Monday, June 30, 2008

Except as otherwise provided in § 1362(d)(3)(C), § 1362(d)(3)(C)(i) provides that the term "passive investment income" means gross receipts derived from royalties, rents, dividends, interest, annuities, and sales or exchanges of stock or securities.


IRS Letter Ruling 200826023

LTR Report Number 1635, July 02, 2008 IRS REF: Symbol: CC:PSI:B01-PLR-145515-07 [Code Sec. 1362]

March 20, 2008

This letter is in response to your letter, on behalf of X , dated October 5, 2007, requesting a ruling that X 's rental income from Property 1 , Property 2 , Property 3 , Property 4 , Property 5 , Property 6 , Property 7 , Property 8 , Property 9 , and Property 10 is not passive investment income within the meaning of § 1362(d)(3)(C)(i) of the Internal Revenue Code.




FACTS


The information submitted states that X was incorporated in Year 1 in accordance with the laws of State . X intends to elect to be an S corporation effective Date 1 . On Date 1 , X expects to have accumulated earnings and profits from prior years.

X owns Property 1 , Property 2 , Property 3 , Property 4 , Property 5 , Property 6 , Property 7 , Property 8 , Property 9 , and Property 10 (collectively, "the Properties"), commercial real estate properties that are leased to tenants. X , through its employees or independent contractors, provides certain services with respect to the leasing of the Properties. These services involve maintaining and repairing the buildings, appurtenances, and grounds of the Properties, including cleaning, painting, electrical, plumbing, roof and structural maintenance, HVAC, trash and snow removal, landscaping services, and extermination services.

In Year 2 , X collected approximately $ M in gross rents and incurred approximately $ in relevant operating expenses.




LAW AND ANALYSIS


Section 1361(a)(1) defines an "S corporation" as a small business corporation for which an election under § 1362(a) is in effect for the taxable year.

Section 1362(d)(3)(A)(i) provides that an S corporation election shall be terminated whenever the corporation (I) has accumulated earning and profits at the close of each of 3 consecutive taxable years, and (II) has gross receipts for each of such taxable years more than 25 percent of which are passive investment income. The termination is effective on and after the first date of the first taxable year beginning after the third consecutive taxable year referred to in § 1362(d)(3)(A)(i). Section 1362(d)(3)(A)(ii).

Except as otherwise provided in § 1362(d)(3)(C), § 1362(d)(3)(C)(i) provides that the term "passive investment income" means gross receipts derived from royalties, rents, dividends, interest, annuities, and sales or exchanges of stock or securities.

Section 1375(a) imposes a tax on the income of an S corporation if the S corporation has (1) accumulated earnings and profits at the close of such taxable year, and (2) gross receipts more than 25 percent of which are passive investment income.

Section 1362(d)(3)(C)(i) provides that, except as otherwise provided, the term "passive investment income" means gross receipts derived from royalties, rents, dividends, interest, annuities, and sales or exchanges of stock or securities.

Section 1.1362-2(c)(5)(ii)(B)(1) defines "rent" as amounts received for the use of, or right to use, property (whether real or personal) of the corporation.

Section 1.1362-2(c)(5)(ii)(B)(2) provides that the term "rents" does not include rents derived in the active trade or business of renting property. Rents are derived in an active trade or business of renting property only if, based on all the facts and circumstances, the corporation provides significant services or incurs substantial costs in the rental business. Generally, significant services are not rendered and substantial costs are not incurred in connection with net leases. Whether significant services are performed or substantial costs are incurred in the rental business is determined based upon all the facts and circumstances including, but not limited to, the number of persons employed to provide the services and types and amounts of costs and expenses incurred (other than depreciation).




CONCLUSION


Based solely on the facts and representations submitted, we conclude that the rental income that X derives from the Properties is not passive investment income as described in §1362(d)(3)(C)(i).

Except as expressly provided herein, no opinion is expressed or implied concerning the tax consequences of any aspect of any transaction or item discussed or referenced in this letter. Specifically, no opinion is expressed concerning whether X is a small business corporation eligible to make an S corporation election. Further, the passive investment income rules of § 1362 are completely independent of the passive activity rules of § 469; unless an exception under § 469 applies, the rental activity remains passive for purposes of § 469.

This ruling is directed only to the taxpayer requesting it. Section 6110(k)(3) of the Code provides that it may not be used or cited as precedent.

Pursuant to the power of attorney on file with this office, a copy of this letter will be sent to the taxpayer's representative.

Sincerely, Audrey Ellis, Senior Counsel, Branch 1, Office of Associate Chief Counsel (Passthroughs & Special Industries).

Labels:

Friday, June 27, 2008

Offer in Compromise - reasonable collection potential
Code Sec. 7122]- Offer-in-compromise
An IRS Appeals officer did not abuse her discretion in rejecting an individual's offers-in-compromise where those offers did not provide for an immediate payment equal to the available cash value of the taxpayer's life insurance policies. The taxpayer made cash offers less than the total available insurance cash value, but the court found no authority requiring the IRS to accept less than the full value on the grounds suggested by the taxpayer, that he and his wife are "in their older years."

Larry D. McClanahan v. Commissioner.

Dkt. No. 19287-05L , TC Memo. 2008-161, June 26, 2008.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GALE, Judge: Pursuant to section 6330(d)(1),1 petitioner seeks review of respondent's determination to maintain a lien filing with respect to petitioner's unpaid income tax for 2000, 2001, and 2002. This case is before us on respondent's motion for summary judgment (motion). Petitioner was afforded an opportunity to respond and timely did so (response). For the reasons set forth below, we shall grant respondent's motion.





Background2



At the time of filing the petition, petitioner resided in Tennessee.



The petition was filed in response to a Notice of Determination Concerning Collection Action(s) Under Section 6320 and/or 6330 concerning petitioner's income tax liability for 2000, 2001, and 2002. Thereafter, the Court granted respondent's motion to remand the case to the Internal Revenue Service Office of Appeals for the purpose of considering petitioner's proposed collection alternatives (second hearing). At the conclusion of the second hearing respondent issued a Supplemental Notice of Determination Concerning Collection Action(s) Under Section 6320 and/or 6330 (supplemental notice of determination).



Petitioner's underlying tax liabilities for 2000, 2001, and 2002 are based on assessments of unpaid amounts reported on petitioner's income tax returns for those years as due. Petitioner's filing status on those returns was married, filing separately. Petitioner has not disputed the underlying liabilities. As of the time respondent issued petitioner a Letter 3172, Notice of Federal Tax Lien Filing and Your Right to a Hearing Under IRC 6320, the amounts of petitioner's unpaid liabilities were $21,485.62, $22,237.96, and $22,198.39 for 2000, 2001, and 2002, respectively, or a total of $65,921.97.



Respondent contends, and petitioner does not dispute, that the only issues petitioner raised during the second hearing were collection alternatives. Petitioner made two offers-in-compromise on the basis of "Doubt as to Collectibility" during the second hearing, the first in the amount of $15,000 and the second in the amount of $29,030, to settle all of his outstanding liabilities for 2000, 2001, and 2002. Petitioner also proposed a partial payment installment agreement during the second hearing to pay $294 per month for an unspecified number of months.





Discussion



"Summary judgment is intended to expedite litigation and avoid unnecessary and expensive trials." Fla. Peach Corp. v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 678, 681 (1988). Summary judgment may be granted where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and a decision may be rendered as a matter of law. Rule 121(a) and (b). Factual inferences are viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and the moving party bears the burden of proving that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Craig v. Commissioner, 119 T.C. 252, 260 (2002); Dahlstrom v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 812, 821 (1985); Jacklin v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 340, 344 (1982). The party opposing summary judgment must set forth specific facts which show that a genuine question of material fact exists and may not merely rely on allegations or denials in the pleadings. Grant Creek Water Works, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 322, 325 (1988); Casanova Co. v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 214, 217 (1986).



Section 6321 imposes a lien in favor of the United States on all property and rights to property of a person liable for taxes (taxpayer) when a demand for the payment of the taxpayer's liability for the taxes has been made and the taxpayer fails to pay those taxes. Such a lien arises when an assessment is made. Sec. 6322. Section 6323(a) requires the Secretary to file a notice of Federal tax lien if such lien is to be valid against any purchaser, holder of a security interest, mechanic's lienor, or judgment lien creditor. Lindsay v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-285, affd. 56 Fed. Appx. 800 (9th Cir. 2003).



Section 6320 provides that the Secretary shall furnish the taxpayer with written notice of the filing of a notice of lien and of the taxpayer's right to a hearing concerning the lien. Sec. 6320(a)(1), (3). If a hearing is timely requested, the taxpayer may raise at the hearing "any relevant issue" relating to the unpaid tax or the proposed lien, including offers of collection alternatives such as an offer-in-compromise or an installment agreement. Sec. 6330(c)(2)(A).



At the conclusion of the hearing, the Appeals employee must determine whether and how to proceed with collection and shall take into account (i) the verification that the requirements of any applicable law or administrative procedure have been met; (ii) the relevant issues raised by the taxpayer, including spousal defenses, challenges to the appropriateness of collection actions, and offers of collection alternatives; and (iii) whether any proposed collection action balances the need for the efficient collection of taxes with the legitimate concern of the taxpayer that the collection action be no more intrusive than necessary. Sec. 6330(c)(3).



Where the underlying tax liability is properly at issue, we review the determination de novo. E.g., Goza v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 176, 181-182 (2000). Where the underlying tax liability is not at issue, we review the determination for abuse of discretion. Id. at 182.



In his motion, respondent contends that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the settlement officer conducting the second hearing evaluated, and rejected, petitioner's offers-in-compromise and proposed installment agreement "in accordance with the provisions of the Internal Revenue Manual." Petitioner argues that the settlement officer abused her discretion in rejecting his collection alternatives and sustaining the lien.



As discussed below, upon review of the motion and response, we find that no genuine issues of material fact remain and that respondent is entitled to judgment in his favor as a matter of law.



Section 7122 authorizes the Secretary to compromise any civil case arising under the internal revenue laws and requires him to prescribe guidelines for officers and employees of the Internal Revenue Service to determine whether an offer-in-compromise is adequate and should be accepted to resolve a dispute. Sec. 7122(a), (d)(1). A compromise based on "doubt as to collectibility" (which petitioner seeks) may be accepted "where the taxpayer's assets and income are less than the full amount of the liability." Sec. 301.7122-1(b)(2), Proced. & Admin. Regs. With respect to offers-in-compromise on this basis, we observed in Murphy v. Commissioner, 125 T.C. 301, 309 (2005), affd. 469 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2006):



Generally, under * * * [the Commissioner's] administrative pronouncements, an offer to compromise based on doubt as to collectibility will be acceptable only if the offer reflects the reasonable collection potential of the case (i.e., that amount, less than the full liability, that the IRS could collect through means such as administrative and judicial collection remedies). Rev. Proc. 2003-71, sec. 4.02(2), 2003-2 C.B. 517. * * *



See also 1 Administration, Internal Revenue Manual (IRM) (CCH), pt. 5.8.1.1.3(3), at 16,253-16,254 (Sept. 1, 2005) ("Absent special circumstances, a Doubt as to Collectibility (DATC) offer amount must equal or exceed a taxpayers [sic] reasonable collection potential (RCP) in order to be considered for acceptance."). The taxpayer's reasonable collection potential includes realizable equity in assets owned by the taxpayer as well as amounts collectible from the taxpayer's future income after allowing for payment of necessary living expenses. 1 Administration, IRM (CCH), pt. 5.8.4.4.1, at 16,307 (Sept. 1, 2005).



The Commissioner's published guidelines provide the basis for (i) calculation of a taxpayer's reasonable collection potential using national and local allowances and other standards, and (ii) a determination, based on the facts and circumstances of each taxpayer, that use of the published schedules will not result in the taxpayer's lacking adequate means to provide for basic living expenses. See sec. 7122(d)(2); sec. 301.7122-1(c)(2), Proced. & Admin. Regs.; 1 Administration, IRM (CCH), pt. 5.8.4.4, at 16,306 (Sept. 1, 2005); see also Lemann v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-37.



Exceptions to the general rule that an offer-in-compromise based on doubt as to collectibility must equal or exceed the taxpayer's reasonable collection potential are made where there are "special circumstances". See 1 Administration, IRM (CCH), pt. 5.8.4.3, at 16,306 (Sept. 1, 2005). Special circumstances include "circumstances demonstrating that the taxpayer would suffer economic hardship if the IRS were to collect from him an amount equal to the reasonable collection potential". Murphy v. Commissioner, supra at 309. Special circumstances that may cause an offer to be accepted notwithstanding that it is for less than the taxpayer's reasonable collection potential include, but are not limited to, advanced age, poor health, history of unemployment, disability, dependents with special needs, and medical catastrophe. Lemann v. Commissioner, supra; see also Murphy v. Commissioner, supra at 309; sec. 301.7122-1(c)(3), Proced. & Admin. Regs.; 1 Administration, IRM (CCH), pt. 5.8.4.3, pt. 5.8.11, at 16,373 through 16,383-7 (Sept. 1, 2005).



"The decision to entertain, accept or reject an offer in compromise is squarely within the discretion of the appeals officer and the IRS in general." Kindred v. Commissioner, 454 F.3d 688, 696 (7th Cir. 2006) (affirming an order granting the Commissioner summary judgment). Generally, where an Appeals employee has followed the Commissioner's guidelines to ascertain a taxpayer's reasonable collection potential and rejected the taxpayer's collection alternative on that basis, we have found no abuse of discretion. Lemann v. Commissioner, supra; see also Schulman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-129.



With regard to installment agreements entered into on or after October 22, 2004, section 6159(a) authorizes the Secretary to enter into installment agreements to satisfy tax liabilities where he determines that doing so will facilitate full or partial collection. Generally, we have held that it is not an abuse of discretion for purposes of sections 6320 and 6330 when an Appeals employee relies on guidelines published in the IRM to evaluate a proposed installment agreement. See, e.g., Orum v. Commissioner, 123 T.C. 1, 13 (2004), affd. 412 F.3d 819 (7th Cir. 2005); Etkin v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-245.



We first consider whether the settlement officer abused her discretion in rejecting petitioner's offers-in-compromise. Petitioner has not disputed respondent's contention that petitioner had three whole life insurance policies with a net cash surrender value of $32,976.50. As noted, under the Commissioner's published guidelines a doubt as to collectibility offer must reflect the taxpayer's reasonable collection potential. In order to calculate reasonable collection potential, the IRM divides a taxpayer's resources into "components of collectibility" including, inter alia, assets and future income, and defines "Assets" as "The amount collectible from the taxpayers [sic] net realizable equity in assets." 1 Administration, IRM (CCH), pt. 5.8.4.4.1. The IRM further provides methods for valuing a taxpayer's components of collectibility. See 1 Administration, IRM (CCH), pt. 5.8.4.4, pt. 5.8.5, at 16,333 through 16,339-17 (Sept. 1, 2005).



According to the "Financial Analysis" provisions of the IRM applicable to evaluating offers-in-compromise when the taxpayer owns a (whole) life insurance policy, if "The taxpayer will retain or sell the policy to help fund the offer" (rather than borrow against it), then "Equity is the cash surrender value." 1 Administration, IRM (CCH), pt. 5.8.5.3.7(2), at 16,339-2 (Sept. 1, 2005). Petitioner admits that during the second hearing he "agreed in principle to liquidate life insurance in support of an offer on his part." In view of the published guidelines, we do not believe that it was an abuse of discretion for the settlement officer to conclude, as she did, that the $32,976.50 cash surrender value constituted the realizable equity in petitioner's whole life insurance policies.



Petitioner argues that because he and his spouse "are in their older years", only $16,500 of the $32,976.50 cash surrender value should be considered realizable equity ("essentially splitting the difference") in order to preserve the remaining funds for petitioner's spouse in the event petitioner predeceases her. We disagree. Petitioner provides no authority, and we are not aware of any provision in the published guidelines, that requires that the Commissioner adjust the realizable equity in a taxpayer's life insurance policies for this reason.3 Under the IRM, whole life insurance policies are treated as discretionary investments that create an asset which may be liquidated, or against which the taxpayer may borrow, for purposes of computing his or her reasonable collection potential. See 1 Administration, IRM (CCH), pt. 5.8.5.5.3(3), at 16,339-11 (Sept. 1, 2005); 2 Administration, IRM (CCH), pt. 5.15.1.10, at 17,664 (May 1, 2004), pt. 5.15.1.22, at 17,667-10 (May 1, 2004).



In addition to petitioner's whole life insurance policies, the settlement officer determined, and petitioner has not disputed, that petitioner had realizable equity of $50 in cash.



Petitioner takes issue with the settlement officer's further determination that petitioner had realizable equity of $3,623 in retirement accounts and $40,700 in his residence, as well as the officer's determination that petitioner's future income would leave $452 available per month for 48 months, totaling $21,696, to pay towards his Federal income tax liabilities. We find it unnecessary to decide whether the settlement officer's determination of these amounts was appropriate because, even if all of the foregoing sources were disregarded, petitioner's reasonable collection potential would be $33,026.50; that is, the net realizable equity in his whole life insurance policies and cash. Petitioner's highest offer-in-compromise was $29,030, an amount less than his reasonable collection potential computed without regard to his future income4 or any other assets.5 On the basis of these undisputed facts, we are satisfied that it was not an abuse of discretion for the settlement officer to reject petitioner's offers-in-compromise. We do not conduct an independent review of what would be an acceptable offer-in-compromise or substitute our judgment for that of the Appeals Office. Rather, the Appeals employee's decision to reject the offers-in-compromise will not be disturbed unless it is arbitrary, capricious, or without sound basis in fact or law. See, e.g., Murphy v. Commissioner, 125 T.C. at 320; Hansen v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-56; Catlow v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-47.



We next consider whether the settlement officer abused her discretion in rejecting petitioner's proposed installment agreement of $294 per month. In his motion respondent asserts, and petitioner has not denied, that the settlement officer required that petitioner agree to pay the cash surrender value of his whole life insurance policies, namely $32,976.50, in the first payment of any partial payment installment agreement. Respondent asserts that petitioner refused this condition; and as we have discussed above, petitioner's position during the second hearing and in his submissions to this Court has been that he was willing to pay only $16,500 of the cash surrender value of his whole life insurance policies towards his tax liabilities.



The IRM addresses these circumstances, stating that "Before a PPIA [partial payment installment agreement] may be granted, equity in assets must be addressed and * * * In most cases taxpayers will be required to use equity in assets to pay liabilities." 2 Administration, IRM (CCH), pt. 5.14.2.2(2), at 17,529 (July 12, 2005). The published guidelines further state:



If the taxpayer does not comply with the requirement of making a good faith attempt to use equity in assets * * * the taxpayer will be considered a "won't pay" and seizure/levy action may be appropriate. If enforcement action is appropriate, a PPIA will not be granted. * * * [2 Administration, IRM (CCH), pt. 5.14.2.2.2(4), at 17,531 (July 12, 2005).]



We have previously held that it was not an abuse of discretion for the Commissioner to rely on guidelines which required "that taxpayers borrow upon or liquidate current assets" as a condition of entering into an installment agreement. See Willis v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-302. Accordingly, we find that it was not an abuse of discretion for the settlement officer to reject petitioner's proposed partial payment installment agreement when he refused to make an initial payment corresponding to the realizable equity in his whole life insurance policies. See Murphy v. Commissioner, supra at 320-321.



In his response petitioner further contends (i) that the settlement officer abused her discretion in failing to balance the need for the efficient collection of taxes with petitioner's legitimate concern that collection action be no more intrusive than necessary, (ii) that the settlement officer failed to consider challenges to the appropriateness of collection actions, and (iii) that the settlement officer failed to consider "spousal defenses".6



We first address petitioner's claim that the settlement officer failed to comply with section 6330(c)(3)(C), which requires the officer to consider whether the proposed collection action balances the need for the efficient collection of taxes with the legitimate concern of the taxpayer that any collection action be no more intrusive than necessary. Petitioner's principal defense against the lien was the offer of collection alternatives. We have found that the settlement officer adhered to the Commissioner's published guidelines in evaluating and rejecting petitioner's proposed collection alternatives. Given the deference inherent in an abuse of discretion standard and the failure of petitioner's collection alternatives to meet the published standards for acceptance, we see no defect in the settlement officer's balancing.



Petitioner contends that the settlement officer failed to consider "the appropriateness of collection actions" as required by section 6330(c)(2)(A)(ii). We disagree. The supplemental notice of determination states: "As you pointed out, seizure and sale of your personal residence may not be feasible as it is jointly owned with your wife. However, levy on the cash value of your insurance policies would be feasible and appropriate if some other resolution cannot be reached." As discussed, in the collection alternatives petitioner offered at the second hearing he refused to disgorge all of the realizable equity in his life insurance policies. In these circumstances the settlement officer's decision not to withdraw the lien reflected detailed consideration of the appropriateness of collection actions.



Finally, petitioner's claim that the settlement officer failed to consider "spousal defenses" is frivolous. Petitioner did not file joint returns for any of the years to which the collection action at issue is addressed. Accordingly, a spousal defense has no possible relevance.




Conclusion


There is no dispute that petitioner had life insurance policies with a net cash surrender value totaling $32,976.50, plus $50 in cash. The offers-in-compromise and installment agreement petitioner offered in the second hearing failed to reflect the reasonable collection potential evidenced by these assets. Consequently, we conclude that no genuine issues of material fact remain and hold that respondent is entitled to judgment as a matter of law that there was no abuse of discretion in the determination to reject petitioner's collection alternatives and maintain the lien at issue. Accordingly, we shall grant respondent's motion. To reflect the foregoing, An appropriate order and decision will be entered.


1 Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.

2 The following findings are established in the record and/or are undisputed.

3 As to whether petitioner's argument concerning retention of some of his interest in the life insurance policies might be construed as a claim of "special circumstances", see infra note 5.

4 Because we conclude that petitioner's realizable equity in his life insurance policies alone justified the settlement officer's rejection of his offers-in-compromise, we need not consider other arguments petitioner advanced that pertain to the proper measurement of the realizable equity in the residence jointly held with his spouse or to his future income potential (such as the appropriate geographical index for his living expenses or local taxes).

5 Petitioner, who was represented by counsel, has not argued that he made a "Doubt as to Collectibility with Special Circumstances" offer-in-compromise that would "warrant acceptance for less than the amount of the calculated reasonable collection potential". See 1 Administration, IRM (CCH), pt. 5.8.4.3, at 16,306 (Sept. 1, 2005). However, we note that petitioner has alluded in his submissions to various factors that might be construed as "special circumstances" under the IRM, including "hardship" if the equity in his residence were used in the offer, the improper inclusion among available assets of a vehicle necessary to the conduct of petitioner's business, and the advanced age of petitioner and his spouse. Nonetheless, these factors are generally irrelevant to the realizable equity in his life insurance policies, which we have concluded provided a sufficient basis for the settlement officer's rejection of petitioner's offered collection alternatives.

As for any "special circumstances" surrounding the life insurance policies, petitioner's argument that he should be allowed to retain one-half of the realizable equity in the policies in view of his advanced age, to provide for his spouse in the event he predeceases her, might be construed as a claim of hardship and/or advanced age giving rise to "special circumstances". However, while admitting that his spouse was employed, petitioner did not disclose his spouse's income or assets to the settlement officer. Consequently, any failure or refusal by the settlement officer to find "special circumstances" based on the alleged necessity of the life insurance to avoid economic hardship for the surviving spouse was not an abuse of discretion, as the settlement officer was not provided sufficient information on which to base such a finding.

6 In addition, petitioner's response seeks "costs, expenses and attorney's fees". We shall disregard this material as a premature claim for administrative or litigation costs under sec. 7430. See Rules 331(b), 231(a)(2), 143(a).


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Thursday, June 26, 2008

The statutory language "all property and rights to property" --which appears in both section 6321, authorizing tax liens, and section 6331, authorizing levies --is "broad and reveals on its face that Congress meant to reach every interest in property that a taxpayer might have." Nat'l Bank of Commerce [ 85-2 USTC ¶9482], 472 U.S. at 719-20.


Joseph Michael Kish, Plaintiff v. David A. Rogers, et al., Defendants.

U.S. District Court, So. Dist. Texas, Houston Div.; Civ. H-06-2389, October 22, 2007.


MEMORANDUM AND ORDER


ROSENTHAL, District Judge: The United States intervened in a small-claims court action filed by Joseph Michael Kish against David Rogers, Dennis Middleton, and Research Mannikins, Inc. in the Justice of the Peace Court Precinct 1 in Grimes County, Texas. The United States then removed the action to this court and asserted claims against Kish to recover unpaid federal income taxes for the 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003 tax years, as well as interest and penalties. In response, Kish, who is representing himself, argued that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) recorded an unlawful Notice of Lien against his property in Grimes County and defrauded him of money to which he is rightfully entitled.

Kish has filed a "Petition for Relief and Remedy." (Docket Entry No. 46). The United States has responded, (Docket Entry No. 54), and Kish has replied, (Docket Entry No. 58). Kish has also moved for a jury trial. (Docket Entry No. 60).

The United States has moved to amend its complaint to add Jan Kish, Kish's ex-wife, as a party to the action in order to foreclose on stock certificates that it seized from Kish, but which bear Jan Kish's name. (Docket Entry No. 45). The United States has also moved for summary judgment as to its claims. (Docket Entry No. 59). Kish has responded, (Docket Entry No. 61); the United States has replied, (Docket Entry No. 62); and Kish has surreplied, (Docket Entry No. 63).

Based on the motions, responses, and replies; the parties' submissions; and the applicable law, this court grants the United States's motion to amend; denies Kish's petition for relief; and grants the United States's motion for summary judgment. Kish's motion for a jury trial is denied as moot.



I. Background

Kish designs and sculpts models for life-size animal mannequins for taxidermy supply companies such as Precision Mannequins, Inc. and Research Mannikins, Inc. In 2000, Kish sold to Precision Mannequins the copyrights to certain models that he had created. The price was $210,000. In May 2001, Kish and Research Mannikins entered into a "Research Mannikins Sculptor Royalty Agreement." Under this agreement, Research Mannikins manufactures and sells taxidermy pieces using Kish's models and pays him a 10% royalty from each sale. The royalty payments are made quarterly and have averaged between $20,000 to $25,000 per year. The parties' agreement provides that Research Mannikins will make royalty payments to Kish "in perpetuity."



A. Tax Year 2000

In tax year 2000, despite receiving $210,000 from Precision Mannequins for his copyrighted models, Kish filed a federal income tax return with zeroes on all the lines. (Docket Entry No. 13, Ex. 2). When the IRS informed Kish that this was a frivolous return, he refiled the same return with zeroes on all the lines and wrote "NOT LIABLE" across the first page. (Docket Entry No. 59, Ex. 4).

The IRS determined that for the 2000 tax year, Kish had taxable income of $246,213.00 and a tax liability of $99,406.00. (Docket Entry No. 59, Ex. 5). On August 13, 2003, the IRS issued Kish a statutory Notice of Deficiency. ( Id., Ex. 5). This notice informed Kish of his outstanding tax liability and instructed him to petition the tax court within ninety days from the date of the notice letter if he wanted to contest the IRS's deficiency determination before making any payment. Kish did not petition the tax court. The IRS's records show that after Kish's "default" under the IRS's ninety-day letter, on April 19, 2004 a delegate of the Secretary of the Treasury assessed interest and penalties and gave Kish notice and demand for tax, penalties, and statutory additions due for tax year 2000. ( Id., Ex. 15). The records also show additional penalties and interest assessed in following years. ( Id.).



B. Tax Year 2001

In the 2001 tax year, Kish filed a federal income tax return reporting $28,210 in income and $6,008 owed in tax. (Docket Entry No. 59, Ex. 13). He did not pay any amount of tax. (Docket Entry No. 59 at 5).

The IRS determined that for the 2001 tax year, Kish had taxable income of $20,760 and a tax liability of $6,195.00. (Docket Entry No. 59, Ex. 16). The IRS's records show that on April 28, 2004, after Kish's "default" under a ninety-day notice letter, a delegate of the Secretary of the Treasury assessed interest and penalties and gave Kish notice and demand for tax, penalties, and statutory additions due for the 2001 tax year. ( Id.). The records also show additional penalties and interest assessed in following years. ( Id.).



C. Tax Year 2002

In the 2002 tax year, Kish did not file a federal income tax return. (Docket Entry No. 59, Ex. 14 at 49). The IRS determined that for the 2002 tax year, Kish had taxable income of $17,188.00 and a tax liability of $5,654.00. (Docket Entry No. 59, Exs. 7, 17). On June 8, 2004, the IRS issued a statutory Notice of Deficiency to Kish. ( Id., Ex. 7). Like the previous notice, the IRS's letter informed Kish of his outstanding tax liability and instructed him to petition the tax court within ninety days from the date of the letter if he wished to contest the IRS's deficiency determination before making any payment. Kish did not petition the tax court. The IRS's records show that the ninety-day letter was "undeliverable." On November 8, 2004, a delegate of the Secretary of the Treasury assessed interest and penalties and gave notice and demand against Kish for tax, penalties, and statutory additions due for the 2002 tax year. ( Id., Ex. 17). The records also show additional penalties and interest assessed in following years. ( Id.).

For tax years 2000, 2001, and 2002, the IRS's records show that on May 14, 2005, a "levy notice" was issued; on May 31, 2005 a "return receipt" for the notice was signed; and on July 15, 2005 a federal tax lien was issued. (Docket Entry No. 59, Exs. 15, 16, 17). On July 19, 2005, the IRS recorded a notice of federal tax lien against Kish in the property records of Grimes County, Texas. ( Id., Ex. 19). The lien listed an unpaid balance of $166,221.36 for tax year 2000; an unpaid balance of $9,830.27 for tax year 2001; an unpaid balance of $8,160.74 for tax year 2002; and an unpaid balance of $500 as a penalty for filing a frivolous income tax return for tax year 2000. ( Id.). The IRS's records further show that for tax years 2000, 2001, and 2002, another statutory notice of the balance owed to the IRS was issued on June 19, 2006. (Docket Entry No. 13, Ex. 15).



D. Tax Year 2003

In the 2003 tax year, Kish filed a blank federal income tax return on which he had written, "NOT REQUIRED." (Docket Entry No. 59, Ex. 8). The IRS determined that for the 2003 tax year, Kish had taxable income of $20,764.00 and a tax liability of $3,585.00. The IRS's records show on February 25, 2005, after Kish's "default" under a ninety-day notice letter, a delegate of the Secretary of the Treasury assessed interest and penalties and gave notice and demand against Kish for tax, penalties, and statutory additions due for the 2003 tax year. (Docket Entry No. 59, Ex. 18). The records also show that on April 10, 2006, a penalty of $500 for filing a frivolous income tax return was assessed and a statutory notice was issued. ( Id.).

The IRS records further show that on October 17, 2005 and on April 10, 2006, statutory notices of the balance owed to the IRS for tax year 2003 were issued. The records show that on December 21, 2005, notice of an intent to levy for Kish's tax liability for tax year 2003 was issued. On May 15, 2006, a notice of intent to levy for Kish's liability for the $500 penalty was issued. (Docket Entry No. 59, Ex. 18).

On December 13, 2005, the IRS issued to Research Mannikins a notice of levy. (Docket Entry No. 59, Ex. 20). The notice listed an unpaid balance of $166,827.96 for tax year 2000; an unpaid balance of $9,830.27 for tax year 2001; an unpaid balance of $8,160.74 for tax year 2002; and a penalty of $321.85 for tax year 2000. ( Id.). The notice also provided details of "Statutory Additions" for each unpaid balance that brought the total amount due to $210,876.10. The notice explained that it was "a notice of levy we [the IRS] are using to collect money owed by the taxpayer named above [Kish]" and that "[t]his levy requires you to turn over to us" Kish's wages, salary, or other income for which Research Mannikins is obligated "until this levy is released." ( Id.).

Kish wrote to Middleton and Rogers, the principals of Research Mannikins, and asked them not to comply with the IRS tax levy. In his letter, Kish asserted that the levy was fraudulent and void because the levy failed to "cite a statute on which it is based" and because "[t]he IRS has NO authority to levy without a court order." (Docket Entry No. 59, Ex. 9). Kish stated that "[t]he IRS has NO authority to levy a person in the private sector," and that "[o]nly public sector employees are subject to levy." ( Id.). Kish further asserted that Middleton and Rogers did not have to comply with the levy because the text of the notice, which specified "wages and salary," did not cover Research Mannikin's royalty payments to Kish. ( Id.).

Research Mannikins complied with the levy and sent the royalty payments to the IRS, Kish sued Research Mannikins and its principals in small-claims court on June 8, 2006. The United States filed and was granted a motion to intervene in the small-claims court action under 26 U.S.C. §7424. The United States removed to this court on July 18, 2006, (Docket Entry No. 1), and was granted leave to file a complaint in intervention, (Docket Entry No. 29).

On November 8, 2006, this court dismissed with prejudice Kish's claims against David Rogers, Dennis Middleton, and Research Mannikins, Inc. (Docket Entry No. 29). On February 27, 2007, the United States filed its complaint against Kish, seeking to reduce to judgment Kish's federal tax liabilities and to establish that the United States has valid liens on Kish's royalty payments from Research Mannikins. (Docket Entry No. 31).

The United States later discovered that Kish held stock certificates for 999 shares of General Electric and 134 shares of Altria/Philip Morris stock. This court approved the United States's attachment and seizure of these stock certificates, making it clear that the United States had to hold the certificates and could not sell or otherwise dispose of them until the merits of the claims and defenses were decided. (Docket Entry No. 39). The stock certificates are currently held in escrow. (Docket Entry No. 54 at 4). The United States has moved to amend its complaint to add Jan Kish as a party to this action because the stock certificates bear her name. (Docket Entry No. 45).



II. The Legal Standards



A. The Rule 15 Standard for Leave to Amend

Rule 15(a) states that a party may amend the party's pleading once without seeking leave of court or the consent of the adverse party at any time before a responsive pleading is served. After a responsive pleading is served, a party may amend only by "leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party." Id. Although leave to amend pleadings "shall be freely given when justice requires," FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a), leave to amend "is not automatic." Matagorda Ventures Inc. v. Travelers Lloyds Inc. Co., 203 F.Supp.2d 704, 718 (S.D. Tex. 2000) (citing Dussouy v. Gulf Coast Inv. Corp., 660 F.2d 594, 598 (5th Cir. 1981)). A district court reviewing a motion to amend pleadings under Rule 15(a) may consider factors such as "whether there has been 'undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive ... undue prejudice to the opposing party, and futility of amendment.'" Jacobsen v. Osborne, 133 F.3d 315, 318 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting In re Southmark Corp., 88 F.3d 311, 314-15 (5th Cir. 1996)).

Denial of leave to amend on the basis of futility is "premised ... on the court's evaluation of the amendment as insufficient to state a claim ... ." Jamieson v. Shaw, 772 F.2d 1205, 1209 (5th Cir. 1985). A denial on this basis "tends to blur the distinction between analysis of the procedural context under Rule 15(a) and analysis of the sufficiency of the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6)." Id. at 1208-09 (citing Pan-Islamic Trade Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 632 F.2d 539, 546 (5th Cir. 1980)). Opinions frequently explicitly equate the futility analysis under Rule 15(a) with the legal sufficiency standard of Rule 12(b)(6). See Glassman v. Computervision Corp., 90 F.3d 617, 623 (1st Cir. 1996) ("In reviewing for 'futility,' the district court applies the same standard of legal sufficiency as applies to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion."); In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d Cir. 1997); General Elec. Capital Corp. v. Lease Resolution Corp., 128 F.3d 1074, 1085 (7th Cir. 1997).



B. The Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate if no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56. The moving party bears the initial burden of "informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co. v. Reyna, 401 F.3d 347, 349 (5th Cir. 2005). When the moving party has met its Rule 56(c) burden, the nonmoving party cannot survive a summary judgment motion by resting on the mere allegations of its pleadings. The nonmovant must identify specific evidence in the record and articulate the manner in which that evidence supports that party's claim. Johnson v. Deep E. Tex. Reg'l Narcotics Trafficking Task Force, 379 F.3d 293, 304 (5th Cir. 2004). The nonmovant must do more than show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Armstrong v. Am. Home Shield Corp., 333 F.3d 566, 568 (5th Cir. 2003). In deciding a summary judgment motion, the court draws all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Calbillo v. Cavender Oldsmobile, Inc., 288 F.3d 721, 725 (5th Cir. 2002). "Rule 56 'mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery, and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.'" Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322).

Kish argues that "the power to exert the authority of the people rests in juries pursuant to the Constitution." (Docket Entry No. 61 at 1). The Supreme Court has rejected the argument that summary judgment contravenes the Seventh Amendment. In re Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 310 (1920) ("No one is entitled in a civil case to trial by jury, unless and except so far as there are issues of fact to be determined."). Summary judgment is appropriate if there are no material issues of fact in the case.



III. Analysis



A. The United States's Motion to Amend Its Complaint

The United States has moved for leave to amend its complaint to add Jan Kish, Kish's ex-wife, as a party to this action. (Docket Entry No. 45). Although Kish asserts that the stock certificates seized under this court's order are his property, the certificates bear Jan Kish's name.

Kish has not responded to the motion to amend. Because the United States first learned of the stock certificates during discovery and moved to amend its complaint within one month after this court's order authorizing the seizure of the stock certificates, it did not delay or act in bad faith. The United States points out that it has not repeatedly failed to cure deficiencies by previous amendments. There is no undue prejudice to Kish from allowing the proposed amendment because adding Jan Kish as a party to resolve the claim to the stock certificates does not affect Kish's arguments about his federal income tax liability. There is no basis to conclude that the proposed amendment is futile.

The motion for leave to file an amended complaint is granted.



B. Kish's Petition for Relief and Remedy and the United States's Summary Judgment Motion

In his Petition for Relief and Remedy and throughout his filings in this litigation, Kish argues that the lien filed against his property in the Grimes County property records and the levy on the Research Mannikins royalty payments are fraudulent and invalid. Kish challenges the lien and levy on a variety of grounds. Basically, Kish denies that he is subject to the Internal Revenue Code and asserts that the United States has failed to show what statute makes him liable for a tax deficiency. (Docket Entry No. 58 at 3; Docket Entry No. 61 at 2). Kish argues that because the lien cites no law that authorizes such a lien, the lien is invalid. (Docket Entry No.46 at 2). Kish also challenges the levy on the ground that it applies only to persons "liable to pay" and argues that he is not. (Docket Entry No. 46 at 3; Docket Entry No. 61 at 15). He supports his contention that he is not liable for any tax by arguing that he never received an assessment from the IRS showing what taxes he owes. (Docket Entry No. 46 at 2). Kish also argues that the levy applies only to "wages and salary," and asserts that the royalty payments from Research Mannikins do not qualify. (Docket Entry No. 63 at 3). Kish further argues that he does not engage in a taxable activity or privilege and that he is therefore not subject to federal income tax. He asserts that he "engages in an occupation of common right, which is not taxable in the 50 states." (Docket Entry No. 58 at 2). 1

In its summary judgment motion, the United States argues that Kish is indebted to the United States for the federal income taxes assessed against him for the 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003 tax years, plus interest and statutory additions. To support its arguments, the United States points to the IRS's Forms 4340, Certificate of Assessments and Payments, which show the assessments against Kish for each tax year. Citing Stallard v. United States [ 94-1 USTC ¶50,056], 12 F.3d 489, 493 (5th Cir. 1994), the United States argues these certificates are presumptively correct and entitled to great weight absent evidence to the contrary. Each Form 4340 shows the taxable income Kish received for that tax year, the amount of tax owed, and the penalties and interest assessed, and the date of each action the IRS took regarding Kish's tax liability, including when penalties were assessed and when notice of the deficiency was given. The United States points out that Kish failed to petition the tax court to challenge any determination of deficiency.

The United States also argues that the federal tax lien that it recorded in the Grimes County property records and the levy against the Research Mannikins royalty payments are valid. Title 26 U.S.C. §6321 provides:


If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same after demand, the amount (including any interest, additional amount, addition to tax, or assessable penalty, together with any costs that may accrue in addition thereto) shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such person.


Title 26 U.S.C. 6331 provides:


If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same within 10 days after notice and demand, it shall be lawful for the Secretary to collect such tax ... by levy upon all property and rights to property ... belonging to such person or on which there is a lien provided in this chapter for the payment of such tax. Levy may be made upon the accrued salary or wages of any officer, employee, or elected official ... .


Citing United States v. National Bank of Commerce [ 85-2 USTC ¶9482], 472 U.S. 713, 719 (1985), the United States asserts that a §6321 federal tax lien arises on the date of assessment and continues until the underlying tax liability is paid or becomes unenforceable. The United States argues that the record shows that the IRS made assessments and gave notice and demand against Kish for the 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003 tax years. Following the assessments for the 2000, 2001, and 2002 tax years, the United States filed a Notice of Federal Tax Lien for Kish's federal tax liabilities for those years in the Grimes County property records. The United States argues that under 26 U.S.C. 6331, the lien attaches to the Research Mannikins royalty agreement and the stock shares seized from Kish, and that under 26 U.S.C. §6331, the levy on the Research Mannikins royalty payments was validly made on property in which Kish has an interest and on which there was a valid lien.

Kish's arguments that he is not subject to the Internal Revenue Code because "[c]ode citations are not law" are not persuasive. (Docket Entry No. 58). Title 1 U.S.C. §204(a) provides that "[t]he matter set forth in the edition of the Code of Laws of the United States current at any time shall ... establish prima facie the laws of the United States." Kish cites no contrary law to show that he is not subject to the laws of the United States, including the Internal Revenue Code, as codified in the United States Code. Although Kish contends that "[c]ode citations ... are mere prima facie evidence of law," (Docket Entry No. 58), he fails to make any rebuttal or contrary showing to such prima facie evidence. He utterly fails to show that the Internal Revenue Code does not apply to him. Kish's challenge to the validity of the United States Code and to the United States's authority under the Internal Revenue Code fails.

In Title 26 U.S.C. §1, Congress "imposed on the taxable income of every individual who is not a married individual ... a tax determined in accordance with the following table." See also Rhodes v. C.I.R., 152 Fed.Appx. 340, 341 (5th Cir. 2005) ("The Constitution grants Congress the power to tax 'incomes ... from whatever source derived ... .' The federal income tax is to be imposed upon every citizen and resident of the United States.") (citing 26 U.S.C. §1). "Taxable income" is defined as "gross income minus the deductions allowed by this chapter." 26 U.S.C. §63. Gross income is defined as "all income from whatever source derived, including ... (1) Compensation for services, including fees, commissions, fringe benefits, and similar items; (2) Gross income derived from business; ... [and] (6) Royalties ... ." 26 U.S.C. §61. By definition, taxable income includes compensation for services and royalties. Kish has failed to show that his royalty payments from Research Mannikins are not subject to tax under the Internal Revenue Code. 2

Kish's challenges to the validity of the lien against his property and the levy on the Research Mannikins royalty payments are similarly unpersuasive. As the United States points out, a federal tax lien "arises when an assessment is made, and it continues until the taxpayer's liability is satisfied or becomes unenforceable." Nat'l Bank of Commerce [ 85-2 USTC ¶9482], 472 U.S. at 719. A valid lien exists under 26 U.S.C. §6321 regardless of whether the notice provided to the taxpayer cites legal authority. Kish's argument that he has no tax liability because he never received a tax assessment from the IRS also fails. (Docket Entry No. 58 at 3-4). The Fifth Circuit has rejected the contention that an assessment must precede tax liability. See Rhodes, 152 Fed.Appx. at 341 (5th Cir. 2005) ("That the Commissioner had not made an assessment against [the taxpayer] does not preclude a deficiency finding."); In re Swift, 129 F.3d 792, 799 n.41 (5th Cir. 1997) ("An assessment is not a prerequisite to tax liability."). 3

As the Supreme Court has recognized, the statutory language "all property and rights to property" --which appears in both section 6321, authorizing tax liens, and section 6331, authorizing levies --is "broad and reveals on its face that Congress meant to reach every interest in property that a taxpayer might have." Nat'l Bank of Commerce [ 85-2 USTC ¶9482], 472 U.S. at 719-20. Kish's argument that the levy applies only to wages and salary, and not to royalties, relies on an incomplete reading of the notice of levy and the instructions provided to Research Mannikins. The notice of levy stated that "[t]his levy requires you to turn over to us: ... this taxpayer's other income that you have now or for which you are obligated." (Docket Entry No. 59, Ex. 20). The instructions that accompanied the notice told Research Mannikins that "[f]or income other than wages and salary ... this levy attaches to all obligations you owe the taxpayer at the time you receive it, even though you plan to make the payment at a later date." (Docket Entry No. 63, Ex. 1). Kish has not shown how this language exempts or fails to cover Research Mannikins's royalty payments to him.

The United States has shown that Kish is liable to the United States for federal income taxes assessed against him for the 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003 tax years, plus interest and statutory additions. The United States has shown that a valid lien exists on Kish's property and that the IRS levy on Kish's royalty payments from Research Mannikins is proper. Kish has failed to show that a fact issue exists regarding his tax liability or the validity of the tax lien and levy on the royalty payments.



III. Conclusion

The United States' motion to amend its complaint is granted. The United States's summary judgment is granted. Kish's Petition for Relief and Remedy is denied. Kish's motion for a jury trial is denied as moot.

The United States has asked for an order foreclosing the tax liens and directing sale of the stock shares. Because the shares are in Jan Kish's name, and because she is now a party to this case, the United States is directed to submit a proposed scheduling order to resolve the remaining issues in this case. The order must be submitted no later than November 9, 2007.

1 Kish also challenges this court's jurisdiction over the case. (Docket Entry No. 58 at 4). This court already addressed these challenges in its memorandum and opinion of November 8, 2007, in which this court found that it has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1340, which provides district courts jurisdiction over civil actions arising under any act of Congress for internal revenue, and §1345, which provides district courts jurisdiction over civil actions commenced by the United States under congressional authority. (Docket Entry No. 29). Kish raises no new arguments to challenge jurisdiction. This court will not revisit the issue.

In addition, Kish relies on 26 U.S.C. §7501 to argue that the United States is improperly attempting "to reclaim trust fund taxes" through its levy on the Research Mannikins royalty payments. Because the United States does not rely on section 7501 in its summary judgment motion and does not argue that Kish is "a trustee of a special fund in trust for the United States," as Kish suggests, (Docket Entry No. 63 at 5), this court will not address these arguments.

2 Kish argues that he does not engage in a taxable activity. He asserts that he "engages in an occupation of common right, which is not taxable in the 50 states." (Docket Entry No. 58 at 2). To support this argument, Kish cites Jack Cole Co. v. MacFarland, 337 S.W.2d 453, 456 (Tenn. 1960), a case in which the Tennessee Supreme Court held that "the right to receive income or earnings ... cannot be taxed as privilege." When Jack Cole was decided, Tennessee's Constitution prohibited a tax on income. The Tennessee Constitution has since been amended to allow a tax on income. The Jack Cole analysis is not pertinent to this case and does not show that the royalty payments from Research Mannikins are not subject to tax under the Internal Revenue Code.

3 Kish acknowledges that the United States has provided him with a "Certificate of Assessments, Payments, and Other Specified Matters" (IRS Form 4340) for each tax year in dispute. (Docket Entry No. 59, Exs. 15-18). Although he admits that Form 4340 is "prima facie evidence of an assessment," (Docket Entry No. 61 at 6), Kish fails to rebut such prima facie evidence. He only challenges the authenticity of the forms, arguing that the forms do not have a seal affixed to them and that they are not "signed under penalty of perjury, or otherwise attested to as authentic or reliable." (Docket Entry No. 61 at 5-6). The Fifth Circuit has held that the law "does not mandate any particular form of notice" of a deficiency. Selgas v. C.I.R. [ 2007-1 USTC ¶50,219], 475 F.3d 697, 700 (5th Cir. 2007). "[A] notice of deficiency is valid as long as it informs a taxpayer that the IRS has determined that a deficiency exists and specifies the amount of the deficiency." Id.


NON: UST02 2007-2USTCP50766 http://tax.cchgroup.com/network&JA=LK&fNoSplash=Y&&LKQ=GUID%3A8ea92a0e-a55b-3ae8-b457-21c8ea1b54d7&KT=L&fNoLFN=TRUE& UST02 #2327 [CASES ]

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Wednesday, June 25, 2008

www.irstaxattorney.com 888-712-7690

"In order to prove a defendant guilty of tax evasion, the government must show (1) a substantial tax liability, (2) willfulness, and (3) an affirmative act constituting evasion or attempted evasion." United States v. Anderson, 319 F.3d 1218, 1219 (10th Cir. 2003); see also 26 U.S.C. § 7201 ("Any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this title or the payment thereof shall ... be guilty of a felony ... .").



United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. James Thompson, Defendant-Appellant; United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Thomas E. Mower, Defendant-Appellant; United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Leslie D. Mower, Defendant-Appellant.

U.S. Court of Appeals, 10th Circuit; 06-4232, 06-4256, 06-4258, March 12, 2008.

Affirming an unreported DC Utah decision.

[ Code Sec. 6531]


[ Code Sec. 7201]




BRISCOE, Circuit Judge: Defendants Thomas Mower and Leslie Mower appeal their convictions of one count of conspiracy to defraud the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and six counts of tax evasion, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201, for the years 1992 through 1997. Defendant James Thompson appeals his conviction of one count of conspiracy to defraud the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and one count of corruptly endeavoring to interfere with the administration of internal revenue laws, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a). Thomas Mower argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to convict him of tax evasion for the years 1992, 1993, and 1997; (2) the district court erred in admitting the government's summary charts; and (3) the district court erred in compelling Thomas Mower's attorney, Allen Davis, to testify before the grand jury. Leslie Mower contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to convict her of all counts; (2) the district court erred in admitting the government's summary charts; (3) her sentence was procedurally and substantively unreasonable; (4) the district court erred in not giving certain jury instructions; (5) the statute of limitations barred four of the counts of tax evasion, for the years 1992 through 1995; (6) her sentence violated the ex post facto clause; and (7) the district court erred in denying her motion for severance. James Thompson argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to convict him of either count; (2) the statute of limitations barred both counts; and (3) the district court erred in denying his motion for severance. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.




I.


On December 19, 2002, Thomas Mower and his wife, Leslie Mower, were indicted on one count of conspiracy to defraud the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and six counts of tax evasion, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201, for the tax years 1992 through 1997. On April 8, 2003, the grand jury returned a Superseding Indictment, adding charges against James Thompson for one count of conspiracy to defraud the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and one count of corruptly endeavoring to interfere with the administration of internal revenue laws, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a).

Defendants Thomas and Leslie Mower owned three corporations --Neways US, Neways Australia, and Neways Malaysia 1 --each of which utilized a multilevel marketing system to sell a variety of personal care products. In a multilevel marketing system, the company manufactures or purchases product and sells it to distributors, who purchase the product at a discount and make money by selling it to the public at retail price. Distributors receive bonuses by signing up other distributors to sell product. Distributors who have recruited new distributors also receive bonuses as a result of sales by distributors beneath them in the "downline." Individuals at the top of a Neways downline could make between $25,000 and $35,000 per month. The Mowers had a downline in Neways US called "Base of the Tree," and a distributorship in Neways US called "Mower Partnership."

Thomas Mower was the president of Neways US, and he was in charge of running the company --"the go-to person." Neways employees regularly discussed the financial status of the company with him, and he made most of the decisions for Neways US. Randy Lindstrom, a former general manager of Neways US, testified that Thomas Mower had a basic understanding of accounting, as evidenced by their conversations about income and expenses. According to Lindstrom, Thomas Mower "didn't like to pay taxes."

Leslie Mower also made decisions on a daily basis for Neways US, although she dealt more with distributors than with sales. In the early 1990s, she had virtually no involvement with the financial side of the business. Later, for a period during the mid-1990s, she became Chief Financial Officer of Neways US, 2 even though she did not have any expertise in accounting or finance, and she had some difficulty understanding the company's financial statements. She would sometimes pay the corporation's bills, but she mostly just promoted the product.

Because of its rapid growth in the early 1990s, Neways US was very heavily indebted to creditors and needed money for operating expenses. The Mowers did not want to borrow working capital from a bank, so they instead tried to solve the company's money problems by bringing in cash from Neways Australia. Thomas Mower began meeting with his attorneys to determine how to get money out of Neways Australia without paying taxes on it. Soon, Neways US began receiving hundreds of thousands of dollars from Neways Australia, which Neways US recorded as pre-payment for product that it later sent to Neways Australia. In addition to these pre-payments, Neways US received other amounts from Neways Australia that it classified as loans.

Neways Australia had two primary bank accounts: an operating account and a bonus checking account. It paid for its day-to-day operations --including bills, payments for product, salaries, and royalty payments to Neways US --from its operating account. Every month, it paid distributor bonuses from the bonus checking account. When examined, the books and records at Neways Australia were found to be in poor condition.

At the top of the Neways Australia downline were seven distributorships: Images, Inc. 1 through 7, which later became Neways, Inc. 1 through 7, and then Mower Properties, Inc. 1 through 7. 3 Marija Lee, a former employee at Neways Australia and Neways Malaysia, testified that John Hunter, the then-CEO of Neways Australia, asked her to place these distributorships at the top of the Neways Australia downline. Thomas Mower had originally wanted to set up the Neways Australia downline like the Neways US downline, but John Hunter advised him to create these seven entities to absorb more bonus payments than one entity alone could absorb. These amounts are known in the industry as "breakage." The Neways 1 through 7 distributorships did not have to sell product to receive commissions, and they were structured to absorb any bonuses that would otherwise flow up to the company itself. Mr. Hunter had several conversations with Thomas Mower regarding Neways 1 through 7, and the need for Neways US to get money from Neways Australia. He assumed the commission payments to Neways 1 through 7 were going to Neways US, because that was why they set up Neways 1 through 7 in the first place. The Neways 1 through 7 entities received commission checks and later, wire transfers, from Neways Australia's bonus checking account. On its books and records, Neways Australia treated these payments as expenses.

Michael Cunningham, a former CEO of Neways Australia, did not know what happened to the commission checks for the Neways 1 through 7 entities after Neways Australia sent the checks to Utah. Marija Lee testified that she sent them to Utah, and none of the checks were ever voided. John Hunter testified that he sent the checks directly to Thomas and Leslie Mower in Utah, although he had no idea what happened to them after they reached the United States. When the checks were late a couple of times, Leslie Mower called Mr. Hunter to ask whether they had been mailed. Once, when the Mowers visited Australia, they asked Mr. Hunter to sign some of the checks over to cash, and he obliged.

Neways 1 through 7 distributorships were also set up at the top of the Neways Malaysia downline, and Neways Malaysia sent the commission checks for these distributorships to the United States. At trial, the government introduced commission checks from Neways Malaysia to several of the Neways 1 through 7 distributorships in 1994 and 1995, as well as registers of commission checks from Neways Malaysia for 1996 and 1997. In 1996, the register showed commission checks issued to Neways 1 through 7, as well as Mower Properties 1 through 7, and these entities had the same identification numbers. 4 In 1997, the register showed checks to five other entities with these same identification numbers: Rezults, N. Trust, N. Properties, Eclat, and CC Corp.

Patricia Sandberg, Thomas Mower's former secretary, testified that the Mowers had distributorships in Australia and Malaysia, and she saw checks from these distributorships. Commission checks from Australia and Malaysia arrived once a month through the mail, in envelopes addressed to Thomas Mower personally. A downline report accompanied the checks, and the checks corresponded to amounts on the downline report. Ms. Sandberg understood the commission checks to be from distributorships that the Mowers had in Neways Australia and Neways Malaysia. Usually, she gave the checks to Thomas Mower; sometimes, he gave them back, and she deposited them in an account for "Rezults," per his instructions. Thomas Mower always had the checkbook for the Rezults account in his possession, and he had signatory authority over the account. Neways US had no records for this account. Ms. Sandberg did not know what the Rezults account was used for, but she thought some of the money may have gone toward the purchase of a warehouse constructed for Neways US. The corporate accounting department at Neways US never saw the commission checks from Australia and Malaysia, never came to ask about them, and never knew that she deposited them. Annette Jenkins, who worked in the accounting department until 1998, testified that, to her knowledge, Neways US never received any commission checks.

Patricia Sandberg also identified several commission checks from Neways US, payable to the following people and entities: Thomas Mower; Neways Independent Distributorship Adpool; Base of the Tree; Brett Mower 5 ; Lead Allocation, Darrid; MP Trust; Orphanage; MP Enterprises; and BW Enterprises. All of these were endorsed, in some capacity, by Thomas or Leslie Mower, or in Thomas or Leslie Mower's handwriting. In addition, David Bevans, who worked in the IT department at Neways US in 1996 and 1997, testified that he gave bonus reports to Leslie Mower and that she would sometimes stop by the IT department to pick up distributor checks, asking, "Are my checks ready?"

Another entity, Mower Properties, Inc., was the property holding company for Neways US. Neways US leased much of its real property from Mower Properties, including a manufacturing facility, office space, and a warehouse. Karin Lane, who worked in the Neways US accounting department, testified that she did the accounting work for Mower Properties. During the years 1994, 1995, and 1996, the Mower Properties bank account received monies via wire transfer from Neways Australia. Ms. Lane thought they were loans or loan proceeds from Australia, and she treated them as such on Mower Properties' financial records. Between October 17, 1994, and July 17, 1996, a total of $736,759 was wired from Neways Australia into the Mower Properties account.

In 1993 or 1994, the Mowers purchased a property called Hobble Creek. David Simpson, the real estate broker for the transaction, testified that he dealt mostly with Thomas Mower. The purchase price for the property was $650,000, of which the Mowers paid $141,621 as a down payment. They paid the remaining $508,379 of the balance within one year of the purchase. The Mowers paid for the property using checks in U.S., Australian, and Malaysian currency, so the parties to the transaction set up a trust account at First Security Bank. The Mowers would deposit the checks into the trust account, and the bank would convert the amounts to U.S. dollars and issue a new check to the sellers of the property. Almost all of the Mowers' checks were Australian or Malaysian commission checks payable to the Neways 1 through 7 entities. One of the checks was a U.S. commission check for $54,427.56, payable to Thomas Mower. Mr. Simpson testified that he would pick up the checks from Thomas Mower personally, and not from anyone in corporate accounting at Neways US. The warranty deed for the property stated that the sellers "hereby convey and warrant to Thomas Mower, trustee of the Mower Family Trust." The Mower Family Trust is a trust controlled by several members of the Mower family, and the Mowers' personal residence was held by the Mower Family Trust.

John Hunter learned about Hobble Creek in 1994. Thomas Mower told him that it was a piece of property they were going to acquire, and he wanted to build a new house on the property, in part because he wanted room to display full-sized animal trophies. Leslie Mower also wanted to move, because she wanted more space for her horses. John Hunter did not know how the property was ultimately used, and he testified that multi-level marketing companies sometimes purchase recreational properties. David Simpson testified that Thomas Mower talked about building a house on the property, although Thomas Mower also stated that he wanted to use the property for corporate retreats and to entertain corporate guests. There was no house on the property at the time of sale, and no house was built after the sale. 6 The property was eventually used for some corporate functions.

On March 27, 1997, Agent Elder of the IRS arrived at the Neways US headquarters, looking for Thomas Mower. Patricia Sandberg and Agent Elder testified that Ms. Sandberg was the only person present when Agent Elder arrived, and she told him that Thomas Mower was unavailable. Allen Davis testified, on the other hand, that when the IRS arrived, the legal department was notified, and he went to the lobby with James Thompson to meet with Agent Elder. James Thompson, who was then an attorney for Neways US, told Agent Elder that Thomas Mower was not present --which was untrue --and that they could set up a meeting for a later time. After Agent Elder left, James Thompson and Allen Davis went to Thomas Mower's office and told him that the IRS was investigating. They informed Thomas Mower that he could either cooperate or refuse to cooperate, and he told them to cooperate.

Thomas Mower also told Allen Davis and James Thompson that Hobble Creek might be an issue. Allen Davis and James Thompson began searching the legal and accounting records for documentation of the purchase. They did not find anything, but they knew it had been purchased with funds from Australia. Prior to Agent Elder returning a second time, they called Mr. Cunningham in Australia to try to determine the details of the transaction and whether there was any supporting documentation. Thomas Mower participated in the call. Mr. Cunningham informed them that the monies used to purchase Hobble Creek were commission payments, not a loan. Thomas Mower disagreed with this assessment; he believed that the monies were a loan from Neways Australia and that Neways Australia had recorded them incorrectly.

Before Agent Elder returned, Allen Davis, James Thompson, and Thomas Mower discussed whether there was any documentation of a loan from Neways Australia for the purchase of Hobble Creek. When they could find none, James Thompson decided to create a document to support the loan. The document that he created, however, was back-dated to January 6, 1994. Thomas Mower signed the loan document, which stated that Neways Australia had loaned $650,000 to the Mower Family Trust for the purchase of Hobble Creek.

When Agent Elder returned, he met with Thomas Mower, Allen Davis, and James Thompson. Thomas Mower told Agent Elder that he did not have any distributorships in the Neways US downline. He told Agent Elder that he did not receive any checks for any distributorships, and that he left with the company any monies to which he might be entitled. He also stated that he did not know what MP Trust was. Although Thomas Mower disclosed several individual and corporate bank accounts to Agent Elder, he did not mention the Rezults account.

Thomas Mower also told Agent Elder that Hobble Creek had been purchased with a loan from Neways Australia. When Agent Elder asked for documentation, James Thompson and Allen Davis left the room to retrieve the newly created loan document. Upon their return, James Thompson handed a folder to Thomas Mower, who reviewed the loan document and handed the folder to Agent Elder. No one told Agent Elder that the loan document was back-dated. Allen Davis later told Leslie Mower about the back-dated loan document, and he continued to keep Leslie Mower apprised of the situation, although she was not directly involved in it.

After the meeting, Allen Davis and James Thompson continued searching for documentation, and they attempted to gather additional information from the accounting department and Neways Australia. They continued to have phone conversations with Michael Cunningham in Australia, and they kept Leslie Mower apprised of what was happening. They verified that Neways Australia had treated the Hobble Creek monies as commission payments, rather than as a loan. They determined that, because the property was in the name of the Mower Family Trust, and because they believed that Thomas Mower was the payee on the commission checks, the income was personal income to the Mowers, and the Mowers needed to amend their individual income tax returns.

For his part, Agent Elder traveled to Australia to investigate the payments made by Neways Australia. Thomas Mower gave him permission to review the books of Neways Australia, but no one informed Agent Elder that there was actually no Hobble Creek loan. On October 31, 1997, Allen Davis wrote a letter to Agent Elder, informing him that Neways Australia had not properly recorded the money as a loan, and that they were amending the Neways US corporate tax returns to reflect the amounts. This letter was the first time anyone informed Agent Elder that Neways Australia might not have recorded these monies as a loan, or that Hobble Creek was an asset of Neways US rather than the Mower Family Trust. During his investigation at Neways Australia, Agent Elder found no evidence that a loan had been made to anyone --including the Mower Family Trust, Mower Properties, or the Mowers personally. When he returned from Australia, he told Allen Davis that Neways Australia had not recorded the payments as a loan. He also interviewed Leslie Mower sometime in 1998, and she told him that she directed the financial operations of Neways US and that anything financial at Neways US would have to go through her.

Meanwhile, in the aftermath of the meeting with Agent Elder, James Thompson contacted Agent Elder and left two telephone messages on his answering machine. The first was on April 4, 1997, and stated:


Hello, this is James Thompson, calling, uh ... uh ... on behalf of Tom Mower, uh ... we have been going through documents and-and things that ... trying to get whatever else might be available in this matter. Uhm, I thought I should call you and just talk to you. Basically to let you know that, uhm ... uh ... we have been unable to find anything new, uhm ... I'm not sure what we would be looking for new. Uhm, I believe you have everything, uhm ... apparently what happened, what you thought happened did happen, uh, the checks came, uhm ... he signed them over directly, uh-uhm ... got the loan from the, uh ... Australian organization and, uh ... must pay that back, uh ... within five years thereof, I believe that answers all your questions, uhm ... we've gone through everything and haven't been able to find anything more. So ... I'm not sure what more we would be looking for at this point. But if there's something specifically ... uh, that you want us to find on that deal, let us know, but-but actually that pretty much covers it, I think. So, if you'll call me back at four two three twenty-eight hundred (423- 2800), again, this is James Thompson and, uh ... and we'll see where we need to go. Okay? Thanks a lot, bye-bye.


Tr. at 705-09; Gov't Ex. 21-5, 21-5A. The second message was on April 8, 1997, and stated:


Hi, Ted. James Thompson here. Uhm ... I was just looking over the file again, uh ... we've been running around seeing if we can't find anymore documents and we've been unable to do so ... uh, just like the message I left you the other day. I'm not sure what else thatthat we might be looking for that would interest you. Uhm ... so far we just have not found any other documents. So, if you could let me know what you prefer as you know we're ... we have several summonses that, uh ... that would be quite burdensome if we tried to produce all of that information and you did mention there were other properties that you might be interested in getting information on, but as I understood it, as you left, really you wanted to focus on the Hobble Creek property and so that's what we've been focusing on and I got the feeling from you that ... that if you were satisfied, uhm ... about the facts surrounding that, that you wouldn't ... that you wouldn't really care to, uh ... make us dig into everything else, uh ... so I haven't, I haven't dug into anything else yet. But I wanted you to know that I'm not just ignoring you, that, uh ... that I want to do whatever you ... want to do on this. Because you're within your right to ask for certain information, but, uh ... just because of the burden, I hope to avoid it. So, you let me know if you would. I'm, again, James Thompson at four two three twenty-eight hundred (423- 2800). Uh, and again ... I assume, you know, this is the ... uh ... (CHUCKLES) ... the Tom Mower matter and, uh ... if there's anything I can do, let me know, but I don't want to just keep you hanging out there, all right? Thanks a lot. Bye-bye.


Tr. at 705-09; Gov't Ex. 21-5, 21-5A. Agent Elder testified that he viewed these messages as an attempt by James Thompson to represent that they had given him everything, and that he did not need to investigate further.

For his part, Michael Cunningham testified that he participated in a conference call with Thomas Mower, Allen Davis, and Karin Lane, in which Thomas Mower asked Mr. Cunningham if Neways Australia had any documentation for a loan from the Mowers to Neways Australia. 7 Ms. Lane also sent a fax to Neways Australia on October 13, 1997, inquiring as to whether they had found any documentation for a loan. John Dwyer, an in-house accountant at Neways Australia, prepared a response, dated October 17, 1997, in which he stated:


All payments from [Neways Australia] to Thomas Mower are for BONUSES for the Mower downline paid from the MLM system. To my knowledge no Loan was made to Neways Australia and the majority of the payments listed were not Loan repayments but are BONUS payments for the Mower Australian downline.


Tr. at 213, 215, 421-22; Gov't Ex. 20-13. 8 In addition, Mr. Cunningham testified that he was not aware of any loans between Neways Australia and the Mowers personally, or between Neways Australia and the Mower Family Trust or Mower Properties. John Hunter similarly testified that Neways Australia never loaned money to the Mowers individually, or to the Mower Family Trust, Mower Properties, or Neways 1 through 7. Moreover, Mr. Hunter testified that Neways Australia would not have made loan payments with commission checks.

Karin Lane likewise testified about the conference call and the alleged loan. Part of the conference call dealt with the characterization of the monies wired to the Mower Properties account. She originally thought that these were loan proceeds, but Mr. Cunningham told her that they were distributor income. She realized that she had incorrectly characterized the monies on Mower Properties' tax returns and that she would have to amend the returns. However, the returns were never amended.

After Ms. Lane received the fax from John Dwyer, she decided to amend the Mowers' individual income tax returns to include the monies wired to the Mower Properties account. These monies included $44,209.59 in 1994, $449,095.13 in 1995, and $328,593.15 in 1996, for a total of approximately $821,897. Ms. Lane also found a check for $54,427, dated March 20, 1994, and payable to Thomas Mower, which she included in the Mowers' income. From this information, a hired accounting firm prepared 1040Xs for the years 1994, 1995, and 1996, stating that the Mowers' owed $39,220, $181,177, and $128,841 in taxes, penalties, and interest for those years, respectively. A later review by the IRS indicated that the amended returns primarily addressed payments made to the Mower Properties account.

The Mowers, however, never filed the amended individual income tax returns. Thomas Mower decided not to file them, and Allen Davis told Karin Lane that the beneficiary of the monies was actually Neways US, and not Mower Properties or the Mowers personally. Allen Davis testified that he had originally thought that Thomas Mower was the payee on the commission checks. This was actually not the case, and when Allen Davis discovered that the payees were the Neways 1 through 7 entities, he recommended to Thomas Mower that the Mowers not file the amended individual returns. Instead, Thomas Mower decided to file amended corporate returns for Neways US, reporting additional income of $283,934.30 for 1994 and $247,233.18 for 1995. They filed the returns in early 1998, and paid the taxes, penalties, and interest owing on the additional income. Thomas Mower remained adamant, though, that the monies were loans and not commissions. Allen Davis informed Leslie Mower about these decisions, and she signed amended corporate returns for Neways US on January 6, 1998.

Karin Lane testified that, even though certain monies were wired directly into the Mower Properties account, they submitted the amended corporate tax returns for Neways US to account for these monies because Neways US was the actual beneficiary --and the amounts were loans from Neways US to Mower Properties. When she filed the amended returns for Neways US, Karin Lane did not yet know about certain other monies. For instance, she did not know about the Rezults account. She did not know about Hobble Creek. She did not know about the commission checks from Neways Malaysia or from Neways Australia. Eventually, when she found out about Rezults and Hobble Creek, she had to ask the accounting firm to prepare another set of amended returns.

Finally, Ms. Lane testified that, when she was preparing the Mowers' individual income tax returns, Leslie Mower informed her that the Mowers had a downline called MP Trust, listed under Thomas Mower's Social Security number. Leslie Mower told Karin Lane that the Mowers received monies from MP Enterprises, Base of the Tree, Revenol, Employee Purchases, BP Sales, and BW Enterprises. Additionally, Ms. Lane discovered that sometimes the Mowers would not cash their distributor checks, particularly if the company was having money troubles, and the Mowers paid some of Neways US's and Mower Properties' bills from the Mowers' personal checking account. Ms. Lane also testified that the Mowers had loaned a lot of money to Mower Properties, that the accounting staff knew about these monies and treated them as loans, and that, when the Mowers received payments from Mower Properties, the payment amounts were subtracted from the loan amounts. Ms. Lane identified several checks and deposited items, payable to Thomas Mower or MP Trust, that had been deposited in the Mower Properties account and had been treated as loans from the Mowers to Mower Properties. These deposits totaled $411,536.91 from 1994 to 1997. Ms. Lane admitted, though, that other deposits into the Mower Properties account during the same time period were commission income that no one had reported.

The government devoted substantial time at trial to the testimony of its expert, IRS Agent Renae Trask. Agent Trask compiled checks, deposit slips, and bank records, and she created summaries of all of the commission checks that the government could discover and that the government alleged were personal income to the Mowers. At least one piece of evidence supported each item listed on the summaries, and she converted amounts in Australian or Malaysian currency to U.S. dollars using the conversion rate at the time of each transaction. Exhibit 81-1 listed all of the checks and wire transfers that the government had been able to discover, and it included all of the information from each transaction: the check date, payor, check number, payee, amount (in U.S. dollars), disposition (if known), disposition date, endorsement (if any), and exhibit number.

Exhibit 80-3 summarized all of the amounts by year and listed the total commission income for each year from each country, the commissions reported by the Mowers on their tax returns, and the total unreported commissions. Agent Trask testified that, in creating this exhibit, she assumed the commissions were the Mowers' personal income. She believed this was a valid assumption for many reasons, including: (1) Thomas Mower originally wanted the Neways Australia commission checks made out to him personally, and John Hunter suggested the Neways 1 through 7 entities as an alternative; (2) all of the Neways 1 through 7 checks were pulled and sent to Utah, addressed to the attention of Thomas and Leslie Mower; (3) the Neways US accounting department was unaware of these checks; (4) Hobble Creek was purchased with these funds, and it was owned by the Mower Family Trust; (5) all of the funds were disposed of at Thomas Mower's direction; (6) no one at Neways US knew this money existed until the IRS began investigating in 1997; (7) John Dwyer's letter stated that these were "BONUSES for the Mower downline"; (8) these were clearly commission checks, and not loans; and (9) John Hunter personally handed some checks to the Mowers and signed them over to cash. For 1992, she calculated the unreported commissions to be $179,362; for 1993, $512,606; for 1994, $1,028,455; for 1995, $555,648; for 1996, $536,711; and for 1997, $397,033. The unreported commissions totaled $3,209,815. 9 In 1996 alone, the Mowers reported only half of the commission income that they received from Neways US, and none of the commission income that they received from either Neways Australia or Neways Malaysia. Ultimately, Agent Trask calculated the total tax due and owing as $1,262,081.

Other exhibits detailed specific dispositions of commission checks. Exhibit 81-5 summarized a series of deposits on July 27, 1994, into Leslie Mower's savings account, all from checks dated June 20, 1994, and made out to Neways 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7. These amounts totaled $55,302.83. Agent Trask did not believe that the Mowers had made a mistake in depositing these amounts in Leslie Mower's savings account, although the defendants introduced evidence showing that, in January 1995, the Mowers transferred $20,000 from this account into the Mower Properties checking account and $40,000 from this account into the Neways US corporate account. Exhibit 100-1 showed how the payee names on the commission checks changed over time from 1992 to 1998. Many of the entities listed as payees on the commission checks --including Neways Independent Distributor Ad Pool, Base of the Tree, MP Enterprises, BP Sales International, BW Enterprises, Rezults, and the Mower Family Trust --had never paid federal taxes. Moreover, two bank accounts --the Mowers' personal checking account and the Rezults account --had been opened using Social Security numbers for two of the Mowers' children. 10

Exhibits 100-2 and 100-3 summarized the disposition of the Neways Australia and Neways Malaysia checks, respectively, between 1994 and 1997. Exhibit 100-4 summarized all commission income from all three entities --Neways US, Neways Australia, and Neways Malaysia --between 1992 and 1997. A total of $712,111 was listed as "unknown" on the summary, and it consisted mostly of Australian commission checks for which the government did not know the ultimate disposition. Of the approximately $2.3 million in commission income from Neways Australia between 1992 and 1997, no person or entity reported any of it before the IRS began investigating.

At the close of the government's evidence, the defendants moved for a judgment of acquittal under Fed. R. Crim. P. 29, but the district court denied the motion. The defendants then called two witnesses: Wade Winegar, a former general counsel at Neways US, and E. Gail Anger, an expert witness.

Mr. Winegar testified that, when he began working in the legal department at Neways US in 1999, he found a lot of corporate structures that various people had set up over the years, and the Mowers did not understand this set up --they just followed their attorneys' advice. The Mowers viewed all of the structures as one "big ball of wax," and they did not view the corporate structures as separate legal entities. Money flowed freely between the different corporations, and although these transfers should have been treated as inter-company loans, no documentation supported this treatment. The Mowers had intended Mower Properties to be a real estate holding company for all of the other companies, and Mower Properties paid the property taxes on the different properties. The Mowers, though, had not run Mower Properties as a separate legal entity, and the properties had been titled in many different names.

As for Hobble Creek, Mr. Winegar testified that he gathered information about the property and was told that it was a retreat for Neways US, where the company would host distributors and customers. He found verification, including pictures and videotapes in the marketing department at Neways US, and he saw plans for a distributor lodge on Hobble Creek. John Dwyer told him that the checks used to purchase Hobble Creek had come from a payment stream assigned to Mower Properties. A number of payment streams came from Neways Australia, and people at Neways US kept getting confused about whether payments were distributor commissions or pre-payments for product. Also, Hobble Creek was kept on the books of Mower Properties, although Mr. Winegar admitted that it did not appear on Mower Properties' financial statements for 1993, 1994, 1995, or 1996. In 2003, Mr. Winegar re-titled Hobble Creek from the Mower Family Trust to Mower Properties.

The defendants' expert, E. Gail Anger, worked to rebut the testimony of Agent Trask. He disagreed with Agent Trask's conclusion that the commissions were personal income to the Mowers. He stated that nothing in the bonus histories indicated that the Hobble Creek monies were personal to the Mowers, and just because the checks were sent to the Mowers in Utah, and the property was titled in the name of the Mower Family Trust, did not make the Hobble Creek monies personal income. According to Mr. Anger, Mower Properties had "the burdens and benefits of ownership," and Hobble Creek was therefore corporate property. The great bulk of the checks from Neways Australia and Neways Malaysia, moreover, were not payable to the Mowers personally. In addition, the unidentified checks were never negotiated, and most of the expenses paid out of the Rezults account were corporate expenses. Mr. Anger also testified that, eventually, all of the unreported items identified by the government --except the checks that were not negotiated --were reported on amended corporate income tax returns for the various companies.

On cross-examination, though, Mr. Anger admitted that Agent Trask had "a reasonable argument," even if he disagreed with her. He also admitted that no one ever reported any of the $3.2 million in any originally filed tax returns, and that Neways US should not have been the entity amending its returns if the income was the income of Mower Properties. Further, he admitted that the accountants at Neways US should have known about the money if it was corporate income.

At the close of the evidence, the defendants renewed their motions for acquittal, which the district court denied. After the jury was instructed and the case submitted, the jury found all three defendants guilty on all counts. Subsequently, Thomas Mower and Leslie Mower renewed their motions for acquittal, or in the alternative, for a new trial, and James Thompson renewed his motion for acquittal. The district court denied the motions.

Prior to sentencing, the district court held a hearing pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3, at which the parties presented their proposed tax loss findings for sentencing. The district court then issued its tax loss findings. After detailing the evidence and its own findings of fact, the district court calculated Thomas Mower's tax loss to be $199,775. Under U.S.S.G. § 2T4.1 (2005), the base level for this tax loss amount was 16. The district court calculated Leslie Mower's tax loss to be $89,112, which also resulted in a base level of 16 under U.S.S.G. § 2T4.1 (2005).

At the sentencing hearing on September 13, 2006, the district court sentenced Thomas Mower first. The district court determined that there were overt acts after 2001, so the 2001 Guidelines applied. The court increased Thomas Mower's base level by 2 for sophisticated means, see U.S.S.G. § 2T1.1(b)(2), and by 2 for playing a leading role, see U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c), for a total offense level of 20. Combined with a criminal history category of I, this yielded a Guidelines range of 33 to 41 months, and the district court sentenced Thomas Mower to 33 months' imprisonment, followed by 36 months of supervised release.

The district court also applied the 2001 Guidelines for Leslie Mower, despite her counsel's argument that the 1997 Guidelines were appropriate. The court increased her base level by 2 for sophisticated means, see U.S.S.G. § 2T1.1(b)(2), resulting in a total offense level of 18, which combined with a criminal history category of I for a Guidelines range of 27 to 33 months. The district court sentenced her to 27 months' imprisonment, followed by 36 months of supervised release.

Lastly, the district court sentenced James Thompson to a term of imprisonment for 12 months and a day, followed by 24 months of supervised release.




II.





Sufficiency of the evidence


On appeal, all three defendants challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support their convictions. Thomas Mower challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as to his conviction for tax evasion for the years 1992, 1993, and 1997. Leslie Mower challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as to all counts --conspiracy to defraud the United States, and tax evasion for the years 1992 through 1997. James Thompson challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as to both counts --conspiracy to defraud the United States, and corruptly endeavoring to interfere with the administration of internal revenue laws.

"'Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if a reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, given the direct and circumstantial evidence, along with reasonable inferences therefrom, taken in a light most favorable to the government.'" United States v. Nelson, 383 F.3d 1227, 1229 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Wilson, 107 F.3d 774, 778 (10th Cir. 1997)). "We will not weigh conflicting evidence or second-guess the fact-finding decisions of the jury." United States v. Summers, 414 F.3d 1287, 1293 (10th Cir. 2005). "Rather than examining the evidence in 'bits and pieces,' we evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence by 'considering the collective inferences to be drawn from the evidence as a whole.'" Nelson, 383 F.3d at 1229 (quoting Wilson, 107 F.3d at 778).

As a preliminary matter, both Thomas and Leslie Mower rely heavily on the district court's tax loss findings at sentencing in attacking the sufficiency of the evidence to support their convictions. The tax loss findings, however, do not alter our sufficiency review for three reasons. First, the district court's determination of a tax loss for sentencing purposes and the jury's determination of guilt based upon the sufficiency of the evidence are different and distinct inquiries. See, e.g., United States v. Greene, 239 F. App'x 431, 447 (10th Cir. 2007) (rejecting the defendant's argument that the district court was prohibited from calculating the tax loss based upon facts found at sentencing); United States v. Kosinski, 480 F.3d 769, 776 (6th Cir. 2007). Granted, in most instances, this distinction becomes relevant where a district court has calculated a greater tax loss than that found by the jury at trial, but there is no reason to blur the two inquiries when the converse situation is presented. Cf. United States v. Scholl, 166 F.3d 964, 981 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that the district court did not err in finding, during sentencing, that "there was insufficient evidence to make a reasonable estimate of tax loss," where the jury convicted the defendant of violating 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1)). Second, in the instant case, the district court denied the Mowers' respective post-verdict motions for judgment of acquittal, indicating the district court thought that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdicts, notwithstanding the district court's later tax loss findings. Third, given the evidence outlined above, the district court would have been justified in calculating a greater tax loss than it did. In analyzing the Mowers' sufficiency of the evidence claims, therefore, we will disregard the district court's tax loss findings and employ our usual sufficiency of the evidence analysis by reviewing the evidence presented at trial to determine "if a reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, given the direct and circumstantial evidence, along with reasonable inferences therefrom, taken in a light most favorable to the government." Nelson, 383 F.3d at 1229 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

A. Thomas Mower

The evidence was sufficient to convict Thomas Mower of tax evasion for the years 1992, 1993, and 1997. He has chosen to appeal these years --and not 1994, 1995, and 1996 --because in 1992, 1993, and 1997, the only alleged unreported income was foreign commission income, as opposed to a combination of domestic and foreign commission income. "In order to prove a defendant guilty of tax evasion, the government must show (1) a substantial tax liability, (2) willfulness, and (3) an affirmative act constituting evasion or attempted evasion." United States v. Anderson, 319 F.3d 1218, 1219 (10th Cir. 2003); see also 26 U.S.C. § 7201 ("Any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this title or the payment thereof shall ... be guilty of a felony ... ."). In proving tax evasion, the government's evidence


is ordinarily circumstantial, since direct proof is often unavailable. Circumstantial evidence in this context may consist of, among other things, a failure to report a substantial amount of income, a consistent pattern of underreporting large amounts of income, the spending of large amounts of cash that cannot be reconciled with the amount of reported income, or any conduct, the likely effect of which would be to mislead or to conceal.


United States v. Kim, 884 F.2d 189, 192 (5th Cir. 1989) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

A reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Thomas Mower had a substantial tax liability for the years 1992, 1993, and 1997. In 1992, several Australian checks, payable to Images 1 through 7, were drawn on the Australian National Bank. One of these checks contained a handwritten note on the front with the words, "Please Pay Cash." John Hunter testified that, when the Mowers visited Australia, they once asked him to sign commission checks over to cash, and he obliged. In addition, the government discovered multiple commission checks from 1992 that had an "unknown disposition." Although the Mowers presented evidence at trial that these checks were not negotiated, the receipt of the checks --and not their negotiation --is the important fact in determining whether income is taxable in a given year. See Walter v. United States, 148 F.3d 1027, 1028-29 (8th Cir. 1998) (explaining, under the theory of constructive receipt, that a lost check was still taxable in the year it was received, even though the defendants did not obtain or cash a replacement check until two years later); see also 26 C.F.R. 1.451-2. For the doctrine of constructive receipt to apply, the checks must have been personal income to the Mowers, but as explained below, there was more than enough evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that they were. 11

As regards 1993, the government produced evidence of a variety of foreign commission checks with a variety of dispositions. Several of the checks were endorsed directly to pay for Hobble Creek. Others were deposited in the Rezults account. Multiple foreign commission checks from 1993 had an "unknown disposition." In 1997, a number of foreign commission checks were deposited in the Mower Properties account, the Rezults account, and the Neways US account.

Most importantly, the evidence indicated that the foreign commission checks were personal income to the Mowers. Thomas Mower originally wanted the Neways Australia commission checks made out to him personally, and he only created the Neways 1 through 7 entities after John Hunter suggested it. All of the foreign commission checks were pulled and sent to Utah, addressed to the attention of Thomas Mower. No one in the corporate accounting department at Neways US was aware of the checks until after the IRS began investigating in 1997. John Hunter personally signed several of the commission checks over to cash and handed them to the Mowers, and one of the 1992 commission checks has "Please Pay Cash" on the front of it. All of the funds were disposed of at Thomas Mower's direction. No one at Neways US --except for the Mowers and Thomas Mower's secretary --knew of the Rezults account, and the Mowers had control over the account. Several of the checks from 1993 were endorsed directly to pay for Hobble Creek, which was titled in the name of the Mower Family Trust and was where the Mowers had planned to build a house. Further, no one at Neways US knew about Hobble Creek until after the IRS became involved. Even the false loan document stated that the "loan" for Hobble Creek was to the Mower Family Trust, not to any of the corporations. John Dwyer's letter stated that these were "BONUSES for the Mower downline." Also, despite the Mowers' insistence that these were loans or loan repayments, they were clearly commission checks, and the evidence showed that when the Mowers needed a loan for Neways US from Neways Australia, they knew how to accomplish it --and how to include it on the books of both companies. Most significantly, despite the Mowers' insistence that these monies were corporate income, and not personal income, no person or entity paid any taxes on the $2,384,849 of Australian commission income or the $324,554 of Malaysian commission income until after the IRS began investigating in 1997. Finally, the Mowers continually changed their story as to what these commission checks actually were --loans from Neways Australia, loan repayments from Neways Australia, income to Neways US, income to Mower Properties, etc. Taken together, the evidence was more than sufficient for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the commission checks were personal income to the Mowers, for which they incurred a "substantial tax liability." Anderson, 319 F.3d at 1219.

Additional evidence --and much of the evidence listed above --showed that Thomas Mower's failure to report these monies was "willful[]." Id. Asking John Hunter to endorse checks directly to cash shows willfulness as to the 1992 amounts. In addition, Thomas Mower endorsed checks directly to purchase Hobble Creek in 1993, and he presented a false, back-dated loan document to the IRS in an effort to cover up the purchase. He lied to Agent Elder about not having a distributorship in Neways US. Further, the sheer number of shell corporations and entities that the Mowers created here --and which were payees for the various commission checks --is nothing short of astounding, as is the number of different payees indicated on the commission checks, as well as the number of different accounts in which the Mowers deposited all of the commission checks. Along these same lines, the Mowers frequently opened bank accounts under incorrect Social Security or employer identification numbers. From this circumstantial evidence, a reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Thomas Mower's failure to report these amounts was willful.

Finally, the evidence showed affirmative acts of evasion for each year. "An affirmative act requires more than the passive failure to file a tax return; rather, it requires a positive act of commission designed to mislead or conceal." United States v. Meek, 998 F.2d 776, 779 (10th Cir. 1993). The government only needed to show one affirmative act of evasion for each count of tax evasion, see Anderson, 319 F.3d at 1219; Meek, 998 F.2d at 779, and here, many of the affirmative acts of evasion related to multiple years. For instance, the creation and presentation of the false, back-dated loan document certainly qualifies as an affirmative act of evasion --arguably for all six years of tax evasion, and at the very least for 1993 and 1994. Later, and long after the IRS began investigating, the Mowers had Neways US file several sets of amended corporate returns, in which they attempted to claim that the commissions were actually corporate income, rather than personal income. A reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that these were affirmative acts of evasion as to the foreign commission checks issued in 1992, 1993, and 1997.

In his argument on appeal, Thomas Mower contends that the evidence did not comport with the government's use of the "specific items method" of proving tax evasion. Under the specific items method, "the Government ... produce[s] evidence of the receipt of specific items of reportable income by the defendant that do not appear on his income tax return or appear in diminished amount." United States v. Horton, 526 F.2d 884, 886 (5th Cir. 1976) (contrasting this with the "net worth method," whereby the government shows an "increase in the taxpayer's net worth during the period in question in an amount greater than that reported to IRS"); see also United States v. Merrick, 464 F.2d 1087, 1092 (10th Cir. 1972). Contrary to Thomas Mower's argument, the government's use of the specific items method does not require the government to prove any additional elements beyond those laid out in Anderson, 319 F.3d at 1219. Rather, the specific items method merely states the obvious with regard to the government's burden to show a "substantial tax liability" under 26 U.S.C. § 7201: the government must produce evidence of a specific item of reportable income that the defendants did not --but should have --included on their income tax returns. The government has done so in the instant case, and the evidence was sufficient to support Thomas Mower's convictions.

B. Leslie Mower




1. Conspiracy


There was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find Leslie Mower guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of conspiracy to defraud the United States. The elements of conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371 are "that (1) the defendant entered into an agreement; (2) the agreement involved a violation of the law; (3) one of the members of the conspiracy committed an overt act; (4) the overt act was in furtherance of the conspiracy's object; and (5) the defendant wilfully entered the conspiracy." United States v. Weidner, 437 F.3d 1023, 1033 (10th Cir. 2006). "Secrecy and concealment are often necessary to a successful conspiracy, and, as a result, direct evidence of the crime is frequently difficult to obtain." Id. Consequently, "conspiracy convictions may be based on circumstantial evidence, and the jury may infer conspiracy from the defendants' conduct and other circumstantial evidence indicating coordination and concert of action." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

The evidence was sufficient to show that Leslie Mower entered into an agreement to conceal approximately $3.2 million in foreign and domestic commission income. "'The core of a conspiracy is an agreement to commit an unlawful act.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Morehead, 959 F.2d 1489, 1500 (10th Cir. 1992)). "The existence of the agreement to violate the law may be inferred from a 'unity of purpose or common design and understanding' among conspirators to accomplish the objects of the conspiracy." Id. (quoting United States v. Kendall, 766 F.2d 1426, 1431 (10th Cir. 1985)). Leslie Mower was the Chief Financial Officer of Neways US. She was aware of the foreign commission checks and knew what they were, and, when the commission checks did not arrive on time, she would call John Hunter to inquire. In her interview with Agent Elder, she told him that she directed the financial operations of Neways US and that anything financial at Neways US would have to go through her. She was with her husband in Australia when they asked John Hunter to sign several of the commission checks over to cash. She often picked up the domestic commission checks from Neways US, and her endorsement appears on several of the domestic commission checks. Several commission checks were deposited into her personal savings account. She never disclosed these payments to anyone at Neways US, including Annette Jenkins and Karin Lane when she asked them to prepare the Mowers' individual income tax returns. She was aware of the purchase of Hobble Creek and told John Hunter that she wanted to build a new house there. In addition, Allen Davis continually kept her apprised of the IRS investigation, including the false loan document that her husband presented to the IRS. Finally, despite all of this, Leslie Mower ultimately signed the amended corporate tax returns that Neways US filed to mislead the IRS after the investigation began.

The totality of this evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Leslie Mower entered into an agreement with her husband to defraud the United States. It was also sufficient to show beyond a reasonable doubt that she entered into the agreement willfully. See Weidner, 437 F.3d at 1033. In addition, even though the government only had to prove that one of the members of the conspiracy committed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, see id., the evidence contained several examples of overt acts committed by Leslie Mower herself. The evidence was sufficient to convict Leslie Mower of conspiracy to defraud the United States.




2. Tax evasion


Leslie Mower's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence also fails with regard to the six counts of tax evasion. "In order to prove a defendant guilty of tax evasion, the government must show (1) a substantial tax liability, (2) willfulness, and (3) an affirmative act constituting evasion or attempted evasion." Anderson, 319 F.3d at 1219.

