Friday, August 29, 2008

An IRS Appeals Officer's determination sustaining the IRS's lien filing and proposed levy against a taxpayer was not an abuse of discretion. The taxpayer's contention that the IRS failed to assess the taxes within the assessment period of limitations was not permitted. Although the IRS's assessment of taxes for wages left off of the return was made in a second notice of deficiency, the taxpayer did not file a petition for redetermination for either the first or second notices and so was barred from challenging the underlying tax liability. During the Collection Due Process hearing for the lien filing, the taxpayer failed to submit financial information and request collection alternatives. The taxpayer also failed to allege any specific facts to show that there was a genuine issue as to whether the Appeals Office abused its discretion.


Valdy Olender v. Commissioner.

Dkt. Nos. 1082-06L ; 21969-06L , TC Memo. 2008-205, August 28, 2008.



[Code Sec. 6330]






Valdy Olender, pro se; Lauren B. Epstein, for respondent.





MEMORANDUM OPINION



SWIFT, Judge: These consolidated matters are before us under Rule 121 on respondent's motion for summary judgment. Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.



Respondent moves for summary judgment as to petitioner's challenges to respondent's lien filing and proposed levy relating to petitioner and his wife's outstanding Federal income tax liability for 1999 in the approximate total amount of $20,700. Petitioner objects to respondent's motion for summary judgment and contends that respondent failed to assess petitioner and his wife's 1999 Federal income tax liability within the assessment period of limitations set out in section 6501. Petitioner also challenges generally the amount of his and his wife's 1999 Federal income tax liability as determined by respondent. For the reasons stated, we will grant respondent's motion for summary judgment.





Background



The facts set forth below are established in the pleadings, moving papers, responses thereto, and attachments.



In 1999 petitioner and his wife received wages in the approximate total amount of $72,500.



On April 15, 2000, petitioner and his wife filed with respondent a 1999 joint Federal income tax return reporting zero in wages and zero for their taxable income, which respondent treated as a valid return for filing purposes.



On November 21, 2001, and after an audit of petitioner and his wife's 1999 Federal income tax return, respondent did not charge petitioner and his wife with the above $72,500 in wage income, but respondent did determine a deficiency in petitioner and his wife's 1999 Federal income tax of $518. Respondent timely mailed to petitioner and his wife and they received a notice of deficiency (first notice of deficiency) for this additional $518. Neither petitioner nor his wife filed a petition in this Court with regard to the first notice of deficiency, and on May 6, 2002, respondent assessed against petitioner and his wife the $518.



On May 29, 2003, respondent mailed to petitioner and his wife a second notice of deficiency, which they received. In the second notice of deficiency respondent charged petitioner and his wife with the $72,500 in wage income which petitioner and his wife had omitted from their 1999 joint Federal income tax return (and which respondent had not included in the first notice of deficiency), resulting in an additional $11,169 deficiency in petitioner and his wife's Federal income taxes for 1999. Neither petitioner nor his wife filed a petition in this Court with regard to the second notice of deficiency, and on October 22, 2003, respondent assessed against petitioner and his wife the $11,169.



On June 7, 2005, respondent timely mailed to petitioner and his wife a notice of Federal tax lien relating to the October 22, 2003, assessment. On July 5, 2005, petitioner requested an Appeals Office collection hearing relating thereto. In connection with this hearing, petitioner did not provide respondent with the financial information which respondent requested. Petitioner did challenge the assessment as untimely.



On December 16, 2005, respondent's Appeals Office mailed to petitioner and his wife a notice of determination sustaining respondent's lien filing against them. On January 13, 2006, petitioner filed with this Court his petition challenging respondent's determination sustaining respondent's lien filing.



On February 10, 2006, respondent timely mailed to petitioner and his wife a final notice of intent to levy relating to the October 22, 2003, assessment. On March 7, 2006, petitioner requested an Appeals Office hearing relating to respondent's proposed levy. In connection with this hearing, petitioner submitted to respondent's Appeals Office limited financial information. On September 28, 2006, respondent's Appeals Office mailed to petitioner and his wife a notice of determination sustaining respondent's proposed levy.



On October 30, 2006, petitioner filed with this Court his petition challenging respondent's Appeals Office's determination sustaining respondent's levy.





Discussion



Petitioner contends that respondent's October 22, 2003, assessment of petitioner's 1999 Federal income tax liability was not made within the assessment period of limitations prescribed by section 6501. A taxpayer's contention, however, that an assessment period of limitations lapsed before the Commissioner made an assessment against the taxpayer constitutes a challenge to the underlying tax liability. In a collection case under section 6320 or section 6330, a taxpayer is not permitted to challenge his underlying Federal income tax liability if he or she had a prior opportunity to do so. Hoffman v. Commissioner, 119 T.C. 140, 145 (2002); Hoffenberg v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-139 n.4; see also Boyd v. Commissioner, 117 T.C. 127, 130 (2001); MacElvain v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-320.



Upon receipt of respondent's first and second notices of deficiency petitioner had the opportunity to challenge his wife's joint 1999 Federal income tax liability. Petitioner did not file a petition in this Court within the 90-day period prescribed by section 6213(a). Petitioner is now barred in this case from challenging his and his wife's joint Federal income tax liability for 1999 and from raising any issue as to the timeliness of respondent's assessment.



Generally under section 6501 the Commissioner has 3 years from the time a taxpayer files a Federal income tax return to assess a deficiency. Petitioners' joint 1999 Federal income tax return --which respondent treated as a valid return --was filed April 15, 2000, and the 3-year period for assessment would have expired on April 15, 2003.



Section 6503(a)(1), however, provides that the running of the 3-year assessment period of limitations under section 6501 will "be suspended for the period during which the Secretary is prohibited from making the assessment * * * and for 60 days thereafter", and section 6213(a) provides that after the Commissioner mails a notice of deficiency to a taxpayer, no assessment of the tax deficiency shall be made during the 90-day period during which the taxpayer may file a petition in this Court.



Accordingly, under section 6213(a) respondent was barred from making any assessment for each of the 90-day periods immediately following respondent's mailing to petitioner of the first and the second notices of deficiency, dated November 21, 2001, and May 29, 2003, respectively. Thus under section 6503 the running of the 3-year assessment period of limitations was suspended for 180 days plus an additional 120 days. Respondent's two notices of deficiency resulted in a total 300-day extension in the assessment period of limitations running against respondent and in favor of petitioner and his wife relating to their 1999 Federal income taxes.



This 300-day extension established a lapse date for the assessment period of limitations that is applicable to this case of February 9, 2004.1 Respondent's October 22, 2003, assessment falls well within this extended period of limitations.



Petitioner raises several other vague grounds for challenging respondent's Appeals Office's determination sustaining respondent's lien filing and proposed levy. Petitioner contends that he did not receive fair Appeals Office hearings and that he was denied an installment plan for payment of his Federal income taxes.2



Summary judgment is proper where there remains no genuine issue of material fact and where the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Beery v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. 184, 187 (2004). In a collection action where the taxpayer's tax liability is not at issue, we review the appropriateness of the Commissioner's determination for abuse of discretion. Sego v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 604, 609-610 (2000); Goza v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 176, 182 (2000).



In connection with petitioner's first Appeals Office hearing, petitioner failed to submit financial information and failed to request collection alternatives. In connection with petitioner's first and second Appeals Office hearings, petitioner has not alleged any specific facts showing there is a genuine issue as to whether respondent's Appeals Office abused its discretion in sustaining respondent's lien filing and proposed levy action. See Rule 121(d); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-323 (1986).



On the record before us and as a matter of law we conclude that respondent's Appeals Office's determination sustaining respondent's lien filing and proposed levy was not an abuse of discretion.



For the reasons stated, we shall grant respondent's motion for summary judgment.



An appropriate order and decisions will be entered.


1 Apr. 15, 2000, plus 3 years plus 300 days fell on Feb. 9, 2004.

2 We note that where a taxpayer raises a reasonable dispute regarding an item of income which a third-party payor reported to the Commissioner on an information return and where the taxpayer fully cooperates with the Commissioner, the burden of production as to the income shifts to the Commissioner. Sec. 6201(d). Petitioner, however, has not raised any such dispute and would be precluded from doing so under sec. 6330(c)(2)(B), and sec. 6201(d) presents no barrier to our granting summary judgment.

Labels:

Thursday, August 28, 2008

When Offers in Compromise are accepted. The following is the internal revenue manual that deals with accepted offers in compromise. There is an additional levy of review where the amount settled is over $50,000. Note also that the public is entitled to review accepted offers in compromise.


Part 5. Collecting Process
Chapter 8. Offer in Compromise
Section 8. Acceptance Processing

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5.8.8 Acceptance Processing
5.8.8.1 Overview
5.8.8.2 Amending Form 656
5.8.8.3 Closing a Case as an Acceptance
5.8.8.4 Acceptance Processing for Specific Types of Offers
5.8.8.5 Legal Opinion of Counsel
5.8.8.6 Public Inspection File
5.8.8.7 Accepted Offer File Processing
5.8.8.1 (09-01-2005)
Overview
The determination to accept an offer in compromise is based on sound decisions relating to an analysis of the individual taxpayers facts and circumstances and financial situation. Documentation supporting this decision and proper approval levels are required to complete the acceptance. This section describes the process for accepting an offer in compromise.

5.8.8.2 (09-01-2005)
Amending Form 656
When an offer is being recommended for acceptance, the tax periods owing and/or payment terms may need to be adjusted. This will require the taxpayer to submit an amended Form 656 to reflect the new terms.

Mark it "amended" in red on the top margin of page one.

Input "A" (amended) on screen one of the AOIC record to reflect receipt of an amended offer, but do notchange the "offer pending date" .

Add any new tax periods not included on the original Form 656 to the MFT screen. The date the IRS official signed the amended offer should be added to the MFT screen as the waiver date for the new periods only.

Delete any tax periods found on the MFT screen that are no longer owing and/or are not included on the amended offer.

Add the new terms for payment, if any, to the terms screen.


5.8.8.3 (09-01-2005)
Closing a Case as an Acceptance
Prior to preparing an acceptance report, IDRS command code " AMDIS" should be checked to ensure that no additional assessments are pending. If an open audit is found contact should be made to resolve the issue per instructions in IRM 5.8.4.12.1, Cases Pending in Examination. Tax must not be compromised unless it is assessed and legally due, therefore IDRS should also be checked to ensure that all tax included on the accepted offer has been properly assessed and is still due and owing.

Before closing a case as an acceptance, document the case history on AOIC regarding the decision. Include any special instructions for the Monitoring Offer in Compromise (MOIC) unit regarding application of funds or requesting a lien re-filing if one will be required during the terms of any deferred payment offer. See IRM 5.12, Federal Tax Liens, for more information about when a re-file may be required.

Order a MFTRA-X as close to the acceptance date as possible without delaying acceptance. Sanitize the MFTRA-X to "black out" or redact all tax information that is not to be disclosed to the public as follows:

Note:
The AOIC download process may be used to generate and print a sanitized report, which may be used instead of the MFTRA-X.


Name and SSN of a co-obligor spouse if the spouse is not a party to the compromise.

Number of exemptions.

Filing status.

Adjusted gross income.

Taxable income.

Principal Industry Activity Code.

Transaction Codes with neither debit or credit money amounts. The entire line including the date should be redacted.

Transactions Codes and explanations dealing with fraud, negligence, or criminal investigations, but not the date and amount of the transaction.

Power of Attorney/Tax Information Authorization (POA/TIA) on file.


Prepare an Acceptance Report. The Offer in Compromise Recommendation Report referenced in IRM Exhibit 5.8.4–3, Offer in Compromise Recommendation Report, may be used for this purpose. The report should contain at a minimum:

The taxpayers personal information such as age, health, dependents, education and occupation.

The cause of the delinquency and state of current compliance.

The amount of reasonable collection potential (RCP) and an explanation of how the RCP was calculated.

Note:
The Asset/Equity Table (AET) and Income/Expense Table (IET) shown in IRM Exhibits 5.8.4–1 and 5.8.4–2, respectively will generally fulfill this requirement.




Whether or not special circumstances exist and how they affected the amount agreed upon.

Negotiations resulting in the acceptable offer amount.

A conclusion that summarizes the basis for acceptance.


In the rare situation where relevant facts of a confidential nature exist that should not be included in the recommendation report, complete a supplemental memorandum for the record and include it in the case file. Do not include information already discussed in the offer recommendation report.

Update the AOIC record as follows:

Main Screen — Update to reflect the correct basis for compromise and if appropriate to indicate the existence of special circumstances. Update the disposition code to "1" (proposed acceptance).

MFT Screen — Input the assessment date for each module. Press "I" to update interest to the current date using the INTST command.

Note:
If any modules have restricted penalty or interest, use IDRS command code COMPAD and/or COMPAF to determine the accrued amounts. Include the accrued amounts in the total liability listed on the MFT screen. The manually accrued amounts must also be added to the paper transcript.


Note:
If any modules are Non-Master File and not on IDRS, secure an Automated Non-Master File (ANMF) transcript and update it as necessary using IDRS command code COMPAD and/or COMPAF.





K-Data Request Screen — Do a re-request for an IDRS download on all applicable TINS to update the AOIC screens with the accruals to the current date. Once the screens are updated generate and print the Public Offer report to use in lieu of a MFTRA-X.

Note:
A MFTRA-X may be requested through IDRS instead of taking this step.





Terms screen — Update the terms to those reflected on the offer that is being accepted ensuring that any collateral agreement(s) are referenced as necessary.


Generate and print the Form 7249, Offer Acceptance Report, for the required signatures. The accepting official is the official that has delegated responsibility for accepting based on the type and dollar amount of the case. Delegation Order Number No. 5-1 (formerly Delegation Order 11, Rev. 29) provides the level of authority for approving all Offer in Compromise dispositions.

Generate and print the appropriate acceptance letter for the signature of the delegated official. Attach copies of the accepted Form 656 and any applicable collateral agreement(s).

Generate and print the Power of Attorney (POA) letter if there is an authorized representative.

Assemble the file using Document 9600 B, Tab Dividers for Offer-in-Compromise Case Files Document.

Note:
The use of labeled dividers is required.


Submit the file for approval, routing to Counsel ( See IRM 5.8.8.5), and signing of the letter(s).

Upon approval and signature, date and mail the acceptance letter(s). Ensure that signed and dated copies are retained in the offer file.

Make a copy of the Form 7249, Offer Acceptance Report, and mail it together with the sanitized transcripts to the appropriate office for placing in the public offer file.

Close the case on AOIC and process. See IRM 5.8.8.7.

5.8.8.4 (09-01-2005)
Acceptance Processing for Specific Types of Offers
When two or more related offers are being recommended for acceptance, but acceptance is based on one financial analysis, one acceptance narrative may be used. Multiple files should be created containing the separate items that pertain to each offer. It is not necessary to duplicate the information that pertains to both files. The files should be clearly marked indicating that there are related offers, for example 1 of 2 and 2 of 2.

When the accepted offer includes Trust Fund Recovery Penalty (TFRP) assessments, a careful review must be made to ensure all TFRP assessments are included. Generally TFRP assessments made before August, 2000, will lump together all unpaid corporate tax quarters and be assessed under the tax period of the latest quarterly period owed by the corporation. Beginning in August, 2000, TFRP assessments are made for each quarterly period that was owed by the corporation. The Form 656 and the Form 7249, Offer Acceptance Report, must match and must reflect each individually assessed TFRP tax period.

Offers from Federal employees require a determination of whether public policy implications exist based on the sensitivity of the employee's position or area of responsibility. The result of this consideration should be documented in the case file. Offer acceptances for employees of the Internal Revenue Service additionally require the approval of the Territory Manager or SB/SE Compliance Operations Manager.

Note:
Offers from Federal civil service retirees are to be considered under normal procedures.


5.8.8.5 (09-01-2005)
Legal Opinion of Counsel
Counsel is required to review offers when the total liability for all related offers on the same taxpayer is $50,000 or more. The purpose of counsel's review is to determine whether the offer legally meets the standards of Doubt as to Liability (DATL), Doubt as to Collectibility (DATC) or the promotion of Effective Tax Administration (ETA). Counsel reviews the offer to ensure it meets the legal requirements for compromise and conforms to the Services' policy and procedures.

Counsel’s signature on the Form 7249, Offer Acceptance Report, constitutes the legal opinion required by IRC 7122(b). By signing the form, Counsel is certifying that all of the legal requirements for compromise have been met. If Counsel does not sign the form, the case cannot be compromised unless any legal issues are resolved.

Counsel’s signature does not necessarily indicate concurrence with the acceptance decision, but only that there are no legal barriers to compromise. In some cases Counsel may determine that the compromise is legally permissible, but may raise concerns of a policy or other issues of a non-legal nature. In such cases, the Form 7249, Offer Acceptance Report, will be signed and any other issues will be communicated by separate memorandum.

It is not required that Counsel concur in the acceptance decision in order for a compromise to go forward. However, the accepting official will review and consider any opinion from Counsel prior to making the acceptance final. Where major policy concerns have been raised, it is appropriate to document the case history indicating that the accepting official fully considered the issues before accepting the offer.

5.8.8.6 (09-01-2005)
Public Inspection File
Public inspection of certain information regarding all offers in compromise accepted under Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Section 7122 and is authorized by IRC Section 6103(k)(1).

A separate file of accepted Offer in Compromise records will be maintained for this purpose and made available to the public for a period of one year. The public inspection file will be maintained in a location designated by the Area office. The Area office may destroy the Public Inspection file after the year has expired.

For each accepted offer the file will only contain the following items:

A copy of the Form 7249, Offer Acceptance Report

The sanitized MFTRA-X or ANMF transcript.


The office that has accepted the offer will be responsible for providing all required documents as soon as possible after acceptance, for inclusion in the public inspection file.

5.8.8.7 (09-01-2005)
Accepted Offer File Processing
Once an offer has been closed on AOIC it should be held in-house until the following Monday. On Monday or as soon as practical thereafter, the offer should be released on AOIC and the entire file mailed to the proper Monitoring Offer in Compromise (MOIC) unit. Care must be used to ensure that the offer is mailed to the same unit it is released to on AOIC. If two related offers are accepted and one has a Business Operating Division (BOD) code of Small Business (SB) and the other is coded Wage & Investment (WI), change the BOD code on the WI offer on AOIC to match the BOD code of the SB offer before releasing it to the MOIC unit and ship both to the designated SB site.

If the case is chosen for Embedded Quality (EQ) review, copies of the following documents should be made and placed in the file in lieu of the originals before the offer is forwarded for review. The following original documents should be sent to the MOIC unit in a file folder clearly indicating that the remaining information was mailed to EQ.

Original and amended Form 656, Offer in Compromise

Form 7249, Offer Acceptance Report

Copy of the Acceptance letter(s)

Any collateral agreements

Note:
Before forwarding the case to the MOIC unit take the following steps:
• Verify that the original and any amended Form(s) 656 are in the case file
• Check to be sure that the Form(s) 656, Form 7249, IDRS, and AOIC all reflect the same tax liability period(s).
• Validate the waiver dates on the Form(s) 656, IDRS, and AOIC are correct and consistent.



Accepted offer files should be mailed with a Form 3210. Shipping offices must ensure that a receipted copy of the Form 3210 is received. If a receipted copy of the Form 3210 is not received within 30 calendar days of mailing, contact should be made with the receiving office and tracing actions taken. Appropriate actions must be taken to recover or replace missing files.

Part 5. Collecting Process
Chapter 8. Offer in Compromise
Section 12. Independent Administrative Review

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5.8.12 Independent Administrative Review
5.8.12.1 Overview
5.8.12.2 Role of the Independent Administrative Reviewer
5.8.12.3 Rejections
5.8.12.4 Independent Review Process
5.8.12.1 (09-01-2005)
Overview
IRC Section 7122(d)(1) requires the Service to conduct an independent administrative review of all proposed offer in compromise rejections. The review must be conducted prior to the rejection being communicated to the taxpayer.

The Independent Administrative Reviewer (IAR) is responsible for conducting this review. Generally, the IAR should report to the Technical Support manager.

5.8.12.2 (09-01-2005)
Role of the Independent Administrative Reviewer
The Independent Administrative Reviewer (IAR) is responsible for reviewing each case to determine if the proposed rejection is reasonable based on the taxpayer's facts and circumstances. The Offer Investigator's analysis of the taxpayers financial information should be reviewed to determine if there are special circumstances that should have been considered. The IAR should compare the amount that the taxpayer offered with the reasonable collection potential (RCP) or the Asset/Equity Table (AET) for legal sufficiency.

The IAR should consider if the taxpayers rights have been observed during the offer investigation and during communication and discussions with the taxpayer or authorized representative. These considerations should be based on issues that would impact the recommended rejection.

The IAR must also consider if the taxpayers facts and circumstances were considered during the investigation. If the file indicates any circumstances that could impact either future earning potential or allowable expenses, the file should document this information and the determinations relating to the taxpayers circumstances.

If the case file indicates issues are raised that meet either Effective Tax Administration (ETA) or Doubt as to Collectibility with Special Circumstance (DCSC) criteria, as defined in IRM .8.11, Effective Tax Administration, the case history must address these issues and discuss the determinations made.

5.8.12.3 (09-01-2005)
Rejections
The IAR should ensure that all of the facts and circumstances of the case were considered during the investigation and that the decision to reject the offer is reasonable, based on the case analysis.

Note:
The IAR is not responsible for conducting a quality analysis of completeness and accuracy of the documents used to support the case decision. That is the responsibility of the manager.


The following items should be present in the file and used as an aid for the IAR to ensure the decision was appropriate.

Form 656, Offer in Compromise

Form 1271, Rejection or Withdrawal memorandum

Rejection Letter

Asset/Equity Table (AET)

Income/Expense Table (IET)

Rejection Narrative

Collection Information Statements (CIS)

Case History

Supporting Documents


If any information is missing or unavailable that hinders the IAR in making a determination that the decision was appropriate, the case file should be returned or a memorandum sent to the Offer Investigator or the manager requesting the missing documentation or supporting information. In the case where the IAR is located off-site, the information needed may be faxed to the IAR for inclusion in the analysis.

The case file should indicate an attempt to communicate the results of the offer investigation with the taxpayer or authorized representative, prior to recommending the rejection. This communication can be accomplished by personal contact or by letter.

Exception:
The only exception is for those cases rejected based on the Screen for Obvious Full Pay criteria as outlined in IRM 5.8.4.5, Screen for Obvious Full Pay.


5.8.12.3.1 (09-01-2005)
Communication
The IAR should consider if required communication with the taxpayer or authorized representative was attempted and if these communications were reasonable based on the facts of the case. Communications need not necessarily include phone calls. They may be conducted entirely in the form of letters to the taxpayers or their authorized representatives.

The case file should document these communications and any specific issues that are in dispute.

5.8.12.4 (09-01-2005)
Independent Review Process
Prior to the proposed rejection being submitted to the IAR, the authorized official must have reviewed the file and signed the Form 1271, Rejection or Withdrawal Memorandum, indicating concurrence with the proposed disposition.

Once the approving official has signed the Form 1271, the offer must be re-assigned to the IAR on AOIC. The file is then forwarded to the IAR for review using a Form 3210, Document Transmittal.

Upon receipt of the file by the IAR, AOIC should be updated to reflect the individual independent reviewers assignment number.

Once the offer is reviewed by the IAR, AOIC must be updated to reflect the results of the review.

5.8.12.4.1 (09-01-2005)
Rejections Sustained by the Independent Administrative Reviewer
If the proposed rejection of the offer is sustained by the IAR, the reviewer will:

Update the IAR Main Screen on AOIC indicating the appropriate disposition.

Sign the Form 1271, Rejection or Withdrawal Memorandum , as the reviewer, indicating concurrence with the proposed disposition.

Return the case file to the originator using a Form 3210, Document Transmittal.


5.8.12.4.2 (09-01-2005)
Rejections Not Sustained by the Independent Administrative Reviewer
If the proposed rejection is not sustained by the IAR, the reviewer will:

Update the IAR Main Screen on AOIC indicating the appropriate IAR disposition.

Prepare the Form 5942, Reviewers Report, providing an explanation of why the determination was not sustained and indicating additional actions necessary by the investigating employee.

Route the Form 5942 and the offer case file to the IAR Manager for approval.


After the IAR Manager approves the Form 5942, the case will be routed as follows:

The original Form 5942 and the offer file will be returned to the Offer Investigator's manager.

A copy of the Form 5942 will be sent to the Offer Investigator's second level manager.

A copy of the 5942 will be retained by the IAR.


The following procedures describe necessary actions once the offer file is received by the originating office:

If… Then…
Reconsideration of the offer based on recommendations from the IAR results in a determination to accept the offer Process the acceptance recommendation following procedures defined in IRM 5.8.8, Acceptance Processing.
Reconsideration of the offer based on recommendations from the IAR results in a determination to continue to recommend rejection of the offer Update the case file with the additional case actions and any new information and re-submit to the IAR for a second review.
The investigating employee determines that the rejection is the correct action without further development, after reviewing the Form 5942 The offer file will be returned to the IAR for reconsideration. If necessary, additional history should be included to further support the offer rejection.
After a second review by the IAR, the rejection is still not sustained by the IAR and the Offer Investigator and the manager disagree with the decision of the IAR The decision will be raised to the second level manager for resolution.
The IAR Manager will forward a memorandum to the Offer Manager with an explanation of why the rejection cannot be sustained.

A copy of the memorandum will be forwarded to the second level manager.

The IAR manager and the second level manager will discuss the issues to reach a resolution.

The final decision will be made by the field second level manager for cases assigned to the field and the second level manager for those cases decided by the COIC sites.



The original Form 5942 and any other documentation regarding second level management involvement and decisions must be retained in the offer file as a record of actions taken during the IAR process.

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Offer in Compromise - "effective tax administration"

Below is the Internal Revenue Manual dealing with the settlement of a tax debt under the "effective tax administration" option for an Offer in Compromise. Generally, effective tax administration applies when there is a "hardship" and the taxpayer had the funds or assets to pay the tax debt but needs the assets or income because of the hardship. The tax regulations consider health and age as factors to take into account in determining "hardship." The same principles appy if taxpayers do not have the assets of income to full pay their tax debt. In these circumstances, the IRS refers to "special circumstances" will include the same elements of "hardship."

5.8.11 Effective Tax Administration
5.8.11.1 Overview
5.8.11.2 Legal Basis for Effective Tax Administration Offer
5.8.11.3 Initial Processing of Effective Tax Administration Offers
5.8.11.4 Evaluation of Offers
5.8.11.5 Documentation and Verification
5.8.11.6 Final Processing
Exhibit 5.8.11-1 Non-Hardship Effective Tax Administration (ETA) Offer in Compromise (OIC) Check Sheet
5.8.11.1 (09-01-2005)
Overview
As part of the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (RRA 98), Congress added section 7122(c) to the Internal Revenue Code. That section provides that the Service shall set forth guidelines for determining when an offer in compromise should be accepted. Congress explained that these guidelines should allow the Service to consider:


Hardship,

Public policy, and

Equity


Treasury Regulation § 301.7122-1 authorizes the Service to consider offers raising these issues. These offers are called Effective Tax Administration (ETA) offers.

The availability of an Effective Tax Administration (ETA) offer encourages taxpayers to comply with the tax laws because taxpayers will:


Believe the laws are fair and equitable, and

Gain confidence that the laws will be applied to everyone in the same manner.


The Effective Tax Administration (ETA) offer allows for situations where tax liabilities should not be collected even though:

The tax is legally owed, and

The taxpayer has the ability to pay it in full.


If a taxpayer submits an Effective Tax Administration (ETA) offer, first investigate the offer for:


Doubt as to Liability (DATL), and/or

Doubt as to Collectibility (DATC).

An Effective Tax Administration (ETA) offer can only be considered when the Service has determined that the taxpayer does not qualify for consideration under Doubt as to Liability (DATL) and/or Doubt as to Collectibility (DATC).
The taxpayer must include the Collection Information Statement (Form 433-A and/or Form 433-B) when submitting an offer requesting consideration under Effective Tax Administration (ETA).

Economic hardship standard of § 301.6343-1 specifically applies only to individuals.

5.8.11.2 (09-01-2005)
Legal Basis for Effective Tax Administration Offer
Compared to Doubt as to Collectibility (DATC)
In a Doubt as to Collectibility (DATC) offer, the tax liability equals or exceeds the taxpayers reasonable collection potential (RCP) which is:

Net equity, plus

Future income

In an Effective Tax Administration (ETA) offer, the tax liability is less than the taxpayers reasonable collection potential (RCP). The taxes owed can be collected in full either:

In a lump sum, or

Through an installment agreement (IA)

A Doubt as to Collectibility (DATC) offer does not convert to an Effective Tax Administration (ETA) offer if the Offer Investigator and the taxpayer cannot agree on an acceptable offer amount.

Compared to Doubt as to Collectibility with Special Circumstances (DCSC)
Taxpayers may qualify for an Effective Tax Administration (ETA) offer when their reasonable collection potential (RCP) is greater than the liability but there are economic or public policy/equity circumstances that would justify accepting the offer for an amount less than full payment.

Example:
The taxpayer owes $20,000. The reasonable collection potential (RCP) is $25,000. The taxpayer could have an offer accepted for less than the total liability of $20,000 under the Effective Tax Administration (ETA) provisions if economic hardship, or public policy/equity issues exist which would support an acceptance recommendation.


Taxpayers could have an offer accepted under Doubt as to Collectibility with Special Circumstance (DCSC) when their reasonable collection potential (RCP) is less than their liability, but there are economic hardship or public policy/equity factors that would justify accepting the offer for an amount less than the reasonable collection potential (RCP).

Example:
The taxpayer owes $20,000. However his reasonable collection potential (RCP) is $15,000. The offer does not meet the legal basis for an Effective Tax Administration (ETA) because the RCP is lower than the liability. However, applying the same factors of economic hardship, or public policy/equity, an offer could be accepted for less than the RCP ($15,000) under Doubt as to Collectibility with Special Circumstance (DCSC) provisions.


Compared to Doubt as to Liability
An offer can be considered under Effective Tax Administration (ETA) provisions only when there are no doubt to liability issues.

In reaching these determinations:

If… Then…
The Service determines that there is doubt as to the amount of the liability the taxpayer owes Taxpayer is not eligible for Effective Tax Administration (ETA) consideration. The offer is considered based on the Doubt as to Liability (DATL) issue.
The Service determines that the taxpayers equity in assets plus future income (RCP) does not exceed the amount of the tax liability Taxpayer is not eligible for an Effective Tax Administration (ETA) offer. The offer is considered based on Doubt as to Collectibility (DATC).
However, hardship or public policy/equity may be present in the case to allow consideration under Doubt as to Collectibility with Special Circumstances (DCSC).
The Service determines the taxpayer is not eligible for compromise based on Doubt as to Liability (DATL) or Doubt as to Collectibility (DATC) and the taxpayer can demonstrate that collection of the tax liability in full would create economic hardship, or demonstrate that there is compelling public policy or equity issues in the case that would provide sufficient basis for compromise The taxpayer would be eligible for Effective Tax Administration (ETA) consideration.


Before we can consider a compromise based on economic hardship or public policy/equity considerations, three factors must exist:

A liability has been or will be assessed against taxpayer(s) before acceptance of the offer.

The net equity in assets plus future income or reasonable collection potential (RCP) must be greater than the amount owed.

Exceptional circumstances exist, such as the collection of the tax would create an economic hardship, or there is compelling public policy or equity considerations that provide sufficient basis for compromise.


5.8.11.2.1 (09-01-2005)
Economic Hardship
When a taxpayers liability can be collected in full but collection would create an economic hardship, an Effective Tax Administration (ETA) offer based on economic hardship can be considered.

The definition of economic hardship as it applies to Effective Tax Administration (ETA) offers is derived from Treasury Regulations § 301.6343-1. Economic hardship occurs when a taxpayer is unable to pay reasonable basic living expenses. The determination of a reasonable amount for basic living expenses will be made by the Commissioner and will vary according to the unique circumstances of the individual taxpayer. Unique circumstances, however, do not include the maintenance of an affluent or luxurious standard of living.

Note:
Because economic hardship is defined as the inability to meet reasonable basic living expenses, it applies only to individuals (including sole proprietorship entities). Compromise on economic hardship grounds is not available to corporations, partnerships, or other non-individual entities.


The taxpayers financial information and special circumstances must be examined to determine if they qualify for an Effective Tax Administration (ETA) offer based on economic hardship. Financial analysis includes reviewing basic living expenses as well as other considerations.

The taxpayers income and basic living expenses must be considered to determine if the claim for economic hardship should be accepted. Basic living expenses are those expenses that provide for health and welfare and production of income of the taxpayer and the taxpayers family. Some basic living expenses are limited to the National Standards while other expenses are limited to Local Standards. Deviation from these standards is permissible if and when the taxpayer is able to justify expenses that exceed these limits.

In addition to the basic living expenses, other factors to consider that impact upon the taxpayers financial condition include:

The taxpayers age and employment status,

Number, age, and health of the taxpayers dependents,

Cost of living in the area the taxpayer resides, and

Any extraordinary circumstances such as special education expenses, a medical catastrophe, or natural disaster.


Note:
This list is not all-inclusive. Other factors may be considered in making an economic hardship determination.


Factors that support an economic hardship determination may include:

The taxpayer is incapable of earning a living because of a long term illness, medical condition, or disability and it is reasonably foreseeable that the financial resources will be exhausted providing for care and support during the course of the condition.

The taxpayer may have a set monthly income and no other means of support and the income is exhausted each month in providing for the care of dependents.

The taxpayer has assets, but is unable to borrow against the equity in those assets, and liquidation to pay the outstanding tax liabilitie(s) would render the taxpayer unable to meet basic living expenses.


Note:
These factors are representative of situations the Service regularly encounters when working with taxpayers to resolve delinquent accounts. They are not intended to provide an exhaustive list of the types of cases that can be compromised based on economic hardship.


Compromise under the Effective Tax Administration (ETA) economic hardship provision is permissible if acceptance does not undermine compliance. The public should not perceive that the taxpayer whose offer is accepted benefited by not complying with the tax laws. Factors supporting a determination that compromise would undermine compliance include, but are not limited to:

The taxpayer has a history of noncompliance with the filing and payment requirements of the Internal Revenue Code.

The taxpayer has taken deliberate actions to avoid the payment of taxes.

The taxpayer has encouraged others to refuse to comply with the tax laws.


Note:
There may be other situations where compromise would be undermined.


The following examples illustrate the types of cases that may be compromised under the economic hardship standard.


Example:
The taxpayer has assets sufficient to satisfy the tax liability and provides full time care and assistance to a dependent child, who has a serious long-term illness. It is expected that the taxpayer will need to use the equity in assets to provide for adequate basic living expenses and medical care for the child. The taxpayers overall compliance history does not weigh against compromise.






Example:
The taxpayer is retired and the only income is from a pension. The only asset is a retirement account and the funds in the account are sufficient to satisfy the liability. Liquidation of the retirement account would leave the taxpayer without adequate means to provide for basic living expenses. The taxpayers overall compliance history does not weigh against compromise.






Example:
The taxpayer is disabled and lives on a fixed income that will not, after allowance of adequate basic living expenses, permit full payment of the liability under an installment agreement. The taxpayer also owns a modest house that has been specially equipped to accommodate for a disability. The equity in the house is sufficient to permit payment of the liability owed. However, because of the disability and limited earning potential, the taxpayer is unable to obtain a mortgage or otherwise borrow against this equity. In addition, because the taxpayers home has been specially equipped to accommodate the disability, forced sale of the taxpayers residence would create severe adverse consequences for the taxpayer, making such a sale unlikely. The taxpayers overall compliance history does not weigh against compromise.



The economic hardship standard authorizes compromise regardless of the cause of the liability, provided compromise does not undermine compliance by other taxpayers.


Example:
The taxpayer submitted an Effective Tax Administration (ETA) offer based on economic hardship. The financial statement appears to support the offer. When a research of the county property records is conducted, it is noted that the home was transferred to a child for $100 plus love and affection. The transfer of the home was made after the tax was assessed. It is confirmed that deliberate actions were taken to avoid the payment of tax; therefore, the offer should not be accepted.



In economic hardship cases, an acceptable offer amount is determined by analyzing the financial information, supporting documentation, and the hardship that would be created if certain assets, or a portion of certain assets, were used to pay the liability.


Example:
The taxpayer was diagnosed with an illness that eventually will hinder any ability to work. Although currently employed, the taxpayer will soon be forced to quit their job and use personal funds for basic living expenses. The taxpayer owes $100,000 and has a reasonable collection potential of $150,000. An offer was submitted for $35,000. Through the investigation, it is determined that collecting more than $50,000 would cause an economic hardship for the taxpayer since it would hinder the ability to meet reasonable living expenses, including ongoing medical expenses. The taxpayer is advised to raise the offer to $50,000 since it is an amount the Service can collect without creating an economic hardship.



The existence of economic hardship criteria does not dictate that an offer must be accepted. An acceptable offer amount must still be determined based on a full financial analysis and negotiation with the taxpayer. When hardship criteria are identified but the taxpayer does not offer an acceptable amount, the offer should not be recommended for acceptance.

5.8.11.2.2 (09-01-2005)
Public Policy or Equity Grounds
Where there is no Doubt as to Liability (DATL), no Doubt as to Collectibility (DATC), and the liability could be collected in full without causing economic hardship, the Service may compromise to promote Effective Tax Administration (ETA) where compelling public policy or equity considerations identified by the taxpayer provide a sufficient basis for accepting less than full payment. Compromise is authorized on this basis only where, due to exceptional circumstances, collection in full would undermine public confidence that the tax laws are being administered in a fair and equitable manner. Because the Service assumes that Congress imposes tax liabilities only where it determines it is fair to do so, compromise on these grounds will be rare.

The Service recognizes that compromise on these grounds will often raise the issue of disparate treatment of taxpayers who can pay in full and whose liabilities arose under substantially similar circumstances. Taxpayers seeking compromise on this basis bear the burden of demonstrating circumstances that are compelling enough to justify compromise notwithstanding this inherent inequity.

Compromise on public policy or equity grounds is not authorized based solely on a taxpayers belief that a provision of the tax law is itself unfair. Where a taxpayer is clearly liable for taxes, penalties, or interest due to operation of law, a finding that the law is unfair would undermine the will of Congress in imposing liability under those circumstances.


Example:
The taxpayer argues that collection would be inequitable because the liability resulted from a discharge of indebtedness rather than from wages. Because Congress has clearly stated that a discharge of indebtedness results in taxable income to the taxpayer it would not promote Effective Tax Administration (ETA) to compromise on these grounds. See Internal Revenue Code (IRC) 61(a)(12).




Example:
In 1983, the taxpayer invested in a nationally marketed partnership which promised the taxpayer tax benefits far exceeding the amount of the investment. Immediately upon investing, the taxpayer claimed investment tax credits that significantly reduced or eliminated the tax liabilities for the years 1981 through 1983. In 1984, the IRS opened an audit of the partnership under the provisions of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA). After issuance of the Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment (FPAA), but prior to any proceedings in Tax Court, the IRS made a global settlement offer in which it offered to concede a substantial portion of the interest and penalties that could be expected to be assessed if the IRS's determinations were upheld by the court. The taxpayer rejected the settlement offer. After several years of litigation, the partnership level proceeding eventually ended in Tax Court decisions upholding the vast majority of the deficiencies asserted in the FPAA on the grounds that the partnership's activities lacked economic substance. The taxpayer has now offered to compromise all the penalties and interest on terms more favorable than those contained in the prior settlement offer, arguing that TEFRA is unfair and that the liabilities accrued in large part due to the actions of the Tax Matters Partner (TMP) during the audit and litigation. Neither the operation of the TEFRA rules nor the TMP's actions on behalf of the taxpayer provide grounds to compromise under the equity provision of paragraph (b)(4)(i)(B) of this section. Compromise on those grounds would undermine the purpose of both the penalty and interest provisions at issue and the consistent settlement principles of TEFRA. Depending on the taxpayers particular facts and circumstances, however, compromise may be authorized on the grounds of Doubt as to Collectibility (DATC), or because collection of the full liability would cause an economic hardship within the meaning of paragraph (b)(4)(i)(A) of this section.



Note:
In both of these examples, the taxpayers are essentially claiming that Congress enacted unfair statutes and are arguing that the Service should use its compromise authority to rewrite those statute based on a perception of unfairness. Compromise for that reason would not promote effective tax administration. The compromise authority under Section 7122 is not so broad as to allow the Service to disregard or override the judgments of Congress.


Section 6404(e) grants the Service the discretion to abate interest attributable to certain errors and delays by the Service. It would not promote Effective Tax Administration (ETA) to compromise a liability based solely on an assertion of delay by the Service if that delay would not support relief from interest under section 6404(e).

Compromise may promote Effective Tax Administration (ETA) where the taxpayer was incapacitated and thus unable to comply with the tax laws.



Example:
In October 1986, the taxpayer developed a serious illness that resulted in almost continuous hospitalization for a number of years. The medical condition was such that during this period, the taxpayer was unable to manage any of their financial affairs. The taxpayer has not filed tax returns since that time. The taxpayers health has now improved and has promptly begun to attend to tax matters. The taxpayer discovered that the IRS prepared a substitute for return for the 1986 tax year based on information documents received and assessed a tax deficiency. When the taxpayer discovered the liability, with penalties and interest, the tax bill was more than three times the original tax liability. The taxpayers overall compliance history does not weigh against compromise.





Note:
In this situation, the Service should first work with the taxpayer and attempt to prepare an accurate return for the 1986 tax year and adjust the taxpayers account accordingly. Following that, the Service should consider accepting a compromise that would approximate the amount the taxpayer would have been assessed had there been an ability to comply with his filing and payment responsibilities in a timely manner. Such a compromise would be fair and equitable to the taxpayer and, under these circumstances, would advance the public policy of voluntary compliance with the tax laws.


It would not promote Effective Tax Administration (ETA) to compromise with the taxpayer in (5), above, if the investigation revealed that the taxpayer was able to attend to matters other than those due in 1986 during the time of the illness. For example, assume the taxpayer discussed, paid all other bills and continued to successfully operate a business during the illness. Under such circumstances, compromise would not promote Effective Tax Administration (ETA), and could serve to undermine compliance by other taxpayers.

Compromise may promote Effective Tax Administration (ETA) where the taxpayers liability was caused by reasonable reliance on a statement issued by the Service that caused the taxpayer to incur a tax liability that would not otherwise have been incurred.


Example:
The taxpayer is a salaried sales manager at a department store who has been able to place $2,000 in a tax-deductible IRA account for each of the last two years. The taxpayer learns that a higher rate of interest can be earned on his IRA savings by moving the savings from a Money Management account to a Certificate of Deposit at a different financial institution. Prior to transferring the savings, the taxpayer submits an E-mail inquiry to the IRS at its Web Page, requesting information about the steps needed to preserve the tax benefits currently enjoyed and to avoid any penalty. The IRS responds by answering the E-mail that the taxpayer may withdraw the IRA savings from the neighborhood bank, but it must redeposited in a new IRA account within 90 days. The taxpayer withdraws the funds and redeposits them in a new IRA account 63 days later. Upon audit, the taxpayer learns that he has been misinformed about the required rollover period and is now liable for additional taxes, penalties and interest for not redepositing the amount within 60 days. Had the advice provided been accurate, the taxpayer would have redeposited the funds timely. The taxpayer retained a copy of the IRS E-mail for his records. The taxpayers overall compliance history does not weigh against compromise.





Note:
Because the tax liability in this example was caused by relying on the Service's erroneous statement, and the taxpayer clearly could have avoided the liability had the Service given correct information, it is reasonable to conclude that collection in full would cause other taxpayers to question the fairness of the tax system. The Service may consider accepting a compromise that would reflect the amount the taxpayer would now owe had the service not made an error.


Compromise may also promote Effective Tax Administration (ETA) where a taxpayers liability was directly caused by the Service and through no fault of the taxpayer.


Example:
The taxpayer is a closely-held corporation. The IRS audited the taxpayers tax returns for 1996, 1997, and 1998 and determined that the taxpayer was a personal holding company liable for personal holding company tax. The taxpayer agreed to immediate assessment of the tax, but attempted to take advantage of the deduction for deficiency dividends under section 547. Although the taxpayer made the distributions necessary to qualify for the deduction, the IRS made several errors in executing the required agreements and other paperwork. As a result, the taxpayer could not avail itself of the section 547 deduction. Under the statute, applicable regulations, and pertinent case law, there is no means by which the mistakes can be corrected to allow the taxpayer to take advantage of the deduction. There is documentary evidence that all of the required Service officials intended to complete the processing of the agreements and that, but for their failure to do so, the taxpayer would have qualified for the deduction. The taxpayer has no prior history of noncompliance.





Note:
That the tax liability was caused solely by an error on the part of the Service supports the determination that collection in full would cause other taxpayers to question the fairness of the tax system. Furthermore, the policies underlying the imposition of the personal holding company tax and the rules regarding deficiency deductions are not undermined by compromise under these circumstances. The Service may consider accepting a compromise that would reflect the amount the taxpayer would now owe had the Service not made an error.


In contrast, compromise would not be authorized based on mistakes by the Service that did not cause the tax liability. For example, providing an incorrect statement of the balance due does not authorized the compromise of additional interest that may have later accrued. However, any relief from interest attributable to errors or delays by the Service should be granted under the standards set forth in section 6404(e). Compromise that would undermine those standards would not promote Effective Tax Administration (ETA). Similarly, relief from penalties attributable to errors by the Service should be granted pursuant to the standards for relief set forth in section 6404(e) and the IRM.

The Service will not compromise on public policy or equity grounds based solelyon the argument that the acts of a third party caused the unpaid tax liability. Third parties include the taxpayers:

Representative,

Partner,

Agent, or

employee


Note:
The actions of a third party may be part of a fact pattern that, viewed as a whole, presents compelling public policy or equity concerns justifying compromise. As with all compromises based on public policy or equity, the taxpayers situation must be compelling enough to justify compromise even though similarly situated taxpayers may have paid in full.


Compromise on public policy or equity grounds promotes Effective Tax Administration (ETA) only where it does not undermine compliance by other taxpayers. In general, compromise would undermine compliance where other taxpayers viewing the compromise may conclude that the taxpayer benefited from a failure to comply with the tax laws (i.e. the result of the compromise places the taxpayer in a position better than they would occupy had they timely and fully met their obligations). Such cases present the danger that other taxpayers may consider it beneficial to take the chance of not complying with the tax laws or litigating an issue they would otherwise concede or settle, and relying on compromise at some later date as a safety net. Factors supporting a determination that compromise would undermine include, but are not limited to:

The taxpayer has a history of noncompliance with the filing and payment requirements of the Internal Revenue Code.

The taxpayer has taken deliberate actions to avoid the payment of taxes.

The taxpayer has encouraged others to refuse to comply with the tax laws.

Note:
Additional factors such as the cause of the delinquency, length of non-compliance, and efforts to resolve non-compliance should also be considered. Generally a review of the last 3–5 years of compliance should be completed.



Once it has been determined that a case raises compelling public policy or equity considerations justifying compromise, the Service must still determine whether the amount offered by the taxpayer should be accepted to resolve the case. An acceptable offer amount should be based on a determination of what is fair and equitable under the circumstances. When public policy or equity considerations are identified but the taxpayer does not offer an acceptable amount, the offer should not be recommended for acceptance.

5.8.11.2.3 (09-01-2005)
Compromise Would Not Undermine Compliance With Tax Laws
No compromise to promote Effective Tax Administration (ETA) may be entered into if compromise of the liability would undermine compliance by taxpayers with the tax laws. See IRM 5.8.11.2.1(7), 5.8.11.2.1(9) and 5.8.11.2.2(11) above, for additional information.

5.8.11.3 (09-01-2005)
Initial Processing of Effective Tax Administration Offers
Offers submitted on the grounds of Effective Tax Administration (ETA) will be worked either by the COIC units or field specialists.

Taxpayers seeking a compromise under Effective Tax Administration (ETA) will submit the Form 656, Offer in Compromise, selecting ETA in Item 6, along with the Collection Information Statement (CIS) (Form 433-A and/or Form 433-B). Taxpayers must complete the Form 656, Item 9 and document their special circumstances. The documentation should explain why collection of the liability in full would cause economic hardship, or the public policy/equity issues present that would justify compromising the liability. An additional attachment can be provided if additional space is needed. If the taxpayer does not submit a financial statement with the offer, normal correspondence activity should be undertaken to secure the financial statement, and any other data determined necessary for evaluation of the offer. If the taxpayer fails to provide the requested information, normal "return" procedures should be followed since Effective Tax Administration (ETA) criteria can not be considered until all other bases have been addressed.

Like all other offers, the Service will only consider an Effective Tax Administration (ETA) offer when taxpayers have met the processability criteria (e.g. paid the application fee or filed Form 656-A; filed all required tax returns; submitted the Form 656, Form 433-A and/or Form 433-B on the latest revision of the forms; and are not a debtor in a bankruptcy proceeding). In-business taxpayers must have timely filed and timely deposited their quarterly federal taxes for the 2 preceding quarters and paid all federal tax deposits during the quarter in which the offer was filed.

Note:
Follow IRM 5.8.3, Processability Determination, for initial processing of offers.


Elements necessary to perfect an offer also apply to Effective Tax Administration (ETA) offers. The requirement to submit complete financial statements for ETA offers is the same as for Doubt as to Collectibility (DATC) offers.

Note:
Follow IRM 5.8.3.11, Types of Perfection, for procedures on perfecting offers.


Effective Tax Administration (ETA) offers are initially added to AOIC as Doubt as to Collectibility (DATC) offers. Once the offer investigation reveals that the taxpayers assets and future income exceed the tax liability thereby indicating no basis for a Doubt as to Collectibility (DATC), the offer should be considered under the ETA provisions. AOIC must be updated to reflect the correct basis for the compromise (e.g. ETA). Refer to IRM 5.8.11.7 below for a full discussion of requirements to update AOIC prior to final processing of ETA and Doubt as to Collectibility with Special Circumstances (DCSC) offers.

5.8.11.4 (09-01-2005)
Evaluation of Offers
Effective Tax Administration (ETA) offers cannot be considered if the taxpayer qualifies for Doubt as to Collectibility (DATC) or Doubt as to Liability (DATL).

Note:
Follow IRM 5.8.4, Evaluation of Offers, for Doubt as to Collectibility (DATC) issues and determining reasonable collection potential (RCP).


If the assets and future income do not exceed the tax liability and special circumstances exist, the taxpayers offer must be considered under Doubt as to Collectibility with Special Circumstance (DCSC). The taxpayers may have checked the ETA box and given an explanation of circumstance on the Form 656, however unless they have the ability to full pay the liability, the offer would not meet the legal standard for Effective Tax Administration (ETA) consideration. The offer must be considered under Doubt as to Collectibility with Special Circumstance (DCSC).

If the taxpayer submits an offer based on Doubt as to Collectibility (DATC) but collection potential exceeds the liability and there are special circumstances, the offer should be considered on the basis of Effective Tax Administration (ETA). The employee that investigates the offer is required to address any potential special circumstances during first contact with the taxpayer or the taxpayers representative. This will be accomplished in conjunction with the current requirement to verify receipt of Publication 1 and Publication 594 and must be documented in the offer case history. This requirement does not apply where the only taxpayer contact is through correspondence.

If the offer is rejected, the narrative should describe the considerations of both bases. If the offer is accepted the offer report must reflect the basis upon which the offer is accepted.

5.8.11.4.1 (09-01-2005)
Public Policy/Equity Issues
Offers submitted under the Public Policy/Equity provisions are authorized under these guidelines only when there are exceptional circumstances. While compromise under these guidelines is expected to be rare, appropriate recommendations for acceptance will be made.

In order to develop consistency in the interpretation and application of Treasury Regulations (TD 9007) published on July 22, 2002, a Specialty Group has been set up in Austin, Texas to work these offers.

Only after consideration has been given to all other potential bases for acceptance (e.g. Doubt as to Liability (DATL), Doubt as to Collectibility (DATC), Doubt as to Collectibility with Special Circumstance (DCSC), and/or Effective Tax Administration (ETA) based on economic hardship) will ETA-Public Policy/Equity be considered. Therefore, all cases must have been completely developed under all other bases before transfer will be accepted by the Austin Group.

After all other potential bases have been considered, complete Exhibit 5.8.11-1 "Non-Economic Hardship Effective Tax Administration (ETA) OIC Check Sheet." The check sheet must be completed and sent to the Austin group before any cases are transferred. The purpose of the check sheet is to document that all issues other than Public Policy/Equity ETA have been evaluated and to provide information on the non-economic ETA factors present.

The completed check sheet and a copy of the entire Form 656 should be faxed to offer Group Manager in Austin. The sender should include a copy of any letter or document presented by the taxpayer to support the special circumstances. The group will evaluate the information and respond to the sender within 10 workdays. This response will either be an explanation of why the taxpayers offer cannot be investigated under Public Policy/Equity ETA provisions, or a request to transfer the offer to the Austin group.

If the Austin group determines that the offer cannot be investigated under the Public Policy/Equity ETA provisions, the information will be faxed back to the sender who will be responsible for issuing the proposed rejection letter to the taxpayer, covering all factors considered.

If the Austin group determines that the information presented requires further analysis, the sender will be notified to transfer the case to Austin.

The sender should contact the taxpayer by telephone and advise the taxpayer of the results of the collectibility and liability portions of the offer investigation prior to transfer. If the taxpayer cannot be reached by phone then a standard transfer letter should be sent.

The file should be sent by overnight mail on Form 3210 to the Austin group.

At the time of mailing, the case should be transferred on AOIC to Area 10.

A history item should be added to AOIC to show the case is being sent to Austin, Area 10.

The Austin group will maintain the faxed copies of all check sheets received and appropriate documentation on all offers accepted for transfer. This documentation will provide a historical record to support a decision to accept or reject the offer.


Note:
The Offer Examiner or Offer Specialist may also seek guidance from the Austin group on a Doubt as to Collectibility with Special Circumstances (DCSC) offers that involve Public Policy/Equity issues. The guidance should be solicited by preparing the check sheet and documenting the issues involved in the case. However, these cases will not be transferred to the Austin group.


5.8.11.4.2 (09-01-2005)
Financial Statement Analysis
Offers submitted under Effective Tax Administration (ETA) require the same full financial analysis as Doubt as to Collectibility (DATC) offers in order to determine reasonable collection potential (RCP) and to determine an acceptable offer amount. Procedures for financial analysis are contained in IRM 5.8.5, Financial Analysis.

Once reasonable collection potential (RCP) is completed a determination can be made as to whether the offer qualifies for consideration under Effective Tax Administration (ETA) or Doubt as to Collectibility (DATC).

If the taxpayers assets and future income exceed the tax liability, the taxpayers offer can be considered under the Effective Tax Administration (ETA) basis.

5.8.11.4.3 (09-01-2005)
Determining an Acceptable Offer Amount
An acceptable offer amount, based on economic hardship, is determined by analyzing the financial information and the hardship that would be created if certain assets, or a portion of certain assets, were used to pay the liability.

Example:
The taxpayer has a $100,000 liability and a reasonable collection potential (RCP) of $125,000. To avoid economic hardship, it is determined that the taxpayer will need $75,000. The remaining $50,000 should be considered the acceptable offer amount.


In offers based on Public Policy/Equity, the Service would expect the taxpayer to offer an amount that is fair and equitable under the circumstances.

Generally, it is the responsibility of the taxpayer to make decisions and take the appropriate actions needed to fund the acceptable offer amount. However, due consideration of these funding options is often needed for the Service to arrive at an acceptable offer amount. For example, in some locations the availability of funding options such as reverse mortgages, assigning deeds of trust, etc. may allow the taxpayer to tap into available equity without creating economic hardship. These options should be taken into consideration in determining an acceptable offer amount for an Effective Tax Administration (ETA) offer based on economic hardship.

5.8.11.5 (09-01-2005)
Documentation and Verification
To verify the taxpayers special circumstances and support a basis of Effective Tax Administration (ETA):

Request supporting documentation of the taxpayers situation. Exercise sound judgement in determining the degree of verification necessary. For example, verification of a health problem could be a doctor’s letter or copies of medical expenses.

When special circumstances are found to exist, the amount offered will be less than reasonable collection potential (RCP). For Effective Tax Administration (ETA), reasonable collection potential (RCP) is always greater than the full liability. In the report narrative, explain clearly the rationale for acceptance of the amount offered. The documentation must include reasons why some or all of the equity in certain assets is not being offered, how the offer amount is being funded, and any other pertinent information that indicates how the amount offered was determined to be acceptable.


5.8.11.6 (09-01-2005)
Final Processing
Prior to final processing, AOIC must be updated to indicate the correct basis for closing the offer. This will ensure that all final closing reports generated from AOIC reflect the correct basis. The approval levels indicated on closing reports and letters must be consistent with the basis for closure.

The following is a guide to these determinations:

If… And… Then…
The offer was submitted under Effective Tax Administration (ETA) An economic hardship has been determined to exist, but the reasonable collection potential (RCP) is less than the liability balance due 1. Update the AOIC offer screen to indicate a "C" under the offer type.
2. Generate all closing reports with the proper approving official for Doubt as to Collectibility with Special Circumstances (DCSC).
The offer was submitted under Doubt as to Collectibility (DCSC) An economic hardship has been determined to exist, and the reasonable collection potential (RCP) is greater than the liability balance due 1. Update AOIC offer screen to indicate "A" under offer type.
2. Generate closing reports with the proper approving official for Effective Tax Administration (ETA) offers.
The offer was submitted under Effective Tax Administration (ETA) The offer is being recommended for acceptance under Doubt as to Collectibility (DATC) with the offer exceeding the reasonable collection potential (RCP) 1. AOIC offer screen does not require updating for special circumstances. The type of offer on AOIC should reflect "C" for Doubt as to Collectibility (DATC).
Generate closing reports with the proper approving official for Doubt as to Collectibility (DATC) without special circumstances.
The offer was submitted under Doubt as to Collectibility with item 9 of Form 656 completed with circumstances that do not meet any of the elements that define economic hardship, or Public Policy/Equity criteria The offer cannot be recommended for acceptance under Doubt as to Collectibility (DATC). Generate closing reports with the proper approving official for Doubt as to Collectibility (DATC) without special circumstances. Address in the history, why the circumstances described in item 9 do not meet defined economic hardship, or Public Policy/Equity criteria.
The offer was submitted under Effective Tax Administration (ETA) with item 9 of Form 656 completed with circumstances that do not meet ETA criteria The taxpayer does not qualify for ETA because the reasonable collection potential (RCP) is less than the liability and the offer cannot be recommended for acceptance under Doubt as to Collectibility with Special Circumstances (DCSC). 1. Update AOIC offer screen to indicate a "C" under special circumstances.
2. Generate closing reports with the proper approving official for Doubt as to Collectibility with Special Circumstances (DCSC).
The offer was submitted under Effective Tax Administration (ETA) with item 9 of the Form 656 completed with circumstances that the investigation reveals do not meet ETA criteria The offer cannot be recommended for acceptance and the reasonable collection potential (RCP) exceeds the liability 1. Update AOIC offer screen to indicate "A" under offer type.
3. Generate closing reports with the proper approving official for Effective Tax Administration (ETA) offers.
The offer was submitted under Effective Tax Administration (ETA) The special circumstances do meet economic hardship, or Public Policy/Equity criteria and the reasonable collection potential (RCP) exceeds the tax liability. However, the offer cannot be recommended for acceptance. 1. Update AOIC offer screen to indicate "A" under offer type.
3. Generate closing reports with the proper approving official for Effective Tax Administration (ETA) offers.
The offer was submitted under Doubt as to Collectibility with Special Circumstances (DCSC) The special circumstances do meet economic hardship, or Public Policy/Equity criteria and the reasonable collection potential (RCP) is less than the tax liability, however, the offer cannot be recommended for acceptance. Generate closing reports with the proper approving official for Doubt as to Collectibility with Special Circumstances (DCSC).


5.8.11.6.1 (09-01-2005)
Rejection/Return/Withdrawal Processing
The procedures in IRM 5.8.7, Return, Terminate, Withdraw, and Reject Processing, discussing rejections, withdrawals and returns should be followed when processing Effective Tax Administration (ETA) rejected, withdrawn or returned offers.

IRM 5.8.12, Independent Administrative Review, provides instructions for independent administrative review of rejected offers.

See Delegation Order No. 5-1 (formerly Delegation Order 11, Rev. 29) for the official with delegated authority based on Effective Tax Administration (ETA). The delegated official’s signature is required on the Form 1271 and the closing letter.

5.8.11.6.2 (09-01-2005)
Acceptance Processing
The procedures in IRM 5.8.8, Acceptance Processing , should be followed when processing accepted Effective Tax Administration (ETA) offers.

Area Counsel’s opinion is required on ETA offers where the unpaid amount of tax assessed (including any interest, addition to the tax, or assessable penalty) is $50,000 or more.

See Delegation Order No. 5-1 (formerly Delegation Order 11, Rev. 29) for the official with delegated authority to accept offers based on Effective Tax Administration (ETA). The delegated official’s signature is required on the Form 7249, Offer Acceptance Report, and the acceptance letter.

Exhibit 5.8.11-1 (09-01-2005)
Non-Hardship Effective Tax Administration (ETA) Offer in Compromise (OIC) Check Sheet

Labels:

Hobby (personal pleasure) or business expense


Ralph Thomas Whitecavage v. Commissioner.

Dkt. No. 788-06 , TC Memo. 2008-203, August 27, 2008.


[Code Secs. 183 and 6662]


A former IRS auditor was not entitled to deduct expenses incurred in his greyhound racing activities to the extent they exceeded his income from the activity. The taxpayer failed to establish that he engaged in the greyhound activity with the predominant, primary or principle objective of making a profit because most of the factors to be considered in making the determination weighed against him. The taxpayer failed to carry on the activity in a businesslike manner because he neither kept complete and accurate records nor maintained a business plan or budget for the activity. While the taxpayer may have had some knowledge about the mechanics of greyhound breeding and racing, he failed to demonstrate that he either consulted with economic experts or acquired his own personal economic expertise about the activity. Further, the taxpayer was a full-time employee while engaged in the activity and did breed enough litters of pups annually to be profitable. The value of the greyhounds generally depreciated over the years, a number of which did not survive training or were euthanized at the end of their racing lives. Finally, the taxpayer had 10 straight years of losses and never realized a profit from the activity, which was partially recreational for him. The taxpayer failed to present evidence that he had reasonable cause and acted in good faith to avoid the accuracy-related penalty for a substantial understatement of tax. Any defense could have been problematic, however, given the taxpayer's former employment.




Accuracy-Related
Penalty

Year Deficiency Sec. 6662(a)

2001 $1,590 --

2002 14,521 $2,904

2003 2,490 --





The issues for decision are: (1) Whether during 2001, 2002, and 2003 petitioner engaged for profit in the activity of breeding greyhounds for racing; and (2) whether petitioner is liable for a section 6662 accuracy-related penalty for 2002.



All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the taxable years at issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.





FINDINGS OF FACT



The parties have stipulated some facts, which are so found. When he petitioned the Court, petitioner resided in Arizona.



Petitioner was an auditor for the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) for 21 years, including the years at issue. He was stationed in the Yuma, Arizona, office of the IRS, where he worked about 42.5 hours a week before retiring in 2006.



Petitioner resided on his property about 3 miles from Yuma. In 1994 petitioner began breeding greyhounds there for the purpose of entering them in dog races. Each year he bred a litter of pups. Over 10 years he raised about 88 greyhounds.



Before 2002 petitioner kept his greyhounds in crates in his garage; twice a day he would take them out for exercise. During 2002 petitioner built a 1,000-square-foot kennel and added a new run and fencing.



Because of his full-time job at the IRS, petitioner could not spend much time with the dogs during workdays, but he fed and cleaned up after them mornings and evenings. Petitioner did not hire any caretaker to tend the dogs while he was at work.



Petitioner would keep the pups on his property until they were a little over 1 year old. Then he would send them to Florida, Oklahoma, or New Mexico to train for racing on a track. After being trained, petitioner's greyhounds were taken to be raced in Florida and Arizona. Petitioner received a percentage of any winnings.



Not all the greyhounds survived training; petitioner "lost" about 20 greyhounds because of bad training methods by the trainers in the racing kennels. The greyhounds that survived spent the rest of their racing lives on the track and generally did not return to petitioner. Instead, at the end of their racing lives the greyhounds generally would be "petted out"; i.e., sent into an adoption program or to a veterinarian, presumably to be euthanized. Petitioner received no money for these dogs upon their retirement.



Before he commenced breeding greyhounds for racing, petitioner did not consult an economist or other professional business adviser. Although he received some racetrack winnings, petitioner never realized a profit from breeding and racing greyhounds. Petitioner ceased his greyhound activity in 2006, the same year he retired from the IRS.



On Schedules C, Profit or Loss From Business, of his Forms 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, petitioner reported losses from his greyhound activity as follows:





2001 2002 2003

Gross dog-race
winnings $5,695 $3,746 $4,210

Total expenses 15,340 53,230 19,873

Net loss 9,645 49,484 15,663





By notice of deficiency respondent determined that these reported losses were not allowable under section 183 because petitioner's greyhound activity was not entered into for profit.1 Respondent also determined that for 2002 petitioner was liable for the section 6662 accuracy-related penalty, on the basis that petitioner's corrected income tax liability for 2002 was $20,513 rather than the $5,992 that petitioner had reported, giving rise to a substantial understatement of income tax within the meaning of section 6662(d).





OPINION




A. Petitioner's Greyhound Activity


Under section 183(b)(2), if an individual engages in an activity without the primary objective of making a profit, deductions attributable to the activity are allowable only to the extent of gross income from the activity. See Allen v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 28, 33 (1979). The critical inquiry is whether making a profit is the taxpayer's "predominant, primary, or principal objective". Wolf v. Commissioner, 4 F.3d 709, 713 (9th Cir. 1993), affg. T.C. Memo. 1991-212; Machado v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-526, affd. without published opinion 119 F.3d 6 (9th Cir. 1997); Warden v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-176, affd. without published opinion 111 F.3d 139 (9th Cir. 1997). Although the taxpayer need not have a reasonable expectation of realizing a profit, he or she must have a bona fide objective to do so. Burger v. Commissioner, 809 F.2d 355, 358 (7th Cir. 1987), affg. T.C. Memo. 1985-523; Golanty v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 411, 425-426 (1979), affd. without published opinion 647 F.2d 170 (9th Cir. 1981); sec. 1.183-2(a), Income Tax Regs. Whether the taxpayer has the requisite objective to realize a profit is a question of fact, to be resolved on the basis of all relevant circumstances, with greater weight being given to objective factors than to mere statements of intent. Dreicer v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 642, 645-646 (1982), affd. without opinion 702 F.2d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Golanty v. Commissioner, supra at 426. The taxpayer generally bears the burden of establishing that the activity was engaged in for profit.2 See Rule 142(a).



The regulations under section 183 provide a nonexclusive list of factors to be considered in determining whether an activity is engaged in for profit. The factors include: (1) The manner in which the taxpayer carried on the activity; (2) the expertise of the taxpayer or his advisers; (3) the time and effort the taxpayer spent in carrying on the activity; (4) the expectation that assets used in the activity may appreciate in value; (5) the taxpayer's success in carrying on other activities; (6) the taxpayer's history of income or losses with respect to the activity; (7) the amount of occasional profits, if any, which are earned; (8) the taxpayer's financial status; and (9) whether elements of personal pleasure or recreation are involved. Sec. 1.183-2(b), Income Tax Regs.; see Golanty v. Commissioner, supra at 426.



As discussed below, on the basis of all the evidence in the record we conclude that petitioner did not engage in his greyhound activity for profit within the meaning of section 183.



1. Manner in Which Petitioner Carried on the Activity



Petitioner did not carry on his greyhound activity in a businesslike manner. He did not maintain complete and accurate books and records regarding his greyhound activity, did not maintain a written business plan, and did not contemporaneously prepare budgets or financial analyses for his greyhound activity. Although petitioner claims to have prepared a "cost analysis plan", at trial he acknowledged that this plan was prepared only in the course of the audit and examination of the tax years at issue. His substantiation of claimed expenses was spotty and consisted largely of some canceled checks supported by his vague testimony. He had no written contracts with the third parties who trained, hauled, and raced his greyhounds.3



Petitioner was licensed with the Arizona Department of Racing, at least for 2001; he alleges that he was also licensed with the Texas Department of Racing and the Florida Department of Racing. He also alleges that he had "some of the best blood lines in Greyhound Racing in the State of Arizona." Such circumstances do not suffice to establish, however, that petitioner conducted his greyhound activity in a businesslike manner. This factor weighs against petitioner.



2. Expertise of Petitioner or Advisers



Preparation for an activity by extensive study of its accepted business, economic, and scientific practices, or consultation with those who are expert therein, may indicate a profit motive if the taxpayer carries on the activity in accordance with such practices. Sec. 1.183-2(b)(2), Income Tax Regs. In analyzing profit motive, a distinction must be drawn between expertise in the mechanics of an activity and expertise in the business and economic aspects of an activity. See Burger v. Commissioner, supra at 359. Failure to consult economic experts or to develop an economic expertise may indicate a lack of a profit motive. Id.



Although petitioner presumably acquired some knowledge about the mechanics of greyhound breeding and racing before he commenced his greyhound activity, he has not demonstrated that he consulted economic experts or developed any personal economic expertise as to how to make a profitable business of his greyhound activity. This factor weighs against petitioner.



