



"(B) under which domestic services are provided to elderly or disabled individuals in their homes.



Such term shall not include any program to the extent home care service recipients make payments to the home care service providers for such in-home domestic services.



"(2) Home care service provider. --The term 'home care service provider' means any individual who provides domestic services to a home care service recipient under a home care service program.



"(3) Home care service recipient. --The term 'home care service recipient' means any individual receiving domestic services under a home care service program.



"(4) Fiscal administrator. --The term 'fiscal administrator' means any person or governmental entity who pays amounts under a home care service program to home care service providers for the provision of domestic services under such program.


"(c) Returns by Fiscal Administrator. --For purposes of this section --


"(1) In general. --Returns relating to taxes imposed or amounts required to be withheld under this subtitle shall be made under the identifying number of the fiscal administrator.



"(2) Identification of service recipient. --The fiscal administrator shall, to the extent required under regulations prescribed by the Secretary, make a return setting forth --



"(A) the name, address, and identifying number of each home care service recipient for whom amounts are paid by such fiscal administrator under the home care services program, and



"(B) such other information as the Secretary may require.


"(d) Regulations. --The Secretary may prescribe such regulations or other guidance as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this section, including requiring deposits of any tax imposed under this subtitle.".

(b) Service Recipient Identification Return Treated as Information Return. --Paragraph (3) of section 6724(d) is amended by striking "and" at the end of subparagraph (C)(ii), by striking the period at the end of subparagraph (D)(ii) and inserting ", and", and by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:


"(E) any requirement under section 3511(c)(2).".


(c) Clerical Amendment. --The table of sections for chapter 25 is amended by adding at the end the following new item:

"Sec. 3511. Elderly and disabled individuals receiving in-home care under certain government programs.".

(d) Effective Date. --The amendments made by this section shall apply to amounts paid after December 31, 2008.



sec. 6. referrals to low income taxpayer clinics permitted.

(a) In General. --Subsection (c) of section 7526 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:


"(6) Treasury employees permitted to refer taxpayers to qualified low-income taxpayer clinics. --Notwithstanding any other provision of law, officers and employees of the Department of the Treasury may refer taxpayers for advice and assistance to qualified low-income taxpayer clinics receiving funding under this section.".


(b) Effective Date. --The amendment made by this section shall apply to referrals made after the date of the enactment of this Act.



sec. 7. programs for the benefit of low-income taxpayers.

(a) Volunteer Income Tax Assistance Programs. --Chapter 77 (relating to miscellaneous provisions) is amended by inserting after section 7526 the following new section:



"sec. 7526a. volunteer income tax assistance programs.

"(a) In General. --The Secretary may, subject to the availability of appropriated funds, make grants to provide matching funds for the development, expansion, or continuation of volunteer income tax assistance programs.

"(b) Volunteer Income Tax Assistance Program. --For purposes of this section, the term 'volunteer income tax assistance program' means a program --


"(1) which does not charge taxpayers for its return preparation services,



"(2) which operates programs to assist low and moderate-income (as determined by the Secretary) taxpayers in preparing and filing their Federal income tax returns, and



"(3) in which all of the volunteers who assist in the preparation of Federal income tax returns meet the requirements prescribed by the Secretary.


"(c) Special Rules and Limitations. --


"(1) Aggregate limitation. --Unless otherwise provided by specific appropriation, the Secretary shall not allocate more than $10,000,000 per year (exclusive of costs of administering the program) to grants under this section.



"(2) Other applicable rules. --Rules similar to the rules under paragraphs (2) through (6) of section 7526(c) shall apply with respect to the awarding of grants to volunteer income tax assistance programs.".


(b) Increase in Authorized Grants for Low-In-come Taxpayer Clinics. --Paragraph (1) of section 7526(c) (relating to aggregate limitation) is amended by striking "$6,000,000" and inserting "$10,000,000".

(c) Clerical Amendments. --


(1) Section 7526(c)(5) is amended by striking the last sentence by inserting "qualified" before "low-income".



(2) The table of sections for chapter 77 is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 7526 the following new item:


"Sec. 7526A. Volunteer income tax assistance program.".

(d) Effective Date. --The amendments made by this section shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act.



sec. 8. eitc outreach.

(a) In General. --Section 32 (relating to earned income) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

"(n) Notification of Potential Eligibility for Credit and Refund. --


"(1) In general. --To the extent possible and on an annual basis, the Secretary shall provide to each taxpayer who --



"(A) for any preceding taxable year for which credit or refund is not precluded by section 6511, and



"(B) did not claim the credit under subsection (a) but may be allowed such credit for any such taxable year based on return or return information (as defined in section 6103(b)) available to the Secretary,



notice that such taxpayer may be eligible to claim such credit and a refund for such taxable year.



"(2) Notice. --Notice provided under paragraph (1) shall be in writing and sent to the last known address of the taxpayer.".


(b) Effective Date. --The amendment made by this section shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act.



sec. 9. prohibition on irs debt indicators for predatory refund anticipation loans.

(a) In General. --Subsection (f) of section 6011 (relating to promotion of electronic filing) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:


"(3) Prohibition on irs debt indicators for predatory refund anticipation loans. --



"(A) In general. --In carrying out any program under this subsection, the Secretary shall not provide a debt indicator to any person with respect to any refund anticipation loan if the Secretary determines that the business practices of such person involve refund anticipation loans and related charges and fees that are predatory.



"(B) Refund anticipation loan. --For purposes of this paragraph, the term 'refund anticipation loan' means a loan of money or of any other thing of value to a taxpayer secured by the taxpayer's anticipated receipt of a Federal tax refund.



"(C) IRS debt indicator. --For purposes of this paragraph, the term 'debt indicator' means a notification provided through a tax return's acknowledgment file that a refund will be offset to repay debts for delinquent Federal or State taxes, student loans, child support, or other Federal agency debt.".


(b) Effective Date. --The amendment made by this section shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act.



sec. 10. study on delivery of tax refunds.

(a) In General. --The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the National Taxpayer Advocate, shall conduct a study on the feasibility of delivering tax refunds on debit cards, prepaid cards, and other electronic means to assist individuals that do not have access to financial accounts or institutions.

(b) Report. --Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury shall submit a report to Congress containing the results of the study conducted under subsection (a).



sec. 11. extension of time for return of property for wrongful levy.

(a) Extension of Time for Return of Property Subject to Levy. --Subsection (b) of section 6343 (relating to return of property) is amended by striking "9 months" and inserting "2 years".

(b) Period of Limitation on Suits. --Subsection (c) of section 6532 (relating to suits by persons other than taxpayers) is amended --


(1) in paragraph (1) by striking "9 months" and inserting "2 years", and



(2) in paragraph (2) by striking "9-month" and inserting "2-year".


(c) Effective Date. --The amendments made by this section shall apply to --


(1) levies made after the date of the enactment of this Act, and



(2) levies made on or before such date if the 9-month period has not expired under section 6343(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (without regard to this section) as of such date.




sec. 12. individuals held harmless on wrongful levy, etc., on individual retirement plan.

(a) In General. --Section 6343 (relating to authority to release levy and return property) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

"(f) Individuals Held Harmless on Wrongful Levy, etc. on Individual Retirement Plan. --


"(1) In general. --If the Secretary determines that an individual retirement plan has been levied upon in a case to which subsection (b) or (d)(2)(A) applies, an amount equal to the sum of --



"(A) the amount of money returned by the Secretary on account of such levy, and



"(B) interest paid under subsection (c) on such amount of money,



may be deposited into such individual retirement plan or any other individual retirement plan (other than an endowment contract) to which a rollover from the plan levied upon is permitted. An amount may not be deposited into a Roth IRA under the preceding sentence unless the individual retirement plan levied upon was a Roth IRA at the time of such levy.



"(2) Treatment as rollover. --If amounts are deposited into an individual retirement plan under paragraph (1) not later than the 60th day after the date on which the individual receives the amounts under paragraph (1) --



"(A) such deposit shall be treated as a rollover described in section 408(d)(3)(A)(i),



"(B) to the extent the deposit includes interest paid under subsection (c), such interest shall not be includible in gross income, and



"(C) such deposit shall not be taken into account under section 408(d)(3)(B).



For purposes of subparagraph (B), an amount shall be treated as interest only to the extent that the amount deposited exceeds the amount of the levy.



"(3) Refund, etc., of income tax on levy. --If any amount is includible in gross income for a taxable year by reason of a levy referred to in paragraph (1) and any portion of such amount is treated as a rollover under paragraph (2), any tax imposed by chapter 1 on such portion shall not be assessed, and if assessed shall be abated, and if collected shall be credited or refunded as an overpayment made on the due date for filing the return of tax for such taxable year.



"(4) Interest. --Notwithstanding subsection (d), interest shall be allowed under subsection (c) in a case in which the Secretary makes a determination described in subsection (d)(2)(A) with respect to a levy upon an individual retirement plan.".


(b) Effective Date. --The amendment made by this section shall apply to amounts paid under subsections (b), (c), and (d)(2)(A) of section 6343 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 after the date of the enactment of this Act.



sec. 13. taxpayer notification of suspected identity theft.

(a) In General. --Chapter 77 (relating to miscellaneous provisions) is amended by adding at the end the following new section:



"sec. 7529. notification of suspected identity theft.

"If, in the course of an investigation under the internal revenue laws, the Secretary determines that there was or may have been an unauthorized use of the identity of the taxpayer or a dependent of the taxpayer, the Secretary shall, to the extent permitted by law --


"(1) as soon as practicable and without jeopardizing such investigation, notify the taxpayer of such determination, and



"(2) if any person is criminally charged by indictment or information with respect to such unauthorized use, notify such taxpayer as soon as practicable of such charge.".


(b) Clerical Amendment. --The table of sections for chapter 77 is amended by adding at the end the following new item:

"Sec. 7529. Notification of suspected identity theft.".

(c) Effective Date. --The amendments made by this section shall apply to determinations made after the date of the enactment of this Act.



sec. 14. repeal of authority to enter into private debt collection contracts.

(a) In General. --Subchapter A of chapter 64 is amended by striking section 6306.

(b) Conforming Amendments. --


(1) Subchapter B of chapter 76 is amended by striking section 7433A.



(2) Section 7811 is amended by striking subsection (g).



(3) Section 1203 of the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring Act of 1998 is amended by striking subsection (e).



(4) The table of sections for subchapter A of chapter 64 is amended by striking the item relating to section 6306.



(5) The table of sections for subchapter B of chapter 76 is amended by striking the item relating to section 7433A.


(c) Effective Date. --


(1) In general. --Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, the amendments made by this section shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act.



(2) Exception for existing contracts, etc. --The amendments made by this section shall not apply to any contract which was entered into before July 18, 2007, and is not renewed or extended on or after March 1, 2008.



(3) Unauthorized contracts and extensions treated as void. --Any qualified tax collection contract (as defined in section 6306 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as in effect before its repeal) which is entered into on or after July 18, 2007, and any extension or renewal on or after March 1, 2008, of any qualified tax collection contract (as so defined) shall be void.




sec. 15. clarification of irs unclaimed refund authority.

Paragraph (1) of section 6103(m) (relating to tax refunds) is amended by inserting ", and through any other means of mass communication," after "media".



sec. 16. prohibition on misuse of department of the treasury names and symbols.

(a) In General. --Subsection (a) of section 333 of title 31, United States Code, is amended by inserting "Internet domain address," after "solicitation," both places it appears.

(b) Penalty for Misuse by Electronic Means. --Subsections (c)(2) and (d)(1) of section 333 of such Code are each amended by inserting "or any other mass communications by electronic means," after "telecast,".

(c) Effective Date. --The amendments made by this section shall apply with respect to violations occurring after the date of the enactment of this Act.



sec. 17. substantiation of amounts paid or distributed out of health savings account.

(a) In General. --Paragraph (1) of section 223(f) (relating to amounts used for qualified medical expenses) is amended by inserting "(and, in the case of amounts paid or distributed after December 31, 2010, substantiated in a manner similar to the substantiation required for flexible spending arrangements)" after "account beneficiary".

(b) Reports. --Subsection (h) of section 223 (relating to reports) is amended --


(1) by redesignating paragraphs (1) and (2) as subparagraphs (A) and (B), respectively,



(2) by moving the text of subparagraphs (A) and (B) (as so redesignated) and the last sentence 2 ems to the right,



(3) by striking "(h) REPORTS. --The Secretary may require --" and inserting the following:





"(h) Reports. --





"(1) In general. --The Secretary may require --", and



(4) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:





"(2) Relating to substantiation. --Not later than January 15 of each calendar year after 2011, the trustee of a health savings account shall make a report regarding such account to the Secretary and the account beneficiary setting forth --



"(A) the name, address, and identifying number of the account beneficiary, and



"(B) the amount paid or distributed out of such account for the preceding calendar year not substantiated in accordance with subsection (f)(1).".


(c) Effective Date. --The amendments made by this section shall apply with respect to amounts paid or distributed out of health savings accounts after December 31, 2010.



sec. 18. certain domestically controlled foreign persons performing services under contract with united states government treated as american employers.

(a) FICA Taxes. --Section 3121 (relating to definitions) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

"(z) Treatment of Certain Foreign Persons as American Employers. --


"(1) In general. --If any employee of a foreign person is performing services in connection with a contract between the United States Government (or any instrumentality thereof) and any member of any domestically controlled group of entities which includes such foreign person, such foreign person shall be treated for purposes of this chapter as an American employer with respect to such services performed by such employee.



"(2) Domestically controlled group of entities. --For purposes of this subsection --



"(A) In general. --The term 'domestically controlled group of entities' means a controlled group of entities the common parent of which is a domestic corporation.



"(B) Controlled group of entities. --The term 'controlled group of entities' means a controlled group of corporations as defined in section 1563(a)(1), except that --



"(i) 'more than 50 percent' shall be substituted for 'at least 80 percent' each place it appears therein, and



"(ii) the determination shall be made without regard to subsections (a)(4) and (b)(2) of section 1563.



A partnership or any other entity (other than a corporation) shall be treated as a member of a controlled group of entities if such entity is controlled (within the meaning of section 954(d)(3)) by members of such group (including any entity treated as a member of such group by reason of this sentence).



"(3) Liability of common parent. --In the case of a foreign person who is a member of any domestically controlled group of entities, the common parent of such group shall be jointly and severally liable for any tax under this chapter for which such foreign person is liable by reason of this subsection, and for any penalty imposed on such person by this title with respect to any failure to pay such tax or to file any return or statement with respect to such tax or wages subject to such tax. No deduction shall be allowed under this title for any liability imposed by the preceding sentence.



"(4) Coordination. --Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any services which are covered by an agreement under subsection (l).



"(5) Cross reference. --For relief from taxes in cases covered by certain international agreements, see sections 3101(c) and 3111(c).".


(b) Social Security Benefits. --Subsection (e) of section 210 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 410(e)) is amended --


(1) by striking "(e) The term" and inserting "(e)(1) The term",



(2) by redesignating paragraphs (1) through (6) as subparagraphs (A) through (F), respectively, and



(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:





"(2)(A) If any employee of a foreign person is performing services in connection with a contract between the United States Government (or any instrumentality thereof) and any member of any domestically controlled group of entities which includes such foreign person, such foreign person shall be treated for purposes of this chapter as an American employer with respect to such services performed by such employee.





"(B) For purposes of this paragraph --



"(i) The term 'domestically controlled group of entities' means a controlled group of entities the common parent of which is a domestic corporation.



"(ii) The term 'controlled group of entities' means a controlled group of corporations as defined in section 1563(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, except that --



"(I) 'more than 50 percent' shall be substituted for 'at least 80 percent' each place it appears therein, and



"(II) the determination shall be made without regard to subsections (a)(4) and (b)(2) of section 1563 of such Code.



A partnership or any other entity (other than a corporation) shall be treated as a member of a controlled group of entities if such entity is controlled (within the meaning of section 954(d)(3) of such Code) by members of such group (including any entity treated as a member of such group by reason of this sentence).".


(c) Effective Date. --The amendment made by this section shall apply to services performed after the date of the enactment of this Act.



sec. 19. time for payment of corporate estimated tax.

The percentage under subparagraph (C) of section 401(1) of the Tax Increase

Labels:

Tuesday, April 15, 2008

SEC. 6694. UNDERSTATEMENT OF TAXPAYER'S LIABILITY BY TAX RETURN PREPARER.


6694(a) UNDERSTATEMENT DUE TO UNREASONABLE POSITIONS. --



6694(a)(1) IN GENERAL. --Any tax return preparer who prepares any return or claim for refund with respect to which any part of an understatement of liability is due to a position described in paragraph (2) shall pay a penalty with respect to each such return or claim in an amount equal to the greater of --



6694(a)(1)(A) $1,000, or



6694(a)(1)(B) 50 percent of the income derived (or to be derived) by the tax return preparer with respect to the return or claim.



6694(a)(2) UNREASONABLE POSITION. --A position is described in this paragraph if --



6694(a)(2)(A) the tax return preparer knew (or reasonably should have known) of the position,



6694(a)(2)(B) there was not a reasonable belief that the position would more likely than not be sustained on its merits, and




6694(a)(2)(C)(i) the position was not disclosed as provided in section 6662(d)(2)(B)(ii), or



6694(a)(2)(C)(ii) there was no reasonable basis for the position.



6694(a)(3) REASONABLE CAUSE EXCEPTION. --No penalty shall be imposed under this subsection if it is shown that there is reasonable cause for the understatement and the tax return preparer acted in good faith.



6694(b) UNDERSTATEMENT DUE TO WILLFUL OR RECKLESS CONDUCT. --



6694(b)(1) IN GENERAL. --Any tax return preparer who prepares any return or claim for refund with respect to which any part of an understatement of liability is due to a conduct described in paragraph (2) shall pay a penalty with respect to each such return or claim in an amount equal to the greater of --



6694(b)(1)(A) $5,000, or



6694(b)(1)(B) 50 percent of the income derived (or to be derived) by the tax return preparer with respect to the return or claim.



6694(b)(2) WILLFUL OR RECKLESS CONDUCT. --Conduct described in this paragraph is conduct by the tax return preparer which is --



6694(b)(2)(A) a willful attempt in any manner to understate the liability for tax on the return or claim, or



6694(b)(2)(B) a reckless or intentional disregard of rules or regulations.



6694(b)(3) REDUCTION IN PENALTY. --The amount of any penalty payable by any person by reason of this subsection for any return or claim for refund shall be reduced by the amount of the penalty paid by such person by reason of subsection (a).



6694(c) EXTENSION OF PERIOD OF COLLECTION WHERE PREPARER PAYS 15 PERCENT OF PENALTY. --



6694(c)(1) IN GENERAL. --If, within 30 days after the day on which notice and demand of any penalty under subsection (a) or (b) is made against any person who is a tax return preparer, such person pays an amount which is not less than 15 percent of the amount of such penalty and files a claim for refund of the amount so paid, no levy or proceeding in court for the collection of the remainder of such penalty shall be made, begun, or prosecuted until the final resolution of a proceeding begun as provided in paragraph (2). Notwithstanding the provisions of section 7421(a), the beginning of such proceeding or levy during the time such prohibition is in force may be enjoined by a proceeding in the proper court. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to prohibit any counterclaim for the remainder of such penalty in a proceeding begun as provided in paragraph (2).



6694(c)(2) PREPARER MUST BRING SUIT IN DISTRICT COURT TO DETERMINE HIS LIABILITY FOR PENALTY. --If, within 30 days after the day on which his claim for refund of any partial payment of any penalty under subsection (a) or (b) is denied (or, if earlier, within 30 days after the expiration of 6 months after the day on which he filed the claim for refund), the tax return preparer fails to begin a proceeding in the appropriate United States district court for the determination of his liability for such penalty, paragraph (1) shall cease to apply with respect to such penalty, effective on the day following the close of the applicable 30-day period referred to in this paragraph.



6694(c)(3) SUSPENSION OF RUNNING OF PERIOD OF LIMITATIONS ON COLLECTION. --The running of the period of limitations provided in section 6502 on the collection by levy or by a proceeding in court in respect of any penalty described in paragraph (1) shall be suspended for the period during which the Secretary is prohibited from collecting by levy or a proceeding in court.



6694(d) ABATEMENT OF PENALTY WHERE TAXPAYER LIABILITY NOT UNDERSTATED. --If at any time there is a final administrative determination or a final judicial decision that there was no understatement of liability in the case of any return or claim for refund with respect to which a penalty under subsection (a) or (b) has been assessed, such assessment shall be abated, and if any portion of such penalty has been paid the amount so paid shall be refunded to the person who made such payment as an overpayment of tax without regard to any period of limitations which, but for this subsection, would apply to the making of such refund.



6694(e) UNDERSTATEMENT OF LIABILITY DEFINED. --For purposes of this section, the term "understatement of liability" means any understatement of the net amount payable with respect to any tax imposed by this title or any overstatement of the net amount creditable or refundable with respect to any such tax. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d), the determination of whether or not there is an understatement of liability shall be made without regard to any administrative or judicial action involving the taxpayer.



6694(f) CROSS REFERENCE. --



For definition of tax return preparer, see section 7701(a)(36).


SEC. 6694. UNDERSTATEMENT OF TAXPAYER'S LIABILITY BY TAX RETURN PREPARER. --History notes applicable to entire section.


l 2007, Small Business and Work Opportunity Tax Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-28)


P.L. 110-28, §8246(a)(2)(F)(i)(I):


Amended Code Sec. 6694 by striking "INCOME TAX RETURN PREPARER" in the heading and inserting "TAX RETURN PREPARER". Effective for returns prepared after 5-25-2007.



l 1976, Tax Reform Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-455)


P.L. 94-455, §1203(b)(1):


Added Code Sec. 6694. Effective for documents prepared after 12-31-76.




Large and Mid Size Business Division Industry Directive on Procedures for Tax Return Preparer Penalty Cases

May 2, 2008

Code Sec. 6694

Internal Revenue Service : Large and Mid Size Business Division : Industry Directive : Return preparers : Penalties .




April 13, 2008




Control No: LMSB-04-0308-009



Impacted IRM: 20.1.6



MEMORANDUM FOR ALL LMSB INDUSTRY DIRECTORS


DIRECTOR, FIELD SPECIALISTS



LMSB HEADQUARTERS DIRECTORS


FROM: Robert L. Trujillo /s/ Robert L. Trujillo


Director, Planning, Quality, Analysis and Support


SUBJECT: LMSB Procedures for Tax Return Preparer Penalty Cases

This memorandum introduces the LMSB Procedures for Tax Return Preparer Penalty Cases. These procedures were developed based on feedback from the Industries, Pre-Filing and Technical Guidance, and the Ogden Compliance Services organizations.

The Small Business and Work Opportunity Tax Act of 2007 broadened the definition of a tax return preparer to include any person that has prepared a substantial portion of any tax return or claim for refund. This law change will greatly expand the number of practitioners subject to return preparer penalty consideration.



Examiner Responsibility for Return Preparer Behavior

The purpose of asserting penalties on return preparers is to increase compliance. When examining a return prepared by a tax return preparer, it is an examiner's responsibility to ensure that the identification and conduct provisions of the Code were followed. If the provisions are not followed, and the preparer can not show reasonable cause, it is the examiner's responsibility to assert the penalties. During every field examination, examiners should determine if return preparer violations exist. This determination will be made based on oral testimony and/or written evidence during the examination process.



Establishing and Working a Preparer Case

When facts and circumstances in the examination give rise to the development of a penalty issue, the examiner must secure the team manager's approval to begin the return preparer examination. Once approved, these cases are established on ERCS. They are not controlled on AIMS. See attachment for the detailed LMSB procedures for return preparer penalty examinations. Examiners can also visit the LMSB Return Preparer webpage http://lmsb.irs.gov/hq/pqa/Post-filing/preparers.asp

Examiners should always contact the LMSB Return Preparer Coordinator (RPC) at the start of the preparer penalty examination. The RPC can advise the examiner if the return preparer is being investigated by Criminal Investigation. Because of their knowledge of past and present return preparer penalty examinations, the RPC can provide invaluable assistance to the examiner at the start of their investigation regarding general questions, audit techniques, and case direction. In addition, the RPC can provide coordination if more than one investigation is ongoing or is contemplated.

If a preparer's misconduct appears to be pervasive and widespread, consideration will be given to opening a Program Action Case (PAC). PACs are preparer investigations where clients of questionable preparers are examined to determine whether preparer penalties and/or injunctive actions against the preparers are warranted. Examiners must work with their manager and the RPC to receive approval to open a PAC. The LMSB procedures for conducting a PAC are contained in the Memorandum from the Director, PQAS dated January 14, 2008.

If you have any questions or need additional information, please contact Senior Program Analyst/RPC Ardell Mueller at 847-303-7830.



LMSB Procedures for Tax Return Preparer Penalty Cases - Attachment



Table of Contents



Introduction

A. Taxpayer Audit

B. Preparer Problem Identified?

C. Gather Pertinent Information from Audit

D. Finish Income Tax Case



Establishing and Working a Preparer Penalty Case

E. Prepare Form 6459 - Obtain Team Manager Approval

F. Contact the LMSB Return Preparer Coordinator (RPC)

G. Prepare Form 5809 to Establish on ERCS - Not AIMS

H. Determine Statute

I. Charging Time to Preparer Penalty Case

J. Forward a Copy of the Completed Form 5809 to the RPC at the Start of the Penalty Investigation

K. Contact Preparer and Conduct Interview

L. Are Preparer Penalties Warranted?



Closing the Preparer Case

M. Group Closes Cases No Change

N. Prepare Form 5816 and Report

O. Is This an Agreed Case?

P. Process as Agreed Case

Q. Process as Unagreed Case

R. IRC Section 6701 Penalty Report

S. Preparer Agrees to Section 6701 Penalty?

T. Process as Agreed Section 6701 Case

U. Process as Unagreed Section 6701 Case



Forms and Letters

Forms

Letters



Introduction



A. Taxpayer Audit

The purpose of asserting penalties on return preparers is to increase compliance. When examining a return prepared by a tax return preparer, it is an examiner's responsibility to ensure that the identification and conduct provisions of the Code were followed. If the provisions are not followed, it is the examiner's responsibility to assert the penalties. During every field examination, examiners should determine if return preparer violations exist. This determination will be made based on oral testimony and/or written evidence during the examination process.



B. Preparer Problem Identified?

No

When facts and circumstances in the examination do not give rise to the development of a penalty issue, a simple statement to that effect in the workpapers and any corresponding leadsheets is sufficient.

Yes



C. Gather Pertinent Information from Audit

Each income tax examination is separate and distinct from the return preparer violation case relating to the income tax examination. Therefore, examiners will not propose or discuss conduct penalties per se in the presence of the taxpayer.



The Interview

Interviews of the taxpayer should serve a dual purpose: 1) to further the tax examination and 2) to identify violations by a tax return preparer. During the initial interview and throughout the examination process, the examiner should ask questions regarding the return preparation as appropriate to the case and issues being developed.

Whether through the interview process or other documentation, the examiner will need to determine whether tax violations may have been committed by a person who for compensation prepared all or a substantial portion of a return.

Questions should be tailored to the individual taxpayer and situation. Examples of questions which may be appropriate to a given situation include:


Did you meet with the preparer?



What documentation was provided to the preparer?



Did you receive a copy of the return or claim?



How was the preparer compensated?



Are you aware of any errors, omissions or mistakes on the return under examination?



Did you disclose this transaction on your tax return? Why? Why not?



Were there any concerns about how the transaction was reported?



What sort of process is used to address those concerns and on what basis are decisions made?



Was there any discussion regarding potential penalties?



Was there any discussion regarding whether the transaction is subject to disclosure under Revenue Procedure 94-69?


Disclosure or the lack of disclosure under Revenue Procedure 94-69 impacts the consideration of preparer penalties. If a dubious transaction is disclosed on the tax return, the transaction will have to be more egregious to warrant the imposition of preparer penalties. However, disclosure of the transaction does not in itself prohibit imposition of preparer penalties. There must still be a reasonable basis for the position (effective 5-25-2007). Under prior law (effective to 5-24-2007), the position could not be frivolous.

When interviewing the taxpayer or preparer ask if any other services are provided by the preparer's firm and how long the preparer has been preparing returns for the taxpayer? These simple questions will give you an idea of the extent of the preparer's knowledge regarding the taxpayer's financial situation/status and alert you as to the applicability of penalties. A tax return preparer who has been preparing a client's return for a number of years is more knowledgeable than a firm that is preparing a client's return for the first time.



Documentation of the Facts

The examiner should document the case file following the conversation with the taxpayer and/or Power of Attorney. While each examiner has their own interview style, examiners should be vigilant in documenting statements made during these interviews.

CAUTION: In the workpaper files examiners should only document the fact that the required inquiries on the return preparer issues were completed. The taxpayer's answers to these inquiries should not be included in any workpapers in the taxpayer's case file. All information on the return preparer's activities and the applicability of any penalties relating to the return preparer should be separated from the taxpayer's case file. This information is then included in the return preparer penalty case file.



Disclosure Issues in Preparer Penalty Case Files:

A preparer penalty determination is an individual federal tax matter of the preparer. As with any individual tax matter, an examiner may disclose Federal tax information to that individual (the preparer in this instance), in accordance with Internal Revenue Code Section 6103(e)(1)(A)(i) or to the preparer's attorney in fact, or duly authorized power of attorney, as permitted by IRC 6103(e)(6).

Penalty files may include copies of tax returns or portions of tax returns prepared by the preparer who is being considered for the penalty. The penalty files may also include other information taken from examination administrative files, including workpapers and transcripts of account of the taxpayers whose returns were prepared by the preparer, as well as information received directly from the preparer.

Information taken from the returns or copies of returns prepared by the preparer and information from the examination files related to such returns may be incorporated into the preparer's penalty file. Such information may be disclosed to the preparer or authorized power of attorney if the information relates to the resolution of the penalty issue (IRC 6103 (h)(4)). These disclosures may be made by the examiner during the course of the penalty determination or subsequent tax administration activity.

Remember that an examiner may disclose information about the prepared returns because that information relates to the penalty determination, not because the preparer prepared the return or may have had a power of attorney to represent the taxpayer. If there is any information in the penalty file that does not relate to the penalty determination, such as the taxpayer's current address or current employer, that information may not be disclosed to the preparer or the preparer's authorized power of attorney.

If the file includes information that would seriously impair federal tax administration if disclosed, that information must be withheld by the examiner's manager in accordance with the manager's authority to withhold information in accordance with IRC 6103(e)(7) . Delegation Order 11-2 contains the specific delegation of authority. For questions on disclosure, examiners may contact LMSB disclosure at http://lmsb.irs.gov/hq/cl/new_liaison/disclosure_office.asp or the local disclosure office at http://mysbse.web.irs.gov/CLD/GLD/Disclosure/Contacts/default.aspx



D. Finish Income Tax Case

Generally, no return preparer penalty will be proposed until the income tax examination is completed at the group level. If the income tax case is unagreed, the examiner may pursue the preparer penalty after the unagreed income tax case is closed from the group level. The determination and settlement of the income tax examination will at all times proceed without regard to the return preparer penalty issue.



Establishing and Working a Preparer Penalty



E. Prepare Form 6459 - Obtain Team Manager Approval

Obtain manager approval to further pursue the preparer penalty - Form 6459. This form remains in preparer penalty (PP) case file.

If the manager does not approve, a simple statement to that effect in the workpapers and any corresponding leadsheets is sufficient



F. Contact the LMSB Return Preparer Coordinator (RPC)

Throughout this document, RPC refers to the LMSB RPC. See LMSB Preparer Penalty Program webpage (http://lmsb.irs.gov/hq/pqa/Post-filing/preparers.asp) for additional information on preparer penalties and the LMSB RPC contact information.

The RPC can advise the examiner if the return preparer is being investigated by Criminal Investigation (CI). Because of their knowledge of past and present return preparer penalty examinations, the RPC can provide invaluable assistance to the examiner at the start of their investigation regarding audit techniques, questions, and direction. In addition, the RPC can provide coordination if more than one investigation is ongoing or is contemplated.



G. Prepare Form 5809 to Establish on ERCS - Not AIMS



Preparer Penalty Case

The examiner establishes ERCS control using Form 5809, Preparer Penalty Case Control Card, as the ERCS input document. These cases are not controlled on AIMS. In addition to information concerning the preparer, record on Form 5809 the relevant information from the client's tax return. Use of this document allows the establishment of the Non-AIMS case on ERCS for purposes of time application and is a means of keeping a manual record of penalty action on the preparer.

Generally, LMSB agents will use the return preparers TIN and name on the Form 5809. The examiner will prepare one Form 5809 control card for each preparer/year/proposed penalty type, regardless of the number of penalties that may ultimately be asserted. Rather than create a card for each client penalty investigation, all of the penalty examinations can be condensed into one and the sum total of hours applied and penalty amounts for each year and penalty type can be input without creating a separate Form 5809 and ERCS record for each client. In the rare situation where an active ERCS control already exists using the preparers TIN and Name, LMSB agents will use the clients TIN and "Clients Name/Preparer Name" on the Form 5809.

NOTE: Form 5345-D, Examination Request Master File, ("Blue Card") is NOT USED to establish a preparer penalty on ERCS.

Establish a separate ERCS record for each preparer/year/proposed penalty combination using one of the following guidelines:



For cases:


Ÿ In the TIN field, record the SSN or EIN of the Preparer



Ÿ In the Name field, record the "Preparer's Name"



Ÿ In the Tax Period field, record the tax period of the client's return.



Ÿ In the Statute field, record the statute of the client's return - P2 and P7 penalties should be assigned an alpha statute of "XX".



Ÿ In the Activity Code (ActCd) field, record one of the following codes -




chart 1

Forward a copy of the completed Form 5809 to the RPC at the start of the penalty investigation.



Consideration of Program Action Case (PAC)

If a preparer's misconduct appears to be pervasive and widespread, consideration will be given to opening a Program Action Case (PAC). PACs are preparer investigations where clients of questionable preparers are examined to determine whether preparer penalties and/or injunctive actions against the preparers are warranted. Examiners must work with their manager and the RPC to receive approval to open a PAC.



Instructions pertaining to Program Action Cases only

Source code 49 is only to be used for the primary return selected as part of the PAC. If multi-year cases are developed in Planning & Special Programs (PSP) for delivery to the groups, only the primary return should reflect source code 49. In addition, aging reason code 49 should be reflected on all return preparer program returns including the primary and multiple-year returns.



H. Determine Statute

The statute of limitations on assessment for IRC sections 6694(a) and 6695 expires three years from the later of the due date of the related (client) return or the date the return was filed. There is no statute of limitations on assessment for IRC sections 6694(b), 6700, and 6701 penalties. There is no statute of limitations on actions to enjoin preparers or promoters under IRC section 7407 or 7408.

CAUTION: Extending the statute on a client taxpayer's return with a Form 872 does not extend the statute for the return preparer penalty case.



Is the Statute of Limitations greater or less than 180 days?

Greater

Go to the next step I (Charging time to Preparer Penalty Case).

Less



Preparer Agrees to extend

The statute on a return preparer penalty case under IRC sections 6694(a) and 6695 can be extended using Form 872-D, Consent to Extend the Time on Assessment of a Tax Return Preparer Penalty, and Letter 907-P, Request for Statute Extension. (See Rev. Rul. 78-245.) Attach a copy of Letter 907-P to the executed consent in the case file. A transcript of the return on which the preparer penalty is based should be included in the preparer penalty case file for accurate monitoring of the expiration date.

Go to the next step I (Charging time to Preparer Penalty Case).



Preparer does not agree to extend

Go to Q (Process as Unagreed Case).



I. Charging Time to Preparer Penalty Case

Use one of the following codes:



chart 2

J. Forward a Copy of the Completed Form 5809 to the RPC at the Start of the Penalty Investigation.

K. Contact Preparer and Conduct Interview

Click here to review Item "C" above.

L. Are Preparer Penalties Warranted?

Note: Team managers should be involved in the development of the penalty so as to assist in making the decision if a penalty is warranted.

Yes, assessing preparer penalties other than Sec. 6701. Go to next step N (Prepare Form 5816 and Report)

Yes, assessing 6701 Penalties. Go to next step R (IRC Section 6701 Penalty Report)

No, go to next step M (Group Closes Case No Change)



Closing the Preparer Case



M. Group Closes Cases No Change

1. The team manager will review the investigation file and document concurrence.

2. The examiner will prepare Letter 1120, Preparer Penalty No-Change Case Letter, mail the original to the preparer and include a copy in the case file.

3. The examiner will complete Form 5809.

4. The examiner will notate workpapers "Closed No Change".

5. The group will update ERCS to status 02 "Closed - No Change" and forward the case to the RPC for review.

6. The RPC will extract pertinent information from the file to be retained for not less than one year. The balance of the no-change case file will not be retained.



N. Prepare Form 5816 and Report

The preparer should be afforded an opportunity to meet with the Team Manager to resolve unagreed issues. Document the actions taken on Form 4665, Report Transmittal, if the preparer does not agree. Examiners give to the preparer Form 5816, Report of Income Tax Return Preparer Penalty, and Form 886-A, Explanation of Items. When penalties are based on many different prepared returns, attach a list of client names, SSNs/EINs and tax periods. Use a separate form for each year/return combination. If penalties are being proposed via mail, send Letter 1125, Preparer Penalty 30-Day Letter, along with the Form 5816 and Form 886-A.



O. Is This an Agreed Case?

No, Unagreed. Go to next step Q (Process as an Unagreed Case)

Yes, Agreed. Go to next step P (Process as Agreed Case)



P. Process as Agreed Case

Preparer signs Form 5816. Solicit payment from preparer and if payment made, prepare Form 3244-A. Also secure Form 5838, Waiver of Restrictions on Assessment and Collection of Tax Return Preparer Penalty. Complete Form 8278, Computation and Assessment of Miscellaneous Penalties. When more than one penalty under different IRC sections will be assessed against the same preparer for the same period, complete a separate Form 8278 for each penalty. Attach Form 3198, Special Handling Notice, to each penalty case file, identifying it as a return preparer penalty case in the "Special Features" section and referencing the applicable IRC section. If the preparer filed a joint income tax return, annotate with either "Assess on Primary SSN" or "Assess on Secondary SSN" in the `Other Instructions' Section to identify the individual against whom the penalty is to be asserted.

Determine the statute of limitations. If less than the four months required to process an agreed case, it will be necessary to extend the statute. The statute on a return preparer penalty case under IRC sections 6694(a) and 6695 can be extended using Form 872-D, Consent to Extend the Time on Assessment of a Tax Return Preparer Penalty. (See Rev. Rul. 78-245.) A transcript of the return on which the preparer penalty is based should be included in the preparer penalty case file for accurate monitoring of the expiration date. If the statute is less than four months and the preparer refuses to sign the consent, complete Form 2859, Request for Quick or Prompt Assessment. See Form 2859 for LMSB quick/prompt processing instructions

When a IRC §6694(a), IRC §6694(b), IRC §6695(f) or IRC §6701 penalty is asserted against an attorney, certified public accountant, enrolled agent or enrolled actuary and is closed agreed by the examiner or sustained in Appeals, or closed unagreed without Appeal contact, a referral to the Director, Office of Professional Responsibility is mandatory. Use Form 8484. Instructions on how to make a referral to OPR and the forms to be used can be found in the OPR website at http://nhq.no.irs.gov/OPR/

Send to the RPC copies of Form 8278, Form 8484, Form 5816, Report of Income Tax Return Preparer Penalty, and Form 886-A, Explanation of Items.

The group clerk will update the return preparer case on ERCS to status 51 and close the case to the Centralized Case Processing unit via Form 3210.



Q. Process as Unagreed Case

Determine the statute of limitations. If the closing will take place in less than the six months required to process an unagreed case, it will be necessary to extend the statute. The statute on a return preparer penalty case under IRC sections 6694(a) and 6695 can be extended using Form 872-D, Consent to Extend the Time on Assessment of a Tax Return Preparer Penalty. (See Rev. Rul. 78-245.) A transcript of the return on which the preparer penalty is based should be included in the preparer penalty case file for accurate monitoring of the expiration date.

If the closing will take place in less than the six month months required to process the case and the preparer refuses to sign the consent, send the preparer a Report of Income Tax Return Preparer Penalty Form 5816, with the preparer signature part of the report removed along with an explanation of the reason for the quick assessment and a discussion of the preparer's Appeals rights. Letter 1125, Preparer Penalty 30-Day Letter, is not sent to the preparer. Complete Form 8278, Computation and Assessment of Miscellaneous Penalties, and Form 2859, Request for Quick or Prompt Assessment. See Form 2859 for LMSB quick/prompt processing instructions. Upon request, the preparer will be provided the same Appeals rights post-assessment as would have been provided if the request for Appeals consideration was received before the assessment.

If adequate time on the statute exists to process the unagreed case closing, the examiner provides the preparer with: Letter 1125, Preparer Penalty 30-Day Letter; Form 5816, Report of Income Tax Return Preparer Penalty, with the preparer signature part of the form removed; Form 886A, Explanation of Items; Form 5838, Waiver of Restrictions on Assessment and Collection of Tax Return Preparer Penalty, along with Pub 1, Pub 5 and Pub 594. The case then goes into suspense for 30 days, during which time the preparer may agree or protest. If response is agreed or there is no response, follow the procedures above for closing case as agreed (Go to next step P).

When a IRC §6694(a), IRC §6694(b), IRC §6695(f) or IRC §6701 penalty is asserted against an attorney, certified public accountant, enrolled agent or enrolled actuary and is closed agreed by the examiner or sustained in Appeals, or closed unagreed without Appeal contact, a referral to the Director, Office of Professional Responsibility is mandatory. Use Form 8484. Instructions on how to make a referral to OPR and the forms to be used can be found in the OPR website at http://nhq.no.irs.gov/OPR/

For cases going to Appeals, the form should be prepared and included in the case file.

Protest: If the preparer submits a pre-assessment protest (written) within 30 days, the examiner will review the adequacy of the protest. The examiner will prepare an assessment document, Form 8278, Computation and Assessment of Miscellaneous Penalties. When more than one penalty under different IRC sections will be assessed against the same preparer for the same period, complete a separate Form 8278 for each penalty. With the team manager's concurrence, the group will then update ERCS to Status 21 and forward the case through Technical Services to Appeals via Form 3210.

The following information should be included on the T-Letter for cases submitted to Appeals.


Ÿ Special action requirement for receiving Appeals Officer



Ÿ As of 7/23/2003, preparer and promoter penalties are coordinated as an Appeals Coordinated Issue: http://appeals.web.irs.gov/ispaci/apcoordissues.htm#Preparer/PromoterPenalties



Ÿ Under the provisions of IRM 8.7.3.11, the Appeals Officer is required to contact/make a referral to Technical Guidance. Referral procedures and forms are located at http://appeals.web.irs.gov/lbsp/documents/Technical_Guidance_Referral_Pro cedures.pdf



Ÿ The coordinator for this issue is Michael Drury, phone number: 720-956-4518



Ÿ Referral Form 13381 can be emailed to Appeals Team Manager Steven Onken, phone number: 651-726-7406.


An unagreed preparer penalty investigation file cannot be submitted to Appeals for pre-assessment consideration if there is less than 180 days remaining on the assessment statute of limitations. Form 872-D is used to extend the statute in a preparer penalty investigation.

Appeals and Unagreed Closings: The unagreed preparer penalty investigation file can not be submitted to Appeals before the tax examination case file. The preparer penalty case would be suspensed in the group until such time as it can be closed.

Send to the RPC copies of Form 8278, Form 8484, Form 3210, Form 5816, Report of Income Tax Return Preparer Penalty, and Form 886-A, Explanation of Items.



R. IRC Section 6701 Penalty Report

The preparer should be afforded an opportunity to meet with the Team Manager to resolve unagreed issues. Document the actions taken on Form 4665, Report Transmittal, if the preparer does not agree. Examiners are to provide the preparer with Form 886-A, Explanation of Items. When penalties are based on many different prepared returns, attach a list of client names, SSNs / EINs and tax periods. See IRM Exhibit 20.1.6-3 Section 6701 Pre-Assessment Letter.