For the same reasons as her husband, Leslie Mower had a "substantial tax liability" in 1992, 1993, and 1997. In 1994, 1995, and 1996, there was evidence of unreported income from the foreign commission checks, and for those years, the government also produced evidence of unreported domestic commission income. The government's evidence of unreported income in 1994, 1995, and 1996 included: foreign commission checks used to purchase Hobble Creek in 1994; domestic and foreign commission checks deposited in Leslie Mower's savings account in 1994 and 1995; domestic commission checks deposited in the Mowers' checking account in 1994, 1995, and 1996; domestic and foreign commission checks deposited in the Mower Properties account in 1994, 1995, and 1996; domestic and foreign commission checks deposited in the Rezults account in 1994, 1995, and 1996; foreign commission checks drawn on the National Australia Bank in 1994 and 1995; and domestic and foreign commission checks of "unknown disposition" in 1994 and 1996. As explained previously, the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that this was personal income to the Mowers.

In addition, the evidence previously cited as supporting Leslie Mower's conviction for conspiracy to defraud the United States was also sufficient to show the final two elements for all six counts of tax evasion: "(2) willfulness, and (3) an affirmative act constituting evasion or attempted evasion." Anderson, 319 F.3d at 1219. The government presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to convict Leslie Mower of tax evasion for the years 1992 through 1997.

C. James Thompson




1. Conspiracy


There was also sufficient evidence to convict James Thompson of conspiracy to defraud the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. The elements of conspiracy are "that (1) the defendant entered into an agreement; (2) the agreement involved a violation of the law; (3) one of the members of the conspiracy committed an overt act; (4) the overt act was in furtherance of the conspiracy's object; and (5) the defendant wilfully entered the conspiracy." Weidner, 437 F.3d at 1033. James Thompson was aware that there was no documentation to support treating the monies used to purchase Hobble Creek as a loan, and further, that Neways Australia had not accounted for the monies as a loan. Yet, he decided to create a false, back-dated loan document for the transaction. Then, during Agent Elder's interview, James Thompson brought the false loan document to Thomas Mower, who presented it to Agent Elder. Neither James Thompson nor Thomas Mower informed Agent Elder that the document was back-dated. In addition, James Thompson left two messages on Agent Elder's answering machine, in which he tried to convince Agent Elder that they had given him all of the information that they had concerning the alleged Hobble Creek loan.

The evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find James Thompson guilty of conspiracy to defraud the United States. His creation of the false, backdated loan document, which Thomas Mower ultimately signed, and their joint presentation of that document to Agent Elder, showed "a unity of purpose or common design and understanding" between James Thompson and Thomas Mower, from which a reasonable jury could infer an agreement to commit an unlawful act. Weidner, 437 F.3d at 1033 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, this series of events contained several overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy, as well as evidence of willfulness. The evidence was sufficient to support James Thompson's conviction for conspiracy.




2. Obstruction


The evidence was also sufficient for a reasonable jury to convict James Thompson of corruptly endeavoring to interfere with the administration of internal revenue laws. "In order to establish a violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a), the government must prove that a defendant 'corruptly' endeavored to obstruct and impede the due administration of the internal revenue laws." United States v. Winchell, 129 F.3d 1093, 1098 (10th Cir. 1997). In this context, "to act corruptly means to act with the intent to secure an unlawful benefit either for oneself or for another." Id.

James Thompson was aware of the pending IRS investigation. He responded by creating a false, back-dated loan document, which Thomas Mower signed and which they presented to Agent Elder without informing him that it was back-dated. He knew, before creating the false loan document, that no documentation supported treating the Hobble Creek monies as a loan, and that Neways Australia had not accounted for the monies as a loan. In addition, after presenting the false loan document to Agent Elder, he called Agent Elder and left two messages trying to convince Agent Elder that they had given him all of the information that they had concerning the alleged Hobble Creek loan. This evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that James Thompson "'corruptly' endeavored to obstruct and impede the due administration of the internal revenue laws." Winchell, 129 F.3d at 1098.




Statute of limitations


Leslie Mower and James Thompson contend that the government did not bring several of the charges against them within the applicable statute of limitations. 12 Specifically, Leslie Mower contends that the government brought four of the tax evasion charges --for the years 1992, 1993, 1994, and 1995 --outside of the statute of limitations, because the limitations periods began to run when the Mowers filed their personal income tax returns for those years. James Thompson argues that his final phone message to Agent Elder, on April 8, 1997, was not an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy and was not an attempt to obstruct or impede the IRS, and, as a result, both counts against him are barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

"We review the district court's interpretation of the statute of limitations de novo." Anderson, 319 F.3d at 1219. The limitations period for each count in the Superseding Indictment is six years. See 26 U.S.C. § 6531(2), (6), & (8); United States v. Workinger, 90 F.3d 1409, 1413-14 (9th Cir. 1996).

A. Leslie Mower

The district court correctly determined that the government brought the four counts of tax evasion against Leslie Mower within the six-year limitations period. In Anderson, 319 F.3d at 1219, we adopted the rule, embraced by many of our sister circuits, "that when a defendant commits a series of evasive acts over several years after incurring a tax liability, the statute of limitations begins to run on the date of the last evasive act." See also United States v. Wilson, 118 F.3d 228, 236 (4th Cir. 1997); United States v. Dandy, 998 F.2d 1344, 1355 (6th Cir. 1993); United States v. Winfield, 960 F.2d 970, 974 (11th Cir. 1992); United States v. DeTar, 832 F.2d 1110, 1113 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Ferris, 807 F.2d 269, 270-71 (1st Cir. 1986). In so holding, we expressly approved of the First Circuit's reasoning in Ferris, explaining:


Section 7201 criminalizes not just the failure to file a return or the filing of a false return, but the willful attempt to evade taxes in any manner. In light of the fact that evasive acts following the filing of a return may be considered part of the offense, ... "it is the date of the latest act of evasion, not the due date of the taxes, that triggers the statute of limitations."


Anderson, 319 F.2d at 1219-20 (citing and quoting Ferris, 807 F.2d at 271). We also quoted the Sixth Circuit's explanation that "'to hold otherwise would only reward a defendant for successfully evading discovery of his tax fraud for a period of six years subsequent to the date the returns were filed.'" Id. at 1220 (quoting Dandy, 998 F.2d at 1355).

An affirmative act of evasion "requires more than the passive failure to file a tax return; rather, it requires a positive act of commission designed to mislead or conceal." Meek, 998 F.2d at 779. In the instant case, the Superseding Indictment alleged that, for each count of tax evasion, the filing of the false amended corporate income tax returns for Neways US on January 6, 1998, was an affirmative act of evasion. In its closing argument, the government again contended that this filing was an affirmative act of evasion occurring after December 18, 1996 --i.e., occurring within six years of when the original indictment was returned against Leslie Mower. Moreover, the jury instructions explained to the jury that it "must unanimously agree that the affirmative act of evasion occurred on or after December 18, 1996." Jury Instruction No. 32, ROA, Vol. V, Doc. 188, at 35. The jury's finding that Leslie Mower was guilty, therefore, necessarily meant that it found beyond a reasonable doubt that she committed an affirmative act of evasion after December 18, 1996. Included in the evidence to support this finding was Leslie Mower's signature on the amended corporate income tax returns for Neways US, filed on January 6, 1998. There was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the statute of limitations did not bar Leslie Mower's convictions for tax evasion.

Leslie Mower argues that our decision in Anderson was contrary to our prior decision in United States v. Payne, 978 F.2d 1177 (10th Cir. 1992), and that "the alleged offense is complete and the six year statute of limitations begins to run when a defendant willfully files a false return on the filing date." L.M. Opening Br. at 38. She is incorrect. In Payne, 978 F.2d at 1179, we addressed the situation where a defendant had committed an affirmative act of evasion but had not yet incurred a tax deficiency. We explained that, because the crime was not complete until the defendant incurred a tax deficiency, the statute of limitations could not begin to run until that point in time. Id. We noted, however, that our holding was consistent with other circuits that had "held that a prosecution under § 7201 is timely if commenced within six years of the last act of evasion," where a defendant incurred a tax deficiency and then committed affirmative acts of evasion. Id. at 1179 n.2. In Anderson, 319 F.3d at 1220-21, we relied upon this language in Payne to reconcile the two cases, and we explained that, where a defendant has already incurred a substantial tax deficiency, the statute of limitations begins to run on the date of the last affirmative act of evasion. 13

B. James Thompson

The district court correctly determined that the government's charges against James Thompson were not barred by the applicable statute of limitations. For the conspiracy count, the government was required to prove that, within the statute of limitations period, one of the conspirators committed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. See Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 396-97 (1957). Here, because the Superseding Indictment was returned on April 8, 2003, the jury needed to find that one of the conspirators committed an overt act on or after April 8, 1997, and the district court correctly instructed the jury as to the law on this issue.

Even if James Thompson's telephone message to Agent Elder on April 8, 1997, when viewed in isolation, may appear innocuous, it came only days after James Thompson and Thomas Mower presented the false Hobble Creek loan document to Agent Elder. Several statements in the telephone message, moreover, indicate that James Thompson was trying to forestall the government's investigation, and Agent Elder testified that he viewed the message as such. In light of its timing and context, a reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that James Thompson's telephone message to Agent Elder on April 8, 1997, was an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.

Further, the government is correct that, because James Thompson did not take the affirmative steps necessary to withdraw from the conspiracy, any of his co-conspirators' overt acts --not just his own acts --may be used to satisfy the statute of limitations as to him. See United States v. Hauck, 980 F.2d 611, 614 (10th Cir. 1992). Even if we were to conclude, therefore, that the telephone message on April 8, 1997, was not an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, any of his co-conspirators' acts in furtherance of the conspiracy, on or after April 8, 1997, brought his conspiracy charge within the statute of limitations.

As for the count of corruptly endeavoring to interfere with the administration of internal revenue laws, the statute of limitations began to run "on the date of the last corrupt act," Wilson, 118 F.3d at 236, so the government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that James Thompson committed a corrupt act on or after April 8, 1997. The district court correctly instructed the jury on this issue, and, for reasons similar to those supporting the conspiracy count, a reasonable jury could have found that James Thompson's telephone message was a corrupt act designed to obstruct or impede the IRS investigation.




Summary charts


Thomas and Leslie Mower both contend that the district court abused its discretion and committed reversible error in admitting the government's "summary charts." Neither of the defendants specifies which particular "summary charts" they are challenging. At a minimum, it appears both defendants are appealing the district court's decision to admit Exhibit 80-3. Some of their argument also appears to challenge the district court's admission of other exhibits.

Regardless of which summary charts the Mowers are appealing, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting them. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence,


[t]he contents of voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs which cannot conveniently be examined in court may be presented in the form of a chart, summary, or calculation. The originals, or duplicates, shall be made available for examination or copying, or both, by other parties at reasonable time and place. The court may order that they be produced in court.


Fed. R. Evid. 1006. "The admission of summaries under Rule 1006 is within the sound discretion of the trial court," Harris Mkt. Research v. Marshall Mktg. & Commc'ns, Inc., 948 F.2d 1518, 1525 (10th Cir. 1991), and we review a district court's decision to admit summary charts under Rule 1006 for an abuse of discretion, United States v. Samaniego, 187 F.3d 1222, 1223 (10th Cir. 1999). In previous cases, we have approved the use of summaries in tax prosecutions, as long as the district court provides appropriate limiting instructions. See, e.g., United States v. Mann, 884 F.2d 532, 539 (10th Cir. 1989); see also United States v. Ray, 370 F.3d 1039, 1046 (10th Cir. 2004) (explaining that "because tax cases often require the presentation of substantial and complex documentation and the technical analyses of these materials by tax experts," summaries are often admissible in tax cases under Rule 1006), vacated on other grounds, 543 U.S. 1109 (2005).

In the present case, the district court did not err in admitting the summaries. The government's evidence was incredibly voluminous, and it would have been incomprehensible to the jury without summarization. Agent Trask compiled the summaries from all of the commission payments that the government alleged were personal income to the Mowers. Each item listed on the summaries was supported by at least one piece of evidence, such as a check, deposit slip, bank record, or wire transfer receipt. Exhibit 81-1 listed all of the items in painstaking detail, cross-referencing to each specific exhibit number.

The Mowers are correct that, in compiling the summaries, Agent Trask assumed the items listed were personal income to the Mowers. She believed, however, that this assumption was factually correct, and she explained how the evidence supported it. Further, the Mowers thoroughly cross-examined Agent Trask concerning the amounts and items listed on the summaries. Moreover, as discussed previously, the evidence supported Agent Trask's contention that these amounts were personal income to the Mowers --even the checks that were never negotiated or were deposited in corporate accounts. Finally, the district court instructed the jury:


Charts or summaries have been prepared by the government and shown to you during the trial for the purpose of explaining facts that are allegedly contained in books, records, and other documents which are in evidence in the case. Such charts or summaries are not evidence in this trial or proof of any fact. If you find that these charts or summaries to [sic] not correctly reflect facts or figures shown by the evidence in the case, the jury should disregard the charts or summaries.



In other words, such charts or summaries are used only as a matter of convenience for you and to the extent that you find they are not, in truth, accurate summaries of facts or figures shown by the evidence in the case, you can disregard them entirely.


Jury Instruction No. 14, ROA, Vol. V, Doc. 188, at 15. These instructions were sufficient to mitigate any potential prejudice resulting from the admission of the summaries here. See United States v. Francis, 131 F.3d 1452, 1458 (11th Cir. 1997). The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the summaries.




Grand jury testimony of Allen Davis


Thomas Mower contends that the grand jury testimony of his attorney, Allen Davis, on March 13, 2002, did not provide prima facie evidence that Thomas Mower used Mr. Davis to further a crime or fraud, and the district court erred in granting the government's motion to compel Mr. Davis's December 5, 2002, grand jury testimony. Thomas Mower also argues that the district court violated his procedural due process rights by refusing to unseal the transcript of an ex parte motion hearing and refusing to compel the production of the government's evidence. He contends that these errors require dismissal of the indictment.

After entering into an immunity agreement with Allen Davis on March 12, 2002, the government subpoenaed Mr. Davis to testify before the grand jury on March 13, 2002. Mr. Davis, an attorney at Neways US, began by explaining that he was representing Thomas Mower individually during the IRS investigation. Mr. Davis testified that he met with Thomas Mower, prior to the interview with Agent Elder, to discuss the IRS investigation, but Mr. Davis asserted attorneyclient privilege in response to questions about the content of that meeting. He then identified the loan document for Hobble Creek, and stated that he was present when James Thompson created it, that he was present when it was provided to Agent Elder, and that the Mowers later permitted him to tell Agent Elder that it was a false loan document. He asserted attorney-client privilege, however, in refusing to answer a question about whether he ever had a meeting with Thomas Mower in which they discussed the Hobble Creek loan document. Later, he testified that, after the IRS investigation began, they originally decided to amend the Mowers' individual income tax returns, but Thomas Mower decided not to file them and instead to amend the Neways US corporate returns. Mr. Davis further testified that he talked with Michael Cunningham about the payments from Australia, but he again asserted attorney-client privilege regarding his conversations with Thomas Mower on that subject.

Following Mr. Davis's grand jury testimony, the government filed an ex parte motion to compel the testimony of Mr. Davis and two other attorneys. The district court granted the motion, finding:


A. The government has established a prima facie showing that the alleged crime has some foundation in fact;



B. The government has sustained their burden of showing that the testimony sought is related to the charges under investigation; and



C. The testimony sought is not covered by the attorney-client privilege because the purported conversations and documents were in furtherance of a crime or fraud[.]


Order to Compel, T.M. Opening Br. at App'x C, at 1. The district court ordered Mr. Davis and the two attorneys


to testify before the grand jury to answer questions regarding Thomas Mower and Leslie Mower's failure to report on their U.S. individual income tax return or a U.S. corporate income tax return their commission income earned from Neways U.S., Neways Australia, Neways Malaysia and other Neways entities from 1989 through the present, the preparation of phoney loan documents, the presentation of phoney loan documents to the IRS, the preparation and filing of the Mower's individual income tax returns, the preparation and filing of Neways corporate tax returns, the preparation and filing of Mower Properties tax returns, the preparation and filing of amendments to Neways corporate tax returns, falsification of Neways U.S. and Mower Properties' corporate books and records and other attempts by these attorneys to knowingly or unwittingly further Thomas Mower and Leslie Mower's tax fraud scheme.


Id. at 1-2. Under compulsion from the order, Allen Davis again appeared before the grand jury on December 5, 2002, and provided answers to questions on the subjects identified in the court's order. In response, Thomas Mower filed a motion to unseal the transcript of the ex parte hearing and to compel the production of the evidence that the government provided to the district court in connection with the hearing. The district court denied this motion. Later, Thomas Mower filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, contending that the government's intrusion into his attorney-client privilege violated his due process rights. The district court denied this motion as well.

We conclude that Thomas Mower's contentions on appeal do not support dismissal of the indictment. As for his first contention --that the order to compel was unjustified and over-broad under the crime-fraud exception to attorney-client privilege --presumably he is claiming a violation of his due process rights, although it is not entirely clear from his discussion. "We review the denial of Appellant's motion to dismiss the indictment for an abuse of discretion." United States v. Kingston, 971 F.2d 481, 490 (10th Cir. 1992). In United States v. Kennedy, 225 F.3d 1187, 1194 (10th Cir. 2000), we explained that, although "[g]overnment intrusions into pre-indictment attorney-client relationships do not implicate the Sixth Amendment," 14 there are instances in which "a defendant may claim his or her rights under the Due Process Clause have been violated by prosecutorial misconduct occurring prior to indictment." Such a violation only occurs where the "[m]isconduct by law enforcement officials in collecting incriminating evidence ... is outrageous enough to shock the conscience of the court." Id. (citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-74 (1952)). After noting that "[o]ther courts have concluded governmental misconduct in the form of a pre-indictment invasion of a defendant's attorney-client relationship may, under some circumstances, amount to a deprivation of the defendant's right to due process," we adopted the Third Circuit's test for evaluating such claims:


[I]n order to raise a colorable claim of outrageousness pertaining to alleged governmental intrusion into the attorney-client relationship, the defendant's submissions must demonstrate an issue of fact as to each of the three following elements: (1) the government's objective awareness of an ongoing, personal attorney-client relationship between its informant and the defendant; (2) deliberate intrusion into that relationship; and (3) actual and substantial prejudice.


Id. at 1195 (quoting United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1067 (3d Cir. 1996)).

Thomas Mower has failed to show that the challenged government conduct --"[t]he government's ex parte invocation of the crime/fraud exception to defendant's attorney-client privilege," T.M. Opening Br. at 40 --caused him any actual and substantial prejudice under the third prong of the Kennedy test. In his brief on appeal, Thomas Mower states:


Among the more damaging disclosures was the disclosure that amended personal tax returns reporting the foreign commissions as the Mowers' personal income had been prepared but never filed. Although those returns were not filed, and the commissions were reported as corporate income instead, the government used the fact that, in a privileged setting, the Mowers and their advisors had first characterized the income as personal to persuade the jury that the later characterization of the income was fraudulent.


T.M. Opening Br. at 43. Contrary to Thomas Mower's contention, this "damaging disclosure" did not occur during Allen Davis's December 5, 2002, grand jury testimony as a result of the district court's order to compel. Rather, Mr. Davis discussed these facts in his previous grand jury testimony on March 13, 2002, prior to the government ever seeking the order to compel. Mr. Davis certainly testified about this point on December 5, 2002, but, given his previous testimony, the later testimony hardly qualifies as a "damaging disclosure." Under the third prong of the Kennedy test, Thomas Mower has not shown any "actual and substantial prejudice" resulting from the district court's order to compel --or from "[t]he government's ex parte invocation of the crime/fraud exception to defendant's attorney-client privilege" --and there was no deprivation of his due process rights. See Kennedy, 225 F.3d at 1195-97. 15 As a result, we do not need to address whether attorney-client privilege, or the crime-fraud exception to that privilege, appropriately applied to Mr. Davis's testimony. See Kingston, 971 F.2d at 491 n.5 ("It is unclear whether, in fact, a breach of the attorney-client privilege occurred during the grand jury proceedings... . We need not reach th[is] issue ... because, as stated in the text, Appellant has failed to show prejudice stemming from this alleged violation of the attorney-client privilege.").

Thomas Mower's second contention --that the district court's refusal to unseal the transcript of the ex parte hearing and compel the production of the government's evidence violated his procedural due process rights --is likewise unpersuasive. Given the procedural posture of the case, this second contention falls within our due process analysis under the Kennedy test, and, as explained above, Thomas Mower has failed to show any "actual and substantial prejudice" under that test. Kennedy, 225 F.3d at 1195.




Severance


Both Leslie Mower and James Thompson challenge the district court's decision to deny their respective motions for severance. Leslie Mower argues that, because of the "overwhelming evidence" at trial against Thomas Mower and James Thompson, it was impossible for the jury to consider only the evidence against her. Likewise, James Thompson argues that he was prejudiced by the great weight of the evidence against the Mowers --especially considering his comparatively brief participation in the alleged conspiracy and the fact that, on multiple days during the trial, he was never even mentioned.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Leslie Mower's or James Thompson's motion to sever. Under Rule 8(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a single indictment may charge multiple defendants "if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction, or in the same series of acts or transactions, constituting an offense or offenses." Even if multiple defendants have been charged together in a single indictment, though, the district court may sever their trials: "If the joinder of offenses or defendants in an indictment, an information, or a consolidation for trial appears to prejudice a defendant or the government, the court may order separate trials of counts, sever the defendants' trials, or provide any other relief that justice requires." Fed. R. Crim. P. 14(a). "The granting of a motion to sever is ordinarily left to the district court's discretion." United States v. Powell, 982 F.2d 1422, 1432 (10th Cir. 1992). "Neither a mere allegation that defendant would have a better chance of acquittal in a separate trial, nor a complaint of the 'spillover effect' from the evidence that was overwhelming or more damaging against the co-defendant than that against the moving party is sufficient to warrant severance." United States v. Hack, 782 F.2d 862, 870-71 (10th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted). Rather, "absent a showing of clear prejudice, a joint trial of the defendants who are charged with a single conspiracy in the same indictment is favored where proof of the charge is predicated upon the same evidence and alleged acts." Id. at 871.

Like Thomas Mower, Leslie Mower and James Thompson were charged with conspiracy to defraud the United States, and generally, "in a conspiracy trial it is preferred that persons charged together be tried together." United States v. Scott, 37 F.3d 1564, 1579 (10th Cir. 1994). As previously discussed, there was more than enough evidence to implicate both Leslie Mower and James Thompson in the conspiracy. They were both active participants in the conspiracy, and even if James Thompson's participation in the conspiracy was comparatively brief, he created the false loan document and assisted in concealing the Mowers' income. The evidence against each defendant --not any "spillover effect" of evidence against others --provided a sufficient and independent basis for the conviction of both Leslie Mower and James Thompson.

In addition, the district court instructed the jury that


[e]ach defendant is entitled to have his or her case decided solely on the evidence which applies to him or her... . You must give separate and individual consideration to each charge against each defendant. The fact that you find one defendant guilty or not guilty of the crimes charged in the Indictment should not control your verdict as to whether you find the other defendant guilty or not guilty of the crimes charged in the Indictment. You must consider the evidence presented and determine whether the government has proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, its case against each of the defendants.


Jury Instruction No. 18, ROA, Vol. V, Doc. 188, at 19; see also Jury Instruction No. 21, id. at 22. These instructions cured any potential prejudice that could have resulted from a joint trial. See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1993) ("Moreover, even if there were some risk of prejudice, here it is of the type that can be cured with proper instructions, and juries are presumed to follow their instructions." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion for severance.




Jury instructions


Leslie Mower appeals three issues with regard to the district court's jury instructions. She argues that the district court erred in (1) refusing to give a requested instruction explaining the difference between corporate and personal income; (2) refusing to give a requested instruction on the Mowers' theory of defense; and (3) not providing an instruction allowing the jury to consider the lesser-included offense of misdemeanor tax evasion.

A. Jury instruction distinguishing personal from corporate income

The defendants proposed a jury instruction explaining the difference between personal and corporate income. At the jury instruction conference, the district court accepted most of the proposed instruction, including the following paragraphs:


The first step in arriving at taxable income is to determine the individual taxpayers' gross income... .



In determining whether the income is personal to the defendants, you may consider several factors, including whether the defendants actually received the money, how the money was used, the intent of the parties as determined by all of the circumstances, the economic realities, and the substance and the form of the transaction.


Jury Instruction No. 31, ROA, Vol. V, Doc. 188, at 34. The district court, however, refused to include an additional paragraph that the defendants had proposed as part of this instruction. This paragraph stated:


However, the fact that a defendant owns a corporation and makes decisions regarding corporate monies does not mean that the corporation's income is taxable to him or her personally because, by definition, the owner of a corporation always has control over corporate monies.


L.M. Opening Br. at 34 n.12. 16 Leslie Mower's counsel, Neil Kaplan, acquiesced in this final jury instruction:


THE COURT: We're going to replace 35 and 36 with the Mowers' proposal, with the third paragraph deleted. And then, in the second paragraph, the phrase between the comma "rather than to their corporations," that's out.



MR. KAPLAN: We're fine... .


Jury Instruction Conference, ROA, Vol. XXV, at 28-29.

Because Leslie Mower agreed to the final language of Jury Instruction No. 31, we review for plain error. See United States v. Robertson, 473 F.3d 1289, 1291 (10th Cir. 2007). "Plain error exists only where (1) there was error, (2) that is plain, (3) that affects substantial rights, and (4) that seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings." Id. Here, the district court did not err in refusing to include the defendants' proposed paragraph, so the first prong of our plain error standard disposes of Leslie Mower's argument. The language that ultimately appeared in Jury Instruction No. 31 was more than adequate to instruct the jury on the difference between corporate and personal income. The omitted language, in contrast, could have created confusion for the jury because it overemphasized the amount of control an owner of a corporation appropriately exercises over corporate monies. The omitted language also failed to account for the law regarding constructive dividends --where the amounts are ultimately taxed twice, as both corporate and shareholder income. See, e.g., Wortham Mach. Co. v. United States, 521 F.2d 160, 164 (10th Cir. 1975). The district court appropriately refused to include this language. See United States v. Kaatz, 705 F.2d 1237, 1246 (10th Cir. 1983) ("The instructions must be reviewed as a whole. The requested instruction would have added nothing but confusion and was properly refused." (citation omitted)).

B. Jury instruction regarding defendants' theory of defense

The defendants also proposed a jury instruction regarding their theory of defense. This proposed instruction stated:


As to Counts Two through Seven, if you have a reasonable doubt as to whether ... Leslie D. Mower willfully failed to report income ... she knew was personal income because ... Leslie D. Mower believed:



1. the monies were income or a loan to a corporation;



2. the monies were repayment of loans;



3. that taxes on the monies had been withheld and paid;



4. that for any other reason the monies were not taxable to [the Mowers] personally,



then you must find ... Leslie D. Mower not guilty, even if you also have some question that additional taxes may still be due.


Theory of Defense Instruction, ROA, Vol. V, Doc. 186, at 4. 17 The district court refused to include this instruction.

"Criminal defendants are entitled to jury instructions upon their theory of defense provided there is evidentiary and legal support. Upon the failure to so instruct, we will find reversible error." United States v. Visinaiz, 428 F.3d 1300, 1308 (10th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). The district court, however, is not required to give a theory of the defense instruction "if it would simply give the jury a clearer understanding of the issues." United States v. Wolny, 133 F.3d 758, 765 (10th Cir. 1998). Rather, the district court is only required to give the instruction "if, without the instruction, the district court's instructions were erroneous or inadequate." Id. "We review the instructions de novo to determine whether, as a whole, they adequately apprised the jury of the issues and the governing law." Id.

Here, the district court's instructions "adequately apprised the jury of the issues and the governing law" regarding willfulness, and the rejected jury instruction was unnecessary. Id. For instance, the district court instructed the jury that "a failure to report income on a tax return, without willfulness, is not sufficient to satisfy the requirement of an affirmative act of evasion." Jury Instruction No. 32, ROA, Vol. V, Doc. 188, at 35. Another jury instruction provided:


The word "willfully," as used in this tax statute means a voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty. In other words, the defendant must have acted voluntarily and intentionally and with the specific intent to do something the law forbids; that is to say, with a purpose either to disobey or to disregard the law... . [N]egligent conduct, even grossly negligent conduct, a mistake, misunderstanding, and/or a good faith belief, even if unreasonable, is not sufficient to constitute willfulness.


Jury Instruction No. 33, id. at 36. In light of these jury instructions, the district court was not required to give Leslie Mower's proposed theory of the defense instruction, which was "essentially [a] summar[y] of the evidence in the light most favorable to the defense, [a] summar[y] that [was] more appropriate for closing argument." Wolny, 133 F.3d at 766 (citations, alteration, and internal quotation marks omitted).

C. Lesser-included offense instruction

Leslie Mower argues that the district court erred in not providing a lesserincluded offense instruction for misdemeanor tax evasion. 18 She admits that she did not request this instruction before the district court. Therefore, as we have explained in a previous case, she may not be entitled to any appellate review --even for plain error: "'[T]his court has often held in noncapital cases involving direct appeals that a trial court does not err in refusing to give a lesser included instruction --even one supported by the evidence --if the defendant neglects to make a proper request for one at trial.'" United States v. Bruce, 458 F.3d 1157, 1164 n.3 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting Hooks v. Ward, 184 F.3d 1206, 1234-35 (10th Cir. 1999)). Nevertheless, in Bruce, 458 F.3d at 1164 & n.3, we noted that we had "occasionally applied plain error review in contexts similar to that at issue in this case," and, given the facts in that case, we did not "definitively decide the issue because Bruce's claim fails even assuming plain error review is applicable when a defendant fails to make a proper request for a lesser-included-offense instruction."

Likewise, even if we review Leslie Mower's claim under our plain error standard, it fails. Like the court in Bruce, 458 F.3d at 1164-66, we need only address the fourth prong of the plain error test, because Leslie Mower has not shown any error "that seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings." "Under this standard, 'we will not notice a non-constitutional error, such as the one in the case before us, unless it is both particularly egregious and our failure to notice the error would result in a miscarriage of justice.'" Id. at 1165 (quoting United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d 727, 736 (10th Cir. 2005) (en banc)). Leslie Mower has the burden of meeting this standard. Id. As discussed previously, there was more than enough evidence to support Leslie Mower's conviction of tax evasion under 26 U.S.C. § 7201, and Leslie Mower has not shown that a "miscarriage of justice" resulted from the district court's failure to instruct on the lesser-included offense of misdemeanor tax evasion. Accord Bruce, 458 F.3d at 1165 ("Despite Bruce's protestations to the contrary, the government's case against him was strong.").




Leslie Mower's sentencing


Leslie Mower appeals several issues with regard to her sentencing. She argues that (1) her sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the district court incorrectly calculated her tax loss and applied the Guidelines as mandatory; (2) her sentence was substantively unreasonable under the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); and (3) the application of the 2005 Guidelines violated the ex post facto clause of the Constitution.

"When reviewing a sentencing challenge, we evaluate sentences imposed by the district court for reasonableness." United States v. Conlan, 500 F.3d 1167, 1169 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1053 (10th Cir. 2006)); see also Gall v. United States, ---U.S. ---, 128 S. Ct. 586, 594 (2007) ("[A]ppellate review of sentencing decisions is limited to determining whether they are 'reasonable.'"). This inquiry includes both procedural and substantive components, and we "review the sentence under an abuse-of-discretion standard." Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597. "Procedural reasonableness involves using the proper method to calculate the sentence. Substantive reasonableness involves whether the length of the sentence is reasonable given all the circumstances of the case in light of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)." Conlan, 500 F.3d at 1169 (citations omitted).

A. Procedural reasonableness




1. Tax loss calculation


Leslie Mower challenges the procedural reasonableness of the district court's tax loss findings. First, she argues that the district court erred in failing to apportion its tax loss findings by year. It does not appear that she raised this issue before the district court, so we review for plain error. See Robertson, 473 F.3d at 1291.

The district court did not err in failing to apportion its tax loss findings by year, and Leslie Mower's claim fails under the first prong of our plain error test. See id. Under the Guidelines, the district court was required to determine Leslie Mower's base offense level by calculating her tax loss and comparing it to the tax loss table in U.S.S.G. § 2T4.1. See U.S.S.G. § 2T1.1(a)(1). For an offense involving tax evasion, "the tax loss is the total amount of loss that was the object of the offense ( i.e., the loss that would have resulted had the offense been successfully completed)." Id. § 2T1.1(c)(1). In addition, where "a defendant [was] convicted of more than one count," and the "counts involv[ed] substantially the same harm," the district court is required to group the counts together and determine "the offense level corresponding to the aggregated quantity." Id. §§ 3D1.1(a)(1), 3D1.2(d) (citing § 2T1.1), 3D1.3(b). The district court, therefore, appropriately grouped the counts against Leslie Mower and calculated her offense level based upon "the aggregated quantity" of the tax loss. Id. § 3D1.3(b).

There is also no support for Leslie Mower's argument that, because Thomas Mower was convicted of tax evasion for the same amounts, the district court was required to reduce her tax loss by fifty percent in calculating her base offense level. Section 1B1.3(a)(1) of the Guidelines explains that


the base level offense ... shall be determined on the basis of the following: ...



(B) in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity (a criminal plan, scheme, endeavor, or enterprise undertaken by the defendant in concert with others, whether or not charged as a conspiracy), all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity,



that occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense[.]


See also United States v. Bishop, 291 F.3d 1100, 1115 (9th Cir. 2002) ("Because the defendants were convicted of conspiring to defraud the IRS, the total tax loss, including the loss through the spouses, is attributable to each defendant. Tax loss is determined from the reasonably foreseeable conduct of all co-actors, not just the defendant's own conduct." (citation omitted)). Given this standard, it is far more likely that the district court erred in not including the Hobble Creek transaction, or all of the money from the Rezults account, in Leslie Mower's tax loss calculations than it is that the district court erred in not reducing her tax loss by fifty percent.

The district court did commit one procedural error, but it was harmless. In its tax loss findings, the district court stated that it was applying the 2005 Guidelines. At sentencing, though, the district court actually applied the 2001 Guidelines. As will be discussed, the district court was correct in applying the 2001 Guidelines. Under the "one-book rule" of the Guidelines, however, the district court erred in using sections from two different versions of the Guidelines. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11(b)(2). Nevertheless, the provision that the district court cites in its tax loss findings --the tax loss table in U.S.S.G. § 2T4.1 --is the same in the 2001 Guidelines as it is in the 2005 Guidelines for calculating Leslie's Mower's base offense level. Compare U.S.S.G. § 2T4.1 (2005), with U.S.S.G. § 2T4.1 (2001). In addition, the sentencing table in both sets of Guidelines is the same with regard to Leslie Mower, who had a total offense level of 18 and a criminal history category of I. Compare U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A (2005), with U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A (2001). Any error was harmless.




2. Application of the Guidelines


Leslie Mower argues that the district court violated Booker by applying the Guidelines in a mandatory fashion, and therefore, her sentence was procedurally unreasonable. Under the Supreme Court's decision in Booker, 543 U.S. at 226- 27, 245, the Guidelines are advisory, and the district court may not apply them in a mandatory fashion. Because Leslie Mower did not object to this alleged sentencing error before the district court, we review for plain error. See United States v. Begay, 470 F.3d 964, 976 (10th Cir. 2006); see also Booker, 543 U.S. at 268 ("[W]e expect reviewing courts to apply ordinary prudential doctrines, determining, for example, whether the issue was raised below and whether it fails the 'plain-error' test.").

The district court did not apply the Guidelines in a mandatory fashion, and Leslie Mower's claim fails under the first prong of our plain error test. Leslie Mower relies on two statements by the district court as evidence that it applied the Guidelines in a mandatory fashion. The first is the district court's statement at sentencing, in response to her contention that her disabled son needed her at home:


I am troubled by the relationship matter, but the law is so --presumptions are so much against family problems to be taken into consideration. You know, about one case out of three has something like this, and the law has just developed steadily presumptively against it and the presumption is that somehow arrangements can be made. So as I said a minute ago, the 3553 factors lead me still to a low end guideline sentence here without leading role applying.


L.M. Sentencing, ROA, Vol. XXIX, Doc. 350, at 23. This statement does not show that the district court viewed the Guidelines as mandatory. Rather, the district court is simply acknowledging that defendants often cite their family responsibilities as a reason for imposing lighter sentences, and the law generally discourages district courts from taking this into account. See United States v. Hildreth, 485 F.3d 1120, 1129 (10th Cir. 2007) ("[I]ndeed, as a matter of policy, the Guidelines discourage courts from considering family ties and responsibilities in sentencing decisions." (citing U.S.S.G. § 5H1.6)).

The second statement came in response to Leslie Mower's request on February 26, 2007, that the district court "recommend to the Bureau of Prisons that she be placed in a Community Correctional Facility pursuant to the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b)." Doc. 354, at 2 (citing Wedelstedt v. Wiley, 477 F.3d 1160 (10th Cir. 2007)). The district court responded with the following:


Defendant's current back problems have arisen since sentencing. Although the court will not affirmatively recommend placement in a community correctional center, the court would not oppose [her] placement in a community correctional center. Her current health problems and the fact that such a placement would afford her increased access to her treating physicians certainly weigh in favor of such a placement. She also poses no threat to the community.


02/28/07 Order, Doc. 360, at 2. This statement does not show that the district court viewed the Guidelines as mandatory. Indeed, this statement came months after sentencing, and even then, the district court did not indicate that it felt in any way constrained by the Guidelines. See id. Instead, the district court appropriately examined her circumstances and decided not to "recommend placement in a community correctional facility." Id.

In addition, the district court explained at sentencing that it had applied the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See L.M. Sentencing, ROA, Vol. XXIX, Doc. 350, at 23 ("[T]he 3553 factors lead me still to a low end guideline sentence here ... ."). Given this explanation, and the lack of any evidence that the district court viewed the Guidelines as mandatory, Leslie Mower's sentence was procedurally reasonable. 19

B. Substantive reasonableness

As the Supreme Court recently explained in Kimbrough v. United States, ---U.S. ---, 128 S. Ct. 558, 564 (2007), "'reasonableness' is the standard controlling appellate review of the sentences district courts impose." We review for substantive reasonableness "under an abuse-of-discretion standard," and, "[w]hen conducting this review, [we] will, of course, take into account the totality of the circumstances, including the extent of any variance from the Guidelines range." Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597. Moreover, we may apply a presumption of reasonableness to a sentence properly calculated under the Guidelines. Id. "'The defendant may rebut this presumption by demonstrating that the sentence is unreasonable in light of the other sentencing factors laid out in [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a).'" United States v. Arrevalo-Olvera, 495 F.3d 1211, 1213 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1055) (alteration in original).

Under the district court's tax loss findings, Leslie Mower's sentence was within the Guidelines range, and we accord it a presumption of reasonableness. Id. Leslie Mower has failed to demonstrate that the sentence is unreasonable in light of the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). We therefore hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion, and we affirm her sentence as substantively reasonable.

C. Leslie Mower's sentence under the ex post facto clause

Leslie Mower argues that the district court violated the ex post facto clause, U.S. Const., art. I, § 9, cl. 3, by sentencing her under the 2005 Guidelines, rather than the 1989 Guidelines. She concedes that she did not object to the district court on this ground, so our review is only for plain error.

The district court did not err here, and, as a result, Leslie Mower's ex post facto claim fails under the first prong of our plain error test. See Robertson, 473 F.3d at 1291. "A sentencing court is generally required to apply the Guidelines that are in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced." United States v. Gerber, 24 F.3d 93, 95 (10th Cir. 1994); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)(A)(ii); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11(a). However, the ex post facto clause "bars the sentencing court from retroactively applying an amended guideline provision when that amendment disadvantages the defendant." Gerber, 24 F.3d at 95-96 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). To determine whether the application of a version of the Guidelines violates the ex post facto clause, we use a two-prong test: "first, did the sentencing court apply the guideline to events occurring before its enactment, and second, did that guideline disadvantage the offender affected by it." Id. at 96 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

In the instant case, the district court correctly applied the 2001 version of the Guidelines in sentencing Leslie Mower. 20 The district court explained:


I think the evidence is that there were overt acts after 2001. I don't think that's inconsistent with the loss findings. So I'm going to apply the 2001 guidelines.


T.M. Sentencing, ROA, Vol. XXIX, Doc. 325, at 18; see also L.M. Sentencing, ROA, Vol. XXIX, Doc. 350, at 7 (same rationale applies). The district court was correct that the evidence showed overt acts (for conspiracy) and affirmative acts of evasion (for the six counts of tax evasion) that occurred after 2001. Given that all of her offenses continued after the date on which the 2001 Guidelines became effective, the district court did not violate the ex post facto clause by applying the 2001 Guidelines at her sentencing. See United States v. Sullivan, 255 F.3d 1256, 1259 (10th Cir. 2001) ("Because the defendant completed the second offense after the amendment to the guidelines took effect, the ex post facto clause does not prevent determining the sentence for that count based on the amended guidelines." (quoting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11 cmt. background)); cf. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11(b)(1) (explaining that, if the ex post facto clause would otherwise be violated, "the court shall use the Guidelines Manual in effect on the date that the offense of conviction was committed").




III.


The convictions and sentences of Thomas Mower, Leslie Mower, and James Thompson are AFFIRMED.

1 Neways US is located in Utah and was originally named "Images & Attitudes."

2 The corporation's bylaws did not actually provide for a position called "Chief Financial Officer," but she referred to herself as such.

3 Individually, these were: Images, Inc. 1; Images, Inc. 2; Images, Inc. 3; Images, Inc. 4; Images, Inc. 5; Images, Inc. 6; and Images, Inc. 7. When their names later changed to Neways, and then to Mower Properties, they stayed as seven separate entities. We will largely refer to these entities collectively, as "Neways 1 through 7."

4 The check registers listed the identification numbers in the column reserved for each payee's Social Security number. For example, both Neways, Inc. 1 and Mower Properties, Inc. 1 had the identification number 000-00-0101 on the check registers.

5 Brett Mower is the Mowers' son.

6 Mr. Simpson also sold a contiguous piece of property to other members of the Mower family. This property has a barn with a "Neways" sign on it, and a pavilion was built on this property for entertaining. Mr. Simpson did not know who presently owned the property.

7 Allen Davis testified that Thomas Mower viewed the Hobble Creek monies as a loan from Neways Australia, whereas Mr. Cunningham's testimony, Mr. Dwyer's fax, and Ms. Lane's testimony stated that Thomas Mower viewed other monies as repayment for a loan from Thomas Mower to Neways Australia. This distinction probably results because Mr. Cunningham, Mr. Dwyer, and Ms. Lane were mostly testifying about the monies wired to the Mower Properties account --not the Hobble Creek monies --but it is not entirely clear from the testimony.

8 Mr. Cunningham and Allen Davis testified that, in referring to the "Mowers," John Dwyer's response may have been referring to the companies themselves, because people in the Neways companies often failed to distinguish between the companies and the Mowers personally. Mr. Cunningham further testified that his testimony was consistent with Neways US owning the Neways 1 through 7 distributorships.

9 The total commissions were $3,775,764, from which she subtracted reported commission income of $565,949.

10 During a previous audit in 1993, the IRS had discovered something similar: a bank account that was not included on Images & Attitudes' tax returns, that had a different identification number than Images & Attitudes'. The account was in the name of "Images International, Inc." and was located in Van Alstyne, Texas.

11 Ordinarily, the doctrine of constructive receipt applies to prevent taxpayers from shifting income into subsequent tax years (e.g., to obtain a more favorable marginal tax rate). Assuming the commission checks were personal income to the Mowers, though, there is no reason for us to refrain from applying this doctrine here.

12 Both Leslie Mower and James Thompson raised this issue before the district court. Thomas Mower raised this issue below, but he does not raise it on appeal.

13 Leslie Mower also argues that tax evasion is not a "continuing offense" for statute of limitations purposes. Given that the affirmative acts of evasion are part of the crime itself, and the statute of limitations does not begin running until the affirmative acts are complete, see Anderson, 319 F.3d at 1220-21, the "continuing offense" doctrine is irrelevant here. See United States v. Eklund, 551 F. Supp. 964, 969 (D. Iowa 1982). There is also no reason to distinguish between evasion of assessment and evasion of payment cases for statute of limitations purposes. See United States v. Hunerlach, 197 F.3d 1059, 1065 (11th Cir. 1999).

In addition, as previously discussed, the jury's finding that she committed the affirmative act within the statute of limitations is not negated by the district court's tax loss findings. Further, because Leslie Mower's statute of limitations theory is wrong as a matter of law, she certainly was not entitled to a jury instruction incorporating that theory. Finally, contrary to her contention, there was unreported commission income in 1992.

14 Thus, Thomas Mower is incorrect in claiming that the government's conduct, pre-indictment, violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Kingston, 971 F.2d at 491 ( "Because the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not attach prior to indictment, Appellant cannot show that he was prejudiced by a Sixth Amendment violation on these facts." (citation omitted)).

15 The disclosure of the draft amended individual income tax returns appears to be the only "damaging disclosure" that Thomas Mower alleges here. Perhaps the language of his brief can be interpreted as contending that other "disclosures" by Mr. Davis on December 5, 2002, were prejudicial, see T.M. Opening Br. at 43 ( "Among the more damaging disclosures ... ." (emphasis added)), but without any additional specificity, it would be difficult --if not impossible --for us to determine whether any "actual and substantial prejudice" resulted from these "damaging disclosures."

16 Although the text of the supposed instruction is not in the record on appeal, the parties appear to agree on its content.

17 Again, Leslie Mower cites to an exhibit to Doc. 187, which is not in the record. The government, however, cites to Doc. 186, which is in the record and appears to include the exact same language.

18 She never actually specifies which crime she is referencing, but presumably it is 26 U.S.C. § 7203. The government assumes as much in its brief.

19 In a separate section of her brief on appeal, Leslie Mower argues that the district court violated United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). This appears to be a restatement of her argument that the district court applied the Guidelines in a mandatory fashion.

20 As discussed above, the district court did err in applying the 2005 Guidelines in calculating Leslie Mower's tax loss, but because the 2005 Guidelines were the same as the 2001 Guidelines in this regard, such error was harmless. For similar reasons, this did not "disadvantage" Leslie Mower for the purposes of our ex post facto clause analysis.

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Tuesday, June 24, 2008

This case agrees Baltic v. Commissioner, 129 T.C. 178, 183 (2007) that a challenge to the amount of the tax liability made in the form of an offer-in-compromise based on doubt as to liability by a taxpayer who has received a notice of deficiency is a challenge to the underlying liability precluded by section 6330(c)(2)(B). We conclude that under Baltic it was not an abuse of discretion for the Appeals officer to refuse to consider at the section 6330 hearing an offer-in-compromise by petitioners premised on Mr. Yesse's asserted doubtful liability for the fraud additions, because such an offer-in-compromise would constitute a challenge to the underlying tax liability. Although not defined in the statute or the legislative history, the term "underlying tax liability" as used in section 6330 is "a reference to the amounts that the Commissioner assessed for a particular tax period * * * [and] may encompass an amount assessed following the issuance of a notice of deficiency under section 6213(a)". Montgomery v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. 1, 7-8 (2004). For the years at issue, the punishment for fraud was an addition to tax, see sec. 6653, and such additions to tax, as well as penalties, "shall be assessed, collected, and paid in the same manner as taxes", and any reference to "tax" imposed by the Internal Revenue Code "shall be deemed also to refer to the additions to the tax" and penalties, sec. 6662(a).8 Petitioners admit that they received the notice of deficiency that determined fraud additions against Mr. Yesse for 1985 and 1986 and decided against petitioning the Tax Court on the basis of "apparent improper legal advice". Consequently, petitioners' opportunity to dispute the fraud additions (and the 1985 deficiency9 ) in the Tax Court before paying them10 ended with the expiration of the 90-day period in which they could have petitioned the Tax Court with respect to the notice of deficiency. Under Baltic they may not resurrect that opportunity by raising an offer-in-compromise based on doubt as to liability in a section 6330 proceeding. The Appeals officer's refusal to consider their offer-in-compromise was therefore no abuse of discretion

Erich S. and Linda A. Yesse v. Commissioner.

Dkt. No. 21745-05L , TC Memo. 2008-157, June 23, 2008.




Collection Due Process hearing: Offer-in-compromise: Doubt as to liability: No abuse of discretion. --
An IRS Appeals officer did not abuse her discretion when she issued a notice of determination without considering a married couple's offer-in-compromise (OIC) based only on doubt as to liability. Because the taxpayers received a notice of deficiency and had an opportunity to challenge the underlying tax liability, but failed to do so, they were barred from challenging the amount of the liability at the Collection Due Process hearing. Therefore, the settlement officer properly refused to consider the taxpayers' OIC since it was a prohibited challenge to the underlying tax liability.


Elliott K. Braverman, for petitioners; Kristina L. Rico, for respondent.


MEMORANDUM OPINION

GALE, Judge: This is a section 63301 proceeding for review of respondent's determination to proceed by levy to collect unpaid income taxes with respect to petitioners' 1985 and 1986 taxable years. Pending before the Court is respondent's motion for summary judgment.

As discussed more fully below, we conclude that there are no genuine issues of material fact, and respondent is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.


Background2

At the time the petition was filed, petitioners resided in Pennsylvania.

Petitioners timely filed Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, for taxable year 1985 on April 15, 1986. On August 18, 1995, respondent sent petitioners a statutory notice of deficiency, determining deficiencies for petitioners' 1985 and 1986 taxable years, as well as fraud additions under section 6653(b)3 against petitioner Erich S. Yesse (Mr. Yesse) for both taxable years.4 Petitioners received the notice of deficiency.

Petitioners did not petition the Tax Court with respect to the notice of deficiency. Consequently, respondent assessed the deficiencies, including the fraud additions, on March 25, 1996.

On February 8, 2005, respondent sent Final Notices --Notice of Intent to Levy and Notice of Your Right to a Hearing to petitioners with respect to the unpaid income tax liability, excluding the fraud addition, for 19855 and to Mr. Yesse with respect to the fraud additions for 1985 and 1986. Petitioners timely submitted a request for a hearing with respect to both notices.

During their hearing respondent's Appeals officer advised petitioners that she would not consider challenges to the underlying liabilities because petitioners had received a statutory notice of deficiency concerning them and had failed to petition the Tax Court. Petitioners indicated that they wanted respondent's Appeals Office to consider an offer-in-compromise based on doubt as to liability. However, petitioners did not submit an offer-in-compromise during the hearing.

On October 21, 2005, the Appeals Office issued petitioners a Notice of Determination Concerning Collections Action(s) Under Section 6320 and/or 6330 (notice of determination) sustaining the proposed levy.

Petitioners timely petitioned the Court in response to the notice of determination. Thereafter, respondent filed the pending motion for summary judgment, to which petitioners responded. Subsequently, the parties were allowed to submit additional memoranda of law in support of their positions.


Discussion

Summary judgment "is intended to expedite litigation and avoid unnecessary and expensive trials." Fla. Peach Corp. v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 678, 681 (1988). Summary judgment may be granted where there is no genuine issue of material fact and a decision may be rendered as a matter of law. Rule 121(a) and (b). The moving party bears the burden of proving that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and factual inferences are viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Craig v. Commissioner, 119 T.C. 252, 260 (2002); Dahlstrom v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 812, 821 (1985); Jacklin v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 340, 344 (1982). The party opposing summary judgment must set forth specific facts which show that a genuine question of material fact exists and may not rely merely on allegations or denials in the pleadings. Grant Creek Water Works, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 322, 325 (1988); Casanova Co. v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 214, 217 (1986).

Section 6331(a) authorizes the Secretary to levy upon property and property rights of a taxpayer liable for taxes who fails to pay those taxes within 10 days after notice and demand for payment is made. Section 6330(a) requires the Secretary to send a written notice to the taxpayer of the amount of the unpaid tax and of the taxpayer's right to a section 6330 hearing at least 30 days before any levy is begun.

If a section 6330 hearing is requested, the hearing is to be conducted by the Commissioner's Office of Appeals, and at the hearing the Appeals officer or employee conducting it must verify that the requirements of any applicable law or administrative procedure have been met. Sec. 6330(b)(1), (c)(1). The taxpayer may raise at the hearing "any relevant issue" relating to the unpaid tax or the proposed levy. Sec. 6330(c)(2)(A). The taxpayer may also raise challenges to the existence or amount of the underlying tax liability if the taxpayer did not receive any statutory notice of deficiency with respect thereto or did not otherwise have an opportunity to dispute the liability. Sec. 6330(c)(2)(B).

At the conclusion of the hearing, the Appeals officer must determine whether and how to proceed with collection and shall take into account: (i) The verification that the requirements of any applicable law or administrative procedure have been met, (ii) the relevant issues raised by the taxpayer, (iii) the challenges to the underlying tax liability by the taxpayer, where permitted, and (iv) whether any proposed collection action balances the need for the efficient collection of taxes with the legitimate concern of the taxpayer that the collection action be no more intrusive than necessary. Sec. 6330(c)(3).

In the case of the determination at issue, which pertains to the income tax, we have jurisdiction to review the Appeals officer's determination by virtue of section 6330(d)(1)(A), before its amendment in the Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-280, sec. 855(a), 120 Stat. 1019.6 See Iannone v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. 287, 290 (2004).

Respondent contends that he is entitled to summary judgment because the only issues petitioners raised in connection with their hearing were challenges to the underlying tax liabilities which were precluded under section 6330(c)(2)(B) because petitioners received a notice of deficiency with respect to the underlying liabilities.

Petitioners contend that respondent's Appeals officer abused her discretion by refusing to consider during the hearing an offer-in-compromise based upon doubt as to liability. Respondent argues that petitioners never submitted an offer-in-compromise and that, in any event, an offer-in-compromise based on doubt as to liability would constitute an impermissible challenge to the underlying liability.

Petitioners argue that there was an abuse of discretion in the failure to consider their offer-in-compromise7 because there was substantial doubt as to their liability for the 1985 deficiency and the 1985 and 1986 fraud additions. In petitioners' view, there is substantial doubt because the notice of deficiency for their 1985 and 1986 taxable years was mailed more than 3 years after their returns for those years were filed and consequently after the period of limitations on assessment had expired, see sec. 6501(a), and because respondent may rely upon the unlimited assessment period provided in section 6501(c)(1) only upon a showing by clear and convincing evidence that the returns were fraudulent, which respondent has not done, see sec. 7454(a); Rule 142(b). Respondent counters that the period of limitations on assessment remained open pursuant to section 6501(c)(1) because petitioners' returns for 1985 and 1986 were fraudulent, as determined in the notice of deficiency issued to petitioners for those years. Since petitioners received the notice of deficiency and failed to timely petition the Tax Court, respondent argues, they may not challenge the underlying liability, including the fraud additions, either directly, or indirectly by raising an offer-in-compromise based on doubt as to liability, in a section 6330 collection proceeding.

We agree with respondent. In Baltic v. Commissioner, 129 T.C. 178, 183 (2007), we held that a challenge to the amount of the tax liability made in the form of an offer-in-compromise based on doubt as to liability by a taxpayer who has received a notice of deficiency is a challenge to the underlying liability precluded by section 6330(c)(2)(B). We conclude that under Baltic it was not an abuse of discretion for the Appeals officer to refuse to consider at the section 6330 hearing an offer-in-compromise by petitioners premised on Mr. Yesse's asserted doubtful liability for the fraud additions, because such an offer-in-compromise would constitute a challenge to the underlying tax liability. Although not defined in the statute or the legislative history, the term "underlying tax liability" as used in section 6330 is "a reference to the amounts that the Commissioner assessed for a particular tax period * * * [and] may encompass an amount assessed following the issuance of a notice of deficiency under section 6213(a)". Montgomery v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. 1, 7-8 (2004). For the years at issue, the punishment for fraud was an addition to tax, see sec. 6653, and such additions to tax, as well as penalties, "shall be assessed, collected, and paid in the same manner as taxes", and any reference to "tax" imposed by the Internal Revenue Code "shall be deemed also to refer to the additions to the tax" and penalties, sec. 6662(a).8 Petitioners admit that they received the notice of deficiency that determined fraud additions against Mr. Yesse for 1985 and 1986 and decided against petitioning the Tax Court on the basis of "apparent improper legal advice". Consequently, petitioners' opportunity to dispute the fraud additions (and the 1985 deficiency9 ) in the Tax Court before paying them10 ended with the expiration of the 90-day period in which they could have petitioned the Tax Court with respect to the notice of deficiency. Under Baltic they may not resurrect that opportunity by raising an offer-in-compromise based on doubt as to liability in a section 6330 proceeding. The Appeals officer's refusal to consider their offer-in-compromise was therefore no abuse of discretion.

Finally, as recorded in the notice of determination, the Appeals officer verified that the requirements of applicable law and administrative procedure had been met and took into account whether any proposed collection action balanced the need for the efficient collection of taxes with the legitimate concern of petitioners that the collection action be no more intrusive than necessary. See sec. 6330(c)(3). Petitioners have identified no specific infirmities in the foregoing not heretofore addressed.


Conclusion

Since we have found that the Appeals officer's refusal to consider an offer-in-compromise based on doubt as to liability was not an abuse of discretion, we conclude that no genuine issues of material fact remain and hold that respondent is entitled to judgment as a matter of law that he may proceed with the proposed levy to collect petitioners' income tax liabilities for 1985 and 1986. Accordingly, we shall grant respondent's motion for summary judgment.

To reflect the foregoing, An appropriate order and decision will be entered.

1 Unless otherwise noted, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code as in effect for 1985 and 1986 with respect to the underlying liabilities or as presently in effect with respect to review of collection actions under sec. 6330. All Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.

2 The following findings are established in the record, have been stipulated, and/or are undisputed.

3 Sec. 6653(b), applicable in 1985 and 1986, was in substantial form recodified as sec. 6663 in 1989 for returns due after Dec. 31, 1989. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 (OBRA), Pub. L. 101-239, sec. 7721, 103 Stat. 2395.

4 The Court dismissed this case as to the income tax liability for taxable year 1986, excluding the fraud addition, for lack of jurisdiction. See infra note 5.

5 Earlier, on Jan. 14, 2004, respondent had sent petitioners a notice of intent to levy with respect to the unpaid income tax liability, excluding the fraud addition, for 1986. Because petitioners' request for a hearing under sec. 6330 concerning the Jan. 14, 2004, notice was untimely, they received an equivalent hearing, and respondent's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over this portion of the liability was granted.

6 Sec. 6330(d)(1) has been amended to give this Court jurisdiction to review all determinations under sec. 6330, effective for determinations made after 60 days after Aug. 17, 2006. Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-280, sec. 855(a), 120 Stat. 1019. The determination in this case was made on Oct. 21, 2005.

7 Although petitioners concede that they did not actually submit a specific offer-in-compromise based on doubt as to liability to the Appeals officer conducting their sec. 6330 hearing they argue that the Appeals officer's stated unwillingness to consider any such offer-in-compromise was the cause of their failure. Since, as discussed hereinafter, any consideration at the sec. 6330 hearing of an offer-in-compromise based on doubt as to liability would have been precluded under sec. 6330(c)(2)(B), it is immaterial whether petitioners' failure to submit an actual offer-in-compromise was attributable to the Appeals officer's representations. We note, however, that respondent alleges, the Appeals officer's case activity records document, and petitioners have not specifically disputed that the Appeals officer advised petitioners' representative that if they wished to dispute the liability they should seek audit reconsideration or submit an offer-in-compromise (outside their sec. 6330 hearing).

8 In 1989 sec. 6662(a) was recodified as sec. 6665(a), and as previously noted, sec. 6653(b) was in substantial form recodified as sec. 6663 with fraud redesignated as a "penalty" rather than "addition to tax", effective for returns due after Dec. 31, 1989. See OBRA sec. 7721.

9 The fraud addition for 1985 determined and assessed against Mr. Yesse suspends the period of limitations on assessment for the 1985 deficiency with respect to both petitioners. See Ballard v. Commissioner, 740 F.2d 659, 663 (8th Cir. 1984), affg. in part and revg. in part T.C. Memo. 1982-466; Vannaman v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1011, 1018 (1970).

10 As part of their claim that their offer-in-compromise based on doubt as to liability should have been considered, petitioners insist that respondent would be unable to demonstrate fraud by clear and convincing evidence in any refund litigation. Because petitioners received a notice of deficiency regarding the fraud additions, they may not dispute them in a sec. 6330 proceeding, either directly or indirectly through their offer-in-compromise. Accordingly, their contentions regarding the outcome of any refund litigation are irrelevant.

The government was entitled to summary judgment with respect to married taxpayers' claim that their civil rights were violated in a Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing in which they attempted to challenge assessment of frivolous return penalties. The CDP hearing allows taxpayers to request judicial review of process, rather than to appeal the underlying merits of the case.

R. Kintzler, DC Nev., 2001-2 USTC ¶50,696.

The district court remanded to the IRS Office of Appeals a married taxpayers' suit seeking a judicial determination that civil penalties assessed against them for filing frivolous tax returns were improper. The taxpayers were entitled to a CDP hearing on the merits of the issue.

R.D. Joling, DC Ore., 2001-2 USTC ¶50,771.

Married taxpayers were entitled to challenge the imposition of the frivolous return penalties both at their CDP hearing and in the subsequent Tax Court proceedings. For purposes of Code Sec. 6330(c)(2)(B), frivolous return penalties are an underlying tax liability that can be challenged in a CDP hearing. Further, the taxpayers did not receive a statutory notice of deficiency or otherwise have a prior opportunity to dispute the imposition of the penalties.

D.J. Callahan, Dec. 57,321, 130 TC --, No. 3.

Taxpayers who failed to timely file Tax Court petitions after receiving a notice of deficiency were barred from raising any issue regarding their underlying tax liability at the collection due process hearing.


An IRS settlement officer did not abuse her discretion when she issued a notice of determination without considering a married couple's offer-in-compromise (OIC) that was based only on doubt as to liability. Because the taxpayers received a notice of deficiency and had an opportunity to challenge the underlying tax liability, but failed to do so, they could not challenge the amount of their tax liability at their CDP hearing. Such an OIC was a prohibited challenge to the underlying tax liability. The settlement officer also exercised discretion in a reasonable way by issuing a notice of determination that sustained the lien but postponed the collection by levy until other IRS employees considered the OIC and various late-filed returns.

P.P. Baltic,, 129 TC 178, Dec. 57,213.

An individual was precluded from challenging her underlying tax liability during her Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing because she received a notice of deficiency and had an opportunity at that time to dispute her tax liability. An earlier Tax Court Summary Opinion involving the same tax liability and in which a decision was entered was final and determinative as to that liability.

J.H. Ginalski, 87 TCM 1249, Dec. 55,620(M), TC Memo. 2004-104.


A individual whose previous Tax Court petition was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction could not raise the same underlying tax liability at a later Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing. The taxpayer had received a notice of deficiency for the tax year at issue and had petitioned the Tax Court regarding that deficiency. However, he failed to comply with the Tax Court's order to file a proper petition and his case was dismissed. Therefore, he could not raise the issue at the CDP hearing he requested after receiving a notice of levy for the same liability.

J. Shere, 95 TCM 1039, Dec. 57,309(M), TC Memo. 2008-8.

An individual who received deficiency notices for the tax years at issues was prohibited from challenging his underlying tax liabilities for those years. Although the taxpayer explicitly declined to accept delivery of the deficiency notices, the receipt requirement of Code Sec. 6330(c)(2)(B) is presumptively met in such circumstances.

S.A. D'Onofrio, 95 TCM 1106, Dec. 57,328(M), TC Memo. 2008-25.

Married taxpayers who alleged that they had overstated their tax liability on their tax return were entitled to challenge the existence or amount of the reported tax liability at a Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing. The plain language of Code Sec. 6330 extends substantive and procedural protections to taxpayers who are confronted with a lien, or proposed levy, but who did not have a prior opportunity to challenge their tax liability. The IRS's contention that persons who report their tax liability on a duly filed return are barred from disputing that liability at a CDP hearing was rejected. Instead, the taxpayers, who did not receive a deficiency notice and were not given an opportunity to dispute the tax liability, were entitled to Code Sec. 6330 relief.

N. Montgomery, 122 TC 1, Dec. 55,501 (Acq.) (AOD 2005-03, December 16, 2005).

The IRS has recommended acquiescence in N. Montgomery, 122 TC 1, Dec. 55,501. In Montgomery, married taxpayers who alleged that they had overstated their tax liability on their tax return were entitled to challenge the existence or amount of the reported tax liability at a Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing. The IRS's contention that persons who report their tax liability on a duly filed return are barred from disputing that liability at a CDP hearing was rejected. Instead, the taxpayers, who did not receive a deficiency notice and were not given an opportunity to dispute the tax liability, were entitled to Code Sec. 6330 relief. The plain language of Code Sec. 6330 extends substantive and procedural protections to taxpayers who are confronted with a lien, or proposed levy, but who did not have a prior opportunity to challenge their tax liability.

AOD 2005-03, December 16, 2005.

An IRS Appeals officer erred in failing to credit a married couple's tax overpayment for one year against their liabilities. The taxpayers were entitled to challenge the existence or amount of their underlying tax liability at the Collection Due Process proceeding (N. Montgomery, 122 TC 1, Dec. 55,501 (2004)). The case was remanded to the Appeals officer for the appropriate credit. However, with respect to a second tax year, the couple failed to substantiate their overpayment and refund claims.

D.R. Cooley, 87 TCM 1025, Dec. 55,558(M), TC Memo. 2004-49.

A taxpayer who reports an amount of tax on a return is not precluded from challenging the accuracy of that amount in a Code Sec. 6330 hearing. N. Montgomery, 122 TC 1, Dec. 55,501 (2004), followed. In the instant case, the IRS was entitled to summary judgment because the taxpayer averred no facts sufficient to show error in assessments on the basis of his tax returns, or otherwise with respect to a notice of determination, failed to raise a justiciable issue.

R.E. Poindexter, 122 TC 280, Dec. 55,604, aff'd CA-2, 2005-2 USTC ¶50,508, 132 FedAppx 919.

A taxpayer who had a hearing with the IRS Appeals Office was precluded under Reg. §301.6330-1(e)(3), Q&A-E2 from disputing the assessed additions to tax again in an action under Code Sec. 6330. Furthermore, that regulation is valid because it implemented a congressional mandate in a reasonable manner. The legislative history of P.L. 105-206 indicates that Congress intended to preclude taxpayers who were previously afforded a conference with the Appeals Office from raising the underlying liabilities again in a collection review hearing and before the Tax Court.

J.E. Lewis, 128 TC 48, Dec. 56,876.

Similarly:

N. Sblendorio Est., 93 TCM 1130, Dec. 56,905(M), TC Memo. 2007-94.

J. Giamelli, 129 TC 107, Dec. 57,155.

The Tax Court properly concluded that an individual could not challenge the extent of his tax liabilities for tax years at issue because he previously had an opportunity to dispute those liabilities. The individual's counsel, who was explicitly authorized to act on his behalf, signed an IRS Form 4549, Income Tax Examination Changes, thereby consenting to an assessment of liability against the individual and to a waiver of the right to contest such liability in the Tax Court.

F. Deutsch, CA-2, 2007-1 USTC ¶50,339, 478 F3d 450.

Although a taxpayer who never received a deficiency notice was entitled to contest his underlying tax liability as part of an appeal of a levy action, his failure to produce any documentation showing error in the amount of tax due entitled the IRS to summary judgment. The IRS conceded that the notice of deficiency mailed to the taxpayer's last known address was returned by the post office. Therefore, the taxpayer was granted an opportunity to challenge the existence or amount of his liability in seeking review of an IRS Appeals notice of determination upholding a levy relating to such assessment. However, the taxpayer's failure to produce evidence or show any error in the determinations made in the notice of deficiency entitled the IRS to summary judgment.

S. Jumaa, 94 TCM 67, Dec. 57,009(M), TC Memo. 2007-192.

An individual was permitted to challenge his underlying tax liability relating to seven tax years where the IRS conceded that a notice of deficiency was not issued to him, and that he had not been given the appropriate opportunity to request a collection due process (CDP) hearing. However, the taxpayer was prohibited from challenging his underlying tax liability relating to six other tax years where he signed a consent to assessment.

J.R. Rivera, 85 TCM 832, Dec. 55,040(M), TC Memo. 2003-35.

An individual contention at his CDP hearing that the period of limitations for assessment and collection of his tax liabilities for eight years had expired was an impermissible challenge to the existence of his underlying tax liability because he failed to establish that he did not receive notices of deficiencies for the taxes in question.

B.L. Moore, 82 TCM 930, Dec. 54,550(M), TC Memo. 2001-305.

An individual taxpayer was not entitled to challenge his underlying tax liability in a Collection Due Process (CDP) appeal before the district court. His complaint, filed in response to the notice of determination issued by the IRS following the CDP hearing, attempted to attack his underlying tax liability. However, a taxpayer may not use a CDP hearing to dispute such a liability unless he had no previous opportunity to do so. Because the taxpayer specifically stated that he had had a prior opportunity to dispute his tax liability, the district court granted the government's motion for summary judgment.

J.R. Lance, DC S.C., 2004-1 USTC ¶50,268.

In consolidated cases, the IRS was entitled to summary judgment with respect to collection of the transferee tax liabilities of individuals who challenged their underlying tax liabilities as transferees of a corporation for its tax liability. The provisions of Code Sec. 6330(c)(2)(B) prevented them from challenging in a collection proceeding the existence and amount of their transferee tax liabilities. The taxpayers unsuccessfully contended that they received no statutory notices of deficiency but only statutory notices of transferee liability; the notices of transferee liability were the equivalent of notices of deficiency. Moreover, the statute did not set forth two alternative criteria authorizing challenges to underlying tax liability in collection proceedings. The taxpayers could only have challenged their underlying tax liabilities if they had lacked another opportunity to raise the challenge by virtue of not having received a notice of deficiency or otherwise.

D.L. Oyer, 85 TCM 1510, Dec. 55,193(M), TC Memo. 2003-178.

An individual was properly precluded at a Code Sec. 6330 hearing from contesting his underlying tax liability for six tax years because he received notices of deficiency for those years. The Secretary's authority to issue Notices of Deficiency was properly delegated to the District Director and also to the Director of the Service Center.

M.E. Nestor, 118 TC 162, Dec. 54,655.

An individual who failed to timely pay employment taxes owed by his sole proprietorship unsuccessfully challenged a Collection Due Process (CDP) determination upholding an IRS tax lien and the underlying assessment of penalties. The taxpayer failed to prove that he did not receive notification letters from the IRS or that any irregularity existed in the IRS's assessment or collection procedures. Moreover, he raised no challenges to the propriety of the penalties, the lien, or the levy during the CDP process because he failed to attend the scheduled hearings. His failure to exhaust available administrative remedies barred him from obtaining judicial review. No showing was made that the Appeals officer abused his discretion or reached an erroneous conclusion regarding the propriety of the lien and proposed levy.

N. Abu-Awad, DC Tex., 2003-2 USTC ¶50,716, 294 FSupp2d 879.

The government was granted summary judgment in connection with a former corporate president's suit alleging that he was denied a fair CDP hearing in connection with the government's assessment of a trust fund recovery penalty against him for the corporation's unpaid withholding taxes. The president questioned only his personal, as opposed to corporate, liability and his ability to pay. Thus, he failed to challenge the amount or the appropriateness of the liability itself. Moreover, a recovery letter sent to the individual clearly described the procedures that he had to follow in order to protest the IRS's collection action. Accordingly, the IRS's refusal to consider his challenges to the underlying tax liability, rather than to the collection activity proposed at his CDP hearing, was proper.

R. Dami, DC Pa., 2002-1 USTC ¶50,433.

Reg. §301.6320-1(e)(3), Q&A-E11, was reasonable and was consistent with the plain language of Code Sec. 6330(c)(2)(B). Thus, because the taxpayer received a notice of deficiency and did not file a timely Tax Court petition challenging the asserted tax liability, he was not entitled to challenge that liability during the collection review process. Even though the Appeals officer at the taxpayer's collection due process (CDP) hearing allowed him to offer information relevant to the existence or amount of his tax liability, that decision did not result in a waiver of the provisions of Code Sec. 6330(c)(2)(B).

H.F. Behling, 118 TC 572, Dec. 54,787.

Chief Counsel determined that a taxpayer who was offered a Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing but failed to timely request it could not challenge the appropriateness of the proposed levy in a subsequent CDP proceeding arising from the filing of a notice of federal tax lien. However, an appeals officer could consider the effect of the levy on the taxpayer in determining whether the filing of the notice of federal tax lien was appropriate.

CCA Letter Ruling 200152043, November 15, 2001.

A corporate taxpayer's allegation that an Appeals Officer failed to collect and credit funds owed to the taxpayer by another government agency to its outstanding tax liabilities was dismissed. Because the taxpayer essentially objected to its underlying tax liability, such arguments were properly disregarded during the CDP hearing.

Triad Microsystems, Inc., DC Calif., 2003-1 USTC ¶50,106.

A nonfiler's Tax Court petition seeking a review of the IRS Appeals officer's Collection Due Process (CDP) determination to levy upon his property in satisfaction of his delinquent taxes was dismissed absent proof that the amount of his assessed tax liability was incorrect. Because the taxpayer had not received a deficiency notice prior to the IRS's collection attempt, the Appeals officer attempted to discuss his underlying tax liability at the CDP hearing; however, the taxpayer refused to answer any questions or provide the requested information.

S.M. Smith, Jr., 84 TCM 647, Dec. 54,958(M), TC Memo. 2002-304.

A civil penalty was properly imposed against an individual for filing a frivolous return. Because no genuine issue of material fact existed over the verification of all legal and administrative requirements, the individual's Collection Due Process determination was valid.

W. Gifford, DC Nev., 2003-1 USTC ¶50,144.

An individual who had been provided with a notice of deficiency but declined the opportunity to dispute it was not permitted to challenge his tax liability in the district court. A notice of deficiency provided to a taxpayer prior to the effective date of Code Sec. 6330 satisfies the "opportunity to dispute" requirement of Code Sec. 6330(c)(2)(B). Moreover, the court noted that the taxpayer rights provided by Code Sec. 6330 ensure that a taxpayer is afforded an opportunity to dispute the underlying tax liability, regardless of whether that opportunity is given before or after the effective date of Code Sec. 6330.

D.E. Walker, DC Calif., 2003-1 USTC ¶50,157.

Married taxpayers' receipt of a deficiency notice precluded them from challenging in the Tax Court the amount or existence of their underlying tax liability. These issues had not been disputed within 90 days after the notice of deficiency was mailed; consequently, the IRS determination on the collection of the taxpayer's deficiency by levy was sustained.

P.F. Nichols, 84 TCM 697, Dec. 54,976(M), TC Memo. 2002-317.

An individual who did not cooperate with the IRS Appeals Office by appearing for or rescheduling an offered Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing was not entitled to another opportunity for a hearing. Her only dispute involved her underlying tax liability, and she was barred from challenging that liability due to her failure to file a Tax Court petition after receiving a deficiency notice. Further, because the taxpayer was precluded from disputing the existence or amount of her underlying tax liability and did not assert spousal defenses, challenge the appropriateness of the collection action, or offer any collection alternatives, the IRS's administrative deficiency determination was sustained.

C.L. Moore, 85 TCM 727, Dec. 55,002(M), TC Memo. 2003-1.

An individual who failed to challenge his underlying tax liability at his prior Collection Due Process administrative hearing was precluded from disputing his penalties and interest in the Tax Court. As a result, the government was entitled to summary judgment. In his Tax Court petition, the taxpayer failed to raise a spousal defense, make a valid challenge to the appropriateness of the IRS's intended collection via tax lien, or offer alternative means of collection, and such issues were deemed conceded.

M. Tabak, 85 TCM 735, Dec. 55,005(M), TC Memo. 2003-4.

Jurisdiction was lacking over an individual's Tax Court challenge to his underlying tax liabilities for three tax years because he failed to file a petition with respect to his notice of deficiency. Thus, he failed to properly place the validity of his underlying tax liability at issue. The IRS did not abuse its discretion in complying with the applicable tax collection procedures for the tax years at issue.

A.B. Jombo, 85 TCM 774, Dec. 55,023(M), TC Memo. 2003-20.

A Collection Due Process (CDP) determination upholding a tax lien imposed against a delinquent taxpayer's property was was not an abuse of discretion. The taxpayer, who received deficiency notices from the IRS but did not challenge the assessments by filing a Tax Court petition, was barred from contesting the deficiencies.

M. Eiselstein, 85 TCM 794, Dec. 55,025(M), TC Memo. 2003-22.

An individual's receipt of two deficiency notices precluded him from challenging the amount or existence of his underlying tax liability. Consequently, the IRS's determination on the collection of the taxpayer's deficiency by levy was sustained. Moreover, there was no evidence of abuse of discretion by the IRS Appeals officer who arranged the taxpayer's collection due process (CDP) hearing.

E.D. Shaffer, CA-10, 2003-1 USTC ¶50,232, 55 FedAppx 532.

An individual who received deficiency notices regarding the assessment of deficiencies and penalties for four tax years, challenged the determinations for three of those years in one Tax Court case, and attempted to challenge the remaining deficiency in a second case, was barred from again contesting the existence and amount of his underlying tax liabilities in a Collection Due Process (CDP) proceeding. Because the taxpayer offered none of the available remedies under Code Sec. 6330(c), the IRS's motion to dismiss the case for failure to state a justiciable claim was granted.

J.G. Beery, 85 TCM 842, Dec. 55,044(M), TC Memo. 2003-38.

An individual's challenge to collection procedures was dismissed where the taxpayer failed to reveal any irregularities in the IRS' actions. The taxpayer, who failed to report any income or tax due, was appropriately prohibited from challenging his underlying tax liability during a Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing because he received a notice of deficiency, failed to respond, and failed to articulate the basis for his objection to the tax liability.

W.G. Koenig, 85 TCM 850, Dec. 55,046(M), TC Memo. 2003-40.

A Collection Due Process determination allowing for the collection of deficiencies against an individual who filed a zero-income return and contended that she was not subject to tax was sustained. The taxpayer was not permitted to challenge the existence or amount of her unpaid taxes because she failed to file a Tax Court petition contesting the findings in the IRS's deficiency notice.

C.D. Flathers, 85 TCM 969, Dec. 55,067(M), TC Memo. 2003-60.

Similarly:

D.A. Fink, 85 TCM 976, Dec. 55,068(M), TC Memo. 2003-61.

A frivolous return penalty was properly imposed against an individual who, despite the receipt of earned income, filed a zero-income return and questioned the IRS's authority to collect taxes. The taxpayer failed to establish that the Appeals officer at his Collection Due Process hearing abused her discretion in disregarding issues that he attempted to raise that did not relate to spousal defenses, the appropriateness of the collection actions, and offers of collection alternatives. The taxpayer had previously been given an opportunity to challenge the penalty when the IRS notified him by letter that his tax form should be corrected; however, he took no action at that time.

M.B. Loze, DC La., 2003-1 USTC ¶50,298.

A taxpayer's challenge to the validity of a Collection Due Process (CDP) determination holding him liable for frivolous return penalties was rejected, and his claim for compensatory and punitive damages against the government was dismissed. Because the taxpayer, who had not received a deficiency notice, challenged the validity of the underlying tax liability, the district court's standard of review was de novo. However, the taxpayer's failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted resulted in the dismissal of the action.

J. Tornichio, DC Ohio, 2003-1 USTC ¶50,285, 263 FSupp2d 1090.

An individual's challenge to a Collection Due Process determination was rejected where he failed to show that an IRS Appeals officer abused his discretion. The taxpayer's underlying tax liability was not at issue because he failed to file a Tax Court petition following his receipt of notices of deficiency for two tax years and, for a third year, he failed to argue that the amounts he reported on his return for that year were reported in error.

S.D. Kaye, 85 TCM 1017, Dec. 55,082(M), TC Memo. 2003-74.

The IRS was granted summary judgment on a notice of intent to levy an individual for an unpaid tax liability. The taxpayer filed a late return alleging zero income and zero taxes due for a tax year. The IRS properly followed all applicable procedures and, thus, did not abuse its discretion in deciding to proceed with the collection action as pursuant to the notice of determination.

A. Williams, 85 TCM 1048, Dec. 55,091(M), TC Memo. 2003-83.

Similarly:

R.H. Frank, 85 TCM 1066, Dec. 55,096(M), TC Memo. 2003-88.

The Tax Court properly determined that an individual was foreclosed from challenging his underlying tax liability at trial. He unsuccessfully contended that he did not owe the assessed amount of taxes because insufficient evidence existed to support the assessment. On appeal, he did not contest that he had received a notice of deficiency. As he did not dispute it within 90 days, pursuant to Code Sec. 6213(a), he was barred from challenging the liability at trial. Moreover, the IRS was not required to conduct an audit before determining a deficiency, and it possessed statutory authority under Code Sec. 6020(b)(1) to file a substitute tax return for a nonfiler.

B.K. Wasson, CA-6 (unpublished opinion), 2003-1 USTC ¶50,337, 59 FedAppx 808.

The Collection Due Process (CDP) determination denying innocent spouse relief to a wife who, with her family, engaged in a systematic plan to place assets beyond the reach of the IRS was upheld. She knew of the understatements generated by the improper tax shelter deductions, significantly benefited from the unpaid liabilities, and attempted to conceal family assets. Thus, it was not inequitable to deny her relief from joint tax liability.

N.B. Doyle, 85 TCM 1108, Dec. 55,104(M), TC Memo. 2003-96.

The Tax Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the government in an individual's suit challenging collection of his tax liabilities for two tax years. The Tax Court properly concluded that the taxpayer was precluded from challenging his underlying tax liability during his Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing because he received a statutory notice of deficiency, and that the IRS Appeals officer who conducted the CDP hearing properly verified the existence and propriety of tax assessments.

W. Barasch, CA-9 (unpublished opinion), 2003-1 USTC ¶50,383, 59 FedAppx 235.

The IRS did not abuse its discretion in proceeding with a collection action against an individual where the taxpayer failed to establish that the Appeals officer did not follow appropriate Collection Due Process (CDP) procedures. The taxpayer was not prohibited from disputing her underlying tax liability where she was not allowed to raise frivolous arguments during her CDP hearing, including her contention that the statutory notice of deficiency was invalid.

A.W. Nebres, 85 TCM 1144, Dec. 55,110(M), TC Memo. 2003-102.

The Collection Due Process (CDP) determination permitting the IRS to proceed with collection of an individual's deficiency and a delay penalty was upheld. Because the taxpayer had received statutory notice of deficiency, he was precluded from challenging his underlying tax liability at the CDP hearing. The imposition of sanctions against him was not an abuse of discretion based on the finding that he had instituted the action primarily for purposes of delay.

H.E. Call, CA-9, 2003-1 USTC ¶50,387, 59 FedAppx 234.

The government was denied summary judgment in a suit in which a married couple challenged an adverse Collection Due Process determination because it failed to overcome genuine issues of material fact regarding the assessments that the taxpayers pointed to on the record. Although the government addressed at length a number of procedural issues, it failed to reach the taxpayers' allegation that the wife's FICA tax liabilities were improperly assessed as income tax liabilities.

H. Langer, DC Minn., 2003-1 USTC ¶50,400.

An individual was precluded from contesting her underlying tax liability at a Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing where the issue had previously been addressed in an earlier Tax Court decision. Moreover, the taxpayer was precluded from raising the issue of her underlying tax liability where she was given prior opportunity to make such objections, and failed to do so.

E.L. Wooten, 85 TCM 1193, Dec. 55,122(M), TC Memo. 2003-113.

Married taxpayers who were not present to accept delivery of a notice of deficiency sent to them by the IRS were allowed to challenge the validity of the deficiency and penalty assessed against them at their Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing. Both taxpayers credibly testified that they did not receive a notice of attempted delivery from the United States Postal Service (USPS) and that they did not know that the USPS was attempting to deliver a certified letter to them. Accordingly, the avoidance exception to actual receipt was not applicable and they were afforded the opportunity to dispute their tax liability for the year in issue.

C.B. Tatum, Jr., 85 TCM 1200, Dec. 55,125(M), TC Memo. 2003-115.

Similarly:

C.P. Durrenberger, Jr., 87 TCM 1000, Dec. 55,552(M), TC Memo. 2004-44.

On reconsideration, an order granting partial summary judgment against the secretary/treasurer of a corporation on the issue of his liability for unpaid trust fund recovery penalties and interest was reversed. It was not clear whether the taxpayer had the opportunity to dispute his underlying tax liability before the IRS made its assessment. There was a question of fact as to whether the deficiency notice went unclaimed because it was not mailed to the proper address.

B.S. Pollack, DC Tenn., 2005-1 USTC ¶50,285, 406 F3d 323, rev'g in part, 2004-2 USTC ¶50,391, 327 FSupp2d 907.

On reconsideration, an individual was considered to have been given the opportunity to contest the determination of the IRS even though he claimed that he never received a notice of the determination. There is no difference between an unclaimed certified letter and a refused one. Because the address on the unclaimed certified letter containing the notice was the taxpayer's correct address, he was considered to have failed to accept delivery; therefore, he had the opportunity to dispute the underlying tax liability.

B.S. Pollack, DC Tenn., 2005-2 USTC ¶50,654.

An IRS Appeals officer did not abuse his discretion in determining that the IRS was entitled to proceed with collection of an individual's delinquent taxes and penalties. The validity of the underlying tax liability was not properly placed at issue by the taxpayer at the Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing.

S.R. Burton, 85 TCM 1203, Dec. 55,126(M), TC Memo. 2003-116.

An individual's receipt of a deficiency notice precluded him from challenging the amount or existence of his underlying tax liability in a collection review proceeding. Consequently, the IRS's determination on the collection of the taxpayer's deficiency by levy was sustained.

P. Maton, DC Ill., 2003-1 USTC ¶50,406.

Similarly:

M.D. Johnson, DC Ga., 2003-2 USTC ¶50,721.

The IRS's Collection Due Process (CDP) determination spanning four tax years was upheld where, in properly contesting his underlying tax liability, an individual failed to establish that he was entitled to claimed loss deductions. The taxpayer unsuccessfully advanced tax-protestor type arguments to support his contention that he was not responsible for the underlying tax liability. Moreover, no abuse of discretion was established, and the collection alternatives were deemed conceded because they were not raised during the CDP hearing. As a result, the IRS was permitted to proceed with collection.

E.C. Aston, 85 TCM 1260, Dec. 55,139(M), TC Memo. 2003-128.

The IRS's determination to proceed with a collection action against an individual for income tax liabilities was not an abuse of discretion. The merits of the taxpayer's claim of entitlement to itemized deductions had previously been determined in court; thus, in the taxpayer was not entitled to contest the underlying tax liability in the Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing. Since the taxpayer did not raise any other issues about the conduct of the hearing or verification that administrative procedures had been followed, he did not show any abuse of discretion by the IRS.

S.G. Orr, 85 TCM 1319, Dec. 55,156(M), TC Memo. 2003-141.

The IRS did not abuse its discretion in proceeding with collection by levy of married taxpayers' unpaid tax liability for one tax year and the husband's tax liability for another tax year. The taxpayers could not seek redetermination of their liability for the earlier tax year, did not timely request credit for any overpaid FICA taxes, and the IRS did not abuse its discretion in denying their request to apply FICA credits against their unpaid tax liabilities. In a prior Tax Court proceeding, the taxpayers stipulated to the amount of credits for increased federal income tax withholdings, including FICA taxes. The taxpayers presented no evidence that their excess withholdings for the tax year at issue exceeded those amounts. With respect to other alleged FICA overpayments, such years were not before the IRS Office of Appeals at the taxpayers' Collection Due Process hearing. The taxpayers also did not file, within the applicable statutory period, a claim for refund or credit of any overpaid FICA tax, or present evidence that they made deposits or that any FICA taxes were assessed after the applicable period of limitations had expired.

J.J. Maloney, 85 TCM 1325, Dec. 55,158(M), TC Memo. 2003-143.

An Appeals officer's Collection Due Process (CDP) determination permitting the IRS to proceed to levy in order to collect an individual's delinquent taxes was not an abuse of discretion. The taxpayer's underlying tax liabilities were properly at issue because he had not received a notice of deficiency; however, because he persisted in advancing frivolous arguments, those liabilities were sustained. He was provided with a fair opportunity to address all relevant issues at the CDP hearing, but failed to do so.

T.V.F. Struhar, 85 TCM 1350, Dec. 55,162(M), TC Memo. 2003-147.

The IRS's determination to proceed with collection of delinquent taxes from a nonfiling individual was not time-barred and was not an abuse of discretion. Her claim that the assessment period had expired was a challenge to the underlying tax liability that should have been made in a deficiency proceeding, not a collection proceeding.

S.S. Rodriguez, 85 TCM 1414, Dec. 55,168(M), TC Memo. 2003-153.

An IRS Appeals officer's determination following a CDP hearing that a frivolous return penalty was properly imposed against a taxpayer, who filed a zero-income return and contended that his wages were not subject to tax, was upheld.

J.C. Pesci, DC Nev., 2003-1 USTC ¶50,498.

Similarly:

L. Goodyke, DC Nev., 2003-1 USTC ¶50,529.

R. Rodriguez, DC Ariz., 2006-2 USTC ¶50,482.

An individual who failed to file a Tax Court petition after receiving a deficiency notice was not entitled to contest the merits of her underlying tax liability at a Collection Due Process hearing. The mere fact that the Appeals officer did consider a part of the merits, although not required to do so, did not result in a waiver of the restrictions on the taxpayer with respect to the remaining underlying issues that were not addressed. Rationale in H.R. Behling, 118 TC 572, Dec. 54,787 (2002), followed.

F. Pahamotang, 85 TCM 1506, Dec. 55,192(M), TC Memo. 2003-177.

A corporation that provided janitorial and cleaning services failed to comply with its employment tax obligations at the time of its Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing and, as a result, was properly denied collection alternatives. Evidence established that the taxpayer failed to meet its semi-weekly deposit obligations that were determined pursuant to a plan of reorganization in bankruptcy in the five quarters preceding its CDP hearing. Moreover, the taxpayer failed to timely file its returns in two quarters preceding the hearing.

PCT Services, Inc., DC Ga., 2003-2 USTC ¶50,536.

The IRS did not abuse its discretion in determining to proceed with a collection action against an individual with respect to two tax years. Although the taxpayer did not receive a notice of deficiency with respect to his unpaid liability for either tax year, the contentions and arguments he raised in his Appeals office hearing, petition, and trial memorandum, and which challenged the existence or the amount of each such unpaid liability, were frivolous and/or groundless. The court determined, sua sponte, to impose the delay penalty because the court previously had warned the taxpayer about such arguments.

I. Israel, 86 TCM 23, Dec. 55,217(M), TC Memo. 2003-198.

Taxpayers who failed to file Tax Court petitions after receiving a notice of deficiency were barred from raising any issues regarding their underlying tax liability at their Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing.

W.O. Smith, 86 TCM 62, Dec. 55,225(M), TC Memo. 2003-205.

An individual who failed to file a Tax Court petition after receiving a notice of deficiency was barred from raising any issues regarding his underlying tax liability at his Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing.

J.R. Peacock, 86 TCM 64, Dec. 55,226(M), TC Memo. 2003-206.

Married taxpayers were precluded from challenging their underlying tax liabilities at a Collection Due Process hearing and on appeal. They had received a statutory notice of deficiency for their tax liabilities and had litigated the merits of their liabilities in the Tax Court.

X.J.R. Avula, CA-8, 2004-2 USTC ¶50,310, 105 FedAppx 127.

Married taxpayers who had an opportunity to challenge a notice of deficiency were barred from raising any issues regarding their underlying tax liability at their Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing. Because the taxpayers entered into an agreement as to the amount of their tax liability in one tax year, they were precluded from arguing the amount of their tax liability at their CDP hearing or in their petition.

A. Thomas, 86 TCM 216, Dec. 55,253(M), TC Memo. 2003-231.

The district court dismissed an individual's challenge to an adverse CDP determination where evidence established that the IRS followed proper hearing procedures. The taxpayer was appropriately prohibited from disputing her underlying tax liability because she received a notice of deficiency and did not contest the liability at that time.

D.J. Barnett, DC Fla., 2003-2 USTC ¶50,612.