3. Time and Effort Expended in Activity



Time and effort expended in carrying on an activity may be indicative of profit motive, particularly in the absence of substantial personal or recreational elements associated with the activity. Sec. 1.183-2(b)(3), Income Tax Regs. During the years at issue, petitioner was a full-time IRS employee. At trial petitioner acknowledged that his full-time IRS job limited the time he could devote to the greyhound activity. Petitioner had time to breed only one litter of pups annually. At trial he conceded that for his greyhound activity to be profitable he would have needed to breed at least three or four litters annually. This factor weighs strongly against petitioner.



4. Expectation That Assets May Appreciate in Value



On brief petitioner contends that the expectation that one or more of his greyhounds might become a winning "Stakes Dog" was "a major component" in his decision to engage in his greyhound activity. He claims that such a dog "could easily have an expected value price of between $100,000 to $250,000." The evidence strongly suggests, however, that petitioner's greyhounds generally depreciated in value, being either "lost" during training or else "petted out" at the end of their racing careers.4 Insofar as the record shows, in all the years that petitioner engaged in his greyhound activity, he never sold any of his dogs. On the basis of the evidence in the record, we are unpersuaded that petitioner had a bona fide expectation of making a profit on his greyhound activity by selling his dogs at a price that would generate sufficient income to offset past losses.



Petitioner claims that improvements made to his property in 2002, such as the addition of a kennel house, added "considerable value" to his property. There is no evidence, however, that petitioner held his property with a view of subsequently selling it for a profit to defray the costs of his greyhound activity. Accordingly, we do not take these improvements into account in judging petitioner's objective in conducting the greyhound activity. See Golanty v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. at 430. In any event, the evidence in the record does not establish either the cost of the improvements or the extent to which they might have added to the property's value. This factor weighs against petitioner.



5. Petitioner's Success in Other Activities



If the taxpayer has engaged in similar activities in the past and converted them from unprofitable to profitable enterprises, it may tend to show that the current activity was entered into for profit, even though it is presently unprofitable. Sec. 1.183-2(b)(5), Income Tax Regs. Insofar as the record reveals, petitioner has not engaged in other activities similar to the greyhound activity by which we might evaluate his success in those other activities.5 This factor is neutral.



6. History of Income or Losses From Activity



Where losses continue beyond the period which is customarily necessary to bring the operation to profitable status, it may be an indication that the activity is not engaged in for profit. Sec. 1.183-2(b)(6), Income Tax Regs. As of 2003 petitioner had realized losses from his greyhound activity for 10 straight years. This factor weighs against petitioner.



7. Amount of Occasional Profits



The amount and frequency of occasional profits earned from the activity may be indicative of a profit objective. Sec. 1.183-2(b)(7), Income Tax Regs. Petitioner never realized a profit from his greyhound activity. This factor weighs against petitioner.



8. Petitioner's Financial Status



Substantial income from sources other than the activity may indicate lack of a profit motive, especially if there are personal or recreational elements involved. Sec. 1.183-2(b)(8), Income Tax Regs. During the years at issue, petitioner had a full-time job with the IRS. This factor weighs against petitioner.



9. Elements of Personal Pleasure



The presence of personal motives in carrying on an activity, especially if recreational or personal elements are involved, may indicate that the activity is not for profit. Sec. 1.183-2(b)(9), Income Tax Regs. The mere fact that a taxpayer derives pleasure from an activity, however, does not show a lack of profit objective if the activity is conducted for profit as evidenced by other factors. Id.



Certain aspects of petitioner's activity, such as feeding, grooming, and cleaning up after the greyhounds, generally might not be considered pleasurable, even though they are not so different from the duties of any pet owner. Ultimately, however, it seems to us that petitioner's activity of breeding greyhounds for racing, although conducted by petitioner in a seemingly inhumane manner (for many years keeping numerous dogs confined in crates in his Yuma, Arizona, garage, while he worked a full-time job at the IRS, sending the pups off to "training" that almost a fourth of them would not survive, and ultimately casting off most of the others for possible adoption or destruction)6 involved recreational elements as are common to other forms of recreational gambling, with those elements being enhanced by such sense of sport or gamesmanship as might derive from having one's own dogs in the races. This factor weighs against petitioner.



On the basis of all the evidence, we conclude that petitioner failed to establish that he engaged in his greyhound activity with a predominant, primary, or principal objective to make a profit within the meaning of section 183.




B. Section 6662 Accuracy-Related Penalty


Section 6662(a) and (b)(2) imposes a 20-percent accuracy-related penalty on any portion of a tax underpayment that is attributable to, among other things, any substantial understatement of income tax, defined in section 6662(d)(1)(A) as an understatement that exceeds the greater of 10 percent of the tax required to be shown on the return or $5,000. Sec. 6662(d)(1). Petitioner's understatement of tax for 2002 ($14,521) exceeds $5,000 (which is greater than 10 percent of the tax required to be shown on his 2002 return ($2,051)). Respondent has satisfied his burden of production under section 7491(c).



The accuracy-related penalty does not apply with respect to any portion of the underpayment if it is shown that the taxpayer had reasonable cause and acted in good faith. Sec. 6664(c)(1). Petitioner has not shown (or even expressly claimed) that he had reasonable cause or acted in good faith with respect to his understatements of income tax. Any such defense appears especially problematic in the light of petitioner's employment as an IRS auditor.



Contentions advanced by the parties and not addressed herein we conclude to be moot or without merit.7



Decision will be entered for respondent.


1 Respondent allowed petitioner miscellaneous itemized deductions equal to the amounts of gross income reported from the greyhound activity.

2 Petitioner has not claimed or shown that he meets the requirements under sec. 7491(a)(1) to shift the burden of proof to respondent as to any factual issue relating to his liability for tax.

3 At trial petitioner indicated that he wished to call as a witness Lonnie Boyle, who allegedly hauled petitioner's dogs to training sites and leased petitioner's dogs to run under Mr. Boyle's kennel name. Petitioner stated that he expected to elicit from Mr. Boyle testimony about the "mechanics of the racing kennel" and "basically what happens to the dogs through the racing end of it and what happens when it's petted out." Having failed to subpoena Mr. Boyle, however, petitioner failed to have him available at trial. The Court declined petitioner's request to continue the trial to receive Mr. Boyle's testimony at some later date. Insofar as it might be pertinent to our analysis of whether petitioner engaged in his greyhound activity for profit within the meaning of sec. 183, the subject matter of Mr. Boyle's expected testimony, as described by petitioner, appears largely redundant of undisputed information already in the record. Moreover, insofar as petitioner may have sought to elicit expert testimony from Mr. Boyle, petitioner failed to submit an expert report pursuant to Rule 143(f).

4 Petitioner claims that in 2000 one of his greyhounds won a race but acknowledges that by 2001 the greyhound had "finished her career" as a brood on his farm.

5 On brief, petitioner alleges that before going to work for the IRS he worked in the hotel industry.

6 In making these observations, we intend no inference as to any finding of criminal liability of petitioner, an issue which is beyond the purview of this Court.

7 In particular, petitioner states on brief that he "believes" that he has been audited twice for tax years 2001 and 2002, the first time as part of an investigation by the U.S. Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA). He appears to suggest that because of this purported TIGTA investigation, the subsequent IRS examination which resulted in the notice of deficiency that is the subject of this proceeding was a second examination of petitioner's books and records that was prohibited pursuant to sec. 7605(b). Petitioner cites no authority (and we are aware of none) for the proposition that sec. 7605(b) applies to a TIGTA investigation of an IRS employee. In any event, the evidence in the record does not establish that respondent ever examined petitioner's books and records in connection with any TIGTA audit. To the contrary, according to petitioner's representations on brief, the TIGTA audit appears to have been concluded upon the basis of an interview with petitioner.

Labels:

Wednesday, August 27, 2008


The government failed to prove that a debtor corporation was the alter ego of a delinquent taxpayer or that the debtor's acquisition of the taxpayer's property constituted a fraudulent transfer under state (Florida) law.
Moreover, while the taxpayer and the debtor were related business entities with shared ownership and office space, the government treated them as separate taxable entities and the IRS assessed taxes and obtained separate and distinct liens against both businesses. Consequently, the debtor could not be held liable for the taxpayer's delinquent tax liabilities. Therefore, the government's right to the surplus funds deposited with the court following the sale of the debtor's property was limited to the amount owed by the debtor. Further, although the debtor acquired the taxpayer's property through a public Chapter 11 bankruptcy auction, the acquisition was not fraudulent or improper but in satisfaction of a valid debt. A promissory note and mortgage securing the debtor's loan to the taxpayer was prima facie evidence of the debt and the loan existed and remained enforceable at the time of the bankruptcy auction.





Old West Annuity and Life Insurance Company, Plaintiff, United States of America, Intervenor-plaintiff v. The Apollo Group, a California Corporation, Defendant.






MEMORANDUM OPINION


HODGES, District Judge: This case concerns a dispute over the disposition of funds deposited in the Court's registry following a Court-approved sale of certain real property located in Clermont, Florida. The property was formerly owned by the Defendant, the Apollo Group, Inc., ("Apollo"), a debtor of Plaintiff Old West Annuity and Life Insurance Company, ("Old West"), and Intervenor-Plaintiffs United States of America, Camp Coast to Coast, Inc., and Affinity Group, Inc. 1 The Court-approved sale generated net proceeds of $4,406,387.61, and on February 28, 2005, the Court directed that the amount of $2,886,261.10 plus interest, be distributed to Old West in full satisfaction of its superior mortgage interest in the Clermont property. (Doc. 97).

A balance of just over $1.5 million remains in the Court's registry. The United States contends that it is entitled to the entire fund to satisfy a tax lien for Apollo's unpaid taxes of approximately $25,000 plus other unpaid tax assessments in excess of $10 million against Apollo,'s alleged alter ego, All Seasons Resorts, Inc. ("All Seasons").

Coast claims an interest in the fund based on a judgment lien on the Clermont property from prior litigation against Apollo in Orange County, California.

The Parties agree that the United States' direct tax claims against Apollo take priority over Coast's judgment lien and should be paid first from the remaining proceeds. There is also no dispute over the validity of the tax liens against All Seasons.

Following an extensive discovery and motions process, the task of distributing the remaining fund has been distilled to two outstanding issues: (1) whether Apollo was the alter ego of All Seasons, and can be held liable for All Seasons' tax liabilities; and (2) whether Apollo's acquisition of the Clermont property from All Seasons in October 1997 constituted a fraudulent transfer under Florida law such that the United States can have the transfer avoided. A non-jury trial was held on these remaining issues, during which the Parties submitted numerous exhibits and the deposition excerpts of one witness, Raymond G. Novelli. At the conclusion of the trial, the Parties were provided the opportunity to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, (Docs. 168-69), and the matter is now ripe for resolution.




FINDINGS OF FACT


At the non-jury trial, the following was established by a preponderance of the testimony and documentary evidence offered and admitted into evidence.



I. The Corporate Entities

All Seasons was a Washington state corporation that owned and managed numerous private membership campgrounds. On June 7, 1984, All Seasons acquired the Clermont property which All Seasons then operated as a private campground. Raymond Novelli became the President of All Seasons in May, 1986 and remained its President through its liquidation in 1997. Novelli's wife, Marlies Novelli, was All Seasons' Secretary. Mr. Novelli owned 75 percent of All Seasons' voting stock, and the other 25 percent was owned by the Schulz Family Trust. 2 Raymond Novelli's brother-in-law, Hans Schulz, was the trustee and creator of the Schulz Family Trust.

Since 1986, All Seasons has failed to pay its federal employment taxes and unemployment taxes, and now owes to the United States approximately $10,779,556.47 plus interest and penalties. The United States, through the Internal Revenue Service, has made tax assessments against All Seasons for these unpaid taxes, and obtained federal tax liens --the same liens which the United States seeks to enforce in this case.

Apollo was incorporated in California on May 29, 1995 for the general purpose of investing in resort properties. Since the time of its formation, and throughout its existence, Raymond Novelli was one of Apollo's principals and, at various times, there were up to 10 other shareholders. Apollo never had its own employees, but did have its own bank account, and for approximately ten years it shared the same business address as All Seasons. Apollo did not pay its federal employment and unemployment taxes for the tax year 1997 and as of December 7, 2006, owes the IRS approximately $25,000. At the time Apollo filed for bankruptcy in 2001, Novelli was the company President/Director and owner of 25 percent of the voting stock, Hans Schulz was the Vice President/Director and owner of 51 percent of the voting stock, and Marlies Novelli was the Secretary/Director and owner of the remaining 24 percent of the voting stock.



II. The 1986 Note and Mortgage

Apollo is the general partner of The Apollo Group, Ltd., a California limited partnership ("Apollo, Ltd."). 3 On April 23, 1986, Apollo, Ltd. loaned All Seasons $1,000,000, for which The Apollo Group received a promissory note and a mortgage on the Clermont property. The note was signed by Leonard Gross, then-President of All Seasons. The terms of the note required that All Seasons make quarterly payments at 12 percent interest. The mortgage was a subordinate mortgage, and at the time of its execution, there purported to be sufficient equity in the Clermont property to secure the loan. The United States has not submitted any evidence to the contrary.

On December 29, 1986, the Mortgage and Security Agreement was filed of record in Lake County, Florida. Although Novelli did not sign the promissory note, he did sign the Mortgage and Security Agreement in his role as President of All Seasons. 4 The Agreement was notarized by Novelli's wife, Marlies Novelli, and witnessed by Hans Schulz, Marlies' brother. Novelli testified at his deposition that All Seasons made a few payments on the Mortgage and note, but not many.



III. All Seasons' Bankruptcy Proceedings

Between 1986 and 1997, All Seasons filed for bankruptcy three times, all in the Central District of California. The first two bankruptcy proceedings were filed under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (in 1987 and 1990), and a plan of reorganization was confirmed. Each plan included payment to Apollo, Ltd. for All Seasons' debt. 5 Between one and three payments were made to Apollo, Ltd. after each bankruptcy proceeding, but the debt was never satisfied. At some point, Apollo, Ltd.'s limited partners filed suit against All Seasons for collection on the note, but the suit was eventually dismissed.

On June 7, 1996, Finova Capital Corporation, a mortgagee of All Seasons, filed suit against All Seasons in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, alleging that All Seasons had defaulted on secured obligations. All Seasons was placed into receivership on August 29, 1996. On July 11, 1997, All Seasons filed its filed its third and final bankruptcy in the Central District of California.

During the bankruptcy proceedings, an entity known as "The Apollo Group" was listed as an unsecured creditor in the amount of $302,415. The United States, through the Internal Revenue Service, also filed a claim for tax assessments against All Seasons --the same tax assessments the United States now seeks to recover in this case.

A bankruptcy trustee was appointed to operate All Seasons' business on August 4, 1997. Following an investigation into All Seasons' assets and creditors, the Trustee determined that All Seasons' business could not continue to operate, that reorganization was not feasible, and that liquidation was appropriate. The Trustee terminated All Season's business on September 29, 1997, and began preparing for the sale of its assets.

Pursuant to the Trustee's Final Report, the Trustee determined what assets should be sold by: (1) reviewing the receivers' appraisals and financial reports from August 29, 1996 to July 31, 1997; (2) reviewing an informal title report dated January 15, 1997 and an updated report dated October 3, 1997; (3) reviewing the pre-petition and post-petition liabilities from the operation of All Season's business; (4) obtaining the computer disks and written copy of the 18,000 membership list from the receiver; (5) obtaining a UCC search dated October 10, 1997 for each state where All Seasons did business; and (6) communicating with the parties in interest. The Trustee then marketed All Seasons' assets, including the Clermont property, for auction, which was scheduled for October 27, 1997.

The Trustee held the public auction on October 27, 1997 as scheduled. That day, Apollo, Ltd. filed a secured claim in the bankruptcy proceedings in the amount of $2,127,820. Mr. Novelli was not directly involved in the decision to file the secured claim, but he was aware of it, and he did participate in at least one meeting of the partnership of Apollo, Ltd. during which the possibility of acquiring some or all of the campgrounds was discussed.

The secured claim listed Apollo, Ltd.'s current address as 17672-B Cowan Avenue, Irvine, California, the same address that All Seasons listed on its bankruptcy petition, and was signed by Phillip Martinez as president of Apollo, Ltd. 6 At the auction, Apollo, Ltd. successfully bid on the Clermont property. The IRS was present at the auction, as well as other creditors of All Seasons. There is no evidence that anyone --including the IRS --challenged the validity of Apollo Ltd.'s secured claim, or its right to bid on the property, either before or after the sale. 7 As part of the sale, the Trustee also sold to Apollo, Ltd. the membership list for the Clermont property's campground.

At the conclusion of the auction the bankruptcy court conducted a hearing on the sale of assets, at which time the court heard from the Trustee, secured creditors, and credit bidders. No one raised any objections to Apollo, Ltd.'s purchase of the Clermont property, and the purchase was confirmed by the bankruptcy court by order dated November 4, 1997. The order recites that the Clermont property, along with the list of members for the campground located on that property, was sold and transferred to "The Apollo Group, Ltd., by its General Partner Apollo Group, Inc., a California limited partnership," for the amount of $1,700,000, to be offset against the Apollo Group's secured claim. The order further recited that Apollo would take title


subject only to: A) any and all claims or liens of Lake County, including but not limited to property taxes and related property tax claims or liens, and, B) all other valid and perfected liens, if any, which are senior to the lien held by the Apollo Group. Except as specifically provided herein, the Apollo Group shall take title free and clear of all junior liens, claims, encumbrances, or interests.


According to the bankruptcy court order, All Seasons was represented by its attorney T. Edward Malports, and Terry Moshenko, who had previously held the position of All Seasons' receiver in the Arizona proceedings, appeared on behalf of The Apollo Group at the hearing confirming the bankruptcy auction. 8

On January 23, 1998, the Trustee executed a Bankruptcy Trustee's Deed conveying the Clermont property to "The Apollo Group, general partner of the Apollo Group, Ltd." free and clear of all other liens. 9 The deed was not recorded in Lake County, Florida until November 18, 1999. It is unclear exactly why the property was conveyed to the corporate general partner as opposed to the limited partnership itself.

The Trustee submitted his final report on August 4, 1998 recommending that All Season's bankruptcy case be dismissed because there was no likelihood of reorganization. The bankruptcy court approved the final report and dismissed the case on August 5, 1998. At that time All Seasons had been fully liquidated and ceased to exist.

On December 24, 1999, Apollo executed a "Quit Claim Deed to Correct Error" in order to address any title concern that may have arisen from the language of the Bankruptcy Trustee's Deed with respect to the Clermont property. The Quit Clam Deed, which was signed by Hans Schulz as President of Apollo, clarified that the intent of the parties at the time of the October 1997 bankruptcy sale was to convey the Clermont property directly to Apollo in its role as the general partner of Apollo, Ltd., and not to provide Apollo, Ltd. with any ownership to the property. The Quit Claim Deed was filed and recorded with the Lake County Clerk of Circuit Court on December 29, 1999, along with a "Partnership Affidavit" listing the partners of The Apollo Group as Apollo, Ray Novelli, Hans Schulz, Mel Tari, Curtis Bain, and Marlies Novelli. The Quit Claim Deed listed the business addresses for both Apollo and Apollo, Ltd. as the same Irvine, California location.



IV. Post-Bankruptcy Events

On March 16, 1998, Apollo filed a bankruptcy petition with the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The petition was signed by Phillip Martinez as Apollo, Inc.'s president and Ray Novelli testified that he participated in the decision to file for bankruptcy. The petition listed Apollo, Inc.'s address as the same Irvine California address used by All Seasons at the time of its bankruptcy proceedings and by Apollo, Ltd. on its secured claim in All Seasons' bankruptcy.

Apollo, Inc.'s bankruptcy petition stated that it was the owner of the Clermont property, as well as the four other campgrounds Schulz transferred to The Apollo Group in 1997. The Michigan bankruptcy proceeding was dismissed on March 31, 2000 as having been filed in bad faith. Apollo, Inc.'s disclosure statement noted that Apollo had previously entered into lease agreements with Travel America, Inc., a California corporation and successor to All Seasons, and that Travel America would operate the campgrounds.

Ray Novelli was the president of Travel America, Hans Schulz ran the company's computer systems and billing systems, and Marlies Novelli assisted with campground operations. All five campgrounds used the same computer system and the same collections department. Each campground was charged a pro rata share of common expenses like office rent and telephones, and all of the monies received from the campgrounds (such as membership dues) were pooled into a single sweep account. Money would be taken from the sweep account to pay each campground's bills. With respect to the Clermont property itself, the campground continued to operate under the same rules previously established by All Seasons, and All Seasons' members were permitted to use the property under the same terms after Apollo acquired the property. There is no evidence that Apollo was a general or limited partner of Travel America, or that there was any common ownership.

Mr. Novelli has continued to use the name "All Seasons" in several successor companies. On November 24, 1999, more than two years after Apollo acquired the Clermont property at the bankruptcy auction and more than one year after All Seasons' dissolution, Apollo created Orlando All Seasons Resort, Inc. ("Orlando All Seasons"), in order to operate the Clermont property. Orlando All Seasons conducted its initial organizational meeting on January 17, 2000. On October 25, 2000, Delaware All Seasons Resorts, Inc., ("Delaware All Seasons") was created to be a conduit to manage properties as part of a reorganization plan to be proffered in an anticipated Apollo bankruptcy. Although these entities bear similar names to the now defunct All Seasons, Mr. Novelli testified at his deposition that the entities are separate and distinct --both from each other and from the dissolved All Seasons --and that he took the similar names because they were available and because he thought they would be recognizable to prospective customers. 10



V. The Old West Foreclosure Proceedings

On January 28, 1998, before Apollo filed for bankruptcy, Apollo, along with Travel America, Hans Schulz as Trustee for the Schulz Family Trust, and twelve other corporate plaintiffs filed suit against Coast and other entities and individuals in Orange County, California, Superior Court. Plaintiffs' counsel was Terry Moshenko, the prior receiver for All Seasons' Arizona receivership and the representative of Apollo in the October 1997 bankruptcy auction. The Orange County complaint alleged that these plaintiffs owned and operated membership recreational vehicle resorts throughout the United States and that they had entered into a series of contract with Coast, which had been breached.

On June 7, 2000, Apollo gave a promissory note and mortgage on the Clermont property to Old West. Both the note and the mortgage were signed by Hans Schulz as Apollo's president. Ray Novelli was involved in the negotiations for the loan and gave final approval for its execution. The documents listed Apollo's address as the same Irvine California address previously used by All Seasons, and now used by Travel America.

On February 11, 2001, Old West filed suit in California state court to foreclose its mortgage on the Clermont property. On February 14, 2001, judgment for attorney's fees was entered in the Orange County, California case in favor of Coast and the other defendants and against Apollo and the other plaintiffs in the amount of $3,880,038.54. On April 23, 2001, Apollo filed for bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Ohio. The bankruptcy petition listed Ray Novelli as president, director and 25 percent stockholder in Apollo, Hans Schulz as vice-president, director, and 51 percent stockholder, and Marlies Novelli as secretary, director and 24 percent stockholder. As of October 28, 2004, Novelli also held the position of secretary-treasurer. At this time, ten different campgrounds were being operated out of the Irvine, California offices, with the office lease in the name of All Seasons Resorts, Inc.

In July 2003, the automatic stay in the Ohio bankruptcy proceeding was modified to allow the foreclosure action on the Clermont property to go forward in state court in Lake County. The United States and Coast subsequently obtained orders further modifying the stay to allow them each to intervene and attempt to collect on their liens. The United States filed a complaint in intervention in the state court proceeding and removed the action to this Court on October 10, 2003, (Doc. 3). A receiver was appointed for the Clermont property on March 29, 2004 (Doc. 22), and Coasts' motion to intervene was granted on September 24, 2004. (Doc. 32).

Following a hearing on the matter, the Court issued an Order authorizing the sale of the Clermont property by the receiver and directing that the net proceeds of the sale be deposited into the Court's registry. (Doc. 59). The Order provided that, in accordance with the stipulation of all parties, all liens would attach to the sale proceeds to the same extent and in the same priority that they attached to the property, with the United States's liens taking priority over Coast's. The Court subsequently disbursed nearly three million dollars to Old West in satisfaction of its mortgage. (Doc. 97).



VI. Additional Procedural History

After Old West received its share of the sale proceeds, the United States moved to amend and supplement its complaint in intervention to include a new claim that Apollo is also the alter ego of Travel America, and to include a request that upon the Court's resolution of all claims in this case, the Court refrain from disbursing the sale proceeds and instead transmit the remaining balance to the trustee in Apollo's Ohio bankruptcy proceedings for distribution in accordance with the priority established in the Bankruptcy Code. (Doc. 107). The Court denied the United States' request to amend its complaint, but permitted amendment and argument on the bankruptcy transfer issue. (Doc. 121). On September 25, 2006, the Court denied the United States' Motion for an Order that Funds be Transferred to Custody of Chapter 7 Trustee, the United States' Motion on Behalf of Bankruptcy Estate for Transfer of Funds, and denied Coast's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 149).




CONCLUSIONS OF LAW


The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§1340 and 1345, and 26 U.S.C. §7402 (a).



I. Federal vs. Florida Alter Ego Law

The United States' first argument in favor of receiving the entire sale proceeds is that Apollo was the alter ego of All Seasons and therefore is equally liable for all of All Seasons' federal tax obligations. 11 There is no dispute that the United States --as the party seeking to pierce the corporate veil and establish alter ego liability --bears the burden of proof on this point. Matter of Multiponics, Inc., 622 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1980); In re Hillsborough Holdings Corp., 166 B.R. 461, 468 (M.D. Fla. 1994). However, before the Court can address whether Apollo is in fact All Seasons' alter ego, the Court must first determine the applicable source of the rule of decision. The United States advocates the use of federal common law, while Coast supports the application of Florida alter ego law.

The Court's decision on this point is critical; federal common law and Florida law define alter ego liability quite differently. The Eleventh Circuit set out the federal standard in Shades Ridge Holding Co., Inc. v. United States, 888 F.2d 725 (11th Cir. 1989), listing three factors to be used to determine alter ego status: (1) the control taxpayer exercises over the nominee or alter ego and its assets; (2) the use of corporate funds to pay the taxpayer's personal expenses; and (3) the family relationship, if any, between the taxpayer and the corporate officers. Id. at 729. The key issue is one of "who has `active' or `substantial' control". Id. at 728. See also In re Homelands of DeLeon Srings, 190 B.R. 666, 669 (M.D. Fla. 1995).

In contrast, Florida courts have adopted a very stringent three-part test, which requires persuasive evidence that: (1) the shareholder dominated and controlled the corporation to such an extent that the corporation's independent existence was in fact nonexistent and the shareholders were in fact alter egos of the corporation; (2) the corporate form must have been used fraudulently or for an improper purpose; and (3) the fraudulent or improper use of the corporate form caused injury to the claimant. Hillsborough Holdings Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 166 B.R. 461, 468 (M.D. Fla. 1994). See also Homelands, 190 B.R. at 670; Dania Jai-Alai Palace, Inc. v. Sykes, 450 So.2d 1114 (1984). Unlike federal common law which focuses solely on the relationship and level of control between entities, Florida courts "disregard the corporate entity in only the most extraordinary cases," and only where there is "proof of deliberate misuse of the corporate form --tantamount to fraud...." Hillsborough Holdings, 166 B.R. at 468. See also Hobco, Inc. v. Tallahassee Assoc., 807 F.2d 1529, 1534 (11th Cir. 1987) ("`[T]he corporate veil may not be pierced [in Florida] absent a showing of improper conduct.' ") (citation omitted); Lovette v. Happy Hooker II, 2006 WL 66722, * 6 (M.D. Fla. 2006) ("[t]he Florida courts have imposed a strict standard upon those wishing to pierce the corporate veil."); Mills v. Webster, 212 B.R. 1006, 1009 (M.D. Fla. 1997) ("Those who seek to pierce the corporate veil...carry a very heavy burden.") (citing Hillsborough Holdings, 166 B.R. at 468).

The United States and Coast have presented a multitude of contrasting decisions from a variety of jurisdictions which have applied either federal common law or the law of the forum state to determine alter ego liability under various federal statutory schemes. 12 The United States has also propounded a lengthy policy argument as to why federal common law should apply. 13 However, all of the decisions cited from courts within this Circuit have applied the law of the forum state in which the court sits, 14 and more importantly, the vast majority of the decisions throughout the United States which address alter ego liability in the federal income tax arena have squarely applied the law of the forum state. 15 Thus, it appears that the better weight of authority militates in favor of applying Florida law to the alter ego analysis. And, applying Florida's three-part test to the evidence submitted in this case, it is clear that the United States has not met its very heavy burden of establishing alter ego status for Apollo.



II. Apollo Was Not An Alter Ego of All Seasons Under Florida Law

With respect to the first prong of Florida's three-part test, domination and control, the United States has presented evidence that All Seasons, Apollo, and Apollo, Ltd. were related business entities with shared ownership and, for several years, shared office space. The Novellis and Hans Schulz at various times were shareholders and principals of each company, and Ray Novelli in particular was involved in the decisions concerning the original loan to All Seasons, each of All Seasons' bankruptcy proceedings, and Apollo's purchase of the Clermont property at the bankruptcy sale. What the United States has not done, however, is present persuasive evidence that Apollo did not have an existence independent from All Seasons.

"The law is clear that the mere ownership of a corporation by a few shareholders, or even one shareholder, is an insufficient reason to pierce the corporate veil." Gasparini v. Pordomingo, 972 So. 2d 1053, 1055 (Fla. 3d Dist Ct. App. 2008). "[E]ven if a corporation is merely an alter ego of its dominant shareholder or shareholders, the corporate veil cannot be pierced so long as the corporation's separate identity was lawfully maintained." Lipsig v. Ramlawi, 760 So. 2d 170, 187 (Fla. 3d Dist.Ct.App. 2000). Here, the United States has presented no evidence even suggesting that Apollo's corporate identity was not lawfully maintained.

To the contrary, the undisputed evidence is that Apollo operated as a separate and distinct financing entity which raised money to lend to All Seasons so that All Seasons could operate its camping grounds. It is a legitimate corporate purpose to set up a corporation to marshal funds and lend money in debt financing for another company, and the United States has made no argument to the contrary. 16 Moreover, there is ample evidence that All Seasons engaged in sufficient "business activity" to be considered a separate taxable entity --it owned and operated camping grounds and mortgaged its property to Apollo and others in order to continue operations. See Moline Properties, Inc. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 319 U.S. 436 (1943); Homelands, 190 B.R. at 671-72. Indeed, the United States itself treated both Apollo and All Seasons as separate taxable entities; the IRS has assessed taxes and obtained separate and distinct liens against both businesses. 17

Other than common identity of some of the shareholders, the United States has not shown that any one shareholder --presumably Ray Novelli --completely controlled and dominated Apollo and All Seasons such that their separate corporate identities evaporated. Rather, the evidence shows that while Mr. Novelli may have had some involvement in various business decisions, there were always other individuals involved. 18 Moreover, the United States has not presented any evidence sufficient to challenge the existence and/or validity of Apollo, Ltd.'s loan to All Seasons in 1986. Rather, the sole witness proffered by the United States, Ray Novelli, testified that the loan was conducted at arms-length, signed by the President of All Seasons, and that at least some payments were made on the loan. The United States has not done anything to refute these facts, other than to emphasize that some of the shareholders owned both companies. This is simply not enough.

Even if the Court were to assume that the United States had established that Apollo and All Seasons were one and the same, the Court concludes that the United States has not met its burden on the last two factors: that Apollo Inc.'s corporate form was used for a fraudulent or improper purpose which caused harm to any creditors. To support this portion of its argument, the United States makes four contentions: (1) that the original loan from Apollo, Ltd. to All Seasons in 1986 was either not valid to begin with or did not survive All Seasons' first two bankruptcies; (2) that Apollo was acting under the direction of Novelli at the time of the October 1997 bankruptcy auction, and that Novelli deliberately set out to obtain the Clermont property to avoid paying All Seasons' creditors; (3) that by waiting until the day of the auction to file its secured claim, Apollo, Ltd., acting in concert with All Seasons, fraudulently obtained the Clermont property to the detriment of All Seasons' other creditors; and (4) that after Apollo acquired the Clermont property, it subsequently leased the property to the newly-formed Travel America company, and ultimately to the newly-formed Orlando All Seasons corporation. 19

With respect to the first contention, the Court concludes that the 1986 loan from Apollo, Ltd. to All Seasons was valid, secured by a properly executed note and mortgage, and existed and remained enforceable at the time of the October 1997 bankruptcy auction. The promissory note and mortgage memorializing and securing the 1986 loan have been submitted as part of the record in this case; and the Court finds that their existence is prima facie evidence of the debt itself. See Perez v. Rivero, 534 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988). In addition, Ray Novelli, the only witness proffered by the United States, testified as to the existence of the note and mortgage, that All Seasons made some payments on the note, and that Apollo, Ltd. filed claims in both of All Seasons' prior bankruptcies. 20 The United States has not put forth any admissible, persuasive evidence demonstrating that the 1986 note and mortgage were either a sham or did not exist at the time of the 1997 bankruptcy auction. 21 Accordingly, the United States has not met its burden as to its first contention.

The Court also finds that the United States has failed to meet its burden as to its second contention --that Ray Novelli directed Apollo, Ltd. to obtain the Clermont property at auction to defraud creditors. Assuming arguendo that the United States has established that Mr. Novelli directed Apollo, Ltd. to file its secured claim in the third All Seasons' bankruptcy and to bid on the Clermont property, the United States' cannot overcome one insurmountable and basic hurdle. The undisputed evidence shows that Apollo obtained the Clermont property in 1997 through a public Chapter 11 bankruptcy auction, conducted by an independent Trustee after a thorough investigation into All Seasons' financial status, before all of All Seasons' creditors --including the United States --with the sale ultimately being approved by the bankruptcy court. There is simply no basis for holding that a public sale, approved by a federal court, and which has never been contested until this case, can constitute a fraud --and the United States has not presented any legal authority to suggest otherwise.

In order for the Court to adopt the United States' position, the Court would have to conclude that, rather than acting in the best interests of the creditors, the Trustee was acting in concert with Apollo and All Seasons to commit a fraud on the creditors. Not only is there no evidence to support such a conclusion, but the United States itself admits that the Trustee acted appropriately. Given that Apollo obtained the Clermont property out in the open, as part of a public and court-supervised proceeding, and in front of the United States and other creditors, the Court cannot find that the United States has met its burden on this point.

The United States' third contention is closely related to the second and focuses solely on the fact that Apollo, Ltd. filed its claim in All Seasons' bankruptcy on the day of the auction. This fact, in of itself, does not demonstrate any nefarious actions on the part of Apollo, Ltd. The United States has not provided any evidence or presented any legal authority to suggest that Apollo, Ltd.'s claim was untimely, or that filing a claim on the day of the auction was prohibited. Moreover, as the United States points out, the address on Apollo Ltd.'s secured claim is the same address as on All Seasons' bankruptcy petition. Thus if the Trustee had any suspicion of any fraudulent activity, the fact that the parties shared the same address should have either raised or fueled those suspicions. The fact that the Trustee, who had conducted a very thorough, months long investigation prior to the auction, did not see anything wrong with the sale of the Clermont property to Apollo, Ltd., coupled with the fact that the United States has nowhere suggested any deficiencies in the Trustee's performance, is very persuasive. The United States has not met its burden on its third contention.

The United States fourth and final contention focuses on events which took place after the conclusion of the bankruptcy auction, and after the bankruptcy court approved the sale of the Clermont property to Apollo, Ltd. According to the United States, Apollo's lease agreements with two separate entities --neither of which existed at the time of the bankruptcy auction --constitute a fraud upon All Seasons' creditors. This barebones argument rests on the necessary conclusion that Apollo's acquisition of the Clermont property in October 1997 was itself fraudulent --a conclusion which the Court has already rejected. If Apollo obtained the Clermont property at auction free and clear and without the taint of any fraudulent or improper purpose, it follows that Apollo was then free to do whatever it wanted with the property post-auction, including entering into leases with later-formed companies. The United States has not presented any evidence or legal authority showing how Apollo's post-auction actions could retroactively render its purchase of the Clermont property fraudulent. 22

In sum, the Court concludes that the United States has not met its very heavy burden under Florida law of demonstrating that Apollo's acquisition of the Clermont property in October 1997 was done with a fraudulent or improper purpose and, therefore, the United States has not established that Apollo was the alter ego of All Seasons. See Hillsborough Holdings, 166 B.R. at 468-69.



III. Successor Liability

The United States has also argued that its tax liens against All Seasons should be imputed to Apollo through a theory of successor, or "mere continuation" liability. According to the United States, when Apollo, Ltd. purchased the Clermont property in October 1997, it was acting as a mere continuation of All Seasons. See Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., 417 U.S. 249, 259, n. 5 (1974). To support this argument, the United States points to the following facts: (1) All Seasons, Apollo, Ltd., and Apollo shared the same business address and had some similarity of ownership; (2) at the time of Apollo's acquisition of the Clermont property Apollo knew of All Seasons' substantial tax debts and that All Seasons would not be able to pay them; and (3) the Clermont property continued to operate as a private campground facility until its foreclosure sale.

Generally, Florida law does not impose the liabilities of a predecessor corporation on a successor corporation unless: (1) the successor expressly or impliedly assumes obligations of the predecessor, (2) the transaction is a de facto merger, (3) the successor is a mere continuation of the predecessor, or (4) the transaction is a fraudulent effort to avoid the liabilities of the predecessor. Laboratory Corp. of America v. Professional Recovery Network, 813 So. 2d 266, 269 (Fla. 5th Dist.Ct.App. 2002); Bernard v. Kee Mfg. Co., Inc., 409 So. 2d 1047, 1049 (Fla. 1982). As already discussed at length, none of these facts exist in this case. There is no evidence that Apollo expressly or impliedly assumed the obligations of All Seasons, that the sale of the Clermont property at the bankruptcy auction was a de facto merger of Apollo and All Season, or that the auction purchase of the Clermont property was a fraudulent effort to avoid the liabilities of All Seasons.

There is also insufficient evidence to establish that Apollo was merely a continuation or reincarnation of All Seasons, primarily for the simple fact that Apollo was created in 1986 for the purpose of obtaining financing and was never dissolved; therefore there was no new corporation created to continue All Seasons' business operations. The fact that Apollo and All Seasons shared the same business address for approximately ten years does not equate to successor liability. See Laboratory Corp., 813 So. 2d at 270 ("having common attributes does not automatically impose liability on a successor corporation"). Cf. In re F & C Services, Inc., 44 B.R. 863, 868 (S. D. Fla. 1984) (corporate form may be disregarded "where principals of a debtor attempt to transfer corporate assets to a newly created corporate entity, which they also control, [and] when the new corporation is a mere continuation of the debtor, controlled by the same persons, and made up essentially of the same assets and resources as the old corporation"). Moreover, just as with the traditional alter ego analysis, the United States' failure to establish that the acquisition of the Clermont property through a court-approved bankruptcy auction was fraudulent similarly dooms its "mere continuation" theory. See Redman v. Cobb Intern., Inc., 23 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1376 (M.D. Fla. 1998) (rejecting mere continuation theory of successor liability in part because underlying asset sales were "mesne transactions" and not a fraudulent effort to avoid the predecessor's liabilities). In this case, where it is clear that Apollo ultimately obtained the Clermont property in satisfaction of an executed and valid debt --i.e. for consideration --the Court cannot conclude that Apollo was a "mere continuation" of All Seasons. See, e.g., Amjad Munim, M.D., P.A. v. Azar, 648 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (finding "mere continuation" theory applied where assets were transferred overnight without any consideration).



IV. Fraudulent Transfer Analysis

The United States' inability to demonstrate any fraud on the part of Apollo also undermines its fraudulent transfer analysis. Under Florida law: 23


(1) A transfer made...by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor, whether the creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was made..., if the debtor made the transfer...:



(a) With actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor; or



(b) Without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer..., and the debtor:



1. Was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transaction for which the remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably small in relation to the business or transaction; or



2. Intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that he or she would incur, debts beyond his or her ability to pay as they become due.


Fla. Stat. § 726.105.

In addition, where a creditor's claim arose before the transfer, the transfer is also considered fraudulent under Florida law if (1) "the debtor made the transfer...without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer...and the debtor was insolvent at the time or the debtor became insolvent as a result of the transfer...;' or (2) "the transfer was made to an insider for an antecedent debt, the debtor was insolvent at the time, and the insider had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent." Fla. Stat. § 726.106. An "insider" is defined as including a corporation where 20 percent or more of its voting securities are directly or indirectly owned, controlled, or held, by the debtor or a person who owns, controls or holds 20 percent or more of the voting securities of the debtor. Fla. Stat § 726.102 (1)(b).

The United States contends that Apollo's acquisition of the Clermont property in October, 1997 was fraudulent for several reasons. 24 First, that All Seasons caused the transfer of the property to Apollo with the actual intent to hinder, delay or defeat the United States and its other creditors from collecting on their debts. 25 One of the many problems with this argument is that the transfer occurred as part of a bankruptcy auction, operated by an independent bankruptcy trustee after concluding a detailed months-long investigation into All Seasons' finances, and approved by the bankruptcy court after conducting a hearing where the creditors (including the United States) were present. Thus, the only way for the United States' argument to work would be to establish that the bankruptcy trustee, the bankruptcy court, and each creditor were all duped by All Seasons and Apollo. And while the United States apparently seeks to make such an argument based on mere speculation, see Doc. 168, p. 30, n. 26, the minimal evidence it has presented to the Court does not support such a result.

Moreover, as counsel for the United States admitted, it is the duty of the bankruptcy trustee to ensure that the liquidation of any of the debtor's assets is done in such a way as to benefit all creditors. 26 The United States does not suggest, much less provide any evidence, showing that the trustee did not fully execute his duties in this respect. 27 There is also a complete absence of any evidence to support the United States' theory that the trustee was blind sided by Apollo's filing of its secured claim on the date of the auction. The Court concludes that this portion of the United States' fraudulent transfer theory fails.

The United States next argues that a fraudulent transfer occurred because All Seasons did not owe a valid antecedent debt to Apollo at the time of the transfer, and as a result, All Seasons did not receive a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the Clermont property. See Fla. Stat. § 726.106 (1). The United States's position is that Apollo never transferred any funds to All Seasons and the alleged debt which All Seasons satisfied by giving Apollo the Clermont property never existed. Stated differently, the United States is again challenging the validity of the original $1,000,000 note and mortgage between All Seasons and Apollo, Ltd. The Court has already found this argument to be without merit --all evidence before the Court demonstrates that the note and mortgage did exist, that they were properly executed, and that they remained valid and enforceable until All Seasons' third and final bankruptcy.

Lastly, the United States argues that even if All Seasons did owe Apollo a valid antecedent debt, the transfer of the Clermont property to Apollo was a transfer to an insider at a time when All Seasons was insolvent, and when Apollo clearly knew or had reason to know of the insolvency, thereby rendering the transfer fraudulent under Fla. Stat. § 726.106 (2). At the time of the transfer, Ray Novelli owned at least 20 percent of both All Seasons and Apollo, which would make Apollo an insider under Fla. Stat. § 726.102 (1)(b).

At first blush this argument is somewhat attractive --there is no dispute that Apollo and All Seasons were affiliated entities with common ownership at various points in time. However, as Coast correctly points out, upon closer inspection the argument fails because Florida's Fraudulent Transfer Act specifically excludes assets "to the extent [they are] encumbered by a valid lien." Fla. Stat. § 726.102 (2)(a). Thus, if All Seasons did owe Apollo a valid antecedent debt --i.e. the note and mortgage were valid --then the Clermont property was properly encumbered by this debt, Apollo had a proper secured claim, and the transfer to Apollo as part of the 1997 bankruptcy proceedings cannot be considered fraudulent.

It is quite common for bankruptcy trustees to permit sales at auction of property to insiders of the debtor, and the United States has not provided any evidence or legal authority suggesting that such an event, when conducted in the face of a valid lien, can be considered fraudulent. To do so would result in a state law negating sales at auctions conducted and approved by federal bankruptcy courts. This cannot be the proper result. 28 As such, the United States' third fraudulent transfer argument also fails. 29



III. Motion for Partial Reconsideration

The United States has also filed a motion for partial reconsideration in which, for the first time, it requests that the Court distribute the remaining sale proceeds pursuant to Section 726 of the Bankruptcy Code. (Doc. 153). In so asking, the United States raises virtually the exact same arguments it put forth in its original motion requesting that the sale proceeds be returned to the Bankruptcy Trustee, arguments which the Court has previously rejected. The United States's motion raises no new issues of law or fact, and does not point out any clear errors or manifest injustices rendered by virtue of the Court's prior Order. As such, the United States of America's Motion for Partial Reconsideration (of 9/25/06 Order), to Have this Court Distribute Sale Proceeds According to Bankruptcy Law, (Doc. 153), is DENIED. 30




CONCLUSION


Having determined that the United States has failed to meet its burden to establish that Apollo is the alter ego of All Seasons, or that Apollo should be held liable for All Seasons' tax liabilities under a "mere continuation" theory, or that Apollo's acquisition of the Clermont property was a fraudulent transfer, the Court finds that the United States's right to distribution of the remaining sale proceeds is limited to its tax liens against Apollo directly, and that the United States is not entitled to collect from the fund any of its tax liens against All Seasons.

With respect to the tax liens against Apollo, the Parties do not dispute, and the Court therefore concludes as a matter of law, that the federal tax liens which arose with the unpaid tax assessments against Apollo as described in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the United States' Supplemented Complaint in Intervention (Doc. 126) have attached to the Clermont property and to the net proceeds of the sale of the Clermont property. The Court further concludes, based on the agreement of all Parties, that these tax liens against Apollo have priority over the judgment lien of Coast.

The Court therefore will first use the remaining proceeds in the Court's registry to satisfy the tax liens against Apollo with the balance going to Coast. Although the United States has repeatedly stated that the tax liens against Apollo are "approximately $25,000," the record before the Court does not reflect the precise amount due. Nor does the record reflect the manner in which either Party wishes to have the proceeds in the Court's registry distributed ( i.e., the address for delivery of payment, the name of the payee, and/or the agent who will accept payment). Accordingly, within ten (10) days of the date of this Opinion, the Parties are directed to file notices with the Court providing information concerning the manner in which the proceeds should be distributed. Within this same time period the United States shall submit its proofs as to the precise amount of the tax liens against Apollo

The United States of America's Motion for Partial Reconsideration (of 9/25/06 Order), to Have this Court Distribute Sale Proceeds According to Bankruptcy Law, (Doc. 153), is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DONE and ORDERED.

1 Camp Coast to Coast and Affinity Group are affiliated companies and will be referred to collectively as "Coast."

2 The Trust owned a number of assets, including stock of several corporations, a jet airplane, a home that Ray Novelli lived in for 10 years, and a Delta Isle campground located near Sacramento, California, which was later transferred to a subsidiary of The Apollo Group, Delta Isle Resort and Marina Club.

3 Where no distinction is made between The Apollo Group, Inc., and The Apollo Group, Ltd., they will be referred to collectively as Apollo.

4 It is unclear from the record to what extent the presidencies of Mr. Novelli and Mr. Gross overlapped.

5 The United States contends that Apollo, Ltd.'s note was not included in the plans of reorganization from these first two bankruptcies, and therefore, by implication, the note ceased to exist and was not a valid debt at the time of the third and final bankruptcy proceeding. The only evidence proffered by the United States on this point consists of a request that the Court take judicial notice of the website for the United States Bankruptcy Court in the Central District of California, and the electronic pages on that website for the claims registers for All Seasons' first two bankruptcy proceedings. According to the United States, these claims registers do not include a claim by Apollo, Ltd. on its note. However, the Court cannot accept the United States' contention that these websites conclusively demonstrate that Apollo Ltd.'s claims were never filed such that judicial notice should be taken of that asserted fact. The United States has not provided evidence explaining the nature of the electronic claims register, what information is typically included in the registers, whether all claims must be listed on the register or can simply be included in the original petition schedules, or even whether the court's website is complete. In addition, neither party has submitted the Plans of Reorganization themselves, which should provide the most conclusive information. Instead, the Court is left with the undisputed deposition testimony of Raymond Novelli who testified that Apollo, Ltd.'s claims on the note were part of each bankruptcy's reorganization plan, that the claims survived each bankruptcy, and that some payments were made on the note after each bankruptcy. The Court will therefore rely on Mr. Novelli's testimony --which was submitted by the United States itself --and finds that Apollo, Ltd.'s note on the Clermont property was part of each Plan of Reorganization.

6 Phillip Martinez and Mr. Novelli had met in the early 1980's when they were both incarcerated in a California prison. Mr. Novelli hired Mr. Martinez in 1995 when he was released from prison, and Mr. Martinez worked for Ray Novelli for three or four years. Based on this prior history, the United States suggests that at all times Phillip Martinez was acting at the direction of Ray Novelli, and that Mr. Novelli in fact controlled the operations of Apollo, Ltd. Other than the United States' speculation, there is no evidence to support this conclusion.

7 Coast points to the deposition excerpts from Ray Novelli, in which he states that the IRS was involved in All Seasons' operations and bankruptcy proceedings from February 1987 through its liquidation, and that the IRS should have been very much aware of the fact that at least some of the owners and officers of Apollo were the same as those of All Seasons. Mr. Novelli further testified that the IRS had copies of Apollo, Ltd.'s note and mortgage with All Seasons, was aware of Apollo, Ltd.'s lien against the Clermont Property, and had a copy of the Bankruptcy Trustee's Deed.

8 According to the order, eight other campground properties and their accompanying membership lists were sold to either Apollo or to Hans Schulz as credits against other secured claims. A Grass Lake, Michigan campground was sold directly to Apollo, and properties in Elkhorn, Wisconsin and Mercer, Pennsylvania were sold and transferred to Hans Schulz in trust for a Barclays American/Business Credit, Inc. secured claim. The order further recited that a campground in Dowagiac, Michigan was sold and transferred to Hans Schulz in trust for the Security Capital Credit Corporation as an offset on its secured claim. Soon after this order was entered, Schulz transferred the Wisconsin, Pennsylvania and Dowagiac, Michigan properties to Apollo.

Ray Novelli testified that these secured claims involved promissory notes that had previously been issued to All Seasons, with the various campgrounds as collateral. However, Mr. Novelli has never been able to produce copies of the promissory notes, and he admitted at his deposition that no payments had ever been made on the notes, and that no deeds of trust had ever been executed to secure the notes. On the other hand, the United States --which has the burden of proof in this case --has not presented any evidence to rebut Mr. Novelli's testimony or to establish that these promissory notes were invalid. Given that the only admissible evidence on this point is again the undisputed testimony from Mr. Novelli, the Court concludes that the promissory notes did, in fact, exist.

9 While the Deed is dated October 27, 1997, it was not notarized until January 23, 1998.

10 Novelli has continued to run a website with the name "allseasonsresorts.com" since 2001, and has continued to distribute membership cards to campground members with the name "All Seasons Resorts" on them.

11 There is no dispute that if the Court determines that Apollo is All Seasons' alter ego, that Apollo would be liable for all of All Seasons' tax liabilities and the United States would therefore be entitled to disbursement of all remaining sale proceeds. See G. M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 42 U.S. 338, 351 (1977).

12 See, e.g. United States' Post-Trial Brief at 7-11 (Doc. 168); Coast's Post-Trial Memorandum of Facts and Law at 3-7 (Doc. 169).

13 The United States contends that federal common law should apply because the determination of alter ego status in this case implicates the rights of the United States arising under a nationwide federal program. See United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979). In particular, the United States argues that there is a compelling need for a national uniform body of law to apply in deciding alter ego status for federal tax collection purposes so that taxpayers cannot avoid their tax liabilities by taking refuge in a state with particularly restrictive laws regarding the imposition of alter ego status. The United States's argument, however, ignores the fact that several courts, including at least one in this district, have held that federal taxes are not considered to be a nationwide federal program such that Kimbell would apply. See Wolfe v. United States, 798 F.2d 1241, 1244 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1986), amended 806 F.2d 1410, 1411 (9th Cir. 1986); Storage and Office Systems, LLC v. United States, 490 F. Supp.2d 955 (S.D. Ind. 2007); In re Homelands of DeLeon Springs, Inc., 190 B.R. 666, 670 (M.D. Fla. 1995). Moreover, the Supreme Court's decision in Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509 (1960) resolved this issue when it held that "state law controls in determining the nature of the legal interest which the taxpayer had in the property," and federal law "determines the priority of competing liens asserted against the taxpayer's `property'." 363 U.S. at 513-14. In this case there is no dispute over the priority over competing liens, nor is there any dispute over the validity of the United States' tax liens themselves. The entire dispute rests on whether the United States has a lien on the Clermont property for All Seasons' tax obligations, which can only exist if Apollo is found to be the alter ego of All Seasons and, in turn, that the original note and mortgage between Apollo, Ltd. and All Seasons was invalid. The Court agrees with Coast that such an analysis implicates the nature of Apollo's and All Seasons' legal interests in the Clermont property, and therefore state law applies. See In re Arizona Dep't of Revenue (In re Blanton), 105 B.R. 811, 821 (W.D. Tex. 1989). See also Drye v. United States, 5238 U.S. 49, 52 (1999) ( "The Internal Revenue Code's prescriptions are most sensibly read to look to state law for delineation of the taxpayer's rights or interests, but to leave to federal law the determination whether those rights or interests constitute `property' or `rights to property' within the meaning of §6321."); United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274 (2002) (holding same).

14 See, e.g., Hillsborough Holdings Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 166 B.R. 461, 468 (M.D. Fla. 1994); In re Homelands of DeLeon Springs, 190 B.R. 666, 670 (M.D. Fla. 1995); Matter of Commonweal, Inc., 171 B.R. 405 (M.D. Fla. 1994); Tato Intern. Corp. v. Department of the Treasury, No. 88-0670-CIV-ATKINS, 1989 WL 104789 (S.D. Fla. July 5, 1989); In re Brickell Inv. Corp., 85 B.R. 164 (S.D. Fla. 1988). See also Bendix Home Systems v. Hurston Enterprises, Inc., 566 F.2d 1039 (5th Cir. 1978).

15 See, e.g., Aquilino, 363 U.S. at 512-13; Homelands, supra; Commonweal, supra; Tato, supra; PBV, Inc. v. Rossotti, 178 F.3d 1295, 1999 WL 220123 (6th Cir. 1999); Floyd v. United States, 151 F.3d 1295, 1298-99 (10th Cir. 1998); Wolfe v. United Sates, 798 F. 2d 1241, 1244 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1986), amended 806 F.2d 1410, 1411 (9th Cir. 1986); In re Porras, 312 B.R. 81, 138 (W.D. Tex. 2004); United States v. Kattar, 81 F.Supp.2d 262, 275 (D. New Hampshire 1999); Today's Child Learning Center, Inc. v. United States, 40 F.Supp.2d 268, 272, n. 2 (E.D. Penn. 1998); Dean v. United States, 987 F. Supp. 1160, 1164 (W.D. Mo. 1997); In re Brickell Investment Corp., 85 B.R. at 167. The Court has only located one unpublished decision which applied federal common law. Tri-State Equipment v. United States, 1997 WL 375264 (E.D. Cal. April 21, 1997).

16 See, e.g. Hillsborough Holdings, 166 B.R. at 473 ( "It should be pointed out at the outset that the financing of a subsidiary by a parent is not improper per se.").

17 In addition, Counsel for the United States stated at the bench trial that "we're certainly not arguing that any of these corporations is a sham, Judge." See Transcript from December 14, 2006 Bench Trial, p. 97. (Doc. 165).

18 For example, the United States makes much of the fact that Ray Novelli hired Phillip Martinez as President of Apollo, Ltd., upon his release from prison. This fact, in and of itself, does not establish that Martinez was acting at the direction of Mr. Novelli, or that Mr. Novelli controlled the decisions of Apollo, Ltd. during All Seasons' 1997 bankruptcy.

19 The United States does not differentiate between Apollo, Ltd. and Apollo for purposes of alter ego status. Rather, the United States urges the Court to consider both entities to be one and the same.

20 During the bench trial, the United States frequently cast aspersions on the credibility of Mr. Novelli while, at the same time, urging the Court to accept as fact portions of his deposition testimony. The Court finds this course of action unavailing --either Mr. Novelli's testimony is to be accepted or it is not. The Court concludes that it should be accepted --there is no evidence suggesting that Mr. Novelli was dishonest in his testimony --at the time of his deposition the Clermont property had been sold at auction under the direction of this Court, and it was known fact that Mr. Novelli (and/or any of his related corporate entities) would never receive any of the sale proceeds. Therefore, Mr. Novelli had no reason to misrepresent the facts surrounding the acquisition and disposition of the Clermont property.

21 Other than calling into question Ray Novelli's veracity, the only other evidence submitted by the United States consists of the web pages from All Seasons' prior two bankruptcies. The Court has already found that these documents are not sufficient to establish the existence or non-existence of Apollo, Ltd.'s secured claim, and therefore will not be further considered.

22 The United States also has not established that these newer corporations, which undisputedly were created years after All Seasons was dissolved, constitute the alter egos of All Seasons.

23 The Parties agree that Florida law governs this portion of the United States' argument.

24 In its post-trial brief, the United States first appears to argue that the transfer at issue is the December 24, 1999 Quit Claim Deed which clarified that Apollo was the owner of the Clermont property. See Doc. 168, p. 26. However, in the very next paragraph, the United States urges that "this Court should disregard any formal distinction between the partnership and the corporation, and find that the transfer from [All Season's] bankruptcy estate was effectively a transfer directly to [Apollo] the corporation." Id. The United States then spends the remainder of its brief arguing from the premise that Apollo's acquisition of the Clermont property in October 1997 was fraudulent. It is therefore clear that the United States has abandoned any fraudulent transfer argument with respect to the Quit Claim Deed, and the Court will limit its analysis to the October 1997 bankruptcy auction transaction.

25 In determining "actual intent," courts may consider, among other factors, whether: (1) the transfer was to an insider; (2) the debtor retained possession or control over the transferred property after the transfer; (3) the transfer was disclosed or concealed; (4) the debtor had been sued or threatened with suit before the transfer was made; (5) the transfer was of substantially all of the debtor's assets; (6) the debtor absconded; (7) the debtor removed or concealed assets; (8) the value of the consideration received by the debtor was reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset transferred or the amount of the obligation incurred; (9) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer was made; (10) the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial debt was incurred; and (11) the debtor transferred the essential assets of the business to a lienor who transferred the assets to an insider of the debtor. Fla. Stat. § 726.105 (2)(a)-(k).

26 See December 14, 2006 Transcript from Bench Trial, pp. 101-02. See also United States' Post-Trial Brief, p. 30 ( "Only when a trustee's efforts will produce some benefit to the estate ( i.e., its unsecured creditors) is it appropriate for the trustee to incur expenses and fees to sell property.") (Doc. 168).

27 See, e.g., Doc. 168, p. 30, n. 26 ( "This is not to suggest that the Trustee was a party to fraud.").

28 There is no apparent decision in which a court declared a transfer to be fraudulent where the transfer took place under the direction of a trustee as part of an ongoing bankruptcy proceeding.

29 The Court finds that the exclusion of property encumbered by valid liens from Florida's Fraudulent Transfer Act equally applies as an alternative basis for rejecting the United States' other arguments that Apollo's acquisition of the Clermont property was a fraudulent transfer.

30 The Court similarly will not consider Coast's waiver argument. The Court previously discussed and rejected Coast's theory of waiver in its order denying summary judgment, and Coast has not presented any new evidence to suggest that the Court should revisit its decision. Moreover, given the Court's findings on the issues of alter ego and fraudulent transfer, the Court concludes that it is not necessary or appropriate to further discuss Coast's waiver defense.

Labels:

6651(a)(1) and 6654(a) penalties imposed - An individual was liable for penalties for failure to file a timely return and failure to pay the amount of tax shown on a return. The failure-to-file penalty was properly imposed because there was no credible evidence to support the individual's contention that his tax advisor prepared and filed valid returns on his behalf. The failure-to-pay penalty was properly imposed because the IRS established that it had filed substitute returns showing the individual's tax liability and that the individual failed to pay the tax shown. Furthermore, the individual's failure to file and failure to pay were not due to reasonable reliance on professional advice because there was no credible evidence regarding the advisor's professional credentials and his advice consisted only of groundless and frivolous arguments. The individual was liable for the estimated tax penalty because the IRS provided evidence showing that he was required to make estimated tax payments and that, after taking into account income tax withheld from his salary, the estimated tax liabilities were underpaid.


Eugene Cobaugh v. Commissioner, TC Memo. 2008-199, August 26, 2008.



Sometime before April 1999 a friend told petitioner about Lee Scott Roberts (Roberts), who was affiliated with American Tax Consultants (ATC). Although petitioner testified that Roberts was a certified public accountant (C.P.A.) who worked in an office in Tampa, Florida, with a tax attorney, petitioner never investigated Roberts's background or verified his C.P.A. license.



In March 1999 petitioner telephoned Roberts to discuss petitioner's tax returns. During the conversation Roberts told petitioner that the Federal Government had jurisdiction only inside Washington, D.C., and the U.S. territories and that petitioner did not owe tax unless he was, among other things, a Government employee. On March 24, 1999, petitioner signed an agreement engaging ATC to provide tax advice and return preparation for a fee.



In a meeting sometime after March 24, 1999, Roberts gave petitioner a bound compilation of documents titled "Associated Tax Consultants Income Tax Seminar". The documents included, among other things, copies of parts of the U.S. Constitution, the Internal Revenue Code, a Treasury publication, and Treasury regulations.



Despite initial concerns about Roberts's advice, petitioner did not seek a second opinion or consult his father, a C.P.A., about the advice. Petitioner did not consult his father because he knew that his father would have disagreed with Roberts's advice.



Although Roberts apparently prepared documents for petitioner that he claimed were returns, petitioner did not introduce any credible evidence to prove that proper returns for 1998-2003 were prepared and filed by their respective due dates. The only documentary evidence that petitioner introduced regarding the preparation of returns was copies of unsigned Forms 1040NR-EZ, U.S. Income Tax Return for Certain Nonresident Aliens With No Dependents, for 1998 and 1999 showing only zeros on the income lines and claiming a refund of the full amount of his Federal income tax withholding reported on his Forms W-2, Wage and Tax Statement. The documents reported that petitioner was not a U.S. citizen and that he had no income.4



On or around April 14, 2003, Roberts was indicted on nine counts of filing false income tax refund claims. Petitioner first learned of Roberts's criminal prosecution from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and sometime in 2002 or 2003 someone from the IRS interviewed petitioner regarding Roberts.



On December 8, 2003, a Federal jury found Roberts guilty on one count of conspiracy to file false claims and 11 counts of filing false claims for income tax refunds. On or around March 16, 2004, Roberts was sentenced to 51 months of imprisonment.



Respondent prepared substitute returns for petitioner on January 10, 2005, for 1998; on January 12, 2005, for 1999-2002; and on January 18, 2005, for 2003. On November 16, 2005, respondent sent petitioner notices of deficiency for 1998-2003. On February 6, 2006, petitioner petitioned this Court alleging that the amounts of tax are incorrect, the additions to tax5 and interest are in error, and the periods of limitations for collection have expired for 1998 and 1999.



In 2006 after petitioner filed his petition, he filed Federal income tax returns for 1998-2003 that his father had prepared.



On May 14, 2007, a trial was held in Miami, Florida.





OPINION




I. Respondent's Burden of Production Under Section 7491(c)


If a taxpayer assigns error to the Commissioner's determination that the taxpayer is liable for an addition to tax or penalty, the Commissioner has the burden, under section 7491(c), of producing evidence that the addition to tax or penalty applies. See Swain v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 358, 364-365 (2002); Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 446 (2001). In order to meet his burden of production, the Commissioner must come forward with sufficient evidence that it is appropriate to impose the relevant addition to tax or penalty. Higbee v. Commissioner, supra at 446. However, the Commissioner is not required to introduce evidence regarding reasonable cause, substantial authority, or similar defenses. Id. Once the Commissioner meets his initial burden of production, the taxpayer must come forward with persuasive evidence that the Commissioner's determination is incorrect. Id. at 447.6



In the petition, petitioner contested his liability for the additions to tax. We conclude, therefore, that petitioner assigned error to the additions to tax, see Swain v. Commissioner, supra at 364-365, and that respondent has the burden under section 7491(c) to produce evidence that it is appropriate to hold petitioner liable for the additions to tax.7




II. Section 6651(a)(1) Addition to Tax


Section 6651(a)(1) authorizes the imposition of an addition to tax for failure to file a timely Federal income tax return, unless it is shown that such a failure is due to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect. See United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 245 (1985). A failure to file a timely return is due to reasonable cause if the taxpayer exercised ordinary business care and prudence but nevertheless was unable to file the return within the prescribed time. See sec. 301.6651-1(c)(1), Proced. & Admin. Regs. Willful neglect means a conscious, intentional failure to file or reckless indifference toward filing. See United States v. Boyle, supra at 245.



Respondent introduced into evidence certified copies of Forms 4340, Certificate of Assessments, Payments, and Other Specified Matters, with respect to petitioner's 1998-2003 taxable years, showing that petitioner did not file timely Federal income tax returns for 1998-2003. The Forms 4340 are sufficient to satisfy respondent's burden of production under section 7491(c) with respect to the additions to tax under section 6651(a)(1).



Petitioner, however, contends that Roberts filed petitioner's 1998-2003 returns. His testimony was not supported by any credible evidence showing that returns satisfying the requirements for a valid return were prepared or filed. The only documents petitioner introduced were unsigned copies of Form 1040NR-EZ for 1998 and 1999. Although petitioner testified that he signed forms and returned them to Roberts to file, the record contains no evidence that petitioner or someone on his behalf actually filed before 2006 forms that qualified as returns for each of the years 1998-2003. In addition, even if we were to conclude that Roberts sent the 1998 and 1999 Forms 1040NR-EZ to respondent, they were not valid returns for purposes of section 6651(a)(1) because they showed only zeros. See Cabirac v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. 163, 169 (2003). The record does not support a finding that petitioner filed valid and timely returns for 1998-2003 before 2006.



To avoid the section 6651(a)(1) addition to tax, petitioner must prove that his failure to file valid and timely 1998-2003 returns was due to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect. See sec. 6651(a)(1); Rule 142(a). Petitioner argues that his failure to file valid and timely 1998-2003 returns was due to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect because he reasonably relied on professional advice that he did not have a tax liability. Petitioner cites two cases, United States v. Boyle, supra at 250-251, and Freytag v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 849, 888 (1987), affd. 904 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1990), affd. 501 U.S. 868 (1991), in support of his argument.



In United States v. Boyle, supra at 252, the Supreme Court held that a taxpayer may not avoid the section 6651(a)(1) addition to tax for reasonable cause when the taxpayer relied on his adviser to file his tax return. The Court stated that "one does not have to be a tax expert to know that tax returns have fixed filing dates and that taxes must be paid when they are due". Id. at 251. The Court suggested, however, that reliance on an adviser for a question of substantive law may constitute reasonable cause. Id. In Freytag v. Commissioner, supra at 888-889, we held that the taxpayers could not avoid the section 6653(a) addition to tax for negligence by relying on the advice of their investment counselors where the taxpayers "had to know that the investment was simply too good to be valid taxwise."



Although those cases suggest that under certain circumstances a taxpayer may avoid additions to tax when a taxpayer relied on the erroneous advice of a competent professional adviser, neither case supports petitioner's position that his reliance on Roberts's advice constitutes reasonable cause. We have held that a mistaken belief that no tax was due is not sufficient to establish reasonable cause absent reliance on a competent tax adviser or a good-faith effort to ascertain the filing requirements. See Shomaker v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 192, 202 (1962); French v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1991-196. Petitioner did not prove that he reasonably relied on a professional tax adviser or that he made a good-faith effort to ascertain the filing requirements. Petitioner offered no credible evidence regarding Roberts's professional credentials, if any, and Roberts's advice, to the extent reflected in the record, consisted only of groundless and frivolous arguments. The Forms 1040NR-EZ that Roberts allegedly prepared on petitioner's behalf, and that petitioner admitted he signed, falsely stated that petitioner was not a U.S. citizen and had no income. The false statements on the Forms 1040NR-EZ should have alerted petitioner that Roberts's advice was faulty and that it was not reasonable to rely on it.



In addition, petitioner did not make a good-faith effort to ascertain the validity of Roberts's advice. Despite having initial concerns about the truth of the advice, petitioner did not investigate Roberts's background or consult another tax professional. Petitioner testified that he wanted to believe that Roberts's advice was valid and that he did not consult his father, a C.P.A., because he knew that if the advice were true, his father "wouldn't have seen the truth in it". Even after learning of Roberts's criminal prosecution, petitioner did nothing to investigate Roberts's credentials. During 2003 Roberts was indicted and convicted of filing false and fraudulent claims for income tax refunds, yet petitioner testified that he still allowed Roberts to prepare his 2003 return.



Petitioner's failure to make a good-faith effort to verify Roberts's credentials or the legitimacy of his advice establishes that petitioner's reliance on Roberts was neither reasonable nor in good faith. We conclude, therefore, that petitioner did not establish that he had reasonable cause for failing to timely file valid 1998-2003 returns.8 Accordingly, we sustain respondent's determination that petitioner is liable for the section 6651(a)(1) addition to tax9 for each of the years at issue.




III. Section 6651(a)(2) Addition to Tax


Section 6651(a)(2) imposes an addition to tax for failure to pay the amount of tax shown on a return. The section 6651(a)(2) addition to tax applies only when an amount of tax is shown on a return. Cabirac v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. at 170. Petitioner did not file valid and timely 1998-2003 returns; however, respondent prepared substitute returns under section 6020(b) for those years. A return made by the Secretary under section 6020(b) is treated as the return filed by the taxpayer for purposes of determining the amount of the section 6651(a)(2) addition to tax. Sec. 6651(g)(2).