When a IRC §6694(a), IRC §6694(b), IRC §6695(f) or IRC §6701 penalty is asserted against an attorney, certified public accountant, enrolled agent or enrolled actuary and is closed agreed by the examiner or sustained in Appeals, or closed unagreed without Appeal contact, a referral to the Director, Office of Professional Responsibility is mandatory. Use Form 8484. Instructions on how to make a referral to OPR and the forms to be used can be found in the OPR website at http://nhq.no.irs.gov/OPR/



S. Preparer Agrees to Section 6701 Penalty?

No, Unagreed. Go to next step U (Process as Unagreed Section 6701 Case)

Yes, Agreed. Go to next step T (Process as Agreed Section 6701 Case)



T. Process as Agreed Section 6701 Case

Solicit payment from preparer and if payment made, prepare Form 3244-A. Secure Form 5838, Waiver of Restrictions on Assessment and Collection of Tax Return Preparer Penalty. Complete Form 8278, Computation and Assessment of Miscellaneous Penalties. If penalties under different IRC sections will be assessed against the same preparer for the same period, complete a separate Form 8278 for each penalty.

Attach Form 3198, Special Handling Notice, to each penalty case file, identifying it as a return preparer penalty case in the "Special Feature" section and referencing the applicable IRC section. If the preparer filed a joint income tax return, annotate with either "Assess on Primary SSN" or "Assess on Secondary SSN" in the `Other Instructions' Section to identify the individual against whom the penalty is to be asserted.

Examiner should file Form 8484 with the Office of Professional Responsibility. Send to the RPC copies of the Form 8278, Form 8484, and Form 886-A, Explanation of Items.

The group clerk will update the return preparer case on ERCS to status 51 and close case to the Centralized Case Processing unit via Form 3210



U. Process as Unagreed Section 6701 Case

Complete Form 8278, Computation and Assessment of Miscellaneous Penalties. If penalties under different IRC sections will be assessed against the same preparer for the same period, complete a separate Form 8278 for each penalty. If the preparer filed a joint income tax return, annotate with either "Assess on Primary SSN" or "Assess on Secondary SSN" in the `Other Instructions' Section to identify the individual against whom the penalty is to be asserted.

Assess penalty by completing Form 2859, Request for Quick or Prompt Assessment. See Form 2859 for quick/prompt processing instructions. The preparer has no pre-assessment appeal rights. The assessment will generate a notice to the preparer which explains the assessment and appeal rights. Request that the preparer file any claims within the 30-day window with the examination team. This will allow for an orderly transfer of the files to Appeals.

Suspense case. See IRM 20.1.6.1.4 - Claims which enables preparer an administrative appeal. Within 30 days from the date of assessment, preparer may pay 15 percent of the penalty and file Form 843, Claim.

If claim filed: If the preparer files a timely claim and makes a timely payment of 15 percent of the penalty, prepare Form 3244-A to process the payment. Associate the claim with the penalty case file. The examiner will notify the preparer of the claim disallowance and that the case will be forwarded to Appeals. Form 8484 should be prepared and included in the case file sent to Appeals. Update ERCS to Status 21 and forward the entire package through Technical Services to Appeals via Form 3210. Send to the RPC copies of Form 8278, Form 8484, Form 3210, and Form 886-A, Explanation of Items.

The following information should be included on the T-Letter for cases submitted to Appeals.


Ÿ Special action requirement for receiving Appeals Officer



Ÿ As of 7/23/2003, preparer and promoter penalties are coordinated as an Appeals Coordinated Issue:



http://appeals.web.irs.gov/ispaci/apcoordissues.htm#Preparer/PromoterPenalties



Ÿ Under the provisions of IRM 8.7.3.11, the Appeals Officer is required to contact/make a referral to Technical Guidance. Referral procedures and forms are located at http://appeals.web.irs.gov/lbsp/documents/Technical_Guidance_Referral_Pro cedures.pdf



Ÿ The coordinator for this issue is Michael Drury, phone number: 720- 956- 4518



Ÿ Referral Form 13381 can be emailed to Appeals Team Manager Steven Onken, phone number: 651-726-7406. If no claim is filed, Attach Form 3198, Special Handling Notice, to each penalty case file, identifying it as a return preparer penalty case in the "Other" section and referencing the applicable IRC section. Annotate in the `Other' Section that the penalties have been assessed prior to closing. File Form 8484 with the Office of Professional Responsibility. The group clerk will update the return preparer case on ERCS to status 51 and close case to the Centralized Case Processing unit via Form 3210. Send to the RPC copies of the Form 8278, Form 8484, Form 3210, and Form 886-A, Explanation of Items.




Forms



Form 6459, Return Preparers Checksheet

Note the entries that are required in Part II, specifically, the name and address of the return preparer along with the SSN/EIN. The manager's signature is required to pursue the return preparer penalty investigation. If the manager signs the form, then the form goes with the return preparer penalty case. Otherwise, it remains with the clients return as part of the documentation that the return preparer penalty was considered.



Form 872-D, Consent to Extend the Time on Assessment of Tax Return Preparer Penalty

The statute of the return preparer penalty case is the statute of the clients return. Extending the statute of limitations of the client's return with a Form 872 does not extend the statute for the return preparer penalty case.



Form 5838, Waiver of Restrictions on Assessment & Collection of Tax Return Preparer Penalty

The form number of return for which the penalty is being charged relates to the clients income tax return. The taxpayers name as shown on the return is the clients' name. Taxpayers Identifying number is the clients. Tax period relates to the tax period of the clients return. The kind of penalty refers to the code section and the amount of penalty is self explanatory.



Form 5816, Report of Income Tax Return Preparer Penalty Case

Note: This form is not used for Section 6701 penalty cases.

Note: This form is prepared somewhat differently than the Form 5809.

The information that is included in the top part of the Form 5816 is that of the preparer including the Name, Address and SSN or EIN. The second part of the form that begins with `The following information identifies the tax return....' Relates to the client income tax return on which the penalty was based. When penalties are based on many different prepared returns, attach a list of client names, SSNs / EINs and tax periods. Use a separate form for each year / return combination.

If the case is agreed, then the preparer signs the form at the bottom. If the case is unagreed, then the bottom part of the form needs to be removed at the dotted line.



Form 8278, Computation & Assessment of Miscellaneous Penalties

A Form 8278 must be filled out for each calendar year warranting penalty assessments.

The information requested in Items 1, 2, and 7 (Name, Address and SSN or EIN) relate to the return preparer. The information requested in items 5 and 6 (Year and Statute Date) refer to the client return that was the impetus for the penalty.

In completing Form 8278, originators will enter in red and initial: The applicable statute of limitations on assessment expiration date in Item 6 (or, if applicable, enter "No Statute" in Item 4), and; The date the Form 8278 was completed by the originator in Item 9 or 11.

When the same penalties for the same period apply to a preparer for more than one return and the statute of limitations on the preparer penalty is determined by the statute of limitations for the return, complete Form 8278 using the earliest statute of limitations date. (See IRM 20.1.6.1.8.Statute of Limitations.). When more than one penalty under different IRC sections will be assessed against the same preparer for the same period, a separate Form 8278 has to be completed for each penalty.



Form 8484, Report of Suspected Practitioner Misconduct

Once it has been determined that a referral is necessary, a referral package to the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) must be prepared and closed separately from the related case.

Instructions on how to make a referral to OPR and the forms to be used can be found in the OPR website at http://nhq.no.irs.gov/OPR/

The workpapers for the related income tax case should note the referral was prepared and forwarded to OPR for any cases without Appeals activity. For cases going to Appeals, the form should be prepared and included in the case file.

In cases in which a referral is not prepared but was considered, a comment should be made in the workpapers explaining why the referral was not made.



Form 4665, Report Transmittal

This form is used to summarize unagreed issues and present information of a confidential nature for Appeals. The information should supplement, not duplicate or replace information in the case file. On field cases, this form is used in conjunction with Form 9984, Examining Officer's Activity Record, to document managerial involvement.

Confidential information included on the report transmittal includes:

a. Statements and facts involving allegations of fraud;

b. Remarks regarding the integrity, motives, or abilities of the preparer;

c. Ability to pay;

d. Potentially dangerous taxpayers;

e. Procrastination by the preparer or representative;

f. Other confidential information which should not be made available to the preparer.



Form 3244-A, Payment Posting Voucher

Upon acceptance of an advance payment (tendered before or after a deficiency has been determined and an agreement has been secured from the taxpayer), the responsible examiner will complete a separate Form 3244-A, Payment Posting Voucher --Examination, for each tax period and class of tax involved, as follows:

a. SSN/EIN --Enter the preparers identification number

b. Form No./MFT --Form numbers and MFT codes can be found in the ADP and IDRS Information Handbook, Document 6209. This handbook is updated annually.

c. Tax Period --Enter "YYYYMM", e.g., --quarterly return ending June 30, 2002 will be shown as "200206". The tax period corresponds to the tax period of the client's income tax return.

d. Transaction/Received Date --Enter the date the remittance was received by the responsible examiner, e.g., June 30, 2002 will be shown 06-30-2002.

e. Taxpayer --Enter the preparers' full name, address, and ZIP code.

f. Transaction Data --Enter the total amount of the payment opposite the transaction Code (any breakdown is entered in Remarks).



In the Remarks Section:

Indicate the pertinent information regarding the transaction such as:

a. The amount of payment allocated for the penalty, and interest as well as any special instructions.

b. Where date of an agreement precedes the date of the advance payment by more than 30 days, enter the agreement date.

c. Where first payment is not for full amount of deficiency enter "Part Payment"; or if part payment is other than the first payment, designate the payment, e.g., "2nd Payment".

d. If a payment is received that will be applied to more than one period, indicate "split remittance" in the remarks section of Form 3244-A.

e. Prepared By --Enter the two-digit area office code, the office symbol, name and telephone number (including area code) so that the preparer of Form 3244-A may be contacted if necessary.



Forwarding Form 3244-A

Follow most current procedures for processing. See memo from Director, Performance Management, Quality Assurance, and Audit Assistance on the subject Large Dollar Remittance Processing dated March 30,



Form 2859, Request for Quick or Prompt Assessment

(1) Follow procedures in Memo from Director, Case Processing SBSE on the subject Direct Shipment to CCP for LMSB groups and Technical Services offices dated April 5, 2005

Note: Ogden contact per the memo is no longer Michael Mayhue but Wendy Jones, 801-620-2102

a. Indicate in "Remarks" if billing needs to be withheld.

b. Enter the 23C Date and the DLN assigned.

c. Enter an agreement date only if the taxpayer signed an agreement and interest is being assessed with TC 190.

d. Do NOT compute interest on civil penalty assessments.



Form 5809, Preparer Penalty Case Control Card


Ÿ Original - remains in PP case file



Ÿ Copy A - Group control card



Ÿ Copy B - As attachment to Form 895 if applicable



Ÿ Copy C - To return to RPC (Return Preparer Coordinator) at start



Ÿ Copy D - Close case file


Establish ERCS Controls using Form 5809, Preparer Penalty Case Control Card, as the ERCS input document. Preparer penalty investigations are NOT controlled on AIMS

NOTE: Form 5345, Examination Request Master File, ("Blue Card") is NOT USED to establish a preparer penalty on ERCS.



Form 3198, Special Handling Notice for Examination Case Processing


Ÿ Examiners will attach Form 3198, Special Handling Notice, to each preparer penalty case file, identifying it as a return preparer penalty case and referencing the applicable IRC section. Annotate with "Return Preparer Penalty Case" in the `Other' section and reference the applicable IRC Section(s).



Ÿ If the preparer filed a joint income tax return, annotate with either "Assess on Primary SSN" or "Assess on Secondary SSN" in the `Other' Section to identify the individual against whom the penalty is to be asserted.



Ÿ Annotate Form 3198 with "Quick Assessment" on the `Other' line in the `Expedite' section if the case is being closed expedited.




Letters

Letter 1120, Preparer Penalty No-Change Case Letter

After review by the Group Manager, mail the original to the preparer and include a copy in the case file.

Letter 1125, Preparer Penalty 30-Day Letter

Letter 907P, Request for Statute Extension Letter

Labels:

Zero income tax return determined to be fraudulent.

This case is surprising because the Court did not consider whehter the taxpayer had technical reasons for filing a zero tax return. There have been hundreds of "zero tax return" cases without a determination of fraud. Zero tax returns have been common intax protestor cases that have previously been determined to be "frivolous" but not tax fraud. I do not defend tax protestors. This case seems to be a change in the position of the courts in dealing with tax protestor argument and for that reason is a "heads up" for ongoing tax protestor argument.

This case is a "heads up" for all tax protestors.

States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Beverly M. Parker, Defendant-Appellant.

U.S. Court of Appeals, 4th Circuit; 06-5238, April 8, 2008.



[ Code Sec. 7206]


An individual was properly convicted and sentenced for making false statements and for willfully attempting to evade taxes. The evidence at trial demonstrated that the individual submitted documents purporting to be tax forms showing zero income despite receiving significant income for the tax years at issue and had signed those forms under penalty of perjury.





A federal grand jury in the Eastern District of North Carolina charged Beverly M. Parker in a four-count indictment with making false statements on her U.S. Individual Income Tax Return Form 1040 for the tax years 1998 and 1999, in violation of 26 U.S.C.A. §7206(1) (West 2002 & Supp. 2007) (Counts One and Two), and with attempting to evade income taxes for the tax years 2000 and 2001, in violation of 26 U.S.C.A. §7201 (West 2002 & Supp. 2007) (Counts Three and Four). Following a trial, a jury convicted Parker of all four counts in the indictment. The district court sentenced Parker to 36-month terms of imprisonment on Counts One and Two and 51-month terms of imprisonment on Counts Three and Four, all to be served concurrently. Parker timely appealed, challenging her convictions and sentences on all four counts. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. §1291 (West 2006) and 18 U.S.C.A. §3742(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2006). Finding no error, we affirm.




I.


Counts One and Two of the indictment against Parker stemmed from her filing 1040 forms for the tax years 1998 and 1999. Parker's 1040 forms for those years showed zero gross income and zero taxes due even though Parker had a total taxable income, after deductions, of $66,994 in 1998 and $54,183 in 1999. Counts Three and Four stemmed from Parker's failure to file any tax returns for the tax years 2000 and 2001 even though she received a total taxable income of $78,589 in 2000 and $110,862 in 2001.

Parker took several steps to hide her assets from the Government, most of which involved the use of her business venture, North Point Management. For instance, Parker opened a business account for North Point Management using her son's social security number and deposited receipts for property management services into that account. She also transferred one of her personal bank accounts into her daughter's name and deposited checks written on the North Point Management accounts and other funds into that account. In addition, she used funds from the North Point Management bank account for personal expenses including payments on her and her husband's personal credit cards, her mortgage, and her children's cars.




II.


On appeal, Parker principally contends that the district court erred in denying her motion for judgment of acquittal on Counts One and Two, which charged her with providing false information on tax return forms, because the Government failed to establish that the forms she submitted to the IRS were in fact tax returns. 1 In this regard, Parker challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting her convictions. We, of course, must sustain the jury verdict if there is substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to the Government, to support it. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942).

Contrary to Parker's argument, the Government was not required to prove that the 1040 forms filed by Parker qualified as tax returns. Counts One and Two charged Parker with "willfully mak[ing] and subscrib[ing] a U.S. Individual Income Tax Return Form 1040 " for the tax years 1998 and 1999 respectively "which she did not believe to be true and correct as to every material matter," (J.A. at 18-19 (emphasis added)), --violations of 26 U.S.C.A. §7206(1). Section 7206(1) prohibits "[a]ny person" from "willfully mak[ing] and subscrib[ing] any return, statement, or other document, which contains or is verified by a written declaration that it is made under the penalties of perjury, and which he does not believe to be true and correct as to every material matter." 26 U.S.C.A. §7206(1) (emphasis added). Even if we assume that Parker's tax return forms are not "returns" within the meaning of §7206(1), those forms are plainly still "other document[s]" within the meaning of the statute. Thus, it is irrelevant whether they also meet the legal definition of a tax return.

Given this conclusion, substantial evidence supports Parker's convictions on Counts One and Two. The evidence demonstrates that (1) Parker submitted 1040 tax forms for the tax years 1998 and 1999 showing zero income; (2) she signed the forms under penalty of perjury; and (3) she in fact received significant income in those years. Because the 1040 forms showing no income were false statements under §7206(1), substantial evidence supports Parker's convictions on Counts One and Two. 2




III.


Parker raises numerous other challenges to both her conviction and her sentence. Our review of the record and consideration of her arguments confirm that these challenges are without merit. 3 We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

1 Parker argues that the 1040 forms she filed were not "returns" because the IRS deemed them frivolous and did not process them. We have previously held that in order for a document to be considered a tax "return," it must "(1) purport to be a return; (2) be executed under penalty of perjury; (3) contain sufficient data to allow calculation of tax; and (4) represent an honest and reasonable attempt to satisfy the requirements of the tax laws." In re Moroney, 352 F.3d 902, 905 (4th Cir. 2003).

2 Substantial evidence also supports Parker's convictions on Counts Three and Four, which charged Parker with income tax evasion for tax years 2000 and 2001. The record demonstrates that Parker did not file tax returns for those years even though she had significant taxable income.

3 For instance, Parker argues that the district court erred when it determined that personal jurisdiction existed over her because rights to U.S. citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment must be "claimed" and did not automatically attach by virtue of her birth in West Virginia. This argument is obviously frivolous.

Moreover, although we cannot determine whether Parker herself or her counsel, Joe Alfred Izen, Jr., is the source of Parker's frivolous arguments, we note that we are not the first circuit to be faced with frivolous claims presented by Mr. Izen. See Johnson v. Comm'r, 289 F.3d 452, 457 (7th Cir. 2002) (issuing an order "to show cause why [Joe Alfred Izen, Jr.] should not be sanctioned for his antics" in a "frivolous" appeal before the Seventh Circuit).

Labels:

Monday, April 14, 2008

Trustee must be named in a notice of lev y

IRS Letter Ruling 200815001

LTR Report Number 1624, April 16, 2008 IRS REF: Symbol: CC:PA:B04-GL-144298-07 [Code Sec. 6331]

December 28, 2007

DATE: December 28, 2007

TO: CC:SB:2:PIT Attn: Julia L. Wahl

FROM: Joseph W. Clark, Senior Technician Reviewer CC:PA:B04 (Procedure & Administration)

SUBJECT: Whether a revenue officer should reissue a levy and notice of seizure to a revocable trust holding real property where those notices list the taxpayer in the "name and address" and "due from" fields, but the notice of seizure describes the property as being held by the revocable trust as nominee or alter ego of the taxpayer?

This Chief Counsel Advice responds to your request for assistance. This advice may not be used or cited as precedent.




ISSUES


Whether the revenue officer should reissue a Levy (Form 668-B (ICS)) and Notice of Seizure (Form 2433) to the revocable trust holding real property where those notices list X in the "Name and Address" and "Due from" fields, but the Notice of Seizure (Form 2433) describes the property as being held by the revocable trust as nominee or alter ego of X?




CONCLUSIONS


In describing the party against whom the levy was issued, the Levy (Form 668-B (ICS)) does not list X in his capacity as the trustee of the revocable trust, or as the nominee or alter ego of X. The levy should be reissued with "X as trustee of the revocable trust and as the nominee or alter ego of X", and with the address of the trustee in the "Due from" field. This information should be placed on the levy form where the taxpayer's name and address would normally be inserted if the Service were seizing property titled directly in the name of X, the delinquent taxpayer.

The Notice of Seizure (Form 2433) should also be reissued and the "Name and Address" field should include "X as trustee of the revocable trust and as nominee or alter ego of X" along with the trustee's address. This form should also include X's name and address (not in his capacity as trustee) in the "Due from" field, and the legal description of the City A property, including the street address, should be retained in the "Description of Property" field. See I.R.M.section 5.10.3.18 and Exhibit 5.10.3-5.




FACTS


X owes delinquent YR1 income taxes, which were assessed on October 13, YR5.1

X's mother transferred certain real property located in City A, State A to revocable trust A. She thereafter obtained a mortgage on the property. Upon the mother's death two years later, X became the trustee of revocable trust A. Subsequently, X transferred the property out of revocable trust A to himself for no consideration by a grantor deed. X then transferred the parcel for no consideration to "X as trustee of the revocable trust". The Service did not file a Notice of Federal tax lien against X in County A until after X transferred the real property to the revocable trust.

The revenue officer handling this matter has verified the following facts in regard to X's control over the real property located in City A: (i) X pays the mortgage for the property by wiring funds from a Country A bank account in the name of "Y" to a Bank A account in the joint names of X and his mother; (ii) telephone and water bills for the property are paid from the Bank A account; (iii) X enrolled in an automatic payment plan with Utility Company A to have the bills paid automatically; and (iv) the real estate taxes are paid by credit card, although it is not clear whose card it is.

During February, YR15 the Service filed a nominee lien against "X as the Trustee of the revocable trust as nominee or alter ego of X" in County A, State A. The property appears to be worth substantially more than the outstanding balance on the mortgage.

On September 10, YR15, the revenue officer handling this matter issued a Notice of Seizure (From 2433) and on this form he inserted X's name and address in the "Name and Address" field and X's name in the "Due from" field.2 This notice of seizure also included the following in the "Description of Property" field:

Description of the property ...

"... X as Trustee of the ... revocable trust as nominee or alter ego of ... X, in the real property situated in State A, City and County of City A, legally described as follows: ...

This real property is a Single Residence more commonly known as: Number A Street A

City A, State A, Zip Code A

A levy (Form 668-B (ICS)), also issued September 10, YR15, listed X's name, address and Country A in the "Due from" field.




LAW AND ANALYSIS


A third party holds property as a nominee for a taxpayer where the taxpayer's property is titled in the name of the third party, but the taxpayer in fact retains beneficial ownership of the property. Long v. United States, 958 F.2d 367 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Barton, 2001-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) P 50,292 (9th Cir. 2000) [2000-1 USTC ¶50,292 ]; Towe Antique Ford Found. v. Internal Revenue Service, 791 F.Supp. 1450, 1454 (D. Mont. 1992)(listing factors considered in determining nominee status) [92-1 USTC ¶50,115 ], aff'd. on other grounds, 999 F.2d 1387 (9th Cir. 1993); Oxford Capital Corp. v. United States, 211 F.3d 280, 284 n.1 (5th Cir. 2000) [2000-1 USTC ¶50,447 ](noting that concepts of "nominee", "transferee", and "alter ego" are independent bases for attaching property of a third-party to satisfy a delinquent taxpayer's liability); Sharp Management LLC v. United States, 2007-1 USTC P 50,511 (W.D. Wash. 2007) [2007-1 USTC ¶50,511 ](Government proved nexus between taxpayer and funds in bank account held by limited liability company by virtue of a nominee relationship); I.R.M. section 5.12.2.6.6 (determining when nominee lien should be filed).

Under the doctrine of limited liability, the owner of a corporation is not liable for the corporation's debts. United States v. Jon-T Chemicals, Inc., 768 F.2d 686 (5th Cir. 1985). There is an exception to this rule, commonly known as the alter ego doctrine. This can be established when the owner of a corporation dominates and controls it to the point that the separate corporate identity becomes merely a sham, i.e. it does not exist independent of its controlling shareholder and it was established for no reasonable business purpose or for fraudulent purposes. Oxford Capital, supra; Jon-T Chemicals, supra. In that situation, all of the assets of the corporation may be levied upon to satisfy the tax liabilities of a delinquent taxpayer-shareholder. Jon-T Chemicals, 768 F.2d at 694-96; see also Loving Savior Church v. United States, 728 F.2d 1085 (8th Cir. 1984)(church, an unincorporated association, was the alter ego of delinquent taxpayers) [84-1 USTC ¶9261 ]

When the Service seeks to collect delinquent taxes by either seizing the property held by a third-party under a nominee or alter ego theory or by filing a lien against such third party, the notice of levy or notice of Federal tax lien should expressly list such third party as the taxpayer's nominee or alter ego. Macklin v. United States, 300 F.3d 814 (7th Cir. 2002)(lien notice identified the taxpayer as "Orvill Macklin, nominee of Gerald Macklin"); Oxford Capital, supra (levy imposed on funds of Oxford as "nominee ... alter ego ... of taxpayer RX Staffing Corporation"); Valley Finance, Inc. v. United States, 629 F.2d 162 (D.C. Cir. 1980)(IRS filed notices of tax liens against "Pacific [Development, Inc.] as the 'alter ego and nominee' of Park") [80-2 USTC ¶9554 ].

The I.R.M. sets forth the Service's internal operating procedures, including guidance in regard to the correct forms to use in connection with property seizures. Upon determining that it is necessary to seize property in which a taxpayer has an interest to collect delinquent taxes, the Service uses the Levy (Form 668-B). Following the seizure, the Notice of Seizure (Form 2433) is issued. I.R.M. section 5.17.3.5.3.1(3).3

In this case, the Levy (Form 668-B (ICS)) includes only X's name and address in the "Due from" field and makes no mention of the revocable trust. Because the Service seeks to seize the real property located in City A, which is titled in the name of the revocable trust, the levy should name X as Trustee of the revocable trust and as the nominee or alter ego of X.

I.R.M. section 5.10.3 (Conducting the Seizure), and Exhibit 5.10.3-5 include instructions and a table showing how to complete the Notice of Seizure (Form 2433). It states that if the seizure involves real property and the taxpayer is not the owner of record, the notice should be addressed to such owner of record. The taxpayer's name and address goes into the "Due from" box and the legal description of the real property (including the address and street location, if available) should be inserted into the "Description of property" field.

The revenue officer should reissue the notice of seizure and include X as Trustee of the revocable trust and as nominee or alter ego of X (plus the revocable trust's address) in the "Name and Address" field. X's name and address should be placed in the "Due From" field and the legal description and street address of the City A property should be retained in the "Description of Property" field.

CASE DEVELOPMENT, HAZARDS AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

*****

In Oxford, a wrongful levy case, the Government's levy was issued on "Oxford as nominee, transferee, alter ego, agent and/or holder of a beneficial interest of taxpayer RX Staffing Corporation". 211 F.3d at 283.

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals observed that based on the record before it, the Government may have had cause to believe that Oxford held the property of RX, its wholly owned subsidiary corporation (the delinquent taxpayer) as a nominee, but not cause to believe that RX was Oxford's alter ego. The appellate court opined that at the time of levy, the record reflected that the Service had cause to believe only one bank account of Oxford, the "2020 account", held the property of the taxpayer. As a result, the levy upon the other bank accounts would have been wrongful under I.R.C. § 7426 because at the time of levy there was no reason to believe that the other accounts held property of the delinquent taxpayer. 211 F.3d at 285.

The appeals court in Oxford found that because the magistrate judge did not apply the proper burden-shifting framework under Texas Commerce Bank-Fort Worth v. United States, 896 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1990) [90-1 USTC ¶50,155 ], it was not possible to determine based on the record whether the IRS had cause to believe that: (1) RX was Oxford's alter ego; or (2) whether the Service developed substantial evidence of nominee liability at the time of the evidentiary hearing sufficient to prevent a finding of wrongful levy. Accordingly, the case was remanded back to the magistrate judge for further proceedings to apply the proper burden-shifting framework to determine: (1) if the Service proved nexus by substantial evidence; and (2) if Oxford could then prove that the levy was otherwise wrongful, e.g. that the levy was imposed without a sufficient evidentiary basis to do so. 211 F.3d at 286. Under Oxford therefore the Service must develop facts sufficient to support the alter ego theory at the time the levy is imposed; see also United States v. Swan, 467 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2006)(in lien foreclosure action, Government failed to present evidence that property owner was the nominee or alter ego of his taxpayer-tenants where evidence showed only that taxpayers were friends of the owner and taxpayers held only contractual right to purchase property) [2007-1 USTC ¶50,191 ].

*****

This writing may contain privileged information. Any unauthorized disclosure of this writing may undermine our ability to protect the privileged information. If disclosure is determined to be necessary, please contact this office for our views.

Please call ***** if you have any further questions.

1 Although the taxes in this matter were assessed October 13, YR5 and the collection statute of limitations would normally expire 10 years later on October 13, YR15, the Service maintains that X's continuous absences from the United States during this time period suspended the collection statute's running until October 13, YR17. I.R.C. §§ 6502(a) and 6503(c). This memorandum therefore assumes that the collection statute of limitations will not bar a levy or foreclosure suit.

2 This memorandum assumes that that this notice of seizure and the Levy (Form 668-B (ICS)) were served upon X as the Trustee of the revocable trust.

3 With respect to notices of levy that name alter egos or nominees, I.R.M. section 5.11.1.2.5(4) states that Area Counsel is to advise the revenue officer in regard to the issuance of such levies and the language to be included on the pre-levy notice and levy.

Labels:

Friday, April 11, 2008

Home Office Expenses - Section 280A(a) generally disallows a deduction, otherwise allowable under the Code, with respect to the use of a dwelling unit. That general rule, however, does not apply with respect to any item to the extent such item is allocable to a portion of the dwelling unit which is exclusively used on a regular basis --

(A) as the principal place of business for any trade or business of the taxpayer, [or]
(B) as a place of business which is used by patients, clients, or customers in meeting or dealing with the taxpayer in the normal course of his trade or business * * *



Sec. 280A(c)(1)(A) and (B).


Chukwuma I. Odelugo v. Commissioner.

Dkt. No. 13408-04 , TC Memo. 2008-92, April 10, 2008.



(1) Does petitioner have unreported income for each of his taxable years 1998 and 1999 in excess of the amount determined in the notice of deficiency with respect to each of those years? We hold that he does not.



(2) Is petitioner entitled for each of his taxable years 1998 and 1999 to deduct certain expenses that petitioner claims with respect to his law practice? We hold that he is not.



(3) Is petitioner liable for each of his taxable years 1998 and 1999 for the addition to tax under section 6651(a)(1)? We hold that he is to the extent stated herein.



(4) Is petitioner liable for each of his taxable years 1998 and 1999 for the addition to tax under section 6651(a)(2)? We hold that he is to the extent stated herein.



(5) Is petitioner liable for each of his taxable years 1998 and 1999 for the addition to tax under section 6654? We hold that he is to the extent stated herein.





FINDINGS OF FACT



Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found. Petitioner's address shown in the petition in this case was in Baltimore, Maryland.



At an undisclosed time before 1998, the Internal Revenue Service employed petitioner in an undisclosed capacity. At all relevant times, including during 1998 and 1999, the years at issue, petitioner was licensed to practice law in Maryland and in the District of Columbia. On an undisclosed date, petitioner was admitted to practice before the United States Tax Court.



During 1998 and 1999, petitioner resided at 1516 U Street, NW, Washington, D.C. The property located at that address (U Street property) consisted of three floors.



During 1998 and 1999, petitioner, who practiced law as a sole practitioner, represented various clients, at least some of whom were assigned to him under the Criminal Justice Act (CJA).3



Starting on an undisclosed date in August 1999 through at least the end of that year, petitioner employed Anitha Johnson (Ms. Johnson) as a paralegal and office manager. Ms. Johnson continued to work for petitioner in an undisclosed capacity at least through 2004. By Ms. Johnson's own admission, she did not perform well the administrative tasks that she was expected to undertake as part of her employment by petitioner. Throughout her employment, neither petitioner nor Ms. Johnson maintained adequate records (e.g., receipts, invoices, billing statements) with respect to petitioner's law practice.



During 1998, petitioner received (1) nonemployee compensation of $44,424 from the General Services Administration KC Federal Building Fund (GSA) and $29,415 from the District of Columbia and (2) an early distribution of $13,964 from the National Finance Center Thrift Savings Plan. During that year, petitioner also earned interest of $265 with respect to the checking and savings accounts (petitioner's IRFCU checking and savings accounts) that he maintained at the Internal Revenue Federal Credit Union (IRFCU).



During 1998, petitioner made deposits totaling $42,145 into a checking account (petitioner's Chevy Chase checking account) that he maintained at Chevy Chase Bank.4 During that year, petitioner also made deposits totaling $124,513 into petitioner's IRFCU checking and savings accounts, of which at least $10,463.685 was made by direct deposit from GSA.



During 1999, petitioner received nonemployee compensation of $64,944 from GSA. During that year, petitioner earned interest of $39 with respect to petitioner's IRFCU checking and savings accounts.



During 1999, petitioner made deposits totaling $35,195 into petitioner's Chevy Chase checking account. During that year, petitioner also made deposits totaling $71,556 into petitioner's IRFCU checking and savings accounts, of which at least $64,944.236 was made by direct deposit from GSA.



Around August 21, 1998, petitioner filed a tax return (return) for his taxable year 1997 that showed tax due of $20,084 and that the Internal Revenue Service accepted as filed. Petitioner did not file a return for his taxable year 1998 or his taxable year 1999. Nor did he make any estimated tax payments with respect to either of those two years.



Respondent prepared substitutes for return for petitioner's respective taxable years 1998 (substitute for return for 1998) and 1999 (substitute for return for 1999). Each of those substitutes for return consisted of the following documents: (1) IRC Section 6020(b) Certification (section 6020(b) certification), (2) Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, for the taxable year for which respondent prepared that substitute, (3) a transcript of petitioner's account for that year, (4) Form 4549, Income Tax Examination Changes, and (5) Form 886-A, Explanation of Items. Each section 6020(b) certification certified that the pages attached thereto constituted a valid substitute for return under section 6020(b). The substitute for return for 1998 showed, inter alia, (1) nonemployee compensation of $73,839 consisting of $44,424 from GSA and $29,415 from the District of Columbia, (2) interest of $265, (3) a taxable distribution from the National Finance Center Thrift Savings Plan of $13,964, and (4) total tax of $30,228.40. The substitute for return for 1999 showed, inter alia, (1) nonemployee compensation of $64,944 from GSA, (2) interest of $39, and (3) total tax of $20,760.



Respondent issued to petitioner separate notices with respect to his taxable years 1998 (notice for 1998) and 1999 (notice for 1999). In the notice for 1998, respondent determined, inter alia, that petitioner has (1) nonemployee compensation of $73,839,7 (2) interest of $265, and (3) a taxable distribution from the National Finance Center Thrift Savings Plan of $13,964. In that notice, respondent also determined that petitioner is liable for additions to tax under sections 6651(a)(1) and (2) and 6654(a) of $6,173.19, an amount to be computed at a later date, and $1,371.98, respectively.



In the notice for 1999, respondent determined, inter alia, that petitioner has nonemployee compensation of $64,9448 and interest of $39. In that notice, respondent also determined that petitioner is liable for additions to tax under sections 6651(a)(1) and (2) and 6654(a) of $4,671, an amount to be computed at a later date, and $996.98, respectively.



In the answer, respondent alleged that respondent conducted a deposit analysis and reconciliation of petitioner's bank accounts for each of petitioner's taxable years 1998 (1998 bank deposits analysis) and 1999 (1999 bank deposits analysis). In the answer, respondent further alleged (1) that the 1998 bank deposits analysis showed that during 1998 petitioner made total deposits of at least $166,658 into petitioner's bank accounts, of which $136,362 is taxable income,9 and (2) that the 1999 bank deposits analysis showed that during 1999 petitioner made total deposits of at least $106,751 into those accounts, of which $101,179 is taxable income.10 Respondent did not allege in the answer that respondent reduced the total deposits that respondent alleged for petitioner's respective taxable years 1998 and 1999 by the amounts of total unreported income that respondent had determined in the respective notices and that respondent should have reasonably known had been deposited into petitioner's bank accounts during those respective years. Nor did respondent allege in the answer that respondent reduced the amounts of total unreported income that respondent alleged in the answer for petitioner's respective taxable years 1998 and 1999 by any portion of the amounts of unreported income that respondent had determined in the respective notices. In the answer, respondent also alleged that petitioner's total tax for petitioner's taxable year 1998 is $46,762 and that the increase in the deficiency that respondent had determined in the notice for 1998 is $16,534. In the answer, respondent further alleged that petitioner's total tax for petitioner's taxable year 1999 is $33,856 and that the increase in the deficiency that respondent had determined in the notice for 1999 is $13,096. In the answer, respondent further alleged certain increases in the additions to tax under sections 6651(a)(1) and (2) and 6654(a) that respondent had determined in the respective notices.11



At an undisclosed time after petitioner commenced the instant case, Ms. Johnson signed petitioner's name on, and submitted to respondent on petitioner's behalf, returns for petitioner's respective taxable years 1998 (purported 1998 return) and 1999 (purported 1999 return). In the purported 1998 return, petitioner showed on page 1, inter alia, "Taxable interest" of $266, "Business income" from Schedule C, Profit or Loss From Business (Schedule C), of $16,051, and "Total pensions and annuities" of $13,965. In the purported 1999 return, petitioner showed on page 1, inter alia, "Business income" from Schedule C of $10,251.



Petitioner included Schedule C as part of the purported 1998 return (purported 1998 Schedule C) and the purported 1999 return (purported 1999 Schedule C). In those purported Schedules C, petitioner showed the "Principal business or profession" as "Lawyer" and "Attorney", respectively.



In the purported 1998 Schedule C, petitioner showed "Gross income" of $73,840.12 In that purported schedule, petitioner claimed "Total expenses before expenses for business use of home" of $55,135 consisting of $1,856 for "Advertising", $6,150 for "Car and truck expenses" (vehicle expenses), $3,601 for "Depreciation", $2,394 for "Insurance (other than health)" (insurance premiums), $11,538 for "Mortgage" interest, $1,835 for "Other" interest, $8,300 for "Office expense", $3,374 for "Repairs and maintenance", $3,125 for "Supplies", $10,716 for "Taxes and licenses", $586 for "Meals and entertainment", $1,100 for "Utilities" (utility expenses), and $560 for "Other expenses". In the purported 1998 Schedule C, petitioner also claimed "Expenses for business use of your home" of $2,654. In that purported schedule, petitioner showed "Net profit" of $16,051, which, as stated above, petitioner reported in petitioner's purported 1998 return on page 1 as "Business income" from Schedule C.



In the purported 1999 Schedule C, petitioner showed "Gross income" of $19,03313 and total expenses of $8,782 for "Depreciation". In that purported schedule, petitioner showed "Net profit" of $10,251, which, as stated above, petitioner reported in petitioner's purported 1999 return on page 1 as "Business income" from Schedule C.





OPINION



Petitioner bears the burden of proving error in the determinations in the notices for petitioner's respective taxable years 1998 and 1999 that remain at issue, see Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933), unless that burden shifts to respondent under section 7491(a). The parties disagree over whether the burden of proof with respect to the deficiency determinations in the respective notices shifts to respondent under that section.14 On the record before us, we find that petitioner has failed to carry his burden of establishing that he complied with the requirements of section 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B). On that record, we hold that the burden of proof with respect to the deficiency determinations in the respective notices does not shift to respondent under section 7491(a). Respondent, however, bears the burden of proof with respect to the allegations in the answer to increase the deficiencies and the additions to tax under sections 6651(a)(1) and (2) and 6654(a) that respondent had determined in the respective notices. See Rule 142(a).



Before turning to the issues presented, we shall summarize certain principles applicable to the Schedule C deductions that petitioner is claiming and evaluate certain evidence on which petitioner relies.




Certain Applicable Principles


Deductions are strictly a matter of legislative grace, and the taxpayer bears the burden of proving entitlement to any deduction claimed. INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992). A taxpayer is required to maintain records sufficient to establish the amount of any deduction claimed. Sec. 6001; sec. 1.6001-1(a), Income Tax Regs.



Section 162(a) generally allows a deduction for ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business. The determination of whether an expenditure satisfies the requirements for deductibility under section 162 is a question of fact. See Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 475 (1943). In general, an expense is ordinary if it is considered normal, usual, or customary in the context of the particular business out of which it arose. See Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 495 (1940). Ordinarily, an expense is necessary if it is appropriate and helpful to the operation of the taxpayer's trade or business. See Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966); Carbine v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 356, 363 (1984), affd. 777 F.2d 662 (11th Cir. 1985). Section 262(a) generally disallows a deduction for personal, living, or family expenses.



For certain kinds of expenses otherwise deductible under section 162(a), such as business expenses relating to "listed property", as defined in section 280F(d)(4), a taxpayer must satisfy substantiation requirements set forth in section 274(d) before such expenses will be allowed as deductions. See sec. 1.274-5T(b)(6), Temporary Income Tax Regs., 50 Fed. Reg. 46016 (Nov. 6, 1985). As pertinent here, "listed property" is defined in section 280F(d)(4) to include passenger automobiles and other property used as a means of transportation, unless excepted by section 280F(d)(4)(C) or (5)(B), and cellular telephones.15 See sec. 280F(d)(4)(A)(i), (ii), (v).



Section 167(a) allows a deduction for a reasonable allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear, and obsolescence of property used in a trade or business or held for the production of income. In general, the basis on which a depreciation deduction is allowable with respect to any property under section 167(a) is the adjusted basis of the property, determined under section 1011 for the purpose of determining gain on the sale or other disposition of such property. See sec. 167(c)(1).



Section 280A(a) generally disallows a deduction, otherwise allowable under the Code, with respect to the use of a dwelling unit. That general rule, however, does not apply with respect to



any item to the extent such item is allocable to a portion of the dwelling unit which is exclusively used on a regular basis --



(A) as the principal place of business for any trade or business of the taxpayer, [or]



(B) as a place of business which is used by patients, clients, or customers in meeting or dealing with the taxpayer in the normal course of his trade or business * * *



Sec. 280A(c)(1)(A) and (B).



Evaluation of Certain Evidence on Which Petitioner Relies



In order to satisfy his burden of proof, petitioner relies on, inter alia, Ms. Johnson's testimony,16 certain stipulated documents, and certain other documents that petitioner introduced into the record at trial.17 (We shall refer collectively to those stipulated documents and those documents that petitioner introduced into the record at trial as petitioner's documents.)



With respect to Ms. Johnson's testimony, Ms. Johnson started working for petitioner's law practice on an undisclosed date in August 1999. She had no personal knowledge regarding petitioner's law practice or any other activities of petitioner during 1998 to the date in August 1999 on which petitioner first employed her. As a result, at the trial in this case, Special Trial Judge Powell ordered Ms. Johnson to restrict her testimony to matters with respect to which she had personal knowledge. See Fed. R. Evid. 602. During her testimony, Ms. Johnson failed in certain material respects to comply with Special Trial Judge Powell's order. Under the circumstances, we shall not rely on Ms. Johnson's testimony to the extent that it pertained to matters with respect to which she did not have personal knowledge. See id.



In addition, we found Ms. Johnson's testimony to be in certain material respects general, vague, conclusory, internally inconsistent, and/or contradicted by the record. Under the circumstances, we are not required to, and we shall not, rely on that testimony to establish petitioner's position with respect to any of the issues presented in this case. See Lerch v. Commissioner, 877 F.2d 624, 631-632 (7th Cir. 1989), affg. T.C. Memo. 1987-295; Geiger v. Commissioner, 440 F.2d 688, 689-690 (9th Cir. 1971), affg. per curiam T.C. Memo. 1969-159; Shea v. Commissioner, 112 T.C. 183, 189 (1999).



With respect to petitioner's documents, those documents include the purported 1998 return and the purported 1999 return. Petitioner apparently is relying on those purported returns to support his position with respect to the Schedule C deductions that he is claiming here.18 The respective expenses and the respective amounts of depreciation that are shown in the purported 1998 Schedule C and the purported 1999 Schedule C are nothing more than statements of petitioner's position and do not establish that petitioner is entitled to deduct those claimed expenses and depreciation.



Petitioner's documents also include virtually all of petitioner's bank statements for 1998 and 1999, respectively, for (1) petitioner's Chevy Chase checking account (Chevy Chase bank statements) and (2) petitioner's IRFCU checking and savings accounts (IRFCU bank statements). Those bank statements show withdrawals from, checks drawn on, and deposits into those respective accounts during the years at issue. The Chevy Chase bank statements and the IRFCU bank statements do not show the purpose of any of those withdrawals, the payee or the purpose of any of those checks,19 or the source of any of those deposits, except certain deposits into the checking account (petitioner's IRFCU checking account) that petitioner maintained at IRFCU.20 We shall not rely on those statements to establish the purpose of any of the withdrawals from, the payee21 or the purpose of any of the checks drawn on, or the source of certain of the deposits22 into petitioner's bank accounts.