An individual who was assessed the trust fund recovery penalty was precluded from challenging his liability for the penalty at a Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing because that issue had already been addressed and determined during earlier proceedings. Thus, the federal district court lacked jurisdiction to review the liability issue that the IRS properly refused to reexamine.

H. Plettner, DC Ill., 2003-2 USTC ¶50,620.

Similarly:

W.F. Currie, DC Ga., 2005-2 USTC ¶50,458.

R.R. Pennington, DC Tex., 2006-2 USTC ¶50,474.

T.G. Totten, DC Wash., 2007-1 USTC ¶50,502.

B.V. Musto, DC N.J. (unpublished opinion), 2008-1 USTC ¶50,286.

The Tax Court properly dismissed an individual's challenge to an adverse Collection Due Process (CDP) determination where the taxpayer attempted to dispute his underlying tax liability during his CDP hearing. The taxpayer received a notice of deficiency and failed to object to the tax liability at that time.

E.P. Tolotti, Jr., CA-9 (unpublished opinion), 2003-2 USTC ¶50,637, 70 FedAppx 971, aff'g 83 TCM 1436, Dec. 54,702(M), TC Memo. 2002-86.

The IRS was entitled to proceed with levy against a delinquent individual because he failed to raise any valid allegations of error in the collection process. The taxpayer was collaterally estopped from raising, in the Tax Court's Code Sec. 6330 proceeding, issues regarding return assessments. In prior litigation (DC Texas, 2001-2 USTC ¶50,735), a federal district court held that the return assessments were validly entered, adequately noticed, and not dependent upon the prior issuance of notices of deficiency. The district court also concluded that the taxpayer's execution of a Form 900 was a valid extension of the period of limitations on collection. The taxpayer was not collaterally estopped from litigating issues regarding examination assessments.

J. Perez, 84 TCM 501, Dec. 54,924(M), TC Memo. 2002-274.

Following a Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing, the government was entitled to proceed with collection efforts against an individual who was assessed frivolous return penalties in connection with the filing of zero-income returns. Tax-protest arguments raised by the taxpayer in opposition to the government's motion for summary judgment were rejected as meritless. Having failed to challenge the penalty assessment prior to the CDP hearing, the taxpayer was barred from contesting the existence or amount of the assessed liability. Moreover, he failed to establish that documents sent to him by the IRS were invalid or that IRS personnel lacked authority to proceed against him. Thus, no showing was made to justify further delay in the government's collection efforts.

S. Rennie, 84 TCM 611, Dec. 54,949(M), TC Memo. 2002-296.

An individual was permitted to challenge his underlying tax liability relating to seven tax years where the IRS conceded that a notice of deficiency was not issued to him, and that he had not been given the appropriate opportunity to request a Collection Due Process hearing. The taxpayer's case was remanded upon a showing that an irregularity occurred in the assessment procedure. However, the taxpayer was prohibited from challenging his underlying tax liability relating to six other tax years because he signed a consent to assessment, thereby waiving his right to a notice of deficiency and opportunity to contest his tax liability.

J. Rivera, 85 TCM 832, Dec. 54,040(M), TC Memo. 2003-35.

An individual who did not dispute his underlying tax liability at his Collection Due Process hearing was not entitled to additional deductions. The taxpayer he had reached an agreement with the IRS as to additional liabilities, and the amounts were assessed. Moreover, the taxpayer presented no credible evidence that his underlying tax liabilities for any of the years in issue were incorrect. He unsuccessfully contended that the proceeds of a foreclosure on his house should have paid off the liabilities at issue. However, he failed to raise a spousal defense, make a valid challenge to the appropriateness of the intended collection action, or offer alternative means of collection; the issues were deemed conceded under Tax Court Rule 331.

D. Stewart, 84 TCM 292, Dec. 54,866(M), TC Memo. 2002-225.

The IRS was permitted to proceed with collection against an individual who gave no bona fide basis for his objection to the Service's collection actions. The Tax Court had given the taxpayer an opportunity to contest his underlying tax liabilities for two years at a Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing because he had received no deficiency notices for those years. However, he did not attend the CDP hearing, attempted to delay the hearing, did not challenge the existence or amount of his underlying deficiencies, and raised previously rejected frivolous arguments in response to an order to show cause. Because he instituted and maintained the proceeding solely for delay, the court concluded that the IRS's collection determination was not an abuse of discretion.

M. Nestor, 84 TCM 410, Dec. 54,896(M), TC Memo. 2002-251.

Taxpayer was entitled to contest his underlying tax liability following the issuance of a notice of intent to levy because he had never received the deficiency notice mailed to him by the IRS.

B. Merriweather, 84 TCM 294, Dec. 54,816(M), TC Memo. 2002-226.

The validity of married taxpayers' underlying liability was properly at issue in the Code Sec. 6330(d) appeal from a Collection Due Process (CDP) determination, and the review was to be conducted under the de novo standard. By raising the issue of whether the limitations period had expired at the CDP hearing, the taxpayers challenged their underlying tax liability. The IRS's assessment was the result of the taxpayers' voluntarily filed amended return. No deficiency notice had been issued to them, and they did not otherwise have an opportunity to dispute their tax liability.

P. Hoffman, 119 TC 140, Dec. 54,882.

The government was entitled to summary judgment with respect to married taxpayers' suit challenging the validity of a notice of determination issued to them after their Collection Due Process hearing. The taxpayers, who had filed a zero-income tax return, failed to raise an issue of material fact as to the validity of the notice. Their argument that the notice was invalid because it was not issued by the Secretary of the Treasury and that IRS employees are not Treasury delegates was summarily rejected. Moreover, a Form 4340 was valid to show notice of assessment and demand for payment of the amounts that the taxpayers owed.

B. Blanchard, DC Ohio, 2002-2 USTC ¶50,712.

A Collection Due Process (CDP) determination allowing for the collection of frivolous return penalty against an individual who filed zero-income returns and contended that the requirement that he file returns violated his Fifth Amendment rights was valid. The taxpayer was permitted to challenge the validity of the penalty at the CDP hearing because the statutory deficiency procedures do not apply to such penalties and, thus, he had no prior opportunity to dispute the assessment.

W. Dean, DC Fla., 2002-2 USTC ¶50,802.

Married taxpayers failed to set forth a valid argument to support their claim that a notice of determination issued to them should be vacated. They raised the same issues in the district court that they had raised in their Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing. Their tax protest arguments were rejected, as was their challenge to the frivolous return penalty imposed in connection with their return that contained zeros while an attached Form W-2 showed income. Moreover, their conclusory allegation that their CDP hearing was improperly conducted was unsupported, as were their contentions that the Treasury Secretary was required to send the notice of determination, and that computer generated transcripts were invalid to show notice and amounts owed.

R. Harrison, DC Nev., 2002-2 USTC ¶50,719.

An individual's suit against the government challenging a levy in response to his nonpayment of a frivolous return penalty was dismissed. Imposition of the penalty was proper as his Form 1040 lacked information such that its correctness could not be judged. Moreover, a document attached to the Form 1040 indicated that the omissions from the Form 1040 were attributable to a frivolous position. He received proper notice and opportunity to appeal the penalty prior to his Collection Due Process hearing in which he failed to raise any relevant issues, focusing instead on the validity of the underlying taxes. All other assertions were dismissed as meritless.

D. Hoffman, DC Wash., 2002-2 USTC ¶50,499, 209 FSupp2d 1089.

An individual who, despite having received taxable wages, filed a zero-income return was held to be liable for the frivolous return penalty following a Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing. The taxpayer's allegation that he was denied a fair and/or meaningful CDP hearing was rejected because the record showed that the IRS complied with the requirements of Code Sec. 6320 and Code Sec. 6330 and he was afforded every opportunity to address issues of his choosing. Moreover, the taxpayer did not have a right to discovery in connection with his CDP hearing, and the IRS did not fail to produce documentation that he was entitled to receive. The mere fact that the notice of a right to a CDP hearing was sent by an IRS official, rather than by the Treasury Secretary, did not invalidate the notice.

B.R. Kelly, DC Mo., 2002-2 USTC ¶50,615, 209 FSupp2d 981.

A Collection Due Process (CDP) determination imposing frivolous return penalties against married taxpayers was valid. The penalties were appropriately imposed after the taxpayers reported zero income and tax liability on their return, despite attached W-2 forms indicating earnings in the years at issue. At the CDP hearing, the taxpayers were permitted to challenge the penalties as their underlying tax liability because, under Code Sec. 6703, the statutory deficiency procedures did not apply and the taxpayers had no prior opportunity to dispute the penalties.

P. Lemieux, DC Nev., 2002-2 USTC ¶50,720, 230 FSupp2d 1143.

A Collection Due Process determination that a frivolous return penalty was properly imposed against an individual who filed a zero-income return and contended that his wages were not subject to tax was upheld. The taxpayer's allegations that the Appeals officer had acted improperly were disregarded in light of the fact that he used the hearing as a forum for discussing matters beyond those permitted by Code Sec. 6330, and never addressed such relevant issues as spousal defenses, challenges to the propriety of the collection actions, and collection alternatives. The issues that he attempted to raise before the Appeals officer and the court were meritless and did not present a genuine issue for trial. Thus, the government's motion for summary judgment was granted.

A. Reynoso, DC Nev., 2002-2 USTC ¶50,775.

Following a Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing, the government was entitled to proceed with collection efforts against an individual who was assessed frivolous return penalties in connection with the filing of zero-income returns. Tax-protest arguments raised by the taxpayer were rejected as meritless. Having failed to challenge the penalty assessment under Code Sec. 6703 prior to the CDP hearing, the taxpayer was barred from contesting the existence or amount of the assessed liability. Moreover, he failed to establish that documents sent to him by the IRS were invalid or that IRS personnel lacked authority to proceed against him. Thus, no showing was made to justify further delay in the government's collection efforts.

P. Tkac, DC Md., 2002-2 USTC ¶50,653.

A Collection Due Process (CDP) determination allowing for the collection of frivolous return penalties against an individual who filed zero-income returns and contended that his wages were not subject to tax was valid. The taxpayer was permitted to challenge the validity of the penalties at the CDP hearing because the statutory deficiency procedures do not apply to such penalties and, thus, he had no prior opportunity to dispute the assessment.

J. Uveges, DC Nev., 2002-2 USTC ¶50,740.

The IRS was entitled to levy on an individual's pension in order to collect a tax liability for five tax years. The taxpayer was not entitled to a determination as to the amount of his pension subject to the liens and, implicitly, a determination that no other assets of the taxpayer were subject to the IRS liens. The taxpayer failed to make such argument before the IRS Appeals officer at his collection due process hearing because he raised no alternatives to collection. The Tax Court noted that it would be inappropriate to anticipate, determine and limit the scope of the liens on the record in the case. The amount of liability was not disputed; the taxpayer's arguments only addressed collectibility.

L. Fusaro, 86 TCM 731, Dec. 55,381(M), TC Memo. 2003-345.

A taxpayer could not challenge his liability for the trust fund recovery penalty at a collection due process hearing. The taxpayer failed to dispute the liability within the appropriate limitation period, prior to assessment. The IRS notified the taxpayer of the proposed assessment and the taxpayer had 60 days to appeal the determination before the assessment. Moreover, the taxpayer agreed to the assessment and could not now be excused absent sufficient legal basis.

B.N. Muller III, DC Tenn., 2004-1 USTC ¶50,239.

Similarly:

C. Jackling, DC N.H., 2005-1 USTC ¶50,159, 352 FSupp2d 129.

A taxpayer was not barred from contesting her liability for interest on a trust fund penalty at her Collection Due Process Hearing. The IRS's attempt to collect amounts after settling the taxpayer's trust fund obligation and payment of the liability constituted an attempt to collect on a new tax that had not been assessed. Because the tax was not previously assessed she should have been entitled to contest the liability at the Collection Due Process Hearing.

P.J. Hudson, DC N.Y., 2004-1 USTC ¶50,241.

An IRS Appeal's Officer's decision that an individual taxpayer's waiver of restriction on assessment was not obtained through duress, coercion, fraud or misrepresentation was not an abuse of discretion. Informing the taxpayer that the IRS would proceed against him and that the IRS could file a lien against or levy his property did not constitute duress but, rather, notice that the IRS would use the lawful means provided by statute to assess and collect taxes.

G.L. Shireman, 87 TCM 1448, Dec. 55,679(M), TC Memo. 2004-155.

The IRS had the burden of showing that an individual received a notice of deficiency or otherwise had an opportunity to dispute the deficiency. However, the IRS failed to introduce any evidence that the notice of deficiency addressed to the taxpayer was actually submitted to the United States Postal Service (USPS) for delivery or that the USPS attempted delivery of the notice. Further, the receipt of the notice of deficiency by the taxpayer's attorney-in-fact could not be imputed to the taxpayer. Therefore, the taxpayer was entitled to contest his underlying tax liability at a collection due process hearing.

G.K. Calderone, Sr., 88 TCM 378, Dec. 55,783(M), TC Memo. 2004-240.

The only "underlying tax liabilities" that can be challenged at a CDP hearing are those for which the IRS has given notice of its intent to collect by levy. Consideration of precluded issues by the hearing officer is discretionary and not subject to judicial review.

Francis P. Harvey & Sons, Inc., DC Mass., 2005-1 USTC ¶50,154.

A Collection Due Process hearing correctly concluded that an individual could not offset his unpaid tax liability for one year with purported Schedule C losses sustained in three subsequent years. No evidence was offered during the taxpayer's Collection Due Process hearing or at trial concerning the manner in which the losses were incurred or why they were incurred. The taxpayer did not produce returns on which the losses were reported. The taxpayer's return for the year in dispute was untimely and the limitations period for filing an amended return had expired.

J.W. Winters, Jr., 89 TCM 693, Dec. 55,914(M), TC Memo. 2005-13.

Married taxpayers had the opportunity to dispute an underlying tax liability in their bankruptcy court case when the IRS submitted a proof of claim for their unpaid tax liability. Thus, they were not entitled to raise the issue at their subsequent Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing.

J. Kendricks, 124 TC 69, Dec. 55,950.

Similarly:

C.E. Salazar, 95 TCM 1149 Dec. 57,342(M), TC Memo. 2008-38.

A married couple's challenge to an Appeals determination to proceed with collection was rejected because the taxpayers failed to convince the court that they had raised the validity of the Form 4549-CG adjustments at the Collection Due Process hearing.

R. Turner-Simmons, 89 TCM 1413, Dec. 56,052(M), TC Memo. 2005-135.

The government's motion for summary judgment was denied where material issues --what arguments the taxpayer raised and what actually transpired at the Code Sec. 6330 hearing --were in dispute. Specifically in dispute was whether the taxpayer submitted requested documents or completed an offer in compromise, as well as what documents should be contained in the taxpayer's administrative record.

J.W. Mandody, 89 TCM 1445, Dec. 56,060(M), TC Memo. 2005-142.

Taxpayers who alleged that they had overstated their tax liability on their tax return were entitled to challenge the existence or amount of the reported tax liability at a Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing. The taxpayers did not receive a statutory notice of deficiency and raised the issue of their underlying tax liability in a request for a Code Sec. 6330 hearing.

I. Molina, 88 TCM 441, Dec. 55,801(M), TC Memo. 2004-258.

Approval of levies was an abuse of discretion where the liability to be collected was partly based on an item improperly treated as a math error. The validity of those items could not be considered de novo, since the IRS could not use the review of an improper math error correction as a back door to raise an issue on which it had not issued a notice of deficiency. The taxpayer's right to dispute the underlying tax liability in a Code Sec. 6330 proceeding does not cure an assessment made in violation of the taxpayer's right to a deficiency proceeding.

J.P. Freije, 125 TC 14, Dec. 56,095.

The IRS did not abuse its discretion in determining to proceed with collection of an individual's unpaid tax liability. The taxpayer could not challenge the validity of the underlying tax liability because his entitlement to deductions in connection with his business had already been litigated in a prior Tax Court proceeding.

M.H. Hajiyani,, 90 TCM 153, Dec. 56,121(M), TC Memo. 2005-198.

The taxpayer had received notices of deficiency for all of the tax years at issue and had filed petitions for redetermination challenging those notices. Therefore, the taxpayer was barred under Code Sec. 6330(c)(2)(B) from contesting his underlying tax liability at his CDP hearing.

R.W. Howard, 89 TCM 1135, Dec. 56,012(M), TC Memo. 2005-100.

Although Code Sec. 6330(c)(2)(B) generally entitles taxpayers to raise the issue of an underlying liability if they did not receive a notice of deficiency or otherwise have an opportunity to dispute the liability, the individual here, who did not receive notices of deficiency, was not entitled to proactively prevent delivery of the notices by giving an old address and subsequently failing to inform the IRS of new addresses. Furthermore, although the Appeals officer had refused to allow a stenographer to record the collection due process hearing, whereupon the individual refused to proceed, the Tax Court declined to remand the case. No purpose would be served by a remand or additional hearings.

D.A. Lehmann, 89 TCM 1084, Dec. 56,001(M), TC Memo. 2005-90.

An IRS Appeals officer's determination to proceed with collection against a self-employed attorney who made numerous mistakes in calculating his tax liability was not an abuse of discretion. Aside from unsuccessfully challenging his underlying tax liability at his Collection Due Process hearing, the taxpayer did not raise any relevant issues relating to the proposed levy and offered no collection alternatives. The taxpayer could challenge the tax liability because the IRS was not required to, and did not, issue a notice of deficiency.

J.W. Richmond, Jr., 90 TCM 383, Dec. 56,167(M), TC Memo. 2005-238.

The IRS did not abuse its discretion when it determined that collection of an individual's tax liability could proceed. The taxpayer was given the opportunity before the Tax Court to identify legitimate issues to warrant further consideration of the merits of his case but he continued to focus on the denial of a recorded hearing and offered no substantive issues of merit.

H.E. Call,90 TCM 601, Dec. 56,222(M), TC Memo. 2005-289. Aff'd, CA-9 (unpublished opinion), 2007-1 USTC ¶50,492.

An individual who executed a Form 4549 could not challenge her underlying tax liability at a Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing. By signing Form 4549 she waived her right to challenge the amount or existence of the proposed tax assessments and, therefore, was deemed to have had an opportunity to dispute her tax liabilities. Thus, she was precluded from challenging them at a CDP hearing.

G. Pomerantz, 90 TCM 628, Dec. 56,229(M), TC Memo. 2005-295.

Similarly:

L.R. Coleman, 94 TCM 254, Dec. 57,085(M), TC Memo. 2007-263.

An individual who received a notice of the IRS's intention to assess him with a penalty, but who failed to file an administrative appeal, could not contest his liability for the penalty at a Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing. Because the taxpayer did not file an administrative appeal, he was precluded, under Code Sec. 6330, from contesting his liability for the penalty at his CDP hearing.

C. Stearns, DC Conn., 2006-1 USTC ¶50,152, 438 F3d 739.

An individual's failure to submit an income tax return for the year at issue should not have prevented consideration of his claims regarding bases and interest deductions. Even though he did not file a tax return, the evidence the individual presented proving loss on the sale of stock and regarding a mortgage interest deduction was credible and corroborated by documentation. Consequently, the individual did not have an outstanding tax liability for the year at issue, and the IRS's collection action was not sustained.

R.L. Sherer, 91 TCM 759 ,Dec. 56,435(M), TC Memo. 2006-29.

An IRS Appeals Officer did not abuse his discretion by upholding the IRS's proposed collection activity against an individual after a Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing. The taxpayer could not contest the underlying tax liability on appeal, having failed to do so at the CDP hearing. Although the taxpayer asserted at the CDP hearing that the liability had been discharged in bankruptcy, that assertion did not rise to the level of a challenge to liability.

J.E. Eby, DC Ohio, 2006-1 USTC ¶50,244.

The IRS failed to provide the taxpayer, a prison inmate representing himself, with a notice of deficiency. The IRS sent the notice of deficiency by certified mail to the taxpayer at the prison, and it did arrive at the prison. However, the taxpayer claimed he never received it, and the taxpayer had a long history of quickly responding to all legal notices in order to preserve his rights. Therefore, the taxpayer was entitled to a hearing at which he could challenge the existence or amount of the underlying tax liability.

T. Butti, 91 TCM 1177 ,Dec. 56,472(M), TC Memo. 2006-66.

An individual's challenge to the merits of his underlying trust fund recovery penalty was not properly before the federal district court because the issue could not be raised at a Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing. Correspondence showed that he had the opportunity to contest the merits of his underlying tax liability prior to the CDP hearing. Therefore, he was statutorily precluded from raising the issues at a hearing.

R. Plumb, DC Fla., 2006-1 USTC ¶50,271.

An individual who received a notice of determination after he failed to appear at his Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing but did not petition the Tax Court to contest the determination could not contest the underlying tax liability at a subsequent CDP hearing. Although the IRS erroneously denied the taxpayer an opportunity to contest the liability at the first CDP hearing, he was given the opportunity to petition the Tax Court, at which time he would have been entitled to contest the underlying liability. However, because the taxpayer failed to petition the Tax Court, he could not contest the underlying liability at the subsequent hearing. Therefore, the IRS did not abuse its discretion and could proceed with the proposed collection action.

G.A. Bell, 126 TC 356, Dec. 56,526.

The IRS did not abuse its discretion in sustaining its proposed collection actions against an attorney who argued that his income was not includible in gross income and raised various other tax-protestor arguments. The attorney could not challenge the validity of the underlying tax liability because he had received a notice of deficiency but did not file a petition with the Tax Court in response. The attorney's argument that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine parties who provided the IRS with bank records used to reconstruct the attorney's income was an improper challenge to the underlying tax liability.

G.E. Harp, 93 TCM 1087, Dec. 56,892(M), TC Memo. 2007-83.

The IRS was entitled to enforce a federal tax lien against an individual relating to unreported discharge of indebtedness income. The taxpayer argued that she did not receive the notice of deficiency associated with the underlying tax liability when it was originally mailed. Nonetheless, she participated in an equivalent hearing after a second levy notice was sent. During the hearing, the taxpayer had the opportunity to discuss and dispute with the IRS' Appeals Office her underlying tax liability. Since the notice of federal tax lien related to the same tax liability and same tax year, the taxpayer could not contest that liability when opposing the notice of federal tax lien.

D.L. Newsome, 93 TCM 1193, Dec. 56,923(M), TC Memo. 2007-111.

Although appropriate spousal defenses can be raised at a hearing before a levy, innocent spouse relief granted to the taxpayer's spouse is not the kind of spousal defense that can be raised. Moreover, whether the taxpayer's spouse has been granted relief from her joint liability for the tax is irrelevant as to whether, and how much tax, the taxpayer owes.

W.R. Holloway, 94 TCM 25, Dec. 56,992(M), TC Memo. 2007-175.

An individual was entitled to challenge his underlying tax liability at a Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing, but the IRS Appeals officer's refusal to allow him to do so was harmless error because his arguments with respect to the liability were frivolous and groundless. The taxpayer was entitled to challenge the liability both because the self-assessed portion of the liability had not been considered in a prior appeal and because, at the time the taxpayer became entitled to the CDP hearing, he had no previous opportunity to challenge the liability. The failure to allow the taxpayer to challenge the liability was, however, harmless error because his only arguments with respect to the liability were frivolous.

R.L. Perkins, 129 TC 58, Dec. 57,099.

An IRS Appeals officer was not required to consider an individual's underlying income tax liability in a Collection Due Process hearing. The taxpayer had the opportunity to contest her underlying tax liability but failed to file a petition in response to a notice of deficiency. The failure to file a petition was not excused by giving the deficiency notice to the police as part of their investigation into whether the stock transactions causing the deficiency were effected with funds stolen from the taxpayer. Also, the evidence did not support her contention that her medical condition prevented her from filing a petition. Furthermore, she could not base arguments on the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) because the provisions of the ADA do not apply to federal courts.

Y. Thomas, 94 TCM 271, Dec. 57,092(M), TC Memo. 2007-269.

A married couple who had only 12 days left to file a Tax Court petition when they received a notice of deficiency could challenge the existence or amount of the underlying tax liability during a collection due process (CDP) hearing under Code Sec. 6330. The IRS mailed a notice of deficiency to the taxpayers following an audit, but the couple had moved and did not receive the notice until approximately two and one-half months later. The taxpayers did not file a petition with the Tax Court, but requested a CDP hearing in which they challenged the underlying tax liability and the IRS's decision not to postpone the audit. The taxpayers were not precluded from challenging the underlying tax liability in the CDP hearing because they had not received the notice of deficiency in time to petition the Tax Court for a redetermination of the deficiency. Similar cases have held that taxpayers who received a notice of deficiency and had at least thirty days remaining in the filing period also had sufficient time to petition the Tax Court. The taxpayers in this case, however, received the notice with only 12 days left in the filing period, and had taken steps to receive the notice once they learned it had been issued.

A.L. Kuykendall, 129 TC 77, Dec. 57,118.

A taxpayer was allowed to challenge the underlying liability of a federal tax lien because the notice of federal tax lien was sent to the incorrect address. The taxpayer and his wife frequently moved and improperly filed returns for the year of their marriage. The taxpayer filed a return for a later year, which was processed more than two months after the IRS received it. In that two-month period, the taxpayer filed a Form 2848 which indicated a new address. The IRS sent the notice of federal tax lien to the address listed on the return, effectively meaning that the delay in processing reverted the taxpayer's mailing address to his old one, cancelling the effect of the Form 2848.

R.M. Downing, 94 TCM 319, Dec. 57,116(M), TC Memo. 2007-291.

A taxpayer did not meet his burden of proving that he paid an amount toward his tax due where the transcript of account for the relevant tax year of the petitioner showed a dishonored check for such amount and the taxpayer did not produce any evidence to refute the inference from the transcript that the taxpayer's check was returned for insufficient funds. In addition, the Tax Court rejected the taxpayer's attempt to raise computational issues that he had not raised at his Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing. The court did not have the authority to review issues if they had not been raised with IRS Appeals.

R.T. Hardie, 94 TCM 453, Dec. 57,168(M), TC Memo. 2007-335.

An individual who failed to pay his total tax liabilities for two tax years could not challenge the underlying tax liabilities or challenge the IRS's filing of a lien to collect the unpaid taxes. Although the individual argued that he was entitled to offset his unpaid tax liabilities with alternative minimum tax (AMT) that he had already paid, he did not claim the appropriate credit on his returns and did not show that he was entitled to the credit. In addition, the IRS settlement officer did not abuse her discretion by determining that the lien on the taxpayer's property was appropriately filed and would remain in effect until his tax liabilities were satisfied. The individual did not demonstrate that any of the collection alternatives he proposed were appropriate and that the IRS erred by rejecting them.

H.Y. Awlachew, 94 TCM 561, Dec. 57,199(M), TC Memo. 2007-365.

The government was entitled to summary judgment with respect to a taxpayer's frivolous suit which challenged the use of summary disposition, where all administrative procedures were properly followed. The taxpayer failed to raise either an issue of material fact or any issue of law that would preclude the entry of summary judgement under Tax Court Rule 121. The notice of determination and related materials submitted by the IRS confirmed that the presiding officer performed the review required by Code Sec. 6330(c), even though the taxpayer's arguments were found to be irrelevant and frivolous attempts to disrupt the collection process.

G. Broderick, 95 TCM 1003, Dec. 57,303(M), TC Memo. 2008-2.

The IRS's determination to proceed with a proposed levy on an individual's retirement account to collect her unpaid income tax liability was proper. The taxpayer was barred under Code Sec. 6330(c)(4) from raising a prepayment credits issue in the collection review proceeding. She had already raised that issue in refund claims that she submitted to the IRS for prior tax years and had participated meaningfully in the previous administrative proceeding concerning those claims.

R.L. Richmond, 95 TCM 1222, Dec. 57,364(M), TC Memo. 2008-59.

An enforcement action to collect penalty amounts was prevented due to the IRS's misunderstanding of the applicable law and misapplication of such law at a Code Sec. 6330 hearing. At issue was whether a taxpayer was sufficiently disabled at the proper time to toll the statute of limitations under Code Sec. 6511(h).

R.A. Perkins, 95 TCM 1196 Dec. 57,408(M), TC Memo. 2008-103.

See also, ¶38,184.35.

An individual was precluded from challenging his underlying tax liability because he had previously received statutory notices of deficiency. The Tax Court correctly concluded that the IRS Appeals officer did not abuse his discretion in verifying that all legal and administrative requirements had been met.

S. Hernandez, CA-9, 2008-1 USTC ¶50,335.

The IRS's determination to sustain a lien against a taxpayer was not an abuse of discretion. The taxpayer was precluded from raising the underling tax liability because he had received a notice of deficiency for the tax years at issue and failed to file a petition for redetermination. Moreover, contrary to his argument, the taxpayer was provided with a CDP hearing at which he failed to raise any legitimate arguments or collection alternatives. The taxpayer had no inherent right to a face-to-face hearing, especially since he failed to raise any meaningful issues regarding his tax liability or the proposed lien. Further, the court admonished the taxpayer that a Code Sec. 6673 delay penalty could be imposed in the future if he attempted to delay collection or advance frivolous or groundless arguments. Finally, since the taxpayer failed to raise any material issues of fact or law, the IRS was entitled to summary judgment.

W.O. Taylor, Dec. 57,466(M), TC Memo. 2008-151.

Labels:

Monday, June 23, 2008

Willfulness - section 7206 - The Ninth Circuit affirmed. [ 2007-1 USTC ¶50,516] 470 F.3d 931 (2006). It acknowledged that "imposing an intent requirement creates a disconnect between civil and criminal liability," but thought that under Miller, "the characterization of diverted corporate funds for civil tax purposes does not dictate their characterization for purposes of a criminal tax evasion charge." [ 2007-1 USTC ¶50,516] 470 F.3d, at 934. The court held the test in a criminal case to be "whether the defendant has willfully attempted to evade the payment or assessment of a tax." Ibid. Because Boulware "`presented no concrete proof that the amounts were considered, intended, or recorded on the corporate records as a return of capital at the time they were made,' " id., at 935 (quoting Miller, supra, at 1215), the Ninth Circuit held that Boulware's proffer was "properly rejected...as inadequate," [ 2007-1 USTC ¶50,516] 470 F.3d, at 935.


Michael H. Boulware, Petitioner v. United States.

Supreme Court of the United States; 06-1509, March 3, 2008, 128 SCt 1168.

Vacating and remanding CA-9, 2007-1 USTC ¶50,516.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. March 3, 2008, 128 SCt 1168128 SCt 1168.

[ Code Secs. 7201 and 7206]

Crimes: Tax evasion: Tax deficiency required: False tax returns: Evidence: Return of capital: Contemporaneous intent. --


An individual's convictions for tax evasion and filing false tax returns were vacated and remanded because the trial court refused to allow him to introduce evidence that corporate distributions to him were a return of capital. However, contrary to the Ninth Circuit's holding in M. Miller, CA-9, 76-2 USTC ¶9809, a corporate distributee accused of tax evasion may claim return-of-capital treatment for a distribution without producing evidence that either he or the corporation intended a capital return at the time of the distribution. There is no criminal tax evasion without a tax deficiency and there is no deficiency related to a distribution if a corporation has no earnings and profits (E&P) and the amount distributed does not exceed the taxpayer's basis in his stock. Thus, the fact that a shareholder distributee of a successful corporation may have different tax liability from a shareholder of a corporation without E&P merely follows from the way Code Secs. 301 and 316(a) are written and from the requirement of a tax deficiency to be convicted of tax evasion. Under Code Sec. 7201, bad intentions alone are not punishable.







Syllabus


One element of tax evasion under 26 U. S. C. §7201 is "the existence of a tax deficiency." Sansone v. United States [ 65-1 USTC ¶9307], 380 U.S. 343, 351. Petitioner Boulware was charged with criminal tax evasion and filing a false income tax return for diverting funds from a closely held corporation, HIE, of which he was the president, founder, and controlling shareholder. To support his argument that the Government could not establish the tax deficiency required to convict him, Boulware sought to introduce evidence that HIE had no earnings and profits in the relevant taxable years, so he in effect received distributions of property that were returns of capital, up to his basis in his stock,which are not taxable, see 26 U. S. C. §§301 and 316(a). Under §301(a), unless the Internal Revenue Code requires otherwise, a "distribution of property" "made by a corporation to a shareholder with respect to its stock shall be treated in the manner provided in [ §301(c)]." Section 301(c) provides that the portion of the distribution that is a "dividend," as defined by §316(a), must be included in the recipient's gross income; and the portion that is not a dividend is, depending on the shareholder's basis for his stock, either a nontaxable return of capital or a taxable capital gain. Section 316(a) defines "dividend" as a "distribution" out of "earnings and profits." The District Court granted the Government's in limine motion to bar evidence supporting Boulware's return-of-capital theory, relying on the Ninth Circuit's Miller decision that a diversion of funds in a criminal tax evasion case may be deemed a return of capital only if the taxpayer or corporation demonstrates that the distributions were intended to be such a return. The court later found Boulware's proffer of evidence insufficient under Miller and declined to instruct the jury on his theory. In affirming his conviction, the Ninth Circuit held that Boulware's proffer was properly rejected under Miller because he offered no proof that the amounts diverted were intended as a return of capital when they were made.

Held: A distributee accused of criminal tax evasion may claim return-of-capital treatment without producing evidence that, when the distribution occurred, either he or the corporation intended a return of capital. Pp. 6-17.

(a) Tax classifications like "dividend" and "return of capital" turn on a transaction's "objective economic realities," not "the particular form the parties employed." Frank Lyon Co. v. United States [ 78-1 USTC ¶9370], 435 U.S. 561, 573. In economic reality, a shareholder's informal receipt of corporate property "may be as effective a means of distributing profits among stockholders as the formal declaration of a dividend," Palmer v. Commissioner [ 37-2 USTC ¶9532], 302 U.S. 63, 69, or as effective a means of returning a shareholder's capital, see ibid. Economic substance remains the touchstone for characterizing funds that a shareholder diverts before they can be recorded on a corporation's books. Pp. 6-8.

(b) Miller's view that a return-of-capital defense requires evidence of a corresponding contemporaneous intent sits uncomfortably not only with the tax law's economic realism, but also with the particular wording of §§301 and 316(a). As these sections are written, the tax consequences of a corporation's distribution made with respect to stock depend, not on anyone's purpose to return capital or get it back, but on facts wholly independent of intent: whether the corporation had earnings and profits, and the amount of the taxpayer's basis for his stock. The Miller court could claim no textual hook for its contemporaneous intent requirement, but argued that it avoided supposed anomalies. The court, however, mistakenly reasoned that applying §§301 and 316(a) in criminal cases unnecessarily emphasizes the deficiency's amount while ignoring the willfulness of the intent to evade taxes. Willfulness is an element of the crimes because the substantive provisions defining tax evasion and filing a false return expressly require it, see, e.g., §7201. Nothing in §§301 and 316(a) relieves the Government of the burden of proving willfulness or impedes it from doing so if there is evidence of willfulness. The Miller court also erred in finding it troublesome that, without a contemporaneous intent requirement, a shareholder distributee would be immune from punishment if the corporation had no earnings and profits but convicted if the corporation did have earning and profits.An acquittal in the former instance would in fact result merely from the Government's failure to prove an element of the crime. The fact that a shareholder of a successful corporation may have different tax liability from a shareholder of a corporation without earnings and profits merely follows from the way §§301 and 316(a) are written and from §7201's tax deficiency requirement. Even if there were compelling reasons to extend §7201 to cases in which no taxes are owed,Congress, not the Judiciary, would have to do the rewriting. Pp. 8-12.

(c) Miller also suffers from its own anomalies. First, §§301 and 316are odd stalks for grafting a contemporaneous intent requirement. Correct application of their rules will often become possible only at the end of the corporation's tax year, regardless of the shareholder or corporation's understanding months earlier when a particular distribution may have been made. Moreover, §301(a), which expressly provides that distributions made with respect to stock "shall be treated in the manner provided in [ §301(c)]," ostensibly provides for all variations of tax treatment of such distributions unless a separate Code provision requires otherwise. Yet Miller effectively converts the section into one of merely partial coverage, leaving the tax status of one class of distributions in limbo in criminal cases. Allowing §61(a) of the Code, which defines gross income, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided," as "all income from whatever source derived," to step in where §301(a) has been pushed aside would sanction yet another eccentricity: §301(a) would not cover what it says it "shall," (distributions with respect to stock for which no more specific provision is made), while §61(a) would have to apply to what by its terms it should not (a receipt of funds for which tax treatment is "otherwise provided" in §301(a)). Miller erred in requiring contemporaneous intent, and the Ninth Circuit's judgment here, relying on Miller, is likewise erroneous. Pp. 12-14.

(d) This Court declines to address the Government's argument that the judgment should be affirmed on the ground that before any distribution may be treated as a return of capital, it must first be distributed to the shareholder "with respect to...stock." The facts in this case have not been raked over with that condition in mind, and any canvas of evidence and Boulware's proffer should be made by a court familiar with the entire evidentiary record. Nor will the Court take up in the first instance the question whether an unlawful diversion may ever be deemed a "distribution...with respect to [a corporation's] stock." Pp. 14-17.

[ 2007-1 USTC ¶50,516] 470 F.3d 931, vacated and remanded.

SOUTER, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.




Opinion of the Court


JUSTICE SOUTER: delivered the opinion of the Court.

Sections 301 and 316(a) of the Internal Revenue Code set the conditions for treating certain corporate distributions as returns of capital, nontaxable to the recipient. 26 U. S. C. §§301, 316(a) (2000 ed. and Supp. V.). The question here is whether a distributee accused of criminal tax evasion may claim return-of-capital treatment without producing evidence that either he or the corporation intended a capital return when the distribution occurred. We hold that no such showing is required.




I


"[T]he capstone of [the] system of sanctions...calculated to induce...fulfillment of every duty under the income tax law," Spies v. United States [ 43-1 USTC ¶9243], 317 U.S. 492, 497 (1943), is 26 U. S. C. §7201, making it a felony willfully to "attemp[t] in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by" the Code. 1 One element of tax evasion under §7201 is "the existence of a tax deficiency," Sansone v. United States [ 65-1 USTC ¶9307], 380 U.S. 343, 351 (1965); see also Lawn v. United States [ 58-1 USTC ¶9189], 355 U.S. 339, 361 (1958), 2 which the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, see ibid. ("[O]f course, a conviction upon a charge of attempting to evade assessment of income taxes by the filing of a fraudulent return cannot stand in the absence of proof of a deficiency").

Any deficiency determination in this case will turn on §§301 and 316(a) of the Code. According to §301(a), unless another provision of the Code requires otherwise, a "distribution of property" that is "made by a corporation to a shareholder with respect to its stock shall be treated in the manner provided in [ §301(c)]." Under §301(c), the portion of the distribution that is a "dividend," as defined by §316(a), must be included in the recipient's gross income; and the portion that is not a dividend is, depending on the shareholder's basis for his stock, either a nontaxable return of capital or a gain on the sale or exchange of stock, ordinarily taxable to the shareholder as a capital gain. Finally, §316(a) defines "dividend" as


"any distribution of property made by a corporation to its shareholders --



"(1) out of its earnings and profits accumulated after February 28, 1913, or



"(2) out of its earnings and profits of the taxable year (computed as of the close of the taxable year without diminution by reason of any distributions made during the taxable year), without regard to the amount of the earnings and profits at the time the distribution was made."


Sections 301 and 316(a) together thus make the existence of "earnings and profits" 3 the decisive fact in determining the tax consequences of distributions from a corporation to a shareholder with respect to his stock. This requirement of "relating the tax status of corporate distributions to earnings and profits is responsive to a felt need for protecting returns of capital from tax." 4 Bittker & Lokken ¶92.1.1, p. 92-3.




II


In this criminal tax proceeding, petitioner Michael Boulware was charged with several counts of tax evasion and filing a false income tax return, stemming from his diversion of funds from Hawaiian Isles Enterprises (HIE), a closely held corporation of which he was the president,founder, and controlling (though not sole) shareholder. At trial, 4 the United States sought to establish that Boulware had received taxable income by "systematically divert[ing]funds from HIE in order to support a lavish lifestyle." 384 F.3d 794, 799 (CA9 2004). The Government's evidence showed that


"[Boulware] gave millions of dollars of HIE money to his girlfriend...and millions of dollars to his wife...without reporting any of this money on his personal income tax returns....[H]e siphoned off this money primarily by writing checks to employees and friends and having them return the cash to him, by diverting payments by HIE customers, by submitting fraudulent invoices to HIE, and by laundering HIE money through companies in the Kingdom of Tonga and Hong Kong." Ibid.


In defense, Boulware sought to introduce evidence that HIE had no retained or current earnings and profits in the relevant taxable years, with the consequence (he argued)that he in effect received distributions of property that must have been returns of capital, up to his basis in his stock. See §301(c)(2). Because the return of capital was nontaxable, the argument went, the Government could not establish the tax deficiency required to convict him.

The Government moved in limine to bar evidence in support of Boulware's return-of-capital theory, on the grounds of "irrelevan[ce] in [this] criminal tax case," App. 20. The Government relied on the Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. Miller [ 76-2 USTC ¶9809], 545 F.2d 1204 (1976), in which that court held that in a criminal tax evasion case, a diversion of funds may be deemed a return of capital only after "some demonstration on the part of the taxpayer and/or the corporation that such [a distribution was] intended to be such a return," id., at 1215. Boulware, the Government argued, had offered to make no such demonstration. App. 21.

The District Court granted the Government's motion,and when Boulware sought "to present evidence of [HIE's] alleged over-reporting of income, and an offer of proof relating to the issue of...dividends," id., at 135, the District Court denied his request. The court said that "[n]ot only would much of [his proffered] evidence be excludable as expert legal opinion, it is plainly insufficient under the Miller case," id., at 138, and accordingly declined to instruct the jury on Boulware's return-of-capital theory. The jury rejected his alternative defenses (that the diverted funds were nontaxable corporate advances or loans, or that he used the moneys for corporate purposes), and found him guilty on nine counts, four of tax evasion and five of filing a false return.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed. [ 2007-1 USTC ¶50,516] 470 F.3d 931 (2006). It acknowledged that "imposing an intent requirement creates a disconnect between civil and criminal liability," but thought that under Miller, "the characterization of diverted corporate funds for civil tax purposes does not dictate their characterization for purposes of a criminal tax evasion charge." [ 2007-1 USTC ¶50,516] 470 F.3d, at 934. The court held the test in a criminal case to be "whether the defendant has willfully attempted to evade the payment or assessment of a tax." Ibid. Because Boulware "`presented no concrete proof that the amounts were considered, intended, or recorded on the corporate records as a return of capital at the time they were made,' " id., at 935 (quoting Miller, supra, at 1215), the Ninth Circuit held that Boulware's proffer was "properly rejected...as inadequate," [ 2007-1 USTC ¶50,516] 470 F.3d, at 935.

Judge Thomas concurred because the panel was bound by Miller, but noted that "Miller --and now the majority opinion --hold that a defendant may be criminally sanctioned for tax evasion without owing a penny in taxes to the government." [ 2007-1 USTC ¶50,516] 470 F.3d, at 938. That, he said, not only "indicate[s] a logical fallacy, but is in flat contradiction with the tax evasion statute's requirement...of a tax deficiency." Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). 5

We granted certiorari, 551 U. S. ___ (2007), to resolve a split among the Courts of Appeals over the application of §§301 and 316(a) to informally transferred or diverted corporate funds in criminal tax proceedings. 6 We now vacate and remand.




III





A


The colorful behavior described in the allegations requires a reminder that tax classifications like "dividend"and "return of capital" turn on "the objective economic realities of a transaction rather than...the particular form the parties employed," Frank Lyon Co. v. United States [ 78-1 USTC ¶9370], 435 U.S. 561, 573 (1978); a "given result at the end of a straight path is not made a different result...by following a devious path," Minnesota Tea Co. v. Helvering [ 38-1 USTC ¶9050], 302 U.S. 609, 613 (1938). 7 As for distributions with respect to stock, in economic reality a shareholder's informal receipt of corporate property "may be as effective a means of distributing profits among stockholders as the formal declaration of a dividend," Palmer v. Commissioner [ 37-2 USTC ¶9532], 302 U.S. 63, 69 (1937), or as effective a means of returning a shareholder's capital, see ibid. Accordingly, "[a] distribution to a shareholder in his capacity as such...is subject to §301 even though it is not declared in formal fashion." B. Bittker & J. Eustice, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders ¶8.05[1], pp. 8-36 to 8-37 (6th ed. 1999) (hereinafter Bittker & Eustice); see also Gardner, The Tax Consequences of Shareholder Diversions in Close Corporations, 21 Tax L. Rev. 223, 239 (1966) (hereinafter Gardner) ("Sections 316 and 301 do not require any formal path to be taken by a corporation in order for those provisions to apply").

There is no reason to doubt that economic substance remains the right touchstone for characterizing funds received when a shareholder diverts them before they can be recorded on the corporation's books. While they "never even pass through the corporation's hands," Bittker & Eustice ¶8.05[9], p. 8-51, even diverted funds may be seen as dividends or capital distributions for purposes of §§301and 316(a), see Truesdell v. Commissioner [ CCH Dec. 44,500], 89 T.C. 1280 (1987) (treating diverted funds as "constructive" distributions in civil tax proceedings). The point, again, is that "taxation is not so much concerned with the refinements of title as it is with actual command over the property taxed --the actual benefit for which the tax is paid." Corliss v. Bowers [ 2 USTC ¶525], 281 U.S. 376, 378 (1930); see also Griffiths v. Commissioner [ 40-1 USTC ¶9123], 308 U.S. 355, 358 (1939). 8




B


Miller's view that a criminal defendant may not treat a distribution as a return of capital without evidence of a corresponding contemporaneous intent sits uncomfortably not only with the tax law's economic realism, but with the particular wording of §§301 and 316(a), as well. As those sections are written, the tax consequences of a "distribution by a corporation with respect to its stock" depend, not on anyone's purpose to return capital or to get it back, but on facts wholly independent of intent: whether the corporation had earnings and profits, and the amount of the taxpayer's basis for his stock. Cf. Truesdell v. Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Action on Decision 1988-25, 1988 WL 570761 (Sept. 12, 1988) (recommendation regarding acquiescence); IRS Non Docketed Service Advice Review, 1989 WL 1172952 (Mar. 15, 1989) (reply to request for reconsideration) ("[I]ntent is irrelevant....[E]very distribution made with respect to a shareholder's stock is taxable as ordinary income, capital gain, or not at all pursuant to section 301(c) dependent upon the corporation's earnings and profits and the shareholder's stock basis. The determination is computational and not dependent upon intent").

When the Miller court went the other way, needless to say, it could claim no textual hook for the contemporaneous intent requirement, but argued for it as the way to avoid two supposed anomalies. First, the court thought that applying §§301 and 316(a) in criminal cases unnecessarily emphasizes the exact amount of deficiency while "completely ignor[ing] one essential element of the crime charged: the willful intent to evade taxes...." [ 76-2 USTC ¶9809] 545 F.2d, at 1214. But there is an analytical mistake here. Willfulness is an element of the crimes charged because the substantive provisions defining tax evasion and filing a false return expressly require it, see §7201 ("Any person who willfully attempts..."); §7206(1) ("Willfully makes and subscribes..."). The element of willfulness is addressed at trial by requiring the Government to prove it.Nothing in §§301 and 316(a) as written (that is, without an intent requirement) relieves the Government of this burden of proving willfulness or impedes it from doing so if evidence of willfulness is there. Those two sections as written simply address a different element of criminal evasion, the existence of a tax deficiency, and both deficiency and willfulness can be addressed straightforwardly (in jury instructions or bench findings) without tacking an intent requirement onto the rule distinguishing dividends from capital returns.

Second, the Miller court worried that if a defendant could claim capital treatment without showing a corresponding and contemporaneous intent,


"[a] taxpayer who diverted funds from his close corporation when it was in the midst of a financial difficulty and had no earnings and profits would be immune from punishment (to the extent of his basis in the stock) for failure to report such sums as income; while that very same taxpayer would be convicted if the corporation had experienced a successful year and had earnings and profits." [ 76-2 USTC ¶9809] 545 F.2d, at 1214.


"Such a result," said the court, "would constitute an extreme example of form over substance." Ibid. The Circuit thus assumed that a taxpayer like Boulware could be convicted of evasion with no showing of deficiency from an unreported dividend or capital gain.

But the acquittal that the author of Miller called form trumping substance would in fact result from the Government's failure to prove an element of the crime. There is no criminal tax evasion without a tax deficiency, see supra, at 1-2, 9 and there is no deficiency owing to a distribution (received with respect to a corporation's stock) if a corporation has no earnings and profits and the value distributed does not exceed the taxpayer-shareholder's basis for his stock. Thus the fact that a shareholder distributee of a successful corporation may have different tax liability from a shareholder of a corporation without earnings and profits merely follows from the way §§301 and 316(a) are written (to distinguish dividend from capital return), and from the requirement of tax deficiency for a §7201 crime. Without the deficiency there is nothing but some act expressing the will to evade, and, under §7201,acting on "bad intentions, alone, [is] not punishable," United States v. D'Agostino [ 98-1 USTC ¶50,380], 145 F.3d 69, 73 (CA2 1998).

It is neither here nor there whether the Miller court was justified in thinking it would improve things to convict more of the evasively inclined by dropping the deficiency requirement and finding some other device to exempt returns of capital. 10 Even if there were compelling reasons extend §7201 to cases in which no taxes are owed, it bears repeating that "[t]he spirit of the doctrine which denies to the federal judiciary power to create crimes forthrightly admonishes that we should not enlarge the reach of enacted crimes by constituting them from anything less than the incriminating components contemplated by the words used in the statute," Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952) (opinion for the Court by Jackson, J.). If §301, §316(a), or §7201 could stand amending, Congress will have to do the rewriting.




C


Not only is Miller devoid of the support claimed for it,but it suffers the demerit of some anomalies of its own. First and most obviously, §§301 and 316 are odd stalks for grafting a contemporaneous intent requirement, given the fact that the correct application of their rules will often become known only at the end of the corporation's tax year, regardless of the shareholder's or corporation's understanding months earlier when a particular distribution may have been made. Section 316(a)(2) conditions treating a distribution as a constructive dividend by reference to earnings and profits, and earnings and profits are to be"computed as of the close of the taxable year...without regard to the amount of the earnings and profits at the time the distribution was made." A corporation may make a deliberate distribution to a shareholder, with everyone expecting a profitable year and considering the distribution to be a dividend, only to have the shareholder end up liable for no tax if the company closes out its tax year in the red (so long as the shareholder's basis covers the distribution); when such facts are clear at the time the reporting forms and returns are filed, 11 the shareholder does not violate §7201 by paying no tax on the moneys received, intent being beside the point. And since intent to make a distribution a taxable one cannot control, it would be odd to condition nontaxable return-of-capital treatment on contemporaneous intent, when the statute says nothing about intent at all.

The intent interpretation is strange for another reason, too (a reason in some tension with the Ninth Circuit's assumption that an unreported distribution without contemporaneous intent to return capital will support a conviction for evasion). The text of §301(a) ostensibly provides for all variations of tax treatment of distributions received with respect to a corporation's stock unless a separate provision of the Code requires otherwise. Yet Miller effectively converts the section into one of merely partial coverage, with the result of leaving one class of distributions in a tax status limbo in criminal cases. That is, while §301(a) expressly provides that distributions made by a corporation to a shareholder with respect to its stock "shall be treated in the manner provided in [ §301(c)]," under Miller, a distribution from a corporation without earnings and profits would fail to be a return of capital for lack of contemporaneous intent to treat it that way; but to the extent that distribution did not exceed the taxpayer's basis for the stock (and thus become a capital gain), §301(a) would leave the distribution unaccounted for.

It is no answer to say that §61(a) of the Code would step in where §301(a) has been pushed out. Although §61(a) defines gross income, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided," as "all income from whatever source derived," the plain text of §301(a) does provide otherwise for distributions made with respect to stock. So using §61(a) as a stopgap would only sanction yet another eccentricity: §301(a) would be held not to cover what its text says it "shall" (the class of distributions made with respect to stock for which no other more specific provision is made), while §61(a) would need to be applied to what by its terms it should not be (a receipt of funds for which tax treatment is "otherwise provided" in §301(a)).

The implausibility of a statutory reading that either creates a tax limbo or forces resort to an a textual stopgap is all the clearer from the Ninth Circuit's discussion in this case of its own understanding of the consequences of Miller's rule: the court openly acknowledged that "imposing an intent requirement creates a disconnect between civil and criminal liability," [ 2007-1 USTC ¶50,516] 470 F.3d, at 934. In construing distribution rules that draw no distinction in terms of criminal or civil consequences, the disparity of treatment assumed by the Court of Appeals counts heavily against its contemporaneous intent construction (quite apart from the Circuit's understanding that its interpretation entails criminal liability for evasion without any showing of a tax deficiency).

Miller erred in requiring a contemporaneous intent to treat the receipt of corporate funds as a return of capital,and the judgment of the Court of Appeals here, relying on Miller, is likewise erroneous.




IV


The Government has raised nothing that calls for affirmance in the face of the Court of Appeals's reliance on Miller. The United States does not defend differential treatment of criminal and civil cases, see Brief for United States 24, and it thus stops short of fully defending the Ninth Circuit's treatment. The Government's argument,instead, is that we should affirm under the rule that before any distribution may be treated as a return of capital (or, by a parity of reasoning, a dividend), it must first be distributed to the shareholder "with respect to...stock." Id., at 19 (internal quotations omitted). The taxpayer's intent, the Government says, may be relevant to this limiting condition, and Boulware never expressly claimed any such intent. See ibid. ("[I]ntent is...relevant to whether a payment is a `distribution...with respect to [a corporation's] stock' "); but see Tr. of Oral Arg. 44 ("[J]ust to be clear, the Government is arguing for an objective test here").

The Government is of course correct that "with respect to...stock" is a limiting condition in §301(a). See supra, at 2-3. 12 As the Government variously says, it requires that "the distribution of property by the corporation be made to a shareholder because of his ownership of its stock," Brief for United States 16; and that "`an amount paid by a corporation to a shareholder [be] paid to the shareholder in his capacity as such,' " ibid. (quoting 26 CFR §1.301-1(c) (2007) (emphasis deleted)).

This, however, is not the time or place to home in on the"with respect to...stock" condition. Facts with a bearing on it may range from the distribution of stock ownership 13 to conditions of corporate employment (whether, for example, a shareholder's efforts on behalf of a corporation amount to a good reason to treat a payment of property as salary). The facts in this case have yet to be raked over with the stock ownership condition in mind, since Miller seems to have pretermitted a full consideration of the defensive proffer, and if consideration is to be given to that condition now, the canvas of evidence and Boulware's proffer should be made by a court familiar with the whole evidentiary record. 14

As a more specific version of its "with respect to...stock" position, the Government says that the diversions of corporate funds to Boulware were in fact unlawful, see Brief for United States 34-37; see also n. 5, supra, and it argues that §§301 and 316(a) are inapplicable to illegal transfers, see Brief for United States 34-37; see also D'Agostino [ 98-1 USTC ¶50,380], 145 F.3d, at 73 ("[T]he `no earnings and profits, no income' rule would not necessarily apply in a case of unlawful diversion, such as embezzlement, theft, a violation of corporate law, or an attempt to defraud third party creditors" (emphasis in original)); see also n. 8, supra. The Government goes so far as to claim that "[t]he only rational basis for the jury's judgment was a conclusion that [Boulware] unlawfully diverted the funds." Brief for United States 37.

But we decline to take up the question whether an unlawful diversion may ever be deemed a "distribution...with respect to [a corporation's] stock," a question which was not considered by the Ninth Circuit. We do, however, reject the Government's current characterization of the jury verdict in Boulware's case. True, the jurors were not moved by Boulware's suggestion that the diversions were corporate advances or loans, or that he was using the funds for corporate purposes. But the jury was not asked,and cannot be said to have answered, whether Boulware breached any fiduciary duty as a controlling shareholder,unlawfully diverted corporate funds to defraud his wife, or embezzled HIE's funds outright.




V


Sections §§301 and 316(a) govern the tax consequences of constructive distributions made by a corporation to a shareholder with respect to its stock. A defendant in a criminal tax case does not need to show a contemporaneous intent to treat diversions as returns of capital before relying on those sections to demonstrate no taxes are owed. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

1 A related provision, 26 U. S. C. §7206(1), criminalizes the willful filing of a tax return believed to be materially false. See n. 9, infra.

2 "[T]he elements of §7201 are willfulness[,] the existence of a tax deficiency,...and an affirmative act constituting an evasion or attempted evasion of the tax." Sansone v. United States [ 65-1 USTC ¶9307], 380 U.S. 343, 351 (1965). The Courts of Appeals have divided over whether the Government must prove the tax deficiency is "substantial," see United States v. Daniels, 387 F.3d 636, 640-641, and n. 2 (CA7 2004) (collecting cases); we do not address that issue here.

3 Although the Code does not "comprehensively define `earnings and profits,'" 4 B. Bittker & L. Lokken, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts ¶92.1.3, p.92-6 (3d ed. 2003) (hereinafter Bittker & Lokken), the "[p]rovisions of the Code and regulations relating to earnings and profits ordinarily take taxable income as the point of departure," id., at 92-9.

4 The trial at issue in this case was actually Boulware's second trial on §§7201 and 7206(1) charges, his convictions on those counts in an earlier trial having been vacated by the Ninth Circuit for reasons not a tissue here, see 384 F.3d 794 (2004). In that earlier trial, Boulware was also convicted of conspiracy to make false statements to a federally insured financial institution, in violation of 18 U. S. C. §371. The Ninth Circuit affirmed Boulware's conspiracy conviction that first time around, however, so the present trial did not include a conspiracy charge.

5 Judge Thomas went on to say that the Government would prevail even without Miller's rule because, in his view, Boulware's diversions were "unlawful," and the return-of-capital rules would not apply to diversions made for unlawful purposes. See [ 2007-1 USTC ¶50,516] 470 F.3d, at 938-939.

6 As noted, the Ninth Circuit holds that §§301 and 316(a) are not to be consulted in a criminal tax evasion case until the defendant produces evidence of an intent to treat diverted funds as a return of capital at the time it was made. See [ 2007-1 USTC ¶50,516] 470 F.3d 931 (2006) (case below). By contrast, the Second Circuit allows a criminal defendant to invoke §§301 and 316(a) without evidence of a contemporaneous intent to treat such moneys as returns of capital. See United States v. Bok [ 98-2 USTC ¶50,765], 156 F.3d 157, 162 (1998) ( "[I]n return of capital cases, a taxpayer's intent is not determinative in defining the taxpayer's conduct"). Meanwhile, the Third, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits arguably have taken the position that §§301 and 316(a) are altogether inapplicable in criminal tax cases involving informal distributions. See United States v. Williams [ 89-2 USTC ¶9390], 875 F.2d 846, 850-852 (CA11 1989); United States v. Goldberg [ 64-1 USTC ¶9316], 330 F.2d 30, 38 (CA3 1964); Davis v. United States [ 55-2 USTC ¶9685], 226 F.2d 331, 334-335 (CA6 1955); but see Brief for Petitioner 16 ( "[T]hese cases can be read to address the allocation of the burden of proof on the return of capital issue, rather than the applicable substantive principles").

7 We have also recognized that "[t]he legal right of a taxpayer to decrease the amount of what otherwise would be his taxes, or altogether avoid them, by means which the law permits, cannot be doubted." Gregory v. Helvering [ 35-1 USTC ¶9043], 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935). The rule is a two-way street: "while a taxpayer is free to organize his affairs as he chooses, nevertheless, once having done so, he must accept the tax consequences of his choice, whether contemplated or not,...and may not enjoy the benefit of some other route he might have chosen to follow but did not," Commissioner v. National Alfalfa Dehydrating & Milling Co., 417 U.S. 134, 149 (1974); see also id., at 148 (referring to "the established tax principle that a transaction is to be given its tax effect in accord with what actually occurred and not in accord with what might have occurred"); Founders Gen. Corp. v. Hoey, 300 U.S. 268, 275 (1937) ( "To make the taxability of the transaction depend upon the determination whether there existed an alternative form which the statute did not tax would create burden and uncertainty"). The question here, of course, is not whether alternative routes may have offered better or worse tax consequences, see generally Isenbergh, Review: Musings on Form and Substance in Taxation, 49 U. Chi. L. Rev. 859 (1982); rather, it is "whether what was done...was the thing which the statute[, here §§301 and 316(a),] intended," Gregory, supra, at 469.

8 Thus in the period between this Court's decisions in Commissioner v. Wilcox [ 46-1 USTC ¶9188], 327 U.S. 404 (1946) (holding embezzled funds to be nontaxable to the embezzler) and James v. United States [ 61-1 USTC ¶9449], 366 U. S. 213 (1961) (overruling Wilcox, holding embezzled funds to be taxable income), the Government routinely argued that diverted funds were "constructive distributions," taxable to the recipient as dividends. See generally Gardner 237 ( "While Wilcox was good law, the safest way to insure that both the corporation and the shareholder would be taxed on their respective gain from the diverted funds was to label them dividends"); 4 Bittker & Lokken ¶92.2 (7), p. 92-23, n. 37.

9 Boulware was also convicted of violating §7206(1), which makes it a felony "[w]illfully [to] mak[e] and subscrib[e] any return, statement, or other document, which contains or is verified by a written declaration that it is made under the penalties of perjury, and which [the taxpayer]does not believe to be true and correct as to every material matter." He argues that if the Ninth Circuit erred, its error calls into question not only his §7201 conviction, but his §7206(1) conviction as well. Brief for Petitioner 15-16. Although the Courts of Appeals are unanimous in holding that §7206(1) "does not require the prosecution to prove the existence of a tax deficiency," United States v. Tarwater, 308 F. 3d 494, 504 (CA6 2002); see also United States v. Peters, 153 F.3d 445, 461 (CA7 1998) (collecting cases), it is arguable that "the nature and character of the funds received can be critical in determining whether ... §7206(1) has been violated, [even if] proof of a tax deficiency is unnecessary," 1 I. Comisky, L. Feld, & S. Harris, Tax Fraud & Evasion ¶2.03[5], p. 21 (2007); see also Brief for Petitioner 15-16. The Government does not argue that Boulware's §§7201 and 7206(1) convictions should be treated differently at this stage of the proceedings, however, and we will accede to the Government's working assumption here that the §§7201 and 7206(1) convictions stand or fall together.

10 "A better [method of exempting returns of capital from taxation]could no doubt be devised." 4 Bittker & Lokken ¶92.1.1, p. 92-3; see ibid. (suggesting, for example, that "all receipts from a corporation could be treated as taxable income, and a correction for any resulting over taxation could be made in computing gain or loss when stock is sold, exchanged, or becomes worthless"); see also Andrews, "Out of its Earnings and Profits": Some Reflections on the Taxation of Dividends, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1403, 1439 (1956) (criticizing the earnings and profits concept "[a]s a device for separating income from return of capital," and suggesting that "[d]istributions which ought to be treated as return of capital [could] be brought within the concept of a partial liquidation by special provision").

11 Sometimes these facts are not clear, and in certain circumstances a corporation may be required to assume it is profitable. For example, the instructions to IRS Form 1099-DIV provide that when a corporation is unsure whether it has sufficient earnings and profits at the end of the taxable year to cover a distribution to shareholders, "the entire payment must be reported as a dividend." See http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1099div.pdf (as visited Feb. 15, 2008, and available in Clerk of Court's case file).

12 Another limiting condition is that the diversion of funds must be a "distribution" in the first place (regardless of the "with respect to stock" limitation), see supra, at 6-8, though the Government is content to assume that §301(a)'s "distribution" language is capacious enough to cover the diversions involved here, and that if Boulware bears the burden of production in going forward with the defense that the funds he received constituted a "distribution" within the meaning of §301(a), see n. 14, infra, that burden has been met. Nor does the Government dispute that Boulware offered sufficient evidence of his basis and HIE's lack of earnings and profits. See Brief for United States 34, n. 11.

13 See, e.g., Truesdell v. Commissioner, IRS Non Docketed Service Advice Review, 1989 WL 1172952 (Mar. 15, 1989) ( "We believe a corporation and its shareholders have a common objective --to earn a profit for the corporation to pass onto its shareholders. Especially where the corporation is wholly owned by one shareholder, the corporation becomes the alter ego of the shareholder in his profit making capacity....[B]y passing corporate funds to himself as shareholder, a sole shareholder is acting in pursuit of these common objectives"). We note, however, that although Boulware was not a sole shareholder, the Tax Court has taken it as "well settled that a distribution of corporate earnings to shareholders may constitute a dividend," and so a return of capital as well, "notwithstanding that it is not in proportion to stock-holdings." Dellinger v. Commissioner [ CCH Dec. 23,749], 32 T.C. 1178, 1183 (1959); see ibid. (noting that because other stockholders did not complain when a taxpayer received unequal property, "under the circumstances they must be deemed to have ratified the distribution"); see also Crowley v. Comissioner [ 92-1 USTC ¶50,235], 962 F.2d 1077 (CA1 1992); Lengsfield v. Commissioner [ 57-1 USTC ¶9437], 241 F.2d 508 (CA5 1957); Baird v. Commissioner [ CCH Dec. 21,363], 25 T. C. 387 (1955); Thielking v. Commissioner [ CCH Dec. 43,891(M)], 53 TCM 746 (1987), ¶87, 227, P-H Memo TC.

14 Boulware does not dispute that he bears the burden of producing some evidence to support his return-of-capital theory, including evidence that the corporation lacked earnings and profits and that he had sufficient basis in his stock to cover the distribution. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 53. He instead argues that, as to the "with respect to... stock"requirement, it suffices to show "[t]hat he is a stockholder, and that he did not receive this money in any non stockholder capacity." Id., at 57. The Government, for its part, on the authority of Holland v. United States [ 54-2 USTC ¶9714], 348 U.S. 121 (1954) and Bok [ 98-2 USTC ¶50,765], 156 F.3d, at 163-164, argues that Boulware must offer more evidence than that. We express no view on that issue here, just as we decline to consider the more general question whether the Second Circuit's rule in Bok, which places on the criminal defendant the burden to produce evidence in support of a return-of-capital theory, is authorized by Holland a

26 U.S.C. § 7201 and 26 U.S.C. § 7203 both have willfulness as an element of the offense, the Gustafsons could not have been properly convicted under either statute if they established a "good-faith misunderstanding of the law or a good-faith belief that [they were] not violating the law." Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201 (1991).


United States of America, Appellee v. Mark A. Gustafson, Appellant. United States of America, Appellee v. Salwa Ali Gustafson, Appellant.

U.S. Court of Appeals, 8th Circuit; 07-3184, 07-3359, June 16, 2008.

Affirming an unreported DC Neb. decision.

[ Code Secs. 7201 and 7203]

Crimes: Tax evasion: Admissibility of evidence: Good faith defense: Instructions to jury. --

The government's evidence in the trial of a chiropractor and his wife for tax evasion showed that the couple took various steps, including removing money to offshore accounts, using multiple bank accounts and changing the name of their clinic frequently, to conceal their income from the IRS. The exclusion of documents the couple claimed they relied on as support for their good-faith defense to tax evasion was not erroneous because the documents lacked foundation or were irrelevant. The trial court properly refused to instruct the jury that a formal assessment is necessary to prove tax evasion. The IRS was not required to issue an assessment in order to prove the existence of a tax deficiency. A jury instruction regarding an employer's legal duty to withhold taxes from employees' wages was not erroneous given the manner in which the couple conducted their business in order to evade taxes. Finally, the court's comments during trial did not prejudice the couple or deprive them of a fair trial.




Before: Riley, Bowman and Hansen, Circuit Judges.

BOWMAN, Circuit Judge: Mark A. Gustafson and Salwa Ali Gustafson, husband and wife, were each convicted by a jury of three counts of income tax evasion pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7201 and two counts of willful failure to file income tax returns pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7203. The District Court 1 sentenced each to thirty months in prison. The Gustafsons appeal their convictions, arguing that the District Court erred in excluding certain exhibits offered by the Gustafsons at trial, erred in instructing the jury, and deprived the Gustafsons of a fair trial by making remarks prejudicial to the Gustafsons. 2 We affirm.




I.


The Gustafsons married in 1993 and shortly thereafter opened a chiropractic clinic in Lincoln, Nebraska. Mark Gustafson, a licensed chiropractor, provided chiropractic services while Salwa Gustafson, a licensed nurse, acted as the clinic's business manager. As of the time of trial, neither Mark Gustafson nor Salwa Gustafson had filed a personal federal income tax return since filing a joint return for the 1994 tax year.

On March 22, 2006, a grand jury issued a five-count indictment naming Mark Gustafson and Salwa Gustafson as defendants in all five counts. Counts I, II, and III charged the Gustafsons with federal income tax evasion for the tax years 1998, 1999, and 2000, respectively. The indictment alleged that the Gustafsons willfully attempted to evade income tax due by failing to file personal income tax returns, by failing to pay income tax, and by attempting to conceal their income from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) by transferring ownership of assets to fraudulent trusts, encumbering assets, removing money to offshore accounts, and using multiple bank accounts. The indictment further alleged that in 2002, after being notified that they were under investigation by the IRS, the Gustafsons filed abusive trust tax returns. Counts IV and V charged the Gustafsons with willful failure to file federal income tax returns for the tax years 1999 and 2000, respectively.

At trial, the evidence established that the IRS contacted the Gustafsons on numerous occasions about their tax obligations. The IRS first contacted the Gustafsons in October 1997, requesting tax returns for the years 1995 and 1996. On June 2, 1999, the IRS sent letters to the Gustafsons indicating that the Gustafsons had not filed tax returns for the years 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998. On October 16, 2001, the IRS sent additional letters to the Gustafsons advising them that the IRS would begin to contact third parties and issue summonses to obtain information in an attempt to establish the Gustafsons' income and expenses for the non-filed tax years.

The government introduced evidence showing that the Gustafsons took a number of steps to hide their income from the IRS. First, in March 1998, shortly after they were first contacted by the IRS regarding their tax deficiencies, the Gustafsons began wiring money to an offshore bank account. Between 1998 and 2000, the Gustafsons wired more than $200,000 to offshore accounts. Second, from 1998 to 2000, the Gustafsons changed the name of the chiropractic clinic four times. Third, during that same period, Salwa Gustafson moved the clinic's bank account to three different banks. Fourth, the Gustafsons began putting their money and assets into trusts.

The Gustafsons' defense at trial was that they had a good-faith belief that the payment of federal income tax was not compulsory. The Gustafsons testified that they formed this belief after talking with other small-business owners, attending seminars, and researching the issue in legal casebooks and treatises (despite their having no legal training). The Gustafsons presented documentary evidence that they claimed to have relied upon in forming their belief.

The jury convicted both Mark Gustafson and Salwa Gustafson of each of the five counts charged. The Gustafsons appeal.




II.


The Gustafsons first challenge a number of the District Court's evidentiary rulings. We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. Spencer v. Young, 495 F.3d 945, 949 (8th Cir. 2007). Even when an evidentiary ruling is improper, we will reverse a conviction on this basis only when the ruling affected substantial rights or had more than a slight influence on the verdict. United States v. Ballew, 40 F.3d 936, 941 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1091 (1995).

At trial, the Gustafsons sought to introduce materials upon which they purportedly relied in forming a good-faith belief that they were not required to file income tax returns. 3 These materials included a photocopy of the business trusts section of the legal treatise American Jurisprudence, Second Edition (defendants' exhibit 211C); documents defining terms set forth in Titles 26 and 28 of the United States Code and discussing Supreme Court decisions about persons over whom the federal government has jurisdiction (defendants' exhibits 211A and 211B); letters to the Gustafsons from the United States Attorney for the Southern District of Ohio informing them that Richard Parris 4 would be sentenced and that they had an opportunity to address the court on injury caused by Parris's crimes (defendants' exhibits 202, 203, and 204); and documents that Mark Gustafson provided the grand jury (defendants' exhibit 269). The District Court excluded these documents as either not relevant or lacking in foundation.

The Gustafsons contend that the excluded evidence was relevant and that the court erred by not admitting it. The Gustafsons have not shown, however, "how the excluded documents would have added new insight into the formation of [their] beliefs beyond the materials that were permitted into evidence." United States v. Willis, 277 F.3d 1026, 1033 (8th Cir. 2002). As in Willis, the Gustafsons "had been permitted to explain the source of [their] beliefs and to introduce other exhibits on which [they] relied." Id. The District Court permitted the defense to read Mark Gustafson's grand jury testimony into evidence. Mark Gustafson cited and summarized three cases that he contended supported his belief that he was not required to pay taxes. He stated that he and Salwa Gustafson had reviewed the law and that a provision of "the code" required the Secretary of the Treasury to inform them that taxes were owed. Tr. at 1013. He also testified that he and Salwa Gustafson studied the tax laws by reading books and articles on the internet. They also obtained information about tax law from a group called Save A Patriot. Salwa Gustafson testified at trial that she went with her husband to a seminar on tax laws presented by Save A Patriot. Salwa then testified in detail about a number of conversations that she had with different people relating to how to structure the chiropractic clinic as a business trust to avoid the legal obligation to pay taxes. She testified that she and Mark Gustafson went to a law library to research tax law. She identified the American Jurisprudence treatise on business trusts as something that they relied on in forming their belief that using business trusts to avoid paying taxes was legal. She further identified the documents offered as defendants' exhibits 211A and 211B and explained that they helped form her belief that the United States did not have "jurisdiction" over her for purposes of taxing her. Tr. at 1280.

It was proper for the District Court "to exclude evidence having no relevance or probative value with respect to willfulness." Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 203 (1991). To the extent that any of the excluded documents may have been relevant, they were cumulative, and the District Court did not abuse its discretion by denying their admission. See Fed. R. Evid. 403; Willis, 277 F.3d at 1033. Moreover, the material interpreting statutes and legal opinions, as well as the legal opinions themselves, "would have had a high potential to confuse the jury and conflict with the court's responsibility to instruct on the law." Willis, 277 F.3d at 1033. The District Court gave the Gustafsons the opportunity to explain how these legal materials affected their beliefs, and the court did not err in excluding the materials themselves. Finally, we note that none of the District Court's evidentiary rulings affected the Gustafsons' substantial rights or could be said to have had more than a slight influence on the verdict. The evidence of the Gustafsons' guilt was substantial and we do not believe that the verdict would have been different had the documents been admitted.




III.


The Gustafsons next contend that the District Court erred in instructing the jury by (1) denying the Gustafsons' request for a particular instruction and (2) including an instruction over their objection. "We review the district court's decision to give or deny an instruction for abuse of discretion, considering the court's ruling in the context of the entire charge." United States v. Tucker, 137 F.3d 1016, 1036 (8th Cir. 1998). We look to "whether the instructions taken as a whole and viewed in the light of the evidence and applicable law, fairly and adequately submitted the issues in the case to the jury." Willis, 277 F.3d at 1031 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

First, the Gustafsons argue that the District Court erred by refusing to instruct the jury, as the Gustafsons requested, "that in order for a defendant to evade payment of taxes there must first be a formal assessment [of the amount owed] issued by the IRS." Br. of Appellant at 41. We reject this argument. The Gustafsons were entitled to an instruction conveying the substance of their request only if the request was "a correct statement of the law." Tucker, 137 F.3d at 1036. The Gustafsons' request was not.

The District Court instructed the jury that to convict a defendant of tax evasion under 26 U.S.C. § 7201, the government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant "owed substantial income tax," "attempted to evade and defeat that tax," and "acted willfully." Jury Instruction No. 13. This instruction adequately stated the law and clearly set forth the three elements that the government needed to prove in order for the Gustafsons to be convicted of tax evasion. See Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 351 (1965) (discussing the elements of tax evasion under § 7201); Willis, 277 F.3d at 1030 (same).

Contrary to the Gustafsons' assertion, United States v. Silkman, 156 F.3d 833 (8th Cir. 1998) ( Silkman I), does not require the IRS to issue a tax assessment in order to meet its burden of proving the existence of a tax deficiency. The main issue in Silkman I was whether a tax assessment issued in a civil collections case is conclusive proof of a tax deficiency in a criminal tax evasion prosecution. Id. at 835. The court held that it was not. Id. at 835-36. In addressing an "additional issue[]" that "require[d] little discussion," the court also held that "an assessment is not a necessary element of a payment evasion charge." Id. at 836-37. Moreover, on appeal after remand, the court specifically addressed whether an accurate assessment was required in a criminal tax evasion case in order for the government to satisfy the tax deficiency element of the offense. United States v. Silkman, 220 F.3d 935, 937 (8th Cir. 2000) ( Silkman II), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1129 (2001). The court stated:


When a taxpayer fails to file a return and then refuses to provide relevant information to the IRS, the agency ... is not compelled to file a substitute return to trigger the assessment process. See Geiselman v. United States, 961 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 891 ... (1992). Indeed, it is not even compelled to make a formal assessment when no return is filed, because any deficiency is deemed to arise by operation of law on the date a return should have been filed. See United States v. Dack, 747 F.2d 1172, 1174 (7th Cir. 1984).


Id. (emphasis omitted). Thus, it is clear in this Circuit that a defendant may be convicted under § 7201 even when the IRS has not issued an assessment of taxes owing. Because the Gustafsons' requested instruction to the contrary would have misled the jury on the law, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in declining to give it.

Second, the Gustafsons argue that the District Court abused its discretion by instructing the jury that federal law requires employers to withhold federal taxes from employees' wages. See Jury Instruction No. 7. The Gustafsons correctly note that this instruction did not discuss an element of any offense charged. The Gustafsons assert that the instruction therefore "served no purpose other than to confuse the jury and in essence ... told the jury that the Gustafsons were in violation of a law that they were not charged with breaking." Br. of Appellant at 52. 5

Instruction No. 7 stems from testimony given by two employees of the Gustafsons' chiropractic clinic. Dr. Paula Wiese testified on direct examination by the government's attorney that when she worked for the clinic in 1999, the Gustafsons did not withhold federal taxes from her paychecks. On cross-examination by the Gustafsons' attorney, Wiese testified that she had agreed in her employment contract with the clinic that the clinic would not be responsible for withholding federal taxes from her paycheck. Counsel for the Gustafsons then introduced the employment contract into evidence, which the court admitted over the government's objection that the contract "in effect is illegal." Tr. at 440. Testifying further, Wiese stated that she had agreed to determine her own tax liability and do her own taxes. The government objected to this testimony. The District Court overruled the objection but indicated that it "may just have to instruct the jury on the validity of that provision" in the contract. Tr. at 441. When the Gustafsons' attorney moved to introduce a second employment contract between Wiese and the clinic containing a similar provision regarding taxes, the court admitted the second contract but indicated that it would "give the jury an instruction regarding that provision." Tr. at 443. Later in the trial, Danielle Dietrich similarly testified that when she worked as a secretary at the Gustafsons' clinic in 2000-2001, the Gustafsons did not withhold taxes from her wages.

Given the admission of testimony from Wiese and Dietrich regarding their arrangement with the Gustafsons and Wiese's employment contracts evidencing the arrangement, we cannot say that the District Court abused its discretion by giving Instruction No. 7. While the legality of the arrangement not to withhold federal taxes was not a direct issue in this case, the manner in which the Gustafsons conducted their business to evade the payment of their individual income taxes was an issue. After the government elicited testimony about the unusual approach that the Gustafsons took toward their employees' federal taxes, the Gustafsons' attorney introduced the employment contracts in an attempt to show that the arrangement had "the air of legitimacy." Tr. 1131. The District Court did not err in instructing the jury on what the law actually holds on this matter. Moreover, Instruction No. 7 was one of twenty-five instructions given to the jury. When we read the instructions as a whole, we conclude that they "fairly and adequately submitted the issues in the case to the jury." Willis, 277 F.3d at 1031 (internal quotations and citations omitted).




IV.


Finally, the Gustafsons argue that their convictions must be overturned because the District Court made comments throughout the trial and in the presence of the jury that prejudiced the Gustafsons and deprived them of a fair trial. "We have always been reluctant to disturb a judgment of conviction by reason of a few isolated, allegedly prejudicial comments of a trial judge, particularly in a long trial." United States v. Van Dyke, 14 F.3d 415, 417 (8th Cir. 1994) (internal quotations and citation omitted). We "will balance and weigh the comments of the judge against the overall fairness of the trial, and will overturn a conviction only when the judge's role loses its color of neutrality and tends to accentuate and emphasize the prosecution's case." United States v. Bamberg, 478 F.3d 934, 940-41 (8th Cir. 2007) (internal quotations and citation omitted), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1650 (2008).

The Gustafsons give a few examples of comments made by the District Court that they argue could have led the jury to believe that the court was siding with the government. First, in responding to an objection during the opening statement of the Gustafsons' attorney, the court told the attorney to "[j]ust recite the events that occurred" and not to argue by characterizing events. Tr. at 50. After a second objection during the same opening statement, the court stated, "[Y]ou're giving everything in detail and I'm going to have to stop you in about eight minutes. You're going to have to finish your opening statement in about eight minutes." Id. at 53. A few minutes later, when defense counsel was forty minutes into his opening statement, the court asked defense counsel how much longer his opening statement was "going to go." Id. at 60. When the attorney answered ten minutes, the court ordered a twenty-minute recess. Id. Later, when the Gustafsons' attorney moved for the admission of certain exhibits, the District Court asked the attorney if he had prepared an exhibit list for the court, noting that an exhibit list would have helped the court. The Gustafsons also note that the District Court asked questions of certain government witnesses.

We have reviewed the trial transcript and conclude that the District Court's comments during the trial did not deprive the Gustafsons of a fair trial. We first note that the court instructed the jury not to "construe any statement, action, or ruling on my part in the trial of this case as an indication of any opinion on my part respecting the proper course of your verdicts." Jury Instruction No. 22. Most of the District Court's comments simply related to the orderly administration of the trial, over which the court had broad discretion. See United States v. Warfield, 97 F.3d 1014, 1028 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1110 (1997). Moreover, the trial was somewhat lengthy, resulting in over 1500 pages of trial transcript. As in Warfield, when the few judicial statements complained about are considered in the context of the entire trial, "any prejudice which might have accrued did not deprive [the Gustafsons of their] right to a fair trial." Id. (discussing a trial consuming approximately 850 pages of trial transcript). Finally, it was appropriate for the District Court to ask questions of witnesses to clarify testimony and draw out facts necessary for a clear presentation of the issues. See United States v. Flying By, 511 F.3d 773, 777 (8th Cir. 2007). The fairness of the trial was not destroyed by the court's questioning. See id. Indeed, the District Court also instructed the jury not to assume that the court held "any opinion on the matters to which the questions related." Jury Instruction No. 22. We will not overturn the Gustafsons' convictions on this basis.

We affirm the judgments of the District Court.

1 The Honorable Lyle E. Strom, United States District Judge for the District of Nebraska.

2 Mark Gustafson and Salwa Gustafson filed separate, but nearly identical, briefs challenging their convictions. We therefore consider their arguments together and refer to the appellants jointly as "the Gustafsons." Although the Gustafsons state that they also are appealing their sentences, they present no argument challenging the calculation or reasonableness of their sentences, and we deem any such challenge waived.

3 Because 26 U.S.C. § 7201 and 26 U.S.C. § 7203 both have willfulness as an element of the offense, the Gustafsons could not have been properly convicted under either statute if they established a "good-faith misunderstanding of the law or a good-faith belief that [they were] not violating the law." Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201 (1991).

4 Parris was the founder of Omega Tax Planning Group. The Gustafsons hired Omega in 1995 to manage the chiropractic clinic's tax matters. After the Gustafsons received a letter from the IRS in 1997 about unfiled tax returns, Parris told them that the letter must have been sent by mistake and that he would contact the IRS on their behalf.

5 The Gustafsons do not contend that Instruction No. 7 was an incorrect statement of the law.

Labels:

HR 6275 IH, To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide individuals temporary relief from the alternative minimum tax, and for other purposes.

Minimum Tax Relief Act of 2008, June 19, 2008

110th CONGRESS, 2d Session



H. R. 6275



IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

June 17, 2008

Mr. RANGEL (for himself, Mr. MCDERMOTT, Mr. LEWIS of Georgia, Mr. NEAL of Massachusetts, Mr. POMEROY, Mrs. JONES of Ohio, Mr. BLUMENAUER, Ms. BERKLEY, Mr. CROWLEY, Mr. VAN HOLLEN, Mr. MEEK of Florida, Mr. LEVIN, and Mr. LARSON of Connecticut) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means



A BILL

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide individuals temporary relief from the alternative minimum tax, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE, ETC.

(a) Short Title- This Act may be cited as the `Alternative Minimum Tax Relief Act of 2008'.

(b) Reference- Except as otherwise expressly provided, whenever in this Act an amendment or repeal is expressed in terms of an amendment to, or repeal of, a section or other provision, the reference shall be considered to be made to a section or other provision of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.

(c) Table of Contents- The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title, etc.

TITLE I --INDIVIDUAL TAX RELIEF

Sec. 101. Extension of increased alternative minimum tax exemption amount.

Sec. 102. Extension of alternative minimum tax relief for nonrefundable personal credits.

TITLE II --REVENUE PROVISIONS

Sec. 201. Income of partners for performing investment management services treated as ordinary income received for performance of services.

Sec. 202. Limitation of deduction for income attributable to domestic production of oil, gas, or primary products thereof.

Sec. 203. Limitation on treaty benefits for certain deductible payments.

Sec. 204. Returns relating to payments made in settlement of payment card and third party network transactions.

Sec. 205. Application of continuous levy to property sold or leased to the Federal Government.

Sec. 206. Time for payment of corporate estimated taxes.

TITLE I --INDIVIDUAL TAX RELIEF

SEC. 101. EXTENSION OF INCREASED ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX EXEMPTION AMOUNT.

(a) In General- Paragraph (1) of section 55(d) is amended --

(1) by striking `($66,250 in the case of taxable years beginning in 2007)' in subparagraph (A) and inserting `($69,950 in the case of taxable years beginning in 2008)', and

(2) by striking `($44,350 in the case of taxable years beginning in 2007)' in subparagraph (B) and inserting `($46,200 in the case of taxable years beginning in 2008)'.

(b) Effective Date- The amendments made by this section shall apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 2007.

SEC. 102. EXTENSION OF ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX RELIEF FOR NONREFUNDABLE PERSONAL CREDITS.

(a) In General- Paragraph (2) of section 26(a) is amended --

(1) by striking `or 2007' and inserting `2007, or 2008', and

(2) by striking `2007' in the heading thereof and inserting `2008'.

(b) Effective Date- The amendments made by this section shall apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 2007.

TITLE II --REVENUE PROVISIONS

SEC. 201. INCOME OF PARTNERS FOR PERFORMING INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT SERVICES TREATED AS ORDINARY INCOME RECEIVED FOR PERFORMANCE OF SERVICES.

(a) In General- Part I of subchapter K of chapter 1 is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

`SEC. 710. SPECIAL RULES FOR PARTNERS PROVIDING INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT SERVICES TO PARTNERSHIP.

`(a) Treatment of Distributive Share of Partnership Items- For purposes of this title, in the case of an investment services partnership interest --

`(1) IN GENERAL- Notwithstanding section 702(b) --

`(A) any net income with respect to such interest for any partnership taxable year shall be treated as ordinary income for the performance of services, and

`(B) any net loss with respect to such interest for such year, to the extent not disallowed under paragraph (2) for such year, shall be treated as an ordinary loss.

All items of income, gain, deduction, and loss which are taken into account in computing net income or net loss shall be treated as ordinary income or ordinary loss (as the case may be).

`(2) TREATMENT OF LOSSES-

`(A) LIMITATION- Any net loss with respect to such interest shall be allowed for any partnership taxable year only to the extent that such loss does not exceed the excess (if any) of --

`(i) the aggregate net income with respect to such interest for all prior partnership taxable years, over

`(ii) the aggregate net loss with respect to such interest not disallowed under this subparagraph for all prior partnership taxable years.

`(B) CARRYFORWARD- Any net loss for any partnership taxable year which is not allowed by reason of subparagraph (A) shall be treated as an item of loss with respect to such partnership interest for the succeeding partnership taxable year.

`(C) BASIS ADJUSTMENT- No adjustment to the basis of a partnership interest shall be made on account of any net loss which is not allowed by reason of subparagraph (A).

`(D) EXCEPTION FOR BASIS ATTRIBUTABLE TO PURCHASE OF A PARTNERSHIP INTEREST- In the case of an investment services partnership interest acquired by purchase, paragraph (1)(B) shall not apply to so much of any net loss with respect to such interest for any taxable year as does not exceed the excess of --

`(i) the basis of such interest immediately after such purchase, over

`(ii) the aggregate net loss with respect to such interest to which paragraph (1)(B) did not apply by reason of this subparagraph for all prior taxable years.

Any net loss to which paragraph (1)(B) does not apply by reason of this subparagraph shall not be taken into account under subparagraph (A).

`(E) PRIOR PARTNERSHIP YEARS- Any reference in this paragraph to prior partnership taxable years shall only include prior partnership taxable years to which this section applies.

`(3) NET INCOME AND LOSS- For purposes of this section --

`(A) NET INCOME- The term `net income' means, with respect to any investment services partnership interest, for any partnership taxable year, the excess (if any) of --

`(i) all items of income and gain taken into account by the holder of such interest under section 702 with respect to such interest for such year, over

`(ii) all items of deduction and loss so taken into account.

`(B) NET LOSS- The term `net loss' means with respect to such interest for such year, the excess (if any) of the amount described in subparagraph (A)(ii) over the amount described in subparagraph (A)(i).

`(b) Dispositions of Partnership Interests-

`(1) GAIN- Any gain on the disposition of an investment services partnership interest shall be treated as ordinary income for the performance of services.

`(2) LOSS- Any loss on the disposition of an investment services partnership interest shall be treated as an ordinary loss to the extent of the excess (if any) of --

`(A) the aggregate net income with respect to such interest for all partnership taxable years, over

`(B) the aggregate net loss with respect to such interest allowed under subsection (a)(2) for all partnership taxable years.

`(3) DISPOSITION OF PORTION OF INTEREST- In the case of any disposition of an investment services partnership interest, the amount of net loss which otherwise would have (but for subsection (a)(2)(C)) applied to reduce the basis of such interest shall be disregarded for purposes of this section for all succeeding partnership taxable years.

`(4) DISTRIBUTIONS OF PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY- In the case of any distribution of property by a partnership with respect to any investment services partnership interest held by a partner --

`(A) the excess (if any) of --

`(i) the fair market value of such property at the time of such distribution, over

`(ii) the adjusted basis of such property in the hands of the partnership,

shall be taken into account as an increase in such partner's distributive share of the taxable income of the partnership (except to the extent such excess is otherwise taken into account in determining the taxable income of the partnership),

`(B) such property shall be treated for purposes of subpart B of part II as money distributed to such partner in an amount equal to such fair market value, and

`(C) the basis of such property in the hands of such partner shall be such fair market value.

Subsection (b) of section 734 shall be applied without regard to the preceding sentence.

`(5) APPLICATION OF SECTION 751- In applying section 751(a), an investment services partnership interest shall be treated as an inventory item.

`(c) Investment Services Partnership Interest- For purposes of this section --

`(1) IN GENERAL- The term `investment services partnership interest' means any interest in a partnership which is held by any person if such person provides (directly or indirectly) a substantial quantity of any of the following services with respect to the assets of the partnership in the conduct of the trade or business of providing such services:

`(A) Advising as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling any specified asset.

`(B) Managing, acquiring, or disposing of any specified asset.

`(C) Arranging financing with respect to acquiring specified assets.

`(D) Any activity in support of any service described in subparagraphs (A) through (C).

For purposes of this paragraph, the term `specified asset' means securities (as defined in section 475(c)(2) without regard to the last sentence thereof), real estate, commodities (as defined in section 475(e)(2))), or options or derivative contracts with respect to securities (as so defined), real estate, or commodities (as so defined).

`(2) EXCEPTION FOR CERTAIN CAPITAL INTERESTS-

`(A) IN GENERAL- If --

`(i) a portion of an investment services partnership interest is acquired on account of a contribution of invested capital, and

`(ii) the partnership makes a reasonable allocation of partnership items between the portion of the distributive share that is with respect to invested capital and the portion of such distributive share that is not with respect to invested capital,

then subsection (a) shall not apply to the portion of the distributive share that is with respect to invested capital. An allocation will not be treated as reasonable for purposes of this subparagraph if such allocation would result in the partnership allocating a greater portion of income to invested capital than any other partner not providing services would have been allocated with respect to the same amount of invested capital.