The Commissioner's burden of production for the section 6651(a)(2) addition to tax requires that the Commissioner introduce evidence that a return showing the taxpayer's tax liability was filed for the year in question. Where the taxpayer did not file a valid return, the Commissioner must introduce evidence that he prepared a substitute return satisfying the requirements under section 6020(b). Wheeler v. Commissioner, 127 T.C. 200, 210 (2006), affd. 521 F.3d 1289 (10th Cir. 2008).



Respondent introduced into evidence substitute returns that satisfy the requirements of section 6020(b)10 and Forms 4340 establishing that petitioner failed to pay the tax shown on the substitute returns. Thus the evidence is sufficient to satisfy respondent's burden of production under section 7491(c).



Petitioner argues, as he did for the section 6651(a)(1) addition to tax, that his failure to pay the tax shown on his returns was due to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect because he relied on professional advice that he did not have a tax liability. For the reasons stated above regarding the section 6651(a)(1) addition to tax, we find that petitioner did not offer sufficient evidence of reasonable cause for his failure to pay his 1998-2003 Federal income tax liabilities. Accordingly, we sustain respondent's determination that petitioner is liable for the additions to tax under section 6651(a)(2).




IV. Section 6654(a) Addition to Tax


Section 6654(a) imposes an addition to tax on an individual taxpayer who underpays his estimated tax. Unless a statutory exception applies, the section 6654(a) addition to tax is mandatory, see sec. 6654(a), (e); Recklitis v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 874, 913 (1988), and section 6654 does not contain a general exception for reasonable cause or absence of willful neglect, see Wheeler v. Commissioner, supra at 212. None of the statutory exceptions under section 6654(e) applies.



To satisfy his burden of production under section 7491(c), respondent introduced evidence establishing that petitioner was required to file Federal income tax returns for 1998-2003; that petitioner did not file such returns; that, after taking into account income tax withheld from petitioner's salary, petitioner did not make any other tax payments for 1998-2003; and that petitioner had filed a 1997 Federal income tax return showing a Federal income tax liability of $34,574. This evidence is sufficient to satisfy respondent's burden of production establishing that petitioner had required annual payments for 1998-2003 payable in installments under section 6654 and that petitioner underpaid his estimated tax liabilities for 1998-2003. See Wheeler v. Commissioner, supra.



Petitioner offered no evidence that he made any payments with respect to his 1998-2003 tax liabilities other than the income tax withheld from his salary. Consequently, we sustain respondent's determination that petitioner is liable for the additions to tax under section 6654(a) for the years at issue.



We have considered the remaining arguments of both parties and to the extent not discussed above, conclude those arguments are irrelevant, moot, or without merit.



To reflect the foregoing,



Decision will be entered under Rule 155.


1 Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the years in issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. Some monetary amounts have been rounded to the nearest dollar.

2 In the amendment to answer, respondent did not calculate the amounts of the sec. 6651(a)(2) addition to tax for 2001-03 because the time period necessary to support the assertion of the maximum penalty amount under sec. 6651(a)(2) had not yet been attained.

3 The parties have stipulated the amounts of the tax deficiencies for 1998 through 2003. The parties have also stipulated that the agreed tax deficiencies for 1998 and 1999 do not account for payments of $22,122 and $5,157 made on Apr. 15, 1999 and 2000, respectively, and that the agreed tax deficiencies for 2000, 2002, and 2003 do not account for prepayment credits of $447, $483, and $2,937 made on Apr. 15, 2001, 2003, and 2004, respectively. As a result of the stipulations, including a concession that petitioner is liable for a reduced deficiency for each of the years 1998-2002, the amount of any addition to tax will have to be recalculated in a Rule 155 proceeding. Any issues regarding the correct calculation of the additions to tax may be addressed therein.

4 Petitioner admitted at trial that the Forms 1040NR-EZ contained false statements.

5 In his petition petitioner uses the term "penalty" to describe the additions to tax respondent determined.

6 The taxpayer ordinarily has the burden of proof regarding additions to tax under secs. 6651(a) and 6654. Rule 142(a)(1). Respondent has the burden of proof with respect to the additions to tax under sec. 6651(a)(2) for all years at issue and the increased addition to tax under sec. 6654 for 2003 because he asserted them in his amended answer. See Rule 142(a)(1). The parties stipulated the 1998-2003 deficiencies and the certified transcripts which show (1) IRS preparation of a substitute return under sec. 6020(b) for each of the years at issue, (2) the earliest dates on which petitioner filed documents that the IRS processed as returns (2006), and (3) the dates and amounts of relevant payments and credits for the years at issue. We hold that the evidence described above is sufficient to satisfy respondent's burden of proof with respect to the additions to tax under sec. 6651(a)(2) and the increased sec. 6654 addition to tax for 2003. See Bhattacharyya v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-19; Howard v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-144.

7 Because we decide that petitioner is liable for the additions to tax, the amounts of the additions to tax will have to be recalculated on the basis of the stipulated deficiencies.

8 In view of our ruling regarding reasonable cause, we need not consider whether petitioner's failure to file was due to willful neglect.

9 Petitioner alleged in his petition that the periods of limitations have expired for 1998 and 1999 and that consequently respondent cannot collect deficiencies and additions to tax for those years. Sec. 6501(c)(3) provides that tax may be assessed at any time in the case of a failure to file a return. Because petitioner did not timely file valid returns for 1998-99 as he was required to do, the periods of limitations on assessment had not expired when respondent issued the notices of deficiency. See sec. 6501(c)(3).

10 In Millsap v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 926, 930 (1988), the Court held that unsubscribed Forms 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, containing the taxpayer's name, address, Social Security number, and filing status, but no information regarding income or tax, to which were attached subscribed revenue agent's reports containing sufficient information from which to compute the taxpayer's tax liability, qualified as returns under sec. 6020(b). Respondent introduced into evidence sec. 6020(b) returns for 1998-2003, consisting of Forms 1040 with subscribed Forms 4549, Income Tax Examination Changes, and Forms 886-A, Explanation of Items, for 1998-2003 attached, which provided sufficient information from which to compute petitioner's tax liabilities for 1998-2003.

Labels:

Tuesday, August 26, 2008

Section 6015 - Innocent spouse relief
As directed by section 6015(f) , the Commissioner has prescribed guidelines in Rev. Proc. 2003-61 , sec. 4.03(2) , 2003-2 C.B. 296, 298, which lists the eight nonexclusive factors that the Commissioner will consider in determining whether, taking into account all the facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the requesting spouse liable for all or part of the deficiency, and full or partial equitable relief under section 6015(f) should be granted.




T.C. Summary Opinion 2008-108] C.D. Strinz, August 26, 2008 T.C. Summary Opinion 2008-108


Code Sec. 6015, ef .


CHARLENE DONIA STRINZ, n.k.a. CHARLENE MONTOUR, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent. CHARLENE D. STRINZ, n.k.a. CHARLENE MONTOUR, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.

UNITED STATES TAX COURT. Docket Nos. 20179-05S, 897-06S. Filed August 25, 2008.

Charlene Montour, pro se.

Robert V. Boeshaar and Jessica Yu , for respondent.

GERBER, Judge: These cases1 were heard pursuant to the provisions of section 7463 of the Internal Revenue Code in effect when the petitions were filed.2 Pursuant to section 7463(b) , the decisions to be entered are not reviewable by any other court, and this opinion shall not be treated as precedent for any other case.

Petitioner sought relief from joint and several tax liability for 1994, 1995, and 1996. She applied for relief under section 6015(b) , (c), and (f), and respondent, in determinations, denied such relief. Petitioner timely petitioned this Court for review of respondent's determinations.




Background


Petitioner, at the time of filing her petitions, resided in the State of Washington. She filed joint returns with her former husband3 for 1994, 1995, and 1996. For each year the return was prepared by a professional preparer and reflected a balance of tax due. Petitioner earned a small amount of wages each year from her work at her husband's construction company, but the underpayments were, in substantial part, due to income reported on Schedules C, Profit or Loss From Business, for the construction company. Petitioner was responsible for the household bills and expenditures during the years in issue.

When the 1994, 1995, and 1996 returns were filed, petitioner was aware of the couple's financial difficulties and that they were having a hard time paying their living expenses. Because she worked at her husband's construction company, she was also aware of its financial situation and that it was also having trouble paying its obligations. Petitioner and her husband had filed for bankruptcy and their unpaid tax liabilities for 1991, 1992, and 1993 were discharged, but the 1994, 1995, and 1996 tax liabilities were not qualified for discharge.

Petitioner separated from her husband during 1995 and obtained a final divorce effective December 31, 1997. Although separated, petitioner and her husband continued to file joint returns throughout the years at issue. After the separation, petitioner showed her husband's girlfriend how to run the administrative office of the construction business. Those duties included handling financial matters, typing contracts, buying office supplies, and related duties. In connection with the divorce, petitioner's husband had made an oral promise to pay the Federal income taxes, but he did not keep his promise. There was no legal obligation under the divorce decree for payment of the income tax liability. Petitioner's husband did not force her to sign the returns or intimidate her in such a way that she signed under duress.

Petitioner filed for relief from joint and several liability. Respondent's determination was that she was not entitled to relief under section 6015(b) or (c) because the assessments were based on underpayments of tax reported due. Respondent also reviewed all of the factors to be considered for relief under section 6015(f) and determined that she was not entitled to equitable relief.




Discussion


Section 6015(b) and (c) provides for relief from joint and several liability in situations where there is an understatement of tax or a deficiency in tax, respectively. Because these cases involve underpayments of tax reported on joint returns, petitioner is not entitled to relief under either section 6015(b) or (c).

Section 6015(f) gives the Commissioner discretion to grant relief from joint and several liability if, taking into account all of the facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to hold an individual liable for any unpaid tax and relief is not available under section 6015(b) or (c).

As directed by section 6015(f) , the Commissioner has prescribed guidelines in Rev. Proc. 2003-61 , sec. 4.03(2) , 2003-2 C.B. 296, 298, which lists the eight nonexclusive factors that the Commissioner will consider in determining whether, taking into account all the facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the requesting spouse liable for all or part of the deficiency, and full or partial equitable relief under section 6015(f) should be granted.

These nonexclusive factors include whether: (1) The requesting spouse is separated or divorced from the nonrequesting spouse; (2) the requesting spouse will suffer economic hardship without relief; (3) the requesting spouse did not know or have reason to know that the nonrequesting spouse would not pay the income tax liability; (4) the nonrequesting spouse had a legal obligation to pay the outstanding liability; (5) the requesting spouse received a significant benefit from the item giving rise to the deficiency; (6) the requesting spouse has made a good faith effort to comply with income tax laws in subsequent years; (7) the requesting spouse was abused by the nonrequesting spouse; and (8) the requesting spouse was in poor mental or physical health when signing the return or requesting relief. Rev. Proc. 2003-61 , sec. 4.03(2) , further provides that no single factor will be determinative, but that all relevant factors will be considered.

The Appeals officer determined that the first and sixth factors were in petitioner's favor, the second and third were against her, and the fourth and fifth were neutral. With respect to the seventh and eighth factors, the Appeals officer determined that petitioner was not abused and no special consideration arises from petitioner's mental and physical health.

We will now consider whether there was an abuse of discretion in the denial of relief on the basis of the above-listed relief factors. After trial and the opportunity to consider petitioner's testimony, it appears that the Appeals officer was correct in the analysis of the eighth factor. There is no question about whether petitioner was separated or divorced and about her subsequent compliance, and so these factors weigh in her favor.

With respect to economic hardship, petitioner is currently employed and she has not established economic hardship. In that regard, petitioner and her husband were relieved of 1991, 1992, and 1993 income tax in an amount approaching $200,000 during their bankruptcy proceeding. This factor weighs against petitioner.

On the basis of petitioner's testimony, it is clear that she had reason to know that her husband would not pay the taxes reported on the returns as she was aware of the internal operations of his business and their personal inability to pay their bills. Accordingly, this factor weighs against petitioner.

Although petitioner's husband had made an oral promise to pay the tax liabilities, there was no enforceable legal obligation to do so. It was reasonable for the Appeals officer to treat this factor as neutral.

It is not clear that petitioner received a significant benefit from the fact that there were tax underpayments, but it is likely that she and her husband lived on the receipts of the business, although the taxes were unpaid. Again, it was reasonable for the Appeals officer to treat this factor as neutral.

Finally, petitioner's husband was prone to overindulge in alcohol and may have used abusive language, but petitioner was not influenced or intimidated by his actions and these conditions did not play a factor in petitioner's choice to sign joint returns. There has been no showing that petitioner's mental or physical health should play a role in the consideration of whether she should have been granted relief under section 6015(f) .

In view of the foregoing, we hold that respondent's refusal to grant petitioner relief from joint and several liability for the 1994, 1995, and 1996 tax years was justified.

To reflect the foregoing,

Decisions will be entered for respondent .

1 Docket No. 20179-05S concerns the 1995 and 1996 tax years and docket No. 897-06S concerns the 1994 tax year for petitioner.

2 Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the taxable years in issue.

3 For convenience, petitioner's former husband will be referred to as her husband.

Monday, August 25, 2008

Amendments of Reg. §§301.6343-2 and 301.7425-3, relating to the discharge of liens under Code Sec. 7425 and return of wrongfully levied upon property under Code Sec. 6343, are adopted. Temporary Reg. §§301.6343-2T and 301.7425-3T are removed.
T.D. 9410 , filed with the Federal Register on July 7, 2008.

[ Code Secs. 6343 and 7425]


Lien for taxes: Nonjudicial foreclosure sale: Return of wrongfully levied property. --









DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY



Internal Revenue Service



26 CFR Part 301

[ TD 9410]

RIN 1545-BF54

Change to Office to which Notices of Nonjudicial Sale and Requests for Return of Wrongfully Levied Property must be sent.

AGENCY: Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Treasury.

ACTION: Final and removal of temporary regulations.

SUMMARY: This document contains final regulations relating to the discharge of liens under section 7425 and return of wrongfully levied upon property under section 6343 of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) of 1986. These regulations revise regulations currently published under sections 7425 and 6343. These regulations clarify that such notices and claims should be sent to the IRS official and office specified in the relevant IRS publications. The regulations will affect parties seeking to provide the IRS with notice of a nonjudicial foreclosure sale and parties making administrative requests for return of wrongfully levied property.

DATES: Effective Date : These regulations are effective on July 8, 2008.

Applicability Date : See §§301.6343-2 and 301.6343-3.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Robin M. Ferguson, (202) 622-3630 (not a toll-free call).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:



Background

This document contains final regulations amending the Procedure and Administration Regulations (26 CFR part 301) relating to the giving of notice of nonjudicial sales under section 7425(b) of the Code. This document also contains final regulations amending the Procedure and Administration Regulations relating to requests for return of wrongfully levied property under section 6343(b) of the Code. On July 20, 2007, temporary regulations ( TD 9344) were published in the Federal Register (72 FR 39737). A notice of proposed rulemaking (REG-148951-05) cross-referencing the temporary regulations was published in the Federal Register on the same day (72 FR 39771). No written comments were received from the public in response to the notice of proposed rulemaking. No public hearing was requested, scheduled or held. The proposed regulations are adopted as amended by this Treasury decision, and the corresponding temporary regulations are removed.

For notices of nonjudicial foreclosure sale under Section 7425(b) and requests for return of property wrongfully levied upon under Section 6343(b), the existing regulations direct the notices and requests to be sent to the "district director (marked for the attention of the Chief, Special Procedures Staff)." The offices of the district director and Special Procedures were eliminated by the IRS reorganization implemented pursuant to the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Public Law 105-206 (RRA 1998), creating uncertainty as to the timeliness of notices and requests under these provisions.



Comments on the Proposed Regulations

None.



Modifications of the Proposed Regulations

None, other than minor grammatical revisions.



Effective/Applicability Date

These regulations are effective on July 8, 2008.



Special Analyses

It has been determined that this Treasury decision is not a significant regulatory actions as defined in Executive Order 12866. Therefore, a regulatory assessment is not required. It also has been determined that section 553(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. chapter 5) does not apply to these regulations, and because the regulations do not impose a collection of information on small entities, the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. chapter 6) does not apply. Pursuant to section 7805(f) of the Internal Revenue Code, these regulations have been submitted to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration for comment on its impact on small business.



Drafting Information

The principal author of these regulations is Robin M. Ferguson, Office of Associate Chief Counsel (Procedure and Administration).



List of Subjects in 26 CFR Part 301

Employment taxes, Estate taxes, Excise taxes, Gift taxes, Income taxes, Penalties, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.



Adoption of Amendments to the Regulations

Accordingly, 26 CFR part 301 is amended as follows:



PART 301 --PROCEDURE AND ADMINISTRATION

Paragraph 1. The authority citation for part 301 continues to read in part as follows:

Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805 * * *

Par. 2. Section 301.6343-2 is amended as follows:

1. Paragraphs (a)(1) introductory text and (b) introductory text are revised.

2. Paragraph (e) is revised.

The revisions read as follows:

§301.6343-2 Return of wrongfully levied upon property.

(a) Return of property --(1) General rule. If the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) determines that property has been wrongfully levied upon, the IRS may return --

* * * * *

(b) Request for return of property. A written request for the return of property wrongfully levied upon must be given to the IRS official, office and address specified in IRS Publication 4528, "Making an Administrative Wrongful Levy Claim Under Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Section 6343(b)," or any successor publication. The relevant IRS publications may be downloaded from the IRS internet site at www.irs.gov. Under this section, a request for the return of property wrongfully levied upon is not effective if it is given to an office other than the office listed in the relevant publication. The written request must contain the following information --

* * * * *

(e) Effective/applicability date. These regulations are effective on July 8, 2008.

§301.6343-2T [REMOVED].

Par. 3. Section 301.6343-2T is removed.

Par. 4. Section 301.7425-3 is amended as follows:

1. Paragraphs (a)(1), (b)(1), (b)(2), (c)(1), (d)(2), (d)(3), and (d)(4) are revised.

2. Paragraph (a)(2)(iii) Example 2 is amended by removing the language "district director" and adding the language "IRS" in its place wherever it appears.

3. Paragraph (e) is revised.

The revisions and additions read as follows:

§301.7425-3 Discharge of liens; special rules.

(a) Notice of sale requirements --(1) In general. Except in the case of the sale of perishable goods described in paragraph (c) of this section, a notice (as described in paragraph (d) of this section) of a nonjudicial sale shall be given, in writing by registered or certified mail or by personal service, not less than 25 days prior to the date of sale (determined under the provisions of §301.7425-2(b)), to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) official, office and address specified in IRS Publication 786, "Instructions for Preparing a Notice of Nonjudicial Sale of Property and Application for Consent to Sale," or any successor publication. The relevant IRS publications may be downloaded from the IRS internet site at www.irs.gov. Under this section, a notice of sale is not effective if it is given to an office other than the office listed in the relevant publication. The provisions of sections 7502 (relating to timely mailing treated as timely filing) and 7503 (relating to time for performance of acts where the last day falls on Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday) apply in the case of notices required to be made under this paragraph.

* * * * *

(b) Consent to sale --(1) In general. Notwithstanding the notice of sale provisions of paragraph (a) of this section, a nonjudicial sale of property shall discharge or divest the property of the lien and title of the United States if the IRS consents to the sale of the property free of the lien or title. Pursuant to section 7425(c)(2), where adequate protection is afforded the lien or title of the United States, the IRS may, in its discretion, consent with respect to the sale of property in appropriate cases. Such consent shall be effective only if given in writing and shall be subject to such limitations and conditions as the IRS may require. However, the IRS may not consent to a sale of property under this section after the date of sale, as determined under §301.7425-2(b). For provisions relating to the authority of the IRS to release a lien or discharge property subject to a tax lien, see section 6325 and the section 6325 regulations.

(2) Application for consent. Any person desiring the IRS's consent to sell property free of a tax lien or a title derived from the enforcement of a tax lien of the United States in the property shall submit to the IRS, at the office and address specified in the relevant IRS publications, a written application, in triplicate, declaring that it is made under penalties of perjury, and requesting that such consent be given. The application shall contain the information required in the case of a notice of sale, as set forth in paragraph (d)(1) of this section, and, in addition, shall contain a statement of the reasons why the consent is desired.

(c) Sale of perishable goods.-(1) In general. A notice (as described in paragraph (d) of this section) of a nonjudicial sale of perishable goods (as defined in paragraph (c)(2) of this section) shall be given in writing, by registered or certified mail or delivered by personal service, at any time before the sale, to the IRS official and office specified in the relevant IRS publications, at the address specified in such publications. Under this section, a notice of sale is not effective if it is given to an office other than the office listed in the relevant publication. If a notice of a nonjudicial sale is timely given in the manner described in this paragraph, the nonjudicial sale shall discharge or divest the tax lien, or a title derived from the enforcement of a tax lien, of the United States in the property. The provisions of sections 7502 (relating to timely mailing treated as timely filing) and 7503 (relating to time for performance of acts where the last day falls on Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday) apply in the case of notices required to be made under this paragraph. The seller of the perishable goods shall hold the proceeds (exclusive of costs) of the sale as a fund, for not less than 30 days after the date of the sale, subject to the liens and claims of the United States, in the same manner and with the same priority as the liens and claims of the United States had with respect to the property sold. If the seller fails to hold the proceeds of the sale in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph and if the IRS asserts a claim to the proceeds within 30 days after the date of sale, the seller shall be personally liable to the United States for an amount equal to the value of the interest of the United States in the fund. However, even if the proceeds of the sale are not so held by the seller, but all the other provisions of this paragraph are satisfied, the buyer of the property at the sale takes the property free of the liens and claims of the United States. In the event of a postponement of the scheduled sale of perishable goods, the seller is not required to notify the IRS of the postponement. For provisions relating to the authority of the IRS to release a lien or discharge property subject to a tax lien, see section 6325 and the regulations.

* * * * *

(d) * * *

(2) Inadequate notice. Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, a notice of sale described in paragraph (a) of this section that does not contain the information described in paragraph (d)(1) of this section shall be considered inadequate by the IRS. If the IRS determines that the notice is inadequate, the IRS will give written notification of the items of information which are inadequate to the person who submitted the notice. A notice of sale that does not contain the name and address of the person submitting such notice shall be considered to be inadequate for all purposes without notification of any specific inadequacy. In any case where a notice of sale does not contain the information required under paragraph (d)(1)(ii) of this section with respect to a Notice of Federal Tax Lien, the IRS may give written notification of such omission without specification of any other inadequacy and such notice of sale shall be considered inadequate for all purposes. In the event the IRS gives notification that the notice of sale is inadequate, a notice complying with the provisions of this section (including the requirement that the notice be given not less than 25 days prior to the sale in the case of a notice described in paragraph (a) of this section) must be given. However, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (b)(1) of this section, in such a case the IRS may, in its discretion, consent to the sale of the property free of the lien or title of the United States even though notice of the sale is given less than 25 days prior to the sale. In any case where the person who submitted a timely notice, which indicates his name and address, does not receive more than 5 days prior to the date of sale written notification from the IRS that the notice is inadequate, the notice shall be considered adequate for purposes of this section.

(3) Acknowledgment of notice. If a notice of sale described in paragraph (a) or (c) of this section is submitted in duplicate to the IRS with a written request that receipt of the notice be acknowledged and returned to the person giving the notice, this request will be honored by the IRS. The acknowledgment by the IRS will indicate the date and time of the receipt of the notice.

(4) Disclosure of adequacy of notice. The IRS is authorized to disclose, to any person who has a proper interest, whether an adequate notice of sale was given under paragraph (d)(1) of this section. Any person desiring this information should submit to the IRS a written request that clearly describes the property sold or to be sold, identifies the applicable notice of lien, gives the reasons for requesting the information, and states the name and address of the person making the request. The request should be submitted to the IRS official, office and address specified in IRS Publication 4235, "Technical Services (Advisory) Group Addresses," or any successor publication. The relevant IRS publications may be downloaded from the IRS internet site at www.irs.gov.

(e) Effective/applicability date. These regulations are effective on July 8, 2008.

§301.7425-3T [REMOVED].

Par. 5. Section 301.7425-3T is removed.

Linda E. Stiff

Deputy Commissioner for Services and Enforcement.

Approved: June 30, 2008

Eric Solomon

Assistant Secretary of the Treasury (Tax Policy).

Labels:

Sunday, August 24, 2008

Acceptance by IRS of Offer in Compromise - section 7122


The following is a series of cases dealing with when an Offer in Compromise is accepted by the IRS

An IRS Appeals officer did not abuse her discretion when she refused a corporation's offer-in-compromise regarding its unpaid employment taxes. Her rejection of the offer as nonprocessable and inadequate was in accordance with the Internal Revenue Code and Treasury regulations. The corporation was not current on the payment of its estimated tax for the prior two periods. Its failure to timely pay taxes owed was a reasonable basis for the Appeals officer to reject its offer-in-compromise relating to other unpaid taxes.

Christopher Cross, Inc., CA-5, 2006-2 USTC ¶50,524, 461 F3d 610.

The IRS did not abuse its discretion by refusing to accept a couple's offer in compromise on an alternative minimum tax liability they incurred for exercising incentive stock options.

R.J. Speltz, CA-8, 2006-2 USTC ¶50,403.

An Appeals officer's determination to reject an individual's offer in compromise and sustain a levy to collect trust fund recovery penalties was not an abuse of discretion. The record established that the determination complied with all the requirements of the Internal Revenue Code and the Treasury Regulations. Moreover, the Appeals officer sustained the levy only after a complete review of the individual's financial information and after determining that the individual's offer in compromise was insufficient. The taxpayer conceded that IRS was not required to negotiate an acceptable offer in compromise.

R.E. Marshall, DC Fla., 2007-2 USTC ¶50,802.

The IRS was not liable for a breach of contract claim with respect to a settlement agreement because the individual bringing suit failed to show the existence of an enforceable contract to settle his outstanding tax liabilities. The IRS agent's written reply to the individual's offer did not constitute a valid offer or counteroffer that could be accepted by the individual to create a binding contract with the IRS. Moreover, the IRS agent was not authorized to enter into any such contract with the individual.

D.W. Jordan, FedCl, 2007-2 USTC ¶50,601.

The government was not estopped from collecting an individual's unpaid taxes merely because he alleged that an IRS employee advised or enticed him to file offers-in-compromise relating to his tax liabilities.

J.C. Ryals, DC Fla., 2006-1 USTC ¶50,293.

The IRS could not be compelled to accept an offer in compromise submitted by a company after the commencement of a bankruptcy proceeding but before the filing of a proposed Chapter 11 plan.Rev. Proc. 2003-71, 2003-2 CB 517, which directs IRS personnel to treat any offer in compromise as nonprocessable if the taxpayer has a bankruptcy case pending, does not violate a clear nondiscretionary duty on the part of the IRS.

1900 M Restaurant Associates, Inc., BC-DC D.C., 2005-1 USTC ¶50,313, 319 BR 302.

The IRS did not abuse its discretion in refusing to accept an individual's multiple offers to compromise her liability for the trust fund recovery penalty. The taxpayer's first offer was for significantly less than her collection potential, and she failed to explain why the IRS's two counter offers would pose a hardship. In calculating its counter offers, the IRS took into consideration the taxpayer's age and numerous medical problems. The IRS also offered to forgo collection until the taxpayer's financial situation improved, or the collection action expired. The taxpayer made the second offer at a Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing, arguing that there was doubt as to her liability for the penalty.

A. Siquieros, DC Tex., 2005-1 USTC ¶50,244. Aff'd, per curiam, CA-5 (unpublished opinion), 2005-1 USTC ¶50,245, 124 FedAppx 279.

A taxpayer was not entitled to monetary damages resulting from the IRS's referral of a collection action against the taxpayer to the Department of Justice (DOJ) while one or more offers in compromise were allegedly pending. The IRS's referral of the taxpayer's case to the DOJ predated temporary regulations precluding any levy to collect outstanding tax debts while an offer in compromise for those tax debts is pending and final regulations, Reg. §301.7122-1(g)(6), prohibiting the referral of cases to the DOJ for the collection of unpaid taxes through judicial proceedings while an offer in compromise is pending. The IRS's failure to include provisions preventing referral of such cases to the DOJ in the temporary regulations was not actionable under the Taxpayer Bill of Rights (P.L. 104-168), as codified under Code Sec. 7433(a). There was also no proof that there were any offers in compromise pending when the taxpayer's case was referred to the DOJ. At least six offers in compromise submitted by the taxpayer were rejected or returned as "unprocessable." Documents evidencing the IRS's acceptance of an offer in compromise submitted by the taxpayer's accountant on behalf of the taxpayer were forgeries.

J.R. Evseroff, DC N.Y., 2005-1 USTC ¶50,112.

Married debtors' tender of a check to the government did not constitute an offer in compromise that would have discharged their tax liability. The government and the debtors agreed that an offer to compromise the tax liability of the debtors was never accepted in writing by an authorized official. Moreover, a certificate of assessment reflected that the debtors' offer in compromise was rejected.

L.M. Smallwood, BC-DC Ark., 2002-1 USTC ¶50,166.

A proposed tax levy and collection action against an individual was not barred because the government failed to entertain a settlement or other compromise of her liability. The taxpayer failed to assert any Internal Revenue Code provision that establishes the government's legal obligation to compromise its action against her. The government has discretion to accept or reject any offer in compromise of a tax liability but is not legally obligated to even consider such an offer.

D.G. Asbury, DC Pa., 2002-1 USTC ¶50,117.

A Cayman Islands corporation's suit for refund of federal withholding taxes was dismissed, with prejudice, in accordance with a closing agreement with the government. A letter sent by the taxpayer that purported to modify its settlement offer to include an offer-in-compromise with regard to tax years not at issue was ineffective. The taxpayer presented no evidence that the proper parties received the letter before the government accepted its offer.

Inverworld, Ltd., DC D.C., 2001-1 USTC ¶50,350. Aff'd, per curiam, CA-D.C. (unpublished opinion), 2002-1 USTC ¶50,113, 22 FedAppx 5.

The co-owner of property foreclosed by a federal tax lien failed to show that he and the government had reached a settlement to release the property from the lien. There was no evidence that the government accepted his offer in compromise.

E.F. Ressler, DC Ala., 98-1 USTC ¶50,417.

Correspondence between a mutual insurance corporation and the government did not reflect an intention that the filing of a stipulation of dismissal would be a condition precedent to the completion of settlement negotiations. Because the parties entered into a valid settlement agreement, the government's acceptance letter merely stated that a stipulation of dismissal would "reflect" the agreement which had already been reached. As such, a stipulation was not essential to the validity of the parties' settlement agreement.

Principal Mutual Life Insurance Co., FedCl, 93-2 USTC ¶50,480, 29 FedCl 157. Aff'd on another issue, CA- FC, 95-1 USTC ¶50,160, 50 F3d 1021.

The IRS was not estopped from denying that it settled tax liabilities, even though it retained money offered as a settlement, because the procedures set forth for settling disputes were not followed. Since the statutory requirements were not followed, there could be no settlement, and thus no estoppel.

W.F. Brooks, DC W.Va., 86-2 USTC ¶9548.

A taxpayer's offer of compromise that contained a waiver of limitations was rejected by the IRS, and, therefore, the IRS could not assert that it accepted the portion of the offer containing the waiver.

G. Hamm, DC Ky., 79-2 USTC ¶9731.

The Commissioner effectively accepted an offer to compromise a refund claim when he mailed the taxpayer's attorney a letter accepting the offer and informing the taxpayer that the refund settlement would be credited against the unpaid tax liability of a later tax year. The court rejected the taxpayer's argument that the IRS letter constituted a counteroffer rather than an acceptance because it materially altered the terms of the offer.

J.P. Kehoe, DC N.Y., 79-2 USTC ¶9524.

There was no acceptance of a compromise settlement, which was negotiated during the trial, where the government's acceptance was not timely and unequivocal and where the taxpayer's counsel decided not to accept the settlement offer. Therefore, the taxpayer was not bound by the settlement agreement.

B.R. Kurio, DC Tex., 71-1 USTC ¶9112.

The IRS did not abuse its discretion when it refused married taxpayers' offer in compromise even though their tax liability arose from the application of the alternative minimum tax (AMT) as a result of the exercise of an incentive stock option on stock which then fell precipitously in value. The taxpayers had the ability to meet their obligation in full (albeit with a substantial reduction in their standard of living). The fact that their tax bill was much higher than the value of what they ended up receiving was not a reason for the IRS to accept the taxpayers' offer. The IRS was precluded from accepting an offer in compromise that would undermine compliance with the tax laws. Whether or not AMT is unfair is a question for Congress, not the IRS.

R.J. Speltz, 124 TC 165, Dec. 55,961.

Disallowance of tithes as allowable expenses in determining a taxpayer's ability to pay outstanding tax liabilities for purposes of an offer in compromise was not an abuse of an IRS Appeals officer's discretion even though the taxpayer argued that tithes were required as a condition of employment. At the Appeals hearing, the taxpayers were given the opportunity to substantiate that the husband was a minister but they failed to do so and the court was not persuaded that tithing was a condition of employment.

B.M. Pixley, 123 TC 269, Dec. 55,744.

An IRS Appeals officer did not abuse her discretion in rejecting an individual's offers-in-compromise where those offers did not provide for an immediate payment equal to the available cash value of the taxpayer's life insurance policies. The court found no authority requiring the IRS to accept less than the full value on the grounds suggested by the taxpayer, that he and his wife are "in their older years."

L.D. McClanahan, 95 TCM 1625, Dec. 57,478(M), TC Memo. 2008-161.

The IRS did not abuse its discretion when it rejected multiple offers-in-compromise submitted by a married couple; therefore, a proposed levy and filing of a federal tax lien were appropriate. The offers contained a number of defects with regard to the taxpayers' reasonable collection potential, which was largely based on the amount they could realize from the equity in their home. The IRS found that their initial offer used outdated appraisals for the home and questioned the validity of a second mortgage on the property held by husband's father, which was recorded shortly before the filing of the notice of federal tax lien. The taxpayers' second offer, based on a recommendation by an IRS Appeals officer, was also insufficient. The IRS's Engineering Group had found that the market value of the taxpayers' home could be 30 percent to 40 percent higher than that stated in the second offer.

W.G. Schwartz, 95 TCM 1427, Dec. 57,424(M), TC Memo. 2008-117.

The Appeals office did not abuse its discretion when it rejected an individual's offer-in-compromise (OIC) and sustained the IRS's notice of federal tax lien. The Appeals officer properly concluded that the offer was inadequate because it failed to include the value of an interest in real property that was awarded to her as part of her divorce settlement. The taxpayer failed to provide an adequate explanation as to why the property interest was not included when it constituted a dissipated asset that should have been included in her OIC.

J.L. Ashlock, 95 TCM 1220, Dec. 57,363(M), TC Memo. 2008-58.

The IRS Appeals Office did not abuse its discretion by rejecting a married couple's offer-in-compromise where the taxpayers had underreported their income for several tax years due to claimed losses and credits from Hoyt partnership tax shelter investments. The taxpayers argued that their offer should have been accepted because of their age, health and anticipated postretirement earnings. However, the court found that the taxpayers failed to show that payment of more than they offered would render them unable to meet their basis living expenses in retirement.

R. Bergevin, 95 TCM 1031, Dec. 57,307(M) , TC Memo. 2008-6.

An IRS Appeals officer abused her discretion by including the full amount of an individual's dissipated assets in his net realizable equity (NRE) during her evaluation of his offer-in-compromise. His NRE should not have included amounts paid for: attorney's fees incurred in the representation in his tax case; attorney's fees incurred in a civil lawsuit he filed for unpaid wages; an estimated tax payment made for one of the tax years at issue; and a lump-sum payment of delinquent child support.

D.L. Samuel, 94 TCM 392, Dec. 57,141(M), TC Memo. 2007-312.

The IRS did not abuse its discretion in rejecting an individual's offer-in-compromise (OIC). The OIC was for less than one-third of his total tax liability and the individual's assets and income were valued at more than the full amount of his assessed tax liability. The individual, while lacking sufficient income to fund an installment agreement, held a one-half interest in two parcels of real estate. The value of the individual's interest in the real estate exceeded the amount of his tax liability. The individual's argument that he owed his brother, who owned the other half interest in the real estate, more than the value of his interest, was rejected because it was unsupported by evidence of such liability.

W.A. Mootz, 94 TCM 362, Dec. 57,131(M), TC Memo. 2007-303.

The IRS Appeals Office did not abuse its discretion in rejecting a married couple's offer-in-compromise where the taxpayers had underreported their income for several tax years due to claimed losses and credits from Hoyt partnership tax shelter investments. The IRS Appeals officer considered all of the evidence submitted, and reasonably applied the guidelines for evaluating an offer-in-compromise. The offer was unacceptable because, among other reasons, the taxpayers were not forthcoming in establishing their financial status, acceptance of the offer would undermine compliance with the tax laws by taxpayers in general, and the taxpayers had the financial wherewithal to pay more than the offered amount. The officer adequately considered the taxpayers' unique facts and circumstances, and the taxpayers did not show that requiring them to pay more than the offer amount would result in an economic hardship. Public policy did not demand that the taxpayers' offer be accepted because they were victims of fraud, and acceptance of the offer would not enhance voluntary compliance by other taxpayers.

M. Smith, 93 TCM 1047, Dec. 56,880(M), TC Memo. 2007-73.

Refusal to accept a married couple's offer-in-compromise was not an abuse of discretion. The taxpayers did not demonstrate either that they would suffer economic hardship from the proposed collection method or that public policy and equity reasons weighed in favor of accepting their offer. The case was not a "longstanding" case in which forgiveness of penalties and interest was appropriate, and there was no evidence that the IRS Appeals officer failed to give adequate consideration to the taxpayers' unique facts and circumstances. Public policy did not demand acceptance of the offer because the taxpayers were victims of a shelter promoter's fraud. Acceptance of the compromise would reduce the risks involved in investing in tax shelters, undermining voluntary compliance with the tax laws.

G. Hansen, 93 TCM 983, Dec. 56,861(M), TC Memo. 2007-56.

Rejection of a taxpayer's offer in compromise was not an abuse of discretion where the financial information provided by the taxpayer conflicted with the implications of the terms of the taxpayer's marital settlement and separation agreement. The information provided did not explain the inconsistencies with regard to the ownership of various assets; thus, it was not sufficient to permit a reasonable analysis of the taxpayer's offer.

J.J. Kerr, 93 TCM 932, Dec. 56,846(M), TC Memo. 2007-43.

The IRS's rejection of an offer-in-compromise from investors in a cattle-breeding tax shelter was not arbitrary, capricious or without sound basis in fact or law, and the IRS was allowed to proceed with its collection action. The IRS did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the offer despite the taxpayer's claim of special circumstances or economic hardship. The IRS was not required to address every aspect of the taxpayers' special circumstances in the notice of determination and its calculation of the taxpayers' reasonable collection potential far exceeded the taxpayers' offer. In addition, the IRS was not required to accept the taxpayer's offer based on considerations of public policy or equity. The longstanding nature of the taxpayers' case did not require acceptance of the offer-in-compromise, the IRS could rely on an example in the Internal Revenue Manual that was similar although not identical to the taxpayers' case, and the IRS did not have to consider all of the taxpayers' equitable facts, including their claim that they were victims of fraud. Finally, the taxpayers' other arguments regarding compromise of penalties and interest, the IRS's alleged failure to provide the court with sufficient information, the IRS's deadline for submission of information, the husband's pending innocent spouse claim and the IRS's alleged failure to balance the need for efficient tax collection of taxes with the concern that collection be no more intrusive than necessary were rejected.

C. Andrews Est., 93 TCM 891, Dec. 56,831(M), TC Memo. 2007-30.

The IRS's rejection of an offer-in-compromise from investors in a cattle-breeding tax shelter was not arbitrary, capricious or without sound basis in fact or law, and the IRS was allowed to proceed with its collection action. The IRS did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the offer despite the taxpayer's claim of exceptional circumstances. In addition, the IRS was not required to accept the taxpayer's offer based on considerations of public policy or equity. The longstanding nature of the taxpayers' case did not require acceptance of the offer, the IRS could rely on an example in the Internal Revenue Manual that was similar although not identical to the taxpayers' case, and the IRS did not have to consider the taxpayers' claim that they were victims of fraud. Finally, the taxpayers' other arguments regarding compromise of penalties and interest, the IRS's alleged failure to provide the court with sufficient information, the IRS's refusal to delay the Code Sec. 6330 hearing, the wife's pending innocent spouse claim, and the IRS's alleged failure to balance the need for efficient tax collection with the concern that collection be no more intrusive than necessary were rejected.

G. Freeman, 93 TCM 879, Dec. 56,829(M), TC Memo. 2007-28.

The IRS's rejection of an offer-in-compromise from investors in a cattle-breeding tax shelter was not arbitrary, capricious or without sound basis in fact or law, and the IRS was allowed to proceed with its collection action. The IRS did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the offer despite the taxpayers' claim of special circumstances or economic hardship. The IRS was not required to address every aspect of the taxpayers' special circumstances in the notice of determination and its calculation of the taxpayers' reasonable collection potential far exceeded the taxpayers' offer. In addition, the IRS was not required to accept the taxpayers' offer based on considerations of public policy or equity. The longstanding nature of the taxpayers' case did not require acceptance of the offer, the IRS could rely on an example in the Internal Revenue Manual that was similar although not identical to the taxpayers' case, and the IRS did not have to consider the taxpayers' claim that they were victims of fraud. Finally, the taxpayers' other arguments regarding compromise of penalties and interest, the IRS's alleged failure to provide the court with sufficient information, the IRS's refusal to delay the Code Sec. 6330 hearing, and the IRS's alleged failure to balance the need for efficient tax collection with the concern that collection be no more intrusive than necessary were rejected.

R. Carter, 93 TCM 861, Dec. 56,826(M), TC Memo. 2007-25.

An IRS Appeals officer did not abuse her discretion in rejecting a taxpayer's offer-in-compromise. The Appeals officer correctly concluded that acceptance of the offer-in-compromise would not promote effective tax administration. Further, she did not abuse her discretion in determining that the taxpayer's real property had a value in excess of the amount indicated by the taxpayer, which was based on an outdated appraisal, and she correctly determined that the reasonable collection potential was greater than the taxpayer's offer amount.

G.W. McDonough, 92 TCM 386, Dec. 56,665(M), TC Memo. 2006-234.

The IRS did not abuse its discretion when it rejected an elderly couple's compromise offer that amounted to less than half of their estimated tax liability. The IRS was not required to compromise the couple's tax liability in order to promote effective tax administration based on economic hardship, public policy or equity grounds because the taxpayers had sufficient assets to pay the tax owed and still meet their necessary living expenses for the foreseeable future. Further, it did not abuse its discretion in disregarding the couple's speculative future medical expenses. In addition, the IRS was not required to accept the offer based on the taxpayers' claim that they were the victims of fraud because the couple's situation was typical of many tax shelter participants who claimed deductions, obtained tax advantages and were now required to pay their tax liability. Thus, the IRS's determination to reject the offer-in-compromise was not arbitrary, capricious, or without a sound basis in fact or law, and it was not abusive or unfair to the taxpayers.

D. Clayton, 92 TCM 222, Dec. 56,612(M), TC Memo. 2006-188.

IRS representatives did not accept or intend to accept the offer of a husband and wife to settle their tax deficiency case. The IRS appeals officer to whom the offer letter was sent did not make a written or oral response, and did not accept the offer. The IRS's counsel in the case did not accept the offer, where the offer was not made to him, he was unaware of its specifics, and the appeals officer conducted the negotiations. Although it was disputed whether the IRS's counsel had told taxpayers' counsel that a settlement had been reached, IRS counsel's statement was, at best, his understanding of the intent or actions of the appeals officer or her office.

R.R. Smith, 92 TCM 219, Dec. 56,611(M), TC Memo. 2006-187.

The IRS's refusal of an individual's offer to compromise her alternative minimum tax (AMT) liability, which arose from the exercise of incentive stock options (ISO), was not an abuse of discretion. The fact that the taxpayer's AMT liability was much higher than the value of income she actually received, was not a reason for the IRS to accept her offer. Any inequity in the application of the AMT in situations such as the taxpayer's is a question for Congress to resolve and not the IRS.

C. Wai, 92 TCM 181, Dec. 56,602(M), TC Memo. 2006-179.

An IRS Appeals officer did not abuse her discretion in rejecting an taxpayer's offer-in-compromise. The Appeals officer's rejection of the offer-in-compromise was justified because the disclosure that the taxpayer had incurred additional tax liability without making payment suggested that the taxpayer preferred consumption over meeting his legal obligations. The Appeals officer had also agreed to allow a collection alternative if the taxpayer met certain conditions, but the taxpayer did not agree to those conditions. Finally, collection of the full tax liability would not have caused the taxpayer and his family financial hardship. Delaying his retirement plans was not considered a hardship.

J.G. Dostal, 90 TCM 496, Dec. 56,194(M), TC Memo. 2005-264.

An IRS Appeals officer's determination to proceed with collection of an individual's unpaid tax liability was not an abuse of discretion. Although the taxpayer's allegation of economic hardship was worthy of review, the taxpayer's substantial equity in his home, against which he could borrow, weighed against a finding of economic hardship. Accordingly, the IRS did not abuse its discretion by rejecting the taxpayer's offer to compromise.

K. Hawkins,, 89 TCM 1075, Dec. 55,999(M), TC Memo. 2005-88.

A settlement agreement between an individual and the IRS did not allow the taxpayer to claim business losses related to his wife's furniture business in a specific tax year. The IRS disallowed the losses, categorizing the expenses as start-up costs required to be capitalized. The IRS and the taxpayer reached a settlement for that year that included, in part, the disallowance of the business loss. The taxpayer argued, however, that the prior to signing the settlement an agreement was reached to allow the loss in the following year. Although the IRS agreed that the loss might be allowed in a subsequent year, there was no assent to allow the loss in any specific tax year. Moreover, the settlement did not contain any express agreement as to the business losses. Therefore, there was no binding agreement as to the losses.

K.J. Barela, 88 TCM 65, Dec. 55,707(M), TC Memo. 2004-175.

An IRS Appeals officer abused his discretion in denying a couple's offer in compromise on the grounds that the taxpayers had inadequate income to meet their living expenses and pay the proposed monthly payments. The officer appeared to rely exclusively on the IRS's prescribed schedule of national and local average living expenses to determine that the taxpayers' basic living expenses exceeded their monthly income. However, all of the facts and circumstances, including the schedule of actual expenses submitted by the taxpayers, should have been considered in determining whether the taxpayers could pay both their expenses and the installment payments (Code Sec. 7122(c)(2)). The filing of the federal tax liens to secure the IRS's interest in the unpaid tax liability was not an abuse of discretion.

M. Fowler, 88 TCM 17, Dec. 55,689(M), TC Memo. 2004-163.

Married taxpayers' challenge to an adverse Collection Due Process determination was rejected because they failed to establish an abuse of discretion on the part of the IRS. The officer's determination that the taxpayers had some ability to pay was supported by their proposed offer in compromise. In light of the unresolved question regarding the taxpayers' ownership of real property, the rejection of their proposed offer in compromise was sustained.

D.G. Willis, 86 TCM 506, Dec. 55,334(M), TC Memo. 2003-302.

A married couple's offer to settle their tax liability for the amount of their deficiency, but excluding penalties and interest, did not constitute a binding compromise agreement. The taxpayers had received an oral confirmation from the IRS auditor that their offer had been accepted; however, the auditor believed their offer was a request for additional time to pay. In fact, the taxpayers had not submitted the offer on the appropriate form and had not received a written confirmation that the offer was accepted. Further, there was no mutual assent to the offer since the auditor misunderstood the nature of their request.

J. Ringgold, 86 TCM 28, Dec. 55,218(M), TC Memo. 2003-199.

The IRS's action in cashing a check submitted by an exempt association with a letter that purported to be an offer in compromise did not amount to an acceptance of the entity's offer and did not bar the IRS from asserting that its income activity gave rise to unrelated business taxable income. Rather, the letter merely constituted a settlement offer to resolve the dispute resulting from the IRS audit of the taxpayer for three of the tax years in issue. Moreover, no compromise was effected because the letter failed to meet the specific requirements of Code Sec. 7122.

Education Athletic Assoc., Inc., 77 TCM 1525, Dec. 53,284(M), TC Memo. 1999-75.

Married taxpayers who were assessed deficiencies did not have a binding settlement agreement with the IRS regarding the years at issue. Although the taxpayers submitted several Forms 656, Offer in Compromise in Any Civil or Criminal Case, and District Director's Recommendation, the IRS never accepted any of their settlement offers. An IRS employee's signing of the forms to indicate that the IRS accepted the taxpayers' waiver of the limitations period did not constitute an acceptance of their offers. Further, the IRS employee and the taxpayers' accountant testified that the IRS employee never orally agreed to accept the taxpayers' proposals. Since the husband had a history of dishonest, criminal behavior, his testimony with respect to the alleged oral agreement lacked credibility. Thus, the taxpayers failed to establish that a binding agreement existed.

D.L. Streck, 74 TCM 545, Dec. 52,240(M), TC Memo. 1997-407. Aff'd, CA-6 (unpublished opinion), 99-2 USTC ¶50,650.

The IRS and an investor did not enter into a binding settlement agreement on deficiencies related to a tax shelter because the parties did not mutually assent to a settlement. The taxpayer failed to indicate his belief that a settlement agreement had been entered into until six months after he received written indications that the IRS did not believe that a settlement agreement existed.

T.W. Heil, 68 TCM 513, Dec. 50,071(M), TC Memo. 1994-417.

The government was not bound by an alleged proposed settlement between a former attorney and his wife and the IRS. A proposed decision document did not conform to the formalities required to execute a binding settlement. Even if the document constituted a formal settlement offer, there was no evidence that the taxpayers executed the agreement. Moreover, the IRS never executed the agreement, and no such document was filed with the Tax Court.

B.J. O'Sullivan, 68 TCM 407, Dec. 50,046(M), TC Memo. 1994-395. Aff'd, CA-9 (unpublished opinion), 96-2 USTC ¶50,496.

A notice of deficiency was not invalidated on account of a prior assessment where it was sent to a taxpayer who, along with her husband (who was also her business partner), had signed a Form 870-L(AD) settlement offer that was not signed by the IRS until after the husband filed for bankruptcy. The settlement agreement was void as to both spouses because acceptance of the offer was precluded by the automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code.

N.J. Gillian, 66 TCM 398, Dec. 49,218(M), TC Memo. 1993-366.

In a case involving a delinquent taxpayer who entered into a compromise agreement with the IRS to discharge the federal tax lien on her home in order to facilitate its sale, and who subsequently sought to compromise her tax liability after a collateral agreement was signed, Chief Counsel determined that the Service could accept the offer. The taxpayer submitted a separate offer in compromise conditioned on the Service's release of the mortgage on her home. However, acceptance of such an offer did not require the IRS to release the mortgage. A collateral agreement in which the taxpayer grants additional security to the IRS creates an independent cause of action and, thus, the original unpaid taxes giving rise to the statutory liens remain as separate liabilities. Absent language to the contrary in the compromise agreement, the mortgage remains unaffected.

IRS Letter Ruling 200133028, July 17, 2001.

Chief Counsel determined that a Compliance Area Director is entitled to compromise a case notwithstanding an opinion by Associate Area Counsel that opposed acceptance of a taxpayer's offer based upon a purported economic hardship that would ensue from collection in full. Although Code Sec. 7122(b) requires the opinion of the Associate Area Counsel whenever an offer in compromise is made, the opinion need not favor acceptance of the compromise in order for the IRS to accept the offer. The ultimate determination of whether an offer is accepted lies with the Area Director or other delegated official. However, an offer may not be accepted unless one of the bases for compromise recognized by Reg. 301.7122-1T has been established.

CCA Letter Ruling 200128054, May 29, 2001.

The IRS could exercise its discretion to accept an offer in compromise in spite of the fact that processability rules pertaining to deposit, payment and filing of employment taxes changed prior to acceptance of the offer. Chief Counsel determined that the in-business corporation could not compel the IRS to apply the former rule that it demonstrated compliance by showing that it had been current in the preceding two quarters, rather than demonstrating compliance by having timely filed and timely deposited the previous two quarters' taxes. Nothing in the Internal Revenue Code or regulations prevented the Service from exercising its discretion to process an offer based on criteria that existed when the offer was first submitted.

CCA Letter Ruling 200137001, April 12, 2001.

Labels:

Thursday, August 14, 2008

Offer in Compromise Investigations

Part 5. Collecting Process
Chapter 8. Offer in Compromise
Section 4. Investigation

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Exhibit 5.8.4-3 Offer in Compromise Recommendation Report

5.8.4.1 (09-01-2005)

Overview

This chapter provides:

Instructions for conducting the different types of offer investigations.

Definitions for considering each possible basis under which an offer may be filed.

How to work offers filed under multiple bases.

Directions for coordinating activities with other Service functions.


5.8.4.2 (09-01-2005)

Doubt as to Liability

After initial processing, offers based on Doubt as to Liability (DATL) of a Trust Fund Recovery Penalty (TFRP) or Personal Liability for Excise Tax (PLET) are transferred to Area offices for assignment to Offer Specialists. All other Doubt as to Liability (DATL) offers should be forwarded with no initial processing, to Area Office Examination OIC Coordinators.

For offers based on Doubt as to Liability (DATL) of a Trust Fund Recovery Penalty (TFRP) or Personal Liability for Excise Tax (PLET), the decision to accept or reject rests primarily on a reconsideration of whether or not the person assessed was responsible for and willfully failed to pay over the subject tax. Offers on assessments of this nature that were determined by Appeals or that received an Appeal hearing should be transferred to Appeals for consideration.

The taxpayer must offer a dollar amount. An offer for zero dollars on this basis, like any other, is not acceptable and is subject to perfection requirements.

The administrative file should be secured and reviewed to examine the supporting evidence that supported the assessment. New information, testimony or documents presented by the taxpayer should be considered. Refer to IRC 5.7, Trust Fund Compliance Handbook, for a discussion of the factors and evidence that support an assessment of a TFRP or PLET.

A Doubt as to Liability (DATL) offer should be resolved in one of the following ways:

If… Then…
No new information is available and the TFRP or PLET file supports the original assessment Reject the offer.
Another amount of liability is determined and the taxpayer agrees to the finding Prepare and submit the Form 3870, Request for Adjustment, to correct the assessment and secure a withdrawal of the offer or recommend acceptance of the offer for the correct amount.
Another amount of liability is determined and the taxpayer still does not agree Submit a Form 3870 to correct the assessment and recommend rejection of the offer.
The Administrative file does not support the assessment Abate the assessment in full and secure a withdrawal of the offer.


Note:
If new information is presented that raises doubt or the existing information supporting the assessment is weak, consider accepting an offer to avoid the hazards of litigation.


5.8.4.3 (09-01-2005)
Effective Tax Administration and Doubt as to Collectibility with Special Circumstances
Refer to IRM 5.8.11, Effective Tax Administration , for a full discussion on how to investigate and determine acceptability of offers submitted under Effective Tax Administration (ETA) or Doubt to Collectibility with Special Circumstance (DCSC).

Note:
Offers Investigators should review any comments in item 9 on the Form 656 to determine if special circumstances should be considered.


Effective Tax Administration (ETA) offers can be accepted only when:

There is no doubt the tax is owed and no doubt that the full amount owed can be collected from the taxpayer.

The taxpayer has a proven economic hardship or has presented facts that would support acceptance under the public policy/equity basis, and

Compromise would not undermine compliance with tax laws.


Doubt as to Collectibility with Special Circumstance (DCSC) offers can only be accepted when the taxpayer cannot fully pay the tax due, but has proven special circumstances that warrant acceptance for less than the amount of the calculated reasonable collection potential (RCP).

Factors establishing special circumstances under Doubt as to Collectibility (DATC) are the same as those considered under Effective Tax Administration (ETA). See IRM 5.8.11, Effective Tax Administration , for a list of those factors.

5.8.4.4 (09-01-2005)
Doubt as to Collectibility
Doubt as to Collectibility (DATC) offers may be worked either in the Centralized Offers in Compromise (COIC) site by Offer Examiners (OE) or in Area offices by Offer Specialists (OS). Cases assigned to Offer Examiners (OE) in COIC may be forwarded to Area offices for assignment to an Offer Specialist (OS) if complex issues requiring a field investigation are identified.

For Doubt as to Collectibility (DATC) offers, the decision to accept or reject usually rests on whether the amount offered reflects reasonable collection potential (RCP). The exception to this rule would be for offers not accepted based on public policy reasons. Reasonable collection potential (RCP) is defined as the amount that can be collected from all available means, including administrative and judicial collection remedies. Generally, the components of collectibility outlined in IRM 5.8.4.4.1 below, will be included in calculating total RCP. See IRM 5.8.5, Financial Analysis , for more detail on how to analyze the taxpayers financial condition to arrive at the value of each component. In determining the taxpayers future ability to pay, full consideration must be given to the taxpayers overall general situation including such factors as age, health, marital status, number and age of dependents, education or occupational training and work experience.

Offers should not be accepted where the tax can be paid in full as a lump sum or can be paid under current installment agreement guidelines, unless special circumstances are identified that warrant consideration of a lesser amount. Once the ability to make payments is established, the investigating employee must determine if a greater amount can be collected through current installment agreement guidelines than is being offered. If so, the offer should be recommended for rejection, unless special circumstances warrant acceptance.

5.8.4.4.1 (09-01-2005)
Components of Collectibility
The following four components of collectibility will ordinarily be included in calculating RCP for offer purposes:

Components Definition
Assets The amount collectible from the taxpayers net realizable equity in assets.
Future Income The amount collectible from the taxpayers expected future income after allowing for payment of necessary living expenses. (a) For cash offers, it is the amount collectible over the next 48 months (b) For short term deferred offers, it is the amount collectible over the next 60 months (c) For deferred payment offers, it is the amount that is collectible over the life of the collection statute
Amount Collectible from third parties The amount we could expect to collect from third parties through administrative or judicial action. For example, amounts collectible through assertion of a TFRP, a transferee assessment, nominee lien, or suit to set aside a fraudulent conveyance.
Assets and/or income that are available to the taxpayer but are beyond the reach of the government Assets that the lien will not attach, such as equity in assets located outside the country.


5.8.4.5 (09-01-2005)
Screen for Obvious Full Pay
Offer Examiners (OE) will verify the full pay worksheet as prepared by the Process Examiner (PE).

If the amounts shown by the taxpayer on the Collection Information Statement (CIS) reflect that the taxpayer can fully pay the tax due by either liquidation of assets or through an installment agreement, the offer should be rejected without substantiation or further analysis. The National Standard Expenses and Local Housing and Transportation expense standards should be applied for this analysis.

Review the case to ensure no special circumstances exist that would warrant consideration under Effective Tax Administration (ETA).

Taxpayers who have submitted an offer with a Collection Information Statement (CIS) that reflects an ability to fully pay the tax, absent special circumstances, will immediately be issued a rejection letter. In these cases, prepare the Form 1271, Rejection or Withdrawal Memorandum , and attach the Full Pay Worksheet in lieu of the Offer Recommendation Report and Asset/Equity and Income/Expense tables as instructed in IRM 5.8.7, Return, Terminate, Withdraw, and Reject Processing.

5.8.4.6 (09-01-2005)
Actions Based on Reasonable Collection Potential
Once the reasonable collection potential (RCP) has been calculated, process the case as follows:

If… Then…
The Screen for Obvious Full Pay shows the taxpayer can full pay based on CIS (See IRM 5.8.4.5 above) The rejection letter should be issued. (See IRM 5.8.7, Return, Terminate, Withdraw, and Reject Processing)
The offer must be increased in order to be recommended for acceptance Issue Letter 3498 (SC/CG) or contact the taxpayer by telephone to amend the offer to the acceptable amount. If the taxpayer response does not change the case determination issue the rejection letter using the option to increase paragraph.
The analysis shows the taxpayer can fully pay the tax through liquidating assets and/or installment payments Issue Letter 3499 (SC/CG) or contact the taxpayer by telephone. If the taxpayer response does not change the case determination, issue the rejection letter using the full pay paragraph.
The offer amount equals or exceeds the RCP and the offer is otherwise acceptable The acceptance letter should be issued. (See IRM 5.8.8, Acceptance Processing)
Special circumstances are identified that warrant acceptance for less than the RCP Consider an ETA offer or DCSC. (See IRM 5.8.11, Effective Tax Administration)


5.8.4.7 (09-01-2005)
Initial Action, Follow-Up, and Closing Action Time Frames
Time frames have been set for completing certain tasks associated with an offer investigation. These time frames vary depending on who is assigned the case.

The timely completion of an offer investigation is an organizational priority. As such, unwarranted inactivity gaps are to be avoided. (See IRM 5.8.1.1.6, Timeliness of Offer Investigations, for definitions of timely case processing.)

5.8.4.7.1 (09-01-2005)
Initial Offer Actions
Within 15 calendar days of the date an offer is assigned to an Offer Examiner (OE) in Centralized Offer in Compromise (COIC) or within 30 calendar days of the date an offer is assigned to an Offer Specialist (OS), the assigned employee must complete the following actions:

Analyze the new receipt to determine if sufficient information is available to make an decision regarding the merits of the offer.

If additional information is needed from the taxpayer to reach a decision, issue an additional information request, as appropriate. Where necessary and appropriate, this request should also include verification of the taxpayers compliance with the current year's estimated tax (ES) payments.

To the extent that information is available, prepare an Asset/Equity Table (AET) and Income/Expense Table (IET), to make a preliminary projection of case resolution.

If no further information is needed, initiate appropriate follow-up actions to recommend the disposition of the offer.

The initial lien determination should be made and documented.


Note:
Prior to the issuance of offer cases to the field, COIC will have made all processability determinations and completed initial internal case building actions. In some cases, no additional information will be needed from the taxpayer to complete the investigations. In these situations, the next appropriate action(s) should be scheduled in a manner that ensures the timely resolution of the case.


In situations where the Field Offer Specialists (OS) are not co-located with the group manager, an additional five (5) days will be allowed from the assignment date to complete the initial case actions. This time accounts for the need to transship the case files to remote locations. Situations where this transit time routinely takes more than five (5) days to accomplish should be reported to the Area Offer in Compromise Coordinator to determine the cause for the delays.

Generally, the AOIC assignment date will be the assignment date of record.

Prior to the income and expense analysis of an individual offer where the taxpayer submitted a Form 656-A certification, the Offer Investigator will determine whether the taxpayers income and family unit size at the time the offer was submitted supported the decision not to pay the application fee. If the Offer Investigator concludes that the income for the family size exceeds the levels for which a Form 656-A certification was allowed (i.e., the taxpayer should have paid the application fee), offer processing should immediately cease. Return the offer using letter code "RET-AB " for failure to pay the application fee.

If additional information is required to make a decision, contact the taxpayer or Power of Attorney (POA) to request the additional supporting documents. If it is determined no information is necessary issue a decision letter.

The offer investigator may analyze the offer through correspondence, in person, which may include telephone contact, an office visit, or a field visit. Letters available on AOIC such as the combo letter or an additional information letter (L-2844) are appropriate to request additional information.

If the request for information is in writing the correspondence must include:

A list of the specific items/information needed,

A specific deadline for providing the information,

A statement indicating that the offer will be returned without further consideration if all the information is not provided,

The name, phone number, and employee number of the investigating employee,

A statement regarding enclosure of Publication 1 and 594,

Include Notice 1326, Offer in Compromise (OIC) Applicants ALERT Notice.

A statement indicating that a Notice of Federal Tax Lien (NFTL) will be filed if a decision has been made to file a lien.

A statement addressing any potential special circumstances (e.g. Effective Tax Administration or Doubt as to Collectiblity with Special Circumstance),

Rubber-stamp or otherwise enter on all outgoing envelopes containing requests for additional information "URGENT — TIME SENSITIVE" .


If the request for information is in person (e.g. by telephone, office, or field visit) the contact must include the following information:

Verify receipt of Pub. 1 and Pub. 594. If the first conversation is with the Power of Attorney (POA), verify that the taxpayer has received these publications. If the response from either the taxpayer or the POA is yes, ask if there are any questions and answer any questions they may have to ensure there is a clear understanding of their rights. If they have not been received, offer to either explain their rights before proceeding or re-mail the publications to the taxpayer and postpone conversation until they have been received and read.

Address and document any potential special circumstances (e.g. Effective Tax Administration or Doubt as to Collectibility with Special Circumstances) identified during the initial review of documents submitted with the offer.


Cases transferred from one office to another should have an AOIC transfer letter sent within 15 calendar days of the transfer advising the taxpayer of the location of the office where the case has been transferred and providing the taxpayer with a local contact telephone number. Since cases are often reassigned to a post of duty (POD) once received in the Area office drop point the receiving office will be responsible for sending the transfer letter. If the case cannot be assigned immediately, the taxpayer should be advised of the anticipated date of assignment to an Offer Specialist. A follow up letter should be sent to the taxpayer advising of any delay in assignment if the case is not assigned by the date specified in the original letter.

To eliminate the potential for mis-routed cases, the procedures outlined in IRM 3.13.62, Media Transport and Control, will be followed.

The originating office responsible for shipment of the offer files will follow-up within 30 days from the shipment date if the acknowledgment copy of the Form 3210, Document Transmittal, is not received.

If all the cases listed on the Form 3210 are not included in the shipment, the receiving office is responsible for notifying the originating office within 10 days of receipt of the Form 3210.

Any and all discrepancies will be resolved within 30 days.


5.8.4.7.2 (09-01-2005)
Follow-up Actions
In order to ensure timely case processing, all in-process offers must have follow-up dates scheduled for the next appropriate action.

Throughout the investigation, the scheduling of timely follow-up actions should be reasonable and appropriate, based on the facts of the case. In order to be considered timely, follow-up actions should be significant actions that can reasonably be expected to move the offer investigation toward resolution. Generally, follow-up actions should occur:

No later than 15 calendar days after a deadline for taxpayer action has passed without an adequate response.

No later than 15 calendar days of an established deadline that has resulted in the receipt of additional information.

Within 30 calendar days in situations where no contact has been established with the taxpayer or no deadline has been given.


Follow-up actions may include:

Recommending acceptance or rejection if the information received is sufficient to make a conclusion regarding the offer.

Recommending the case for closure when the taxpayer has clearly failed to provide the requested documents or information.

Personal contact when the taxpayer has made an attempt to comply with the requested documentation but the provided information is incomplete, or needs clarification.


5.8.4.7.3 (09-01-2005)
Case Recommendations and Closing Actions
Case Recommendations

Offer Examiners in Centralized Offer in Compromise (COIC) must submit all appropriate recommendation reports (i.e. Forms 1271/7249) within 10 calendar days from the date of the documented case decision.

Offer Specialists must submit all appropriate recommendation reports within 15 calendar days from the date of the documented case decision.

.

Closing Actions

Case must be submitted for closing actions (i.e. - dating/mailing of letters, closing on AOIC, ICS, etc.) within the defined 10 to 15 calendar days as described above.


5.8.4.8 (09-01-2005)
Documentation
Documentation must include but is not limited to:

The basis of the processability determination

Plans of action

Case actions

Requests for information/documentation

Receipt of requested information

Conversations with taxpayers or representatives

Results of internal information analysis

Special issues or circumstances

Financial analysis, if applicable

Case decisions


Note:
Do not repeat information already present on AOIC screens.


Documentation should include evaluation of the income, allowable expenses, asset values, and encumbrances. It should support and define differences and/or verification of the assets/expenses, including reasons for disallowance of income and/or expenses.

COIC employees will use AOIC to document case actions. Field compliance employees will use Integrated Collection System (ICS) to document actions. If ICS is used to record documentation, a closing summary history must be placed on AOIC prior to closing the case, indicating the basis for the closure and that the complete history is available on ICS.

Documentation should be recorded the day the action occurs or as soon as practical thereafter.

5.8.4.9 (09-01-2005)
Notice of Federal Tax Lien Filing
It is the responsibility of the employee to safeguard the government's interest and taxpayer rights. Employees must exercise judgment in deciding whether or not a Notice of Federal Tax Lien (NFTL) should be filed. See IRM 5.12, Federal Tax Liens, for further discussion on the NFTL.

A NFTL filing determination must be made and documented on all assigned cases as part of the initial offer actions defined in IRM 5.8.4.7.1(1) above.

Example:
Your initial case analysis reveals that the taxpayer has an interest in real property and no indication that a Notice of Federal Tax Lien is filed. Or, your initial case analysis indicates that there are no Notice of Federal Tax Liens filed and the taxpayer threatens to file bankruptcy if we do not accept the offer. You should immediately file the lien to safeguard the government's interest.


The initial review of any case must include an analysis of whether a NFTL has been correctly filed on all tax modules owing, is filed in the correct jurisdiction, and whether or not any filed liens should be re-filed. If analysis indicates a lien was erroneously allowed to self-release, appropriate action must be taken to correct the problem.

A NFTL will generally be filed whenever the unpaid balance of assessments exceeds $5,000 and an offer is recommended for rejection or a deferred payment offer is accepted. Circumstances warranting non-filing in the above situations should be clearly documented in the case histories.

In the event a NFTL is filed and the taxpayer exercises Collection Due Process (CDP) rights, it is not necessary to delay processing of the offer to wait for the outcome of the hearing. However, communication with Appeals is essential to expedite processing of the offer.
In those cases where an offer is being investigated and the taxpayer files a request for a CDP during the investigation, the case then becomes the jurisdiction of Appeals. If a determination to accept the offer has been made, the Offer Investigator should contact Appeals to recommend the taxpayer withdraw the CDP request. If a determination to reject the offer has been made, the offer file should be forwarded to the Appeals Officer handling the CDP hearing before sending any rejection letters.