Unreported Income


In the notice for 1998, respondent determined that petitioner has the following unreported income: (1) Nonemployee compensation of $73,839 consisting of $44,424 from GSA and $29,415 from the District of Columbia,23 (2) interest of $265, and (3) a taxable distribution of $13,964 from the National Finance Center Thrift Savings Plan. In the notice for 1999, respondent determined that petitioner has the following unreported income: (1) Nonemployee compensation of $64,944 from GSA24 and (2) interest of $39. Petitioner concedes the income determinations in the notices.



In the answer, respondent alleged (1) that the 1998 bank deposits analysis showed that during 1998 petitioner made total deposits of at least $166,658 into petitioner's bank accounts, of which $136,362 is taxable (and therefore $30,296 is not taxable), and (2) that the 1999 bank deposits analysis showed that during 1999 petitioner made total deposits of at least $106,751 into those accounts, of which $101,179 is taxable (and therefore $5,572 is not taxable).25 Respondent did not allege in the answer that respondent reduced the total deposits that respondent alleged for petitioner's respective taxable years 1998 and 1999 by the amounts of total unreported income that respondent had determined in the respective notices and that respondent should have reasonably known had been deposited into petitioner's bank accounts during those respective years. Nor did respondent allege in the answer that respondent reduced the amounts of total unreported income that respondent alleged in the answer for petitioner's respective taxable years 1998 and 1999 by any portion of the amounts of unreported income that respondent had determined in the respective notices.



Where a taxpayer has failed to maintain sufficient records under section 6001, as is the case here, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Commissioner) may rely on the bank deposits method in order to determine the taxpayer's income. Nicholas v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 1057, 1064 (1978). Respondent has the burden of proof with respect to the allegations of unreported income that respondent advanced in the answer on the basis of the bank deposits method, see Rule 142(a), and the obligation to check all reasonable leads in order to verify the essential accuracy of the income approximation produced by that method.26



On the record before us, we find that respondent has failed to carry respondent's burden of showing that respondent checked all reasonable leads in order to verify the essential accuracy of the amount of total unreported income for each of petitioner's taxable years 1998 and 1999 that respondent alleged in the answer. In fact, respondent appears to have ignored actual facts of which respondent was aware that affect the essential accuracy of each of those amounts of alleged total unreported income.



With respect to the total deposits that respondent alleged in the answer for petitioner's taxable year 1998, respondent knew that at least certain ($10,464) of the nonemployee compensation that petitioner received from GSA during that year, which respondent included as part of the total unreported income determined in the notice for 1998,27 had been deposited by direct deposit into petitioner's IRFCU checking account.28 Respondent has not proffered any evidence as to whether the $30,296 that respondent excluded from petitioner's total deposits under the 1998 bank deposits analysis included any of the $10,464 that GSA had deposited into petitioner's IRFCU checking account during 1998. Nor has respondent proffered any evidence as to whether respondent checked all reasonable leads in order to verify whether any of the remaining unreported income that respondent determined in the notice for 1998 (i.e., the balance of the nonemployee compensation from GSA ($33,960), the nonemployee compensation from the District of Columbia ($29,415), and the distribution from the National Finance Center Thrift Savings Plan ($13,964)), had been deposited into petitioner's bank accounts during that year.



With respect to the total deposits that respondent alleged in the answer for petitioner's taxable year 1999, respondent knew that all ($64,944) of the nonemployee compensation that petitioner received from GSA during that year, which respondent included as part of the total unreported income determined in the notice for 1999, had been deposited by direct deposit into petitioner's IRFCU checking account. Respondent has not proffered any evidence as to whether the $5,572 that respondent excluded from petitioner's total deposits under the 1999 bank deposits analysis included any of the $64,944 that GSA had deposited into petitioner's IRFCU checking account during 1999. Moreover, even if respondent had excluded $5,572 of the total amount that GSA had deposited, respondent did not exclude from petitioner's total deposits during 1999 the balance ($59,372) that GSA had deposited into petitioner's IRFCU checking account during that year. Nor did respondent reduce the amount of total unreported income that respondent alleged in the answer for petitioner's taxable year 1999 by any portion of the amount of unreported income that respondent determined in the notice for 1999.



On the record before us, we find that respondent has failed to carry respondent's burden of establishing that petitioner has unreported income for his respective taxable years 1998 and 1999 in excess of the amounts determined in the notices. On that record, we further find that respondent has failed to carry respondent's burden of establishing that petitioner has the increases in the deficiencies for his respective taxable years 1998 and 1999 that respondent alleged in the answer.




Claimed Deductions


It is petitioner's position that he is entitled to deduct for his taxable year 1998 the following: (1) Advertising expenses of $1,856, (2) vehicle expenses of $6,150, (3) insurance premiums of $2,394, (4) mortgage interest of $11,538, (5) other interest of $1,835, (6) office expenses of $8,300, (7) repair and maintenance expenses of $3,374, (8) expenses for supplies of $3,125, (9) taxes and licenses of $10,716, (10) utility expenses of $1,100, and (11) depreciation of $3,601 with respect to (a) the U Street property and (b) certain unidentified vehicles. It is petitioner's position that he is entitled to deduct for his taxable year 1999 depreciation of $8,782 with respect to (1) the U Street property and (2) an unidentified vehicle.29



In support of his position that he is entitled to the Schedule C deductions that he is claiming, petitioner relies on Ms. Johnson's testimony and petitioner's documents. We set forth above our evaluation of that evidence. Petitioner also relies on petitioner's proffered documents, virtually all of which pertain to petitioner's taxable year 1998 (petitioner's 1998 proffered documents).30 At the trial in this case, respondent objected to the admission of petitioner's proffered documents on the ground that no proper foundation had been laid for the admission of those documents as business records. It is not clear from the record whether Special Trial Judge Powell ruled on that objection. The following discussion assumes arguendo that Special Trial Judge Powell admitted petitioner's proffered documents into evidence and made them part of the record.



We first evaluate petitioner's 1998 proffered documents. Those proffered documents consist of (1) certain checks (petitioner's checks) that petitioner issued to various individuals and establishments, including certain checks that petitioner issued to a pediatrician; (2) certain credit card statements consisting of (a) two statements for a Chase card that show closing dates of June 18 and July 20, 1998, respectively, and (b) two statements for a Visa Gold card that show closing dates of June 19, 1998, and September 11, 1998, respectively; (3) a purported mileage log of petitioner (petitioner's 1998 purported mileage log); (4) duplicates of certain of the IRFCU bank statements and the Chevy Chase bank statements that are included in petitioner's documents that the parties stipulated; (5) certain invoices and billing statements from various establishments (petitioner's invoices and billing statements), including certain statements from a pediatrician; (6) certain receipts consisting of (a) two receipts from Sears dated September 12 and October 21, 1998, respectively, (b) a receipt from Hechinger dated October 17, 1998, and (c) a receipt from the University of the District of Columbia dated May 29, 1998; (7) certain documents relating to certain student loans; (8) certain deposit slips; and (9) a notice dated September 25, 1998, with respect to an unsatisfied parking ticket.



We find that petitioner's 1998 proffered documents are inadequate to establish petitioner's entitlement to any of the Schedule C deductions that he is claiming for his taxable year 1998. By way of illustration of the inadequacies of petitioner's 1998 proffered documents, we do not know the claimed expense(s) to which approximately three-quarters of petitioner's checks pertain.31 As for the remainder of petitioner's checks, although we have been able to determine the claimed expense(s) to which those checks pertain, we find that those checks do not establish, inter alia, that petitioner paid those expenses in conducting his law practice.



By way of further illustration of the inadequacies of petitioner's 1998 proffered documents, petitioner's credit card statements do not establish the claimed expense(s) to which those statements pertain or whether petitioner is claiming all of the expenses shown in those statements. Moreover, we find that petitioner's credit card statements do not establish, inter alia, that petitioner paid the expenses shown in petitioner's credit card statements in conducting his law practice.



As a further illustration of the inadequacies of petitioner's 1998 proffered documents, petitioner's 1998 purported mileage log32 consists of four columns with the headings "Date", "From", "To", and "Miles". The entries shown in the columns headed "From" and "To" for the period January 5 through May 10, 1998, consist of various addresses with no further explanation. Virtually all of the entries shown in the columns headed "From" and "To" for the period May 11 through December 29, 1998, consist of terms such as "Home", "Court", "Jail", "Witness", "Client's Home", and "Crime Scene".33 Because petitioner was not at the trial in this case, he was not available to explain the entries in petitioner's 1998 purported mileage log. Nor is there reliable evidence in the record to explain (1) any of the entries in petitioner's 1998 purported mileage log and (2) how petitioner used that purported log to calculate the deduction that he claims for vehicle expenses. We find that petitioner's 1998 purported mileage log does not establish, inter alia, that petitioner made the purported trips reflected in that purported log in conducting his law practice.



By way of further illustration of the inadequacies of petitioner's 1998 proffered documents, we find that petitioner's invoices and billing statements do not establish, inter alia, that petitioner paid the amounts shown therein and/or that petitioner paid the amounts shown in those invoices and billing statements in conducting his law practice.



As a final illustration of the inadequacies of petitioner's 1998 proffered documents, neither the receipt from the University of the District of Columbia nor the receipts from Sears indicate the reason petitioner expended the amounts shown in those respective receipts. Although the receipt from Hechinger shows the items34 that were purchased for the total amount shown in that receipt, we find that it does not establish, inter alia, that petitioner purchased those items in conducting his law practice.



We now address petitioner's argument that he is entitled to the Schedule C deductions that he is claiming for his respective taxable years 1998 and 1999. With respect to the claimed Schedule C deductions for 1998 for advertising expenses, vehicle expenses, insurance premiums,35 mortgage interest, other interest,36 office expenses, repair and maintenance expenses, expenses for supplies, taxes and licenses, and utility expenses, we find nothing in the record that satisfies petitioner's burden of showing (1) that during 1998 petitioner paid or incurred those expenses, (2) that he paid or incurred those expenses in conducting his law practice, and/or (3) that those expenses constitute ordinary and necessary business expenses in conducting his law practice under section 162(a). On the record before us, we find that petitioner has failed to carry his burden of establishing that he is entitled for his taxable year 1998 to the respective deductions under section 162(a) that he claims for advertising expenses, vehicle expenses, insurance premiums, mortgage interest, other interest, office expenses, repair and maintenance expenses, expenses for supplies, taxes and licenses, and utility expenses.



With respect to the depreciation deductions that petitioner claims with respect to the U Street property for his respective taxable years 1998 and 1999, the only evidence that petitioner introduced to support those claimed deductions is Ms. Johnson's general and vague testimony that "the depreciation on the home is based on a calculation of a formula based on * * * the amount you purchase the home over a period of time" and that a "good guess" of the purchase price for that property is $260,000. On the record before us, we find that petitioner has failed to carry his burden of establishing that he is entitled for his respective taxable years 1998 and 1999 to the depreciation deductions under section 167(a) that he claims with respect to the U Street property.



With respect to the respective depreciation deductions that petitioner claims for his taxable year 1998 with respect to certain unidentified vehicles and the depreciation deduction that he claims for his taxable year 1999 with respect to an unidentified vehicle, on the record before us, we find that petitioner has failed to carry his burden of establishing, inter alia, that he used any vehicle as part of his law practice. See sec. 167(a). On that record, we further find that petitioner has failed to carry his burden of establishing that he is entitled (1) for his taxable year 1998 to the depreciation deduction under section 167(a) that he claims with respect to certain unidentified vehicles and (2) for his taxable year 1999 to the depreciation deduction under that section that he claims with respect to an unidentified vehicle.



Assuming arguendo that we had found that petitioner carried his burden of establishing (1) for his taxable year 1998 the deductibility under section 162(a) of petitioner's claimed expenses pertaining to the U Street property (i.e., petitioner's claimed mortgage interest, petitioner's claimed utility expenses, and petitioner's claimed repair and maintenance expenses) and (2) for his respective taxable years 1998 and 1999 the deductibility under section 167(a) of petitioner's claimed depreciation with respect to that property, he would still have to satisfy the requirements of section 280A(c) with respect to those expense and depreciation deductions. In order to satisfy the requirements of that section, petitioner would have to establish that those expense and depreciation deductions are allocable to a portion of the U Street property that was exclusively used on a regular basis as the principal place of business for his law practice or as a place of business to meet or deal with clients in the normal course of his law practice. See sec. 280A(c).



The parties do not dispute that petitioner resided at the U Street property and that that property consisted of three floors. Petitioner contends that during each of the years at issue he exclusively used on a regular basis the lower two floors of the U Street property as his principal place of business for his law practice or as a place of business to meet or deal with clients in the normal course of his practice. To support petitioner's contention, petitioner relies on Ms. Johnson's testimony. As discussed above, we are unwilling to rely on Ms. Johnson's testimony to the extent that it pertained to matters surrounding petitioner's law practice or any other activities of petitioner during 1998 to the date in August 1999 on which petitioner first employed her.



Assuming arguendo that we were willing to rely on Ms. Johnson's testimony with respect to whether during each of the years at issue petitioner exclusively used on a regular basis the U Street property as his principal place of business for his law practice or as a place of business to meet or deal with clients in the normal course of his practice, we found her testimony to be internally inconsistent. Ms. Johnson testified on direct examination that the top two floors of the U Street property were "completely business". On cross-examination, Ms. Johnson contradicted that testimony and testified that the top floor of the U Street property was "just his residence" and that the lower two floors of that property were used for business purposes.



On the record before us, we find that petitioner has failed to carry his burden of establishing that during each of the years at issue he exclusively used on a regular basis any portion of the U Street property as the principal place of business for his law practice or as a place of business to meet or deal with clients in the normal course of his law practice. See sec. 280A(c).



Assuming arguendo that we had found that petitioner carried his burden of establishing for his taxable year 1998 the deductibility under section 162(a) of petitioner's claimed vehicle expenses, petitioner would still have to satisfy the requirements of section 274(d) with respect to those expenses. On the record before us, we find that he has not done so. See sec. 274(d)(4); sec. 1.274-5T(b)(6), Temporary Income Tax Regs., 50 Fed. Reg. 46016 (Nov. 6, 1985).



Assuming arguendo that we had found that petitioner carried his burden of establishing for his taxable year 1998 the deductibility under section 162(a) of petitioner's claimed office expenses, it appears from Ms. Johnson's testimony that those claimed expenses include certain expenses that pertained to the use of a cellular telephone.37 To the extent that petitioner is claiming expenses that pertained to the use of a cellular telephone, petitioner would still have to satisfy the requirements of section 274(d). On the record before us, we find that he has not done so. See sec. 274(d)(4); sec. 1.274-5T(b)(6), Temporary Income Tax Regs., 50 Fed. Reg. 46016 (Nov. 6, 1985).




Additions to Tax


It is respondent's position that petitioner is liable for the respective additions to tax under sections 6651(a)(1) and (2) and 6654(a) that respondent determined in the notices and the increases in those respective additions to tax that respondent alleged in the answer.



Section 6651(a)(1) imposes an addition to tax for failure to file timely a return. Section 6651(a)(2) imposes an addition to tax for failure to pay timely the amount shown as tax in a return. The respective additions to tax under section 6651(a)(1) and (2) do not apply if the respective failures to file timely and to pay timely are due to reasonable cause, and not willful neglect. Sec. 6651(a)(1) and (2). Section 6654(a) imposes an addition to tax in the case of an underpayment of estimated tax by an individual.38 The addition to tax under that section is mandatory unless petitioner qualifies under one of the exceptions in section 6654(e).39



Respondent must carry the burden of production with respect to the respective additions to tax under sections 6651(a)(1) and (2) and 6654(a) that respondent determined in the notices and the increases in those respective additions to tax that respondent alleged in the answer. Sec. 7491(c); Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 446-447 (2001). To satisfy respondent's burden of production, respondent must come forward with "sufficient evidence indicating that it is appropriate to impose" the additions to tax. Higbee v. Commissioner, supra at 446. Although respondent bears the burden of production with respect to the respective additions to tax under sections 6651(a)(1) and (2) and 6654(a) that respondent determined in the notices, respondent "need not introduce evidence regarding reasonable cause * * * or similar provisions. * * * the taxpayer bears the burden of proof with regard to those issues." Higbee v. Commissioner, supra. Respondent bears the burden of proof with respect to the increases in the respective additions to tax under sections 6651(a)(1) and (2) and 6654(a) for petitioner's taxable years 1998 and 1999 that respondent alleged in the answer. See Rule 142(a).



With respect to the respective additions to tax under sections 6651(a)(1) and (2) and 6654(a) that respondent determined in the notices, we turn first to the addition to tax under section 6651(a)(1). We have found that petitioner did not file a return for each of his taxable years 1998 and 1999. On the record before us, we find that respondent has carried respondent's burden of production under section 7491(c) with respect to the additions to tax under section 6651(a)(1) that respondent determined in the respective notices.



Petitioner relies on Ms. Johnson's testimony to support his position that his failure to file timely was due to reasonable cause, and not willful neglect. Section 1.6081-4, Income Tax Regs., provides that "An individual who is required to file an individual income tax return will be allowed an automatic 4-month extension of time to file the return after the date prescribed for filing the return". After taking the automatic four-month extension into account, the due date for petitioner's return for 1998 would have been August 15, 1999, and the due date for petitioner's return for 1999 would have been August 15, 2000. Ms. Johnson began working for petitioner sometime in August 1999 and continued to work for him until at least through 2004. We believe that Ms. Johnson had personal knowledge about why petitioner failed to file a return for each of his taxable years 1998 and 1999.



Ms. Johnson testified that petitioner did not file a return for each of his taxable years 1998 and 1999 because he (1) did not have all of the information that he needed to file a return for each of those years and (2) was too busy in his law practice. The unavailability of information or records does not necessarily establish reasonable cause for failure to file timely a return. See Elec. & Neon, Inc. v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1324, 1342-1343 (1971), affd. without published opinion 496 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1974). A taxpayer is required to file timely based upon the best information available and to file thereafter an amended return if necessary. Estate of Vriniotis v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 298, 311 (1982). Moreover, a taxpayer's preoccupation with employment or other activities does not necessarily establish reasonable cause for failure to timely file a return. Dustin v. Commissioner, 53 T.C. 491, 507 (1969), affd. 467 F.2d 47 (9th Cir. 1972).



On the record before us, we find that petitioner has failed to carry his burden of showing that his failure to file a return for each of his taxable years 1998 and 1999 was due to reasonable cause, and not willful neglect. On that record, we further find that petitioner has failed to carry his burden of establishing that he is not liable for the additions to tax under section 6651(a)(1) that respondent determined in the respective notices.



We turn now to the additions to tax under section 6651(a)(2) that respondent determined in the respective notices. That section applies only in the case of an amount of tax shown in a return. Cabirac v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. 163, 170 (2003). For purposes of section 6651(a)(2), a return prepared by the Commissioner under section 6020(b) is treated as the return filed by the taxpayer. Sec. 6651(g)(2); Cabirac v. Commissioner, supra. Because petitioner did not file a return for each of his taxable years 1998 and 1999, respondent prepared a substitute for return under section 6020(b) for each of those years. The substitute for return for 1998 showed total tax of $30,228.40. The substitute for return for 1999 showed total tax of $20,760. The record establishes that petitioner failed to pay timely the tax shown in each of those substitutes for return. On the record before us, we find that respondent has carried respondent's burden of production under section 7491(c) with respect to the additions to tax under section 6651(a)(2) that respondent determined in the respective notices.



It appears that petitioner is claiming that he failed to pay timely the tax shown in the substitute for return for 1998 and the tax shown in the substitute for return for 1999 for the same reasons that petitioner failed to file timely a return for each of those years, that is to say, he (1) did not have all of the requisite information and (2) was too busy in his law practice. On the record before us, we find that petitioner has failed to carry his burden of showing that his failure to pay timely the tax shown in the substitute for return for 1998 and the tax shown in the substitute for return for 1999 was due to reasonable cause, and not willful neglect.40 On that record, we further find that petitioner has failed to carry his burden of establishing that he is not liable for the additions to tax under section 6651(a)(2) that respondent determined in the respective notices.



We turn finally to the additions to tax under section 6654(a) that respondent determined in the respective notices. We have found (1) that petitioner filed a return for his taxable year 1997 that showed tax due of $20,084 and that the IRS accepted as filed, (2) that petitioner did not file a return for each of his taxable years 1998 and 1999, and (3) that petitioner did not make any estimated tax payments for either of his taxable years 1998 or 1999. On the record before us, we find that respondent has carried respondent's burden of production under section 7491(c) with respect to the additions to tax under section 6654(a) that respondent determined in the respective notices.



With respect to the additions to tax under section 6654(a) that respondent determined in the respective notices, petitioner does not argue, and the record does not establish, that he qualifies under any of the exceptions listed in section 6654(e). On the record before us, we find that petitioner is liable for the additions to tax under section 6654(a) that respondent determined in the respective notices.



With respect to the increases in the additions to tax under sections 6651(a)(1) and (2) and 6654(a) for petitioner's respective taxable years 1998 and 1999 that respondent alleged in the answer, we have found that respondent has failed to carry respondent's burden of establishing that petitioner has the increases in the deficiencies for his respective taxable years 1998 and 1999 that respondent alleged in the answer. On the record before us, we find that respondent has failed to carry respondent's burden of establishing that petitioner is liable for his respective taxable years 1998 and 1999 for the increases in the additions to tax under sections 6651(a)(1) and (2) and 6654(a) that respondent alleged in the answer.



We have considered all of the contentions and arguments of petitioner that are not discussed herein, and we find them to be without merit, irrelevant, and/or moot.



To reflect the foregoing, Decision will be entered for respondent with respect to the deficiencies and additions to tax determined in the notices and for petitioner with respect to the increases in those deficiencies and those additions to tax alleged in the answer.


1 Special Trial Judge Carleton D. Powell conducted the trial in this case. He died after the case was submitted. The parties have declined the opportunity for a new trial or for supplementation of the record and have expressly consented to the reassignment of this case for opinion and decision based on the record of the trial held in this case.

3 The Court takes judicial notice that Congress codified the CJA in 18 U.S.C. sec. 3006A (1994).

4 We shall sometimes refer collectively to petitioner's Chevy Chase checking account and petitioner's IRFCU checking and savings accounts as petitioner's bank accounts.

5 For convenience, we shall round up to the nearest dollar the $10,463.68 of direct deposits that GSA made into petitioner's IRFCU checking account during 1998.

6 The total amount of direct deposits that GSA made into petitioner's IRFCU checking account during 1999 rounded down to the nearest dollar equals the amount of nonemployee compensation from GSA that, as discussed below, was shown in the substitute for return that respondent prepared for petitioner's taxable year 1999 and the notice of deficiency that respondent issued to petitioner with respect to that year. We presume that respondent rounded down to the nearest dollar the $64,944.23 of nonemployee compensation that petitioner received from GSA during 1999. For convenience, we shall round down to the nearest dollar that total amount of direct deposits.

7 The $73,839 of nonemployee compensation that respondent determined in the notice for 1998 was based upon the nonemployee compensation shown in the substitute for return for 1998. As discussed above, of that total amount of nonemployee compensation for 1998, $44,424 was from GSA and $29,415 was from the District of Columbia.

8 The $64,944 of nonemployee compensation that respondent determined in the notice for 1999 was based upon the nonemployee compensation shown in the substitute for return for 1999. As discussed above, the entire amount of that nonemployee compensation for 1999 was from GSA.

9 In effect, respondent alleged in the answer that for 1998 $30,296 of petitioner's total deposits during that year are not taxable.

10 In effect, respondent alleged in the answer that for 1999 $5,572 of petitioner's total deposits during that year are not taxable.

11 In the answer, respondent alleged that the amounts of the increases in the additions to tax under secs. 6651(a)(1) and (2) and 6654(a) for petitioner's respective taxable years 1998 and 1999 that respondent had determined in the notices are to be determined based upon the "increases in the underlying deficiencies" for those respective years.

12 The amount of "Gross income" shown in the purported 1998 Schedule C is $1 more than the total nonemployee compensation that respondent showed in the substitute for return for 1998 and that respondent determined in the notice for 1998.

13 Respondent showed in the substitute for return for 1999 and determined in the notice for 1999 that petitioner has total nonemployee compensation of $64,944 for that year.

14 Respondent submitted to the Court a pretrial memorandum; petitioner did not. In respondent's pretrial memorandum, respondent argues that the burden of proof with respect to the deficiency determinations in the respective notices does not shift to respondent under sec. 7491(a). At the end of the trial in this case, Special Trial Judge Powell ordered the parties to file posttrial memoranda. He specifically ordered the parties to limit the content of their memoranda to proposed findings of fact. Respondent complied with that order; petitioner did not. In violation of Special Trial Judge Powell's order, petitioner advances in petitioner's posttrial memorandum various arguments with respect to the burden of proof in this case and the issues presented.

15 The elements that a taxpayer must prove with respect to any listed property are: (1)(a) The amount of each separate expenditure with respect to such property and (b) the amount of each business use based on the appropriate measure, e.g., mileage for automobiles, of such property; (2) the time, i.e., the date of the expenditure or use with respect to any such property; and (3) the business purpose for an expenditure or use with respect to such property. Sec. 1.274-5T(b)(6), Temporary Income Tax Regs., 50 Fed. Reg. 46016 (Nov. 6, 1985).

16 Petitioner was not at the trial in this case.

17 As discussed below, in order to satisfy his burden of proof, petitioner also relies on certain other documents (petitioner's proffered documents).

18 Although not altogether clear, it appears that petitioner is claiming for his respective taxable years 1998 and 1999 all of the expense and depreciation deductions that are shown in the purported 1998 Schedule C and the purported 1999 Schedule C, except the respective expense deductions claimed in the 1998 purported Schedule C for "Other expenses", "Meals and entertainment", and "Expenses for business use of your home". If our understanding were incorrect and if petitioner were also claiming that he is entitled for his taxable year 1998 to deduct "Other expenses", "Meals and entertainment", and "Expenses for business use of your home", on the record before us, we find that petitioner has failed to carry his burden of establishing that he is entitled to those deductions.

19 Although the Chevy Chase bank statements and the IRFCU bank statements do not show the payee of the checks drawn on petitioner's Chevy Chase checking account and petitioner's IRFCU checking account, petitioner included as part of petitioner's proffered documents copies of more than one-third of the checks drawn on petitioner's Chevy Chase checking account and one check drawn on petitioner's IRFCU checking account. Those checks show the payees thereof.

20 We found above that the IRFCU bank statements show that GSA was the source of certain of the deposits made into petitioner's IRFCU checking account during each of the years 1998 and 1999.

21 See supra note 19.

22 See supra note 20.

23 See supra note 7.

24 See supra note 8.

25 In the stipulation of facts, the parties stipulated:

Of the $42,145 petitioner deposited into the Chevy Chase checking account in 1998, $3,587 was from non-taxable sources.

* * * * * * *

* * * Of the $35,195 petitioner deposited into the Chevy Chase checking account in 1999, $5,572 was from non-taxable sources.

* * * * * * *

* * * Of the $124,513 petitioner deposited into the IRFCU accounts in 1998, $26,709 was from non-taxable sources.

We construe the foregoing stipulations to mean that at least $30,296 of the total deposits that petitioner made during 1998 into petitioner's bank accounts and at least $5,572 of the total deposits that petitioner made during 1999 into those accounts are not taxable. To construe those stipulations otherwise would mean that petitioner conceded in the parties' stipulation of facts that for each of his taxable years 1998 and 1999 he has the total amount of unreported income that respondent alleged in the answer for each of those years. On the record before us, we find that petitioner did not intend to make that concession. Cf. Rule 91(e).

26 See Cruz v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1990-594.

27 In the notice for 1998, respondent determined that petitioner has additional nonemployee compensation of $33,960 from GSA. See supra note 7.

28 The IRFCU bank statements show that GSA started making direct deposits into petitioner's IRFCU checking account in November 1998 and that during November through December 1998 GSA made direct deposits totaling $10,464 into that account.

29 In his posttrial memorandum, petitioner states: "The Petitioner includes all his 1999 business expenses under Depreciation and section 179 expense deduction." Although not altogether clear, we construe petitioner's statement to mean that the only Schedule C deduction that he is claiming for 1999 is a depreciation deduction. Our understanding of petitioner's statement in petitioner's posttrial memorandum is consistent with the purported 1999 return. The only deduction that petitioner claimed in the purported 1999 Schedule C is a depreciation deduction of $8,782.

30 Only two of petitioner's proffered documents pertain to petitioner's taxable year 1999, i.e., a check drawn on petitioner's IRFCU checking account, dated Nov. 12, 1999, and payable to "Ana & Jose Reyes" and a check drawn on petitioner's Chevy Chase checking account, dated June 12, 1999, and payable to "U Street Cleaners". The record does not disclose the issue(s) presented in this case, if any, to which those checks pertain.

31 Included in petitioner's checks are a substantial number of checks with handwritten notations, most of which are illegible or unclear as to their meaning. We note that even if the handwritten notations on petitioner's checks were legible and clear as to their meaning, those notations do not establish that the expenditures paid by those checks were paid in conducting petitioner's law practice.

32 Ms. Johnson, who did not start working for petitioner until sometime in August 1999, testified that petitioner prepared petitioner's 1998 purported mileage log. Ms. Johnson did not testify (1) how she knew that petitioner prepared that purported log, which purports to cover trips during 1998 only, or (2) when he prepared it.

33 Certain of the entries in the respective columns headed "From" and "To" for the period May 11 through July 19, 1998, are addresses.

34 The items shown in the receipt from Hechinger are "DRUM LINER TRASH BAG", "GROUND FAULT KIT", "STAPLE DISPENSER", "ROMEX CONNECTOR", and "NMB CABLE".

35 The record does not establish the type of insurance policy to which petitioner's claimed insurance premiums pertain.

36 The record does not establish the nature of petitioner's claimed interest.

37 Because Ms. Johnson testified that she "itemized the expenses" shown in the purported 1998 return, we believe that she had personal knowledge of the nature of the expenses that petitioner is claiming for his taxable year 1998. As discussed above, that is not to say that Ms. Johnson had personal knowledge of the expenses that petitioner paid during that year in conducting his law practice.

38 For purposes of sec. 6654(a), it is necessary to determine whether there is an underpayment of a required installment of estimated tax. See sec. 6654(a) and (b). In this connection, the amount of any required installment is 25 percent of the required annual payment. Sec. 6654(d)(1)(A). The required annual payment is equal to the lesser of (1) 90 percent of the tax shown in the return for the taxable year or, if no return was filed, 90 percent of the tax for such year, or (2) if the individual filed a return for the preceding taxable year, 100 percent of the tax shown in such return. Sec. 6654(d)(1)(B).

39 Sec. 6654(e) provides that no addition to tax shall be imposed under sec. 6654(a) for any taxable year if (1) the tax shown in the return for such taxable year (or, if no return is filed, the tax), reduced by the credit allowable under sec. 31, is less than $1,000, sec. 6654(e)(1); (2) the preceding taxable year was a taxable year of 12 months, the individual did not have any liability for such preceding taxable year, and the individual was a citizen or resident of the United States throughout such preceding taxable year, sec. 6654(e)(2); (3) the Secretary determines that by reason of casualty, disaster, or other unusual circumstances the imposition of such addition to tax would be against equity and good conscience, sec. 6654(e)(3)(A); or (4) the Secretary determines that during the taxable year for which the estimated payments are required or in the taxable year preceding such taxable year, the taxpayer retired after having attained the age of 62 or became disabled and the underpayment of any estimated tax was due to reasonable cause and not willful neglect, sec. 6654(e)(3)(B).

40 Cf. Klein v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-325; Joubert v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-292.

Labels:

Thursday, April 10, 2008

HR 5719Taxpayer Assistance and Simplification Act of 2008

April 10, 2008

110th Congress

_____________________________



(Original Signature of Member)



110TH CONGRESS



2D SESSION



H. R. ________

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to conform return preparer penalty standards, delay implementation of withholding taxes on government contractors, enhance taxpayer protections, assist low-income taxpayers, and for other purposes.



IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Mr. RANGEL introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on ________



A BILL

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to conform return preparer penalty standards, delay implementation of withholding taxes on government contractors, enhance taxpayer protections, assist low-income taxpayers, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,



SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE, ETC.

(a) SHORT TITLE. --This Act may be cited as the "Taxpayer Assistance and Simplification Act of 2008".

(b) AMENDMENT OF 1986 CODE. --Except as otherwise expressly provided, whenever in this Act an amendment or repeal is expressed in terms of an amendment to, or repeal of, a section or other provision, the reference shall be considered to be made to a section or other provision of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.

(c) TABLE OF CONTENTS. --The table of contents of this Act is as follows:



Sec. 1. Short title, etc.



Sec. 2. Modification of penalty on understatement of taxpayer's liability by tax return preparer.



Sec. 3. Removal of cellular telephones (or similar telecommunications equipment) from listed property.



Sec. 4. Delay of application of withholding requirement on certain governmental payments for goods and services.



Sec. 5. Elderly and disabled individuals receiving in-home care under certain government programs not subject to employment tax provisions.



Sec. 6. Referrals to low income taxpayer clinics permitted.



Sec. 7. Programs for the benefit of low-income taxpayers.



Sec. 8. EITC outreach.



Sec. 9. Prohibition on IRS debt indicators for predatory refund anticipation loans.



Sec. 10. Study on delivery of tax refunds.



Sec. 11. Extension of time for return of property for wrongful levy.



Sec. 12. Individuals held harmless on wrongful levy, etc., on individual retirement plan.



Sec. 13. Taxpayer notification of suspected identity theft.



Sec. 14. Repeal of authority to enter into private debt collection contracts.



Sec. 15. Clarification of IRS unclaimed refund authority.



Sec. 16. Prohibition on misuse of Department of the Treasury names and symbols.



Sec. 17. Substantiation of amounts paid or distributed out of health savings account.



Sec. 18. Increase in information return penalties.



Sec. 19. Increase in penalty for failure to file partnership returns.



Sec. 20. Increase in penalty for failure to file S corporation return.



Sec. 21. Time for payment of corporate estimated tax.



SEC. 2. MODIFICATION OF PENALTY ON UNDERSTATEMENT OF TAXPAYER'S LIABILITY BY TAX RETURN PREPARER.

(a) IN GENERAL. --Subsection (a) of section 6694 (relating to understatement due to unreasonable positions) is amended to read as follows:

"(a) UNDERSTATEMENT DUE TO UNREASONABLE POSITIONS. --

"(1) IN GENERAL. --If a tax return preparer --

"(A) prepares any return or claim of refund with respect to which any part of an understatement of liability is due to a position described in paragraph (2), and

"(B) knew (or reasonably should have known) of the position, such tax return preparer shall pay a penalty with respect to each such return or claim in an amount equal to the greater of $1,000 or 50 percent of the income derived (or to be derived) by the tax return preparer with respect to the return or claim.

"(2) UNREASONABLE POSITION. --

"(A) IN GENERAL. --Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, a position is described in this paragraph unless there is or was substantial authority for the position.

"(B) DISCLOSED POSITIONS. --If the position was disclosed as provided in section 6662(d)(2)(B)(ii)(I) and is not a position to which subparagraph (C) applies, the position is described in this paragraph unless there is a reasonable basis for the position.

"(C) TAX SHELTERS AND REPORTABLE TRANSACTIONS. --If the position is with respect to a tax shelter (as defined in section 6662(d)(2)(C)(ii)) or a reportable transaction to which section 6662A applies, the position is described in this paragraph unless it is reasonable to believe that the position would more likely than not be sustained on its merits.

"(3) REASONABLE CAUSE EXCEPTION. --No penalty shall be imposed under this subsection if it is shown that there is reasonable cause for the understatement and the tax return preparer acted in good faith.".

(b) EFFECTIVE DATE. --The amendment made by this section shall apply --

(1) in the case of a position described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of section 6694(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (as amended by this section), to returns prepared after May 25, 2007, and

(2) in the case of a position described in subparagraph (C) of such section (as amended by this section), to returns prepared for taxable years ending after the date of the enactment of this Act.



SEC. 3. REMOVAL OF CELLULAR TELEPHONES (OR SIMILAR TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT) FROM LISTED PROPERTY.

(a) IN GENERAL. --Subparagraph (A) of section 280F(d)(4) (defining listed property) is amended by inserting "and" at the end of clause (iv), by striking clause (v), and by redesignating clause (vi) as clause (v).

(b) EFFECTIVE DATE. --The amendment made by subsection (a) shall apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 2008.



SEC. 4. DELAY OF APPLICATION OF WITHHOLDING REQUIREMENT ON CERTAIN GOVERNMENTAL PAYMENTS FOR GOODS AND SERVICES.

(a) IN GENERAL. --Subsection (b) of section 511 of the Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005 is amended by striking "December 31, 2010" and inserting "December 31, 2011".

(b) REPORT TO CONGRESS. --Not later than 6 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury shall submit to the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the Senate a report with respect to the withholding requirements of section 3402(t) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, including a detailed analysis of --

(1) the problems, if any, which are anticipated in administering and complying with such requirements,

(2) the burdens, if any, that such requirements will place on governments and businesses (taking into account such mechanisms as may be necessary to administer such requirements), and

(3) the application of such requirements to small expenditures for services and goods by governments.



SEC. 5. ELDERLY AND DISABLED INDIVIDUALS RECEIVING IN-HOME CARE UNDER CERTAIN GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS NOT SUBJECT TO EMPLOYMENT TAX PROVISIONS.

(a) IN GENERAL. --Chapter 25 (relating to general provisions relating to employment taxes) is amended by adding at the end the following new section:



"SEC. 3511. ELDERLY AND DISABLED INDIVIDUALS RECEIVING IN-HOME CARE UNDER CERTAIN GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS.

"(a) IN GENERAL. --In the case of amounts paid under a home care service program to a home care service provider by the fiscal administrator of such program --

"(1) the home care service recipient shall not be liable for the payment of any taxes imposed under this subtitle with respect to amounts paid for the provision of services under such program, and

"(2) the fiscal administrator shall be so liable.

"(b) DEFINITIONS. --For purposes of this section --

"(1) HOME CARE SERVICE PROGRAM. --The term `home care service program' means a State or local government program --

"(A) any portion of which is funded with Federal funds, and

"(B) under which domestic services are provided to elderly or disabled individuals in their homes.

Such term shall not include any program to the extent home care service recipients make payments to the home care service providers for such in-home domestic services.

"(2) HOME CARE SERVICE PROVIDER. --The term `home care service provider' means any individual who provides domestic services to a home care service recipient under a home care service program.

"(3) HOME CARE SERVICE RECIPIENT. --The term `home care service recipient' means any indi vidual receiving domestic services under a home care service program.

"(4) FISCAL ADMINISTRATOR. --The term `fiscal administrator' means any person or governmental entity who pays amounts under a home care service program to home care service providers for the provision of domestic services under such program.

"(c) RETURNS BY FISCAL ADMINISTRATOR. --For purposes of this section --

"(1) IN GENERAL. --Returns relating to taxes imposed or amounts required to be withheld under this subtitle shall be made under the identifying number of the fiscal administrator.

"(2) IDENTIFICATION OF SERVICE RECIPIENT. --The fiscal administrator shall, to the extent required under regulations prescribed by the Secretary, make a return setting forth --

"(A) the name, address, and identifying number of each home care service recipient for whom amounts are paid by such fiscal administrator under the home care services program, and

"(B) such other information as the Secretary may require.

"(d) REGULATIONS. --The Secretary may prescribe such regulations or other guidance as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this section, including requiring deposits of any tax imposed under this subtitle.".

(b) SERVICE RECIPIENT IDENTIFICATION RETURN TREATED AS INFORMATION RETURN. --Paragraph (3) of section 6724(d) is amended by striking "and" at the end of subparagraph (C)(ii), by striking the period at the end of subparagraph (D)(ii) and inserting ", and", and by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:

"(E) any requirement under section 3511(c)(2).".

(c) CLERICAL AMENDMENT. --The table of sections for chapter 25 is amended by adding at the end the following new item:



"Sec. 3511. Elderly and disabled individuals receiving in-home care under certain government programs.".

(d) EFFECTIVE DATE. --The amendments made by this section shall apply to amounts paid after December 31, 2008.



SEC. 6. REFERRALS TO LOW INCOME TAXPAYER CLINICS PERMITTED.

(a) IN GENERAL. --Subsection (c) of section 7526 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

"(6) TREASURY EMPLOYEES PERMITTED TO REFER TAXPAYERS TO QUALIFIED LOW-INCOME TAXPAYER CLINICS. --Notwithstanding any other provision of law, officers and employees of the Department of the Treasury may refer taxpayers for advice and assistance to qualified low-income taxpayer clinics receiving funding under this section.".

(b) EFFECTIVE DATE. --The amendment made by this section shall apply to referrals made after the date of the enactment of this Act.



SEC. 7. PROGRAMS FOR THE BENEFIT OF LOW-INCOME TAXPAYERS.

(a) VOLUNTEER INCOME TAX ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS. --Chapter 77 (relating to miscellaneous provisions) is amended by inserting after section 7526 the following new section:



"SEC. 7526A. VOLUNTEER INCOME TAX ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS.

"(a) IN GENERAL. --The Secretary may, subject to the availability of appropriated funds, make grants to provide matching funds for the development, expansion, or continuation of volunteer income tax assistance programs.

"(b) VOLUNTEER INCOME TAX ASSISTANCE PROGRAM. --For purposes of this section, the term `volunteer income tax assistance program' means a program --

"(1) which does not charge taxpayers for its return preparation services,

"(2) which operates programs to assist low and moderate-income (as determined by the Secretary) taxpayers in preparing and filing their Federal income tax returns, and

"(3) in which all of the volunteers who assist in the preparation of Federal income tax returns meet the requirements prescribed by the Secretary.

"(c) SPECIAL RULES AND LIMITATIONS. --

"(1) AGGREGATE LIMITATION. --Unless otherwise provided by specific appropriation, the Secretary shall not allocate more than $10,000,000 per year (exclusive of costs of administering the program) to grants under this section.

"(2) OTHER APPLICABLE RULES. --Rules similar to the rules under paragraphs (2) through (6) of section 7526(c) shall apply with respect to the awarding of grants to volunteer income tax assistance programs.".

(b) INCREASE IN AUTHORIZED GRANTS FOR LOW-INCOME TAXPAYER CLINICS. --Paragraph (1) of section 7526(c) (relating to aggregate limitation) is amended by striking "$6,000,000" and inserting "$10,000,000".

(c) CLERICAL AMENDMENTS. --

(1) Section 7526(c)(5) is amended by striking the last sentence by inserting "qualified" before "low-income".

(2) The table of sections for chapter 77 is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 7526 the following new item:



"Sec. 7526A. Volunteer income tax assistance program.".

(d) EFFECTIVE DATE. --The amendments made by this section shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act.



SEC. 8. EITC OUTREACH.

(a) IN GENERAL. --Section 32 (relating to earned income) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

"(n) NOTIFICATION OF POTENTIAL ELIGIBILITY FOR CREDIT AND REFUND. --

"(1) IN GENERAL. --To the extent possible and on an annual basis, the Secretary shall provide to each taxpayer who --

"(A) for any preceding taxable year for which credit or refund is not precluded by section 6511, and

"(B) did not claim the credit under subsection (a) but may be allowed such credit for any such taxable year based on return or return information (as defined in section 6103(b)) available to the Secretary,

notice that such taxpayer may be eligible to claim such credit and a refund for such taxable year.

"(2) NOTICE. --Notice provided under paragraph (1) shall be in writing and sent to the last known address of the taxpayer.".

(b) EFFECTIVE DATE. --The amendment made by this section shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act.



SEC. 9. PROHIBITION ON IRS DEBT INDICATORS FOR PREDATORY REFUND ANTICIPATION LOANS.

(a) IN GENERAL. --Subsection (f) of section 6011 (relating to promotion of electronic filing) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

"(3) PROHIBITION ON IRS DEBT INDICATORS FOR PREDATORY REFUND ANTICIPATION LOANS. --

"(A) IN GENERAL. --In carrying out any program under this subsection, the Secretary shall not provide a debt indicator to any person with respect to any refund anticipation loan if the Secretary determines that the business practices of such person involve refund anticipation loans and related charges and fees that are predatory.