`(B) SPECIAL RULE FOR DISPOSITIONS- In any case to which subparagraph (A) applies, subsection (b) shall not apply to any gain or loss allocable to invested capital. The portion of any gain or loss attributable to invested capital is the proportion of such gain or loss which is based on the distributive share of gain or loss that would have been allocable to invested capital under subparagraph (A) if the partnership sold all of its assets immediately before the disposition.

`(C) INVESTED CAPITAL- For purposes of this paragraph, the term `invested capital' means, the fair market value at the time of contribution of any money or other property contributed to the partnership.

`(D) TREATMENT OF CERTAIN LOANS-

`(i) PROCEEDS OF PARTNERSHIP LOANS NOT TREATED AS INVESTED CAPITAL OF SERVICE PROVIDING PARTNERS- For purposes of this paragraph, an investment services partnership interest shall not be treated as acquired on account of a contribution of invested capital to the extent that such capital is attributable to the proceeds of any loan or other advance made or guaranteed, directly or indirectly, by any partner or the partnership.

`(ii) LOANS FROM NONSERVICE PROVIDING PARTNERS TO THE PARTNERSHIP TREATED AS INVESTED CAPITAL- For purposes of this paragraph, any loan or other advance to the partnership made or guaranteed, directly or indirectly, by a partner not providing services to the partnership shall be treated as invested capital of such partner and amounts of income and loss treated as allocable to invested capital shall be adjusted accordingly.

`(d) Other Income and Gain in Connection With Investment Management Services-

`(1) IN GENERAL- If --

`(A) a person performs (directly or indirectly) investment management services for any entity,

`(B) such person holds a disqualified interest with respect to such entity, and

`(C) the value of such interest (or payments thereunder) is substantially related to the amount of income or gain (whether or not realized) from the assets with respect to which the investment management services are performed,

any income or gain with respect to such interest shall be treated as ordinary income for the performance of services. Rules similar to the rules of subsection (c)(2) shall apply where such interest was acquired on account of invested capital in such entity.

`(2) DEFINITIONS- For purposes of this subsection --

`(A) DISQUALIFIED INTEREST- The term `disqualified interest' means, with respect to any entity --

`(i) any interest in such entity other than indebtedness,

`(ii) convertible or contingent debt of such entity,

`(iii) any option or other right to acquire property described in clause (i) or (ii), and

`(iv) any derivative instrument entered into (directly or indirectly) with such entity or any investor in such entity.

Such term shall not include a partnership interest and shall not include stock in a taxable corporation.

`(B) TAXABLE CORPORATION- The term `taxable corporation' means --

`(i) a domestic C corporation, or

`(ii) a foreign corporation subject to a comprehensive foreign income tax (as defined in section 457A(d)(4)).

`(C) INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT SERVICES- The term `investment management services' means a substantial quantity of any of the services described in subsection (c)(1) which are provided in the conduct of the trade or business of providing such services.

`(e) Regulations- The Secretary shall prescribe such regulations as are necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of this section, including regulations to --

`(1) prevent the avoidance of the purposes of this section, and

`(2) coordinate this section with the other provisions of this subchapter.

`(f) Cross Reference- For 40 percent no fault penalty on certain underpayments due to the avoidance of this section, see section 6662.'.

(b) Application to Real Estate Investment Trusts-

(1) IN GENERAL- Subsection (c) of section 856 is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

`(8) EXCEPTION FROM RECHARACTERIZATION OF INCOME FROM INVESTMENT SERVICES PARTNERSHIP INTERESTS-

`(A) IN GENERAL- Paragraphs (2), (3), and (4) shall be applied without regard to section 710 (relating to special rules for partners providing investment management services to partnership).

`(B) SPECIAL RULE FOR PARTNERSHIPS OWNED BY REITS- Section 7704 shall be applied without regard to section 710 in the case of a partnership which meets each of the following requirements:

`(i) Such partnership is treated as publicly traded under section 7704 solely by reason of interests in such partnership being convertible into interests in a real estate investment trust which is publicly traded.

`(ii) 50 percent or more of the capital and profits interests of such partnership are owned, directly or indirectly, at all times during the taxable year by such real estate investment trust (determined with the application of section 267(c)).

`(iii) Such partnership meets the requirements of paragraphs (2), (3), and (4) (applied without regard to section 710).'.

(2) CONFORMING AMENDMENT- Paragraph (4) of section 7704(d) is amended by inserting `(determined without regard to section 856(c)(8))' after `856(c)(2)'.

(c) Imposition of Penalty on Underpayments-

(1) IN GENERAL- Subsection (b) of section 6662 is amended by inserting after paragraph (5) the following new paragraph:

`(6) The application of subsection (d) of section 710 or the regulations prescribed under section 710(e) to prevent the avoidance of the purposes of section 710.'.

(2) AMOUNT OF PENALTY-

(A) IN GENERAL- Section 6662 is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

`(i) Increase in Penalty in Case of Property Transferred for Investment Management Services- In the case of any portion of an underpayment to which this section applies by reason of subsection (b)(6), subsection (a) shall be applied with respect to such portion by substituting `40 percent' for `20 percent'.'.

(B) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS- Subparagraph (B) of section 6662A(e)(2) is amended --

(i) by striking `section 6662(h)' and inserting `subsection (h) or (i) of section 6662', and

(ii) by striking `GROSS VALUATION MISSTATEMENT PENALTY' in the heading and inserting `CERTAIN INCREASED UNDERPAYMENT PENALTIES'.

(3) REASONABLE CAUSE EXCEPTION NOT APPLICABLE- Subsection (c) of section 6664 is amended --

(A) by redesignating paragraphs (2) and (3) as paragraphs (3) and (4), respectively,

(B) by striking `paragraph (2)' in paragraph (4), as so redesignated, and inserting `paragraph (3)', and

(C) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following new paragraph:

`(2) EXCEPTION- Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any portion of an underpayment to which this section applies by reason of subsection (b)(6).'.

(d) Conforming Amendments-

(1) Subsection (d) of section 731 is amended by inserting `section 710(b)(4) (relating to distributions of partnership property),' before `section 736'.

(2) Section 741 is amended by inserting `or section 710 (relating to special rules for partners providing investment management services to partnership)' before the period at the end.

(3) Paragraph (13) of section 1402(a) is amended --

(A) by striking `other than guaranteed' and inserting `other than --

`(A) guaranteed',

(B) by striking the semi-colon at the end and inserting `, and', and

(C) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:

`(B) any income treated as ordinary income under section 710 received by an individual who provides investment management services (as defined in section 710(d)(2));'.

(4) Paragraph (12) of section 211(a) of the Social Security Act is amended --

(A) by striking `other than guaranteed' and inserting `other than --

`(A) guaranteed',

(B) by striking the semi-colon at the end and inserting `, and', and

(C) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:

`(B) any income treated as ordinary income under section 710 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 received by an individual who provides investment management services (as defined in section 710(d)(2) of such Code);'.

(5) The table of sections for part I of subchapter K of chapter 1 is amended by adding at the end the following new item:

`Sec. 710. Special rules for partners providing investment management services to partnership.'.

(e) Effective Date-

(1) IN GENERAL- Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, the amendments made by this section shall apply to taxable years ending after June 18, 2008.

(2) PARTNERSHIP TAXABLE YEARS WHICH INCLUDE EFFECTIVE DATE- In applying section 710(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (as added by this section) in the case of any partnership taxable year which includes June 18, 2008, the amount of the net income referred to in such section shall be treated as being the lesser of the net income for the entire partnership taxable year or the net income determined by only taking into account items attributable to the portion of the partnership taxable year which is after such date.

(3) DISPOSITIONS OF PARTNERSHIP INTERESTS- Section 710(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (as added by this section) shall apply to dispositions and distributions after June 18, 2008.

(4) OTHER INCOME AND GAIN IN CONNECTION WITH INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT SERVICES- Section 710(d) of such Code (as added by this section) shall take effect on June 18, 2008.

(5) PUBLICLY TRADED PARTNERSHIPS- For purposes of applying section 7704, the amendments made by this section shall apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 2010.

SEC. 202. LIMITATION OF DEDUCTION FOR INCOME ATTRIBUTABLE TO DOMESTIC PRODUCTION OF OIL, GAS, OR PRIMARY PRODUCTS THEREOF.

(a) Denial of Deduction for Major Integrated Oil Companies for Income Attributable to Domestic Production of Oil, Gas, or Primary Products Thereof-

(1) IN GENERAL- Subparagraph (B) of section 199(c)(4) (relating to exceptions) is amended by striking `or' at the end of clause (ii), by striking the period at the end of clause (iii) and inserting `, or', and by inserting after clause (iii) the following new clause:

`(iv) in the case of any major integrated oil company (as defined in section 167(h)(5)(B)), the production, refining, processing, transportation, or distribution of oil, gas, or any primary product thereof during any taxable year described in section 167(h)(5)(B).'.

(2) PRIMARY PRODUCT- Section 199(c)(4)(B) is amended by adding at the end the following flush sentence:

`For purposes of clause (iv), the term `primary product' has the same meaning as when used in section 927(a)(2)(C), as in effect before its repeal.'.

(b) Limitation on Oil Related Qualified Production Activities Income for Taxpayers Other Than Major Integrated Oil Companies-

(1) IN GENERAL- Section 199(d) is amended by redesignating paragraph (9) as paragraph (10) and by inserting after paragraph (8) the following new paragraph:

`(9) SPECIAL RULE FOR TAXPAYERS WITH OIL RELATED QUALIFIED PRODUCTION ACTIVITIES INCOME-

`(A) IN GENERAL- If a taxpayer (other than a major integrated oil company (as defined in section 167(h)(5)(B))) has oil related qualified production activities income for any taxable year beginning after 2009, the amount of the deduction under subsection (a) shall be reduced by 3 percent of the least of --

`(i) the oil related qualified production activities income of the taxpayer for the taxable year,

`(ii) the qualified production activities income of the taxpayer for the taxable year, or

`(iii) taxable income (determined without regard to this section).

`(B) OIL RELATED QUALIFIED PRODUCTION ACTIVITIES INCOME- The term `oil related qualified production activities income' means for any taxable year the qualified production activities income which is attributable to the production, refining, processing, transportation, or distribution of oil, gas, or any primary product thereof during such taxable year.'.

(2) CONFORMING AMENDMENT- Section 199(d)(2) (relating to application to individuals) is amended by striking `subsection (a)(1)(B)' and inserting `subsections (a)(1)(B) and (d)(9)(A)(iii)'.

(c) Effective Date- The amendments made by this section shall apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 2008.

SEC. 203. LIMITATION ON TREATY BENEFITS FOR CERTAIN DEDUCTIBLE PAYMENTS.

(a) In General- Section 894 (relating to income affected by treaty) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

`(d) Limitation on Treaty Benefits for Certain Deductible Payments-

`(1) IN GENERAL- In the case of any deductible related-party payment, any withholding tax imposed under chapter 3 (and any tax imposed under subpart A or B of this part) with respect to such payment may not be reduced under any treaty of the United States unless any such withholding tax would be reduced under a treaty of the United States if such payment were made directly to the foreign parent corporation.

`(2) DEDUCTIBLE RELATED-PARTY PAYMENT- For purposes of this subsection, the term `deductible related-party payment' means any payment made, directly or indirectly, by any person to any other person if the payment is allowable as a deduction under this chapter and both persons are members of the same foreign controlled group of entities.

`(3) FOREIGN CONTROLLED GROUP OF ENTITIES- For purposes of this subsection --

`(A) IN GENERAL- The term `foreign controlled group of entities' means a controlled group of entities the common parent of which is a foreign corporation.

`(B) CONTROLLED GROUP OF ENTITIES- The term `controlled group of entities' means a controlled group of corporations as defined in section 1563(a)(1), except that --

`(i) `more than 50 percent' shall be substituted for `at least 80 percent' each place it appears therein, and

`(ii) the determination shall be made without regard to subsections (a)(4) and (b)(2) of section 1563.

A partnership or any other entity (other than a corporation) shall be treated as a member of a controlled group of entities if such entity is controlled (within the meaning of section 954(d)(3)) by members of such group (including any entity treated as a member of such group by reason of this sentence).

`(4) FOREIGN PARENT CORPORATION- For purposes of this subsection, the term `foreign parent corporation' means, with respect to any deductible related-party payment, the common parent of the foreign controlled group of entities referred to in paragraph (3)(A).

`(5) REGULATIONS- The Secretary may prescribe such regulations or other guidance as are necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of this subsection, including regulations or other guidance which provide for --

`(A) the treatment of two or more persons as members of a foreign controlled group of entities if such persons would be the common parent of such group if treated as one corporation, and

`(B) the treatment of any member of a foreign controlled group of entities as the common parent of such group if such treatment is appropriate taking into account the economic relationships among such entities.'.

(b) Effective Date- The amendment made by this section shall apply to payments made after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 204. RETURNS RELATING TO PAYMENTS MADE IN SETTLEMENT OF PAYMENT CARD AND THIRD PARTY NETWORK TRANSACTIONS.

(a) In General- Subpart B of part III of subchapter A of chapter 61 is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

`SEC. 6050W. RETURNS RELATING TO PAYMENTS MADE IN SETTLEMENT OF PAYMENT CARD AND THIRD PARTY NETWORK TRANSACTIONS.

`(a) In General- Each payment settlement entity shall make a return for each calendar year setting forth --

`(1) the name, address, and TIN of each participating payee to whom one or more payments in settlement of reportable transactions are made, and

`(2) the gross amount of the reportable transactions with respect to each such participating payee.

Such return shall be made at such time and in such form and manner as the Secretary may require by regulations.

`(b) Payment Settlement Entity- For purposes of this section --

`(1) IN GENERAL- The term `payment settlement entity' means --

`(A) in the case of a payment card transaction, the merchant acquiring bank, and

`(B) in the case of a third party network transaction, the third party settlement organization.

`(2) MERCHANT ACQUIRING BANK- The term `merchant acquiring bank' means the bank or other organization which has the contractual obligation to make payment to participating payees in settlement of payment card transactions.

`(3) THIRD PARTY SETTLEMENT ORGANIZATION- The term `third party settlement organization' means the central organization which has the contractual obligation to make payment to participating payees of third party network transactions.

`(4) SPECIAL RULES RELATED TO INTERMEDIARIES- For purposes of this section --

`(A) AGGREGATED PAYEES- In any case where reportable transactions of more than one participating payee are settled through an intermediary --

`(i) such intermediary shall be treated as the participating payee for purposes of determining the reporting obligations of the payment settlement entity with respect to such transactions, and

`(ii) such intermediary shall be treated as the payment settlement entity with respect to the settlement of such transactions with the participating payees.

`(B) ELECTRONIC PAYMENT FACILITATORS- In any case where an electronic payment facilitator or other third party makes payments in settlement of reportable transactions on behalf of the payment settlement entity, the return under subsection (a) shall be made by such electronic payment facilitator or other third party in lieu of the payment settlement entity.

`(c) Reportable Transaction- For purposes of this section --

`(1) IN GENERAL- The term `reportable transaction' means any payment card transaction and any third party network transaction.

`(2) PAYMENT CARD TRANSACTION- The term `payment card transaction' means any transaction in which a payment card is accepted as payment.

`(3) THIRD PARTY NETWORK TRANSACTION- The term `third party network transaction' means any transaction which is settled through a third party payment network.

`(d) Other Definitions- For purposes of this section --

`(1) PARTICIPATING PAYEE-

`(A) IN GENERAL- The term `participating payee' means --

`(i) in the case of a payment card transaction, any person who accepts a payment card as payment, and

`(ii) in the case of a third party network transaction, any person who accepts payment from a third party settlement organization in settlement of such transaction.

`(B) EXCLUSION OF FOREIGN PERSONS- To the extent provided by the Secretary in regulations or other guidance, such term shall not include any foreign person.

`(C) INCLUSION OF GOVERNMENTAL UNITS- The term `person' includes any governmental unit (and any agency or instrumentality thereof).

`(2) PAYMENT CARD- The term `payment card' means any card which is issued pursuant to an agreement or arrangement which provides for --

`(A) one or more issuers of such cards,

`(B) a network of persons unrelated to each other, and to the issuer, who agree to accept such cards as payment, and

`(C) standards and mechanisms for settling the transactions between the merchant acquiring banks and the persons who agree to accept such cards as payment.

The acceptance as payment of any account number or other indicia associated with a payment card shall be treated for purposes of this section in the same manner as accepting such payment card as payment.

`(3) THIRD PARTY PAYMENT NETWORK- The term `third party payment network' means any agreement or arrangement --

`(A) which involves the establishment of accounts with a central organization for the purpose of settling transactions between persons who establish such accounts,

`(B) which provides for standards and mechanisms for settling such transactions,

`(C) which involves a substantial number of persons unrelated to such central organization who provide goods or services and who have agreed to settle transactions for the provision of such goods or services pursuant to such agreement or arrangement, and

`(D) which guarantees persons providing goods or services pursuant to such agreement or arrangement that such persons will be paid for providing such goods or services.

Such term shall not include any agreement or arrangement which provides for the issuance of payment cards.

`(e) Exception for De Minimis Payments by Third Party Settlement Organizations- A third party settlement organization shall not be required to report any information under subsection (a) with respect to third party network transactions of any participating payee if the amount which would otherwise be reported under subsection (a)(2) with respect to such transactions does not exceed $10,000 and the aggregate number of such transactions does not exceed 200.

`(f) Statements To Be Furnished to Persons With Respect to Whom Information Is Required- Every person required to make a return under subsection (a) shall furnish to each person with respect to whom such a return is required a written statement showing --

`(1) the name, address, and phone number of the information contact of the person required to make such return, and

`(2) the aggregate amount of payments made to the person required to be shown on the return.

The written statement required under the preceding sentence shall be furnished to the person on or before January 31 of the year following the calendar year for which the return under subsection (a) was required to be made.

`(g) Regulations- The Secretary may prescribe such regulations or other guidance as may be necessary or appropriate to carry out this section, including rules to prevent the reporting of the same transaction more than once.'.

(b) Penalty for Failure To File-

(1) RETURN- Subparagraph (B) of section 6724(d)(1) is amended --

(A) by striking `or' at the end of clause (xx),

(B) by redesignating the clause (xix) that follows clause (xx) as clause (xxi),

(C) by striking `and' at the end of clause (xxi), as redesignated by subparagraph (B) and inserting `or', and

(D) by adding at the end the following:

`(xxii) section 6050W (relating to returns to payments made in settlement of payment card transactions), and'.

(2) STATEMENT- Paragraph (2) of section 6724(d) is amended by striking `or' at the end of subparagraph (BB), by striking the period at the end of the subparagraph (CC) and inserting `, or', and by inserting after subparagraph (CC) the following:

`(DD) section 6050W(c) (relating to returns relating to payments made in settlement of payment card transactions).'.

(c) Application of Backup Withholding- Paragraph (3) of section 3406(b) is amended by striking `or' at the end of subparagraph (D), by striking the period at the end of subparagraph (E) and inserting `, or', and by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:

`(F) section 6050W (relating to returns relating to payments made in settlement of payment card transactions).'.

(d) Clerical Amendment- The table of sections for subpart B of part III of subchapter A of chapter 61 is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 6050V the following:

`Sec. 6050W. Returns relating to payments made in settlement of payment card transactions.'.

(e) Effective Date-

(1) IN GENERAL- Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, the amendments made by this section shall apply to returns for calendar years beginning after December 31, 2010.

(2) APPLICATION OF BACKUP WITHHOLDING- The amendment made by subsection (c) shall apply to amounts paid after December 31, 2011.

SEC. 205. APPLICATION OF CONTINUOUS LEVY TO PROPERTY SOLD OR LEASED TO THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.

(a) In General- Paragraph (3) of section 6331(h) is amended by striking `goods' and inserting `property'.

(b) Effective Date- The amendment made by this section shall apply to levies approved after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 206. TIME FOR PAYMENT OF CORPORATE ESTIMATED TAXES.

(a) Repeal of Adjustment for 2012- Subparagraph (B) of section 401(1) of the Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005 is amended by striking the percentage contained therein and inserting `100 percent'.

(b) Modification of Adjustment for 2013- The percentage under subparagraph (C) of section 401(1) of the Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005 in effect on the date of the enactment of this Act is increased by 59.5 percentage points.

Labels:

The Tax Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over an individual's petition to review the IRS's rejection of his offer-in-compromise. The individual's offer was not made as part of a Collection Due Process (CDP) proceeding and, therefore, the IRS did not issue a statutory notice of determination. Without a statutory notice of determination, the individual's petition was premature. The individual could not rely on notices of intent to levy or an installment agreement to demonstrate the existence of an undisclosed and undocumented notice of determination. Moreover, the IRS never actually levied on the individual's property or filed a lien against him.



Before: Scirica, Chief Judge, and Hardiman and Stapleton, Circuit Judges.




OPINION OF THE COURT




I.


In a letter dated May 5, 2006, the IRS Office of Appeals rejected the "offer in compromise" previously submitted by Vivenzio and his wife, Gloria E. Vivenzio (collectively "Vivenzios"), with respect to their unpaid federal income tax liabilities for the 1999 and 2000 tax years. On May 23, 2006, the Vivenzios filed a pro se petition for lien or levy action with the Tax Court, alleging that the Office of Appeals abused its discretion by denying their offer. They also filed a motion to restrain assessment or collection.

Lawrence F. Vivenzio, Appellant v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.

U.S. Court of Appeals, 3rd Circuit; 07-3328, June 16, 2008.

Unpublished opinion affirming, per curiam, an unreported Tax Court decision.

[ Code Secs. 6213, 6330 and 7122]




In addition to submitting an objection to the motion to restrain, the IRS moved to dismiss the entire case for lack of jurisdiction. It explained that the Tax Court possesses jurisdiction to review lien and levy collection actions under I.R.C. § 6320 and I.R.C. § 6330 only if the IRS issued a "notice of determination." According to the IRS, it never issued any notice of determination in this matter. The Tax Court subsequently ordered the IRS to file a response to the Vivenzios' objection to its dismissal motion and to provide tax history documentation by September 26, 2006. The IRS's response was filed on September 27, 2006, and it included both additional documentation as well as a declaration by Robert Green, a lead tax examiner. After reviewing the documentation, Green reiterated that no notice of determination was issued by the IRS. The Vivenzios then filed a motion to strike the IRS's September 27, 2006 submission because of its untimeliness.

The Tax Court entered an order dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction and denying the motion to restrain assessment or collection. According to the Tax Court, its jurisdiction to review certain collection actions depends on the issuance of a notice of determination, and "there is nothing in the record to suggest that any such notices have of yet been issued to petitioners." (App. Doc. #1: Order and Order of Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction at 1.)

A timely notice of appeal was then filed with the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit transferred this appeal to this Court, which has jurisdiction under I.R.C. § 7482(a)(1).




II.


Mr. Vivenzio challenges the Tax Court's dismissal of his case for lack of jurisdiction. 1 After considering the record on appeal as well as the parties' arguments, we conclude that the Tax Court was correct to dismiss this matter on jurisdictional grounds.

Congress has created a framework for "collection due process" (or "CDP") hearings. I.R.C. § 6330 governs the process for IRS levy actions against the property of delinquent taxpayers, and I.R.C. § 6320 applies to federal tax lien filings. Following the CDP hearing, the IRS Office of Appeals sends the taxpayer a notice of determination setting forth the basis for its decision and expressly addressing the relevant issues raised by the taxpayer at the hearing. I.R.C. § 6330(c)(3). The taxpayer in turn "may, within 30 days of a determination under this section, appeal such determination to the Tax Court (and the Tax Court shall have jurisdiction with respect to such matter)." I.R.C. § 6330(d)(1); see also I.R.C. § 6320(c) (providing that I.R.C. § 6330(d)(1) also applies in lien context). The notice of determination issued by the Office of Appeals accordingly constitutes a jurisdictional prerequisite to seeking judicial review in the Tax Court. See, e.g., Boyd v. Comm'r, 451 F.3d 8, 10 & n.1 (1st Cir. 2006); Weber v. Comm'r, 122 T.C. 258, 263 (2004) (describing notice of determination as taxpayer's "'ticket' to the Tax Court"); Offiler v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 492, 498 (2000).

In an apparent effort to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement, Mr. Vivenzio has turned to various documents in the administrative record, specifically: (1) statutory notices of intent to levy on state tax refunds; (2) a monthly statement showing a payment due under an installment agreement; (3) account statements notifying the Vivenzios that the IRS was offsetting federal tax overpayments against their tax liabilities and also that it reduced their 2000 liability on account of a statutory tax credit; and (4) the Office of Appeals letter denying their offer in compromise. Nevertheless, none of these documents is either a statutory notice of determination or otherwise points to the existence of such an administrative notice. The statutory framework itself distinguishes between notices of intent to levy, which allow a taxpayer to request a CDP hearing before the Office of Appeals, and subsequent notices of determination, which are issued by the Office of Appeals after the hearing is conducted and allow the taxpayer to obtain judicial review. 2 See I.R.C. §§ 6330(a), (b), (d). Mr. Vivenzio provides no real support for his allegation that the "unilateral" installment agreement, which he allegedly never signed, somehow demonstrates the existence of an undisclosed and undocumented notice of determination. The Tax Court also properly found that the IRS's offsetting does not constitute a levy. See, e.g., Boyd, 451 F.3d at 11-13; Hankin v. United States, 891 F.2d 480, 482-83 (3d Cir. 1989). In fact, there is no indication in the record that the IRS ever actually levied on the Vivenzios' property or filed a lien notice against them. Finally, the IRS's rejection of their offer to compromise, evidently made outside of the context of CDP proceedings, does not rise to the level of a statutory notice of determination.

Under the circumstances, the Tax Court properly accepted the IRS's contention, supported by both ample documentation as well as a lead tax examiner's declaration, that the agency never issued a notice of determination. Furthermore, the Tax Court did not otherwise possess jurisdiction over a challenge to the IRS's denial of a free-standing offer in compromise. The Tax Court generally possesses only such jurisdiction as is expressly conferred upon it by Congress. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 7442 (specifying jurisdiction of Tax Court); Comm'r v. McCoy, 484 U.S. 3, 7 (1987) (per curiam) ("The Tax Court is a court of limited jurisdiction and lacks general equitable powers." (citation omitted)). It does have the authority to consider the IRS's rejection of a taxpayer's proposed collection alternatives, such as an offer in compromise, as part of its review of an underlying notice of determination. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 6330(c)(2)(A)(iii), (c)(3)(B), (d)(1); Fifty Below Sales & Mktg., Inc. v. United States, 497 F.3d 828, 830 (8th Cir. 2007); Olsen v. United States, 414 F.3d 144, 150 (1st Cir. 2005). However, "the handling and processing of an offer in compromise not submitted in conjunction with a CDP hearing is not subject to judicial review at all." Olsen, 414 F.3d at 156 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Because the offer made by the Vivenzios was "not submitted in conjunction with a CDP hearing," the Tax Court lacked jurisdiction to review the denial of this offer. 3

Finally, we must reject Mr. Vivenzio's unsupported constitutional claims. By holding that it lacked jurisdiction because of the absence of a notice of determination, the Tax Court essentially determined that the current case was premature. If the IRS wishes in the future to proceed with a levy or lien collection action, Mr. Vivenzio will apparently have the opportunity to request administrative and possibly judicial review of the collection action in accord with the applicable requirements for seeking relief from either the IRS Office of Appeals or the Tax Court. In the end, the Tax Court's jurisdictional ruling in this case did not "deprive taxpayers of a remedy against arbitrary administrative action." 4 Robinson v. United States, 920 F.2d 1157, 1161 (3d Cir. 1990) (allowing quiet title action challenging procedural irregularity of tax lien to proceed in district court where failure to send notice of deficiency denied taxpayers opportunity to obtain review in Tax Court).




III.


For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the Tax Court properly dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction. Accordingly, we will affirm. We also deny Mr. Vivenzio's request for oral argument.

1 Although not mentioned by the parties, the notice of appeal in this matter was signed only by Lawrence Vivenzio and not by his wife, Gloria Vivenzio. Accordingly, this Court's docket identifies Mr. Vivenzio as the sole appellant, and we treat him as such.

2 In addition, the procedural protections provided by I.R.C. § 6330 do not apply when the IRS "has served a levy on a State to collect a Federal tax liability from a State tax refund." I.R.C. § 6330(f)(2). The taxpayer is nevertheless provided "the opportunity for the hearing described in this section within a reasonable period of time after the levy." Id. § 6330(f). According to the lead tax examiner's declaration, the notices of intent to levy on the Vivenzios' state tax refunds were never actually executed.

3 Mr. Vivenzio appears to argue that the Eighth Circuit's decision in Speltz v. Commissioner, 454 F.3d 782 (8th Cir. 2006), recognized "an alternative basis" for the Tax Court's jurisdiction over the denial of the offer in compromise. (Appellant's Reply Br. at 3.) However, unlike in the present proceedings, the taxpayers in Speltz filed their Tax Court petition after the IRS Office of Appeals conducted a CDP hearing and issued a notice of determination sustaining the underlying lien filing and rejecting the taxpayers' offer in compromise. Id. at 783.

4 We likewise must reject Mr. Vivenzio's apparent assertions that the Tax Court violated his due process and equal protection rights by allegedly failing to order production of the alleged installment agreement and by not granting the motion to strike the IRS's September 27, 2006 submission as untimely. It appears that the Tax Court properly determined that the discovery motion was premature given the preliminary stage of the proceedings and its manifest lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Furthermore, the IRS did produce documentation in the Tax Court proceedings, and it addressed the installment agreement and its supposed effects on jurisdiction in some detail. It therefore cannot be said that Mr. Vivenzio suffered substantial prejudice from the Tax Court's apparent refusal to consider a motion to compel. Similarly, although the IRS's response was in fact filed one day after the Tax Court's deadline, Mr. Vivenzio fails to indicate how this minimal delay resulted in any prejudice to him.

Labels:

Friday, June 20, 2008

Fraud on the Court - Offer in Compromise

Steven G. and Elaine R. Stroube v. Commissioner.

Dkt. No. 12628-07L , 130 TC --, No. 15, June 19, 2008.

[Code Sec. 6320]

Tax Court: Collection: Fraud on the court. --
An allegation that a fraud was perpetrated on the Tax Court in a deficiency action cannot be raised for the first time in a subsequent collection action, but must be raised in a motion to vacate the decision entered in the case in which the fraud occurred. Since the taxpayers had the opportunity to raise the allegation in their deficiency actions, the IRS Appeals office and the Tax Court were precluded from considering this means of challenging their underlying tax liability in a collection action.



Respondent moves for summary judgment on a procedural issue as to whether petitioners' allegation that a fraud on this Court occurred during the trial of a tax shelter tax deficiency test case may be raised in this collection case under sec. 6320, I.R.C. Petitioners filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment on this same procedural issue.



Held: The typical and proper method to raise an allegation that a fraud on this Court occurred during the trial of a tax deficiency case is by filing a motion to vacate the decision entered in the specific tax deficiency case in which the alleged fraud occurred. Rule 162, Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.



Held, further, if other tax deficiency cases (or TEFRA partnership cases) have been filed that are related to and controlled by a test case in which a fraud allegedly occurred, there also may be situations in which the alleged fraud may be raised by filing a motion under Rule 162, Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure, to vacate decisions entered in one or more of the related tax deficiency (or TEFRA partnership) cases.



Held, further, in this collection case under sec. 6320, I.R.C., however, petitioners may not raise an issue of whether a fraud on the Court occurred in an income tax deficiency case.





OPINION



SWIFT, Judge: This matter is before us in this collection case under section 6320 on respondent's motion for summary judgment and on petitioners' cross-motion for partial summary judgment. On January 29, 2008, a hearing was held and arguments were heard on the parties' cross-motions in Denver, Colorado.



All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.





Background



On their 1977 through 1985 individual Federal income tax returns, petitioners claimed tax benefits relating to investments in a tax shelter partnership named Dillon Oil Technology Partners (Dillon Oil). Dillon Oil was one of many related tax shelter partnerships that in the 1970s and early 1980s invested in so-called enhanced oil recovery technology, interests in which were sold to individual taxpayers. The generic name used to describe these particular tax shelter partnerships was Elektra Hemisphere.



In audits of returns of individual investors, including petitioners, and of the related Elektra Hemisphere non-TEFRA and TEFRA partnerships, respondent disallowed claimed flow-through loss deductions relating to Dillon Oil and to the other Elektra Hemisphere partnerships. Relating to respondent's disallowance of petitioners' claimed Dillon Oil loss deductions, respondent determined Federal income tax deficiencies against petitioners in the cumulative total amount of $421,170 for 1977, 1978, 1980, 1981, 1984, and 1985.



In Freedman v. Commissioner, docket No. 2471-89, petitioners1 filed petitions in this Court challenging the above tax deficiencies for 1977, 1978, 1980, and 1981.



In Vulcan Oil Tech. Partners v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 153 (1998), affd. without published opinions sub nom. Tucek v. Commissioner, 198 F.3d 259 (10th Cir. 1999), and Drake Oil Tech. Partners v. Commissioner, 211 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2000), petitions also were filed in this Court challenging the above TEFRA partnership income tax adjustments respondent had determined against petitioners and others relating to their investments in Dillon Oil for 1984 and 1985.



Both the above tax deficiency cases were part of the Elektra Hemisphere tax shelter project that was litigated in the test case of Krause v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. 132 (1992), affd. sub nom. Hildebrand v. Commissioner, 28 F.3d 1024 (10th Cir. 1994). See also Vulcan Oil Tech. Partners v. Commissioner, supra; Acierno v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-441, affd. without published opinion 185 F.3d 861 (3d Cir. 1999); Karlsson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-432; Vanderschraaf v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-306, affd. without published opinion 211 F.3d 1276 (9th Cir. 2000), affd. without published opinion sub nom. Estate of Lawrenz v. Commissioner, 238 F.3d 429 (9th Cir. 2000). In these cases, respondent's disallowance of the tax losses claimed by individual taxpayers and by partnerships relating to investments in Elektra Hemisphere tax shelters were sustained.



More specifically as it relates to petitioners, in Acierno v. Commissioner, supra, we held that the Dillon Oil tax shelter in which petitioners invested was similar to the tax shelters that were involved in Krause and that the investors in Dillon Oil, including petitioners, were bound by the final adverse Opinion in Krause.



Louis Coppage (Coppage) was a general partner of the Denver-based partnerships, including Dillon Oil, and he was a witness in Krause.



On September 27, 1999, we entered a decision in Freedman v. Commissioner, supra. On June 13, 2002, we entered an order of dismissal and decision in Vulcan Oil Tech. Partners v. Commissioner, supra.



On the basis of and consistent with the disallowed loss deductions in the above opinions and decisions, respondent timely assessed the above income tax deficiencies against petitioners.



On October 27, 2005, respondent filed a Federal tax lien relating to the above outstanding Federal income tax deficiencies that had been assessed against petitioners. On November 3, 2005, respondent mailed to petitioners a notice of their right to an Appeals Office collection hearing under section 6320 relating to the filed Federal tax lien.



On November 17, 2005, petitioners mailed to respondent a request for a collection due process hearing relating to the above filed Federal tax lien. On October 12, 2006, under section 6320 respondent's Appeals officer conducted by telephone with petitioners' counsel an Appeals Office collection hearing.



During the collection hearing with respondent's Appeals Office, petitioners did not propose any collection alternatives such as an offer-in-compromise or an installment agreement. Rather, petitioners requested abatements of all outstanding Federal income taxes respondent had assessed against them and refunds of all Federal income taxes they had paid relating to their investments in Dillon Oil. The sole stated basis for petitioners' requested refunds and abatements was set forth in a letter from petitioners' counsel alleging that a fraud on the Court had occurred during the trial of Krause v. Commissioner, supra. In particular, petitioners' counsel alleged that, as part of a "secret deal" to obtain Coppage's testimony in the Krause test case, respondent had promised to Coppage an abatement of all tax deficiencies determined against Coppage relating to his investments in Elektra Hemisphere tax shelters.



On May 1, 2007, respondent's Appeals Office mailed to petitioners its notice of determination in which it was concluded that an allegation of fraud occurring in the trial of a tax deficiency case should be raised in the tax deficiency case itself, not in a collection case under section 6320; and respondent's Appeals Office sustained the filing of respondent's Federal tax lien.



On June 4, 2007, petitioners filed their petition under section 6320. On January 29, 2008, we held a hearing concerning the parties' cross-motions.





Discussion



Respondent moves for summary judgment on the procedural issue as to whether petitioners' allegation that a fraud on this Court occurred during the trial of a tax deficiency test case may be raised in this collection case under section 6320. Respondent believes that a negative answer to this procedural issue is called for as a matter of law, and petitioners raise no other issue.



On this same procedural issue, petitioners move for partial summary judgment seeking an affirmative answer. If petitioners prevail on this procedural issue, petitioners ask for an evidentiary hearing with regard to their allegation that a fraud on the Court occurred during the trial of the Krause test case.



Generally, the proper method to raise and resolve an allegation that a fraud on this Court occurred in a tax deficiency case would be to file a motion to vacate the decision entered in the specific tax deficiency case in which the fraud allegedly occurred. Rule 162.



Petitioners' allegation that a fraud on the Court occurred in the trial of Krause v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. 132 (1992) (assuming a reasonable and good faith basis therefor exists), should have been raised therein or in one of the other tax deficiency cases that were filed in this Court which related to the Krause test case, which were controlled thereby, and in which decisions have been entered on the basis of the Krause final Opinion.



In Freedman v. Commissioner, docket No. 2471-89, and in Vulcan Oil Tech. Partners v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 153 (1998), petitioners had vehicles to raise an allegation of fraud on the Court relating to the Federal income tax deficiencies which respondent determined against them and which the Court sustained. Because petitioners disputed in the above cases their Federal income tax liabilities and failed to make any attempt to vacate the decisions in those cases on the basis of an alleged fraud on the Court, by statute respondent's Appeals Office and this Court are expressly precluded from considering in this collection case any issue challenging the existence or the amount of petitioners' related underlying tax liabilities. Secs. 6320(c), 6330(c)(2)(B);2 Goza v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 176, 180-181 (2000); see also Dixon v. Commissioner, 316 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2003), revg. on other grounds and remanding T.C. Memo. 1999-101; Estate of Campion v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 165, 170 (1998), affd. without published opinions sub nom. Tucek v. Commissioner, 198 F.3d 259 (10th Cir. 1999), and Drake Oil Tech. Partners v. Commissioner, 211 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2000).



We conclude that an alleged fraud on the Court occurring in an income tax deficiency test case should be raised in the test case or in another income tax deficiency case (or TEFRA partnership case) relating thereto and may not be raised in a subsequent collection case under section 6320 or 6330 in which the taxpayer's Federal income tax liability is not in issue.



Under Rule 162, unless the Court shall otherwise permit, a motion to vacate must be filed within 30 days after a decision has been entered, and sections 7481(a)(1) and 7483 provide that a Tax Court decision becomes final 90 days after entry of a decision if no party files a notice of appeal.



We emphasize that in Dixon v. Commissioner, supra, neither a section 6320 nor a section 6330 collection case was involved, and Dixon provides no support for petitioners' cross-motion for partial summary judgment.



Petitioners have failed to raise any bona fide issue, collection alternative, or genuine issue of material fact. See Rule 121(b). Respondent's Appeals officer met the requirements of section 6330(c), and summary judgment in favor of respondent is appropriate.3



For the reasons stated, we shall grant respondent's motion for summary judgment, and we shall deny petitioners' cross-motion for partial summary judgment.



To reflect the foregoing,



An appropriate order and decision will be entered.


1 Petitioners are two of the four individuals who joined in the petition in Freedman v. Commissioner, docket No. 2471-89.

2 Sec. 6330(c)(2)(B) provides as follows:

(B) Underlying liability. --The person may also raise at the hearing challenges to the existence or amount of the underlying tax liability for any tax period if the person did not receive any statutory notice of deficiency for such tax liability or did not otherwise have an opportunity to dispute such tax liability.

3 We note that at the Jan. 29, 2008, hearing on the parties' instant cross-motions, the Court asked petitioners' counsel for a brief explanation of the factual basis for the allegation that a secret agreement between respondent and Coppage had been entered into during the trial of Krause v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. 132 (1992), affd. sub nom. Hildebrand v. Commissioner, 28 F.3d 1024 (10th Cir. 1994). Petitioners' counsel offered merely supposition, surmise, and bizarre inference, and he provided absolutely no credible factual support for his allegation that a fraud on this Court occurred in the Krause trial.

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Thursday, June 19, 2008

Whether revenue officers have authority under IRC § 6020(b) to prepare employment tax returns in employment tax cases in which worker classification issues are presentCCA 200822026, February 26, 2008

Symbol: CC:TEGE:EOEG:ET1:LMDonis-PREF-151037-07


Uniform Issue List Nos. 6020.02-00, 7436.01-03

[ Code Secs. 6020 and 7436]






Returns prepared for or executed by secretary; Return prepared by IRS personnel; Proceedings for determination of employment status; Tax court jurisdiction; Worker classification



DATE: February 26, 2008



TO: Virginia E. Cochran, Deputy Area Counsel, (Great Lakes & Gulf Coast Area, Dallas Group) (Tax Exempt & Government Entities)



FROM: Dan E. Boeskin, Assistant Branch Chief, Employment Tax Branch 1 (Exempt Organizations/Employment Tax/Government Entities) (Tax Exempt & Government Entities)



SUBJECT: ET 6020(b) Returns by Revenue Officer Worker, PREF-151037-07



This Chief Counsel Advice responds to your request for assistance. This advice may not be used or cited as precedent.





ISSUES



Whether revenue officers have authority under IRC § 6020(b) to prepare employment tax returns in employment tax cases in which worker classification issues are present.





CONCLUSION



In employment tax cases where worker classification issues are present, revenue officers have authority under IRC § 6020(b) to prepare employment tax returns, but the requirements of IRC § 7436 must be met prior to assessment.





FACTS



We have been asked to review a memorandum which addresses the issue of whether a revenue officer has authority under IRC § 6020(b) to prepare employment tax returns on behalf of taxpayers who fail to file such returns in a case in which worker classification issues are present and where the revenue officer did not refer the case to the Employment Tax Program as required under the Internal Revenue Manual (IRM).



The facts indicate that, for the years at issue, the taxpayer took the position that certain workers were independent contractors for federal tax purposes. However, for previous years the taxpayer had treated such workers as employees. After reviewing the facts of the case, the revenue officer determined that the workers should have been treated as employees for federal tax purposes and prepared Substitute for Returns (SFRs) under IRC § 6020(b). The taxpayer objected to the preparation of the SFRs and requested an appeal. The appeals officer concluded that the worker classification issue was undeveloped and that [the revenue officer did not have the authority to prepare Forms 941 under IRC § 6020(b) procedures because the IRM requires the issue to be referred to the Employment Tax Program,] and recommended the government concede the case.





LAW AND ANALYSIS



Where there is an actual controversy involving a determination by the Secretary that one or more individuals performing services for the taxpayer are employees as part of an examination, IRC § 7436 gives the Tax Court jurisdiction to determine certain [worker classification issues] (i.e., the proper amount of the additions to tax, additional amounts, and penalties that relate to the employment tax imposed by subtitle C with respect to determinations of worker classification and whether the taxpayer is entitled to relief under § 530 of the Revenue Act of 1978). To meet the requirements of IRC § 7436, certain procedures must be followed prior to an assessment of employment taxes.



Notice 2002-5, 2002-1 C.B. 320, describes the procedures that IRC § 7436 requires. Notice 2002-5 provides generally that a taxpayer will first receive a [30-day] letter which lists the proposed employment tax adjustments to be made and describes the taxpayer's right either to agree to the proposed adjustments or to protest the proposed adjustments to the Appeals function of the Service (Appeals) within 30 days of the date of the letter. If the taxpayer does not respond to the [30-day] letter by agreeing to the proposed adjustments or by filing a protest to Appeals, the taxpayer will receive a Notice of Determination of Worker Classification (NDWC). 1 The taxpayer may also receive the NDWC if the taxpayer files a protest with Appeals and the worker classification issues are not settled in Appeals.



Notice 2002-5 further provides that under IRC § 7436(d)(1), the mailing of the NDWC suspends the period of limitations for assessment of taxes attributable to the worker classification issues for the 90-day period during which the taxpayer can bring suit 2 and precludes the Service from assessing the taxes identified in the NDWC prior to the expiration of the 90-day period during which the taxpayer may file a timely Tax Court petition. If the Service erroneously makes an assessment of taxes attributable to the worker classification issues without first either issuing a NDWC or obtaining a waiver of restrictions on assessment from the taxpayer, the taxpayer is entitled to an automatic abatement of the assessment. However, once any such procedural defects are corrected, the Service may reassess the employment taxes to the same extent as if the abated assessment had not occurred.



A taxpayer may settle the worker classification issues either before issuance of the NDWC or after issuance of the NDWC but before expiration of the 90-day period for filing a Tax Court petition. To settle the worker classification issues, the taxpayer must formally waive the restrictions on assessment contained in IRC §§ 7436(d) and 6213(a). If the taxpayer does not settle or file a Tax Court petition before the ninety-first day after the NDWC is mailed, the employment taxes identified in the NDWC shall thereafter be assessed.



Under IRC § 6501(a), the amount of any tax imposed by the Code shall be assessed within 3 years after the return was filed, subject to certain specified exceptions. Under IRC § 6020(b), if any person fails to make a required return or makes, willfully or otherwise, a false or fraudulent return, the Secretary is authorized to make a return from his or her own knowledge and from such information as can be obtained through testimony or otherwise. Section 6020(b)(2) provides that any return made and subscribed by the Secretary shall be prima facie good and sufficient for all legal purposes. 3



In this case, the taxpayer failed to file an employment tax return and did not submit evidence to establish that no employment tax return was due. The revenue officer determined that some of the taxpayer's workers were employees and that an employment tax return should have been filed. The revenue officer prepared returns pursuant to the authority in IRC § 6020(b). 4



Because the revenue officer failed to meet the requirements of IRC § 7436, an assessment of employment taxes based on the IRC § 6020(b) return prepared by the revenue officer in this case is improper. However, the facts in this case do not indicate that the government is required to concede the case. Notice 2002-5 provides that once the procedural defects are corrected and the requirements of IRC § 7436 are met, employment taxes may thereafter be assessed.



In employment tax cases where worker classification issues are present, revenue officers have authority under IRC § 6020(b) to prepare employment tax returns, but the requirements of IRC § 7436 must be met prior to assessment.



This writing may contain privileged information. Any unauthorized disclosure of this writing may undermine our ability to protect the privileged information. If disclosure is determined to be necessary, please contact this office for our views.



Please call (202) 622-0047 if you have any further questions.


1 The NDWC is a jurisdictional prerequisite for seeking Tax Court review under IRC § 7436.

2 If the taxpayer does file a timely petition in Tax Court, the period of limitations for assessment is suspended until 60 days after the decision of the Tax Court becomes final.

3 Note, however, that IRC § 6501(b)(3) provides that notwithstanding IRC § 6020(b), the execution of a return by the Secretary pursuant to such section shall not start the running of the period of limitations on assessment and collection.

4 Delegation Order Number 182 specifically gives Revenue Officers the authority to prepare returns pursuant to IRC § 6020(b). In addition, Revenue Procedure 77-13, 1977-1 C.B. 570, specifically discusses the preparation of IRC § 6020(b) returns by Revenue Officers.

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In order to prove a conspiracy to defraud the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the existence of an agreement to defraud the United States; (2) the defendant's participation in that agreement with the intent to defraud the United States; and (3) an overt act by one of the conspirators in furtherance of that objective. United States v. McKee, 506 F.3d 225, 238-44 (3d Cir. 2007); see also Gambone, 314 F.3d at 176. Where a defendant is charged with a "Klein" conspiracy, as Defendant is here, the "agreed-upon objective must be to impede the IRS" from its lawful collection of federal income taxes. See United States v. Gricco, 277 F.3d 339, 348 (3d Cir. 2002); see also United States v. Klein, 247 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1957).


United States v. Thomas L. Root.

U.S. District Court, East. Dist. Pa.; 07-149, June 10, 2008.

[ Code Sec. 7201]

-
The director of a television station was properly convicted of tax evasion and conspiracy to defraud the government. The government showed that the individual had conspired with the station's president to impede the IRS from imposing taxes on their commissions received from the station by assigning them to various LLCs and instructing the corporation's bookkeeper to avoid issuing Form 1099s to those LLCs. The individual used similar techniques to evade taxes on the income earned from his legal services. Further, a single count charging the individual with tax evasion covering several years was not duplicitous when the director exhibited the same pattern of evasive conduct for all those years. Finally, the director was not entitled to a new trial because he could not establish a Brady violation or show that the trial court erred in summarizing the indictment's allegations in the jury charge.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER


Schiller, J.

Defendant Thomas Root moves this Court for a judgment of acquittal or, alternatively, for a new trial following convictions for conspiracy to defraud the United States and for tax evasion. For the following reasons, the Court denies his motions.



II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When considering a claim that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, a district court views the evidence, both direct and circumstantial, "in the light most favorable to the government and affirm[s] the judgment if there is substantial evidence from which any rational trier of fact could find [the defendant] guilt[y] beyond a reasonable doubt." Frorup, 963 F.2d at 42; see also United States v. Gambone, 314 F.3d 163, 170 (3d Cir. 2003); FED. R. CRIM. P. 29. In doing so, a court must "credit all available inferences in favor of the government." United States v. Riddick, 156 F.3d 505, 509 (3d Cir. 1998). If evidence emerges from the trial that supports the jury's verdict, regardless of how probative the court believes it to be, then a defendant's motion for acquittal based on insufficient evidence should be denied. See United States v. McNeill, 887 F.2d 448, 450 (3d Cir. 1989). "The 'contention that the evidence also permits a less sinister conclusion is immaterial. To sustain the jury's verdict, the evidence does not need to be inconsistent with every conclusion save that of guilt.'" United States v. Smith, 294 F.3d 473, 478 (3d Cir. 2002) ( quoting United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 188 (3d Cir. 1998)).

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33, a court may grant a new trial "if the interest of justice so requires." FED. R. CRIM. P. 33(a). A district court has discretion to "grant a defendant a new trial only if it finds that 'there is a serious danger that a miscarriage of justice has occurred --that is, that an innocent person has been convicted.'" United States v. Rich, 326 F. Supp. 2d 670, 673 (E.D. Pa. 2004) ( quoting United States v. Johnson, 302 F.3d 139, 150 (3d Cir. 2002)). "Additionally, the court must grant a new trial if errors occurred during the trial, and it is reasonably possible that such error, or combination of errors, substantially influenced the jury's decision." Id. ( citing United States v. Copple, 24 F.3d 535, 547 n.17 (3d Cir. 1994)).



III. DISCUSSION



A. Defendant is not entitled to a judgment of acquittal



1. The jury's verdict on the conspiracy charge is supported by sufficient evidence

In order to prove a conspiracy to defraud the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the existence of an agreement to defraud the United States; (2) the defendant's participation in that agreement with the intent to defraud the United States; and (3) an overt act by one of the conspirators in furtherance of that objective. United States v. McKee, 506 F.3d 225, 238-44 (3d Cir. 2007); see also Gambone, 314 F.3d at 176. Where a defendant is charged with a "Klein" conspiracy, as Defendant is here, the "agreed-upon objective must be to impede the IRS" from its lawful collection of federal income taxes. See United States v. Gricco, 277 F.3d 339, 348 (3d Cir. 2002); see also United States v. Klein, 247 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1957).

"[A] conspiratorial agreement can be proven circumstantially based upon reasonable inferences drawn from actions and statements of the conspirators or from the circumstances surrounding the scheme." McKee, 506 F.3d at 238. However, "'[w]hen the government relies upon circumstantial evidence to establish a tax conspiracy, the circumstances must be such as to warrant a jury's finding that the alleged conspirators had some common design with unity of purpose to impede the IRS.'" Id. at 240 ( quoting United States v. Adkinson, 158 F.3d 1147, 1154 (11th Cir. 1998). To establish the requisite "unity of purpose" the government must establish that the defendant "knew of the agreement and intended both to join it and to accomplish its illegal objects." Id. at 241. "[T]he evidence must be sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that impeding the IRS was one of the conspiracy's objects and not merely a foreseeable consequence or collateral effect." Gricco, 277 F.3d at 348.

Defendant argues that he is entitled to judgment of acquittal because the Government failed to prove both the existence of an agreement to impede the IRS from collecting income taxes and Defendant's participation in such an agreement. Defendant's argument, however, is premised on a view of the evidence that draws all the reasonable inferences in his favor or on facts that are immaterial. 6 When the evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to the Government, as it must be in resolving a Rule 29 motion, the record supports the jury's verdict on the conspiracy charge.

The totality of the evidence, taking all reasonable inferences in the Government's favor, supports a finding that Defendant and McCracken agreed to impede the IRS from taxing their commissions by funneling those commissions through LLCs and avoiding the issuance of Form 1099s to those LLCs. The evidence at trial illustrated that Defendant is a sophisticated defendant who is knowledgeable about legal issues, attuned to dealing with accountants, RBI board members and shareholders, and familiar with setting up limited liability companies. After McCracken informed Defendant, Williamson and Peiffer that they would be receiving commissions, Defendant requested in an October 2001 memo that his commission be assigned to New Perspectives, LLC. A reasonable jury could infer that Defendant requested this change in order to evade taxes on that income. This inference is supported by the fact that Defendant was using the same means to avoid taxes on income earned from Ford and Merullo by requesting payment through LISA, and is further supported by the fact that Defendant could have impeded the issuance of a Form 1099 since he was responsible for preparing those forms for RBI during the relevant time period. That McCracken adopted the same plan --to have his commissions paid through a limited liability company --shortly after receiving Defendant's October memo and had Defendant set up Framco on his behalf supports an inference that the two shared a purpose of evading income taxes. Indeed, as a result of this change in payment, taxes were no longer withheld from Defendant and McCracken's commission payments.

The existence of an agreement between Defendant and McCracken to frustrate taxation of their commissions is further supported by Williamson's testimony. It is undisputed that Williamson had a discussion with McCracken and Defendant regarding whether she was required to issue Form 1099s to New Perspectives and Framco, and that in a subsequent conversation, McCracken directed her not to issue Form 1099s to those entities. As a result of this instruction, the IRS was not notified of the monies that RBI paid to New Perspectives or Framco. 7 Whether or not Defendant was present for this second conversation, the jury could reasonably infer, in light of the above-mentioned facts, that McCracken and Defendant agreed to misinform Williamson for purposes of concealing this income from the IRS. Although Defendant would have the Court and the jury believe that he was a bumbling fool when it came to tax matters, he was clearly familiar with Form 1099s in some respect since his job responsibilities included preparing such forms for RBI. Furthermore, he acquired tax identification numbers for New Perspectives and Framco, (Gov't Ex. 31 (Framco Tax ID) & 32 (New Perspectives Tax ID)), which suggests that he was aware of an obligation to report income earned by those companies to the IRS, yet he clearly did not report New Perspectives's income. Looking at the evidence in a light most favorable to the Government, the record supports an inference that Defendant was aware that a Form 1099 would alert the IRS to his commission payments and that he conspired with McCracken regarding an instruction to Williamson to prevent that from happening. That McCracken and Defendant both endeavored to conceal the existence of Framco and New Perspectives from the RBI Board and shareholders provides additional support for the inference that they sought to conceal evidence of their scheme to hide these payments from the IRS.

Furthermore, that Defendant set up Framco for McCracken and that McCracken signed a fake commission agreement with New Perspectives, which was found in a folder labeled "Framco," evidences that this was not a matter of two individuals exhibiting similar but unconnected conduct, as Defendant suggests, but that Defendant and McCracken were acting jointly in furtherance of their scheme. A jury could reasonably infer that the commissions agreement, signed by McCracken and Defendant's wife. Indeed, there was no evidence that Kathy Root or New Perspectives performed any sales services on behalf of RBI and a jury could certainly disbelieve Defendant's suggestion that Kathy Root was being paid approximately $3,000.00 a month to occasionally spruce up RBI annual reports with graphics. Whether or not New Perspectives currently conducts any legitimate business is besides the point --the evidence supports a finding that the company was a shell created primarily so that Defendant could evade taxes on his commissions.

In order to overcome this evidence, Defendant argues that the Government's conspiracy case must fail because the Government did not prove that McCracken evaded taxes on his Framco income. Defendant overstates the Government's burden in a conspiracy case. The Government need prove only an agreement between the Defendant and at least one other individual to impede the IRS, and an overt act by one of the conspirators in furtherance of that agreement; it need not prove that McCracken, who is not charged here, is also guilty of substantive tax evasion. See McKee, 506 F.3d at 238-44 (explaining elements of conspiracy); see also Gov't of Virgin Islands v. Hoheb, 777 F.2d 138, 140 (3d Cir. 1985) (co-conspirator's guilt is irrelevant to a defendant's guilt where the two are not tried together). Furthermore, whether or not McCracken himself evaded taxes, a jury could infer that McCracken told Williamson not to issue Form 1099s after conferring with Defendant on the matter, knowing that Defendant intended not to report New Perspectives income and intending to facilitate Defendant's plan. See Gricco, 277 F.3d at 349 (upholding Klein conspiracy conviction where jury could infer that defendant, who orchestrated an embezzlement scheme and instructed participants in the scheme not to deposit their unlawful earnings in a bank but to instead keep them in a safe, intended for his co-conspirators not to pay taxes on those monies).

Overall, the record supports the existence of an agreement between Defendant and McCracken to impede the IRS. Additionally, both Defendant and McCracken engaged in several overt acts in furtherance of that agreement including Defendant's creation of both LLCs, McCracken's instruction to Williamson, and McCracken's execution of the false Commission Agreement. Accordingly, Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal is denied.



2. Defendant is not entitled to judgment of acquittal on the tax evasion charge

Defendant does not argue that the guilty verdict on Count Two is unsupported by a sufficiency of the evidence. Instead, he argues that he is entitled to judgement of acquittal on Count Two because of "the infirmities in Count 2" that he raised before trial. (Def.'s Mot. for J. of Acquittal at 17.) Primarily, Defendant argues that Count Two is duplicitous because it impermissibly aggregates several years of tax evasion into one count. Defendant also reasserts his argument that venue was improper over Count Two.



i. Count Two is not duplicitous

A conviction for tax evasion under 26 U.S.C. § 7201 requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of "1) the existence of a tax deficiency, 2) an affirmative act constituting an attempt to evade or defeat payment of the tax, and 3) willfulness." United States v. McGill, 964 F.2d 222, 229 (3d Cir. 1992); see also McKee, 506 F.3d at 233. "[S]ection 7201 proscribes the offense of tax evasion, which can be committed either by evading the assessment or evading the payment of taxes." United States v. Pollen, 978 F.2d 78, 87 n.16 (3d Cir. 1992). A defendant evades the assessment of taxes by impeding the IRS from assessing a tax on his or her income, for example, by filing a false tax returns and creating false documents. McGill, 964 F.2d at 230. Evasion of payment, on the other hand, generally involves concealment of the taxpayer's ability to pay his or her taxes by hiding assets from the IRS after tax returns have been filed. Id. ("Affirmative acts of evasion of payment include: placing assets in the name of others; dealing in currency; causing receipts to be paid through and in the name of others; and causing debts to be paid through and in the name of others.").

Defendant argues that Count Two is duplicitous because the Government charged him with evading several years of taxes in one count, an improper unit of prosecution, instead of charging him with one count of evasion for each year at issue. Defendant recognizes that one count of evasion covering several years might be appropriate in an evasion of payment case. Although Defendant was charged with evasion of payment and evasion of assessment, he argues that the evidence at his trial was akin to that of an evasion of assessment case, and thus, the Government's chosen unit of prosecution is, in retrospect, impermissible.

"Duplicity is the joining of distinct and separate offenses in a single count." United States v. Haddy, 134 F.3d 542, 548 (3d Cir. 1998). In order to determine whether Count Two is duplicitous as Defendant alleges, the Court must first determine the appropriate unit of prosecution for a violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201. Id. Generally speaking, the unit of prosecution for tax evasion in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201 is one tax year. Pollen, 978 F.2d at 84. The Third Circuit has recognized an exception to this rule, that the Government may "charge tax evasion covering several years in a single count as a 'course of conduct' in circumstances 'where the underlying basis of the indictment is an allegedly consistent, long-term pattern of conduct directed at the evasion of taxes for [the] years [in question].'" Id. ( quoting United States v. Shorter, 809 F.2d 54, 58 (D.C. Cir. 1987)); see also United States v. Kruckel, Crim. A. No. 92-611, 1993 WL 765648, at **14-15 (D.N.J. Aug. 13, 1993).

In United States v. Pollen, the Third Circuit upheld four counts of tax evasion where each count was based on a different means of evasion for the same seven year period. 978 F.2d at 81-82. Similarly in United States v. Shorter, relied on by the Third Circuit in Pollen, the D.C. Circuit concluded that one count of tax evasion encompassing twelve tax years was not impermissibly duplicitous where the defendant engaged in a single scheme to evade taxes spanning those years. 809 F.2d 54, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1987), abrogated on other grounds, Daubert v. Merrel Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Defendant makes much of the fact that in those cases, the defendants were charged with violating Section 7201 by evading payment of taxes. However, nowhere in Pollen did the Third Circuit explicitly state that charging an evasion of assessment case in such a manner is impermissible. Indeed, such a suggestion is baseless --nothing in Section 7201 indicates that a different unit of prosecution would apply depending on the means of tax evasion charged. Pollen, 978 F.2d at 85-86 (neither the statutory language nor "section 7201's legislative history requires ... [the conclusion] that Congress intended to limit this provision's unit of prosecution to an individual tax year"). Such a result would frustrate the Government's ability to charge both means of evasion in one count --which is clearly permissible under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and relevant case law. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(1) ("A count may allege ... that the defendant committed [an offense] by one or more specifiedmeans."); see also United States v. Mal, 942 F.2d 682, 687-89 (9th Cir. 1991) (rejecting duplicity challenge where indictment charged evasion of assessment and evasion of payment); United States v. Dunkel, 900 F.2d at 107 (7th Cir. 1990) (charges incorporating allegations of evasion of payment and evasion of assessment were not duplicitous because "Section 7201 creates only one crime: tax evasion"), vacated on other grounds, 498 U.S. 1043 (1991).

Here, Defendant was charged with one continuous course of conduct spanning the years 2001 through 2003. The Government alleged that Defendant evaded taxes over the course of these three years by funneling his earnings through LLCs, avoiding the issuance of Form 1099s to those LLCs, characterizing bonuses from Parker as loans instead of income, and failing to report all such income on his tax returns. The evidence the Government would have used to prove evasion in 2001, 2002 and 2003 individually is the same evidence the Government in fact used to prove one count of tax evasion encompassing those years; this illustrates that Defendant exhibited the same pattern of evasive conduct for all three years in question, making prosecution based on that span of years appropriate. See Shorter, 809 F.2d at 57 (continuous course of conduct existed where the same evidence that would be used to prove evasive acts for each individual year of evasion would be used to prove one count of evasion spanning those years). Furthermore, that Defendant knew exactly the allegations that he would be defending against --tax evasion for the years 2001 through 2003 by failing to report income from New Perspectives, LISA, and Parker --mitigates against any concern that he was prejudiced by the inclusion of all three years in one count. See Dunkel, 900 F.2d at 107 (indictment charging evasion of assessment and evasion of payment was not duplicitous --defendant "knew exactly what he had to prepare to defend against and the jury knew its role as well").

Although the Government's choice to charge Defendant with one count of tax evasion for all of the years at issue, as opposed to three counts on a per year basis, may have been unorthodox, Pollen sanctions such an approach. 8 Accordingly, Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal is denied in this regard.



ii. Venue was proper with respect to Count Two

The Constitution and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 18 require prosecution of a criminal defendant "in a district where the offense was committed." FED. R. CRIM. P. 18; see also United States v. Cabrales, 524 U.S. 1, 6 (1998). Where an offense continues across multiple districts, it may be prosecuted "in any district in which such offense was begun, continued, or completed." 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a). "Because an 'attempt to evade' tax can occur over time and in more than one judicial district, a violation of § 7201 is a 'continuing offense' within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a)." United States v. Strawberry, 892 F. Supp. 519, 521 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); cf. Kruckel, 1993WL76648, at *14, 14 n.11 (D.N.J. Aug. 13, 1993) (tax evasion considered continuing course of conduct for statute of limitations purposes). Thus, venue is appropriate in a tax evasion case in any district where the defendant "engaged in some affirmative act with a tax evasion motive." Strawberry, 892 F. Supp. at 521 ( citing United States v. Marchant, 774 F.2d 888, 891 (8th Cir. 1985)). The Government bears the burden of proving venue by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 328-30 (3d Cir. 2002).

Here, a preponderance of the evidence at trial supports a finding that at least one affirmative act of evasion occurred in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. As discussed above, the Government agreed to dismiss any allegations of tax evasion pertaining to the year 2000, which did not include any income earned from RBI. Consequently, Defendant was only tried on tax evasion for the years 2001 through 2003. Defendant himself conceded prior to trial that the allegations pertaining to RBI-related income were properly venued in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. (Sept. 20, 2007 Hearing Tr. at 27; Mar. 7, 2008 Hearing Tr. at 5.) Indeed, Defendant traveled to Reading in connection with his job at RBI, and the memos he prepared to facilitate payment of his commissions to New Perspectives, including the Commissions Agreement between RBI and New Perspectives, were found at RBI's offices in Reading. See United States v. Martino, Crim. A. No. 00-389, 2000 WL 1843233, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2000) (venue was proper over tax evasion charges where defendant sent faxes, placed phone calls and directed wire transfers to a bank within the district in furtherance of her tax evasion scheme). Consequently, venue was proper over Count Two. 9



B. Defendant is not entitled to a new trial



1. The jury charge was proper

Defendant argues that he is entitled to a new trial because he was prejudiced by "the inclusion of ten unproven allegations in the final jury charge, over objection, which substantially influenced the jury's decision to convict the Defendant." (Def.'s Mot. for New Trial at 3-5.) Defendant's argument fails for several reasons.

First, this Court merely summarized the allegations in the Indictment so as to guide the jury, which it is clearly appropriate for a court to do. United States v. Smith, 410 F. Supp. 1256, 1260 (D.C. Pa. 1976). Second, Defendant's argument is again based on his biased view of the evidence. As discussed above, there was sufficient evidence at trial supporting the allegations in the Indictment. As such, inclusion of these allegations in the jury charge cannot possibly be considered improper. Third, after extensive discussions on the matter at the charge conference, and in an abundance of caution, this Court added language to the jury instructions to clarify that its references to the allegations in the Indictment were just that --references to allegations. (Mar. 19, 2008 Tr. at 39.) Finally, this Court's charge included instructions that the Indictment is not evidence, which the jury is presumed to have followed. (Mar. 20, 2008 Tr. at 45.); see, e.g., Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234 (2000) ("A jury is presumed to follow its instructions."). Accordingly, the Court did not err by summarizing the Indictment's allegations in the jury charge, nor has any miscarriage of justice has occurred here that would warrant a new trial.



2. The jury was not prejudiced by Williamson's comments

Defendant argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the jury was prejudiced by two statements, both elicited by Defense Counsel in his cross-examination of Barbara Williamson: (1) that McCracken had been indicted and (2) that Defendant's hired investigator, Dennis Hanzel, told Williamson that Defendant was considering a guilty plea. (Def.'s Mot. for New Trial at 5.) These comments were elicited during Defense counsel's admittedly "aggressive questioning" of Williamson. (Mar. 17, 2008 Tr. at 89.) Defendant did not move for a mistrial in the wake of this testimony nor did he move to strike this testimony from the record. Nevertheless, he now asserts that he was prejudiced by these stray remarks. Defendant is not entitled to a new trial on this basis, however, because defense counsel cannot complain that he was unfairly prejudiced by testimony that he is responsible for eliciting. United States v. Harris, 368 F. Supp. 697, 710 (D.C. Pa. 1973) ("[A] prejudicial item of evidence or a trial setback experienced by defense counsel cannot be complained of if it was caused by defense counsel.")

Furthermore, Defendant was not prejudiced by this testimony. Even if Williamson's reference to McCracken having been indicted could have prejudiced the Defendant, any possible prejudice was ameliorated by the Court's sua sponte curative instruction to the jury:
[T]he last witness who was on the stand answered a question and indicated that Mr. McCracken left [RBI] because he was indicted. That indictment had nothing to do, was separate and apart from this case. So I don't want you to think it had anything to do with this case. And it's important that you know that. I had asked the government to make sure, to check over the lunch break, as to what he was indicted for and it had nothing to do with this case.

(Mar. 17, 2008 at 90.)

Likewise, any possible prejudice to the Defendant from Williamson's stray remark about a potential guilty plea was ameliorated by Hanzel's testimony clarifying that remark:
Q: All right. And with respect, then, to that last part we were talking about, you did not tell her that Mr. Root ever had any intention to plea to this case, did you?

A. No, that was just so out of line because I had just started talking to people and my job was much like my job as a special agent with the IRS. I was doing an investigation to determine if there was any culpability, and she was one of the first people I talked to.

Q: All right.

A: So I had no idea of Mr. Root's guilt or innocence.

(Mar. 19, 2008 Tr. at 194.) Further, Williamson's testimony was already fairly benign since Williamson put the statement in context. She testified on recross-examination that Hanzel said to her "depending what you have to say, maybe Tom will take a plea. And if he --if you don't talk to me, then we're going to have to put you on the stand and we're going to have to say in court that you didn't cooperate with us." (Mar. 17, 2008 Tr. at 84.)

Accordingly, since the testimony of which Defendant complains were elicited by his own counsel, and since those comments did not prejudice him in any way, Defendant is not entitled to a new trial in this regard.



3. Defendant was not prejudiced by late disclosure of Brady information

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) requires the government to disclose to a defendant exculpatory evidence that is material to guilt or punishment. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 674 (1985). "[A] defendant is entitled to a new trial where 'there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.'" Gov't of the Virgin Islands v. Martinez, 780 F.2d 302, 306 (3d Cir. 1985) ( quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 683). "In order to find a Brady violation in the first place, a court must find that some prejudice ensued to the defendant." Gov't of the Virgin Islands v. Fahie, 419 F.3d 249, 256 n.10 (3d Cir. 2005). "Where the government makes Brady evidence available during the course of a trial in such a way that a defendant is able to effectively use it, due process is not violated and Brady is not contravened." United States v. Johnson, 816 F.2d 918, 924 (3d Cir. 1987).

Defendant asserts that he was prejudiced because he received "voluminous Brady documents approximately one week before trial," and because the Government only produced certain documents, such as a spreadsheet from Parker and a summary from Ford, shortly before trial. (Def.'s Mot. for a New Trial at 3-4.) It is clear that the Government turned this evidence over to the defense either the same day or the day after it was received by the Government, and in any event, prior to the start of trial. 10 (Gov't's Consolidated Resp. to Def.'s Mot. for J. of Acquittal and Mot. for a New Trial Attachment 1 (3/14/2008 Letter enclosing transcripts and fax from George Ford)&Attachment 2 (3/15/2008 E-mail enclosing spreadsheet from Parker) & Attachment 3 (3/12/2008 Letter Disclosing Ford Statement); see also Mar. 18, 2008 Tr. at 193-95.) Clearly then, Defendant was able to use this information at trial, and thus, his argument that he was prejudiced in violation of Brady fails. See Johnson, 816 F.2d at 924 (no Brady violation where government failed to produce fingerprint reports prior to trial but produced the reports in time for defendant to use in cross-examination); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d 852, 861 (5th Cir. 1979) (no Brady violation where government's production of exculpatory evidence on the day before trial did not prejudice the defendant); United States v. Kerr, Crim. A. No. 07-3, 2008 WL 1943440, at *6 (W.D. Pa. May 2, 2008) (no Brady violation where the government produced photographs intended for use at trial to the defendant three business days prior to jury selection.) Since Defendant has not established a Brady violation, he is not entitled to a new trial on that ground.



IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's motions are denied. An appropriate order follows.


ORDER


AND NOW, this 10 th day of June, 2008, upon consideration of Defendant's Motion for a New Trial (Document No. 59), Defendant's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal (Document No. 60), the Government's Response thereto, Defendant's Reply thereon and for the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that:
1. Defendant's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal is DENIED.

2. Defendant's Motion for a New Trial is DENIED.

BY THE COURT:

______________________________

Berle M. Schiller, J.

1 A Form 1099 is an IRS form that a business issues to an individual who is not an employee, but who earns income, such as a bonus or commission, in excess of $600.00. (Mar. 19, 2008 Tr. at 45-47.) This form is also sent to the IRS for tax years in which the income is earned. ( Id. at 47.) In contrast, a W-2 is a form given to employees at the end of the tax year indicating the amount of money the employee has earned during that tax year and the amount of taxes withheld by the employer. ( Id. at 45-46.) The employer also files a copy of its employees' W-2 forms with the IRS. ( Id. at 46.) Income taxes are not withheld through a Form 1099 as they are with a W-2. ( Id.)

2 Ford was also in the process of repaying Defendant on a loan. Thus, for a period of time, he wrote weekly checks to Defendant for $300.00, which encompassed Defendant's $250.00 salary and $50.00 in loan repayment. (Mar. 18, 2008 Tr. at 174-75.)

3 Parker testified at the grand jury that these checks were bonuses, and the Government impeached him with that testimony. (Mar. 18, 2008 Tr. at 63, 70, 86.)

4 Although Defendant's analyst testified that these payments should have been considered loans, looking at the evidence in a light most favorable to the Government, sufficient evidence supports the conclusion that these payments constituted income. ( see Mar. 19, 2008 Tr. at 181-82.)

5 These figures excluded reimbursed expenses and loan repayments from George Ford from taxable income. (Mar. 19, 2008 Tr. at 95-103.)

6 For instance, Defendant makes much of the fact that prior to November 2001, before McCracken became president of RBI, McCracken gave himself an unauthorized sales commission. (Mar. 18, 2008 Tr. at 140-41.) This fact is wholly irrelevant as to whether McCracken and Defendant conspired to conceal the commissions McCracken authorized in November 2001 from the IRS.

7 That RBI ultimately issued a Form 1099 to New Perspectives for the 2004 tax year (Gov't Ex. 4 (New Perspectives 1099)), presumably as a result of the investigation following McCracken's departure, does not change the fact that no Form 1099s were issued for the prior three years in accordance with McCracken's instruction to Williamson.

8 Defendant further argues that he is entitled to judgment of acquittal because "a general verdict has been rendered on tax evasion during a three-year period from which it is impossible to tell whether Defendant was actually found guilty of tax evasion in any calendar year, the allowable unit of prosecution." (Def.'s Mot. For Judgment of Acquittal at 21.) As discussed above, the Indictment appropriately alleged a course of conduct spanning three years, and therefore charged Defendant in a permissible unit of prosecution. Defendant's reliance on United State v. House, 524 F.2d 1035 (3d Cir. 1975), which did not address the unit of prosecution for tax evasion, is therefore misplaced.

9 Defendant argues that "had the jury considered evasion conduct on the allowable 'per year' basis, it may have found that tax evasion did not occur in one or more years because the only acts of evasion it could find were non-venued." (Def.'s Mot. for J. of Acquittal at 25.) If the Government charged Defendant with one count of evasion for 2001, one count of evasion for 2002 and one count of evasion for 2003, each "per year" count would still incorporate evasive conduct pertaining to RBI-related income, which occurred in this district. Thus, Defendant's argument that the purported venue problem stems from the Government's decision to charge Defendant with one count of tax evasion spanning several years is nonsensical.

10 One document of which Defendant specifically

Labels:

IRS met its has the burden of production under 7491(c). Taxpayer failed to keep adequate books or records or to substantiate items properly. See sec. 6662(c); sec. 1.6662-3(b)(1), Income Tax Regs. Taxpayers bear the burden of proving that the accuracy-related penalties should not be imposed with respect to any portion of the underpayments for which they acted with reasonable cause and in good faith. See sec. 6664(c)(1); sec. 1.6664-4(b)(1), Income Tax Regs.


Ronald Michael and Lorraine Elizabeth Skalko v. Commissioner.

Docket No. 10958-05S . Filed June 18, 2008.

[ Code Secs. 151, 162, 274 and 6662]

Tax Court: Summary opinion: Dependency exemption: Business deductions: Unreported income: Accuracy-related penalty: Substantial understatement: Evidence. --
A married couple, who operated two businesses as sole proprietorships, was allowed a portion of the deductions taken for certain business expenses, but they were not allowed to deduct legal expenses, wages paid to their sons, interest, rent and meal and entertainment expenses relating to the husband's attendance at a bartending conference, because the taxpayers failed to offer sufficient substantiation to show that they were entitled to the deductions. In addition, the taxpayers were liable for the accuracy-related penalties under Code Sec. 6662(a) and (b) for negligent failure to accurately report income and for substantial understatements of income tax.



PURSUANT TO INTERNAL REVENUE CODE SECTION 7463(b),THIS OPINION MAY NOT BE TREATED AS PRECEDENT FOR ANY OTHER CASE.



WELLS, Judge: This case was heard pursuant to the provisions of section 7463 of the Internal Revenue Code in effect when the petition was filed. Pursuant to section 7463(b), the decision to be entered is not reviewable by any other court, and this opinion shall not be treated as precedent for any other case.



Respondent determined deficiencies in petitioners' income taxes and penalties as follows:





Penalty Sec. 6662
Year Deficiency (a)

2001 $5,812 $1,162.40

2002 4,352 870.40

2003 4,176 835.20





The issues we must decide are: (1) Whether petitioners are liable for deficiencies in taxable years 2001, 2002, and 2003 where the deficiencies arose in part from deductions petitioners claimed on Schedule C, Profit or Loss From Business; (2) whether petitioners properly reported the gross receipts of their businesses; (3) whether petitioners may claim a dependency exemption deduction for their daughter for 2003; (4) whether petitioners properly reported an early distribution from a qualified pension or retirement plan; and (5) whether petitioners are liable for section 6662(a) accuracy-related penalties for negligent failure to accurately report income or for substantial understatements of income tax.





Background



Some facts have been stipulated and are so found. The stipulation of facts and the attached exhibits are incorporated herein by this reference. At the time the petition was filed, petitioners resided in Georgia.



During 2001, 2002, and 2003 petitioner Ronald Skalko (petitioner) operated two businesses as sole proprietorships. The first business was a party equipment rental and bartending service conducted under the name Pourmasters. The second business was a newspaper delivery service (Newspaper Delivery). For part of the year Mr. Skalko also worked full time as a seasonal employee of the Internal Revenue Service.




Car and Truck Expenses


Petitioner did not maintain contemporaneous mileage logs for car and truck expenses for Pourmasters and Newspaper Delivery. Petitioner provided a noncontemporaneous log for Pourmasters and Newspaper Delivery for 2001. On Schedule C for Pourmasters petitioners claimed car and truck expense deductions of $5,175 for 2001, $7,665 for 2002, and $10,800 for 2003 of which respondent allowed in the notice of deficiency the following: $3,695 for 2001, $5,000 for 2002, and $6,873 for 2003. On Schedule C for Newspaper Delivery petitioners claimed car and truck expense deductions of $3,450 for 2001 and $8,424 for 2003, of which respondent allowed in the notice of deficiency the following: $3,450 for 2001 and $3,600 for 2003.




Depreciation Expenses


For 2001 petitioners deducted $7,000 in depreciation expenses for Pourmasters. The documents petitioners provided to respondent reported expenses of $7,297.30. Of that amount in the notice of deficiency, respondent disallowed $1,968.20 paid to purchase a refrigerator during 2001 and allowed $5,311 of the remaining depreciation expense deductions claimed.




Legal Expenses


For 2001 petitioners deducted $3,500 in legal expenses for Pourmasters. In 2001 petitioners paid $3,500 to J. William Morse, an attorney, to defend Mr. Skalko against charges of driving under the influence of intoxicants, possessing an open container, and failing to maintain his lane while driving. In the notice of deficiency respondent disallowed all of petitioners' claimed legal expense deductions.




Itemized Deductions for Employee Business Expenses


For 2001 petitioners claimed deductions of $4,895 in employee business expenses, and in the notice of deficiency respondent allowed $3,954 of the amounts claimed. For 2002 petitioners deducted $6,593 in employee business expenses for Mrs. Skalko and $370 for Mr. Skalko, and of these amounts, in the notice of deficiency respondent allowed $990 for language training expenses and $2,964 for meal and entertainment expenses for Mrs. Skalko. For 2003 petitioners deducted $5,117 in employee business expenses for Mrs. Skalko and $240 for Mr. Skalko, and of those amounts, in the notice of deficiency respondent allowed $3,783 in employee business expenses for Mrs. Skalko.




Wages


During 2001 petitioners' older son was a full-time student at the University of Denver. Also during 2001 petitioners' younger son was 17 years old and was a high school student. Petitioners claimed that they employed both of their sons in Newspaper Delivery. For 2001 petitioners deducted payments they claim they paid their older son of $200 per week for 27.5 weeks, for a total of $5,500. Additionally for 2001, petitioners claimed deductions for payments they claim they made to their younger son of $200 per week for 15 weeks for a total of $3,000. Petitioner claims that he delivered newspapers for the remaining weeks of 2001. Petitioners failed to keep contemporaneous records of the days on which their sons delivered newspapers as well as of any payments made to their sons during 2001. In the notice of deficiency respondent disallowed all of the deductions claimed for wages paid to petitioners' sons.




Gross Receipts


For 2001 petitioners' records indicate that petitioners' gross receipts from Pourmasters were $18,532.95; however, petitioners reported only $15,350 of gross income. In the notice of deficiency respondent adjusted petitioners' gross receipts to include an additional $3,182.95.




Other Expenses


For 2001, 2002, and 2003 petitioners claimed other expense deductions for Pourmasters. Specifically, for 2001 petitioners deducted $1,500 for telephone expenses, $250 in cleaning expenses, $150 in postage expenses, and $500 in supplies. In the notice of deficiency respondent disallowed $124 of the cell phone expense deduction and allowed the remaining expense deductions claimed for 2001.



For 2002 petitioners deducted $2,500 in telephone expenses, $150 in cleaning expenses, $150 in postage expenses, $3,697 in supply expenses, and $1,250 in periodical expenses. In the notice of deficiency respondent disallowed $1,000 of the telephone expense deduction and $1,250 of the periodical expense deduction and allowed the remaining expense deductions claimed for 2002. 2



For 2003 petitioners claimed deductions of $2,400 in telephone expenses, $150 in cleaning expenses, $150 in postage expenses, $500 in periodical expenses, and $5,525 in supply expenses. In the notice of deficiency respondent disallowed $900 of the telephone expense deduction and $500 of the periodical expense deduction and allowed the remaining expense deductions.




Interest Expenses


For 2001 and 2002 petitioners claimed deductions for interest expenses charged on credit cards they used for both personal and business expenses. For 2001 petitioners deducted $1,500 in interest expenses for Pourmasters. Also, for 2002 petitioners deducted $2,500 in interest expenses for Pourmasters. In the notice of deficiency respondent disallowed all of the amounts deducted for those interest expenses.




Rent Expenses


For 2001, 2002, and 2003 respondent disallowed petitioners' claimed rent expense deductions for Pourmasters. Petitioners deducted amounts for rent expenses that they did not pay. During the audit petitioners asserted that goods were used to pay rent invoices in lieu of monetary compensation.




Travel/Meals and Entertainment Expenses


For Pourmasters for 2002 petitioners claimed $1,200 in expense deductions for attending a bartending conference. For 2002 and 2003 petitioners claimed $1,050 as meal and entertainment expense deductions related to Mr. Skalko's attendance at a bartending conference. In the notice of deficiency respondent disallowed all of the expense deductions.




Early Distribution


During 2002 Mrs. Skalko received an early distribution of $704 from a qualified pension or retirement plan. During 2003 Mrs. Skalko received $1,207 as an early distribution from a qualified pension or retirement plan. In the notice of deficiency respondent determined that the early distributions were to be included in petitioners' income for the respective taxable years.




Exemptions


During 2003 petitioners' daughter was 26 years old and earned $11,091 in income. Petitioners' daughter filed a tax return on which she claimed a personal exemption for herself and also claimed the earned income tax credit. For 2003 petitioners claimed a dependency exemption deduction for their daughter which respondent disallowed in the notice of deficiency.





Discussion



Generally, respondent's determinations in the statutory notice of deficiency are presumed correct. See Rule 142(a)(1); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). Deductions are a matter of legislative grace, and petitioners bear the burden of proving that they are entitled to the deductions claimed. See Rule 142(a); INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934). Under certain circumstances, the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner. Sec. 7491(a)(1). Section 7491(a) does not shift the burden of proof to respondent because petitioners failed to maintain records or comply with substantiation requirements as required by section 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B).



Where a taxpayer establishes that he incurred a business expense but cannot prove the amount of the expense, the Court may approximate the amount allowable, bearing heavily against the taxpayer whose inexactitude is of his own making. Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540, 543-544 (2d Cir. 1930) (the Cohan rule). To apply the Cohan rule, however, the Court must have a reasonable basis for approximating the amount of the expense. Vanicek v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 731, 742-743 (1985). We are not required to accept a taxpayer's unsubstantiated testimony that he is entitled to a deduction. See Tokarski v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 74, 77 (1986); Hoang v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-47.



Petitioners failed to offer sufficient substantiation to provide a reasonable basis for approximating the amounts of the expenses. See Vanicek v. Commissioner, supra at 742-743. Petitioners substantiated the cost of a refrigerator, the deduction for which respondent had disallowed; however, petitioners failed to demonstrate that they used it in one of their businesses. In addition, petitioners failed to provide any substantiation at trial that would permit the Court's use of the Cohan rule. We conclude that petitioners have failed to carry their burden to show that they are entitled to deductions in excess of the amounts respondent allowed in the notice of deficiency. Accordingly, we uphold respondent's determinations in the notice of deficiency for the taxable years in issue in full.



We next consider whether petitioners are liable for accuracy-related penalties pursuant to section 6662(a). Respondent determined section 6662(a) accuracy-related penalties of $1,162.40, $870.40, and $835.20 for taxable years 2001, 2002, and 2003. Respondent determined that petitioners' 2001, 2002, and 2003 underpayments of tax were attributable to negligence or disregard of rules and regulations, or alternatively that the 2001, 2002, and 2003 underpayments were attributable to substantial understatements of income tax.



Pursuant to section 6662(a) and (b), a taxpayer may be liable for a penalty of 20 percent of the portion of an underpayment of tax due to negligence or disregard of rules or regulations. The term "negligence" in section 6662(b)(1) includes any failure to make a reasonable attempt to comply with the Internal Revenue Code and any failure to keep adequate books and records or to substantiate items properly. Sec. 6662(c); sec. 1.6662-3(b)(1), Income Tax Regs. Negligence has also been defined as the failure to exercise due care or the failure to do what a reasonable person would do under the circumstances. See Allen v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 1, 12 (1989), affd. 925 F.2d 348, 353 (9th Cir. 1991); Neely v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 934, 947 (1985). The term "disregard" includes any careless, reckless, or intentional disregard. Sec. 6662(c).



The Commissioner has the burden of production with respect to accuracy-related penalties. Sec. 7491(c). To meet that burden, the Commissioner must produce sufficient evidence indicating that it is appropriate to impose the penalty. See Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 446 (2001). Once the Commissioner meets his burden of production, the taxpayer must come forward with persuasive evidence that the Commissioner's determination is incorrect. Rule 142(a); see Higbee v. Commissioner, supra at 446-447. The taxpayer may meet this burden by proving that he or she acted with reasonable cause and in good faith. See sec. 6664(c)(1); sec. 1.6664-4(b)(1), Income Tax Regs.



We conclude that respondent has met his burden of production under 7491(c). The record shows that petitioners failed to keep adequate books or records or to substantiate items properly for tax years 2001, 2002, and 2003. See sec. 6662(c); sec. 1.6662-3(b)(1), Income Tax Regs. Accordingly, petitioners bear the burden of proving that the accuracy-related penalties should not be imposed with respect to any portion of the underpayments for which they acted with reasonable cause and in good faith. See sec. 6664(c)(1); sec. 1.6664-4(b)(1), Income Tax Regs.



Petitioners claimed substantial deductions for which they failed to provide credible evidence that respondent's determinations are incorrect. We conclude that petitioners have failed to meet their burden of persuasion with respect to the accuracy-related penalties. Thus, we conclude that petitioners are liable for the section 6662(a) penalties for negligence determined by respondent.



We have considered the parties' remaining arguments and conclude that the arguments are either without merit or unnecessary to reach.



To reflect the foregoing, Decision will be entered for respondent.


Unless otherwise indicated, all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure, and all subsequent section references are to the Internal Revenue Code as in effect for the years in issue.

2 Although respondent intended in the notice of deficiency that $2,250 in expense deductions claimed for taxable year 2002 should be disallowed for Pourmasters, the notice of deficiency determined only a $1,000 adjustment. Respondent did not subsequently move to increase the deficiency accordingly.

Wednesday, June 18, 2008

Taxpayers who had foreign financial accounts during calendar year 2007 may be required to file Form TD F 90-22.1 by June 30, 2008. U.S. persons, who have a financial interest in or signature authority or any other authority over a financial account in a foreign country and the aggregate value of all financial accounts exceeds $10,000 at any time during the calendar year, are required to file a Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR) each year. The FABR information returns (Form TD F 90-22.1) for the 2007 calendar year must be filed with the U.S. Department of Treasury, P.O. Box 32621, Detroit, Michigan, 48232-0621.


IRS News Release IR-2008-79 , June 17, 2008.

[ Code Sec. 6011]


General requirement of return: Taxpayers affected: Foreign bank, securities, and other financial accounts reporting. --


Taxpayers who had foreign financial accounts during calendar year 2007 may be required to file Form TD F 90-22.1 by June 30, 2008. U.S. persons, who have a financial interest in or signature authority or any other authority over a financial account in a foreign country and the aggregate value of all financial accounts exceeds $10,000 at any time during the calendar year, are required to file a Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR) each year. The FABR information returns (Form TD F 90-22.1) for the 2007 calendar year must be filed with the U.S. Department of Treasury, P.O. Box 32621, Detroit, Michigan, 48232-0621. Back reference: ¶35,141.02.




WASHINGTON -- The Internal Revenue Service today reminded U.S. persons who have bank and other financial accounts in a foreign country that they may be required to report those accounts to the U.S. Department of Treasury by the June 30 deadline.

With globalization, more people in the U.S. have foreign financial accounts. There is nothing improper about setting up or maintaining such accounts. Still, IRS officials are concerned that U.S. persons may overlook that their accounts are large enough to trigger reporting obligations.

"There are responsibilities that go along with owning such foreign bank and financial accounts," said IRS Commissioner Doug Shulman. "Foreign account owners must remember that they may have to report their accounts to the government, even if the accounts do not generate any taxable income."

Since 2000, the number of Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR) forms received by the Treasury has increased by nearly 85 percent, from 174,528 in 2000 to 322,414 in 2007. Despite this significant increase in filings, concern remains about the degree of reporting compliance for those who are required to file.

U.S. persons are required to file a Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR), Form TD F 90-22.1, each year if they have a financial interest in or signature authority or other authority over any financial accounts, including bank, securities or other types of financial accounts, in a foreign country, if the aggregate value of these financial accounts exceeds $10,000 at any time during the calendar year.

The 2007 FBAR form is due June 30, 2008.

The FBAR is not an income tax return and should not be mailed with any income tax returns. The FBAR must be filed on or before June 30 of the following year to: U.S. Department of the Treasury, P.O. Box 32621, Detroit, MI 48232-0621.

Unlike with federal income tax returns, requests for an extension of time to file an FBAR are not granted.