If… Then…
No lien has been filed and a decision is made to not file a lien until the conclusion of the investigation The case file should be documented when a lien determination was made and it should also include the basis for the decision to withhold filing. An additional determination will be required at the conclusion of the investigation. Generally, a lien will be filed if the offer is:
accepted as a deferred payment offer,

rejected

returned

Caution: Remember that an attempt must be made to contact the TP by phone, in person, or by letter to advise of the filing before requesting the lien. AOIC combo and rejection letters satisfy the notification requirement.
A determination is made to file a lien immediately Ensure that an attempt to notify the TP of the proposed filing (by phone, letter, or in person) has been made and documented before requesting the lien be filed. Provide the required appeal rights per IRM 5.12, Federal Tax Liens, if the taxpayer objects to the filing. If the lien is filed and a CDP request is received process it immediately following guidelines in IRM 5.1.9, Collection Appeal Rights.
Liens were previously filed but in an incorrect jurisdiction Determine whether to file a NFTL in the correct jurisdiction or withhold filing until the conclusion of the investigation. Follow instructions above based on your decision. If the decision is made to withhold the filing until the conclusion of the investigation, an additional determination must be made at that time.
Liens were filed but have expired Follow instructions in IRM 5.12, Federal Tax Liens.
Liens were filed and are currently in the refiled period Ensure that liens are correctly refiled in all required jurisdictions.
An offer where the unpaid balance of assessment is $5,000 or more and is being rejected or accepted with deferred payment terms A lien will normally be filed on these cases. Circumstances warranting non-filing must be documented in case history.


5.8.4.10 (09-01-2005)
Combination Offers
Taxpayers may submit an offer based on Doubt as to Collectibility (DATC), Doubt as to Liability (DATL), Effective Tax Administration (ETA) or any combination of the three. During the offer investigation consider all bases submitted, providing the taxpayer complies with the requests for information needed as each basis is considered.

The offer will be accepted under only one basis. It is the Service’s responsibility to determine the correct basis for acceptance.

If the taxpayer submits the offer under both Doubt as to Collectibility (DATC) and Doubt as to Liability (DATL) or Effective Tax Administration (ETA), the Collection function will determine DATC first. Collection will retain control of the account on AOIC while coordinating with the Examination function on any combination offer. See the chart below for processing instructions.

For offers submitted based on both Doubt as to Collectibility (DATC) and Doubt as to Liability (DATL):

If… Then…
A decision is made to accept based on DATC Upon recommendation of acceptance on the DATC component of a "combination offer" , the Offer Investigator should review and discuss with the taxpayer the option to agree with the current recommendation of acceptance of the DATC offer or opt to pursue the DATL offer. If the taxpayer chooses not to pursue the DATL offer, recommend acceptance of the DATC offer using normal procedures. Do not send any information to Examination. It is not necessary to amend the offer to remove the reference to DATL.
Reasonable collection potential (RCP) cannot be determined because the taxpayer failed to provide the requested information, or the taxpayer no longer meets processability criteria Return the offer using normal procedures. Do not send any information to Examination.
Taxpayer chooses to withdraw the DATL basis only Secure an amended Form 656 removing the DATL basis. Do not send any information to Examination and consider under DATC.
Taxpayer chooses to withdraw the DATC basis Secure an amended Form 656 eliminating the DATC basis. Close the AOIC record as a withdrawal. Annotate the AOIC history indicating the offer is being forwarded to Examination and why. Note: Monitor the case until the TC 482 posts after closing the AOIC record. Then, coordinate with Examination to ensure that the TC 480 jurisdiction code 2 (Exam) and Status 71 are input.
A decision is made to reject the offer based on the DATC basis Prepare the Form 1271, Rejection or Withdrawal Memorandum, per IRM 5.8.7, Return, Terminate, Withdraw, and Reject Processing, and send to the Independent Administrative Reviewer (IAR). Once approved by the IAR: (1) Send the letter to the TP explaining the reasons for rejection based on DATC, using the following statement: "We have concluded our evaluation of your offer based on Doubt as to Collectibility and are now forwarding it to the following office for consideration of the Doubt as to Liability issue." (2) Assign the AOIC record to 7000 (field) and 6500 (COIC), and (3) Forward the entire case file to Examination with a cover memo requesting an expedite evaluation of the DATL issue and advise us of the outcome so the AOIC record can be closed or transferred to Appeals if the TP appeals the decision to reject the DATC basis.


For offers submitted based on Doubt as to Collectibility (DATC), Doubt as to Liability (DATL), and Effective Tax Administration (ETA):

If… Then…
A determination is made to accept under ETA - hardship provisions, but DATL must be determined first Send the offer, any pertinent information and a memo to Examination requesting an expedite investigation of the DATL issue. If Examination responds stating there is no DATL issue, accept as an ETA. If Examination states there is DATL issue: (1) Send the AOIC transfer letter to the TP advising where the case was transferred. In the open paragraph inform the taxpayer that Examination has concluded there is DATL issue so ETA cannot be considered. (2) Assign the case to 7500, and (3) Advise Examination to notify Collection when the case is completed so the AOIC record can be closed.
A determination is made to reject under ETA but accept under Doubt as to Collectibility with Special Circumstances (DCSC) Accept under that basis. It is not necessary to amend the offer to remove the other bases. Nothing should be forwarded to Examination.
Reasonable collection potential (RCP) can not be determined because the taxpayer failed to provide the required information, or the taxpayer no longer meets processability criteria Return the offer using normal procedures. Do not send any information to Examination.
A determination is made that the offer should be rejected based on DATC but the ETA offer is submitted based on public policy/equity issue(s) requiring Examination consideration. Prepare Form 1271 per IRM 5.8.7, Return, Terminate, Withdraw, and Reject Processing, and send to the Independent Administrative Reviewer (IAR).
Once approved by the IAR: (1) Send a letter to the TP explaining the reasons for rejection based on DATC, using the following statement: "We have concluded our evaluation of your offer based on Doubt as to Collectibility and are now forwarding it to the following office for consideration of the public policy/equity issue." (2) COIC should assign the AOIC record to "6500 " (COIC) and Offer Specialists should assign it to "7000 " , and(3) Forward the entire case file to Examination with a cover memo asking them to expedite evaluation and advise Collection of the outcome so the AOIC record can be closed or assigned to Appeals if the TP appeals the decision.


If a combo offer is forwarded to Examination and they conclude that a different amount of liability is due, generally an adjustment to the account will be made rather than acceptance of the offer. If Examination requests a release of the offer freeze to allow the adjustment, the TC 483 should be manually input to IDRS to temporarily release the –Y freeze. This will allow the adjustment to post to the account(s). TC 480 should be re-input to reconsider Doubt as to Collectibility (DATC) or Effective Tax Administration (ETA) issues as applicable following the adjustment of the account(s).

If Examination accepts, rejects, or secures a withdrawal on a combo offer that is still open on AOIC and assigned to "6500" (COIC) or "7000" (field OS), sufficient information should be secured to close the record on AOIC. If the offer is to be accepted, release the AOIC record to the appropriate end processing center. Coordination with Examination is required to ensure the accepted case file is simultaneously mailed to the same center. The AOIC history should be annotated indicating the basis for the closure.

Offices must print an inventory listing of accounts assigned to "6500" (COIC) or "7000" (field Offer Specialist) and reconcile it each quarter with Examination to ensure all cases are still open and assigned. Appropriate actions should be taken to resolve mismatches.

5.8.4.11 (09-01-2005)
Responsibility of Offer Specialist and Field Revenue Officers
Offer investigators are responsible for working only offer aspects of an investigation. During the offer process employees may discover collection issues that require traditional Revenue Officer (RO) investigation. Generally, if these issues are initially identified by an Offer Examiner (OE) in COIC, the case will be forwarded to a field Offer Specialist (OS), where the issues will be confirmed and if appropriate, action taken to refer the case to a traditional RO. Some of the issues that may be identified and the way they should be processed are:


Issue Procedure
Transferee, Nominee or Alter Ego When these issues arise during an offer investigation, Offer Specialist (OS) should establish a valuation for the involved asset or income stream. The OS should include the value in computing the reasonable collection potential (RCP) but not actually complete the administrative actions required to establish the liability or secure a lien against the third party. If the value of the involved asset or income stream will be obtained through an accepted offer, that fact should be clearly documented and any transferee, nominee or alter ego remedy not pursued through administrative or judicial action.
If the offer is rejected or moving toward rejection and time is of the essence due to the dissipation/transfer of assets or statute expiration, a Form 2209, Courtesy Investigation, or Other Investigation (OI) should be initiated to request the assignment of a RO to complete the required action to establish the transferee, nominee or alter ego liability or lien.
Levy or seizure related actions If during the course of an offer investigation an Offer Investigator determines that immediate levy or seizure action may be needed, the case will be referred to the Collection field function. The offer investigator will initiate an OI request to an RO group outlining the actions needed and providing any additional information that would assist the RO. Upon notification that a jeopardy levy has been approved the Offer Investigator will follow the procedures to close the offer outlined in IRM 5.8.3.19, Offers Submitted Solely to Delay Collection, if both the field and offer manager concur that the offer was filed to hinder or delay collection.
Suit recommendations Offer Specialists (OS) should consider the value of any recovery that may be made through a suit when determining reasonable collection potential (RCP). If the anticipated recovery amount is obtained through an accepted offer this fact should be clearly documented and the suit recommendation not pursued. If the offer is rejected or moving toward rejection and time is of the essence due to the statute expiration for filing suit, an OI should be initiated to request the assignment of a RO to complete the suit recommendation.
Continuing action on In Business Trust Fund (IBTF) cases Due to the potential for the pyramiding of liabilities and dissipation of assets in IBTF cases, the Offer Specialist will initiate an OI on rejected or returned offers involving ongoing businesses with employment tax liabilities. Because rejected, returned and withdrawn offers do not systemically revert to Status 26 (field assignment), the OI serves as an open assignment until the case is systemically assigned to Status 24 (queue), at which time the collection group manager can assign the case to an RO and close the OI. This process will generally take about 30 days.
Trust Fund Recovery Penalty (TFRP) and Personal Liability for Excise Tax (PLET) cases It is the responsibility of the traditional RO to complete the investigation and make a determination regarding personal responsibility in these cases. Follow the provisions in IRM 5.7.4, Investigation and Recommendation of TFRP. The process of completing the TFRP or PLET can be ongoing while the offer is pending, but before the determination is finalized. The LEM 5.4, non-assertion criteria, does not apply when an offer is under consideration. The TFRP investigation must be completed, because the reasonable collection potential (RCP) for the corporate offer must include not only what can be collected from the corporation, but any amounts that could reasonably be expected to collect from responsible officers on a TFRP assessment. For this reason, a hardship "non-assertion" recommendation against a responsible person should not be proposed if there is any reasonable collection potential (RCP) for that person based on current offer guidelines.
TFRP investigations should be completed through the point of assessment (i.e. through delivery of Letter(s) 1153 (DO) and consideration of any timely protests). See IRM 5.8.4.13 below for instructions on processing these investigations in conjunction with open offers.
Note:
OIs referred per these instructions should be considered high risk cases, i.e. risk code 100, and processed accordingly.



Note:
In the above situations , except in the case of TFRP or PLET investigations, an OI will be initiated only after the OIC manager and RO manager have discussed the issue and agree that the situation warrants the issuance of the OI.


5.8.4.12 (09-01-2005)
Coordination with Other Functions
Coordination with other functions is sometimes required during offer investigations. The most common coordination occurs between Collection and Examination or Collection and Appeals offices.

5.8.4.12.1 (09-01-2005)
Cases Pending in Examination
During initial analysis of an offer, IDRS should be checked to verify there are no actions for any periods either included or not included on the offer; such as, open audits, underreporter cases, TEFRA proceedings, or amended returns pending but not yet assessed. Pending examination cases may be identified by:

TC 922 without a CP 2000 process code or TC 290/291

TC 976 or 977 without a subsequent tax increase or decrease

-L Freeze and/or an AMDIS record

Partnership Investor Control File (PIFC) code on AMDIS of 5 indicating an investor with at least one open TEFRA key case linkage


If any potential adjustments are identified the assigned Examination or AUR function or employee should be contacted to determine the status of the audit and informed that an offer based on DATC has been received. The decision on how to proceed with the offer should be based on the status of the potential adjustment.

For example:

If… Then…
The TP was involved in abusive tax avoidance transactions (ATAT), appears to have substantial unreported income (UIDIF), or there is another reasonable explanation given by the assigned Examination employee as to why the audit should continue The TP should be advised that the offer investigation cannot proceed until the Exam issues have been resolved. Solicit a withdrawal explaining that it is in the TPs best interest due to CSED suspension. If the TP refuses to withdraw, consider returning the offer using the AOIC reason "Other investigations are pending that may affect the liability sought to be compromised or the grounds upon which it was submitted" .
The audit is routine and the assigned Exam employee has agreed to close the tax year(s) with no change Proceed with the offer investigation.
The audit is routine, but nearly concluded, and Examination wishes to conclude and assess the tax. Proceed with the offer investigation. Talk to the TP and the Revenue Agent (RA) to coordinate securing an agreement to the deficiency to expedite assessment. Include the tax year in the acceptance, but do not issue the acceptance letter until the tax is assessed.
The return has been selected for examination or Automated Under Reporter (AUR) consideration, but not yet assigned. Contact the controlling Examination or AUR function to advise that we are proceeding with the offer investigation.
The Partnership Investor File Control (PIFC) code on AMDIS is a 5, indicating at least one open TEFRA key case linkage exists Advise the TP that we cannot consider an offer until all TEFRA partnership issues have been resolved. Attempt to secure a withdrawal. If the taxpayer refuses to withdraw, consider returning the offer using the AOIC Return Letter paragraph "Other investigations are pending that may affect the liability sought to be compromised or the grounds upon which it was submitted."
The Partnership Investor File Control (PIFTD) code on AMDIS is a 7, the TEFRA case is closed Verify with the assigned Examination employee that the assessment was made and include the additional liability(s) in the offer.


Within 7 to 14 calendar days prior to accepting an offer, the Integrated Data Retrieval System (IDRS) should be rechecked to ensure that there are no new audit issues pending.

5.8.4.12.2 (09-01-2005)
Innocent Spouse Claims
When one spouse files an innocent spouse claim and the other spouse submits an offer, the assigned Examination employee should be contacted prior to proceeding to ensure there are no additional reasons to delay the offer investigation until the innocent spouse claim is resolved.

If a taxpayer files a Doubt as to Collectibility (DATC) offer but raises an innocent spouse issue during the investigation, the issue should be discussed with the taxpayer. If appropriate, the offer should be withdrawn and an innocent spouse claim should be forwarded to Examination.

If IDRS indicates that the taxpayer has an open innocent spouse claim, or if a Doubt as to Collectibility (DATC) offer and innocent spouse claim are filed simultaneously the taxpayer should be requested to withdraw the offer unless the Examination function advises that the claim will be closed immediately with no change. If Examination indicates that the claim appears valid and the taxpayer will not withdraw the offer it should be suspended pending disposition of the innocent spouse claim.

5.8.4.12.3 (09-01-2005)
Cases Pending or Decided in Appeals
During a Collection Due Process (CDP) or Equivalent Hearing (EH) assigned to Appeals, an offer may be submitted by the taxpayer. Taxpayers also occasionally submit a Doubt as to Collectibility (DATC) offer during an appeal of a proposed audit deficiency. Appeals retains jurisdiction of both these types of offers, but may send an Appeals Referral Investigation (ARI) to Collection.
An Appeals Referral Investigation (ARI) requesting Collection Information Statement (CIS) verification of a complex nature should be assigned to field revenue officers (RO). The results of the investigation will be reported via memorandum to Appeals and Appeals will conclude the investigation.
Requests for any expeditious treatment of an ARI will be decided on a case by case basis through a discussion between the two functional managers.

Offers based on Doubt as to Liability (DATL) on Trust Fund Recovery Penalty (TFRP) or Personal Liability Excise Tax (PLET) assessments must be reviewed upon receipt to ensure that the case is not pending or was not already heard in Appeals. If a DATL assessment had previously been determined in Appeals or is found to be currently assigned to an Appeals office, the offer should be removed from AOIC and transferred to Appeals. Coordination should be made with Appeals to ensure that the TC 480 (and if applicable Command Code STAUP to Status 71) is re-input with the proper Appeals jurisdiction code, since removing the offer from AOIC will reverse the TC 480.
If an offer based on Doubt as to Collectibility (DATC) only is received and there is an open case pending in Appeals, contact Appeals to determine who will have jurisdiction of the offer.

5.8.4.12.4 (09-01-2005)
Open Criminal Investigations
Open criminal investigations can be identified on IDRS by an unreversed transaction code (TC) 914 or (TC) 916. When these transaction codes are discovered contact must be made with the assigned Special Agent and procedures in IRM 5.1.5 followed. It may be necessary for the group or unit managers to discuss with the Criminal Investigation division (CID) manager to determine the next appropriate action. A decision will need to be made on the appropriate actions to take (including disposition of any application fee or deposit) and what may or may not be discussed with the taxpayer.

Once a taxpayer has been advised of the open criminal investigation, if the assigned Special Agent has no objection, the taxpayer may be asked to withdraw the offer until the criminal matter is resolved. If the taxpayer declines to withdraw the offer a joint decision should be made whether it should be closed as a return or held open until the investigation is closed.

5.8.4.12.5 (09-01-2005)
Offer Submitted Solely to Delay Collection
When it is determined that an offer is submitted "solely to delay" collection, the offer should be returned to the taxpayer without further consideration. The term "solely to delay" collection means an offer was submitted for the sole purpose of avoiding or delaying collection activity. A determination that an offer is submitted solely for the purpose of delaying collection should be apparent to an impartial observer. See IRM 5.8.3.19, Offers Submitted Solely to Delay Collection , for a complete discussion of this topic and procedures to follow when a case meeting this criteria is identified.

5.8.4.13 (09-01-2005)
Procedures for Certain Types of Taxpayers and Liabilities
Certain types of taxpayers and/or liabilities require unique considerations. The instructions described below should be followed when considering cases of this nature.

5.8.4.13.1 (09-01-2005)
Trust Fund Liabilities From Operating Businesses
When an offer is accepted to compromise trust fund tax owed by an operating business, the taxpayer is relieved of a significant operating expense. The effect is to grant the delinquent taxpayer an economic advantage over competitors who are in tax compliance. Recovery of the unpaid trust fund tax amount is a significant issue when considering an offer from a business taxpayer. In the interest of "fairness to all taxpayers" the Service must be cautious to avoid providing financial advantages to those taxpayers through the forgiveness of employment tax debt, as this may be detrimental to competitors who are remaining in compliance with their tax obligations. The following procedures apply to all In Business Trust Fund (IBTF) taxpayers, including sole proprietorships, partnerships, as well as corporations.

These taxpayers must meet the compliance requirements of IRM 5.8.3.4.1(1)(a), Determining Processability, and must remain in compliance while the offer is being considered. An untimely Federal Tax Deposit (FTD) during investigation will result in a return of the offer.

If financial analysis reveals that the taxpayer cannot pay operating expenses and remain current with taxes (i.e. the business is operating at a loss), all business assets should be valued rather than just valuing the income stream. Close review should be conducted as well to see whether the offer meets the criteria for return as one "solely to delay collection."

Business tax returns (Schedule C, Form 1120, and Form 1065), the taxpayers balance sheet, income statements, and the Form 433-B, Collection Information Statement for Business, need to be carefully analyzed to arrive at the correct reasonable collection potential (RCP). The following issues should be carefully reviewed and/or considered:


1) Depreciation — Do not allow depreciation. Instead allow necessary actual monthly obligations paid to secured creditors on depreciable assets (i.e. autos, equipment or real estate loans).


2) Accounts Receivable — Accounts receivable that are current (i.e. generally less than 90 days past due) generally should not be discounted at Quick Sale Value (QSV). Value all accounts receivable at 100% of the balance due, unless the taxpayer can substantiate the account has been delinquent over 90 days. If the account is determined to be delinquent, it may be discounted up to a maximum of 50%. However, supporting documentation is required to substantiate accounts the taxpayer claims are delinquent over 90 days; such as a request for the taxpayer to provide an aging report. If the account is over 90 days and the taxpayer fails to provide substantiation, it will be valued at 100%.

Note:
A delinquent account is defined as an uncollectible account that has been delinquent for more than 90 days. A collectible account is defined as one that may be considered to be past due, but is still an active client.



3) Personal Expenses Paid by the Business — Financial statements must be reviewed to ensure expenses such as car payments, insurance, utilities, etc. are not claimed on both the Form 433-A and the Form 433-B.


4) Compensation to Corporate Officers — Wages and/or other compensation paid to corporate officers in excess of applicable expenses allowable per National and Local standards should generally not be allowed as business expenses.


5) Stock Holder Distributions and Repayment of Loans to Officers — These expenses are discretionary in nature. Distributions of this nature made after the incurrence of the employment tax delinquency should be factored into the reasonable collection potential (RCP) analysis as dissipated assets. Loans to officers should be considered an account receivable and valued according to their collectibility.


6) Potential Recovery of "Priority Taxes" — Trust fund tax plus associated interest is classified as a "priority tax" in the U.S. Bankruptcy code. As such this tax must be paid in full, in a Chapter 11 or 13 payment schedule. If it is probable that the taxpayer will file a Chapter 11 or 13 if the offer is returned or rejected, then an offer should not be considered for less than what would be recovered through the bankruptcy proceeding.


7) Field Visits to Evaluate Business Assets — A field call should be made to validate the existence and value of business assets and inventory for all offers involving operating businesses and that will be recommended for acceptance. The offer specialist should make the call, if practical, or initiate an Other Investigation (OI) to request that a call be made by another revenue officer (RO) if the taxpayer operates in a remote location.

Note:
OIs referred per these instructions should be considered high risk cases, code 100, and processed accordingly.




5.8.4.13.2 (09-01-2005)
Corporate Trust Fund Liabilities
If an offer to compromise trust fund tax is being considered for a corporation that is still in business all the issues outlined in IRM 5.8.4.13.1 above should be considered. In addition, the Trust Fund Recovery Penalty (TFRP) must be addressed.

It is the Service's policy that the amount offered to compromise a corporate employment tax liability must include, in addition to what can be collected from the corporation an amount equal to what can be collected from all responsible persons, up to the amount of the TFRP (plus interest, if the penalty has been assessed). However, if the Service enters into a compromise with an employer for a portion of the trust fund tax liability, the remainder of the trust fund taxes may still be collected from a responsible person pursuant to Section 6672 of the Internal Revenue Code.

During initial analysis of an offer received from a corporation involving unpaid trust fund tax the Offer Specialist must determine the Assessment Statute Expiration Date (ASED) of each period and take immediate steps to protect it if expiration is imminent.

The following actions should be taken based on the facts of the case:

If… Then the RO will… Then the Offer Specialist will…
The TFRP has been completed and the assessment processed prior to the time the corporate offer is filed Document this fact on ICS and Form 657 submitted with the offer. Obtain a copy of the Form 4183 and the CIS for each responsible person and proceed with offer investigation.
The TFRP has not been completed at the time the corporate offer is submitted, but the RO is continuing to complete the TFRP investigation and plans to request assessment Continue holding the balance due accounts in Status 26 until the Form 4183 is approved, Letter 1153 (DO) issued, and the assessment requested. Request Status 71 on the Corporate liability at the time the TFRP assessment is processed. Send copies of the signed Form 4183 and CIS on the responsible officers to the Offer Specialist when secured. Obtain a copy of Form 4183 and the CIS for each responsible person and proceed with the investigation. Coordinate with the field RO and if information needed to make a TFRP determination is not received in a reasonable amount of time, return the offer based on failure to provide the requested information.
The TFRP has been completed but not assessed at the time the corporate offer is submitted and the RO recommends withholding assessment of the penalty until the offer investigation is completed Complete the investigation through issuance of Letter 1153 (DO) and process any appeals received. Establish an OI to maintain control of the TFRP case. Send copies of the Form 4183 and CIS for each responsible person to the Offer Specialist. Secure a Form 2750 from each responsible person extending the ASED to ensure there are at least 2 years remaining on the statute from the date the offer was submitted. Obtain a copy of the Form 4183 and CIS for each responsible person from the field RO and proceed with the investigation. Coordinate with the field RO and if a CIS and/or information is needed to make the TFRP determination is not received in a reasonable amount of time, return the offer for failure to provide requested information.
Trust fund tax is due, the corporate account is not assigned to an RO and the TFRP has not been investigated, or was investigated and was not asserted because the potential assessment was below LEM-V criteria or was potentially uncollectibility from responsible officer. Complete the TFRP investigation, using an OI (coded 100). Follow the chart above based on a decision of whether to assess TFRP or not. OI should be completed within 90 days. Contact a field group to ensure an OI is assigned to an RO to conduct the investigation. Follow the chart above based on the decision of the RO. Coordinate with the RO and if information is needed to make a TFRP determination and it is not received in a reasonable amount of time, return the offer based on failure to provide requested information.
The ASED has expired without any TFRP assessment Annotate the expiration in the case history and continue processing the offer determining only the corporation’s RCP. Prepare an expired statute notification and submit to your manager for processing.


If a decision is made to accept the corporate offer and the TFRP is not assessed, as a condition of acceptance of the offer, Form 2751, Proposed Assessment of Trust Fund Recovery Penalty, and Form 2750, Waiver Extending Statutory Period for Assessment of Trust Fund Recovery Penalty, must be secured from each responsible person. The ASED should be extended to a date 2 years beyond the anticipated completion date of all terms and conditions of the offer, the applicable compliance provisions, and any related collateral agreements. The complete TFRP administrative file, including the signed Forms 2751 and 2750 should be sent with the accepted offer file to the appropriate Monitoring OIC (MOIC) unit once the offer is accepted. Should the offer default, that unit will be responsible for returning the TFRP Administrative file to the appropriate area office for assessment.

Caution:
Ensure the responsible persons are advised of IRC Section 6501(c) (4)(B) rights to (1) refuse to extend the statute, (2) limit the extension to particular issues, or (3) limit the extension to a particular period of time.
If the person refuses to extend the statute, a decision must be made to either (1) accept the offer without protecting the Service's ability to later assess the penalty, (2) assess the penalty, or (3) reject the offer.




When a cash offer is accepted from a corporation and has been paid in full all employees assigned related TFRP accounts should be notified and asked to initiate the Form 3870, Request for Adjustment, only if the amount offered will full pay the TFRP liability. If the accounts are not currently in active collection status the Offer Specialist (OS) should initiate the adjustment requests. The Form 3870 should request that the TFRP module(s) be brought to a "zero" balance. If any payment or refund offset has been made on the TFRP the Form 3870 should also include the statement "Do not refund any credits on the module" .

When a deferred payment offer is accepted from a corporation the Form 3870, Request for Adjustment, for each related TFRP should be prepared as in (6) above, but should be attached to the accepted file when it is forwarded to the Monitoring OIC (MOIC) unit. A note should be attached asking that the Form 3870 be processed when the offer amount has been paid in full, only if the amount offered will full pay the TFRP liability. Employees assigned TFRP accounts should be notified of the acceptance and should assign all account(s) to IDRS t-sign code "8500" .

In the situation where the amount offered by a corporation combined with the payments already made on related TFRP assessments exceeds the total employment tax liability of the corporation for the same tax periods:

Request the responsible person(s) sign irrevocable requests to transfer their payments on the TFRP accounts to the related corporation liability.

Complete and process Form 3870 to accomplish the credit transfer.

Secure full payment of the balance due from the corporation.

Secure a withdrawal of the offer.



Note:
The above situation should be rare. If the combined payments made on the related TFRP assessments exceed the total employment tax liability of the corporation, then the accounting transactions completed by the campus should have posted the related payments to all accounts.


5.8.4.13.3 (09-01-2005)
Excise Tax Liabilities
When the Personal Liability Excise Tax (PLET) is assessed at the time we accept an offer from the business, we may still collect from the responsible person any amount not paid by the business. Therefore, do not request abatement of the PLET just because the business's liability has been compromised.

While investigating an offer to compromise excise tax subject to PLET, also:

Determine if the PLET has been assessed.

Follow locally established guidelines if no PLET investigation has been completed. Actual assessment of the PLET may be held in abeyance pending the outcome of the offer investigation.

Verify ASEDs and protect them if expiration is imminent.

Secure a Collection Information Statement (CIS) from each responsible person.




Caution:
The assessment waiver on the Form 656 does not extend the statute of limitations for assessing the PLET against a responsible person.


If the taxpayer should default an accepted offer, an opportunity to assert the PLET will be available at that time. For this reason, when an offer is accepted from a business based in part on our ability to collect the excise tax from responsible persons no PLET will be assessed:

As a condition of acceptance secure the Form 9490, Waiver Extending Statutory Period for Assessment of Personal Liability for Excise Tax, from each responsible person.

Extend the assessment statute 2 years beyond the anticipated completion date of all terms and conditions of the offer; including the applicable compliance provision and any related collateral agreements.

Caution:
Insure the responsible person is advised of IRC Section 6501(c)(4)(B) rights to: (1) refuse to extend the statute, (2) limit the extension to particular issues, (3) limit the extension to a particular period of time. If the person refuses to extend the statute a decision must be made to either: (1) accept the offer without protecting the Service’s ability to later assess the penalty, (2) assess the penalty and include the additional liability in the offer, or (3) reject the offer.


Forward the Form 9490, Waiver Extending Statutory Period for Assessment of Personal Liability for Excise Tax, to Compliance Services with the accepted offer file. Should the offer default, this file will be returned to the Compliance Area office for processing and assessment of the PLET.

Note:
The Form 9490 is not required for any responsible person who makes a designated payment of the excise tax or when a non-assertion decision has been made because the excise tax could not be collected from that person.



5.8.4.13.4 (09-01-2005)
Partnership Liabilities
Partnership employment tax liabilities are not "joint and several" as are joint income tax assessments. The Service's ability to collect from the partners is based on state law.

When a partnership liability is compromised for any individual general partner our ability to collect from all other general partners may be affected. Therefore, the amount offered to compromise a partnership tax liability must include what we can collect from the partnership plus what can be collected from each of the general partners. No offer should be accepted to compromise only one partner’s individual liability for the partnership debt.

When investigating partnership offers a Collection Information Statement (CIS) should be secured from the partnership and from all general partners. The reasonable collection potential (RCP) for the partnership must equal what could be collected from the partnership plus what could be collected from all general partners. Generally, an offer based on Doubt as to Collectibility (DATC) from a partnership will not be accepted when the RCP of one or more of the general partners cannot be determined. When it is not possible to secure a CIS from one or more of the general partners, because they cannot be located or they refuse to cooperate or join in the offer, the offer may still be accepted if the investigation is able to establish that there is no collection potential from the non-participating partners.

5.8.4.13.5 (09-01-2005)
Child Support Obligations
While the Service is charged with collecting certain child support obligations, we do not have the authority to compromise them. These accounts are identified on the Non-Master-File with a Masterfile Transaction (MFT) code of 59.

If a taxpayer proposes a compromise that includes a child support liability, Service employees should request that the offer be amended to remove the child support obligation. If the offer is acceptable it can be compromised without including the child support debt. If the taxpayer refuses to remove the child support liability the offer should be rejected using the public policy reason and the open paragraph stating that "We do not have authority to compromise child support obligations" .

5.8.4.14 (09-01-2005)
Concluding the Offer Investigation
Once the reasonable collection potential (RCP) has been calculated, immediate action should be taken to bring the case to closure. See IRM 5.8.4.7.3 above for time frames within which closing actions must be taken.


Part 5. Collecting Process
Chapter 8. Offer in Compromise
Section 6. Collateral Agreements

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5.8.6 Collateral Agreements
5.8.6.1 Overview
5.8.6.2 Co-obligor Agreements
5.8.6.3 Other Collateral Agreements
5.8.6.4 Multiple Agreements
5.8.6.5 Waiver of Refunds
Exhibit 5.8.6-1 Co-obligor Agreement Common Law States Pattern Letter P–229 (Rev. 6-90)
Exhibit 5.8.6-2 Co-obligor Agreement Other States Pattern Letter P–230 (Rev. 6-90)
Exhibit 5.8.6-3 Collateral Agreement – Modification of Waiver Provisions of Compromise Agreement
Exhibit 5.8.6-4 Form 2261-C, Collateral Agreement Waiver of Net Operating Losses, Capital Losses and Unused Investment Credits
5.8.6.1 (09-01-2005)
Overview
A collateral agreement enables the government to collect funds in addition to the amount actually secured by the offer or to add additional terms not included in the standard Form 656 agreement, thereby recouping part or all of the difference between the amount of the offer or additional terms of the offer and the liability compromised.

5.8.6.2 (09-01-2005)
Co-obligor Agreements
When a compromise is accepted from one party to a joint liability, the other party is not released from their several liability. Secure a co-obligor agreement from the taxpayer submitting the offer to clarify the effect of the compromise on the obligations of the other parties.

Note:
Trust Fund Recovery Penalty (TFRP) assessments are not joint liability assessments and do not require a co-obligor agreement.


If… Then…
The taxpayer lives in a state where acceptance of an offer in compromise from one party to a joint assessment also releases the other party Secure the common law co-obligor agreement. See Exhibit 5.8.6-1.
The taxpayer lives in a state where the right is expressly reserved to proceed against the other taxpayer who is not a party to the compromise Secure the non-common law co-obligor agreement. See Exhibit 5.8.6-2.
The taxpayer lives in a state where acceptance of an offer in compromise from one party to a joint assessment also releases the other party up to the amount of their proportionate share of the liability There is no co-obligor agreement available for this case. An acceptable offer should include the reasonable collection potential (RCP) of all the obligors. When it is impossible to investigate all the obligors, there is a risk that the full collection potential will not be collected. Such an offer must meet the criteria for acceptance on the basis of Doubt as to Collectibility with Special Circumstances (DCSC) or Effective Tax Administration (ETA).
Both parties have submitted separate offers which are recommended for acceptance If appropriate, the parties may submit a joint offer to eliminate the need for co-obligor agreements. Otherwise, secure a co-obligor agreement from each taxpayer.


A co-obligor agreement is not warranted in the following instances:

In a proportionate liability state, when the offer amount is equal to or exceeds the not compromising taxpayers proportionate liability.

No possibility exists for collecting from the other obligors.

Under state law, no specific reservation of collection rights is required to protect the ability to collect from co-obligors.


5.8.6.3 (09-01-2005)
Other Collateral Agreements
Other collateral agreements may be appropriate in certain circumstances. Because all other collateral agreements must be monitored for compliance, they should only be secured when a significant recovery is anticipated. Securing a collateral agreement should be the exception and not the rule.

Do not use a collateral agreement to accept an offer amount less than the taxpayers financial condition indicates.

In lieu of a collateral agreement, the taxpayer may increase the amount of the offer equivalent to what the government could reasonably expect to recover from the collateral agreement.

A collateral agreement may be appropriate in the following situations:

If the taxpayer… Then consider securing a…
Anticipates a substantial increase in future income Future income collateral agreement.
Is compromising the income tax liability of a defunct professional corporation Future income collateral agreement from the professional to collect from future individual income.
Has real or personal property that is being depreciated Collateral agreement to reduce the basis of the asset.
Has net operating losses or capital losses arising from prior years available for deduction in future years A collateral agreement to waive the loss.
Is seeking to compromise a Trust Fund Recovery Penalty (TFRP) and qualifies to take a capital loss benefit from the defunct corporation on the Form 1040 A collateral agreement from the individual taxpayer to waive the capital loss.


5.8.6.3.1 (09-01-2005)
Future Income
It is appropriate to consider future collateral agreements for both individuals and corporations when the investigation reveals that a substantial increase in the taxpayers future income is expected.

The use of a future income collateral agreement may be an option when attempting to determine a taxpayers future income for reasonable collection potential (RCP) purposes. When investigating an offer where the taxpayers past income does not provide an accurate analysis for what may be earned in the future then the use of a future income collateral agreement may be a better option.

Example:
1) The taxpayer is an engineer, but is currently employed as a salesman earning less than half of his prior salary due to difficulty he has had in obtaining a job in the engineering field at the present time, or
2) The taxpayer is a student and is expected to graduate soon and begin earning a significant annual income.


The period of time a future income collateral agreement should cover will be determined by the circumstances identified in the offer investigation based on the taxpayers financial situation. Generally the period of time the agreement covers should coincide with the future compliance provision.

Example:

•If the offer terms are for cash payment (paid within 90 days of acceptance) the future income collateral agreement should generally run for a five year period,
•If the offer terms are based on deferred payments calculated through the collection statute periods, the future income collateral should generally run through the last full year before the statutory period for collection expires.
•The offer file should document the basis for the time frame used for each collateral agreement.


Use the Form 2261, Collateral Agreement — Future Income (Individual), for individual taxpayers or the Form 2261–A, Collateral Agreement — Future Income (Corporation) for corporate taxpayers. The beginning year is defined as the year following acceptance of the offer. The ending year is defined as the last year for which the collateral agreement will remain in effect. The beginning dollar amount is negotiable but generally should be the amount determined necessary to meet living expenses during the term of the offer. In determining the beginning dollar amount the expected rate of inflation during the term of the agreement should be considered, as well as any additional expenses such as those for an expected additional child or a replacement auto.

Offers with future income collateral agreements must be approved by a second level manager. The Territory manager for the field and Department manager for COIC will indicate approval by signing the Form 7249, Offer Acceptance Report, and the acceptance letter. The Form 2261 may be signed by the authorized official in Delegation Order 42.

Do not secure a future income collateral agreement:

To collect future income that should be included in the offer amount.

Merely on unfounded speculation about an increase in income.

To cover statistically improbable events, such as lottery winnings.

To attempt collection from a potential inheritance.

Example:
Do not secure a future income collateral agreement when the investigation reveals that the taxpayer is the only child of wealthy parents, and the surviving parent is well advanced in years and in poor health.



Future income collateral agreements must be monitored annually for the life of the agreement. The cost of monitoring and the difficulty in tracing income structured through other entities should be considered when deciding whether such an agreement is warranted.

5.8.6.3.2 (09-01-2005)
Adjusted Basis of Specific Assets
The initial basis of an asset is equal to the cost of acquiring it. Adjustments to the basis are made each year for the cost of improvements and accumulated depreciation. When an asset is sold, the basis is used to determine the amount of capital gain to be taxed.

A collateral agreement may be used to reduce the basis after accumulated depreciation, or book value, of a specific asset to a lesser amount or zero. This will have two effects. It will limit or eliminate the amount of deprecation deduction allowed in future years and it will cause a higher capital gain tax to be paid if the asset is later sold for an amount more than the adjusted basis.

Use the Form 2261–B, Collateral Agreement — Adjusted Basis of Specific Assets. The beginning year is defined as the year after the last filed tax return. Insert the year of the last filed tax return in the phrase "for all taxable years beginning after" . Specifically describe each asset. Set the amount of the basis at the reduced or zero value.

Adjusted basis collateral agreements must be monitored annually until the asset is ultimately disposed of all value. Consider the cost to monitor the agreement and the difficulty in tracing the sale or exchange of the property when deciding whether such an agreement is warranted.

5.8.6.3.3 (09-01-2005)
Waiver of Losses
Use the Form 2261–C, Collateral Agreement —Waiver of Net Operating Losses, Capital Losses, and Unused Investment Credits. The beginning year is defined as the next year after the last filed tax return. Insert the year of the last filed tax return in the phrase "for all taxable years beginning after" . Waive net operating losses and capital losses arising from all years prior to and including the last filed tax return.

Do not prohibit the deduction of losses that arise in years after the offer is accepted.

The waiver of investment credits is obsolete.

Waiver of losses collateral agreements must be monitored annually until all the losses are extinguished, potentially for decades. Consider the cost to monitor the agreement and potential for recovery of future tax liabilities when deciding whether such an agreement is warranted.

A waiver of losses collateral agreement may be secured to partially waive a loss, if the facts of the case support this determination.

5.8.6.3.3.1 (09-01-2005)
Net Operating Loss
Net Operating Loss (NOL) may be incurred when expenses exceed the income of a business.

The taxpayer must be able to prove the amount of the loss.

Generally, losses may be carried back no more than two years and forward no more than twenty years or until all the loss is offset against taxable income.

If the taxpayer only wishes to carry the loss forward, the taxpayer must elect to do so no a timely field return for the year of the loss, or if the original return is filed timely but no election is made on an amended return by the close of the period 6 months after the due date of the return excluding extensions.


When the taxpayer has claimed a Net Operating Loss (NOL), determine and verify the exact origin and amount of the loss. If a taxpayer has been associated with more than one business there may be multiple losses.

When… Then…
Calculating the remainder of the NOL The loss can be located on the "other income" line or the "business loss" line on the Form 1040 and should be labeled as Net Operating Loss.
1. Determine the original loss amount claimed on the tax return.
2. Subtract any carry backs.
3. Subtract the amounts claimed on subsequent tax returns from the year the NOL was established.


5.8.6.3.3.2 (09-01-2005)
Capital Loss
Capital Loss is one in which the taxpayer experiences a loss associated with such investments as land, stock, paid in capital, or loans from shareholders. This loss is:

Found on a Schedule D.

Only offset against income or capital gain in the year in which it is incurred and the remainder carried forward at a limit of $3,000 per year against other income or;

Offset against a capital gain in total

Example:
A taxpayer has a $100,000 loss and a $40,000 gain. The taxpayer may offset $40,000 against the gain and an additional $3,000 loss against other income leaving a $57,000 loss that may be carried forward in future years.


Individuals may deduct $3,000 each year until the loss is extinguished with no limit on the number of years. Corporations are generally limited to 3 preceding and 5 succeeding taxable years.


When the taxpayer claims a capital loss, determine and verify the exact origin and amount of the loss.

If… Then…
The loss is derived from personal investment The investment can be either loans to the corporation or the individual's capital investment in the corporation.•Verify loans through copies of checks or general journal entries that establish the loan and track repayment.•Verify capital investment through canceled checks or other documents which support the amount of the original loan.
Determining the remaining amount of the loss once you have determined the origin Trace the loss forward through the tax return copy or RTVUE.


5.8.6.3.3.3 (09-01-2005)
Passive Loss
Passive Activity Loss is one that involves the conduct of any trade or business in which the taxpayer does not materially participate. This loss should not be confused with net operating loss.

Any rental activity is a passive activity even if the taxpayer does materially participate.

Losses from a passive activity generally cannot be deducted from other types of income (e.g., wages, interest, or dividends).

The amount of the taxpayers allowable loss is subject to the "at-risk" rules. Generally losses are limited to the amount of the taxpayers cash contribution, adjusted basis of other property which contributes to the activity, and amounts borrowed for use in the activity if the taxpayer has personal liability for the borrowed amounts.

Note:
Refer to the current Master Tax Guide for additional information.



Because passive losses are not deducted from earned income, waiving them may have little or no effect. One option is to reduce the basis of the property to zero so that the taxpayer cannot carry the loss over to the tax year in which the property is sold and receive benefit of the loss against a capital gain at that time.

5.8.6.4 (09-01-2005)
Multiple Agreements
When related taxpayers submit more than one offer to compromise different tax liabilities secure only one collateral agreement. Describe on the collateral agreement all the offers to which it relates.

When more than one type of collateral agreement is secured for the same offer, the terms of all the agreements may be incorporated into one Form 2261, Collateral Agreements – Future Income (Individuals) or Form 2261–A, Collateral Agreements – Future Income Corporation. The appropriate language may be found on the Form 2261–B, Collateral Agreement – Adjusted Basis of Specific Assets, or Form 2261–C, Collateral Agreement – Waiver of Net Operating Losses, Capital Losses, and Unused Investment Credits.

Type of Agreement… Statement…
Adjusted Basis of Assets "For the purpose of computing income taxes of the taxpayer for all years beginning after ___, the basis for certain assets, under existing law for computing depreciation and the gain or loss upon sale, exchange or other disposition shall be as follows:
Name of asset _____
Dollar amount ______
That in no event shall the basis set forth above be in excess of the basis that would otherwise be allowable for tax purposes, except for this agreement."
Waiver of Net Operating Loss "For the purpose of computing income taxes of the taxpayer for all years beginning after ___, Any net operating losses sustained for the years before __shall not be claimed as net operating loss deductions under the provisions of Section 1212 of the Internal Revenue Code."
Waiver of Capital Losses "For the purpose of computing income taxes of the taxpayer for all years beginning after ___, Any net capital losses sustained for the years before __shall not be claimed as carryovers or carrybacks under the provisions of Section 172 of the Internal Revenue Code."


If there is insufficient space on the form to insert all the necessary paragraphs simply type the paragraph numbers followed by "See Attached" and fasten a separate sheet containing the added provisions.

5.8.6.5 (09-01-2005)
Waiver of Refunds
Form 656 contains a term which waives refunds and overpayments for all tax years through the year the offer in compromise is accepted. This waiver is a standard term, which cannot be altered.

When accepting an offer based on doubt as to liability (DATL) or under the basis of Effective Tax Administration (ETA) based on public policy/equity considerations, the waiver of refunds is not applicable.

In order to remove the waiver of refund provision for these type of offers, both the taxpayer and the investigating employee must sign an agreement and include it with the accepted offer in compromise. See Exhibit 5.8.6-3.

Exhibit 5.8.6-1 (09-01-2005)
Co-obligor Agreement Common Law States Pattern Letter P–229 (Rev. 6-90)
Collateral Agreement—Taxpayer Involved in Joint Assessment
(For Use in States Where Common Law Rule Applies)

To: Commissioner of Internal Revenue:
 I submitted an offer dated (date) in the amount of $(amount) to compromise unpaid (Kind of tax) tax, plus statutory additions, for the tax period(s) (date(s)).
 The purpose of this letter is to amend that offer by adding the following provisions:
 The (a) liability, which is the subject of this proposed agreement, is the joint and individual responsibility of myself and my co-obligor(s). I agree to pay the United States $(amount). The United States agrees, in turn, not to:
  (1) sue the undersigned for the difference between the amount of the offer in compromise and the amount of the Iiability, or
  (2) collect the difference from assets of the undersigned by levy or any other means.
If this proposal is accepted, it does not mean that the liability or any part of the liability is settled for myself or the co-obligor(s). The United States still reserves all its rights to collect the liability from the co-obligors.

________________
Taxpayer's Signature

________________
Date

Exhibit 5.8.6-2 (09-01-2005)
Co-obligor Agreement Other States Pattern Letter P–230 (Rev. 6-90)
Collateral Agreement — Taxpayer Involved in Joint Assessment
(For Use in States Where Statutes Expressly Reserve Right to Proceed Against Co-obligor)

To: Commissioner of Internal Revenue

 I submitted an offer dated (date) in the amount of $(amount), to compromise unpaid (kind of tax) tax, plus statutory additions, for the tax periods (dates).
 The purpose of this letter is to amend and clarify that offer by adding the following provision:
 Although the liability sought to be compromised is the joint and individual liability of myself and my co-obligors, I am submitting this offer to compromise my individual liability only. If this offer is accepted, it does not release or discharge my co-obligor(s) from liability. The United States still reserves all rights of collection against co-obligors.

________________
Taxpayer's Signature

________________
Date

Exhibit 5.8.6-3 (09-01-2005)
Collateral Agreement – Modification of Waiver Provisions of Compromise Agreement

Collateral Agreement — Modification of Waiver Provisions of Compromise Agreement
(For Use when offer is being accepted under Detriment to Voluntary Compliance only)

To: Commissioner of Internal Revenue

 I submitted an offer dated (date) in the amount of $(amount), to compromise unpaid (kind of tax) tax, plus statutory additions, for the tax periods (dates).
 The purpose of this letter is to modify that offer by stating that Items 8(g) and (h) of the agreement, Form 656, governing refunds and overpayments, will not apply to this offer. Acceptance of this offer will in no way alter my rights to refunds of overpayment or my ability to designate an overpayment to estimated tax payments for the following year:

________________
Taxpayer's Signature
________________
Date

Labels:

Offer in Compromise - Financial Analysis - Internal Revenue Manual

Part 5. Collecting Process
Chapter 8. Offer in Compromise
Section 5. Financial Analysis

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5.8.5 Financial Analysis
5.8.5.1 Overview
5.8.5.2 Verification
5.8.5.3 Equity in Assets
5.8.5.4 Dissipation of Assets
5.8.5.5 Future Income
5.8.5.6 Payment Terms
Exhibit 5.8.5-1 Deferred Payments Limited by Short Statute
Exhibit 5.8.5-2 Deferred Payments Limited by Small Amount Due
Exhibit 5.8.5-3 Deferred Payments Limited by Application of Payment From Equity in Assets
5.8.5.1 (09-01-2005)
Overview
This chapter provides instructions for analyzing the taxpayers financial condition to determine reasonable collection potential (RCP). IRM 5.15, Financial Analysis Handbook, provides information for the analyzing and verifying of financial information and should be used in conjunction with this section.

5.8.5.2 (09-01-2005)
Verification
A thorough verification of the taxpayers Collection Information Statement (CIS) involves reviewing information available from internal sources and requesting that the taxpayer provide additional information or documents that are necessary to determine reasonable collection potential (RCP).

Collection issues that have been previously addressed during a balance due investigation by field personnel will not be re-examined unless there is convincing evidence that such reinvestigation is absolutely necessary. It is expected that the results of a previous collection investigation will be used and only supplemented when necessary to make a determination on an offer in compromise. Investigative actions that are less than 12 months old may be used to evaluate the offer in compromise.

Example:
If a Revenue Officer has completed a full CIS analysis including verification of assets, income, and expenses and has made a determination of the fair market value (FMV) of assets, equity in assets and monthly ability to pay, this information should not be reinvestigated. The Offer Examiner (OE) should use the Revenue Officer's (RO) determinations to calculate reasonable collection potential (RCP). If the balance due case file does not provide documentation to indicate the source of the offer amount, the taxpayer will be contacted to determine the source of the offer funds


5.8.5.2.1 (09-01-2005)
Internal Sources
Verify as much of the collection information statement (CIS) as possible through internal sources.

When internal locator services are not available, or indicate a discrepancy, request that the taxpayer provide reasonable information necessary to support the Collection Information Statement (CIS).

A full credit report should be requested prior to accepting an offer when the current balance due exceeds $100,000.

Regardless of the amount of the liability the following information sources may be considered:

Internal Sources Review
ENMOD and INOLES Identify cross reference TINs for related business activity not declared on the CIS.
SUMRY, IMFOL and BMFOL Verify full compliance.
RTVUE (IMF) or copy of the last filed income tax return • Compare the amount of reported income to that declared on the CIS.
• Identify past sources of income:
Schedule B — interest and dividends
Schedule C — self-employment income
Schedule D — capital gains or losses
Schedule E — rental or other investment income, net operating loss deduction
Schedule F — farm income
IRPTRO and/or copy of older year income tax returns
•Compare real estate tax and mortgage interest deductions to the amounts declared on the CIS. Higher amounts may indicate present or past real property ownership not declared on the CIS. Lower amounts may indicate property has been recently sold or transferred.
•Identify accounts not reported on the CIS, such as certificates of deposit or investment accounts.
•Verify sources of income, such as employers, bank accounts, and retirement accounts.
•Identify recently dissipated assets.
BRTVUE (BMF) or copy of last filed income tax return • Compare the amount of reported income to that declared on the CIS.
• Compare the value of assets and the amount of reported depreciation to the asset values declared on the CIS.
State Motor Vehicle Records Identify motor vehicles registered to the taxpayer but not declared on the CIS. Also check for ownership in business names.
Real Estate Records • Identify real property titled to the taxpayer but not declared on the CIS.
• Identify property held by transferee, nominee, or alter ego. Also check for ownership in business names.
Credit Bureau Report • Identify past residences and employers.
• Verify competing lien holders, balances due and payment history.
•Identify property not listed on CIS.


5.8.5.2.2 (09-01-2005)
Taxpayer Submitted Documents
Collection Information Statements (CIS) submitted with an offer in compromise should reflect information no older than the prior six months. If during the processing of the offer, the financial information becomes older than 12 months, contact should be made with the taxpayer to update the information. However, in certain situations information may become outdated due to significant processing delays caused by the Service and through no fault of the taxpayer. In those cases, it may be appropriate to rely on the outdated information if there is no indication the taxpayers overall situation has significantly changed. Judgment should be exercised to determine whether, and to what extent, updated information is necessary. If there is any reason to believe the taxpayers situation may have significantly changed, secure a new CIS.

Do not make a blanket request for information. Tailor your request to each taxpayers specific situation. Do not require the taxpayer to provide information that is available from internal sources.

Offer Investigators may receive offers (other than those identified by the "Screen for Obvious Full Pay" process) where the taxpayers have not provided, either proof of payment for certain monthly expenses claimed in Section 9 of Form 433-A, or statements showing current real estate mortgage or motor vehicle loan balance. Often the taxpayers are not actually paying claimed expenses, or they are not allowable under offer program guidelines. For example, taxpayers frequently list their unsecured credit card bills under "secured debt" or " other expenses" . While a taxpayer may have a liability for a court ordered judgment that is senior to the Notice of Federal Tax Lien (NFTL), unless they are actually making payments on that liability it is not considered as an allowable monthly expense.

If taxpayers do not substantiate claimed expenses for Form 433-A categories of health care expenses, court ordered payments, child/dependent care, life insurance, other secured debt, or other expenses, Offers Investigators will complete the Income/Expense Table (IET) assuming that the taxpayer is not making any payments for the particular unsubstantiated expense, except for health care. In those cases, refer to LEM 5.3.1.

When computing equity in real estate or allowable motor vehicles, and the taxpayer has not submitted substantiation of loan balances claimed on the Form 433-A, Offers Investigators should request a credit report and use that loan balance information to determine the current balances of any relevant loans from commercial lenders. If the loan is from a private source, it may be necessary to contact the taxpayer/representative for the information.

If not present in the file when assigned for investigation, appropriate documentation from the chart below should be requested to verify the information on the Collection Information Statement (CIS).

Taxpayer Documentation Review
Wage Earner — wage statements for the prior three months or a current or a statement with current year–to–date figures. • Compare average earnings to the income declared on the CIS.
• Verify adequate tax withholding.
• Identify payroll deductions to ensure the expense is necessary and not claimed again on the CIS.
•Identify deductions to savings accounts, credit union accounts, or retirement accounts.
Self-employed — proof of gross income (invoices, accounts receivable, commission statements, etc.) for the prior three months. • Compare average earnings to the income declared on the CIS.
• Identify deductions to ensure the expense is necessary and not claimed again on the CIS.
Three (3) current months of bank statements that show the monthly transactions, withdrawals, and deposits. Compare deposit amounts to income reported on the tax return and CIS. Question deposits that exceed reported income and unusual expenses paid. Consider asking for the cancelled checks and deposit items for a specified time frame if questionable items cannot be adequately explained.
Retirement account statements and brochures, brokerage account statements, securities, or other investments Identify the type, conditions for withdrawal, and current market value.
Life insurance policies •Identify the type, conditions for borrowing or cancellation, and the current loan and cash values.
• Verify the amount of the required premiums and ensure payments are being made.
Motor vehicle purchase or lease contracts, statements from the lender indicating the payoff amount Verify equity and monthly payment expense.
Real estate warranty deeds, mortgage deeds, HUD closing statements, statements from the lender indicating the pay off amount Identify the type of ownership, amount of equity, and monthly payment expense.
Homeowners or renters insurance policies and riders. • Compare the insured value to the value declared on the CIS.
• Identify high value personal items such as jewelry, antiques or artwork.
Financial statements recently provided to lending institutions or others. Compare the financial information on the CIS to those submitted to other lending institutions.
Divorce court orders. Verify disposition of assets in the property settlement.
Court orders for child support and proof of payment. Verify responsibility for child support, that the payments are actually being made, and the length of time payments are required to be made. A copy of the court order is not critical or required if the taxpayer does not provide supporting documentation that payments are being made. In those cases, the payment will be disallowed as an expense. If the payment is to be allowed, a copy of the Court Order must be secured.


5.8.5.3 (09-01-2005)
Equity in Assets
Proper asset valuation is essential to determine reasonable collection potential (RCP).

Field calls may be made to locate or personally ascertain the condition of assets.

Assets will not be eliminated or valued at zero dollars simply because the Service may choose not to take enforcement action against the asset, even though the net result is rejection of the offer and reporting the case currently not collectible.

5.8.5.3.1 (09-01-2005)
Net Realizable Equity
For offer purposes, assets are valued at net realizable equity (NRE). Net realizable equity is defined as quick sale value (QSV) less amounts owed to secured lien holders with priority over the federal tax lien.

Quick sale value (QSV) is defined as an estimate of the price a seller could get for the asset in a situation where financial pressures motivate the owner to sell in a short period of time, usually 90 calendar days or less. Generally, QSV is an amount less than fair market value (FMV) but greater than forced sale value (FSV). FSV is defined as no less than 75% of FMV.

Normally, quick sale value (QSV) is calculated at 80% of fair market value (FMV). A higher or lower percentage may be applied in determining QSV when appropriate, depending on the type of asset and/or current market conditions. If, based on the current market and area economic conditions, it is believed that the property would quickly sell at full FMV, then it may be appropriate to consider QSV to be the same as FMV. This is occasionally found to be true in real estate markets where real estate is selling quickly at or above the listing price. As long as the value chosen represents a fair estimate of the price a seller could get for the asset in a situation where the asset must be sold quickly (usually 90 calendar days or less) then it would be appropriate to use of a percentage other than 80%. Generally, it is the policy of the Service to apply QSV in valuing property for offer purposes.

When a particular asset has been sold (or a sale is pending) in order to fund the offer, no reduction for quick sale value (QSV) should be made. Instead, verify the actual sale price, ensuring that the sale is an arms length transaction, and use that amount as the QSV. A reduction may be made for the costs of the sale and the expected current year tax consequence to arrive at the net realizable equity (NRE) of the asset.

5.8.5.3.2 (09-01-2005)
Jointly Held Assets
When taxpayers submit separate offers but have jointly owned assets, allocate equity in the assets equally between the owners. However:

If… Then…
The joint owners demonstrate their interest in the property is not equally divided Allocate the equity based on each owner's contribution to the value of the asset.
The joint owners have joint and individual tax liabilities included in the offer investigation Apply the equity first to the joint liability and then to the individual liability.


See IRM 5.8.5.3.11(4) below for the treatment of assets held as tenancies by the entirety.

5.8.5.3.3 (09-01-2005)
Income-Producing Assets
When determining the reasonable collection potential (RCP) for an offer that includes business assets, an analysis is necessary to determine if certain assets are essential for the production of income. When it is determined that an asset or a portion of an asset is necessary for the production of income, it may be appropriate to adjust the income or expense calculation for that taxpayer to account for the loss of income stream if the asset was either liquidated or used as collateral to secure a loan to fund the offer .

When valuing income-producing assets:

If… Then…
There is no equity in the assets There is no adjustment necessary to the income stream.
There is equity and no available income stream (i.e. profit) produced by those assets There is no adjustment necessary to the income stream. Consider including the equity in the asset in the RCP.
There are both equity in assets that are determined to be necessary for the production of income and an available income stream produced by those assets Compare the value of the income stream produced by the income producing asset(s) to the equity that is available.
Determine if an adjustment to income or expenses is appropriate.
An asset used in the production of income will be liquidated to help fund an offer Adjusting the income to account for the loss of the asset.
A taxpayer borrows against an asset that is necessary for the production of income, and devotes the proceeds to the payment of the offer Consider the effect that loan will have on future expenses and the future income stream.
The taxpayer is either unable or unwilling to secure a loan on the equity in income producing assets Compare the equity in the assets with the income produced by those assets. Determine if an adjustment to income stream is appropriate to account for the potential loss of the assets.

These considerations should be fully documented in the case history. For example:

If… Then…
A self-employed construction tradesman sells a truck, which he used to haul materials, and devotes the proceeds to the offer Consider allowing the expected cost of delivery services as a business expense.
A tradesman borrows against the truck instead of selling it and devotes the proceeds to the offer Consider allowing the loan repayment as a business expense.
A loan cannot be secured and loss of the truck would create an economic hardship When special circumstances warrant acceptance of less than RCP, document the circumstances and recommend acceptance to the authorized official in Delegation Order No. 5-1 (formerly DO 11, Rev. 29).
An outside salesman has a luxury car when all that is necessary is a moderate value sedan The equity should be included in the offer. Consider allowing only a portion of the loan repayment that would be required to purchase a moderate value replacement vehicle.
An outside salesman has a luxury car but no ability to make installment payments for purchase of a moderate value replacement vehicle The equity should be included in the offer. When special circumstances warrant acceptance of less than the RCP, document the circumstances and recommend acceptance to the authorized official in Delegation Order No. 5-1 (formerly DO 11, Rev. 29). Determine the acceptable amount of a special circumstances offer by allowing the taxpayer to retain only enough equity to purchase a moderate value replacement vehicle.
A business owns a vacation property, which is used for annual board meetings. The equity should be included in the offer. Do not allow any loan repayment.


5.8.5.3.4 (09-01-2005)
Assets Held By Others as Transferees, Nominees, or Alter Egos
A critical part of the financial analysis is to determine what degree of control the taxpayer has over assets and income in the possession of others. This is especially true when the offer will be funded by a third party.

When these issues arise, apply the principles in IRM 5.17.1, Legal Reference Guide for Revenue Officers, or request a counsel opinion.

It is not necessary to actually seek or obtain any specific legal remedy in order to address these issues in an offer.

If the taxpayer has a beneficial interest in the asset or income stream then the value should be reflected in the reasonable collection potential (RCP).

5.8.5.3.5 (09-01-2005)
Cash
Review checking account statements over a reasonable period of time, normally three months.

Note:
Determine if there are funds in the account that are not spent on a monthly basis. Generally this would be the amount reflected on each month's statement when the account is at its lowest point. Treat overdrafts as a zero balance. This should represent the amount available in the account each month after all deposits and withdrawals. Average the lowest daily ending balance on each of the three statements and use this amount as the value of the account. This amount will be added to the AET as an asset, however, it cannot be valued for less than zero.


Determine the taxpayers interest in bank accounts by ascertaining the manner in which they are held and applying the principles described in IRM 5.17.1, Legal Reference Guide for Revenue Officers.

If analysis of the bank statements and/or discussions with the taxpayer reveal that an adjustment to the balance is appropriate based on unusual expenses that are necessary for the production of income or the health and welfare of the taxpayer, consider adjusting the balance. The case file should clearly document these determinations.

Analyze the statement for any unusual activity, i.e. deposit in excess of reported income, withdrawals, transfers, or checks for expenses not reflected on the Collection Information Statement (CIS). The Offer Investigator should question these inconsistencies, as appropriate.

Review savings accounts statements over a reasonable period of time, normally three months.

If the account has little withdrawal activity use the ending balance on the latest statement as the asset value for the AET.

If it is apparent that the account is used for paying monthly living expenses, treat it as a checking account and follow the instructions in paragraphs (1) through (4) above to determine its value.


If analysis of the bank statement reveals recently dissipated funds, see 5.8.5.4 below for a full discussion of the treatment of dissipated assets.

If the taxpayer offers the balances of accounts to fund the offer, allow for any penalty for early withdrawal and the expected current year tax consequence.

Verify whether deposits in escrow or trust accounts are actually held for the benefit of others.

For funds on deposit with the offer in compromise, allow as an encumbrance any amount borrowed under the provision that, if the offer is not accepted, it must be repaid.

5.8.5.3.6 (09-01-2005)
Securities
Financial securities are considered an asset and their value should be determined and included in the reasonable collection potential (RCP) when investigating an offer.

When the taxpayer will liquidate the investment to fund the offer, allow any penalty for early withdrawal and the current year tax consequence.

To determine the value of publicly traded stock, research a daily paper or inquire with a broker for the current market price. Then, allow for the estimated costs of the sale to arrive at the quick sale value (QSV).

To determine the value of closely held stock that is either not traded publicly or for which there is no established market, consider the following methods of valuing the company and assign a proportion of the company's value to the taxpayers stock:

Secure and verify a Collection Information Statement (CIS).

Review recent year's annual report to stockholders.

Review recent year's corporate income tax returns.

Request an appraisal of the business as a going concern by a qualified and impartial appraiser.


When a taxpayer holds only a negligible or token interest, has made no investment and exercises no control over the corporate affairs, it is permissible to assign no value to the stock.

5.8.5.3.7 (09-01-2005)
Life Insurance
Life insurance as an investment is not considered necessary. However, reasonable premiums for term life policies may be allowed as a necessary expense.

When determining the value in a taxpayers insurance policy, consider:

If… Then…
The taxpayer will retain or sell the policy to help fund the offer Equity is the cash surrender value.
The taxpayer will borrow on the policy to help fund the offer Equity is the cash loan value less any prior policy loans or automatic premium loans required to keep the contract in force.


5.8.5.3.8 (09-01-2005)
Retirement or Profit Sharing Plans
Funds held in a retirement or profit sharing plan are considered an asset and must be valued for offer purposes.

Contributions to voluntary retirement plans are not a necessary expense. Review of the retirement plan document is generally necessary to determine the taxpayers benefits and options under the plan.

When determining the value of a taxpayers pension and profit sharing plans consider:

If… And… Then…
The account is an Individual Retirement Account (IRA) or Keogh Account The taxpayer is not retired or close to retirement Equity is the cash value less any expense for liquidating the account and early withdrawal penalty.
The account is an Individual Retirement Account (IRA), 401(k), or Keogh Account The taxpayer is retired or close to retirement Equity is the cash value less any expense for liquidating the account and early withdrawal penalty. The plan may be considered as income, if the income from the plan is necessary to provide for necessary living expenses.
The contribution to a retirement plan is required as a condition of employment The taxpayer is able to withdraw funds from the account Equity is the amount the taxpayer can withdraw less any expense associated with the withdrawal
The contribution to an employer's plan is required as a condition of employment The taxpayer is unable to withdraw funds from the account but is permitted to borrow on the plan Equity is the available loan value.
Any retirement plan that may not be borrowed on or liquidated until separation from employment The taxpayer is retired, eligible to retire, or close to retirement Equity is the cash value less any expense for liquidating the account and early withdrawal penalty, or consider the plan as income if the income from the plan is necessary to provide for necessary living expenses.
The plan may not be borrowed on or liquidated until separation from employment The taxpayer is not eligible to retire until after the period for which we are calculating future income The plan has no equity.
The plan includes a stock option The taxpayer is eligible to take the option Equity is the value of the stock at current market price less any expense to exercise the option.


When the taxpayer will liquidate the retirement plan to fund the offer, allow any penalty for early withdrawal and the current year tax consequence.

When the taxpayer will borrow against the retirement plan to fund the offer, allow any penalty for early withdrawal and the current year tax consequence.

5.8.5.3.9 (09-01-2005)
Furniture, Fixtures, and Personal Effects
The taxpayers declared value of household goods is usually acceptable unless there are articles of extraordinary value; such as, antiques, artwork, jewelry, or collector's items. Exercise discretion in determining whether the assets warrant personal inspection.

There is a statutory exemption from levy that applies to the taxpayers furniture and personal effects. This exemption amount is updated on an annual basis.

Note:
This exemption applies only to individual taxpayers.


When determining the value consider the following:

If… Then…
The taxpayer qualifies as head of household, single, or married Grant a reduction in the value of personal effects for the levy exemption amount.
The property is owned jointly with any person who is not liable for the tax Determine the value of the taxpayers proportionate share of property before allowing the levy exemption.
Some of the furniture or fixtures are used in a business They are not personal effects, but they may qualify for the levy exemption as tools of a trade.


5.8.5.3.10 (09-01-2005)
Motor Vehicles, Airplanes, and Boats
Equity in motor vehicles, airplanes, and boats must be determined and included in the reasonable collection potential (RCP). The general rule for determining net realizable equity (NRE), as discussed in IRM 5.8.5.3.1 above, applies when determining equity in these assets. Unusual assets such as airplanes and boats may require an appraisal to determine fair market value (FMV), unless the items can be located in a trade association guide. The case file should document how the values were determined.

Generally, it is not necessary to personally inspect automobiles used for personal transportation. When it appears reasonable, accept the taxpayers stated value. No further investigation is required except for vehicles that are three years old or newer with no lien. For these vehicles, consult a trade association guide and discount the fair market value (FMV) to 80% to arrive at the quick sale value (QSV).

Example:
When investigating an offer in the year 2003, a 2001 model year is 3 years old or newer.


When these assets are used for business purposes they may be considered income producing assets. See IRM 5.8.5.3.3 above for a full discussion on the treatment of income producing assets.

5.8.5.3.11 (09-01-2005)
Real Estate
Equity in real estate is included when calculating the taxpayers reasonable collection potential (RCP) and in an acceptable offer amount.

When determining equity in real estate, the fair market value (FMV) of the property must be established. FMV is defined as the price a willing buyer will pay for the property, given time to obtain the best and highest possible price. The following methods may be used to establish FMV:

Recent purchase price or an existing contract to sell

Recent appraisals

Real estate tax assessment

Market comparable

Homeowners insurance replacement cost


Once the fair market value (FMV) of real estate is established, a determination regarding a reduction of value for offer purposes must be made. Procedures outlining reduction to quick sale value (QSV) are discussed in IRM 5.8.5.3.1 above. If the value of real estate is reduced beyond 80% or if FMV is not reduced to QSV, the case file should document the basis for the value used.

For real estate and other related property held as tenancies by the entirety when the tax is owed by only one spouse, the taxpayers portion is usually 50% of the property's net realizable equity (NRE).