"(B) REFUND ANTICIPATION LOAN. --For purposes of this paragraph, the term `refund anticipation loan' means a loan of money or of any other thing of value to a taxpayer secured by the taxpayer's anticipated receipt of a Federal tax refund.

"(C) IRS DEBT INDICATOR. --For purposes of this paragraph, the term `debt indicator' means a notification provided through a tax return's acknowledgment file that a refund will be offset to repay debts for delinquent Federal or State taxes, student loans, child support, or other Federal agency debt.".

(b) EFFECTIVE DATE. --The amendment made by this section shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act.



SEC. 10. STUDY ON DELIVERY OF TAX REFUNDS.

(a) IN GENERAL. --The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the National Taxpayer Advocate, shall conduct a study on the feasibility of delivering tax refunds on debit cards, prepaid cards, and other electronic means to assist individuals that do not have access to financial accounts or institutions.

(b) REPORT. --Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury shall submit a report to Congress containing the results of the study conducted under subsection (a).



SEC. 11. EXTENSION OF TIME FOR RETURN OF PROPERTY FOR WRONGFUL LEVY.

(a) EXTENSION OF TIME FOR RETURN OF PROPERTY SUBJECT TO LEVY. --Subsection (b) of section 6343 (relating to return of property) is amended by striking "9 months" and inserting "2 years".

(b) PERIOD OF LIMITATION ON SUITS. --Subsection (c) of section 6532 (relating to suits by persons other than taxpayers) is amended --

(1) in paragraph (1) by striking "9 months" and inserting "2 years", and

(2) in paragraph (2) by striking "9-month" and inserting "2-year".

(c) EFFECTIVE DATE. --The amendments made by this section shall apply to --

(1) levies made after the date of the enactment of this Act, and

(2) levies made on or before such date if the 9-month period has not expired under section 6343(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (without regard to this section) as of such date.



SEC. 12. INDIVIDUALS HELD HARMLESS ON WRONGFUL LEVY, ETC., ON INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT PLAN.

(a) IN GENERAL. --Section 6343 (relating to authority to release levy and return property) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

"(f) INDIVIDUALS HELD HARMLESS ON WRONGFUL LEVY, ETC. ON INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT PLAN. --

"(1) IN GENERAL. --If the Secretary determines that an individual retirement plan has been levied upon in a case to which subsection (b) or (d)(2)(A) applies, an amount equal to the sum of --

"(A) the amount of money returned by the Secretary on account of such levy, and

"(B) interest paid under subsection (c) on such amount of money,

may be deposited into such individual retirement plan or any other individual retirement plan (other than an endowment contract) to which a rollover from the plan levied upon is permitted. An amount may not be deposited into a Roth IRA under the preceding sentence unless the individual retirement plan levied upon was a Roth IRA at the time of such levy.

"(2) TREATMENT AS ROLLOVER. --If amounts are deposited into an individual retirement plan under paragraph (1) not later than the 60th day after the date on which the individual receives the amounts under paragraph (1) --

"(A) such deposit shall be treated as a rollover described in section 408(d)(3)(A)(i),

"(B) to the extent the deposit includes interest paid under subsection (c), such interest shall not be includible in gross income, and

"(C) such deposit shall not be taken into account under section 408(d)(3)(B).

For purposes of subparagraph (B), an amount shall be treated as interest only to the extent that the amount deposited exceeds the amount of the levy.

"(3) REFUND, ETC., OF INCOME TAX ON LEVY. --If any amount is includible in gross income for a taxable year by reason of a levy referred to in paragraph (1) and any portion of such amount is treated as a rollover under paragraph (2), any tax imposed by chapter 1 on such portion shall not be assessed, and if assessed shall be abated, and if collected shall be credited or refunded as an overpayment made on the due date for filing the return of tax for such taxable year.

"(4) INTEREST. --Notwithstanding subsection (d), interest shall be allowed under subsection (c) in a case in which the Secretary makes a determination described in subsection (d)(2)(A) with respect to a levy upon an individual retirement plan.".

(b) EFFECTIVE DATE. --The amendment made by this section shall apply to amounts paid under subsections (b), (c), and (d)(2)(A) of section 6343 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 after the date of the enactment of this Act.



SEC. 13. TAXPAYER NOTIFICATION OF SUSPECTED IDENTITY THEFT.

(a) IN GENERAL. --Chapter 77 (relating to miscellaneous provisions) is amended by adding at the end the following new section:



"SEC. 7529. NOTIFICATION OF SUSPECTED IDENTITY THEFT.

"If, in the course of an investigation under the internal revenue laws, the Secretary determines that there was or may have been an unauthorized use of the identity of the taxpayer or a dependent of the taxpayer, the Secretary shall, to the extent permitted by law --

"(1) as soon as practicable and without jeopardizing such investigation, notify the taxpayer of such determination, and

"(2) if any person is criminally charged by indictment or information with respect to such unauthorized use, notify such taxpayer as soon as practicable of such charge.".

(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT. --The table of sections for chapter 77 is amended by adding at the end the following new item:



"Sec. 7529. Notification of suspected identity theft.".

(c) EFFECTIVE DATE. --The amendments made by this section shall apply to determinations made after the date of the enactment of this Act.



SEC. 14. REPEAL OF AUTHORITY TO ENTER INTO PRIVATE DEBT COLLECTION CONTRACTS.

(a) IN GENERAL. --Subchapter A of chapter 64 is amended by striking section 6306.

(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS. --

(1) Subchapter B of chapter 76 is amended by striking section 7433A.

(2) Section 7811 is amended by striking subsection (g).

(3) Section 1203 of the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring Act of 1998 is amended by striking subsection (e).

(4) The table of sections for subchapter A of chapter 64 is amended by striking the item relating to section 6306.

(5) The table of sections for subchapter B of chapter 76 is amended by striking the item relating to section 7433A.

(c) EFFECTIVE DATE. --

(1) IN GENERAL. --Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, the amendments made by this section shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act.

(2) EXCEPTION FOR EXISTING CONTRACTS, ETC. --The amendments made by this section shall not apply to any contract which was entered into before July 18, 2007, and is not renewed or extended on or after March 1, 2008.

(3) UNAUTHORIZED CONTRACTS AND EXTENSIONS TREATED AS VOID. --Any qualified tax collection contract (as defined in section 6306 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as in effect before its repeal) which is entered into on or after July 18, 2007, and any extension or renewal on or after March 1, 2008, of any qualified tax collection contract (as so defined) shall be void.



SEC. 15. CLARIFICATION OF IRS UNCLAIMED REFUND AUTHORITY.

Paragraph (1) of section 6103(m) (relating to tax refunds) is amended by inserting ", and through any other means of mass communication," after "media".



SEC. 16. PROHIBITION ON MISUSE OF DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY NAMES AND SYMBOLS.

(a) IN GENERAL. --Subsection (a) of section 333 of title 31, United States Code, is amended by inserting "Internet domain address," after "solicitation," both places it appears.

(b) PENALTY FOR MISUSE BY ELECTRONIC MEANS. --Subsections (c)(2) and (d)(1) of section 333 of such Code are each amended by inserting "or any other mass communications by electronic means," after "telecast,".

(c) EFFECTIVE DATE. --The amendments made by this section shall apply with respect to violations occurring after the date of the enactment of this Act.



SEC. 17. SUBSTANTIATION OF AMOUNTS PAID OR DISTRIBUTED OUT OF HEALTH SAVINGS ACCOUNT.

(a) IN GENERAL. --Paragraph (1) of section 223(f) (relating to amounts used for qualified medical expenses) is amended by inserting "(and substantiated in a manner similar to the substantiation required for flexible spending arrangements)" after "account beneficiary".

(b) REPORTS. --Subsection (h) of section 223 (relating to reports) is amended --

(1) by redesignating paragraphs (1) and (2) as subparagraphs (A) and (B), respectively,

(2) by moving the text of subparagraphs (A) and (B) (as so redesignated) and the last sentence 2 ems to the right,

(3) by striking "(h) REPORTS. --The Secretary may require --" and inserting the following:

"(h) REPORTS. --

"(1) IN GENERAL. --The Secretary may require --", and

(4) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

"(2) RELATING TO SUBSTANTIATION. --Not later than January 15 of each calendar year, the trustee of a health savings account shall make a report regarding such account to the Secretary and the account beneficiary setting forth --

"(A) the name, address, and identifying number of the account beneficiary, and

"(B) the amount paid or distributed out of such account for the preceding calendar year not substantiated in accordance with subsection (f)(1).".

(c) EFFECTIVE DATE. --The amendments made by this section shall apply with respect to amounts paid or distributed out of health savings accounts after December 31, 2008.



SEC. 18. INCREASE IN INFORMATION RETURN PENALTIES.

(a) FAILURE TO FILE CORRECT INFORMATION RETURNS. --

(1) IN GENERAL. --Subsections (a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and (b)(2)(A) of section 6721 are each amended by striking "$50" and inserting "$100".

(2) AGGREGATE ANNUAL LIMITATION. --Subsections (a)(1), (d)(1)(A), and (e)(3)(A) of section 6721 are each amended by striking "$250,000" and inserting "$1,500,000".

(b) REDUCTION WHERE CORRECTION WITHIN 30 DAYS. --

(1) IN GENERAL. --Subparagraph (A) of section 6721(b)(1) is amended by striking "$15" and inserting "$25".

(2) AGGREGATE ANNUAL LIMITATION. --Subsections (b)(1)(B) and (d)(1)(B) of section 6721 are each amended by striking "$75,000" and inserting "$250,000".

(c) REDUCTION WHERE CORRECTION ON OR BEFORE AUGUST 1. --

(1) IN GENERAL. --Subparagraph (A) of section 6721(b)(2) is amended by striking "$30" and inserting "$60".

(2) AGGREGATE ANNUAL LIMITATION. --Subsections (b)(2)(B) and (d)(1)(C) of section 6721 are each amended by striking "$150,000" and inserting "$500,000".

(d) AGGREGATE ANNUAL LIMITATIONS FOR PERSONS WITH GROSS RECEIPTS OF NOT MORE THAN $5,000,000. --Paragraph (1) of section 6721(d) is amended --

(1) by striking "$100,000" in subparagraph (A) and inserting "$500,000",

(2) by striking "$25,000" in subparagraph (B) and inserting "$75,000", and

(3) by striking "$50,000" in subparagraph (C) and inserting "$200,000".

(e) PENALTY IN CASE OF INTENTIONAL DISREGARD. --Paragraph (2) of section 6721(e) is amended by striking "$100" and inserting "$250".

(f) FAILURE TO FURNISH CORRECT PAYEE STATEMENTS. --

(1) IN GENERAL. --Subsection (a) of section 6722 is amended by striking "$50" and inserting "$100".

(2) AGGREGATE ANNUAL LIMITATION. --Subsections (a) and (c)(2)(A) of section 6722 are each amended by striking "$100,000" and inserting "$1,500,000".

(3) PENALTY IN CASE OF INTENTIONAL DISREGARD. --Paragraph (1) of section 6722(c) is amended by striking "$100" and inserting "$250".

(g) FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH OTHER INFORMATION REPORTING REQUIREMENTS. --Section 6723 is amended --

(1) by striking "$50" and inserting "$100", and

(2) by striking "$100,000" and inserting "$1,500,000".

(h) EFFECTIVE DATE. --The amendments made by this section shall apply with respect to information returns required to be filed after December 31, 2008.



SEC. 19. INCREASE IN PENALTY FOR FAILURE TO FILE PARTNERSHIP RETURNS.

Section 6698 is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

"(e) MODIFICATIONS. --In the case of any return required to be filed after December 31, 2008, the dollar amount in effect under subsection (b)(1) shall be increased by $15.".



SEC. 20. INCREASE IN PENALTY FOR FAILURE TO FILE S CORPORATION RETURN.

Section 6699 is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

"(e) MODIFICATIONS. --In the case of any return required to be filed after December 31, 2008, the dollar amount in effect under subsection (b)(1) shall be increased by $15.".



SEC. 21. TIME FOR PAYMENT OF CORPORATE ESTIMATED TAX.

The percentage under subparagraph (C) of section 401(1) of the Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005 in effect on the date of the enactment of this Act is increased by 0.25 percentage points.

Labels:

Wednesday, April 9, 2008

Section 469(g)(1)(A) provides that the excess of --



(i) any loss from such activity for the taxable year (determined after the application of subsection (b)), over



(ii) any net income or gain for such taxable year from all other passive activities (determined after the application of subsection (b)),



shall be treated as a loss which is not from a passive activity.
Rodolfo C. Uy v. Commissioner.

Docket No. 24177-05S . Filed April 8, 2008.

[Code Secs. 469 and 6001]

Tax Court: Summary opinion: Real estate: Passive activity losses. --

An individual was not entitled to deduct a current year passive activity loss (PAL), prior year PALs or suspended PALs arising from his rental real estate activities. First, the individual's entitlement to deductions for current and prior years' PALs could not be considered by the Tax Court because it was raised for the first time on brief. Even if the issue could be considered, the taxpayer did not provide adequate substantiation for a current net passive loss deduction in excess of the amount conceded by the IRS. Second, the deduction for prior years' losses could not be raised as an issue because the losses were not claimed on the individual's return and were not the type of deduction specified in his petition. Even if the issue could be raised, the taxpayer failed to provide any substantiation in support of the claimed prior years' losses. Finally, no deduction was allowed for suspended losses arising from the disposition of interests in passive activities. The individual had not claimed the amount on his return and raised the issue for the first time on brief, and he provided no proof as to the amounts of suspended losses.



PURSUANT TO INTERNAL REVENUE CODE SECTION 7463(b),THIS OPINION MAY NOT BE TREATED AS PRECEDENT FOR ANY OTHER CASE.









GOLDBERG, Special Trial Judge: This case was heard pursuant to the provisions of section 7463 of the Internal Revenue Code in effect when the petition was filed.1 Pursuant to section 7463(b), the decision to be entered is not reviewable by any other court, and this opinion shall not be treated as precedent for any other case.



On his income tax returns for 2003 and 2004, petitioner claimed the following rental real estate and pass-through loss deductions which respondent disallowed:





2003 2004

Rental real estate $49,896 $5,400

Pass-through loss from S 63,176
corporation 54,393

Total
113,072 59,793





As a result of these disallowances, respondent determined deficiencies in petitioner's income taxes of $36,091 for 2003, and $24,098 for 2004. In computing the deficiencies respondent increased the amounts of alternative minimum tax shown on the returns and recomputed the amount of itemized deductions allowable, taking into account the limitations due to adjusted gross income under section 67.



After concessions,2 the remaining issues for decision are: (1) Whether we may consider petitioner's argument that he is entitled to deduct a current net passive activity loss and prior years' losses for 2003, and if so, whether petitioner has met his burden of proof with respect to these claims; and (2) whether petitioner is entitled to deduct certain other suspended passive activity losses for 2003.





Background



Some of the facts have been stipulated, and they are so found. We incorporate by reference the parties' stipulation of facts and the accompanying exhibits.



At the time the petition was filed, petitioner resided in New York, New York.



During the taxable year in issue, petitioner worked for Wakefield Medical Professionals, P.C., as a physician specializing in pediatric medicine. In this capacity petitioner managed five medical offices and a staff comprising five pediatricians and two interns.



In 2003 and 2004, in addition to working as a physician, petitioner was the sole owner of R & D Super Laundromat, an S corporation, located in Bronx, New York.



On his returns and in his petition, petitioner maintained that he actively participated in rental real estate and S corporation activities in 2003 and 2004.




Rental Real Estate Activities


Petitioner attached to his 2003 return a Schedule E, Supplemental Income and Loss, which listed six rental income properties. Petitioner reported deductible losses for five of these properties on line 23, Deductible rental real estate loss, as follows: (1) Residential co-op, 67-105 Burns Street, Apartment 105-3B --$5,845; (2) residential co-op, 67-109 Burns Street, Apartment 109-1B --$6,081; (3) residential building, 4409 Byron Avenue, Bronx, New York --$1,862; (4) residential condo, 301 W. 57th Street, Apartment #18B, New York --$15,346; and (5) condo, 201 Ohua Avenue, #1813, Honolulu, Hawaii --$20,762. Petitioner reported the $49,896 total of deductible rental real estate losses for the five properties on line 17, Rental real estate, royalties, partnerships, S corporations, trusts, etc., of his 2003 Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return. Petitioner did not report as deductible a $3,150 loss for the sixth property, a residential condo located at 5401 Collins Avenue, Miami, Florida (the Collins Avenue property), which he listed on line 22, Income or (loss) from rental real estate or royalty properties of his Schedule E. Petitioner sold the Collins Avenue property on March 20, 2003, and the residential co-op located at 67-105 Burns Street, Apartment 105-3B (the Burns Street property) on June 23, 2003. Petitioner reported the sales on Form 4797, Sales of Business Property, as follows:





Burns Street Collins Avenue
Property Property

Gross sale price $100,000 $220,711

Cost or other basis 77,820 157,755

Depreciation 20,474 30,899

Adjusted basis 57,346 126,856


Total gain 42,654
93,855





Petitioner's total gain from the sale of business property for 2003 was $136,509.




Current and Prior Years' Losses


On Form 8582, Passive Activity Loss Limitations, which he attached to his 2003 return, petitioner reported a $3,150 net loss for rental real estate activities with active participation (line 1b) and a $74,218 loss for unallowed losses for prior years (line 1c). Petitioner computed these figures using Worksheet 1 --For Form 8582, Lines 1a, 1b, and 1c (Worksheet 1), which he attached to his 2003 return and on which he reported the following:





Prior Overall gain or
Current year years loss

Name of Net Net Unallowed
activity income loss loss Gain Loss

Residential
co-op -- -- $26,018 -- $26,018

Residential
co-op -- -- 6,862 -- 6,862

Residential
building -- -- 28,267 -- 28,267

Residential
condo -- $3,150 13,071 -- 16,221

Total -- 3,150 74,218 -- 77,368





Petitioner entered $77,368, the total of current and prior years' losses, on line 4 of Form 8582. On the basis of this entry, the form instructed petitioner to complete Part II, Special Allowance for Rental Real Estate With Active Participation. Because petitioner's modified adjusted gross income for 2003 --as reported on Part II --was $299,805, petitioner could not deduct any portion of the $77,368 from his nonpassive income for that year.3




Petitioner's Failure To Appear


This case was set for trial on February 5, 2007, at the Court's trial session in New York, New York. Petitioner did not appear at the calendar call. Petitioner's counsel, Mr. Iannone, appeared and asked for a continuance on the grounds that petitioner was out of town and that Mr. Iannone had been retained as counsel 2 days before the calendar call. The Court denied this motion, set the case for recall, and firmly instructed Mr. Iannone to meet with his client before trial.



When this case was recalled for trial, Mr. Iannone and respondent's counsel appeared and were heard. The parties filed a stipulation of facts with attached exhibits. Petitioner did not appear in court, and Mr. Iannone was unable to present any meaningful evidence as to the issues. The Court closed the proceedings and provided the parties with the opportunity to file posttrial briefs.





Discussion



The Commissioner's determination as set forth in a notice of deficiency is generally presumed correct, and the taxpayer bears the burden of showing that the determination is in error. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). Pursuant to section 7491(a) the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner where the taxpayer complies with substantiation requirements, maintains records, and cooperates fully with reasonable requests for witnesses, documents, and other information. On the basis of our review of the record, and for the reasons discussed infra, we conclude that petitioner did not comply with these requirements, and thus, the burden of proof remains with petitioner.



On brief petitioner argues that respondent carries the burden of proof as a result of his concession for 2003. We do not agree. Rule 142(a)(1) would place the burden of proof on respondent only if respondent pleaded a new matter in his answer. For the reasons discussed infra, we conclude that respondent did not plead or raise on brief any new matter, and therefore, respondent bears no additional burden of proof.



Deductions are a matter of legislative grace, and a taxpayer generally bears the burden of proving that he is entitled to the deductions claimed. See Rule 142(a); INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79 (1992); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435 (1934). A taxpayer bears the burden of proof with respect to his entitlement to claimed loss deductions. Lee v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-70. A taxpayer is required to maintain records that are sufficient to enable the Commissioner to determine his correct tax liability. See sec. 6001; sec. 1.6001-1(a), Income Tax Regs.




Petitioner's Contentions


Petitioner's argument is based on a two-pronged approach. First, petitioner argues that he is entitled --at a minimum --to a $23,437 passive activity loss deduction for 2003. This amount --$23,437 --if coupled with the amount respondent conceded as petitioner's passive activity loss for 2003, $113,072, equals $136,509 of petitioner's total gain from passive activities, namely real estate, for 2003.



The $23,437 figure represents the $3,150 loss associated with the Collins Avenue property, which petitioner reported on line 22 of his Schedule E (but did not actually report as a deductible loss on line 23) and included on line 1b of his Form 8582, and $20,287 of the $74,218 of prior years' losses, which petitioner included on line 1c of his Form 8582.



Petitioner argues that the Forms 1040, for taxable years 1997 through 2002 which were attached as exhibits to his reply brief, substantiate adequately the $74,218 of prior years' losses.



Second, petitioner argues in the alternative that he is entitled to a $42,239 suspended loss deduction for 2003. Specifically, petitioner argues his claim to current and cumulative suspended losses of $26,018 and $16,221 ($42,239 total) for the Collins Avenue property and the Burns Street property, respectively, on the basis that he disposed of his entire interest in each activity in 2003.4 Petitioner claims that because he sold both of the properties in 2003, the unused or suspended passive activity losses associated with those properties should first be used to offset his passive income gain and, to the extent that gain is exceeded (in this case by $17,802, or $42,239 - $24,437), his nonpassive income for that year.




Respondent's Contentions


With respect to the deductible losses raised for the first time in petitioner's posttrial briefs, respondent contends that petitioner is barred from raising as a new issue for decision either his entitlement to deduct the current year loss associated with the Collins Avenue property or the prior years' losses for the taxable years 1997 through 2002 because: (1) The petition seeks relief specifically and only under section 469(c)(7) and; (2) even if petitioner were entitled to raise as an issue the aforementioned losses, he has not met his burden of proof.



Furthermore, respondent contends that petitioner is not entitled to suspended loss deductions of $26,018 and $16,221 for 2003 from his sale of the properties in that year because Worksheet 1 does not identify sufficiently the properties listed on Schedule E, and petitioner has failed to substantiate the suspended passive activity losses reported on Worksheet 1.




Current and Prior Years' Losses


With respect to petitioner's argument that he is entitled to claim current and prior years' losses for 2003, we agree with respondent that this issue was raised for the first time in petitioner's opening brief. The Court has consistently held that it will not consider issues raised for the first time on brief. Estate of Kleemeier v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 241, 248-249 (1972). Contrary to petitioner's belief, this issue was not raised by respondent directly or by respondent's concession but was raised for the first time on brief by petitioner.



Assuming arguendo that we may consider this issue, petitioner cannot prevail. Petitioner argues on brief his entitlement to these losses on the basis that: (1) Respondent conceded that his rental real estate and S corporation activities were passive activities for 2003; (2) had he characterized these activities as passive activities when he filed his 2003 return, he would have claimed the $3,150 net passive loss deduction for the Collins Avenue property at that time; and (3) respondent had sufficient information in petitioner's return to adequately compute any allowable passive activity loss for 2003.



Respondent's concession that petitioner's rental real estate and S corporation activities were passive activities for 2003 does not entitle petitioner to claim additional passive loss deductions for that year; and even if it were to have this effect, petitioner would still be required to provide adequate substantiation for the claimed deductions. Petitioner has provided no proof establishing any amount of the current net passive activity loss deduction of $3,150 to which he now claims that he is entitled. Second, as petitioner admits, he did not claim this net passive loss deduction for 2003. Respondent's concession, in itself, does not permit petitioner to recharacterize the items of income and loss reported on his 2003 return. It is not respondent's duty, as petitioner argues, to recompute the losses a taxpayer may be entitled to claim following a concession by respondent. On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that petitioner is not entitled to any additional amount of current net passive loss deduction for 2003 above the amount respondent conceded.



Regarding the prior years' losses, we note that the petition very clearly --and very narrowly --limited petitioner's claim to entitlement for relief to that provided for under sections 465, 469(c)(7), and 1016, thereby excluding from our consideration section 469(d), which governs prior years' passive activity losses. Moreover, the petition requests no overpayment but merely states that petitioner is "entitled to all of the deductions claimed on his 2003 and 2004 1040 tax returns".



In general, no deduction is allowed in a year for an individual taxpayer's passive activity losses in excess of passive activity income. However, excess losses may be carried forward to subsequent years to offset subsequent passive activity income. Sec. 469(a), (b), (d).



The prior years' passive losses at issue were not claimed on petitioner's 2003 return and therefore do not fall among those deductions that petitioner seeks entitlement to in his petition. We again correct petitioner's misguided argument that the losses in issue should be allowed on the basis of the figures listed on petitioner's 2003 return and the returns for taxable years 1997 through 2002. Not only did petitioner fail to substantiate any of the loss figures reported on his 2003 return; the returns for taxable years 1997 through 2002, which were attached to petitioner's reply brief, are not part of the evidence in this case. See Rule 143(b); Logsdon v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-8.



Even if the Court had admitted these returns into evidence, they, by themselves, cannot substantiate the loss figures reported on petitioner's 2003 return. See Widemon v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-162 (applying principle to capital losses). Accordingly, we conclude that petitioner is not entitled to raise these purported prior years' losses as an issue and that even if he were so entitled, he has failed to provide any substantiation to support the losses to which he claims he is entitled.




Suspended Passive Activity Losses


With regard to the treatment of a suspended passive activity loss, section 469(g)(1)(A) provides for such a loss when a taxpayer disposes of his entire interest in a passive activity in a transaction where all of the gain or loss realized on the disposition of the interest is recognized. Section 469(g)(1)(A) provides that the excess of --



(i) any loss from such activity for the taxable year (determined after the application of subsection (b)), over



(ii) any net income or gain for such taxable year from all other passive activities (determined after the application of subsection (b)),



shall be treated as a loss which is not from a passive activity.



Accordingly, the usual result upon a taxable disposition of a passive activity is that the taxpayer may use any remaining suspended passive activity loss allocated to that activity first against passive income from the same activity, then against net passive income from other passive activities, and then as a nonpassive loss.



On Worksheet 1, petitioner reported overall losses of $26,018 for a "residential co-op" and $16,221 for a "residential condo". No further description of these properties was included on Worksheet 1. Since petitioner's Schedule E characterizes three of the six total listed properties as "condo" and two of the six total listed properties as "co-op", it is impossible for the Court to ascertain definitively which of the Schedule E properties correspond to the figures reported on Worksheet 1. As previously stated, petitioner raised these suspended losses as a new issue, and therefore bears the burden of proof as to the amounts claimed.



Petitioner has not met his burden with respect to the standard for record keeping under section 6001. Petitioner provided no proof as to the amounts of the suspended losses to which he now claims that he is entitled. The only exhibits pertinent to this issue are petitioner's tax returns for 2003 and 2004. Contrary to petitioner's belief, a tax return alone is not proof of a taxpayer's entitlement to a deduction claimed therein; a tax return merely sets forth the taxpayer's claim. See Roberts v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 834, 837 (1974); Seabord Commercial Corp. v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 1034, 1051 (1957). Without substantive evidence, we simply cannot determine whether petitioner is entitled to deduct losses for 2003 from the properties that he sold in that year.



After concessions, it is agreed that petitioner's rental real estate activities were passive activities during the years in issue. While we agree that under section 469(g)(1)(A) petitioner would be entitled to claim a suspended loss deduction for 2003 on the basis of his disposition of his entire interest in the aforementioned passive activities, he did not do so on his 2003 return. This issue was first raised on brief. Moreover, we lack the necessary proof that he did, in fact, incur these losses. Accordingly, and on the basis of the foregoing, we hold that petitioner has not met his burden with respect to this issue, and is therefore not entitled to claim a suspended loss deduction for the dispositions of his interests in the aforementioned passive activities for 2003.



To reflect the foregoing, including all concessions,



Decision will be entered under Rule 155.


1 Unless otherwise indicated, all subsequent section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the taxable years in issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.

2 Respondent concedes that petitioner is entitled to a $113,072 passive activity loss deduction for 2003. This amount represents the aggregate of petitioner's rental real estate loss of $49,896 and a pass-through loss of $63,176 stemming from his ownership of an S corporation. Respondent acknowledges that petitioner is entitled to deduct the aforementioned amounts as a passive activity loss on the basis of the $136,509 of passive activity gain that petitioner reported for 2003. Petitioner concedes that he is not entitled to a deduction for either rental real estate losses or a pass-through loss for the taxable year 2004. On brief petitioner concedes that for 2003 his S corporation activity was a passive activity. Inasmuch as petitioner failed to appear at trial and present credible evidence to support his contention that he was an active participant in his real estate activity for 2003, we deem this issue conceded.

3 A taxpayer who "actively participated" in a rental real estate activity may deduct a maximum loss of $25,000 per year related to the activity. Sec. 469(i)(1) and (2). This exception is fully phased out, however, when adjusted gross income (AGI) equals or exceeds $150,000. Sec. 469(i)(3)(A), (F). Petitioner reported AGI of $299,805. Under sec. 469(i)(3)(F)(iv), AGI is determined without regard to any passive activity or any loss allowable by reason of sec. 469(c)(7).

4 Although not contained in the petition, this argument was raised by petitioner's counsel during opening statements. Respondent's reply brief is responsive to this issue.

Labels:

Tuesday, April 8, 2008

6672 Trust fund penalty

Among the factors indicative of the requisite authority over the corporate taxpayer's finances or general decision making to qualify an individual as a "responsible person," are:
whether the employee (1) served as an officer of the company or as a member of its board of directors; (2) controlled the company's payroll; (3) determined which creditors to pay and when to pay them; (4) participated in the day-to-day management of the corporation; (5) possessed the power to write checks; and (6) had the ability to hire and fire employees.


Charles B. Erwinv. United States Of America,

U.S. District Court, Mid. Dist. N.C.; 1:06CV59, March 18, 2008.

[ Code Sec. 6672]

Assessment: Employment withholding taxes: Failure to pay taxes: Willfulness: Trust fund recovery penalty: Responsible person. --


The founder, shareholder and officer of a corporation was liable for the trust fund recovery penalty assessed against him in connection with the corporation's unpaid withholding taxes. The individual was a "responsible person" with respect to the corporation because he exercised significant control over the corporation's day-to-day activities, hired or fired management employees and accountants in charge of the corporation's payroll operations, reviewed weekly and monthly financial statements, personally guaranteed payments to vendors and directed checks to be written and expenses to be paid. Further, the individual acted willfully because he had reason to know that the taxes were not being paid, but directed that payments be made to creditors other than the IRS.




ORDER


BEATY, Chief Judge: This matter is before the Court on the Recommendation from the United States Magistrate Judge [Document #55] granting summary judgment in favor of the United States for unpaid payroll withholding taxes owed by GC Affordable Dining, Inc. ("GCAD"), a corporation in which Plaintiff was a shareholder, pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §6672. Plaintiff brought suit against the United States for the recovery of tax penalties assessed against him. The United States filed a Counterclaim against Plaintiff for a trust fund recovery penalty, plus interest, in the amount of $264,579.00, representing the payroll taxes required to be withheld from GCAD employees' wages during four quarters: the third quarter of 1998 and the first, second, and third quarters of 1999. The United States subsequently filed a Third-Party Complaint against Stephen C. Coggin ("Coggin"), William G. Pintner ("Pintner"), James Barry Light ("B. Light"), and Hartsell B. Light, Jr. ("H. Light") alleging the same claims alleged against Erwin [Document #9]. On September 19, 2007, the United States filed a Motion for Summary Judgment against Erwin on his claims as well as its counterclaims against Erwin [Document #45]. Erwin then filed a cross Motion for Summary Judgment against the United States on its counterclaims against him [Document #46]. On November 27, 2007, Magistrate Judge Dixon recommended that the Court deny Erwin's Motion for Summary Judgment and grant the United States' Motion for Summary Judgment [Document #55].

Within the time provided by 28 U.S.C. §636, Counsel for Plaintiff objected to the Recommendation. This Court reviewed de novo the Objections and the portions of the Magistrate Judge's Recommendation to which objection was made, and has made a determination which is in accord with the Magistrate Judge's decision. The Court will therefore adopt the Magistrate Judge's Recommendation.

Consequently, the Court will order that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment be denied, and that the United States Motion for Summary Judgment against Plaintiff Charles B. Erwin be granted. As a result of this determination, Plaintiff Erwin's claims against the United States will be dismissed and judgment will be entered in favor of the United States on its counterclaims against Plaintiff Erwin. 1

Because all claims by and against Plaintiff Erwin have now been resolved, the only remaining claims are those claims brought by the United States against the Third Party Defendants, Stephen C. Coggin, William G. Pintner, James Barry Light, and Hartsell B. Light, Jr. However, the United States has filed a Motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) for Entry of Final Judgment Against Plaintiff Erwin and a Motion to Stay further proceedings against the Third Party Defendants [Document #67]. Plaintiff Erwin and Defendants Pintner, B. Light and H. Light all consent. 2 Having considered this motion, the Court finds that all of the claims by and against Plaintiff Erwin have been resolved, but that the United States' claims against the Third Party Defendants in this case remain unresolved. The Court further finds that there is no just reason for delay of the entry of final judgment as to the claims by and against Plaintiff Erwin. Therefore, the United States' motion will be granted and final judgment as to Plaintiff Erwin pursuant to Rule 54(b) will be entered contemporaneously herewith. Further, the Court concludes that a Stay as to the United States' claims against the Third Party Defendants in this case is appropriate pending final resolution of any appeal by Plaintiff Erwin.



RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE


DIXON, United States Magistrate Judge: This matter is before the court on cross motions for summary judgment filed by Plaintiff Charles B. Erwin (doc. no. 46) and Defendant United States of America (doc. no. 45). Plaintiff filed this action after paying a portion of the amount allegedly due under a trust fund recovery penalty for unpaid payroll withholding taxes for GC Affordable Dining, Inc, ("GCAD"), assessed against him pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §6672. The government counterclaimed for a total of $264,579 in unpaid assessments, penalties and interest for the fourth quarter of 1998 and the first three quarters of 1999. The motions have been fully briefed and the matter is ripe for disposition. Because there has been no consent, I must address the motions by way of a recommendation. For the following reasons, it will be recommended that the court grant Defendant's motion for summary judgment and deny Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.




II. Discussion



A. Summary Judgment Standard


Summary judgment is appropriate when there exists no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Zahodnick v. International Bus. Machs. Corp., 135 F.3d 911, 913 (4th Cir. 1997). The party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of initially coming forward and demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the moving party has met its burden, the non-moving party must then affirmatively demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact which requires trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). There is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party for a fact-finder to return a verdict for that party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986); Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert County, Md., 48 F.3d 810, 817 (4th Cir. 1995). Thus, the moving party can bear his burden either by presenting affirmative evidence or by demonstrating that the non-moving party's evidence is insufficient to establish his claim. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 331 (Brennan, J., dissenting). When making the summary judgment determination the court must view the evidence, and all justifiable inferences from the evidence, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Zahodnick, 135 F.3d at 913; Halperin v. Abacus Tech. Corp., 128 F.3d 191, 196 (4th Cir. 1997).


B. Liability under 26 U.S.C. §6672


Federal law requires that employers withhold from their employees' paychecks their shares of federal social security taxes and income taxes. See 26 U.S.C. §§3102(a) and 3402(a). The employer holds the withheld taxes `in trust' for the United States and must pay them over to the government on a regular basis. If an employer withholds the taxes from its employees but fails to remit them, the government must nevertheless credit the employees for having paid the taxes and seek the unpaid funds from the employer. The relevant statute, 26 U.S.C. §6672(a), provides:
Any person required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over any tax imposed by this title who willfully fails to collect such tax, or truthfully account for and pay over such tax, or willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any such tax or the payment thereof, shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be liable to a penalty equal to the total amount of the tax evaded, or not collected, or not accounted for and paid over.

Liability under section 6672, thus, requires proof that the actor (1) was a "responsible person" under a duty to collect, account for, and pay over trust fund taxes, and (2) willfully failed to discharge his duty. Turpin v. United States, 970 F.2d 1344, 1347 (4th Cir. 1992). A party is not presumed to be a "responsible person," however, merely on the basis of his title. See O'Connor v. United States, 956 F.2d 48, 51 (4th Cir. 1992) (titular authority is not sufficient; substance of circumstances must demonstrate that officer exercises and uses authority over financial affairs or is under a duty to do so.) The Fourth Circuit has stated that, in determining responsibility under section 6672, the "crucial inquiry [is] whether the person had the effective power to pay taxes - that is, whether he had the actual authority or ability, in view of his status within the corporation, to pay taxes owed." Plett v. United States, 185 F.3d 216, 219 (4th Cir. 1999) (quoting Barnett v. I.R.S., 988 F.2d 1449, 1455 (5th Cir. 1993)). Among the factors indicative of the requisite authority over the corporate taxpayer's finances or general decision making to qualify an individual as a "responsible person," are:
whether the employee (1) served as an officer of the company or as a member of its board of directors; (2) controlled the company's payroll; (3) determined which creditors to pay and when to pay them; (4) participated in the day-to-day management of the corporation; (5) possessed the power to write checks; and (6) had the ability to hire and fire employees.

Id. These factors are to be evaluated together; no single factor is dispositive or determinative of authority. Barnett, 988 F.2d at 1455. There can be more than one person in a corporation who qualifies as a "responsible person", Plett, 185 F.3d at 219, and section 6672 applies to all responsible persons, not just the most responsible person. Turnbull v. United States, 929 F.2d 173, 178 (5th Cir. 1991).

1. Responsible person

Crediting all factual assertions which favor Plaintiff, the court nonetheless concludes that as to who is the "responsible person" under 26 U.S.C. §6672, no genuine issue of material fact precludes summary judgment for the Government, and summary judgment is therefore appropriate.

Upon review of the substance of Plaintiff's authority within GCAD, and applying the Plett factors, it is clear and beyond genuine issue that Plaintiff had the authority to direct that the tax payments be made. Concrete indications of Plaintiff's authority include the fact that he was involved in most, if not all, of the major decisions regarding GCAD, including lease negotiations, and hiring of the management team and the accountants who performed services for GCAD. In fact, all but one of the Plett factors go in the Government's favor.

a. Board of Directors

While an individual's title is not necessarily determinative, it is a factor to be considered. O'Connor, 956 F.2d at 50. Plaintiff here was a founder, shareholder and officer of GCAD. He started as a one-third shareholder, but by 2000 he owned 100 percent of the GCAD stock. He also served as Secretary and Treasurer during the entire period, and as Vice-President in the late 1990s and President as of February 1, 2000. This factor clearly favors the Government's position that Plaintiff was a "responsible person."

b. Control of company payroll

Plaintiff admits that, on several occasions, he and the other shareholders attempted to infuse capital into the corporation to pay the delinquent payroll taxes. In fact, Plaintiff admits that when he "learned that the Light Brothers had not satisfied [the withholding tax] obligations the shareholders raised capital and remitted $150,000 to the Light Brothers, expressly instructing the Light Brothers to cure the tax deficiency." (Plaintiff's memo in support of s.j. 12). Clearly, then, Plaintiff viewed himself (together with the other shareholders) to be responsible for payment of the payroll taxes and further had the authority to order that the taxes be paid. There is no evidence that Plaintiff himself personally oversaw the payroll, but there is evidence that he participated in the decision to hire the accountants who took care of the day-to-day payroll operations. Moreover, in late 1999, Plaintiff put his own management company, Chelda, in charge of GCAD's accounting functions, including payroll and withholding tax matters. (Pl. dep. 212.)

c. Payment of creditors

The evidence also shows that Plaintiff had decision-making authority over which creditors would be paid. He signed personal guarantees to several food vendors, ensuring that those bills would be paid. In his deposition, Plaintiff admitted that lease payments and food vendors were paid out of gross receipts which were available even in 2000 to pay down the tax delinquency. Barry Light, one of GCAD's accountants, testified that Plaintiff regularly gave instructions as to which creditors should be paid, and at one point at the end of 1998, Plaintiff and Coggin instructed Light to pay rents and expenses "but nothing on the taxes." (Barry Light dep. 78). While Plaintiff may not have exercised his authority on a daily basis, he clearly had the power to direct which payments were made and when they would be made.

d. Participation in day-to-day management

Plaintiff was involved in many facets of the GCAD operations from its startup in 1994 to the close of business in 2001. Plaintiff participated in the hiring and firing of GCAD's managers and accountants. He also participated in decisions regarding restaurant locations, negotiation of leases and other contracts, and personally guaranteed payments to food vendors so that they would extend credit to GCAD. In addition, Plaintiff admits that he reviewed weekly sales figures and monthly financial statements and visited the GCAD restaurants and met with the restaurant managers. According to Barry Light, daily sales figures for each store were faxed to Plaintiff and Coggin every day. (Barry Light dep. 68.) In fact, Barry Light and Pintner regarded Plaintiff's involvement to be on a daily basis. (Pintner dep. 33-34; Barry Light dep. 68.) Pintner testified that he "didn't do anything without [Coggin and Plaintiff's] awareness." (Pintner dep. 33.) Plaintiff testified that he reviewed the federal income tax returns for GCAD. (Pl. dep. 124.) Plaintiff clearly was more than a "passive investor" in GCAD. His participation in the operations of the corporation qualifies him as a responsible person.

e. Check-writing authority

There is no evidence in the record that Plaintiff had authority to write or sign checks on behalf of GCAD. Nevertheless, it is clear that, in light of his many roles in the corporation, he had the authority to direct checks be written and expenses be paid, and that he in fact exercised that authority on many occasions.

f. Hiring/firing authority

The final Plett factor is whether the individual had the authority to hire and fire employees. Plaintiff was actively involved in the hiring and firing of Markley, Pugal, Pintner, and the Light Brothers, all of whom were management employees or, in the case of the Light Brothers, individuals performing professional services to GCAD. There is no evidence that Plaintiff was involved in the hiring and/or firing of the individual restaurant managers or employees, but his participation in the hiring of the corporate managers clearly shows that he had authority over employment decisions.

In analyzing these factors, the court is cognizant that no one factor is controlling, and, indeed, that the salient, deciding point is whether Plaintiff had the effective power to see that the taxes were paid. The evidence clearly shows that Plaintiff had that power, stemming from his actual authority and ability, in view of his status as a founder, director, officer and shareholder and his day-to-day involvement in GCAD. Simply because Plaintiff may not have been present on a daily basis does not change the fact that at any point, by virtue of his authority, Plaintiff could have had substantial input into financial decisions of the corporation, and in fact, on numerous occasions he exercised that authority. Based upon the evidence set forth, supra, Plaintiff clearly falls within the parameters of a "responsible person" under section 6672. 8

2. Willfulness

To determine whether a responsible person "willfully" failed to collect, account for or remit payroll taxes to the United States, the court must "inquire whether the `responsible person' had `knowledge of nonpayment or reckless disregard of whether the payments were being made.' " Plett, 185 F.3d at 219 (citing Turpin, 970 F.2d at 1347). A responsible person's intentional preference of other creditors over the United States with knowledge of the nonpayment of payroll taxes establishes his willfulness as a matter of law. Plett, 185 F.3d at 219; United States v. Pomponio, 635 F.2d 293, 298 (4th Cir. 1980). An intentional preference is shown by establishing that the responsible person knew of or recklessly disregarded the existence of an unpaid payroll tax deficiency. Plett, 185 F.3d at 219; Turpin, 970 F.2d at 1347. One way in which willfulness may be established is to show that the responsible person made a "voluntary, conscious and intentional decision to prefer other creditors over the Government." Greenberg v. United States, 46 F.3d 239, 244 (3rd Cir. 1994).

Plaintiff asserts that because he was relying on "seasoned professional" accountants, he "had no reason to think that GCAD's IRS obligations were not being satisfied." (Pl. memo in support of s.j. 18). By the end of 1998, however, Plaintiff knew or had strong reason to know that GCAD was undergoing a financial crisis. In fact, in December 1998 Plaintiff learned that the Light Brothers had failed to make payroll tax deposits for a prior quarter. Plaintiff then made capital contributions and "strongly admonished" the Light Brothers to make timely tax payments in the future. His failure to monitor the situation after first becoming aware of the Light Brothers' actions is simply indefensible.