Civil and criminal penalties for non-compliance with the FBAR filing requirements are severe. Civil penalties for a non-willful violation can range up to $10,000 per violation. Civil penalties for a willful violation can range up to the greater of $100,000 or 50 percent of the amount in the account at the time of the violation. Criminal penalties for violating the FBAR requirements while also violating certain other laws can range up to a $500,000 fine or 10 years imprisonment or both. Civil and criminal penalties may be imposed together.

If a holder of a foreign account was required to file FBARs for earlier years, however, he or she should file the delinquent FBAR reports and attach a statement explaining why the reports are filed late. No penalty will be assessed if IRS determines that the late filings were due to reasonable cause. The account holder should keep copies of their statement for his or her own record.

FBAR information returns for the 2007 calendar year must be filed with the U.S. Department of Treasury, P.O. Box 32621, Detroit, Mich., 48232-0621. The address for commercial delivery is: U.S. Department of Treasury, Currency Transaction Reporting, 985 Michigan Avenue, Detroit, Mich., 48226.

The FBAR form is not available for electronic filing, but many income tax software packages can prepare a printed copy. FBAR forms and instructions are also available on IRS.gov or the FinCEN Web site and by calling 1-800-829-3676.

Taxpayers who need assistance completing Form TD F 90-22.1 can contact the IRS by telephone at 1-800-800-2877, option 2, or via email at FBARquestions@irs.gov.

Labels:

Heroes Earnings Assistance and Relief Tax Act of 2008, as Passed by the House on May 20, 2008

May 22, 2008

110th Congress

110th CONGRESS



2d Session



H. R. 6081



AN ACT

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide benefits for military personnel, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,



SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE, ETC.

(a) Short Title- This Act may be cited as the `Heroes Earnings Assistance and Relief Tax Act of 2008'.

(b) Reference- Except as otherwise expressly provided, whenever in this Act an amendment or repeal is expressed in terms of an amendment to, or repeal of, a section or other provision, the reference shall be considered to be made to a section or other provision of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.

(c) Table of Contents- The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title, etc.



TITLE I --BENEFITS FOR MILITARY

Sec. 101. Recovery rebate provided to military families.

Sec. 102. Election to include combat pay as earned income for purposes of earned income tax credit.

Sec. 103. Modification of mortgage revenue bonds for veterans.

Sec. 104. Survivor and disability payments with respect to qualified military service.

Sec. 105. Treatment of differential military pay as wages.

Sec. 106. Special period of limitation when uniformed services retired pay is reduced as a result of award of disability compensation.

Sec. 107. Distributions from retirement plans to individuals called to active duty.

Sec. 108. Authority to disclose return information for certain veterans programs made permanent.

Sec. 109. Contributions of military death gratuities to Roth IRAs and Education Savings Accounts.

Sec. 110. Suspension of 5-year period during service with the Peace Corps.

Sec. 111. Credit for employer differential wage payments to employees who are active duty members of the uniformed services.

Sec. 112. State payments to service members treated as qualified military benefits.

Sec. 113. Permanent exclusion of gain from sale of a principal residence by certain employees of the intelligence community.

Sec. 114. Special disposition rules for unused benefits in health flexible spending arrangements of individuals called to active duty.

Sec. 115. Technical correction related to exclusion of certain property tax rebates and other benefits provided to volunteer firefighters and emergency medical responders.



TITLE II --IMPROVEMENTS IN SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME

Sec. 201. Treatment of uniformed service cash remuneration as earned income.

Sec. 202. State annuities for certain veterans to be disregarded in determining supplemental security income benefits.

Sec. 203. Exclusion of AmeriCorps benefits for purposes of determining supplemental security income eligibility and benefit amounts.

Sec. 204. Effective date.



TITLE III --REVENUE PROVISIONS

Sec. 301. Revision of tax rules on expatriation.

Sec. 302. Certain domestically controlled foreign persons performing services under contract with United States Government treated as American employers.

Sec. 303. Increase in minimum penalty on failure to file a return of tax.



TITLE IV --PARITY IN THE APPLICATION OF CERTAIN LIMITS TO MENTAL HEALTH BENEFITS

Sec. 401. Parity in the application of certain limits to mental health benefits.



TITLE I --BENEFITS FOR MILITARY



SEC. 101. RECOVERY REBATE PROVIDED TO MILITARY FAMILIES.

(a) In General- Subsection (h) of section 6428 (relating to identification number requirement) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

`(3) SPECIAL RULE FOR MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES- Paragraph (1) shall not apply to a joint return where at least 1 spouse was a member of the Armed Forces of the United States at any time during the taxable year.'.

(b) Effective Date- The amendments made by this section shall take effect as if included in the amendments made by section 101 of the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008.



SEC. 102. ELECTION TO INCLUDE COMBAT PAY AS EARNED INCOME FOR PURPOSES OF EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT.

(a) In General- Clause (vi) of section 32(c)(2)(B) (defining earned income) is amended to read as follows:

`(vi) a taxpayer may elect to treat amounts excluded from gross income by reason of section 112 as earned income.'.

(b) Conforming Amendment- Paragraph (4) of section 6428(e) is amended by striking `except that --' and all that follows through `(B) such term shall' and inserting `except that such term shall'.

(c) Sunset Not Applicable- Section 105 of the Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004 (relating to application of EGTRRA sunset to this title) shall not apply to section 104(b) of such Act.

(d) Effective Date- The amendments made by this section shall apply to taxable years ending after December 31, 2007.



SEC. 103. MODIFICATION OF MORTGAGE REVENUE BONDS FOR VETERANS.

(a) Qualified Mortgage Bonds Used To Finance Residences for Veterans Without Regard to First-Time Homebuyer Requirement- Subparagraph (D) of section 143(d)(2) (relating to exceptions) is amended by striking `and before January 1, 2008'.

(b) Increase in Bond Limitation for Alaska, Oregon, and Wisconsin- Clause (ii) of section 143(l)(3)(B) (relating to State veterans limit) is amended by striking `$25,000,000' each place it appears and inserting `$100,000,000'.

(c) Definition of Qualified Veteran- Paragraph (4) of section 143(l) (defining qualified veteran) is amended to read as follows:

`(4) QUALIFIED VETERAN- For purposes of this subsection, the term `qualified veteran' means any veteran who --

`(A) served on active duty, and

`(B) applied for the financing before the date 25 years after the last date on which such veteran left active service.'.

(d) Effective Date- The amendments made by this section shall apply to bonds issued after December 31, 2007.

(e) Transition Rule- In the case of any bond issued after December 31, 2007, and before the date of the enactment of this Act, subparagraph (B) of section 143(l)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended by this section, shall be applied by substituting `30 years' for `25 years'.



SEC. 104. SURVIVOR AND DISABILITY PAYMENTS WITH RESPECT TO QUALIFIED MILITARY SERVICE.

(a) Plan Qualification Requirement for Death Benefits Under USERRA-Qualified Active Military Service- Subsection (a) of section 401 (relating to requirements for qualification) is amended by inserting after paragraph (36) the following new paragraph:

`(37) DEATH BENEFITS UNDER USERRA-QUALIFIED ACTIVE MILITARY SERVICE- A trust shall not constitute a qualified trust unless the plan provides that, in the case of a participant who dies while performing qualified military service (as defined in section 414(u)), the survivors of the participant are entitled to any additional benefits (other than benefit accruals relating to the period of qualified military service) provided under the plan had the participant resumed and then terminated employment on account of death.'.

(b) Treatment in the Case of Death or Disability Resulting From Active Military Service for Benefit Accrual Purposes- Subsection (u) of section 414 (relating to special rules relating to veterans' reemployment rights under USERRA) is amended by redesignating paragraphs (9) and (10) as paragraphs (10) and (11), respectively, and by inserting after paragraph (8) the following new paragraph:

`(9) TREATMENT IN THE CASE OF DEATH OR DISABILITY RESULTING FROM ACTIVE MILITARY SERVICE-

`(A) IN GENERAL- For benefit accrual purposes, an employer sponsoring a retirement plan may treat an individual who dies or becomes disabled (as defined under the terms of the plan) while performing qualified military service with respect to the employer maintaining the plan as if the individual has resumed employment in accordance with the individual's reemployment rights under chapter 43 of title 38, United States Code, on the day preceding death or disability (as the case may be) and terminated employment on the actual date of death or disability. In the case of any such treatment, and subject to subparagraphs (B) and (C), any full or partial compliance by such plan with respect to the benefit accrual requirements of paragraph (8) with respect to such individual shall be treated for purposes of paragraph (1) as if such compliance were required under such chapter 43.

`(B) NONDISCRIMINATION REQUIREMENT- Subparagraph (A) shall apply only if all individuals performing qualified military service with respect to the employer maintaining the plan (as determined under subsections (b), (c), (m), and (o)) who die or became disabled as a result of performing qualified military service prior to reemployment by the employer are credited with service and benefits on reasonably equivalent terms.

`(C) DETERMINATION OF BENEFITS- The amount of employee contributions and the amount of elective deferrals of an individual treated as reemployed under subparagraph (A) for purposes of applying paragraph (8)(C) shall be determined on the basis of the individual's average actual employee contributions or elective deferrals for the lesser of --

`(i) the 12-month period of service with the employer immediately prior to qualified military service, or

`(ii) if service with the employer is less than such 12-month period, the actual length of continuous service with the employer.'.

(c) Conforming Amendments-

(1) Section 404(a)(2) is amended by striking `and (31)' and inserting `(31), and (37)'.

(2) Section 403(b) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

`(14) DEATH BENEFITS UNDER USERRA-QUALIFIED ACTIVE MILITARY SERVICE- This subsection shall not apply to an annuity contract unless such contract meets the requirements of section 401(a)(37).'.

(3) Section 457(g) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

`(4) DEATH BENEFITS UNDER USERRA-QUALIFIED ACTIVE MILITARY SERVICE- A plan described in paragraph (1) shall not be treated as an eligible deferred compensation plan unless such plan meets the requirements of section 401(a)(37).'.

(d) Effective Date-

(1) IN GENERAL- The amendments made by this section shall apply with respect to deaths and disabilities occurring on or after January 1, 2007.

(2) PROVISIONS RELATING TO PLAN AMENDMENTS-

(A) IN GENERAL- If this subparagraph applies to any plan or contract amendment, such plan or contract shall be treated as being operated in accordance with the terms of the plan during the period described in subparagraph (B)(iii).

(B) AMENDMENTS TO WHICH SUBPARAGRAPH (A) APPLIES-

(i) IN GENERAL- Subparagraph (A) shall apply to any amendment to any plan or annuity contract which is made --

(I) pursuant to the amendments made by subsection (a) or pursuant to any regulation issued by the Secretary of the Treasury under subsection (a), and

(II) on or before the last day of the first plan year beginning on or after January 1, 2010.

In the case of a governmental plan (as defined in section 414(d) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986), this clause shall be applied by substituting `2012' for `2010' in subclause (II).

(ii) CONDITIONS- This paragraph shall not apply to any amendment unless --

(I) the plan or contract is operated as if such plan or contract amendment were in effect for the period described in clause (iii), and

(II) such plan or contract amendment applies retroactively for such period.

(iii) PERIOD DESCRIBED- The period described in this clause is the period --

(I) beginning on the effective date specified by the plan, and

(II) ending on the date described in clause (i)(II) (or, if earlier, the date the plan or contract amendment is adopted).



SEC. 105. TREATMENT OF DIFFERENTIAL MILITARY PAY AS WAGES.

(a) Income Tax Withholding on Differential Wage Payments-

(1) IN GENERAL- Section 3401 (relating to definitions) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

`(h) Differential Wage Payments to Active Duty Members of the Uniformed Services-

`(1) IN GENERAL- For purposes of subsection (a), any differential wage payment shall be treated as a payment of wages by the employer to the employee.

`(2) DIFFERENTIAL WAGE PAYMENT- For purposes of paragraph (1), the term `differential wage payment' means any payment which --

`(A) is made by an employer to an individual with respect to any period during which the individual is performing service in the uniformed services (as defined in chapter 43 of title 38, United States Code) while on active duty for a period of more than 30 days, and

`(B) represents all or a portion of the wages the individual would have received from the employer if the individual were performing service for the employer.'.

(2) EFFECTIVE DATE- The amendment made by this subsection shall apply to remuneration paid after December 31, 2008.

(b) Treatment of Differential Wage Payments for Retirement Plan Purposes-

(1) PENSION PLANS-

(A) IN GENERAL- Section 414(u) (relating to special rules relating to veterans' reemployment rights under USERRA), as amended by section 103(b), is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

`(12) TREATMENT OF DIFFERENTIAL WAGE PAYMENTS-

`(A) IN GENERAL- Except as provided in this paragraph, for purposes of applying this title to a retirement plan to which this subsection applies --

`(i) an individual receiving a differential wage payment shall be treated as an employee of the employer making the payment,

`(ii) the differential wage payment shall be treated as compensation, and

`(iii) the plan shall not be treated as failing to meet the requirements of any provision described in paragraph (1)(C) by reason of any contribution or benefit which is based on the differential wage payment.

`(B) SPECIAL RULE FOR DISTRIBUTIONS-

`(i) IN GENERAL- Notwithstanding subparagraph (A)(i), for purposes of section 401(k)(2)(B)(i)(I), 403(b)(7)(A)(ii), 403(b)(11)(A), or 457(d)(1)(A)(ii), an individual shall be treated as having been severed from employment during any period the individual is performing service in the uniformed services described in section 3401(h)(2)(A).

`(ii) LIMITATION- If an individual elects to receive a distribution by reason of clause (i), the plan shall provide that the individual may not make an elective deferral or employee contribution during the 6-month period beginning on the date of the distribution.

`(C) NONDISCRIMINATION REQUIREMENT- Subparagraph (A)(iii) shall apply only if all employees of an employer (as determined under subsections (b), (c), (m), and (o)) performing service in the uniformed services described in section 3401(h)(2)(A) are entitled to receive differential wage payments on reasonably equivalent terms and, if eligible to participate in a retirement plan maintained by the employer, to make contributions based on the payments on reasonably equivalent terms. For purposes of applying this subparagraph, the provisions of paragraphs (3), (4), and (5) of section 410(b) shall apply.

`(D) DIFFERENTIAL WAGE PAYMENT- For purposes of this paragraph, the term `differential wage payment' has the meaning given such term by section 3401(h)(2).'.

(B) CONFORMING AMENDMENT- The heading for section 414(u) is amended by inserting `and to Differential Wage Payments to Members on Active Duty' after `USERRA'.

(2) DIFFERENTIAL WAGE PAYMENTS TREATED AS COMPENSATION FOR INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT PLANS- Section 219(f)(1) (defining compensation) is amended by adding at the end the following new sentence: `The term compensation includes any differential wage payment (as defined in section 3401(h)(2)).'.

(3) EFFECTIVE DATE- The amendments made by this subsection shall apply to years beginning after December 31, 2008.

(c) Provisions Relating to Plan Amendments-

(1) IN GENERAL- If this subsection applies to any plan or annuity contract amendment, such plan or contract shall be treated as being operated in accordance with the terms of the plan or contract during the period described in paragraph (2)(B)(i).

(2) AMENDMENTS TO WHICH SECTION APPLIES-

(A) IN GENERAL- This subsection shall apply to any amendment to any plan or annuity contract which is made --

(i) pursuant to any amendment made by subsection (b)(1), and

(ii) on or before the last day of the first plan year beginning on or after January 1, 2010.

In the case of a governmental plan (as defined in section 414(d) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986), this subparagraph shall be applied by substituting `2012' for `2010' in clause (ii).

(B) CONDITIONS- This subsection shall not apply to any plan or annuity contract amendment unless --

(i) during the period beginning on the date the amendment described in subparagraph (A)(i) takes effect and ending on the date described in subparagraph (A)(ii) (or, if earlier, the date the plan or contract amendment is adopted), the plan or contract is operated as if such plan or contract amendment were in effect, and

(ii) such plan or contract amendment applies retroactively for such period.



SEC. 106. SPECIAL PERIOD OF LIMITATION WHEN UNIFORMED SERVICES RETIRED PAY IS REDUCED AS A RESULT OF AWARD OF DISABILITY COMPENSATION.

(a) In General- Subsection (d) of section 6511 (relating to special rules applicable to income taxes) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

`(8) SPECIAL RULES WHEN UNIFORMED SERVICES RETIRED PAY IS REDUCED AS A RESULT OF AWARD OF DISABILITY COMPENSATION-

`(A) PERIOD OF LIMITATION ON FILING CLAIM- If the claim for credit or refund relates to an overpayment of tax imposed by subtitle A on account of --

`(i) the reduction of uniformed services retired pay computed under section 1406 or 1407 of title 10, United States Code, or

`(ii) the waiver of such pay under section 5305 of title 38 of such Code,

as a result of an award of compensation under title 38 of such Code pursuant to a determination by the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, the 3-year period of limitation prescribed in subsection (a) shall be extended, for purposes of permitting a credit or refund based upon the amount of such reduction or waiver, until the end of the 1-year period beginning on the date of such determination.

`(B) LIMITATION TO 5 TAXABLE YEARS- Subparagraph (A) shall not apply with respect to any taxable year which began more than 5 years before the date of such determination.'.

(b) Effective Date- The amendment made by subsection (a) shall apply to claims for credit or refund filed after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(c) Transition Rules- In the case of a determination described in paragraph (8) of section 6511(d) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (as added by this section) which is made by the Secretary of Veterans Affairs after December 31, 2000, and before the date of the enactment of this Act, such paragraph --

(1) shall not apply with respect to any taxable year which began before January 1, 2001, and

(2) shall be applied by substituting for `the date of such determination' in subparagraph (A) thereof.



SEC. 107. DISTRIBUTIONS FROM RETIREMENT PLANS TO INDIVIDUALS CALLED TO ACTIVE DUTY.

(a) In General- Clause (iv) of section 72(t)(2)(G) is amended by striking `, and before December 31, 2007'.

(b) Effective Date- The amendment made by this section shall apply to individuals ordered or called to active duty on or after December 31, 2007.



SEC. 108. AUTHORITY TO DISCLOSE RETURN INFORMATION FOR CERTAIN VETERANS PROGRAMS MADE PERMANENT.

(a) In General- Paragraph (7) of section 6103(l) is amended by striking the last sentence thereof.

(b) Conforming Amendment- Section 6103(l)(7)(D)(viii)(III) is amended by striking `sections 1710(a)(1)(I), 1710(a)(2), 1710(b), and 1712(a)(2)(B)' and inserting `sections 1710(a)(2)(G), 1710(a)(3), and 1710(b)'.

(c) Effective Date- The amendment made by subsection (a) shall apply to requests made after September 30, 2008.



SEC. 109. CONTRIBUTIONS OF MILITARY DEATH GRATUITIES TO ROTH IRAS AND EDUCATION SAVINGS ACCOUNTS.

(a) Provision in Effect Before Pension Protection Act- Subsection (e) of section 408A (relating to qualified rollover contribution), as in effect before the amendments made by section 824 of the Pension Protection Act of 2006, is amended to read as follows:

`(e) Qualified Rollover Contribution- For purposes of this section --

`(1) IN GENERAL- The term `qualified rollover contribution' means a rollover contribution to a Roth IRA from another such account, or from an individual retirement plan, but only if such rollover contribution meets the requirements of section 408(d)(3). Such term includes a rollover contribution described in section 402A(c)(3)(A). For purposes of section 408(d)(3)(B), there shall be disregarded any qualified rollover contribution from an individual retirement plan (other than a Roth IRA) to a Roth IRA.

`(2) MILITARY DEATH GRATUITY-

`(A) IN GENERAL- The term `qualified rollover contribution' includes a contribution to a Roth IRA maintained for the benefit of an individual made before the end of the 1-year period beginning on the date on which such individual receives an amount under section 1477 of title 10, United States Code, or section 1967 of title 38 of such Code, with respect to a person, to the extent that such contribution does not exceed --

`(i) the sum of the amounts received during such period by such individual under such sections with respect to such person, reduced by

`(ii) the amounts so received which were contributed to a Coverdell education savings account under section 530(d)(9).

`(B) ANNUAL LIMIT ON NUMBER OF ROLLOVERS NOT TO APPLY- Section 408(d)(3)(B) shall not apply with respect to amounts treated as a rollover by subparagraph (A).

`(C) APPLICATION OF SECTION 72- For purposes of applying section 72 in the case of a distribution which is not a qualified distribution, the amount treated as a rollover by reason of subparagraph (A) shall be treated as investment in the contract.'.

(b) Provision in Effect After Pension Protection Act- Subsection (e) of section 408A, as in effect after the amendments made by section 824 of the Pension Protection Act of 2006, is amended to read as follows:

`(e) Qualified Rollover Contribution- For purposes of this section --

`(1) IN GENERAL- The term `qualified rollover contribution' means a rollover contribution --

`(A) to a Roth IRA from another such account,

`(B) from an eligible retirement plan, but only if --

`(i) in the case of an individual retirement plan, such rollover contribution meets the requirements of section 408(d)(3), and

`(ii) in the case of any eligible retirement plan (as defined in section 402(c)(8)(B) other than clauses (i) and (ii) thereof), such rollover contribution meets the requirements of section 402(c), 403(b)(8), or 457(e)(16), as applicable.

For purposes of section 408(d)(3)(B), there shall be disregarded any qualified rollover contribution from an individual retirement plan (other than a Roth IRA) to a Roth IRA.

`(2) MILITARY DEATH GRATUITY-

`(A) IN GENERAL- The term `qualified rollover contribution' includes a contribution to a Roth IRA maintained for the benefit of an individual made before the end of the 1-year period beginning on the date on which such individual receives an amount under section 1477 of title 10, United States Code, or section 1967 of title 38 of such Code, with respect to a person, to the extent that such contribution does not exceed --

`(i) the sum of the amounts received during such period by such individual under such sections with respect to such person, reduced by

`(ii) the amounts so received which were contributed to a Coverdell education savings account under section 530(d)(9).

`(B) ANNUAL LIMIT ON NUMBER OF ROLLOVERS NOT TO APPLY- Section 408(d)(3)(B) shall not apply with respect to amounts treated as a rollover by the subparagraph (A).

`(C) APPLICATION OF SECTION 72- For purposes of applying section 72 in the case of a distribution which is not a qualified distribution, the amount treated as a rollover by reason of subparagraph (A) shall be treated as investment in the contract.'.

(c) Education Savings Accounts- Subsection (d) of section 530 is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

`(9) MILITARY DEATH GRATUITY-

`(A) IN GENERAL- For purposes of this section, the term `rollover contribution' includes a contribution to a Coverdell education savings account made before the end of the 1-year period beginning on the date on which the contributor receives an amount under section 1477 of title 10, United States Code, or section 1967 of title 38 of such Code, with respect to a person, to the extent that such contribution does not exceed --

`(i) the sum of the amounts received during such period by such contributor under such sections with respect to such person, reduced by

`(ii) the amounts so received which were contributed to a Roth IRA under section 408A(e)(2) or to another Coverdell education savings account.

`(B) ANNUAL LIMIT ON NUMBER OF ROLLOVERS NOT TO APPLY- The last sentence of paragraph (5) shall not apply with respect to amounts treated as a rollover by the subparagraph (A).

`(C) APPLICATION OF SECTION 72- For purposes of applying section 72 in the case of a distribution which is includible in gross income under paragraph (1), the amount treated as a rollover by reason of subparagraph (A) shall be treated as investment in the contract.'.

(d) Effective Dates-

(1) IN GENERAL- Except as provided by paragraphs (2) and (3), the amendments made by this section shall apply with respect to deaths from injuries occurring on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(2) APPLICATION OF AMENDMENTS TO DEATHS FROM INJURIES OCCURRING ON OR AFTER OCTOBER 7, 2001, AND BEFORE ENACTMENT- The amendments made by this section shall apply to any contribution made pursuant to section 408A(e)(2) or 530(d)(5) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended by this Act, with respect to amounts received under section 1477 of title 10, United States Code, or under section 1967 of title 38 of such Code, for deaths from injuries occurring on or after October 7, 2001, and before the date of the enactment of this Act if such contribution is made not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(3) PENSION PROTECTION ACT CHANGES- Section 408A(e)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (as in effect after the amendments made by subsection (b)) shall apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 2007.



SEC. 110. SUSPENSION OF 5-YEAR PERIOD DURING SERVICE WITH THE PEACE CORPS.

(a) In General- Subsection (d) of section 121 (relating to special rules) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

`(12) PEACE CORPS-

`(A) IN GENERAL- At the election of an individual with respect to a property, the running of the 5-year period described in subsections (a) and (c)(1)(B) and paragraph (7) of this subsection with respect to such property shall be suspended during any period that such individual or such individual's spouse is serving outside the United States --

`(i) on qualified official extended duty (as defined in paragraph (9)(C)) as an employee of the Peace Corps, or

`(ii) as an enrolled volunteer or volunteer leader under section 5 or 6 (as the case may be) of the Peace Corps Act (22 U.S.C. 2504, 2505).

`(B) APPLICABLE RULES- For purposes of subparagraph (A), rules similar to the rules of subparagraphs (B) and (D) shall apply.'.

(b) Effective Date- The amendment made by subsection (a) shall apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 2007.



SEC. 111. CREDIT FOR EMPLOYER DIFFERENTIAL WAGE PAYMENTS TO EMPLOYEES WHO ARE ACTIVE DUTY MEMBERS OF THE UNIFORMED SERVICES.

(a) In General- Subpart D of part IV of subchapter A of chapter 1 (relating to business credits) is amended by adding at the end the following new section:



`SEC. 45P. EMPLOYER WAGE CREDIT FOR EMPLOYEES WHO ARE ACTIVE DUTY MEMBERS OF THE UNIFORMED SERVICES.

`(a) General Rule- For purposes of section 38, in the case of an eligible small business employer, the differential wage payment credit for any taxable year is an amount equal to 20 percent of the sum of the eligible differential wage payments for each of the qualified employees of the taxpayer during such taxable year.

`(b) Definitions- For purposes of this section --

`(1) ELIGIBLE DIFFERENTIAL WAGE PAYMENTS- The term `eligible differential wage payments' means, with respect to each qualified employee, so much of the differential wage payments (as defined in section 3401(h)(2)) paid to such employee for the taxable year as does not exceed $20,000.

`(2) QUALIFIED EMPLOYEE- The term `qualified employee' means a person who has been an employee of the taxpayer for the 91-day period immediately preceding the period for which any differential wage payment is made.

`(3) ELIGIBLE SMALL BUSINESS EMPLOYER-

`(A) IN GENERAL- The term `eligible small business employer' means, with respect to any taxable year, any employer which --

`(i) employed an average of less than 50 employees on business days during such taxable year, and

`(ii) under a written plan of the employer, provides eligible differential wage payments to every qualified employee of the employer.

`(B) CONTROLLED GROUPS- For purposes of subparagraph (A), all persons treated as a single employer under subsection (b), (c), (m), or (o) of section 414 shall be treated as a single employer.

`(c) Coordination With Other Credits- The amount of credit otherwise allowable under this chapter with respect to compensation paid to any employee shall be reduced by the credit determined under this section with respect to such employee.

`(d) Disallowance for Failure To Comply With Employment or Reemployment Rights of Members of the Reserve Components of the Armed Forces of the United States- No credit shall be allowed under subsection (a) to a taxpayer for --

`(1) any taxable year, beginning after the date of the enactment of this section, in which the taxpayer is under a final order, judgment, or other process issued or required by a district court of the United States under section 4323 of title 38 of the United States Code with respect to a violation of chapter 43 of such title, and

`(2) the 2 succeeding taxable years.

`(e) Certain Rules to Apply- For purposes of this section, rules similar to the rules of subsections (c), (d), and (e) of section 52 shall apply.

`(f) Termination- This section shall not apply to any payments made after December 31, 2009.'.

(b) Credit Treated as Part of General Business Credit- Section 38(b) (relating to general business credit) is amended by striking `plus' at the end of paragraph (31), by striking the period at the end of paragraph (32) and inserting `, plus', and by adding at the end of following new paragraph:

`(33) the differential wage payment credit determined under section 45P(a).'.

(c) No Deduction for Compensation Taken Into Account for Credit- Section 280C(a) (relating to rule for employment credits) is amended by inserting `45P(a),' after `45A(a),'.

(d) Clerical Amendment- The table of sections for subpart D of part IV of subchapter A of chapter 1 is amended by adding at the end the following new item:

`Sec. 45P. Employer wage credit for employees who are active duty members of the uniformed services.'.

(e) Effective Date- The amendments made by this section shall apply to amounts paid after the date of the enactment of this Act.



SEC. 112. STATE PAYMENTS TO SERVICE MEMBERS TREATED AS QUALIFIED MILITARY BENEFITS.

(a) In General- Section 134(b) (defining qualified military benefit) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

`(6) CERTAIN STATE PAYMENTS- The term `qualified military benefit' includes any bonus payment by a State or political subdivision thereof to any member or former member of the uniformed services of the United States or any dependent of such member only by reason of such member's service in an combat zone (as defined in section 112(c)(2), determined without regard to the parenthetical).'.

(b) Effective Date- The amendment made by this section shall apply to payments made before, on, or after the date of the enactment of this Act.



SEC. 113. PERMANENT EXCLUSION OF GAIN FROM SALE OF A PRINCIPAL RESIDENCE BY CERTAIN EMPLOYEES OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

(a) In General- Paragraph (9) of section 121(d) is amended by striking subparagraph (E).

(b) Duty Station May Be Inside United States- Section 121(d)(9)(C) (defining qualified official extended duty) is amended by striking clause (vi).

(c) Effective Date- The amendments made by this section shall apply to sales or exchanges after the date of the enactment of this Act.



SEC. 114. SPECIAL DISPOSITION RULES FOR UNUSED BENEFITS IN HEALTH FLEXIBLE SPENDING ARRANGEMENTS OF INDIVIDUALS CALLED TO ACTIVE DUTY.

(a) In General- Section 125 (relating to cafeteria plans) is amended by redesignating subsections (h) and (i) as subsection (i) and (j), respectively, and by inserting after subsection (g) the following new subsection:

`(h) Special Rule for Unused Benefits in Health Flexible Spending Arrangements of Individuals Called to Active Duty-

`(1) IN GENERAL- For purposes of this title, a plan or other arrangement shall not fail to be treated as a cafeteria plan or health flexible spending arrangement merely because such arrangement provides for qualified reservist distributions.

`(2) QUALIFIED RESERVIST DISTRIBUTION- For purposes of this subsection, the term `qualified reservist distribution' means, any distribution to an individual of all or a portion of the balance in the employee's account under such arrangement if --

`(A) such individual was (by reason of being a member of a reserve component (as defined in section 101 of title 37, United States Code)) ordered or called to active duty for a period in excess of 179 days or for an indefinite period, and

`(B) such distribution is made during the period beginning on the date of such order or call and ending on the last date that reimbursements could otherwise be made under such arrangement for the plan year which includes the date of such order or call.'.

(b) Effective Date- The amendment made by this section shall apply to distributions made after the date of the enactment of this Act.



SEC. 115. TECHNICAL CORRECTION RELATED TO EXCLUSION OF CERTAIN PROPERTY TAX REBATES AND OTHER BENEFITS PROVIDED TO VOLUNTEER FIREFIGHTERS AND EMERGENCY MEDICAL RESPONDERS.

(a) Social Security Taxes-

(1) Section 3121(a) (relating to definition of wages) is amended by striking `or' at the end of paragraph (21), by striking the period at the end of paragraph (22) and inserting `; or', and by inserting after paragraph (22) the following new paragraph:

`(23) any benefit or payment which is excludable from the gross income of the employee under section 139B(b).'.

(2) Section 209(a) of the Social Security Act is amended by striking `or' at the end of paragraph (18), by striking the period at the end of paragraph (19) and inserting `; or', and by inserting after paragraph (19) the following new paragraph:

`(20) Any benefit or payment which is excludable from the gross income of the employee under section 139B(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986).'.

(b) Unemployment Taxes- Section 3306(b) (relating to definition of wages) is amended by striking `or' at the end of paragraph (18), by striking the period at the end of paragraph (19) and inserting `; or', and by inserting after paragraph (19) the following new paragraph:

`(20) any benefit or payment which is excludable from the gross income of the employee under section 139B(b).'.

(c) Wage Withholding- Section 3401(a) (defining wages) is amended by striking `or' at the end of paragraph (21), by striking the period at the end of paragraph (22) and inserting `; or', and by inserting after paragraph (22) the following new paragraph:

`(23) for any benefit or payment which is excludable from the gross income of the employee under section 139B(b).'.

(d) Effective Date- The amendments made by this section shall take effect as if included in section 5 of the Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007.



TITLE II --IMPROVEMENTS IN SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME



SEC. 201. TREATMENT OF UNIFORMED SERVICE CASH REMUNERATION AS EARNED INCOME.

(a) In General- Section 1612(a)(1)(A) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1382a(a)(1)(A)) is amended by inserting `(and, in the case of cash remuneration paid for service as a member of a uniformed service (other than payments described in paragraph (2)(H) of this subsection or subsection (b)(20)), without regard to the limitations contained in section 209(d))' before the semicolon.

(b) Certain Housing Payments Treated as In-Kind Support and Maintenance- Section 1612(a)(2) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 1382a(a)(2)) is amended --

(1) by striking `and' at the end of subparagraph (F);

(2) by striking the period at the end of subparagraph (G) and inserting `; and'; and

(3) by adding at the end the following:

`(H) payments to or on behalf of a member of a uniformed service for housing of the member (and his or her dependents, if any) on a facility of a uniformed service, including payments provided under section 403 of title 37, United States Code, for housing that is acquired or constructed under subchapter IV of chapter 169 of title 10 of such Code, or any related provision of law, and any such payments shall be treated as support and maintenance in kind subject to subparagraph (A) of this paragraph.'.



SEC. 202. STATE ANNUITIES FOR CERTAIN VETERANS TO BE DISREGARDED IN DETERMINING SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME BENEFITS.

(a) Income Disregard- Section 1612(b) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1382a(b)) is amended --

(1) by striking `and' at the end of paragraph (22);

(2) by striking the period at the end of paragraph (23) and inserting `; and'; and

(3) by adding at the end the following:

`(24) any annuity paid by a State to the individual (or such spouse) on the basis of the individual's being a veteran (as defined in section 101 of title 38, United States Code), and blind, disabled, or aged.'.

(b) Resource Disregard- Section 1613(a) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 1382b(a)) is amended --

(1) by striking `and' at the end of paragraph (14);

(2) by striking the period at the end of paragraph (15) and inserting `; and'; and

(3) by inserting after paragraph (15) the following:

`(16) for the month of receipt and every month thereafter, any annuity paid by a State to the individual (or such spouse) on the basis of the individual's being a veteran (as defined in section 101 of title 38, United States Code), and blind, disabled, or aged.'.



SEC. 203. EXCLUSION OF AMERICORPS BENEFITS FOR PURPOSES OF DETERMINING SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME ELIGIBILITY AND BENEFIT AMOUNTS.

Section 1612(b) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1382a(b)), as amended by section 202(a) of this Act, is amended --

(1) in paragraph (23), by striking `and' at the end;

(2) in paragraph (24), by striking the period and inserting `; and'; and

(3) by adding at the end the following:

`(25) any benefit (whether cash or in-kind) conferred upon (or paid on behalf of) a participant in an AmeriCorps position approved by the Corporation for National and Community Service under section 123 of the National and Community Service Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12573).'.



SEC. 204. EFFECTIVE DATE.

The amendments made by this title shall be effective with respect to benefits payable for months beginning after 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.



TITLE III --REVENUE PROVISIONS



SEC. 301. REVISION OF TAX RULES ON EXPATRIATION.

(a) In General- Subpart A of part II of subchapter N of chapter 1 is amended by inserting after section 877 the following new section:



`SEC. 877A. TAX RESPONSIBILITIES OF EXPATRIATION.

`(a) General Rules- For purposes of this subtitle --

`(1) MARK TO MARKET- All property of a covered expatriate shall be treated as sold on the day before the expatriation date for its fair market value.

`(2) RECOGNITION OF GAIN OR LOSS- In the case of any sale under paragraph (1) --

`(A) notwithstanding any other provision of this title, any gain arising from such sale shall be taken into account for the taxable year of the sale, and

`(B) any loss arising from such sale shall be taken into account for the taxable year of the sale to the extent otherwise provided by this title, except that section 1091 shall not apply to any such loss.

Proper adjustment shall be made in the amount of any gain or loss subsequently realized for gain or loss taken into account under the preceding sentence, determined without regard to paragraph (3).

`(3) EXCLUSION FOR CERTAIN GAIN-

`(A) IN GENERAL- The amount which would (but for this paragraph) be includible in the gross income of any individual by reason of paragraph (1) shall be reduced (but not below zero) by $600,000.

`(B) ADJUSTMENT FOR INFLATION-

`(i) IN GENERAL- In the case of any taxable year beginning in a calendar year after 2008, the dollar amount in subparagraph (A) shall be increased by an amount equal to --

`(I) such dollar amount, multiplied by

`(II) the cost-of-living adjustment determined under section 1(f)(3) for the calendar year in which the taxable year begins, by substituting `calendar year 2007' for `calendar year 1992' in subparagraph (B) thereof.

`(ii) ROUNDING- If any amount as adjusted under clause (i) is not a multiple of $1,000, such amount shall be rounded to the nearest multiple of $1,000.

`(b) Election To Defer Tax-

`(1) IN GENERAL- If the taxpayer elects the application of this subsection with respect to any property treated as sold by reason of subsection (a), the time for payment of the additional tax attributable to such property shall be extended until the due date of the return for the taxable year in which such property is disposed of (or, in the case of property disposed of in a transaction in which gain is not recognized in whole or in part, until such other date as the Secretary may prescribe).

`(2) DETERMINATION OF TAX WITH RESPECT TO PROPERTY- For purposes of paragraph (1), the additional tax attributable to any property is an amount which bears the same ratio to the additional tax imposed by this chapter for the taxable year solely by reason of subsection (a) as the gain taken into account under subsection (a) with respect to such property bears to the total gain taken into account under subsection (a) with respect to all property to which subsection (a) applies.

`(3) TERMINATION OF EXTENSION- The due date for payment of tax may not be extended under this subsection later than the due date for the return of tax imposed by this chapter for the taxable year which includes the date of death of the expatriate (or, if earlier, the time that the security provided with respect to the property fails to meet the requirements of paragraph (4), unless the taxpayer corrects such failure within the time specified by the Secretary).

`(4) SECURITY-

`(A) IN GENERAL- No election may be made under paragraph (1) with respect to any property unless adequate security is provided with respect to such property.

`(B) ADEQUATE SECURITY- For purposes of subparagraph (A), security with respect to any property shall be treated as adequate security if --

`(i) it is a bond which is furnished to, and accepted by, the Secretary, which is conditioned on the payment of tax (and interest thereon), and which meets the requirements of section 6325, or

`(ii) it is another form of security for such payment (including letters of credit) that meets such requirements as the Secretary may prescribe.

`(5) WAIVER OF CERTAIN RIGHTS- No election may be made under paragraph (1) unless the taxpayer makes an irrevocable waiver of any right under any treaty of the United States which would preclude assessment or collection of any tax imposed by reason of this section.

`(6) ELECTIONS- An election under paragraph (1) shall only apply to property described in the election and, once made, is irrevocable.

`(7) INTEREST- For purposes of section 6601, the last date for the payment of tax shall be determined without regard to the election under this subsection.

`(c) Exception for Certain Property- Subsection (a) shall not apply to --

`(1) any deferred compensation item (as defined in subsection (d)(4)),

`(2) any specified tax deferred account (as defined in subsection (e)(2)), and

`(3) any interest in a nongrantor trust (as defined in subsection (f)(3)).

`(d) Treatment of Deferred Compensation Items-

`(1) WITHHOLDING ON ELIGIBLE DEFERRED COMPENSATION ITEMS-

`(A) IN GENERAL- In the case of any eligible deferred compensation item, the payor shall deduct and withhold from any taxable payment to a covered expatriate with respect to such item a tax equal to 30 percent thereof.

`(B) TAXABLE PAYMENT- For purposes of subparagraph (A), the term `taxable payment' means with respect to a covered expatriate any payment to the extent it would be includible in the gross income of the covered expatriate if such expatriate continued to be subject to tax as a citizen or resident of the United States. A deferred compensation item shall be taken into account as a payment under the preceding sentence when such item would be so includible.

`(2) OTHER DEFERRED COMPENSATION ITEMS- In the case of any deferred compensation item which is not an eligible deferred compensation item --

`(A)(i) with respect to any deferred compensation item to which clause (ii) does not apply, an amount equal to the present value of the covered expatriate's accrued benefit shall be treated as having been received by such individual on the day before the expatriation date as a distribution under the plan, and

`(ii) with respect to any deferred compensation item referred to in paragraph (4)(D), the rights of the covered expatriate to such item shall be treated as becoming transferable and not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture on the day before the expatriation date,

`(B) no early distribution tax shall apply by reason of such treatment, and

`(C) appropriate adjustments shall be made to subsequent distributions from the plan to reflect such treatment.

`(3) ELIGIBLE DEFERRED COMPENSATION ITEMS- For purposes of this subsection, the term `eligible deferred compensation item' means any deferred compensation item with respect to which --

`(A) the payor of such item is --

`(i) a United States person, or

`(ii) a person who is not a United States person but who elects to be treated as a United States person for purposes of paragraph (1) and meets such requirements as the Secretary may provide to ensure that the payor will meet the requirements of paragraph (1), and

`(B) the covered expatriate --

`(i) notifies the payor of his status as a covered expatriate, and

`(ii) makes an irrevocable waiver of any right to claim any reduction under any treaty with the United States in withholding on such item.

`(4) DEFERRED COMPENSATION ITEM- For purposes of this subsection, the term `deferred compensation item' means --

`(A) any interest in a plan or arrangement described in section 219(g)(5),

`(B) any interest in a foreign pension plan or similar retirement arrangement or program,

`(C) any item of deferred compensation, and

`(D) any property, or right to property, which the individual is entitled to receive in connection with the performance of services to the extent not previously taken into account under section 83 or in accordance with section 83.

`(5) EXCEPTION- Paragraphs (1) and (2) shall not apply to any deferred compensation item to the extent attributable to services performed outside the United States while the covered expatriate was not a citizen or resident of the United States.

`(6) SPECIAL RULES-

`(A) APPLICATION OF WITHHOLDING RULES- Rules similar to the rules of subchapter B of chapter 3 shall apply for purposes of this subsection.

`(B) APPLICATION OF TAX- Any item subject to the withholding tax imposed under paragraph (1) shall be subject to tax under section 871.

`(C) COORDINATION WITH OTHER WITHHOLDING REQUIREMENTS- Any item subject to withholding under paragraph (1) shall not be subject to withholding under section 1441 or chapter 24.

`(e) Treatment of Specified Tax Deferred Accounts-

`(1) ACCOUNT TREATED AS DISTRIBUTED- In the case of any interest in a specified tax deferred account held by a covered expatriate on the day before the expatriation date --

`(A) the covered expatriate shall be treated as receiving a distribution of his entire interest in such account on the day before the expatriation date,

`(B) no early distribution tax shall apply by reason of such treatment, and

`(C) appropriate adjustments shall be made to subsequent distributions from the account to reflect such treatment.

`(2) SPECIFIED TAX DEFERRED ACCOUNT- For purposes of paragraph (1), the term `specified tax deferred account' means an individual retirement plan (as defined in section 7701(a)(37)) other than any arrangement described in subsection (k) or (p) of section 408, a qualified tuition program (as defined in section 529), a Coverdell education savings account (as defined in section 530), a health savings account (as defined in section 223), and an Archer MSA (as defined in section 220).

`(f) Special Rules for Nongrantor Trusts-

`(1) IN GENERAL- In the case of a distribution (directly or indirectly) of any property from a nongrantor trust to a covered expatriate --

`(A) the trustee shall deduct and withhold from such distribution an amount equal to 30 percent of the taxable portion of the distribution, and

`(B) if the fair market value of such property exceeds its adjusted basis in the hands of the trust, gain shall be recognized to the trust as if such property were sold to the expatriate at its fair market value.

`(2) TAXABLE PORTION- For purposes of this subsection, the term `taxable portion' means, with respect to any distribution, that portion of the distribution which would be includible in the gross income of the covered expatriate if such expatriate continued to be subject to tax as a citizen or resident of the United States.

`(3) NONGRANTOR TRUST- For purposes of this subsection, the term `nongrantor trust' means the portion of any trust that the individual is not considered the owner of under subpart E of part I of subchapter J. The determination under the preceding sentence shall be made immediately before the expatriation date.

`(4) SPECIAL RULES RELATING TO WITHHOLDING- For purposes of this subsection --

`(A) rules similar to the rules of subsection (d)(6) shall apply, and

`(B) the covered expatriate shall be treated as having waived any right to claim any reduction under any treaty with the United States in withholding on any distribution to which paragraph (1)(A) applies unless the covered expatriate agrees to such other treatment as the Secretary determines appropriate.

`(5) APPLICATION- This subsection shall apply to a nongrantor trust only if the covered expatriate was a beneficiary of the trust on the day before the expatriation date.

`(g) Definitions and Special Rules Relating to Expatriation- For purposes of this section --

`(1) COVERED EXPATRIATE-

`(A) IN GENERAL- The term `covered expatriate' means an expatriate who meets the requirements of subparagraph (A), (B), or (C) of section 877(a)(2).

`(B) EXCEPTIONS- An individual shall not be treated as meeting the requirements of subparagraph (A) or (B) of section 877(a)(2) if --

`(i) the individual --

`(I) became at birth a citizen of the United States and a citizen of another country and, as of the expatriation date, continues to be a citizen of, and is taxed as a resident of, such other country, and

`(II) has been a resident of the United States (as defined in section 7701(b)(1)(A)(ii)) for not more than 10 taxable years during the 15-taxable year period ending with the taxable year during which the expatriation date occurs, or

`(ii)(I) the individual's relinquishment of United States citizenship occurs before such individual attains age 18 1/2 , and

`(II) the individual has been a resident of the United States (as so defined) for not more than 10 taxable years before the date of relinquishment.

`(C) COVERED EXPATRIATES ALSO SUBJECT TO TAX AS CITIZENS OR RESIDENTS- In the case of any covered expatriate who is subject to tax as a citizen or resident of the United States for any period beginning after the expatriation date, such individual shall not be treated as a covered expatriate during such period for purposes of subsections (d)(1) and (f) and section 2801.

`(2) EXPATRIATE- The term `expatriate' means --

`(A) any United States citizen who relinquishes his citizenship, and

`(B) any long-term resident of the United States who ceases to be a lawful permanent resident of the United States (within the meaning of section 7701(b)(6)).

`(3) EXPATRIATION DATE- The term `expatriation date' means --

`(A) the date an individual relinquishes United States citizenship, or

`(B) in the case of a long-term resident of the United States, the date on which the individual ceases to be a lawful permanent resident of the United States (within the meaning of section 7701(b)(6)).

`(4) RELINQUISHMENT OF CITIZENSHIP- A citizen shall be treated as relinquishing his United States citizenship on the earliest of --

`(A) the date the individual renounces his United States nationality before a diplomatic or consular officer of the United States pursuant to paragraph (5) of section 349(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1481(a)(5)),

`(B) the date the individual furnishes to the United States Department of State a signed statement of voluntary relinquishment of United States nationality confirming the performance of an act of expatriation specified in paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4) of section 349(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1481(a)(1)-(4)),

`(C) the date the United States Department of State issues to the individual a certificate of loss of nationality, or

`(D) the date a court of the United States cancels a naturalized citizen's certificate of naturalization.

Subparagraph (A) or (B) shall not apply to any individual unless the renunciation or voluntary relinquishment is subsequently approved by the issuance to the individual of a certificate of loss of nationality by the United States Department of State.

`(5) LONG-TERM RESIDENT- The term `long-term resident' has the meaning given to such term by section 877(e)(2).

`(6) EARLY DISTRIBUTION TAX- The term `early distribution tax' means any increase in tax imposed under section 72(t), 220(e)(4), 223(f)(4), 409A(a)(1)(B), 529(c)(6), or 530(d)(4).

`(h) Other Rules-

`(1) TERMINATION OF DEFERRALS, ETC- In the case of any covered expatriate, notwithstanding any other provision of this title --

`(A) any time period for acquiring property which would result in the reduction in the amount of gain recognized with respect to property disposed of by the taxpayer shall terminate on the day before the expatriation date, and

`(B) any extension of time for payment of tax shall cease to apply on the day before the expatriation date and the unpaid portion of such tax shall be due and payable at the time and in the manner prescribed by the Secretary.

`(2) STEP-UP IN BASIS- Solely for purposes of determining any tax imposed by reason of subsection (a), property which was held by an individual on the date the individual first became a resident of the United States (within the meaning of section 7701(b)) shall be treated as having a basis on such date of not less than the fair market value of such property on such date. The preceding sentence shall not apply if the individual elects not to have such sentence apply. Such an election, once made, shall be irrevocable.

`(3) COORDINATION WITH SECTION 684- If the expatriation of any individual would result in the recognition of gain under section 684, this section shall be applied after the application of section 684.

`(i) Regulations- The Secretary shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of this section.'.

(b) Tax on Gifts and Bequests Received by United States Citizens and Residents From Expatriates-

(1) IN GENERAL- Subtitle B (relating to estate and gift taxes) is amended by inserting after chapter 14 the following new chapter:



`CHAPTER 15 --GIFTS AND BEQUESTS FROM EXPATRIATES

`Sec. 2801. Imposition of tax.



`SEC. 2801. IMPOSITION OF TAX.

`(a) In General- If, during any calendar year, any United States citizen or resident receives any covered gift or bequest, there is hereby imposed a tax equal to the product of --

`(1) the highest rate of tax specified in the table contained in section 2001(c) as in effect on the date of such receipt (or, if greater, the highest rate of tax specified in the table applicable under section 2502(a) as in effect on the date), and

`(2) the value of such covered gift or bequest.

`(b) Tax To Be Paid by Recipient- The tax imposed by subsection (a) on any covered gift or bequest shall be paid by the person receiving such gift or bequest.

`(c) Exception for Certain Gifts- Subsection (a) shall apply only to the extent that the value of covered gifts and bequests received by any person during the calendar year exceeds the dollar amount in effect under section 2503(b) for such calendar year.

`(d) Tax Reduced by Foreign Gift or Estate Tax- The tax imposed by subsection (a) on any covered gift or bequest shall be reduced by the amount of any gift or estate tax paid to a foreign country with respect to such covered gift or bequest.

`(e) Covered Gift or Bequest-

`(1) IN GENERAL- For purposes of this chapter, the term `covered gift or bequest' means --

`(A) any property acquired by gift directly or indirectly from an individual who, at the time of such acquisition, is a covered expatriate, and

`(B) any property acquired directly or indirectly by reason of the death of an individual who, immediately before such death, was a covered expatriate.

`(2) EXCEPTIONS FOR TRANSFERS OTHERWISE SUBJECT TO ESTATE OR GIFT TAX- Such term shall not include --

`(A) any property shown on a timely filed return of tax imposed by chapter 12 which is a taxable gift by the covered expatriate, and

`(B) any property included in the gross estate of the covered expatriate for purposes of chapter 11 and shown on a timely filed return of tax imposed by chapter 11 of the estate of the covered expatriate.

`(3) EXCEPTIONS FOR TRANSFERS TO SPOUSE OR CHARITY- Such term shall not include any property with respect to which a deduction would be allowed under section 2055, 2056, 2522, or 2523, whichever is appropriate, if the decedent or donor were a United States person.

`(4) TRANSFERS IN TRUST-

`(A) DOMESTIC TRUSTS- In the case of a covered gift or bequest made to a domestic trust --

`(i) subsection (a) shall apply in the same manner as if such trust were a United States citizen, and

`(ii) the tax imposed by subsection (a) on such gift or bequest shall be paid by such trust.

`(B) FOREIGN TRUSTS-

`(i) IN GENERAL- In the case of a covered gift or bequest made to a foreign trust, subsection (a) shall apply to any distribution attributable to such gift or bequest from such trust (whether from income or corpus) to a United States citizen or resident in the same manner as if such distribution were a covered gift or bequest.

`(ii) DEDUCTION FOR TAX PAID BY RECIPIENT- There shall be allowed as a deduction under section 164 the amount of tax imposed by this section which is paid or accrued by a United States citizen or resident by reason of a distribution from a foreign trust, but only to the extent such tax is imposed on the portion of such distribution which is included in the gross income of such citizen or resident.

`(iii) ELECTION TO BE TREATED AS DOMESTIC TRUST- Solely for purposes of this section, a foreign trust may elect to be treated as a domestic trust. Such an election may be revoked with the consent of the Secretary.

`(f) Covered Expatriate- For purposes of this section, the term `covered expatriate' has the meaning given to such term by section 877A(g)(1).'.

(2) CLERICAL AMENDMENT- The table of chapters for subtitle B is amended by inserting after the item relating to chapter 14 the following new item:



`Chapter 15. Gifts and Bequests From Expatriates.'.

(c) Definition of Termination of United States Citizenship-

(1) IN GENERAL- Section 7701(a) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

`(50) TERMINATION OF UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP-

`(A) IN GENERAL- An individual shall not cease to be treated as a United States citizen before the date on which the individual's citizenship is treated as relinquished under section 877A(g)(4).

`(B) DUAL CITIZENS- Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary, subparagraph (A) shall not apply to an individual who became at birth a citizen of the United States and a citizen of another country.'.

(2) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS-

(A) Paragraph (1) of section 877(e) is amended to read as follows:

`(1) IN GENERAL- Any long-term resident of the United States who ceases to be a lawful permanent resident of the United States (within the meaning of section 7701(b)(6)) shall be treated for purposes of this section and sections 2107, 2501, and 6039G in the same manner as if such resident were a citizen of the United States who lost United States citizenship on the date of such cessation or commencement.'.

(B) Paragraph (6) of section 7701(b) is amended by adding at the end the following flush sentence:

`An individual shall cease to be treated as a lawful permanent resident of the United States if such individual commences to be treated as a resident of a foreign country under the provisions of a tax treaty between the United States and the foreign country, does not waive the benefits of such treaty applicable to residents of the foreign country, and notifies the Secretary of the commencement of such treatment.'.

(C) Section 7701 is amended by striking subsection (n) and by redesignating subsections (o) and (p) as subsections (n) and (o), respectively.

(d) Termination of Section 877- Section 877 is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

`(h) Termination- This section shall not apply to any individual whose expatriation date (as defined in section 877A(g)(3)) is on or after the date of the enactment of this subsection.'.

(e) Information Returns- Section 6039G is amended --

(1) by inserting `or 877A' after `section 877(b)' in subsection (a), and

(2) by inserting `or 877A' after `section 877(a)' in subsection (d).

(f) Clerical Amendment- The table of sections for subpart A of part II of subchapter N of chapter 1 is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 877 the following new item:

`Sec. 877A. Tax responsibilities of expatriation.'.

(g) Effective Date-

(1) IN GENERAL- Except as provided in this subsection, the amendments made by this section shall apply to any individual whose expatriation date (as so defined) is on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(2) GIFTS AND BEQUESTS- Chapter 15 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (as added by subsection (b)) shall apply to covered gifts and bequests (as defined in section 2801 of such Code, as so added) received on or after the date of the enactment of this Act from transferors (or from the estates of transferors) whose expatriation date is on or after such date of enactment.



SEC. 302. CERTAIN DOMESTICALLY CONTROLLED FOREIGN PERSONS PERFORMING SERVICES UNDER CONTRACT WITH UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TREATED AS AMERICAN EMPLOYERS.

(a) FICA Taxes- Section 3121 (relating to definitions) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

`(z) Treatment of Certain Foreign Persons as American Employers-

`(1) IN GENERAL- If any employee of a foreign person is performing services in connection with a contract between the United States Government (or any instrumentality thereof) and any member of any domestically controlled group of entities which includes such foreign person, such foreign person shall be treated for purposes of this chapter as an American employer with respect to such services performed by such employee.

`(2) DOMESTICALLY CONTROLLED GROUP OF ENTITIES- For purposes of this subsection --

`(A) IN GENERAL- The term `domestically controlled group of entities' means a controlled group of entities the common parent of which is a domestic corporation.

`(B) CONTROLLED GROUP OF ENTITIES- The term `controlled group of entities' means a controlled group of corporations as defined in section 1563(a)(1), except that --

`(i) `more than 50 percent' shall be substituted for `at least 80 percent' each place it appears therein, and

`(ii) the determination shall be made without regard to subsections (a)(4) and (b)(2) of section 1563.

A partnership or any other entity (other than a corporation) shall be treated as a member of a controlled group of entities if such entity is controlled (within the meaning of section 954(d)(3)) by members of such group (including any entity treated as a member of such group by reason of this sentence).

`(3) LIABILITY OF COMMON PARENT- In the case of a foreign person who is a member of any domestically controlled group of entities, the common parent of such group shall be jointly and severally liable for any tax under this chapter for which such foreign person is liable by reason of this subsection, and for any penalty imposed on such person by this title with respect to any failure to pay such tax or to file any return or statement with respect to such tax or wages subject to such tax. No deduction shall be allowed under this title for any liability imposed by the preceding sentence.

`(4) PROVISIONS PREVENTING DOUBLE TAXATION-

`(A) AGREEMENTS- Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any services which are covered by an agreement under subsection (l).

`(B) EQUIVALENT FOREIGN TAXATION- Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any services if the employer establishes to the satisfaction of the Secretary that the remuneration paid by such employer for such services is subject to a tax imposed by a foreign country which is substantially equivalent to the taxes imposed by this chapter.

`(5) CROSS REFERENCE- For relief from taxes in cases covered by certain international agreements, see sections 3101(c) and 3111(c).'.

(b) Social Security Benefits- Subsection (e) of section 210 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 410(e)) is amended --

(1) by striking `(e) The term' and inserting `(e)(1) The term',

(2) by redesignating clauses (1) through (6) as clauses (A) through (F), respectively, and

(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

`(2)(A) If any employee of a foreign person is performing services in connection with a contract between the United States Government (or any instrumentality thereof) and any member of any domestically controlled group of entities which includes such foreign person, such foreign person shall be treated as an American employer with respect to such services performed by such employee.

`(B) For purposes of this paragraph --

`(i) The term `domestically controlled group of entities' means a controlled group of entities the common parent of which is a domestic corporation.

`(ii) The term `controlled group of entities' means a controlled group of corporations as defined in section 1563(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, except that --

`(I) `more than 50 percent' shall be substituted for `at least 80 percent' each place it appears therein, and

`(II) the determination shall be made without regard to subsections (a)(4) and (b)(2) of section 1563 of such Code.

A partnership or any other entity (other than a corporation) shall be treated as a member of a controlled group of entities if such entity is controlled (within the meaning of section 954(d)(3) of such Code) by members of such group (including any entity treated as a member of such group by reason of this sentence).

`(C) Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to any services to which paragraph (1) of section 3121(z) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 does not apply by reason of paragraph (4) of such section.'.

(c) Effective Date- The amendment made by this section shall apply to services performed in calendar months beginning more than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.



SEC. 303. INCREASE IN MINIMUM PENALTY ON FAILURE TO FILE A RETURN OF TAX.

(a) In General- Subsection (a) of section 6651 is amended by striking `$100' in the last sentence and inserting `$135'.

(b) Effective Date- The amendment made by this section shall apply to returns required to be filed after December 31, 2008.



TITLE IV --PARITY IN THE APPLICATION OF CERTAIN LIMITS TO MENTAL HEALTH BENEFITS



SEC. 401. PARITY IN THE APPLICATION OF CERTAIN LIMITS TO MENTAL HEALTH BENEFITS.

(a) Internal Revenue Code of 1986- Subsection (f) of section 9812 is amended --

(1) by striking `and' at the end of paragraph (2), and

(2) by striking paragraph (3) and inserting the following new paragraphs:

`(3) on or after January 1, 2008, and before the date of the enactment of the Heroes Earnings Assistance and Relief Tax Act of 2008, and

`(4) after December 31, 2008.'.

(b) Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974- Subsection (f) of section 712 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1185a(f)) is amended by striking `services furnished after December 31, 2007' and inserting `services furnished --

`(1) on or after January 1, 2008, and before the date of the enactment of the Heroes Earnings Assistance and Relief Tax Act of 2008, and

`(2) after December 31, 2008.'.

(c) Public Health Service Act- Subsection (f) of section 2705 of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 300gg-5(f)) is amended by striking `services furnished after December 31, 2007' and inserting `services furnished --

`(1) on or after January 1, 2008, and before the date of the enactment of the Heroes Earnings Assistance and Relief Tax Act of 2008, and

`(2) after December 31, 2008.'.



Passed the House of Representatives May 20, 2008.



Attest:



Clerk.



110th CONGRESS



2d Session



H. R. 6081



AN ACT

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide benefits for military personnel, and for other purposes.

BAUCUS, GRASSLEY MILITARY TAX RELIEF PACKAGE BECOMES LAW


Senate Finance Committee Release: Baucus, Grassley Military Tax Relief Package Becomes Law

June 18, 2008

110th Congress

For Immediate Release

Contact: Erin Shields (Baucus)

Jill Gerber (Grassley)

June 17, 2008








Provisions crafted by Finance leaders will help military families save money, boost businesses that employ reservists


Washington, DC - Senate Finance Committee Chairman Max Baucus (D-Mont.) and Ranking Member Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa) today hailed the signing of the Heroes Earnings Assistance and Relief Tax Act (HEART) into law. The bill will provide more than $1.2 billion dollars in tax relief to benefit America's veterans and soldiers. Baucus and Grassley worked closely with House colleagues to combine their own military tax relief bill - the Defenders of Freedom Tax Relief Act of 2007 - with an earlier version of the House's HEART Act. HEART was approved by the Senate and the House of Representatives in late May. The legislation includes tax cuts for members of the military who are receiving combat pay, saving for retirement, or purchasing their own homes. It also helps civilian employers of military men and women keep jobs available for soldiers who are called to active duty.

"I worked to get this bill to the President's desk because tax relief for America's military men and women is the right thing to do," said Baucus. "This bill helps our fighting forces and our veterans purchase their own homes, save for their retirements, and put their kids through college. It helps businesses keep reservists on the payroll while they are overseas. This new law provides timely and appropriate tax relief to those who sacrifice for our freedom."

"Military service makes taxes complicated and sometimes unfair," Grassley said. "People shouldn't suffer a tax hit to serve our country. We need to make sure military men and women have fair treatment under the tax code. It's a no-brainer."

Final HEART Act provisions, including many originally introduced by Baucus and Grassley in the Defenders of Freedom Act, include:




Tax Fairness for Military Personnel



Ÿ A permanent allowance for soldiers to count their non-taxable combat pay when figuring their eligibility for the earned income tax credit, a refundable federal income tax credit that puts cash in the hands of low-income working individuals and families.



Ÿ The ability for active duty troops to withdraw money from retirement plans, and an allowance of two years to replace the funds without tax penalty.



Ÿ A 180-day period for Reservists called to active duty to use unspent funds in a health flexible spending account or cafeteria plan.



Ÿ The ability for military families to count most military cash allowances beyond basic pay to be treated as earned income for purposes of determining Supplemental Security Income (SSI) eligibility and benefit amounts, and treat certain housing payments as in-kind support and maintenance.



Ÿ Clarification that members of the military who file a joint tax return would be eligible for the stimulus rebate payment even if the spouse does not have a Social Security number.



Ÿ A one year extension of parity between mental and physical health benefits.





Honoring our Veterans



Ÿ A permanent allowance for all veterans to use qualified mortgage bonds to purchase their homes.



Ÿ Extension of a provision that gives retired veterans more time to claim a tax refund on some types of disability benefit payments.



Ÿ Authority for the IRS to treat gifts of thanks from states to veterans --such as payments of excess state revenue --as nontaxable gifts.



Ÿ The ability for blind, disabled, and aged veterans to disregard state annuity payments when determining Supplemental Security Income eligibility and benefits.





Helping Military Families and Survivors



Ÿ The ability for families of Reservists killed in the line of duty to collect life insurance and other benefits provided by the civilian employer.



Ÿ The ability for families of soldiers killed in the line of duty to contribute up to 100 percent of survivor benefits to retirement savings accounts or to education savings accounts.





Helping Businesses Support Military Personnel



Ÿ A tax cut for small businesses when they continue paying some salary to members of the National Guard and Reserve who are called to duty.



Ÿ An end to cumbersome rules for reporting of income when companies continue paying some salary to members of the National Guard and Reserve who are called to duty. This makes it easier for reservists to file their taxes and simpler for employers to keep contributing to those employees' retirement plans.





Other Provisions for Americans Serving Overseas



Ÿ A permanent extension of a provision that gives intelligence service employees and Peace Corps volunteers a longer period of time to meet residency requirements necessary to exclude profits from the sale of their home from capital gains tax, which is often necessary due to frequent deployment.



Ÿ The ability to disregard allowances paid to all AmeriCorps volunteers for the purpose of determining SSI eligibility and benefit amounts.


The Heroes Earnings Assistance and Relief Tax Act is offset in part with a provision to ensure defense contractors are not sidestepping their tax obligations by going offshore, no matter where in the world they employ workers. This provision will require U.S. employers doing federal contract work for the U.S. government, and using foreign subsidiaries to compensate their U.S. employees working abroad, to begin paying Social Security and Medicare taxes on behalf of these employees. The provision will insure defense contractors in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere meet their legal obligation to pay payroll taxes on behalf of the people who work for them.

Other offsets include a provision that makes certain that individuals who relinquish their U.S. citizenship or long-term U.S. residency pay the same Federal taxes for appreciation of assets, such as stocks or bonds that they would pay if they sold them as U.S. citizens or residents. The bill increases the penalty for people who fail to file their tax returns and allows the Social Security Administration and the Veterans' Administration to work together to verify low-income status when distributing veteran's benefits

Tuesday, June 17, 2008

SECTION 6694 PROPOSED REGULATIONS

The IRS has released proposed return preparer penalty regulations. The proposed regulations provide guidance on the new Code Sec. 6694(a) more-likely-than-not preparer standard, and contain a comprehensive overhaul of all preparer penalties. The IRS predicted that final regulations will be in place for the 2009 filing season. A hearing on the proposed regulations is scheduled for August 18, 2008, at the IRS National Office in Washington, D.C.

The IRS stated that it will not stack penalties under Code Sec. 6694 and Circular 230. The IRS stated that penalties under Code Sec. 6694 are not automatic. Additionally, the IRS included many examples of various provisions in the proposed regulations.

The House-passed Renewable Energy and Job Creation Bill of 2008 (HR 6049) would equalize the preparer and taxpayer penalty standards at substantial authority. Although Senate Democrats were unable to bring HR 6049 before the full Senate for debate during the week of June 9, they are expected to try again the week of June 16.

Passage of the Small Business and Work Opportunity Tax Act of 2007 (2007 Small Business Tax Act) (P.L. 110-28), sparked the drafting of the proposed regulations. The new law replaced the "realistic possibility of success standard" in Code Sec. 6694(a) with the heightened "more likely than not standard" for non-abusive undisclosed positions. The preparer must have a reasonable belief that the tax treatment of the position would more likely than not be sustained on its merits.

The 2007 Small Business Tax Act also extended Code Sec. 6694 to preparers of all returns and not just preparers of income tax returns. Additionally, the new law significantly increased the penalties for noncompliance. The old, first-tier $250 penalty in Code Sec. 6694(a) jumped to the greater of $1,000 or 50 percent of the income derived, or to be derived, by the preparer. The penalty for willful or reckless conduct in Code Sec. 6694(b) increased from $1,000 to the greater of $5,000 or 50 percent of the income derived or to be derived by the preparer.

The proposed regulations eliminate the current "one preparer per firm" rule used in determining who in a particular firm is responsible for penalties in favor of a framework that focuses on returns on a position-by-position basis. If a preparer is primarily responsible for a position on a return giving rise to an understatement, that person will be subject to Code Sec. 6694. Only one person within a firm will be considered primarily responsible for each position; however, multiple individuals may be responsible for a position if employed by multiple firms.

The individual signing the return will continue to be held responsible for all of the positions on a return, but if another individual is determined (either via information received from the signing individual or from other sources) to have primary responsibility for a position giving rise to the understatement, that other individual will be responsible under Code Sec. 6694. If there are one or more nonsigning tax return preparers at the same firm and no signing preparer at the firm, the individual within the firm with supervisory responsibility for the position will be responsible for the Code Sec. 6694 penalty.
These new rules allow the IRS more flexibility in assessing responsibility for positions giving rise to understatements than the IRS has under the current "one preparer per firm" system.

The proposed regulations also provide new guidance for determining the amount of income derived by a firm or an individual in preparing a return containing a position giving rise to an understatement, upon which the maximum penalty under Code Sec. 6694 is calculated. Income derived includes all compensation the preparer receives or expects to receive in preparing the return or providing tax advice. If the preparer is paid by a firm for work done for a client of the firm, income derived is all compensation that can be reasonably allocated to work done in preparing the return or advising the client on a position giving rise to an understatement.

If the firm is subject to penalty under Code Sec. 6694, then all compensation received by the firm will be included as income derived from the transaction. If both the firm and the preparer are subject to liability, the income derived from the transaction will only count once, meaning that income received by the firm from the client and paid to the preparer will not both be used in determining the maximum penalty.

The proposed regulations provide additional guidance on satisfaction of the "more likely than not" standard. The standard would be satisfied if the preparer analyzes the facts and authorities and reasonably concludes in good faith that the position has a greater than 50-percent likelihood of being sustained. The IRS will take into account the preparer's experience in tax law, familiarity with the taxpayer's affairs and the complexity of the facts. The standard may also be satisfied through a well-reasoned construction of statutory authority where no other authority exists or if the preparer relies upon the advice of another preparer or the taxpayer. However, the preparer may not rely upon information provided by taxpayers with respect to legal conclusions on tax issues.

Preparers must provide disclosure of a return position where the position has a reasonable basis, but the "more likely than not" standard cannot be satisfied. The proposed regulations provide that the reasonable basis standard for these purposes is the same as is used for the accuracy-related penalty under Code Sec. 6662 (significantly higher than not frivolous or patently improper and not satisfied by a position that is merely arguable or a merely colorable claim). However, in meeting the "reasonable basis" standard, preparers can rely in good faith upon the advice furnished by a taxpayer, advisor or another preparer without verification.

The proposed regulations also provide guidance on what constitutes adequate disclosure, building upon guidance provided in Notice 2008-13. For a signing return preparer, disclosure can be accomplished in one of five ways:
- through the use of Form 8275, Disclosure Statement, or Form 8275-R, Regulation Disclosure Statement, or on the return in accordance with the annual procedure (see Rev. Proc. 2008-14, I.R.B. 2008-7, 435);

- if the position does not satisfy the substantial authority standard of Reg. §1.6662-4(d), provision of a disclosure to the taxpayer with the prepared tax return;

- if the position does satisfy the substantial authority standard of Reg. §1.6662-4(d), by advising the taxpayer of all the penalty standards applicable under Code Sec. 6662;

- if the position can be described as a tax shelter or reportable transaction, the preparer must advise the taxpayer of the requirements of minimum substantial authority and possession, on the part of the taxpayer, of a reasonable belief that the "more likely than not standard" is met and that the disclosure does not preclude the assessment of an accuracy-related penalty; or

- for returns or refund claims subject to penalties other than the accuracy-related penalty for substantial understatements, the preparer must advise the taxpayer of the applicable penalty standards under Code Sec. 6662.

For a non-signing return preparer, adequate disclosure may be met in one of three ways:

- through the use of Form 8275, Disclosure Statement, or Form 8275-R, Regulation Disclosure Statement, or on the return in accordance with the annual procedure (see Rev. Proc. 2008-14, I.R.B. 2008-7, 435);

- the preparer may advise the taxpayer of opportunities to avoid potentially applicable Code Sec. 6662 accuracy-related penalties and of applicable standards of disclosure; and

- the non-signing preparer advises another preparer that disclosure may be required and notes this advice in the other preparer's files.

Each of these methods of disclosure with regard to advice given to a taxpayer must be tailored to the taxpayer's facts and circumstances. Boilerplate language is not sufficient.

Under current Reg. §1.6694-2(d), an exception to the imposition of the penalty is provided where the understatement is due to reasonable cause where the preparer acted in good faith. The regulation includes factors to be considered in determining if the exception applies. The proposed regulations provide that whether the position is supported by generally accepted administrative or industry practices is to be added as an additional factor to be taken into consideration.

The proposed regulations provide definitions of both a signing tax return preparer and a non-signing tax return preparer. A signing tax return preparer is any tax return preparer who signs or is required to sign a return or claim for refund. A non-signing tax return preparer is any tax return preparer who is not a signing tax return preparer but prepares all or a substantial portion of a return.

Electronically Filed and Signed Returns

The proposed regulations provide two changes that will better facilitate the use of electronically signed returns. First, Reg. § 1.6107-1(a), which requires signing return preparers to provide a copy of the filed return to the taxpayer is proposed to be amended to allow preparers electronically filing Form 1040EZ or Form 1040-A to provide the copy to the taxpayer by reproducing the information on Form 1040. Also, a preparer need not sign an electronically signed return prior to providing the taxpayer with a copy of the return but must provide all of the information to that taxpayer at the same time the preparer provides the taxpayer with Form 8879, IRS e-file Signature Authorization.

The proposed regulations also provide the following changes:

- the rules under Reg. §§1.6694-2 and -3 are proposed to be changed to allow for a firm to be subject to penalty where the firm's review procedures are not followed through willfulness, recklessness or gross indifference;

- a reasonableness standard is provided for signing return preparer's due diligence requirements in determining eligibility for the earned income credit; and

- for purposes of the penalties under Code Sec. 6694, the date that a return is determined to be prepared is the date the return is signed by the preparer or, if the preparer fails to sign the return, the date the return is filed.

The IRS stated in the preamble to the proposed regulations that the Service intends to modify its internal guidance so that a referral by revenue agents to the IRS Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) will not be per se mandatory when the IRS assesses a tax return preparer penalty under Code Sec. 6694(a) against a tax return preparer who is also a practitioner within the meaning of Circular 230.

A public hearing has been scheduled for August 18, 2008, beginning at 10:00 a.m. Written or electronic comments must be received by the IRS by August 16, 2008. Outlines of topics to be discussed at the public hearing must be received by August 4, 2008.


Proposed Regulations, NPRM REG-129243-07

June 17, 2008

Code Sec. 6060

Code Sec. 6107

Code Sec. 6109

Code Sec. 6694

Code Sec. 6695

Code Sec. 6696

Code Sec. 7701

Tax return preparers : Definitions : Penalties : Standards : Calculation : Disclosure .



DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY



Internal Revenue Service (IRS)

26 CFR Parts 1, 20, 25, 26, 31, 40, 41, 44, 53, 54, 55, 56, 156, 157, and 301

[REG-129243-07]

RIN 1545-BG83

Tax Return Preparer Penalties under Sections 6694 and 6695

AGENCY: Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Treasury.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking and notice of public hearing.

SUMMARY: This document contains proposed regulations implementing amendments to the tax return preparer penalties under sections 6694 and 6695 of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) and related provisions under sections 6060, 6107, 6109, 6696, and 7701(a)(36) reflecting amendments to the Code made by section 8246 of the Small Business and Work Opportunity Tax Act of 2007. The proposed regulations affect tax return preparers and provide guidance regarding the amended provisions. This document also provides notice of a public hearing on these proposed regulations.

DATES: Written or electronic comments must be received by [INSERT DATE THAT IS 60 DAYS AFTER PUBLICATION OF THIS DOCUMENT IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER] . Outlines of topics to be discussed at the public hearing scheduled for Monday, August 18, 2008, must be received by Monday, August 4, 2008.

ADDRESSES: Send submissions to: CC:PA:LPD:PR (REG-129243- 07), room 5203, Internal Revenue Service, PO Box 7604, Ben Franklin Station, Washington, DC 20044. Submissions may be hand delivered Monday through Friday between the hours of 8 a.m. and 4 p.m. to: CC:PA:LPD:PR (REG-129243-07), Courier's Desk, Internal Revenue Service, 1111 Constitution Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C., or sent electronically via the Federal eRulemaking Portal at http://www.regulations.gov/Regs (IRS REG-129243-07). The public hearing will be held in the IRS Auditorium, Internal Revenue Building, 1111 Constitution Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Concerning the proposed regulations, Michael E. Hara, (202) 622-4910, and Matthew S. Cooper, (202) 622-4940; concerning submissions of comments, the hearing, and/or to be placed on the building access list to attend the hearing, Regina Johnson, (202) 622-7180 (not toll-free numbers).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:



Paperwork Reduction Act

The collection of information contained in this notice of proposed rulemaking has been submitted to the Office of Management and Budget in accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3507(d)). Comments on the collection of information should be sent to the Office of Management and Budget, Attn: Desk Officer for the Department of the Treasury, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Washington, DC 20503, with copies to the Internal Revenue Service, Attn: IRS Reports Clearance Officer, SE:W:CAR:MP:T:T:SP, Washington, DC 20224. Comments on the collection of information should be received by [INSERT DATE THAT IS 60 DAYS AFTER PUBLICATION OF THIS DOCUMENT IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER ]. Comments are specifically requested concerning:

Whether the proposed collection of information is necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the IRS, including whether the information will have practical utility;

The accuracy of the estimated burden associated with the proposed collection of information;

How the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be collected may be enhanced;

How the burden of complying with the proposed collection of information may be minimized, including through the application of automated collection techniques or other forms of information technology; and

Estimates of capital or start-up costs and costs of operation, maintenance, and purchase of services to provide information.

The collection of information in this proposed regulation is in §§1.6060-1(a)(1), 1.6107-1, 1.6694- 2(c)(3), 20.6060-1(a)(1), 20.6107-1, 25.6060-1(a)(1), 25.6107-1, 26.6060-1(a)(1), 26.6107-1, 31.6060-1(a)(1), 31.6107-1, 40.6060-1(a)(1), 40.6107-1, 41.6060-1(a)(1), 41.6107-1, 44.6060-1(a)(1), 44.6107-1, 53.6060-1(a)(1), 53.6107-1, 54.6060-1(a)(1), 54.6107-1, 55.6060-1(a)(1), 55.6107-1, 56.6060-1(a)(1), 56.6107-1, 156.6060-1(a)(1), 156.6107-1, 157.6060-1(a)(1), and 157.6107-1. This information is necessary to make the record of the name, taxpayer identification number, and principal place of work of each tax return preparer, make each return or claim for refund prepared available for inspection by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and to document that the tax return preparer advised the taxpayer of the penalty standards applicable to the taxpayer in order for the tax return preparer to avoid penalties under section 6694. The collection of information is required to comply with the provisions of section 8246 of the Small Business and Work Opportunity Tax Act of 2007. The likely respondents are tax return preparers and their employers.

Estimated total annual reporting burden: 10,679,320 hours.

Estimated average annual burden per respondent: 15.6 hours.

Estimated number of respondents: 684,268.

Estimated frequency of responses: 127,801,426.

An agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information unless it displays a valid control number assigned by the Office of Management and Budget.



Background

This document contains proposed amendments to the Income Tax Regulations (26 CFR part 1), the Estate Tax Regulations (26 CFR part 20), the Gift Tax Regulations (26 CFR part 25), the Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax Regulations (26 CFR part 26), the Employment Tax and Collection of Income Tax at Source Regulations (26 CFR part 31), the Excise Tax Procedural Regulations (26 CFR part 40), the Highway Use Tax Regulations, (26 CFR part 41), the Wagering Tax Regulations (26 CFR part 44), the Foundation and Similar Excise Tax Regulations (26 CFR part 53), the Pension Excise Tax Regulations (26 CFR part 54), the Excise Tax on Real Estate Investment Trusts and Regulated Investment Companies Regulations (26 CFR part 55), the Public Charity Excise Tax Regulations (26 CFR part 56), the Excise Tax on Greenmail Regulations (26 CFR part 156), the Excise Tax on Structured Settlement Factoring Transactions Regulations (26 CFR part 157), and the Regulations on Procedure and Administration (26 CFR part 301) implementing the amendments to tax return preparer penalties under sections 6694 and 6695 (and the related provisions under sections 6060, 6107, 6109, 6696, and 7701(a)(36)) made by section 8246 of the Small Business and Work Opportunity Tax Act of 2007, Public Law 110-28 (121 Stat. 190) (May 25, 2007) (the 2007 Act).

In accordance with the 2007 Act, these proposed regulations amend existing regulations defining income tax return preparers to broaden the scope of that definition to include preparers of estate, gift, and generation-skipping transfer tax returns, employment tax returns, excise tax returns, and returns of exempt organizations. These proposed regulations also revise current regulations to amend the standards of conduct that must be met to avoid imposition of the tax return preparer penalty under section 6694. In addition, these proposed regulations reflect changes to the computation of the section 6694 tax return preparer penalty made by the 2007 Act. These regulations also amend current regulations under the penalty provisions of section 6695 to conform them with changes made by the 2007 Act expanding the scope of that statute beyond income tax returns. The Treasury Department and the IRS intend to finalize these proposed regulations by the end of 2008, with the expectation that the final regulations will be applicable to returns and claims for refund filed (and advice given) after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register , but in no event sooner than December 31, 2008.



History of the Tax Return Preparer Penalty Provisions

The 2007 Act amended section 6694 to expand the definition of tax return preparer, broaden the scope of the tax return preparer penalties to include preparers of returns other than income tax returns, revise the standards of conduct that tax return preparers must meet to avoid imposition of penalties, and change the computation of the tax return preparer penalties. The 2007 Act did not amend a number of other Code sections related to tax return preparer conduct, nor did it directly address the tax regulations, published guidance, and case law that have developed since enactment of the preparer penalty regime as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Public Law 94-455 (90 Stat. 1688) (October 4, 1976) (the 1976 Act).

The Treasury Department and the IRS believe that the recent amendments to the tax return preparer penalty provisions necessitate a comprehensive review and overhaul of all the tax return preparer penalties and related regulatory provisions. These proposed regulations are the first significant step in this process. Because the proposed regulations were drafted with consideration of the existing regulations and the legislative history of the statutory provisions that were amended by the 2007 Act, a brief review of the legislative and regulatory history leading up to the recent amendments is appropriate in order to place the proposed regulatory changes reflecting the 2007 Act amendments in context.



The Tax Reform Act Of 1976

The provisions in section 7701(a)(36) defining income tax return preparers, and the provisions in sections 6694, and 6695, imposing various penalties on income tax return preparers, were first enacted by the 1976 Act. Sections 6107 and 6109, imposing an obligation on return preparers to furnish and maintain copies of returns and include an identifying number on those returns, were also enacted by the 1976 Act.

As originally enacted, section 7701(a)(36)(A) defined the term income tax return preparer to mean any person who prepared for compensation, or who employed one or more persons to prepare for compensation, any income tax return or income tax claim for refund, or a "substantial portion" of such return or claim. Section 7701(a)(36)(B) excluded from the definition of income tax return preparer persons who merely provided mechanical assistance in the preparation of a return or claim for refund, or who prepared returns and claims as an employee of the taxpayer or in a fiduciary capacity. The legislative history to the 1976 Act explained that whether or not a portion of a return constituted a substantial portion of a tax return was to be determined by examining both the length and complexity of that particular portion of the return and the amount of tax liability involved. The legislative history noted, however, that the filling out of a single schedule would generally not be considered a substantial portion of that return unless that particular schedule was the dominant portion of the entire tax return. The legislative history also provided that a person who prepared a return for compensation may be an income tax return preparer even though that person did not actually place figures on a taxpayer's return. See S. Rep. No. 94-938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 349-359 (1976).

As originally enacted, section 6694(a) imposed a "first tier" penalty of $100 if any part of an understatement was due to the negligent or intentional disregard of rules or regulations by an income tax return preparer. Section 6694(b) imposed a "second tier" penalty of $500 if any part of an understatement was due to a willful attempt in any manner to understate tax liability by an income tax return preparer. Section 6695(b) imposed a penalty of $25 if an income tax return preparer failed to sign a return or claim for refund in the manner prescribed by regulations. Sections 6695(a), (c), (d), and (e) also imposed penalties of $25 if an income tax return preparer failed to comply with the various identification rules in sections 6107(a), 6109(a)(4), 6107(b) and 6060.

The House and Senate Reports to the 1976 Act, H. Rep. No. 94-658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. at 274 (1975) and S. Rep. No. 94-938 at 349-50, and the Joint Committee on Taxation's General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. at 346 (1976), explained the need for the new tax return preparer penalty regime by noting the significant number of fraudulent returns and tax return preparers engaged in abusive practices. The legislative history further explained that, under prior law, it was often difficult for the IRS to detect any individual case of improper return preparation. This was because the IRS generally had no way of knowing whether the return was prepared by the taxpayer or by a tax return preparer who may have engaged in abusive practices involving a number of returns. Further, even when the IRS could trace the improper preparation of tax returns to an individual tax return preparer, the only sanctions available were criminal penalties, which were often considered inappropriate, cumbersome, and ineffective deterrents because of the cost and length of time involved in prosecuting those cases. The legislative history makes clear that Congress intended the tax return preparer penalties to aid the IRS in detecting returns that were incorrectly prepared and to deter tax return preparers from engaging in improper conduct. See S. Rep. No. 94-938, at 350-51 (1976).

Regulations implementing certain of the amendments made by the 1976 Act were published on December 29, 1976, as TD 7451, 41 FR 56631, and later amended on March 31, 1977, by TD 7473, 42 FR 17124. Additional regulations were published on April 1, 1977, as TD 7475, 42 FR 17452, and November 23, 1977, as TD 7519, 42 FR 17452 (the November 1977 final regulations).

The November 1977 final regulations applied the tax return preparer penalty provisions to persons who did not sign the return or claim for refund, or make or control the entries on the return or claim for refund, including tax professionals who rendered advice that was directly related to the determination of the existence, characterization, or amount, of an entry on a return or claim for refund. By including a broad definition of tax return preparer, the Treasury Department and the IRS intended the regulations to increase advisor care and to monitor careless or deceptive members of the profession. The November 1977 final regulations reflected the considered view that excluding nonsigning tax professionals from the reach of section 6694 could result in a lack of accountability for positions taken on a return, as taxpayers could escape penalty liability because they employed tax return preparers, tax return preparers could escape liability because they relied on nonsigning tax professionals' opinions, and nonsigning tax professionals could escape liability because they would not be considered tax return preparers. The November 1977 final regulations also reflected a concern with the possible exemption of tax attorneys and other professionals involved in preparing more complex returns while at the same time subjecting to penalties preparers of less sophisticated returns who did not rely on the work of others.

The November 1977 final regulations also adopted the safe harbor provisions of §301.7701-15(b)(2), which excluded from the definition of a tax return preparer persons providing tax advice (other than those signing the return) if the amounts of gross income, deductions, or credits giving rise to the understatement were less than $2,000; or less than $100,000 and also less than 20 percent of the gross income (or, for an individual, the individual's adjusted gross income) shown on the return or claim for refund.



Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989

Sections 6694 and 6695 were amended by the Improved Penalty Administration and Compliance Tax Act of 1989, enacted as title G of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 (OBRA 1989), Public Law 101-239 (103 Stat. 2106) (December 19, 1989). The OBRA 1989 amended section 6694(a) to remove the prior link to negligence or intentional disregard of rules or regulations and instead impose a $250 penalty on an income tax return preparer who understated a taxpayer's tax liability on an income tax return or claim for refund if the understatement was due to a position for which there was not a "realistic possibility" of being sustained on its merits, and the tax return preparer knew or reasonably should have known of such position. The revised section 6694(a) penalty did not apply, however, if the position was "not frivolous" and was adequately disclosed, or if there was reasonable cause for the position taken and the tax return preparer acted in good faith. The OBRA 1989 also amended section 6694(b) to impose a $1,000 penalty on a tax return preparer who understated a taxpayer's tax liability on an income tax return or claim for refund if the understatement was due to the tax return preparer's willful attempt to understate tax liability or the tax return preparer's reckless or intentional disregard of rules or regulations.

The OBRA 1989 also made uniform the tax return preparer penalties that apply for each failure by a tax return preparer to: (1) furnish a copy of a return or claim for refund to the taxpayer under section 6695(a); (2) sign the return or claim for refund under section 6695(b); (3) furnish his or her identification number under section 6695(c); or (4) file a correct information return under section 6695(e). The unified penalty amount was $50 for each failure, with a limit of $25,000 for the total amount of penalties that could be imposed for any single type of failure.

The OBRA 1989 also consolidated the negligence, substantial understatement and valuation misstatement penalties applicable to taxpayers. These penalties were consolidated into a single accuracy-related penalty regime under section 6662. The new accuracy-related penalty for a substantial understatement of income tax generally would not be imposed, however, if (1) there was "substantial authority" for the taxpayer's treatment of the item giving rise to the understatement, or (2) relevant facts affecting the tax treatment of the item were adequately disclosed in the return or in a statement attached to the return and there was a "reasonable basis" for the tax treatment of the item.

By adopting the "realistic possibility" standard for tax return preparers, and the higher "substantial authority" standard for taxpayers with respect to undisclosed positions, OBRA 1989 created a disparity between the penalty treatment of tax return preparers and most taxpayers subject to income tax.

Regulations were published on December 31, 1991, as TD 8382, 56 FR 67509, which amended the regulations under section 6694 to conform the income tax return preparer regulations with the statutory changes made by OBRA 1989 and to make other changes.



The Small Business and Work Opportunity Tax Act of 2007

Section 8246 of the 2007 Act amended sections 6694 and 7701(a)(36) and made conforming changes to other Code provisions to make tax return preparer penalties applicable to a broader range of tax returns. The 2007 Act's amendments to section 6694 also changed the standards of conduct that tax return preparers must meet in order to avoid imposition of penalties in the event that a return prepared results in an understatement of tax. For undisclosed positions, the 2007 Act replaced the "realistic possibility" standard with a standard requiring the tax return preparer to "reasonably believe that the tax treatment of the position is more likely than not" the proper treatment. For disclosed positions, the 2007 Act replaced the "not-frivolous" standard with a standard requiring the tax return preparer to have a "reasonable basis" for the tax treatment of the position.

The 2007 Act also increased the first-tier penalty under section 6694(a) from $250 to the greater of $1,000 or 50 percent of the income derived (or to be derived) by the tax return preparer from the preparation of a return or claim for refund with respect to which the penalty was imposed. In addition, the 2007 Act increased the secondtier penalty under section 6694(b) from $1,000 to the greater of $5,000 or 50 percent of the income derived (or to be derived) by the tax return preparer. The amendments made by the 2007 Act are effective for tax returns prepared after the date of enactment, May 25, 2007.



Notice 2008-13

Notice 2008-13 (2008-3 IRB 282) was released on December 31, 2007 and provided interim guidance under the 2007 Act regarding: (1) the relevant categories of tax returns or claims for refund for purposes of applying the penalty under section 6694(a); (2) the definition of "tax return preparer" under sections 6694 and 7701(a)(36); (3) the date a return is deemed prepared; (4) the standards of conduct applicable to tax return preparers for disclosed and undisclosed positions taken on tax returns; and (5) the penalty compliance obligations applicable to tax return preparers. Additional guidance was provided in Notice 2008-12 (2008-3 IRB 280) with respect to the implementation of the tax return preparer signature requirement of section 6695(b), and in Notice 2008-11 (2008-3 IRB 279), which clarified the earlier transition relief provided in Notice 2007-54 (2007-27 IRB 12 (July 2, 2007)). Notice 2008-46 (2008-18 IRB 868) was released on April 16, 2008 and added certain returns and documents to Exhibits 1, 2, and 3 of Notice 2008-13.



Explanation of Provisions

In developing these proposed regulations, the Treasury Department and the IRS recognize that the majority of tax return preparers serve the interests of their clients and the tax system by preparing complete and accurate returns. Tax return preparers are critical to ensuring compliance with the Federal tax laws and are an important component in the IRS's administration of those laws. The proposed regulations intend to balance the interests of the IRS in curtailing the activities of noncompliant tax return preparers against the burden imposed on all tax return preparers in complying with the requirements imposed by the 2007 Act and these proposed regulations.