5.8.5.3.12 (09-01-2005)
Accounts and Notes Receivable
Accounts and notes receivable are considered assets unless a determination is made to treat them as part of the income stream when they are required for the production of income. When it is determined that liquidation of a receivable would be detrimental to the continued operation of an otherwise profitable business, it may be treated as future income.

To determine the value of accounts receivable:

Consider discounting the value of accounts that are over 90 calendar days past due.

When the receivables have been sold at a discount or pledged as collateral on a loan, apply the provisions of IRC 6323(c) to determine the lien priority of commercial transactions and financing agreements.

Closely examine accounts of significant value that the taxpayer is not attempting to collect, or that are receivable from officers, stockholders, or relatives.


To determine the value of a note receivable, consider the following:

Whether it is secured and if so by what asset(s)

What is collectable from the borrower

If it could be successfully levied upon.


5.8.5.3.13 (09-01-2005)
Inventory, Machinery, and Equipment
Inventory, machinery and equipment may be considered income producing assets. See IRM 5.8.5.3.3 above when it is determined that liquidation of these assets would be detrimental to the continued operation of an otherwise profitable business.

To determine the value of business assets use the following:

For assets commonly used in many businesses such as automobiles and trucks, the value may be easily determined by consulting trade association guides.

For specialized machinery and equipment suitable for only certain applications, consult a trade association guide, secure an appraisal from a knowledgeable and impartial dealer, or contact the manufacturer.

When the property is unique or difficult to value and no other resource will meet the need, follow local procedure to request the services of an IRS valuation engineer.

Consider asking the taxpayer to secure an appraisal from a qualified business appraiser.


There is a statutory exemption from levy that applies to an individual taxpayers tools used in a trade or business. This exemption for tools of the trade generally does not apply to automobiles. The levy exemption amount is updated on an annual basis.

5.8.5.3.14 (09-01-2005)
Business as a Going Concern
Evaluation of a business as a going concern is sometimes necessary when determining reasonable collection potential (RCP) of an operating business owned individually or by a corporation, partnership, or LLC. This analysis recognizes that a business may be worth more than the sum of its parts, when sold as a going concern.

To determine the value of a business as a going concern consider the value of assets, future income, and intangible assets such as:

Good will

Ability or reputation of a professional

Established customer base

Prominent location

Well known trade name, trademark, or telephone number

Possession of government licenses, copyrights, or patents



Generally, the difference between what an ongoing business would realize if sold on the open market as a going concern and the traditional reasonable collection potential (RCP) analysis is attributable to the value of these intangibles.

Request the assistance of an IRS valuation engineer when a difficult or complex valuation is necessary.

When determining reasonable collection potential (RCP) for an individual taxpayer that has an interest in a business entity, flexibility should be used with consideration given to the taxpayers control over the business.

5.8.5.4 (09-01-2005)
Dissipation of Assets
During an offer investigation it may be discovered that assets (liquid or non-liquid) have been sold, gifted, transferred, or spent on non-priority items and/or debts and are no longer available to pay the tax liability. This section discusses treatment of the value of these assets when considering an offer in compromise.

Note:
The scope of an offer investigation should not be expanded beyond the requirements defined in IRM 5.8.5.4, for the sole purpose of attempting to locate dissipated assets.


Once it is determined that a specific asset has been dissipated, the investigation should address whether the value of the asset, or a portion of the value, should be included in an acceptable offer amount.

Inclusion of the value of dissipated assets must clearly be justified in the case file and documented on the ICS/AOIC history. Justification should include an analysis of the following facts:

When the asset(s) were dissipated in relation to the offer submission,

How the asset was dissipated,

If the taxpayer realized any funds from the dissipation of assets,

How any funds realized from the dissipation of assets were used,

The value of dissipated assets and the taxpayers interest in those assets.


When the taxpayer can show that assets have been dissipated to provide for necessary living expenses, these amounts should not be included in the reasonable collection potential (RCP) calculation.
For Example:

Dissolving an IRA account to pay for necessary living expenses during unemployment

Using bank accounts to pay for medical expenses

An asset that was dissipated and the funds were used to purchase another asset that is included in the offer evaluation.


If the investigation clearly reveals that assets have been dissipated with a disregard of the outstanding tax liability, consider including the value in the reasonable collection potential (RCP) calculation.

Note:
The examples below are only guidelines and the value of the dissipated assets should not automatically be included in the calculation of the RCP. Each particular case must be evaluated on it's own merit and with the factors in (3) above in mind. In addition, if the tax liability did not exist prior to the dissipation or the dissipation occurred prior to the taxable event giving rise to the tax liability, a taxpayer cannot be said to have dissipated the assets with a disregard of the outstanding tax liability. For example, if a taxpayer withdraws funds from an IRA to invest in a business opportunity but does not have any tax liability prior to the withdrawal, the fact that taxes are not withheld from the distribution does not result in the value of the funds being included in the RCP calculation.


For Example:

Dissolving an IRA account to pay unsecured credit card debt

Sale of real estate and "gifting" the funds from the sale to family members.

A recent refinancing of equity in property and using the funds to pay unsecured debt.


If the taxpayer cannot or will not provide information showing the disposition of funds from dissipated assets, consider including a portion or all of these values in an acceptable offer amount.

5.8.5.5 (09-01-2005)
Future Income
Future income is defined as an estimate of the taxpayers ability to pay based on an analysis of gross income, less necessary living expenses, for a specific number of months into the future. The number of months used depends on the payment terms of the offer.

For cash offers — project for the next 48 months.

For short term deferred offers — project for the next 60 months.

For deferred payment offers — project for the number of months remaining on the statutory period for collection.


Detailed instructions for calculating future income are contained in IRM 5.8.5.5.5 below.

Consider the taxpayers overall general situation including such facts as age, health, marital status, number and age of dependents, highest education or occupational training, and work experience.

Retired Debts — A taxpayers ability to pay in the future may change during the period it is being considered because necessary expenses may increase or decrease. Adjust the amount or number of payments to be included in the future income calculation, based on the expected change in necessary expenses.


Example:
The taxpayer may pay off an auto loan 24 months from the date the offer is accepted. This would increase the monthly future income by the amount of the loan payment. Child support payments may stop before the future income period is complete because the child turns a certain age. It is expected that these retired payments would increase the taxpayers ability to pay.


Note:
Inclusion of retired debt should not be added automatically in the calculation of the reasonable collection potential (RCP). The Offer Investigator should use judgment in determining whether inclusion of the retired debt is appropriate based on the facts of the case; such as special circumstance or Effective Tax Administration (ETA) situations. In all instances, the case histories should be documented to support the inclusion and/or exclusion of the retired debt.


Some situations may warrant placing a different value on future income than current or past income indicates:

If… Then…
Income will increase or decrease or current necessary expenses will increase or decrease Adjust the amount or number of payments to what is expected during the appropriate number of months.
A taxpayer is temporarily unemployed or underemployed Use the level of income expected if the taxpayer were fully employed and if the potential for employment is apparent. Each case should be judged on its own merit, including consideration of special circumstance or ETA issues.
Example:
Underemployed – If a taxpayer is a teacher but recently moved and is currently working as a janitor until a teaching position becomes available; or has been hired and does not begin work until the school season begins, is considered to be currently underemployed.

A taxpayer has a sporadic employment history or fluctuating income Average earnings over several prior years. Usually this is the prior 3 years.
Note:
This practice does not apply to wage earners.

A taxpayer is elderly, in poor health, or both and the ability to continue working is questionable Adjust the amount or number of payments to the expected earnings during the appropriate number of months. Consider special circumstance situations when making any adjustments.
A taxpayer will file a petition for liquidating bankruptcy Consider reducing the value of future income. The total value of future income should not be reduced to an amount less than what could be paid toward non-dischargeable periods, or what could be recovered through bankruptcy. When considering a reduction in future income also consider the intangible value to the taxpayer of avoiding bankruptcy.


Below are some examples on when it is and is not appropriate to income average. Judgment should be used in determining the appropriate time to apply income averaging on a case by case basis. All circumstances of the taxpayer should be considered when determining the appropriate application of income averaging, including special circumstance and Effective Tax Administration considerations.

The examples below are instances when income averaging may or may not be appropriate.


Example:
A taxpayer is a commissioned sales person and the income varies year to year. It would be appropriate to income average in this case.


Example:
Mr. taxpayer was on a fixed retirement and Mrs. taxpayer had not worked for over 2 1/2 years with no promise of future employment. Do not average income for the spouse during past employment.


Example:
The taxpayer had been unemployed for over a year and provided proof that Social Security Disability was the sole source of income. Do not apply income averaging in this case.


Example:
The taxpayer was incarcerated and unable to work for the past 4 years and provided proof that a relative was paying for all expenses, including child support payments. The taxpayer had no skills or promise of work in the near future but was planning on attending trade school to improve his chances of getting a job. Do not include income from the 4 years of employment prior to the incarceration. In this case, the income and expenses would be zero. Consideration should be given whether it would be in the best interest of the Government to accept the offer or to place it in Currently Not Collectible (CNC) status.


Example:
The taxpayer recently began working after several months of unemployment. Use the most recent 3 months pay statements to determine future income. Do not income average.


In some instances, a future income collateral agreement may be used in lieu of including the estimated value of future income in reasonable collection potential (RCP). When investigating an offer where current or past income does not provide an ability to accurately estimate future income, the use of a future income collateral agreement may provide a better means of calculating an acceptable offer amount. Future income collateral agreements should not be used to enable a taxpayer to submit an offer in a lesser amount than the current or past financial condition dictates. However, if the future is uncertain, but it is reasonably expected that the taxpayer will be receiving a substantial increase in income, it may be appropriate.

Example:
A taxpayer is currently in medical school and it is anticipated that upon graduation income should increase dramatically. See IRM 5.8.6.3.1, Future Income, for instructions on completing collateral agreements.


Example:
A taxpayer recently secured a job as an attorney with a starting salary at $80,000 per year, with potential for significant increases in salary.


5.8.5.5.1 (09-01-2005)
Allowable Expenses
Allowable expenses as defined in IRM 5.15.1, Financial Analysis Handbook, are those expenses that are necessary for the production of income or for the health and welfare of the taxpayers family. That handbook also contains national and local standard expense amounts designed to provide accuracy and consistency in determining a taxpayers basic living expenses. The standards are updated periodically based upon Bureau of Labor Statistics and Census Bureau information.

National and local expense standards are guidelines. If it is determined that a standard amount is inadequate to provide for a specific taxpayers basic living expenses, allow a deviation. Require the taxpayer to provide reasonable substantiation and document the case file.

Example:
A taxpayer with a physical disability or an unusually large family requires a housing cost that is not anticipated by the local standard. Require the taxpayer to provide copies of mortgage or rent payments, utility bills and maintenance costs to verify the necessary amount.


Generally, the total number of persons allowed for national standard expenses should be the same as those allowed as dependents on the taxpayers current year income tax return. There may be reasonable exceptions. Fully document the reasons for any exceptions.

Example:
Foster children or children for whom adoption is pending.


A deviation from the local standard is not allowed merely because it is inconvenient for the taxpayer to dispose of excessively valued assets. In some situations, taxpayers may be expected to make life-style choices that will facilitate collection of the delinquent tax.

5.8.5.5.2 (09-01-2005)
Treatment of Non-Business Transportation Expenses
Transportation expenses are considered necessary when they are used by taxpayers and their families to provide for their health and welfare and/or the production of income. Employees investigating offers in compromise are expected to exercise appropriate judgment in determining whether claimed transportation expenses meet these standards. Expenses that appear to be excessive should be questioned and, in appropriate situations, disallowed.

Operating Expenses — Allow the full operating costs portion of the local transportation standard, or the amount actually claimed by the taxpayer, whichever is less .

Note:
Substantiation for this allowance is not required.


Ownership Expenses — Expenses are allowed for purchase and/or lease of a vehicle, with different rates established for a first car and, if allowed, a second or more cars.
Taxpayers will be allowed the local standard or the amount actually paid, whichever is less. Generally, auto loan and/or lease payments will not continue as allowed expenses after the terms of the loan/lease have been satisfied. However, depending on the age and/or condition of the vehicle, the complete disallowance of the ownership expense may result in a transportation expense allowance that does not adequately meet the necessary expenses of the taxpayer.
Therefore, in situations where the taxpayer owns a vehicle that is currently over six years old and/or has reported mileage of 75,000 miles or more, an additional operating expense of $200 will generally be allowed for the collection period that remains after the loan/lease has been "retired" plus the operating expense.

Note:
This also applies to those taxpayers that have no loan/lease on a vehicle over six years old and/orhas reported mileage of 75,000 miles or more.


Example:
The taxpayer, who lives in the Midwest Region, owns a 1995 Ford Taurus, with 90,000 reported miles. The vehicle was bought used, and the auto loan will be fully paid in 30 months, at $300 per month. In this situation, the taxpayer will be allowed the ownership expense until the loan is fully paid; i.e., $300 plus the allowable operating expense of $231 per month (unless less is claimed), for a total transportation allowance of $531 per month. After the auto loan is "retired" in 30 months, the ownership expense is not applicable; however, at that point, the taxpayer will be allowed a $200 operating expense allowance, in addition to the standard $231, for a total operating expense allowance of $431 per month.


Example:
The taxpayer who owns a 1998 Chevrolet Caviler with 50,000 miles, will be allowed the standard of $231 per month (unless less is claimed) plus $200 per month operating expense (because of the age of the vehicle), for a total operating expense allowance of $431 per month.


5.8.5.5.3 (09-01-2005)
Conditional Expenses
Conditional expenses are defined in IRM 5.15, Financial Analysis Handbook, as those that may be allowed when the tax will be paid in full by an installment agreement. For offers purposes, the full amount of the tax will not be collected; therefore, the rules for conditional expenses are different.

The one year rule which allows time for a taxpayer to adjust current expenses to meet the terms of an installment agreement is not allowed for Offers in Compromise.

The purchase of discretionary investments is not allowed.

Example:
Payroll savings plans, purchase of whole life policies, mutual funds or voluntary retirement plan contributions.


Repayment of loans incurred to fund the offer and secured by the taxpayers’ assets are allowed when those assets are of reasonable value and necessary to provide for the health and welfare of the taxpayers family. The same rule applies whether the equity is paid to tax before the offer is submitted or will be paid upon acceptance of the offer. See IRM 5.8.5.3.3, Income-Producing Assets, to determine when to allow repayment of loans on those assets used to fund the offer.

Repayment of student loans secured by the federal government is allowed only for the taxpayers higher education. If student loans are owed but no payments are being made, do not allow them.

Education expense is allowed only for the taxpayer and only if it is required as a condition of present employment. Expenses for dependents to attend colleges, universities or private schools are not allowed unless the dependents have special needs that cannot be met by public schools.

Child support payments for natural children or legally adopted dependents may be allowed, based on the taxpayers situation, even when they are not court ordered. Regardless of whether they are court ordered, if no child support payments are being made, do not allow them.

Monthly payments to state or local taxing agencies should not be allowed as a necessary expense, even if the state or local taxing agency has a lien that was choate prior to our lien or is collecting funds via a wage attachment or approved installment agreement. State and federal lien (regardless of priority) attach simultaneously to after acquired property. In general, if the federal tax lien attaches to after acquired property simultaneously with a competing perfected lien, the federal tax lien will take priority (see IRM 5.17.2, Legal Reference Guide). Since future earnings of the taxpayer are after acquired property the Service has first right to the earnings. Explain to the taxpayer that although the payment may be allowed in an installment agreement where the tax will be paid in full, it will not be allowed for computation of an acceptable offer amount because the Federal government has priority rights to the funds.

Note:
State or local liens may enjoy a priority in fixed payment streams such as annuity payments. If necessary, consult with area counsel to determine lien priorities.


Charitable contributions are not allowed.

Payments being made to fund or re-pay loans from voluntary plans will not be allowed. Taxpayers who cannot repay these loans will have a tax consequence in the year that the loan is declared in default and that consequence should be estimated and allowed as an additional tax expense on the IET for the required number of months necessary to cover the additional tax consequence. Request the taxpayer or their representative estimate the tax ramification of the failure to re-pay the loan or the Offers Investigator may request assistance from the Examination function or Customer Service to determine the tax consequences.

5.8.5.5.4 (09-01-2005)
Shared Expenses
This situation can happen one of two ways:

Separate offers are submitted by two or more persons who owe joint liabilities and/or separate liabilities and who share the same household.

An offer is submitted by a taxpayer who shares living expenses with a not liable person.


Generally, the assets and income of a not liable person are excluded from the computation of the taxpayers ability to pay. One notable exception is in community property states. Follow the community property laws in these states to determine what assets and income of the otherwise not liable person are subject to collection of the tax.

Regardless of community property laws, the Offers Investigator should secure sufficient information concerning the not liable person to determine the taxpayers proportionate share of the total household income and expenses. Review the entire household's information and:

Determine the total actual household income and expense.

Determine what percentage of the total household income the taxpayer contributes.

Determine necessary and allowable expense amounts using the rules in this chapter and IRM 5.15, Financial Analysis Handbook.

Determine which expenses are shared and which expenses are the sole responsibility of the taxpayer.

Apply the taxpayers percentage of income to the shared expenses.

Verify that the taxpayer actually contributes at least this amount to the total household expense.

Do not allow the taxpayer any amount paid toward a not liable person's discretionary expenses.


When the taxpayer can provide documentation that income is not commingled (as in the case of roommates who share housing) and responsibility for household expenses are divided equitably between co-habitants, (as documented by rental agreements, bank statement analysis, etc.) the total allowable expense should not exceed the total allowable housing standard for the taxpayer. In this situation, it would not be necessary to obtain the income information of the non-liable person(s), however sufficient financial information must be secured to verify the total household expenses and prove that the taxpayer is paying his/her proportionate share. The investigating employees should exercise sound judgment in these situations to determine which approach is most appropriate, based on the facts of each case.

Note:
In the situation where the taxpayer is renting an apartment or room and the owner of the property is the non-liable person, the rental agreement or signed statement from the owner of the property should support the decision to not require the owner to divulge any personal information regarding income or household expenses. In these cases, the investigating employee should accept the information provided by the taxpayer and make a determination based on that information.

If an in-house verification is conducted on the non-liable person, this information cannot be relayed to the taxpayer. This is not a Unauthorized Access (UNAX) violation but would be considered disclosure if any information is shared with someone other than the non-liable person in question.


5.8.5.5.5 (09-01-2005)
Calculation of Future Income
Generally, the amount to be collected from future income is calculated by taking the projected gross monthly income less allowable expenses and multiplying the difference times the number of months remaining on the statutory period for collection.

For cash and short term deferred offers, when there are less than 48 or 60 months remaining on the statutory period for collection, use the number of months remaining. To determine the amount collectible from future income on a deferred payment offer through the life of the statutory period for collection, take the following steps:

Subtract allowable expenses from the monthly income to determine the monthly installment amount.

Determine the valid Collection Statute Expiration Date (CSED) for each tax period included in the offer.

Sort the tax periods by earliest CSED.

For each tax period, determine the number of months remaining on the statutory period for collection. Begin with the day the offer was determined to be processable and end on the CSED. Round partial months up to the nearest whole month.

For each tax period, determine the number of installments that may be applied before running out available funds. Round partial payments up to the nearest whole payment.

Calculate the number of installments applied to each period. For succeeding periods, do not count months on the CSED that were used for applying installments to prior periods.

Caution:
If the allowed payment terms call for the first installment to begin later than 30 calendar days from acceptance, there will be one less month available to apply payments.


Add the number of installments applied to all the periods and multiply the sum by the monthly installment amount to arrive at the total amount collectible from future income. For examples of situations where the amount that may be applied to a period is limited. See Exhibits 5.8.5-1 through 5.8.5-3.


5.8.5.5.6 (09-01-2005)
Deferred Payment Offer in Compromise Received After Collection Statute Expiration Date Extension
Taxpayers that previously extended the Collection Statute Expiration Date (CSED) in connection with an installment agreement, may request approval of a deferred payment offer in compromise (DPOIC).

On March 24, 1998 the Service issued procedures that limited the length of CSED extensions. See IRM 5.14, Installment Agreements , for further instruction on the policy of the Service.

By policy, if extensions granted prior to October 18, 1999:

resulted in collection periods longer than 15 years; and,

a deferred payment offer in compromise (DPOIC) is later submitted on the balance due accounts (subject to the extension), then, for the purpose of reviewing the DPOIC request, CSEDs are considered to be the later of the following:


The original CSED (10 years from the tax assessment upon which the liability is based); or,

5 years from the date of acceptance of the offer in compromise.


IDRS will not reflect any adjustments based on these procedures; therefore, it is essential that case histories be fully documented and reflect the following statement:

"Time left prior to the CSED (per IDRS) was not used for computation of the deferred offer payment amount, per IRM 5.8.5.5.6. "

Note:
These procedures do not apply to extensions up to 6 years, but only applies to CSED extensions longer than 5 years as agreed to prior to October 18, 1999 and were granted in conjunction with an installment agreement.


5.8.5.6 (09-01-2005)
Payment Terms
Payment terms are negotiable, but should provide for payment of the offered amount in the least time possible. If a taxpayer is planning to sell asset(s) to fund all or a portion of the offer, the payment terms for the offer should provide for immediate payment of the amounts received from the sale. If the taxpayer is planning to borrow a portion of the money, the Offer Investigator should determine when the loan will be received and the payment terms of the offer should provide for payment of the borrowed portion at the time the funds are received.

For those taxpayers who agree to shorter payment terms, fewer months of future income is required:


Payment Type Payment Terms Number of Months Future Income Required
Cash Within 90 calendar days 48
Short term Deferred Within 2 years 60
Deferred Payment Within time remaining on the statute Number of months remaining on the statute


There are three possibilities for deferred payment terms:

Payment of an amount equal to the net realizable equity (NRE) in assets within 90 calendar days and payment of the future income amount by monthly installments over the time remaining on the statutory period for collection, or

Payment of a portion of the net realizable equity (NRE) in assets within 90 calendar days and payment of the balance of the equity in assets and the future income amount by monthly installments over the time remaining on the statutory period for collection, or

Payment of the entire compromise amount by monthly installments over the time remaining on the statutory period for collection.

Note:
A third party source of funds may be required to make the portion of the monthly payment that is greater than we determined the taxpayer can afford from future income.



Exhibit 5.8.5-1 (09-01-2005)
Deferred Payments Limited by Short Statute
For example, the taxpayer has accrued the following tax liability:

MFT–Period CSED Liability
30-9312 07/20/2005 $29,000
30-9412 07/20/2005 $61,000
30-9512 09/27/2006 $ 8,900
30-9612 09/20/2007 $ 7,400


The offer was determined processable on May 31, 1999. The taxpayer has no equity in assets and can pay $300 per month.

MFT–Period Months on the statute Installments Due Installments Applied
30-9312 74 96 74
30-9412 74 203 0
30-9512 87 29 14
30-9612 99 24 12
Total 99


The amount collectible from future income is: $300 times 100 months = $30,000.

Exhibit 5.8.5-2 (09-01-2005)
Deferred Payments Limited by Small Amount Due
For example the taxpayer accrued the following liability:

MFT–Period CSED Liability
30-8912 07/20/2000 $100,000
30-9512 09/27/2006 $ 1,200
30-9612 09/20/2007 $ 600


The offer was determined processable on May 31, 1999. The taxpayer has no equity in assets and can pay $300 per month.

MFT–Period Months on the statute Installments Due Installments Applied
30-8912 14 333 14
30-9512 87 4 4
30-9612 99 2 2
Total 20


The amount collectible from future income is $300 times 20 months = $6,000.

Exhibit 5.8.5-3 (09-01-2005)
Deferred Payments Limited by Application of Payment From Equity in Assets
For example the taxpayer accrued the following liability:

MFT–Period CSED Liability
30-8912 07/20/2000 $30,000
30-9512 09/27/2006 $ 1,200
30-9612 09/20/2007 $ 600


The offer was determined processable on May 31, 1999. The taxpayer has $30,000 equity in assets which he will pay within 90 calendar days and can pay $300 per month which he will begin paying within 30 calendar days.

MFT–Period Months on the statute Installments Due Installments Applied
30-8912 13 0 0
30-9512 87 4 4
30-9612 99 2 2
Total 6


After applying the $30,000 payment for the equity in assets, the amount collectible from future income is $300 times 6 months = $1,800. Reasonable collection potential is $31,800.

Part 5. Collecting Process
Chapter 8. Offer in Compromise
Section 3. Processability

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5.8.3 Processability
5.8.3.1 Overview
5.8.3.2 Routing Cases Based on Jurisdictional Responsibility
5.8.3.3 Combined Application Fee Payment Processing
5.8.3.4 Processability
5.8.3.5 Processing Application Fees
5.8.3.6 Dishonored Application Fee Payments
5.8.3.7 Forms 656 Application Fee Requirements and Perfection
5.8.3.8 Centralized Offers in Compromise Processability Determinations
5.8.3.9 Not Processable
5.8.3.10 Processable
5.8.3.11 Types of Perfection
5.8.3.12 Screen For Obvious Full Pay Processing
5.8.3.13 Centralized Offer in Compromise Case Building and Perfection Procedures
5.8.3.14 Centralized Offer in Compromise Internal Verification Research
5.8.3.15 Processing Taxpayer Responses to Combo Letters
5.8.3.16 Analyzing Taxpayer Responses to Combo Letter
5.8.3.17 "No Reply" Procedures
5.8.3.18 Withholding Collection
5.8.3.19 Offers Submitted Solely to Delay Collection
Exhibit 5.8.3-1 COIC Application Fee Tracking Report
5.8.3.1 (09-01-2005)
Overview
All offer receipts other than those based solely upon Doubt as to Liability (DATL) are reviewed to determine if they are processable. No fee is due on Doubt as to Liability (DATL) offers, including Trust Fund Recovery Penalty (TFRP). Processable offers are then "built" (i.e. internal and external information is secured to verify financial information), and perfected, if necessary, before being assigned for investigation. Not processable offers are returned to taxpayers. This chapter defines the procedures to be followed for determining jurisdictional responsibility, processability, and case building.

5.8.3.2 (09-01-2005)
Routing Cases Based on Jurisdictional Responsibility
The following table provides guidance when it has been determined that Collection does not have jurisdictional responsibility:

If responsibility lies with… Then…
Department of Justice (DOJ) Contact Area Counsel to determine the status of the pending bankruptcy or litigation and whether Collection has jurisdiction to process the offer. If the DOJ requests the offer be sent directly to them, delete the offer from the Automated Offer in Compromise (AOIC) system and forward the case to the DOJ.
Examination Send the offer directly to the OIC Coordinator in Technical Support. No fee is required for these offers. Do not open a record on the AOIC system. If the record was inadvertently loaded to AOIC, delete the record.
Appeals Determine processability, complete the AOIC " Appeals Fee Screen" and follow the established Appeals application fee procedures.


5.8.3.3 (09-01-2005)
Combined Application Fee Payment Processing
Multiple offers submitted with one remittance intended as the application fees for all will not be processed. Do not load the cases to the Automated Offers in Compromise (AOIC) system. Return the offers to the submitter (i.e.- Power of Attorney not the individuals) with the Letter 3796.

5.8.3.4 (09-01-2005)
Processability
Centralized Offers in Compromise (COIC) Process Examiners (PE) are responsible for determining processability of all offers received and worked by the Service, except those based solely on Doubt as to Liability (DATL) issues. This determination must be made within 14 calendar days of receipt of an offer in compromise in the appropriate COIC site.
Each new receipt will fall into one of the following categories:

Not processable – the taxpayer does not meet one or more of the minimum established criteria for offer consideration.

Processable – The taxpayer meets the minimum criteria for offer consideration.


5.8.3.4.1 (09-01-2005)
Determining Processability
An offer in compromise will be deemed not processable if one or more of the following criteria are present:

Taxpayer Not in Compliance — All tax returns for which the taxpayer has a filing requirement must be filed. This rule applies even if a Service employee previously decided not to pursue the filing of the return under the provisions of Policy Statement P-5-133, because it was believed to have "little or no tax due" . In-business taxpayers must have timely deposited, filed, and paid all required employment tax returns for the two (2) preceding quarters prior to filing the offer and must be current with federal tax deposits for the quarter in which the offer was submitted. An individual taxpayer should not be considered an in-business taxpayer because he owns or controls a corporation that is not in compliance. IRM 5.8.7.6(5), Rejection, discusses the criteria for possible rejection of an offer from such an individual if a related entity is not in compliance.

Note:
Generally speaking, IRM 5.1.11.1.3(2), Delinquent Return Program, only requires employees to conduct a compliance check to confirm and document all IMF tax returns were filed for the preceding 6-year period. The only exception would be if fraud were discovered during the course of the investigation. Even then it should be extremely rare to go beyond 6 years.


IRM 5.1.11.4, Cases Requiring Special Handling, discusses enforcement criteria, which states that if the taxpayer refuses to file, neglects to file, or indicates an inability to file, then the employees should determine to what extent enforcement should be used (e.g. summons, 6020(b), referral to Exam, or field, etc.). Filing requirements will normally be enforced for a 6-year period, which is calculated by starting with the tax year that is currently due and going back 6 years.


Taxpayer in Bankruptcy — An offer will not be considered during a bankruptcy proceeding. See IRM 5.8.10.2, Bankruptcy.

Note:
IRM 25.17.4.7, Offers-in-Compromise and Bankruptcy (09–01–2004) , states that "administrative and legal problems would be created if a tax liability was simultaneously the subject of a court-supervised bankruptcy case and the administrative offer-in-compromise process." Therefore, it is the policy of IRS that an offer will not be considered if a taxpayer is in bankruptcy. Offer materials including financial information should be forwarded to the Insolvency unit assigned to the bankruptcy.


Taxpayer did not submit the application fee with the offer — The application fee of $150 or the signed Form 656-A, Income Certification for Offer in Compromise Application Fee, must be submitted with each Form 656. No application fee is required for offers filed solely on the basis of Doubt as to Liability (DATL).

Note:
The Form 656-A applies only to individual taxpayers.



No deviations from or additions to processability criteria may be made without written authorization from the Headquarters Office.

An offer cannot be returned for the sole reason that the cost of an investigation may exceed the amount offered.

5.8.3.4.2 (09-01-2005)
Determining Processability for Appeals Collection Due Process Offers
Apply the same processability criteria as outlined in IRM 5.8.3.4.1, Determining Processablity, but do not load these offers on the Automated Offer in Compromise (AOIC).

Note:
If Collection files a lien while an offer is being investigated, and the taxpayer files a Collection Due Process (CDP) request because of that lien and the CDP remains open, the offer will become the jurisdiction of Appeals. Collection cannot work any offer that has an open CDP case. Appeals may require the assistance to complete the investigation on complex cases. In those cases, an Appeal Referral Investigation (ARI) may be issued to the field.


Appeals will provide Centralized Offer in Compromise (COIC) with both processable and not processable determination letters containing all necessary information, including the Appeals contact information. It is the responsibility of COIC to sign, date, and mail the applicable letter based on the processability determination.

If… Then…
The offer is not processable and a remittance was attached Prepare the not processable letter and the Form 656 to mail to the taxpayer in accordance with the procedures in IRM 5.8.3.5.1(5), Processing Application Fees. Fax a copy of the non-processable letter to the Appeals employee.
The offer is not processable and no remittance was attached Prepare the not processable letter and the Form 656 to mail to the taxpayer in accordance with procedures in IRM 5.8.3.5.1(5), Processing Application Fees.
If the offer is processable and a remittance is attached Access the "Appeals Fee Screen" application of AOIC and input the fee data.

Write the application fee serial number on the upper left corner of the remittance.

Prepare the Form 13479, COIC Application Fee Tracking Report, in accordance with IRM 5.8.3.5.1(3).

Mail the processability letter to the taxpayer.

Send a copy of the letter and the offer package to the designated Appeals employee on a Form 3210, Document Transmittal.

If the offer is processable and no remittance is attached Mail the processability letter to the taxpayer.

Send a copy of the letter and the offer package to the designated Appeals employee on Form 3210, Document Transmittal.



Offers submitted directly to the Compliance employee, are occasionally identified as having an open Collection Due Process (CDP) control. When this occurs, the Centralized Offer in Compromise (COIC) site CDP coordinator will research the Appeals Centralized database System (ACDS) to determine:

If the CDP is still open, and

If a determination letter has been issued.

If ACDS research indicates that there is an open CDP, contact the assigned Appeals/Settlement Officer (AO/SO) to determine the status of the CDP hearing.

Note:
If the CDP determination letter has not been issued or a withdrawal has not been signed and dated, the offer is considered to still be open and under the jurisdiction of Appeals.


If… Then…
It is determined that the case is under appeals jurisdiction and the CDP condition is identified while the offer is still in "U" (undetermined) status on AOIC The COIC site CDP coordinator will advise the AO/SO of the processability determination.

The AO/SO will generate and transmit via encrypted E-mail to the COIC site CDP coordinator the appropriate appeals processable and not processable letters.

The COIC site will delete the offer record from AOIC and load the fee information to the Appeals application fee screen of AOIC.

The COIC site will follow the procedures in IRM 5.8.3.4.2(2) to process the letter and application fee.

COIC will:
(1) Change the offer number on the Form 13479, COIC Application Fee Tracking Report, to the Appeals application fee serial number.
(2) Contact Receipt & Control or the mail team to change the number on the corresponding remittance.

It is determined that the case is under Appeals jurisdiction but the CDP condition is identified after the offer has already been deemed processable by COIC COIC will:
(1) Delete the offer record from AOIC.
(2) Load the fee information to the Appeals application fee screen on AOIC.



When an offer is received in conjunction with a CDP and is deemed to be processable, the COIC site will input the Transaction Code (TC) 480 on all tax periods relating to the offer submission. This includes the input of a TC 480 on all balance due periods not specifically listed on the Form 656. It will be the responsibility of Appeals to perfect the offer document.
COIC will advise the Appeals/Settlement Officer (AO/SO) when it is necessary for the Appeals employee to secure additional Form(s) 656 and/or application fee(s) prior to investigation by generating the letter identifying " Option Y" criteria. See IRM 5.8.3.7, Forms 656 Application Fee Requirements and Perfection, for examples of these situations. The COIC site will prepare the Form 3210, Document Transmittal, for transmittal of the processable offer back to Appeals. The Form 3210 will include the following information:

List the specific periods with the TC 480.

Identify an "Option Y" condition.


Note:
It will be the responsibility of Appeals to resolve each TC 480 (e.g., input of TC 481, 482, 483) after Appeals concludes the offer investigation.


5.8.3.4.3 (09-01-2005)
Exception Processing for Offers in Compromise Investigations Involving Taxpayers in Combat Zones
The following procedures are instructions on handling those taxpayers identified as being located in a "Combat Zone" (CZ) area. This determination should be based on correspondence, case history entries, or telephone contact. Relief provisions for extensions of deadlines are provided to taxpayers located in the designated CZ areas; such as, a contingency operation designated by the Department of Defense (DOD), a qualified hazardous duty area as defined by Congress, or direct support of military operations in a combat zone certified by the DOD. The relief provisions are also applicable to any support personnel on official duty in the CZ; such as, Merchant Marines serving aboard vessels under the operational control of the DOD, Red Cross personnel, accredited corespondents, and civilian personnel acting under the direction of the U.S. Armed Forces in support of those forces.

Offers that are received and deemed not processable should be worked following standard procedures. If any of the following situations exist, exception processing should be followed:

Offers that are received and deemed processable;

Offers in which a Combo Letter was issued and Combat Zone notification is received after the letter was issued;

Offers in which a determination was made to accept, return, or reject the offer; or

Offers in which a Return or Rejection Letter was issued prior to the CZ notification.


In all of the situations identified in IRM 5.8.3.4.3(2) above, the following actions should be taken:

Prepare the Form 3244, Payment Posting Voucher , or Form 4844, Request for Terminal Action , requesting input of Transaction Code (TC) 500 Closing Code (CC) 56 on the taxpayers account. Use the current date for the incoming call or the IRS received date for the correspondence. The case should be suspended for 120 calendar days without taking any further action and should be reassigned on the Automated Offers in Compromise (AOIC) system to a designated or locally designated assignment number. Management should utilize the AOIC Follow-up Screen to monitor the progress on the case until the TC 500 is reversed.

The offer investigation may continue if there is a Power of Attorney or in the case of a joint offer, the spouse is able and willing to provide all substantiation.


The Service established an E-mail site at combatzone@irs.gov , which can be used by military personnel, support personnel, and their families to contact the IRS.

5.8.3.5 (09-01-2005)
Processing Application Fees
The following situations assume that the taxpayer has met the processability criteria for compliance and the Form 656, Offer in Compromise, and Form 433-A, Collection Information Statement for Wage Earners and Self-Employed Individuals, and/or Form 433-B, Collection Information Statement for Business , as appropriate, were submitted:

If you receive a… Then…
Processable Form 656 and the $150 application fee Complete the AOIC Application Fee screen and Form 13479, COIC Application Fee Tracking Report, as described in IRM 5.8.3.5.1 below.
Processable Form 656 with a signed Form 656-A certification (instead of the $150 fee) Complete the AOIC Application Fee screen and input "LI" in the "Waiver Criteria" field.
Processable Form 656 from an individual taxpayer with both a $150 application fee and a signed Form 656-A certification Complete the AOIC "Application Fee" screen and the Form 13479, COIC Application Fee Tracking Report, to treat the $150 as the application fee.
DATL offer for a TFRP only liability with a separate application fee Return the $150 fee using combo letter "A" and optional combo letter paragraph "AM" .
DATL offer for a TFRP only liability with a single remittance that represents both an application fee and a deposit Apply the entire amount as a deposit to the offer. Complete the Form 13479, COIC Application Fee Tracking Report, as described in IRM 5.8.3.5.1 below.
Processable offer and one undesignated remittance greater than the $150 and there was no indication how to apply the funds. (i.e., TP did not specify where the money was to be applied). Treat $150 of the remittance as the application fee and apply the balance as a deposit to the offer. Complete the Form 13479, COIC Application Fee Tracking Report, as described in IRM 5.8.3.5.1 below.


5.8.3.5.1 (09-01-2005)
Completing the Form 13479, COIC Application Fee Tracking Report
Offers with remittances will be batched with the Form 13479, COIC Application Fee Tracking Report, for processability determinations. Each separate remittance will appear on its own line of the Form 13479. Offers submitted with separate remittances for the application fee and a deposit will have entries on two lines, while an offer submitted with a single remittance that combines the application fee and deposit will have only one entry. Batch integrity must be maintained throughout the processability determination.

Cases with deposits and/or tax payments must have a processability determination made and the remittance deposited within 48 hours of the IRS receipt date (unless "misdirected" ).

Those offers received with application fees only must have a processability determination made within 14 calendar days of the IRS receipt date.

Upon assignment to the Process Examiner (PE), the manager will ensure that the "PE Received Date" and " PE COIC #" fields on the Form 13479 are accurately completed.

The last four (4) columns of the Form 13479 are used to document the decision to process or return the remittance. They are:

"Deposit 4710/3244 Amt."

"Application Fee Amt."

"Return Non-Negotiable"

"Return Negotiable"


Form 13479 should be completed as follows:

If Processable, and… Then…
An Application Fee was submitted Enter $150 in the "Application Fee Amt." column.
An offer deposit was submitted Enter the amount of the deposit in the "Deposit 4710/3244 Amt" column and prepare the Form 2515, Record of Offer in Compromise.
A tax payment (e.g., installment agreement (IA) payment, estimated tax (ES) payment) was submitted Prepare the Form 3244, Payment Posting Voucher, for the amount and application of the payment and enter the amount in the "Deposit 4710/3244 Amt. " column.


If the offer has one remittance for any combination of the above three payments enter the appropriate amounts in the respective columns and ensure the amounts entered equal the "Check Amount" column.

If the offer is not processable take one of the following actions based on the type of remittance received:

If Not Processable, and… Prepare the offer package to be returned and…
There is an application fee or deposit to be returned to the taxpayer with the Not Processable Return letter Date and sign the Return letter,

Put the offer package and the letter in an addressed envelope to be returned to the taxpayer. Do not seal the envelope.

Close the offer with a disposition code "10" on AOIC.

Note:
This procedure does not apply to Appeals Collection Due Process (CDP) offers.


Annotate the amount of the remittance under the"Return Negotiable " or "Return Non-Negotiable" column, as appropriate, to indicate that the remittance is to be sent back to the taxpayer.

A separate tax payment (e.g., IA or ES payment) was submitted Prepare the Form 3244, Payment Posting Voucher , for the amount and application of the payment,

Enter the amount of the payment in the "Deposit 4710/3244 Amt." column.

One remittance was submitted that combined any tax payment (e.g., IA or ES payment) with an application fee or deposit amount Apply the entire remittance as the tax payment by preparing a Form 3244 and enter that amount in the "Deposit 4710/3244 Amt." column.



Processability determinations must be made for all offers listed on the Form 13479 before returning it to Receipt and Control for processing of the remittances. When all of the determinations have been made and the Form 13479 is complete, send the original with all Forms 2515, 3244, letters, and envelopes to Receipt & Control for processing of the checks. Acknowledgement of the receipt of the Form 13479 must be secured from the Receipt and Control/mail team employee by having them place their initials in the upper right hand corner of the Form 13479.

Personal checks will be stamped non-negotiable and enclosed in the return offer package to the taxpayer.

It is the responsibility of Receipt and Control to return all " negotiable" remittances back to the taxpayer in accordance with Receipt and Control procedures.


5.8.3.6 (09-01-2005)
Dishonored Application Fee Payments
Accounting Branch will hand carry or fax copies of dishonored application fee checks to the Centralized Offer in Compromise (COIC) site that originated the Form 13479, COIC Application Fee Tracking Report . Upon notification of a dishonored application fee payment, the site will determine the current Automated Offer in Compromise (AOIC) offer assignment by querying the offer number annotated on the upper left hand corner of the check. For Appeals Collection Due Process offers, see IRM 5.8.3.6.1(3), below.

Note:
Due to AOIC programming, only the assigned office can gain access to the "Action Cd" field of the "Application Fee" screen to input the dishonored check status.


5.8.3.6.1 (09-01-2005)
Centralized Offer in Compromise Procedures
If the offer is still assigned to a Centralized Offer in Compromise (COIC) site, COIC will immediately cease processing the associated offer, update the Automated Offer in Compromise (AOIC) "Application Fee" screen by entering "I" in the " Action Cd" field and return it to the taxpayer, utilizing letter option "RET-AA" .

If the offer is assigned to an Area office, COIC will telephone the employee assigned the offer (or the manager of the assigned function, if no individual is specified on AOIC) to advise of the dishonored payment. Once contact is made with the assigned area office employee or manager, COIC will fax a copy of the dishonored check to include in the case file and document AOIC to indicate the information was communicated and to whom.

If the case was processed as an Appeals Collection Due Process (CDP) offer, COIC should query the Appeals Centralized Database System (ACDS) to determine which Appeals employee is assigned the case. COIC will telephone the Appeals employee to advise of the dishonored check and fax a copy to include in the Appeals case file. COIC will update the "Appeals Fee Screen" application of AOIC by entering "I" in the "Action Cd" field.

Note:
Appeals Collection due Process (CDP) cases can be identified by the application fee number annotated on the upper left corner of the check.


If notification of the dishonored check occurs after the offer was closed on Automated Offer in Compromise (AOIC), the designated AOIC liaison within the COIC site, will contact the Headquarters AOIC analyst to correct the application fee record of the closed offer.

5.8.3.6.2 (09-01-2005)
Area Office Procedures
Upon notification by the Centralized Offer in Compromise (COIC) site of a dishonored fee payment, the Offer Specialist (OS) (or manager of the assignment function, if the offer is not assigned to an individual) will immediately:

Cease processing of the associated offer.

Update the AOIC Application Fee screen by entering "I" in the "Action Cd" field

Return the offer to the taxpayer utilizing letter option " RET-AA" .


5.8.3.6.3 (09-01-2005)
Notification of Dishonored Application Fee Check After Issuance of the Rejection Letter
If notification of the dishonored OIC application fee check occurred after issuance of a rejection letter, in addition to procedures in IRM 5.8.3.6.1 and 5.8.3.6.2 above, the employee should:

Date the return letter 31 days from the date of the rejection letter.

Include the open paragraph "RET-M" with the following language: "As a result, your request for appeal has been dismissed. "

Note:
This should only be used in those cases where a request for an Appeal was received within the 30-day appeal period.


Close the case on AOIC as a return using the mail date of the return letter and AOIC final disposition code "10."


5.8.3.7 (09-01-2005)
Forms 656 Application Fee Requirements and Perfection
Treasury Regulations §300.3 requires taxpayers to submit one fee for each Form 656, Offer in Compromise, received, if no Form 656–A, Income Certification for Offer in Compromise Application Fee, was submitted.
The table below is intended to assist in identifying a processable offer for application fee purposes and provide guidance to advise the taxpayer when more than one Form 656, application fee, and/or Form 656-A should be submitted. In the following scenarios the status of the taxpayer is not relevant (e.g. married, separated or divorced). The general rule is that there should only be as many Forms 656 as there are entities seeking to compromise. The following scenarios assume all processability criteria (other than for the application fee) are met.

Scenario Procedures
1) Two TPs have joint liabilities only. The TPs jointly submit one Form 656 and one $150 application fee. One offer was submitted therefore one fee is required.
2) Two TPs have joint liabilities only. The TPs submit two Forms 656 but only one $150 application fee without a signed Form 656-A. Two offers were submitted; therefore, two fees are required.
The Process Examiner (PE) must secure a copy of the remittance to make the appropriate determination as indicated below.
If it can be determined which TP paid the application fee (i.e., a personal check drawn on the account of one of the taxpayers), the offer from the TP that paid the fee is processable. The second offer should be returned as not processable because the TP did not submit the required processing fee.

If each TP contributed a portion of the $150 fee (e.g., each submitted a personal check for $75), then neither TP has paid the appropriate fee and both offers should be returned as not processable.

If it cannot be determined which TP paid the application fee treat it as though half were submitted by each individual. Return both offers as not processable, enclose the fee payment with the not processable return letter addressing it to the party with the primary SSN on the liability.

3) Two TPs have separate liabilities only. The TPs submit two Forms 656 but only one $150 application fee without a signed Form 656-A. Same as Scenario 2
4) Two TPs have joint liabilities and one or both of the TPs also have separate liabilities. The TPs submit one Form 656 listing both the joint and separate liabilities and only one $150 application fee without a signed Form 656-A. Although it is the policy of the Service to require separate offers when TPs have both joint and separate liabilities, the offer submitted in this scenario is processable. However, the Service can require the TP to perfect the original offer by submitting a new offer to separate the liabilities. In this instance, the new offer will require a second fee.
When requesting the perfection of an offer that requires the submission of a second offer, send the TPs two Forms 656:
Prepare an "amended/revised" Form 656 by completing items 1 through 5 with the entity and tax liability information of the individual with the primary SSN on the joint liability. Include both joint and separate liabilities in item 5. Note the original offer number on the top of the "Amended/Revised" Form 656.

Prepare a second Form 656 by completing items 1 through 5 with the entity and tax liability information of the individual with the secondary SSN on the joint liability. Include both joint and separate liabilities in item 5. Annotate the top of the Form 656 in red "Related to Offer Number ________" , inserting the number of the original offer. This will help identify that the offer submitted is in response to a perfection request.

Note:
Clerical units should be aware that new offers received in the PO Box designated for response correspondence must keep all correspondence and attachments associated with the offer to assist in the identification of the related offer.


Include Option "Y" in the combo letter:

Include Form 656-A and the a copy of the original Form 656 with the combo letter

If the TPs refuse to perfect the offer, the Service will return the offer without any further consideration.
5) One Form 656 is submitted that includes both corporation or partnership and individual liabilities, but only one $150 application fee without a signed Form 656-A for the individual. Follow the procedures outlined in Scenario 4 above.
6) Two taxpayers have joint liabilities and either or both of the taxpayers also have separate liabilities. The taxpayers submit two Forms 656, listing the joint liability on one and the separate liability on the other, but only one $150 application fee. Since the taxpayers submitted two offers, they require two fees. Only load the joint Form 656, treating it as processable and including the separate liabilities on the MFT screen. Follow procedures in Scenario 4 above.


5.8.3.8 (09-01-2005)
Centralized Offers in Compromise Processability Determinations
Centralized Offer in Compromise (COIC) sites determine offer processability. To accomplish this Process Examiners (PE) must take the following actions:

Check IDRS to determine if the taxpayer is currently in compliance or is in bankruptcy.
• This includes checking all Social Security Numbers (SSN), Employer Identification Numbers (EIN), and Individual Taxpayer Identification Numbers (ITINs) known or found for the taxpayer. At a minimum check the following IDRS command codes: ENMOD, INOLES, CFINK, BMFOLI, SUMRY, IMFOLI. If any data is found, print and include it in the file. Also, research IDRS command codes TXMOD and FFINQ for additional data, but it is not necessary to include printed copies in the file.
• Research the Master File to determine if the taxpayer has any unfiled tax returns. Review the offer package to determine if documentation submitted by the taxpayer or another Service employee indicates that the taxpayer has recently filed or was not required to file any delinquent returns. A delinquency check notification or taxpayer delinquency investigation (TDI) does not have to exist to determine if a taxpayer has unfiled delinquent returns.

Note:
If a delinquent return was recently filed and has not yet posted to IDRS, a copy of the return is sufficient verification of compliance.


Check for any freeze codes such as: -Y, -W, -Z, -A, -V, -L that may require special action. Refer to local guidelines.

Verify that the taxpayer has submitted the appropriate Form 656, Offer in Compromise, Form 433–A, Collection Information Statement for Wage Earners and Self-Employed Individuals , and/or Form 433-B, Collection Information for Businesses.

Verify that the taxpayer has submitted the application fee (or signed Form 656-A, Income Certification for Offer in Compromise Application Fee) for each offer submitted.

During the internal analysis, AOIC should be documented of any findings.


Review Automated Offer in Compromise (AOIC) and the history for any previous offers to determine if the offer was submitted "solely to delay collection." See IRM 5.8.3.19, Offers Submitted Solely to Delay Collection.

5.8.3.9 (09-01-2005)
Not Processable
When returning the offer as not processable, the return letter will specify all reasons for the determination.

If the offer is not processable:

Stamp the Form 656 "RETURN" in red (or circle the date in red if a red ink stamp is not available) and write the date that the offer was determined to be not processable.

Cross out all IRS received dates with a red"X."

Prepare the return letter with all applicable reason code paragraphs.

In addition to identifying all of the reasons for the determination, also address the issue of the combined joint and separate liabilities, if appropriate. For example, individual and corporate or partnership liabilities on one Form 656. In those cases, include Option "Y" in the return letter.

Complete the Form 13479, COIC Application Fee Tracking Report, if applicable.

Update the history specifying the reason(s) for the not processable determination.

Do not sign the Form 656 as pending.

Update AOIC "Proc Cd" field to "N" (not processable).

Managers and journey level Process Examiners (PE) may sign and date the letter and close the case on AOIC.

Send the Form 656, the Return letter, Publication 1 and Publication 594 to the taxpayer along with all other documents originally sent. If a Power of Attorney (POA) is present, send the representative a copy of the letter. If disclosure issues exist, use the appropriate paragraph to indicate this in the return letter, and do not send a copy to the representative.

If a Form 656 was forwarded by a Revenue Officer (RO) and is not processable, the COIC site should also forward the Form 657 and a copy of the " not processable" letter to the approving official of the Form 657.


Caution should be exercised to ensure that no IDRS prints or other internally generated documents are sent to either the taxpayer or the Power of Attorney (POA). All internal documents should be destroyed. Nothing is required to be maintained in local closed files on these cases.

If the offer was originally determined processable and the application fee was deposited, but it was later concluded that this determination was made in error, processing should stop. The case should be closed using not processable procedures defined above. In these cases, it is important to ensure the "N" (not processable) is input on AOIC to reverse the Transaction Code (TC) 480(s). This will result in the generation of a TC 483 posting to the appropriate modules, and a refund of the $150 application fee.

5.8.3.10 (09-01-2005)
Processable
An offer is considered pending when a delegated IRS official signs and dates the Form 656, Offer in Compromise, in the appropriate section. This date is the official offer pending date.

Note:
The pending date entered on AOIC must match the date the delegated official signed the Form 656. This date must also match the Transaction Code (TC) 480 date when it posts to IDRS.


If the offer is processable:

Sign and date the waiver on Form 656 (item 11).

Change the "Proc Cd" to a "Y" (processable).

Complete the AOIC Application Fee Screen.

Complete the MFT and "Terms" screen on AOIC.

Note:
If tax periods are in status 60, 61, or 53 (except for those status 53 modules with Closing Code "03" [unable to locate] or Closing Code "12" [unable to contact]) remove the "Y" on each tax period on the MFT screen. DO NOT change the status of those accounts, unless the taxpayer has defaulted the installment agreement.


On all IMF cases enter "P" if the offer is for the primary taxpayer or the controlling taxpayer identification number (TIN) on the entity, enter"S" if the offer is for the secondary taxpayer , or enter "B" if both husband and wife are making a joint offer.

Note:
If only one party of a joint liability is submitting the offer, remove the "Y" from the MFT screen. This will take the case out of Status 71.



Communication with the taxpayer and/or authorized representative may be necessary to perfect the offer while it is pending. This communication may be completed by letter or personal contact.

If processable and… Then…
The offer requires perfection due to an insufficient number of Forms 656 and application fees Except for examples in IRM 5.8.3.7, Form 656 Application Fee Requirements and Perfection, send the combo letter to request the following information:
Correct number of Forms 656 and fees (Option "Y" perfection),

Any required financial substantiation,

Any additional Form 656 perfection, including incorrect or old Form(s).

Assign to "5100"

The offer does not need Option "Y" perfection and falls into the category for direct field transfer. See IRM 5.8.2.2, Initial Receipt of Offers. Reassign on AOIC to the appropriate area office.
The offer does not need Option "Y" perfection and qualifies under the " Screen For Obvious Full Pay" procedures. See IRM 5.8.3.12, Screen for Obvious Full Pay. Process under "Screen For Obvious Full Pay" Procedures.
The offer does not need Option "Y" perfection and does not qualify under "Screen For Obvious Full Pay" procedures, but all required financial substantiation is not attached or needs Form 656 perfection before beginning the investigation. Assign to "5100"

Send the combo letter to address all perfection issues and request the required substantiation, including incorrect or old form(s).

The offer does not need Option "Y" perfection and does not qualify under "Screen For Obvious Full Pay" procedures and has attached all required substantiation except for proof of payment of certain expenses; such as, current real estate, or motor vehicle loan balances. Send the combo letter to request substantiation and Form 656 perfection, if appropriate, including incorrect or old Form(s).

Check internal verification sources,

Assign the case to"5300" .

Note:
If the taxpayer has provided a substantial amount of the information and a determination can be made, assign the case to 6000.


The offer does not need Option "Y" perfection and does not qualify under "Screen For Obvious Full Pay" procedures and is a total submission. Send the combo letter, Option "A."

Check internal verification sources.

Assign to "6000."



If an offer was submitted by an Revenue Officer (RO) and it is processable, but the RO has determined that the offer was submitted "solely to delay collection" , the COIC site will contact the originating RO to advise that the return letter has been issued. Unless a jeopardy situation exists, the RO must wait for COIC notification that the return letter has been issued before taking any collection enforcement action. See IRM 5.8.3.19, Offers Submitted Solely to Delay Collection, for delegated approval authority.

COIC will request Transaction Code (TC) 480 and Status 71 through the AOIC system. However, there may be situations when the Status 71 will not generate (e.g. MFT 31 modules created prior to January 2005, imminent statute, etc.). In those cases, the field Offer Specialist may request input of the TC 470 with Closing Code (CC) 90 to suspend collection activity.

5.8.3.10.1 (09-01-2005)
Erroneous Processability Determinations
The Service only collects the application fee for processable offers; therefore, fees associated with offers that are initially deemed processable but subsequently determined to be not processable must be returned to the taxpayer.

When an erroneous processability determination is corrected prior to forwarding the related application fee for deposit and it is still in the custody of Receipt and Control or the mail team, the COIC sites should follow campus procedures designed to include the remittance in the not processable return letter and to correct the AOIC fee screen record.

5.8.3.10.2 (09-01-2005)
"Application Fee Refund/Apply Listing" Validation
When an erroneous processability determination is corrected after forwarding the related application fee remittance for deposit, the COIC sites will need to determine whether the remittance has been deposited. An " Application Fee Refund/Apply Listing" should be generated from AOIC to identify application fees that were initially determined to be processable, but later determined to be not processable. Generation of this listing is required in order for the COIC site to verify and authorize a manual refund.


Note:
The COIC sites should request the Monitoring Offer in Compromise (MOIC) function to generate the "Application Fee Refund/Apply Listing" on a monthly basis.


Generally, when an offer is deemed "not processable" , the Service includes the taxpayers remittance with the return disposition letter. However, depending on the elapsed time between inputting a processability change on AOIC from a "YES" to a "NO" , the Service may have already deposited the related application fee.

To determine whether or not manual refunds of the application fee should be issued, research the completed Form 13479, COIC Application Fee Tracking Report, for those offers to determine whether the application fee was deposited by the Service or returned to the taxpayer.

Caution:
Thorough research and care is required when determining which offers on the "Application Fee Refund/Apply Listing" should receive manual refunds.


If… Then…
Research indicated that the application fee was returned to the taxpayer(s) The designated COIC site AOIC liaison should contact the Headquarters AOIC analyst to make the necessary adjustment to the application fee information to remove it from the "Refund/Apply Listing" . This action will eliminate the potential for the taxpayer to receive an erroneous refund.
Research indicated that the application fee was deposited Contact the Monitoring OIC (MOIC) function co-located with the COIC site and request a manual refund be generated to the taxpayer(s).


To request the Monitoring OIC (MOIC) function to issue manual refunds, the COIC sites must prepare a memorandum that includes:

The offer number

The taxpayer(s) name

The taxpayer(s) identification number (TIN)


Records that support the COIC sites decision to either remove the offer record from the "Refund/Apply Listing" or to issue a manual refund must be retained for one year. At a minimum, the file should consist of:

Copies of the "Refund/Apply Listing" .

Copies of the Form 13479, COIC Application Fee Tracking Report.

Any other supporting documentation necessary to support the decision; including, but not limited to the Remittance Processing System daily remittance register.


5.8.3.11 (09-01-2005)
Types of Perfection
Certain perfection errors must be corrected before beginning the offer investigation. The combo letter on the Automated Offer in Compromise (AOIC) system is designed to communicate with the taxpayer and their representative to request the necessary corrective action. If there is no response to the request letter, return the offer to the taxpayer as not perfected. A return for failure to perfect an offer does not require a Form 1271, Rejection or Withdrawal Memorandum. The taxpayer has no appeal rights when the offer is closed as a return. The following errors must be corrected before beginning the investigation:

The taxpayers name, physical address or taxpayer identification number (TIN) is missing or incorrect and cannot be determined from IDRS or other documents submitted with the offer.

The offered amount is blank or zero.

No tax liability has been assessed or pending and the amount(s) can not be determined.

Insufficient number of Forms 656 and application fees submitted.


When sending a combo letter to perfect the errors listed in (1) above or to request financial substantiation, also include a request to correct the following errors.

Note:
If acceptance of the offer is considered and a combo letter was not sent but the errors listed below exist, they must be corrected prior to the recommendation to accept the offer.


The offer was submitted on an obsolete Form 656.

The Form 656 is not a verbatim duplicate. Such as, preprinted terms of the Form 656 are altered, deleted or missing.

An amount of money is offered, but the payment terms are not specified.

The taxpayer(s) signature is missing on Form 656.

Form 433–A and/or 433–B is incomplete.

The taxpayer has included a period(s) for which no amount is due.


If a period with an amount due is missing from the Form 656, but all periods due can be determined from IDRS or other documents submitted with the offer, add the missing period(s) to the AOIC MFT screen. Do not add the missing period(s) to the Form 656 unless contact is made with the taxpayer.

When a taxpayer has included a period(s) for which there is no apparent amount due, do not add the period(s) to AOIC. Contact the taxpayer to determine if any issues are pending that may result in additional tax. If there is no tax due after contact with the taxpayer, document the history and do not add the period(s).

Note:
Contact may be made by telephone or by sending the AOIC combo letter requesting the inclusion of the missing period(s) or the deletion of the no tax due period(s) on the amended Form 656. If the taxpayer agrees to the addition of the missing period(s) or the deletion of the no tax due period(s), the history must document the method of agreement by the taxpayer.


If the taxpayers name, physical address, or TIN is missing or incorrect and the correct information can be located on IDRS or other documents submitted with the offer, input the correct information on AOIC.

If the basis for compromise is not indicated, but it can be determined by reviewing the package, begin the investigation.

Note:
The offer cannot be accepted unless an amended Form 656 is signed, correcting all errors listed in (1) and (2) above.


5.8.3.12 (09-01-2005)
Screen For Obvious Full Pay Processing
Taxpayers may submit an offer to compromise the liabilities based on Doubt as to Collectibility (DATC), yet indicate on their application an ability to pay the account in full. These cases, once determined to be processable, will be screened out. Absent any special circumstances they will be rejected with no further investigation or verification. The taxpayer will be directed toward the appropriate resolution for the delinquency. The rejection letter will be the first communication with the taxpayer. A decision to reject with appeals rights is adequately justified by the taxpayers self-disclosed ability to pay in full.

For processable offers one of the first considerations is to determine if the taxpayer can pay in full. The following initial review should be conducted by the Centralized Offer in Compromise (COIC) site on all processable offers to make that determination.

Complete the Full Pay worksheet using the taxpayers figures only, as reflected on the CIS.

Do not adjust any asset values or apply necessary expense standards.

If the amount shown by the taxpayer on the CIS reflect that the taxpayer can fully pay the tax due via either liquidation of assets or on an installment agreement, assign the offer to AOIC designation "6900."

Note:
If special circumstances or Effective Tax Administration (ETA) conditions are presented by the taxpayer, assign the case to an Offer Examiner (OE) for further evaluation and consideration.



5.8.3.13 (09-01-2005)
Centralized Offer in Compromise Case Building and Perfection Procedures
For all processable offers not directly transferred to an Area office or for those qualifying under the "Screen for Obvious Full Pay " procedures, the Collection Information Statement (CIS) should be reviewed to verify the taxpayer has submitted all supporting documents.

Prepare the combo letter using the paragraphs that address the missing substantiation or incomplete documents as well as any Form 656 perfection issues. Include Publications 1 and 594. Document the AOIC history to summarize the required substantiation submitted with the offer as well as all perfection issues.

A copy of the signed and dated letter must be retained in the file.

Note:
All combo letters will be postdated five (5) calendar days. Schedule follow up for the 45th day after the date of the letter. Thus, at least 50 calendar days (5 postdate plus 45 calendar days from the date of the letter) would have elapsed before following up.


Mail the letter to the taxpayer and representative, if applicable. If a disclosure issue exists, use the appropriate paragraph to indicate this in the combo letter, and do not send a copy to the representative.

Envelopes containing combo letters including Options "B " , "C" , or "D" must be stamped or otherwise marked "URGENT - TIME SENSITIVE" and include Notice 1326, Offer in Compromise (OIC) Applicant ALERT.

Document the mailing date of the letter and a follow up date on AOIC.

Assign the offer to AOIC designation "5100" or "5300" , as identified in IRM 5.8.3.10(3) above.


An analysis of the information provided on the Collection Information Statement (CIS) or any other documentation received should be made prior to issuing a document request or combo letter.

Note:
The letter(s) should only request information necessary to make a reasonable collection decision.


The following information is considered to be necessary to allow the Offer Examiner (OE) the ability to make a determination. If the following expenses were claimed on the CIS but substantiation was not included, supporting documentation should be requested.

Income statements for the last three months (a current year-to-date statement is acceptable as long as it represents at least three months).

For those taxpayers on Social Security or a fixed pension or retirement where the monthly income does not fluctuate, it may only be necessary to secure one monthly statement to verify the amount of income. In those cases, verification of income may be available through secured bank statements.

Note:
If applicable, substantiation for three months of income statements for any not liable person should also be requested in order to determine taxpayers share of living expenses. See IRM 5.8.5.5.4, Shared Expenses, for additional information on the treatment of shared expenses.


Bank statements for the last three months.

The current available cash value or loan value of 401(k), profit sharing or other retirement plans, and the current balance due on any existing loans against that plan. See IRM 5.8.5.3.8, Retirement or Profit Sharing Plans, for more information on valuing a Retirement or Profit Sharing plan.


Substantiation should also be requested for the following information; however, if the taxpayer fails to provide the supporting documentation, the expense should be disallowed and a determination made based on all other information. The following list is not all-inclusive. See IRM5.8.3.16, Analyzing Taxpayer Responses to Combo Letter.

Health insurance and out of pocket cost for the last three months (refer to LEM 5.3)

Current balance due on motor vehicle loans.

Court orders and proof of payment for the last three months.

Note:
Court orders will only be required if the payment is to be allowed in the computation of the Reasonable Collection Potential (RCP).


Current balance due on real estate mortgages

Child and dependent care for the last three months.

Other secured debt statements for the last three months.

Life insurance premiums for the last three months.


5.8.3.14 (09-01-2005)
Centralized Offer in Compromise Internal Verification Research
Prior to assigning the offer for investigation internal sources must be searched.

Conduct research using IDRS, the electronic locator source, state motor vehicle records, and in-house real property valuation sources, to verify claimed amounts and to identify undisclosed assets or sources of income.

Generally it will only be necessary to secure motor vehicle valuations from a trade association guide on vehicle(s) that are three years old or newer and have no lien

Example:
When considering an offer in the year 2004, a 2001 model is considered to be three years old or newer


5.8.3.15 (09-01-2005)
Processing Taxpayer Responses to Combo Letters
Update the Automated Offer in Compromise (AOIC) history to annotate the information and/or documents received and sign any amended or revised Forms 656 with the current date. Retain the original Form 656 and any amended Forms 656 in the file.

If the determination is made to return the offer for failure to provide the requested information, use the appropriate paragraph(s) in the AOIC return letter.

Retain the original Form 656, any amended Forms 656, and a copy of the return letter in the file.

Cross out all IRS received dates with a red"X" . Stamp the Form 656 with "RETURN" , in red, and add the current date.

Update the case history on AOIC including the reason for the return. Include a copy of the history in the file and give the file to the manager for approval.


If… Then…
The offer is assigned to "5100 " , no taxpayer response is received and the follow-up date passes Invoke the "No Reply" procedures.
The offer is assigned to "5100 " and the taxpayer responds Associate the mail and assign to " 5500" .
Note:
However, if the taxpayer has substantially replied to the request, but has not provided all the information the case should be assigned to an OE for review. The OE should review the reply to determine if the information provided is sufficient to make a decision. If not, the OE should attempt one phone call to secure the missing information before returning the offer as a"No Reply" .

The offer is assigned to "5300 " and the taxpayer has provided sufficient information to make a determination Assign to "6000" .


Process Examiners (PE) are required to initiate the next appropriate action on cases where taxpayers have responded to the combo letter within 10 calendar days from the date the offer is assigned to the PE.

If the taxpayer or their representative requests an extension of time to comply with the request for information, a reasonable amount of time should be granted. Document the Automated Offer in Compromise (AOIC) history indicating the new deadline for the response. If the taxpayer and/or their representative fails to meet the additional deadline, initiate the procedures as defined in IRM 5.8.3.17, "No Reply" Procedures .

5.8.3.16 (09-01-2005)
Analyzing Taxpayer Responses to Combo Letter
The failure to provide proof of payment of any Collection Information Statement (CIS) claimed monthly expense amounts for health care expenses, court orders/court ordered payments, child/dependent care, life insurance, other secured debt, other expenses, or the failure to submit current loan balance statements for real estate mortgages, or current loan balance statements for motor vehicles will by itself not be sufficient reason to return an offer.

If a court ordered payment is to be acknowledged as an expense, a copy of the court order must be secured to determine the number of months to allow for the remainder of the payments. If the court ordered payment is not to be allowed, a copy of the court order will not be required.

Process Examiner's (PE) will determine if the taxpayers response or original submission statements and/or documents addressed all requested items even when it may not have specifically included the information sought by the combo letter. The failure to provide the desired information/documents will by itself not be sufficient reason to return an offer, as long as the taxpayer addressed the particular information/document requested.

Note:
If the taxpayer has substantially replied to the request, but has not provided all the information requested, the case should be assigned to an Offer Examiner (OE) for further review and evaluation on whether a reasonable collection potential (RCP) can be calculated. The OE should attempt one phone call to secure the missing information before returning the offer as a "No Reply"


Below are some examples of when a taxpayer may address, while not actually providing the requested substantiation, may include but are not limited to the following:

Bank statements are provided , but not all pages were included or only two months were sent instead of three.

Wage statements are provided, but not all pages were included or only two months were sent instead of three.

The taxpayer indicates an inability to provide a particular requested document (e.g., court order or judgment, annual statement of Social Security annuity amount).

The taxpayer indicates that they did not understand the request or that all requested documentation is attached.

The taxpayer indicates that a non-liable person(s) has no income or refuses to provide the substantiation.


Offers for which the Process Examiner (PE) determined the taxpayer has substantially replied and/or adequately addressed the requested information and/or documents (even if they did not specifically include them in the response), or where they failed to substantiate certain claimed monthly expenses or loan balances, will be assigned to an Offer Examiner (OE) for further consideration.

If the Offer Examiner (OE) determines that the RCP calculation cannot be completed because of the missing information and/or documents, the OE will attempt to telephone the taxpayer (or representative, if applicable) to secure any needed substantiation, explaining the information is needed in order to conduct the offer investigation. If unable to contact the taxpayer by telephone after one attempt or if the taxpayer/representative is unable to provide the substantiation to the OE within five (5) calendar days (fax transmission is preferable), document the AOIC history and return the offer for failure to provide necessary information.