Even assuming, as Plaintiff claims, that he was not aware of the tax deficiencies until August 1999, his actions after that period show willfulness. During the third quarter of 1999, GCAD's payroll tax liability increased by $163,000, yet the corporation only made two tax deposits totaling $7,118.24. Thus, the withholding tax deficiency at the end of the third quarter of 1999 was over $150,000. Plaintiff made a capital contribution of $50,000, but GCAD still owed over $100,000 for that quarter. Moreover, prior deficiencies from 1998 and the first two quarters of 1999 were not satisfied. During this entire period, however, other creditors were paid and substantial sales revenues were generated. To be sure, GCAD was struggling financially; Plaintiff asserts that rents and expenses were paid just to keep the doors open. Nevertheless, as the court noted in Greenberg, "[i]t is no defense that the corporation was in financial distress and that funds were spent to keep the corporation in business with the expectation that sufficient revenue would later become available to pay the United States." 46 F.3d at 244. It must also be noted that Plaintiff himself raised funds to pay the first tax deficiencies. At the very least, at that point, and as an officer and shareholder of the company actively involved in many corporate decisions, Plaintiff was on notice that tax liability was an issue which might again be a problem in the future and that it was critical to stay on top of the matter and prevent future tax delinquency. After all, "the government cannot be made an unwilling partner in a business experiencing financial difficulties." Thibodeau v. United States, 828 F.2d 1499, 1506 (11th Cir. 1987).

Although not yet addressed by the Fourth Circuit, courts in other circuits have held that even if a "responsible person" is unaware that withholding taxes have gone unpaid in past quarters, a responsible person who becomes aware that taxes have gone unpaid in past quarters in which he was also a responsible person, is under a duty to use all "unencumbered funds" available to the corporation to pay those back taxes. See Thosteson v. United States, 331 F.3d 1294, 1300-01 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Kim, 111 F.3d 1351, 1357 (7th Cir. 1997); Honey v. United States, 963 F.2d 1083, 1089 (8th Cir. 1992); Mazo v. United States, 591 F.2d 1151, 1157 (5th Cir. 1979). This duty extends not only to funds available to the corporation at the time the responsible person becomes aware, but also to any unencumbered funds acquired thereafter. Thosteson, 331 F.3d 1294. As explained by the Eleventh Circuit:
If the responsible person fails to use such unencumbered funds to satisfy the past unpaid liability, he is deemed personally liable for the taxes that went unpaid in the past while he was responsible. The responsible person deemed liable for the unpaid liability of past tax quarters is considered to have "willfully" failed to pay over the taxes for those past quarters, even though he was unaware at that time that the taxes were going unpaid.

Thosteson, 331 F.3d at 1301. Plaintiff was under a duty to reduce GCAD's accrued tax liability with funds acquired after the taxes had been withheld and the funds, presumably, were dissipated. Thus, once Plaintiff was made aware of the unpaid tax liability, payments made to creditors other than the IRS constituted willful violations of section 6672.

Plaintiff, relying on Turpin v. United States, 970 F.2d 1344 (4th Cir. 1992), argues that his knowledge of GCAD's past tax deficiency "does not, as a matter of law, establish that he acted willfully with respect to the next deficiency." (Pl. memo. in resp. to def. m.s.j. 16-17). Plaintiff's reliance on Turpin, however, is misplaced, because the plaintiff in that case was found, by a jury, to have neither known of nor to have recklessly disregarded the corporation's tax deficiency. Plaintiff here clearly knew of the tax deficiency as of August 1999, and there is evidence that GCAD generated over $5 million in gross receipts after that date. These funds were used to pay other creditors, including landlords and food vendors, together with employee wages, while the tax deficiencies remained unpaid. Moreover, even after the initial deficiencies were brought to Plaintiff's attention, he continued to entrust the financial management of the corporation to the Light Brothers, whom he knew to be unreliable. Under these facts, Plaintiff's reckless disregard demonstrates willfulness as a matter of law for the purposes of summary judgment.


III. Conclusion


Because Plaintiff is a responsible person under section 6672 and he willfully failed to pay withheld taxes to the IRS, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the motion of the United States for summary judgment (doc. no. 45) be GRANTED and Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (doc. no. 46) be DENIED .

1 Plaintiff filed an action seeking a refund of tax penalties and related interest assessed to him under 26 U.S.C. §6672. Because the reasoning of the Magistrate Judge's Recommended decision applies equally to the claims by Plaintiff Erwin against the United States and the counterclaims by the United States against Plaintiff Erwin, and because the Magistrate Judge recommended granting the United States' Motion for Summary Judgment in its entirety, all of Plaintiff Erwin's claims against the United States will be dismissed.

Labels:

Monday, April 7, 2008

Amended "tax lien release" and "tax lien discharge" regulations



[ TD 9378]

RIN 1545-BE35

Release of Lien or Discharge of Property
AGENCY: Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Treasury.

ACTION: Final regulations and removal of temporary regulations.

SUMMARY: This document contains final regulations related to release of lien and discharge of property under sections 6325, 6503, and 7426 of the Internal Revenue Code (Code). These regulations update existing regulations and contain procedures for processing a request made by a property owner for discharge of a Federal tax lien from his property under section 6325(b)(4). The regulations also clarify the impact of these procedures on sections 6503(f)(2) and 7426(a)(4) and (b)(5). These regulations reflect the enactment of sections 6325(b)(4), 6503(f)(2), and 7426(a)(4) by the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998.

DATES: Effective Date: These regulations are effective January 31, 2008.

Applicability Date: These regulations apply to any release of lien or discharge of property that is requested after January 31, 2008.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Debra A. Kohn, (202) 622-7985 (not a toll-free number).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:



Background

This document contains final regulations that amend the Procedure and Administration Regulations (26 CFR part 301) under sections 6325, 6503, and 7426 of the Code. The IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Public Law 105-206 (112 Stat. 685) (RRA 1998), enacted sections 6325(b)(4), 6503(f)(2), 7426(a)(4), and 7426(a)(5) to provide a statutory mechanism for a person other than the person against whom the underlying tax was assessed, upon furnishing a deposit or bond, to obtain a discharge of the Federal tax lien from property owned by him, and for the IRS or the courts to determine the disposition of the deposit or bond amount. RRA 1998 thereby necessitated changes to the rules under sections 6325, 6503, and 7426.

On January 11, 2007, a notice of proposed rulemaking (REG-159444-04) relating to release of lien or discharge of property was published in the Federal Register (72 FR 1301-03). No comments were received and no public hearing was requested or held. Accordingly, the proposed regulations are adopted as amended by this Treasury decision. These final regulations generally retain the provisions of the proposed regulations but include one modification as explained in more detail below.



Explanation of Modification

The final regulations differ substantively in one respect from the version of the regulations set forth in the notice of proposed rulemaking. The proposed regulations interpret section 6325(b)(4)(D), which states that section 6325(b)(4)(A) is inapplicable "if the owner of the property is the person whose unsatisfied liability gave rise to the lien," as indicating that the procedures for obtaining a discharge of a Federal tax lien under section 6325(b)(4) are not available to a person who owns the subject property with the person whose tax liability gave rise to the lien (the taxpayer). Upon further consideration of this issue, it was decided that section 6235(b)(4)(D) should not be so interpreted, as that interpretation would unfairly leave some third-party property owners without a means to discharge Federal tax liens from their properties. Accordingly, the final regulations reflect an interpretation of section 6325(b)(4)(D) that makes the section 6325(b)(4) procedures available to a person who co-owns property with the taxpayer.



Special Analyses

It has been determined that this Treasury decision is not a significant regulatory action as defined in Executive Order 12866. Therefore, a regulatory assessment is not required. It also has been determined that section 553(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. chapter 5) does not apply to these regulations, and because these regulations do not impose collection of information on small entities, the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. chapter 6) does not apply. Pursuant to section 7805(f) of the Code, the notice of proposed rulemaking preceding these regulations was submitted to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration for comment on its impact on small business.



Drafting Information

The principal author of these regulations is Debra A. Kohn of the Office of the Associate Chief Counsel (Procedure and Administration).



List of Subjects

26 CFR Part 301

Employment taxes, Estate taxes, Excise taxes, Gift taxes, Income taxes, Penalties, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

26 CFR Part 401

Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Taxes.

Adoption of Amendments to the Regulations

Accordingly, under the authority of 26 U.S.C. 7805, 26 CFR parts 301 and 401 are amended as follows:

PART 301 --PROCEDURE AND ADMINISTRATION

Paragraph 1. The authority citation for part 301 continues to read, in part, as follows:

Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805 * * *

Par. 2. Section 301.6325-1 is amended as follows:

1. Paragraphs (a) and (b)(1)(i), (b)(2)(i), and (b)(2)(ii) and (b)(3) are revised.

2. Paragraph (b)(2)(iii) is redesignated as paragraph (b)(6) and revised.

3. Paragraph (b)(4) is redesignated as paragraph (b)(5) and revised.

4. A new paragraph (b)(4) is added.

5. Paragraphs (c)(1) and (c)(2) are amended by removing the language "district director" and adding the language "appropriate official" in its place, wherever it appears.

6. The first sentence of paragraph (d)(1) is amended by removing the language "A district director" and adding the language "The appropriate official" in its place, by removing the word "Code" and adding the language "Internal Revenue Code" in its place, and by removing the language "the district director" and adding the language "the appropriate official" in its place. The third sentence is amended by removing the language "a district director" and adding the language "the appropriate official" in its place, and removing the language "the district director" and adding "the appropriate official" in its place.

7. Paragraph (d)(2)(i) is amended by removing the language "A district director" and adding the language "The appropriate official" in its place, by removing the word "Code" and adding the language "Internal Revenue Code" in its place, and by removing the language "the district director" and adding the language "the appropriate official" in its place.

8. Paragraph (d)(2)(ii), Examples 1 through 4, are amended by removing the language "district director" and adding the language "appropriate official" in its place, wherever it appears.

9. Paragraphs (d)(3) and (d)(4) are amended by removing the language "district director" and adding the language "appropriate official" in its place, wherever it appears.

10. The first sentence of paragraph (e) is amended by removing the language "a district director" and adding the language "the appropriate official" in its place, and by removing the language "the district director" and adding the language "the appropriate official" in its place. The third and fourth sentences are amended by removing the language "district director" and adding the language "appropriate official" in its place.

11. Paragraphs (f)(1) and (f)(2)(i) are amended by removing the language "a district director" and adding the language "the appropriate official" in its place, paragraph (f)(2)(i)(b) is amended by removing the language "the district director" and adding the language "the appropriate official" in its place, and paragraph (f)(3) is amended by removing the word "Code" and adding the language "Internal Revenue Code" in its place.

12. Paragraphs (h) and (i) are added.

The revisions and additions read as follows:



§301.6325-1 Release of lien or discharge of property.

(a) Release of lien --(1) Liability satisfied or unenforceable. The appropriate official shall issue a certificate of release for a filed notice of Federal tax lien, no later than 30 days after the date on which he finds that the entire tax liability listed in such notice of Federal tax lien either has been fully satisfied (as defined in paragraph (a)(4) of this section) or has become legally unenforceable. In all cases, the liability for the payment of the tax continues until satisfaction of the tax in full or until the expiration of the statutory period for collection, including such extension of the period for collection as is agreed to.

(2) Bond accepted. The appropriate official shall issue a certificate of release of any tax lien if he is furnished and accepts a bond that is conditioned upon the payment of the amount assessed (together with all interest in respect thereof), within the time agreed upon in the bond, but not later than 6 months before the expiration of the statutory period for collection, including any agreed upon extensions. For provisions relating to bonds, see sections 7101 and 7102 and §§301.7101-1 and 301.7102-1.

(3) Certificate of release for a lien which has become legally unenforceable. The appropriate official shall have the authority to file a notice of Federal tax lien which also contains a certificate of release pertaining to those liens which become legally unenforceable. Such release will become effective as a release as of a date prescribed in the document containing the notice of Federal tax lien and certificate of release.

(4) Satisfaction of tax liability. For purposes of paragraph (a)(1) of this section, satisfaction of the tax liability occurs when --

(i) The appropriate official determines that the entire tax liability listed in a notice of Federal tax lien has been fully satisfied. Such determination will be made as soon as practicable after tender of payment; or

(ii) The taxpayer provides the appropriate official with proof of full payment (as defined in paragraph (a)(5) of this section) with respect to the entire tax liability listed in a notice of Federal tax lien together with the information and documents set forth in paragraph (a)(7) of this section. See paragraph (a)(6) of this section if more than one tax liability is listed in a notice of Federal tax lien.

(5) Proof of full payment. As used in paragraph (a)(4)(ii) of this section, the term proof of full payment means --

(i) An internal revenue cashier's receipt reflecting full payment of the tax liability in question;

(ii) A canceled check in an amount sufficient to satisfy the tax liability for which the release is being sought;

(iii) A record, made in accordance with procedures prescribed by the Commissioner, of proper payment of the tax liability by credit or debit card or by electronic funds transfer; or

(iv) Any other manner of proof acceptable to the appropriate official.

(6) Notice of a Federal tax lien which lists multiple liabilities. When a notice of Federal tax lien lists multiple tax liabilities, the appropriate official shall issue a certificate of release when all of the tax liabilities listed in the notice of Federal tax lien have been fully satisfied or have become legally unenforceable. In addition, if the taxpayer requests that a certificate of release be issued with respect to one or more tax liabilities listed in the notice of Federal tax lien and such liability has been fully satisfied or has become legally unenforceable, the appropriate official shall issue a certificate of release. For example, if a notice of Federal tax lien lists two separate liabilities and one of the liabilities is satisfied, the taxpayer may request the issuance of a certificate of release with respect to the satisfied tax liability and the appropriate official shall issue a release.

(7) Taxpayer requests. A request for a certificate of release with respect to a notice of Federal tax lien shall be submitted in writing to the appropriate official. The request shall contain the information required in the appropriate IRS Publication.

(b) Discharge of specific property from the lien --(1) Property double the amount of the liability. (i) The appropriate official may, in his discretion, issue a certificate of discharge of any part of the property subject to a Federal tax lien imposed under chapter 64 of the Internal Revenue Code if he determines that the fair market value of that part of the property remaining subject to the Federal tax lien is at least double the sum of the amount of the unsatisfied liability secured by the Federal tax lien and of the amount of all other liens upon the property which have priority over the Federal tax lien. In general, fair market value is that amount which one ready and willing but not compelled to buy would pay to another ready and willing but not compelled to sell the property.

* * * * *

(2) Part payment; interest of United States valueless --(i) Part payment. The appropriate official may, in his discretion, issue a certificate of discharge of any part of the property subject to a Federal tax lien imposed under chapter 64 of the Internal Revenue Code if there is paid over to him in partial satisfaction of the liability secured by the Federal tax lien an amount determined by him to be not less than the value of the interest of the United States in the property to be so discharged. In determining the amount to be paid, the appropriate official will take into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the case, including the expenses to which the government has been put into the matter. In no case shall the amount to be paid be less than the value of the interest of the United States in the property with respect to which the certificate of discharge is to be issued.

(ii) Interest of the United States valueless. The appropriate official may, in his discretion, issue a certificate of discharge of any part of the property subject to the Federal tax lien if he determines that the interest of the United States in the property to be so discharged has no value.

(3) Discharge of property by substitution of proceeds of sale. The appropriate official may, in his discretion, issue a certificate of discharge of any part of the property subject to a Federal tax lien imposed under chapter 64 of the Internal Revenue Code if such part of the property is sold and, pursuant to a written agreement with the appropriate official, the proceeds of the sale are held, as a fund subject to the Federal tax liens and claims of the United States, in the same manner and with the same priority as the Federal tax liens or claims had with respect to the discharged property. This paragraph does not apply unless the sale divests the taxpayer of all right, title, and interest in the property sought to be discharged. Any reasonable and necessary expenses incurred in connection with the sale of the property and the administration of the sale proceeds shall be paid by the applicant or from the proceeds of the sale before satisfaction of any Federal tax liens or claims of the United States.

(4) Right of substitution of value --(i) Issuance of certificate of discharge to property owner who is not the taxpayer. If an owner of property subject to a Federal tax lien imposed under chapter 64 of the Internal Revenue Code submits an application for a certificate of discharge pursuant to paragraph (b)(5) of this section, the appropriate official shall issue a certificate of discharge of such property after the owner either deposits with the appropriate official an amount equal to the value of the interest of the United States in the property, as determined by the appropriate official pursuant to paragraph (b)(6) of this section, or furnishes an acceptable bond in a like amount. This paragraph does not apply if the person seeking the discharge is the person whose unsatisfied liability gave rise to the Federal tax lien. Thus, if the property is owned by both the taxpayer and another person, the other person may obtain a certificate of discharge of the property under this paragraph, but the taxpayer may not.

(ii) Refund of deposit and release of bond. The appropriate official may, in his discretion, determine that either the entire unsatisfied tax liability listed on the notice of Federal tax lien can be satisfied from a source other than the property sought to be discharged, or the value of the interest in the United States is less than the prior determination of such value. The appropriate official shall refund the amount deposited with interest at the overpayment rate determined under section 6621 or release the bond furnished to the extent that he makes this determination.

(iii) Refund request. If a property owner desires an administrative refund of his deposit or release of the bond, the owner shall file a request in writing with the appropriate official. The request shall contain such information as the appropriate IRS Publication may require. The request must be filed within 120 days after the date the certificate of discharge is issued. A refund request made under this paragraph neither is required nor is effective to extend the period for filing an action in court under section 7426(a)(4).

(iv) Internal Revenue Service's use of deposit if court action not filed. If no action is filed under section 7426(a)(4) for refund of the deposit or release of the bond within the 120-day period specified therein, the appropriate official shall, within 60 days after the expiration of the 120-day period, apply the amount deposited or collect on such bond to the extent necessary to satisfy the liability listed on the notice of Federal tax lien, and shall refund, with interest at the overpayment rate determined under section 6621, any portion of the amount deposited that is not used to satisfy the liability. If the appropriate official has not completed the application of the deposit to the unsatisfied liability before the end of the 60-day period, the deposit will be deemed to have been applied to the unsatisfied liability as of the 60th day.

(5) Application for certificate of discharge. Any person desiring a certificate of discharge under this paragraph (b) shall submit an application in writing to the appropriate official. The application shall contain the information required by the appropriate IRS Publication. For purposes of this paragraph (b), any application for certificate of discharge made by a property owner who is not the taxpayer, and any amount submitted pursuant to the application, will be treated as an application for discharge and a deposit under section 6325(b)(4) unless the owner of the property submits a statement, in writing, that the application is being submitted under another paragraph of section 6325 and not under section 6325(b)(4), and the owner in writing waives the rights afforded under paragraph (b)(4), including the right to seek judicial review.

(6) Valuation of interest of United States. For purposes of paragraphs (b)(2) and (b)(4) of this section, in determining the value of the interest of the United States in the property, or any part thereof, with respect to which the certificate of discharge is to be issued, the appropriate official shall give consideration to the value of the property and the amount of all liens and encumbrances thereon having priority over the Federal tax lien. In determining the value of the property, the appropriate official may, in his discretion, give consideration to the forced sale value of the property in appropriate cases.

* * * * *

(h) As used in this section, the term appropriate official means either the official or office identified in the relevant IRS Publication or, if such official or office is not so identified, the Secretary or his delegate.

(i) Effective/applicability date. This section applies to any release of lien or discharge of property that is requested after January 31, 2008.

Par. 3. Section 301.6503(f)-1 is amended as follows:

1. The section heading is revised.

2. The undesignated paragraph is designated as paragraph (a), a paragraph heading is added, and a new sentence is added immediately prior to the Example.

3. In newly designated paragraph (a), the language "a district director" is removed and the language "the appropriate official" is added in its place, the language "the district director" is removed and the language "the appropriate official" is added in its place, and in the Example the language "district director" is removed and the language "appropriate official" is added in its place, wherever it appears.

4. Paragraphs (b), (c), and (d) are added.

The revisions and additions read as follows:



§301.6503(f)-1 Suspension of running of period of limitation; wrongful seizure of property of third-party owner and discharge of lien for substitution of value.

(a) Wrongful seizure. * * * The following example illustrates the principles of this section:

* * * * *

(b) Discharge of wrongful lien for substitution of value. If a person other than the taxpayer submits a request in writing for a certificate of discharge for a filed Federal tax lien under section 6325(b)(4), the running of the period of limitations on collection after assessment under section 6502 for any liability listed in such notice of Federal tax lien shall be suspended for a period equal to the period beginning on the date the appropriate official receives a deposit or bond in the amount specified in §301.6325-1(b)(4)(i) and ending on the date that is 30 days after the earlier of --

(1) The date the appropriate official no longer holds, or is deemed to no longer hold, within the meaning of paragraph (b)(4)(iv) of this section, any amount as a deposit or bond by reason of taking such actions as prescribed in sections 6325(b)(4)(B) and (C); or

(2) The date the judgment secured under section 7426(b)(5) becomes final.

(c) As used in this section, the term appropriate official means either the official or office identified in the relevant IRS Publication or, if such official or office is not so identified, the Secretary or his delegate.

(d) Effective/applicability date. This section applies to any request for a certificate of discharge made after January 31, 2008.

Par. 4. In §301.7426-1, paragraphs (a)(4), (b)(5), and (d) are added.



§301.7426-1 Civil actions by persons other than taxpayers.

(a) * * *

(4) Substitution of value. A person who obtains a certificate of discharge under section 6325(b)(4) with respect to any property may, within 120 days after the day on which the certificate is issued, bring a civil action against the United States in a district court of the United States for a determination of whether the value of the interest of the United States (if any) in such property is less than the value determined by the appropriate official. A civil action under this provision shall be the exclusive judicial remedy for a person other than the taxpayer who obtains a certificate of discharge for a filed notice of Federal tax lien.

(b) * * *

(5) Substitution of value. If the court determines that the determination by the appropriate official of the value of the interest of the United States in the property exceeds the actual value of such interest, the court may grant a judgment ordering a refund of the amount deposited, or a release of the bond, to the extent that the aggregate of those amounts exceeds the value as determined by the court.

* * * * *

(d) Paragraphs (a)(4) and (b)(5) of this section apply to any request for a certificate of discharge made after January 31, 2008.

PART 401 --[REMOVED]

Par. 5. Part 401 is removed.

Linda E. Stiff,

Deputy Commissioner for Services and Enforcement.

Approved: January 9, 2008.

Eric Solomon,

Assistant Secretary of the Treasury (Tax Policy).

SEC. 6325. RELEASE OF LIEN OR DISCHARGE OF PROPERTY.
6325(a) RELEASE OF LIEN. --Subject to such regulations as the Secretary may prescribe, the Secretary shall issue a certificate of release of any lien imposed with respect to any internal revenue tax not later than 30 days after the day on which --

6325(a)(1) LIABILITY SATISFIED OR UNENFORCEABLE. --The Secretary finds that the liability for the amount assessed, together with all interest in respect thereof, has been fully satisfied or has become legally unenforceable; or

6325(a)(2) BOND ACCEPTED. --There is furnished to the Secretary and accepted by him a bond that is conditioned upon the payment of the amount assessed, together with all interest in respect thereof, within the time prescribed by law (including any extension of such time), and that is in accordance with such requirements relating to terms, conditions, and form of the bond and sureties thereon, as may be specified by such regulations.

6325(b) DISCHARGE OF PROPERTY. --

6325(b)(1) PROPERTY DOUBLE THE AMOUNT OF THE LIABILITY. --Subject to such regulations as the Secretary may prescribe, the Secretary may issue a certificate of discharge of any part of the property subject to any lien imposed under this chapter if the Secretary finds that the fair market value of that part of such property remaining subject to the lien is at least double the amount of the unsatisfied liability secured by such lien and the amount of all other liens upon such property which have priority over such lien.

6325(b)(2) PART PAYMENT; INTEREST OF UNITED STATES VALUELESS. --Subject to such regulations as the Secretary may prescribe, the Secretary may issue a certificate of discharge of any part of the property subject to the lien if --

6325(b)(2)(A) there is paid over to the Secretary in partial satisfaction of the liability secured by the lien an amount determined by the Secretary, which shall not be less than the value, as determined by the Secretary, of the interest of the United States in the part to be so discharged, or

6325(b)(2)(B) the Secretary determines at any time that the interest of the United States in the part to be so discharged has no value.

In determining the value of the interest of the United States in the part to be so discharged, the Secretary shall give consideration to the value of such part and to such liens thereon as have priority over the lien of the United States.

6325(b)(3) SUBSTITUTION OF PROCEEDS OF SALE. --Subject to such regulations as the Secretary may prescribe, the Secretary may issue a certificate of discharge of any part of the property subject to the lien if such part of the property is sold and, pursuant to an agreement with the Secretary, the proceeds of such sale are to be held, as a fund subject to the liens and claims of the United States, in the same manner and with the same priority as such liens and claims had with respect to the discharged property.

6325(b)(4) RIGHT OF SUBSTITUTION OF VALUE. --

6325(b)(4)(A) IN GENERAL. --At the request of the owner of any property subject to any lien imposed by this chapter, the Secretary shall issue a certificate of discharge of such property if such owner --

6325(b)(4)(A)(i) deposits with the Secretary an amount of money equal to the value of the interest of the United States (as determined by the Secretary) in the property; or

6325(b)(4)(A)(ii) furnishes a bond acceptable to the Secretary in a like amount.

6325(b)(4)(B) REFUND OF DEPOSIT WITH INTEREST AND RELEASE OF BOND. --The Secretary shall refund the amount so deposited (and shall pay interest at the overpayment rate under section 6621), and shall release such bond, to the extent that the Secretary determines that --

6325(b)(4)(B)(i) the unsatisfied liability giving rise to the lien can be satisfied from a source other than such property; or

6325(b)(4)(B)(ii) the value of the interest of the United States in the property is less than the Secretary's prior determination of such value.

6325(b)(4)(C) USE OF DEPOSIT, ETC., IF ACTION TO CONTEST LIEN NOT FILED. --If no action is filed under section 7426(a)(4) within the period prescribed therefor, the Secretary shall, within 60 days after the expiration of such period --

6325(b)(4)(C)(i) apply the amount deposited, or collect on such bond, to the extent necessary to satisfy the unsatisfied liability secured by the lien; and

6325(b)(4)(C)(ii) refund (with interest as described in subparagraph (B)) any portion of the amount deposited which is not used to satisfy such liability.

6325(b)(4)(D) EXCEPTION. --Subparagraph (A) shall not apply if the owner of the property is the person whose unsatisfied liability gave rise to the lien.

6325(c) ESTATE OR GIFT TAX. --Subject to such regulations as the Secretary may prescribe, the Secretary may issue a certificate of discharge of any or all of the property subject to any lien imposed by section 6324 if the Secretary finds that the liability secured by such lien has been fully satisfied or provided for.

6325(d) SUBORDINATION OF LIEN. --Subject to such regulations as the Secretary may prescribe, the Secretary may issue a certificate of subordination of any lien imposed by this chapter upon any part of the property subject to such lien if --

6325(d)(1) there is paid over to the Secretary an amount equal to the amount of the lien or interest to which the certificate subordinates the lien of the United States,

6325(d)(2) the Secretary believes that the amount realizable by the United States from the property to which the certificate relates, or from any other property subject to the lien, will ultimately be increased by reason of the issuance of such certificate and that the ultimate collection of the tax liability will be facilitated by such subordination, or

6325(d)(3) in the case of any lien imposed by section 6324B, if the Secretary determines that the United States will be adequately secured after such subordination.

6325(e) NONATTACHMENT OF LIEN. --If the Secretary determines that, because of confusion of names or otherwise, any person (other than the person against whom the tax was assessed) is or may be injured by the appearance that a notice of lien filed under section 6323 refers to such person, the Secretary may issue a certificate that the lien does not attach to the property of such person.

6325(f) EFFECT OF CERTIFICATE. --

6325(f)(1) CONCLUSIVENESS. --Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3), if a certificate is issued pursuant to this section by the Secretary and is filed in the same office as the notice of lien to which it relates (if such notice of lien has been filed) such certificate shall have the following effect:

6325(f)(1)(A) in the case of a certificate of release, such certificate shall be conclusive that the lien referred to in such certificate is extinguished;

6325(f)(1)(B) in the case of a certificate of discharge, such certificate shall be conclusive that the property covered by such certificate is discharged from the lien;

6325(f)(1)(C) in the case of a certificate of subordination, such certificate shall be conclusive that the lien or interest to which the lien of the United States is subordinated is superior to the lien of the United States; and

6325(f)(1)(D) in the case of a certificate of nonattachment, such certificate shall be conclusive that the lien of the United States does not attach to the property of the person referred to in such certificate.

6325(f)(2) REVOCATION OF CERTIFICATE OF RELEASE OR NONATTACHMENT. --If the Secretary determines that a certificate of release or nonattachment of a lien imposed by section 6321 was issued erroneously or improvidently, or if a certificate of release of such lien was issued pursuant to a collateral agreement entered into in connection with a compromise under section 7122 which has been breached, and if the period of limitation on collection after assessment has not expired, the Secretary may revoke such certificate and reinstate the lien --

6325(f)(2)(A) by mailing notice of such revocation to the person against whom the tax was assessed at his last known address, and

6325(f)(2)(B) by filing notice of such revocation in the same office in which the notice of lien to which it relates was filed (if such notice of lien had been filed).

Such reinstated lien (i) shall be effective on the date notice of revocation is mailed to the taxpayer in accordance with the provisions of subparagraph (A), but not earlier than the date on which any required filing of notice of revocation is filed in accordance with the provisions of subparagraph (B), and (ii) shall have the same force and effect (as of such date), until the expiration of the period of limitation on collection after assessment, as a lien imposed by section 6321 (relating to lien for taxes).

6325(f)(3) CERTIFICATES VOID UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS. --Notwithstanding any other provision of this subtitle, any lien imposed by this chapter shall attach to any property with respect to which a certificate of discharge has been issued if the person liable for the tax reacquires such property after such certificate has been issued.

6325(g) FILING OF CERTIFICATES AND NOTICES. --If a certificate or notice issued pursuant to this section may not be filed in the office designated by State law in which the notice of lien imposed by section 6321 is filed, such certificate or notice shall be effective if filed in the office of the clerk of the United States district court for the judicial district in which such office is situated.

6325(h) CROSS REFERENCE. --

For provisions relating to bonds, see chapter 73 (sec. 7101 and following).

Labels:

Friday, April 4, 2008

Thomas Butti v. Commissioner.




The IRS abused its discretion by proceeding with the collection of a taxpayer's liabilities because it failed to show that it had issued a notice of deficiency before assessing the taxpayer's taxes.

The IRS relied on Postal Service Form 3877 to prove that the notice was issued. However, there was no proof offered by the Appeals officer that the notice he saw in the file was the final version of the notice, and his log indicated that the administrative file contained a default notice of deficiency.





Dkt. No. 11084-02L , TC Memo. 2008-82, April 3, 2008.


[Code Sec. 6330]

Assessment: Notice and demand: Notice of Deficiency: Abuse of discretion. --


MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION



COLVIN, Chief Judge: Respondent sent a Notice of Determination Concerning Collection Action(s) Under Section 63201 and/or 6330 to petitioner with respect to a proposed levy to collect petitioner's unpaid income taxes for tax years 1989, 1990, and 1999.2 Petitioner timely filed a petition seeking our review of respondent's determination.



The issue for decision is whether respondent's determination to collect tax from petitioner for tax years 1989 and 1990 was an abuse of discretion. We conclude that it was because, as discussed below, the record does not show that a notice of deficiency had been issued to petitioner with respect to those years.





FINDINGS OF FACT3




A. Petitioner


Petitioner was incarcerated in the Wyoming Correctional Facility, Attica, New York, when the petition was filed. He lived in the State of New York before and after he was incarcerated.



Before he was incarcerated, petitioner was a licensed chiropractor practicing in Yonkers, New York. On August 18, 1994, he pleaded guilty to offering a false instrument for filing in the first degree, insurance fraud in the second degree, grand larceny in the second degree, and attempted grand larceny in the third degree.




B. The Notice of Deficiency for 1989 and 1990


Respondent sent article No. Z 009 132 166 by certified mail to petitioner at the Gowanda Correctional Facility, P.O. Box 311, Gowanda, NY 14070 (Gowanda) and article No. Z 009 132 167 by certified mail to petitioner at 47 Malverne Road, Scarsdale, NY 10583, on December 30, 1998. Respondent recorded the mailing on a U.S. Postal Service Form 3877, Acceptance of Registered, Insured, C.O.D. and Certified Mail, or its equivalent, a certified mail list, which stated at the top: "Statutory Notice of Deficiency for the years indicated have been sent to the following taxpayers". Gowanda received that item on January 4, 1999. Petitioner was not housed at Gowanda from October 22, 1998, to January 20, 1999.



Gowanda maintained a log for mail pertaining to inmates' legal proceedings. Petitioner signed that log in order to receive two items of certified mail on January 21, 1999. The log does not state the certified mail numbers of the items he received. Petitioner received various articles of certified mail from respondent while he was incarcerated at Gowanda.




C. The Section 6330 Hearing


Respondent issued a Final Notice, Notice of Intent to Levy and Notice of Your Right to a Hearing, on November 8, 2000. In the final notice, respondent stated that petitioner owed $270,087.60 for 1989, $108,044.26 for 1990, and $5,507.84 for 1999.



On December 1, 2000, petitioner sent to respondent a Form 12153, Request for a Collection Due Process Hearing. Petitioner was incarcerated at the Wyoming Correctional Facility at that time. He attached an explanation in which he said he had not received the notice of deficiency and that he was not liable for tax in the amounts stated in the notice.



One of respondent's Appeals officers was assigned to petitioner's case on February 12, 2002. The Appeals officer kept an activity log for the case in which he said: (1) The case is very complex; (2) petitioner claims that he had no prior opportunity to contest the underlying liability and he did not receive the notice of deficiency; and (3) the "administrative file indicates that a defaulted * * * [notice of deficiency] is in [the administrative] file".



On May 1, 2002, the Appeals officer sent a letter to petitioner at the Wyoming Correctional Facility stating in part:



We scheduled the conference you requested on this case for * * * [9:30 a.m., May 21, 2002, at room 1137, 290 Broadway, New York, New York]. Please let me know within 10 days from the date of this letter whether this is convenient. If it is not, I will be glad to arrange another time.



Our meeting will be informal and you may present facts, arguments, and legal authority to support your position. If you plan to discuss new material, please send me copies at least five days before our meeting.



You should prepare statements of fact as affidavits, or sign them under penalties of perjury. * * *.



The Appeals officer knew that petitioner was incarcerated when he sent that letter. On May 15, 2002, petitioner wrote the following to the Appeals officer:



I received your May 1, 2002, correspondence affixed hereto, and I respond accordingly. I was transferred to the facility listed below and * * * Wyoming did not forward your correspondence expeditiously. Therefore, I apologize for the delayed response, but it is with just cause.



I commence by thanking you for scheduling a conference on this case. Unfortunately, I am faced with two challenges: (1) I am confined to solitary until July 16, 2002 and I do not have access to a telephone, legal documents, and/or transportation to even meet with you at this time. Furthermore and due to my indigency status as granted by both Federal and State courts, I am unable to retain an attorney, certified public accountant or person enrolled to practice before the Internal Revenue Service. I am currently petitioning a professional willing to assist pro bono.



* * * * * * * *



I humbly request a moratorium until I can either (1) access my complete file post July 16, 2002, (2) obtain a pro bono accountant or attorney or, (3) complete my due process right to a full and fair opportunity to appeal my criminal case. * * *.



Petitioner did not meet with the Appeals officer in New York on May 21, 2002. On that day, the Appeals officer wrote in his activity log that he had reviewed respondent's transcripts of account for petitioner's tax years 1989 and 1990, including Forms 4340, Certificate of Assessments, Payments, and Other Specified Matters, and concluded that respondent had followed administrative and procedural requirements.



The Appeals officer received and read petitioner's May 15, 2002, letter on May 22, 2002. Even though he told petitioner he would reschedule the hearing at petitioner's request, the Appeals officer did not do so. On June 4, 2002, respondent issued a Notice of Determination Concerning Collection Action(s) Under Section 6320 and/or 6330. In it, respondent determined that respondent's collection action with respect to petitioner's tax years 1989, 1990, and 1999 was proper.





OPINION




1. Procedural Background


In Butti v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-66, we held that respondent had not provided petitioner an opportunity for a hearing as required by section 6330(b) and that petitioner had not received a notice of deficiency and had no prior opportunity to dispute the underlying tax liability.



On April 10, 2006, we remanded this case to respondent to provide petitioner an opportunity for a hearing as required by section 6330(b). We also ordered the parties to provide status reports by July 7, 2006. By order dated October 18, 2006, the Court also required respondent to provide to petitioner so that petitioner would receive by October 20, 2006, copies of the notice of deficiency for 1989 and 1990 and Forms 4340 for those years. Respondent subsequently reported that (1) Respondent was unable to provide copies of the notices of deficiency issued to petitioner for 1989 and 1990 because the administrative files for those tax years are no longer available; and (2) respondent had provided petitioner with copies of Forms 4340 for 1989 and 1990 in September 2005, as part of the stipulation process before trial.




2. Requirement of Issuance of a Notice of Deficiency


The Secretary generally may not assess a deficiency in tax unless the Secretary has first mailed a notice of deficiency to the taxpayer.4 Sec. 6213(a).



Respondent does not contend that any of the statutory exceptions to issuing a notice of deficiency applies here. Thus, respondent may not proceed with collection unless respondent issued a notice of deficiency. See Manko v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 195, 200-201 (2006); Freije v. Commissioner, 125 T.C. 14, 34-37 (2005).




3. Whether Respondent Issued a Notice of Deficiency to Petitioner


Respondent contends that a notice of deficiency was issued to petitioner. We disagree.



Respondent bears the burden of proving by competent and persuasive evidence that the notice of deficiency was properly mailed. Coleman v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 82, 90 (1990); August v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1535, 1536-1537 (1970). The act of mailing may be proven by documentary evidence of mailing or by evidence of respondent's mailing practices corroborated by direct testimony. Coleman v. Commissioner, supra.



Where the existence of the notice of deficiency is not in dispute, a properly completed Form 3877 by itself is sufficient, absent evidence to the contrary, to establish that the notice was properly mailed to a taxpayer. United States v. Zolla, 724 F.2d 808, 810 (9th Cir. 1984); Coleman v. Commissioner, supra at 91. However, where, as here, the existence of the notice of deficiency is in dispute, we have previously rejected the Commissioner's reliance on the presumption of regularity based solely on the Form 3877 under circumstances similar to those present here. Pietanza v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 729 (1989), affd. without published opinion 935 F.2d 1282 (3d Cir. 1991); see also Koerner v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-144 (a Form 3877 does not by itself establish that the Commissioner mailed a notice of deficiency); cf. Spivey v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-29 (the Commissioner produced a copy of the notice of deficiency and witnesses described how notices of deficiency are produced and mailed), affd. 29 Fed. Appx. 575 (11th Cir. 2001).



Respondent contends that Pietanza is distinguishable; however, respondent has not shown that the facts present in this case differ in any material way from those in Pietanza. In Pietanza, as here, the Commissioner (1) lost the administrative file, (2) had no copies of a notice of deficiency, (3) did not establish that a final notice of deficiency ever existed, (4) relied on a Postal Service Form 3877, and (5) did not introduce evidence showing how the Commissioner's personnel prepare and mail notices of deficiency.



The Commissioner in Pietanza produced a draft copy of the notice of deficiency but did not establish that a final notice ever existed. Here, the Appeals officer testified that he saw a copy of the notice of deficiency, but he did not say whether it was a final version. Further, his testimony is curious in the light of the contemporaneous entry in his log, which states only that the administrative file indicates that a defaulted notice of deficiency is in the administrative file. We do not understand why the Appeals officer would have chosen that language if he had seen the notice of deficiency. Thus, as in Pietanza, the record does not show that respondent issued a final notice of deficiency. Respondent has provided no reason that this case is not bound by our holding in Pietanza.




4. Conclusion


We conclude that respondent's determination to proceed with collection of petitioner's tax liabilities for 1989 and 1990 was in error and thus an abuse of discretion because respondent failed to show that respondent issued a notice of deficiency before assessing petitioner's taxes.



Decision will be entered for petitioner.


1 Section references are to the Internal Revenue Code as amended.

2 Petitioner's tax liability for 1999 is no longer at issue.

3 For convenience, some of the findings of fact which appeared in Butti v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-66, are repeated here.

4 A deficiency notice is not required to assess taxes where there is no deficiency. For example, the Secretary may assess without a deficiency notice the amount of tax shown due on a return. Sec. 6201(a)(1).

Labels:

No statute of limitations for tax fraud

In the case of a false or fraudulent return with the intent to evade tax, the tax may be assessed at any time. See sec. 6501(c)(1). A fraudulent return deprives the taxpayer the bar of the statutory period of limitations for that year. See Badaracco v. Commissioner, 464 U.S. 386, 396 (1984); Lowy v. Commissioner, 288 F.2d 517, 520 (2d Cir. 1961), affg. T.C. Memo. 1960-32; see also Colestock v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 380, 385 (1994).


Industrial Electrical and Instrumentation, Inc., v. Commissioner.

Dkt. No. 19355-05 , TC Memo. 2008-84, April 3, 2008.



[Code Sec. 6501]

Statute of limitations: Understatement of income: Fraud. --
The IRS was not barred by the statute of limitations from assessing a tax liability against a corporation for two tax years for amounts received by three of its shareholders for services performed in the name of the corporation. Because the corporation filed false or fraudulent returns for those years by intentionally underreporting its income, there was no statute of limitations on assessing a deficiency against it with respect to such returns.

[Code Sec. 6663]

Penalties: Understatement of income: Fraud penalty. --
A corporation was required to include in income for two tax years amounts received by three of its shareholders for services performed in the name of the corporation. The corporation was also liable for a civil fraud penalty for the two tax years. The indications of fraud were that the corporation understated its gross receipts and taxable income, maintained inadequate records, failed to provide a plausible or consistent explanation for the unreported income, filed false documents by not disclosing the identity of the three shareholders on the corporation's returns, and paid its workers in cash to conceal its activities. Further, the three shareholders concealed income by not depositing checks made out to the corporation into the corporation's bank account but instead cashing them or depositing them into third-party accounts. --CCH.


Robert A. Shupack, for petitioner; W. Robert Abramitis and Justin L. Campolieta, for respondent.


MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION




OPINION




I. Unreported Income
The Commissioner's determinations generally are presumed correct, and the taxpayer bears the burden of proving that those determinations are erroneous. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933); Durando v. United States, 70 F.3d 548, 550 (9th Cir. 1995). Once there is evidence of actual receipt of funds by the taxpayer, the taxpayer has the burden of proving that all or part of those funds are not taxable. Tokarski v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 74 (1986).

There is ample evidence linking petitioner to an income-producing activity (IEI), and respondent has demonstrated that petitioner received unreported income.



II. Fraud
The fraud penalty is a civil sanction provided primarily as a safeguard for the protection of the revenue and to reimburse the Government for the heavy expense of investigation and the loss resulting from a taxpayer's fraud. See Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 401 (1938). Fraud is intentional wrongdoing on the part of the taxpayer with the specific purpose to evade a tax believed to be owing. See McGee v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 249, 256 (1973), affd. 519 F.2d 1121 (5th Cir. 1975).

The Commissioner has the burden of proving fraud by clear and convincing evidence. See sec. 7454(a); Rule 142(b). To satisfy the burden of proof, the Commissioner must show: (1) An underpayment exists; and (2) the taxpayer intended to evade taxes known to be owing by conduct intended to conceal, mislead, or otherwise prevent the collection of taxes. See Parks v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 654, 660-661 (1990). The Commissioner must meet this burden through affirmative evidence because fraud is never presumed. See Beaver v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 85, 92 (1970).

A. Underpayment

An "underpayment" is the amount by which the tax imposed exceeds the excess of the sum of the amount shown as the tax by the taxpayer on his return, plus amounts not so shown that were previously assessed (or collected without assessment), over the amount of rebates made. See sec. 6664(a).