The Treasury Department and the IRS also recognize that the government has a number of tools to monitor and sanction tax return preparers, and will continue to coordinate the application of penalties under sections 6694, 6695, 6695A, 6700, 6701, 6702, and Circular 230, as well as other applicable penalties and criminal sanctions.

The IRS will assess penalties under section 6694 in appropriate cases. In keeping with a balanced enforcement program for tax return preparers, the IRS intends to modify its internal guidance so that a referral by revenue agents to the IRS Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) will not be per se mandatory when the IRS assesses a tax return preparer penalty under section 6694(a) against a tax return preparer who is also a practitioner within the meaning of Circular 230. This change is consistent with the general administrative recommendations made in the legislative history of the amendments made by OBRA 1989 to the section 6694 penalty. See H.R. Conf. Rep. 101-386, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. at 662 (1989). In matters involving non-willful conduct, the IRS will generally look for a pattern of failing to meet the required penalty standards under section 6694(a) before making a referral to OPR, although any egregious conduct subjecting a tax return preparer to penalty may also form a basis for a referral to OPR.



Proposed Changes

The following is a summary of the proposed changes to the existing regulations affecting tax return preparers. The changes included in these proposed regulations are discussed in order of the Code sections to which they relate. When appropriate, cross-references to definitional sections are included. Significantly, the definition of tax return preparer, which maintains the concepts in the existing regulations of signing and nonsigning tax return preparers, is located at the end of these proposed regulations in §301.7701-15, and that section is crossreferenced in the relevant sections of the regulations under sections 6694 and 6695.



Furnishing of Copy of the Tax Return

Section 1.6107-1(a), which requires signing tax return preparers to furnish the taxpayer a copy of the prepared return, is proposed to be amended to provide that for electronically filed Forms 1040EZ, "Income Tax Return for Single Filers and Joint Filers With No Dependents," and Forms 1040A, "U.S. Individual Income Tax Return," filed for the 2009, 2010 and 2011 taxable years, the return information may be provided on a replica of a Form 1040, "U.S. Individual Income Tax Return," that provides all of the return information. For other electronically filed returns, the information may be provided on a replica of an official form that provides all of the information. This amendment addresses the IRS' transitional issues in implementing the Modernized e-File platform for the Form 1040 series of returns.



Date Return is Prepared

Proposed §1.6694-1(a)(2) defines the date a return or claim for refund is prepared as the date it is signed by the tax return preparer, and also provides that if the tax return preparer fails to sign the return when otherwise required to do so, the date the return is deemed prepared is the date the return is filed. In the case of a nonsigning tax return preparer, the relevant date is the date the person provides the advice on the position that results in the understatement. This date will be determined based on all the facts and circumstances.



Defining the Preparer Within a Firm

Current §1.6694-1(b)(1) provides a "one preparer per firm" rule. Specifically, if a signing tax return preparer is associated with a firm, that individual, and no other individual in the firm, is treated as a tax return preparer with respect to the return or claim for purposes of section 6694. Under the current regulations, if two or more individuals associated with a firm are tax return preparers with respect to a return or claim for refund, and none of them is the signing tax return preparer, only one of the individuals is a nonsigning tax return preparer with respect to that return or claim for purposes of section 6694. In such a case, ordinarily, the individual who is a tax return preparer for purposes of section 6694 is the individual with overall supervisory responsibility for the advice given by the firm with respect to the return or claim. The "one preparer per firm" rule and the corollary rule included in §1.6694-2(d)(5) of the current regulations precluding a tax return preparer from relying on the advice of an individual associated with the tax return preparer's same firm for purposes of penalty protection were intended to eliminate the administrative difficulty of attempting to apply the section 6694 penalty on an intra-firm basis.

The Treasury Department and the IRS believe that the amendments to section 6694 made by the 2007 Act, together with the evolution in existing business practices and the increased complexity of the Federal tax law that has created an increased need for specialization, require reconsideration of the "one preparer per firm" rule. Specifically, the Treasury Department and the IRS believe this evolution requires the adoption of a framework that centers on the return or claim for refund on a position-byposition basis, with the focus of any penalty on the position(s) giving rise to the understatement on the return or claim for refund and any responsible parties with respect to such position(s). Thus the Treasury Department and the IRS believe that the "one preparer per firm" rule is no longer appropriate and have proposed to adopt a framework defining a preparer-per-position within a firm.

Under both the current and the proposed regulations, an individual is a tax return preparer subject to section 6694 if the individual is primarily responsible for the position on the return or claim for refund giving rise to the understatement.

Under proposed §1.6694-1(b)(1), only one person within a firm will be considered primarily responsible for each position giving rise to an understatement and, accordingly, be subject to the penalty. In the course of identifying the individual who is primarily responsible for the position, the IRS may advise multiple individuals within the firm that it may be concluded that they are the individual within the firm who is primarily responsible. In some circumstances, there may be more than one tax return preparer who is primarily responsible for the position(s) giving rise to an understatement if multiple tax return preparers are employed by, or associated with, different firms.

Proposed §1.6694-1(b)(2) provides that the individual who signs the return or claim for refund as the tax return preparer will generally be considered the person that is primarily responsible for all of the positions on the return or claim for refund giving rise to an understatement. The "one preparer per firm" rule, however, is revised by these proposed regulations if it is concluded based upon information received from the signing tax return preparer (or other relevant information from a source other than the signing tax return preparer) that another person within the signing tax return preparer's same firm was primarily responsible for the position(s) giving rise to the understatement. In this situation, the "one preparer per firm" rule in the current regulations could unduly limit the IRS to assessing the penalty against a person who may have overall responsibility in terms of signing the return, but who may lack detailed knowledge of, or responsibility for, a problematic return position, and who reasonably relied on another professional at the same firm with greater knowledge of, and responsibility for, the accuracy of a position giving rise to the understatement.

The Treasury Department and the IRS believe that amending the regulations to better target the person or persons responsible for the position(s) giving rise to the understatement will further compliance and result in more equitable administration of the tax return preparer penalty regime.

Proposed §1.6694-1(b)(3) establishes a similar rule for situations when there are one or more nonsigning tax return preparers at the same firm. If there are one or more nonsigning tax return preparers at the firm and no signing tax return preparer within the firm, the individual within the firm with overall supervisory responsibility for the position(s) giving rise to the understatement is the tax return preparer who is primarily responsible for the position for purposes of section 6694. Additionally, if after the application of proposed §1.6694-1(b)(2) it is concluded that the signer is not primarily responsible for the position or the IRS cannot conclude which individual (as between the signing tax return preparer and other persons within the firm) is primarily responsible for the position, the individual nonsigning tax return preparer within the firm with overall supervisory responsibility for the position(s) is the tax return preparer who is primarily responsible for the position(s) giving rise to the understatement.

This rule in proposed §1.6694-1(b)(3) is intended to address the potential for uncertainty regarding the identification of the primarily responsible tax return preparer prior to the time of the expiration of the period of limitations on making an assessment under section 6694(a). The proposed rule is distinguished from the current "one preparer per firm" rule in the current regulations because under the proposed rule the IRS may assess the penalty against either the signing tax return preparer or the nonsigning tax return preparer with overall supervisory responsibility for the position(s) giving rise to an understatement depending on the facts and circumstances. Specifically, when the facts indicate that the signing tax return preparer is the primarily responsible tax return preparer under proposed §1.6694-1(b)(1) and (b)(2), the IRS may assess the section 6694 penalty against that individual when appropriate under the statute and regulations. In situations when the facts indicate that the nonsigning tax return preparer with overall supervisory responsibility is the primarily responsible tax return preparer under proposed §1.6694-1(b)(1) and (b)(3), the IRS may assess the section 6694 penalty against that individual when appropriate. In situations when it is unclear which individual, as between the signer and other nonsigning tax return preparers at the firm, the IRS may assess the section 6694 penalty against the nonsigning tax return preparer with overall supervisory responsibility with respect to the position giving rise to the understatement when appropriate. The Treasury Department and the IRS specifically request comments regarding the approach taken in these proposed regulations and any recommendations to improve this rule.

As described in this preamble, conforming rules are included in §1.6694-1(f) of the proposed regulations regarding computation of the "income derived (or to be derived)" from the firm and the individual(s) associated with the firm, in order to ensure that the same income is not counted twice in determining the amount of income subject to the section 6694 penalty.



Reliance on Information Provided

Section 1.6694-1(e) of the current regulations allows a tax return preparer generally to rely in good faith without verification upon information furnished by the taxpayer. Proposed §1.6694-1(e) allows similar reliance, but provides that a tax return preparer may not rely on information provided by taxpayers with respect to legal conclusions on Federal tax issues.

The proposed regulations expand on the current regulations to provide that a tax return preparer may rely in good faith and without verification on information furnished by another advisor, another tax return preparer, or other party (even when the advisor or tax return preparer is within the tax return preparer's same firm). Similarly, a tax return preparer may rely in good faith without verification upon a tax return that has been previously prepared by a taxpayer or another tax return preparer and filed with the IRS. The tax return preparer, however, may not ignore the implications of information furnished to the tax return preparer or actually known by the tax return preparer, and must make reasonable inquiries if the information as furnished appears to be incorrect or incomplete. The Treasury Department and the IRS believe that this expansion of the current rules regarding reliance is necessary given the heightened standards imposed on tax return preparers by the 2007 Act and the increased complexity of the tax law, which often requires signing and nonsigning tax return preparers to rely on the work of others in ensuring compliance.



Income Derived Determination in Computing Penalty Amount

Proposed §1.6694-1(f) defines "income derived (or to be derived)" with respect to a return or claim for refund as all compensation the tax return preparer receives or expects to receive with respect to the engagement of preparing the return or claim for refund or providing tax advice (including research and consultation) with respect to the position(s) taken on the return or claim for refund that gave rise to the understatement. In the situation of a tax return preparer who is not compensated directly by the taxpayer, but rather by a firm that employs the tax return preparer or with whom the tax return preparer is associated, income derived (or to be derived) means all compensation the tax return preparer receives from the firm that can be reasonably allocated to the engagement of preparing the return or claim for refund or providing tax advice (including research and consultation) with respect to the position(s) taken on the return or claim for refund that gave rise to the understatement. In the situation where a firm that employs the individual tax return preparer (or the firm with which the individual tax return preparer is associated) is subject to a penalty under section 6694(a) or (b), income derived (or to be derived) means all compensation the firm receives or expects to receive with respect to the engagement of preparing the return or claim for refund or providing tax advice (including research and consultation) with respect to the position(s) taken on the return or claim for refund that gave rise to the understatement.

If the tax return preparer or the tax return preparer's firm has multiple engagements related to the same return or claim for refund, only those engagements relating to the position(s) taken on the return or claim for refund that gave rise to the understatement are considered for purposes of computing the income derived (or to be derived). In the situation of a tax return preparer who is not compensated directly by the taxpayer, but rather by a firm that employs the tax return preparer or with whom the tax return preparer is associated, income derived (or to be derived) means all compensation the tax return preparer receives from the firm that can be reasonably allocated to the relevant firm engagements.

The proposed regulations also provide that only compensation for time spent on tax advice that is given with respect to events that have occurred at the time the advice is rendered and that relates to the position(s) giving rise to the understatement will be taken into account for purposes of calculating the section 6694 penalty. This rule is intended to be consistent with the definition of tax return preparer in §301.7701-15(b)(2)(i).

The proposed regulations provide that it may be concluded, based upon information received from the tax return preparer, that an appropriate allocation of compensation attributable to the position(s) giving rise to the understatement on the return or claim for refund is less than the total amount of compensation associated with the engagement. For example, it may be concluded that the number of hours of the engagement spent on the position(s) giving rise to the understatement may be less than the total hours associated with the engagement. If this is concluded, the amount of the penalty will be calculated based upon the compensation attributable to the position(s) giving rise to the understatement. Otherwise, the total amount of compensation from the engagement will be the amount of income derived for purposes of calculating the penalty under section 6694.

The proposed regulations also clarify that the amount of penalties assessed against the individual and the firm shall not exceed 50 percent of the income derived (or to be derived) by the firm from the relevant engagement(s) relating to the position(s) giving rise to an understatement. The portion of the total amount of penalty assessed against the individual tax return preparer shall not exceed 50 percent of the individual's compensation attributable to the engagement that relates to the position(s) giving rise to an understatement. In other words, the same income will not be taken into consideration more than once in calculating the penalty against an individual tax return preparer and the individual tax return preparer's firm. The Treasury Department and the IRS also anticipate that Circular 230 will be revised to state that the IRS generally will not stack the section 6694 penalty and monetary penalties under 31 U.S.C. section 330 with respect to the same conduct.



Firm Liability

Proposed §§1.6694-2(a)(2) and 1.6694-3(a)(2) are the same as §§1.6694-2(a)(2) and 1.6694-3(a)(2) of the current regulations regarding when a firm is liable for the section 6694(a) or (b) penalty with one exception. Proposed §§1.6694-2(a)(2)(iii) and 1.6694-3(a)(2)(iii) provide that a firm is also subject to the penalty when the firm's review procedures were disregarded by the firm through willfulness, recklessness, or gross indifference (including ignoring facts that would lead a person of reasonable prudence and competence to investigate or ascertain) in the formulation of the advice, or the preparation of the return or claim for refund, that included the position for which the penalty is imposed.



Reasonable Belief of More Likely Than Not

Proposed §1.6694-2(b)(1) provides that the "reasonable belief that the position would more likely than not be sustained on its merits" standard will be satisfied if the tax return preparer analyzes the pertinent facts and authorities and, in reliance upon that analysis, reasonably concludes in good faith that the position has a greater than 50 percent likelihood of being sustained on its merits. Whether a tax return preparer meets this standard will be determined based upon all facts and circumstances, including the tax return preparer's due diligence. In determining the level of diligence in a particular case, the IRS will take into account the tax return preparer's experience with the area of tax law and familiarity with the taxpayer's affairs, as well as the complexity of the issues and facts in the case. The proposed regulations also provide that a tax return preparer may meet the "reasonable belief that the position would more likely than not be sustained on its merits" standard if a position is supported by a well-reasoned construction of the applicable statutory provision despite the absence of other types of authority, or if the tax return preparer relies on information or advice furnished by a taxpayer, advisor, another tax return preparer, or other party (even when the advisor or tax return preparer is within the tax return preparer's same firm), as provided in proposed §1.6694-1(e).

Proposed §1.6694-2(b)(2) provides that a tax return preparer may not rely on unreasonable assumptions, while proposed §1.6694-2(b)(3) states that the authorities contained in §1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii) (or any successor provision) are to be considered in determining whether a position satisfies the "more likely than not" standard. Proposed §1.6694-2(b)(4) also provides examples that illustrate positions meeting the "reasonable belief that the position would more likely than not be sustained on its merits" standard.



Reasonable Basis

Proposed §§1.6694-2(c)(1) and (2) establish that the "reasonable basis" standard that must be met for disclosed positions is the same standard as defined in §1.6662-3(b)(3) (or any successor provision). The proposed regulations also provide that, to meet the "reasonable basis" standard, a tax return preparer may rely in good faith, without verification, upon information furnished by a taxpayer, advisor, another tax return preparer, or other party (even when the advisor or tax return preparer is within the tax return preparer's same firm), as provided in proposed §1.6694-1(e).



Adequate Disclosure

Section 1.6694-2(c)(3) builds on the current regulations and the interim guidance provided in Notice 2008-13 and provides the rules for disclosure of a position for which there is a "reasonable basis" but for which the tax return preparer does not have a "reasonable belief that the position would more likely than not be sustained on its merits."

For a signing tax return preparer within the meaning of §301.7701-15(b)(1), the proposed regulations provide that a position may be disclosed in one of five ways. First, the position may be disclosed on a properly completed and filed Form 8275, Disclosure Statement, or Form 8275-R, Regulation Disclosure Statement, as appropriate, or on the tax return in accordance with the annual revenue procedure. See Revenue Procedure 2008-14 (2008-7 IRB 435 (February 19, 2008)). Second, for income tax returns, if the position does not meet the "substantial authority" standard described in §1.6662-4(d), disclosure of the position is adequate if the tax return preparer provides the taxpayer with a prepared tax return that includes the appropriate disclosure. Third, for income tax returns, if the position meets the "substantial authority" standard, disclosure of the position is adequate if the tax return preparer advises the taxpayer of all of the penalty standards applicable to the taxpayer under section 6662. Fourth, for income tax returns, if the position may be described as a tax shelter under section 6662(d)(2)(C) or a reportable transaction to which section 6662A applies, disclosure of the position is adequate if the tax return preparer advises the taxpayer that there needs to be at a minimum "substantial authority" for the position, that the taxpayer must possess a "reasonable belief that the tax treatment was more likely than not" the proper treatment, and that disclosure will not protect the taxpayer from assessment of an accuracy-related penalty. Fifth, for tax returns or claims for refund that are subject to penalties other than the accuracy-related penalty for substantial understatements under sections 6662(b)(2) and (d), the tax return preparer advises the taxpayer of the penalty standards applicable to the taxpayer under section 6662. This fifth rule is intended to address the situation when the penalty standard applicable to the taxpayer is based on compliance with requirements other than disclosure on the return (for example, section 6662(e)). In order to establish that the tax return preparer's disclosure obligation was satisfied, the tax return preparer must document contemporaneously in the tax return preparer's files that the information or advice required by the proposed regulations was provided.

In the case of a nonsigning tax return preparer within the meaning of §301.7701-15(b)(2), the position may be disclosed in one of three ways. First, the position may be disclosed on a properly completed and filed Form 8275, "Disclosure Statement," or Form 8275-R, "Regulation Disclosure Statement," as appropriate, or on the tax return in accordance with the annual revenue procedure. Second, a nonsigning tax return preparer may meet the disclosure standards if the nonsigning tax return preparer advises the taxpayer of all opportunities to avoid penalties under section 6662 that could apply to the position and advises the taxpayer of the standards for disclosure to the extent applicable. Third, disclosure of a position is adequate if a nonsigning tax return preparer advises another tax return preparer that disclosure under section 6694(a) may be required. The nonsigning tax return preparer must document contemporaneously in the tax return preparer's files that this advice required by the proposed regulations was provided.

In order to satisfy the disclosure standards when the position is not disclosed on or with the return, each return position for which there is a "reasonable basis" but for which the tax return preparer does not have a "reasonable belief that the position would more likely than not be sustained on the merits" must be addressed by the tax return preparer. Thus, the advice to the taxpayer with respect to each position must be particular to the taxpayer and tailored to the taxpayer's facts and circumstances. No form of a general boilerplate disclaimer will satisfy these standards. Proposed §1.6694-2(c)(iv) provides that disclosure in the case of items attributable to a passthrough entity is adequate if made at the entity level in accordance with the rules in §1.6662-4(f)(5). For example, a tax return preparer of a partnership tax return need only advise the partnership in order to satisfy any of the above disclosure rules and does not need to advise each individual partner in the partnership of the applicable penalties.



Reasonable Cause

Proposed §1.6694-2(d) maintains the rules in the current regulations regarding reasonable cause and good faith, except that §1.6694-2(d) is proposed to be revised to provide that whether a position is supported by a generally accepted administrative or industry practice is an additional factor to consider in determining whether the tax return preparer acted with reasonable cause and good faith. This provision is intended to address situations in the absence of published guidance when administrative or industry practice has developed that would not reasonably be subject to challenge by the IRS.

The reasonable cause factor regarding reliance on advice of another tax return preparer is also expanded to allow a tax return preparer to reasonably rely on information or advice furnished by a taxpayer, advisor, another tax return preparer, or other party (even when the advisor or tax return preparer is within the tax return preparer's same firm), as provided in proposed §1.6694-1(e).



Electronically Signed Returns

Proposed §1.6695-1(b)(2) provides that, in the case of an electronically signed tax return, a tax return preparer need not sign the return prior to presenting a completed copy of the return to the taxpayer. The tax return preparer, however, must furnish all of the information to the taxpayer contemporaneously with furnishing the Form 8879, IRS e-file Signature Authorization, or similar IRS efile signature form. The information may be furnished on a replica of an official form that provides all of the information.



Due Diligence for Earned Income Credit

Proposed §1.6695-2(b)(3) establishes a reasonableness standard for signing tax return preparers' due diligence requirements with respect to determining eligibility for the earned income credit and adds examples.



Claims for Refund or Credit by Tax Return Preparers or Appraisers

Proposed §1.6696-1, discussing the procedures for filing claims for credit or refund for penalties assessed against tax return preparers under sections 6694 or 6695, is revised to also cover the new appraiser penalty under section 6695A. Section 6695A was enacted by section 1219 of the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (Public Law 109-280 (120 Stat. 780, 1084- 86) (August 17, 2006)), as amended by the Tax Technical Corrections Act of 2007 (Public Law 110-172 (121 Stat. 2473, 2474) December 29, 2007)). A separate regulation project will provide guidance under section 6695A.



Definition of Tax Return Preparer

Proposed §§301.7701-15(b)(1) and (2) add to the section 7701 regulations the definitions of "signing tax return preparer" and "nonsigning tax return preparer" that are included in §1.6694-1 of the current regulations. Proposed §301.7701-15(b)(1) provides that a signing tax return preparer is any tax return preparer who signs or who is required to sign a return or claim for refund as a tax return preparer pursuant to §1.6695-1(b).

Proposed §301.7701-15(b)(2) provides that a nonsigning tax return preparer is any tax return preparer who is not a signing tax return preparer but who prepares all or a substantial portion of a return or claim for refund within the meaning of §301.7701-15(b)(3) with respect to events that have occurred at the time the advice is rendered. In determining whether an individual is a nonsigning tax return preparer, the proposed regulations provide that any time spent on advice that is given with respect to events that have occurred, which is less than 5 percent of the aggregate time incurred by the person with respect to the position(s) giving rise to the understatement will not be taken into account in determining whether an individual is a nonsigning tax return preparer. The Treasury Department and the IRS believe that this less than 5 percent test will encourage tax professionals who principally rendered advice regarding events that had not yet occurred to provide follow-up advice requested by a taxpayer without the concern that, by providing such advice to a taxpayer, the advisor would become a tax return preparer under proposed §301.7701-15(b)(2) and (3).

Consistent with the current regulations and the legislative history of the 1976 Act, proposed §301.7701- 15(b)(3)(i) clarifies that whether a schedule, entry, or other portion of a return or claim for refund is a substantial portion is determined based upon all facts and circumstances, and a single tax entry may constitute a substantial portion of the tax required to be shown on a return. The proposed regulations include additional factors to consider in determining whether a schedule, entry, or other portion of a return or claim for refund is a substantial portion, such as the size and complexity of the item relative to the taxpayer's gross income and the size of the understatement attributable to the item compared to the taxpayer's reported tax liability.

Proposed §301.7701-15(b)(3)(ii) increases the de minimis exception in determining a substantial portion of a return or claim for refund for nonsigning tax return preparers. Under the proposed regulations, the de minimis exception applies if the item giving rise to the understatement is (i) less than $10,000, or (ii) less than $400,000 if the item is also less than 20 percent of the taxpayer's gross income (or, for an individual, the individual's adjusted gross income). This de minimis rule does not apply for signing tax return preparers within the meaning of §301.7701-15(b)(1). This change to the regulations updates the current de minimis amounts to reflect the passage of time since those amounts were set in 1977. The Treasury Department and the IRS are considering whether other de minimis rules applicable to nonsigning tax return preparers of non-income tax returns are warranted.

Consistent with the interim guidance set forth in Notice 2008-13, §301.7701-15(b)(4) is proposed to be amended by revising the definitions of "return" and "claim for refund" to only include preparers of returns and claims for refund that are specifically identified in published guidance in the Internal Revenue Bulletin. The Treasury Department and the IRS will publish this guidance simultaneously with the publication of final regulations and will likely maintain the three tiered approach used in the exhibits to Notice 2008-13, subject to any appropriate modifications. Under the substantial portion rule in section 7701(a)(36)(A), preparation of a broad range of information returns, schedules, and other documents can subject a person to the section 6694 penalties even though the documents may not themselves give rise to an understatement. Accordingly, the Treasury Department and the IRS believe that including a list of returns or other documents, the preparation of which may subject a tax return preparer to penalties, will further compliance by not unduly increasing the burden on persons preparing information returns and other documents.



Cross-References

Conforming changes are made in §§1.6060-1, 1.6107-1, 1.6109-2, 1.6694-0, 1.6694-1, 1.6694-4, 1.6695-1, 1.6695-2, 1.6696-1, and 301.7701-15 to replace references to income tax return preparers with references to tax return preparers, consistent with the provisions of the 2007 Act. Conforming cross references are also made to Part 20, Estate Tax; Estates of Decedents Dying After August 16, 1954; Part 25, Gift Tax; Gifts Made After December 31, 1954; Part 26, Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax Under the Tax Reform Act of 1986; Part 31, Employment Taxes and Collection of Income Tax at Source; Part 40, Procedural Excise Tax; Part 41, Highway Use Tax; Part 44, Wagering Tax; Part 53, Foundation and Similar Excise Taxes; Part 54, Pension Excise Taxes; Part 55, Excise Tax on Real Estate Investment Trusts and Regulated Investment Company Taxes; Part 56, Public Charity Excise Taxes; Part 156, Excise Tax on Greenmail; and Part 157, Excise Tax on Structured Settlement Factoring Transactions; to conform these parts with the provisions in Parts 1 and 301, consistent with the provisions of the 2007 Act.



Availability of IRS Documents

The IRS notices referred to in this preamble are published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin and are available at http://www.irs.gov.



Special Analyses

It has been determined that this notice of proposed rulemaking is not a significant regulatory action as defined in Executive Order 12866. Therefore, a regulatory assessment is not required. It also has been determined that section 553(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. chapter 5) does not apply to these regulations.

When an agency issues a rulemaking proposal, the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. chapter 6), requires the agency to "prepare and make available for public comment an initial regulatory flexibility analysis" that will "describe the impact of the proposed rule on small entities." (5 U.S.C. 603(a)). Section 605 of the RFA provides an exception to this requirement if the agency certifies that the proposed rulemaking will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.

The proposed rules affect tax return preparers. The IRS estimates there are 38,566 tax return preparation firms and 260,338 self-employed tax return preparers that qualify as small entities. Therefore, the IRS has determined that these proposed rules will have an impact on a substantial number of small entities.

The IRS has determined, however, that the impact on entities affected by the proposed rule will not be significant. The statute and proposed regulations would require entities that employ tax return preparers to retain a record of the name, taxpayer identification number and principal place of work of each tax return preparer employed. The IRS estimates that this would not require purchase of additional software and would take five minutes per tax return preparer employed. The statute and proposed regulations would also require tax return preparers to retain a complete copy of a return (or claim for refund) or a list of the name, taxpayer identification number and taxable year for each return (or claim for refund) and the name of the tax return preparer required to sign the return or claim for refund. Many tax return preparers have copying machines or scanners and already make copies of the returns prepared, and the IRS estimates this would not require the purchase of additional equipment. The IRS estimates that it would take an average of five minutes to make copies or prepare a record of the returns prepared. Accordingly, the burden on employers of tax return preparers to make a record of the name, taxpayer identification number, and principal place of work of each employed tax return preparer, and a copy of each return or claim for refund prepared, or a record, is insignificant.

The proposed regulations also allow the tax return preparer to generally avoid imposition of the tax return preparer penalties under section 6694 in cases when a tax return position meets the "substantial authority" standard but not the "reasonable belief that the position would more likely than not be sustained on its merits" standard if the tax return preparer advises the taxpayer of the penalty standards applicable to the taxpayer, and contemporaneously documents in the tax return preparer's files that this information or advice was provided. Often, tax return preparers will choose not to advise the taxpayer of the applicable penalty standards and will instead disclose the position on a properly completed and filed Form 8275, "Disclosure Statement," or Form 8275-R, "Regulation Disclosure Statement," as appropriate, or on the tax return in accordance with the annual revenue procedure. In those instances when the tax return preparer elects to advise the taxpayer of the penalty standards, the IRS estimates that it would take an average of 15 minutes to document this advice. Accordingly, the burden on those who choose this option is insignificant.

Although the proposed regulations also conform the standards of conduct and tax return preparer penalties to the provisions of the 2007 Act, tax return preparers already enroll in educational seminars or training programs to keep up to date with the latest changes to the Code, and the provisions of the 2007 Act and the proposed regulations will generally be part of that training.

Moreover, these proposed regulations are required to comply with the provisions of section 8246 of the 2007 Act and flow directly from amendments to the Code contained in the 2007 Act.

Based on these facts, the IRS hereby certifies that the collection of information contained in these regulations will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. Accordingly, a Regulatory Flexibility Analysis is not required.

Pursuant to section 7805(f) of the Code, these regulations have been submitted to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration for comment on their impact on small business.



Comments and Public Hearing

Before these proposed regulations are adopted as final regulations, consideration will be given to any written (a signed original and eight (8) copies) or electronic comments that are submitted timely to the IRS. The IRS and the Treasury Department request comments on the clarity of the proposed regulations and how they can be made easier to understand. Comments are requested on the examples in the proposed regulations, and commentators are specifically invited to suggest changes to these examples or to suggest new examples that they believe would better illustrate the principles that should be included in the final regulations. The IRS and the Treasury Department also request comments on the accuracy of the certification that the regulations in this document will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. All comments will be available for public inspection and copying.

A public hearing has been scheduled for Monday, August 18, 2008, at 10:00 a.m. in the IRS Auditorium, Internal Revenue Building, 1111 Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington, DC. Due to building security procedures, visitors must enter at the Constitution Avenue entrance. In addition, all visitors must present photo identification to enter the building. Because of access restrictions, visitors will not be admitted beyond the immediate entrance area more than 30 minutes before the hearing starts. For information about having your name placed on the building access list to attend the hearing, see the "FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT" section of this preamble.

The rules of 26 CFR 601.601(a)(3) apply to the hearing. Persons who wish to present oral comments at the hearing must submit written or electronic comments by [INSERT DATE 60 DAYS AFTER PUBLICATION OF THIS DOCUMENT IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER ] and an outline of the topics to be discussed and the time to be devoted to each topic (a signed original and eight (8) copies) by Monday, August 4, 2008. A period of 10 minutes will be allotted to each person for making comments. An agenda showing the scheduling of the speakers will be prepared after the deadline for receiving outlines has passed. Copies of the agenda will be available free of charge at the hearing.



Drafting Information

The principal authors of these proposed regulations are Matthew S. Cooper and Michael E. Hara, Office of the Associate Chief Counsel (Procedure and Administration).

List of Subjects



26 CFR Part 1

Income taxes, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.



26 CFR Part 20

Estate taxes, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.



26 CFR Part 25

Gift taxes, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.



26 CFR Part 26

Estate taxes, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.



26 CFR Part 31

Employment taxes, Income taxes, Penalties, Pensions, Railroad Retirement, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Social security, Unemployment compensation.



26 CFR Part 40

Excise taxes, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.



26 CFR Part 41

Excise, Motor vehicles, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.



26 CFR Part 44

Excise, Gambling, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.



26 CFR Part 53

Excise taxes, Foundations, Investments, Lobbying, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.



26 CFR Part 54

Excise taxes, Pensions, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.



26 CFR Part 55

Excise taxes, Investments, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.



26 CFR Part 56

Excise taxes, Lobbying, Nonprofit organizations, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.



26 CFR Part 156

Excise taxes, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.



26 CFR Part 157

Excise taxes, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.



26 CFR Part 301

Employment taxes, Estate taxes, Excise taxes, Gift taxes, Income taxes, Penalties, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.



Proposed Amendments to the Regulations

Accordingly, 26 CFR parts 1, 20, 25, 26, 31, 40, 41, 44, 53, 54, 55, 56, 156, 157, and 301 are proposed to be amended as follows:



PART 1 --INCOME TAXES

Paragraph 1. The authority citation for part 1 is amended by adding entries in numerical order to read in part as follows:

Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805 * * *

Section 1.6060-1 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6060(a).

* * *

Section 1.6109-2 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6109(a).

* * *

Section 1.6695-1 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6695(b).

* * *

Section 1.6695-2 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6695(g).

* * *

Par. 2. Section 1.6060-1 is amended by revising the section heading and paragraphs (a) and (c) and adding paragraph (d) to read as follows:



§1.6060-1 Reporting requirements for tax return preparers .

(a) In general . (1) Each person who employs one or more signing tax return preparers to prepare any return of tax or claim for refund of tax, other than for the person, at any time during a return period shall satisfy the requirements of section 6060 of the Internal Revenue Code by --

(i) Retaining a record of the name, taxpayer identification number, and principal place of work during the return period of each tax return preparer employed by the person at any time during that period; and

(ii) Making that record available for inspection upon request by the Commissioner.

(2) The record described in this paragraph (a) must be retained and kept available for inspection for the 3-year period following the close of the return period to which that record relates.

(3) The person may choose any form of documentation to be used under this section as a record of the signing tax return preparers employed during a return period. However, the record must disclose on its face which individuals were employed as tax return preparers during that period.

(4) For the definition of the term "signing tax return preparer," see section 7701(a)(36) and §301.7701-15(b)(1) of this chapter. For the definition of the term "return period," see paragraph (b) of this section.

(5)(i) For purposes of this section, any individual who, in acting as a signing tax return preparer, is not employed by another tax return preparer shall be treated as his or her own employer. Thus, a sole proprietor shall retain and make available a record with respect to himself (or herself) as provided in this section.

(ii) A partnership shall, for purposes of this section, be treated as the employer of the partners of the partnership and shall retain and make available a record with respect to the partners and others employed by the partnership as provided in this section.

* * * * *

(c) Penalty . For the civil penalty for failure to retain and make available a record of the tax return preparers employed during a return period as required under this section, or for failure to include an item in the record required to be retained and made available under this section, see §1.6695-1(e).

(d) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 3. Section 1.6107-1 is revised to read as follows:



§1.6107-1 Tax return preparer must furnish copy of return to taxpayer and must retain a copy or record .

(a) Furnishing copy to taxpayer . A person who is a signing tax return preparer of any return of tax or claim for refund of tax under the Internal Revenue Code shall furnish a completed copy of the return or claim for refund to the taxpayer (or nontaxable entity) not later than the time the return or claim for refund is presented for the signature of the taxpayer (or nontaxable entity). For electronically filed Forms 1040EZ, "Income Tax Return for Single Filers and Joint Filers With No Dependents," and Form 1040A, "U.S. Individual Income Tax Return," filed for the 2009, 2010 and 2011 taxable years, the information may be provided on a replica of a Form 1040, "U.S. Individual Income Tax Return," that provides all of the information. For other electronically filed returns, the information may be provided on a replica of an official form that provides all of the information. The signing tax return preparer may, at its option, request a receipt or other evidence from the taxpayer (or nontaxable entity) sufficient to show satisfaction of the requirement of this paragraph (a).

(b) Copy or record to be retained . (1) A person who is a signing tax return preparer of any return or claim for refund shall --

(i)(A) Retain a completed copy of the return or claim for refund; or

(B) Retain a record, by list, card file, or otherwise of the name, taxpayer identification number, and taxable year of the taxpayer (or nontaxable entity) for whom the return or claim for refund was prepared, and the type of return or claim for refund prepared;

(ii) Retain a record, by retention of a copy of the return or claim for refund, maintenance of a list or card file, or otherwise, for each return or claim for refund presented to the taxpayer (or nontaxable entity), of the name of the individual tax return preparer required to sign the return or claim for refund pursuant to §1.6695-1(b); and

(iii) Make the copy or record of returns and claims for refund and record of the individuals required to sign available for inspection upon request by the Commissioner.

(2) The material described in this paragraph (b) shall be retained and kept available for inspection for the 3- year period following the close of the return period during which the return or claim for refund was presented for signature to the taxpayer (or nontaxable entity). In the case of a return that becomes due (with extensions, if any) during a return period following the return period during which the return was presented for signature, the material shall be retained and kept available for inspection for the 3-year period following the close of the later return period in which the return became due. For the definition of "return period," see section 6060(c). If the person subject to the record retention requirement of this paragraph (b) is a corporation or a partnership that is dissolved before completion of the 3-year period, then all persons who are responsible for the winding up of the affairs of the corporation or partnership under state law shall be subject, on behalf of the corporation or partnership, to these record retention requirements until completion of the 3-year period. If state law does not specify any person or persons as responsible for winding up, then, collectively, the directors or general partners shall be subject, on behalf of the corporation or partnership, to the record retention requirements of this paragraph (b). For purposes of the penalty imposed by section 6695(d), such designated persons shall be deemed to be the tax return preparer and will be jointly and severally liable for each failure.

(c) Tax return preparer . For the definition of "signing tax return preparer," see section 7701(a)(36) and §301.7701-15(b)(1) of this chapter. For purposes of applying this section, in the case of --

(1) An arrangement between two or more signing tax return preparers, the person who employs one or more other signing tax return preparers to prepare any return or claim for refund for compensation other than for the person shall be considered to be the sole signing tax return preparer; and

(2) A partnership arrangement for the preparation of returns and claims for refund, the partnership shall be considered to be the sole signing tax return preparer.

(d) Penalties . (1) For the civil penalty for failure to furnish a copy of the return or claim for refund to the taxpayers (or nontaxable entity) as required under paragraphs (a) of this section, see section 6695(a) and §1.6695-1(a).

(2) For the civil penalty for failure to retain a copy of the return or claim for refund, or to retain a record as required under paragraphs (b) of this section, see section 6695(d) and §1.6695-1(d).

(e) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed on the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 4. Section 1.6109-2 is amended by revising the section heading and paragraphs (a) and (d) to read as follows:



§1.6109-2 Tax return preparers furnishing identifying numbers for returns or claims for refund filed after December 31, 2008 .

(a) Furnishing identifying number . (1) Each return of tax or claim for refund of tax under the Internal Revenue Code prepared by one or more tax return preparers must include the identifying number of the tax return preparer required by §1.6695-1(b) to sign the return or claim for refund. In addition, if there is an employment arrangement or association between the individual tax return preparer and another person (except to the extent the return prepared is for the person), the identifying number of the other person must also appear on the return or claim for refund. For the definition of the term "tax return preparer," see section 7701(a)(36) and §301.7701-15 of this chapter.

(2) The identifying number of an individual tax return preparer is that individual's social security account number, or such alternative number as may be prescribed by the Internal Revenue Service in forms, instructions, or other appropriate guidance.

(3) If an individual tax return preparer described in paragraph (a)(2) of this section is employed by, or associated with, a person (whether an individual or entity) and prepares the return or claim for refund (other than a return prepared for the person), the identifying number is the person's employer identification number.

* * * * *

(d) Effective/applicability date . Paragraph (a) of this section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register , but no sooner than December 31, 2008. For returns or claims for refund filed before January 1, 2000, see §1.6109-2A(a).

Par 5. Section 1.6694-0 is revised to read as follows:



§1.6694-0 Table of contents .

This section lists the captions that appear in §§1.6694-1 through 1.6694-4.



§1.6694-1 Section 6694 penalties applicable to tax return preparers .

(a) Overview.

(1) In general.

(2) Date return is deemed prepared.

(b) Tax return preparer.

(1) In general.

(2) Responsibility of signing tax return preparer.

(3) Responsibility of nonsigning tax return preparer.

(4) Tax return preparer and firm responsibility.

(5) Examples.

(c) Understatement of liability.

(d) Abatement of penalty where taxpayer's liability not understated.

(e) Verification of information furnished by taxpayer or other third party.

(1) In general.

(2) Verification of information on previously filed returns.

(3) Examples.

(f) Income derived (or to be derived) with respect to the return or claim for refund.

(1) In general.

(2) Compensation.

(i) Multiple engagements.

(ii) Reasonable allocation.

(iii) Fee refunds.

(iv) Reduction of compensation.

(3) Individual and firm allocation.

(4) Examples.

(g) Effective/applicability date.



§1.6694-2 Penalty for understatement due to an unreasonable position .

(a) In general.

(1) Proscribed conduct.

(2) Special rule for corporations, partnerships, and other firms.

(b) Reasonable belief that the position would more likely than not be sustained on its merits.

(1) In general.

(2) No unreasonable assumptions.

(3) Authorities.

(4) Examples.

(5) Written determinations.

(6) When more likely than not standard must be satisfied.

(c) Exception for adequate disclosure of positions with a reasonable basis.

(1) In general.

(2) Reasonable basis.

(3) Adequate disclosure.

(i) Signing tax return preparers.

(ii) Nonsigning tax return preparers.

(A) Advice to taxpayers.

(B) Advice to another tax return preparer.

(iii) Requirements for advice.

(iv) Pass-through entities.

(v) Examples.

(d) Exception for reasonable cause and good faith.

(1) Nature of the error causing the understatement.

(2) Frequency of errors.

(3) Materiality of errors.

(4) Tax return preparer's normal office practice.

(5) Reliance on advice of others.

(6) Reliance on generally accepted administrative or industry practice.

(e) Burden of proof.

(f) Effective/applicability date.



§1.6694-3 Penalty for understatement due to willful, reckless, or intentional conduct .

(a) In general.

(1) Proscribed conduct.

(2) Special rule for corporations, partnerships, and other firms.

(b) Willful attempt to understate liability.

(c) Reckless or intentional disregard.

(d) Examples.

(e) Rules or regulations.

(f) Section 6694(b) penalty reduced by section 6694(a) penalty.

(g) Burden of proof.

(h) Effective/applicability date.



§1.6694-4 Extension of period of collection when tax return preparer pays 15 percent of a penalty for understatement of taxpayer's liability and certain other procedural matters .

(a) In general.

(b) Tax return preparer must bring suit in district court to determine liability for penalty.

(c) Suspension of running of period of limitations on collection.

(d) Effective/applicability date.

Par. 6. Section 1.6694-1 is revised to read as follows:



§1.6694-1 Section 6694 penalties applicable to tax return preparers .

(a) Overview --(1) In general . Sections 6694(a) and (b) impose penalties on tax return preparers for conduct giving rise to certain understatements of liability on a return (including an amended or adjusted return) or claim for refund. The section 6694(a) penalty is imposed in an amount equal to the greater of $1,000, or 50 percent of the income derived (or to be derived) by the tax return preparer for an understatement of liability with respect to tax that is due to an undisclosed position for which the tax return preparer did not have a reasonable belief that the position would more likely than not be sustained on its merits (or due to a disclosed position for which there is no reasonable basis). The section 6694(b) penalty is imposed in an amount equal to the greater of $5,000, or 50 percent of the income derived (or to be derived) by the tax return preparer for an understatement of liability with respect to tax that is due to a willful attempt to understate tax liability or that is due to reckless or intentional disregard of rules or regulations. See §1.6694-2 for rules relating to the penalty under section 6694(a). See §1.6694-3 for rules relating to the penalty under section 6694(b).

(2) Date return is deemed prepared . For purposes of the penalties under section 6694, a return or claim for refund is deemed prepared on the date it is signed by the tax return preparer. If a signing tax return preparer within the meaning of §301.7701-15(b)(1) of this chapter fails to sign the return, the return is deemed prepared on the date the return is filed. See §1.6695-1 of this section. In the case of a nonsigning tax return preparer within the meaning of §301.7701-15(b)(2) of this chapter, the relevant date is the date the nonsigning tax return preparer provides the tax advice with respect to the position giving rise to the understatement. This date will be determined based on all the facts and circumstances.

(b) Tax return preparer --(1) In general . For purposes of this section, "tax return preparer" means any person who is a tax return preparer within the meaning of section 7701(a)(36) and §301.7701-15 of this chapter. An individual is a tax return preparer subject to section 6694 if the individual is primarily responsible for the position(s) on the return or claim for refund giving rise to an understatement. There is only one individual within a firm who is primarily responsible for each position on the return or claim for refund giving rise to an understatement. In the course of identifying the individual who is primarily responsible for the position, the Internal Revenue Service may advise multiple individuals within the firm that it may be concluded that they are the individual within the firm who is primarily responsible. In some circumstances, there may be more than one tax return preparer who is primarily responsible for the position(s) giving rise to an understatement if multiple tax return preparers are employed by, or associated with, different firms.

(2) Responsibility of signing tax return preparer . The signing tax return preparer within the meaning of §301.7701-15(b)(1) of this chapter will generally be considered the person who is primarily responsible for all of the positions on the return or claim for refund giving rise to an understatement. It may be concluded, however, based upon information received from the signing tax return preparer (or other relevant information from a source other than the signing tax return preparer) that another person within the signing tax return preparer's same firm was primarily responsible for the position(s) on the return or claim for refund giving rise to an understatement.

(3) Responsibility of nonsigning tax return preparer . If there are one or more individuals within a firm who are nonsigning tax return preparers within the meaning of §301.7701-15(b)(2) of this chapter and there is no signing tax return preparer within the meaning of §301.7701- 15(b)(1) of this chapter for the return or claim for refund within that firm, the individual within the firm with overall supervisory responsibility for the position(s) giving rise to the understatement is the tax return preparer who is primarily responsible for the position for purposes of section 6694. Additionally, if, after the application of paragraph (b)(2) of this section, it is concluded that the signing tax return preparer is not primarily responsible for the position or the IRS cannot conclude which individual (as between the signing tax return preparer and other persons within the firm) is primarily responsible for the position, the individual within the firm with overall supervisory responsibility for the position(s) giving rise to the understatement is the tax return preparer who is primarily responsible for the position for purposes of section 6694.

(4) Tax return preparer and firm responsibility . To the extent provided in §§1.6694-2(a)(2) and 1.6694-3(a)(2), an individual and the firm that employs the individual, or the firm of which the individual is a partner, member, shareholder, or other equity holder, may both be subject to penalty under section 6694 with respect to the position(s) on the return or claim for refund giving rise to an understatement. If an individual (other than the sole proprietor) who is employed by a sole proprietorship is subject to penalty under section 6694, the sole proprietorship is considered a "firm" for purposes of this paragraph (b).

(5) Examples . The provisions of paragraph (b) of this section are illustrated by the following examples:

Example 1 . Attorney A provides advice to Client C concerning the proper treatment of an item with respect to which all events have occurred on C's income tax return. In preparation for providing that advice, A seeks advice regarding the proper treatment of the item from Attorney B, who is within the same firm as A, but A is the attorney who signs C's return as a tax return preparer. B provides advice on the treatment of the item upon which A relies. B's advice is reflected on C's income tax return but no disclosure was made in accordance with §1.6694-2(c)(3). The advice constitutes preparation of a substantial portion of the return within the meaning of §301.7701-15(b)(3) and the IRS later challenges the position taken on the tax return, giving rise to an understatement of liability. For purposes of the regulations under section 6694, A is initially considered the tax return preparer with respect to C's return and the IRS advises A that A may be subject to the penalty under section 6694 with respect to C's return. Based upon information received from A or another source, it may be concluded that B had primary responsibility for the position taken on the return that gave rise to the understatement because B had overall supervisory responsibility for the position giving rise to an understatement.

Example 2 . Same as Example 1 , except that neither Attorney A nor any other attorney within A's firm signs Client C's return as a tax return preparer. Attorney B is the nonsigning tax return preparer within the firm with overall supervisory responsibility for the position giving rise to an understatement. Accordingly, B is the tax return preparer who is primarily responsible for the position on C's return giving rise to an understatement and is subject to penalty under section 6694.

Example 3 . Same as Example 1 , except Attorney D, who works for a different firm than A, also provides advice on the same position upon which A relies. It may be concluded that D is also primarily responsible for the position on the return.

(c) Understatement of liability . For purposes of this section, an "understatement of liability" exists if, viewing the return or claim for refund as a whole, there is an understatement of the net amount payable with respect to any tax imposed by the Internal Revenue Code (Code), or an overstatement of the net amount creditable or refundable with respect to any tax imposed by the Code. The net amount payable in a taxable year with respect to the return for which the tax return preparer engaged in conduct proscribed by section 6694 is not reduced by any carryback. Tax imposed by the Code does not include additions to the tax, additional amounts, and assessable penalties imposed by subchapter 68 of the Code. Except as provided in paragraph (d) of this section, the determination of whether an understatement of liability exists may be made in a proceeding involving the tax return preparer that is separate and apart from any proceeding involving the taxpayer.

(d) Abatement of penalty where taxpayer's liability not understated . If a penalty under section 6694(a) or (b) concerning a return or claim for refund has been assessed against one or more tax return preparers, and if it is established at any time in a final administrative determination or a final judicial decision that there was no understatement of liability relating to the position(s) on the return or claim for refund, then --

(1) The assessment shall be abated; and

(2) If any amount of the penalty was paid, that amount shall be refunded to the person or persons who so paid, as if the payment were an overpayment of tax, without consideration of any period of limitations.

(e) Verification of information furnished by taxpayer or other party --(1) In general . For purposes of sections 6694(a) and (b) (including meeting the reasonable belief that the position would more likely than not be sustained on its merits and reasonable basis standards in §§1.6694- 2(b) and (c)(2), and demonstrating reasonable cause and good faith under §1.6694-2(d)), the tax return preparer generally may rely in good faith without verification upon information furnished by the taxpayer. A tax return preparer, however, may not rely on information provided by a taxpayer with respect to legal conclusions on Federal tax issues. A tax return preparer may also rely in good faith and without verification upon information furnished by another advisor, another tax return preparer or other party (including another advisor or tax return preparer at the tax return preparer's firm). The tax return preparer is not required to audit, examine or review books and records, business operations, or documents or other evidence to verify independently information provided by the taxpayer, advisor, other tax return preparer, or other party. The tax return preparer, however, may not ignore the implications of information furnished to the tax return preparer or actually known by the tax return preparer. The tax return preparer must make reasonable inquiries if the information as furnished appears to be incorrect or incomplete. Additionally, some provisions of the Code or regulations require that specific facts and circumstances exist (for example, that the taxpayer maintain specific documents) before a deduction or credit may be claimed. The tax return preparer must make appropriate inquiries to determine the existence of facts and circumstances required by a Code section or regulation as a condition of the claiming of a deduction or credit.

(2) Verification of information on previously filed returns . For purposes of section 6694(a) and (b) (including meeting the reasonable belief that the position would more likely than not would be sustained on its merits and reasonable basis standards in §§1.6694-2(b) and (c)(2), and demonstrating reasonable cause and good faith under §1.6694-2(d)), a tax return preparer may rely in good faith without verification upon a tax return that has been previously prepared by a taxpayer or another tax return preparer and filed with the IRS. For example, a tax return preparer who prepares an amended return (including a claim for refund) need not verify the positions on the original return. The tax return preparer, however, may not ignore the implications of information furnished to the tax return preparer or actually known by the tax return preparer. The tax return preparer must make reasonable inquiries if the information as furnished appears to be incorrect or incomplete. The tax return preparer must confirm that the position being relied upon has not been adjusted by examination or otherwise.

(3) Examples . The provisions of this paragraph (e) are illustrated by the following examples:

Example 1 . During an interview conducted by Preparer E, a taxpayer stated that he had made a charitable contribution of real estate in the amount of $50,000 during the tax year, when in fact he had not made this charitable contribution. E did not inquire about the existence of a qualified appraisal or complete a Form 8283, Noncash Charitable Contributions, in accordance with the reporting and substantiation requirements under section 170(f)(11). E reported a deduction on the tax return for the charitable contribution, which resulted in an understatement of liability for tax, and signed the tax return as the tax return preparer. E is subject to a penalty under section 6694.

Example 2 . While preparing the 2008 tax return for an individual taxpayer, Preparer F realizes that the taxpayer did not provide a Form 1099 for a bank account that produced significant taxable income in 2008. When F inquired about any other income, the taxpayer furnished the Form 1099 to F for use in preparation of the 2008 tax return. F did not know that the taxpayer owned an additional bank account that generated taxable income for 2008 and the taxpayer did not reveal this information to the tax return preparer notwithstanding F's general inquiry about any other income. F signed the taxpayer's return as the tax return preparer. F is not subject to a penalty under section 6694.

Example 3 . In preparing a tax return, Accountant G relies on the advice of an actuary concerning the limit on deductibility under section 404(a)(1)(A) of a contribution by an employer to a qualified pension trust. On the basis of this advice, G completed and signed the tax return. It is later determined that there is an understatement of liability for tax that resulted from the incorrect advice provided by the actuary. G had no reason to believe that the advice was incorrect or incomplete, and the advice appeared reasonable on its face. G was also not aware at the time the return was prepared of any reason why the actuary did not know all of the relevant facts or that the advice was no longer reliable due to developments in the law since the time the advice was given. G is not subject to a penalty under section 6694. The actuary, however, may be subject to penalty under section 6694 if the advice given by the actuary constitutes a substantial portion of the tax return within the meaning of §301.7701-15(b)(3) of this chapter.

(f) Income derived (or to be derived) with respect to the return or claim for refund --(1) In general . For purposes of sections 6694(a) and (b), income derived (or to be derived) means all compensation the tax return preparer receives or expects to receive with respect to the engagement of preparing the return or claim for refund or providing tax advice (including research and consultation) with respect to the position(s) taken on the return or claim for refund that gave rise to the understatement. In the situation of a tax return preparer who is not compensated directly by the taxpayer, but rather by a firm that employs the tax return preparer or with whom the tax return preparer is associated, income derived (or to be derived) means all compensation the tax return preparer receives from the firm that can be reasonably allocated to the engagement of preparing the return or claim for refund or providing tax advice (including research and consultation) with respect to the position(s) taken on the return or claim for refund that gave rise to the understatement. In the situation where a firm that employs the individual tax return preparer (or the firm of which the individual tax return preparer is a partner, member, shareholder, or other equity holder) is subject to a penalty under section 6694(a) or (b) pursuant to the provisions in §§1.6694-2(a)(2) or 1.6694-3(a)(2), income derived (or to be derived) means all compensation the firm receives or expects to receive with respect to the engagement of preparing the return or claim for refund or providing tax advice (including research and consultation) with respect to the position(s) taken on the return or claim for refund that gave rise to the understatement.

(2) Compensation --(i) Multiple engagements . For purposes of applying paragraph (f)(1) of this section, if the tax return preparer or the tax return preparer's firm has multiple engagements related to the same return or claim for refund, only those engagements relating to the position(s) taken on the return or claim for refund that gave rise to the understatement are considered for purposes of calculating the income derived (or to be derived) with respect to the return or claim for refund.

(ii) Reasonable allocation . For purposes of applying paragraph (f)(1) of this section, only compensation for tax advice that is given with respect to events that have occurred at the time the advice is rendered and that relates to the position(s) giving rise to the understatement will be taken into account for purposes of calculating the section 6694(a) and (b) penalties. If a lump sum fee is received that includes amounts not taken into account under the preceding sentence, the amount of income derived will be based on a reasonable allocation of the lump sum fee between the tax advice giving rise to the penalty and the advice that does not give rise to the penalty.

(iii) Fee refunds . For purposes of applying paragraph (f)(1) of this section, a refund to the taxpayer of all or part of the amount paid to the tax return preparer or the tax return preparer's firm will not reduce the amount of the section 6694 penalty assessed. A refund in this context does not include a discounted fee or alternative billing arrangement for the services provided.

(iv) Reduction of compensation . For purposes of applying paragraph (f)(1) of this section, it may be concluded based upon information provided by the tax return preparer or the tax return preparer's firm that an appropriate allocation of compensation attributable to the position(s) giving rise to the understatement on the return or claim for refund is less than the total amount of compensation associated with the engagement. For example, the number of hours of the engagement spent on the position(s) giving rise to the understatement may be less than the total hours associated with the engagement. If this is concluded, the amount of the penalty will be calculated based upon the compensation attributable to the position(s) giving rise to the understatement. Otherwise, the total amount of compensation from the engagement will be the amount of income derived for purposes of calculating the penalty under section 6694.

(3) Individual and firm allocation . If both an individual within a firm and a firm that employs the individual (or the firm of which the individual is a partner, member, shareholder, or other equity holder) are subject to a penalty under section 6694(a) or (b) pursuant to the provisions in §§1.6694-2(a)(2) or 1.6694-3(a)(2), the amount of penalties assessed against the individual and the firm shall not exceed 50 percent of the income derived (or to be derived) by the firm from the engagement of preparing the return or claim for refund or providing tax advice (including research and consultation) with respect to the position(s) taken on the return or claim for refund that gave rise to the understatement. The portion of the total amount of the penalty assessed against the individual tax return preparer shall not exceed 50 percent of the individual's compensation as determined under paragraphs (f)(1) and (2) of this section.

(4) Examples . The provisions of this paragraph (f) are illustrated by the following examples:

Example 1 . Signing Tax Return Preparer H is engaged by a taxpayer and paid a total of $21,000. Of this amount, $20,000 relates to research and consultation regarding a transaction that is later reported on a return, and $1,000 for the activities relating to the preparation of the return. Based on H's hourly rates, a reasonable allocation of the amount of compensation related to the advice rendered prior to the occurrence of events that are the subject of the advice is $5,000. The remaining compensation of $16,000 is considered to be compensation related to the advice rendered after the occurrence of events that are the subject of the advice and return preparation. The income derived by H with respect to the return for purposes of computing the penalty under section 6694(a) is $16,000, and the amount of the penalty imposed under section 6694(a) is $8,000.

Example 2 . Accountants I, J, and K are employed by Firm L. I is a principal manager of Firm L and provides corporate tax advice for the taxpayer after all events have occurred subject to an engagement for corporate tax advice. J provides international tax advice for the taxpayer after all events have occurred subject to a different engagement for international tax advice. K prepares and signs the taxpayer's return under a general tax services engagement. I's advice is the source of an understatement on the return and the advice constitutes preparation of a substantial portion of the return within the meaning of §301.7701-15(b) of this chapter. I is the nonsigning tax return preparer within the firm with overall supervisory responsibility for the position on the taxpayer's return giving rise to an understatement. Thus, I is the tax return preparer who is primarily responsible for the position on the taxpayer's return giving rise to the understatement. Because K's signature as the signing tax return preparer is on the return, the IRS advises K that K may be subject to the section 6694(a) penalty against K to the understatement. K provides information that I is the tax return preparer with primary responsibility for the position that gave rise to the understatement and K formed a reasonable belief that the position would more likely than not be sustained on the merits by relying on the advice provided by I. Furthermore, K has reasonable cause because K relied on I for the advice on the corporate tax matter. The IRS, therefore, assesses the section 6694 penalty against I. The portion of the total amount of the penalty allocable to I does not exceed that part of I's compensation that is attributable to the corporate tax advice engagement. In the event that Firm L is also liable under the provisions in §1.6694-2(a)(2), the IRS assesses the section 6694 penalty in an amount not exceeding 50 percent of Firm L's firm compensation based on the engagement relating to the corporate tax advice services provided by I where there is no applicable reduction in compensation pursuant to §1.6694-1(f)(2)(iii).

Example 3 . Same facts as Example 2 , except that I provides the advice on the corporate matter when the events have not yet occurred. I's advice is the cause of an understatement position on the return but I is not a tax return preparer pursuant to §301.7701-15(b)(2) or (3) of this chapter. K has reasonable cause because K relied on I for the advice on the corporate tax matter and K is not limited to reliance on persons who provide post-transactional advice if such reliance is reasonable and in good faith. I, K and Firm L are not liable for the section 6694 penalty.

(g) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 7. Section 1.6694-2 is revised to read as follows:



§1.6694-2 Penalty for understatement due to an unreasonable position .

(a) In general --(1) Proscribed conduct . Except as otherwise provided in this section, a tax return preparer is liable for a penalty under section 6694(a) equal to the greater of $1,000 or 50 percent of the income derived (or to be derived) by the tax return preparer for any return or claim for refund that it prepares that results in an understatement of liability due to a position if the tax return preparer knew (or reasonably should have known) of the position and either --

(i) The position was not disclosed as provided in this section and there was not a reasonable belief that the position would more likely than not be sustained on its merits; or

(ii) The position was disclosed as provided in this section but there was no reasonable basis for the position.

(2) Special rule for corporations, partnerships, and other firms . A firm that employs a tax return preparer subject to a penalty under section 6694(a) (or a firm of which the individual tax return preparer is a partner, member, shareholder or other equity holder) is also subject to penalty if, and only if --

(i) One or more members of the principal management (or principal officers) of the firm or a branch office participated in or knew of the conduct proscribed by section 6694(a);

(ii) The corporation, partnership, or other firm entity failed to provide reasonable and appropriate procedures for review of the position for which the penalty is imposed; or

(iii) Such review procedures were disregarded by the corporation, partnership, or other firm entity through willfulness, recklessness, or gross indifference (including ignoring facts that would lead a person of reasonable prudence and competence to investigate or ascertain) in the formulation of the advice, or the preparation of the return or claim for refund, that included the position for which the penalty is imposed.

(b) Reasonable belief that the position would more likely than not be sustained on its merits --(1) In general . A tax return preparer may "reasonably believe that a position would more likely than not be sustained on its merits" if the tax return preparer analyzes the pertinent facts and authorities, and in reliance upon that analysis, reasonably concludes in good faith that the position has a greater than 50 percent likelihood of being sustained on its merits. In reaching this conclusion, the possibility that the position will not be challenged by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) (for example, because the taxpayer's return may not be audited or because the issue may not be raised on audit) is not to be taken into account. The analysis prescribed by §1.6662-4(d)(3)(ii) (or any successor provision) for purposes of determining whether substantial authority is present applies for purposes of determining whether the more likely than not standard is satisfied. Whether a tax return preparer meets this standard will be determined based upon all facts and circumstances, including the tax return preparer's diligence. In determining the level of diligence in a particular situation, the tax return preparer's experience with the area of Federal tax law and familiarity with the taxpayer's affairs, as well as the complexity of the issues and facts, will be taken into account. A tax return preparer may reasonably believe that a position more likely than not would be sustained on its merits despite the absence of other types of authority if the position is supported by a well-reasoned construction of the applicable statutory provision. For purposes of determining whether the tax return preparer has a reasonable belief that the position would more likely than not be sustained on the merits, a tax return preparer may rely in good faith without verification upon information furnished by the taxpayer, advisor, other tax return preparer, or other party (including another advisor or tax return preparer at the tax return preparer's firm), as provided in §1.6694-1(e).

(2) No unreasonable assumptions . A position must not be based on unreasonable factual or legal assumptions (including assumptions as to future events) and must not unreasonably rely on the representations, statements, findings, or agreements of the taxpayer or any other person. For example, a position must not be based on a representation or assumption that the tax return preparer knows, or has reason to know, is inaccurate.

(3) Authorities . The authorities considered in determining whether a position satisfies the more likely than not standard are those authorities provided in §1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii) (or any successor provision).

(4) Examples . The provisions of paragraphs (b)(1) through (b)(3) of this section are illustrated by the following examples:

Example 1 . A new statute is silent as to whether the taxpayer may take advantage of certain tax benefits. The Treasury Department and the IRS have not issued any interpretative guidance for the newly enacted provision. A well-reasoned construction of the statutory text supports the position that a taxpayer may claim the tax benefits. Preparer M may avoid the section 6694(a) penalty by taking the position that M reasonably believed that the taxpayer's position would more likely than not be sustained on its merits.

Example 2 . After the passage of legislation containing a new statutory provision, a taxpayer engaged in a transaction that is adversely affected by the new provision. Prior law supported a position favorable to the taxpayer. Preparer N believes that the new statute is inequitable as applied to the taxpayer's situation. The statutory language, however, is unambiguous as applied to the transaction to deny the result claimed by the taxpayer previously. In considering the new statutory provision as applied to the taxpayer's position, N may not avoid the section 6694(a) penalty by taking the position that the tax return preparer reasonably believed that the position would more likely than not be sustained on its merits.

Example 3 . While preparing the taxpayer's return, Preparer O determines that a statute is silent as to whether the taxpayer may take a certain position on the taxpayer's 2007 Federal income tax return. Three private letter rulings issued to other taxpayers in 2002 and 2003 support the taxpayer's position. Temporary regulations issued in 2004, however, are clearly contrary to the taxpayer's position. After the issuance of the temporary regulations, the earlier private letter rulings cease to be authorities and are not taken into account in determining whether the taxpayer's position satisfies the reasonable belief that the position would more likely than not be sustained on its merits standard. Preparer O may not avoid the section 6694(a) penalty by taking the position that the tax return preparer reasonably believed that the taxpayer's position would more likely than not be sustained on its merits.

Example 4 . In the course of researching whether an interpretation of a phrase in the Internal Revenue Code (Code) is a position that more likely than not will be sustained on its merits, Preparer P discovers that the only relevant authorities include decisions of five U.S. courts of appeal. Three U.S. courts of appeal have construed the language as being taxpayer favorable. Two other U.S. courts of appeal, however, have construed the identical language as being favorable to the government's position. The U.S. court of appeals in the jurisdiction where the taxpayer is located has not addressed this issue. P reasonably believes that the taxpayer's facts more closely parallel the facts involved in the three U.S. courts of appeals' decisions that were taxpayer favorable. Under the analysis prescribed by §1.6662-4(d)(3)(ii), P may avoid the section 6694(a) penalty by taking the position that the tax return preparer reasonably believed that a well-reasoned position consistent with the taxpayer favorable interpretation would more likely than not be sustained on its merits.

(5) Written determinations . The tax return preparer may avoid the section 6694(a) penalty by taking the position that the tax return preparer reasonably believed that the taxpayer's position satisfies the "more likely than not" standard if the taxpayer is the subject of a "written determination" as provided in §1.6662-4(d)(3)(iv)(A).

(6) When "more likely than not" standard must be satisfied . For purposes of this section, the requirement that a position satisfies the "more likely than not" standard must be satisfied on the date the return is deemed prepared, as prescribed by §1.6694-1(a)(2).

(c) Exception for adequate disclosure of positions with a reasonable basis --(1) In general . The section 6694(a) penalty will not be imposed on a tax return preparer if the position taken has a reasonable basis and is adequately disclosed within the meaning of paragraph (c)(3) of this section. For an exception to the section 6694(a) penalty for reasonable cause and good faith, see paragraph (d) of this section.

(2) Reasonable basis . For purposes of this section, "reasonable basis" has the same meaning as in §1.6662-3(b)(3) or any successor provision of the accuracy-related penalty regulations. For purposes of determining whether the tax return preparer has a reasonable basis for a position, a tax return preparer may rely in good faith without verification upon information furnished by the taxpayer, advisor, other tax return preparer, or other party (including another advisor or tax return preparer at the tax return preparer's firm), as provided in §1.6694-1(e).

(3) Adequate disclosure --(i) Signing tax return preparers . In the case of a signing tax return preparer within the meaning of §301.7701-15(b)(1) of this chapter, disclosure of a position for which there is a reasonable basis but for which the tax return preparer does not have a reasonable belief that the position would more likely than not be sustained on the merits is adequate if the tax return preparer meets any of the following standards:

(A) The position is disclosed in accordance with §1.6662-4(f) (which permits disclosure on a properly completed and filed Form 8275, "Disclosure Statement," or Form 8275-R, "Regulation Disclosure Statement," as appropriate, or on the tax return in accordance with the annual revenue procedure described in §1.6662-4(f)(2)).

(B) For income tax returns, if the position would not meet the standard for the taxpayer to avoid a penalty under section 6662(d)(2)(B) without disclosure (no substantial authority), the tax return preparer provides the taxpayer with the prepared tax return that includes the disclosure in accordance with §1.6662-4(f).

(C) For income tax returns, if the position would otherwise meet the standard for nondisclosure under section 6662(d)(2)(B)(i) (substantial authority), the tax return preparer advises the taxpayer of all the penalty standards applicable to the taxpayer under section 6662. The tax return preparer must also contemporaneously document the advice in the tax return preparer's files.

(D) For income tax returns, if section 6662(d)(2)(B) does not apply because the position may be described in section 6662(d)(2)(C) or section 6662A (a tax shelter, reportable transaction with a significant purpose of tax avoidance or evasion, or a listed transaction), the tax return preparer advises the taxpayer that there needs to be at a minimum substantial authority for the position, that the taxpayer must possess a reasonable belief that the tax treatment was more likely than not the proper treatment in order to avoid a penalty under section 6662(d) or section 6662A as applicable, and that disclosure will not protect the taxpayer from assessment of an accuracy-related penalty if either section 6662(d)(2)(C) or 6662A applies to the position. The tax return preparer must also contemporaneously document the advice in the tax return preparer's files.

(E) For returns or claims for refund that are subject to penalties pursuant to section 6662 other than the substantial understatement penalty under section 6662(b)(2) and (d), the tax return preparer advises the taxpayer of the penalty standards applicable to the taxpayer under sections 6662. The tax return preparer must also contemporaneously document the advice in the tax return preparer's files.

(ii) Nonsigning tax return preparers . In the case of a nonsigning tax return preparer within the meaning of §301.7701-15(b)(2) of this chapter, disclosure of a position that satisfies the reasonable basis standard but does not satisfy the reasonable belief that a position would more likely than not be sustained on its merits standard is adequate if the position is disclosed in accordance with §1.6662-4(f) (which permits disclosure on a properly completed and filed Form 8275 or Form 8275-R, as appropriate, or on the return in accordance with an annual revenue procedure described in §1.6662-4(f)(2)). In addition, disclosure of a position is adequate in the case of a nonsigning tax return preparer if, with respect to that position, the tax return preparer complies with the provisions of paragraph (c)(3)(ii)(A) or (B) of this section, whichever is applicable.

(A) Advice to taxpayers . If a nonsigning tax return preparer provides advice to the taxpayer with respect to a position for which there is a reasonable basis but for which the nonsigning tax return preparer does not have a reasonable belief that the position would more likely than not be sustained on the merits, disclosure of that position is adequate if the tax return preparer advises the taxpayer of any opportunity to avoid penalties under section 6662 that could apply to the position, if relevant, and of the standards for disclosure to the extent applicable. The tax return preparer must also contemporaneously document the advice in the tax return preparer's files.

(B) Advice to another tax return preparer . If a nonsigning tax return preparer provides advice to another tax return preparer with respect to a position for which there is a reasonable basis but for which the nonsigning tax return preparer does not have a reasonable belief that the position would more likely than not be sustained on the merits, disclosure of that position is adequate if the tax return preparer advises the other tax return preparer that disclosure under section 6694(a) may be required. The tax return preparer must also contemporaneously document the advice in the tax return preparer's files.

(iii) Requirements for advice . For purposes of satisfying the disclosure standards of paragraphs (c)(3)(i) and (ii) of this section, each return position for which there is a reasonable basis but for which the tax return preparer does not have a reasonable belief that the position would more likely than not be sustained on the merits must be addressed by the tax return preparer. The advice to the taxpayer with respect to each position, therefore, must be particular to the taxpayer and tailored to the taxpayer's facts and circumstances. The tax return preparer is required to contemporaneously document the fact that the advice was provided. There is no general pro forma language or special format required for a tax return preparer to comply with these rules. No form of a general boilerplate disclaimer, however, is sufficient to satisfy these standards. A tax return preparer may choose to comply with the documentation standard in one document covering each position, or in multiple documents covering all of the positions.

(iv) Pass-through entities . Disclosure in the case of items attributable to a pass-through entity is adequate if made at the entity level in accordance with the rules in §1.6662-4(f)(5) or at the entity level in accordance with the rules in paragraphs (c)(3)(i) or (ii) of this section.

(v) Examples . The provisions of paragraph (c)(3) of this section are illustrated by the following examples:

Example 1 . An individual taxpayer hires Accountant Q to prepare its income tax return. Q does not reasonably believe that a particular position taken on the tax return would more likely than not be sustained on its merits although there is substantial authority for the position. Q prepares and signs the tax return without disclosing the position taken on the tax return, but advises the individual taxpayer of the penalty standards applicable to the taxpayer under section 6662, and contemporaneously documents in Q's files that this advice was provided. The individual taxpayer signs and files the tax return without disclosing the position because the position meets the standards for nondisclosure under section 6662(d)(2)(B)(i). The IRS later challenges the position taken on the tax return, resulting in an understatement of liability. Q is not subject to a penalty under section 6694.

Example 2 . Attorney R advises a large corporate taxpayer concerning the proper treatment of complex entries on the corporate taxpayer's tax return. R has reason to know that the tax attributable to the entries is a substantial portion of the tax required to be shown on the tax return within the meaning of §301.7701-15(b)(3). When providing the advice, R concludes that one position with respect to these entries does not meet the reasonable belief that the position would more likely than not be sustained on the merits standard and also does not have substantial authority, although the position meets the reasonable basis standard. R, in good faith, advises the corporate taxpayer that the position lacks substantial authority and the taxpayer will be subject to an accuracy-related penalty under section 6662 unless the position is disclosed in a disclosure statement included in the return. R also documents the fact that this advice was contemporaneously provided to the corporate taxpayer at the time the advice was provided. Neither R nor any other attorney within R's firm signs the corporate taxpayer's return as a tax return preparer, but the advice by R constitutes preparation of a substantial portion of the tax return and R is the individual with overall supervisory responsibility for the position giving rise to the understatement. Thus, R is a tax return preparer for purposes of section 6694. R, however, will not be subject to a penalty under section 6694.

(d) Exception for reasonable cause and good faith . The penalty under section 6694(a) will not be imposed if, considering all the facts and circumstances, it is determined that the understatement was due to reasonable cause and that the tax return preparer acted in good faith. Factors to consider include:

(1) Nature of the error causing the understatement . The error resulted from a provision that was complex, uncommon, or highly technical and a competent tax return preparer of tax returns or claims for refund of the type at issue reasonably could have made the error. The reasonable cause and good faith exception, however, does not apply to an error that would have been apparent from a general review of the return or claim for refund by the tax return preparer.

(2) Frequency of errors . The understatement was the result of an isolated error (such as an inadvertent mathematical or clerical error) rather than a number of errors. Although the reasonable cause and good faith exception generally applies to an isolated error, it does not apply if the isolated error is so obvious, flagrant, or material that it should have been discovered during a review of the return or claim for refund. Furthermore, the reasonable cause and good faith exception does not apply if there is a pattern of errors on a return or claim for refund even though any one error, in isolation, would have qualified for the reasonable cause and good faith exception.

(3) Materiality of errors . The understatement was not material in relation to the correct tax liability. The reasonable cause and good faith exception generally applies if the understatement is of a relatively immaterial amount. Nevertheless, even an immaterial understatement may not qualify for the reasonable cause and good faith exception if the error or errors creating the understatement are sufficiently obvious or numerous.

(4) Tax return preparer's normal office practice . The tax return preparer's normal office practice, when considered together with other facts and circumstances, such as the knowledge of the tax return preparer, indicates that the error in question would rarely occur and the normal office practice was followed in preparing the return or claim for refund in question. Such a normal office practice must be a system for promoting accuracy and consistency in the preparation of returns or claims for refund and generally would include, in the case of a signing tax return preparer, checklists, methods for obtaining necessary information from the taxpayer, a review of the prior year's return, and review procedures. Notwithstanding these rules, the reasonable cause and good faith exception does not apply if there is a flagrant error on a return or claim for refund, a pattern of errors on a return or claim for refund, or a repetition of the same or similar errors on numerous returns or claims for refund.

(5) Reliance on advice of others . For purposes of demonstrating reasonable cause and good faith, a tax return preparer may rely without verification upon advice and information furnished by the taxpayer or other party, as provided in §1.6694-1(e). The tax return preparer may reasonably rely in good faith on the advice of, or schedules or other documents prepared by, the taxpayer, another advisor, another tax return preparer, or other party (including another advisor or tax return preparer at the tax return preparer's firm), and who the tax return preparer had reason to believe was competent to render the advice or other information. The advice or information may be written or oral, but in either case the burden of establishing that the advice or information was received is on the tax return preparer. A tax return preparer is not considered to have relied in good faith if --

(i) The advice or information is unreasonable on its face;

(ii) The tax return preparer knew or should have known that the other party providing the advice or information was not aware of all relevant facts; or

(iii) The tax return preparer knew or should have known (given the nature of the tax return preparer's practice), at the time the return or claim for refund was prepared, that the advice or information was no longer reliable due to developments in the law since the time the advice was given.

(6) Reliance on generally accepted administrative or industry practice . The tax return preparer reasonably relied in good faith on generally accepted administrative or industry practice in taking the position that resulted in the understatement. A tax return preparer is not considered to have relied in good faith if the tax return preparer knew or should have known (given the nature of the tax return preparer's practice), at the time the return or claim for refund was prepared, that the administrative or industry practice was no longer reliable due to developments in the law or IRS administrative practice since the time the practice was developed.

(e) Burden of proof . In any proceeding with respect to the penalty imposed by section 6694(a), the issues on which the tax return preparer bears the burden of proof include whether --

(1) The tax return preparer knew or reasonably should have known that the questioned position was taken on the return;

(2) There is reasonable cause and good faith with respect to such position; and

(3) The position was disclosed adequately in accordance with paragraph (c) of this section.

(f) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 8. Section 1.6694-3 is amended by revising paragraphs (a),(c)(2) and (3),(d),(e),(f),(g) and (h) to read as follows:



§1.6694-3 Penalty for understatement due to willful, reckless, or intentional conduct .

(a) In general --(1) Proscribed conduct . A tax return preparer is liable for a penalty under section 6694(b) equal to the greater of $5,000 or 50 percent of the income derived (or to be derived) by the tax return preparer if any part of an understatement of liability for a return or claim for refund that is prepared is due to --

(i) A willful attempt in any manner to understate the liability for tax by a tax return preparer on the return or claim for refund; or

(ii) Any reckless or intentional disregard of rules or regulations by any such person.

(2) Special rule for corporations, partnerships, and other firms . A firm that employs a tax return preparer subject to a penalty under section 6694(b) (or a firm of which the individual tax return preparer is a partner, member, shareholder or other equity holder) is also subject to penalty if, and only if --

(i) One or more members of the principal management (or principal officers) of the firm or a branch office participated in or knew of the conduct proscribed by section 6694(b);

(ii) The corporation, partnership, or other firm entity failed to provide reasonable and appropriate procedures for review of the position for which the penalty is imposed; or

(iii) Such review procedures were disregarded by the corporation, partnership, or other firm entity through willfulness, recklessness, or gross indifference (including ignoring facts that would lead a person of reasonable prudence and competence to investigate or ascertain) in the formulation of the advice, or the preparation of the return or claim for refund, that included the position for which the penalty is imposed.

* * * * *

(c) Reckless or intentional disregard --(1)* * *

(2) A tax return preparer is not considered to have recklessly or intentionally disregarded a rule or regulation if the position contrary to the rule or regulation has a reasonable basis as defined in §1.6694- 2(c)(2) and is adequately disclosed in accordance with §1.6694-2(c)(3). In the case of a position contrary to a regulation, the position must represent a good faith challenge to the validity of the regulation and, when disclosed in accordance with §1.6694-2(c)(3), the tax return preparer must identify the regulation being challenged. For purposes of this section, disclosure on the return in accordance with an annual revenue procedure under §1.6662-4(f)(2) is not applicable.

(3) In the case of a position contrary to a revenue ruling or notice (other than a notice of proposed rulemaking) published by the Internal Revenue Service in the Internal Revenue Bulletin, a tax return preparer also is not considered to have recklessly or intentionally disregarded the ruling or notice if the tax return preparer reasonably believes that the position would more likely than not be sustained on its merits in accordance with §1.6694-2(b).

(d) Examples . The provisions of paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section are illustrated by the following examples:

Example 1 . A taxpayer provided Preparer S with detailed check registers reflecting personal and business expenses. One of the expenses was for domestic help, and this expense was identified as personal on the check register. S knowingly deducted the expenses of the taxpayer's domestic help as wages paid in the taxpayer's business. S is subject to the penalty under section 6694(b).

Example 2 . A taxpayer provided Preparer T with detailed check registers to compute the taxpayer's expenses. T, however, knowingly overstated the expenses on the return. After adjustments by the examiner, the tax liability increased significantly. Because T disregarded information provided in the check registers, T is subject to the penalty under section 6694(b).

Example 3 . Preparer U prepares a taxpayer's return and encounters certain expenses incurred in the purchase of a business. Final regulations provide that such expenses incurred in the purchase of a business must be capitalized. One U.S. Tax Court case has expressly invalidated that portion of the regulations. Under these facts, U will have a reasonable basis for the position as defined in §1.6694- 2(c)(2) and will not be subject to the section 6694(b) penalty if the position is adequately disclosed in accordance with paragraph (c)(2) of this section because the position represents a good faith challenge to the validity of the regulations.

(e) Rules or regulations . The term rules or regulations includes the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, temporary or final Treasury regulations issued under the Code, and revenue rulings or notices (other than notices of proposed rulemaking) issued by the Internal Revenue Service and published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin.

(f) Section 6694(b) penalty reduced by section 6694(a) penalty . The amount of any penalty to which a tax return preparer may be subject under section 6694(b) for a return or claim for refund is reduced by any amount assessed and collected against the tax return preparer under section 6694(a) for the same return or claim for refund.

(g) Burden of proof . In any proceeding with respect to the penalty imposed by section 6694(b), the government bears the burden of proof on the issue of whether the tax return preparer willfully attempted to understate the liability for tax. See section 7427. The tax return preparer bears the burden of proof on such other issues as whether --

(1) The tax return preparer recklessly or intentionally disregarded a rule or regulation;

(2) A position contrary to a regulation represents a good faith challenge to the validity of the regulation; and

(3) Disclosure was adequately made in accordance with §1.6694-3(c)(2).

(h) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 9. Section 1.6694-4 is amended by revising paragraph (a) to read as follows:



§1.6694-4 Extension of period of collection when tax return preparer pays 15 percent of a penalty for understatement of taxpayer's liability and certain other procedural matters .

(a) In general . (1) The Internal Revenue Service will investigate the preparation by a tax return preparer of a return of tax under the Internal Revenue Code (Code) or claim for refund of tax under the Code as described in §301.7701-15(b)(4) of this chapter, and will send a report of the examination to the tax return preparer before the assessment of either --

(i) A penalty for understating tax liability due to a position for which there was not a reasonable belief that the position would more likely than not be sustained on its merits under section 6694(a) (or not a reasonable basis for disclosed positions); or

(ii) A penalty for willful understatement of liability or reckless or intentional disregard of rules or regulations under section 6694(b).

* * * * *

(d) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 10. Section 1.6695-1 is revised to read as follows:



§1.6695-1 Other assessable penalties with respect to the preparation of tax returns for other persons .

(a) Failure to furnish copy to taxpayer . (1) A person who is a signing tax return preparer as described in §301.7701-15(b)(1) of this chapter of any return of tax or claim for refund of tax under the Internal Revenue Code (Code), and who fails to satisfy the requirements imposed by section 6107(a) and §1.6107-1(a) to furnish a copy of the return or claim for refund to the taxpayer (or nontaxable entity), shall be subject to a penalty of $50 for such failure, with a maximum penalty of $25,000 per person imposed with respect to each calendar year, unless it is shown that the failure is due to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect.

(2) No penalty may be imposed under section 6695(a) and paragraph (a)(1) of this section upon a tax return preparer who furnishes a copy of the return or claim for refund to taxpayers who --

(i) Hold an elected or politically appointed position with the government of the United States or a state or political subdivision thereof; and

(ii) In order faithfully to carry out their official duties, have so arranged their affairs that they have less than full knowledge of the property that they hold or of the debts for which they are responsible, if information is deleted from the copy in order to preserve or maintain this arrangement.

(b) Failure to sign return . (1) An individual who is a tax return preparer as described in §301.7701-15 of this chapter with respect to a return of tax or claim for refund of tax under the Code that is not signed electronically shall sign the return or claim for refund after it is completed and before it is presented to the taxpayer (or nontaxable entity) for signature. For rules covering electronically signed returns, see paragraph (b)(2) of this section. For purposes of this paragraph (b), a return of tax shall not include information returns under subpart B and subpart C of Part III of Subtitle F. If the tax return preparer is unavailable for signature, another tax return preparer shall review the entire preparation of the return or claim for refund, and then shall sign the return or claim for refund. The tax return preparer shall sign the return in the manner prescribed by the Commissioner in forms, instructions, or other appropriate guidance.

(2) In the case of electronically signed tax returns, the tax return preparer need not sign the return prior to presenting a completed copy of the return to the taxpayer. The tax return preparer, however, must furnish all of the information that will be transmitted as the electronically signed tax return to the taxpayer contemporaneously with furnishing the Form 8879, "IRS e-file Signature Authorization," or other similar Internal Revenue Service (IRS) e-file signature form. The information may be furnished on a replica of an official form. The tax return preparer shall electronically sign the return in the manner prescribed by the Commissioner in forms, instructions, or other appropriate guidance.

(3) If more than one tax return preparer is involved in the preparation of the return or claim for refund, the individual tax return preparer who has the primary responsibility as between or among the tax return preparers for the overall substantive accuracy of the preparation of such return or claim for refund shall be considered to be the signing tax return preparer for purposes of this paragraph (b) and §301.7701-15(b)(1) of this chapter. Any other tax return preparer as described in §301.7701-15(b)(2) of this chapter is not required to sign the return or claim for refund.

(4) Examples . The application of this paragraph (b) is illustrated by the following examples:

Example 1 . Law Firm A employs B, a lawyer, to prepare for compensation estate tax returns and claims for refund of taxes. Firm A is engaged by C to prepare a Federal estate tax return. Firm A assigns B to prepare the return. B obtains the information necessary for completing the return from C and makes determinations with respect to the proper application of the tax laws to such information in order to determine the estate's tax liability. B then forwards such information to D, a computer tax service that performs the mathematical computations and prints the return by means of computer processing. D then sends the completed estate tax return to B who reviews the accuracy of the return. B is the individual tax return preparer who is primarily responsible for the overall accuracy of the estate tax return. B must sign the return as tax return preparer.

Example 2 . Partnership E is a national accounting firm that prepares returns and claims for refund of taxes for compensation. F and G, employees of Partnership E, are involved in preparing the Form 990-T, Exempt Organization Business Income Tax Return, for H, a tax exempt organization. After they complete the return, including the gathering of the necessary information, analyzing the proper application of the tax laws to such information, and the performance of the necessary mathematical computations, I, a supervisory employee of Partnership E, reviews the return. As part of this review, I reviews the information provided and the application of the tax laws to this information. The mathematical computations and carriedforward amounts are reviewed by J, an employee of Partnership E. The policies and practices of Partnership E require that K, a partner, finally review the return. The scope of K's review includes reviewing the information provided and applying to this information his knowledge of H's affairs, observing that Partnership E's policies and practices have been followed, and making the final determination with respect to the proper application of the tax laws to determine H's tax liability. K may or may not exercise these responsibilities, or may exercise them to a greater or lesser extent, depending on the degree of complexity of the return, his confidence in I (or F and G), and other factors. K is the individual tax return preparer who is primarily responsible for the overall accuracy of H's return. K must sign the return as tax return preparer.

Example 3 . L corporation maintains an office in Seattle, Washington, for the purpose of preparing partnership returns for compensation. L makes compensatory arrangements with individuals (but provides no working facilities) in several states to collect information from partners of a partnership and to make decisions with respect to the proper application of the tax laws to the information in order to prepare the partnership return and calculate the partnership's distributive items. M, an individual, who has such an arrangement in Los Angeles with L, collects information from N, the general partner of a partnership, and completes a worksheet kit supplied by L that is stamped with M's name and an identification number assigned to M by L. In this process, M classifies this information in appropriate categories for the preparation of the partnership return. The completed worksheet kit signed by M is then mailed to L. O, an employee in L's office, reviews the worksheet kit to make sure it was properly completed. O does not review the information obtained from N for its validity or accuracy. O may, but did not, make the final decision with respect to the proper application of tax laws to the information provided. The data from the worksheet is entered into a computer and the return form is completed. The return is prepared for submission to N with filing instructions. M is the individual tax return preparer primarily responsible for the overall accuracy of the partnership return. M must sign the return as tax return preparer.

Example 4 . P employs R, S, and T to prepare gift tax returns for taxpayers. After R and S have collected the information from a taxpayer and applied the tax laws to the information, the return form is completed by a computer service. On the day the returns prepared by R and S are ready for their signatures, R is away from the city for 1 week on another assignment and S is on detail to another office in the same city for the day. T may sign the gift tax returns prepared by R, provided that T reviews the information obtained by R relative to the taxpayer, and T reviews the preparation of each return prepared by R. T may not sign the returns prepared by S because S is available.

(5) An individual required by this paragraph (b) to sign a return or claim for refund shall be subject to a penalty of $50 for each failure to sign, with a maximum of $25,000 per person imposed with respect to each calendar year, unless it is shown that the failure is due to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect. If the tax return preparer asserts reasonable cause for failure to sign, the IRS will require a written statement to substantiate the tax return preparer's claim of reasonable cause. For purposes of this paragraph (b), reasonable cause is a cause that arises despite ordinary care and prudence exercised by the individual tax return preparer.

(6) Effective/applicability date . This paragraph (b) is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

(c) Failure to furnish identifying number . (1) A person who is a signing tax return preparer as described in §301.7701-15(b)(1) of this chapter of any return of tax under the Code or claim for refund of tax under the Code, and who fails to satisfy the requirement of section 6109(a)(4) and §1.6109-2(a) to furnish one or more identifying numbers of signing tax return preparers or persons employing the signing tax return preparer (or with which the signing tax return preparer is associated) on a return or claim for refund after it is completed and before it is presented to the taxpayer (or nontaxable entity) for signature shall be subject to a penalty of $50 for each failure, with a maximum of $25,000 per person imposed with respect to each calendar year, unless it is shown that the failure is due to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect.

(2) No more than one penalty of $50 may be imposed under section 6695(c) and paragraph (c)(1) of this section with respect to a single return or claim for refund.

(d) Failure to retain copy or record . (1) A person who is a signing tax return preparer as described in §301.7701-15(b)(1) of this chapter of any return of tax under the Code or claim for refund of tax under the Code, and who fails to satisfy the requirements imposed upon him or her by section 6107(b) and §1.6107-1(b) and (c) (other than the record requirement described in both §1.6107-1(b)(2) and (3)) to retain and make available for inspection a copy of the return or claim for refund, or to include the return or claim for refund in a record of returns and claims for refund and make the record available for inspection, shall be subject to a penalty of $50 for the failure, unless it is shown that the failure is due to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect.

(2) A person may not, for returns or claims for refund presented to the taxpayers (or nontaxable entities) during any single return period, be subject to more than $25,000 in penalties under section 6695(d) and paragraph (d)(1) of this section.

(e) Failure to file correct information returns . A person who is subject to the reporting requirements of section 6060 and §1.6060-1 and who fails to satisfy these requirements shall pay a penalty of $50 for each such failure, with a maximum of $25,000 per person imposed for each calendar year, unless such failure was due to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect.

(f) Negotiation of check . (1) No person who is a tax return preparer as described in §301.7701-15 of this chapter may endorse or otherwise negotiate, directly or through an agent, a check for the refund of tax under the Code that is issued to a taxpayer other than the tax return preparer if the person was a tax return preparer of the return or claim for refund which gave rise to the refund check.

(2) Section 6695(f) and paragraphs (f)(1) and (3) of this section do not apply to a tax return preparer-bank that --

(i) Cashes a refund check and remits all of the cash to the taxpayer or accepts a refund check for deposit in full to a taxpayer's account, so long as the bank does not initially endorse or negotiate the check (unless the bank has made a loan to the taxpayer on the basis of the anticipated refund); or

(ii) Endorses a refund check for deposit in full to a taxpayer's account pursuant to a written authorization of the taxpayer (unless the bank has made a loan to the taxpayer on the basis of the anticipated refund).

(3) A tax return preparer-bank may also subsequently endorse or negotiate a refund check as a part of the checkclearing process through the financial system after initial endorsement or negotiation.

(4) The tax return preparer shall be subject to a penalty of $500 for each endorsement or negotiation of a check prohibited under section 6695(f) and paragraph (f)(1) of this section.

(g) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 11. Section 1.6695-2 is amended by revising the heading and paragraphs (a), (b)(3), (c) and (d) to read as follows:



§1.6695-2 Tax return preparer due diligence requirements for determining earned income credit eligibility .

(a) Penalty for failure to meet due diligence requirements . A person who is a signing tax return preparer of a tax return or claim for refund under the Internal Revenue Code with respect to determining the eligibility for, or the amount of, the earned income credit (EIC) under section 32 and who fails to satisfy the due diligence requirements of paragraph (b) of this section will be subject to a penalty of $100 for each such failure.