If any of the necessary Form 656 perfection errors identified in IRM 5.8.3.11(1) above were not corrected, the offer will be returned. The following conditions assume that the response corrected any perfection errors on the Form 656.

If the offer is assigned to "5500 " and… Then…
The response included all required financial substantiation. Check internal verification sources.

Assign to "6000"

The response included all requested financial information/substantiation except proof of payment of mortgage/motor vehicle loan balance, court order, or court ordered payments. Check internal verification sources.

Assign to"6000"

The taxpayer substantially replied or addressed the requested items Assign to an Offer Examiner (OE) to determine if the information is sufficient to make an RCP calculation.
The response neither included nor addressed requested income or bank statements, non-liable person, or 401(k) information. Return the offer.


5.8.3.17 (09-01-2005)
"No Reply" Procedures
After the offer is determined processable and the combo letter has been sent, the offer should be held for the required number of days to allow the taxpayer to provide the requested information. If after the designated time period has passed and the COIC site has not received a response, an automated return process will be completed. The AOIC system will generate all the necessary letters and documents to close the case. Before closing the offer the employee must check AOIC to verify that no response was received.

Note:
Processable returns for "No Reply" will not be made by the Process Examiner (PE) unless the taxpayer did not submit any requested documentation and the taxpayer did not provide substantive information with the original submission. Those cases where the PE determined that the taxpayer substantially provided the information will be assigned to an Offer Examiner for a determination whether the response was sufficient to make a determination or to return the offer.


Offers for which the Process Examiner (PE) determined the taxpayer has substantially replied and/or adequately addressed the requested information and/or documents (even if they did not specifically include them in the response), or where they failed to substantiate certain claimed monthly expenses or loan balances, will be assigned to an Offer Examiner (OE) for further consideration. The PE will not implement the "No Reply" procedures.

If the taxpayer or their representative requests an extension of time to comply with the request for information, a reasonable amount of time should be granted. Document the Automated Offer in Compromise (AOIC) history indicating the new deadline for the response. If the taxpayer and/or their representative fails to meet the additional deadline, initiate the "No Reply " procedures as defined above.

5.8.3.18 (09-01-2005)
Withholding Collection
Installment agreements remain in effect while the offer is pending.

For offers submitted after December 31, 1999, collection by levy on property owned by the offer taxpayer is prohibited while the offer is pending unless collection is in jeopardy.

The term "jeopardy" has the same definition described in IRM 5.11.3, Initial Processing of Effective Tax Administration Offers, and Policy Statement P-4-88. Collection is not considered to be in jeopardy because an undisclosed asset was discovered during the investigation.

Upon receiving information that a jeopardy levy has been approved, contact the employee issuing the levy and if it is agreed that the offer was filed to hinder or delay collection follow procedures in IRM 5.8.3.19, Offers Submitted Solely to Delay Collection, below to return the offer.

The prohibition on levy does not require release of a levy that was served prior to the offer submission. However, the taxpayers circumstances should be considered when making a determination to release a levy or keep it in place while the offer is pending.

The prohibition on levy while an offer is pending does not extend to filing notices of federal tax lien. See IRM 5.8.4.9, Notice of Federal Tax Lien Filing, for a discussion of filing notice of federal tax lien while an offer is pending.

5.8.3.19 (09-01-2005)
Offers Submitted Solely to Delay Collection
When it is determined that an offer is submitted "solely to delay collection" , the offer can be returned to the taxpayer without further consideration.

Note:
The term "solely to delay collection " means an offer that was submitted for the sole purpose of avoiding or delaying collection activity. See IRM 5.8.3.19.1, Solely to Delay Collection Determinations, below.

.

The Field OIC group manager and the Unit Manager at the COIC site, have delegated authority to approve returns based on "solely to delay collection" .

An offer is not considered submitted "solely to delay collection" just because there is an imminent CSED issue or if an offer has been investigated and rejected and the taxpayer exercises appeal rights.

5.8.3.19.1 (09-01-2005)
Solely to Delay Collection Determinations
When a taxpayer resubmits an offer that is not"materially" different from a previous offer that was considered and either rejected with appeal rights or returned, the offer may be returned as "solely to delay collection" .

Example:
The taxpayer fails to address the issues or defects of the previously submitted offer.


The offer may be considered as "materially" different when:

The amount reflected on the re-submission is substantially similar to, less than, or the same as the prior offer and the following exists:
1) The taxpayers financial situation has changed.

Note:
A change in the taxpayers financial situation may include:
•A change in employment and/or income,
•A change in marital status effecting future ability to pay or ownership of assets,
•The loss of an asset that was included in the original offer investigation,
•A change in circumstances that would affect allowable expenses and future ability to pay.



2) The taxpayer has raised special circumstances that were not considered during the prior offer investigation.


When the Service has accepted an offer in compromise and the taxpayer subsequently defaults on the offer agreement and then files a new offer within one year of the default, the offer may be returned as "solely to delay collection" unless the new offer indicates any of the following:

The current offer submission reflects special circumstances

The re-submission is materially different from the prior accepted and defaulted offer.


Although no provisions are provided for any formal appeal of a decision to return an offer submitted "solely to delay collection" , all employees must honor any taxpayers request to review this decision with their immediate manager.

In some situations it may be determined that an offer is submitted as "solely to delay collection" when no prior offer has been submitted. When a collection employee has determined that the next action necessary is to enforce collection through levy or seizure, but the taxpayer files an offer to delay this enforcement action the offer may be returned as " solely to delay collection" .

5.8.3.19.2 (09-01-2005)
Examples and Discussion
The following are examples of offers considered submitted " solely to delay collection" based on re-submission after a prior rejection or return:

Example:
During initial processing of an offer, it is discovered on AOIC that the taxpayer had a previous offer returned. This offer was closed six months ago as part of the "No Reply " process. The AOIC case history indicated that the taxpayer did not provide any bank statements with the first offer and did not respond to the combo letter sent. No bank statements were provided with the new offer submission. No special circumstances were indicated.


Example:
A taxpayer resubmits an offer that was rejected because the amount offered was $10,000 below the reasonable collection potential (RCP). The original amount offered was $10,000. The current amount offered is $10,100. There is no change in financial condition and no special circumstances were indicated.


Example:
A taxpayer submits an offer for $3,000 to be paid within 90 days of acceptance. A prior offer was submitted for $10,000 to be paid within 90 days. The investigation of the initial offer submission resulted in the offer being rejected with appeal rights. During that offer investigation it was determined that a piece of property was transferred to a non-liable spouse for no consideration and that a clear transferee issue exists. The value placed on the transferred property was $30,000, and was included in the reasonable collection potential (RCP). The taxpayer failed to request a timely appeal on the rejected offer. There were no special circumstances indicated.


Example:
During initial processing of an offer in compromise, AOIC indicates there have been three offers submitted by the taxpayer over the past 18 months. All three were returned for failure to provide requested CIS information. The closed return file indicates the taxpayer was asked to provide a financial statement for a closely held corporation, which the taxpayer holds 75% interest in and is the corporate president. A Form 433-B for this corporation was requested during the offer investigation. The offer specialist clearly documented in the file the taxpayers interest and position in this corporation. The request was clear and specific and the taxpayer refused to provide this information claiming the IRS has no right to place a value on the corporation when determining his ability to pay on personal tax liabilities. The newly submitted offer package does not include a Form 433-B for the corporation and the Form 433-A indicates the same corporation is the taxpayers current employer.


Example:
An offer is submitted for $30,000 payable within 90 days of acceptance. Research on AOIC indicates this the second offer submitted by the taxpayer. A prior offer was submitted for $20,000 payable within 90 days of acceptance. The original offer was rejected with appeal rights, the taxpayer filed a timely appeal, and Appeals sustained the rejection. A review of the prior offer file indicates the taxpayer has the ability to full pay the outstanding liability through an installment agreement. The total liability is for $40,000. A review of the financial information indicates the taxpayer still has the ability to full pay the liability. The original offer was received 18 months ago and no payments have been made during this period. There is no change indicated on the financial statement, except the taxpayer has a new employer. The taxpayers income remained the same. There are no special circumstances indicated.


Example:
A taxpayer filed an offer in January 2005. The offer was returned after the Offer Examiner requested that the taxpayer make estimated tax payments for the tax year 2004. The taxpayer failed to comply and therefore the offer was returned for noncompliance. In June 2005 the taxpayer submitted a second offer, which included the 2004 liability. Because the taxpayer failed to make the required estimated payments for 2004 and did not correct the defect by paying the full liability with the filing of the return, the offer should be returned. No special circumstances were indicated.




The following are examples of offers considered "solely to delay collection" based on re-submission after a prior default within the past year:

Example:
The taxpayer had an offer accepted 18 months ago for $20,000 to be paid within 90 days of acceptance. The taxpayer paid $5,000 within 120 days of acceptance and failed to pay the balance of offer funds. The offer was defaulted for failure to meet the terms of the offer. A new offer is now submitted for $10,000 to be paid within 90 days of acceptance. Financial statements submitted with the new offer show no decrease in ability to pay and special circumstances were not cited and/or evident.


Example:
The taxpayer had an offer accepted for $10,000 paid within 90 days of acceptance. Subsequent to the acceptance the taxpayer incurred 2 additional years of income tax liabilities. The offer was defaulted because the taxpayer did not resolve the two additional liabilities. A new offer has been submitted for $5,000, that includes the prior offer periods and the two new periods. There are no special circumstances.


The following are examples of offers considered "solely to delay collection" based on a prior collection analysis and determination of ability to pay:

Example:
Taxpayer owes $500,000. An offer is submitted for $15,000. The Collection Information Statement (CIS), as submitted by the taxpayer, indicates the taxpayer has recently been fired from his job where he had been earning $200,000 a year. The CIS also reflects a personal residence with a Fair Market Value (FMV) of $1.5 million and outstanding mortgage of $750,000 leaving equity of $750,000; a piece of property owned free and clear valued at $60,000, a large boat with a value of $140,000 which is unencumbered. Final demand has been made and a collection employee has indicated to the taxpayer that a Notice of Federal Tax Lien (NFTL) will be filed and possible enforcement action if the taxpayer does not full pay the liability. The investigation has shown that there are no special circumstances to be considered.


Example:
Taxpayers owe a joint 1040 liability for 1997 of $139,854 and submitted an offer for $250. Both taxpayers are self-employed: The husband is a painter and the wife is a real estate sales person. They have no future income potential. They own an unimproved lot valued at $14,700, a personal residence valued at $177,500, six automobiles and two horse trailers valued at $20,775. Their total reasonable collection potential (RCP) is $127,191 based on the equity in the assets. The balance due period was in active collection inventory prior to the offer submission. The collection employee advised the taxpayer to secure a loan on their equity or levy action would be initiated. The taxpayer refused to pay more than the proposed $250 and submitted the offer instead of making any payment to their tax liability. The investigation has shown that there are no special circumstances to be considered.


Example:
Taxpayer owes $32,000 and submits an offer for $100. The reasonable collection potential (RCP) is based on an ability to pay $400 per month. The earliest CSED's will expire within 5 months of the receipt of the offer , which is where the majority of the liability is assessed. The taxpayer has been advised of the CIS analysis and monthly ability to pay, but submitted an offer for $100. The reason given was that he wanted the tax liability "forgiven" and all he wants to pay is the $100 offer amount. No special circumstances were indicated.


5.8.3.19.3 (09-01-2005)
Procedures for Return of Offers Submitted Solely to Delay Collection
The determination that an offer was submitted "solely to delay collection" may be made immediately after the offer is deemed processable or at any time during the offer investigation when the facts support the decision.

The determination that an offer was submitted after a prior reject or default can be supported by reviewing records on AOIC and IDRS transactions:

If… Then…
AOIC indicates that prior offer records exist Determine the type of disposition used to close the prior offer submissions.
AOIC indicates the prior offer submission was rejected with appeal rights The re-submission requires review to determine if it was submitted "solely to delay collection" .
AOIC indicates the prior offer record was accepted Review the AOIC history screen and IDRS transactions to determine if the prior offer was defaulted within the past year.
The prior offer was defaulted within the past year The re-submission requires review to determine if it was submitted "solely to delay collection" .


To determine if the re-submission is materially different from the prior rejected or defaulted offer:

Request the prior closed offer file, if available, from the appropriate office. Previously rejected closed offer files are located in the office that concluded the offer. Previously defaulted offer files are maintained in the Campus OIC Unit servicing the office that closed the offer.

Note:
The Centralized Offer in Compromise (COIC) Examiners will not be required to secure and review closed files as long as there is sufficient information in the AOIC/ICS history to establish that an offer is a re-submission "solely to delay collection" .



Compare the information contained in the original offer file with the resubmitted offer package to determine if the offer was submitted " solely to delay collection" .


When an Offer Specialist (OS) identifies that an offer was submitted "solely to delay collection" , Form 657, Revenue Officer Report, must be completed and submitted to the group manager for approval. If the group manager concurs, the case will be closed immediately as a return. A copy of the Form 657 should be forwarded to the appropriate revenue officer group manager to explain why the offer was not investigated and to refer the balance due accounts for appropriate collection activity.

Note:
Coordination should occur to ensure no levy is issued until after the return letter is sent.


Centralized Offers in Compromise (COIC) Examiners will not be required to complete a Form 657, but will be required to document the AOIC history that the offer was determined to be a re-submission solely to delay collection. If the COIC Unit manager concurs, the offer will be closed immediately as a return.

When revenue officers (RO) determine an offer is submitted " solely to delay collection" , they will complete a Form 657, Revenue Officer Report, and submit it to their group manager for approval. If the revenue officer group manager concurs, the Form 657 will be forwarded to the offer group manager or the COIC manager. If the offer group or COIC manager concurs, the offer will be closed as a return.

Note:
Coordination should occur to ensure no levy is issued until after the return letter is sent.


If an offer was forwarded by a Revenue Officer (RO) and the Centralized Offers in Compromise (COIC) unit deems it to be processable, but the RO has determined that the offer was submitted to "solely delay collection " , the case must include the Form 657, Revenue Officer Report, detailing the reason(s) supporting the decision and approved by the field manager.

If the COIC unit manager agrees with the determination, the COIC employee will contact the originating RO to advise that the return letter has been issued.


If the COIC manager disagrees with the determination, discussions should be initiated with the field manager to reach an agreeable solution.


When the investigating employee determines an offer was submitted "solely to delay collection" , regardless of the status of the balance due periods prior to the offer submission, the periods should be placed into the appropriate collection status to ensure that necessary collection actions are initiated. If the accounts were in Status 26 prior to the offer submission, the case should be reassigned to the field. If the balance due periods were not in Status 26 prior to the offer submission, discuss the case with the field group manager to determine if assignment to the field is appropriate. If the field group manager does not assign the case into inventory, the periods should be placed into ACS status.

Note:
These accounts should not be allowed to systemically proceed to notice status.


The Form 657, Revenue Officer Report, serves to establish coordination between the field group, the offer group, and the Centralized Offers in Compromise (COIC) site to provide case documentation regarding these determinations, and to ensure collection action is not pursued until the return is approved.




Labels:

Friday, August 8, 2008

The criteria set forth for the issuance of summonses for the issuance of a valid summons, are as follows: (1) the summons must be issued for a proper purpose, (2) the information sought must be relevant to that purpose, (3) the information must not be in the possession of the IRS and (4) that the administrative steps required by law regarding the summons and the issuance and the service of the summons must have been followed.




Clearwater Consulting Concepts, LLLP, Petitioner v. The United States of America, Respondent. CCC Holdings, LLC, Petitioner v. United States of America, Respondent.

U.S. District Court, Virgin Islands Div., of St. Thomas and St. John; Civ.. 2007-33, Civ. 2007-34, July 22, 2008.

[ Code Secs. 7602 and 7609]



MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER


BARNARD, U.S. Magistrate Judge: This matter came before the Honorable Geoffrey W. Barnard, United States Magistrate Judge, on January 10, 2008 for oral argument on the Petitioners', Clearwater Consulting Concepts, LLLP ("Clearwater") and CCC Holdings, LLC ("CCC Holdings"), (collectively "Petitioners") Motions to Quash the Internal Revenue Service's ("IRS") third-party summonses served on FirstBank Virgin Islands ("FirstBank"). 1 At the hearing, the Petitioners were represented by Ian M. Comisky, Esq., Henry L. Feuerzeig, Esq. and Daniel L. Stackhouse, Esq. The United States of America was represented by Assistant United States Attorneys Timothy Abraham, Esq. and Thomas J. Jaworski, Esq.

At the hearing, the Petitioners called two witnesses, William L. Blum, Esq. and Theodore C. Skokos, Jr., Tax Matters Partner for Clearwater and manager of CCC Holdings. Attorney Blum testified regarding his understanding and opinion of the Virgin Islands "mirror system" of taxation and whether the Petitioners were required to dual-file Form 1065 partnership returns with the Internal Revenue Service and the Virgin Islands Bureau of Internal Revenue. Mr. Skokos testified regarding the nature of the relationship between the Petitioners and FirstBank after the summonses were issued and the types of documents that were produced to the IRS.




RELEVANT FACTS


Clearwater is a limited liability partnership created in the Virgin Islands on July 23, 2002. It offers business and management consulting and financial services in the Virgin Islands to clients worldwide. Clearwater was granted tax benefits under the Virgin Islands Economic Development Commission's Economic Development Program ("EDC Program") in December 2002. CCC Holdings is a limited liability company created in the Virgin Islands on July 23, 2002 and is a general partner of Clearwater. 2 Petitioners claim that in error they filed their 2002 partnership tax returns with the IRS, instead of the Virgin Islands Bureau of Internal Revenue ("BIR"). However, they corrected that error and at a later time, filed the returns with the BIR. Petitioners further state that they filed their 2003 and 2004 taxes with the BIR.

On November 13, 2005, the IRS issued to Clearwater a Notice of Examination and Information Document Request ("IDR")for tax year 2002. On February 6, 2006, the IRS issued Clearwater a Notice of Beginning of Administrative Proceeding for the 2002 tax year and on February 24, 2006, the IRS issued a summons to Clearwater requesting certain documents relating to tax year 2002. On August 1, 2006, the IRS notified Clearwater that it had been selected for an inquiry to determine its possible filing requirements with the United States for tax years 2003 and 2004 and also served Clearwater with an IDR for tax years 2003 and 2004. Finally, also on August 1, 2006, the IRS notified CCC Holdings that it had been selected for an audit for tax year 2002 and enclosed with the notice was an IDR for tax year 2002. On the same day, August 1, 2006, CCC Holdings was also notified that it had been selected for an inquiry for tax years 2003 and 2004 and the IRS also served an IDR for records for those tax years. (Petitioner's Omnibus Memorandum of Law in Support of Petitions to Quash Third-Party Summonses Directed to FirstBank, page 5). ("Petitioner's Omnibus Memorandum")

Petitioners contend that they cooperated fully with the IRS in its investigations. Petitioners further contend that nonetheless, on February 1, 2007, the IRS sent Clearwater and CCC Holdings a notice of and a copy of summonses served on FirstBank dated January 29, 2007. (Petitioner's Omnibus Memorandum, page 6). On February 20, 2007, Petitioners filed these Petitions to Quash the IRS third-party summonses on FirstBank alleging that the summonses were not issued in accordance with the criteria set forth in Powell v. United States, 379 U.S. 48(1964). The Petitioners allege that the summonses do not meet any of the requirements of Powell and must be quashed for the following reasons: (1)the IRS is illegitimately using the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982,("TERFA"), Internal Revenue Code §§ 6221- 6324, partnership audit procedures with respect to Clearwater in an attempt to "look through" the Virgin Islands entities to attack the residency of individual partners in violation of the Tax Implementation Agreement ("TIA")between the Virgin Islands and the United States; (2) the vast majority of Clearwater and CCC Holdings records sought from FirstBank are already in the possession of the IRS; and (3) the IRS did not provide reasonable advance notice of third-party contacts as required by 26 U.S.C. § 7602(c)because it provided no notice to CCC Holdings and unreasonable notice to Clearwater. (Petitioners' Onmibus Memorandum, page 2).

On May 21, 2007, the United States of America ("Respondent" or "IRS") responded to the Petitioners' Omnibus Memorandum. 3 Specifically, the IRS contends that it is investigating the reporting requirements of CCC Holdings and Clearwater and whether they have reported the proper amounts of income and the source of such income for the 2002 through 2004 tax years and that the records sought from FirstBank are necessary in its determination of whether the income earned by Clearwater during 2002, 2003 and/or 2004 tax years is U.S. sourced or effectively connected income and whether the income earned by CCC Holdings during 2002, 2003, and/or 2004 tax years are United States sourced income or effectively connected income. (Respondent's Memoranda, pages 3).

Respondent further alleges that pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §6031(e)(2), a foreign partnership is required to file a Form 1065(U.S. Partnership Return) if it has gross income derived for sources within the United States, or gross income which is effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business conducted in the United States. (Respondent's Memoranda, pages 3). Respondent further alleges that income from services are sourced where the services are provided; therefore it is necessary to determine where Clearwater consultants provided their services 4 and if the income is U.S. sourced, CCC Holdings and Clearwater were required to file United States partnership tax returns reporting U.S. and non-U.S. income and if CCC Holdings and/or Clearwater received U.S. sourced income for the 2002, 2003 and/or 2004 tax years, that income must be identified on the BIR tax returns and is not available for the computation of the Economic Development credit by the partners. (Respondent's Memoranda, pages 3 and 4).

Respondent further contends that it followed all the administrative steps as required by the Internal Revenue Code ("IRC")and the summonses seek documents that are relevant and necessary to the IRS's investigation of the reporting requirements of Petitioners and whether CCC Holdings and/or Clearwater reported the proper amounts of income and the source of such income for tax years 2002 through 2004. (Respondent's Memoranda, pages 4). Finally, Respondent contends that although, the Petitioners produced various documents in response to its pre-summons requests, the documents contained some, but not all, of the documents records reflecting the details of funds activity. (Respondent's Memoranda, pages 5 and 6).

In their reply, Petitioners contend that Respondents' assertion that partnerships formed and existing solely in the Virgin Islands are subject to dual-filing requirements ignores the mirror tax system, fails to address the IRS's illegitimate use of TERFA Audit Procedures and is legally incorrect and is made in bad faith.




DISCUSSION


The question before this Court is whether the IRS has met the criteria set forth in Powell for the issuance of summonses and whether the Petitioners have set forth appropriate grounds to establish that the IRS has not met the Powell requirements. The criteria set forth in Powell v. United States for the issuance of a valid summons, are as follows: (1) the summons must be issued for a proper purpose, (2) the information sought must be relevant to that purpose, (3) the information must not be in the possession of the IRS and (4) that the administrative steps required by law regarding the summons and the issuance and the service of the summons must have been followed. Powell at 57-58.




I.


A. In regard to the first prong of the Powell criteria, Petitioners contend that the IRS's issuance of the summonses does not meet the first criteria of the Powell test in that the summonses were not issued for legitimate purposes. The Petitioners set forth several grounds in support of this proposition. First, the Petitioners allege that the TEFRA partnership audit rules do not apply to the 2003 and 2004 tax years inquiry of Clearwater. Second, Petitioners allege that only the residency of the partnership, Clearwater, and its general partner, CCC Holdings, is relevant and it is undisputed that these entities are Virgin Islands residents and, thus, the IRS has improperly issued summonses and is improperly attempting to avoid the Tax Implementation Agreement ("TIA").

In regards to its first argument, Petitioners state that in absence of an audit, TERFA procedures do not apply and that Clearwater and CCC Holdings are being audited for the 2002 tax year only and the IRS is merely conducting an inquiry for the 2003 and 2004 tax years and thus, the TERFA procedures do not apply to the 2003 and 2004 inquiries. Further, Petitioners contend that in other Virgin Islands tax controversy cases, there was a dispute regarding the residency of the taxpayers; however, here, there is no controversy about residency of Clearwater and CCC Holdings 5 , as they are bona fide Virgin Islands partnerships and as bona fide partnerships/residents, the "mirror code" systems, codified at 48 U.S.C. 1397, 6 controls their tax filing requirement and Clearwater and CCC Holdings would fulfill their U.S. tax obligation by filing their tax returns and paying all their income taxes into the Treasury of the Virgin Islands.

B. Additionally, Petitioners allege that they are not aware of any other instance in which the IRS has taken the position that bona fide Virgin Islands partnerships are subject to a dual filing requirement as a foreign partnership under Internal Revenue Code § 6031(e)(2). In support of their position that the dual filing is not required, the Petitioners contend that there is no form to report sourcing of income for foreign partnerships as there are for individual taxpayers, such as the 1040 Info. Further, the Petitioners argue that the returns they filed with the BIR, of which the IRS has copies which were provided to it by the Petitioners, contain the partners' worldwide income and the Schedules K-1s of its partners and under dual filing, the Petitioners would be required to file only the Schedule K-1 with its U.S. returns. Thus, Petitioners contend that Clearwater and CCC Holdings returns filed with the BIR are more comprehensive than if they were filing U.S. returns and that the IRS may readily obtain the information by requesting copies of the Schedule K-1s from the BIR pursuant to Article 4 of the TIA. Further, Petitioners argue that it is impossible for CCC Holdings to have income other than Virgin Island source income in that it is the general partner of Clearwater, a Virgin Islands partnership, and receives all its distributions from Clearwater. Therefore, all of CCC Holdings income is Virgin Islands source income.

C. Petitioners' last contention in support of its position that the Respondent has failed to meet the criteria of the first prong of the Powell test, is that the IRS has violated the TIA. Petitioners assert that notwithstanding Article 4,paragraph 4, of the TIA, a reservation clause that allows the IRS to exercise its rights under § 7602 7 of the Internal Revenue Code without complying with procedure set forth in the TIA, the IRS was required to request needed information from the BIR before issuing the summonses to FirstBank. Petitioners further contend that the reservation of rights clause does not apply for the following reasons: (1)because the language of the TIA is limited to information in the Virgin Islands and the information in this case is requested from the FirstBank in Puerto Rico; (2) that the IRS has successfully invoked the clause only in cases that involve the issue of residency of the taxpayer; (3) that to the extent that the clause may be applicable, the TIA only preserves it authority under § 7602 and the strictures of § 7602 are not satisfied in that there was no request for a summons from the BIR and there is not a legitimate inquiry into the bona fide Virgin Islands status of the taxpayer; (4) the reservation clause itself limits the right for the IRS to act outside of the BIR only to the extent that the IRS notifies the BIR before taking action or as soon a practicable, unless the IRS and BIR agree to limit notification to certain classes of cases; and finally, (5) that the actions of the IRS in this case do not fit the "necessity" exception of § 7602.

The IRS on the other hand contends that the summonses were issued for a proper purpose in that summonses were issued to investigate Petitioners' reporting requirements and whether Petitioners reported the proper amounts of income and the source of the income for the tax years 2002 through 2004 pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §6031(e)(2) 8 and 26 U.S.C. 863,864. The IRS concedes that the residency of the partners is relevant to the extent it may indicate where the consultants of Clearwater, most of whom are also partners of CCC Holdings, provided services in order to determine whether Clearwater failed to report U.S. sourced income or income effectively connected to a U.S. trade or business. (Respondent's Memoranda pages 11).

1. Petitioners' first argument is that the IRS does not have authority under TERA to "audit" or conduct an inquiry for tax years 2002 through 2004 because no "returns" were filed with the IRS for those years and therefore, in absence of a United States' return, TERA does not apply and there can be no audit. 9 The court notes that Clearwater and CCC Holdings filed returns with the IRS and BIR in 2002 and with the BIR for 2003 and 2004. The court further notes that CCC Holdings is a bona fide limited liability company that files its taxes as a partnership and that Clearwater is bona fide Virgin Islands partnership. As such, Clearwater and CCC Holdings are properly considered foreign partnerships within the meaning of 26 U.S.C. §3061(e)(2). The court further notes that whether the Respondent has authority to conduct an audit/inquiry of the Respondent on the facts of this case is not dispositive to issue before the court. The court finds that the Petitioners are foreign partnerships within the meaning of 26 U.S. C. 603 (e)(2) and as foreign partnerships, the Respondent has the authority under 26 U.S.C. section (e)(2) to investigate the Petitioners whether designated as an audit or as an inquiry to determine if any of Petitioners' gross income was derived from sources within the United States or if any of their gross income was effectively connected with the conduct of trade or business conducted in the United States.

2. Petitioners next argue that because they are bona fide Virgin Islands partnerships, the mirror tax system applies. As such, the Petitioners are only required to file their tax returns with the Virgin Islands government. In support of this argument, the Petitioners cite several cases. Particularly, the Petitioners cite Polychrome International Corporation v. Krigger, 5 F.3d 1522 (3d Cir. 1993)for the proposition that foreign sales corporations incorporated in the Virgin Islands are obligated, in the absence of any special exemption, to pay income taxes to the Virgin Islands government under the "mirror code" provision, 13 U.S.C.1397 (1988), which make the IRC applicable to all Virgin Islands residents. Polychrome at 1527. This essentially means that an individual or a corporation in the Virgin Islands pays its taxes to the BIR as an individual or a corporation under the same circumstance would pay its taxes to the IRS. Id. Most interestingly though, the court in Polychrome, in footnote 8, notes "[a]lthough individuals paying taxes under the mirror code provision are normally not required to pay taxes to the United States, the FSC provisions in the IRC provide that no tax imposed by §§ 921- 927 must be "covered over" (i.e., not payable to) the Virgin Islands government. See IRC § 927 (e)(5)(c)." Polychrome at 1527, n. 8. It should be further noted that the exempted portion of FSCs income is treated as "foreign source income which is not effectively connected with the conduct of trade or business with the United States." Polychrome at 1527, n. 6.

Thus, as evidenced in Polychrome, although the Virgin Islands FSCs were required to pay its taxes to the Virgin Island government, they were certain types of taxes that were still payable to Untied States Government. Likewise, is the case before us. Accordingly, pursuant to 26 U.S.C. 3601(e)(2), Petitioners are required to file tax returns for any income earned from sources within the United States or on gross income effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business in the Untied States. Petitioners' arguments that this is the first time that the IRS has attempted to enforce this provision; that there are not separate IRS or BIR forms to list United States gross income from sources within the United States or gross income effectively connected with the conduct of trade or business conducted in the United States and that they are not aware of regulations, rulings or IRS guidance prescribing, nor any case holding that bona fide Virgin Islands partnerships are subject to a dual filing requirement under 26 U.S.C. 3061(e)(2) does not, in this court's opinion, affect the enforceability of the provision nor estop the government from enforcing the provision.

3. Finally, the Petitioners assert that the TIA is on the facts of this case. First, Petitioners contend that the TIA is not applicable because the summonses were issued to the FirstBank in Puerto Rico and not Virgin Islands Branch. In Respondent's memoranda, Respondent asserts that the summonses were issued to the Puerto Rican branch of FirstBank because the bank's legal counsel's division is located there. The court disagrees with the Petitioners' asserting that the TIA is not applicable because the summonses were sent to the Puerto Rican branch office FirstBank and not to the St. Thomas branch. Albeit, the summonses were sent to the Puerto Rican branch, the summonses requested information generated in the Virgin Islands for CCC Holdings and Clearwater. Thus, to the extent the summonses requested information about Virgin Islands residents and is merely addressed to the Puerto Rican branch of FirstBank because the legal counsel's office is in Puerto Rico, the finds that the request does not violate the spirit of the TIA agreement.

Secondly, Petitioners assert that the IRS has only successfully invoked the applicability of the TIA reservation clause on the issue of residency of the taxpayer. Even given this statement to be true that in and of its self is not disposition of the issue. The IRS, under 7602, has several grounds to initiate an investigation of a taxpayer and the court finds that this investigation of the Petitioners falls within the parameter of 7602. The court specifically rejects the Petitioners assertion that in absence the IRS's request from the BIR to issue a summons or an inquiry into the residency status of the partnerships, the IRS does not have a basis under 7602 to investigate the Petitioners.

Finally, the Petitioners contend that the IRS does not have authority to request information of Virgin Islands taxpayer without first notifying or as soon as practicable thereafter notifying the IRB of its request. Petitioners have not submitted any affidavit or other document to establish that the IRS did not first notify the BIR before proceeding with the issuance of the summonses. The Petitioners have merely asserted in their memoranda that "to petitioners' knowledge, there has been no request to or from the Virgin Islands government for assistance." In the absence of an affirmative assertion that the TIA has not been complied with, the court finds that the provision has not been complied with. Finally, as the court finds that the TIA agreement is applicable here, it does not need to address Petitioners fifth contention.




II.


Petitioners contend that the IRS fails to meet the second prong of the Powell test in that IRS has in its possession documents that it requested pursuant to the summonses. In support of their position, the Petitioners cite United States v. Monumental Life Insurance Company, 440 F.3d 729 (6 th Cir. 2006). In that case, the court held that Monumental Life Insurance Company, the third-party, was not required to produce documents that the IRS already had in its possession as the documents were produced by Monumental to the IRS with regards to the IRS's investigation of another company. The distinguishing factor between that case and here is that in Monumental, the IRS had obtained the requested documents from Monumental relative to the IRS's investigation of different company regarding the same issues. Here, the IRS received the document from CCC Holdings and Clearwater only and had not received the documents in a prior investigation from FirstBank. The court notes and agrees that the IRS should be able to independently verify the completeness and accuracy of the documents produced by Clearwater and CCC Holdings. See United States v. Davey 653 F.2d 996 (2d Cir. 1976). Thus, its request for documents from FirstBank that it may have already received from the Petitioners, under this circumstances, is not violative of Powell.




III.


Finally, the Petitioners argue that the IRS did not provide sufficient notice to the Petitioner regarding it intent to serve summonses on FirstBank. Specifically, they allege that the Publication 1 enclosed with the August 1, 2006 letters for the 2003 and 2004 notices of inquiry were not sufficient to put the Petitioners on notice that the IRS had the right to contact third-parties. Further with respect to the letters sent in March 2006 advising of the possible third-party contacts for the 2002 tax year examinations, Petitioners argue there was an unreasonable ten-month delay between their receipt of the letters and the date the summonses were served and that they had produced documents in the interim and were never advised that their production was deficient in any manner.

In support of its position the Petitioners cite United States v. Jillson, 84 A.F.T.R.2d 99-7115 (S.D. Fla. 1999) and recites the legislative history of section 7602(c). The court notes that in United States v. Jillson, the contact letter was not sent until after the summonses were issued. This is not the case here; in this case, the contact letter and the Publication 1s advising of potential third-party contact were sent before the summonses were issued. The legislative history acknowledges that the taxpayer has a right to know of third-party contacts before they occur and gives the taxpayer the opportunity to volunteer information and to resolve issues before third-parties are contacted.

Here, the court finds that the letters sent to the Petitioners in March 2006 regarding potential third-party contact for the 2002 tax year examination and the Publication 1s sent regarding the 2003 and 2004 notices of inquiry were sufficient notice to the Petitioners. Further, the court also finds that the timing of March 2006 letters and the sufficiency of Publication 1s notice to the third-party contacts were not violative of the intent of section 7602 as articulated in the legislative history.




CONCLUSION


For the foregoing reasons, the Petitioners' Motions to Quash the Third-Party summonses issued on FirstBank are DENIED and the United States' counterclaim to enforce the summonses is GRANTED.

1 The Petitioners filed identical Motions to Quash on behalf of CCC Holdings and Clearwater. By Order dated November 27, 2007, the court granted Petitioners' Motion to Consolidate the cases.

2 Respondent, United States of America, describes CCC Holdings as a Virgin Islands limited liability company and one percent general partner of Clearwater Consulting Concepts, LLLP which received its distributive shares of ordinary income and other incomes from Clearwater which reports income form providing consulting services to clients, including clients of the United States. (United States' Memoranda in Support of Motion For Summary Denial of Petition to Quash & Summary Enforcement of Summons, pages 2).

3 The Respondent filed two memoranda, one respective to CCC Holdings and the other applicable to Clearwater.

4 Respondents state that many of the consultants of Clearwater are also partners of CCC Holdings. (Respondent's Memorandum regarding CCC Holdings, page 4).

5 Although CCC Holdings is a limited liability company, it has elected to file its returns as a partnership. (Petitioners' Omnibus Reply, page 14.)

6 Income law of the United States in force; payment of proceeds; levy of surtax on all taxpayers The income-tax laws in force in the United States of America and those which may hereafter be enacted shall be held to be likewise in force in the Virgin Islands of the United States, except that the proceeds of such taxes shall be paid into the treasuries of said islands: Provided however, That, notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Legislature of the Virgin Islands is authorized to levy a surtax on all taxpayers in an amount not to exceed 10 per centum of their annual income tax obligations to the government of the Virgin Islands.

7 Section 7602 in pertinent part reads:

Examination of books and witnesses.

(a) Authority to summon, etc. For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a return where none has been made, determining the liability of any person for any internal revenue tax or the liability at law or in equity of any transferee or fiduciary of any person in respect of any internal revenue tax, or collecting any such liability, the Secretary is authorized --

(1) To examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may be relevant or material to such inquiry;

(2) To summon the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any officer or employee of such person, or any person having possession, custody, or care of books of account containing entries relating to the business of the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any other person the Secretary may deem proper, to appear before the Secretary at a time and place named in the summons and to produce such books, papers, records, or other data, and to give such testimony, under oath, as may be relevant or material to such inquiry; and

(3) To take such testimony of the person concerned, under oath, as may be relevant or material to such inquiry.

(b) Purpose may include inquiry into offense. The purposes for which the Secretary may take any action described in paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of subsection (a) include the purpose of inquiring into any offense connected with the administration or enforcement of the internal revenue laws.

(c) Notice of contact of third parties.

(1) General notice. An officer or employee of the Internal Revenue Service may not contact any person other than the taxpayer with respect to the determination or collection of the tax liability of such taxpayer without providing reasonable notice in advance to the taxpayer that contacts with persons other than the taxpayer may be made.

(2) Notice of specific contacts. The Secretary shall periodically provide to a taxpayer a record of persons contacted during such period by the Secretary with respect to the determination or collection of the tax liability of such taxpayer. Such record shall also be provided upon request of the taxpayer.

(3) Exceptions. This subsection shall not apply-

(A) to any contact which the taxpayer has authorized;

(B) if the Secretary determines for good cause shown that such notice would jeopardize collection of any tax or such notice may involve reprisal against any person; or

(C) with respect to any pending criminal investigation.

8 Foreign Partnerships.-

(1) Exception for foreign partnership.-Except as provided in paragraph (2), the preceding provisions of this section shall not apply to a foreign partnership.

(2) Certain foreign partnerships required to file return. Except as provided in regulations prescribed by the Secretary, this section shall apply to a foreign partnership for any taxable year if for such year, such partnership has-

(A) gross income derived from sources within the United States, or

(B) gross income which is effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the United States. The Secretary may provide simplified filing procedure for foreign partnerships to which this section applies.

9 As noted above returns were initially filed with the IRS, but were subsequently filed with the BIR.

Labels:

Thursday, August 7, 2008

www.irstaxattorney.com 888-712-7690 Substantiation and Reporting Requirements for Cash and Noncash Charitable Contribution Deductions.


Regulations, NPRM REG-140029-07

August 7, 2008

Code Sec. 170


[4830-01-p]



DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY



Internal Revenue Service

26 CFR Part 1

[REG-140029-07]

RIN 1545-BH62

Substantiation and Reporting Requirements for Cash and Noncash Charitable Contribution Deductions.

AGENCY: Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Treasury.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.

SUMMARY: These proposed regulations provide guidance concerning substantiation and reporting requirements for cash and noncash charitable contributions under section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code (Code). The regulations reflect the enactment of provisions of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 and the Pension Protection Act of 2006. The regulations provide guidance to individuals, partnerships, and corporations that make charitable contributions, and will affect any donor claiming a deduction for a charitable contribution after the date these regulations are published as final regulations in the Federal Register .

DATES: Written or electronic comments and requests for a public hearing must be received by [INSERT DATE 90 DAYS AFTER PUBLICATION OF THIS DOCUMENT IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER] .

ADDRESSES: Send submissions to: CC:PA:LPD:PR (REG-140029-07), room 5203, Internal Revenue Service, P.O. Box 7604, Ben Franklin Station, Washington, DC 20044. Submissions may be hand delivered Monday through Friday between the hours of 8 a.m. and 4 p.m. to CC:PA:LPD:PR (REG-140029-07), Courier's Desk, Internal Revenue Service, 1111 Constitution Avenue, N.W., Washington, DC 20224, or sent electronically via the Federal eRulemaking Portal at www.regulations.gov (IRS REG- 140029-07).

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Concerning the proposed regulations, Susan J. Kassell at (202) 622-5020; concerning submissions of comments and requests for a hearing, Oluwafunmilayo Taylor at (202) 622-7180 (not toll-free numbers). SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION



Paperwork Reduction Act

The collections of information contained in this notice of proposed rulemaking have been submitted to the Office of Management and Budget for review in accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3507(d)). Comments on the collections of information should be sent to the Office of Management and Budget , Attn: Desk Officer for the Department of the Treasury, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Washington, DC 20503, with copies to the Internal Revenue Service , Attn: IRS Reports Clearance Officer, SE:W:CAR:MP:T:T:SP, Washington, DC 20224. Comments on the collections of information should be received by [INSERT DATE 60 DAYS AFTER PUBLICATION OF THIS DOCUMENT IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER] . Comments are specifically requested concerning:

Whether the proposed collections of information are necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the IRS, including whether the information will have practical utility;

The accuracy of the estimated burden associated with the proposed collections of information;

How the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be collected may be enhanced;

How the burden of complying with the proposed collections of information may be minimized, including through the application of automated collection techniques or other forms of information technology; and

Estimates of capital or start-up costs and costs of operation, maintenance, and purchase of services to provide information.

The collections of information in these proposed regulations are in §§ 1.170A- 15(a) and (d)(2); 1.170A-16(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f); 1.170A-17(a)(3) and (a)(7); and 1.170A-18(a)(2) and (b). These collections of information will help the IRS determine if a taxpayer is entitled to a claimed deduction for a charitable contribution. The collections of information are required to obtain a benefit. The likely respondents are individuals, partnerships, and corporations that claim a deduction for a charitable contribution.

The collections of information may vary depending on the item contributed, the amount of the deduction claimed for the contribution, and whether the taxpayer claiming the deduction is an individual, partnership, S corporation, C corporation that is a personal service corporation or closely held corporation, or other C corporation.

The following estimates are based on the information that is available to the IRS. A respondent may require more or less time, depending on the circumstances.

The estimated total annual reporting burden is 226,419 hours.

The estimated annual burden per respondent varies from 5 minutes to 4 hours, with an estimated average annual burden of slightly more than 1 hour. The estimated number of respondents is 201,920.

An agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information unless it displays a valid control number assigned by the Office of Management and Budget.

Books or records relating to a collection of information must be retained as long as their contents may become material in the administration of any internal revenue law. Generally, tax returns and return information are confidential, as required by section 6103 .



Background

This document contains proposed amendments to the Income Tax Regulations (26 CFR part 1) for substantiating and reporting deductions for charitable contributions under section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code. Section 170(f)(11) , as added by section 883 of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Public Law 108-357 (118 Stat. 1418) (Jobs Act), contains reporting and substantiation requirements relating to deductions for noncash charitable contributions. Under section 170(f)(11)(C) , for contributions of property for which a deduction of more than $5,000 is claimed, taxpayers are required to obtain a qualified appraisal of the property. Under section 170(f)(11)(D) , for contributions of property for which a deduction of more than $500,000 is claimed, taxpayers must attach a qualified appraisal of the property to the tax return on which the deduction is claimed.

For appraisals prepared with respect to returns filed on or before August 17, 2006, §1.170A-13(c) of the current regulations provides definitions of the terms "qualified appraisal" and "qualified appraiser". For appraisals prepared with respect to returns filed after August 17, 2006, section 170(f)(11)(E) , as added by the Jobs Act and amended by section 1219 of the Pension Protection Act of 2006, Public Law 109-280 (120 Stat. 780) (PPA), provides statutory definitions of the terms qualified appraisal and qualified appraiser.

Section 170(f)(11)(E)(i) provides that the term qualified appraisal means an appraisal that is (1) treated as a qualified appraisal under regulations or other guidance prescribed by the Secretary, and (2) conducted by a qualified appraiser in accordance with generally accepted appraisal standards and any regulations or other guidance prescribed by the Secretary.

Section 170(f)(11)(E)(ii) provides that the term qualified appraiser means an individual who (1) has earned an appraisal designation from a recognized professional appraiser organization or has otherwise met minimum education and experience requirements set forth in regulations prescribed by the Secretary, (2) regularly performs appraisals for which the individual receives compensation, and (3) meets such other requirements as may be prescribed by the Secretary in regulations or other guidance. Section 170(f)(11)(E)(iii) further provides that an individual will not be treated as a qualified appraiser unless that individual (1) demonstrates verifiable education and experience in valuing the type of property subject to the appraisal, and (2) has not been prohibited from practicing before the IRS by the Secretary under section 330(c) of Title 31 of the United States Code at any time during the 3-year period ending on the date of the appraisal.

On October 19, 2006, the IRS and the Treasury Department released Notice 2006-96 , 2006-46 IRB 902 (see §601.601(d)(2)(ii)(b) of this chapter), which provides transitional guidance relating to section 170(f)(11)(E) as amended by the PPA. Specifically, Notice 2006-96 provides transitional safe harbor definitions for the terms "qualified appraisal" (section 3.02(1)) , "generally accepted appraisal standards" (section 3.02(2)) , "appraisal designation" (section 3.03(1)) , "education and experience in valuing the type of property" (section 3.03(2)) , and "minimum education and experience" (section 3.03(3)) . These definitions apply to contributions of property for which a deduction of more than $5,000 is claimed on returns filed after August 17, 2006. Notice 2006-96 solicited comments regarding the definitions of these terms. All comments received were considered in drafting these regulations.

Section 1216 of the PPA added section 170(f)(16) , which provides that no deduction is allowed for a contribution of clothing or a household item unless the clothing or household item is in good used condition or better. Section 1217 of the PPA added section 170(f)(17) , which imposes a recordkeeping requirement for all cash contributions, regardless of amount. Section 1219 of the PPA added section 6695A , which imposes penalties on appraisers in certain circumstances. Regulations implementing the penalty provisions of section 6695A will be published separately.

Section 170(f)(11)(H) authorizes the Secretary to prescribe regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of section 170(f)(11) , including regulations that may provide that some or all of the requirements of section 170(f)(11) do not apply in appropriate cases. Other statutory authority to issue regulations is in sections 170(f)(11)(B) , (C), (E)(i)(I) and (II), and (E)(ii)(I) and (III).



Explanation of Provisions



I. In General

The proposed regulations generally implement the Jobs Act and PPA changes to the substantiation and reporting rules for charitable contributions. For example, the proposed regulations implement the recordkeeping requirements imposed by the PPA for all cash contributions and the new definitions of a qualified appraisal and qualified appraiser applicable to all noncash contributions. The proposed regulations also incorporate the substantiation requirements for noncash contributions imposed by the Jobs Act on (1) a C corporation (other than a closely held corporation or a personal service corporation) claiming a deduction of more than $5,000, and (2) any taxpayer claiming a deduction in excess of $500,000.

The proposed regulations also generally incorporate many of the requirements of §1.170A-13 , except to the extent §1.170A-13 is inconsistent with the Jobs Act and PPA requirements. For example, many of the requirements of §1.170A-13(c)(3) for a qualified appraisal are incorporated in proposed §1.170A-17(a) ; many of the "appraisal summary" requirements of §1.170A-13(c)(4) are incorporated in the required entries for a completed Form 8283, "Noncash Charitable Contributions," in proposed §1.170A-16 ; and many of the requirements of §1.170A-13(c)(5) for a qualified appraiser are incorporated in proposed §1.170A-17(b) .

The IRS and the Treasury Department may propose additional changes to the substantiation regulations in the future and hereby request comments concerning additional issues that should be addressed.



II. Cash, check or other monetary gifts

Proposed §1.170A-15 implements the requirements of section 170(f)(17) , which was added by the PPA and provides that no deduction is allowed for any contribution of a cash, check, or other monetary gift unless the donor maintains as a record of the contribution a bank record or written communication from the donee. Compare The Check Clearing for the 21st Century Act, Public Law 108-100, 117 Stat. 1178-1180 (12 U.S.C. 5002(16) and 5003(b)), which provides guidance under the banking laws regarding substitute checks. The bank record or written communication must show the name of the donee, the date of the contribution, and the amount of the contribution.

After section 170(f)(17) was enacted, the IRS and the Treasury Department received questions and comments about the new requirements. One commenter suggested a "de minimis exception," under which donors of small amounts would not be required to maintain bank records or written communications from the donee. This suggestion was not adopted in the proposed regulations because the exception would be contrary to the statute and the express language in the legislative history that the provision applies "regardless of the amount." However, there is precedent for exempting from the substantiation requirements certain types of payments for which a charitable beneficiary cannot provide a receipt, either because the charitable beneficiary has not yet been identified or because the charitable beneficiary has no firsthand knowledge of the amount of the payment. For example, a taxpayer making a contribution in the form of a transfer to a charitable remainder trust is not required to obtain the contemporaneous written acknowledgment generally required under section 170(f)(8) . A similar exception is contained in the proposed regulations for monetary contributions to a charitable remainder trust of less than $250. The proposed regulations also provide an exception from the substantiation requirements for unreimbursed expenses of less than $250 incurred incident to the rendition of services to a charitable organization. Taxpayers claiming deductions for monetary contributions to a charitable remainder trust or for out of pocket expenses incurred incident to the rendition of services are advised to maintain records of the gifts or expenses.

Some commenters asked how to comply with section 170(f)(17) if a bank statement does not include the name of the donee. In this situation, a monthly bank statement and a photocopy or image obtained from the bank of the front of the check indicating the name of the donee would satisfy the provision.



III. Revised noncash substantiation requirements

As under current rules, the proposed regulations provide that donors who claim deductions for noncash contributions of less than $250 are required to obtain a receipt from the donee or keep reliable records. The proposed regulations provide that donors who make contributions of $250 or more but not more than $500 are required to obtain only a contemporaneous written acknowledgment, as provided under section 170(f)(8) and §1.170A-13(f) , and are not required to obtain any other written records. No revisions to §1.170A-13(f) are proposed in these proposed regulations. For claimed contributions of more than $500 but not more than $5,000, the donor must obtain a contemporaneous written acknowledgment and must file a completed Form 8283 (Section A) with the return on which the deduction is claimed. For claimed contributions of more than $5,000, in addition to a contemporaneous written acknowledgment, a qualified appraisal generally is required, and either Section A or Section B of Form 8283 (depending on the type of property contributed) must be completed and filed with the return on which the deduction is claimed. For claimed contributions of more than $500,000, the donor must attach a copy of the qualified appraisal to the return. The proposed regulations also provide that the requirements for substantiation that must be submitted with a return also apply to the return for any carryover year under section 170(d) .

Section 1.170A-16(c) and §1.170A-16(d) of the proposed regulations generally apply to deductions claimed for contributions of motor vehicles. Section 1.170A- 16(c)(4) and §1.170A-16(d)(2)(iii) explain the substantiation requirements for contributions of motor vehicles described in section 170(f)(12)(A)(ii) (vehicles that the donee organization sells without any significant intervening use or material improvement). These substantiation requirements are in addition to the requirements imposed in section 170(f)(12) , as added by section 884 of the Jobs Act.

Section 170(f)(11)(A)(ii)(II) , as added by the PPA, provides that the requirements of sections 170(f)(11)(B) , (C), and (D) do not apply if the donor shows that the failure to meet these requirements is due to reasonable cause and not to willful neglect. Section 170(f)(11)(H) provides that the Secretary may provide that some or all of the requirements of section 170(f)(11) do not apply in appropriate cases. The proposed regulations provide that, to satisfy the "reasonable cause" exception under section 170(f)(11)(A)(ii)(II) , the donor must submit with the return a detailed explanation of why the failure to comply was due to reasonable cause and not to willful neglect, and must have timely obtained a contemporaneous written acknowledgment and a qualified appraisal, if applicable. The proposed regulations supersede §1.170A-13(c)(4)(H) , which provides that a taxpayer who fails to file an appraisal summary (Form 8283) with the return is permitted to provide it within 90 days of a request from the IRS, and the deduction will be allowed if the donor's original failure to file the appraisal summary is a "good faith omission." Consistent with the Congressional purpose for enacting section 170(f)(11) of reducing valuation abuses, the IRS and the Treasury Department anticipate that the "reasonable cause" exception will be strictly construed to apply only when the donor meets the requirements for the exception as specified in the regulations.



IV. New requirements for qualified appraisals and qualified appraisers

New definitions of qualified appraisal and qualified appraiser, taking into account the PPA definitions of these terms in section 170(f)(11)(E) , are provided in proposed §1.170A-17 . Some new terms to implement these new definitions are also included.



A. Qualified appraisal

In proposed §1.170A-17(a) , the proposed regulations provide that a qualified appraisal means an appraisal document that is prepared by a qualified appraiser in accordance with generally accepted appraisal standards. Generally accepted appraisal standards are defined in the proposed regulations as the substance and principles of the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice (USPAP), as developed by the Appraisal Standards Board of the Appraisal Foundation. See Title XI of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Public Law 101- 73, 103 Stat. 183 (12 U.S.C. 3331-3351). The proposed regulations are similar to section 3.02(2) of Notice 2006-96 , except that the proposed regulations require compliance with the substance and principles of USPAP.

Commenters suggested requiring that appraisal documents be "in accordance with published appraisal standards of national professional appraisal credentialing organizations," including references to certain other specific standards such as the Uniform Appraisal Standards for Federal Land Acquisitions, and requiring appraisers to include specific items in an appraisal, such as all sales of the contributed property within 18 months of the appraisal date. The IRS and the Treasury Department believe the "substance and principles of USPAP" is broad enough to include these suggestions. One commenter suggested that generally accepted appraisal standards are satisfied by an appraisal issued by a corporation or company that is regularly engaged in the business of producing appraisals, relies on the services of specialist departments, is affiliated with an auction house, dealer or association of dealers that conducts at least 100 auctions or sales per year, and regularly conducts appraisals for estate, income and/or charitable donation purposes. This suggestion was not incorporated in the proposed regulations because it does not contain any "appraisal standards."

Application of the "substance and principles of USPAP" rule provided in the proposed regulations may be illustrated by the following situation. The IRS is aware that some appraisers of historic conservation easements have stated that local ordinances restricting modifications of a façade should be disregarded because local governments do not enforce these ordinances. Under applicable substance and principles of USPAP, an appraiser must identify and analyze any known restrictions, ordinances, or similar items, and the likelihood of any modification to those restrictions, in formulating a value opinion. For example, see USPAP Standards Rules 1-2(e)(iv), 1- 3(a), and 2-2(vi). An appraisal that does not take into account a local ordinance is not consistent with the substance and principles of USPAP. See also §1.170A-14(h)(3)(ii) .

In addition, some commenters requested a specific reference to highest and best use in the proposed regulations. This suggestion was not incorporated in the proposed regulations because USPAP Standards Rule 1-3(b) requires an appraiser to "develop an opinion of the highest and best use of the real estate" when it is "necessary for credible assignment results in developing a market value opinion." An appraisal that does not include a development of highest and best use when required by USPAP is not consistent with the substance and principles of USPAP.

The proposed regulations also clarify the current rules. For example, the current regulations require an appraisal to be made no earlier than 60 days before the contribution date. Under the proposed regulations, the valuation effective date , which is the date to which the value opinion applies, generally must be the date of the contribution. In cases where the appraisal is prepared before the date of the contribution, the valuation effective date must be no earlier than 60 days before the date of the contribution and no later than the date of the contribution. The date the appraiser signs the appraisal report (appraisal report date) must be no earlier than 60 days before the date of the contribution and no later than the due date (including extensions) of the return on which the deduction is claimed or reported. As under current regulations, if the deduction is claimed for the first time on an amended return, the appraisal report date must be no later than the date the amended return is filed.

Several commenters requested clarification of when a contribution is "made" for purposes of determining the proper year of the deduction and the timeliness of the appraisal. Under §1.170A-1(b) of the current regulations, generally a contribution is made at the time delivery is effected. The IRS and the Treasury Department invite comments about when the contribution should be treated as "made" for section 170 purposes if a donor contributes a conservation easement to a qualified organization in a jurisdiction where a completed transfer requires execution, delivery, and recording of the transfer documents in the local governmental office, and the parties deliver the fully executed easement documents to the appropriate governmental office for recording in one year, but the documents are not recorded until the following year.

One commenter asked the IRS to state that an appraisal prepared by an insurance or real estate broker is not a qualified appraisal. This recommendation was not adopted in the proposed regulations because an insurance or real estate broker's appraisal, like any other appraisal, is a qualified appraisal if it meets all of the requirements for a qualified appraisal by a qualified appraiser.



B. Qualified appraiser

Section 1.170A-17(b) of the proposed regulations incorporates many of the requirements from the current regulations, but certain other provisions were modified. For example, the appraiser declarations required in the appraisal and on Form 8283 have been modified. In addition, the proposed regulations contain several new terms implementing the PPA requirements of a qualified appraiser under section 170(f)(11)(E)(ii) and(iii). In general, under the proposed regulations, a "qualified appraiser" must be an individual with verifiable education and experience in valuing the relevant type of property for which the appraisal is performed.

The PPA refers to two types of education and experience: Minimum education and experience in section 170(f)(11)(E)(ii)(I) to establish qualification as an appraiser generally, and verifiable education and experience in valuing the type of property subject to the appraisal in section 170(f)(11)(E)(iii)(I) to establish qualification as an appraiser for a particular appraisal. The IRS and the Treasury Department believe that it is sufficient for an appraiser to satisfy the more stringent requirement of verifiable education and experience in valuing the type of property subject to the appraisal. Satisfaction of that requirement will also satisfy the minimum education and experience requirement of section 170(f)(11)(E)(ii)(I) . The proposed regulations provide that an individual has verifiable education and experience if the individual has successfully completed professional or college-level coursework in valuing the relevant type of property and has two or more years experience in valuing that type of property.

Furthermore, because significant education and experience are required to obtain a designation from a recognized professional appraiser organization, under the proposed regulations appraisers with these designations are deemed to have demonstrated sufficient verifiable education and experience. One commenter asked about the qualifications of organizations that award designations and suggested that a recognized professional appraisal organization should be one that, among other things, offers comprehensive educational programs in USPAP and principles of valuation, and requires qualification to be demonstrated through written exams and peer reviews. The proposed regulations incorporate some of these principles in the definition of education and experience in valuing the relevant type of property.

A number of comments focused on education and experience. Several commenters suggested that an appraiser's evidence of education and experience should be required to be verifiable as provided in section 170(f)(11)(E)(iii)(I) . The proposed regulations incorporate this suggestion by requiring a statement in the appraisal of the appraiser's specified education and experience in valuing the relevant type of property. The proposed regulations also require the appraiser to complete coursework in valuing the category of property that is customary in the appraisal field for an appraiser to value.

One commenter indicated that some of its appraiser employees may have significant experience but lack formal education, and suggested that "education and experience" be interpreted as "education or experience." The commenter also asked that the "education and experience" requirement be applied to a group of appraisers rather than individually. The proposed regulations do not adopt these suggestions because they are contrary to the section 170(f)(11)(E) requirement that the person who signs the appraisal report be an individual with the requisite education and experience in valuing the relevant type of property. However, the proposed regulations define education broadly to include coursework obtained in an employment context, provided it is similar to an educational program of an educational institution or a generally recognized professional appraisal organization.

Section 3.03(3)(a)(ii) of Notice 2006-96 provides that, for real estate appraisers, education and experience are sufficient if the appraiser holds a license or certificate to value the relevant type of property in the state in which the property is located. This provision was not incorporated in the proposed regulations, which set forth more specific requirements applicable to all appraisers.

Several commenters asked for a definition of "types of property" for purposes of identifying the required education and experience. More education and experience may be necessary and available for some types of property than for others. Therefore, the proposed regulations provide that the relevant type of property is determined by what is customary in the appraisal profession. The IRS and the Treasury Department request suggestions for categorizing types of property that would be helpful in determining the qualification of appraisers, for purposes of both the education and experience requirements.

The IRS and the Treasury Department believe that the term "regularly performs appraisals for which the individual receives compensation" under section 170(f)(11)(E)(ii)(II) is generally encompassed by the experience requirement of section 170(f)(11)(E)(iii)(I) and does not need to be separately met. One corporate commenter was concerned that its individual employees could never be qualified appraisers, because the corporation receives the compensation, not the individual employees. Similar comments were received from otherwise qualified individual appraisers who do not regularly receive compensation. The proposed regulations address both of these concerns by not separately stating a compensation requirement.

Expressing concerns about identity theft, some commenters requested elimination of the requirements of supplying the appraiser's taxpayer identification number on Form 8283 and in the appraisal, as currently required under §§1.170A- 13(c)(3)(ii)(E) and 1.170A-13(c)(4)(ii)(I). The concern arises from appraisers who do not have a taxpayer identification number other than a social security number. The proposed regulations continue to require this information because, pursuant to §301.6109-1(a)(1)(ii)(D) of the Procedure and Administration Regulations, an appraiser may obtain an employer identification number even if the appraiser does not have employees. This number may be obtained by completing Form SS-4, "Application for Employer Identification Number." See Pub. 1635, "Understanding Your Employer Identification Number." If an appraiser is employed by a firm, the firm's employer identification number should be used.

Taxpayers are reminded that the IRS may challenge the amount of a claimed deduction, even if the donor substantiates the amount of the deduction with a qualified appraisal prepared by a qualified appraiser.



C. Clothing and household items

Section 1.170A-18 of the proposed regulations implements section 170(f)(16) , which provides that no deduction is allowed for any contribution of clothing or a household item unless it is in good used condition or better. The purpose of this provision relates to ensuring that donated clothing and household items are "of meaningful use to charitable organizations." Joint Committee on Taxation, Technical Explanation of H.R. 4, the "Pension Protection Act of 2006" (Aug. 3, 2006). The IRS and the Treasury Department are aware that a number of charities publish donation guidelines listing items the charity will and will not accept, and believe that the guidelines are helpful in ensuring that charities receive donations of items that are of meaningful use to the charity. The IRS and the Treasury Department request comments regarding how donation guidelines published by a charity may relate to the "good used condition" requirement in section 170(f)(16) .

Under the proposed regulations, no deduction is allowed unless the clothing or household item is in good used condition or better at the time of the contribution. The proposed regulations also provide that this rule does not apply to a contribution of a single item of clothing or a household item for which a donor claims a deduction of more than $500 if the donor submits a qualified appraisal with the return on which the deduction is claimed. Several commenters questioned whether a qualified appraisal is required for any contribution of an item of clothing or a household item with a claimed value over $500. If the item is not in good used condition or better and a deduction in excess of $500 is claimed, the taxpayer must obtain a qualified appraisal and file a completed Form 8283 (Section B) with the return on which the deduction is claimed. If the item is in good used condition or better and a deduction in excess of $500 is claimed, the taxpayer must file a completed Form 8283 (Section A or B depending on the type of contribution and claimed amount), but a qualified appraisal is required only if the claimed contribution amount exceeds $5,000.

If the donor claims a deduction of less than $250, §1.170A-16(a) of the proposed regulations requires that the donor obtain a receipt from the donee or maintain reliable written records of the contribution. A reliable written record for a contribution of clothing or a household item must include a description of the condition of the item. If the donor claims a deduction of $250 or more, the donor must obtain from the donee a receipt that meets the requirements of section 170(f)(8) (contemporaneous written acknowledgment).



Proposed Effective/Applicability Date

These proposed regulations are proposed to apply to contributions occurring after the date these regulations are published as final regulations in the Federal Register . Taxpayers should continue to comply with the recordkeeping and return requirements in §1.170A-13 of the existing regulations to the extent those provisions are not superseded by the Jobs Act or the PPA.



Special Analyses

It has been determined that this notice of proposed rulemaking is not a significant regulatory action as defined in Executive Order 12866. Therefore, a regulatory assessment is not required. It is hereby certified that these regulations will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. Therefore, a regulatory flexibility analysis under the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. chapter 6) is not required. This certification is based on the belief of the IRS and the Treasury Department that these regulations reduce the burden on taxpayers by clarifying and simplifying the existing substantiation and reporting requirements for charitable contributions. Furthermore, to the extent these regulations contain requirements that may impact small entities that are not contained in the current substantiation and reporting rules, those additional requirements are based on statutory changes to the rules that are being incorporated into the regulations. Pursuant to section 7805(f) of the Internal Revenue Code, this notice of proposed rulemaking has been submitted to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration for comment on its impact on small businesses.



Comments and Requests for a Public Hearing

Before these proposed regulations are adopted as final regulations, consideration will be given to any written comments (a signed original and eight (8) copies) or electronic comments that are submitted timely to the IRS. The IRS and the Treasury Department request comments on the clarity of the proposed rules and how they can be made easier to understand. All comments will be available for public inspection and copying. A public hearing will be scheduled if requested in writing by any person that timely submits comments. If a public hearing is scheduled, notice of the date, time, and place for the public hearing will be published in the Federal Register .



Drafting Information

The principal author of this regulation is Susan J. Kassell of the Office of Associate Chief Counsel (Income Tax and Accounting). Other personnel from the IRS and the Treasury Department participated in its development.



List of Subjects in 26 CFR Part 1

Income taxes, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.



Partial Withdrawal of Proposed Regulations

Accordingly, under the authority of 26 U.S.C. 7805, §1.170A-13 of the notice of proposed rulemaking (LR-83-87) that was published in the Federal Register on Thursday May 5, 1988 (53 FR 16156) is withdrawn.



Proposed Amendments to the Regulations

Accordingly, 26 CFR part 1 is proposed to be amended as follows:



PART 1 --INCOME TAXES

Paragraph 1. The authority citation for part 1 is amended by adding entries in numerical order to read as follows:

Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805 * * *

§1.170A-15 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 170(a)(1).

§1.170A-16 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 170(a)(1) and 170(f)(11).

§1.170A-17 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 170(a)(1) and 170(f)(11).

§1.170A-18 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 170(a)(1).



§§1.170-0 and 1.170-2 [Removed]

Par. 2. Sections 1 .170-0 and 1.170-2 are removed.



§1.170A-13 [Amended]

Par. 3. In § 1.170A-13 , paragraphs (a)(3), (b)(3)(i)(B), (b)(4), and (d) are removed.

Par. 4. Section 1.170A-15 is added to read as follows:



§1.170A-15 Substantiation requirements for charitable contribution of a cash, check, or other monetary gift .

(a) In general --(1) Bank record or written communication required . No deduction is allowed under section 170(a) for a charitable contribution in the form of a cash, check, or other monetary gift (as described in paragraph (b)(1) of this section) unless the donor substantiates the deduction with a bank record (as described in paragraph (b)(2) of this section) or a written communication (as described in paragraph (b)(3) of this section) from the donee showing the name of the donee, the date of the contribution, and the amount of the contribution.

(2) Additional substantiation required for contributions of $250 or more . No deduction is allowed under section 170(a) for any contribution of $250 or more unless the donor substantiates the contribution with a contemporaneous written acknowledgment (as described in section 170(f)(8) and §1.170A-13(f)) from the donee.

(3) Single document may be used . The requirements of paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) of this section may be met by a single document that contains all the information required by paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) of this section, if the single document is obtained by the donor no later than the date prescribed by paragraph (c) of this section.

(b) Terms --(1) Monetary gift includes a transfer of a gift card redeemable for cash, and a payment made by credit card, electronic fund transfer (as described in section 5061(e)(2) ), an online payment service, or payroll deduction.

(2) Bank record includes a statement from a financial institution, an electronic fund transfer receipt, a canceled check, a scanned image of both sides of a canceled check obtained from a bank website, or a credit card statement.

(3) Written communication includes electronic mail correspondence.

(c) Deadline for receipt of substantiation . The substantiation described in paragraph (a) of this section must be received by the donor on or before the earlier of --

(1) The date the donor files the original return for the taxable year in which the contribution was made; or

(2) The due date (including extensions) for filing the donor's original return for that year.

(d) Distributing organizations as donees --(1) In general . The following organizations are treated as donees for purposes of section 170(f)(17) and paragraph (a) of this section, even if the organization (pursuant to the donor's instructions or otherwise) distributes the amount received to one or more organizations described in section 170(c) :

(i) An organization described in section 170(c) .

(ii) An organization described in 5 C.F.R. 950.105 (a Principal Combined Fund Organization for purposes of the Combined Federal Campaign) and acting in that capacity.

(2) Contributions made by payroll deduction . In the case of a charitable contribution made by payroll deduction, a donor is treated as meeting the requirements of section 170(f)(17) and paragraph (a) of this section if, no later than the date described in paragraph (c) of this section, the donor obtains --

(i) A pay stub, Form W-2, "Wage and Tax Statement," or other employerfurnished document that sets forth the amount withheld during the taxable year for payment to a donee; and

(ii) A pledge card or other document prepared by or at the direction of the donee that shows the name of the donee.

(e) Substantiation of out-of-pocket expenses . Paragraph (a)(1) of this section does not apply to a donor who incurs unreimbursed expenses of less than $250 incident to the rendition of services, within the meaning of §1.170A-1(g) . For substantiation of unreimbursed out-of-pocket expenses of $250 or more, see §1.170A-13(f)(10) .

(f) Charitable contributions made by partnership or S corporation . If a partnership or an S corporation makes a charitable contribution, the partnership or S corporation is treated as the donor for purposes of section 170(f)(17) and paragraph (a) of this section.