Petitioner argues that there is no underpayment because the money the Pennys earned performing electrical contracting services was income either to the Pennys or to Omni. Further, petitioner claims that it was not actively engaged in the performance of electrical contracting services during the years at issue but merely allowed the Pennys to use its name, its credit, and Mr. White's electrical contracting license. We disagree.

The Pennys wanted to engage in the electrical contracting business but did not have a license to do so. In fact, the State of Florida enjoined Stewart from being in the electrical contracting business. As a result, the Pennys made a deal with Mr. White whereby they would become officers and shareholders of IEI and thus have access to a license and be able to engage in the electrical contracting business.

Income is be taxed to the individual or entity which earns it. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930). Petitioner cannot contract away its liability for Federal income taxes, nor can it anesthetize us to the fact that it tried to do so. Gibson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1982-374. Further, taxation of income cannot be escaped by anticipatory arrangements assigning it to someone else. Id. The "Agreement to Qualify" was an anticipatory agreement that attempted to assign all of petitioner's income to the Pennys and/or Omni despite the fact that the work was performed by or on behalf of petitioner.


Respondent has shown by clear and convincing evidence that during the taxable years at issue, petitioner engaged in the electrical contracting business and did not report all of its gross receipts on its tax returns. Proceeds of checks that were not deposited into petitioner's checking account were not reported on petitioner's tax return. Instead of depositing the checks into petitioner's bank account, the Pennys, officers and shareholders of petitioner, either cashed the checks at check cashing stores or endorsed them over to Classic or to the Harlan Trust.

.

Accordingly we conclude that petitioner understated its income in both 1999 and 2000.

B. Fraudulent Intent

The Commissioner must prove that a portion of the underpayment for each taxable year at issue was due to fraud. Sec. 7454(a); see also Profl. Servs. v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 888, 930 (1982). The existence of fraud is a question of fact to be resolved from the entire record. See Gajewski v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 181, 199 (1976), affd. without published opinion 578 F.2d 1383 (8th Cir. 1978). Because direct proof of a taxpayer's intent is rarely available, fraud may be proven by circumstantial evidence, and reasonable inferences may be drawn from the relevant facts. See Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 499 (1943); Stephenson v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 995, 1006 (1982), affd. 748 F.2d 331 (6th Cir. 1984). A taxpayer's entire course of conduct can be indicative of fraud. See Stone v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 213, 223-224 (1971); Otsuki v. Commissioner, 53 T.C. 96, 105-106 (1969). The following badges of fraud have been used to prove fraud: (1) Understating income, (2) maintaining inadequate records, (3) implausible or inconsistent explanations of behavior, (4) concealment of income or assets, (5) failing to cooperate with tax authorities, (6) engaging in illegal activities, (7) an intent to mislead which may be inferred from a pattern of conduct, (8) lack of credibility of the taxpayer's testimony, (9) filing false documents, (10) failing to file tax returns, and (11) dealing in cash. No single factor is necessarily sufficient to establish fraud. A combination of a number of factors constitutes persuasive evidence. Below we discuss the factors that we find to be present.

In the case of a corporation, such as petitioner, the fraudulent activities of a corporate agent or officer may be imputed to the corporation if: (1) The wrongdoer so dominates the corporation that it is, in reality, a creature of his will, his alter ego or, (2) the agent was acting in behalf of, and not against the interests of, the corporation. M.J. Laputka & Sons, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1981-730.

1. Understating Income

Petitioner, as we found above, understated its gross receipts in both 1999 and 2000, and as a result also understated its taxable income in both years. Only funds deposited into petitioner's bank account were reported on its return. However, petitioner earned significantly more than was deposited into the account. Petitioner argues that the money from electrical contracting services belonged to Omni or the Pennys individually. We disagree. See supra.

2. Maintaining Inadequate Records

Petitioner kept a "transaction detail" report that was little more than a reflection of the activity of petitioner's corporate account. Petitioner's "transaction detail" report did not reflect the checks that were cashed at check cashing stores or endorsed to Classic or the Harlan Trust. The report did not reflect all of petitioner's business.

3. Implausible or Inconsistent Explanations of Behavior

In his testimony, Mr. White acknowledged that he was aware that petitioner was working on the Archdiocese job and that it was a "significant" job. Mr. White claimed that the income from this work was the Pennys', he did not know how much the job was worth, and it was not his business to know. Despite these claims, Mr. White endorsed a check from the archdiocese payable to petitioner in the amount of $132,332.80.

4. Concealment of Income or Assets

The stockholders and officers of petitioner concealed petitioner's income through various methods. In 1999 officers and shareholders of petitioner endorsed over to Classic checks totaling $300,445 payable to petitioner.18 In 1999, officers and shareholders of petitioner cashed at check cashing stores checks totaling $1,143,655.10 made out to petitioner.19 In 2000, officers and shareholders of petitioner cashed at check cashing stores checks totaling $1,568,7335.50 made out to petitioner.20 Also in 2000, officers and shareholders of petitioner endorsed over to the Harlan Trust checks totaling $851,123 made out to petitioner.21 By not depositing the money in the corporate account and distributing the money from the corporation, petitioner avoided "double taxation" on millions of dollars.

Officers and shareholders of petitioner exhibited a pattern of concealment of IEI's income during the years at issue. The incidents were not isolated, but were continuous throughout the 2-year period.

5. An Intent To Mislead

The behavior described in relation to the concealment of income also indicates an intent to mislead. Once again, the behavior was continuous on the part of petitioner's officers and shareholders.

6. Filing False Documents

Petitioner's 1999 and 2000 tax returns indicate that Mr. White was the sole shareholder. The two tax returns failed to disclose that the Pennys were shareholders and officers who collectively owned 49 percent of petitioner.22 As we have found, the returns understated petitioner's income by large amounts for both 1999 and 2000.

7. Dealing in Cash

During 1999 and 2000, petitioner dealt in cash. The cashing of checks at check cashing stores has been detailed supra. In addition, petitioner paid its workers in cash. Michael Delucia and Jamie Massey testified that petitioner paid them in cash for their services performed for petitioner.

8. Petitioner's Arguments

Petitioner relies heavily on the argument that the Pennys were not officers of petitioner and that Mr. White was the only officer. Petitioner argues that Mr. White's actions were not fraudulent, and therefore neither were petitioner's. We disagree. Mr. White endorsed a check payable to IEI in the amount of $132,332.80 that he knew was never reported on petitioner's tax return. Mr. White was more involved with petitioner than he claimed. Mr. White knew that petitioner had a major project at LaSalle and work at other locations, yet the documents he turned over to Mr. Cole did not include much of the income those jobs generated for petitioner. Pursuant to Fla. Stat. Ann. sec. 607.0830 (West 2007), a director must discharge his or her duties in good faith, with ordinary care, and in a manner he or she believes to be in the best interests of the corporation. Even if we assume arguendo that Mr. White's conduct on behalf of petitioner was not fraudulent, the Pennys were officers and shareholders of petitioner; and their actions in their capacity as officers and shareholders of petitioner also establish that petitioner is liable for the civil fraud penalty. The Pennys, who were 49-percent shareholders, were, together with Mr. White, the dominant figures of petitioner. See M.J. Laputka & Sons, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra. Petitioner's counsel admitted at trial that Stewart was a "thief, a liar, and a crook". Stewart, however, was the general manager of IEI's Miami branch, a vice president, and together with Lance, Sean, and Donna ran that branch of petitioner on a day-to-day basis.

All of the electrical contracting work that petitioner undertook in 1999 and 2000 was the result of the Pennys' efforts. Pursuant to Florida law, when in the usual course of business of a corporation an officer or other agent is held out by the corporation, or has been permitted to act for it or manage its affairs, in such a way as to justify third persons who deal with him in inferring or assuming that he is doing an act within the scope of his authority, the corporation is bound thereby. Edward J. Gerrits, Inc. v. McKinney, 410 So. 2d 542 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).

We conclude that respondent has proven by clear and convincing evidence that petitioner fraudulently underpaid its taxes for 1999 and 2000.

Once the Commissioner establishes that any portion of the underpayment is attributable to fraud, the entire underpayment is treated as attributable to fraud and subject to a 75-percent penalty, except with respect to any portion of the underpayment that the taxpayer establishes is not attributable to fraud. Sec. 6663(a) and (b). Petitioner has not proven that any part of either underpayment is not attributable to fraud. Therefore, the underpayments for 1999 and 2000 are subject to the 75-percent penalty.



III. Period of Limitations
Petitioner argues that respondent cannot assess the tax liabilities petitioner reported on its tax returns because the statutory periods of limitations have expired.

In the case of a false or fraudulent return with the intent to evade tax, the tax may be assessed at any time. See sec. 6501(c)(1). A fraudulent return deprives the taxpayer the bar of the statutory period of limitations for that year. See Badaracco v. Commissioner, 464 U.S. 386, 396 (1984); Lowy v. Commissioner, 288 F.2d 517, 520 (2d Cir. 1961), affg. T.C. Memo. 1960-32; see also Colestock v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 380, 385 (1994).

We found that petitioner filed fraudulent income tax returns for 1999 and 2000; therefore, the periods of limitations on assessment for both of these years remain open.

In reaching all of our holdings herein, we have considered all arguments made by the parties, and to the extent not mentioned above, we find them to be irrelevant or without merit.

To reflect the foregoing,

Decision will be entered for respondent.

Labels:

Thursday, April 3, 2008

Joint Committee on Taxation Report on Taxation of Wealth Transfers Within a Family: A Discussion of Selected Areas for Possible Reform

April
3, 2008

110th Congress


TAXATION OF WEALTH TRANSFERS WITHIN A FAMILY: A DISCUSSION OF SELECTED AREAS FOR POSSIBLE REFORM


Scheduled for a Public Hearing Before the SENATE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE on April 3, 2008

Prepared by the Staff of the JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION

April 2, 2008

JCX-23-08




CONTENTS


INTRODUCTION


I. WEALTH TRANSFERS AND THE UNIFIED CREDIT




A. Overview



B. Present Law and Recent Proposals Relating to Estate and Gift Tax Rates and Exemption Amounts




1. In general



2. Increase in unified credit effective exemption amount and reduction in estate and gift tax rates under EGTRRA



3. Repeal of estate and generation skipping transfer taxes in 2010



4. Reinstatement of the estate and generation skipping transfer taxes for decedents dying and generation skipping transfers made after December 31, 2010



5. H.R. 5638 and H.R. 5970



C. Issues Related to Reunification of Estate and Gift Tax Exemptions and Rates and Portability Between Spouses of Unused Exemption




1. Issues related to unification



2. Issues related to exemption portability



D. Estimates of Utilization



II. WEALTH TRANSFERS AND LIQUIDITY




A. Overview



B. Present and Prior Law for Special-Use Valuation, Installment Payments, and Family-Owned Businesses




1. Valuation



2. Installment payment of estate tax for closely held businesses



3. Qualified family-owned business interests



C. Issues and Data Related to Liquidity




1. Criticisms of sections 2032A, 6166, and 2057



2. Effects of present law on small and family-owned businesses




APPENDIX: REFORM OPTIONS PREVIOUSLY PREPARED BY THE STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION


A. Limit Perpetual Dynasty Trusts (secs. 2631 and 2632)



B. Determine Certain Valuation Discounts More Accurately for Federal Estate and Gift Tax Purposes (secs. 2031, 2512, and 2624)



C. Curtail the Use of Lapsing Trust Powers to Inflate the Gift Tax Annual Exclusion Amount (sec. 2503)





INTRODUCTION


The Federal estate and gift tax rules are in flux. Under the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 ("EGTRRA"), the estate tax and the gift tax are partially unified: a single tax rate schedule applies under the estate tax and the gift tax, but after 2003 the exemption amounts differ. The highest rate of estate and gift tax has decreased in steps from 55 percent in 2001 to 45 percent last year, this year, and next year. The estate tax exemption amount is increasing in several steps from $1 million in 2002 to $3.5 million next year. The gift tax exemption amount remains at $1 million during that period. The credit against Federal estate tax liability for State estate and inheritance taxes was phased down from 2002 through 2004 and was replaced by a deduction starting in 2005. For 2010, the estate tax is repealed, but the gift tax remains in effect with an exemption of $1 million and a maximum rate of 35 percent. In the year of estate tax repeal, property transferred at death generally has the same basis in the hands of the heir as it had in the hands of the decedent (that is, a carryover basis). Under the present estate tax, by contrast, the heir's basis generally equals the property's fair market value at the time of the decedent's death. Estate tax repeal lasts only for one year. In 2011, the estate and gift tax rules are scheduled to be the same as those that would have been in effect without enactment of EGTRRA. Under pre-EGTRRA law, the estate and gift tax was fully unified: a single rate schedule and exemption amount applied to gifts made during life and to transfers at death. Consequently, unless rules are changed, starting in 2011 the estate and gift tax exemption amount will be $1 million, and the highest estate and gift tax rate will be 55 percent. The credit for State estate and inheritance taxes will return, and property acquired from a decedent will take a fair market value basis rather than a carryover basis.

It is in this context of changing Federal estate and gift tax rules that Congress is considering reform of the system for taxing transfers of wealth. The Committee on Finance is holding a series of public hearings to examine the current system and possible changes to, or replacements of, that system. A November 14, 2007 hearing addressed broad design issues such as rates, exemption amounts, and the treatment of farms and family businesses.1 A hearing on March 12, 2008 studied alternatives to the present estate and gift tax system. These alternatives include an inheritance tax, an income inclusion approach (under which gifts and bequests are included in the income of the recipient), and a deemed realization system (under which a gratuitous transfer is treated as a realization event and the transferor is taxed on any gain in the property transferred, generally at rates applicable to capital gains).2 Among the 30 member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development ("OECD"), only the United States and the United Kingdom have estate and gift tax systems. The majority of OECD countries have inheritance taxes. A public hearing scheduled by the Finance Committee for April 3, 2008 will include a discussion of possible reforms to the existing Federal estate and gift tax rules. This document,3 which is intended to supplement the discussions set forth in Joint Committee on Taxation pamphlets prepared in connection with the two previous hearings, provides an overview of several selected areas for possible reform.

This document is divided into two parts. The first part describes a prominent feature of the current Federal estate and gift tax system, the partially unified credit against estate and gift tax, and evaluates two possible reforms to that credit. The credit against estate and gift tax is partially unified under present law because a single tax rate schedule applies to gifts made during life and transfers at death but the effective exemption amount under the gift tax ($1 million) is different from the effective exemption amount under the estate tax ($2 million in 2008).4

One possible reform to present law's partially unified credit would be to make the credit fully unified. Under a fully unified credit, a common rate schedule and a single exemption amount would apply to gifts made during life and transfers at death. Two bills that passed the House of Representatives in 2006 included provisions for a fully unified credit. Arguments in favor of replacing the current credit with a fully unified credit are that a fully unified credit would simplify planning and that the current credit distorts behavior by encouraging taxpayers to hold onto property until they die to take advantage of the higher exemption amount under the estate tax than under the gift tax. The extent to which raising the gift tax exemption amount so that it equaled the estate tax exemption amount would counteract the gift tax's role in preventing income tax avoidance is unknown. In the absence of a tax on gifts, income tax liability may be reduced when high-income individuals make gifts to lower-income individuals. An increased gift tax exemption amount permits an increased amount of this income shifting. A fully unified credit also could encourage gifts over bequests, the opposite of the distortion that may be caused by present law's significantly larger exemption amount under the estate tax than under the gift tax. The distortion in favor of lifetime gifts would arise because the tax exclusive nature of the gift tax (tax is not imposed on funds used to pay the gift tax) and the tax inclusive nature of the estate tax (tax is imposed on funds used to pay the estate tax) causes the effective rate of tax on gifts to be lower than the effective rate of tax on bequests.

A second possible reform to the unified credit, referred to as portability, would allow a surviving spouse to benefit from unused exemption amount of the first spouse to die. The 2006 bills that passed the House of Representatives also included provisions making unused exemption portable from one spouse to another. As for a fully unified credit, a principal argument for portability of unused exemption is that portability would simplify wealth transfer tax planning. Portability, however, raises concerns about the IRS's ability to administer the transfer tax rules. Certain design features, such as the treatment of multiple marriages, also may create difficulties.

The second part of this document sets forth a discussion of liquidity to pay estate tax when estates consist largely of farms or other businesses. Congress at various times has passed reforms intended to mitigate the effect of the estate tax on family farms and other family-owned businesses. A particular concern has been that if the value of an estate is largely attributable to a farm or other business, heirs of the estate may be forced to sell the business to pay the estate tax. Forced sales of family businesses are seen as undesirable in part because of possible job losses and other disruptions to communities.

This document describes three provisions intended to mitigate the effect of the estate tax on farms and other family-owned active businesses. One provision (in section 2032A) permits real property to be valued for estate tax purposes at its current-use value (for example, as a farm) rather than at a higher market value (for example, the price that could be received in a sale to a developer). A second provision (in section 6166) allows payment of estate tax attributable to certain family businesses to be deferred for five years and then made in installments over the succeeding ten years. A third provision (in section 2057, terminated after 2003 but scheduled to be in effect after 2010), grants a deduction from the value of the gross estate for the value of certain family-owned business interests.

This document evaluates criticisms of these three provisions. The principal criticisms have been that the provisions are complex and distort taxpayers' behavior by encouraging them to hold active business assets rather than other assets. This document concludes that although there may be validity to those criticisms, the policy goals underlying sections 2032A, 6166, and 2057 inherently involve complications and distortions. The discussion of liquidity closes with a presentation of data showing relative liquidities of estates that include closely held businesses and showing certain characteristics of estates for which the benefits of sections 2032A, 6166, and 2057 have been elected. This data presentation includes an analysis of the possible effects of the estate tax on closely held businesses. This analysis concludes that many estates that include farms and other businesses have enough liquidity to fund their estate tax liabilities. The estate tax may, however, harm the ongoing operations of these businesses by reducing cash available for investment and day-to-day needs.

This document includes an appendix. The appendix reprints previous Joint Committee on Taxation staff options for reforms of certain estate, gift, and generation-skipping transfer tax rules. These options were offered as part of a 2005 report prepared at the request of Senator Charles Grassley and Senator Max Baucus, at that time Chairman and Ranking Member, respectively, of the Senate Finance Committee.5 The report described proposals that were intended to reduce the size of the tax gap by curtailing tax shelters, closing unintended loopholes, and targeting other areas of noncompliance with the tax laws. Proposals addressed the estate and gift tax and also, among other areas, the individual income tax, corporate and partnership taxation, and international taxation. The estate, gift, and generation-skipping transfer tax proposals republished in this document deal with certain trust arrangements and with valuation discounts.




I. WEALTH TRANSFERS AND THE UNIFIED CREDIT





A. Overview


Some commentators argue that present law encourages costly and inefficient planning to maximize use of estate and gift tax exemption amounts, particularly in the case of certain transfers among family members. This section describes and discusses two proposed reforms that are designed at least in part to simplify tax planning with respect to estate and gift tax exemptions. The first reform would provide for "portability" between spouses of any unused exemption. In other words, a surviving spouse would be permitted to use, in addition to his or her own estate and gift tax exemption, the amount of any such exemption that had not been used by the deceased spouse at or prior to the deceased spouse's death. The second reform would fully "reunify" the estate and gift taxes, such that a common exemption amount and rate schedule would apply for both estate tax purposes and gift tax purposes.




B. Present Law and Recent Proposals Relating to Estate and Gift Tax Rates and Exemption Amounts




1. In general

Under present law in effect through 2009 and after 2010, a unified credit is available with respect to taxable transfers by gift and at death. The unified credit offsets tax computed at the lowest estate and gift tax rates.6

Prior to 2004, the estate and gift taxes were fully unified, such that a single graduated rate schedule and a single effective exemption amount of the unified credit applied for purposes of determining the tax on cumulative taxable transfers made by a taxpayer during his or her lifetime and at death. For years 2004 through 2009, the gift tax and the estate tax continue to be determined using a single graduated rate schedule, but the effective exemption amount allowed for estate tax purposes is increased above the effective exemption amount allowed for gift tax purposes, as described below.7



2. Increase in unified credit effective exemption amount and reduction in estate and gift tax rates under EGTRRA

Under EGTRRA, the estate, gift, and generation skipping transfer taxes are gradually reduced between 2002 and 2009. In 2002, the unified credit effective exemption amount (for both estate and gift tax purposes) increased to $1 million, and the highest estate and gift tax rate was 50 percent. In 2003, the highest estate and gift tax rate was 49 percent. In 2004, the highest estate and gift tax rate was 48 percent, and the unified credit effective exemption amount for estate tax (but not gift tax) purposes increased to $1.5 million. In 2005, the highest estate and gift tax rate was 47 percent. For 2006, the highest estate and gift tax rate was 46 percent, and the unified credit effective exemption amount for estate tax purposes was increased to $2 million, also the amount for 2007 and 2008. In 2007 and 2008, the highest estate and gift tax rate is 45 percent. In 2009, the unified credit effective exemption amount for estate tax purposes is scheduled to increase to $3.5 million.8

The unified credit effective exemption amount for gift tax purposes remained at $1 million in 2004 and later years, as the exemption amount for estate tax purposes increased above $1 million.9 Therefore, under present law for the years 2004 through 2009, the estate and gift taxes are not fully unified because the estate and gift tax effective exemption amounts differ.



3. Repeal of estate and generation skipping transfer taxes in 2010

Under EGTRRA, the estate and generation skipping transfer taxes are repealed for decedents dying and generation skipping transfers made during 2010. The gift tax remains in effect during 2010, with a $1 million exemption amount and a gift tax rate of 35 percent.



4. Reinstatement of the estate and generation skipping transfer taxes for decedents dying and generation skipping transfers made after December 31, 2010

The estate, gift, and generation skipping transfer tax provisions of EGTRRA are scheduled to sunset after 2010, such that those provisions (including repeal of the estate and generation skipping transfer taxes) will not apply to estates of decedents dying, gifts made, or generation skipping transfers made after December 31, 2010. As a result, in general, the unified estate, gift, and generation skipping transfer tax rates and exemption amounts as in effect prior to 2002 will apply for estates of decedents dying, gifts made, or generation skipping transfers made in 2011 or later years. A single graduated rate schedule with a top rate of 55 percent and a single effective exemption amount of $1 million will apply for purposes of determining the tax on cumulative taxable transfers made by a taxpayer by lifetime gift or bequest.



5. H.R. 5638 and H.R. 5970

In 2006, the House of Representatives passed two bills, each of which contained two provisions designed at least in part to simplify planning, principally in the case of intra-family transfers.10



Reunification of the estate and gift taxes

The first such reform would have reunified the estate and gift taxes such that a common rate schedule and a single effective exemption amount would apply for purposes of determining the cumulative tax on taxable transfers. In general, H.R. 5638 would have increased the effective exemption amount for estate and gift tax purposes to $5 million for transfers after 2009, whereas H.R. 5970 would have phased in a $5 million effective exemption amount over a period of years. Each bill would have applied an estate and gift tax rate equal to the long-term capital gains rate specified in section 1(h)(1)(C) (currently 15 percent in 2010 and 20 percent thereafter) on the first $25 million in taxable transfers. For transfers in excess of $25 million, H.R. 5638 would have applied a rate equal to twice the long-term capital gains rate described above, whereas H.R. 5970 would have phased in a 30-percent rate over a period of years.



Portability between spouses of unused exemption

Second, H.R. 5638 and H.R. 5970 each contained a provision that generally would permit a surviving spouse to use any effective exemption amount that was not used by the predeceased spouse. Under the bills, for gift and estate tax purposes, the unified credit effective exemption amount that remains unused as of the death of a spouse who dies after December 31, 2009 (the "deceased spousal unused exclusion amount"), generally would be available for use by such spouse's surviving spouse, in addition to such surviving spouse's own exemption amount.11

The aggregate amount of unused exemption equivalent (the "aggregate deceased spousal unused exclusion amount") that would be available for use by a surviving spouse from all predeceased spouses could not exceed the basic exclusion amount in effect at any given time (e.g., $5 million in H.R. 5638). The bills would permit a surviving spouse to use the aggregate deceased spousal unused exclusion amount for taxable transfers made during life or at death.

Under the bills, a deceased spousal unused exclusion amount is available to a surviving spouse only if an election is made on a timely filed estate tax return (including extensions) of the predeceased spouse on which such amount is computed, regardless of whether the predeceased spouse otherwise is required to file an estate tax return. In addition, notwithstanding the statute of limitations for assessing estate or gift tax with respect to a predeceased spouse, the bills provide that the Secretary of the Treasury may examine the return of a predeceased spouse for purposes of determining the deceased spousal unused exclusion amount available for use by the surviving spouse.

Example 1 .-Assume that Husband 1 dies in 2015, having made taxable gifts of $3 million and having no taxable estate. Assume further that the basic exclusion amount under the above-referenced bills would be $5 million as of that time. An election is made on Husband 1's estate tax return to permit Wife to use Husband 1's deceased spousal unused exclusion amount. As of Husband 1's death, Wife has made no taxable gifts. Thereafter, Wife's applicable exclusion amount is $7 million (her $5 million basic exclusion amount plus $2 million deceased spousal unused exclusion amount from Husband 1), which she may use for lifetime gifts or for transfers at death.

Example 2 .-Assume the same facts as in Example 1, except that Wife subsequently marries Husband 2. Husband 2 predeceases Wife in a year in which the basic exclusion amount is assumed for purposes of this example to be $5 million, having made no taxable gifts and having no taxable estate. An election is made on Husband 2's estate tax return to permit Wife to use Husband 2's deceased spousal unused exclusion amount. Although the deceased spousal unused exclusion amount from Husband 2 is $5 million (the amount of his unused exclusion), only $3 million of this amount is available for use by Wife, because she previously received the benefit of $2 million of deceased spousal unused exclusion amount from Husband 1, and the bills place a limit equal to the basic exclusion amount ($5 million for purposes of this example) on the aggregate deceased spousal unused exclusion amount available to a surviving spouse from all predeceased spouses.

Example 3 .-Assume the same facts as in Example 2, except that Wife predeceases Husband 2 in a year in which the basic exclusion amount is assumed for purposes of this example to be $5 million. Husband 2 had no prior spouses. An election is made on Wife's estate tax return to permit Husband 2 to use Wife's deceased spousal unused exclusion amount. Wife made no taxable gifts and has a taxable estate of $3 million. Under the provision, Husband 2's applicable exclusion amount is increased by $4 million, i.e., the amount of the deceased spousal unused exclusion amount from Wife (computed as Wife's $7 million applicable exclusion amount less her $3 million taxable estate).




C. Issues Related to Reunification of Estate and Gift Tax Exemptions and Rates and Portability Between Spouses of Unused Exemption




1. Issues related to unification

As described above, under present law as in effect from 2004 through 2009, the gift tax effective exemption amount remains $1 million, while the estate tax effective exemption amount rises above $1 million (ultimately to $3.5 million in 2009). Commentators have argued that this decoupling of the estate and gift tax exemption amounts complicates wealth transfer tax planning and raises administrability issues.

For example, some commentators argue that, as a result of the lower gift tax exemption amount, taxpayers are likely to engage in complicated and costly planning to avoid gift tax.12 They argue that the lower gift tax exemption (and resulting higher cost of the gift tax) could encourage taxpayers to create complicated long-term trusts at death designed to avoid gift tax on transfers to successive generations. They further argue that the lower gift tax exemption will encourage taxpayers to delay transfers until death, "encouraging family wealth to remain 'locked in' older generations."13

The extent to which such practices have increased in use since the exemption amounts were decoupled in 2004 is uncertain. In addition, the effect of the lower gift tax exemption amount from 2004 through 2009 is partially mitigated by a structural difference between the estate tax and the gift tax that generally benefits taxpayers who make inter vivos gifts: the gift tax is "tax exclusive," whereas the estate tax is "tax inclusive." In other words, under the estate tax, the assets used to pay the tax are included in the estate tax base. Thus, if the estate and gift taxes were fully reunified, the gift tax would be a less costly tax.

Furthermore, the gift tax often is viewed as being necessary to protect the income tax base. In the absence of a gift tax, it may be possible for a taxpayer to transfer an asset with builtin gain or that produces income to a taxpayer who is in a lower tax bracket, where the gain or income would be realized and taxed at a lower rate before the asset is returned to the original holder. Therefore, if the gift tax effective exemption amount were increased to equal the higher estate tax exemption amount, the effectiveness of the gift tax as a tool to protect the income tax base may be diminished.



2. Issues related to exemption portability



Simplification of wealth transfer tax planning

Proponents of portability between spouses of unused exemption generally argue that it eliminates the need for inefficient and costly tax planning and results in similarly situated taxpayers being treated equally.14

Assume, for example, that Husband and Wife each have $2 million in assets titled in their separate names. Husband and Wife both die in 2008 (when the effective exemption amount is $2 million), and each bequeaths $2 million to Son. Husband and Wife collectively have used $4 million in exemption, successfully maximizing use of their available exemptions. Now assume that Husband dies in early 2008 and bequeaths his $2 million estate to Wife. No estate tax is due on the transfer, because the transfer qualifies for the 100-percent marital deduction. Wife, who now owns $4 million in assets, dies in late 2008 and bequeaths her entire estate to Son. Wife has available only her own $2 million exemption to offset the transfer to Son; the additional $2 million transferred to Son will be subject to estate tax. Husband's estate tax exemption was not used.

To maximize the use of a couple's estate tax exemption amounts, couples frequently employ a tax planning strategy under which assets of the first spouse to die pass into a "credit shelter trust" at the time of that spouse's death. The trust is designed to benefit the surviving spouse during his or her lifetime while using the exemption of the first spouse to die to shield trust assets that ultimately will pass to another beneficiary (such as Son in the above example) from estate tax. To take advantage of this strategy, couples generally must hire a lawyer to draft the trust documents and also must ensure that each spouse has sufficient assets titled in his or her separate name to fund a credit shelter trust up to the full amount of his or her exemption amount. Couples who do not have such trusts in place at the death of the first spouse to die may not be able to take full advantage of both spouses' exemption amounts. Even where couples do have such trusts in place, if the first spouse to die does not have sufficient assets titled in his or her own name at the time of death to fund the trust up to the amount of the then-applicable exemption amount, a portion of such spouse's exemption amount may be lost.

For these reasons, the American Bar Association Task Force on Wealth Transfer Taxes (the "ABA Task Force") has argued that "the law rewards both sophisticated planning and constant reallocation of wealth, but does not offer the same benefits to couples who do not engage in sophisticated planning or whose assets do not lend themselves to appropriate allocation, such as property held in a qualified retirement plan."15 Therefore, allowing for portability between spouses of unused exemption arguably would contribute to simplicity and facilitate compliance with the law, because it largely would eliminate the need for couples to employ the credit shelter trust strategy or to monitor and adjust the titling of assets.

Although proponents of portability generally assert that portability simply allows spouses to achieve the results that otherwise would have been achieved through costly tax planning and re-titling of assets, a portability provision (depending on how it is drafted) may allow couples to achieve better results than they could have achieved through the best estate planning. Assume, for example, that Wife dies when Husband's and Wife's collective assets were $4 million. The most exemption that Wife's estate could have used is $4 million (which could, for example, be achieved by titling all of the couple's assets in Wife's name). Husband dies a decade later with $10 million in assets, $5 million of which would be exempt under his own $5 million exemption. Combined, the maximum amount of exemption Wife and Husband could have used without portability would have been $9 million. With portability, it may be possible for Husband and Wife to use a combined amount of $10 million (assuming that Wife used none of her $5 million exemption because she had made no taxable gifts and either had no taxable estate at death or bequeathed all assets to Husband). If this situation were viewed as problematic, it could be addressed through a rule that would limit the amount of exemption that could be passed to a surviving spouse to the lesser of (1) the combined value of the spouses' assets as of the death of the first spouse to die or (2) the unused exemption amount of the first spouse to die. However, such a rule would add complexity and raise administrability concerns, as one would need to value the assets of both the decedent and the surviving spouse as of the death of the first spouse to die.



Administrability issues

Portability of unused exemption raises a number of other administrability issues. For example, to determine the amount of additional exemption available to a surviving spouse, one must know the amount of unused exemption remaining at the death of the first spouse to die. Under the above-described House-passed bills, for example, unused exemption may be made available to a surviving spouse regardless of the value of assets owned at the time of the first spouse's death, e.g., even where the first spouse to die otherwise would not have been required to file an estate tax return because the estate assets were below filing thresholds. If no return were filed, it would be virtually impossible at the death of the surviving spouse to determine the amount of unused exemption that remained at the death of the first spouse to die, which may have occurred years or even decades earlier.16 These problems could be mitigated by requiring (as in the House-passed bills) that, in order to preserve unused exemption for a surviving spouse, the estate of the first spouse to die file a return computing the amount of unused exemption. However, such a return requirement likely would result in the filing of numerous returns solely to preserve exemption for a surviving spouse, potentially burdening the IRS. In many cases, the filings will prove to have been unnecessary, as the surviving spouse ultimately will have no need for additional exemption to offset transfers. Nevertheless, estates are likely to file prophylactic returns to preserve unused exemption, because of the possibility (however remote) that a surviving spouse may accumulate significant additional wealth by the time of his or her subsequent death.

Furthermore, even if a return is filed to preserve unused exemption, the IRS likely will have little incentive to examine the return at the death of the first spouse to die. The IRS has limited resources, and examination of a return filed solely to preserve unused exemption generally would not lead to additional tax due from the estate of the first spouse to die. In addition, by the time the surviving spouse dies, the statute of limitations with respect to the estate of the first spouse may have expired. The House-passed bills attempt to address this issue by providing that, notwithstanding any statute of limitations that may apply with respect to the estate of the first spouse to die, the IRS may examine the return of the deceased spouse for purposes of determining the amount of unused exemption available for the surviving spouse (though not for purposes of adjusting the liability of the estate of the first spouse to die). Even so, it could be difficult for the IRS to adjust the claimed amount of unused exemption. Particularly in situations in which the spouses die many years apart, there may not be contemporaneous records to support the claimed unused exemption amount.17



Multiple marriage situations

Portability of unused exemption presents additional policy and complexity issues in multiple marriage situations. Assume, for example, the estate tax effective exemption amount is $5 million, as under the House-passed bills containing portability provisions. If a surviving spouse is predeceased by more than one spouse, should that surviving spouse be allowed to use the full amount of unused exemption of all predeceased spouses (e.g., should the surviving spouse have available (in addition to his own $5 million exemption) as much as $5 million from each of two predeceased spouses, for a total of $15 million)? The House-passed bills partially address this question by capping the cumulative amount of additional ported exemption from all predeceased spouses from which a surviving spouse may benefit at the basic exemption amount then in effect ($5 million in the example here).

To highlight another issue, assume that the estate tax exemption amount is $5 million and that Husband 1 dies with no taxable estate and having made no taxable gifts, such that his entire $5 million exemption is available for Wife, in addition to her own exemption. Therefore, Wife has $5 million for her use for purposes of making lifetime gifts or bequests. Further assume that Wife remarries and predeceases Husband 2. From a policy perspective, one may question whether the amount of unused exemption passed from Husband 1 to Wife should be available to Husband 2 following Wife's death. As noted above, the House-passed bills cap the amount of exemption a person may receive from all predeceased spouses at $5 million (the basic exemption amount under such bills when fully phased in), such that in this situation, Husband 2 could benefit from only $5 million of Wife's $10 million unused exemption. But the bills do not differentiate between a decedent's own exemption and ported exemption for this purpose. So, for example, if Wife had made taxable gifts prior to Husband 1's death and had only $2 million of her own exemption remaining, and subsequently received $5 million of unused exemption from Husband 1 (for a total of $7 million), she could still pass $5 million of unused exemption to Husband 2 at her death, even though a portion of this amount originally had been the exemption of Husband 1. The Congress could craft a rule to address this issue, but such a rule would raise additional administrability issues. Such a rule, for example, would make relevant at the death of Husband 2 the amount of unused exemption passed from Husband 1 to Wife at Husband 1's death. As an alternative, one simply could provide that unused exemption received from Husband 1 expires if Wife remarries.




D. Estimates of Utilization


The following table provides estimates of the number of taxpayers that would potentially benefit if exemption portability were in effect. The second column assumes that portability had been enacted effective for decedents dying after 1998. The third column assumes that portability will be enacted for decedents dying after 2008. Estimates are provided for two selected years: 2009 (when the effective exemption amount is scheduled to be $3.5 million) and 2012 (when the effective exemption amount is scheduled to be $1 million). For purposes of determining the number of estates that would benefit from enactment of exemption portability, the estimates assume enactment of a provision substantially similar to the portability provisions included in the above-described House-passed bills. The estimates assume that other aspects of present law remain unchanged. The estimates in the second column (which assume portability had been enacted for decedents dying after 1998) are intended to show utilization when a portability provision has been in effect for a number of years. Portability only is used at the death of a surviving spouse, and a surviving spouse may survive a predeceased spouse by many years. Therefore, the full benefits of portability likely would not be seen until portability had been in effect for several decades. The estimates of utilization in 2012 (when the exemption is scheduled to be $1 million) as compared to 2009 (when the exemption is scheduled to be $3.5 million) generally show that more taxpayers will benefit from portability when the effective exemption amount is lower because more estates will have estate tax liabilities.


Table 1.-Estimated Number of Estates Benefiting From Portability





___________________________________________________________________________________
Total number of Number of estates Number of estates
taxable estate tax that benefit that benefit
assuming assuming
returns portability was portability was
effective 1999 effective 2009

___________________________________________________________________________________
Returns filed in 2009
($3.5 million exemption) 18,400 10,000 730

___________________________________________________________________________________
Returns filed in 2012
($1 million exemption) 66,500 41,000 3,900

___________________________________________________________________________________






II. WEALTH TRANSFERS AND LIQUIDITY





A. Overview


At various times, Congress has expressed concern about the special burdens an estate tax may place on farms and other family-owned businesses. A particular concern has been that if a large part of the value of an estate subject to estate tax consists of a farm or another familyowned business, the estate may not include sufficient liquid assets to fund estate tax liability. It has been argued that if an estate lacks this liquidity, heirs may be forced to sell the business to generate funds to pay the estate tax. Potential forced sales of farms and other family businesses have been viewed as undesirable: farming and other family-owned businesses have been seen as important to the U.S. economy and culture, and sales of those businesses might harm local communities by causing job losses and other disruptions.

Congress has acted on its concerns about the effects of the estate tax on farming and other family-owned businesses by passing bills with provisions that make it easier for certain estates that include those businesses to satisfy their estate tax liabilities. One provision permits a farm or other real property used in a business to be valued at the property's current use rather than at its higher market value.18 Another provision allows the estate tax attributable to an interest in a closely held business to be deferred for five years and then paid in installments over the following ten years.19 A third provision allows a deduction from the value of the gross estate for the value of certain family-owned business interests in the estate.20 The House Report of the Ways and Means Committee accompanying the bill that included current-use valuation and installment payment rules largely similar to those in present law makes the following statement:


[T]he estate tax can impose acute problems when the principal asset of the estate is equity in a farm or small business. Because assets are valued at their "highest and best use" rather than on the specific use to which the assets are being put and because these assets are illiquid, family members have been forced to sell farms and small businesses in order to pay the estate tax.... The[ ] changes [to the current-use valuation and installment payment rules] are intended to preserve the family farm and other family businesses, two very important American institutions, both economically and culturally.21


Similarly, the Senate Report of the Finance Committee accompanying the bill that led to the enactment of section 2057 states:


The Committee believes that a reduction in estate taxes for qualified family-owned businesses will protect and preserve family farms and other family-owned enterprises, and prevent the liquidation of such enterprises in order to pay estate taxes. The Committee further believes that the protection of family enterprises will preserve jobs and strengthen the communities in which such enterprises are located.22


This section discusses wealth transfers and liquidity. It first describes sections 2032A, 6166, and 2057. It then evaluates criticisms of those provisions. Last, to help assess the extent to which the estate tax creates cash flow problems for family businesses, it presents data showing relative liquidities of estates with farms and other closely held businesses and showing certain characteristics of estates for which benefits have been claimed under section 2032A, 6166, or 2057. The data suggest that many estates that are comprised largely of farms or other closely held businesses have enough liquid assets to satisfy estate tax liabilities. Nonetheless, the decreased liquidity attributable to payment of estate tax may impair a business's ability to function and grow. It is difficult to assess the extent of this impairment caused under the current estate tax.




B. Present and Prior Law for Special-Use Valuation, Installment Payments, and Family-Owned Businesses




1. Valuation



In general

For Federal estate and gift tax purposes, the value of property generally is its fair market value, that is, the price at which the property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts. For Federal estate tax purposes, fair market value generally is determined at either (1) the time of the decedent's death, or (2) the "alternate valuation date," which is six months after the decedent's death.23 For federal gift tax purposes, fair market value generally is determined on the date the gift is made.



Special-use valuation

If certain requirements described below are satisfied, an executor of an estate that includes real property used in farming or another trade or business generally may elect for estate tax purposes to value the property based on its current-use value, rather than based on its highest and best use.24 For an estate of a decedent dying in 2008, the maximum special-use valuation reduction in value for this real property resulting from an election under section 2032A is $960,000.25

An executor of an estate may elect application of the special-use valuation rules if, among other conditions, the following chief requirements are satisfied:


Ÿ The decedent must be a citizen or resident of the United States at the time of death, and the real property qualifying for special-use valuation must be located in the United States;



Ÿ At least 50 percent of the adjusted value of the decedent's gross estate must consist of real or personal property being used at the time of the decedent's death as a farm or in another trade or business;



Ÿ At least 25 percent of the adjusted value of the gross estate must consist of real property that passes to a qualified heir and that was used as a farm or in another closely held trade or business by the decedent or a member of the decedent's family for at least five of the eight years ending on the date of the decedent's death;26



Ÿ For at least five of the eight years ending on the date of the decedent's death, the real property qualifying for current-use valuation must have been owned by the decedent or a member of the decedent's family and must have been used by the decedent or a member of the decedent's family as a farm or other business (a "qualified use"), and the decedent or a member of the decedent's family must have materially participated in the operation of the farm or other business;27 and



Ÿ The real property qualifying for current-use valuation must pass to a qualified heir.28


If, after an election is made to value property at its current-use value, the heir who acquired the real property disposes of the property or ceases to use it in its qualified use within 10 years after the decedent's death, an additional estate tax is imposed as a way of recapturing the estate tax benefit of the current-use valuation.

Recipients of property for which special-use valuation is elected take a basis equal to the property's special-use value, rather than its fair market value.



2. Installment payment of estate tax for closely held businesses

In general, an estate tax return must be filed, and estate tax is due, within nine months of a decedent's death.29 If, however, certain conditions described below are satisfied, an executor generally may elect to pay estate tax attributable to an interest in a closely held business in two or more, but in no more than 10, equal installments.30 If the election is made, the first installment of tax must be paid within five years after the normal nine-months-after-date-ofdeath deadline for payment of estate tax. Each succeeding installment must be paid within one year after the preceding installment.

If payment of tax is deferred during the initial five-year period, interest on the unpaid tax amount must be paid annually during that period. After the initial five-year period, interest on the remaining unpaid tax amount must be paid at the time each installment payment is made. For an estate of a decedent dying in 2008, interest on the amount of deferred estate tax attributable to a maximum of $1.28 million in taxable value of a closely held business is computed at a twopercent rate.31 The maximum amount for which interest is computed at a two-percent rate is adjusted annually for inflation. If the taxable value of a closely held business exceeds the maximum amount for which the two-percent rate is available, the interest rate applicable to estate tax attributable this excess is 45 percent of the rate applicable to underpayments of tax.32 Interest paid on deferred estate taxes is not deductible for estate or income tax purposes.

The installment payment election for payment of estate tax is available only if the decedent at the date of death was a citizen or resident of the United States and the decedent's interest in the closely held business exceeds 35 percent of the adjusted gross estate. An interest in a closely held business includes:


Ÿ an interest as a proprietor in a trade or business carried on as a proprietorship;



Ÿ an interest as a partner in a partnership carrying on a trade or business if the partnership has 45 or fewer partners or if at least 20 percent of the total capital interest in the partnership is included in determining the decedent's gross estate; and



Ÿ stock in a corporation carrying on a trade or business if the corporation has 45 or fewer shareholders or if at least 20 percent of the value of the corporation's voting stock is included in determining the decedent's gross estate.