(b) * * *

(3) Knowledge --(i) In general . The tax return preparer must not know, or have reason to know, that any information used by the tax return preparer in determining the taxpayer's eligibility for, or the amount of, the EIC is incorrect. The tax return preparer may not ignore the implications of information furnished to, or known by, the tax return preparer, and must make reasonable inquiries if the information furnished to the tax return preparer appears to be incorrect, inconsistent, or incomplete. A tax return preparer must make reasonable inquiries if a reasonable and well-informed tax return preparer knowledgeable in the law would conclude that the information furnished to the tax return preparer appears to be incorrect, inconsistent, or incomplete. The tax return preparer must also contemporaneously document in the files the reasonable inquiries made and the responses to these inquiries.

(ii) Examples . The provisions of paragraph (b)(3)(i) of this section are illustrated by the following examples:

Example 1 . A 22 year-old taxpayer wants to claim two sons, ages 10 and 11, as qualifying children for purposes of the EIC. Preparer A must make additional reasonable inquiries regarding the relationship between the taxpayer and the children as the age of the taxpayer appears inconsistent with the ages of the children claimed as sons.

Example 2 . An 18 year-old female taxpayer with an infant has $3,000 in earned income and states that she lives with her parents. Taxpayer wants to claim the infant as a qualifying child for the EIC. This information appears incomplete and inconsistent because the taxpayer lives with her parents and earns very little income. Preparer B must make additional reasonable inquires to determine if the taxpayer is the qualifying child of her parents and, therefore, ineligible to claim the EIC.

Example 3 . In March 2008, Mr. D has Preparer C prepare his tax year 2007 return using Married Filing Separate filing status, and an address of 25 Main Street, Mytown, Mystate. Two weeks later Mrs. D has C prepare her tax year 2007 return, and she asks C to use the Head of Household filing status, claiming two qualifying children, and the EIC. She tells C that her address is 25 Main Street, Mytown, Mystate. Mrs. D's filing status appears incorrect based on the filing status used by Mr. D. Therefore, C must make additional reasonable inquiries to determine Mrs. D's proper filing status.

Example 4 . Taxpayer asks Preparer E to prepare her tax return and tells D that she has a Schedule C business, that she has two qualifying children and that she wants to claim the EIC. Taxpayer indicates that she earned $10,000 from her Schedule C business, but that she has no expenses. This information appears incomplete because it is very unlikely that someone who is self-employed has no business expenses. E must make additional reasonable inquiries regarding taxpayer's business to determine whether the information regarding both income and expenses is correct.

(c) Exception to penalty . The section 6695(g) penalty will not be applied with respect to a particular tax return or claim for refund if the tax return preparer can demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Internal Revenue Service that, considering all the facts and circumstances, the tax return preparer's normal office procedures are reasonably designed and routinely followed to ensure compliance with the due diligence requirements of paragraph (b) of this section, and the failure to meet the due diligence requirements of paragraph (b) of this section with respect to the particular return or claim for refund was isolated and inadvertent.

(d) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 12. Section 1.6696-1 is revised to read as follows:



§1.6696-1 Claims for credit or refund by tax return preparers or appraisers .

(a) Notice and demand . (1) The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) shall issue to each tax return preparer or appraiser one or more statements of notice and demand for payment for all penalties assessed against the tax return preparer or appraiser under section 6694 and §1.6694-1, under section 6695 and §1.6695-1, or under section 6695A (and any subsequently issued regulations).

(2) For the definition of the term "tax return preparer," see section 7701(a)(36) and §301.7701-15 of this chapter. A person who prepares a claim for credit or refund under this section for another person, however, is not, with respect to that preparation, a tax return preparer as defined in section 7701(a)(36) and §301.7701-15 of this chapter.

(b) Claim filed by tax return preparer or appraiser . A claim for credit or refund of a penalty (or penalties) assessed against a tax return preparer or appraiser under section 6694 and §1.6694-1, under section 6695 and §1.6695-1, or under section 6695A (and any subsequently issued regulations) may be filed under this section only by the tax return preparer or the appraiser (or the tax return preparer's or appraiser's estate) against whom the penalty (or penalties) is assessed and not by, for example, the tax return preparer's or appraiser's employer. This paragraph (b) is not intended, however, to impose any restrictions on the preparation of this claim for credit or refund. The claim may be prepared by the tax return preparer's or appraiser's employer or by other persons. In all cases, however, the claim for credit or refund shall contain the information specified in paragraph (d) of this section and, as required by paragraph (d) of this section, shall be verified by a written declaration by the tax return preparer or appraiser that the information is provided under penalty of perjury.

(c) Separation and consolidation of claims . (1) Unless paragraph (c)(2) of this section applies, a tax return preparer shall file a separate claim for each penalty assessed in each statement of notice and demand issued to the tax return preparer.

(2) A tax return preparer may file one or more consolidated claims for any or all penalties imposed on the tax return preparer by a single IRS Office under section 6695(a) and §1.6695-1(a) (relating to failure to furnish copy of return to taxpayer), section 6695(b) and §1.6695-1(b) (relating to failure to sign), section 6695(c) and §1.6695-1(c) (relating to failure to furnish identifying number), or under section 6695(d) and §1.6695-1(d) (relating to failure to retain copy of return or record), whether the penalties are asserted on a single or on separate statements of notice and demand. In addition, a tax return preparer may file one consolidated claim for any or all penalties imposed on the tax return preparer by a single IRS Office under section 6695(e) and §1.6695-1(e) (relating to failure to file correct information return), which are asserted on a single statement of notice and demand.

(d) Content of claim . Each claim for credit or refund for any penalty (or penalties) paid by a tax return preparer under section 6694 and §1.6694-1, or under section 6695 and §1.6695-1, or paid by an appraiser under section 6695A (and any subsequently issued regulations) shall include the following information, verified by a written declaration by the tax return preparer or appraiser that the information is provided under penalty of perjury:

(1) The tax return preparer's or appraiser's name.

(2) The tax return preparer's or appraiser's identification number. If the tax return preparer or appraiser is --

(i) An individual (not described in paragraph (d)(2)(iii) of this section) who is a citizen or resident of the United States, the tax return preparer's or appraiser's social security account number (or such alternative number as may be prescribed by the IRS in forms, instructions, or other appropriate guidance) shall be provided;

(ii) An individual who is not a citizen or resident of the United States and also was not employed by another tax return preparer or appraiser to prepare the document (or documents) with respect to which the penalty (or penalties) was assessed, the tax return preparer's or appraiser's employer identification number shall be provided; or

(iii) A person (whether an individual, corporation, or partnership) that employed one or more persons to prepare the document (or documents) with respect to which the penalty (or penalties) was assessed, the tax return preparer's or appraiser's employer identification number shall be provided.

(3) The tax return preparer's or appraiser's address where the IRS mailed the statement (or statements) of notice and demand and, if different, the tax return preparer's or appraiser's address shown on the document (or documents) with respect to which the penalty (or penalties) was assessed.

(4)(i) The address of the IRS campus or office that issued the statement (or statements) of notice and demand for payment of the penalty (or penalties).

(ii) The date (or dates) and identifying number (or numbers) of the statement (or statements) of notice and demand.

(5)(i) The identification, by amount, type, and document to which related, of each penalty included in the claim. Each document referred to in the preceding sentence shall be identified by the form title or number, by the taxpayer's (or nontaxable entity's) name and taxpayer identification number, and by the taxable year to which the document relates.

(ii) The date (or dates) of payment of the amount (or amounts) of the penalty (or penalties) included in the claim.

(iii) The total amount claimed.

(6) A statement setting forth in detail --

(i) Each ground upon which each penalty overpayment claim is based; and

(ii) Facts sufficient to apprise the IRS of the exact basis of each such claim.

(e) Form for filing claim . Notwithstanding §301.6402(c) of this chapter, Form 6118, "Claim for Refund of Tax Return Preparer Penalties," is the form prescribed for making a claim as provided in this section.

(f) Place for filing claim . A claim filed under this section shall be filed with the IRS campus or office that issued to the tax return preparer or appraiser the statement (or statements) of notice and demand for payment of the penalty (or penalties) included in the claim.

(g) Time for filing claim . (1)(i) Except as provided in section 6694(c)(1) and §1.6694-2(a)(3)(ii) and (4), and in section 6694(d) and §1.6694-1(c):

(A) A claim for a penalty paid by a tax return preparer under section 6694 and §1.6694-1, or under section 6695 and §1.6695-1, or by a appraiser under section 6695A (and any subsequently issued regulations) shall be filed within three years from the date the payment was made.

(B) A consolidated claim, permitted under paragraph (c)(2) of this section, shall be filed within three years from the first date of payment of any penalty included in the claim.

(ii) For purposes of this paragraph (g)(1), payment is considered made on the date payment is received by the IRS or, if applicable, on the date an amount is credited in satisfaction of the penalty.

(2) For purposes of determining whether a claim is timely filed, the rules under sections 7502 and 7503 and the provisions of §§1.7502-1, 1.7502-2, and 1.7503-1 apply.

(h) Application of refund to outstanding liability of tax return preparer or appraiser . The IRS may, within the applicable period of limitations, credit any amount of an overpayment by a tax return preparer or appraiser of a penalty (or penalties) paid under section 6694 and §1.6694-1, under section 6695 and §1.6695-1, or under section 6695A (and any subsequently issued regulations) against any outstanding liability for any tax (or for any interest, additional amount, addition to the tax, or assessable penalty) owed by the tax return preparer or appraiser making the overpayment. If a portion of an overpayment is so credited, only the balance will be refunded to the tax return preparer or appraiser.

(i) Interest . (1) Section 6611 and §301.6611-1 of this chapter apply to the payment by the IRS of interest on an overpayment by a tax return preparer or appraiser of a penalty (or penalties) paid under section 6694 and §1.6694-1, under section 6695 and §1.6695-1, or under section 6695A (and any subsequently issued regulations).

(2) Section 6601 and §301.6601-1 of this chapter apply to the payment of interest by a tax return preparer or appraiser to the IRS on any penalty (or penalties) assessed against the tax return preparer under section 6694 and §1.6694-1, under section 6695 and §1.6695-1, or under section 6695A (and any subsequently issued regulations).

(j) Suits for refund of penalty . (1) A tax return preparer or appraiser may not maintain a civil action for the recovery of any penalty paid under section 6694 and §1.6694-1, under section 6695 and §1.6695-1, or under section 6695A(and any subsequently issued regulations), unless the tax return preparer or appraiser has previously filed a claim for credit or refund of the penalty as provided in this section (and the court has jurisdiction of the proceeding). See sections 6694(c) and 7422.

(2)(i) Except as provided in section 6694(c)(2) and §1.6694-2(b), the periods of limitation contained in section 6532 and §301.6532-1 of this chapter apply to a tax return preparer's or appraiser's suit for the recovery of any penalty paid under section 6694 and §1.6694-1, under section 6695 and §1.6695-1, or under section 6695A (and any subsequently issued regulations).

(ii) The rules under section 7503 and §301.7503-1 of this chapter apply to the timely commencement by a tax return preparer or appraiser of a suit for the recovery of any penalty paid under section 6694 and §1.6694-1, under section 6695 and §1.6695-1, or under section 6695A (and any subsequently issued regulations).

(k) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.



PART 20 --ESTATE TAX; ESTATES OF DECEDENTS DYING AFTER

AUGUST 16, 1954

Par. 13. The authority citation for part 20 is amended by adding entries in numerical order to read in part as follows:

Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805 * * *

Section 20.6060-1 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6060(a).

* * *

Section 20.6109-2 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6109(a).

* * *

Section 20.6695-1 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6695(b).

* * *

Section 20.6695-2 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6695(g).

* * *

Par. 14. Section 20.6060-1 is added to read as follows:



§20.6060-1 Reporting requirements for tax return preparers .

(a) In general . A person that employs (or engages) one or more tax return preparers to prepare a return or claim for refund of estate tax under chapter 11 of subtitle B of the Internal Revenue Code, other than for the person, at any time during a return period, shall satisfy the recordkeeping and inspection requirements in the manner stated in §1.6060-1 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 15. Section 20.6107-1 is added to read as follows:



§20.6107-1 Tax return preparer must furnish copy of return to taxpayer and must retain a copy or record .

(a) In general . A person who is a signing tax return preparer of any return or claim for refund of estate tax under chapter 11 of subtitle B of the Internal Revenue Code shall furnish a completed copy of the return or claim for refund to the estate, and retain a completed copy or record in the manner stated in §1.6107-1 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 16. Section 20.6109-1 is added to read as follows:



§20.6109-1 Tax return preparers furnishing identifying numbers for returns or claims for refund.

(a) In general . Each estate tax return or claim for refund prepared by one or more signing tax return preparers must include the identifying number of the preparer required by §1.6695-1(b) of this chapter to sign the return or claim for refund in the manner stated in §1.6109-2 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . Paragraph (a) of this section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 17. Section 20.6694-1 is added to read as follows:



§20.6694-1 Section 6694 penalties applicable to tax return preparer .

(a) In general . For general definitions regarding section 6694 penalties applicable to preparers of estate tax returns or claims see §1.6694-1 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . Paragraph (a) of this section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 18. Section 20.6694-2 is added to read as follows:



§20.6694-2 Penalties for understatement due to an unreasonable position .

(a) In general . A person who is a tax return preparer of any return or claim for refund of estate tax under chapter 11 of subtitle B of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) shall be subject to penalties under section 6694(a) of the Code in the manner stated in §1.6694-2 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 19. Section 20.6694-3 is added to read as follows:



§20.6694-3 Penalty for understatement due to willful, reckless, or intentional conduct .

(a) In general . A person who is a tax return preparer of any return or claim for refund of estate tax under chapter 11 of subtitle B of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) shall be subject to penalties under section 6694(b) of the Code in the manner stated in §1.6694-3 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 20. Section 20.6694-4 is added to read as follows:



§20.6694-4 Extension of period of collection when preparer pays 15 percent of a penalty for understatement of taxpayer's liability and certain other procedural matters .

(a) In general . For rules relating to the extension of the period of collection when a tax return preparer who prepared a return or claim for refund for estate tax under chapter 11 of subtitle B of the Internal Revenue Code pays 15 percent of a penalty for understatement of the taxpayer's liability, and procedural matters relating to the investigation, assessment and collection of the penalties under sections 6694(a) and (b), the rules under §1.6694-4 of this chapter will apply.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 21. Section 20.6695-1 is added to read as follows:



§20.6695-1 Other assessable penalties with respect to the preparation of tax returns for other persons .

(a) In general . A person who is a tax return preparer of any return or claim for refund of estate tax under chapter 11 of subtitle B of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) shall be subject to penalties for failure to furnish a copy to the taxpayer under section 6695(a) of the Code, failure to sign the return under section 6695(b) of the Code, failure to furnish an identification number under section 6695(c) of the Code, failure to retain a copy or list under section 6695(d) of the Code, failure to file a correct information return under section 6695(e) of the Code, and negotiation of a check under section 6695(f) of the Code, in the manner stated in §1.6695-1 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 22. Section 20.6696-1 is added to read as follows:



§20.6696-1 Claims for credit or refund by tax return preparers or appraisers .

(a) In general . For rules for claims for credit or refund by a tax return preparer who prepared a return or claim for refund for estate tax under chapter 11 of subtitle B of the Internal Revenue Code, or by an appraiser that prepared an appraisal in connection with such a return or claim for refund under section 6695A, the rules under §1.6696-1 of this chapter will apply.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 23. Section 20.7701-1 is added to read as follows:



§20.7701-1 Tax return preparer .

(a) In general . For the definition of a tax return preparer, see §301.7701-15 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.



PART 25 --GIFT TAX; GIFTS MADE AFTER DECEMBER 31, 1954

Par. 24. The authority citation for part 25 is amended by adding entries in numerical order to read in part as follows:

Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805* * *

Section 25.6060-1 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6060(a). * * *

Section 25.6109-2 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6109(a). * * *

Section 25.6695-1 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6695(b). * * *

Section 25.6695-2 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6695(g). * * *

Par. 25. Section 25.6060-1 is added to read as follows:



§25.6060-1 Reporting requirements for tax return preparers .

(a) In general . A person that employs (or engages) one or more tax return preparers to prepare a return or claim for refund of gift tax under chapter 12 of subtitle B of the Internal Revenue Code, other than for the person, at any time during a return period, shall satisfy the record keeping and inspection requirements in the manner stated in §1.6060-1 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 26. Section 25.6107-1 is added to read as follows:



§25.6107-1 Tax return preparer must furnish copy of return to taxpayer and must retain a copy or record .

(a) In general . A person who is a signing tax return preparer of any return or claim for refund of gift tax under chapter 12 of subtitle B of the Internal Revenue Code shall furnish a completed copy of the return or claim for refund to the taxpayer, and retain a completed copy or record in the manner stated in §1.6107-1 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 27. Section 25.6109-1 is added to read as follows:



§25.6109-1 Tax return preparers furnishing identifying numbers for returns or claims for refund .

(a) In general . Each gift tax return or claim for refund prepared by one or more signing tax return preparers must include the identifying number of the preparer required by §1.6695-1(b) of this chapter to sign the return or claim for refund in the manner stated in §1.6109-2 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . Paragraph (a) of this section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register .

Par. 28. Section 25.6694-1 is added to read as follows:



§25.6694-1 Section 6694 penalties applicable to tax return preparer .

(a) In general . For general definitions regarding section 6694 penalties applicable to preparers of gift tax returns or claims see §1.6694-1 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . Paragraph (a) of this section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 29. Section 25.6694-2 is added to read as follows:



§25.6694-2 Penalties for understatement due to an unreasonable position .

(a) In general . A person who is a tax return preparer of any return or claim for refund of gift tax under chapter 12 of subtitle B of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) shall be subject to penalties under section 6694(a) of the Code in the manner stated in §1.6694-2 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 30. Section 25.6694-3 is added to read as follows:



§25.6694-3 Penalty for understatement due to willful, reckless, or intentional conduct .

(a) In general . A person who is a tax return preparer of any return or claim for refund of gift tax under chapter 12 of subtitle B of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) shall be subject to penalties under section 6694(b) of the Code in the manner stated in §1.6694-3 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 31. Section 25.6694-4 is added to read as follows:



§25.6694-4 Extension of period of collection when tax return preparer pays 15 percent of a penalty for understatement of taxpayer's liability and certain other procedural matters .

(a) In general . For rules for the extension of period of collection when a tax return preparer who prepared a return or claim for refund for gift tax under chapter 12 of subtitle B of the Internal Revenue Code pays 15 percent of a penalty for understatement of taxpayer's liability, and procedural matters relating to the investigation of , assessment and collection of the penalties under section 6694(a) and (b), the rules under §1.6694-4 of this chapter will apply.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 32. Section 25.6695-1 is added to read as follows:



§25.6695-1 Other assessable penalties with respect to the preparation of tax returns for other persons .

(a) In general . A person who is a tax return preparer of any return or claim for refund of gift tax under chapter 12 of subtitle B of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) shall be subject to penalties for failure to furnish a copy to the taxpayer under section 6695(a) of the Code, failure to sign the return under section 6695(b) of the Code, failure to furnish an identification number under section 6695(c) of the Code, failure to retain a copy or list under section 6695(d) of the Code, failure to file a correct information return under section 6695(e) of the Code, and negotiation of a check under section 6695(f) of the Code, in the manner stated in §1.6695-1 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 33. Section 25.6696-1 is added to read as follows:



§25.6696-1 Claims for credit or refund by tax return preparers .

(a) In general . For rules for claims for credit or refund by a tax return preparer who prepared a return or claim for refund for gift tax under chapter 12 of subtitle B of the Internal Revenue Code, or by an appraiser that prepared an appraisal in connection with such a return or claim for refund under section 6695A, the rules under §1.6696-1 of this chapter will apply.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 34. Section 25.7701-1 is added to read as follows:



§25.7701-1 Tax return preparer .

(a) In general . For the definition of a tax return preparer, see §301.7701-15 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.



PART 26 --GENERATION-SKIPPING TRANSFER TAX REGULATIONS UNDER THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986

Par. 35. The authority citation for part 26 is amended by adding entries in numerical order to read in part as follows:

Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805* * *

Section 26.6060-1 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6060(a).

* * *

Section 26.6109-2 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6109(a).

* * *

Section 26.6695-1 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6695(b).

* * *

Section 26.6695-2 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6695(g).

* * *

Par. 36. Section 26.6060-1 is added to read as follows:



§26.6060-1 Reporting requirements for tax return preparers .

(a) In general . A person that employs (or engages) one or more tax return preparers to prepare a return or claim for refund of generation-skipping transfer tax under chapter 13 of subtitle B of the Internal Revenue Code, other than for the person, at any time during a return period, shall satisfy the record keeping and inspection requirements in the manner stated in §1.6060-1 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 37. Section 26.6107-1 is added to read as follows:



§26.6107-1 Tax return preparer must furnish copy of return to taxpayer and must retain a copy or record .

(a) In general . A person who is a signing tax return preparer of any return or claim for refund of generationskipping transfer tax under chapter 13 of subtitle B of the Internal Revenue Code shall furnish a completed copy of the return or claim for refund to the estate, and retain a completed copy or record in the manner stated in §1.6107-1 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 38. Section 26.6109-1 is added to read as follows:



§26.6109-1 Tax return preparers furnishing identifying numbers for returns or claims for refund .

(a) In general . Each generation-skipping transfer tax return or claim for refund prepared by one or more signing tax return preparers must include the identifying number of the preparer required by §1.6695-1(b) of this chapter to sign the return or claim for refund in the manner stated in §1.6109-2 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . Paragraph (a) of this section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 39. Section 26.6694-1 is added to read as follows:



§26.6694-1 Section 6694 penalties applicable to tax return preparer .

(a) In general . For general definitions regarding section 6694 penalties applicable to preparers of generation-skipping transfer tax returns or claims see §1.66994-1 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . Paragraph (a) of this section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 40. Section 26.6694-2 is added to read as follows:



§26.6694-2 Penalties for understatement due to an unreasonable position .

(a) In general . A person who is a tax return preparer of any return or claim for refund of generationskipping transfer tax under chapter 13 of subtitle B of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) shall be subject to penalties under section 6694(a) of the Code in the manner stated in §1.6694-2 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 41. Section 26.6694-3 is added to read as follows:



§26.6694-3 Penalty for understatement due to willful, reckless, or intentional conduct .

(a) In general . A person who is a tax return preparer of any return or claim for refund of generation-skipping transfer tax under chapter 13 of subtitle B of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) shall be subject to penalties under section 6694(b) of the Code in the manner stated in §1.6694-3 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 42. Section 26.6694-4 is added to read as follows:



§26.6694-4 Extension of period of collection when preparer pays 15 percent of a penalty for understatement of taxpayer's liability and certain other procedural matters .

(a) In general . For rules relating to the extension of period of collection when a tax return preparer who prepared a return or claim for refund for generationskipping transfer tax under chapter 13 of subtitle B of the Internal Revenue Code pays 15 percent of a penalty for understatement of taxpayer's liability, and procedural matters relating to the investigation, assessment and collection of the penalties under section 6694(a) and (b), the rules under §1.6694-4 of this chapter will apply.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 43. Section 26.6695-1 is added to read as follows:



§26.6695-1 Other assessable penalties with respect to the preparation of tax returns for other persons .

(a) In general . A person who is a tax return preparer of any return or claim for refund of generation-skipping transfer tax under chapter 13 of subtitle B of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) shall be subject to penalties for failure to a furnish copy to the taxpayer under section 6695(a) of the Code, failure to sign the return under section 6695(b) of the Code, failure to furnish an identification number under section 6695(c) of the Code, failure to retain a copy or list under section 6695(d) of the Code, failure to file a correct information return under section 6695(e) of the Code, and negotiation of a check under section 6695(f) of the Code, in the manner stated in §1.6695-1 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 44. Section 26.6696-1 is added to read as follows:



§26.6696-1 Claims for credit or refund by tax return preparers .

(a) In general . For rules for claims for credit or refund by a tax return preparer who prepared a return or claim for refund for generation-skipping transfer tax under chapter 13 of subtitle B of the Internal Revenue Code, or by an appraiser that prepared an appraisal in connection with such a return or claim for refund under section 6695A, the rules under §1.6696-1 of this chapter will apply.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 45. Section 26.7701-1 is added to read as follows:



§26.7701-1 Tax return preparer .

(a) In general . For the definition of a tax return preparer, see §301.7701-15 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.



PART 31 --EMPLOYMENT TAXES AND COLLECTION OF INCOME TAX AT THE SOURCE

Par. 46. The authority citation for part 31 is amended by adding entries in numerical order to read in part as follows:

Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805* * *

Section 31.6060-1 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6060(a).

* * *

Section 31.6109-2 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6109(a).

* * *

Section 31.6695-1 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6695(b).

* * *

Section 31.6695-2 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6695(g).

* * *

Par. 47. Section 31.6060-1 is added to read as follows:



§31.6060-1 Reporting requirements for tax return preparers .

(a) In general . A person that employs (or engages) one or more tax return preparers to prepare a return or claim for refund of employment tax under chapters 21 through 25 of subtitle C of the Internal Revenue Code, other than for the person, at any time during a return period, shall satisfy the record keeping and inspection requirements in the manner stated in §1.6060-1 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 48. Section 31.6107-1 is added to read as follows:



§31.6107-1 Tax return preparer must furnish copy of return to taxpayer and must retain a copy or record .

(a) In general . A person who is a signing tax return preparer of any return or claim for refund of employment tax under chapters 21 through 25 of subtitle C of the Internal Revenue Code shall furnish a completed copy of the return or claim for refund to the taxpayer, and retain a completed copy or record in the manner stated in §1.6107-1 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 49. Section 31.6109-2 is added to read as follows:



§31.6109-2 Tax return preparers furnishing identifying numbers for returns or claims for refund .

(a) In general . Each employment tax return or claim for refund of employment tax under chapters 21 through 25 of subtitle C of the Internal Revenue Code prepared by one or more signing tax return preparers must include the identifying number of the preparer required by §1.6695-1(b) of this chapter to sign the return or claim for refund in the manner stated in §1.6109-2 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . Paragraph (a) of this section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Registe r.

Par. 50. Section 31.6694-1 is added to read as follows:


(a) In general . For general definitions regarding section 6694 penalties applicable to preparers of employment tax returns or claims of employment tax under chapters 21 through 25 of subtitle C of the Internal Revenue Code, see §1.6694-1 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . Paragraph (a) of this section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 51. Section 31.6694-2 is added to read as follows:



§31.6694-2 Penalties for understatement due to an unreasonable position .

(a) In general . A person who is a tax return preparer of any return or claim for refund of employment tax under chapters 21 through 25 of subtitle C of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) shall be subject to penalties under section 6694(a) of the Code in the manner stated in §1.6694-2 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 52. Section 31.6694-3 is added to read as follows:



§31.6694-3 Penalty for understatement due to willful, reckless, or intentional conduct .

(a) In general . A person who is a tax return preparer of any return or claim for refund of employment tax under chapters 21 through 25 of subtitle C of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) shall be subject to penalties under section 6694(b) of the Code in the manner stated in 1.6694-3 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 53. Section 31.6694-4 is added to read as follows:



§31.6694-4 Extension of period of collection when tax return preparer pays 15 percent of a penalty for understatement of taxpayer's liability and certain other procedural matters .

(a) In general . For rules relating to the extension of period of collection when a tax return preparer who prepared a return or claim for refund for employment tax under chapters 21 through 25 of subtitle C of the Internal Revenue Code pays 15 percent of a penalty for understatement of taxpayer's liability, and procedural matters relating to the investigation, assessment and collection of the penalties under section 6694(a) and (b), the rules under §1.6694-4 of this chapter will apply.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 54. Section 31.6695-1 is added to read as follows:



§31.6695-1 Other assessable penalties with respect to the preparation of tax returns for other persons .

(a) In general . A person who is a tax return preparer of any return or claim for refund of employment tax under chapters 21 through 25 of subtitle C of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) shall be subject to penalties for failure to furnish a copy to the taxpayer under section 6695(a) of the Code, failure to sign the return under section 6695(b) of the Code, failure to furnish an identification number under section 6695(c) of the Code, failure to retain a copy or list under section 6695(d) of the Code, failure to file a correct information return under section 6695(e) of the Code, and negotiation of a check under section 6695(f) of the Code, in the manner stated in §1.6695-1 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 55. Section 31.6696-1 is added to read as follows:



§31.6696-1 Claims for credit or refund by tax return preparers .

(a) In general . For rules for claims for credit or refund by a tax return preparer who prepared a return or claim for refund for employment tax under chapters 21 through 25 of subtitle C of the Internal Revenue Code, the rules under §1.6696-1 of this chapter will apply.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 56. Section 31.7701-1 is added to read as follows:



§31.7701-1 Tax return preparer .

(a) In general . For the definition of a tax return preparer, see §301.7701-15 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.



PART 40 --EXCISE TAX PROCEDURAL REGULATIONS

Par. 57. The authority citation for part 40 is amended by adding entries in numerical order to read in part as follows:

Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805 * * *

Section 40.6060-1 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6060(a). * * *

Section 40.6109-2 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6109(a). * * *

Section 40.6695-1 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6695(b). * * *

Section 40.6695-2 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6695(g). * * *

Par. 58. Section 40.6060-1 is added to read as follows:



§40.6060-1 Reporting requirements for tax return preparers .

(a) In general . A person that employs (or engages) one or more tax return preparers to prepare a return or claim for refund of excise tax under chapters 31, 32 (other than section 4181), 33, 34, 36 (other than section 4461), 38, and 39 of subtitle D of the Internal Revenue Code, other than for the person, at any time during a return period, shall satisfy the recordkeeping and inspection requirements in the manner stated in §1.6060-1 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 59. Section 40.6107-1 is added to read as follows:



§40.6107-1 Tax return preparer must furnish copy of return to taxpayer and must retain a copy or record .

(a) In general . A person who is a signing tax return preparer of any return or claim for refund of excise tax under chapters 31, 32(other than section 4181), 33, 34, 36 (other than section 4461), 38, and 39 of subtitle D of the Internal Revenue Code shall furnish a completed copy of the return or claim for refund to the taxpayer, and retain a completed copy or record in the manner stated in §1.6107-1 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable for returns and claims for refund filed after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 60. Section 40.6109-1 is added to read as follows:



§40.6109-1 Tax return preparers furnishing identifying numbers for returns or claims for refund .

(a) In general . Each return or claim for refund of excise tax under chapters 31, 32 (other than section 4181), 33, 34, 36(other than section 4461), 38, and 39 of subtitle D of the Internal Revenue Code prepared by one or more signing tax return preparers must include the identifying number of the preparer required by §1.6695-1(b) of this chapter to sign the return or claim for refund in the manner stated in §1.6109-2 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 61. Section 40.6694-1 is added to read as follows:



§40.6694-1 Section 6694 penalties applicable to tax return preparer .

(a) In general . For general definitions regarding section 6694 penalties applicable to preparers of returns or claims for refund of excise tax under chapters 31, 32(other than section 4181), 33, 34, 36 (other than section 4461), 38, and 39 of subtitle D of the Internal Revenue Code, see §1.6694-1 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 62. Section 40.6694-2 is added to read as follows:



§40.6694-2 Penalties for understatement due to an unreasonable position .

(a) In general . A person who is a tax return preparer of any return or claim for refund of excise tax under chapters 31, 32 (other than section 4181), 33, 34, 36 (other than section 4461), 38, and 39 of subtitle D of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) shall be subject to penalties under section 6694(a) of the Code in the manner stated in §1.6694-2 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 63. Section 40.6694-3 is added to read as follows:



§40.6694-3 Penalty for understatement due to willful, reckless, or intentional conduct .

(a) In general . A person who is a tax return preparer of any return or claim for refund of excise tax under chapters 31, 32 (other than section 4181), 33, 34, 36 (other than section 4461), 38, and 39 of subtitle D of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) shall be subject to penalties under section 6694(b) of the Code in the manner stated in §1.6694-3 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 64. Section 40.6694-4 is added to read as follows:



§40.6694-4 Extension of period of collection when tax return preparer pays 15 percent of a penalty for understatement of taxpayer's liability and certain other procedural matters .

(a) In general . For rules relating to the extension of period of collection when a tax return preparer who prepared a return or claim for refund for excise tax under chapters 31, 32 (other than section 4181), 33, 34, 36 (other than section 4461), 38, and 39 of subtitle D of the Internal Revenue Code pays 15 percent of a penalty for understatement of taxpayer's liability, and procedural matters relating to the investigation, assessment and collection of the penalties under section 6694(a) and (b), the rules under §1.6694-4 of this chapter will apply.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 65. Section 40.6695-1 is added to read as follows:



§40.6695-1 Other assessable penalties with respect to the preparation of tax returns for other persons .

(a) In general . A person who is a tax return preparer of any return or claim for refund of excise tax under chapters 31, 32 (other than section 4181), 33, 34, 36 (other than section 4461), 38, and 39 of subtitle D of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) shall be subject to penalties for failure to furnish a copy to the taxpayer under section 6695(a) of the Code, failure to sign the return under section 6695(b) of the Code, failure to furnish an identification number under section 6695(c) of the Code, failure to retain a copy or list under section 6695(d) of the Code, failure to file a correct information return under section 6695(e) of the Code, and negotiation of a check under section 6695(f) of the Code, in the manner stated in §1.6695-1 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable for returns and claims for refund filed after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 66. Section 40.6696-1 is added to read as follows:



§40.6696-1 Claims for credit or refund by tax return preparers .

(a) In general . For rules for claims for credit or refund by a tax return preparer who prepared a return or claim for refund for excise tax under chapters 31, 32 (other than section 4181), 33, 34, 36 (other than section 4461), 38, and 39 of subtitle D of the Internal Revenue Code, the rules under §1.6696-1 of this chapter will apply.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 67. Section 40.7701-1 is added to read as follows:



§40.7701-1 Tax return preparer .

(a) In general . For the definition of a tax return preparer, see §301.7701-15 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.



PART 41 --EXCISE TAX ON USE OF CERTAIN HIGHWAY MOTOR VEHICLES

Par. 68. The authority citation for part 41 is amended by adding entries in numerical order to read in part as follows:

Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805 * * *

Section 41.6060-1 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6060(a). * * *

Section 41.6109-2 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6109(a). * * *

Section 41.6695-1 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6695(b). * * *

Section 41.6695-2 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6695(g). * * *

Par. 69. Section 41.6060-1 is added to read as follows:



§41.6060-1 Reporting requirements for tax return preparers .

(a) In general . A person that employs (or engages) one or more tax return preparers to prepare a return or claim for refund of excise tax under section 4481 of the Internal Revenue Code, other than for the person, at any time during a return period, shall satisfy the record keeping and inspection requirements in the manner stated in §1.6060-1 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable for returns and claims for refund filed after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 70. Section 41.6107-1 is added to read as follows:



§41.6107-1 Tax return preparer must furnish copy of return to taxpayer and must retain a copy or record .

(a) In general . A person who is a signing tax return preparer of any return or claim for refund of excise tax section 4481 of the Internal Revenue Code shall furnish a completed copy of the return or claim for refund to the taxpayer, and retain a completed copy or record in the manner stated in §1.6107-1 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable for returns and claims for refund filed after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 71. Section 41.6109-2 is added to read as follows:



§41.6109-2 Tax return preparers furnishing identifying numbers for returns or claims for refund filed after December 31, 2008 .

(a) In general . Each excise tax return or claim for refund under section 4481 prepared by one or more signing tax return preparers must include the identifying number of the preparer required by §1.6695-1(b) of this chapter to sign the return or claim for refund in the manner stated in §1.6109-2 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable for returns and claims for refund filed after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 72. Section 41.6694-1 is added to read as follows:



§41.6694-1 Section 6694 penalties applicable to tax return preparer .

(a) In general . For general definitions regarding section 6694 penalties applicable to preparers of tax returns or claims for refund, see §1.6694-1 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 73. Section 41.6694-2 is added to read as follows:



§41.6694-2 Penalties for understatement due to an unreasonable position .

(a) In general . A person who is a tax return preparer of any return or claim for refund of excise tax under section 4481 of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) shall be subject to penalties under section 6694(a) of the Code in the manner stated in §1.6694-2 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 74. Section 41.6694-3 is added to read as follows:



§41.6694-3 Penalty for understatement due to willful, reckless, or intentional conduct .

(a) In general . A person who is a tax return preparer of any return or claim for refund of excise tax under section 4481 of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) shall be subject to penalties under section 6694(b) of the Code in the manner stated in §1.6694-3 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 75. Section 41.6694-4 is added to read as follows:



§41.6694-4 Extension of period of collection when preparer pays 15 percent of a penalty for understatement of taxpayer's liability and certain other procedural matters .

(a) In general . For rules relating to the extension of period of collection when a tax return preparer who prepared a return or claim for refund for excise tax under section 4481 of the Internal Revenue Code pays 15 percent of a penalty for understatement of taxpayer's liability, and procedural matters relating to the investigation, assessment and collection of the penalties under section 6694(a) and (b), the rules under §1.6694-4 of this chapter will apply.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 76. Section 41.6695-1 is added to read as follows:



§41.6695-1 Other assessable penalties with respect to the preparation of tax returns for other persons .

(a) In general . A person who is a tax return preparer of any return or claim for refund of excise tax under section 4481 of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) shall be subject to penalties for failure to furnish a copy to the taxpayer under section 6695(a) of the Code, failure to sign a return under section 6695(b) of the Code, failure to furnish an identification number under section 6695(c) of the Code, failure to retain a copy or list under section 6695(d) of the Code, failure to file a correct information return under section 6695(e) of the Code, and negotiation of a check under section 6695(f) of the Code, in the manner stated in §1.6695-1 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 77. Section 41.6696-1 is added to read as follows:



§41.6696-1 Claims for credit or refund by tax return preparers .

(a) In general . For rules for claims for credit or refund by a tax return preparer who prepared a return or claim for refund for excise tax under section 4481 of the Internal Revenue Code, the rules under §1.6696-1 of this chapter will apply.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 78. Section 41.7701-1 is added to read as follows:



§41.7701-1 Tax return preparer .

(a) In general . For the definition of a tax return preparer, see §301.7701-15 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.



PART 44 --TAXES ON WAGERING; EFFECTIVE JANUARY 1, 1955

Par. 79. The authority citation for part 44 is amended by adding entries in numerical order to read in part as follows:

Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805 * * *

Section 44.6060-1 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6060(a). * * *

Section 44.6109-2 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6109(a). * * *

Section 44.6695-1 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6695(b). * * *

Section 44.6695-2 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6695(g). * * *

Par. 80. Section 44.6060-1 is added to read as follows:



§44.6060-1 Reporting requirements for tax return preparers .

(a) In general . A person that employs (or engages) one or more tax return preparers to prepare a return or claim for refund of tax on wagers under sections 4401 or 4411 of the Internal Revenue Code, other than for the person, at any time during a return period, shall satisfy the record keeping and inspection requirements in the manner stated in §1.6060-1 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 81. Section 44.6107-1 is added to read as follows:



§44.6107-1 Tax return preparer must furnish copy of return to taxpayer and must retain a copy or record .

(a) In general . A person who is a signing tax return preparer of any return or claim for refund of tax on wagers under sections 4401 or 4411 of the Internal Revenue Code shall furnish a completed copy of the return or claim for refund to the taxpayer, and retain a completed copy or record in the manner stated in §1.6107-1 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable for returns and claims for refund filed after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 82. Section 44.6109-1 is added to read as follows:



§44.6109-1 Tax return preparers furnishing identifying numbers for returns or claims for refund .

(a) In general . Each tax return or claim for refund of tax under sections 4401 or 4411 prepared by one or more signing tax return preparers must include the identifying number of the preparer required by §1.6695-1(b) of this chapter to sign the return or claim for refund in the manner stated in §1.6109-2 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable for returns and claims for refund filed after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 83. Section 44.6694-1 is added to read as follows:



§44.6694-1 Section 6694 penalties applicable to tax return preparer .

(a) In general . For general definitions regarding section 6694 penalties applicable to preparers of wagering tax returns or claims for refund under sections 4401 or 4411, see §1.6694-1 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 84. Section 44.6694-2 is added to read as follows:



§44.6694-2 Penalties for understatement due to an unreasonable position .

(a) In general . A person who is a tax return preparer of any return or claim for refund of tax on wagers under sections 4401 or 4411 of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) shall be subject to penalties under section 6694(a) of the Code in the manner stated in §1.6694-2 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 85. Section 44.6694-3 is added to read as follows:



§44.6694-3 Penalty for understatement due to willful, reckless, or intentional conduct .

(a) In general . A person who is a tax return preparer of any return or claim for refund of tax on wagers under sections 4401 or 4411 of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) shall be subject to penalties under section 6694(b) of the Code in the manner stated in §1.6694-3 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 86. Section 44.6694-4 is added to read as follows:



§44.6694-4 Extension of period of collection when preparer pays 15 percent of a penalty for understatement of taxpayer's liability and certain other procedural matters .

(a) In general . For rules relating to the extension of period of collection when a tax return preparer who prepared a return or claim for refund for tax on wagers under sections 4401 or 4411 of the Internal Revenue Code pays 15 percent of a penalty for understatement of taxpayer's liability, and procedural matters relating to the investigation, assessment and collection of the penalties under section 6694(a) and (b), the rules under §1.6694-4 of this chapter will apply.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 87. Section 44.6695-1 is added to read as follows:



§44.6695-1 Other assessable penalties with respect to the preparation of tax returns for other persons .

(a) In general . A person who is a tax return preparer of any return or claim for refund of tax on wagers under sections 4401 or 4411 of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) shall be subject to penalties for failure to furnish a copy to the taxpayer under section 6695(a) of the Code, failure to sign the return under section 6695(b) of the Code, failure to furnish an identification number under section 6695(c) of the Code, failure to retain a copy or list under section 6695(d) of the Code, failure to file a correct information return under section 6695(e) of the Code, and negotiation of a check under section 6695(f) of the Code, in the manner stated in §1.6695-1 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 88. Section 44.6696-1 is added to read as follows:



§44.6696-1 Claims for credit or refund by tax return preparers .

(a) In general . For rules for claims for credit or refund by a tax return preparer who prepared a return or claim for refund for tax on wagers under sections 4401 or 4411 of the Internal Revenue Code, the rules under §1.6696- 1 of this chapter will apply.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 89. Section 44.7701-1 is added to read as follows:



§44.7701-1 Tax return preparer .

(a) In general . For the definition of a tax return preparer, see §301.7701-15 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.



PART 53 --FOUNDATION AND SIMILAR EXCISE TAXES

Par. 90. The authority citation for part 53 is amended by adding entries in numerical order to read in part as follows:

Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805 * * *

Section 53.6060-1 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6060(a). * * *

Section 53.6109-2 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6109(a). * * *

Section 53.6695-1 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6695(b). * * *

Section 53.6695-2 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6695(g). * * *

Par. 91. Section 53.6060-1 is added to read as follows:



§53.6060-1 Reporting requirements for tax return preparers .

(a) In general . A person that employs (or engages) one or more tax return preparers to prepare a return or claim for refund of tax under Chapter 42 of the Internal Revenue Code, other than for the person, at any time during a return period, shall satisfy the record keeping and inspection requirements in the manner stated in §1.6060-1 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 92. Section 53.6107-1 is added to read as follows:



§53.6107-1 Tax return preparer must furnish copy of return to taxpayer and must retain a copy or record .

(a) In general . A person who is a signing tax return preparer of any return or claim for refund of tax under Chapter 42 of the Internal Revenue Code shall furnish a completed copy of the return or claim for refund to the taxpayer, and retain a completed copy or record in the manner stated in §1.6107-1 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 93. Section 53.6109-1 is added to read as follows:



§53.6109-1 Tax return preparers furnishing identifying numbers for returns or claims for refund filed .

(a) In general . Each tax return or claim for refund under Chapter 42 of the Internal Revenue Code prepared by one or more signing tax return preparers must include the identifying number of the preparer required by §1.6695-1(b) of this chapter to sign the return or claim for refund in the manner stated in §1.6109-2 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . Paragraph (a) of this section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 94. Section 53.6694-1 is added to read as follows:



§53.6694-1 Section 6694 penalties applicable to tax return preparer .

(a) In general . For general definitions regarding section 6694 penalties applicable to preparers of tax returns or claims for refund under Chapter 42 of the Internal Revenue Code, see §1.6694-1 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . Paragraph (a) of this section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 95. Section 53.6694-2 is added to read as follows:



§53.6694-2 Penalties for understatement due to an unreasonable position .

(a) In general . A person who is a tax return preparer of any return or claim for refund of tax under Chapter 42 of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) shall be subject to penalties under section 6694(a) of the Code in the manner stated in §1.6694-2 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 96. Section 53.6694-3 is added to read as follows:



§53.6694-3 Penalty for understatement due to willful, reckless, or intentional conduct .

(a) In general . A person who is a tax return preparer of any return or claim for refund of tax under Chapter 42 of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) shall be subject to penalties under section 6694(b) of the Code in the manner stated in §1.6694-3 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 97. Section 53.6694-4 is added to read as follows:



§53.6694-4 Extension of period of collection when tax return preparer pays 15 percent of a penalty for understatement of taxpayer's liability and certain other procedural matters .

(a) In general . For rules relating to the extension of period of collection when a tax return preparer who prepared a return or claim for refund of tax under Chapter 42 of the Internal Revenue Code pays 15 percent of a penalty for understatement of taxpayer's liability, and procedural matters relating to the investigation, assessment and collection of the penalties under section 6694(a) and (b), the rules under §1.6694-4 of this chapter will apply.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 98. Section 53.6695-1 is added to read as follows:



§53.6695-1 Other assessable penalties with respect to the preparation of tax returns for other persons .

(a) In general . A person who is a tax return preparer of any return or claim for refund of tax under Chapter 42 of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) shall be subject to penalties for failure to furnish a copy to the taxpayer under section 6695(a) of the Code, failure to sign the return under section 6695(b) of the Code, failure to furnish an identification number under section 6695(c) of the Code, failure to retain a copy or list under section 6695(d) of the Code, failure to file a correct information return under section 6695(e) of the Code, and negotiation of a check under section 6695(f) of the Code, in the manner stated in §1.6695-1 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 99. Section 53.6696-1 is added to read as follows:



§53.6696-1 Claims for credit or refund by tax return preparers .

(a) In general . For rules for claims for credit or refund by a tax return preparer who prepared a return or claim for refund for tax under Chapter 42 of the Internal Revenue Code, the rules under §1.6696-1 of this chapter will apply.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 100. Section 53.7701-1 is added to read as follows:



§53.7701-1 Tax return preparer .

(a) In general . For the definition of a tax return preparer, see §301.7701-15 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.



PART 54 --PENSION EXCISE TAXES

Par. 101. The authority citation for part 54 is amended by adding entries in numerical order to read in part as follows:

Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805* * *

Section 54.6060-1 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6060(a). * * *

Section 54.6109-2 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6109(a). * * *

Section 54.6695-1 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6695(b). * * *

Section 54.6695-2 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6695(g). * * *

Par. 102. Section 54.6060-1 is added to read as follows:



§54.6060-1 Reporting requirements for tax return preparers .

(a) In general . A person that employs (or engages) one or more tax return preparers to prepare a return or claim for refund under Chapter 43 of subtitle D of the Internal Revenue Code, other than for the person, at any time during a return period, shall satisfy the record keeping and inspection requirements in the manner stated in §1.6060-1 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 103. Section 54.6107-1 is added to read as follows:



§54.6107-1 Tax return preparer must furnish copy of return to taxpayer and must retain a copy or record .

(a) In general . A person who is a signing tax return preparer of any return or claim for refund of tax under Chapter 43 of subtitle D of the Internal Revenue Code, shall furnish a completed copy of the return or claim for refund to the taxpayer, and retain a completed copy or record in the manner stated in §1.6107-1 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 104. Section 54.6109-1 is added to read as follows:



§54.6109-1 Tax return preparers furnishing identifying numbers for returns or claims for refund filed .

(a) In general . Each tax return or claim for refund of tax under Chapter 43 of subtitle D prepared by one or more signing tax return preparers must include the identifying number of the preparer required by §1.6695-1(b) of this chapter to sign the return or claim for refund in the manner stated in §1.6109-2 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . Paragraph (a) of this section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 105. Section 54.6694-1 is added to read as follows:



§54.6694-1 Section 6694 penalties applicable to tax return preparer .

(a) In general . For general definitions regarding section 6694 penalties applicable to preparers of tax returns or claims for refund of tax under Chapter 43 of subtitle D, see §1.6694-1 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . Paragraph (a) of this section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 106. Section 54.6694-2 is added to read as follows:



§54.6694-2 Penalties for understatement due to an unreasonable position .

(a) In general . A person who is a tax return preparer of any return or claim for refund of tax under chapter 43 of subtitle D of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) shall be subject to penalties under section 6694(a) of the Code in the manner stated in §1.6694-2 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 107. Section 56.6694-3 is added to read as follows:



§54.6694-3 Penalty for understatement due to willful, reckless, or intentional conduct .

(a) In general . A person who is a tax return preparer of any return or claim for refund of excise tax under chapter 43 of subtitle D of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) shall be subject to penalties under section 6694(b) of the Code in the manner stated in §1.6694-3 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 108. Section 54.6694-4 is added to read as follows:



§54.6694-4 Extension of period of collection when tax return preparer pays 15 percent of a penalty for understatement of taxpayer's liability and certain other procedural matters .

(a) In general . For rules relating to the extension of period of collection when a tax return preparer who prepared a return or claim for refund for tax under chapter 43 of subtitle D of the Internal Revenue Code pays 15 percent of a penalty for understatement of taxpayer's liability, and procedural matters relating to the investigation, assessment and collection of the penalties under section 6694(a) and (b), the rules under §1.6694-4 of this chapter will apply.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 109. Section 54.6695-1 is added to read as follows:



§54.6695-1 Other assessable penalties with respect to the preparation of tax returns for other persons .

(a) In general . A person who is a tax return preparer of any return or claim for refund of tax under chapter 43 of subtitle D of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) shall be subject to penalties for failure to furnish a copy to the taxpayer under section 6695(a) of the Code, failure to sign the return under section 6695(b) of the Code, failure to furnish an identification number under section 6695(c) of the Code, failure to retain a copy or list under section 6695(d) of the Code, failure to file a correct information return under section 6695(e) of the Code, and negotiation of a check under section 6695(f) of the Code, in the manner stated in §1.6695-1 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 110. Section 54.6696-1 is added to read as follows:



§54.6696-1 Claims for credit or refund by tax return preparers .

(a) In general . For rules for claims for credit or refund by a tax return preparer who prepared a return or claim for refund for excise tax under chapter 43 of subtitle D of the Internal Revenue Code, the rules under §1.6696-1 of this chapter will apply.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 111. Section 54.7701-1 is added to read as follows:



§54.7701-1 Tax return preparer .

(a) In general . For the definition of a tax return preparer, see §301.7701-15 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.



PART 55 --EXCISE TAX ON REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS AND REGULATED INVESTMENT COMPANIES

Par. 112. The authority citation for part 55 is amended by adding entries in numerical order to read in part as follows:

Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805* * *

Section 55.6060-1 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6060(a). * * *

Section 55.6109-2 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6109(a). * * *

Section 55.6695-1 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6695(b). * * *

Section 55.6695-2 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6695(g). * * *

Par. 113. Section 55.6060-1 is added to read as follows:



§55.6060-1 Reporting requirements for tax return preparers .

(a) In general . A person that employs (or engages) one or more tax return preparers to prepare a return or claim for refund under chapter 44 of subtitle D of the Internal Revenue Code, other than for the person, at any time during a return period, shall satisfy the record keeping and inspection requirements in the manner stated in §1.6060-1 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 114. Section 55.6107-1 is added to read as follows:



§55.6107-1 Tax return preparer must furnish copy of return to taxpayer and must retain a copy or record .

(a) In general . A person who is a signing tax return preparer of any return or claim for refund of tax under Chapter 44 of subtitle D of the Internal Revenue Code shall furnish a completed copy of the return or claim for refund to the taxpayer, and retain a completed copy or record in the manner stated in §1.6107-1 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 115. Section 55.6109-1 is added to read as follows:



§55.6109-1 Tax return preparers furnishing identifying numbers for returns or claims for refund .

(a) In general . Each tax return or claim for refund of tax under chapter 44 of Subtitle D prepared by one or more signing tax return preparers must include the identifying number of the preparer required by §1.6695-1(b) of this chapter to sign the return or claim for refund in the manner stated in §1.6109-2 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . Paragraph (a) of this section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 116. Section 55.6694-1 is added to read as follows:



§55.6694-1 Section 6694 penalties applicable to tax return preparer .

(a) In general . For general definitions regarding section 6694 penalties applicable to preparers of tax returns or claims for refund of tax under chapter 44 of Subtitle D see §1.6694-1 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . Paragraph (a) of this section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 117. Section 55.6694-2 is added to read as follows:



§55.6694-2 Penalties for understatement due to an unreasonable position .

(a) In general . A person who is a tax return preparer of any return or claim for refund of excise tax under chapter 44 of subtitle D of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) shall be subject to penalties under section 6694(a) of the Code in the manner stated in §1.6694-2 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 118. Section 55.6694-3 is added to read as follows:



§55.6694-3 Penalty for understatement due to willful, reckless, or intentional conduct .

(a) In general . A person who is a tax return preparer of any return or claim for refund of tax under chapter 44 of subtitle D of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) shall be subject to penalties under section 6694(b) of the Code in the manner stated in §1.6694-3 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 119. Section 55.6694-4 is added to read as follows:



§55.6694-4 Extension of period of collection when tax return preparer pays 15 percent of a penalty for understatement of taxpayer's liability and certain other procedural matters .

(a) In general . For rules relating to the extension of period of collection when a tax return preparer who prepared a return or claim for refund for excise tax under chapter 44 of subtitle D of the Internal Revenue Code pays 15 percent of a penalty for understatement of taxpayer's liability, and procedural matters relating to the investigation, assessment and collection of the penalties under section 6694(a) and (b), the rules under §1.6694-4 of this chapter will apply.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 120. Section 55.6695-1 is added to read as follows:



§55.6695-1 Other assessable penalties with respect to the preparation of tax returns for other persons .

(a) In general . A person who is a tax return preparer of any return or claim for refund of tax under chapter 44 of subtitle D of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) shall be subject to penalties for failure to furnish a copy to the taxpayer under section 6695(a) of the Code, failure to sign the return under section 6695(b) of the Code, failure to furnish an identification number under section 6695(c) of the Code, failure to retain a copy or list under section 6695(d) of the Code, failure to file a correct information return under section 6695(e) of the Code, and negotiation of a check under section 6695(f) of the Code, in the manner stated in §1.6695-1 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 121. Section 55.6696-1 is added to read as follows:



§55.6696-1 Claims for credit or refund by tax return preparers .

(a) In general . For rules for claims for credit or refund by a tax return preparer who prepared a return or claim for refund for tax under chapter 44 of subtitle D of the Internal Revenue Code, the rules under §1.6696-1 of this chapter will apply.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 122. Section 55.7701-1 is added to read as follows:



§55.7701-1 Tax return preparer .

(a) In general . For the definition of a tax return preparer, see §301.7701-15 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.



PART 56 --PUBLIC CHARITY EXCISE TAXES

Par. 123. The authority citation for part 56 is amended by adding entries in numerical order to read in part as follows:

Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805* * *

Section 56.6060-1 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6060(a). * * *

Section 56.6109-2 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6109(a). * * *

Section 56.6695-1 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6695(b). * * *

Section 56.6695-2 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6695(g). * * *

Par. 124. Section 56.6060-1 is added to read as follows:



§56.6060-1 Reporting requirements for tax return preparers .

(a) In general . A person that employs (or engages) one or more tax return preparers to prepare a return or claim for refund of tax under chapter 41 of subtitle D of the Internal Revenue Code, other than for the person, at any time during a return period, shall satisfy the record keeping and inspection requirements in the manner stated in §1.6060-1 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 125. Section 56.6107-1 is added to read as follows:



§56.6107-1 Tax return preparer must furnish copy of return to taxpayer and must retain a copy or record .

(a) In general . A person who is a signing tax return preparer of any return or claim for refund of tax under Chapter 41 of subtitle D of the Internal Revenue Code shall furnish a completed copy of the return or claim for refund to the estate, and retain a completed copy or record in the manner stated in §1.6107-1 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 126. Section 56.6109-1 is added to read as follows:



§56.6109-1 Tax return preparers furnishing identifying numbers for returns or claims for refund .

(a) In general . Each tax return or claim for refund for tax under chapter 41 of subtitle D prepared by one or more tax signing return preparers must include the identifying number of the preparer required by §1.6695-1(b) of this chapter to sign the return or claim for refund in the manner stated in §1.6109-2 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . Paragraph (a) of this section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 127. Section 56.6694-1 is added to read as follows:



§56.6694-1 Section 6694 penalties applicable to tax return preparer .

(a) In general . For general definitions regarding section 6694 penalties applicable to preparers of tax returns or claims for refund of tax under chapter 41 of subtitle D see §1.6694-1 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . Paragraph (a) of this section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 128. Section 56.6694-2 is added to read as follows:



§56.6694-2 Penalties for understatement due to an unreasonable position .

(a) In general . A person who is a tax return preparer of any return or claim for refund of excise tax under chapter 41 of subtitle D of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) shall be subject to penalties under section 6694(a) of the Code in the manner stated in §1.6694-2 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 129. Section 56.6694-3 is added to read as follows:



§56.6694-3 Penalty for understatement due to willful, reckless, or intentional conduct .

(a) In general . A person who is a tax return preparer of any return or claim for refund of tax under chapter 41 of subtitle D of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) shall be subject to penalties under section 6694(b) of the Code in the manner stated in §1.6694-3 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 130. Section 56.6694-4 is added to read as follows:



§56.6694-4 Extension of period of collection when tax return preparer pays 15 percent of a penalty for understatement of taxpayer's liability and certain other procedural matters .

(a) In general . For rules relating to the extension of period of collection when a tax return preparer who prepared a return or claim for refund for tax under chapter 41 of subtitle D of the Internal Revenue Code pays 15 percent of a penalty for understatement of taxpayer's liability, and procedural matters relating to the investigation, assessment and collection of the penalties under section 6694(a) and (b), the rules under §1.6694-4 of this chapter will apply.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 131. Section 56.6695-1 is added to read as follows:



§56.6695-1 Other assessable penalties with respect to the preparation of tax returns for other persons .

(a) In general . A person who is a tax return preparer of any return or claim for refund of tax under chapter 41 of subtitle D of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) shall be subject to penalties for failure to furnish a copy to the taxpayer under section 6695(a) of the Code, failure to sign the return under section 6695(b) of the Code, failure to furnish an identification number under section 6695(c) of the Code, failure to retain a copy or list under section 6695(d) of the Code, failure to file a correct information return under section 6695(e) of the Code, and negotiation of a check under section 6695(f) of the Code, in the manner stated in §1.6695-1 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 132. Section 56.6696-1 is added to read as follows:



§56.6696-1 Claims for credit or refund by tax return preparers .

(a) In general . For rules relating to claims for credit or refund by a tax return preparer who prepared a return or claim for refund for tax under chapter 41 of subtitle D of the Internal Revenue Code, the rules under §1.6696-1 of this chapter will apply.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 133. Section 56.7701-1 is added to read as follows:



§56.7701-1 Tax return preparer .

(a) In general . For the definition of a tax return preparer, see §301.7701-15 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.



PART 156 --EXCISE TAX ON GREENMAIL

Par. 134. The authority citation for part 156 is amended by adding entries in numerical order to read in part as follows:

Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805* * *

Section 156.6060-1 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6060(a). * * *

Section 156.6109-2 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6109(a). * * *

Section 156.6695-1 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6695(b). * * *

Section 156.6695-2 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6695(g). * * *

Par. 135. Section 156.6060-1 is added to read as follows:



§156.6060-1 Reporting requirements for tax return preparers .

(a) In general . A person that employs (or engages) one or more tax return preparers to prepare a return or claim for refund under section 5881 of the Internal Revenue Code, other than for the person, at any time during a return period, shall satisfy the record keeping and inspection requirements in the manner stated in §1.6060-1 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 136. Section 156.6107-1 is added to read as follows:



§156.6107-1 Tax return preparer must furnish copy of return to taxpayer and must retain a copy or record .

(a) In general . A person who is a signing tax return preparer of any return or claim for refund of tax under Section 5881 of the Internal Revenue Code shall furnish a completed copy of the return or claim for refund to the taxpayer, and retain a completed copy or record in the manner stated in §1.6107-1 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 137. Section 156.6109-1 is added to read as follows:



§156.6109-1 Tax return preparers furnishing identifying numbers for returns or claims for refund .

(a) In general . Each tax return or claim for refund for tax under section 5881 of the Internal Revenue Code prepared by one or more signing tax return preparers must include the identifying number of the preparer required by §1.6695-1(b) of this chapter to sign the return or claim for refund in the manner stated in §1.6109-2 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . Paragraph (a) of this section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 138. Section 156.6694-1 is added to read as follows:



§156.6694-1 Section 6694 penalties applicable to tax return preparer .

(a) In general . For general definitions regarding section 6694 penalties applicable to preparers of tax returns or claims for refund for tax under section 5881 of the Internal Revenue Code, see §1.6694-1 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . Paragraph (a) of this section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 139. Section 156.6694-2 is added to read as follows:



§156.6694-2 Penalties for understatement due to an unreasonable position .

(a) In general . A person who is a tax return preparer of any return or claim for refund of tax under section 5881 of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) shall be subject to penalties under section 6694(a) of the Code in the manner stated in §1.6694-2 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 140. Section 156.6694-3 is added to read as follows:



§156.6694-3 Penalty for understatement due to willful, reckless, or intentional conduct .

(a) In general . A person who is a tax return preparer of any return or claim for refund of tax under section 5881 of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) shall be subject to penalties under section 6694(b) of the Code in the manner stated in §1.6694-3 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 141. Section 156.6694-4 is added to read as follows:



§55.6694-4 Extension of period of collection when tax return preparer pays 15 percent of a penalty for understatement of taxpayer's liability and certain other procedural matters .

(a) In general . For rules relating to the extension of period of collection when a tax return preparer who prepared a return or claim for refund for tax under section 5881 of the Internal Revenue Code pays 15 percent of a penalty for understatement of taxpayer's liability, and procedural matters relating to the investigation, assessment and collection of the penalties under section 6694(a) and (b), the rules under §1.6694-4 of this chapter will apply.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 142. Section 156.6695-1 is added to read as follows:



§156.6695-1 Other assessable penalties with respect to the preparation of tax returns for other persons .

(a) In general . A person who is a tax return preparer of any return or claim for refund of tax under section 5881 of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) shall be subject to penalties for failure to furnish a copy to the taxpayer under section 6695(a) of the Code, failure to sign the return under section 6695(b) of the Code, failure to furnish an identification number under section 6695(c) of the Code, failure to retain a copy or list under section 6695(d) of the Code, failure to file a correct information return under section 6695(e) of the Code, and negotiation of a check under section 6695(f) of the Code, in the manner stated in §1.6695-1 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 143. Section 156.6696-1 is added to read as follows:



§156.6696-1 Claims for credit or refund by tax return preparers .

(a) In general . For rules for claims for credit or refund by a tax return preparer who prepared a return or claim for refund for tax under section 5881 of the Internal Revenue Code, the rules under §1.6696-1 of this chapter will apply.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 144. Section 156.7701-1 is added to read as follows:



§156.7701-1 Tax return preparer .

(a) In general . For the definition of a tax return preparer, see §301.7701-15 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.



PART 157 --EXCISE TAX ON STRUCTURED SETTLEMENT FACTORING TRANSACTIONS

Par. 145. The authority citation for part 157 is amended by adding entries in numerical order to read in part as follows:

Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805* * *

Section 157.6060-1 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6060(a). * * *

Section 157.6109-2 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6109(a). * * *

Section 157.6695-1 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6695(b). * * *

Section 157.6695-2 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6695(g). * * *

Par. 146. Section 157.6060-1 is added to read as follows:



§157.6060-1 Reporting requirements for tax return preparers .

(a) In general . A person that employs (or engages) one or more tax return preparers to prepare a return or claim for refund for tax under section 5891 of the Internal Revenue Code, other than for the person, at any time during a return period, shall satisfy the record keeping and inspection requirements in the manner stated in §1.6060-1 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 147. Section 157.6107-1 is added to read as follows:



§157.6107-1 Tax return preparer must furnish copy of return to taxpayer and must retain a copy or record .

(a) In general . A person who is a signing tax return preparer of any return or claim for refund of tax under section 5891 of the Internal Revenue Code shall furnish a completed copy of the return or claim for refund to the taxpayer, and retain a completed copy or record in the manner stated in §1.6107-1 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 148. Section 157.6109-1 is added to read as follows:



§157.6109-1 Tax return preparers furnishing identifying numbers for returns or claims for refund .

(a) In general . Each tax return or claim for refund for tax under section 5891 of the Internal Revenue Code prepared by one or more signing tax return preparers must include the identifying number of the preparer required by §1.6695-1(b) of this chapter to sign the return or claim for refund in the manner stated in §1.6109-2 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . Paragraph (a) of this section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 149. Section 157.6694-1 is added to read as follows:



§157.6694-1 Section 6694 penalties applicable to tax return preparer .

(a) In general . For general definitions regarding section 6694 penalties applicable to preparers of tax returns or claims for refund for tax under section 5891 of the Internal Revenue Code see §1.6694-1 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . Paragraph (a) of this section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register .

Par. 150. Section 157.6694-2 is added to read as follows:



§157.6694-2 Penalties for understatement due to an unreasonable position .

(a) In general . A person who is a tax return preparer of any return or claim for refund of tax under section 5891 of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) shall be subject to penalties under section 6694(a) of the Code in the manner stated in §1.6694-2 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 151. Section 157.6694-3 is added to read as follows:



§157.6694-3 Penalty for understatement due to willful, reckless, or intentional conduct .

(a) In general . A person who is a tax return preparer of any return or claim for refund of tax under section 5891 of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) shall be subject to penalties under section 6694(b) of the Code in the manner stated in §1.6694-3 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 152. Section 157.6694-4 is added to read as follows:



§157.6694-4 Extension of period of collection when preparer pays 15 percent of a penalty for understatement of taxpayer's liability and certain other procedural matters .

(a) In general . For rules relating to the extension of period of collection when a tax return preparer who prepared a return or claim for refund for tax under section 5891 of the Internal Revenue Code pays 15 percent of a penalty for understatement of taxpayer's liability, and procedural matters relating to the investigation, assessment and collection of the penalties under section 6694(a) and (b), the rules under §1.6694-4 of this chapter will apply.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 153. Section 157.6695-1 is added to read as follows:



§157.6695-1 Other assessable penalties with respect to the preparation of tax returns for other persons .

(a) In general . A person who is a tax return preparer of any return or claim for refund of tax under section 5891 of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) shall be subject to penalties for failure to furnish a copy to the taxpayer under section 6695(a) of the Code, failure to sign the return under section 6695(b) of the Code, failure to furnish an identification number under section 6695(c) of the Code, failure to retain a copy or list under section 6695(d) of the Code, failure to file a correct information return under section 6695(e) of the Code, and negotiation of a check under section 6695(f) of the Code, in the manner stated in §1.6695-1 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 154. Section 157.6696-1 is added to read as follows:



§157.6696-1 Claims for credit or refund by tax return preparers .

(a) In general . For rules for claims for credit or refund by a tax return preparer who prepared a return or claim for refund for tax under section 5891 of the Internal Revenue Code, the rules under §1.6696-1 of this chapter will apply.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Par. 155. Section 157.7701-1 is added to read as follows:



§157.7701-1 Tax return preparer .

(a) In general . For the definition of a tax return preparer, see §301.7701-15 of this chapter.

(b) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.



PART 301 --PROCEDURE AND ADMINISTRATION

Par. 156. The authority citation for part 301 continues to read in part as follows:

Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805 * * *

Par. 157. Section 301.7701-15 is amended to read as follows:



§301.7701-15 Tax return preparer .

(a) In general . A tax return preparer is any person who prepares for compensation, or who employs one or more persons to prepare for compensation, all or a substantial portion of any return of tax or any claim for refund of tax under the Internal Revenue Code (Code).

(b) Definitions --(1) Signing tax return preparer . A signing tax return preparer is any tax return preparer who signs or who is required to sign a return or claim for refund as a tax return preparer pursuant to §1.6695-1(b) of this chapter.

(2) Nonsigning tax return preparer --(i) In general . A nonsigning tax return preparer is any tax return preparer who is not a signing tax return preparer but who prepares all or a substantial portion of a return or claim for refund within the meaning of paragraph(b)(3) of this section with respect to events that have occurred at the time the advice is rendered. In determining whether an individual is a nonsigning tax return preparer, time spent on advice that is given after events have occurred that represents less than 5 percent of the aggregate time incurred by such individual with respect to the position(s) giving rise to the understatement shall not be taken into account. Examples of nonsigning tax return preparers are tax return preparers who provide advice (written or oral) to a taxpayer (or to another tax return preparer) when that advice constitutes a substantial portion of the return within the meaning of paragraph(b)(3) of this section.

(ii) Examples . The provisions of this paragraph (b)(2) are illustrated by the following examples:

Example 1 . Attorney A, an attorney in a law firm, provides legal advice to a large corporate taxpayer regarding a completed corporate transaction. The advice provided by A is directly relevant to the determination of an entry on the taxpayer's return and this advice constitutes a substantial portion of the return. A, however, does not prepare any other portion of the taxpayer's return and is not the signing tax return preparer of this return. A is considered a tax return preparer.

Example 2 . Attorney B, an attorney in a law firm, provides legal advice to a large corporate taxpayer regarding the tax consequences of a proposed corporate transaction. Based upon this advice, the corporate taxpayer enters into the transaction. Once the transaction is completed, the corporate taxpayer does not receive any additional advice from B with respect to the transaction. B did not provide advice with respect to events that have occurred and is not considered a tax return preparer.

Example 3 . The facts are the same as Example 2 , except that Attorney B provides supplemental advice to the corporate taxpayer on a phone call after the transaction is completed. The time incurred on this supplemental advice by B represented less than 5 percent of the aggregate amount of time spent by B providing tax advice on the position. B is not considered a tax return preparer.

(3) Substantial portion . (i) Only a person who prepares all or a substantial portion of a return or claim for refund shall be considered to be a tax return preparer of the return or claim for refund. A person who renders tax advice on a position that is directly relevant to the determination of the existence, characterization, or amount of an entry on a return or claim for refund will be regarded as having prepared that entry. Whether a schedule, entry, or other portion of a return or claim for refund is a substantial portion is determined based upon whether the person knows or reasonably should know that the tax attributable to the schedule, entry, or other portion of a return or claim for refund is a substantial portion of the tax required to be shown on the return or claim for refund. A single tax entry may constitute a substantial portion of the tax required to be shown on a return. Factors to consider in determining whether a schedule, entry, or other portion of a return or claim for refund is a substantial portion include but are not limited to --

(A) the size and complexity of the item relative to the taxpayer's gross income; and

(B) the size of the understatement attributable to the item compared to the taxpayer's reported tax liability.

(ii)(A) For purposes of applying the rules of paragraph (b)(3)(i) of this section to a nonsigning tax return preparer within the meaning of paragraph (b)(2) of this section only, if the schedule, entry, or other portion of the return or claim for refund involves amounts of gross income, amounts of deductions, or amounts on the basis of which credits are determined that are --

(1 ) Less than $10,000; or

(2 ) Less than $400,000 and also less than 20 percent of the gross income as shown on the return or claim for refund (or, for an individual, the individual's adjusted gross income), then the schedule or other portion is not considered to be a substantial portion.

(B) If more than one schedule, entry or other portion is involved, all schedules, entries or other portions shall be aggregated in applying this rule. This paragraph shall not apply to a signing tax return preparer within the meaning of paragraph (b)(1) of this section.

(iii) A tax return preparer with respect to one return is not considered to be a tax return preparer of another return merely because an entry or entries reported on the first return may affect an entry reported on the other return, unless the entry or entries reported on the first return are directly reflected on the other return and constitute a substantial portion of the other return. For example, the sole preparer of a partnership return of income or small business corporation income tax return is considered a tax return preparer of a partner's or a shareholder's return if the entry or entries on the partnership or small business corporation return reportable on the partner's or shareholder's return constitute a substantial portion of the partner's or shareholder's return.

(iv) Examples . The provisions of this paragraph (b)(3) are illustrated by the following examples:
Example 1 . Accountant C prepares a Form 8886, "Reportable Transaction Disclosure Statement", that is used to disclose reportable transactions. C does not prepare the tax return or advise the taxpayer regarding the tax return reporting position of the transaction to which the Form 8886 relates. The preparation of the Form 8886 is not directly relevant to the determination of the existence, characterization, or amount of an entry on a tax return or claim for refund. Rather, the Form 8886 is prepared by C to disclose a reportable transaction. C has not prepared a substantial portion of the tax return and is not considered a tax return preparer under section 6694.

Example 2 . Accountant D prepares a schedule for an individual taxpayer's Form 1040, "U.S. Individual Income Tax Return", reporting $4,000 in dividend income and gives oral or written advice about Schedule A, which results in a claim of a medical expense deduction totaling $5,000, but does not sign the tax return. D is not a tax return preparer because the total aggregate amount of the deductions is less than $10,000.

(4) Return and claim for refund --(i) Return . For purposes of this section, a return of tax is a return (including an amended or adjusted return) filed by or on behalf of a taxpayer reporting the liability of the taxpayer for tax under the Code, if the type of return is identified in published guidance in the Internal Revenue Bulletin. A return of tax also includes any information return or other document identified in published guidance in the Internal Revenue Bulletin, and that reports information that is or may be reported on another taxpayer's return under the Code if the information reported on the information return or other document constitutes a substantial portion of the taxpayer's return within the meaning of paragraph (b)(3) of this section.

(ii) Claim for refund . For purposes of this section, a claim for refund of tax includes a claim for credit against any tax that is included in published guidance in the Internal Revenue Bulletin. A claim for refund also includes a claim for payment under section 6420, 6421, or 6427.

(c) Mechanical or clerical assistance . A person who furnishes to a taxpayer or other tax return preparer sufficient information and advice so that completion of the return or claim for refund is largely a mechanical or clerical matter is considered a tax return preparer, even though that person does not actually place or review placement of information on the return or claim for refund. See also paragraph (b)(3) of this section.

(d) Qualifications . A person may be a tax return preparer without regard to educational qualifications and professional status requirements.

(e) Outside the United States . A person who prepares a return or claim for refund outside the United States is a tax return preparer, regardless of the person's nationality, residence, or the location of the person's place of business, if the person otherwise satisfies the definition of tax return preparer . Notwithstanding the provisions of §301.6109-1(g), the person shall secure an employer identification number if the person is an employer of another tax return preparer, is a partnership in which one or more of the general partners is a tax return preparer, is a firm entity in which one or more of the equity holders is a tax return preparer, or is an individual not employed by another tax return preparer.

(f) Persons who are not tax return preparers . (1) The following persons are not tax return preparers:

(i) An official or employee of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) performing their official duties.

(ii) Any individual who provides tax assistance under a Volunteer Income Tax Assistance (VITA) program established by the IRS, but only with respect to those returns prepared as part of the VITA program.

(iii) Any organization sponsoring or administering a VITA program established by the IRS, but only with respect to that sponsorship or administration.

(iv) Any individual who provides tax counseling for the elderly under a program established pursuant to section 163 of the Revenue Act of 1978, but only with respect to those returns prepared as part of that program.

(v) Any organization sponsoring or administering a program to provide tax counseling for the elderly established pursuant to section 163 of the Revenue Act of 1978, but only with respect to that sponsorship or administration.

(vi) Any individual who provides tax assistance as part of a qualified Low-Income Taxpayer Clinic (LITC), as defined by section 7526, subject to the requirements of paragraphs (f)(2) and (3) of this section, but only with respect to those returns prepared as part of the LITC program.

(vii) Any organization that is a qualified LITC, as defined by section 7526, subject to the requirements of paragraphs (h)(2) and (3) of this section.

(viii) An individual providing only typing, reproduction, or other mechanical assistance in the preparation of a return or claim for refund.

(ix) An individual preparing a return or claim for refund of a person, or an officer, a general partner, member, shareholder, or employee of a person, by whom the individual is regularly and continuously employed or compensated or in which the individual is a general partner.

(x) An individual preparing a return or claim for refund for a trust, estate, or other entity of which the person either is a fiduciary or is an officer, general partner, or employee of the fiduciary.

(xi) An individual preparing a claim for refund for a taxpayer in response to --

(A) A notice of deficiency issued to the taxpayer; or

(B) A waiver of restriction on assessment after initiation of an audit of the taxpayer or another taxpayer if a determination in the audit of the other taxpayer affects, directly or indirectly, the liability of the taxpayer for tax under subtitle A.

(xii) A person who prepares a return or claim for refund for a taxpayer with no explicit or implicit agreement for compensation, even if the person receives an insubstantial gift, return service, or favor.

(2) Paragraphs (f)(1)(vi) and (vii) of this section apply only if any assistance with a return of tax or claim for refund is directly related to a controversy with the IRS for which the qualified LITC is providing assistance, or is an ancillary part of an LITC program to inform individuals for whom English is a second language about their rights and responsibilities under the Code.

(3) Notwithstanding paragraph (f)(2) of this section, paragraphs (f)(1)(vi) and (f)(1)(vii) of this section do not apply if an LITC charges a separate fee or varies a fee based on whether the LITC provides assistance with a return of tax or claim for refund under the Code, or if the LITC charges more than a nominal fee for its services.

(4) For purposes of paragraph (f)(1)(ix) of this section, the employee of a corporation owning more than 50 percent of the voting power of another corporation, or the employee of a corporation more than 50 percent of the voting power of which is owned by another corporation, is considered the employee of the other corporation as well.

(5) For purposes of paragraph (f)(1)(x) of this section, an estate, guardianship, conservatorship, committee, or any similar arrangement for a taxpayer under a legal disability (such as a minor, an incompetent, or an infirm individual) is considered a trust or estate.

(6) Examples . The mechanical assistance exception described in paragraph (f)(1)(viii) of this section is illustrated by the following examples:

Example 1 . A reporting agent received employment tax information from a client from the client's business records. The reporting agent did not render any tax advice to the client or exercise any discretion or independent judgment on the client's underlying tax positions. The reporting agent processed the client's information, signed the return as authorized by the client pursuant to Form 8655, Reporting Agent Authorization, and filed the client's return using the information supplied by the client. The reporting agent is not a tax return preparer.

Example 2 . A reporting agent rendered tax advice to a client on determining whether its workers are employees or independent contractors for Federal tax purposes. For compensation, the reporting agent received employment tax information from the client, processed the client's information and filed the client's return using the information supplied by the client. The reporting agent is a tax return preparer.

(g) Effective/applicability date . This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after the date that final regulations are published in the Federal Register.

Linda E. Stiff

Deputy Commissioner for Services and Enforcement.

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The IRS has released proposed return preparer penalty regulations. The proposed regulations. The proposed regulations provide guidance on the new Code Sec. 6694(a) more-likely-than-not preparer standard, and contain a comprehensive overhaul of all preparer penalties. The IRS predicted that final regulations will be in place for the 2009 filing season.

A hearing on the proposed regulations is scheduled for August 18, 2008, at the IRS National Office in Washington, D.C.



The IRS stated that it will not stack penalties under Code Sec. 6694 and Circular 230. The IRS stated that penalties under Code Sec. 6694 are not automatic (TAXDAY, 2008/03/07, I.9). Additionally, the IRS included many examples of various provisions in the proposed regulations.



The House-passed Renewable Energy and Job Creation Bill of 2008 (HR 6049) would equalize the preparer and taxpayer penalty standards at substantial authority. Although Senate Democrats were unable to bring HR 6049 before the full Senate for debate during the week of June 9, they are expected to try again the week of June 16.


Passage of the Small Business and Work Opportunity Tax Act of 2007 (2007 Small Business Tax Act) (P.L. 110-28), sparked the drafting of the proposed regulations. The new law replaced the "realistic possibility of success standard" in Code Sec. 6694(a) with the heightened "more likely than not standard" for nonabusive undisclosed positions. The preparer must have a reasonable belief that the tax treatment of the position would more likely than not be sustained on its merits.



The 2007 Small Business Tax Act also extended Code Sec. 6694 to preparers of all returns and not just preparers of income tax returns. Additionally, the new law significantly increased the penalties for noncompliance. The old, first-tier $250 penalty in Code Sec. 6694(a) jumped to the greater of $1,000 or 50 percent of the income derived, or to be derived, by the preparer. The penalty for willful or reckless conduct in Code Sec. 6694(b) increased from $1,000 to the greater of $5,000 or 50 percent of the income derived or to be derived by the preparer.


Preparer Within Firm


The proposed regulations eliminate the current "one preparer per firm" rule used in determining who in a particular firm is responsible for penalties in favor of a framework that focuses on returns on a position-by-position basis. If a preparer is primarily responsible for a position on a return giving rise to an understatement, that person will be subject to Code Sec. 6694. Only one person within a firm will be considered primarily responsible for each position; however, multiple individuals may be responsible for a position if employed by multiple firms.



The individual signing the return will continue to be held responsible for all of the positions on a return, but if another individual is determined (either via information received from the signing individual or from other sources) to have primary responsibility for a position giving rise to the understatement, that other individual will be responsible under Code Sec. 6694. If there are one or more nonsigning tax return preparers at the same firm and no signing preparer at the firm, the individual within the firm with supervisory responsibility for the position will be responsible for the Code Sec. 6694 penalty.



These new rules allow the IRS more flexibility in assessing responsibility for positions giving rise to understatements than the IRS has under the current "one preparer per firm" system.


Income Derived


The proposed regulations also provide new guidance for determining the amount of income derived by a firm or an individual in preparing a return containing a position giving rise to an understatement, upon which the maximum penalty under Code Sec. 6694 is calculated. Income derived includes all compensation the preparer receives or expects to receive in preparing the return or providing tax advice. If the preparer is paid by a firm for work done for a client of the firm, income derived is all compensation that can be reasonably allocated to work done in preparing the return or advising the client on a position giving rise to an understatement.



If the firm is subject to penalty under Code Sec. 6694, then all compensation received by the firm will be included as income derived from the transaction. If both the firm and the preparer are subject to liability, the income derived from the transaction will only count once, meaning that income received by the firm from the client and paid to the preparer will not both be used in determining the maximum penalty.


"More Likely Than Not Standard"


The proposed regulations provide additional guidance on satisfaction of the "more likely than not" standard. The standard would be satisfied if the preparer analyzes the facts and authorities and reasonably concludes in good faith that the position has a greater than 50-percent likelihood of being sustained. The IRS will take into account the preparer's experience in tax law, familiarity with the taxpayer's affairs and the complexity of the facts. The standard may also be satisfied through a well-reasoned construction of statutory authority where no other authority exists or if the preparer relies upon the advice of another preparer or the taxpayer. However, the preparer may not rely upon information provided by taxpayers with respect to legal conclusions on tax issues.


Adequate Disclosure, Reasonable Basis


Preparers must provide disclosure of a return position where the position has a reasonable basis, but the "more likely than not" standard cannot be satisfied. The proposed regulations provide that the reasonable basis standard for these purposes is the same as is used for the accuracy-related penalty under Code Sec. 6662 (significantly higher than not frivolous or patently improper and not satisfied by a position that is merely arguable or a merely colorable claim). However, in meeting the "reasonable basis" standard, preparers can rely in good faith upon the advice furnished by a taxpayer, advisor or another preparer without verification.



The proposed regulations also provide guidance on what constitutes adequate disclosure, building upon guidance provided in Notice 2008-13. For a signing return preparer, disclosure can be accomplished in one of five ways:



- through the use of Form 8275, Disclosure Statement, or Form 8275-R, Regulation Disclosure Statement, or on the return in accordance with the annual procedure (see Rev. Proc. 2008-14, I.R.B. 2008-7, 435);



- if the position does not satisfy the substantial authority standard of Reg. §1.6662-4(d), provision of a disclosure to the taxpayer with the prepared tax return;



- if the position does satisfy the substantial authority standard of Reg. §1.6662-4(d), by advising the taxpayer of all the penalty standards applicable under Code Sec. 6662;



- if the position can be described as a tax shelter or reportable transaction, the preparer must advise the taxpayer of the requirements of minimum substantial authority and possession, on the part of the taxpayer, of a reasonable belief that the "more likely than not standard" is met and that the disclosure does not preclude the assessment of an accuracy-related penalty; or



- for returns or refund claims subject to penalties other than the accuracy-related penalty for substantial understatements, the preparer must advise the taxpayer of the applicable penalty standards under Code Sec. 6662.


For a nonsigning return preparer, adequate disclosure may be met in one of three ways:


- through the use of Form 8275, Disclosure Statement, or Form 8275-R, Regulation Disclosure Statement, or on the return in accordance with the annual procedure (see Rev. Proc. 2008-14, I.R.B. 2008-7, 435);



- the preparer may advise the taxpayer of opportunities to avoid potentially applicable Code Sec. 6662 accuracy-related penalties and of applicable standards of disclosure; and



- the nonsigning preparer advises another preparer that disclosure may be required and notes this advice in the other preparer's files.


Each of these methods of disclosure with regard to advice given to a taxpayer must be tailored to the taxpayer's facts and circumstances. Boilerplate language is not sufficient.

Reasonable Cause


Under current Reg. §1.6694-2(d), an exception to the imposition of the penalty is provided where the understatement is due to reasonable cause where the preparer acted in good faith. The regulation includes factors to be considered in determining if the exception applies. The proposed regulations provide that whether the position is supported by generally accepted administrative or industry practices is to be added as an additional factor to be taken into consideration.


Tax Return Preparer


The proposed regulations provide definitions of both a signing tax return preparer and a nonsigning tax return preparer. A signing tax return preparer is any tax return preparer who signs or is required to sign a return or claim for refund. A nonsigning tax return preparer is any tax return preparer who is not a signing tax return preparer but prepares all or a substantial portion of a return.


Electronically Filed and Signed Returns


The proposed regulations provide two changes that will better facilitate the use of electronically signed returns. First, Reg. § 1.6107-1(a), which requires signing return preparers to provide a copy of the filed return to the taxpayer is proposed to be amended to allow preparers electronically filing Form 1040EZ or Form 1040-A to provide the copy to the taxpayer by reproducing the information on Form 1040. Also, a preparer need not sign an electronically signed return prior to providing the taxpayer with a copy of the return but must provide all of the information to that taxpayer at the same time the preparer provides the taxpayer with Form 8879, IRS e-file Signature Authorization.


Additional Proposed Changes


The proposed regulations also provide the following changes:



- the rules under Reg. §§1.6694-2 and -3 are proposed to be changed to allow for a firm to be subject to penalty where the firm's review procedures are not followed through willfulness, recklessness or gross indifference;



- a reasonableness standard is provided for signing return preparer's due diligence requirements in determining eligibility for the earned income credit; and



- for purposes of the penalties under Code Sec. 6694, the date that a return is determined to be prepared is the date the return is signed by the preparer or, if the preparer fails to sign the return, the date the return is filed.



The IRS stated in the preamble to the proposed regulations that the Service intends to modify its internal guidance so that a referral by revenue agents to the IRS Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) will not be per se mandatory when the IRS assesses a tax return preparer penalty under Code Sec. 6694(a) against a tax return preparer who is also a practitioner within the meaning of Circular 230.


Hearing and Comments


A public hearing has been scheduled for August 18, 2008, beginning at 10:00 a.m. Written or electronic comments must be received by the IRS by August 16, 2008. Outlines of topics to be discussed at the public hearing must be received by August 4, 2008.

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Monday, June 16, 2008

Willful Failure to File Return, Supply Information, or Pay Tax: Failure to report income

Taxpayer was a close friend of prominent political figures, and by virtue of his public offices was able to grant them favors in the way of contracts for materials and machinery in the construction of public works. The evidence sustains his conviction for failure to report the sums he received.

Murray, CA-8, 41-1 USTC ¶9247, 117 F2d 40.

Barrow, CA-5, 49-1 USTC ¶9112, 171 F2d 286.

Tax evasion conviction was upheld for failure to include in income a fee for arranging a mortgage loan.

B. Cohen, CA-5, 66-2 USTC ¶9560, 363 F2d 321.

Conviction of taxpayer who failed to report as taxable income the amounts extorted from another was upheld.

Rutkin, 52-1 USTC ¶9260, 343 US 130.

[Note: See also Rutkin at ¶41,318.20. --CCH.]

But a conviction for embezzling done before Rutkin was decided when Wilcox, 46-1 USTC ¶9188, was in effect (holding that embezzled funds are not taxable) was reversed since a willful attempt to evade could not be established so long as the law contained the gloss put upon it by Wilcox.

E.C. James, SCt, 61-1 USTC ¶9449, 81 SCt 1052.

Since funds which the taxpayer failed to report in his income tax returns were embezzled funds, and the embezzlement occurred before Wilcox was overruled, the taxpayer could not be prosecuted for willful evasion of income tax for his failure to include the funds in his tax returns.

M. Pitoscia, DC, 65-1 USTC ¶9281, 238 FSupp 135.

Conviction for failure to report certain funds which taxpayer acquired through his employment before James, was sustained, since the taking of the fund was not technically an embezzlement under local law.

R.C. Jannsen, CA-7, 65-1 USTC ¶9142, 339 F2d 941.

Failure to report funds embezzled 3 days before James was decided was willful evasion of income tax for the year 1961.

H.B. Nordstrom, CA-8, 66-1 USTC ¶9437, 360 F2d 734. Cert. denied, 385 US 826.

A taxpayer who acquired property and money by fraud and deceit, obtained such funds unlawfully in the first instance; therefore the Wilcox doctrine was inapplicable and the taxpayer could be found guilty of filing fraudulent returns as a result of his failure to include these amounts in gross income.

H.H. McGuire, CA-6, 65-1 USTC ¶9299, 347 F2d 99. Cert. denied, 382 US 826.

W.J. Dawson, CA-2, 68-2 USTC ¶9527, 400 F2d 194.

C. Rosenthal, CA-2, 73-1 USTC ¶9135, 470 F2d 837.

Conviction for tax evasion was reversed and a new trial was ordered, to find out if unreported income was embezzled funds or income from some other source, following James, above.

D.D. Beck, CA-9, 62-1 USTC ¶9227, 298 F2d 622.

To the contrary, where reliance on the James decision was first presented on appeal.

B.C. Wallace, CA-4, 62-1 USTC ¶9330, 300 F2d 525. Cert. denied, 370 US 923.

Dismissal of indictment for tax evasion before determining whether or not defendant had an interest in part of a fund allegedly embezzled was premature.

O.P. Colamatteo, CA-7, 63-1 USTC ¶9206, 312 F2d 154.

Proof that taxpayers deliberately omitted to report side payments received in connection with over-ceiling sales of whiskey and that after investigation had begun each taxpayer filed an amended return disclosing a part of the income previously omitted was sufficient.

Rosenblum, CA-7, 49-1 USTC ¶9314, 176 F2d 321. Cert. denied, 338 US 893.

Conviction for failure to report suppliers' cash discounts as income was sustained. Since the case was built on the correct amount of the discount receipts, the government was not required to prove the correct amount of the purchases, even though such discounts are normally reflected as reductions of purchases.

A.L. Wainwright, CA-10, 69-2 USTC ¶9503, 413 F2d 796. Cert. denied, 396 US 1009.

Circumstantial evidence supported the District Court's determination that the taxpayer made no agreement to repay unreported income from trade-outs in which businesses exchanged merchandise for newspaper advertising.

H.B. Brown, Jr., CA-10, 71-2 USTC ¶9557, 446 F2d 1119.

Taxpayer's conviction for failing to report long-term capital gain by using false basis was sustained.

R.R. Krilich, CA-7, 72-2 USTC ¶9767, 470 F2d 341. Cert. denied, 411 US 938.

Taxpayer's tax evasion conviction for fraudulently understating income was affirmed on appeal.

H.H. Feaster, CA-5, 74-1 USTC ¶9472, 494 F2d 871.

F.E. Burkhart, CA-6, 74-2 USTC ¶9661, 501 F2d 993.