(g) Transfers to certain trusts . The requirements of section 170(f)(17) and paragraph (a)(1) of this section do not apply to a transfer of a cash, check, or other monetary gift to a trust described in section 170(f)(2)(B) , a charitable remainder annuity trust (as defined in section 664(d)(1) ), or a charitable remainder unitrust (as defined in section 664(d)(2) or (d)(3) or §1.664-3(a)(1)(i)(b)) . The requirements of section 170(f)(17) and paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) of this section do apply, however, to a transfer to a pooled income fund (as defined in section 642(c)(5) ). For contributions of $250 or more, see section 170(f)(8) and §1.170A-13(f)(13) .

(h) Effective/applicability date . This section applies to contributions made after the date these regulations are published as final regulations in the Federal Register .

Par. 5. . Section 1.170A-16 is added to read as follows:



§1.170A-16 Substantiation and reporting requirements for noncash charitable contributions .

(a) Substantiation of charitable contributions of less than $250 --(1) Individuals, partnerships, and certain corporations required to obtain receipt . Except as provided in paragraph (a)(2) of this section, no deduction is allowed under section 170(a) for a noncash charitable contribution of less than $250 by an individual, partnership, S corporation, or C corporation that is a personal service corporation or closely held corporation unless the donor maintains for each contribution a receipt from the donee showing the following information:

(i) The name and address of the donee;

(ii) The date of the contribution;

(iii) A description of the property in sufficient detail under the circumstances (taking into account the value of the property) for a person who is not generally familiar with the type of property to ascertain that the described property is the contributed property; and

(iv) In the case of securities, the name of the issuer, the type of security, and whether the securities are publicly traded securities within the meaning of §1.170A- 13(c)(7)(xi).

(2) Substitution of reliable written records --(i) In general . If it is impractical to obtain a receipt (for example, a donor deposits canned food at a donee's unattended drop site), the donor may satisfy the recordkeeping rules of this paragraph (a)(2)(i) by maintaining reliable written records (as described in paragraphs (a)(2)(ii) and (a)(2)(iii) of this section) for the contributed property.

(ii) Reliable written records . The reliability of written records is to be determined on the basis of all of the facts and circumstances of a particular case, including the contemporaneous nature of the writing evidencing the contribution.

(iii) Contents of reliable written records . Reliable written records must include --

(A) The information required by paragraph (a)(1) of this section;

(B) The fair market value of the property on the date the contribution was made;

(C) The method used in determining the fair market value; and

(D) In the case of a contribution of clothing or a household item as defined in



§1.170A-18(c), the condition of the item.

(3) Additional substantiation rules may apply . For additional substantiation rules, see paragraph (f) of this section.

(b) Substantiation of charitable contributions of $250 or more but not more than $500 . No deduction is allowed under section 170(a) for a noncash charitable contribution of $250 or more but not more than $500 unless the donor substantiates the contribution with a contemporaneous written acknowledgment (as described in section 170(f)(8) and §1.170A-13(f)) .

(c) Substantiation of charitable contributions of more than $500 but not more than $5,000 --(1) In general . No deduction is allowed under section 170(a) for a noncash charitable contribution of more than $500 but not more than $5,000 unless the donor substantiates the contribution with a contemporaneous written acknowledgment (as described in section 170(f)(8) and §1.170A-13(f)) and meets the applicable requirements of this section.

(2) Individuals, partnerships, and certain corporations also required to file Form 8283 (Section A) . No deduction is allowed under section 170(a) for a noncash charitable contribution of more than $500 but not more than $5,000 by an individual, partnership, S corporation, or C corporation that is a personal service corporation or closely held corporation unless the donor --

(i) Substantiates the contribution with a contemporaneous written acknowledgment (as described in section 170(f)(8) and §1.170A-13(f)) ; and

(ii) Completes Form 8283 (Section A), "Noncash Charitable Contributions" (as provided in paragraph (c)(3) of this section), or a successor form, and files it with the return on which the deduction is claimed.

(3) Completion of Form 8283 (Section A) . A completed Form 8283 (Section A) includes --

(i) The donor's name and taxpayer identification number (social security number if the donor is an individual or employer identification number if the donor is a partnership or corporation);

(ii) The name and address of the donee;

(iii) The date of the contribution;

(iv) The following information about the contributed property:

(A) A description of the property in sufficient detail under the circumstances (taking into account the value of the property) for a person who is not generally familiar with the type of property to ascertain that the described property is the contributed property;

(B) In the case of real or personal property, the condition of the property;

(C) In the case of securities, the name of the issuer, the type of security, and whether the securities are publicly traded securities within the meaning of §1.170A- 13(c)(7)(xi); and

(D) The fair market value of the property on the date the contribution was made and the method used in determining the fair market value;

(v) The manner of acquisition (for example, by purchase, gift, bequest, inheritance, or exchange), and the approximate date of acquisition of the property by the donor (except that in the case of a contribution of publicly traded securities as defined in §1.170A-13(c)(7)(xi) , a representation that the donor held the securities for more than one year is sufficient) or, if the property was created, produced, or manufactured by or for the donor, the approximate date the property was substantially completed;

(vi) The cost or other basis, adjusted as provided by section 1016 , of the property (except that the cost or basis is not required for contributions of publicly traded securities (as defined in §1.170A-13(c)(7)(xi)) that if sold on the contribution date would have resulted in long term capital gain);

(vii) In the case of tangible personal property, whether the donee has certified it for a use related to the purpose or function constituting the donee's basis for exemption under section 501 (or in the case of a governmental unit, an exclusively public purpose); and

(viii) Any other information required by Form 8283 (Section A) or the instructions to Form 8283 (Section A).

(4) Additional requirement for certain motor vehicle contributions . In the case of a contribution of a qualified vehicle described in section 170(f)(12)(A)(ii) for which an acknowledgment under section 170(f)(12)(B)(iii) is provided to the IRS by the donee organization, the donor must attach a copy of the acknowledgment to the Form 8283 (Section A) for the return on which the deduction is claimed.

(5) Additional substantiation rules may apply . For additional substantiation rules, see paragraph (f) of this section.

(d) Substantiation of charitable contributions of more than $5,000 --(1) In general . Except as provided in paragraph (d)(2) of this section, no deduction is allowed under section 170(a) for a noncash charitable contribution of more than $5,000 unless the donor --

(i) Substantiates the contribution with a contemporaneous written acknowledgment (as described in section 170(f)(8) and §1.170A-13(f)) ;

(ii) Obtains a qualified appraisal (as defined in §1.170A-17(a)(1)) prepared by a qualified appraiser (as defined in §1.170A-17)(b)(1)) ; and

(iii) Completes Form 8283 (Section B) (as provided in paragraph (d)(3) of this section), or a successor form, and files it with the return on which the deduction is claimed.

(2) Exception for certain noncash contributions . A qualified appraisal is not required, and a completed Form 8283 (Section A) (containing the information required in paragraph (c)(3) of this section) meets the requirements of paragraph (d)(1)(iii) of this section for contributions of --

(i) Publicly traded securities as defined in §1.170A-13(c)(7)(xi) ;

(ii) Property described in section 170(e)(1)(B)(iii) (certain intellectual property);

(iii) A qualified vehicle described in section 170(f)(12)(A)(ii) for which an acknowledgment under section 170(f)(12)(B)(iii) is provided to the IRS by the donee organization and attached to the Form 8283 (Section A) by the donor; and

(v) Property described in section 1221(a)(1) (inventory and property held by the donor primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of the donor's trade or business).

(3) Completed Form 8283 (Section B) . A completed Form 8283 (Section B) includes --

(i) The donor's name and taxpayer identification number (social security number if the donor is an individual or employer identification number if the donor is a partnership or corporation);

(ii) The donee's name, address, taxpayer identification number, and signature, the date signed by the donee, and the date the donee received the property;

(iii) The appraiser's name, address, taxpayer identification number, appraiser declaration (as described in paragraph (d)(4) of this section), signature, and the date signed by the appraiser;

(iv) The following information about the contributed property:

(A) The fair market value on the valuation effective date (as defined in §1.170A- 17(a)(5)(i)).

(B) A description in sufficient detail under the circumstances (taking into account the value of the property) for a person who is not generally familiar with the type of property to ascertain that the described property is the contributed property.

(C) In the case of real or tangible personal property, the condition of the property;

(v) The manner of acquisition (for example, by purchase, gift, bequest, inheritance, or exchange), and the approximate date of acquisition of the property by the donor, or, if the property was created, produced, or manufactured by or for the donor, the approximate date the property was substantially completed;

(vi) The cost or other basis, adjusted as provided by section 1016 ;

(vii) A statement explaining whether the charitable contribution was made by means of a bargain sale and, if so, the amount of any consideration received from the donee for the contribution; and

(viii) Any other information required by Form 8283 (Section B) or the instructions to Form 8283 (Section B).

(4) Appraiser declaration . The appraiser declaration referred to in paragraph (d)(3)(iii) of this section must include the following statement: "I understand that my appraisal will be used in connection with a return or claim for refund. I also understand that, if a substantial or gross valuation misstatement of the value of the property claimed on the return or claim for refund results from my appraisal, I may be subject to a penalty under section 6695A of the Internal Revenue Code, as well as other applicable penalties. I affirm that I have not been barred from presenting evidence or testimony before the Department of the Treasury or the Internal Revenue Service pursuant to 31 U.S.C. section 330(c) ."

(5) Donee signature --(i) Person authorized to sign . The person who signs Form 8283 for the donee must be either an official authorized to sign the tax or information returns of the donee, or a person specifically authorized to sign Forms 8283 by that official. In the case of a donee that is a governmental unit, the person who signs Form 8283 for the donee must be an official of the governmental unit.

(ii) Effect of donee signature . The signature of the donee on Form 8283 does not represent concurrence in the appraised value of the contributed property. Rather, it represents acknowledgment of receipt of the property described in Form 8283 on the date specified in Form 8283 and that the donee understands the information reporting requirements imposed by section 6050L and §1.6050L-1 .

(iii) Certain information not required on Form 8283 before donee signs . Before Form 8283 is signed by the donee, Form 8283 must be completed (as described in paragraph (d)(3) of this section), except that it is not required to contain the following:

(A) Information about the qualified appraiser or the appraiser declaration.

(B) The manner or date of acquisition.

(C) The cost or other basis of the property.

(D) The appraised fair market value of the contributed property.

(E) The amount claimed as a charitable contribution.

(6) Additional substantiation rules may apply . For additional substantiation rules, see paragraph (f) of this section.

(e) Substantiation of noncash charitable contributions of more than $500,000 --

(1) In general . Except as provided in paragraph (e)(2) of this section, no deduction is allowed under section 170(a) for a noncash charitable contribution of more than $500,000 unless the donor --

(i) Substantiates the contribution with a contemporaneous written acknowledgment (as described in section 170(f)(8) and §1.170A-13(f)) ;

(ii) Obtains a qualified appraisal (as defined in §1.170A-17(a)(1)) prepared by a qualified appraiser (as defined in §1.170A-17(b)(1)) ;

(iii) Completes (as described in paragraph (d)(3) of this section) Form 8283 (Section B) and files it with the return on which the deduction is claimed; and

(iv) Attaches the qualified appraisal of the property to the return on which the deduction is claimed.

(2) Exception for certain noncash contributions . For contributions of property described in paragraph (d)(2) of this section, a qualified appraisal is not required, and a completed Form 8283 (Section A) (containing the information required in paragraph (c)(3) of this section) meets the requirements of paragraph (e)(1)(iii) of this section.

(3) Additional substantiation rules may apply . For additional substantiation rules, see paragraph (f) of this section.

(f) Additional substantiation requirements that may be applicable to any noncash contribution --(1) Signed Form 8283 furnished by donor to donee . A donor who presents a Form 8283 to a donee for signature must furnish to the donee a copy of Form 8283 as signed by the donee.

(2) Number of Forms 8283 --(i) In general . For each item of contributed property for which a Form 8283 is required under paragraphs (c), (d), or (e) of this section, a donor must attach a separate Form 8283 to the return on which the deduction for the item is claimed.

(ii) Exception for similar items . The donor may attach a single Form 8283 for all similar items of property (as defined in §1.170A-13(c)(7)(iii)) contributed to the same donee during the donor's taxable year, if the donor includes on Form 8283 the information required by paragraph (c)(3) or (d)(3) of this section for each item of property.

(3) Substantiation requirements for carryovers of noncash contribution deductions . The rules in paragraphs (c)(2)(ii), (d)(1)(iii), (d)(2), (e)(1)(iii) and (e)(1)(iv) of this section (regarding substantiation that must be submitted with a return) apply to the return for any carryover year under section 170(d) .

(4) Partners and S corporation shareholders --(i) Form 8283 must be provided to partners and S corporation shareholders . If the donor is a partnership or S corporation, the donor must provide a copy of the completed Form 8283 to every partner or shareholder who receives an allocation of a charitable contribution deduction under section 170 for the property described in Form 8283.

(ii) Partners and S corporation shareholders must attach Form 8283 to return . A partner of a partnership or shareholder of an S corporation who receives an allocation of a deduction under section 170 for a charitable contribution of property to which paragraphs (c), (d), or (e) of this section applies must attach a copy of the partnership's or S corporation's completed Form 8283 to the return on which the deduction is claimed.

(5) Determination of deduction amount for purposes of substantiation rules --(i) In general . In determining whether the amount of a donor's deduction exceeds the amounts set forth in section 170(f)(11)(B) (noncash contributions exceeding $500), 170(f)(11)(C) (noncash contributions exceeding $5,000), or 170(f)(11)(D) (noncash contributions exceeding $500,000), the rules of paragraphs (f)(5)(ii) and (f)(5)(iii) of this section apply.

(ii) Similar items of property must be aggregated . Under section 170(f)(11)(F) , the donor must aggregate the amount claimed as a deduction for all similar items of property (as defined in §1.170A-13(c)(7)(iii)) contributed during the taxable year. For rules regarding the number of qualified appraisals and Forms 8283 required if similar items of property are contributed, see §§1.170A-13(c)(3)(iv)(A) and 1.170A- 13(c)(4)(iv)(B).

(iii) For contributions of certain inventory and scientific property, excess of amount claimed over cost of goods sold taken into account . (A) In general . In determining the amount of a donor's contribution of property to which section 170(e)(3) or (4) applies, the donor must take into account only the excess of the amount claimed as a deduction over the amount that would have been treated as the cost of goods sold if the donor had sold the contributed property to the donee.

(B) Example . The following example illustrates the rule of this paragraph (f)(5)(iii):

Example . X Corporation makes a contribution to which section 170(e)(3) applies of clothing for the care of the needy. The cost of the property to X Corporation is $5,000, and, pursuant to section 170(e)(3)(B) , X Corporation claims a charitable contribution deduction of $8,000. The amount taken into account for purposes of determining the $5,000 threshold of paragraph (d) of this section is $3,000 ($8,000- $5,000).

(6) Failure due to reasonable cause . If a donor fails to meet the requirements of paragraphs (c), (d), or (e) of this section, the donor's deduction will be disallowed unless the donor establishes that the failure was due to reasonable cause and not to willful neglect. The donor may establish that the failure was due to reasonable cause and not to willful neglect only if the donor --

(i) Submits with the return a detailed explanation that the failure to meet the requirements of this section was due to reasonable cause and not to willful neglect;

(ii) Obtained a contemporaneous written acknowledgment (as required by section 170(f)(8) and §1.170A-13(f)(3)) ; and

(iii) Obtained a qualified appraisal (as defined by section 170(f)(11)(E)(i) and §1.170A-17(a)(1)) prepared by a qualified appraiser (as defined by section 170(f)(11)(E)(ii) and §1.170A-17(b)(1)) within the dates specified in §1.170A-17(a)(4) , if required.

(7) Additional requirement for returns claiming conservation easements for buildings in registered historic districts . [Reserved]

(g) Effective/applicability date . This section applies to contributions made after the date these regulations are published as final regulations in the Federal Register .

Par. 6. Section 1.170A-17 is added to read as follows:

§1.170A-17 Qualified appraisal and qualified appraiser .

(a) Qualified appraisal --(1) Definition . For purposes of section 170(f)(11) and §§1.170A-16(d)(1)(ii) and 1.170A-16(e)(1)(ii), the term qualified appraisal means an appraisal document that is prepared by a qualified appraiser (as defined in paragraph (b)(1) of this section) in accordance with generally accepted appraisal standards (as defined in paragraph (a)(2) of this section) and otherwise complies with the requirements of this paragraph (a).

(2) Generally accepted appraisal standards defined . For purposes of paragraph (a)(1) of this section, generally accepted appraisal standards means the substance and principles of the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice, as developed by the Appraisal Standards Board of the Appraisal Foundation.

(3) Contents of qualified appraisal . A qualified appraisal must include --

(i) The following information about the contributed property:

(A) A description in sufficient detail under the circumstances (taking into account the value of the property) for a person who is not generally familiar with the type of property to ascertain that the appraised property is the contributed property.

(B) In the case of real or personal tangible property, the condition of the property.

(C) The valuation effective date (as defined in paragraph (a)(5)(i) of this section).

(D) The fair market value (within the meaning of §1.170A-1(c)(2)) of the contributed property on the valuation effective date;

(ii) The terms of any agreement or understanding by or on behalf of the donor and donee that relates to the use, sale, or other disposition of the contributed property, including, for example, the terms of any agreement or understanding that --

(A) Restricts temporarily or permanently a donee's right to use or dispose of the contributed property;

(B) Reserves to, or confers upon, anyone (other than a donee or an organization participating with a donee in cooperative fundraising) any right to the income from the contributed property or to the possession of the property, including the right to vote contributed securities, to acquire the property by purchase or otherwise, or to designate the person having income, possession, or right to acquire; or

(C) Earmarks contributed property for a particular use;

(iii) The date (or expected date) of the contribution to the donee;

(iv) The following information about the appraiser:

(A) Name, address, and taxpayer identification number.

(B) Qualifications to value the type of property being valued, including the appraiser's education and experience.

(C) If the appraiser is acting in his or her capacity as a partner in a partnership, an employee of any person (whether an individual, corporation, or partnership), or an independent contractor engaged by a person other than the donor, the name, address, and taxpayer identification number of the partnership or the person who employs or engages the qualified appraiser;

(v) The signature of the appraiser and the date signed by the appraiser (appraisal report date);

(vi) The following declaration by the appraiser: "I understand that my appraisal will be used in connection with a return or claim for refund. I also understand that, if a substantial or gross valuation misstatement of the value of the property claimed on the return or claim for refund results from my appraisal, I may be subject to a penalty under section 6695A of the Internal Revenue Code, as well as other applicable penalties. I affirm that I have not been barred from presenting evidence or testimony before the Department of the Treasury or the Internal Revenue Service pursuant to 31 U.S.C. section 330(c) ;"

(vii) A statement that the appraisal was prepared for income tax purposes;

(viii) The method of valuation used to determine the fair market value, such as the income approach, the market-data approach, or the replacement-cost-lessdepreciation approach; and

(ix) The specific basis for the valuation, such as specific comparable sales transactions or statistical sampling, including a justification for using sampling and an explanation of the sampling procedure employed.

(4) Timely appraisal report . A qualified appraisal must be signed and dated by the qualified appraiser no earlier than 60 days before the date of the contribution and no later than --

(i) The due date (including extensions) of the return on which the deduction for the contribution is first claimed;

(ii) In the case of a donor that is a partnership or S corporation, the due date (including extensions) of the return on which the deduction for the contribution is first reported; or

(iii) In the case of a deduction first claimed on an amended return, the date on which the amended return is filed.

(5) Valuation effective date --(i) Definition . The valuation effective date is the date to which the value opinion applies.

(ii) Timely valuation effective date . For an appraisal report dated before the date of the contribution (as described in §1.170A-1(b)) , the valuation effective date must be no earlier than 60 days before the date of the contribution and no later than the date of the contribution. For an appraisal report dated on or after the date of the contribution, the valuation effective date must be the date of the contribution.

(6) Exclusion for donor knowledge of falsity . An appraisal is not a qualified appraisal for a particular contribution, even if the requirements of this paragraph (a) are met, if a reasonable person would conclude that the donor failed to disclose or misrepresented facts that would cause the appraiser to overstate the value of the contributed property.

(7) Number of appraisals required . A donor must obtain a separate qualified appraisal for each item of property for which an appraisal is required under paragraphs (c), (d), or (e) of this section and that is not included in a group of similar items of property (as defined in §1.170A-13(c)(7)(iii)) . For rules regarding the number of appraisals required if similar items of property are contributed, see §1.170A- 13(c)(3)(iv)(A).

(8) Prohibited appraisal fees . The fee for a qualified appraisal cannot be based to any extent on the appraised value of the property. For example, a fee for an appraisal will be treated as based on the appraised value of the property if any part of the fee depends on the amount of the appraised value that is allowed by the IRS after an examination.

(9) Retention of qualified appraisal . The donor must retain the qualified appraisal for so long as it may be relevant in the administration of any internal revenue law.

(10) Appraisal disregarded pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 330(c) . If an appraisal is disregarded pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 330(c), it has no probative effect as to the value of the appraised property and does not satisfy the appraisal requirements of paragraphs (d) and (e) of this section, unless the appraisal and Form 8283 include the appraiser signature, the date signed by the appraiser, and the appraiser declaration described in paragraphs (a)(3)(v) and (a)(3)(vi) of this section and §§1.170A-16(d)(3)(iii) and (d)(4), and the donor had no knowledge that the signature, date, or declaration was false when the appraisal and Form 8283 were signed by the appraiser.

(11) Partial interest . If the contributed property is a partial interest, the appraisal must be of the partial interest.

(b) Qualified appraiser --(1) Definition . For purposes of section 170(f)(11) and §§1.170A-16(d)(1)(ii) and 1.170A-16(e)(1)(ii), the term qualified appraiser means an individual with verifiable education and experience in valuing the relevant type of property for which the appraisal is performed (as described in paragraphs (b)(2) through (b)(4) of this section).

(2) Education and experience in valuing relevant type of property . (i) In general . An individual is treated as having education and experience in valuing the relevant type of property within the meaning of paragraph (b)(1) of this section if, as of the date the individual signs the appraisal, the individual has --

(A) Successfully completed (for example, received a passing grade on a final examination) professional or college-level coursework (as described in paragraph (b)(2)(ii) of this section) in valuing the relevant type of property (as described in paragraph (b)(3) of this section), and has two or more years of experience in valuing the relevant type of property (as described in paragraph (b)(3) of this section); or

(B) Earned a recognized appraisal designation (as described in paragraph (b)(2)(iii) of this section) for the relevant type of property (as described in paragraph (b)(3) of this section).

(ii) Coursework must be obtained from professional or college-level educational institution, appraisal organization, or employer educational program . For purposes of paragraph (b)(2)(i)(A) of this section, the coursework must be obtained from --

(A) A professional or college-level educational organization described in section 170(b)(1)(A)(ii) ;

(B) A generally recognized professional appraisal organization that regularly offers educational programs in the principles of valuation; or

(C) An employer as part of an employee apprenticeship or educational program substantially similar to the educational programs described in paragraphs (b)(2)(ii)(A) and (B) of this section.

(iii) Recognized appraisal designation defined . A recognized appraisal designation means a designation awarded by a recognized professional appraiser organization on the basis of demonstrated competency. For example, an appraiser who has earned a designation similar to the Member of the Appraisal Institute (MAI), Senior Residential Appraiser (SRA), Senior Real Estate Appraiser (SREA), or Senior Real Property Appraiser (SRPA) membership designation has earned a recognized appraisal designation.

(3) Relevant type of property defined --(i) In general . The relevant type of property means the category of property customary in the appraisal field for an appraiser to value.

(ii) Examples . The following examples illustrate the rule of paragraph (b)(3)(i) of this section:

Example (1) . Coursework in valuing relevant type of property . There are very few professional-level courses offered in widget appraising, and it is customary in the appraisal field for personal property appraisers to appraise widgets. Appraiser A has successfully completed professional-level coursework in valuing personal property generally but has completed no coursework in valuing widgets. The coursework completed by Appraiser A is for the relevant type of property under paragraphs (b)(2)(i) and (b)(3)(i) of this section.

Example (2) . Experience in valuing relevant type of property . It is customary for professional antique appraisers to appraise antique widgets. Appraiser A has 2 years of experience in valuing antiques generally and is asked to appraise an antique widget. Appraiser A has obtained experience in valuing the relevant type of property under paragraphs (b)(2)(i) and (b)(3)(i) of this section.

Example (3) . No experience in valuing relevant type of property . It is not customary for professional antique appraisers to appraise new widgets. Appraiser A has experience in appraising antiques generally but no experience in appraising new widgets. Appraiser A is asked to appraise a new widget. Appraiser A does not have experience in valuing the relevant type of property under paragraphs (b)(2)(i) and (b)(3)(i) of this section.

(4) Verifiable . For purposes of paragraph (b)(1) of this section, education and experience in valuing the relevant type of property are verifiable if the appraiser specifies in the appraisal the appraiser's education and experience in valuing the relevant type of property (as described in paragraphs (b)(2) and (b)(3) of this section), and the appraiser makes a declaration in the appraisal that, because of the appraiser's education and experience described in this paragraph (b)(4), the appraiser is qualified to make appraisals of the relevant type of property being valued.

(5) Individuals who are not qualified appraisers . The following individuals cannot be qualified appraisers for the appraised property:

(i) An individual who receives a fee prohibited by paragraph (a)(8) of this section.

(ii) The donor of the property.

(iii) A party to the transaction in which the donor acquired the property (for example, the individual who sold, exchanged, or gave the property to the donor, or any individual who acted as an agent for the transferor or for the donor for the sale, exchange, or gift), unless the property is contributed within 2 months of the date of acquisition and its appraised value does not exceed its acquisition price.

(iv) The donee of the property.

(v) Any individual who is either --

(A) Related (within the meaning of section 267(b) ) to, or an employee of, any of the individuals described in paragraphs (b)(5)(ii), (b)(5)(iii), or (b)(5)(iv) of this section, or married to an individual who is in a relationship described in section 267(b) with any of the foregoing individuals; or

(B) An independent contractor who is regularly used as an appraiser by any of the individuals described in paragraphs (b)(5)(ii), (b)(5)(iii), or (b)(5)(iv) of this section, and who does not perform a majority of his or her appraisals for others during the taxable year.

(vi) An individual who is prohibited from practicing before the Internal Revenue Service by the Secretary under 31 U.S.C. section 330(c) at any time during the 3-year period ending on the date the appraisal is signed by the individual.

(c) Effective/applicability date . This section applies to contributions made after the date these regulations are published as final regulations in the Federal Register .

Par. 7. Section 1.170A-18 is added to read as follows:

§1.170A-18 Contributions of clothing and household items --(a) In general . Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, no deduction is allowed under section 170(a) for a contribution of clothing or a household item (as described in paragraph (c) of this section) unless --

(1) The item is in good used condition or better at the time of the contribution; and

(2) The donor meets the substantiation requirements of §1.170A-16 .

(b) Certain contributions of clothing or household items with claimed value of more than $500 . The rule described in paragraph (a)(1) of this section does not apply to a contribution of a single item of clothing or a household item for which a deduction of more than $500 is claimed, if the donor submits with the return on which the deduction is claimed a qualified appraisal (as defined in §1.170A-17(a)(1)) of the property prepared by a qualified appraiser (as defined in §1.170A-17(b)(1)) and a completed Form 8283 (Section B) (as described in §1.170A-16(d)(3)) .

(c) Definition of household items . For purposes of section 170(f)(16) and this section, the term household items includes furniture, furnishings, electronics, appliances, linens, and other similar items. Food, paintings, antiques, and other objects of art, jewelry, gems, and collections are not household items.

(d) Effective/applicability date . This section applies to contributions made after the date these regulations are published as final regulations in the Federal Register .


Acting Deputy Commissioner for Services and Enforcement.



Sherri L. Brown


[FR Doc. 2008-17953 Filed 08/06/2008 at 8:45 am; Publication Date: 08/07/2008]

Labels:

Wednesday, August 6, 2008

An individual was entitled to challenge his underlying tax liability during a Collection Due Process hearing because he did not receive a notice of deficiency in time to petition the court. The IRS did not produce any evidence to show that the notice of deficiency was sent to the taxpayer at his address in prison where he resided at the time a notice was sent to his home and during the period in which he could have petitioned the court. The fact that the taxpayer's wife petitioned the court in response to a notice sent to her home only showed that she received the notice and that it was mailed to the couple's personal residence; it did not show that the taxpayer received the notice.





Michael L. Conn v. Commissioner.

Dkt. No. 4422-07L , TC Memo. 2008-186, August 5, 2008.

[Code Sec. 6330]




Eric Johnson, for petitioner; Emile L. Hebert III, for respondent.





MEMORANDUM OPINION



HAINES, Judge: Pursuant to section 6330(d),1 petitioner seeks review of respondent's determination to proceed with the collection of petitioner's unpaid 1993 Federal income tax liability. The issue is whether petitioner received a notice of deficiency for 1993, thus precluding him from challenging the 1993 liability during his section 6330 hearing.





Background



The parties submitted this case fully stipulated pursuant to Rule 122. The stipulation of facts, along with the attached exhibits, is incorporated herein by this reference. Petitioner resided in Louisiana at the time his petition was filed.



Petitioner and his wife, Patricia A. Conn, timely filed a joint Federal income tax return for 1993. Petitioner was subsequently convicted of embezzlement and sentenced to 21 months in Federal prison. He began serving his sentence in December 1996 in a Federal penitentiary in El Paso, Texas.



On March 6, 1997, respondent's Chief Counsel Office in New Orleans, Louisiana, received a proposed joint notice of deficiency for petitioner and Ms. Conn for 1993 through 1995 from the Internal Revenue Service auditor who prepared the notice. Included with the proposed notice were two pages which showed the notice should be sent to the couple's Slidell, Louisiana, address2 as well as to a post office box at the Federal penitentiary in El Paso, Texas.



Respondent mailed petitioner and Ms. Conn a joint notice of deficiency dated April 8, 1997, at their Slidell address. Respondent determined that petitioner and Ms. Conn received unreported embezzlement income in 1993 and that petitioner, but not Ms. Conn, was liable for a fraud penalty under section 6663. Petitioner does not recall receiving a notice of deficiency for 1993. Ms. Conn does not recall providing petitioner a copy of the 1993 notice of deficiency at any time between April 8 and July 10, 1997.



In response to the notice of deficiency Ms. Conn, but not petitioner, timely filed a petition with this Court on July 10, 1997. Before trial respondent conceded that under the provisions of section 6015 Ms. Conn was not liable for the deficiency, and the Court entered a decision based on the parties' settlement.



On September 9, 1997, respondent assessed the 1993 income tax deficiency and section 6663 penalty against petitioner. Petitioner was released from prison in February 1998. On January 16, 2003, respondent issued petitioner two Notices of Federal Tax Lien Filing and Your Right to a Hearing Under IRC 6320 for 1993. On February 7, 2003, respondent issued petitioner a Final Notice of Intent to Levy and Notice of Your Right to a Hearing for 1993.



On February 15, 2003, petitioner timely requested an Appeals hearing pursuant to sections 6320 and 6330. During his hearing petitioner sought to challenge the 1993 liability. Petitioner took the position that although he was convicted of embezzlement, he did not direct the embezzled funds to himself or use those funds for personal purposes. On January 18, 2007, respondent's Appeals officer issued petitioner a Notice of Determination Concerning Collection Actions Under Section 6320 and 6330. The Appeals officer determined that petitioner was precluded from challenging the 1993 liability because he failed to file a petition with this Court in response to the notice of deficiency dated April 8, 1997.





Discussion



Before the Commissioner may levy on any property or property right of a taxpayer, the taxpayer must be provided written notice of the right to request a hearing, and such notice must be provided no less than 30 days before the levy is made. Sec. 6330(a). Section 6320(a) requires that the Commissioner furnish the taxpayer with written notice of the filing of a Federal tax lien within 5 business days after the lien is filed. Section 6320 further provides that the taxpayer may request an Appeals hearing within 30 days beginning on the day after the 5-day period described above. Sec. 6320(a)(3)(B), (b)(1). If the taxpayer requests a hearing under either section 6320 or 6330, an Appeals officer of the Commissioner must hold the hearing. Secs. 6320(b)(1), 6330(b)(1). Within 30 days of the issuance of the Appeals officer's determination, the taxpayer may seek judicial review of the determination. Sec. 6330(d)(1).



At the hearing the taxpayer may raise any relevant issue relating to the unpaid tax or the proposed levy, including appropriate spousal defenses, challenges to the appropriateness of collection actions, and offers of collection alternatives. Sec. 6330(c)(2)(A). Section 6330(c)(2)(B) limits the taxpayer's ability to challenge the underlying tax liability during the hearing. Specifically, the taxpayer may "raise at the hearing challenges to the existence or amount of the underlying tax liability for any tax period if the person did not receive any statutory notice of deficiency for such tax liability or did not otherwise have an opportunity to dispute such tax liability." Id.



Respondent argues that for purposes of section 6330(c)(2)(B), the mailing of a notice of deficiency to the taxpayer's last known address is sufficient. Respondent is mistaken. Under section 6330(c)(2)(B), the receipt of a notice of deficiency, not its mailing, is the relevant event.3 A taxpayer is precluded from challenging the liability if the taxpayer actually received a notice of deficiency in time to petition this Court for a redetermination of the deficiency.4 Sec. 6330(c)(2)(B); Kuykendall v. Commissioner, 129 T.C. 77, 80 (2007); sec. 301.6330-1(e)(3), Q&A-E2, Proced. & Admin. Regs. If the taxpayer did not actually receive the notice in time to petition this Court, the taxpayer is entitled to challenge the underlying liability. Kuykendall v. Commissioner, supra at 81-82.



A properly completed U.S. Postal Service Form 3877 reflecting the timely mailing of a notice of deficiency to a taxpayer at the taxpayer's correct address by certified mail, absent evidence to the contrary, establishes that the notice was properly mailed to the taxpayer. United States v. Zolla, 724 F.2d 808, 810 (9th Cir. 1984); Coleman v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 82, 90-91 (1990). Furthermore, compliance with certified mail procedures raises a presumption of official regularity with respect to notices sent by the Commissioner. See United States v. Zolla, supra at 810. If the presumption is raised and the taxpayer does not rebut the presumption, the Court may find that the taxpayer received the notice of deficiency, thus precluding challenges to the underlying liability under section 6330(c)(2)(B). See, e.g., Sego v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 604, 611 (2000); Clark v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-155.



However, respondent has not produced any evidence, such as U.S. Postal Service Form 3877, which shows that the notice of deficiency was sent to petitioner at his address in prison, where he resided at the time the notice was sent and during the period in which to petition this Court. Cf. Sego v. Commissioner, supra at 610 (the Commissioner introduced into evidence Form 3877 indicating that the notice was sent to the taxpayers at their correct address); Clark v. Commissioner, supra (same).



Respondent's argument that petitioner actually received the notice of deficiency is based on the fact that Ms. Conn petitioned this Court in response to the notice. That Ms. Conn petitioned this Court shows that she received the notice and that it was mailed to the Slidell address.5 It does not show that petitioner received the notice.



The parties stipulated that petitioner does not recall receiving a copy of the notice and that Ms. Conn does not recall giving her husband a copy of the notice during the 90-day period in which to petition this Court. Respondent has failed to introduce any evidence indicating that petitioner received the notice. Therefore, on the preponderance of the evidence, we find that petitioner did not actually receive the 1993 notice of deficiency in time to petition this Court. Accordingly, petitioner was entitled to dispute the 1993 liability during his section 6330 hearing.



In cases where the taxpayer did not receive a notice of deficiency for a particular year and did not have an opportunity to challenge the underlying tax liability, we have remanded the matter to the Commissioner's Office of Appeals for a hearing during which the taxpayer may dispute the liability. See, e.g., Kuykendall v. Commissioner, supra at 82. We shall do that in this case as well.



To reflect the foregoing,



An appropriate order will be issued.


1 Unless otherwise indicated, section references are to the Internal Revenue Code, as amended. Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.

2 Ms. Conn has resided at the Slidell address at all relevant times. Petitioner has also resided at the Slidell address at all relevant times other than the period he spent in prison.

3 For the purpose of asserting a deficiency in tax, respondent is authorized to send a notice of deficiency to the taxpayer. Sec. 6212(a). For that purpose, mailing a notice of deficiency to the taxpayer's last known address is sufficient regardless of receipt or nonreceipt. Sec. 6212(b); Pietanza v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 729, 735-736 (1989), affd. without published opinion 935 F.2d 1282 (3d Cir. 1991).

4 If, however, the notice of deficiency was not received because the taxpayer deliberately refused delivery, the taxpayer may not seek to challenge the underlying tax liability at a sec. 6330 hearing or before this Court. Sego v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 604, 611 (2000).

5 That the notice of deficiency was sent to petitioner's last known address is not sufficient to establish that petitioner actually received the notice. See Kuykendall v. Commissioner, 129 T.C. 77 (2007) (taxpayers were entitled to challenge the underlying tax liability during their sec. 6330 hearing when the notice of deficiency was mailed to their last known address, but because petitioners had moved they did not receive the notice in time to petition this Court).

Labels:

Tuesday, August 5, 2008

A corporation could use the percentage-of completion (PCM) method to report income from a highway project as income from a long-term contract. The contract created long-term construction obligations without regard to any proof of defect. Although the corporation did not directly perform any construction work, it bore the obligations of a general contractor. It also bore the entire expense for the reconstruction, rehabilitation, and preventive maintenance work required over the next two decades. The parties knew with certainty that extensive construction work would occur in the future but were uncertain of the amount or timing of the future costs. Further, portions of the contract labeled "warranties" were performance warranties, not traditional warranties, and did not disqualify the contract from PCM treatment. The label was not controlling, since the substance and actual obligations incurred by the corporation indicated that the provisions were part of a long-term contract.




Koch Industries, Inc. and Subsidiaries, Plaintiff v. United States of America, Defendant.

U.S. District Court, Dist. Kan.; 06-1049-JTM, July 10, 2008.




MEMORANDUM AND ORDER


MARTEN, Chief Judge, United States District Court: This is an action by Koch Industries, Inc. and its subsidiary companies seeking to determine whether it may properly report its income from a New Mexico highway project pursuant to the percentage of completion method (PCM) authorized by 26 U.S.C. § 460, IRC § 460. The defendant United States contends that PCM may not be used for any of Koch's income from the project. Both Koch and the United States have moved for summary judgment on the issue. In addition, Koch has moved to strike certain exhibits in the government's Response to its Motion for Summary Judgment. For the reasons that follow, the court grants plaintiff's summary judgment motion.

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must examine all evidence in a light most favorable to the opposing party. McKenzie v. Mercy Hospital, 854 F.2d 365, 367 (10th Cir. 1988). The party moving for summary judgment must demonstrate its entitlement to summary judgment beyond a reasonable doubt. Ellis v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 754 F.2d 884, 885 (10th Cir. 1985). The moving party need not disprove plaintiff's claim; it need only establish that the factual allegations have no legal significance. Dayton Hudson Corp. v. Macerich Real Estate Co., 812 F.2d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 1987).

In resisting a motion for summary judgment, the opposing party may not rely upon mere allegations or denials contained in its pleadings or briefs. Rather, the nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing the presence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial and significant probative evidence supporting the allegation. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). Once the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), the party opposing summary judgment must do more than simply show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. "In the language of the Rule, the nonmoving party must come forward with 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)) (emphasis in Matsushita). One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses, and the rule should be interpreted in a way that allows it to accomplish this purpose. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).



Findings of Fact

Koch Industries, Inc. is a corporation organized under the laws of the state of Kansas. Koch filed consolidated federal income tax returns on behalf of itself and its affiliated group of corporations. Mesa PDC ("Mesa"), a single-member limited liability company, is an indirect subsidiary of Koch, and filed as part of Koch's federal income tax returns.

In 1998, Mesa entered into an "Agreement for Corridor 44 Professional Services and Warranty" with the New Mexico State Highway Transportation Department ("SHTD") relating to the expansion of a roadway in New Mexico known as State Route (SR) 44 or US 550.

On its consolidated federal income tax returns, Koch treated all of the income it received during the years 1998 through 2001 under the Agreement as income from a long-term contract under Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Section 460.

Koch, which had been in the business of producing asphalt for many years, was looking for opportunities to expand to the road-building market and began marketing a concept it called Koch Performance Roads. Koch Performance Roads, Inc. (KPR), is an indirect subsidiary of Koch Industries, Inc. KPR and its affiliates embarked on a new business concept to provide state and local governments with a more cost-effective means to build roads and assure their performance for extended periods of time. The key concept of the business plan centered on KPR's assuming responsibility for all of the reconstruction, rehabilitation, and preventive maintenance work required to continue the road's performance at a high level over a long-term period of time (e.g., 20 years). KPR believed that by adopting a life-cycle approach to road construction, rehabilitation, and reconstruction, states could obtain a high-performing road for a longer period of time at a lower overall cost. KPR projected that it could deliver these savings by combining superior knowledge (e.g., design, construction, management, asphalt) in the construction process with more active and continuous rehabilitation work during the long-term performance period.

Koch stated the purpose of the new asphalt technology in a "vision" statement for the project.:


The Performance Roadtrade; objective is to provide a road with lower life cycle costs. Agencies currently spend less on initial construction and then incur greater maintenance and reconstruction expense. A Performance Roadtrade; would spend more on initial construction but would incur far less maintenance and reconstruction costs leading to lower life-cycle costs.


(Heitmann dep., Ex. 34).

Koch Materials, a Koch subsidiary, bought a French company called Elf Asphalt, whose flagship product was a polymer-modified asphalt. Koch believed that the new asphalt, although more expensive than regular asphalt, would last longer, and it marketed it this way to New Mexico. Although Koch had also entered into other Performance Road projects on a smaller scale in Pulawki County, Missouri in 1997, and Springfield Road, Illinois in 1999, it is undisputed that the New Mexico project was KPR's first major project.

At the same time, Koch knew that under the New Mexico agreement, it bore the risk that the pavement would not last longer, and Mesa and New Mexico both projected reconstruction and rehabilitation work.

Pete Rahn, the Secretary of Transportation for the State of New Mexico, wanted to widen SR 44 from two lanes to four lanes. Because the State legislature would not agree to spend State funds, Mr. Rahn had to look elsewhere for financing.

Late in 1996, representatives of Koch met with officials from New Mexico about the Corridor 44 Project. They came up with a creative financing solution, using GARVEE Bonds. The State would issue bonds, and, through innovative financing provisions of the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) would allow the State to pledge future federal-aid highway funds for a term of 18 years to the repayment of the bonds.

Bob Heitmann, Vice President of Koch Materials, met a few weeks later with Rahn and John Fenner, the Adjutant Secretary of Transportation, and discussed the concept of a long term contract or warranty. Koch presented, but Pete Rahn raised the concern that "if they were to fully leverage the funds coming from the Federal Highway Department ... how were they able to keep from spending more money on that road while the bonds were being paid off?" Koch's representatives suggested that New Mexico solicit a competitive bid for constructing SR 44, and that the contract would include "performance measures necessary for that road for the full 20 years while those bonds were being paid off." (Heitmann dep. at 57). There was no discussion at the time about a warranty.

On April 21, 1997, Heitmann sent the Deputy Secretary for Highway Operations a draft proposal for the "financing, construction, and fiscal warranty of pavement that will have a lower life cycle cost to the taxpayer." The proposal included as "Warranty Terms" that the contractor would be "responsible for the condition and upkeep of the pavement for a period of 14 years or the occurrence of a specific number of Equivalent Standard Axle Loads (ESALs)." (Heitmann, Exh. 19).



The Agreement

On July 27, 1998, Mesa and SHTD executed the Agreement. The Agreement was the result of protracted negotiations, with at least ten drafts of the Agreement reviewed by Koch's in-house counsel, outside counsel, SHTD's attorneys, the New Mexico Attorney General's Office, and the FHWA. According to Pete Rahn, Koch was "well represented with legal counsel," because "[w]e understood this thing would be under a great deal of legal and political scrutiny, so we had to ensure that every "I" was dotted and every "T" was crossed." (Rahn Dep. at 21 and 78.).

The Agreement consists of three separately executed contracts, which govern two identifiable phases of the project: the Construction Phase, which related to Mesa's obligations to provide design and construction management services during the initial construction of the road; and a subsequent "Rehabilitation Phase." The government accurately notes that the term "Rehabilitation Phase" is not explicitly contained in the Agreement, but the court finds that the term is appropriate. The terms are a natural, accurate, and useful description of the obligation of Mesa/Koch to do reconstruction, rehabilitation, and preventive maintenance work with respect to the road that commences upon substantial completion of each road segment and continued for approximately 20 years. Mesa's obligations during the Rehabilitation Phase were divided into two parts: (1) doing all work necessary to assure performance of the pavement, which is governed by Exhibit E of the Agreement entitled "Pavement Warranty," and (2) doing all work necessary to assure performance of the structures (e.g., bridges, drainage and erosion structures), which is governed by Exhibit F of the Agreement entitled "Structures Warranty."

Mesa received $46,753,000 under the Professional Services Agreement for its Construction Phase services and $62,000,000 under the Pavement and Structures Warranties for its obligations under the Rehabilitation Phase, with $3,000,000 paid when the road design was complete, $6,000,000 paid at substantial completion of each of segments B, C, and D, and $41,000,000 paid at substantial completion of the road. Koch originally sought a refund for the full amount of the income with the project with respect to the IRS's determination of deficiencies, including the $46,753,000 for the Construction Phase, but subsequently conceded that portion of the claim.

The Pavement Warranty commenced for each segment on the date the segment was substantially complete and will continue for a period of up to 21.5 years (or 20 years from completion of the last segment). The Pavement Warranty contains an overall liability limitation equal to $175,000,000 in the first year after substantial completion of the road. Commencing in year 2 and continuing for each annual period thereafter, the liability limitation is approximately $110,000,000, reduced by amounts already expended and increased by inflation at a 3.5% rate.

The Structures Warranty began for each segment on the date the segment was substantially complete and will continue for approximately 11.5 years. The Structures Warranty contains an overall liability limitation equal to $4,000,000.

The Construction Phase of the project was substantially completed by November 2001.

It is uncontroverted that, during the Construction Phase, Mesa's obligations included the design of the road and the overall management of the road's construction. Although the United States disputes this contention, it does not cite any fact which would controvert the finding, other than noting (without an direct citation to a portion of the record) that a New Mexico State-licensed engineer was required to supervise contract services. Moreover, the United States explicitly admits the plaintiff's contention (Fact ¶ 18) that under the Agreement "Mesa determined the way the work was to be performed, reviewed and commented upon the submissions of prospective bidders, and inspected and certified the construction work." Rahn of the FHWA testified that in the Construction Phase, the State "turn[ed] the contract over to Mesa for them to manage the construction work that was to be done." (Rahn dep. at 33-33, 38).

Due to state law requirements, all construction work was let for bid under contracts directly with New Mexico. Although Mesa had overall management of the construction, state law required that the construction contractors be paid directly by New Mexico from state funds separate from the $46,753,000 paid to Mesa for its Construction Phase services. Those construction contractors were required to provide one-year warranties to New Mexico in their contracts.

As part of the Professional Services Agreement, Mesa provided a traditional Design Warranty and a traditional Construction Management Warranty. Professional Services Agreement §§ 12.1, 12.2. These warranties are separate and distinct from the Pavement and Structures Warranties that are the focus of this litigation. The three-year Construction Management Warranty, described in section 12.2 of the Professional Services Agreement, provides that Mesa will perform its construction management services in accordance with the standard of care normally practiced by construction management firms in performing services of a similar nature at the time and place the services are performed by Mesa.

Under § 1.1 of the Pavement and Structures Warranties, if the road's pavement or structures fail to meet the stated performance criteria at any time during the Rehabilitation Phase, Mesa must repair or replace the pavement or structures as necessary to cause them to meet such criteria. The performance criteria in the Pavement and Structures Warranties are stringent by industry standards. New Mexico is not required to establish or prove any design or construction defects relating to the road before the requirement to repair or replace becomes operational. All that needs to be shown is the road's failure to meet the stated performance criteria.

In addition, Mesa in its sole discretion may undertake such Reconstruction or Preventive Maintenance activities as it deems necessary or appropriate. For all of the required work during the Rehabilitation Phase, Mesa was required to provide design services; initiate, prepare, and submit bid packages to New Mexico; provide management and supervision services; provide certification to New Mexico of payments due and owing; and process purchase orders and other supervised contracts. Although the contracts for performing the repair work would be let for bid by the State, the reconstruction and rehabilitation work is to be performed under Mesa's control, is to be done in a manner determined by Mesa, and Mesa is responsible for its cost. Mesa would determine what work was done and how. According to Rahn of the FHWA, Mesa would have control and responsibility for the road equivalent to what an "owner" would have. (Rahn dep. at 36). Indeed, the former Secretary of the New Mexico SHTD stated that Mesa was free to use peanut butter to build the road as long as NM 44 continued to meet the performance criteria.

As indicated earlier, due to state law requirements, all work under the Pavement and Structures Warranties is required to be performed under contracts let for bid by New Mexico. After the Rehabilitation Phase began, the parties agreed on a modified procurement method that differed from the approach used during the Construction Phase in order to make it easier for Mesa to get rehabilitation work completed without New Mexico's involvement. Rather than let a contract for bid each time construction work was required, as set forth in the Pavement and Structures Warranties at § 2.1, New Mexico agreed to permit job order contracting, which involves letting a single master contract for bid by New Mexico which sets forth unit costs for various types of jobs. When Mesa determines that work is required, it prepares individual task orders defining the scope and specifications of the particular work to be done.

Mesa is required to inspect and certify the work of the construction contractors. Moreover, it must reimburse New Mexico for amounts the State pays construction contractors for any reconstruction, rehabilitation, or preventive maintenance work that is done during the Rehabilitation Phase - even if such amounts exceed the $62,000,000 consideration received by Mesa.

Under § 1.2 of the Pavement & Structures Warranties, Mesa is responsible for virtually all work necessary to ensure that the road satisfies the performance criteria throughout the periods of the Pavement and Structures Warranties. Mesa is excused from responsibility only for certain unusual damage to the Pavement or Structures: (a) damage due to snow plows, vandalism, or cuts for utility crossings or installations or, unless caused by Mesa, damage due to accidents or spills and releases of hazardous materials; (b) damage due to a natural disaster within the meaning of 23 C.F.R. § 668.103 or due to a sudden and unusual natural occurrence not defined as a natural disaster, including a 50-year flood event, collapse, subsidence, falling rocks, explosion, fire, or Act of God; (c) damage due to civil strife or hostilities, including strikes, civil commotion, civil strife, riot, terrorism, sabotage, acts of civil or military authorities, or an Act of War; and (d) damage due to weapon discharges or caused by military equipment or heavy construction equipment resulting from responses to mobilization of military or emergency forces. Notwithstanding these exclusions, Mesa is not excused from responsibility for other consequences of such events (e.g., increased materials costs resulting from increased demand due to a natural disaster, delays caused by strikes). Similarly, as to other acts of nature, the Force Majeure clause in the Pavement and Structures Warranties simply excuses Mesa from being in default in the performance of its obligations under the contract (except the obligation to make payment or reimbursement); it does not shield Mesa from increased costs due to the Force Majeure. Mesa has no responsibility for routine maintenance, including vegetation control; landscape maintenance; litter control; right of way fence maintenance; courtesy patrol; repair of pavement markings, signs, delineations and object markers, and impact attenuators; lighting maintenance; sweeping; repair of guardrails and barriers; retention ponds/detention basins/outfalls repair; snow and ice removal; and cattleguard maintenance. Such routine maintenance remains the responsibility of New Mexico.

Unlike the Professional Services Agreement, the Pavement and Structures Warranties do not label Mesa as New Mexico's agent. Mesa is also required to procure a surety bond equal to its liability limit under the Pavement and Structures Warranties.



Party Expectations

Both New Mexico and Mesa evaluated the expected cost of meeting the obligations under the Pavement and Structures Warranties over a 20-year period. Both parties believed it was certain or virtually certain that the project would require substantial reconstruction and rehabilitation work to be performed during the term of the Pavement and Structures Warranties, as well as preventive maintenance that would extend the life of the road. Leroy Sandoval, the Planning Division Director for the New Mexico SHTD, believed that the agreements would "requir[e] substantial work" during the Rehabilitations Phase. (Sandoval Aff. at ¶ 9). Other witnesses, including FHWA officers who were not parties to the agreements, agreed that substantial expenditures were virtually certain. The United States has supplied no evidence showing any substantial possibility that Koch/Mesa might emerge from the Rehabilitation Period with zero expenses for repair or rehabilitation.

There is general industry agreement that milling and overlaying and full and partial depth patching constitute rehabilitation or reconstruction, while crack filling and sealing, shoulder maintenance, and surface/pothole patching constitute maintenance. Depending on the extent of the work, fog sealing and other surface treatments may constitute preventive maintenance or rehabilitation.

The State of New Mexico anticipated substantial work during the Rehabilitation Phase. Under conventional practices and methods, New Mexico concluded that "at least two overlays of the full 119 miles of the project" would be necessary to maintain the roadway under the performance criteria set out in the Agreement. New Mexico projected that these mills and overlays would cost almost $224 million, and that an additional $2.5 million would be spent on other rehabilitation. All of the projections performed by New Mexico for the Performance Roads project anticipated there would be extensive reconstruction and rehabilitation during the Rehabilitation Phase.

A study performed by Applied Pavement Technology, Inc. for Koch regarding the expected life of roads built with the hot-mix asphalt (HMA) used on NM 44 determined unequivocally that "HMA pavements will not last 20 years without pavement rehabilitation;" generally, the first major rehabilitation or reconstruction work first occurs no later than between years 8-15. (Plf. Exh. 16).

Mesa prepared cost estimates as well, and it is uncontroverted that these estimates anticipated that substantial expenditures would be required during the Rehabilitation Period. The United States disputes this fact (Plf. ¶ 46), but it supplies no evidence in support of its denial. The evidence indicates that Mesa engineers prepared projections of maintenance and reconstruction to be performed over the term of the Pavement Warranty under the most likely case, best case, and worst case. The best and worst cases were each viewed as having a 1 in 40 (2.5%) chance of occurring. Under any of the scenarios, Mesa expected to do milling and overlaying, full-depth patching, surface/pothole patching, fog sealing, other surface treatments, crack filling and sealing, and monitoring and administration. In the expected case, Mesa anticipated spending more than $40 million dollars, including more than $39 million on rehabilitation. In the worst-case scenario, Mesa projected that it would spend slightly more than $94 million in expenditures, most of which (almost $93 million) represented rehabilitation. Even in its best-case scenario, Mesa expected to spend more than $17 million, including more than $16.5 million in rehabilitation. These amounts would be incurred over the 20-year term of the contract. Id.

Dr. Rita Leahy, a pavement expert retained by Koch, with nearly 25 years of experience as a pavement engineer, opined that Mesa's projections were reasonable, but optimistic. She determined that the likely cost of the work required for Mesa to meet its obligations under the Pavement Warranty would exceed the revenues Mesa received. According to Leahy's projections, Mesa would incur the following spending during the Rehabilitation Period.




Mesa Spending (in $
million)

Total Rehabilitation
Scenario Spending Costs

Best Case 68 44-50

Expected Case 102 70-83

Worst Case 131 90-109




Mesa's projections are subject to change because Mesa bears responsibility for any fluctuation in the precise amount of work that will be done, and the materials costs for completing that work are not predictable.

Under all projections by all parties associated with the project, Mesa would perform extensive rehabilitation and reconstruction throughout the Rehabilitation Phase.



Use of the Term "Warranty"

Notwithstanding the fact that both parties and the FHWA understood that Mesa would be required to engage in reconstruction and rehabilitation during the Rehabilitation Phase, the parties called the Pavement and Structures Warranties, "warranties." All of the parties involved, including the FHWA attached no legal significance to that label. The Pavement and Structure Warranties were the first of their kind in the nation. The United States has pointed to no other project which has similar provisions.

At the time, warranties that were used within the pavement industry limited coverage to defects in the pavement and did not require reconstruction and rehabilitation necessitated by normal wear and tear. Although some European countries employed warranties for the pavement itself, the only evidence is that these were for shorter periods of seven to ten years, compared to the 20-year provision in the Agreement between New Mexico and Koch. Typical warranties used in the American pavement industry extend only for the period within which latent defects are expected to manifest themselves, typically two to seven years. Absent such short-term defects, such warranties usually require no significant work.

The Pavement and Structures Warranties are thus significantly different from warranties that had been used in the road-building industry in the United States at the time of the Agreement, both in terms of scope and duration. They are also significantly different from the Design and Construction Management warranties in sections 12.1 and 12.2 of the Professional Services Agreement; from the one-year warranties used by New Mexico in the past and the warranties given by the construction subcontractors in their contracts with New Mexico; and from traditional consumer products warranties with which the parties had personal experience.

The term "warranty" was used for the Pavement and Structures Warranties at the request of New Mexico for political reasons: the term "warranty" was used as an analogy to explain the novel concept to the New Mexico legislators and the public. Koch never agreed with the characterization of the agreements as "warranties." Internally, Koch officers disagreed with the term.

The term "warranty" in its traditional usage did not accurately describe the extent of the obligations imposed on Mesa, which were much greater than those of a traditional warranty. The Pavement and Structures Warranties were heavily negotiated by a specific "warranty team," distinct from those negotiating the Professional Services Agreement.

The price for the Pavement and Structures Warranties was separately stated in the Agreement and paid separately. The $62,000,000 price was a far greater percentage of the initial construction price than one would expect for a traditional warranty.

Mesa earned no profit under the Professional Services Agreement and relied on the Pavement and Structures Warranties for its profits.

Both the Pavement and Structures Warranties remain in effect today. As of July 2007, Mesa had spent approximately $8 million on the Pavement Warranty and just under $2 million on the Structures Warranty. Current projections indicate that Mesa will expend an amount between the original expected amount ($40,942,870) and the original downside case amount ($94,010,183) to meet its obligations.



The FHWA

Before entering the Agreement, New Mexico was required to seek approval from the FHWA to use federal funds for the project. Although not itself a party to the Agreement, the FHWA was very involved in the project. Three FHWA technical writers went to New Mexico to help prepare a SEP-14 (Special Experimental Project) and to help draft applications, which allowed the State to request warranties. The FHWA helped structure the State's request for proposal. The FHWA was also involved in the negotiation and review of the Agreement. Rueben Thomas, the District Administrator for the FHWA, received copies of correspondence between SHTD's General Counsel and Koch's outside counsel, and made comments on and suggestions about the draft Agreement.

Federal funding is available only for work that qualifies as "construction" under the Federal Highway Law. 23 U.S.C. §§ 101(a)(3), 119(a). The federal government will not fund routine "maintentance," but may fund "reconstruction, rehabilitation" projects. (Evan dep. at 8-9).

In a letter dated August 28, 1997, to the Acting Chief Counsel of the FHWA, Arthur Waskey, General Counsel for SHTD, assured the FHWA that the Corridor 44 Project was in compliance with New Mexico procurement laws. Waskey specifically mentioned Section 13-1-28 through 13-1-199 of the New Mexico Procurement Code, which forbids design-build for highway projects, and noted: "Since the Project will be designed by one entity and constructed by a completely independent entity, the Project is not design-build." Waskey noted that the Attorney General's Office would approve the project, and that "the Department strictly kept the distinction between the PDC's services and subsequent construction." (Thomas Dep. Exh. 78).

John Fenner of the SHTD asked the FHWA if there was anything in FHWA regulations which explicitly referenced the eligibility of a warranty reimbursement. Counsel for the FHWA on June 5, 1998, stated that warranty provisions can be included in federal aid highway provisions, subject to the approval by the Division Administrator. Citing 23 C.F.R. § 635.413, counsel stated: "Warranties must be for specific construction product or feature and not for maintenance items not eligible for Federal aid." (Thomas Dep. Exh. 88).

There is nothing in the record to indicate that the FHWA determined that the Pavement and Structures Warranties were in fact "warranties" in a traditional legal sense. The FHWA authorization included the requirement for Koch/Mesa to provide "warranty and preventative maintenance services" under the Warranties. In this context, the FHWA essentially construed "maintenance" in a colloquial sense to include all reconstruction or rehabilitation activities including surface and full-depth patching, milling and overlaying, and micro surfacing treatments provided to "extend the service life of the pavement." (Def. Exh. 32, at 9). Under 23 U.S.C. §§ 101(a)(3) and 119(a) the FHWA funds highway construction contracts; it cannot fund maintenance contracts.

Rueben Thomas, on behalf of the Federal Highway Administration, executed a Federal Project Authorization Agreement on July 31, 1998, for the disbursement of $420,000,000 in federal funds. According to the approval documents, the project was approved as an Innovative Financing Project and Innovative Contracting Project. "The authorization includes the award of the contract to Mesa PDC, LLC., the Project Development Contractor, to provide final design, construction management, and warranty and preventive maintenance services for the Corridor 44 Project." With respect to maintenance, the FHWA wrote: "Future maintenance expenditures necessary to meet the warranty criteria, shown in Table 3, were estimated for each alternative as part of a normal sequence of rehabilitation to ensure that the entire project would endure beyond the 20-year warranty period by a minimum of five years." (Def. Exh. 32, at 4). The cost was broken down as follows:




Design $ 8,320,000

Construction Management 24,150,000

Insurance 3,500,000

General & Administrative 5,000,000

Development Fee 5,500,000

Construction (estimated) 187,530,000

Warranty 62,000,000

Interest 124,000,000


_____________________
Total Federal Cost $420,000,000




The defendant cites Reuben Thomas's deposition statement that in approving the project, "[The FHWA was] approving the Warranty." (Thomas dep. at 11 -12). The deposition testimony, in context, demonstrates that (consistent with the findings above) that FHWA approval reflected an understanding that the warranty would require construction costs:


Q. Because the folks in Washington included the cost of the warranty as something that the feds could cover, does that tell you anything about what they concluded about the work that would be required under that 20-year contract, i.e., whether it was something more than mere maintenance?



A. Yes, it was. They approved it as an innovative contracting procedure, a new concept that they wanted to look at. So it was approved, which required experimental documentations on how it worked and that type of stuff.



Q. Now, you said a little while ago that the federal highway financing couldn't pay for maintenance, but could pay for construction, rehabilitation, reconstruction, et cetera. Correct?



A. Yes. Correct.



Q. So is the fact that the federal government was prepared to include and pay for the cost of the 20-year contract is here indicative of whether Washington reached a conclusion as to whether that was a contract for maintenance, or had elements of a contract for construction, reconstruction or rehabilitation?



...



A. We were approving the warranty -


(Id. at 9-12). Thomas thus testified that the FHWA's approval reflected a conclusion that the Agreement called for construction.



Implementation of the Agreement

The Agreement states the term "Agreement" meant the Agreement for Project Professional Services and the Pavement and Structures Warranties, together with all Exhibits attached. The Exhibits attached to the Contract were:


Exhibit A. Scope of Design Professional Services



Exhibit B. Scope of Construction Management Professional Services



Exhibit C. Term Sheet



Exhibit D. Payment Bond



Exhibit E. Pavement Warranty



Exhibit F. Structures Warranty


Under Section 11.1 SHTD would pay $46,320,000 to Mesa PDC as full compensation for professional services. Section 11.7 of the Agreement provides that $62,000,000 be paid by SHTD to Mesa as full compensation for the Warranty. Section 11.7.1 states


the Warranty Price includes (I) all design, equipment, materials, labor, insurance and bond premiums, home office, job Site and all other overhead, profit and services relating to the Warranty; (ii) all services, equipment, materials, labor provided by PDC Subconsultants; (iii) supervision and management of Warranty work, and (iv) all deliverables specified in the Warranty, Exhibits E and F.


It further provides that "Title to all deliverable shall pass from PDC to SHTD at the time the Warranty Price is paid in full." The Warranty was to be paid according to a time line outlined in Section 11.72 of the Agreement.


$3,000,000 at completion of the Design Complete Schedule



$6,000,000 at substantial completion of Segment B



$6,000,000 at substantial completion of Segment C



$6,000,000 at substantial completion of Segment D



$41,000,000 at substantial completion of the Project


A Schedule of Values was used for SHTD to make partial progress payments for the Professional Services on a monthly basis. The Agreement created the following revenues:




Professional Services - Section 11.1 $ 46,320,000

Professional Services - Amendment #3 433,000

Warranty - Section 11.7 62,000,000


_____________________
Total Contract 108,753,000




(Karpoff Decl. Exh. 33).

The design services portion of the Agreement required Mesa to prepare bid packages for SHTD to use when obtaining road construction contracts with the general contractors that would actually build the road. The design-services portion of the Agreement also required that Mesa provide SHTD with technical assistance during the construction bidding process and provide engineering and design recommendations on the structures foundations, the pavement design, and the drainage. The construction management services portion of the Agreement required Mesa to assist in project planning, to coordinate with the various stakeholders involved in or affected by the project (such as the general contractors, the public, and tribal governments), to provide partnering workshops for stakeholders, to assist in the design-development phase, to review change orders, and to provide certain procedures and project manuals. To perform these services, the Agreement allowed PDC to subcontract these obligations. It also specified which professional engineering and construction management firms could be used. (Agreement Section 3.2.)

Section 3.5.6 of the Professional Services Agreement states "SHTD shall let to bid through competitive sealed bidding, invitations for bids prepared by PDC for performance of Work." Section 3.5.7 states "SHTD shall enter into contract with, and upon receipt of certification of PDC make payment to, contractors awarded contract to perform the Work." This section also requires SHTD to notify such contractors that PDC, as SHTD's agent for construction management, administers all contract and purchase order for the Work. The Contract defines "Work" as all of the construction, reconstruction materials, equipment, services and all other items and activities to be furnished and provided by SHTD's construction contractors and suppliers for the Project.

The "Warranty" is defined in the Agreement to both mean the Pavement Warranty instrument and the Structures Warranty instrument collectively. Section 12.1.1, discussing a three-year design warranty, states "PDC makes no warranties relating to the Work performed by construction contractors, nor does PDC make any other warranties, express or implied, which are not expressly set forth in this Agreement."

The Pavement Warranty provides:


PDC warrants that during the term of this Warranty the Pavement shall meet the Pavement Performance Criteria. If at any time during the term of this Warranty any portion of the Pavement described in the Pavement Performance Criteria shall fail to meet to applicable Pavement Performance Criteria, PDC, shall Repair or Replace the Pavement to the extent necessary to cause such portion of the Pavement to meet the Pavement Performance Criteria.


(Karpoff Decl. Exh. 33, ¶ 1.1).

The Pavement Warranty required Mesa to: (i) provide design services if necessary; (ii) initiate, prepare and submit a bid package to NMSHTD; (iii) "provide management and supervision services for all Warranty Work" and certify to NMSHTD payments due and owing under contracts for Warranty Work; and (iv) process purchase orders and other supervised contracts. SHTD, with the assistance and upon the non-binding recommendation of Mesa, would (i) prequalify construction workers; (ii) advertise invitations to bid; (iii) receive bids, conduct bid openings, open and read bids, perform bid analysis and award contracts; (iv) enter into contracts with contractors, suppliers and vendors for the Warranty Work; and (v) upon certification by Mesa, make payments to the contractors. (Karpoff Decl. Exh. 33). Mesa "at its sole discretion may undertake such Pavement Reconstruction or Preventative Maintenance activities as it deems necessary or appropriate." Mesa was to reimburse SHTD for amounts SHTD expended for Warranty Work. (Id. at ¶ ¶ 2.2 and 2.8).

The Pavement Performance Criteria, to which the Pavement Warranty referred, listed certain minimum acceptable criteria by periods, and established the minimum acceptable criteria for the payment over the term of the Warranty. The periods are divided into four periods of five years' duration, and include performance criteria for smoothness, rut depth, cracking, bleeding, raveling, delamination, pot holes, depressions and shoving. Attachment 2 outlines Mesa's liability limits through year 20 of the warranty. The Pavement Warranty contains an overall liability limitation equal to $175,000,000 in the first year after substantial completion of the road. Commencing in year 2 and continuing for each annual period thereafter, the liability limitation is approximately $110,000,000, reduced by amounts already expended and increased by inflation at a 3.5% rate. The term of the Pavement Warranty is outlined in Section 1.3 of Defendant Exhibit E, which states the term of the Warranty will commence as to each segment on the date on which Substantial Completion of such Segment shall occur and shall continue with respect to such Segment and run for twenty years or 4 million ESALs (Equivalent Standard Axle Loads).

The Structures Warranty states, "PDC warrants that during the term of this Warranty the Structures shall meet the Structures Performance Criteria." "If at any time during the term of this Warranty any of the Structures shall fail to meet the Structures Performance Criteria, PDC shall Repair or Replace the Structure to the extent necessary to cause it to meet the Structure Performance Criteria." The Structures Warranty further provides: "This Section 1.1 does not require SHTD to establish or prove a defect in design or construction management as a condition to PDC performing its obligation under this Section 1.1." Attachment 1 is titled "Structures Performance Criteria" and establishes the minimum acceptable criteria for the Structures over the term of the Warranty. The Structures Warranty has a term limit of ten years or 2,000,000 ESALs, and a liability limit of $4,000,000. (Karpoff Decl. Exh. 9).

The Agreement allowed Mesa to subcontract out the design and contract management professional services to specific firms. Mesa did subcontract out design work to CH2M Hill, and construction management to Flatiron. These companies are referred to in the Agreement as subconsultants. Both companies were unrelated to Mesa. Koch paid those firms $34,020,000 and $8,320,000, respectively, for their services (a total of $42,340,000).