There are special rules for applying these ownership requirements and the 35-percent test.33 Stock or a partnership interest held by a husband and wife as community property, joint tenants, tenants by the entirety, or tenants in common is treated as owned by one shareholder or one partner, respectively. Property indirectly owned by or for a corporation, partnership, estate, or trust is treated as owned proportionately by its shareholders, partners, or beneficiaries. All stock and all partnership interests held by the decedent or by any member of the decedent's family (within the meaning of section 267(c)(4)) is treated as owned by the decedent. For purposes of the 35-percent test, an interest in a closely held farming business includes an interest in residential buildings and related improvements on the farm that are regularly occupied by the owner or lessees of the farm or by employees that operate or maintain the farm.

In determining whether the 35-percent requirement described above is satisfied and in determining the value of the closely held business, the value of an interest in a closely held business is reduced to the extent the interest is attributable to certain passive assets held by the business.34 Passive assets generally include any assets not used in carrying on a trade or business. Special rules, however, allow executors to elect to treat stock in certain lending and finance businesses to be treated as an active trade or business interest.35 Under this election, the five-year deferral of principal payments is not allowed, and the maximum number of installment payments is five rather than ten.

In general, the installment payment election is available only if the estate directly owns an interest in a closely held active trade or business. Under a special rule, however, an executor may elect to look through certain non-publicly traded holding companies that own stock in a closely held active trade or business.36 If this election is made, neither the five-year deferral of principal payments nor the two-percent interest rate on the first $1.28 million of taxable estate is available.

If the installment payment election is made for an estate, the amount deferred under section 6166 is a lien in favor of the Federal government on designated property that has passed to beneficiaries of the estate.37

If 50 percent or more of the value of the closely held business is distributed, sold, exchanged, or otherwise disposed of, then, in general, the extension of time for the payment of tax no longer applies, and the unpaid portion of the tax payable in installments must be paid upon notice and demand from the Treasury Secretary.38 An exception to this rule is provided for transfers of property to a person entitled to receive the decedent's property under the decedent's will, applicable State law, or a trust created by the decedent. A similar exception applies in the case of a series of subsequent transfers of the property by reason of death so long as each transfer is to a member of the decedent's family (including the decedent's brothers and sisters (whether by the whole or half blood), spouse, ancestors, and lineal descendants).



3. Qualified family-owned business interests

An estate of a decedent dying in 2003 or earlier was permitted to deduct from the value of the gross estate the adjusted value of the qualified family-owned business interests of the decedent.39 The deduction was limited to $675,000.

The qualified family-owned business deduction and the estate tax applicable exclusion amount were coordinated. If the maximum deduction amount of $675,000 was allowed, the applicable exclusion amount was $625,000. The effective estate tax exclusion amount therefore became $1.3 million. If the qualified family-owned business deduction was less than $675,000, the applicable exclusion amount was equal to $625,000 plus the difference between $675,000 and the amount of the qualified-family owned business deduction. The applicable exclusion amount for an estate was not, however, permitted to be increased above the amount that would apply to the estate if section 2057 did not apply. The deduction was terminated for estates of decedents dying after 2003.40 Under present law, however, the qualified family-owned business interest deduction will be available for estates of decedents dying after 2010. The rules for the deduction are therefore summarized below.

A qualified family-owned business interest generally was defined as an interest in a trade or business with a principal place of business in the United States if the decedent and members of the decedent's family owned at least 50 percent of the trade or business, two families owned at least 70 percent of the trade or business, or three families owned at least 90 percent of the trade or business. The 70-percent and 90-percent tests also required the decedent and the decedent's family to own at least 30 percent of the trade or business. An interest in a trade or business did not qualify if any interest in the business (or a related entity) was readily tradable on an established securities market or secondary market at any time within three years of the decedent's death. An interest in a trade or business (other than a bank or a domestic building and loan association (within the meaning of section 542(c)(2)) also did not qualify if more than 35 percent of the adjusted ordinary gross income of the business for the taxable year that included the decedent's death would have been considered personal holding company income (under section 543 with certain modifications) if the business had been a corporation. The value of a trade or business qualifying as a family-owned business interest generally was reduced to the extent the business held cash or marketable securities in excess of reasonably expected day-to-day working capital needs of the business or held other assets that produced passive income (within the section 954(c)(1) definition of personal holding company income, with certain modifications).

The qualified family-owned business deduction was allowed to an estate only if certain other requirements were satisfied. The decedent was required to be a citizen or resident of the United States on the date of death. The decedent or a member of the decedent's family must have owned and materially participated in the trade or business for at least five of the eight years ending on the date of the decedent's date of death. The adjusted value of the qualified family-owned business interests (plus certain gifts of those interests) was required to exceed 50-percent of the decedent's gross estate.

The benefit of the deduction for qualified family-owned business interests was subject to recapture (by imposition of an additional estate tax under detailed rules in section 2057(f)(2)) if, within 10 years of the decedent's death and before the qualified heir's death, one of the following events occurred:


Ÿ the material participation requirements of section 2032A(c)(6)(B) were not satisfied;



Ÿ the qualified heir disposed of any portion of a qualified family-owned business interest, other than by a disposition to a member of the qualified heir's family or through a qualified conservation contribution under section 170(h);



Ÿ the principal place of business of the trade or business ceased to be located within the United States; or



Ÿ the qualified heir lost U.S. citizenship (or certain conditions related to long-term U.S. residence no longer were satisfied).





C. Issues and Data Related to Liquidity




1. Criticisms of sections 2032A, 6166, and 2057

Commentators have criticized the special-use valuation, installment payment, and qualified family-owned business interest rules in several ways. A chief criticism has been that those rules are complex, uncertain in their application, and a poor fit with actual business structures.41 A task force of the American Bar Association's Real Property, Probate and Trust Law Section has provided detailed criticisms of section 6166 and recommendations for reform.42 It has argued, among other things, that the qualification rules for section 6166 vary based on whether a business is a sole proprietorship, corporation, or partnership; that a business with multiple legal entities is treated differently from a business conducted in a single entity, particularly in determining whether assets of the business are passive assets; that the ownership rules are inconsistent with ownership requirements for qualifying as a subchapter S corporation; that the requirement that a section 6166 election be made by the time the estate tax return is filed may prevent estates from satisfying the 35-percent test when changes or new information learned after filing would allow the test to be satisfied; and that the lien requirements for making a section 6166 election (described previously) in some circumstances have made elections impractical. The task force's recommended changes follow from these criticisms.

Other commentators have found complexity and lack of certainty in section 6166 and also in sections 2032A and 2057. The ABA Task Force has argued that the installment payment rules make planning difficult because they require a subjective determination whether a closely held business is an active business; include special rules for distinguishing between passive assets and non-passive assets and for looking through certain holding companies to their underlying assets; and demand post-death monitoring of dispositions or similar transactions that would end deferral of estate tax payments.43 Another commentator has made similar observations about section 6166 and also has argued that the rules for determining whether a business is closely held - specifically the ownership attribution rules - create complexity.44 The ABA Task Force has criticized the qualified family-owned business interest rules as unduly complicated and uncertain in their application, in particular because of the 50-percent test described previously and the requirement that a decedent or a member of the decedent's family materially participate in the operation of the business for a certain period of time before the decedent's death.45 Another commentator has argued that the definitions of a family in sections 2032A and 6166 are conflicting, complicated, and under-inclusive.46 The perceived complications in sections 2032A, 6166, and 2057 are seen not only to make planning and postdeath business management difficult; they are also viewed as creating inequity between welladvised and less well-advised taxpayers.47

The special-use valuation, installment payment, and qualified family-owned business interest rules are detailed and in certain ways subjective, but it is not clear that Congress could achieve its stated objective of ameliorating burdens on family-owned businesses without creating complexity. If Congress is concerned about operating businesses, a distinction between active businesses and other activities - for example, buying and selling securities for investment - is necessary. To determine what constitutes an active business, rules (such as those in present law section 6166) defining passive assets and addressing the treatment of holding companies may be unavoidable. Similarly, the material participation requirement of section 2057 is a logical way to ensure that the family-owned business interest rules are available only for an active, closely held business. If Congress wants preferential rules to be available only when estates are insufficiently liquid to fund their tax liabilities, rules for defining circumstances in which this illiquidity is likely - such as the 35-percent test in section 6166 and the 50-percent test in section 2057 - are needed. If Congress intends to allow preferential treatment only when businesses are family-owned or closely held, there must be rules defining a family, rules limiting ownership to a certain number of individuals, and rules for when ownership is attributed from one person to another person. Last, if the chief policy goal is to prevent the forced sale of farms and other family businesses but not to allow preferential treatment when heirs choose to cease operating a business, rules providing consequences on such a cessation are appropriate.48

Commentators have proposed changes to sections 2032A, 6166, and 2057 to address concerns about complexity. Certain proposed changes may reduce complexity but may do so at the expense of changing the policy of those sections. For instance, the ABA Task Force has suggested, among other alternatives, modifying section 6166 to allow deferral, for a shorter period than the current fifteen years, for all estates, not just estates that satisfy the present law conditions.49 A universal deferral rule would be simpler than current section 6166 but would not be targeted to estates for which liquidity is likely to be a problem. It is unclear whether other proposed changes would have their intended effect of reducing complexity. One commentator has suggested that in place of existing preferential rules, it may be possible to exempt from the estate tax family farms and small businesses.50 In theory, this exemption may not seem complicated. In practice, however, determining what constitutes a family farm or another small business may be contentious and difficult. Examples of questions include the following. What is the result if some number of acres of land is regularly planted with crops but some number of contiguous acres is planted only occasionally? What sort of ownership is needed for a farm to be a family farm? How is a small business distinguished from a medium-sized business? Is the relevant measure number of employees, value of assets, amount of gross receipts, or some other criterion?51 These and other questions underlie many of the current rules in sections 2032A, 6166, and 2057.

A second broad criticism of sections 2032A, 6166, and 2057 has been that those provisions favor the holding of certain assets over other kinds of assets, thereby encouraging planning and distorting economic behavior.52 In 2001 testimony before the Senate Finance Committee on the subject of tax simplification, Richard M. Lipton, then chair of the American Bar Association Section of Taxation, stated:


Much attention has been focused on specific provisions designed to alleviate the impact of the gift and estate tax on specific groups, such as the owners of family farms, ranches, and businesses. As a result of that attention, specific relief has been enacted to assist those affected individuals. However, despite the best intentions of these provisions, qualification for and compliance with them are onerous, and in many cases business decisions are driven purely by planning for a tax result instead of being based on sound economics.53


Lipton argued that a "truly meaningful increase" in the estate tax exclusion amount would remove many taxpayers from the estate tax entirely, thereby reducing the need for complicated planning, and would allow repeal of sections 2032A and 2057.54 Another commentator has noted that as a result of the special-use valuation and installment payment rules, the estate of a decedent who dies holding a business "will benefit from more favorable treatment under the estate tax than if the estate's assets consisted of passive investments...."55 This commentator has argued that this preference for business assets over passive investments is part of a systemic (though, in the commentator's view, likely accidental) "tax subsidy for entrepreneurship" throughout the Code.56 It is undeniable that by granting favorable treatment to estates that consist largely of family-owned business assets, sections 2032A, 2057, and 6166 encourage planning (and the incurrence of significant related costs). This planning likely produces real economic distortions. The extent of these distortions is unknown.



2. Effects of present law on small and family-owned businesses



Overview

Some observers note that the transfer tax system may impose special cash flow burdens on small or family-owned businesses. They note that if a family has a substantial proportion of its wealth invested in one enterprise, the need to pay estate taxes may force heirs to liquidate all or part of the enterprise or to encumber the business with debt to meet the estate tax liability. If the business is sold, while the assets generally do not cease to exist and remain a productive part of the economy, the share of business represented by small or family-owned businesses may be diminished by the estate tax. If the business borrows to meet estate tax liability, the business's cash flow may be strained.57

Others argue that potential deleterious effects on investment by small or family-owned businesses are limited. The present (2008) exemption value of the unified credit is $2 million per decedent. As a result, small business owners can obtain an effective exemption of up to $4 million per married couple, and other legitimate tax planning can further reduce the burden on such enterprises. For example, lifetime gifts to heirs of interests in the closely held business reduce the eventual estate tax liability attributable to business assets. Alternatively, lifetime gifts of cash or securities may provide funds to heirs to meet some or all of an estate tax liability that may be attributable to closely held business assets. Also, as described previously, sections 2032A, 6166, and (for estates before 2004) 2057 are provided to reduce the impingement on small business cash flow that may result from an estate tax liability.

It is difficult to assess the degree to which estate tax impedes the survival and future growth of a closely held small business. Any tax payment reduces funds available to the heirs, but at the choice of the heirs, some or all of the reduction in funds could come from reduced personal consumption by the heirs rather than by reduced future business investment. Similarly, rather than reduce business investment, the decedent may have chosen to reduce his or her personal consumption to assure that the business would be adequately funded after payment of any transfer taxes.



Examination of 2001 data

A recent study of estate returns of persons who died in 2001 shows that many estates that claimed benefits under secs. 2032A, 2057, or 6166 held liquid assets nearly sufficient to meet all debts against the estate and that only 2.4 percent of estates that reported closely held business assets and agricultural assets elected the deferral of tax under section 6166.58 This study uses detailed estate tax return data to calculate a liquidity ratio, the ratio of liquid assets (cash, cash management accounts, State and local bonds, Federal government bonds, publicly traded stock, and insurance on the life of the decedent) to the sum of the net estate tax plus mortgages and liens. A liquidity ratio of one implies that the estate has liquid assets sufficient to pay the net estate tax plus pay off all mortgages and liens. The study found that in 2001, on average, this ratio exceeded three for estates of less than $2.5 million claiming benefits of the special deduction for qualified family owned business assets or the section 2032A special use valuation.59 This means that, on average such estates had $3 in liquid assets for every $1 of estate tax liability and mortgage and lien. The study found that for estates of less than $2.5 million electing deferral of tax, the average liquidity ratio was slightly larger than one.60

A liquidity ratio of one or more suggests that closely held business assets need not be sold, nor need a loan be incurred, to pay the estate tax. While the existence of liquid assets can insure that core business assets are unencumbered by the estate tax, the business's ability to function could be adversely affected by the reduction in liquid assets. Ongoing businesses need liquid assets in order to purchase raw materials, pay labor, finance expansion, and engage in other routine business activities. The greater the liquidity ratio is above one, the less likely that on-going business needs are impaired. The study found that generally all estates claiming special use valuations had an average liquidity ratio of at least one. For larger estates claiming benefits of the special deduction for qualified family owned business assets or deferral of tax, liquidity ratios averaged 0.5 or more.61 While a liquidity ratio of less than one suggests that it is likely that closely held business assets would be impaired by the estate tax liability, it is important to remember the limitations of the estate tax data. These data do not show pre-death estate planning transfers of assets to the heirs who might ultimately be running the business. For example, the purchase of life insurance by the heirs is a common planning technique to insure that business assets need not be sold to meet estate tax liabilities. Insurance amounts paid on the death of the decedent to a person other than the estate are not included as liquid assets for the purpose of computing the liquidity ratios reported in the study.

A limitation of the study discussed above is that it reports the average liquidity ratio. If there is substantial variation in the way owners of closely held business assets manage their affairs, an average does not provide sufficient detail as to the extent to which the estate tax may or may not be thought to impair the continuity of closely held businesses upon the death of an owner. In Tables 2 though 6, below, the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation ("JCT staff") replicates the computation of the liquidity ratio on the 2001 estates with closely held business assets, but in addition to reporting the overall average liquidity ratio, the tables report average liquidity ratios from the second and ninth deciles of the distribution of such returns. Specifically, Tables 2 and 3 report liquidity ratios for 2001 estates that included farm land as an asset in the estate (13,981 estates) and those that claimed the special use valuation for some or all of the farmland in the estate (788 estates). Table 2 reports liquidity ratios for all such estates, while Table 3 reports liquidity ratios for those estates with an estate tax liability ("taxable estates"). The first row reports the average liquidity ratio of all 2001 estates that included farm land as an asset in the estate and all 2001 estates that claimed the special use valuation for some or all of the farmland in the estate. For this purpose, the JCT staff assigns a zero liquidity ratio to estates with no tax liability or outstanding debts.62 The JCT staff ranks and numbers all estates with farmland and all estates with farmland claiming a special use valuation from the estate with the lowest liquidity ratio to the estate with the highest liquidity ratio. The second decile is made up of estates with farmland numbered 1,398 to 2,796 and for estates with farmland claiming the special use valuation numbered 79 to 157. Likewise the ninth deciles are estates with farmland numbered 11,184 to 12,583 and for estates with farmland claiming the special use valuation numbered 630 to 709. The second row reports the average liquidity ratio for the second decile, the third row reports the median liquidity ratio, and the fourth row reports the average liquidity ratio for the ninth decile.


Table 2.-Liquidity Ratios for Estates with Farmland and Estates with Farmland Claiming Benefits Under Sec. 2032A [2001 Decedents]





____________________________________________________________________________________
All Estates including Estates including
Farmland Farmland and claiming
special-use valuation

____________________________________________________________________________________
Average liquidity ratio 3.4 0.5

____________________________________________________________________________________
Average liquidity ratio of the
second decile 0.0 0.0

____________________________________________________________________________________
Median liquidity ratio 0.0 0.0

____________________________________________________________________________________
Average liquidity ratio of the
ninth decile 8.0 1.3

____________________________________________________________________________________




Table 3.-Liquidity Ratios for Taxable Estates with Farmland and Estates with Farmland Claiming Benefits Under Sec. 2032A [2001 Decedents]





____________________________________________________________________________________
All estates including Estates including
Farmland Farmland and claiming
special-use valuation

____________________________________________________________________________________
Average liquidity ratio 2.7 0.9

____________________________________________________________________________________
Average liquidity ratio of the
second decile 1.0 0.4

____________________________________________________________________________________
Median liquidity ratio 3.0 2.6

____________________________________________________________________________________
Average liquidity ratio of the
ninth decile 26.0 7.0

____________________________________________________________________________________



Tables 2 and 3 present rather similar results. The majority of estates with farmland and those claiming benefits of section 2032A have either a liquidity ratio of zero (meaning no estate tax or debt liability) or a liquidity ratio of one or more. In Table 3 the average liquidity ratio in the second decile of estates with farmland is one. That is, the estate includes liquid assets equal in value to the sum of the estate's estate tax liability and other debts. For estates claiming the special-use valuation the liquidity ratio of half of the estates exceeds 2.6. These data suggest that estates with farmland and estates that claim the special use valuation generally are not directly impaired by an estate tax liability. In 2001, these estates generally included sufficient liquid assets to pay the estate tax, if any, without necessitating a sale of farmland.63

A more detailed examination of liquidity ratios for those estates reporting closely held business assets and those claiming benefits under section 2057 suggest a greater potential for the estate tax to create a direct impairment of closely held business assets. While Table 4, below, reports that more than 50 percent of all such estates have no estate tax liability (median liquidity ratio of zero), among taxable estates (Table 5) the median liquidity ratio is 0.2. That is, the value of liquid assets in the estate equals only 20 percent of the sum of the estate's estate tax liability and other outstanding debts. Even in the ninth decile of taxable estates claiming the benefit of section 2057 in 2001 the average estate had liquid assets somewhat less in value than the sum of the estate tax liability and other outstanding debts (average liquidity ratio of 0.9). On the other hand, among taxable estates reporting some closely held business assets (the second column of Table 5) more than 50 percent of estates had liquidity ratios in excess of one (median liquidity ratio of 3.0 implying the median estate had liquid assets equal to three times the value of the sum of the estate tax and other outstanding debts). To be eligible for the benefit of section 2057, closely held business assets had to constitute a significant proportion of the estate. Many estates included some closely held business assets but were not eligible for the exclusion under section 2057. For those estates with closely held business assets that did not claim the benefit of section 2057 in 2001, closely held business assets generally were not a large portion of the estate.


Table 4.-Liquidity Ratios for Estates with Closely Held Business Assets and Estates Claiming Benefits Under Sec. 2057 [2001 Decedents]1





____________________________________________________________________________________
All estates including All estates including
closely held business closely held business
assets assets and claiming
deduction for qualified
family owned business
interests

____________________________________________________________________________________
Average liquidity ratio 2.8 1.0

____________________________________________________________________________________
Average liquidity ratio of the
second decile 0.0 0.0

____________________________________________________________________________________
Median liquidity ratio 0.0 0.0

____________________________________________________________________________________
Average liquidity ratio of the
ninth decile 8.0 3.0

____________________________________________________________________________________
1 The total number of estates with closely held business assets was 15,784. Of
those estates, 1,022 elected section 2057.





Table 5.-Liquidity Ratios for Taxable Estates with Closely Held Business Assets and Estates Claiming Benefits Under Sec. 2057 [2001 Decedents]1





____________________________________________________________________________________
All estates All estates including
including closely closely held business assets
held business assets and claiming deduction for
qualified family owned
business interests

____________________________________________________________________________________
Average liquidity ratio 2.2 0.4

____________________________________________________________________________________
Average liquidity ratio of the
second decile 0.8 0.1

____________________________________________________________________________________
Median liquidity ratio 3.0 0.2

____________________________________________________________________________________
Average liquidity ratio of the
ninth decile 24.0 0.9

____________________________________________________________________________________
1 The total number of taxable estates with closely held business assets was 6,640.
Of those estates, 91 elected section 2057.




In 2001, an estate could claim benefits under section 2032A or 2057 and reduce the value of the estate below the threshold at which any estate tax would be liable. Unlike section 2032A or section 2057, section 6166 is only beneficial to an estate if the estate has an estate tax liability after application of the provision. Table 6 below again reports liquidity ratios for estates with closely held business assets but reports data only for those estates with a positive estate tax liability. Therefore the second column of Table 6 is identical to the second column of Table 5. The third column of Table 6 reports liquidity ratios for those estates that defer payment of the estate tax liability under section 6166. Comparison of column three to column two indicates that estates that use the deferred payment of section 6166 have lower liquidity ratios than all estates that include closely held business assets. Such a result is consistent with the purpose of section 6166, to provide deferral when sale of closely held business assets might otherwise be necessary to meet an estate tax obligation. However, Table 6 also suggests that in some cases even when there is sufficient liquidity in the estate, the estate elects deferral under section 6166, as the average liquidity ratio of the ninth decile of estates that elect deferral under 6166 is 2.0 (the estate holds liquid assets equal to twice the value of the sum of the estate tax liability and other outstanding debts). However, without knowing the business needs for operating capital, it is not possible to conclude that such estates are taking advantage of perceived favorable interest rates under section 6166.


Table 6.-Liquidity Ratios for Estates with Closely Held Business Assets and Estates Electing to Defer Payment Under Sec. 6166 [2001 Decedents]1





____________________________________________________________________________________
All estates All estates including
including closely closely held business assets
held business assets and electing deferral of tax
liability under sec. 6166

____________________________________________________________________________________
Average liquidity ratio 2.2 0.50

____________________________________________________________________________________
Average liquidity ratio of the
second decile 0.8 0.01

____________________________________________________________________________________
Median liquidity ratio 3.0 0.70

____________________________________________________________________________________
Average liquidity ratio of the
ninth decile 24.0 2.00

____________________________________________________________________________________
1 The total number of estates making an election under section 6166 was 488.






More recent data

As described previously, several Code provisions may reduce the burden of the estate tax borne by small or family-owned businesses. Table 7,64 below, presents data from estate tax returns filed in 2005 on the utilization of these provisions in comparison to all estate tax returns filed. In 2005, among estates valued at less than $5 million, and with a positive estate tax liability, approximately 0.6 percent elected deferral under section 6166, while among estates valued at $5 million or more approximately 3.6 percent of estates elected deferral under section 6166. With respect to estates claiming a special-use valuation under section 2032A, the percentages are roughly the reverse. Among estates valued at less than $5 million, and with a positive estate tax liability, approximately 1.4 percent claimed a special use valuation under section 2032A, while among estates valued at $5 million or more approximately 0.6 percent of estates claimed a special use valuation under section 2032A.


Table 7.-Estates Claiming a Special Use Valuation or Electing Deferral of Tax Liability, Returns Filed in 2005





____________________________________________________________________________________
Item Estates with Value Estates with Value of total
of total gross gross estate $5 million or
estate less than $5 greater
million

____________________________________________________________________________________
Number of returns filed 29,060 5,108

____________________________________________________________________________________
Percentage of all returns filed 85% 15%

____________________________________________________________________________________
Number of taxable returns 12,804 2,981

____________________________________________________________________________________
Percentage of total taxable gross
estate on all taxable returns 39% 61%

____________________________________________________________________________________
Number of returns claiming a
special use valuation under sec.
2032A 181 17

____________________________________________________________________________________
Number of returns making sec.
6166 election 74 108

____________________________________________________________________________________
Source: JCT staff tabulations from Statistics of Income data.




Table 8,65 below, reports data on the extent to which estates are made up of closely held stock or business interests. The data show that approximately 14.4 percent of estate tax returns filed in 2005 reported some holdings of closely held stock. For estates claiming the tax benefits provided by section 2032A or 6166, the holdings of closely held stock comprised 46 percent of the taxable estate for estates valued at $5 million or greater and comprised 34 percent for estates valued less than $5 million. For estates holding closely held stock, but not claiming the tax benefits provided by section 2032A or 6166, closely held stock represented less than 20 percent of the taxable gross estate on average.


Table 8.-Closely Held Stock in Estate Tax Returns Filed in 2005





____________________________________________________________________________________
Item Estates with Value Estates with Value of total
of total gross gross estate $5 million or
estate less than $5 greater
million

____________________________________________________________________________________
Number of returns filed 29,060 5,108

____________________________________________________________________________________
Total gross estate (millions of
dollars) $64,379 $77,049

____________________________________________________________________________________
Value of closely held stock
millions of dollars) $1,778 $7,267

____________________________________________________________________________________
Value of closely held stock as a
percentage of total gross estate 2.8% 9.4%

____________________________________________________________________________________
Number of estates with closely
held stock 3,420 1,507

____________________________________________________________________________________
Number of estates with closely
held stock as a percentage of all
returns filed 11.8% 29.5%

____________________________________________________________________________________
Total gross estate of those
estates with closely held stock
(millions of dollars) $9,187 $32,418

____________________________________________________________________________________
Number of estates with closely
held stock and claiming benefits
of secs. 2032A or 6166 54 74

____________________________________________________________________________________
Value of closely held stock as a
percentage of the taxable gross
estate of estates claiming
benefits of secs. 2032A or 6166 34% 46%

____________________________________________________________________________________
Number of estates with closely
held stock not claiming benefits
of secs. 2032A or 6166 3,366 1,433

____________________________________________________________________________________
Value of closely held stock as a
percentage of the taxable gross
estate of estates not claiming
benefits of secs. 2032A or 6166 19% 18%

____________________________________________________________________________________
Source: JCT staff tabulations from Statistics of Income data.







APPENDIX: REFORM OPTIONS PREVIOUSLY PREPARED BY THE STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION 66





A. Limit Perpetual Dynasty Trusts (secs. 2631 and 2632)





Present Law


In general, present law imposes transfer taxes that are designed to tax transfers once each generation. These taxes are in the form of a gift tax for lifetime transfers, an estate tax for death time transfers, and a generation skipping transfer tax for transfers to persons more than one generation younger than the transferor. A generation skipping tax is imposed on all transfers, whether directly or indirectly, to "skip persons." A skip person includes a person who is two or more generations below the generation of the transferor or a trust, if all the interests are held by skip persons. The transferor generally is the individual who transfers property in a transaction that is subject to Federal estate or gift tax. Transfers that are subject to the generation skipping tax are direct skips (e.g., a transfer from a grandparent to a grandchild), taxable distributions (e.g., a distribution of income or corpus to a grandchild from a trust created by a grandparent), and taxable terminations (e.g., the death of a grandchild who was a beneficiary of a trust created by a grandparent).

Present law provides for a lifetime per-transferor exemption from the generation skipping transfer tax.67 The amount of the generation skipping transfer tax exemption is $1,500,000 for generation skipping transfers made in 2005, $2,000,000 for generation skipping transfers made in 2006, 2007, or 2008, and $3,500,000 for generation skipping transfers made in 2009. In the case of a generation skipping trust, the exemption applies to distributions from, or terminations of interests in, that fraction of the trust that the portion of the exemption that is allocated to the trust bears to the value of trust's assets at its creation. Thus, if a generation skipping trust is created with $1.5 million and $1.5 million of the creator's generation skipping transfer tax exemption is allocated to that trust, no generation skipping transfer tax ever is imposed on any distributions from, or termination of interests in, that trust regardless of the number of generations of the trust's beneficiaries that are skipped.

Many States limit the length of time that assets can be held in trust for the benefit of beneficiaries who were not alive at the time of the creation of the trust. This limitation is generally referred to as the rule against perpetuities. The rule against perpetuities was a judicially created rule of English common law. In many cases, States adopted the rule against perpetuities when they adopted British common law as their basic law. The rule has been criticized as being inconsistent with the present capital market system, and because of its complexity and resulting uncertainty of application. In order to alleviate this uncertainty, some States have adopted the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities. Under that uniform statute, "trust settlors may elect to create either a trust measured by lives in being at the creation of the trust plus 21 years or trust measured by ninety-years."68 Other States have either repealed the rule against perpetuities, or provided an ability to opt out of the rule. In a State without a mandatory rule against perpetuities, it is possible to transfer assets to a trust created in that State, to which the transferor's generation skipping tax exemption has been allocated. The trust assets may grow for a potentially unlimited period of time without being subject to any transfer tax. Because of their potential long life and potential for substantial accumulation, such trusts generally are called "perpetual dynasty trusts."




Reasons for Change


Perpetual dynasty trusts are inconsistent with the uniform structure of the estate and gift taxes to impose a transfer tax once every generation. In addition, perpetual dynasty trusts deny equal treatment of all taxpayers because such trusts can only be established in the States that have repealed the mandatory rule against perpetuities.




Description of Proposal


The proposal prohibits the allocation of the generation skipping tax exemption to a "perpetual dynasty trust," except to the extent that the trust provides for distributions to beneficiaries in the generations of the transferor's children or grandchildren. Under the proposal, the generation-skipping tax exemption effectively is limited to an exemption of a skip of one generation. A "perpetual dynasty trust" is defined as a trust whose situs (place of creation) is a State that either (1) has repealed the rule against perpetuities, (2) allows the creator of a trust to elect to be exempt from the rule against perpetuities and the creator so elects, or (3) has modified its rule against perpetuities to permit creation of interests for individuals more than three generations younger than the interest's creator. If the situs of a trust is moved from a State that has retained the rule against perpetuities to a State that has repealed the rule against perpetuities, the inclusion ratio thereafter will be changed to one.




Effective Date


The proposal is effective for transfers made after the date of enactment.




Discussion


As Congress stated both when it originally imposed a tax on generation skipping transfers in 1976 and again when it revised the generation skipping tax in 1986, the purpose of imposing gift, estate and generation skipping tax was "not only to raise revenue, but to do so in a manner that has as nearly as possible a uniform effect."69 Similarly, the Congress stated that it "believed that the tax law should basically be neutral and that there should be no tax advantage available in setting up trusts."70 The imposition of a generation skipping tax was believed necessary to achieve the uniformity of imposing a transfer tax once every generation. A $1 million exemption from the generation skipping tax originally was provided when the generation skipping tax was revised in 1986. The size of the generation-skipping transfer tax exemption was increased beginning in 2002 to be equal to the amount of effective exemption for estate and gift taxes. Thus, the exemption from the generation skipping transfer tax is scheduled to increase to $3.5 million by 2009. When Congress originally enacted a tax on generation skipping transfers, it noted that "[m]ost States have a rule against perpetuities which limits the duration of a trust."71

Since that time, a number of States have either repealed the rule against perpetuities or provided an ability to opt out of such limitations. Thus, it is possible to transfer a relatively large initial amount of assets to a trust created in such States and to which the transferor's entire generation skipping tax exemption has been allocated. Potentially unlimited growth in the trust assets may occur, while the assets are not subject to any transfer tax even though the trust's beneficiaries have changed many generations. These "perpetual dynasty trusts" can be used to frustrate the uniform application of transfer tax that was envisioned when the generation skipping tax was enacted. This lack of uniformity is compounded by the fact that perpetual dynasty trusts can be created only in the limited number of States that have repealed or modified the rule against perpetuities.

The proposal would result in greater uniformity by limiting exemption from the generation skipping transfer tax for perpetual dynasty trusts. The proposal is consistent both with the purpose of enacting a generation skipping transfer tax, and with the operation of the present transfer tax system, which generally imposes a tax once every generation by limiting the amount of assets that can be placed beyond the present-law transfer taxes. The proposal also is consistent with the generation skipping tax exemption, in that it permits an exemption from the generation skipping transfer tax for transfers to the transferor's grandchildren. The proposal avoids the possible constitutional limitations of alternative proposals to limit the transfer tax advantage of perpetual dynasty trusts (e.g., impose an ad valorem tax every set number of years on perpetual dynasty trusts). In addition, the proposal is consistent with the purposes of the rule against perpetuities to prevent perpetuation of wealth disparities, promote alienability of property, and make property productive.72 The proposal does not prevent an individual from creating a trust in a State that has repealed the rule against perpetuities. Thus, the proposal does not prevent the creation of a trust in a State if that State otherwise would be the best State in which to create a trust. The proposal does, however, eliminate a Federal transfer tax advantage for creating a trust in a State that has repealed the rule against perpetuities.




B. Determine Certain Valuation Discounts More Accurately for Federal Estate and Gift Tax Purposes (secs. 2031, 2512, and 2624)





Present Law




In general

The value of property subject to transfer taxes is the fair market value of the property being transferred on the date of transfer.73 The fair market value is the price at which the property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or to sell and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts.74

If actual sales prices and bona fide bid and asked prices are lacking, the fair market value of stock in a closely held business is determined by looking to various factors including: the company's net worth; its prospective earning power and dividend-paying capacity; the goodwill of the business; the economic outlook in the nation and in the particular industry; the company's position in the industry and its management; the degree of control of the business represented by the block of stock to be valued; and the values of securities of corporations engaged in the same or similar lines of businesses.75



Discounts



In general

Courts and the IRS have recognized that for various reasons interests in an entity (shares in a corporation or interests in a partnership, for instance) may be worth less than the owner's proportionate share of the value of the entity's assets. For example, the value of a 50-percent shareholder's stock might differ from the value of 50 percent of the assets owned by the corporation in which the stock is held. Some (but not all) of the valuation discounts used under present law are discussed below.76 In many cases courts apply more than one discount. The theories of some discounts overlap, and court decisions sometimes blur the distinctions between those discounts.



Minority (or lack of control) discount

Numerous courts and the IRS have recognized that shares of stock or other ownership interests in a closely held business entity that represent a minority interest are usually worth less than a proportionate share of the value of the assets of the entity.77 Minority discounts arise from a division of control because the holder of a minority interest cannot control the ongoing direction of the business entity, the timing and amount of income distributed by the entity to its owners, or the liquidation of its assets. Minority discounts often result in reductions in the value of transferred property from 15 percent to 40 percent.78



Marketability (or illiquidity) discount

Recognizing that closely held stock and partnership interests often are less attractive to investors and have fewer potential purchasers than publicly traded stock, courts and the IRS grant discounts to reflect the illiquidity of such interests. Courts sometimes combine marketability and minority discounts into a single discount,79 but the discounts reflect different concerns. Whereas the minority discount compensates for lack of control over an interest, the marketability discount compensates for the limitations upon free exit inherent in interests for which no public market exists. The marketability discount may be appropriate whether valuing a controlling or a minority ownership interest.80 Generally, the size of the marketability discount is reduced as the donor's or decedent's control of the corporation or partnership increases. However, the discount has been applied to a 100-percent ownership interest in a closely held corporation.81 Marketability discounts often result in reductions in the value of transferred property of 20 to 30 percent82 in addition to any applicable minority discount.83 Marketability discounts often are created by placing assets in a limited partnership. Marketability discounts created through the use of a limited partnership permit the donee or legatee to recreate value by liquidating the partnership or having a partner's interest redeemed by the partnership.



Fragmentation (or fractional interest) discount

Fragmentation discounts are similar to minority discounts. This discount arises from the lack of control inherent in joint ownership of an asset (e.g., a gift of an undivided fractional interest in real estate).84 Fragmentation discounts often result in reductions in the value of transferred property of 15 to 60 percent.85



Investment company discount

The investment company discount arises because the market values of closed-end mutual funds and investment companies often are less than the net asset values of those funds and companies. These discounts can be as high as 50 percent and may overlap with the marketability discount.86




Reasons for Change


Under present law, valuation discounts can significantly reduce the estate and gift tax values of transferred property. Minority and marketability discounts in particular often create substantial reductions in value. In some cases these reductions in value for estate and gift tax purposes do not accurately reflect value. For example, a taxpayer may make gifts to a child of minority interests in property and claim lack-of-control discounts under the gift tax even though the taxpayer or the taxpayer's child controls the property being transferred. A taxpayer also may contribute marketable property such as publicly-traded stock to a partnership (such as a family limited partnership) or other entity that he or she controls and, when interests in that entity are transferred through the estate, claim marketability discounts even though the heirs may be able to liquidate the entity and recover the full value by accessing the underlying assets directly.




Description of Proposal




In general

The proposal provides rules for determining the value of property for Federal transfer tax purposes. These rules limit the availability of minority and marketability discounts. In certain situations the proposal also may have an effect on other discounts such as the investment company discount and the fragmentation discount. The property interests to which the proposal applies include shares of stock of a corporation, interests in a partnership or limited liability company, and other similar interests in a business or investment entity or in an asset. The proposal has two parts, aggregation rules and a look-through rule. Under the proposal, step transaction principles are used to determine whether two or more transfers are treated as a single transfer. Moreover, any interest in an asset owned by the spouse of a transferor or transferee is considered as owned by the transferor or transferee.

The aggregation and look-through rules described below generally apply to all gifts made during life without consideration, transfers at death, generation-skipping events, and any transfer of an asset by gift for an amount of consideration less than the value determined under those rules. The rules described below are not intended, however, to change the principles of present law concerning whether transfers made in the ordinary course of business are, or are not, treated as gifts.87



Aggregation rules



Basic aggregation rule

Under the proposal, the value for Federal estate, gift, and generation-skipping transfer tax purposes of any asset transferred by a transferor (a donor or decedent) generally is a pro-rata share of the fair market value of the entire interest in the asset owned by the transferor just before the transfer (the "basic aggregation rule").


Example 1 .-Mother owns 80 percent of the interests in a limited liability company ("LLC"). LLC's value is $100,000, and Mother's 80-percent interest has a value of $80,000.88 Mother makes related gifts of 20-percent interests to each of her two children. Under the proposal, the value of each 20-percent interest for transfer tax purposes is one-quarter (20/80) of the value of Mother's 80-percent interest, or $20,000. Because this value is a pro-rata share of the value of Mother's controlling interest, the value does not reflect a minority discount.89



Example 2 .-Mother owns a 40-percent interest in LLC. The value of this 40-percent interest is $32,000, reflecting a 20-percent minority discount. Mother dies. This 40-percent interest passes through Mother's estate in equal shares to two children who did not previously own any interests in the LLC. Under the proposal, the value of each 20-percent share for transfer tax purposes is $16,000, one-half (20/40) of Mother's interest at death.90




Transferee aggregation rule

A special rule applies if a donor or a decedent's estate does not own a controlling interest in an asset just before a transfer of all or a portion of the asset to a donee or heir and, in the hands of the donee or heir, the transferred asset is part of a controlling interest. In that case, the estate, gift, and generation-skipping transfer tax value of the asset transferred is a pro-rata share of the fair market value of the entire interest in the asset owned by the donee or heir (not by the transferor) after taking into account the gift or bequest (the "transferee aggregation rule").


Example 3 .-The facts follow those in Examples 1 and 2 except that instead of making gifts and bequests to different children, Mother transfers interests in LLC only to one child. Thus, during her life Mother makes a single gift of a 40-percent interest to one child. After application of the basic aggregation rule, this gift has a value of $40,000, one half (40/80) of the value of Mother's entire 80-percent interest. At the time of her death, assume that an 80-percent interest in the LLC is still worth $80,000, but that Mother's remaining 40-percent interest is worth only $32,000, reflecting a minority discount. After application of the transferee aggregation rule, the 40-percent interest transferred to the child has a value of $40,000, one-half the $80,000 value of child's 80-percent interest after the bequest. Because the child has a controlling interest after the transfer, the value of the bequest for transfer tax purposes does not incorporate a minority discount.




Look-through rule

If, after application of the aggregation rules described above, a transferred interest in an entity is part of a controlling interest owned (before the transfer) by the transferor or (after the transfer) by the transferee, a look-through rule may apply to determine the value of that transferred interest. Under the look-through rule, if at least one-third of the entity's assets (by value) consists of marketable assets, the value of a transferred interest in that entity for Federal estate, gift, and generation-skipping transfer tax purposes is the sum of (1) the net value of the entity's marketable assets allocable to that transferred interest and (2) the value of the transferor's interest in the entity attributable to nonmarketable assets. Marketable assets include cash, bank accounts, certificates of deposit, money market accounts, commercial paper, U.S. and foreign treasury obligations and bonds, corporate obligations and bonds, precious metals or commodities, and publicly traded instruments. Marketable assets do not include assets that are part of an active lending or financing business.91

If the look-through rule applies, the effect is to deny a marketability discount to the extent the entity holds marketable assets. In all cases in which the look-through rule applies, no minority discount is permitted because a condition of the look-through rule is that the transferred interest must be part of a controlling interest either before or after the transfer.


Example 4 .-At her death, Aunt owns 80 percent of the interests in an LLC whose assets have a total value of $1 million. The LLC owns publicly-traded stock worth $600,000, real estate worth $200,000, and a laundromat business worth $200,000. Aunt's 80-percent interest in LLC passes through her estate to Niece. If it is assumed that a marketability discount, if available, is 25 percent, then under the proposal the estate tax value of this 80-percent interest is $720,000, computed in the following manner. Because 60 percent of the value of LLC's assets is represented by marketable assets (the publicly-traded stock) and because Aunt owns a controlling interest before the transfer, the look-through rule applies. The $720,000 value thus equals (1) 80 percent of the value of the publicly-traded stock, or $480,000 ($600,000 x 80 percent), plus (2) the value of Aunt's interest in the entity attributable to the real estate and laundromat business, or $240,000 (80 percent of $300,000 (with the $300,000 representing the value of the laundromat business and real estate after taking into account a 25-percent marketability discount)).92



Example 5 .-The facts are the same as in Example 4, except that the laundromat business is worth $1.2 million. The total value of LLC's assets is $2 million. Consequently, the value of the marketable assets equals only 30 percent of the value of the LLC, and the look-through rule does not apply. The estate tax value of this 80-percent interest is $1.2 million, which equals 80 percent of the value of the LLC (80 percent ´ $2 million = $1.6 million), less a 25-percent marketability discount ($400,000). No minority discount is available because the 80-percent interest is a controlling interest.



Example 6 .-The facts are the same as in Example 4, except that Aunt owns only a 10-percent interest in the LLC and Niece does not own any interest in it before she inherits her Aunt's interest. Accordingly, the look-through rule does not apply because the 10-percent interest is not part of a controlling interest either before or after the transfer. Therefore, a minority discount is available. Assume the minority discount is 20 percent. The value of the 10-percent interest is therefore $60,000, which equals 10 percent of the value of the LLC ($100,000), less (1) a 20-percent minority discount ($20,000) and (2) a 25-percent marketability discount ($20,000) computed after application of the minority discount (that is, 25 percent of $80,000, the value remaining after taking into account the minority discount).





Effective Date


The proposal applies to transfers occurring and estates of decedents dying on or after the date of enactment.