A.E. Marabelles, CA-9, 84-1 USTC ¶9189.

T.J. Barrow, CA-6, 97-2 USTC ¶50,558, 118 F3d 482. Cert. denied, 1/16/2001.

Taxpayer's conviction of willfully and knowingly attempting to evade and defeat federal income taxes for two years by omitting from gross income money received as salary was upheld. The court held that the taxpayer knew that money received from a partnership was income and that he deliberately omitted such sums from his returns. Such payments could not be construed as a return of equity since the taxpayer, as a limited partner, had not made any capital contributions and was not responsible for any partnership losses.

T.M. Fahey, CA-2, 75-1 USTC ¶9102, 510 F2d 302.

Taxpayer's conviction for willfully attempting to evade taxes by concealing his Irish Sweepstakes winnings of approximately $130,000 in a foreign bank account was affirmed on appeal.

F.L. McNulty, CA-9, 76-1 USTC ¶9215, 528 F2d 1223. Cert. denied, 425 US 972.

Although an individual correctly and timely reported the amount of tax due, his concealment of assets alone was a sufficient act to support a conviction for tax evasion. Congress did not intend that Code Sec. 7206(4) be the sole remedy for concealment of assets or be interpreted to limit the scope of Code Sec. 7201.

F.L. Hook, CA-6, 86-1 USTC ¶9179, 781 F2d 1166.

It was not shown that a payment received from a corporation for which the taxpayers were selling products, which payment was the only income they failed to report, was a discount or rebate rather than a bonus payment.

M.L. Schutterle, CA-8, 78-2 USTC ¶9773, 586 F2d 1201.

No error was committed when the defendant was found guilty of tax evasion for the years 1975 and 1976. Although the defendant had formal legal control over all of certain unreported funds prior to 1976, that did not preclude a conviction for 1976 because there had been an issue of facts as to when he felt free to use the funds. The funds in his bank account did not result in reportable income until he had "practical control" over the funds.

D. Dixon, CA-11, 83-1 USTC ¶9213.

Where the government in a tax evasion prosecution established that a resident alien received unreported income and that his nondisclosure resulted in a tax deficiency, the resident alien did not negate the deficiency by claiming a foreign tax credit when there had been no firmly established taxable amount owed the Dominican Republic and determined by it before the discovery of the federal tax deficiency.

J.M.A. Cruz, CA-11, 83-1 USTC ¶9216, 698 F2d 1148. Cert. denied, 104 SCt 391.

The conviction of an engineering president for failure to report income on his individual income tax returns was upheld. The firm's general business practices included depositing in the corporation's account payments received for engineering services rendered to its clients. For the tax years at issue, a number of the clients' checks were either cashed by the president or deposited in his personal checking account.

T.P. Meyer, CA-8, 87-1 USTC ¶9132, 808 F2d 1304.

A personal injury lawyer who concealed and attempted to conceal the nature, extent, and ownership of his assets by placing his assets, funds, and other property in the names of others and by transacting his personal business in cash to avoid creating a financial record was properly convicted by a jury on three counts of willful attempt to evade and defeat the payment of his personal income tax.

E.J. Conley, CA-7, 87-2 USTC ¶9469, 826 F2d 551.

The conviction of an individual for tax evasion was upheld. The taxpayer forged documents charging personal expenses to her family corporation, failed to report interest income on 10 money market accounts and deposited large amounts of cash that were not attributable to any known source into her bank accounts.

R.R. Walker, CA-8, 90-1 USTC ¶50,084, 896 F2d 295.

An individual's conviction for tax evasion was upheld. The government properly determined that the individual had unreported income under the cash expenditures and bank deposits method of reconstructing income. The individual's cash on hand at the beginning of each year was established with reasonable certainty based on the individual's personal records and safety deposit box access records.

C.T. Conaway, CA-5, 94-1 USTC ¶50,009, 11 F3d 40.

The evidence was sufficient to sustain an individual's conviction for willful failure to file tax returns and tax evasion. He could not claim that his taxes were not deficient by treating fees received from an insurance adjusting company as a nontaxable settlement award for personal injuries. The company stated that no settlement was ever agreed upon, and, even if one had been reached, the damages would have flowed from a breach of contract.

W.J. Benson, CA-7, 95-2 USTC ¶50,540, 67 F3d 641.

There was sufficient evidence for a jury to find that the majority shareholder, president, and director of a corporation was guilty of tax evasion based on his exercise of control over a liquidating dividend that was due another shareholder. The money was not used for the alleged purpose of providing a contingency fund to protect former officers and directors from claims arising out of the liquidation but, instead, was for the taxpayer's benefit.

R.P. Mueller, CA-11, 96-1 USTC ¶50,190.

Insufficient evidence was presented to support married taxpayers' convictions for tax evasion where the government failed to prove the required existence of a tax deficiency. Under the "no earnings and profits, no income" rule established in P.F. DiZenzo, CA-2, 65-2 USTC ¶9518, amounts that the couple diverted from their wholly owned corporation could not be taxable to them personally as a constructive dividend, where the company had no earnings or profits. Instead, the diverted funds constituted a nontaxable reduction of the couple's shareholder loan account.

J. D'Agostino, CA-2, 98-1 USTC ¶50,380, 145 F3d 69.

The taxpayer's contention that the bonus and interest payments were motivated solely by tax concerns and that they did not constitute taxable income and, thus, could not result in a tax deficiency, was rejected.

M.Y. Khalaf, CA-9 (unpublished opinion), 2002-1 USTC ¶50,297, aff'g an unreported District Court decision.

A federal district court properly determined the amounts embezzled by an individual from his employers. The individual produced no evidence in support of his claim that he embezzled less than the amounts alleged by the victim, and he failed to refute the reliability of the victim's allegations.

D.J. Peterson, CA-10, 2003-1 USTC ¶50,168.

An individual's conviction for filing false tax returns was not set aside because the evidence supported the jury's finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the individual's tax returns contained false information as to material matters in that he did not report income he should have reported. The evidence also showed that the individual exerted control over funds he obtained from his business trust but did not report those funds as income on his personal returns or otherwise properly account for the funds.

M.E. Diesel, DC Kan., 2006-2 USTC ¶50,398.

Two individuals who operated a printing and copying business were properly convicted for willful tax evasion. They concealed business assets using a secret bank account that was not known to their accountant and used the funds in that account for personal expenses. They also handled affairs in cash to avoid making records and repeatedly failed to report large amounts of income.

L.K. Spurlock, CA-5 (unpublished opinion), 2007-1 USTC ¶50,384, aff'g an unreported DC Texas decision.

Labels:

FS-2008-21 -Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 : Expensing rules : Special depreciation allowance, June 16, 2008 - Code Sec. 179


Business Provisions of the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008




FS-2008-21, June 2008

The Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 contains two provisions that provide tax benefits for businesses. The first provision increases the limit up to which a business can expense property purchased and placed in service during its 2008 tax year. The second provision provides an additional 50 percent special depreciation allowance for property acquired and placed in service during calendar year 2008.

Unlike the economic stimulus payments that millions of individuals have already received, the tax benefits for businesses are not automatic; businesses must act to take advantage of the new provisions by purchasing qualifying property.

The Joint Committee on Taxation estimates that businesses stand to lower their 2008 tax bills by roughly $45 billion as a result of the two business provisions in the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008; these provisions accelerate into 2008 the tax benefits that otherwise would not have been available until future years.

The following are some details about these two key tax benefits:



Section 179 Expensing


Ÿ In general, section 179 provides that, instead of depreciating property, a business with a sufficiently small amount of annual property purchases may choose to expense the cost of the property. For taxable years beginning in 2008, the Economic Stimulus Act increased the section 179 expensing limit allowing more property to be currently expensed.



Ÿ The Economic Stimulus Act increased the maximum section 179 expense deduction to $250,000 for qualified section 179 property that is placed in service in tax years that begin in 2008. This is a 95 percent increase from the previous limitation of $128,000.



Ÿ The Economic Stimulus Act also increased the total amount of qualifying property a taxpayer may purchase before the section 179 expensing limit begins to be reduced. Under the new law, the $250,000 deduction amount is reduced only when a business acquires more than $800,000 of qualifying property. Prior to changes made by the Economic Stimulus Act, the reduction began when a business acquired more than $510,000 of qualifying property.



Ÿ The new law does not alter the section 179 expense limit for sport utility vehicles, which remains at $25,000.



Ÿ More than 4.5 million small businesses claimed the section 179 expense deduction for tax year 2005, the most recent year for which this information is available. These businesses placed almost $44 billion of section 179 property in service in 2005 and claimed related deductions of approximately $41 billion. (Data from Depreciation and Amortization forms filed with Forms 1040.)




Special Depreciation Allowance


Ÿ The Economic Stimulus Act also provided a 50 percent special depreciation allowance for property acquired and placed in service during 2008. Depreciation is an income tax deduction that allows a taxpayer to recover the cost or other basis of certain property over several years. It is an annual allowance for the wear and tear, deterioration or obsolescence of the property.



Ÿ Under the new law, a taxpayer is entitled to depreciate 50 percent of the adjusted basis (after subtracting any section 179 deduction taken on that property) of qualified property during the year the property is placed in service. For example , if the taxpayer purchased and placed in service in 2008 a single piece of property at a cost of $450,000 that qualified for section 179 expensing and the 50 percent special depreciation allowance, $250,000 of the cost could be immediately expensed (under section 179 ) and the remaining $200,000 of adjusted basis would be available for the 50 percent special depreciation allowance. The taxpayer would also be permitted to take regular depreciation on the remaining $100,000 of adjusted basis during that year. This is similar to the special depreciation allowance that was previously available for certain property placed in service generally before Jan. 1, 2005, often referred to as "bonus depreciation."



Ÿ The types of property that qualify for the 50 percent special depreciation allowance are section 168 property with a recovery period of 20 years or less, off-the-shelf computer software, water utility property and qualified leasehold improvement property.



Ÿ To qualify for the 50 percent special depreciation allowance, a taxpayer must meet all of the following tests:



Ÿ The taxpayer must have acquired the property after December 31, 2007, and before January 1, 2009. If a binding contract to acquire the property existed before January 1, 2008, the property does not qualify for the special depreciation allowance.



Ÿ The property must be placed in service before January 1, 2009 (before January 1, 2010, for certain transportation property and certain property with a long productions period).



Ÿ The original use of the property must begin with the taxpayer after December 31, 2007. In other words, the property must be "new" property.



Ÿ Prior to the enactment of the Economic Stimulus Act the total depreciation amount (including the section 179 deduction) a business could deduct for a passenger automobile was $2,960. The Economic Stimulus Act increased this limitation by $8,000. Therefore, the maximum limit is increased to $10,960 for automobiles for which the special bonus depreciation allowance is claimed.



Ÿ Prior to the enactment of the Economic Stimulus Act the total depreciation amount (including the section 179 deduction) a business could deduct for a truck or van used in a business and first placed in service in 2008 was $3,160. The Economic Stimulus Act increased this limitation by $8,000. The new maximum limit is increased to $11,160 for trucks and vans for which the special bonus depreciation is claimed.



Ÿ The Economic Stimulus Act is the most recent legislation that provides depreciation tax benefits. Previously, the Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002 allowed an additional first-year depreciation deduction equal to 30 percent of the adjusted basis of qualified property for property acquired on or after September 11, 2001, and generally placed in service before January 1, 2005. The Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 provided an additional first-year depreciation deduction equal to 50 percent of the adjusted basis of qualified property for property acquired after May 5, 2003 and generally placed in service before January 1, 2005.

Friday, June 13, 2008

Under IRC § 6501(a), the amount of any tax imposed by the Code shall be assessed within 3 years after the return was filed, subject to certain specified exceptions. Under IRC § 6020(b), if any person fails to make a required return or makes, willfully or otherwise, a false or fraudulent return, the Secretary is authorized to make a return from his or her own knowledge and from such information as can be obtained through testimony or otherwise. Section 6020(b)(2) provides that any return made and subscribed by the Secretary shall be prima facie good and sufficient for all legal purposes. 3



In this case, the taxpayer failed to file an employment tax return and did not submit evidence to establish that no employment tax return was due. The revenue officer determined that some of the taxpayer's workers were employees and that an employment tax return should have been filed. The revenue officer prepared returns pursuant to the authority in IRC § 6020(b)

CCA 200822026, February 26, 2008

Symbol: CC:TEGE:EOEG:ET1:LMDonis-PREF-151037-07


Uniform Issue List Nos. 6020.02-00, 7436.01-03

[ Code Secs. 6020 and 7436]






Returns prepared for or executed by secretary; Return prepared by IRS personnel; Proceedings for determination of employment status; Tax court jurisdiction; Worker classification



DATE: February 26, 2008



TO: Virginia E. Cochran, Deputy Area Counsel, (Great Lakes & Gulf Coast Area, Dallas Group) (Tax Exempt & Government Entities)



FROM: Dan E. Boeskin, Assistant Branch Chief, Employment Tax Branch 1 (Exempt Organizations/Employment Tax/Government Entities) (Tax Exempt & Government Entities)



SUBJECT: ET 6020(b) Returns by Revenue Officer Worker, PREF-151037-07



This Chief Counsel Advice responds to your request for assistance. This advice may not be used or cited as precedent.





ISSUES



Whether revenue officers have authority under IRC § 6020(b) to prepare employment tax returns in employment tax cases in which worker classification issues are present.





CONCLUSION



In employment tax cases where worker classification issues are present, revenue officers have authority under IRC § 6020(b) to prepare employment tax returns, but the requirements of IRC § 7436 must be met prior to assessment.





FACTS



We have been asked to review a memorandum which addresses the issue of whether a revenue officer has authority under IRC § 6020(b) to prepare employment tax returns on behalf of taxpayers who fail to file such returns in a case in which worker classification issues are present and where the revenue officer did not refer the case to the Employment Tax Program as required under the Internal Revenue Manual (IRM).



The facts indicate that, for the years at issue, the taxpayer took the position that certain workers were independent contractors for federal tax purposes. However, for previous years the taxpayer had treated such workers as employees. After reviewing the facts of the case, the revenue officer determined that the workers should have been treated as employees for federal tax purposes and prepared Substitute for Returns (SFRs) under IRC § 6020(b). The taxpayer objected to the preparation of the SFRs and requested an appeal. The appeals officer concluded that the worker classification issue was undeveloped and that [the revenue officer did not have the authority to prepare Forms 941 under IRC § 6020(b) procedures because the IRM requires the issue to be referred to the Employment Tax Program,] and recommended the government concede the case.





LAW AND ANALYSIS



Where there is an actual controversy involving a determination by the Secretary that one or more individuals performing services for the taxpayer are employees as part of an examination, IRC § 7436 gives the Tax Court jurisdiction to determine certain [worker classification issues] (i.e., the proper amount of the additions to tax, additional amounts, and penalties that relate to the employment tax imposed by subtitle C with respect to determinations of worker classification and whether the taxpayer is entitled to relief under § 530 of the Revenue Act of 1978). To meet the requirements of IRC § 7436, certain procedures must be followed prior to an assessment of employment taxes.



Notice 2002-5, 2002-1 C.B. 320, describes the procedures that IRC § 7436 requires. Notice 2002-5 provides generally that a taxpayer will first receive a [30-day] letter which lists the proposed employment tax adjustments to be made and describes the taxpayer's right either to agree to the proposed adjustments or to protest the proposed adjustments to the Appeals function of the Service (Appeals) within 30 days of the date of the letter. If the taxpayer does not respond to the [30-day] letter by agreeing to the proposed adjustments or by filing a protest to Appeals, the taxpayer will receive a Notice of Determination of Worker Classification (NDWC). 1 The taxpayer may also receive the NDWC if the taxpayer files a protest with Appeals and the worker classification issues are not settled in Appeals.



Notice 2002-5 further provides that under IRC § 7436(d)(1), the mailing of the NDWC suspends the period of limitations for assessment of taxes attributable to the worker classification issues for the 90-day period during which the taxpayer can bring suit 2 and precludes the Service from assessing the taxes identified in the NDWC prior to the expiration of the 90-day period during which the taxpayer may file a timely Tax Court petition. If the Service erroneously makes an assessment of taxes attributable to the worker classification issues without first either issuing a NDWC or obtaining a waiver of restrictions on assessment from the taxpayer, the taxpayer is entitled to an automatic abatement of the assessment. However, once any such procedural defects are corrected, the Service may reassess the employment taxes to the same extent as if the abated assessment had not occurred.



A taxpayer may settle the worker classification issues either before issuance of the NDWC or after issuance of the NDWC but before expiration of the 90-day period for filing a Tax Court petition. To settle the worker classification issues, the taxpayer must formally waive the restrictions on assessment contained in IRC §§ 7436(d) and 6213(a). If the taxpayer does not settle or file a Tax Court petition before the ninety-first day after the NDWC is mailed, the employment taxes identified in the NDWC shall thereafter be assessed.



Under IRC § 6501(a), the amount of any tax imposed by the Code shall be assessed within 3 years after the return was filed, subject to certain specified exceptions. Under IRC § 6020(b), if any person fails to make a required return or makes, willfully or otherwise, a false or fraudulent return, the Secretary is authorized to make a return from his or her own knowledge and from such information as can be obtained through testimony or otherwise. Section 6020(b)(2) provides that any return made and subscribed by the Secretary shall be prima facie good and sufficient for all legal purposes. 3



In this case, the taxpayer failed to file an employment tax return and did not submit evidence to establish that no employment tax return was due. The revenue officer determined that some of the taxpayer's workers were employees and that an employment tax return should have been filed. The revenue officer prepared returns pursuant to the authority in IRC § 6020(b). 4



Because the revenue officer failed to meet the requirements of IRC § 7436, an assessment of employment taxes based on the IRC § 6020(b) return prepared by the revenue officer in this case is improper. However, the facts in this case do not indicate that the government is required to concede the case. Notice 2002-5 provides that once the procedural defects are corrected and the requirements of IRC § 7436 are met, employment taxes may thereafter be assessed.



In employment tax cases where worker classification issues are present, revenue officers have authority under IRC § 6020(b) to prepare employment tax returns, but the requirements of IRC § 7436 must be met prior to assessment.



This writing may contain privileged information. Any unauthorized disclosure of this writing may undermine our ability to protect the privileged information. If disclosure is determined to be necessary, please contact this office for our views.



Please call (202) 622-0047 if you have any further questions.


1 The NDWC is a jurisdictional prerequisite for seeking Tax Court review under IRC § 7436.

2 If the taxpayer does file a timely petition in Tax Court, the period of limitations for assessment is suspended until 60 days after the decision of the Tax Court becomes final.

3 Note, however, that IRC § 6501(b)(3) provides that notwithstanding IRC § 6020(b), the execution of a return by the Secretary pursuant to such section shall not start the running of the period of limitations on assessment and collection.

4 Delegation Order Number 182 specifically gives Revenue Officers the authority to prepare returns pursuant to IRC § 6020(b). In addition, Revenue Procedure 77-13, 1977-1 C.B. 570, specifically discusses the preparation of IRC § 6020(b) returns by Revenue Officers.

Labels:

Thursday, June 12, 2008

Section 7433. Taxpayer failed to allege that he suffered any actual, direct economic damages from the unlawful collection activities as required by Code Sec. 7433. He also failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Moreover, since tapayer was the only "taxpayer", as defined by Code Sec. 7433, neither his wife nor his corporations could maintain an action for unauthorized collection activities.



Mark A. Krasemann; Beth Krasemann; Krasemann Vision Centers, Inc.; Krasemann Eye Center, Inc., Plaintiffs vs. the United States of America; and Abe Reyes, Defendants.

U.S. District Court, Dist. Ariz.; CV07-2599-PHX-NVW, May 29, 2008.

[ Code Secs. 7421 and 7426]

Collection of taxes: Wrongful levy: Anti-Injunction Act: Judicial exceptions. --
A federal district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over claims for damages and injunctive relief relating to an IRS lien and levy made by a doctor, his wife and his two corporations. All claims for injunctive relief were barred by the Anti-Injunction Act (AJA). The Code Sec. 6330 exception did not apply because the doctor requested a Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing under Code Sec. 6320, which does not suspend collection actions pending a hearing, and the other claimants did not request CDP hearings at all. Moreover, the judicially created exception to the AJA did not apply because the claimants failed to allege an irreparable injury or that the government could not prevail. Similarly, the conversion claims were specifically barred by the Federal Tort Claims Act and the claimants failed to prove the bar did not apply. However, the doctor's wife and one corporation properly stated claims for wrongful levy under Code Sec. 7426.










ORDER


Pending before the court are the United States' Motion to Dismiss (doc. #37) and Plaintiffs' Petition for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction (doc. #38).




The United States' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #37)


The United States' Motion to Dismiss seeks dismissal of all of Plaintiffs' claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction except for Plaintiff Beth Krasemann's and Plaintiff Krasemann Eye Center, Inc.'s claims against the United States under 26 U.S.C. §7426 for wrongful levy. Although Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint for Wrongful Tax Levy and Application for Preliminary and Permanent Injunction includes a brief listing of statutes that they assert confer jurisdiction upon the court, it makes no attempt to connect specific parties, claims, and factual allegations to any of those statutes. The motion to dismiss moves for dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but much of the United States' motion requires the court to find Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted before concluding that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiffs have failed to plead a claim for which the United States has waived its sovereign immunity. "[W]hen a statute provides the basis for both the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal court and the plaintiff's substantive claim for relief, a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction rather than for failure to state a claim is proper only when the allegations of the complaint are frivolous." Black v. Payne, 591 F.2d 83, 86 n.1 (9th Cir. 1979) (quoting Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 602 (9th Cir. 1976) and affirming dismissal as for failure to state a claim and as judgment on the merits). The court does not decide in this Order whether the allegations of the complaint are frivolous, but decides the motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) where appropriate and under Rule 12(b)(6) where appropriate.



I. Legal Standards for Dismissal Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6)

To avoid dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007) (citations and footnote omitted).

A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) may either attack the allegations of the complaint ("a facial attack") or be made as a "speaking motion" attacking the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact ("a factual attack"). Thornhill Pub. Co. v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979). Although Defendants contend the court should not presume Plaintiffs' allegations to be true when they challenge the veracity of the jurisdictional facts underlying Plaintiffs' complaint, their motion is a facial attack, not a factual attack, and the court does not need to resolve any factual issues to decide the jurisdictional questions.

For the purposes of deciding issues under Rule 12(b)(1), the court presumes Plaintiffs' factual allegations to be true, and the motion will be granted only if Plaintiffs have not set forth the elements necessary for subject matter jurisdiction. See Doe v. Schachter, 804 F. Supp. 53, 57 (N.D. Cal. 1992). After construing the factual allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the court will dismiss a claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction if: (1) the claim does not arise under federal law or the Constitution; (2) there is no case or controversy; or (3) the cause of action is not described in any jurisdictional statute. Id. (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962)). Plaintiffs bear the burden of proving the court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994).

Sovereign immunity limits subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts, and the United States, as sovereign, can be sued only to the extent it has waived its sovereign immunity. Vacek v. U.S. Postal Serv., 447 F.3d 1248, 1250 (9th Cir. 2006). The scope of a waiver of sovereign immunity must be strictly construed in favor of the sovereign. Id. Further, the absence of immunity does not confer subject matter jurisdiction. Alvarado v. Table Mountain Rancheria, 509 F.3d 1008, 1016 (9th Cir. 2007). To establish subject matter authority against a sovereign, the party asserting jurisdiction must prove statutory authority vests a district court with subject matter jurisdiction in addition to proving waiver of sovereign immunity Id.



II. Background

Plaintiff Mark Krasemann is an optometrist who in 2007 entered into a settlement agreement with the Internal Revenue Service of the United States ("IRS") for his personal income tax liabilities for tax years 1999 through 2002. To collect amounts Mark Krasemann stipulated were due, the IRS levied Beth Krasemann's wages and Krasemann Eye Center, Inc.'s accounts receivable. Based on the First Amended Complaint, the court assumes the following facts to be true for the purpose of deciding the motion to dismiss.

Krasemann Vision Centers, Inc., and Krasemann Eye Center, Inc., are corporations doing business in Mesa, Arizona. Plaintiffs have not pled when these entities were incorporated, filed tax returns, or paid taxes.

On November 1, 2003, Mark Krasemann and Beth Krasemann signed a property settlement agreement, which was recorded on November 14, 2003. Plaintiffs allege that, as a result of the agreement, Beth Krasemann's wages are not community property.

On December 1, 2005, and March 14, 2006, Revenue Officer Abe Reyes sent materials to James J. Everett, Plaintiffs' counsel in this action, with cover letters stating they were sent to Everett under the provisions of a power of attorney or other authorization on file with the IRS for Mark Krasemann. On April 28, 2006, Everett submitted to the IRS two copies of Form 2848, Power of Attorney, on which Mark Krasemann appointed Everett to represent Krasemann Vision Centers, Inc., and Mark Krasemann before the IRS with respect to specific tax matters identified on the forms.

On May 15, 2007, the United States Tax Court entered decisions pursuant to an agreement between Mark Krasemann and the IRS for Mark Krasemann's personal income tax liabilities for tax years 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002. On July 13, 2007, Reyes contacted Mark Krasemann at Krasemann's office. According to Krasemann, Reyes erroneously informed him that neither Mark Krasemann nor Krasemann Vision Centers, Inc., were represented by Everett, and Reyes threatened and coerced Mark Krasemann to discuss tax matters for both Mark Krasemann individually and Krasemann Vision Centers, Inc. Plaintiffs allege that Reyes "untruthfully asserted that Dr. Krasemann advised Officer Reyes that he was operating Krasemann Eye Center, Inc., as a sole proprietorship."

On August 21, 2007, the IRS issued a Notice of Federal Tax Lien Filing and Your Right to a Hearing Under IRC 6320 to Mark Krasemann, which indicated the IRS had filed with the County Recorder a Notice of Federal Tax Lien on 8/21/2007 and included a copy of the Notice of Federal Tax Lien. The Notice states the amounts owed by Mark Krasemann for 1040 taxes were $21,671.38 for the tax period ending 12/31/1999, $33,743.96 for the tax period ending 12/31/2000, $43,131.38 for the tax period ending 12/31/2001, and $41,868.98 for the tax period ending 12/31/2002, for a total of $140,415.62. The date of assessment for each of the tax periods is 6/25/2007.

On August 30, 2007, Everett submitted a Request for a Collection Due Process or Equivalent Hearing on behalf of Mark Krasemann. The basis for the hearing request is indicated as "Filed Notice of Federal Tax Lien."

On September 3 and 10, 2007, the IRS notified Mark Krasemann that it intended to levy for interest he owed for 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002 taxes. On each of the four notices, no amount is printed after the words "Current Balance," but an amount is entered after "Interest." The total of the "Interest" amounts is $2,204.42.

On September 17, 2007, the IRS issued a Notice of Levy to Vision Service Plan, which identified the taxpayer as Mark Krasemann d/b/a "Drasemann [sic] Eye Center Inc." The notice identified amounts owed as Form 1040 tax for tax periods ending 12/31/1999, 12/31/2000, 12/31/2001, and 12/31/2002, which totaled $177,475.25. Approximately $7,366.40 was levied. Plaintiffs allege this levy was issued without proper due diligence and confirmation regarding whether Krasemann Eye Center, Inc., was a sole proprietorship or corporation and whether it was the correct taxpaying entity.

On September 17, 2007, the IRS also issued a Notice of Levy on Wages, Salary, and Other Income on CIGNA HealthCare of AZ, Inc., which identified the taxpayer as Mark Krasemann. The notice identified amounts owed as Form 1040 tax for tax periods ending 12/31/1999, 12/31/2000, 12/31/2001, and 12/31/2002, which totaled $177,475.25. The notice also stated, "Note: This levy attaches to the 1/2 community property interest of Mark A Kraseman [sic] on the wages of Beth A Krasemann." In the section to be completed by the taxpayer, Beth Krasemann is identified as the taxpayer, and a box is checked indicating that her filing status for her income tax return is "Married Filing a Joint Return."

With a cover letter dated September 25, 2007, Everett sent a check from Mark Krasemann to the IRS in the amount of $2,204.42.

On October 22, 2007, the IRS issued a second Notice of Levy on Wages, Salary, and Other Income on CIGNA HealthCare of AZ, Inc., which identified the taxpayer as Mark Krasemann. The notice states the total amount due is $170,108.87. As of the date the First Amended Complaint was filed, approximately $1,404.59 of Beth Krasemann's wages had been levied.

By letter dated November 8, 2007, Everett notified the IRS Appeals Office that the Krasemanns had executed a property settlement agreement through which the parties agreed that wages earned during their marriage are characterized as separate property, and therefore Beth Krasemann's wages should not be subject to the separate income tax liability of Mark Krasemann. Everett requested immediate release of the levy on Beth Krasemann's wages, but the Appeals Officer declined to do so.



By letter dated December 6, 2007, Everett notified the IRS Director of Collections for the Western Area that approximately $8,334.12 had been wrongfully levied from assets of Krasemann Vision Centers, Inc., 1 and Beth Krasemann's wages, and their fees for services rendered as a result of the levies was approximately $35,500.00. Plaintiffs allege Everett's December 6, 2007 letter constitutes a formal administrative claim for damages as a result of wrongful tax levies pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §7433's requirement that a taxpayer exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing suit.

On December 19, 2007, Krasemann Vision Centers, Inc., filed a bankruptcy petition, which Plaintiffs refer to in their response to the motion to dismiss, but did not mention in their Complaint or First Amended Complaint.

On December 21, 2007, Plaintiffs Mark Krasemann, Beth Krasemann, Krasemann Vision Centers, Inc., and Krasemann Eye Center, Inc., commenced this litigation against the United States and IRS Revenue Officer Reyes. On March 6, 2008, the IRS issued a Release of Levy/Release of Property from Levy, releasing the Levy on Beth Krasemann's wages.

On March 18, 2008, Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint for Wrongful Tax Levy and Application for Preliminary and Permanent Injunction (doc. #22), alleging six counts:


Count I: Revenue Officer Reyes Engaged in Harassing and Embarrassing Ex-Parte Communication with a Party Known to Be Represented by Counsel and Misstated and Mischaracterized the Substance of the Communications



Count II: Illegally Issued Federal Tax Levy on Vision Service Plan



Count III: Illegally Issued Federal Tax Levy on the Income of Beth Krasemann



Count IV: Revenue Officer Abe Reyes Acted Outside the Scope of His Employment and as Such Should Be Personally Liable for His Harassing, Unethical, and Illegal Actions



Count V: Conversion



Count VI: Application for Preliminary and Permanent Injunction


Plaintiffs request a hearing on their application for a preliminary injunction "enjoining the Defendant and its agents from levying Plaintiffs' wages or other property of the Plaintiffs until further order of the Court" and an order "[p]ermanently enjoining the Defendant and its agents from levying or seizing upon Plaintiffs' property." To justify injunctive relief, Plaintiffs allege the following:


Defendants' levies on Plaintiff Krasemann Eye Center, Inc., and on Plaintiff Beth Krasemann's wages cause, and would continue to cause, irreparable injury. If said levies are not removed, Plaintiff Dr. Mark Krasemann will continue to be unable to pay himself a salary, will be unable to pay his employees, and will lose his business, as well as his job. Additionally, Plaintiff Dr. Krasemann will be unable to afford suitable living quarters for himself, his wife and their two minor children, and Plaintiffs, Dr. Krasemann and Beth Krasemann, will be unable to live and pay their reasonably ordinary and necessary living expenses. Plaintiffs' real property, as well as Plaintiff Dr. Mark Krasemann's job, are both unique and cannot be duplicated or the loss fully compensated by a damage award.


(Doc. #22 at 15, ¶XXIX.) In their Petition for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, Plaintiffs acknowledge the levies have been released. (Doc. #38 at 2.)

In both their April 24, 2008 response to the motion to dismiss and April 18, 2008 petition for injunctive relief, Plaintiffs allege that on March 4, 2008, Reyes served a summons on JP Morgan Chase Bank for records of Krasemann Vision Centers, Inc., and Krasemann Eye Center, Inc., and that the summons demonstrates "continuing illegal collection action" and violates the automatic stay afforded to bankruptcy debtor Krasemann Vision Centers, Inc. (nka CVK, Inc.) by 11 U.S.C. §362(a). (Doc. ## 40 at 3 n.1, 38-2 at 3 n.1, 9.) In CVK, Inc.'s bankruptcy case, on May 2, 2008, the debtor informed that court that Reyes withdrew the summons for bank records as a result of CVK, Inc.'s April 10, 2008 motion for contempt against Reyes filed in Case No. BK-07-6949.

On April 8, 2008, Krasemann Eye Center, Inc., filed a Petition to Quash Summons in separate action, Case No. MC-08-39-PHX-FJM. On April 22, 2008, Krasemann Eye Center, Inc., filed notice that the IRS summons to JP Morgan Chase Bank had been cancelled on April 21, 2008. That case was terminated on May 8, 2008, by an order finding the parties had resolved the entire dispute and dismissing the case as moot. (Doc. #12 in MC-08-39-PHX-FJM.)

Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendant United States' Response to Plaintiffs' Petition for Temporary Order filed May 8, 2008, does not correct their previous representation that the IRS bank records summons demonstrates continuing collection activity. In fact, the Reply expressly states, "As Plaintiffs have demonstrated in their Petition for Temporary Restraining Order and Memorandum in Support thereof, injunctive relief is necessary to stop Defendant, Revenue Officer Reyes from engaging in continued wrongful collection action." (Doc. #46 at 5-6.)

On May 21, 2008, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Arizona, Case No. BK-07-6949, granted the Trustee's Motion to Dismiss CVK, Inc.'s bankruptcy case upon finding: "The debtor is a defunct corporation in which it and its principal are involved in a United States District Court action with the IRS. The debtor has no assets and because it is a corporation it is not entitled to a chapter 7 discharge."



III. Statutory Authorization for the Court's Subject Matter Jurisdiction

A. Waiver of Sovereign Immunity by the United States

Because Plaintiffs have alleged both tax-related claims and tort claims, the court must determine whether the United States has waived its sovereign immunity for each of the types. First, under 28 U.S.C. §1346(a)(1), the district courts have original jurisdiction of "[a]ny civil action against the United States for recovery of any internalrevenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority or any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected under the internal-revenue laws." Second, under 28 U.S.C. §1346(b)(1), the district courts have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States for money damages for injury to or loss of property or personal injury caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any federal employee while acting within the scope of his office or employment.

B. Tax-Related Actions by Taxpayers

A taxpayer may bring a civil action for damages against the United States in a United States district court under 26 U.S.C. §7433 or §7432. A taxpayer may bring an action under §7433(a) if, in connection with any collection of federal tax with respect to the taxpayer, any officer or employee of the Internal Revenue Service disregards any provision of the Internal Revenue Code or regulations promulgated under the Internal Revenue Code. 26 U.S.C. §7433(a). "[S]uch civil action shall be the exclusive remedy for recovering damages resulting from such actions" except as provided in §7432. Id. A taxpayer may bring an action under §7432 for actual, direct damages sustained by the taxpayer if any officer or employee of the Internal Revenue Service knowingly, or by reason of negligence, fails to release a lien under §6325 on the taxpayer's property. 26 U.S.C. §7432(a), (b)(1). The parties agree Plaintiff Mark Krasemann is the only "taxpayer" in this lawsuit, and Plaintiffs do not request relief under §7432.

C. Tax-Related Actions by Non-Taxpayers

"If a levy has been made on property . . ., any person (other than the person against whom is assessed the tax out of which such levy arose) who claims an interest in or lien on such property and that such property was wrongfully levied upon may bring a civil action against the United States in a district court of the United States." 26 U.S.C. §7426(a)(1). The parties agree that under §7426(a)(1) Beth Krasemann is permitted to sue the United States to challenge the levy of her CIGNA wages and Krasemann Eye Center, Inc., is permitted to sue the United States to challenge the levy of its Vision Service Plan accounts receivable.

Relief for an action brought under §7426(a)(1) includes a judgment for the amount of money levied upon and an injunction to prohibit the enforcement of a levy or to prohibit a sale that would irreparably injure rights in property that the court determines to be superior to right of the United States in such property. 26 U.S.C. §7426(b)(1), (b)(2). Section 7426(d) expressly prohibits an action against any officer or employee of the United States with respect to any acts for which an action could be maintained under this section.

D. Prohibition of Suits to Restrain Assessment or Collection

The Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. §7421, provides that "no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person, whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax was assessed," except as provided in specific statutes, including §§7426(a) and (b)(1). The statute also prohibits actions for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of the amount of liability of a transferee of property of a taxpayer in respect of any internal revenue tax. 26 U.S.C. §7421(b)(1).

E. Tort Claims

Under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), the United States waives its immunity for suits alleging certain common law torts by federal officials acting within the scope of their employment. 28 U.S.C. §2674. Under the FTCA, a claimant may not institute an action until after presenting a claim to the appropriate federal agency and receiving a final denial of the claim. 28 U.S.C. §2675(a). The remedy against the United States provided by 28 U.S.C. §1346(b) for injury arising from the negligent or wrongful act of any federal employee while acting within the scope of his employment is exclusive of any other civil action for money damages against the employee whose act gave rise to the claim. 28 U.S.C. §2679(b). Any civil action for money damages arising out of the same subject matter against the employee is precluded unless the action is for a constitutional violation or authorized under a different statute. Id. Waiver of sovereign immunity under §1346(b) does not apply to any claim arising out of the assessment or collection of any tax except for a claim based on injury or loss of goods, merchandise, or other property while in the possession of a federal officer. 28 U.S.C. §2680(c).



IV. Analysis

The United States and IRS Revenue Officer Abe Reyes move for (a) dismissal of all claims against Reyes, (b) dismissal of all claims against the United States except for Krasemann Eye Center, Inc.'s and Beth Krasemann's §7426 wrongful levy claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, (c) denial of injunctive relief until a time after the parties have completed discovery, and (d) award of costs and fees. As explained above, Plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing the court's subject matter jurisdiction, and to establish subject matter authority against the United States, Plaintiffs must also prove waiver of sovereign immunity. In order to prove subject matter jurisdiction and waiver of sovereign immunity for any of their claims, Plaintiffs must allege facts that actually state a claim. Although the First Amended Complaint does not identify which claims are alleged by which Plaintiffs against which Defendant, Plaintiffs argue in their response to the motion to dismiss that Defendants err by grouping all Plaintiffs in the same category. For the sake of clarity, the court will analyze whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction over claims by each Plaintiff against each Defendant.

A. Claims Against the United States


1. Claims by Mark Krasemann


The First Amended Complaint does not state any claims by Mark Krasemann against the United States. He stipulated to the amounts he owes the IRS, Plaintiffs claim none of the assets levied were his property, and Plaintiffs assert that the IRS applied the levied monies as payment towards Mark Krasemann's separate tax liability, and thus, Mark Krasemann does not have a conversion claim. Further, Plaintiffs acknowledge Mark Krasemann may not sue the United States under 26 U.S.C. §7426, which permits a wrongful levy action by someone other than the person against whom the tax is assessed.

Regarding unauthorized collection actions, the parties agree Mark Krasemann is the only "taxpayer" under the statutes relevant to this lawsuit, and therefore he is the only one permitted to bring a civil action under 26 U.S.C. §7433(a) for damages against the United States. Under §7433(b)(1), damages are limited to "actual, direct economic damages sustained by the plaintiff as a proximate result of the reckless or intentional or negligent actions of the officer or employee." Plaintiffs have not alleged Mark Krasemann sustained any actual, direct economic damages proximately caused by any unauthorized collection actions.

Section 7433(a) provides that, except as provided in §7432, a civil action under §7333 is the exclusive remedy for recovering damages if, "in connection with any collection of Federal tax with respect to a taxpayer, any officer or employee of the Internal Revenue Service recklessly or intentionally, or by reason of negligence disregards any provision of [Title 26] or any regulation promulgated under [Title 26]." Because §7432 does not apply, and Plaintiffs have affirmatively stated they do not seek relief under §7432, Mark Krasemann's exclusive remedy for damages against the United States is an action under §7433.

Section 7433(d)(1) requires that administrative remedies be exhausted. Although the First Amended Complaint alleges "Plaintiffs have exhausted their administrative remedies" by submitting a written damage claim pursuant to Treas. Reg. 301-7433-1(e) on December 6, 2007, they now contend in response to the motion to dismiss that the exhaustion requirement applies only to Mark Krasemann because he is the only taxpayer, and Beth Krasemann's and Krasemann Eye Center, Inc.'s claims arise under §7426, which does not require exhaustion of administrative remedies. Treas. Reg. 301-7433-1(a) expressly provides, "An action for damages filed in federal district court may not be maintained unless the taxpayer has filed an administrative claim pursuant to paragraph (e) of this section, and has waited for the period required under paragraph (d) of this section." Paragraph (d) provides that no action shall be maintained in any federal district court before the earlier of a decision on the administrative claim or six months after the administrative claim was filed except if the administrative claim is filed within the last six months of the two-year limitations period. Plaintiffs concede they initiated this action only fifteen days after submitting their administrative claim.

Plaintiffs argue an exception to the exhaustion requirement applies because they "have clearly demonstrated continuous requests for relief from Revenue Officer Reyes' wrongful collection action were futile and the Plaintiffs' interest in immediate judicial review outweigh[s] the government's interest in the efficiency or administrative autonomy that the exhaustion doctrine is designed to further." However, the cases Plaintiffs cite do not support their argument. See Glass v. United States, 424 F. Supp. 2d 224, 227-29 (D.D.C. 2006) (exhaustion requirement of §7433 is jurisdictional); Amato v. Bernard, 618 F.2d 559, 566-69 (9th Cir. 1980) (although ERISA text nowhere mentions the exhaustion doctrine, federal courts have authority to enforce the exhaustion requirement in ERISA suits, and as a matter of sound policy, they usually should do so except when "resort to the administrative route is futile or the remedy inadequate"). Even if an exception to §7433's express exhaustion requirement were permitted, Plaintiffs have not shown that compliance with the procedures established in Treas. Reg. 301.7433-1(e) would have been futile. Therefore, Plaintiffs have failed to state any claim or prove subject matter jurisdiction over any claim by Mark Krasemann against the United States for damages resulting from wrongful tax collection.

Plaintiffs also have failed to state any claim or prove subject matter jurisdiction over any claim by Mark Krasemann against the United States for injunctive relief. Plaintiffs acknowledge that §7421 prohibits suits for injunctive relief restraining the assessment or collection of any tax except under specific statutes and that Mark Krasemann may not seek injunctive relief under §7426 because that section authorizes actions by persons other than taxpayers. Instead, Plaintiffs argue that Mark Krasemann's and Krasemann Vision Centers, Inc.'s claims fall within a different exception to §7421, i.e., §6330(e). But the First Amended Complaint refers to §6330 only regarding the levy against Krasemann Eye Center, Inc.'s accounts receivable. Although §6330(e)(1) provides that "levy actions which are the subject of a requested hearing . . . shall be suspended for the period during which such hearing, and appeals therein, are pending," the only hearing Mark Krasemann requested expressly regarded the notice of filing federal tax liens, not levy actions, and was requested pursuant to §6320, not §6330. Section 6320 does not suspend any proceedings pending hearing. Plaintiffs do not allege that any of them filed a request for Collection Due Process Hearing regarding the notices of levy or that it would have been proper for Mark Krasemann individually to have requested a levy hearing since the levied assets did not belong to him. Thus, the §6330(e) exception to §7421 does not apply to Mark Krasemann individually or to any of the Plaintiffs.



Plaintiffs also argue they fall within a judicially created exception to §7421 defined in Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation, Co., 370 U.S. 1, 7 (1962):


The manifest purpose of §7421(a) is to permit the United States to assess and collect taxes alleged to be due without judicial intervention, and to require that the legal right to the disputed sums be determined in a suit for refund. In this manner the United States is assured of prompt collection of its lawful revenue. Nevertheless, if it is clear that under no circumstances could the Government ultimately prevail, the central purpose of the Act is inapplicable and . . . the attempted collection may be enjoined if equity jurisdiction otherwise exists.



We believe that the question of whether the Government has a chance of ultimately prevailing is to be determined on the basis of the information available to it at the time of suit. Only if it is then apparent that, under the most liberal view of the law and the facts, the United States cannot establish its claim, may the suit for an injunction be maintained. Otherwise, the District Court is without jurisdiction, and the complaint must be dismissed.... Thus, in general, the Act prohibits suits for injunctions barring the collection of federal taxes when the collecting officers have made the assessment and claim that it is valid.


Even assuming all of Plaintiffs' factual allegations to be true, this exception could not apply to Mark Krasemann because he admits his tax liability and has no cause of action for alleged violations of internal IRS procedures.

Therefore, Plaintiffs have failed to state any claim and failed to prove the court has subject matter jurisdiction over any claim by Mark Krasemann against the United States.


2. Claims by Beth Krasemann


Plaintiffs concede Beth Krasemann may not seek relief under §7433. Further, Plaintiffs do not identify any statute that provides the court with subject matter jurisdiction over conversion claims by any of the Plaintiffs against the United States. If they intended to bring a conversion claim under the FTCA, they failed to address why 28 U.S.C. §2680(c)'s explicit bar on claims "arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any tax" does not prohibit conversion claims by all of the Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs argue instead that their conversion claim should not be dismissed because Reyes was acting outside the scope of his employment and therefore 28 U.S.C. §2679(b)(1) does not exclude it. This argument, coupled with a complete failure to allege any basis for a claim against the United States, concedes lack of subject matter jurisdiction over any conversion claim against the United States.

Defendants acknowledge the court has subject matter jurisdiction over any claims by Beth Krasemann against the United States under §7426 for wrongful levy based on the IRS levy on her CIGNA wages for taxes owed by Mark Krasemann. Plaintiffs do not allege or argue any other basis for claims by Beth Krasemann against the United States. Therefore, Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim and failed to prove the court has subject matter jurisdiction over any claim by Beth Krasemann against the United States except for a §7426(a)(1) claim for wrongful levy, which the United States acknowledged in its motion to dismiss.

Although Beth Krasemann has stated a claim for recovering amounts wrongfully levied pursuant to §7426(a)(1) and (b)(2)(B), she has not alleged a basis for injunctive relief to prevent irreparable injury to property rights under §7426(b)(1) or under the Enochs v. Williams Packing exception to §7421's prohibition of injunctive relief. The court cannot conclude that "under no circumstances could the Government ultimately prevail" against Beth Krasemann. The United States may be able to prove the Krasemanns' actions invalidated their 2003 marital property agreement and its enforceability against the United States or that it is ineffective as against community debts existing before the agreement was made. Thus, under some circumstances, the United States may prevail on Beth Krasemann's §7426 claim for wrongful levy.


3. Claims by Krasemann Eye Center, Inc.


As explained above, Plaintiffs concede Krasemann Eye Center, Inc., does not have a §7433 claim or a conversion claim against the United States. In Count II (Illegally Issued Federal Tax Levy on Vision Service Plan), Plaintiffs allege that the IRS levy on Krasemann Eye Center, Inc.'s Vision Service Plan accounts receivable violated Mark Krasemann's due process rights because he had filed a Request for Collection Due Process or Equivalent Hearing for a Notice of Tax Lien and the IRS should have suspended its levy action until the requested hearing was completed. However, Mark Krasemann's hearing request was made under §6320, which does not suspend collection proceedings. Plaintiffs also allege that the levy was improper because Krasemann Eye Center, Inc., is "a separate and distinct taxpayer and taxpaying entity." If Mark Krasemann and Krasemann Eye Center, Inc., are distinct, Count II does not allege a constitutional due process violation on behalf of either party because Mark Krasemann requested the hearing regarding a tax lien on his property and Krasemann Eye Center, Inc., did not request a hearing regarding the IRS levy of its assets.

Therefore, Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim and failed to prove the court has subject matter jurisdiction over any claim by Krasemann Eye Center, Inc., against the United States except under §7426(a)(1) for wrongful levy based on the IRS levy on its Vision Service Plan accounts receivable, which the United States acknowledged in its motion to dismiss. Although Krasemann Eye Center, Inc., has stated a claim for recovering amounts wrongfully levied pursuant to §7426(a)(1) and (b)(2)(B), it has not alleged a basis for injunctive relief to prevent irreparable injury to property rights under §7426(b)(1) or under the Enochs v. Williams Packing exception to §7421's prohibition of injunctive relief. The court cannot conclude that "under no circumstances could the Government ultimately prevail" against Krasemann Eye Center, Inc. The United States may be able to prove Mark Krasemann transferred his individual assets to Krasemann Eye Center, Inc., incorporated in March 2006, for the purpose of avoiding his individual federal tax obligations for tax years 1999-2002. Thus, under some circumstances, the United States may prevail on Krasemann Eye Center, Inc.'s §7426 claim for wrongful levy.


4. Claims by Krasemann Vision Centers, Inc .


As explained above, Plaintiffs concede Krasemann Vision Center, Inc., does not have a §7433 claim or a conversion claim against the United States.

The First Amended Complaint does not allege that the IRS levied upon or wrongfully collected from any assets of Krasemann Vision Centers, Inc. It does not allege that any IRS notices were issued to Krasemann Vision Centers, Inc., or that Krasemann Vision Centers, Inc., requested any hearing from the IRS. The only allegations regarding Krasemann Vision Centers, Inc., pled by Plaintiffs are (1) Everett submitted a Form 2848 to represent Krasemann Vision Centers, Inc., before the IRS regarding specific tax matters and (2) on July 13, 2007, Reyes erroneously informed Mark Krasemann that Everett did not represent Krasemann Vision Centers, Inc., and coerced Krasemann to discuss tax matters regarding Krasemann Vision Centers, Inc. On the allegations of the First Amended Complaint, therefore, Krasemann Vision Centers, Inc., has pled only Count I: Revenue Officer Reyes engaged in harassing and embarrassing ex-parte communication with a party known to be represented by counsel and misstated and mischaracterized the substance of the communications.

In their response to the motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs do not contend that Krasemann Vision Centers, Inc., has claims for damages against the United States for wrongful collections, wrongful levy, or conversion. Plaintiffs argue only that Krasemann Vision Centers, Inc., falls within the §6330(e) exception to §7421's general prohibition of restraints on tax collection because Plaintiffs had requested a hearing and is entitled to bring a wrongful levy action against the United States. However, Krasemann Vision Centers, Inc., never requested a hearing, never was subject to a tax lien or levy, and asserts no statutory authority under which it may sue the United States for "harassing and embarrassing ex-parte communication" by an IRS revenue officer. Plaintiffs do not allege any facts that would suggest Krasemann Vision Centers, Inc., needs injunctive relief.

Thus, Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim and failed to prove the court has subject matter jurisdiction over any claim by Krasemann Vision Centers, Inc., against the United States.

The only claims against the United States Plaintiffs can pursue in this action, therefore, are Beth Krasemann's and Krasemann's Eye Center, Inc.'s §7426(a) wrongful levy claims. The only relief they may seek is a judgment under §7426(b)(2)(B) for the amount of money levied upon.

B. Claims Against Revenue Officer Abe Reyes

Two of the six counts pled in the First Amended Complaint are asserted against Reyes personally. 2 Count I is titled, "Revenue Officer Reyes Engaged in Harassing and Embarrassing Ex-Parte Communication with a Party Known to Be Represented by Counsel and Misstated and Mischaracterized the Substance of the Communications." Count IV is titled, "Revenue Officer Abe Reyes Acted Outside the Scope of His Employment and as Such Should Be Personally Liable for His Harassing, Unethical, and Illegal Actions." Plaintiffs allege Reyes abused his position as a Revenue Officer, disregarded the rules and procedures contained in the Internal Revenue Manual and the Internal Revenue Code, and continues to be harassing, unethical, and illegal with respect to Plaintiffs. The only relief sought that appears to apply to Reyes is holding him in contempt for illegal collection activity.



If any IRS officer or employee recklessly, intentionally, or negligently disregards any provision of the Internal Revenue Code or regulation in connection with any collection of federal tax with respect to a taxpayer, the exclusive remedy for recovering damages is a civil action for damages brought by the taxpayer in federal district court against the United States, not the officer or employee. 26 U.S.C. §7433(a). Plaintiffs may not bring a claim under the FTCA because the FTCA excludes claims arising out of tax collections, Plaintiffs did not exhaust their administrative remedies, and they may not bring a claim against a federal employee for money damages for a negligent or wrongful act while acting within the scope of his employment unless the action involves a constitutional violation or is authorized under a different statute. 28 U.S.C. §§2675(a), 2680(c), 2679(b). Even if Reyes' alleged conduct constituted a constitutional violation, Bivens relief for personal liability of government officials is not available for alleged constitutional violations by IRS officials involved in the process of assessing and collecting taxes. Adams v. Johnson, 355 F.3d 1179, 1186 (9th Cir. 2004).

For purposes of the motion to dismiss, the court is not required to accept Plaintiffs' legal assertion that Reyes acted outside the scope of his employment, but if even if the court were to agree with legal conclusion, Plaintiffs still would be lacking any authority establishing the court's subject matter jurisdiction over their claims against Reyes personally. They have cited no authority that claims for "harassing and embarrassing exparte communication" and "harassing, unethical, and illegal actions" arise under federal law or the United States Constitution or that any statute grants the court jurisdiction over such claims against Reyes personally.

Thus, whether Reyes acted within or outside the scope of his employment, Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim and failed to prove the court has subject matter jurisdiction over any claim against Reyes personally. In any event, it is plain to a legal certainty that Reyes' alleged acts were within the scope of his employment, and Plaintiffs' conclusory allegation to the contrary is frivolous.

C. Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs

Defendants request award of costs and fees, but do not provide authority and justification for such an award. Therefore, the court will deny the request at this time without prejudice. Aspects of the dismissed claims are objectively frivolous. The United States is not precluded from seeking award of attorneys' fees at the conclusion of this case.




Plaintiffs' Petition for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction





(Doc. #38)


In addition to their Application for Preliminary and Permanent Injunction included in the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs separately filed a "Petition for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction." The Petition requests that the court issue a temporary restraining order pending a hearing and award of relief preliminarily and permanently enjoining the United States and Reyes from issuing further levies or taking further collection against Plaintiffs and to return all wrongfully levied monies to Plaintiffs pending the Court's ruling on the merits. (Doc. #38 at 2.) As previously noted, the levies have been lifted, and the only alleged "continued collection action" has been terminated.

No evidentiary hearing on Plaintiffs' petition for injunctive relief is required because it presents only purely legal questions and no purpose would be served by holding an evidentiary hearing. See United States v. McGee, 714 F.2d 607, 613 (6th Cir. 1983); Socialist Workers Party v. Illinois State Bd. of Elections, 566 F.2d 586, 586 (7th Cir. 1977). Even if Plaintiffs were to prove all of their factual allegations to be true, they have shown no legal basis for granting any of the injunctive relief they have requested.

Plaintiffs concede 26 U.S.C. §7421 prohibits any of the injunctive relief they seek unless they can satisfy an exception. As explained above, none of the Plaintiffs meet the judicially created exception under Enochs v. Williams Packing.

Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief for Beth Krasemann and Krasemann Eye Center, Inc., under 26 U.S.C. §7426(b)(1), which permits an injunction if a levy or sale would irreparably injure rights in property that the court determines to be superior to rights of the United States in such property. Plaintiffs admit the levies have been released. Plaintiffs do not allege that either Beth Krasemann or Krasemann Eye Center, Inc., have suffered or are likely to suffer irreparable injury to their rights in any property. Plaintiffs do not even expressly allege that Beth Krasemann and Krasemann Eye Center, Inc., have been deprived of their money that has been applied to Mark Krasemann's separate tax debt. To qualify for injunctive relief under an exception to §7421, parties still must satisfy the usual equitable prerequisites to injunctive relief, i.e., irreparable injury and lack of adequate legal remedy. Cool Fuel, Inc. v. Connett, 685 F.2d 309, 313 (9th Cir. 1981). If Beth Krasemann or Krasemann Eye Center, Inc., prevail on proving their wrongful levy claims, they will have adequate legal remedy under §7426(b)(2)(B) and, therefore, cannot obtain injunctive relief under §7426(b)(1).

Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief for Mark Krasemann and Krasemann Vision Centers, Inc., under 26 U.S.C. §6330(e), which suspends levy actions that are the subject of a requested hearing. As discussed above, Mark Krasemann requested a hearing regarding tax liens under §6320, which does not suspend liens or any other collection action. Plaintiffs did not allege that Krasemann Vision Centers, Inc., requested any hearing. Plaintiffs do not allege the IRS wrongfully levied any property belonging to Mark Krasemann or Krasemann Vision Centers, Inc. In fact, Plaintiffs acknowledge the assets levied were applied to Mark Krasemann's separate tax debt. Therefore, neither Mark Krasemann or Krasemann Vision Centers, Inc., can obtain injunctive relief under §6330(e)

Plaintiffs have not alleged any specific irreparable injury that would result if an injunction is not issued. They allege only that as a result of the levy against Beth Krasemann in the amount of approximately $1,404.59 3 and the levy against Krasemann Eye Center, Inc., in the amount of approximately $7,366.40, Mark Krasemann was unable to pay himself a salary, the Krasemanns have filed for a divorce, Mark Krasemann will be unable to run his business, and Plaintiffs will be unable to pay necessary living expenses. They argue "[t]here is no immediate adequate remedy at law to allow Plaintiffs to keep their property and allow Plaintiff Mark Krasemann to be able to pay reasonable ordinary and necessary living expenses, pay himself a salary and pay his employees, which will result in a failure to maintain his business and keep his job." (Doc. #38-2 at 14.) These alleged "injuries" would affect only Mark Krasemann, who admittedly owes the tax debt.

Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendant United States' Response to Plaintiffs' Petition for Temporary Restraining Order includes four exhibits apparently for the purpose of demonstrating likelihood of Plaintiffs prevailing on the merits. (Doc. #46.) Exhibits A and B show that Krasemann Eye Center, Inc., was organized on March 20, 2006; Mark Krasemann is its sole Board member, its incorporator, President, Secretary, and Treasurer, and do not indicate how the corporation was capitalized. Exhibit C is a copy of Krasemann Eye Center, Inc.'s 2007 U.S. Income Tax Return for an S Corporation. It shows Mark Krasemann holds 100% of stock ownership for Krasemann Eye Center, Inc. Exhibit D is an Affidavit of Mark Krasemann dated May 7, 2008, swearing that he and Beth Krasemann kept all of their assets, including wages, separate from the time they married on December 1, 2001, through the present date, and at no time commingled their separate assets. Although Defendants did not have opportunity to respond to exhibits attached to Plaintiffs' Reply, it is unnecessary for them to do so because the exhibits do not affect any of the court's rulings in this Order.

Therefore, none of the Plaintiffs have shown they are or could possibly be entitled to any of the temporary, preliminary, or permanent injunction relief they request.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the United States' Motion to Dismiss (doc. #37) is granted in part, dismissing all claims against Abe Reyes and all claims against the United States except Beth Krasemann's and Krasemann Eye Center, Inc.'s claims against the United States under 26 U.S.C. §7426 for wrongful levy.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the United States' request for award of its costs and fees (doc. #37) is denied without prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Petition for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction (doc. #38) is denied.

DATED this 29th day of May, 2008.

1 Although Everett's letter attached as an exhibit to the Complaint states the assets of Krasemann Vision Centers, Inc., were levied, the First Amended Complaint alleges the levy was issued on Krasemann Eye Center, Inc.

2 Plaintiffs are expressly prohibited from asserting any §7426 wrongful levy claim against any officer or employee of the United States. 26 U.S.C. §7426(d).

Labels:

Friday, June 6, 2008

GAMBLING LOSSES - Although a reasonable expectation of a profit is not required, the taxpayer's profit objective must be actual and honest. Dreicer v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 642, 644-645 (1982), affd. without published opinion 702 F.2d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 1983); sec. 1.183-2(a), Income Tax Regs. Whether a taxpayer has an actual and honest profit objective is a question of fact to be answered from all of the relevant facts and circumstances. Hastings v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-310; sec. 1.183-2(a), Income Tax Regs.



The pertinent regulations set forth a nonexhaustive list of factors that may be considered in deciding whether a profit objective exists. These factors include: (1) The manner in which the taxpayer carries on the activity, (2) the expertise of the taxpayer or his advisers, (3) the time and effort expended by the taxpayer in carrying on the activity, (4) the expectation that assets used in the activity may appreciate in value, (5) the success of the taxpayer in carrying on other similar or dissimilar activities, (6) the taxpayer's history of income or losses with respect to the activity, (7) the amount of occasional profits, if any, which are earned, (8) the financial status of the taxpayer, and (9) the elements of personal pleasure or recreation. Golanty v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 411, 426 (1979), affd. without published opinion 647 F.2d 170 (9th Cir. 1981); sec. 1.183-2(b), Income Tax Regs. No single factor or group of factors is determinative. Golanty v. Commissioner, supra at 426. A final determination is made only after a consideration of all of the relevant facts and circumstances.



Petitioners argue that we should hold that Dr. Merkin was engaged in the trade or business of gambling in 2003 and accordingly that petitioners are entitled to claim a loss attributable to this activity on their 2003 Schedule C. After consideration of the facts contained in the record, and for the reasons discussed infra, we disagree.



Dr. Merkin did not carry on his gambling activity in a businesslike manner. See sec. 1.183-2(b)(1), Income Tax Regs. He did not maintain any receipts, books, or records but instead relied solely upon Mohegan Sun to track all of his playing time, betting history, wins, and losses on his Player's Club card. Petitioners argue that it would have been too onerous for Dr. Merkin to have kept receipts, books, or records of his time spent at the casino and the amounts of his bets. See sec. 6001 (pertaining to the requirement for a taxpayer to keep records). Dr. Merkin also testified that he did not maintain such records because he assumed that Mohegan Sun was doing that for him. He also admitted, however, that the Player's Club card did not always record his activity, since the record of hours spent playing video poker shown on his Player's Club statement for 2003 did not comport with his estimate of the actual amount of time he spent playing video poker during the year in issue. Although the Court has acknowledged and accepted a taxpayer's reliance on a Player's Club card statement as a record of his winnings and losses, we have not accepted the argument that where a card statement does not show all of the taxpayer's activity (i.e., is an incomplete statement), the taxpayer is thereby excused from providing other evidence of his winnings and losses. See Hardwick v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-359; Lutz v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-89.



Michael N. and Barbara J. Merkin v. Commissioner.

Dkt. No. 766-06 , TC Memo. 2008-146, June 5, 2008.





Neil L. Prupis, for petitioners; Elizabeth S. Martini, for respondent.





MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION



GOLDBERG, Special Trial Judge: Respondent determined a deficiency of $21,150 in petitioners' Federal income tax for 2003 and an accuracy-related penalty of $4,300 under section 6662(a).1 The issues for decision are whether petitioner husband was engaged in the trade or business of gambling during 2003 and whether petitioners are liable for an accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a).





FINDINGS OF FACT



Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found. The stipulation of facts and the attached exhibits are incorporated herein by this reference. At the time the petition was filed, petitioners resided in New York, New York.



During the taxable year in issue petitioner husband (Dr. Merkin) was self-employed as a psychiatrist. His medical practice is located on Park Avenue in New York City. Dr. Merkin has been engaged in private practice as a psychiatrist since 1972. Petitioner wife (Mrs. Merkin) is, according to petitioners' tax return, an investor.



Petitioners' primary residence is located on West 13th Street in New York City. Petitioners own a secondary residence in Guilford, Connecticut.



In 1999, when Dr. Merkin was 59 years old he began to ponder new ways whereby he could augment his income in retirement. Motivated by his preexisting interest in gambling and in particular the card game of poker, Dr. Merkin began reading up on betting games and attending card game conventions. At these conventions Dr. Merkin played poker and video slot machine games and purchased literature and other materials concerning casino games and odds-making.



Dr. Merkin became particularly fascinated with video poker. Unlike table poker, where a dealer deals a set of cards to a player or group of players, in video poker a machine deals a hand of five cards to a single player, and the player sees on the machine's screen --according to the cards he or she is dealt --the odds and subsequent payout amounts for possible final card combinations (such as a full house, straight suit, or flush suit of cards). During the latter half of 1999 Dr. Merkin decided to play video poker exclusively because he believed that it was a type of casino game where knowledge of mathematical probabilities --a knowledge he honed into his system --could improve his odds of winning video poker jackpots.



Although Dr. Merkin frequented several casinos and gaming establishments during the year in issue, he spent most of his time playing video poker at the Mohegan Sun Casino (Mohegan Sun) in Uncasvile, Connecticut. Mohegan Sun is approximately 40 miles from the petitioners' secondary residence in Guilford, Connecticut.



Dr. Merkin had a definitive routine when gambling at Mohegan Sun. First, upon arrival at the casino Dr. Merkin would scout the various video poker machines located throughout the facility in order to find a machine that was paying out the highest jackpot amounts according to bets placed. Dr. Merkin would then select a video poker machine to play by inserting a Mohegan Sun "Player's Club" card --similar to a credit card --into a slot on the machine. Dr. Merkin relied upon the card to record the length of time that he played the machine and his betting history. The card would also record his winnings and losses. When Dr. Merkin hit a jackpot on the machine, the card would record the jackpot and freeze both his card activity and the machine itself until a member of the Connecticut Board of Gaming could inspect the machine for signs of illegal tampering and/or software irregularities.



Each time that Dr. Merkin would use his Player's Club card in a gaming machine he would accrue Player's Club points. These points were awarded at the rate of one point per dollar spent and according to the length of play. Points were accruable and could be traded in at the casino for food, beverages, accommodations, travel, and other prizes. The points had no cash value and were not awarded in addition to winning a video poker jackpot.



Mohegan Sun issued Dr. Merkin a Form W-2G, Certain Gambling Winnings, for 2003 reflecting gross winnings of $691,575. Petitioners timely filed their 2003 income tax return. They reported total income of $228,157, consisting of the following items: (1) Wage income of $57,187; (2) taxable interest of $18; (3) taxable State income tax refund of $537; and (4) business income of $170,415.



Petitioners attached two Schedules C, Profit or Loss From Business, to their 2003 return. The first pertained to Dr. Merkin's private medical practice and reported gross receipts of $238,500 and deductions of $49,411 for a net Schedule C gain of $189,089. The second pertained to Dr. Merkin's activity as a professional gambler and reported gross gambling receipts of $691,575 and claimed a deduction of $710,249 of gambling losses, for a net Schedule C loss of $18,674. Thus, after combining the figures listed on both Schedule C forms, petitioners' net business income reported was $170,415.



In arriving at their adjusted gross income petitioners deducted $6,328 from their total income. Petitioners claimed itemized deductions of $82,120 and personal exemptions of $10,736, resulting in taxable income of $128,973 and a total tax of $37,719 after including the alternative minimum tax and self-employment tax.



On October 11, 2005, respondent issued petitioners a notice of deficiency. Respondent determined that Dr. Merkin was not engaged in the trade or business of gambling during 2003 and therefore could not deduct his gambling losses on petitioners' Schedule C. Instead, respondent determined that petitioners had to report Dr. Merkin's gambling winnings in total income and could deduct the gambling losses on a Schedule A, Itemized Deductions, but only to the extent of Dr. Merkin's gambling winnings. On the basis of the foregoing, respondent determined that the amount of tax required to be shown on petitioners' 2003 return was $59,220. Petitioners reported tax due of $37,719 on their return, resulting in a deficiency of $21,501. Respondent also determined petitioners were liable for an accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a) of $4,300.





OPINION




Burden of Proof


Taxpayers generally bear the burden of proving that the Commissioner's determinations are incorrect. Rule 142(a). However, section 7491(a) may in specific circumstances place the burden on the Commissioner with regard to any factual issue relating to the taxpayers' liability for tax if the taxpayers produce credible evidence with respect to that issue and meet the requirements found in section 7491(a)(2). The taxpayers bear the burden of proving that they have met the requirements of section 7491(a)(2). Miner v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-39; Nichols v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-24, affd. 79 Fed. Appx. 282 (9th Cir. 2003). Although neither party has directly raised section 7491(a) as an issue, on our review of the entire record, and for the reasons discussed infra, we conclude that petitioners have neither complied with all substantiation requirements of the Code nor maintained all required records. See secs. 6001, 7491(a)(2). Consequently, the burden of proof respecting factual issues relevant to their liability for the deficiency in their tax remains on them.




Tax Treatment of Gambling Losses


Section 61(a) defines gross income to mean all income from whatever source derived. Gambling winnings are includable in gross income. Paul v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1992-582.



Section 162(a) allows deductions for all ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business. If a taxpayer is engaged in the trade or business of gambling, his losses from gambling, up to the amount of his gains from such transactions, would be deductible in arriving at his adjusted gross income. See secs. 62, 165(d). Thus, if Dr. Merkin's gambling activity constituted a trade or business, his losses from gambling as reported on Schedule C up to the amount of his gambling winnings as reported on that schedule would be deductible in arriving at adjusted gross income. If his gambling activity did not constitute a trade or business, his gambling losses to the extent of his winnings would be deductible as an itemized deduction on petitioners' Schedule A, in arriving at taxable income.2 Sec. 63(a).



Irrespective of whether the activity constituted a trade or business, section 165(d) provides that "Losses from wagering transactions shall be allowed only to the extent of the gains from such transactions." See also sec. 1.165-10, Income Tax Regs.



Respondent determined that Dr. Merkin was not in the trade or business of gambling during 2003 and thus could not claim his gambling losses as a Schedule C deduction on petitioners' 2003 return. Petitioners argue that Dr. Merkin was in the trade or business of gambling because he pursued the activity in good faith, with regularity, and for the production of income.



To be engaged in a trade or business within the meaning of section 162(a), an individual taxpayer must be involved in the activity with continuity, regularity, and with the primary purpose of deriving a profit. Commissioner v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 35 (1987). Whether the taxpayer is carrying on a trade or business requires an examination of all of the facts in each case. Id. at 36.



Although a reasonable expectation of a profit is not required, the taxpayer's profit objective must be actual and honest. Dreicer v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 642, 644-645 (1982), affd. without published opinion 702 F.2d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 1983); sec. 1.183-2(a), Income Tax Regs. Whether a taxpayer has an actual and honest profit objective is a question of fact to be answered from all of the relevant facts and circumstances. Hastings v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-310; sec. 1.183-2(a), Income Tax Regs.



The pertinent regulations set forth a nonexhaustive list of factors that may be considered in deciding whether a profit objective exists. These factors include: (1) The manner in which the taxpayer carries on the activity, (2) the expertise of the taxpayer or his advisers, (3) the time and effort expended by the taxpayer in carrying on the activity, (4) the expectation that assets used in the activity may appreciate in value, (5) the success of the taxpayer in carrying on other similar or dissimilar activities, (6) the taxpayer's history of income or losses with respect to the activity, (7) the amount of occasional profits, if any, which are earned, (8) the financial status of the taxpayer, and (9) the elements of personal pleasure or recreation. Golanty v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 411, 426 (1979), affd. without published opinion 647 F.2d 170 (9th Cir. 1981); sec. 1.183-2(b), Income Tax Regs. No single factor or group of factors is determinative. Golanty v. Commissioner, supra at 426. A final determination is made only after a consideration of all of the relevant facts and circumstances.



Petitioners argue that we should hold that Dr. Merkin was engaged in the trade or business of gambling in 2003 and accordingly that petitioners are entitled to claim a loss attributable to this activity on their 2003 Schedule C. After consideration of the facts contained in the record, and for the reasons discussed infra, we disagree.



Dr. Merkin did not carry on his gambling activity in a businesslike manner. See sec. 1.183-2(b)(1), Income Tax Regs. He did not maintain any receipts, books, or records but instead relied solely upon Mohegan Sun to track all of his playing time, betting history, wins, and losses on his Player's Club card. Petitioners argue that it would have been too onerous for Dr. Merkin to have kept receipts, books, or records of his time spent at the casino and the amounts of his bets. See sec. 6001 (pertaining to the requirement for a taxpayer to keep records). Dr. Merkin also testified that he did not maintain such records because he assumed that Mohegan Sun was doing that for him. He also admitted, however, that the Player's Club card did not always record his activity, since the record of hours spent playing video poker shown on his Player's Club statement for 2003 did not comport with his estimate of the actual amount of time he spent playing video poker during the year in issue. Although the Court has acknowledged and accepted a taxpayer's reliance on a Player's Club card statement as a record of his winnings and losses, we have not accepted the argument that where a card statement does not show all of the taxpayer's activity (i.e., is an incomplete statement), the taxpayer is thereby excused from providing other evidence of his winnings and losses. See Hardwick v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-359; Lutz v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-89.



Petitioners were misguided to assume that Dr. Merkin's Players Club card would keep a complete business record of his activities at a casino and that this record would absolve them of the duty to maintain business records. See sec. 6001. It is the taxpayer's duty, and not that of the casino, to maintain such records. Sec. 6001. In short, his lack of records and accountability for his activities illustrates to us that Dr. Merkin did not carry on his video poker playing in a businesslike manner.



To further illustrate this point, although Dr. Merkin testified that he spent 47 out of 52 weekends during 2003 playing video poker at Mohegan Sun for at least 24 hours per weekend (for a total of approximately 1,128 hours), he did not provide any credible evidence to corroborate this testimony. In fact, the only credible evidence in the record with respect to Dr. Merkin's time spent playing video poker in 2003 was a Player's Club statement generated by Mohegan Sun and provided by petitioners at trial. This statement shows that Dr. Merkin spent 19,140 minutes or 319 hours (19,140/60) playing video poker at Mohegan Sun in 2003. We do not believe that Dr. Merkin spent 1,128 hours at Mohegan Sun solely on the basis of his testimony to that effect and in the absence of any receipts or records aside from a noncontemporaneous calendar of time spent at the casino that petitioners produced in anticipation of trial. Moreover, Dr. Merkin admitted that it was a mistake on his part to have relied on the Player's Club card to record all of his time spent playing video poker. We note that if petitioners were as concerned with the amount of Player's Club points that Dr. Merkin was earning from his playing as he represented in his argument, he would likely have checked the balance of points and time played on his Player's Club card before the end of 2003. Then, if a discrepancy existed between the casino's record and Dr. Merkin's estimate of hours spent playing video poker at the casino, he could have resolved the issue and obtained an accurate accounting of his time spent playing video poker at the casino during the year in issue. He failed to do this.



We infer that Dr. Merkin's testimony that he spent approximately 1,128 hours playing video poker during 2003 represented petitioners' attempt to equate the amount of time Dr. Merkin spent practicing medicine with the amount of time he spent playing video poker. Dr. Merkin did not testify as to the amount of time he spent engaged in his medical practice in 2003, and for the aforementioned reasons we do not find his testimony and his calendar of the time purportedly spent at Mohegan Sun in that year credible. Accordingly, we cannot make a well-informed judgment as to how much time Dr. Merkin devoted to each of these activities during the year in issue.



Ultimately, and on the basis of the one source of credible evidence before us --the Player's Club statement --we believe that Dr. Merkin spent 319 hours playing video poker at Mohegan Sun in 2003. Despite Dr. Merkin's playing time (whether it was 319 or 1,128 hours), he did not testify that he spent any time honing or adjusting his system when it became clear to him that he was not on track to make a profit playing video poker in 2003. See sec. 1.183-2(b)(2) and (3), Income Tax Regs. Dr. Merkin did testify that he read video poker magazines and kept abreast of the machines and their respective payout histories at the casino, but he did not prove that he used this knowledge to adjust his system in the light of his overall losses. We view Dr. Merkin's failure to spend any time adjusting and/or improving his system as a factor weighing against his gambling activity's being a trade or business.



Although Dr. Merkin may have read video poker magazines and spent time on the casino floor scouting various machines, there is nothing in the record to validate petitioners' claim that Dr. Merkin is a renowned poker expert. See sec. 1.183-2(b)(2), Income Tax Regs. Aside from his explanation of how the video poker game machine works, Dr. Merkin offered no testimony as to the specifics of his system for increasing the odds of winning video poker jackpots. In fact, Dr. Merkin admitted at trial that he had recently quit playing video poker because his system simply did not work.



Petitioners maintain that Dr. Merkin played video poker with an honest intent to make a profit and that he did in fact make a profit, if not always through his gambling winnings, then through the many Player's Club points that he accrued while playing video poker at Mohegan Sun. See sec. 1.183-2(b)(7), Income Tax Regs.



To be sure, petitioners argue at length that the added element of the Player's Club points distinguishes their case from other cases involving gambling losses because the large number of Player's Club points that Dr. Merkin earned and redeemed in 2003 illustrates that his activity was not only entered into for profit but was, in fact, profitable. We disagree.



Petitioners filed Schedules C for Dr. Merkin's gambling activities for all of the 4 taxable years preceding the year in issue. Petitioners reported a total of $105,326 in gambling losses for those years and reported a gambling loss of $18,674 for 2003. Despite those losses, Dr. Merkin maintains that his activities were profitable because he redeemed hundreds of thousands of his accrued Player's Club points for items such as airfare, travel, and automobiles throughout the years, including 2003.



Petitioners have maintained throughout their case that Dr. Merkin's earning hundreds of thousands of Player's Club points was, in fact, profit to them and that the value of the points should be included in the amount of profit generated by Dr. Merkin's gambling activities. It is petitioners' position that if we include the value of these points as profit, we will see not only that Dr. Merkin's gambling activity was indeed profitable, but also that Dr. Merkin continued to engage in the gambling because of an actual profit objective as evidenced by the value of the Player's Club points. We disagree.



We fail to see how Dr. Merkin's earning Player's Club points supports petitioners' contention that his gambling activity was engaged in with an actual and honest profit objective. Dr. Merkin's Player's Club points were based on his dollar amounts bet and length of play. While there is no accounting of the points Dr. Merkin earned and redeemed for 2003 and there is nothing in the record showing the items for which he redeemed the points for 2003, such evidence would do nothing more than show what "prizes" Dr. Merkin received in exchange for his total wagering at Mohegan Sun in 2003. That is, if petitioners received airfare, accommodations, and/or trips from the Player's Club program, they did so because of the amount of money that Dr. Merkin was spending at the casino. The items he earned through redemption of his Player's Club points were items that he essentially paid for with the amounts that he bet. Put another way, if petitioners were to have purchased all of the items they received through the redemption of their Player's Club points in 2003, it is highly improbable that the value of those items would equal the amount of money wagered by Dr. Merkin in 2003.



Moreover, and with respect to the items for which Dr. Merkin redeemed his Player's Club points in 2003, we note that petitioners failed to report as income the value of any car, airfare, or travel that they acquired from the casino in 2003. In Libutti v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-108, we held that the value of such items awarded by a casino to a taxpayer-patron, if included in his gross income, could be considered a gain from wagering against which he was allowed to offset his wagering losses. However, if Dr. Merkin received any items of that type in redemption of his Player's Club points, we could not permit him to have it both ways; that is, by taking the value of those items into account to determine whether his gambling activity was engaged in with the actual intent of making a profit while not including the value of those items in income. See id.; cf. Portland Golf Club v. Commissioner, 497 U.S. 154, 168 (1990).



Petitioners also argue that Dr. Merkin's substantial income from his medical practice should have no effect on our determination with respect to petitioners' profit objective. See Commissioner v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23 (1987). We disagree. The facts in the present case differ from those in Groetzinger. There, the Supreme Court noted that the taxpayer, following the termination of his 20-year employment in February, spent the balance of that year --and most of his time --engaged in parimutuel betting and that the taxpayer looked to that activity and his winnings from it as his livelihood. To the contrary, Dr. Merkin was self-employed as a psychiatrist with a longstanding practice on Park Avenue in New York City. Petitioners did not rely on Dr. Merkin's winnings to support themselves. See sec. 1.183-2(b)(8), Income Tax Regs. Petitioners had ample disposable income as a result of Dr. Merkin's practice to cover the expenses associated with two residences as well as Dr. Merkin's spending while at Mohegan Sun.



Finally, petitioners have not persuaded us --despite Dr. Merkin's testimony about his system and the Player's Club points --that Dr. Merkin, when he played video poker machines programmed by the casino, had as his primary objective income or profit. As Dr. Merkin candidly admitted through his testimony regarding his scouting the various machines, casinos are in the business of generating revenues. To be sure, Dr. Merkin's scouting process illustrated how casinos manipulate the computer gaming machines to increase the odds that the house will usually prevail. As a result, his system --developed in hopes of beating video poker machines --ultimately proved ineffective. Dr. Merkin conceded this reality when he admitted at trial that his system did not work.



Accordingly, in the light of section 1.183-2, Income Tax Regs., and on the basis of our analysis of the facts of this case, we hold that Dr. Merkin's gambling activity in 2003 did not constitute a trade or business.




Accuracy-Related Penalty Under Section 6662(a)


Respondent determined that petitioners are liable for an accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a) for 2003 of $4,300.



Section 6662(a) imposes a penalty in the amount of 20 percent of the portion of the underpayment to which section 6662 applies. As relevant to this case, the penalty applies to any portion of the underpayment that is attributable to any substantial understatement of income tax. Sec. 6662(b)(2). There is a "substantial understatement of income tax" if the amount of the understatement exceeds the greater of 10 percent of the tax required to be shown on the return or $5,000. Sec. 6662(d)(1).



Although the Commissioner bears the burden of production with respect to the penalty, in this case, petitioners failed to raise the penalty as an issue in their petition, at trial, or on brief. See sec. 7491(c); Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 446-447 (2001). The issue is thereby deemed conceded. See Rule 34(b)(4); Swain v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 358 (2002).



On the record before us, and for the reasons previously discussed, we hold that Dr. Merkin's gambling activity in 2003 did not rise to the level of a trade or business activity as contemplated by section 162(a). See also sec. 1.183-2, Income Tax Regs. Accordingly, and because petitioners have conceded respondent's application of the accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a), we find for respondent.



To reflect our disposition of the issues,



Decision will be entered for respondent.


1 Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code (Code) in effect for the taxable year in issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.

2 The shift from Schedule C to Schedule A lowers the ceiling imposed by sec. 68 on itemized deductions (other than the deduction for the gambling loss itself). See Calvao v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-57 n.6.




A full-time gambler who made wagers solely for his own account was engaged in a trade or business. The Supreme Court ruled that in order to be engaged in a trade or business the taxpayer must be involved in the activity with continuity and regularity and the taxpayer's primary purpose for engaging in the activity must be for income or profit.

R.P. Groetzinger, SCt, 87-1 USTC ¶9191, 107 SCt 980.

The taxpayer's full-time gambling activity constituted a trade or business and, thus, losing wagers were deductible as business expenses and not as itemized deductions. Groetzinger followed.

P.S. Regan, 54 TCM 846, Dec. 44,252(M), TC Memo. 1987-512.

A taxpayer was not entitled to deduct expenses incurred in connection with his gambling activities, which included placing wagers on horses and acting as a bookkeeper for professional football games. The taxpayer failed to show that his activities constituted a trade or business.

P.T. Jones, Jr., 55 TCM 1690, Dec. 45,004(M), TC Memo. 1988-393.

Gambling losses allegedly incurred by the taxpayer's acceptance of bets that his partner would not assume were not deductible since the record contained no evidence as to these losses other than the taxpayer's testimony.

H. Bennett, 27 TCM 365, Dec. 28,928(M), TC Memo. 1968-71.

Sum paid to compromise a gambling debt was not deductible despite taxpayer's allegation that his visit to a gambling house was "to establish business contacts."

M.R. Gano, 19 BTA 518, Dec. 5962.

Labels:

Thursday, June 5, 2008

Negligence is a defence to the section 6663 fraud penalty

Roberto and Maria L. Gigliardi, Plaintiffs v. The United States, Defendant.

U.S. Court of Federal Claims; 06-799-T, May 16, 2008.

[ Code Sec. 6663]

Penalties, civil: Fraud penalties: Refund: Fraudulent intent: Evidence: Concealment of assets: Failure to cooperate. --
A dentist and his wife were entitled to a refund of fraud penalties they paid because the government failed to prove that their tax underpayment was motivated by a fraudulent intent to evade taxes. The government did not show that the taxpayers willfully and purposefully concealed business income from the IRS or that they concealed income information from their accountant. The government also failed to prove that the taxpayers were uncooperative with the IRS investigation. Although they negligently maintained their financial records, their recordkeeping practices did not rise to the level of fraud. The couple's testimony that they orally provided their accountant with information regarding their deposit of business income into personal accounts was credible.



MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER


MILLER, Judge: This tax refund suit is before the court following a two-day, five-witness trial. The Internal Revenue Service (the "IRS") determined that the taxpayers understated their income for the 2000 and 2001 tax years. This understatement led to an assessment for underpayment of tax. The IRS attributed the underpayment to fraud and imposed a 75% fraud penalty for the 2000 and 2001 tax years pursuant to 26 U.S.C. ("I.R.C.") § 6663(a) (2000). Plaintiffs sued for a refund of $17,742.75 in fraud penalties. Trial focused on whether the Government discharged its burden to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the taxpayers acted with the requisite mens rea: omission motivated by an intent to evade payment of income tax. When defendant rested, plaintiffs moved pursuant to RCFC 52(c) for judgment on partial findings. Following argument on the motion, the court indicated that the motion would be granted as to both plaintiffs and that an opinion would enter setting forth the grounds for granting the motion and the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to RCFC 52(a). See Order entered Mar. 14, 2008.




FACTS 1


Plaintiffs Roberto and Maria L. (MariaLucia) Gagliardi, husband and wife, reside in Woodridge, NJ. Dr. Roberto Gagliardi is a dentist, who in 2000 practiced dentistry in two locations under two practice names: Union City, NJ, as "Roberto Gagliardi" (the "Union City practice"); and Fair Lawn, NJ, as "Family Dentistry of Fair Lawn, LLC" ("Family Dentistry"). In 2001 Dr. Gagliardi practiced dentistry in three locations: the Union City Practice; Family Dentistry; and an additional practice in Fair Lawn, NJ, "Restorative Dentistry" ("Restorative Dentistry"). Mrs. Gagliardi is currently a homemaker and during 1984-1990 worked as a bank teller. Beginning in 1991 Mrs. Gagliardi performed bookkeeping for her husband's Union City practice. Plaintiffs filed joint returns for the 2000 and 2001 tax years.

After an audit of plaintiffs' returns for the 2000 and 2001 tax years that commenced on January 28, 2003, the IRS adjusted the amount of tax due by $17,917.00 for the 2000 tax year and by $5,740.00 for the 2001 tax year and imposed penalties for fraud in the amount of $13,437.75 for the 2000 tax year and $4,305.00 for the 2001 tax year. On July 14, 2004, plaintiffs' accountant, Lawrence B. Goodman, CPA, the senior partner of Lawrence B. Goodman, P.A., who prepared plaintiffs' tax returns for both tax years and who held a power-of-attorney from plaintiffs to represent them during the IRS audit beginning in 2003, signed a Form 870 consenting to the assessment and collection of deficiencies, including fraud penalties under I.R.C. § 6663(a).

Plaintiffs filed on September 10, 2004, with the Commissioner of the IRS claims for refund of the fraud penalties assessed for the 2000 and 2001 tax years. The "Explanation and additional claims" portion of both claims reads identically and asserts that the taxpayers' representative, Mr. Goodman, "agreed to a fraud penalty without our knowledge or consent" and that, in any case, the taxpayers "gave [their] accountant access to all [their] books and records." DX 3 and 4. Plaintiffs requested "abatement of the fraud penalty and the interest on the fraud penalty." Id. The Commissioner denied plaintiffs' claims for refund by letters dated December 9, 2004, and June 1, 2005. Plaintiffs filed this refund action in the United States Court of Federal Claims on November 29, 2006. Notably, plaintiffs do not contest the underpayment, which defendant refers to as unreported income.

In tax refund suits involving the assessment of a fraud penalty, the Government bears the burden of proving fraud by clear and convincing evidence. See Irolla v. United States, 390 F.2d 951, 953 (Ct. Cl. 1968) (discussed more fully infra Discussion part II). For this reason the court directed defendant to present its case-in-chief before plaintiffs opened their case. Defendant called five witnesses: Dr. Gagliardi; Mrs. Gagliardi; Carole D. Downey (now Anderson-Downey), plaintiffs' bookkeeper from 2000 to 2001; Mr. Goodman; and Mary M. Wieme, the IRS revenue agent conducting the IRS's audit.

Plaintiffs established three bank accounts, each corresponding to one of the three dental practices (the "business bank accounts"). The bulk of the income from each of the dental practices was deposited into the corresponding business bank account. In the course of the audit, Ms. Wieme identified deposits of income from the dental practices made to three other bank accounts: a bank account with Fleet National Bank in the name of Dr. Gagliardi and his mother (the "shared Fleet account"); a bank account with Fleet National Bank in Mrs. Gagliardi's name ("Mrs. Gagliardi's Fleet account"); and a bank account with Kearny Federal Savings Bank in Dr. Gagliardi's name (the "Kearny account"). The income from the dental practices that was not reported in plaintiffs' 2000 and 2001 tax returns correlated with the deposits of income from the dental practices into these three non-business accounts in 2000 and into the Kearny account in 2001. Plaintiffs did not dispute that they made these deposits, nor do they contest that an underreporting of income on their 2000 and 2001 tax returns led to an underpayment of tax. They argued, however, that they informed Mr. Goodman about the deposits of additional income to the three personal accounts, that Mr. Goodman was responsible for the preparation of the tax returns and that he exceeded his scope of authority in agreeing to the fraud penalties. Plaintiffs stand on their bona fides that they did not intend to evade taxes and that the IRS's assessment of the fraud penalty cannot be sustained.

Mr. Goodman had a long-standing personal and professional relationship with plaintiffs that predated their marriage; he was the accountant for Mrs. Gagliardi's father, and Mrs. Gagliardi met Mr. Goodman for the first time during the early 1970s when she was fifteen to sixteen years old. At that time Mrs. Gagliardi began helping her father with his business payroll, and Mr. Goodman taught her how to keep the payroll books and records. Tr. at 198-99. When Dr. and Mrs. Gagliardi married in 1989, Mr. Goodman became their accountant and prepared their tax returns. 2 Mrs. Gagliardi also recounted that Mr. Goodman knew plaintiffs quite well and was involved in their personal lives beyond serving as their accountant and tax preparer. Mr. Goodman furnished letters of recommendation in connection with helping plaintiffs to adopt their children. Mr. Goodman also introduced Dr. Gagliardi to dentist clients of his accounting practice who were interested in retiring and selling their practices to Dr. Gagliardi. Dr. Gagliardi ultimately purchased those two practices. Mrs. Gagliardi termed Mr. Goodman's involvement as "convinc[ing] [Dr. Gagliardi] to purchase both practices." Transcript of Proceedings, Gagliardi v. United States, No. 06-799T, at 204 (Fed. Cl. Mar. 4-5, 2008) ("Tr."). Mr. Goodman introduced Dr. Gagliardi to a banker in connection with moving his practice into the same condominium building as Mr. Goodman. Tr. at 462-63. In 2001 Restorative Dentistry shared the same office building as Mr. Goodman's accounting firm.

After plaintiffs married, while they were both working and before Dr. Gagliardi had his own dental practice, plaintiffs would meet annually with Mr. Goodman to provide him with all of their information relevant to the preparation of their personal tax returns, including their Forms W-4 and W-2. Mrs. Gagliardi testified that during these meetings she went through her checkbook, totaled all deposits, and identified for Mr. Goodman all of plaintiffs' expenses. Dr. and Mrs. Gagliardi testified that this practice continued whereby plaintiffs would provide Mr. Goodman with information pertaining to their personal returns during their annual meetings. Mr. Goodman agreed that he would receive orally plaintiff's information relating to personal expenses. Tr. at 419-21.

Plaintiffs testified that, during their annual meetings for the tax years in question, they provided Mr. Goodman with information about the deposits of business income that they made to all of their personal accounts in the same manner that they had done in previous years. Mrs. Gagliardi stated that plaintiffs commingled their business and personal accounts during 2000-2001 and "filed one return, so everything was one for us." Tr. at 193. Mrs. Gagliardi admitted that she had no written evidence that she had provided Mr. Goodman with information pertaining to deposits to the two Fleet bank accounts; however, she was convincing that she compiled a list of deposits that she read off to Mr. Goodman and importuned tha