Discussion


The proposal responds to the frequent use of family limited partnerships ("FLPs") and LLCs to create minority and marketability discounts. In a common planning technique, a taxpayer forms an FLP or LLC, contributes to that entity marketable securities, real estate, and other assets, and makes gifts of noncontrolling interests in the entity. At death, the taxpayer owns only a noncontrolling interest in the FLP or LLC (rather than the underlying assets). Under present law the gifts made during life may qualify for minority and marketability discounts, and the estate tax value of the taxpayer's interest in the FLP or LLC also may be substantially reduced by those discounts.93 The proposal seeks to curb the use of this strategy frequently employed to manufacture discounts that do not reflect the economics of the transfers during life and after death. More broadly, the proposal attempts to reduce the inefficiency caused by the creation of complicated structures that serve only to shelter value from taxation.

The proposed aggregation and look-through rules restrict a taxpayer's ability to claim minority and marketability discounts in certain situations in which those discounts do not accurately reflect the value of the property interests transferred. In general, the basic aggregation rule of the proposal determines the existence of a minority discount by taking into account the entire interest held by the transferor just before the transfer. This is because the focus of the estate and gift tax should be on the amount a transfer depletes the value of the transferor's holdings. Thus, no minority interest should apply if the transferor holds a controlling interest in the property just before the transfer. Although inconsistent with this theory, the transferee aggregation rule is proposed to prevent the strategic sequencing of multiple gifts made to the same donee. The aggregate value of a series of lifetime and testamentary gifts made by one donor to the same donee should not depend upon the order in which controlling and noncontrolling interests are transferred to the donee.

The proposed look-through rule addresses abusive situations in which a marketability discount is inappropriate. If an entity whose interests are nonmarketable holds marketable assets, a marketability discount for an interest in the entity results in the undervaluing of the interest if the owner has a controlling interest in the entity and can easily access the marketable assets.

The proposal does not eliminate minority and marketability discounts in other contexts in which facts generally support those discounts. If, for example, neither the transferor nor the transferee owns a controlling interest in an entity, the estate and gift tax value of an interest in that entity may be determined by taking into account the lack of control. Similarly, where an entity's value primarily is attributable to nonmarketable assets, the estate and gift tax value of an interest in that entity may reflect that illiquidity.

The proposal is similar to, but refines, several previous legislative proposals. First, the basic aggregation rule is similar to a proposal made by the Treasury Department in 1984 as part of a broad report on tax reform.94 The 1984 proposal, however, based the value of transferred property on the transferor's highest level of ownership after taking into account prior gifts. This tracing of ownership backward through all gifts made by a transferor during his or her lifetime would create significant administrative difficulties. The proposed basic aggregation rule, therefore, looks only to the transferor's ownership interest just before the transfer. To eliminate the advantage of strategic sequencing of gifts to the same donee, the proposal adds a donee aggregation rule. Second, the look-through rule is similar to the approach taken in the Fiscal Year 2000 Administration Budget Proposal.95 That proposal would have required an interest in an entity to be valued at a proportionate share of the net asset value of the entity to the extent the entity held non-business assets. The proposal's look-through rule is narrower than the earlier Treasury proposal, on the theory that in certain cases it may be inappropriate to look through an interest in an entity if the entity primarily holds non-marketable assets.96 Third, the proposal incorporates spousal attribution but does not include a broader family attribution approach taken by various legislative proposals. The proposal does not take this broader approach because it is not correct to assume that individuals always will cooperate with one another merely because they are related. Any proposal involving family attribution could include an exception based on family hostility, but that exception could entail significant administrative difficulties and might yield unintended incentive effects.




C. Curtail the Use of Lapsing Trust Powers to Inflate the Gift Tax Annual Exclusion Amount (sec. 2503)





Present Law


Under present law, gift tax is imposed on transfers of property by gift, subject to several exceptions. One major exception is the gift tax annual exclusion of section 2503(b). Under this exclusion, a donor can transfer up to $11,000 of property to each of an unlimited number of donees without incurring gift tax on such transfers.97 In order to qualify for the exclusion, the property interests transferred must be present interests, as opposed to future interests (such as remainders). In addition, spouses are allowed to "split" gifts for purposes of applying the exclusion.98 For example, at both spouses' election, a $22,000 gift from one spouse to a third person could be treated as being made equally by both spouses, and thus would be sheltered entirely by the spouses' combined annual exclusion amounts.

Gifts in trust are treated as made to the trust beneficiaries for purposes of applying the annual exclusion.99 Accordingly, if the trust beneficiaries have no right to present enjoyment of the transferred property, the annual exclusion will not apply, as no present interest will have been transferred. However, the courts and the IRS have long agreed that a temporary right of withdrawal of trust property on the part of a beneficiary may serve to create a present interest, thus qualifying such a gift for the annual exclusion. This result obtains even if the right of withdrawal is of short duration, and even if all parties involved expect that the right will not be exercised, and thus the beneficiary will not actually "enjoy" the transferred property on a current basis as a practical matter.100 For example, a married couple may establish a trust for the benefit of their minor child, and the general terms of the trust may allow distributions to the child only upon reaching age 25. This couple nevertheless can transfer $22,000 per year to the trust, fully sheltered by the annual exclusion, as long as the child is given a temporary power to demand distribution of each new amount transferred into the trust, even if it is highly improbable that the power will be exercised. These powers, and these arrangements in general, are referred to as "Crummey powers," and "Crummey trusts" (so named after a court case upholding one such arrangement).

While Crummey powers may be used in connection with simple transfers of cash or any other kind of asset into a trust, use of the powers is particularly common in the case of life insurance trusts. In these arrangements, a trust owns the life insurance policy, the insured makes periodic payments into the trust for the purpose of covering the premiums, and the trust beneficiaries are given Crummey powers with respect to these periodic payments, in order to ensure that the payments qualify as transfers of present interests eligible for the gift tax annual exclusion.

In recent years, taxpayers have used Crummey powers to achieve benefits extending beyond the conversion of future interests into present interests. Specifically, taxpayers have taken the position that the holder of the Crummey power need not even be a vested beneficiary of the trust, which creates the possibility of using multiple annual exclusions (one for each Crummey power holder) for what ultimately will be a gift to a single donee, as a practical matter. The Tax Court has sustained this position.101




Reasons for Change


Recent arrangements involving Crummey powers have extended the "present interest" concept far beyond what the Congress likely contemplated in enacting the gift tax annual exclusion, resulting in significant erosion of the transfer-tax base.




Description of Proposal




In general

The proposal sets forth three options that the Congress may wish to consider for improving the tax treatment of Crummey powers.



Option 1

Under the first option, for purposes of determining the applicability of the annual exclusion, a holder of a Crummey power is not treated as the donee with respect to an amount transferred into trust unless such holder is also a direct, noncontingent beneficiary of the trust. The Treasury Secretary is given regulatory authority to disregard other Crummey powers in cases in which the holder of a power is given a relatively small vested interest in a trust, with a principal purpose of avoiding the application of this provision. This option is designed simply to prevent taxpayers from claiming multiple annual exclusions in connection with gifts that are intended and arranged to accrue to a single person.



Option 2

Under the second option, for purposes of determining the applicability of the annual exclusion, powers to demand the distribution of trust property are taken into account only if they cannot lapse during the holder's lifetime. This option effectively eliminates Crummey powers as a tax planning tool.



Option 3

Under the third option, for purposes of determining the applicability of the annual exclusion, powers to demand the distribution of trust property are taken into account only if: (1) there is no arrangement or understanding to the effect that the powers will not be exercised; and (2) there exists at the time of the creation of such powers a meaningful possibility that they will be exercised. This option requires a facts-and-circumstances analysis of every Crummey power and disregards those that are found to be essentially lacking in substance. In view of the prevalence of Crummey powers that essentially lack substance, the practical effect of this option would be to eliminate Crummey powers as a planning tool in a wide range of cases.




Effective Date


The first option is effective for transfers made after the date of enactment.

The second and third options are effective for transfers made to trusts that are established after the date of enactment.




Discussion




In general

Crummey arrangements are often essentially shams, and yet they are for the most part respected for gift tax purposes. While it is arguably troubling for any arrangement essentially lacking in substance to be given credence for any purpose under the tax law, it nevertheless may be appropriate to distinguish among various uses of Crummey powers. In many cases, even though the Crummey power is essentially a sham, the results may be considered unobjectionable, as the powers may be used simply to provide somewhat greater flexibility in making a gift in trust to a single person without running afoul of the present-interest constraint. In other cases, the results may be considered more objectionable, such as when the powers are used to claim multiple annual exclusions in connection with gifts that are intended and arranged to accrue to a single person.



Option 1

If Crummey powers held by individuals with no significant interest in the underlying trust assets are respected for purposes of determining the annual exclusion, then taxpayers are effectively free to mint multiple annual exclusions for what is in substance a gift through the trust to a single beneficiary. This power to mint exclusions is limited only by the number of friends and relatives that a donor can find and can trust not to exercise the withdrawal right during its brief existence. The use of Crummey powers for this purpose is an abuse of the annual exclusion and may cause significant erosion of the transfer tax base. By requiring a Crummey power holder to be a significant, vested beneficiary of the underlying trust, the first option would curtail this abuse of Crummey powers. At the same time, this option would preserve the availability of the powers for the more limited purpose of allowing a donor to place practical constraints on a donee's enjoyment of a gift without running afoul of the present-interest limitation. This option would not affect standard life insurance trusts. Because this option narrowly targets abusive applications of Crummey powers, it is effective for transfers made after the date of enactment, regardless of whether the trust already existed prior to enactment.



Option 2

Crummey powers arguably have eviscerated the present-interest requirement. This requirement was originally designed to protect the integrity of the per-donee annual exclusion amount under the gift tax. As the Cristofani case illustrates, if an exclusion amount is allowed to attach to an interest that lapses, then it becomes possible for the benefit of the gift shielded by the exclusion ultimately to inure to some other person, resulting in an inappropriate multiplication of the exclusion amount. Narrowly targeted anti-abuse rules that leave Crummey powers basically intact --like the first option above --may leave open some avenues of abuse. The second option ensures that the benefit of a gift will inure only to the holder of a withdrawal power, by respecting that power for tax purposes only if it never lapses. On the other hand, as noted above, Crummey powers are well-established tools widely used for the purpose of making a gift in trust to a single person without running afoul of the present-interest constraint. Eliminating the powers could force a large number of individuals to revisit their family financial plans, although this problem would be mitigated significantly by grandfathering transfers made to existing trusts.



Option 3

Some may argue that Crummey powers are objectionable only insofar as they are effectively shams. According to this view, the case law on this subject is problematic only because it allows "wink and a nod" arrangements to dictate tax results, with little analysis of the surrounding facts and circumstances. It would arguably be inappropriate to disregard a lapsing withdrawal power that might actually be exercised as a practical matter, thus making the second option too aggressive according to this view. In such a case, possession of the power actually is tantamount to ownership of a present interest in property. The IRS and the courts are equipped to examine the substance of these arrangements, and doing so arguably would lead to appropriate, commonsense results: illusory powers would be given no tax effect, and real powers would be given tax effect. As a practical matter, if such a rule were applied vigorously, it would eliminate most common Crummey arrangements, as such arrangements generally involve powers that are not expected to be exercised. Thus, like the second option above, this option could force a large number of individuals to revisit their family financial plans (and thus, this option also would grandfather transfers to existing trusts). This option would present the administrative and compliance difficulties common to all rules that require facts-and-circumstances determinations.

1 For a background discussion related to that hearing, see Joint Committee on Taxation, History, Present Law, and Analysis of the Federal Wealth Transfer Tax System (JCX-108-07), November 13, 2007. That document describes the history of the U.S. Federal estate and gift tax system, summarizes the present estate and gift tax rules, and sets forth data and an economic analysis related to wealth transfer taxation.

2 For a discussion of these alternative systems, see Joint Committee on Taxation, Description and Analysis of Alternative Wealth Transfer Tax Systems (JCX-22-08), March 10, 2008.

3 This document may be cited as Joint Committee on Taxation, Taxation of Wealth Transfers Within a Family: A Discussion of Selected Areas for Possible Reform (JCX-23-08), April 2, 2008. The document also is available on the internet at www.house.gov/jct .

4 The credit against estate and gift tax operates as an exemption by shielding a certain amount of transfers from tax. In 2008 the estate tax effective exemption amount is implemented by means of a $780,800 credit against tax.

5 Joint Committee on Taxation, Options to Improve Tax Compliance and Reform Tax Expenditures (JCS-02-05), January 27, 2005.

6 Secs. 2010, 2505.

7 Under present law in effect through 2009 and after 2010, the generation skipping transfer tax is imposed using a flat rate equal to the highest estate tax rate on cumulative generation skipping transfers in excess of the exemption amount in effect at the time of the transfer. The generation skipping transfer tax exemption for a given year (prior to repeal, discussed below) is equal to the unified credit effective exemption amount for estate tax purposes.

8 Secs. 2001(c)(2), 2010(c), 2502, 2505(a).

9 Sec. 2505(a).

10 H.R. 5638 (109th Cong.) (as passed by the House); H.R. 5970 (109th Cong.) (as passed by the House).

11 H.R. 5638 and H.R. 5970 would not permit a surviving spouse to use a predeceased spouse's unused exemption for generation skipping transfer tax purposes.

12 ABA Task Force, p. 22.

13 Ibid. , pp. 22-23.

14 See, e.g., American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Tax Simplification Recommendations (Apr. 30, 1997), reproduced in 97 TNI 95-21 (May 16, 1997); American Bar Association Task Force on Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes, Report on Reform of Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes (2004) (hereafter, "ABA Task Force Report" ), pp. 99-101.

15 ABA Task Force Report, pp. 99-100.

16 A similar issue may arise if, after many years, the surviving spouse instead makes taxable gifts using ported exemption.

17 Designing a portability regime in which the estate and gift taxes are not reunified (i.e., if the gift tax exemption and rates are different from the estate tax exemption and rates) would raise additional policy issues. For example, assume the estate tax exemption is $5 million and the gift tax exemption is $1 million. Husband dies with no taxable estate, but he used $500,000 of exemption on lifetime taxable gifts, such that he passes a total of $4.5 million unused exemption to Wife. Should Wife be permitted to use only $500,000 of this amount to offset lifetime taxable gifts (the amount of Husband's unused gift tax exemption), with the remainder available for use only at Wife's death? Should such a regime include a gift tax cap and a separate cumulative cap on the amount of exemption a person can receive from predeceased spouses?

18 Sec. 2032A.

19 Sec. 6166.

20 Sec. 2057. This provision is terminated after 2003 but is scheduled to be in effect after 2010.

21 H.R. Rep. No. 94-1380, p. 5 (1976).

22 S. Rep. No. 105-33, p. 40 (1997).

23 Sec. 2032(a).

24 Sec. 2032A.

25 Rev. Proc. 2007-66, 2007-45 I.R.B. 970 (November 5, 2007).

26 In applying the 50-percent and 25-percent tests, the value of property and the value of the gross estate are determined (1) based on property's highest and best use rather than on its current-use value, and (2) by subtracting the amount of any indebtedness in respect of property.

27 Material participation is defined by reference to section 1402(a)(1) (relating to net earnings for self employment).

28 For any property, the term "qualified heir" means a member of the decedent's family who acquires the property. For this purpose a member of the family includes, among others, the spouse of the decedent, lineal descendants of the decedent or the decedent's spouse, or the spouse of any of these lineal descendants.

29 Secs. 6075(a), 6151(a).

30 Sec. 6166(a). Other provisions of the Code permit the time for payment of estate tax to be extended in certain circumstances. The Treasury Secretary may extend, for reasonable cause, the time for payment of estate tax or for payment of an installment under section 6166 for a reasonable period not in excess of 10 years. Sec. 6161(a)(2). Under regulations, the district director or the director of a service center may grant, at the request of the estate's executor, an extension of time to pay estate tax for a reasonable period of time not to exceed 12 months if such request, based on all the facts and circumstances, is based on reasonable cause, such as liquid assets being located in several jurisdictions and not being immediately subject to the control of the executor. Treas. Reg. sec. 20.6161-1(a)(1). If the district director determines that payment of estate tax, payment of a deficiency for estate tax, or an installment payment of estate tax under section 6166 would impose undue hardship on the estate, the district director may extend the time for payment for a period not to exceed 10 years. Undue hardship must be more than an inconvenience or the sale of an asset at its fair market value. Undue hardship may exist where the executor needs additional time to raise funds instead of selling a farm or other closely held business to an unrelated person or where assets of the estate can only be sold at a sacrifice price. Treas. Reg. sec. 20.6161-1(a)(2).

The Treasury Secretary also may extend, for reasonable cause, the time for the payment of a deficiency of estate tax for a period not to exceed four years. No extension may be granted for any deficiency that is due to negligence, to intentional disregard of rules and regulations, or to fraud with intent to evade tax. Sec. 6161(b)(2).

The estate tax attributable to a reversionary or remainder interest in property included in the value of a gross estate may, at the election of the estate's executor, be postponed until six months after the termination of the precedent interest. At the end of this postponement period, the Treasury Secretary may, for reasonable cause, extend the time for payment for a reasonable period not to exceed an additional three years. Sec. 6163.

The Treasury Secretary may require the furnishing of a bond for payment of any tax for which an extension of time for payment has been granted. Sec. 6165.

31 Sec. 6601(j)(1)(A); Rev. Proc. 2007-66, 2007-45 I.R.B. 970 (Nov. 5, 2007).

32 Sec. 6601(j)(1)(B). The underpayment rate is the Federal short-term rate plus three percentage points. The underpayment rate for the second quarter of 2008 is six percent. Rev. Rul. 2008-10, 2008-13 I.R.B. 676 (March 31, 2008).

33 Sec. 6166(b)(2), (b)(3).

34 Sec. 6166(b)(9).

35 Sec. 6166(b)(10).

36 Sec. 6166(b)(8).

37 Sec. 6324A.

38 Sec. 6166(g).

39 Sec. 2057.

40 Sec. 2057(j). Even without formal termination, the section 2057 deduction effectively would be terminated: for estates of decedents dying after 2003, the applicable exclusion amount ($1.5 million in 2004 and 2005, and $2 million in 2006, 2007, and 2008) has exceeded the maximum effective exclusion ($1.3 million) that was allowed for an estate for which the qualified family-owned business deduction was claimed.

41 For a broad critique of all three sets of rules as being too complex, see James R. Repetti, Democracy, Taxes, and Wealth, 76 New York University Law Review 825, 868 (June 2001).

42 Steven B. Gorin, E. Burke Hinds, Benjamin H. Pruett, Don Kozusko, and Michael Patiky Miller, Internal Revenue Code Section 6166: Comments to Tax Counsel for the Senate Finance Committee, 41 Real Property, Probate and Trust Journal 73 (Spring 2006).

43 ABA Task Force Report, pp. 136-38.

44 See Leah LaPorte, Keeping the Farm: Estate Tax Deferral and Closely Held Business Owners, 41 Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems 177, 186-202 (Winter 2007). LaPorte advocates creating an alternative to sections 6161 (the short-term deferral rule described previously) and 6166 that would permit varying lengths of deferral based on the extent to which an estate is comprised of business assets. This alternative, however, might introduce other administrative complexities.

45 ABA Task Force Report, pp. 139-42.

46 Bridget J. Crawford, The Profits and Penalties of Kinship: Conflicting Meanings of Family in Estate Tax Law , 3 Pittsburgh Tax Review 1 (Fall 2005). One suggestion Crawford makes is that the definition of a family in section 2032A be expanded so that real property can qualify for special-use valuation if it is left to a long-term employee (rather than to a spouse, child, or other family member).

47 See Repetti, note 41, pp. 868-69.

48 The legislative history for section 2032A notes Congress's intent not to provide benefits when property ceases to be used in a qualifying business after a decedent's death:

[Y]our committee recognizes that it would be a windfall to the beneficiaries of an estate to allow real property used for farming or closely related business purposes to be valued for estate tax purposes at its farm or business value unless the beneficiaries continue to use the property for farm or business purposes, at least for reasonable period of time after the decedent's death. Also, your committee believes that it would be inequitable to discount speculative values if the heirs of the decedent realize these speculative values by selling the property within a short time after the decedent's death.

H.R. Rep. No. 94-1380, p. 22 (1976).

49 ABA Task Force Report, p. 139.

50 Repetti, note 41, p. 869.

51 Repetti understands the need for rules: "[O]nce a business has a certain number of employees or reaches a certain size, the social benefits of the small business begin to decrease, and the estate tax should apply. Whatever criteria are adopted for identifying which businesses qualify for the exemption, however, they should be simple and apply automatically to all similarly situated taxpayers so that less sophisticated taxpayers will not suffer." Ibid.

52 For criticism of sections 6166 and 2057 on these grounds, see ABA Task Force Report, pp. 138-40.

53 Testimony reprinted in 54 Tax Lawyer 617, 624 (Spring 2001).

54 Ibid. At the time of Lipton's testimony, the unified credit effective exemption amount for gift and estate tax was $675,000.

55 Leandra Lederman, The Entrepreneurship Effect: An Accidental Externality in the Federal Income Tax, 65 Ohio State Law Journal 1401, 1475-76 (2004).

56 Ibid. , p. 1477.

57 In an earlier pamphlet, Joint Committee on Taxation, History, Present Law, and Analysis of the Federal Wealth Transfer Tax System (JCX-108-07), November 13, 2007, the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation reviewed a number of issues related transfer taxes and small business.

58 Martha Eller Gangi and Brian G. Raub, "Utilization of Special Estate Tax Provisions for Family-Owned Farms and Closely Held Businesses," SOI Bulletin , 26, Summer 2006, pp. 128-145. Gangi and Raub report that in 2001 of 12,683 estates with farm real estate, 831 elected special use valuation; of 15,612 estates with closely held businesses or agri-business assets, 1,144 claimed a deduction for qualified family-owned business interests; and 382 estates elected to defer payment of the estate tax.

59 Ibid. , Figures D and I.

60 Ibid. , Figure N.

61 Ibid. , Figures D, I, and N.

62 This is not conceptually correct as mathematically if an estate has any liquid assets and no tax or debt liability the liquidity ratio would be infinite. An infinite value would render reported averages as meaningless. However, it is important to recognize that an estate could also have liquidity ratio of zero if it had no liquid assets and some, however modest, estate tax or debt liability. In the 2001 data almost all of the zero liquidity ratios are estates with no estate tax or debt liabilities.

63 It is important to remember that the operation of the farm going forward could be impaired by a reduction in liquid operating capital.

64 This is similar to Table 7 in JCX-108-07, but reports data from estate tax returns filed in a more recent year. The 2003 included information on estates that claimed benefits under section 2057. The special deduction available under section 2057 was not available for estates in 2005.

65 This is similar to Table 8 in JCX-108-07, but reports data from estate tax returns filed in a more recent year. The 2003 included information on estates that claimed benefits under section 2057. The special deduction available under section 2057 was not available for estates in 2005.

66 These reform options are reprinted from Joint Committee on Taxation, Options to Improve Tax Compliance and Reform Tax Expenditures (JCS-02-05), January 27, 2005, pp. 392-408.

67 Every transferor is entitled to a generation skipping tax exemption that may be allocated to transfers made by the transferor either during the transferor's life or at death. The amount of the generation skipping transfer tax on a transfer technically is determined by multiplying the amount transferred by the applicable rate. The applicable rate is the maximum Federal estate tax rate multiplied by the inclusion ratio. The inclusion ratio is defined in turn as one minus the applicable fraction. The applicable fraction is a fraction the numerator of which is the generation skipping transfer exemption allocated to the trust (or the property transferred in a direct skip) and the denominator of which is the value of the property transferred to the trust (or involved in the direct skip) reduced by Federal or State estate and death taxes actually recovered from the trust (or transferred property) and any charitable deduction allowed for Federal estate and gift tax on the transfer.

68 Jesse Dukeminier, "The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities and the GST Tax: New Perils for Practitioners and New Opportunities," Real Property Probate & Trust Journal , 30 (1995) at 185.

69 Joint Committee on Taxation, General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (JCS-10-87), May 4, 1987, at 1263.

70 Joint Committee on Taxation, General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 (JCS-33-76), December 29, 1976, at 565.

71 Id .

72 Brian Layman, "Comment: Perpetual Dynasty Trusts: One of the Most Powerful Tools in the Estate Planner's Arsenal," Akron Law Review , 32 (1999), at 747.

73 Secs. 2031 (estate tax), 2512 (gift tax), and 2624 (generation-skipping transfer tax). Fair market value is determined on the date of the gift in the case of the gift tax or on the date of the decedent's death (or on the alternative valuation date if the executor so elects) in the case of the estate tax.

74 Treas. Reg. secs. 20.2031-1(b) and 25.2512-1.

75 Treas. Reg. secs. 20.2031-2(f)(2) and 25.2512-2(f)(2); Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237.

76 Other valuation discounts that courts have recognized include a blockage discount (if the sale of a block of assets, such as 80 percent of the stock of a public company, would depress the market for that asset); a key man (thin management) discount (if the value of a business declines due to the loss of a key manager); and a capital gain (or General Utilities) discount (to reflect the tax on gain from the eventual sale of assets acquired by gift or held by a corporation).

77 See Rev. Rul. 93-12, 1993-2 C.B. 202; Propstra v. United States, 680 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1982); Ward v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 78 (1986); Estate of Leyman v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 100 (1963). More recently, a minority discount was allowed even where the total shares owned by related persons constituted a majority interest. For example, in Estate of Bright v. United States , 658 F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1981), the court upheld a minority discount on stock transferred to a trust even though the other principal shareholder of the corporation was trustee of the trust and father of its beneficiary.

78 See David T. Lewis and Andrea Chomakos, The Family Limited Partnership Deskbook: Forming and Funding FLPs and Other Closely Held Business Entities (ABA Publishing 2004) at 11.

79 E.g., Central Trust Co. v. United States, 305 F.2d 393 (Ct. Cl. 1962); Estate of Titus v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1989-466.

80 Controlling shares in a nonpublic corporation, which do not qualify for a minority discount, may nonetheless receive a marketability discount because there is no ready private placement market and because transaction costs would be incurred if the corporation were to publicly offer its stock.

81 See, e.g., Estate of Bennett v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo 1993-34, in which the Tax Court concluded that in determining the discount, the corporate form could not be ignored. ("Here, we have a real estate management company whose assets are varied and nonliquid. We think that the corporate form is a quite important consideration here: there is definitely a difference in owning the assets and liabilities of Fairlawn directly and in owning the stock of Fairlawn, albeit 100 percent of the stock. We think some discounting is necessary to find a buyer willing to buy Fairlawn's package of desirable and less desirable properties." ).

82 There is no established formula to compute the size of a discount. One measure of the size of a discount, applicable when valuing a controlling interest, is the total cost of registering securities with the Securities and Exchange Commission, i.e., converting nonliquid securities into liquid ones. Other factors considered are the size of any costs and the amounts realizable on a private placement or secondary offering, the opportunity cost of losing access to the invested funds, and the discounts applied in comparable transactions involving sales of comparable closely held businesses.

83 The United States Tax Court has noted that the application of a minority discount and a marketability discount is multiplicative rather than additive. According to the Court, the minority discount should be applied first and then the marketability discount should be applied to that figure. For example, a 20-percent minority discount and a 40-percent marketability discount should result in a 52-percent discount (20 percent + (40 percent ´ 80 percent)), not a 60-percent discount. See Estate of Bailey v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo 2002-152.

84 Because the holder of a fractional interest in real property has the power to compel partition (a remedy not available to minority holders of other interests), the discount should reflect the cost of partition and the value of the interest secured thereby. See Boris I. Bittker & Lawrence Lokken, Federal Income Taxation of Estates, Gifts, and Trusts , para. 135.3.4 (2d ed. 1993). Courts, however, often apply a minority discount instead. See, e.g., LeFrak v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo 1993-526.

85 See, e.g., Estate of Van Loben Sels v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo 1986-501.

86 For example, the Tax Court in Estate of Folks v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo 1982-43, granted the taxpayer a 50-percent investment company discount and then applied to the resulting value a 50-percent marketability discount, resulting in a total discount of 75 percent.

87 See, e.g., Estate of Anderson v. Commissioner , 8 T.C. 706 (1947), acq. 1947-2 C.B. 1.

88 For illustrative purposes only, the $80,000 value, and the values described in all subsequent examples, disregard the possible existence of a control premium. The $80,000 value also assumes a marketability discount does not apply.

89 The result is the same even if, just before the gifts, Mother owned only 65 percent of the LLC and her husband owned 15 percent.

90 The result for a minority discount is the same as under present law.

91 For purposes of this proposal, rules similar to those of section 6166(b)(10)(B) apply.

92 As in all of these examples, the possible existence of a control premium is ignored.

93 Commentators have referred to this discounting as the "disappearing wealth" phenomenon: Wealth disappears from the transfer tax base even though no (or little) economic actual value is lost. See Mary Louise Fellows & William H. Painter, "Valuing Close Corporations for Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes: A Statutory Solution to the Disappearing Wealth Syndrome," 30 Stanford Law Review 895 (1978); James Repetti, "Minority Discounts: The Alchemy in Estate and Gift Taxation," 50 Tax Law Review (1995); Laura E. Cunningham, Remember the Alamo: The IRS Needs Ammunition in its Fight Against the FLP , 86 Tax Notes 1461 (2000).

Church v. United States , 85 A.F.T.R. 2d (RIA) 804 (W.D. Tex. 2000), aff'd without published opinion , 268 F.3d 1063 (5th Cir. 2001), provides a simple example of the creation of discounts shortly before death. Mrs. Church, who was the mother of the plaintiff and was suffering from a terminal illness, and her two children together formed a limited partnership. In exchange for limited partnership interests, Mrs. Church contributed to the partnership her interest in a Texas ranch (valued at $380,038) together with $1,087,710 in publicly traded securities, while her two children contributed their undivided interests in the ranch. A corporation owned equally by the two children was the general partner of the partnership. Two days after the formation of the partnership, Mrs. Church died. The District Court found that the date-of-death value of Mrs. Church's limited partnership interest was $617,591, despite the fact that Mrs. Church transferred assets to the partnership worth $1,467,748 just two days earlier. The court upheld a 58-percent discount based upon the noncontrolling and illiquid nature of Mrs. Church's limited partnership interest.

94 Department of the Treasury, Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic Growth, vol. 2, General Explanation of the Treasury Department Proposals (November 1984) at 386-88.

95 Department of the Treasury, General Explanations of the Administration's Revenue Proposals (February 1999) at 167. The Fiscal Year 2001 Administration Budget Proposal included the same proposal. See Department of the Treasury, General Explanations of the Administration's Fiscal Year 2001 Revenue Proposals (February 2000) at 184-85.

96 The proposal also bases its application on the existence of marketable assets, not non-business assets. The definitions of those two terms may differ.

97 The statute provides an amount of $10,000, adjusted in $1,000 increments for inflation occurring after 1997. The inflation-adjusted amount for 2005 is $11,000.

98 See sec. 2513.

99 See Helvering v. Hutchings, 312 U.S. 393 (1941).

100 See Crummey v. Commissioner, 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1968); Rev. Rul. 73-405, 1973-2 C.B. 321.

101 See Estate of Cristofani v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 74 (1991). Taxpayers still must exercise some caution in executing this strategy: under section 2514(e), the lapse of a Crummey power may itself be treated as a taxable gift from the power holder to the beneficiary of such lapse, but only if the property subject to the lapsed power exceeds the greater of $5,000 or five percent of the value of trust assets available to satisfy the power. To avoid the application of this rule, taxpayers either may limit their Crummey powers to $5,000 each, or may fund the underlying trust with at least $220,000 (such that an $11,000 Crummey power would not exceed five percent of trust assets).

Wednesday, April 2, 2008

New 6694(a) Standard

Practitioners are bracing for possible conflicts with clients because of the disconnect in their disclosure standards, tax professionals heard at the recent AICPA National Conference on Federal Taxes in Washington, D.C. The new more-likely-than-not standard in Code Sec. 6694(a) could motivate a preparer to disclose a return position that a taxpayer, under the substantial authority standard, might not be inclined to disclose. Ultimately, the client controls the return and practitioners could be put in the unenviable position of deciding not to sign the return.

Not signing a return as its preparer is not itself an airtight solution. A preparer for penalty purposes may be anyone who gives tax advice relating to any line item on a return. If a client disagrees with the tax professional's advice, the practitioner should memorialize that disagreement in writing.


New Standard

The Small Business and Work Opportunity Tax Act of 2007 (2007 Small Business Tax Act) significantly changed Code Sec. 6694. Before the new law, the standard for nonabusive, undisclosed items under Code Sec. 6694(a) was a realistic possibility of success (essentially a one-third likelihood of success). Under the new law, the standard is more-likely-than-not (essentially a 51 percent chance of success).

The new standard was added to the 2007 Small Business Tax Act without any hearings or testimony. "It surprised the IRS, Treasury and every practitioner."


The more-likely-than-not standard sets the stage for conflict with clients. The taxpayer standard remains substantial authority (which traditionally has been understood to mean a 40 percent chance of success). The client, and not the preparer, controls the return. The preparer cannot force the client to disclose a position. If the client does not agree to disclose the position, the preparer may not be able to sign the return. Section 6695 requires the preparer to sign the tax returns.


Anita Soucy, an attorney-advisor in Treasury's Office of Tax Policy acknowledged that the two standards create a "difficult situation" for practitioners. "We are acutely aware of the conflicts that have developed." Soucy told the AICPA that Treasury and the IRS are considering adopting a rule that would "ameliorate and not exacerbate" these conflicts. However, she did not give any details of how a proposed rule would ameliorate these conflicts.


The AICPA and other professional organizations are urging Congress to equalize the paid preparer and the taxpayer standards for nonabusive, undisclosed positions. The taxpayer standard could be changed to more-likely-than-not or the paid preparer standard changed to substantial authority. John Buckley, a senior aide to House Ways and Means Committee Chair Thomas Rangel, D-N.Y., told the AICPA on November 6 that no legislation has yet been introduced in Congress to make either change.


The 2007 Small Business Tax Act also raised the penalties for violations of Code Sec. 6694. The old first tier penalty in Code Sec. 6694(a) increases from $250 to $1,000 or 50 percent of the income to be derived from the preparation of the return, whichever is greater. The penalty in Code Sec. 6694(b) for willful and reckless misconduct jumps from $1,000 to $5,000 or 50 percent of the income to be derived from the preparation of the return, whichever is greater.

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Tuesday, April 1, 2008

7122 offer in compromise
Non-liable spouse must provide financial data

Dean Fangonilo v. Commissioner.

Dkt. No. 19747-06L , TC Memo. 2008-75, March 31, 2008.

[Code Sec. 6330]


Collection Due Process hearing: Abuse of discretion: Offer in compromise: Acceptable amount: Currently not collectible liability. --
An IRS Appeals officer did not abuse his discretion when he refused to accept an individual taxpayer's offer-in-compromise (OIC) or to treat the individual's tax liability as currently not collectible. The OIC was rejected because the taxpayer did not offer an acceptable amount. In addition, the taxpayer's liability was not designated as currently not collectible because the taxpayer had a liquid asset that was worth more than his tax liability even though his income was not sufficient to meet his stated monthly living expenses.


MEMORANDUM OPINION

DEAN, Special Trial Judge: This case is before the Court on respondent's motion for summary judgment, as supplemented, filed pursuant to Rule 121. Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. Section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 as amended. The motion arises in the context of a petition filed in response to a Notice of Determination Concerning Collection Action(s) Under Section 6320 and/or 6330 (notice) that respondent sent to petitioner.


Background

At the time the petition was filed, petitioner resided in California. The parties do not disagree as to the following facts.



Origin of the Tax Liability
Petitioner filed his Federal income tax return for 2002 on July 7, 2003, showing no tax due. After examination, petitioner signed a consent to the assessment of additional tax on March 9, 2005. As a result of the examination, respondent assessed tax of $14,423 plus statutory additions on June 20, 2005. As of August 22, 2006, there was a balance due of $17,137.85 on petitioner's account for 2002.



Administrative Activity
On November 22, 2005, after receiving respondent's Notice of Intent to Levy and Notice of Your Right to a Hearing, petitioner submitted Form 12153, Request for a Collection Due Process Hearing (request). Petitioner stated in the request that he had "Filed An Offer To Compromise This Liability As A Way Of Resolving It." The offer-in-compromise (OIC) had been submitted on September 15, 2005. The Appeals officer assigned to consider the proposed levy was able to confirm that petitioner had filed an OIC covering 1991 and 1999 through 2004 and that petitioner had appealed respondent's rejection of the offer of $250. The Court assumes that an appeal was denied. Petitioner did not submit a new or amended Form 656, Offer In Compromise, to the Appeals officer considering his request for relief under section 6330.

During discussions between the Appeals Office and petitioner's counsel, two "additional" grounds for relief were raised: (1) Alternative means of collection due to economic hardship, or (2) placing the liability into "currently not collectible" status.

Petitioner, who is now 71, submitted financial information to the Appeals officer including a Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, for 2005, signed and dated June 7, 2006; Form 433-A, Collection Information Statement for Wage Earners and Self-Employed Individuals (collection statement); copies of bank statements, and insurance information. Further, petitioner stated that he was responsible for a portion of the household expenses of the home in which he resided, one quarter of the mortgage payment and one fifth of the electric and water bills. Petitioner submitted a copy of monthly mortgage statements, a Pacific Gas and Electric bill, and a water bill for the house. Petitioner's name did not appear on any of the household expense bills. He disclosed monthly living expenses of $3,092.10 and gross monthly income of $900 on the Form 433-A. Petitioner also disclosed documents showing that he was entitled to receive three approximately equal payments on May 26 and November 25, 2006, and on May 25, 2007, totaling $56,319 due to the "termination" of a contract with Farmers Insurance Group.

Petitioner's counsel represented to the Appeals officer that petitioner's friend and roommate provided economic support to petitioner. Petitioner provided the Appeals officer with copies of checks drafted by the roommate to pay the household expenses, including petitioner's portion. The Appeals officer requested from petitioner information about the roommate's income and contributions to the household expenses. Petitioner's roommate refused to disclose any of her financial information.

Respondent issued the notice upholding the proposed collection action because "The financial information that you provided did not enable a determination as to your ability to pay".


Discussion




Standard for Granting Summary Judgment
The standard for granting a motion for summary judgment under Rule 121 is stated in Rule 121(b) as follows:

A decision shall * * * be rendered if the pleadings, answers to interrogatories, depositions, admissions, and any other acceptable materials, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that a decision may be rendered as a matter of law. * * *

The parties agree that there is no material issue of fact for trial. They differ, however, as to what the result of this circumstance should be.



Section 6330
Section 6330 generally provides that the Commissioner cannot proceed with collection by way of a levy until the taxpayer has been given notice and the opportunity for an administrative review of the matter (in the form of an Appeals Office hearing) and, if dissatisfied, the person may obtain judicial review of the administrative determination. See Davis v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 35, 37 (2000); Goza v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 176, 179 (2000). The taxpayer requesting the hearing may raise any relevant issue with regard to the Commissioner's intended collection activities, including spousal defenses, challenges to appropriateness of the collection action, and offers of collection alternatives. Sec. 6330(c)(2)(A); see Sego v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 604, 609 (2000); Goza v. Commissioner, supra at 180.

The taxpayer may raise challenges "to the existence or amount of the underlying tax liability", however, only if he "did not receive any statutory notice of deficiency for such tax liability or did not otherwise have an opportunity to dispute such tax liability." Sec. 6330(c)(2)(B). Petitioner is not challenging the underlying tax liability.

Where the validity of the tax liability is not properly part of the appeal, the taxpayer may challenge the determination of the Appeals officer for abuse of discretion. Sego v. Commissioner, supra at 609-610; Goza v. Commissioner, supra at 181-182.

Respondent's Position

Because petitioner did not provide respondent with his roommate's financial information,1 respondent concludes that petitioner's reasonable living expenses cannot be properly determined. Respondent argues that any financial support petitioner received is relevant in determining his ability to fulfill his tax obligations.

Respondent relies on 2 Administration, Internal Revenue Manual (IRM)(CCH), pt. 5.15.1.4, at 17,656 (May 1, 2004). The manual section provides that for collection purposes, the taxpayer is allowed only the expenses he is required to pay, and "Consideration must be given to any other income into the household and any expenses shared with a not liable person(s)." Id. pt. 5.15.1.4(1). The manual provision also provides that the assets and income of a "not liable" person may be considered in the computation of the taxpayer's ability to pay. Id. pt. 5.15.1.4(2). When the taxpayer indicates that his or her income is not commingled with that of the not liable person and responsibility for expenses is divided between the cohabitants, expenses are to be allowed according to the expenses "assigned to the taxpayer" or the taxpayer's "percentage of income to the total expenses, whichever is less." Id. pt. 5.15.1.4(3).

Petitioner's Position

Petitioner argues that 2 Administration, IRM (CCH), pt. 5.15.1.4 should not be applied here. According to petitioner, the manual provision "clearly ought to apply and does apply in order to determine whether the taxpayer is paying more than his share of expenses." Because petitioner's monthly living expenses far exceed his $900 monthly income, he argues that it is not necessary to inquire into the not liable person's income and expenses. A reasonable approach, suggests petitioner, would be to use "government guidelines to determine his expenses."

Petitioner's position appears to find support in a manual provision not addressed by the parties, 1 Administration, IRM (CCH), pt. 5.8.5.5.4(4), at 16,339-12 (Sept. 1, 2005), concerning OICs. Under this provision, where a taxpayer can document that income is not commingled "(as in the case of roommates who share housing)" and household expenses are divided "equitably" between cohabitants, the total allowable expenses should not exceed the total allowable housing standard for the taxpayer. "In this situation, it would not be necessary to obtain the income information of the non-liable person(s)". Id.

The provision, however, warns the reader that there must be sufficient financial information to verify the total household expenses and prove that the taxpayer is paying his/her proportionate share of the expenses. See Olsen v. United States, 414 F.3d 144, 153-154 (1st Cir. 2005).

Petitioner also complains that he raised two "alternative" grounds for relief that were denied, "economic hardship" or placing the liability in "currently not collectible" status.

If the liability of a taxpayer can be collected in full but would create an economic hardship, the Commissioner can consider an OIC to promote effective tax administration. Sec. 301.7122-1(b)(3)(i), Proced. & Admin. Regs.; 1 Administration, IRM (CCH), pt. 5.8.11.2.1(1), at 16,375 (Sept. 1, 2005). The Commissioner advises his employees that the existence of hardship criteria does not require that an offer be accepted, and if "the taxpayer does not offer an acceptable amount, the offer should not be recommended for acceptance." Id. pt. 5.8.11.2.1(11), at 16,377. Petitioner's prior offer of $250 had been rejected. According to the undisputed facts, petitioner did not make a higher offer to the Appeals officer considering this case after having been notified that an earlier offer had been rejected.

Since petitioner did not submit an offer of "an acceptable amount" to the Appeals officer charged with conducting the section 6330 hearing, there was no abuse of discretion in respondent's failing to accept an OIC as an alternative to collection. See Speltz v. Commissioner, 454 F.3d 782 (8th Cir. 2006), affg. 124 T.C. 165 (2005).

A taxpayer may request that his Federal income tax liability be designated currently not collectible where, "based on the taxpayer's assets, equity, income and expenses," he has no apparent ability to make payments on the outstanding tax liability. Foley v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-242. Although petitioner's income was not sufficient to meet his stated monthly living expenses, he had a liquid asset worth more than $56,000, which exceeds his tax liability.2 Respondent's refusal to treat petitioner's tax liability as currently not collectible was not an abuse of discretion.


Conclusion

Petitioner has failed to show that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial, and respondent's motion for summary judgment, as supplemented, will be granted. Respondent did not abuse his discretion in approving the proposed collection activity. Although the Court has granted respondent's motion, petitioner can still submit another OIC on the form required by respondent under the rubric of effective tax administration because of economic hardship.

An appropriate order and decision will be entered granting respondent's motion for summary judgment, as supplemented.

1 The Internal Revenue Manual appears to contemplate that if the "not liable" person's information is necessary, the Commissioner will conduct "an in-house verification" and that the information will not be shared with the taxpayer. 1 Administration, Internal Revenue Manual (CCH), pt. 5.8.5.5.4(4), at 16,339-12 (Sept. 1, 2005).

2 Petitioner also owned a one-half interest in an account worth about $2,400 at the time of the hearing under sec. 6330.

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