In accordance with Section 3.5.7 of the Agreement, during the Construction Phase SHTD directly entered into subcontracts with four general contractors, all unrelated to Koch, to perform the actual construction job of widening NM 44. Each of the four general contractors was responsible for one of four segments of the NM 44 project. The four general contractors were: Sundt Construction, FNF, LaFarge, and E.L. Yeager. The State's payments to the Construction Phase General Contractors were not part of SHTD's Agreement with Koch, but rather were separate contracts each Construction Phase General Contractor entered into with the State.

Actual construction was substantially completed in accordance with the terms of the Agreement as follows:




Segment A November 16, 2001

Segment B October 16, 2000

Segment C November 16, 2001

Segment D September 6, 2001




Koch had no construction equipment in New Mexico. Indeed, during the construction phase the only equipment Koch had in New Mexico for its three full-time employees based there was a couple of cars. Mesa acted as an agent of the State of New Mexico during the Construction Phase. During the Rehabilitation Phase, Mesa operated as the general contractor, with control over and financial responsibility for the costs of the work.

Under the Agreement, work covered by Koch's Warranty is performed under a contract let for bid by SHTD, known as the Job Order Contract ("JOC"). The State entered into the JOC with A.S. Horner, Inc. For such Warranty work Koch prepares a Task Order for Horner. Horner then performs the work and sends an invoice to the State, the State pays Horner and then bills Koch. Koch then reimburses the State for the money it paid to Horner. (McWaters Dep. at 39-43; and 88-89 (attached as Exhibit 31 to Karpoff Decl.)).

Mesa reviewed and modified the "US 550 Pavement Maintenance Contract General Conditions," for Job Order Contracts which provides: "The work shall consist of performing maintenance, preventative maintenance and repairs to the roadway and as necessary to the adjacent shoulders and includes removal and replacement of damaged sections of the roadway, milling or surfacing, paving, patching of surfacing, sealing of cracks, fog sealing roadway surface, striping and other related work" (McWaters dep. Exh. 162)

In a letter to Max Valerio, the engineer in charge of the project, dated June 24, 2005, Mesa protested a Letter of Demand for Job Order Contract Documentation. Schmidt, Mesa's administrator of the Agreement, wrote: "Contrary to the implications of your letter, Mesa PDC is performing services to manage 'maintenance and repair work' as labeled in the actual contracts and so ordered by NMDOT in conformance with our July 27, 1998 agreement for Corridor 44 Professional Services and Warranty." (McWaters dep. Exh. 118).

According to a report Mesa submitted to Valerio on May 29, 2007, the life-to-date "Pavement Warranty Expenditures" as of March 31, 2007, were $7,883,106.41. Of those expenditures, $6,684,452.25 was Mesa's reimbursement of job order contracts. The report showed that while 26 % of the cumulative term of the Warranty had elapsed, only 6.7 % of the limit of liability had been expended. However, the level of expenditure is consistent with Koch's projections that the ultimate price tag for the repair work (most of which would come towards the end of the warranty period) could total some $40 million.

In a brochure Koch drafted entitled, "The New Mexico State Route 44 Highway Project," the Warranty was described as follows:


In the Warranty Agreement, the pavement is covered for up to twenty years or to a certain amount of use, whichever comes first; structures, such as bridges [or] and culverts, are covered up to ten years. The NM 44 warranty is similar to a warranty you might receive with the purchase of a new car- three years or 36,000 miles... . Having the warranty means the state of new Mexico will not have to maintain or repair the pavement on NM 44 for the many years to come.


(Valerio Decl. Exh. A).

Arguing against the plaintiff's contention that its lawyers were not involved in the negotiations concerning the warranty, the United States points to the correspondence between Koch and the SHTD, arguing that the correspondence demonstrates that the "warranty" was a bargainedfor provision used in its traditional legal sense. Thus, on December 10, 1007, shortly after the Mesa bid on the SR 44 Project, Leroy Sandoval on behalf of SHTD sent a five-page letter to Mesa discussing various aspects of the warranty. Fred Abbott, representing Koch, wrote a letter to Arthur Waskey, SHTD General Counsel on January 21, 1998, concerning the "Mesa Warranty Liability." In reference to a conversation of the previous day, Mr. Abbott bluntly stated that "Mesa rejects 'no fault' or 'strict liability' under the warranty." He cited several reasons, including that Mesa's offer was for a limited warranty. (Karpoff Dec. Exh. 3).

Mickey Hines forwarded an e-mail to Abbott on January 28, 1998, attaching a draft of language for the drainage structure warranty. Mike DiLembo, who provided the information to Hines, wrote: "I realize that the attorneys have to have their turn at it to make sure the legal requirements are in order for New Mexico, so you can use the draft as a source document to extract the technical requirements and fold them into the overall warranty that you are composing." (Karpoff Dec. Exh. 4).

On April 8, 1998, Stan Betzer, SHTD outside counsel, wrote to Abbott discussing revisions to the agreement and warranty package. Betzer wrote: "As a reminder, we are definitely looking for an early response that reflects the current thinking of Mickey Hines and his counterpart at SHTD on the performance criteria for the pavement and the structures." (Karpoff Dec. Exh. 5).

On April 13, 1998, Abbott wrote to Betzer, stating with respect to the warranty provision:


We must address two threshold issues. PDC has not agreed: (1) to extend the warranty term; or (2) to payment of the Warranty Price at Final Acceptance. As SHDT has structured warranty commencement and payment of warranty price PDC may be required to finance maintenance and warranty services in advance of receipt of payment. Extension of the warranty term may adversely affect PDC's enforcement of warranties of the construction contractors and material suppliers. Performance Criteria will require re-examination. Mr. Hines is addressing the matter. I will forward his suggestions when I receive them.


(Karpoff Dec. Exh. 6).

John Fenner, Adjutant Secretary of SHTD responded two days later, stating, "With Fred's letter of April 13, we just do not see where Koch is standing behind its assertion of its ability to build a better road." (Karpoff Dec. Exh. 7).

On May 8, 1998, Abbott sent a fax to Arthur Waskey, General Counsel for SHTD, asking for a revision to one section of the agreement at the request of Koch tax counsel. Waskey replied on May 15, copying Pete Rahn and John Fenner, about an item Abbott raised in the negotiations. Waskey quoted Abbott's May 14 correspondence: "If SHTD has doubts as to the legality or constitutionality of the Agreement or Warranty PDC needs to know. If SHTD develops such concerns or other agencies of the State express reservations, I trust PDC will be informed prior to purchase of Bond Anticipation Notes."

Waskey responded by assuring Abbott that there were no doubts as to the Agreement's legality or constitutionality. He continued:


Nevertheless lest there be any doubt that SHTD has not from the beginning of negotiations, and consistently and forthrightly thereafter, alerted you and Mesa/Koch to areas of the Agreement where we must carefully assure that we are in compliance with state law, I list them as follows:



(1) This is not a design/build contract and therefore Mesa cannot provide any construction;



(2) Specific language from NMSA 1978, Section 56-7-1 must be included to avoid the Warranty from being an impermissible agreement to indemnify;



(3) SHTD's intent is to secure financing backed by federal highway funds, although it will use its best efforts to obtain other valid sources of funding;



(4) The Warranty must be secure and void of SHTD continuing obligations that it is clear that PDC's obligation to provide the Warranty is satisfied when the Warranty Price is paid, and that the only remaining tasks for the 20+ years of the Warranty are inspection, preparing invitations to bid, issuing construction contracts and subtracting Expenditures from the Warranty liability limits provided by the PDC, therefore allowing the warranty to survive the term of the Agreement.


(Karpoff Dec. Exh. 9).

On June 26, 1998, Abbott forwarded to counsel for SHTD background information for the bridges and drainage performance criteria. On June 29, Betzer sent to Abbott and Ron Hull, general counsel for Koch, marked changes on the criteria. On July 15, Abbott sent a fax to Hull and employees of Koch Materials concerning the "Warranty and Preventive Maintenance Services Performance Bond." The fax attaches the revised draft and states: "When I receive confirmation of the acceptability of the revisions, I will discuss with New Mexico counsel, inclusion of the agreed Bond form in the Warranty documents." (Karpoff Dec. Exh. 12).



The Prior Negotiations of the Parties

The United States contends that the "warranty" language contained in the Agreement was not, as characterized by Koch, a matter of salesmanship focused particularly on the New Mexico project, but a standard term in Koch's Performance Roads sales. In support of this contention, the United States cites Exhibit 1 in its response, a document produced by one of Koch's potential customers, Herzog. Koch has separately moved to strike Exhibit 1 on the grounds that, contrary to the defendant's representation, the document is not in fact authored by Koch and that the document is hearsay. In response to the motion to strike, the United States presents two arguments. First, it stresses the refusal, on advice of Koch's counsel, of Brian McWaters to testify as to Koch's prospective customers. (Dkt. No. 116, at 3). Second, it argues that the document was received by Herzog, the potential customer of Koch, and is admissible as a business record of that company.

The court concludes that Exhibit 1 lacks evidentiary value. The first point of the United States is simply irrelevant to the question of whether the document contains hearsay. The second argument is also unavailing. It fails to account for all of the multiple levels of hearsay the document presents - it merely establishes that the document Herzog kept in the normal course of business. Business records frequently comprise multiple hearsay levels.


Double hearsay in the context of a business record exists when the record is prepared by an employee with information supplied by another person. If both the source and the recorder of the information, as well as every other participant in the chain producing the record, are acting in the regular course of business, the multiple hearsay is excused by Rule 803(6). United States v. Baker, 693 F.2d 183, 188 (D.C.Cir.1982). However, if the source of the information is an outsider, as in the facts before us, Rule 803(6) does not, by itself, permit the admission of the business record. The outsider's statement must fall within another hearsay exception to be admissible because it does not have the presumption of accuracy that statements made during the regular course of business have. See United States v. Davis, 571 F.2d 1354, 1360 (5th Cir.1978). Further, Federal Rule of Evidence 805 requires that all levels of hearsay satisfy exception hearsay requirements before the statement is admissible.


Wilson v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 939 F.2d 260, 271 (5th Cir. 1991). The truth of the statement contained in the document that the warranty included in the Agreement is a "standard" one which Koch gives to "customers around the country" are statements by persons unknown, statements presented for the truth of the matters asserted. This statement is not a representation by Herzog, and the government has not identified the source of the statement, or shown an applicable hearsay exception. Accordingly, the court will grant the motion to strike on this issue. 1

Internally, Koch's management disagreed with the term "warranty," but decided to use the term to be internally consistent with the State and not confuse the political process. According to Heitmann, Koch understood that attaching the term "warranty" to the Agreement had no independent legal significance, given that the Agreement encompassed many more obligations than that of a standard warranty; if the company understood that some term "warranty" had such independent significance, it would not have agreed to the inclusion of the term. The term "warranty" was not negotiated as a part of the contract after Koch's proposal was submitted. Both Koch and the State anticipated much more work than reflected in a standard warranty.

In a draft summary of the "Performance Road Play" dated June 16, 1997, an internal Koch document, the project's sponsor, Bob Heitmann, noted that "there exists an opportunity to privately finance, construct, and warrant the expansion of SR 44 in northern New Mexico." (Karpoff Decl. Exh. 16).

In a document entitled "Koch Material Company SR-44 Proposal Development" dated July 23, 1997, Koch Materials advised Koch that SHTD was drafting a Request for Proposal and potential developers would have 60 days to reply with a proposal to "finance, design, build, and warrant the project," which would include a proposal to "Warrant the pavement for a predetermined period of time." The document recommended steps to initiate the proposal development process, which included direct involvement with "Legal." (Karpoff Decl. Exh. 15).

On August 29, 1997, the SHTD issued a request for proposal (RFP) soliciting bids to provide design, construction-management, a warranty, and possible financing services to SHTD to widen NM 44 between the towns of San Ysidro and Bloomfield from two to four lanes. The RFP was to:


solicit competitive proposals for the award of a contract to a Project Development Contractor (PDC) that shall be retained, subject to Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) authorization, by the SHTD to obtain financing for the Corridor 44 Project and to provide final design, construction management, and warranty, and preventative maintenance services for the Corridor 44 Project.


The RFP requested, among other things:


The PDC, following substantial completion of the proposed highway improvement and the opening of reconstructed NM 44 to traffic ... shall undertake to provide warranty and preventive maintenance services to the SHTD for a term of not less that 5 years and not more than 20 years.


The RFP described in detail the services for design, construction management and the warranty. For the warranty the RFP provided:


The SHTD's goals for the Corridor 44 Project are to obtain a safe, high quality roadway at a reasonable cost for the traveling public. It is therefore the SHTD's intent to require the PDC to provide warranty and preventive maintenance services that are directly related to the quality of the major design and construction elements for a predetermined period of time and to place all ordinary maintenance responsibilities on the Department.


(Valerio Decl. Exh. D).

On December 1, 1997, Koch submitted the only bid in response to the RFP. The bid was for one price, which included the design, professional services, construction management, and warranty. The RFP made clear that the warranty portion "must be proposed and evaluated independently of the design and construction management portions of proposals." (Dkt. No. 89, Gov't. Ex. B at 9.) The price for the Pavement and Structures Warranties was separately stated in the Agreement and paid separately. § 11.1; 11.7.


In its proposal, Mesa describes its base warranty as a 20-year pavement warranty: We are prepared to negotiate warranty items for these items at an additional cost based on maintenance standard for the existing NM44 bridges we will add to our maintenance program. This is the standard 20-year pavement warranty that Koch Materials provides to the Performance Roadstrade; customers around the country. In summary, our proposed pavement warranty provides for 20 years of inspection, monitoring, and preventive maintenance and emergency maintenance of the NM44 corridor.


(Valerio Decl. Exh. C). At the same time, Mesa indicated that "long-term transportation infrastructure warranties are a relatively new, untested approach," and neither prior "warranty" project to which Koch referred was as long as the twenty-year agreement for NM 44. The State agreed that this was a "first time long term warranty." (Def. Exh. 8 at 2658; 2664). Moreover, this exhibit supports the construction placed on it by the United States - that the Pavement and Structures Warranties were "standard" warranties in the common legal sense of the term. The proposal explicitly states that the "Warranty" provisions reflect "the standard 20-year pavement warranty that Koch Materials provides to the Performance Roadstrade; customers around the country." The evidence is otherwise wholly uncontradicted that the Performance Roads concept was new, that the New Mexico Project was the first to implement the concept on a major scale, and that the Pavement and Structures Warranties integrated into the Agreement were a first-of-the-kind in the pavement industry.

In response to written questions from John Fenner about the allocation of the project cost between construction and warranty, Mesa replied on December 8, 1997: "The project development tasks within our approach are interrelated - reducing the effort on one element increases the effort on another. Therefore, Mesa has proposed a $110 million amount which includes design, construction management, QA/QC, 20-year pavement warranty, and project administration. This amount excludes construction costs, utilities, right-of-way, permits, environmental mitigation, and project finance costs." (Karpoff Decl. Exh. 24, 25).

On December 4, 1997, Leroy Sandoval, Transportation Planning Division Director and Warranty Team Chair for the SHTD, wrote to Mesa, to request clarification about the proposal. He wrote: "Mesa Developers indicates that the warranty proposal being provided is a standard 20-year pavement warranty provided to 'Performance Roads customers.'" We understood this to be a formal warranty document. Please provide us a copy of that document. Mesa responded by attaching a "draft warranty document." (Thomas dep. Exh. 84, 85). Sandoval also stated:


Although an annual plan for warranty and preventive maintenance work is shown to be developed once the warranty process is to take place, the intent of the department in the RFP was to obtain an initial Preventive Maintenance Plan to show what activities the proposer intended to include in the plan. Please provide what you anticipate the activities to include.


Mesa replied:


Until we further define the project with SHTD, we cannot develop a fully detailed preventative maintenance plan. Using present technology as a base, maintenance activities over the 20-year warranty period are anticipated to include such tasks as mill and overlays, 2-inch overlays, surface treatments, fog seals, full-depth patching, surface patching, shoulder maintenance, crack filling, and joint sealing.


(Id., at ¶ 14). However, the uncontroverted testimony of the witnesses involved with the Agreement is that the term "maintenance" was used here in its colloquial sense only, and was intended to apply to work after the Construction Phase, including rehabilitation and reconstruction.

Mesa wrote:


By using specific pavement distresses instead of indices, Mesa Developers intends to provide a clearly definable basis for the warranty. Because of the 20-year warranty duration, Mesa Developers has the incentive to render repairs to the pavement as soon as possible, to avoid pavement deterioration resulting from neglected maintenance, Visual inspections made by qualified SHTD staff enhances the annual pavement condition surveys. If the pavement conditions are found to be outside of the warranty requirement, repairs will be performed in accordance with paragraph 6 of the warranty.


(Thomas dep. Exh. 85, ¶15). Under this provision, the State would not have to demonstrate any defect in design or construction to trigger the obligation to replace or repair, it only had to show that the road failed to meet the performance criteria.

Heitmann wrote a letter to Rahn on February 16, 1998, attaching a schedule of how the "warranty cap" would work: "The concept is that we would have to spend the $60MM plus annual increase of 3.5% on work needed to keep performing at the appropriate PSR." The "Pavement Warranty Concept" was described in the attachment as follows: "The state will pay Mesa $60 million for a pavement warranty. Mesa agrees to maintain the pavement for twenty years at an agreed upon PSR, at not [sic] time going below 3.0." (Karpoff Decl. Exh. 13). Under Pavement Warranty § 3.3.2, Mesa's liability was limited by the overall liability limitations contained in the Pavement and Structures Warranties. The Pavement Warranty cap equaled $175,000,000 in the first year after substantial completion of the road. Commencing in year 2 and continuing for each annual period thereafter, the liability limitation is approximately $110,000,000, reduced by amounts already expended and increased by inflation at a 3.5% rate. The Structures Warranty contains an overall liability limitation equal to $4,000,000.

Engineers and financial analysts with Koch prepared numerous spreadsheets to analyze the profitability and risk of the proposed project. Bob Huitt, a financial analyst who prepared many of the spreadsheets, testified about the factors Mesa considered in determining whether it would have to perform mill and overlays over the twenty-year period of the Warranty:


I think, as I described earlier, it's the ultimate pavement design, the ultimate quality of construction, the ultimate quality of the materials used, the traffic and loading of that traffic and the weather conditions. All of these things at the time you design it and estimate it are unknown. They're future events that cannot be predicted.


Huitt also testified:


This, however, is a longer-term warranty of 20 years, and we fully expected in even the potential [best] case to go out and do a certain amount of maintenance and rehabilitation, repair, reconstruction to keep the pavement at a level of performance that would be stipulated in any contract.


(Huitt dep. at 30). Mesa predicted that it would spend between $10,561,00 and $59,235,00 on rehabilitation during the Rehabilitation Phase. (Id. at 66). All of the witnesses providing testimony have stated that it was virtually certain that Koch would spend a significant amount for reconstruction and rehabilitation.

Huitt agreed during his deposition that could not accurately predict how much it would have to spend, because of fluctuations in the amount of work required and the price of materials. However, he testified that significant work would be required.

The United States notes that in spreadsheets Koch charted "Mesa Developers Warranty Cost Estimate Breakdown" over a twenty-year period, which predicted "Warranty Revenue" over "Maintenance Year(s)." The expected case was broken down by "Warranty Costs" with a "Description of Maintenance Expected to be Performed." The defendant points out that one projection indicated a total net present value of the Warranty Costs of $9,812,536. (Karpoff Decl. Exh. 26). Koch stresses that it performed numerous projections, and that the one selected by the government is the smallest, and one reflecting the best potential outcome. The same projection indicated expected costs of $24,362,00 for pavement costs, and $2,000,000 under the Structures Warranty. Other projections indicated even higher potential costs for repair.

In an internal Koch document dated February 2, 1998, requesting approval to execute an offer to SHTD, Koch explained the Pavement warranty as follows: "KMC will warrant the pavement for 20 years and cause to be performed the necessary preventive maintenance and rehabilitation to meet a pavement serviceability rating. Pavement warranty price, $60 MM, less the cost to service that warranty is the primary profit driver." The same document describes the BDE Warranty: "KMC will warrant bridge, drainage and erosion control structures (BDE) for 10 years and cause to be performed the necessary repair of site-specific defects. BDE warranty price is $2MM and the liability limitation is $4MM." The Document explains that Koch "can maintain the pavement for one third the cost of NMSHTD" because of its custom pavement design, incentives and resources for proactive preventive maintenance, quality assurance during production, and quality based-selection of contractor. (Def. Resp. Exh. 28).

In a later internal update on the project, dated May 4, 1998, Koch summarized the Warranty Underwriting Profit:


Up-front warranty revenue less future expenses. KMC will receive $62MM, $3MM in 1999, $12MM in 2000 and $47MM in 2001 ... up-front to perform reconstruction and maintenance required to maintain an agreed level of serviceability (Lack of problems such as roughness, cracking, rutting and potholes) for 20 years."


Koch identified its role in the project as:


Ÿ Leader/developer



Ÿ Pavement criteria



Ÿ Materials criteria



Ÿ Maintain road serviceability



Ÿ Insurance procurement and management


Koch acknowledged its risk to be "Road reconstruction and maintenance costs" during the Rehabilitation Phase. New Mexico assumed the construction costs during the Construction Phase. This same language was used in the venture package Rob Witte, the President of Koch Materials, submitted for final approval to Koch's directors on May 13, 1998. The Project's sponsors acknowledged that the timing and magnitude - but not the fact - of the future expenses was uncertain.

Abbott wrote an e-mail to Stan Betzer, outside counsel for SHTD, on May 18, 1998, commenting on the latest draft of the Warranty. In regard to one section of the Warranty, Mr. Abbott wrote: "A rose is a rose is a rose. Either Sect. 1.1 is an effective statement of a performance warranty or it is not." (Def. Resp. Exh. E). The government suggests that the e-mail demonstrates the parties understood the contract to include a performance warranty. It is unclear which draft of the Agreement this e-mail is referring to, or what Abbott understood a performance warranty to mean. The general language in the earlier drafts of § 4.12 provided:


PDC acknowledges and agrees that SHTD shall have no obligation to prove any defects in design, construction management, or Work as a condition to PDC's obligations under this Warranty. If the Roadway fails to meet the standards set forth in Sub section 1.1 hereof, PDC shall at its sole cost and expense in accordance with this Warranty repair and replace the affected portion of the Roadway to a condition that meets the standards then applicable under the Roadway Performance Criteria.


(Def. Exh. 32-33). In this context, the Abbott-Betzer correspondence reflects an inquiry whether the plaintiff's obligation to repair and rehabilitate was triggered by performance criteria, or would require a demonstration of fault. The actual substantive language employed in the agreement reflects the consistent determination to impose a no-fault obligation to repair and rehabilitate.

In a May 29, 1998 Project Description, the Project's sponsors explained: "We plan to combine material technology and know-how with an economically disciplined approach to pavement management to minimize Koch's warranty costs over the 20-year coverage of the SR-44 project." They attached a Summary of Maintenance Expenditures, with an "Expected Case" and a "Downside Case." In the Expected Case, Koch estimated that the "Nominal Warranty Costs" over a twenty-year period would total $40,942,242, with a net present value of the costs totaling $21,262,502. In almost half of the years, the only "Maintenance Expected to be Performed" was monitoring. In year 2009, Koch estimated that it would incur warranty costs of more than $5 million for a 2-inch mill and overlay of 10 % of the pavement, as well as fog sealing the remaining 90 % of the pavement. Koch predicted that the bulk of the warranty costs would occur in year 2017, with more than $26 million for, among other costs, a two-inch mill and overlay of 20% of the pavement and surface treatment of the remaining 80 % of the pavement. (Karpoff Decl. Exh. 22).

The SR 44 Project was discussed at several of Koch's Board meetings. Mickey Hines, Koch Materials engineer, attended one such Board meeting. Asked whether the Project would be "like the Golden Gate Bridge where by the time they start painting one end of it and get to the other, they just turn around and do it all over again so you're constantly painting it," Hines told the Board "that we would have work to do - we believed that we would have some work to do every year. We'd be monitoring the road and trying to identify problems and correct them as soon as we could and we believed that by being as proactive as we could be, that we could reduce the amount of work on the road." (Hines dep. at 120-121).

Nothing in the extensive documentary history presented by the United States contradicts the facts otherwise established and identified herein - that none of the parties associated with the negotiations for the Agreement used the term "Warranty" in its standard legal sense. Rather, the evidence is consistent and uncontradicted that the term was used for political purposes in New Mexico. The term was included at the request of New Mexico State officials for political and public relations reasons. The term "Warranty" was adopted by the State before its Request for Proposals was issued. All of the witnesses are consistent on the question, and there is no evidence contradicting their statements concerning the parties' intentions.



Additional Facts

As additional facts in response to Koch's motion for summary judgment, the United States points to four additional communications by the plaintiff as supportive of its position, three of these involving messages sent by Heitmann, as well as a 1990 FHWA policy governing special construction funding.

In an e-mail to Heitmann, dated February 16, 2001, Dale Gooch, the Tax Director of Koch Materials Group, suggested language to insert in correspondence to the New Mexico Transportation Secretary "to have the potential desired tax effect upon audit."


I have put certain words or phrases in bold that really should be part of whatever document you send to NM because these buzzwords would show the IRS the essence of our construction obligation. I am attempting to recast the maintenance activity as being more of "light" construction activity so that it may also be shown as incident to and necessary as related to the secondary reconstruction activities. If we are successful at doing that, we may be able to include the maintenance revenues & costs in the LTC method along with the secondary reconstruction revenues & costs.


(Def. Resp. Exh. F) (emphasis in original).

The government next cites a letter written by Heitmann to the editor of the Albuquerque Journal on December 15, 1999, taking issue with the Journal's coverage of the NM 44 project. Heitmann pointed out in his letter that the General Counsel for the SHTD was involved in every step of the process, and that he was in frequent communication with the State's Attorney General's Office. Heitmann defended the Performance Roads warranty: "A warranty will provide New Mexico with a higher quality product for a lower total price. Highway maintenance is very expensive. Yet, the warranty price is significantly lower that SHTD's history maintenance costs." (Def. Resp. Exh. G).

Mr. Heitmann also wrote a letter to Brian Deery of the Associated General Contractors of America commenting on the draft of a white paper Mr. Deery prepared on long term warranties. Heitmann wrote: "Since Koch Materials Company is in the business of providing long term warranties on several projects, we must take issue with several points raised in your paper." Under the Koch materials model, he continued:


Because the contractor is made to be responsible for those future maintenance and rehabilitation costs through a warranty, he will have the incentive to choose the combination that minimizes those resources over the life of the road. Thus, a warranty is not so fairly characterized as a "cost of covering risk" as so charged in the white paper, but is more properly viewed as a mechanism that encourages greater allocation of resources at initial construction in order to minimize or avoid altogether resources that would otherwise be spent on maintenance during the life of the road.


In response to Deery's prediction that warranties will spell the demise of small contractors, Heitmann countered:


It is important to note that Mesa itself is doing no construction work on the project. All paving work is being performed by traditional paving contractors who are contracted directly to the State, and special efforts have been made to encourage local contractors to bid the work.


(Def. Resp. Exh. H).

Finally, the United States notes that on February 13, 1990, FHWA's Special Experimental Project No 14 (SEP-14) "Innovative Contracting" was initiated, as a result of recommendations from a Transportation Research Board (TRB) task force formed to explore innovative contracting practices. Since 1990, the FHWA has allowed the State DOTs to evaluate non-traditional contracting techniques which are competitive in nature but do not fully comply with the requirements in Title 23 United State Code. Federal-aid construction contracts that utilize a method of award other than the lowest responsive bid must be evaluated under SEP-14. The non-traditional practices originally approved for evaluation were: cost-plus-time bidding, lane rental, design-build contracting, and warranty clauses.

The additional facts the United States cites do not alter the essential nature of the facts otherwise established in the case, specifically, that under the agreements it was a virtual certainty that extensive reconstruction and rehabilitation would be required, and that Koch would operate as a general contractor overseeing those repairs. The February 16, 2001 email only shows that the company, facing a likely audit, was trying to position itself favorably. In fact, the email is wholly consistent with the understanding that Koch was responsible for construction costs during the Rehabilitation Phase. Similarly, nothing in the letter by Heitmann to the Albuquerque Journal is inconsistent with the understanding of all of the parties associated with the Agreement that it was virtually certain that Mesa would be required to expend extensive sums during the Rehabilitation Period. The letter to Deery is consistent with the parties' general usage of the term "maintenance" in a colloquial sense to include repair and rehabilitation costs, and that the fact that Mesa was responsible for all such work done by local New Mexico subcontractors. And while the FHWA has encouraged "innovative contracting," it also remains true that the FHWA will not approve such innovation where it contradicts federal statutes. (Def. Res. Exh. I., at 1-2).

Koch received total Warranty compensation of $59 million in 2000 and 2001. Treating the income it received during the years 1998 through 2001 under the Agreement as income for a long-term contract under IRC § 460, Koch reported $0 in income from the project for 1998, $1,814,384 for 1999, $1,578,653 for 2000, and ($1,953,698) for 2001 on its consolidated federal income tax returns. The IRS later concluded that the income could not be properly treated as coming from a long-term contract, and issued Koch a notice of deficiency. Koch paid the additional tax and filed claims for refund on September 26, 2005. The IRS has disallowed the claims.



Conclusions of Law

Section 460 provides an exception to the general rule for income under long-term contracts, permitting the taxpayer to claim income of the duration of the contract by proportionally matching the income to expenses over the duration of the contract, rather at the time of the original receipt of the income. In this context, a long-term contract "generally is any contract for the manufacture, building, installation, or construction of property if such contract is not completed within the taxable year in which such contract is entered into." IRC § 460(f)(1). See Treas. Reg. § 1.460-1(b)(1); I.R.S. Notice 89-15, 1989-1 C.B. 634, Q&A 1 (Jan. 12, 1989). Treas. Reg. § 1.460-1(b)(2)(I) provides an express definition for construction contacts within the meaning of Section 460:


A contract is a contract for the manufacture, building, installation, or construction of property if the manufacture, building, installation, or construction of property is necessary for the taxpayer's contractual obligations to be fulfilled and if the manufacture, building, installation, or construction of that property has not been completed when the parties enter into the contract. .... Furthermore, how the parties characterize their agreement ( e.g., as a contract for the sale of property) is not relevant.


(Emphasis in original). The IRS has concluded that a contract is long term if it "involves the building, construction, reconstruction, or rehabilitation of real property; the installation of an integral component to real property; or the improvement of real property." Treas. Reg. § 1.460-3(a). The purpose underlying PCM is the difficulty of determining profitability in the face of fluctuating future costs . United States v. Howard, 855, F.2d 832 (11th Cir. 1988).

The uncontroverted facts establish that it is virtually certain that Koch will have substantial future construction expenses during the Rehabilitation Phase, running into the millions of dollars, but that the precise amount of these expenditures cannot be known for a variety of reasons, including variations in the price of materials. Under Treas. Reg. § 1.460-3(a), the rehabilitation of roadways is explicitly acknowledged as construction. Further, it is uncontroverted that the FHWA, which may expend federal funds for construction projects and not for routine maintenance, was closely involved in the New Mexico highway project. The FHWA viewed the agreement as requiring future construction efforts by Koch, and ultimately approved the project.

In support of its argument, Koch cites a variety of cases, including Exchange Sec. Bank v. United States, 345 F. Supp. 486 (N.D. Ala. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 492 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir. 1974), for the proposition that the courts have accepted that an event virtually certain to occur should be treated as if it will occur. The government correctly notes that this case is not directly on point, since it applied the principle of virtual certainty to the timing of the realization of income, and not the statutory categorization of income.

But the general principle reflected in the case remains applicable here, and, significantly, the government presents no authority in support of the opposite conclusion - that the court should ignore uncontroverted evidence that the plaintiff is virtually certain to expend millions of dollars for road construction over several decades. It is true that the exact timing and amount of such expenditures are uncertain, but that is the underlying purpose for the percentage of completion method - to allow appropriate matching of income against future expenses which are uncertain due, for example, to changing costs for future materials. See Rev. Rul. 70-67, 1970-1 C.B. 117.

The government contends that the plaintiff cannot use PCM because Koch was not the designated "general contractor" of the project for the Rehabilitation Period work, but that work was instead actually performed by other companies who directly contracted with the State of New Mexico. The court finds that Koch is entitled to the provisions of Section 460 even though it did not directly perform any construction work. The IRS has previously taken the position that such obligations as those performed by Koch fall within those of a general contractor.

Under a Coordinated Issue Paper, the IRS articulated a distinction between general contractors (which can use PCM), and construction management (CM) firms (which cannot), stating that "[t]o distinguish between a construction contract and a CM contract, it must be determined whether the activities performed are in the nature of personal services or are those of a general contractor." IRS, Coordinated Issue Paper, Construction/Real Estate Industry, Construction Management Contracts § 1 (Apr. 17, 1995) (here, "CIP"). A general contractor typically controls the work and bears the cost risks of failure; a CM acts as an agent for the owner and is not liable for construction defects. The CIP notes that "[l]arge scale contractors typically engage in actual construction activities." Id. (emphasis added). More fundamentally, "[a] general contractor contracts with an owner to be responsible for all of the construction work necessary to complete a project, even though subcontractors may be used to perform part or all of the work." Id.

Here, Koch meets this definition. It was fully responsible for the final constructed product, controlled the work of the contractors, and bears the entire expense for the Rehabilitation Period construction - even if the expense exceeds the amount of its income from the project. Koch determined all aspects of the work to be performed. To meet its obligations, it was required to post a bond in the full amount of its potential liability. The court finds that Pavement and Structures Warranties are construction contracts within the meaning of Section 460, and that Koch is entitled to report its income by PCM. The government's reliance on pre- Section 460 case law (citing a series of 1920s era road construction cases as well as cases such as RCA Corp. v. United States, 664 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1981), which involved service contracts rather than construction) does not alter this result.

However, an additional question remains. Are Koch's obligations under the Agreement "warranties" within the meaning of Section 460? PCM treatment is not available for income for "warranties" under Treas. Reg. § 1.460-1(d)(2). This is the crux of the government's argument: that the income in question here is not eligible for Section 460 treatment. The court finds that the government's argument does not bar PCM treatment of Koch's income under the Pavement and Structures Warranties. The regulations do not independently define the term "warranties," but the structure of the exclusion gives an important understanding of the nature of the exclusion. Under § 1.460-1(d)(1), the regulations focus on whether the contract is incidental to a long-term contract:


Gross receipts and costs attributable to non-long-term contract activities (as defined in paragraph (d)(2) of this section) generally must be taken into account using a permissible method of accounting other than a long-term contract method. See section 446(c) and § 1.446-1(c). However, if the performance of a non-long-term contract activity is incident to or necessary for the manufacture, building, installation, or construction of the subject matter of one or more of the taxpayer's long-term contracts, the gross receipts and costs attributable to that activity must be allocated to the long-term contract(s) benefitted as provided in §§ 1.460-4(b)(4)(I) and 1.460- 5(f)(2), respectively.


The regulations then further specify in the following paragraph:


Non-long-term contract activity means the performance of an activity other than manufacturing, building, installation, or construction, such as the provision of architectural, design, engineering, and construction management services, and the development or implementation of computer software. In addition, performance under a guaranty, warranty, or maintenance agreement is a non-long-term contract activity that is never incident to or necessary for the manufacture or construction of property under a long-term contract.


Treas. Reg. 1.460-1(d)(2).

The term "warranty" used in the regulations should be understood in the context of the regulation's focus on the relationship of the contract activity to the construction obligation, and indeed reflects the historical understanding of "warranty" as "'an affirmation of the quality or condition of the thing sold (not uttered as matter of opinion or belief) made by the seller at the time of sale, for the purpose of assuring the buyer of the truth of the facts affirmed, and inducing him to make the purchase.'" Shippen v. Bowen, 122 U.S. 575, 581 (1887) ( quoting Osgood v. Lewis, 2 H. & G. 495, 518 (Md. 1829)).

Here, the "Warranties" bear none of the hallmarks of traditional warranty as being merely incidental to the underlying obligation. Rather, the uncontroverted evidence establishes that the Pavement and Structures Warranties were the subject of separate and extensive negotiation, creating significant obligations for Koch/Mesa over the lifetime of the contract which were: (1) virtually certain to occur; (2) which were not dependent on any showing of defect; and (3) which were paid for separately by the State of New Mexico. See P.L.R. 8349028 (Aug. 31, 1983) ("[w]arranty liability can be properly viewed as liability arising out of a breach of the initial sales contract to furnish a sound product").

The government argues that Koch, having used the term "Warranty" in the Agreement, cannot not claim that its Agreement with New Mexico was anything other than a warranty. In support of what is essentially an estoppel argument, the United States notes language in a footnote in decision by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the court observing: "Appellee never explicitly argues that the document is not a warranty. Indeed, having drafted the document and labeled it a warranty, Appellee would be hard pressed to so argue." Nationwide Insurance Co. v. General Motors Corp., 533 Pa. 423, 625 A.2d 1172, 1177 n.9 (1993). The cited decision was an action for breach of warranty arising from a consumer purchase of an automobile, and the court explicitly expressed concern with the consumer nature of the transaction. See 625 A.2d at 1177-78 ("we will not permit Appellee and other sellers who draft similar documents to escape the consequences of presenting them to the consumer"). The case would therefore have limited application here where all the parties to the Agreement were experienced and sophisticated, and all agreed that the substance of the transaction was not a traditional warranty.

The government cites no further authority for this estoppel argument, which is further contradicted by the government's recognition elsewhere that Koch is not absolutely bound by the labels used in the contract. It its Brief, the United States stresses that "a taxpayer may not disavow the form of an agreement that it freely entered into in the absence of 'strong proof' that the parties intended a different arrangement" Dkt. No. 88 at 26 (emphasis added). The requirement for "strong proof" is addressed separately herein; for present purposes, it is sufficient to note and agree with the government's position that the form of the agreement is not absolutely controlling of the outcome of the case. The IRS has explicitly concluded that, for purposes of determining whether an agreement is a long-term contract under Section 460, "how the parties characterize their agreement ... is not relevant." Treas. Reg. 1.460-1(b)(2)(ii). Thus, the label is not only not controlling, it is not even relevant. The focus of the court must be on the substance and actual obligations of the parties' agreement.

The government also argues that Koch cannot contend that the provisions are not true warranties, as this would violate the parol evidence rule. That rule generally applies in actions between the parties to an agreement, and prevents one party from using prior oral communications to vary the terms of a written agreement. However, in an action involving a "stranger to the [contract], parol evidence may be considered." Megatech, Inc. v. NSD Acquistions, LP, No. 99- 2344, 2000 WL 718392, * 3 (4th Cir. June 5, 2000) (applying Virgina and Pennsylvania law). The Tenth Circuit has observed that "the parol evidence rule is ordinarily applied only to issues between the parties to the contract and not to third parties." Greta West Cas. Co. v. Truck Ins. Exch., 358 F.2d 883, 885 (10th Cir. 1966).

This limitation on the rule has been explicitly recognized in tax cases. Thus, in Stern v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 137 F.2d 43, 46 (2d Cir. 1943), the court ruled that "the parol evidence rule only excludes proof varying a written instrument, where the issues are between the parties to it, and does not affect the right of the Commissioner, who was not a party, to go behind the written contract in order to discover the true facts."


It is well settled that the rule against varying or contradicting writings by parol evidence obtains only in actions between the parties thereto and their privies. We have many times held that parol evidence is competent and admissible to modify or explain the terms of a written instrument involved in a tax proceeding, where the Commissioner is neither a party nor a privy to the instrument.


Pickrell & Craig Co. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 1938 WL 8207 (B.T.A.), B.T.A.M. (P-H) P 38,145 (1938) (citing cases).

The court finds that the parol evidence rule has no application here. Even if it did, it would not alter the result. It is apparent that Koch is not attempting to contradict or alter the terms of the Performance and Service Warranties. Rather, its evidence reflects an attempt to define what the label "Warranty" means within the terms of the Agreement. The evidence of how Koch and New Mexico understood the Agreement is consistent with the obligations of those parties as spelled out in the operative written language of the Agreement. Both the written agreement and the understanding of Koch and New Mexico are consistent - Koch would be responsible for significant construction work during the Rehabilitation Period. The uncontrovered evidence establishes that Koch was given obligations for future construction under the Agreement, and this, rather than the label "Warranty," is the essential matter here.

The government argues that the Pavement and Structures Warranties fall within a form of agreement in modern business practice, a performance warranty. Citing a variety of non-case authorities but particularly Bruner and O'Connor, Construction Law, § 9:20 (2002), the United States stresses that performance warranties are increasingly used in commercial practices, and that the warranties for the highway construction here are examples of such provisions. The court finds that the argument fails to justify a different analysis or result. A performance warranty is an agreement which supplies explicit criteria for determining the existence of actual or latent defects. See McBride & Touhey, Government Contracts Cyclopedic Guide to Law, Administration, Procedure, § 27A.40[3][a] (2006 ed.).

Performance warranties are therefore not some wholly new species of agreement, but a variation in the familiar animal; the focus remains on the buyer's ability to correct unexpected defects. The obligations of Koch in the present case far exceed those of any standard or performance warranty. Under the Agreements, Koch was required as a near certainty to spend millions of dollars during the term of Rehabilitation Period for reconstruction and rehabilitation of the highway. This obligation existed wholly independent of any showing of defect. Indeed, the certainty of such remediation and expenditures was no surprise to either Koch or the State of New Mexico; both parties actively expected that such actions would be required on a substantial scale. The government has identified no similar agreement - an obligation across two decades to rehabilitate a major highway to specified criteria, irrespective of defect - being treated as warranty; indeed, it is uncontroverted that the present Agreement was innovative and the first of its kind for a major highway construction project.

Just as the provider of what is in essence a traditional warranty would not be allowed to use PCM merely because it tacked the term "Construction Contract" onto the top of its agreement, so the mere fact that Koch and the State of New Mexico used the label "warranty" for purposes of salesmanship should not obscure the fact that the Agreement in reality created, and was understood to create, almost certain, extensive and long term construction obligations on the part of Koch.

Finally, the government stresses that Koch's interpretation of the contract should be rejected pursuant to a "strong proof" rule, citing cases holding that a taxpayer may not disavow the form of an agreement that it freely entered into in the absence of strong proof that the parties intended a different arrangement. See Guaderrama v. Comm'r, 21 Fed. Appx. 858, 861 (10th Cir. 2001); Kreider v. Comm'r, 762 F.2d 580, 586 (7th Cir. 1985) (taxpayer seeking to attack form of agreement must present "strong proof" showing that intent of parties was other than that expressed in agreement); Hamlin's Trust v. Comm'r, 209 F.2d 761, 765 (10th Cir. 1954) (parties transacting at arm's length cannot later attempt to avoid tax consequences by claiming that substance of transaction differed from its form).

The court finds that the "strong proof" should not be required here. First, in the cases cited, the parties to the agreement had divergent interests in how an agreement was characterized for tax purposes. Faced with competing interests between form and substance, courts have recognized the burden is on the party to an agreement attempting to give priority to first over the second. The rule has little point where both of the parties share the same interpretation of the agreement. More importantly, the requirement of strong proof is here effectively displaced by Treas. Reg. 1.460- 1(b)(2)(ii) which explicitly provides that "how the parties characterize their agreement ... is not relevant." Thus, for purposes of applying Section 460 the court always focuses only on the substance of the agreement, since its form is irrelevant.

Even if the court were to apply a "strong proof" requirement, that standard would be easily met in the present action. The uncontroverted evidence establishes that both parties to the Agreement understood the duties created for Koch, that those duties would include much more than any standard warranty. As noted several times in this opinion, both parties used that term for political purposes only. Both the operative language in the Agreement and the parties' expectations were in accord: Koch would be required to provide construction work on the highway for over two decades.

In conclusion, the court finds that the Pavement and Structures Warranties were not the sort of tacked-on provision providing assurance to the uncertain buyer that a product will be free of unanticipated defect, as is emblematic of the traditional warranty. Instead, these provisions were separately negotiated and separately priced. They created the virtual certainty that Koch would have to spend millions of dollars for road construction work over two decades. Both Koch and the State of New Mexico knew such extensive construction work would happen. The Agreement created this obligation to perform the construction without regard to any proof of defect. While the parties actively and extensively negotiated the contents and details of those obligations, the parties never actively negotiated the label "Warranty" which was attached to the document. The FHWA viewed the project as one for construction, and so funded the project. The Agreement is unique in its combination of mandatory rehabilitation to achieve specified criteria, regardless of defect, with a duration of twenty years. The Agreement squarely falls within the purpose of Section 460, which is to match income from long-term construction contracts against future expenses, given the uncertainty of the amount or timing of the future costs.

IT IS ACCORDINGLY ORDERED this 10th day of July, 2008, that the plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 85) is granted; that of the defendant (Dkt. No. 87) is denied; the plaintiff's Motion to Strike (Dkt. No. 110) is granted in part as provided herein.

1 The Reply of Koch indicates that it has withdrawn its motion to strike as it relates to matters other than Exhibit 1. (Dkt. No. 119 at n.1).

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Saturday, August 2, 2008

Offer in Compromise TutorialEverything You Need to Know About Offers in Compromise in Easy to Understand Language

What is an Offer in Compromise?
An offer in compromise (OIC) is an agreement between a taxpayer and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) that resolves the taxpayer's tax liability. The IRS has the authority to settle, or compromise, federal tax liabilities by accepting less than full payment under certain circumstances. The IRS may legally compromise for one of the following reasons:
• Doubt as to Liability: Doubt exists that the assessed tax is correct.
• Doubt as to Collectibility: Doubt exists that the taxpayer could ever pay the full amount of tax owed. The minimum offer amount must generally be equal to (or greater than) the taxpayer's reasonable collection potential (RCP). The RCP is defined as the total of the taxpayer's realizable value in real and personal assets, plus his/her future income.
Note: Unless the taxpayer files an OIC claiming special circumstances, the offered amount must equal or exceed the reasonable collection potential. Realizable value is the asset's quick sale value (amount which could be reasonably expected through the sale of the asset) minus what the taxpayer owes to a secured creditor.
• Effective Tax Administration: There is no doubt that the tax is correct and no doubt that the amount owed could be collected in full, but exceptional circumstances exist such that collection of the full amount would create economic hardship or where compelling public policy or equity considerations provide sufficient basis for compromise. The taxpayer bears the burden of proof to show their OIC qualifies for public policy or equity considerations. They must show that their circumstances are compelling enough to justify acceptance of their OIC compared to other taxpayers in similar circumstances.

What are the requirements for an OIC?

As a result of TIPRA, beginning July 17, 2006 in order to be considered for an OIC, a taxpayer must have met all of the following requirements:
• The taxpayer is not a debtor in an open bankruptcy proceeding.
• The $150 application fee, or a signed Form 656-A, "Income Certification for Offer in Compromise Application Fee and Payment" must be submitted.
• The 20 percent payment with the lump sum offer, or a signed Form 656-A, "Income Certification for Offer in Compromise Application Fee and Payment" must be submitted.
• The first installment payment on a periodic payment offer, or a signed Form 656-A, "Income Certification for Offer in Compromise Application Fee and Payment" must be submitted.
Taxpayers must comply with all federal tax filing and paying requirements for a period of five years following acceptance of their OIC, or until the OIC is paid in full, whichever is longer. This also includes making required estimated tax payments and federal tax deposits.

How do I complete an OIC?
First obtain a Form 656, Offer in Compromise package (Version 2/2007). The package includes information and instructions for completing the form, as well as a worksheet that can be used to calculate an amount to offer. Form 433-A, Collection Information Statement for Wage Earners and Self-Employed Individuals, and Form 433-B, Collection Information Statement for Businesses (Version 5/2001), are included in the Form 656 package and may need to be completed as well depending upon each individual situation. Taxpayers will need to review and include amounts for items such as housing and utilities from the Collection Financial Standards, and Necessary Expenses, to complete their collection information statement(s).
NOTE: For corporations and partnerships, Form 433-A may be requested from corporate officers and individual partners.

When does a Form 433, Collection Information Statement, need to be completed?

Collection Information Statement(s) are required for doubt as to collectibility and effective tax administration OICs, and doubt as to liability involving Trust Fund Recovery Penalty assessments.

Are the forms available on-line?

Yes. The forms needed to complete an OIC are available on-line. Also, forms may be obtained by calling 1-800-829-3676 or by visiting a local IRS office.

What forms are submitted to request an effective tax administration OIC?

To receive consideration on this basis, a taxpayer must submit:
• The February 2007 version of Form 656, "Offer in Compromise"
• The May 2001 version of the "Collection Information Statement" (Form 433-A and/or Form 433-B)
• A detailed written narrative must be documented on Form 656, Item 9. The narrative must explain the exceptional circumstances and why payment of the tax liability in full would either create an economic hardship or demonstrate why there is compelling public policy or equity considerations sufficient to support an acceptance recommendation. The taxpayer bears the burden of proof to show their OIC qualifies for public policy or equity considerations. They must show that their circumstances are compelling enough to justify acceptance of their OIC compared to other taxpayers in similar circumstances.
If a taxpayer requests consideration on the basis of effective tax administration, the IRS must first establish that no doubt as to liability and no doubt as to collectibility conditions exist. Hence, an OIC filed under effective tax administration can only be considered once the IRS determines that the tax liability is correct and collectible in full.

Once the IRS begins the process of processing the OIC under the effective tax administration guidelines, it will consider such issues as the taxpayer's overall history of filing and paying taxes, as well as the overall impact on voluntary compliance.

I qualify for an installment agreement, can I still submit an OIC?

If a tax liability can be paid in a lump sum or through an installment agreement, taxpayers will not be considered for an OIC. If an OIC is received, it will be rejected with appeal rights. The only exception is if a taxpayer can demonstrate special circumstances that would show that full payment of the liability would result in economic hardship or be detrimental to voluntary compliance.

The IRS recently levied my bank account. Will the levy proceeds be returned if I file an offer in compromise?

The IRS will keep all payments and credits made, received or applied to the total original tax liability before the OIC was submitted. The IRS may also keep any proceeds from a levy that was served prior to the submission of an OIC, but which were not received at the time the OIC was submitted.

Can I stop sending payments as part of my approved installment agreement once I file an offer in compromise?

No. Installment agreement payments must be continued while the OIC is being considered. Installment agreement payments will not be applied against the amount you offered.

Can taxes be settled by offering pennies on the dollar?

OICs must include an amount equal to or greater than the total value of all assets, plus future income. That total is generally the reasonable collection potential amount, and not simply an offer of ten cents on the dollar, or a percentage of the debt. A consumer alert has been issued advising taxpayers to beware of promoters' claims that tax debts can be settled for "pennies on the dollar." The IRS cautions that the OIC program is not designated to be a program for everyone with financial problems, and it should not be viewed as an invitation to avoid paying taxes.

Can I file an offer in compromise to delay collection action?

Once it is determined an OIC was filed solely to hinder and/or delay collection actions, the IRS will return the OIC without any further consideration. Taxpayers will not be afforded the right to appeal this decision.
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Application Fee

What is an offer in compromise user or application fee?

Federal agencies are authorized to establish charges for services provided by the agency, called "user fees." The U.S. Office of Management and Budget encourages agencies to implement these fees to recover the cost of providing special services to some recipients that others do not use. Accordingly, the IRS has established a user fee that will recover part of the cost of processing and reviewing offer in compromise requests. The IRS has chosen to call it an "application fee" because the fee is required when an OIC application is submitted for consideration.
How much is the application fee and when does it begin?
The application fee for submitting an OIC is $150 and will be required on all offers that are postmarked November 1, 2003, and thereafter.
Who will have to pay this application fee?

All taxpayers who submit a Form 656, "Offer in Compromise," postmarked November 1, 2003, and thereafter, must pay the $150 fee, except in two instances:
• The OIC is submitted based solely on "doubt as to liability;" or
• The taxpayer's total monthly income falls at or below 250% of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHSS) poverty income levels
What method of payment does the IRS accept?

A check or money order made payable to the United States Treasury.
Can I send cash as payment for the application fee?

No. Taxpayers must send a check or money order for $150 made payable to the United States Treasury.
Can I send one check to cover both the application fee and OIC amount?
No. Taxpayers must initially pay the application fee. After the IRS accepts the offer, the IRS will notify the taxpayer to promptly pay any unpaid amounts that become due under the terms of the offer agreement.
Can a tax practitioner who represents a number of clients and files multiple OICs combine several application fees into one check?

No. Checks that combine application fees for several offers will not be accepted, and the offers will be returned. Each Form 656 must have a separate check attached.
What happens if I submit an application fee and find that I have insufficient funds in my account to cover the check?

If we receive notification of insufficient funds, the IRS will immediately stop processing the Form 656 and the OIC will be returned to the taxpayer without any further consideration.
Will payment of the application fee reduce the OIC amount?

The application fee is in addition to the amount listed on Form 656, Item 7. However, when the IRS determines the acceptable amount of an OIC based on doubt as to collectibility, it considers the value of all of the taxpayer's assets. Because some of the taxpayer's assets were used to pay the OIC application fee, payment of the fee will reduce the acceptable amount of the OIC. The taxpayer therefore pays no more for an OIC with the fee than the taxpayer would have paid without the fee.
Will the application fee create an additional financial hardship on taxpayers who are already having payment problems?

Because payment of the fee reduces the acceptable OIC amount, most taxpayers will not experience any additional financial hardship as a result of the fee. However, for some taxpayers the $150 fee may exceed their ability to pay. The IRS believes that the exception to the fee for taxpayers whose income is at or below poverty will protect such taxpayers. The IRS intends to monitor this issue and adjust the amount of the exception if it appears there are a number of taxpayers who cannot pay even the amount of the fee for an OIC.
) What does the IRS review when I submit my OIC, Form 656?

As a result of TIPRA, beginning July 17, 2006 in order to be considered for an OIC, a taxpayer must have met all of the following requirements:
• The taxpayer is not a debtor in an open bankruptcy proceeding.
• The $150 application fee, or a signed Form 656-A, "Income Certification for Offer in Compromise Application Fee and Payment" must be submitted.
• The 20 percent payment with the lump sum offer, or a signed Form 656-A, "Income Certification for Offer in Compromise Application Fee and Payment" must be submitted.
• The first installment payment on a periodic payment offer, or a signed Form 656-A, "Income Certification for Offer in Compromise Application Fee and Payment" must be submitted.
What happens to my fee if the OIC is not considered processable?

The application fee will be returned to the taxpayer if the OIC is determined not to be processable.
Why does the IRS require the February 2007 version of Form 656, “Offer in Compromise” package?
The February 2007 version of the Form 656 package was redesigned in order to assist taxpayers in the correct preparation of an OIC application, as well as reduce the burden associated with the process. The package contains the offer in compromise, instructions, Forms 433-A and 433-B, and a worksheet to help calculate the offer amount. In addition, it includes a processability checklist that helps taxpayers determine if they meet the eligibility requirements to submit an offer. The forms prompt taxpayers to attach necessary financial documents needed in the processing of the offer.

The IRS developed an “Offer in Compromise Application Fee Worksheet” found in the Form 656 package to assist taxpayers in determining whether they qualify for the income exception. If they determine that they qualify, taxpayers must complete Form 656-A “Income Certification for Offer in Compromise Application Fee,” and attach it along with the worksheet to the Form 656 at the time of submission.
(REVISED 8/2004) What do I need to do if the OIC Application Fee Worksheet shows that I qualify for the income exception?
Taxpayers must sign and date Form 656-A, "Income Certification for Offer in Compromise Application Fee." If a taxpayer is submitting a joint OIC with a spouse, the spouse must also sign the certification. The Income Certification must be attached to Form 656. It is recommended that the Application Fee Worksheet also be submitted.
What happens if I submit the Form 656-A and the IRS later says I made an error and do not qualify for the poverty guideline exception?

The IRS will return the OIC to the taxpayer without any further processing.
Does the poverty guideline exception apply to businesses?

No. The exception for taxpayers with total monthly incomes falling at or below 250% of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHSS) poverty income levels only applies only applies to individuals. It does not apply to other entities, such as corporations or partnerships.
What happens if I do not submit the OIC application fee with the OIC Form 656?

Unless the taxpayer has submitted an OIC under the doubt as to liability provision, or attached Form 656-A, showing a poverty guideline certification, the IRS will return the Form 656 as not processable.
How is the application fee collected?

The application fee is collected when a taxpayer submits a Form 656. The general rule is that the IRS needs as many Forms 656 as there are entities seeking to compromise. A check or money order in the amount of $150 must be attached to each OIC.
[Note: This assumes that the taxpayer does not meet one of the exceptions for paying the application fee: 1) OIC filed solely under doubt as to liability, or 2) total monthly income falls at or below income levels based on the DHSS poverty guideline levels.]
How many Forms 656 must I complete if my spouse and I are submitting one offer to compromise the same joint liability? How many application fees must be attached?
A married couple owing the same joint income tax liability may file only one Form 656 listing the joint liability. One fee of $150 should be attached to Form 656. A married couple opting to file separate offers to compromise the same joint liability may do so, but two $150 fees will be required.
[Note: This assumes that the taxpayers do not meet one of the exceptions for paying the application fee: 1) OIC filed solely under doubt as to liability, or 2) total monthly income falls at or below income levels based on the DHSS poverty guideline levels.]
How many Forms 656 should be filed when the taxpayers are divorced, separated, or/married, but living apart? How many fees must be attached in these situations?
A divorced, separated, or married couple living apart may still file one Form 656 listing their joint liability and pay only one $150 fee, as long as all the taxes owed are joint liabilities. Taxpayers in these situations that opt to file separate offers must pay a $150 application fee for each offer that is submitted for consideration.
[Note: This assumes that the taxpayers do not meet one of the exceptions for paying the application fee: 1) OIC filed solely under doubt as to liability, or 2) total monthly income falls at or below income levels based on the DHSS poverty guideline levels.]
When a married couple owes a joint liability and one spouse also owes an individual (non-joint) liability, how many Forms 656 are required?
Two OICs are needed. One for the joint liability and another one for the individual (non-joint) liability. A check or money order for $150 should accompany each Form 656.
[Note: This assumes that the taxpayers do not meet one of the exceptions for paying the application fee: 1) OIC filed solely under doubt as to liability, or 2) total monthly income falls at or below income levels based on the DHSS poverty guideline levels.]
How many Forms 656 are required from a married couple who owe joint income tax, plus the husband owes an individual year before he was married and a business liability, and the wife owes an individual year with her prior spouse? How many application fees will be required?
In keeping with the “one fee per entity” rule:
• The husband should file one offer listing the joint income tax, the individual year he owes before the marriage and his business liability, and attach a $150 application fee to the offer.
• The wife should file an offer listing the joint income tax and the individual year that she owes with her prior spouse, and attach a $150 application fee to the offer.
It does not matter that the joint liability will appear on both offers.
[Note: This assumes that the taxpayers do not meet one of the exceptions for paying the application fee: 1) OIC filed solely under doubt as to liability, or 2) total monthly income falls at or below income levels based on the DHSS poverty guideline levels.]
How many Forms 656 are required if you have an individual who owes tax and who also owes a partnership debt as a general partner or corporate debt from a closely held corporation? How much would the application fee be?
In this situation, two Forms 656 will be required. One for the individual liability, and the other for the partnership or corporate liability. A check or money order for $150 must be attached to each offer, for a total of $300. The IRS cannot combine individual tax on an offer application with taxes owed by a partnership or corporation.
[Note: This assumes that the taxpayers do not meet one of the exceptions for paying the application fee: 1) OIC filed solely under doubt as to liability, or 2) total monthly income falls at or below income levels based on the DHSS poverty guideline levels.]
What will happen if the IRS accepts an OIC for processing, along with the $150 application fee, but then requests additional Forms 656 be submitted with additional $150 fees, and the taxpayer fails to respond?
Taxpayers are required to submit one fee for each Form 656 taken in for processing. Failure to submit additional Form 656 with the corresponding $150 application fee when requested, will cause the IRS to return the offer without any further consideration. The $150 application fee will be retained.
What happens to the Form 656 and application fee after I send it to the IRS?

The $150 is retained until the IRS determines whether the Form 656 is processable.
Are there any instances when the application fee will be applied against the amount of the offer or refunded to me after the OIC has been accepted for processing?

Yes. The fee will be applied against the amount of the offer or, if the taxpayer requests, returned to the taxpayer if:
1. If the IRS accepts an OIC based on effective tax administration(ETA).
If the IRS accepts an OIC based on a determination of doubt as to collectibility with special circumstances.
What if my OIC is not accepted, will the application fee be refunded to me?

No. The IRS will retain the fee when:
1. The taxpayer's initial OIC amount is too low - based on the IRS evaluation of the taxpayer's financial condition - and the taxpayer is given the opportunity to increase it. If the taxpayer does not increase the OIC amount, or show special circumstances, the IRS will reject the Form 656;
2. The taxpayer fails to submit additional financial documents to assist in the IRS review. If the taxpayer fails to respond, and/or submit the requested information, the OIC will be returned without further consideration; or
3. The taxpayer chooses to withdraw the Form 656.
Where can I find more information on the OIC application fee?

For additional information, see the OIC application fee final regulations and Form 656-A, "Income Certification for Offer in Compromise Application Fee."
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Processing Your OIC
What happens if an OIC is submitted using the wrong forms?

The Form 656 and/or Forms 433 "Collection Information Statements" are necessary to conduct an offer investigation. Failure to submit these documents will cause considerable delay in the process. Taxpayers wanting to pursue the OIC as a way to satisfy their tax liability will have to submit the forms in order to have the OIC reconsidered.

Will the submission of inaccurate Form 656 and Forms 433-A/B affect the timely disposition of my case?

Yes. The IRS' procedures require that a taxpayer be contacted in writing and provided a one-time opportunity to correct the error(s), and/or update the financial statement. Failure to correct the error(s) and/or respond results in the OIC being returned to the taxpayer without any further actions on the part of the IRS.
What are the common errors when preparing an offer in compromise?

The following are key items that require the IRS to request corrections and delay the processing of OICs:
• Incorrect address (don't use P.O. Box, must use street address), Form 656, Item 1.
• Taxpayer identification numbers missing or incorrect on Form 656, Item 2.
• EIN not included for an offer on a sole proprietor liability, From 656, Item 3.
• Tax liability periods/years missing on Form 656, Item 5.
• Tax periods included where no tax is due, Form 656, Item 5.
• Reason for compromise not checked, Form 656, Item 6.
• No "offer to pay" amount or an inappropriate amount shown on Form 656, Item 7.
• OIC includes joint liabilities without signatures of both parties, Form 656, Item 11.
• OIC includes single liabilities, but has signatures of two parties.
• OIC submitted by single taxpayer, but includes joint liabilities.
What happens if I miscalculate my OIC or do not offer an amount equal to my reasonable collection potential?

This will result in processing delays and could be grounds for the IRS ultimate decision to reject an OIC. The IRS is observing a large upsurge of receipts in which the offered amount is clearly much lower than the reasonable collection potential illustrated on the taxpayer's financial statement. Furthermore, in a large number of these cases, the financial statement also shows that the taxpayer has a clear ability to satisfy the liability in full, or via an installment agreement during the course of the collection statute, and the taxpayer cites no special circumstances.

The IRS reviews OICs for indications of fraudulent intent. Submitting an OIC with false information, or making a false statement to an IRS employee, is considered an indicator of fraud and may be subject to civil or criminal penalties.
What are the National and Local Standards and how are they considered in evaluating an OIC?

Collection Financial Standards are used to help determine a taxpayer's ability to pay a delinquent tax liability.

Allowances for food, clothing and other items, known as the National Standards, apply nationwide, except for Alaska and Hawaii, which have their own tables. Taxpayers are allowed the total National Standards amount for their family size and income level, without questioning amounts actually spent.

Maximum allowances for housing and utilities and transportation, known as the Local Standards, vary by location. Unlike the National Standards, the taxpayer is allowed the lesser of the amount actually spent or the standard.


What happens if the IRS accepts an OIC?

If an OIC is accepted, the following will apply:
• The taxpayer must pay the OIC amount as quickly as possible in accordance with the acceptance agreement.
• The IRS will keep any tax refund, including interest due, as the result of an overpayment of any tax or other liability for the tax period extending through the calendar year the IRS accepts the OIC. A taxpayer may not designate a refund and/or overpayment to be applied to estimated tax payments for the following year. This condition does not apply if the OIC is based on Doubt as to Liability only.
• The taxpayer will waive their right to contest in court or otherwise, the amount of the tax liability.
• If a Notice of Federal Tax Lien has been filed against a taxpayer, the IRS will release it when the payment terms of the OIC are satisfied.
The taxpayer must remain in compliance with filing and payment of all tax returns for a period of five years from the date the OIC is accepted or until the OIC is paid in full, whichever is longer. Failure to pay the OIC on time, and/or to remain in compliance during the five-year period or until the OIC is paid in full, whichever is longer, will result in the OIC being declared in default..
What happens if the IRS does not accept an OIC?

Once the IRS determines it cannot accept an offer, the taxpayer will be advised of the reasons behind the decision. The taxpayer will be afforded another opportunity to submit any other information that might cause the IRS to reconsider it preliminary decision to reject the offer. The exception to this is when the taxpayer has an ability to satisfy the liability in full and has not pointed to special circumstances.
How much interest am I going to pay if my OIC is accepted?

Interest will not accrue on the taxpayer's accepted OIC amount from the date of acceptance until the OIC is paid. Interest and penalties will continue to accrue on the unpaid tax liability while the OIC is under consideration.
Will I be entitled to receive tax refunds if my OIC is accepted?

As additional consideration beyond the amount of the taxpayer's offer, the IRS will keep any refund, including interest due, because of an overpayment of any tax or other liability, for tax periods extending through the calendar year the IRS accepts an OIC. Exception: This condition does not apply if the offer is based solely on Doubt as to Liability.
Can I designate any payments once my OIC is accepted?

No. Refunds and overpayments may not be designated as estimated tax payments for the following year. This condition does not apply if the OIC was accepted under doubt as to liability only.
Is a tax lien released when an OIC is accepted?

The IRS releases a Notice of Federal Tax Lien when all of the OIC payment terms are satisfied. For an immediate release of a lien, a taxpayer can submit payment using a certified check and include a request letter.
What happens if I do not meet all the terms of my accepted OIC?

The IRS may default the OIC and reinstate the entire tax liability, less all payments and credits received.
What happens if I default my OIC?

The IRS may take the following actions:
• Immediately file suit to collect the entire unpaid balance of the offer
• Immediately file suit to collect an amount equal to the original amount of the tax liability as liquidating damages, minus any payment already received under the terms of this offer
• Disregard the amount of the offer and apply all amounts already paid under the offer against the original amount of the tax liability
• File suit or levy to collect the original amount of the tax liability, without further notice of any kind
NOTE: The IRS will not default an agreement when taxpayers have filed a joint OIC with your spouse or ex-spouse, as long as you have kept, or are keeping, all the terms of the agreement, even if your spouse or ex-spouse violates the future compliance provision.

What happens if I do not file my tax return or pay my taxes next year?

The OIC will be defaulted. An OIC requires future compliance for a period of five (5) years from the date of acceptance of the OIC, or until the offered amount is paid in full, whichever is longer. Compliance is the timely filing and paying of all required returns and taxes.
If you want to know if you qualify for an Offer in Compromise, complete the following worksheet:


http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f656.pdf#page=27

If you have any questions about the worksheet or whether you qualify for an Offer in Compromise, call 888-712-7690, ex 106 or ex 102 and ask to speak with a tax attorney for a free consultation or send an e-mail request to ab@irstaxattorney.com.

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IRS abuse of discretion - section 6015 - Innocent Spouse

August 1, 2008

Code Sec. 6015


T.C. Memo. 2008-185

ALIOTOv. INTERNAL REVENUE.

UNITED STATES TAX COURT. Docket No. 14356-03. Filed July 31, 2008.


MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION


VASQUEZ, Judge: Respondent determined that petitioner did not qualify for relief from joint and several liability pursuant to section 6015 1 for 1995 and 1996.2 This case is before the Court on petitioner's motion to vacate order of dismissal, as supplemented, pursuant to Rule 162 and petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The Court will grant petitioner's motion to vacate order of dismissal, as supplemented, and will grant petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The issue for decision is whether petitioner is entitled to relief from joint and several liability pursuant to section 6015(f) for 1995 and 1996.
IV. Section 6015(f) Relief

Section 6015(f) allows relief to a requesting spouse "if --(1) taking into account all the facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the individual liable". The Commissioner applies Rev. Proc. 2000-15 ,15 sec. 4.01 , 2000-1 C.B. 447, 448, to determine whether to grant equitable relief. See, e.g., Washington v. Commissioner , 120 T.C. 137, 147-152 (2003); Jonson v. Commissioner , 118 T.C. 106, 125-126 (2002), affd. 353 F.3d 1181 (10th Cir. 2003); Nihiser v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo. 2008-135.

Rev. Proc. 2000-15 , sec. 4.01 has seven general requirements that all requesting spouses must meet for relief pursuant to section 6015(f) . Respondent concedes that Mrs. Alioto meets the guidelines for relief set forth in Rev. Proc. 2000-15 , sec. 4.01(1)-(7) .

A. Safe Harbor: Rev. Proc. 2000-15 , Sec. 4.02

Revenue Procedure 2000-15 , supra , also has a safe harbor whereby the IRS ordinarily will grant relief pursuant to section 6015(f) (safe harbor). Nihiser v. Commissioner , supra ; Gonce v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo. 2007-328 (discussing identical provisions in Rev. Proc. 2003-61 , sec. 4.02 , 2003-2 C.B. 296, 298); Billings v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo. 2007-234 ("The procedure also has a safe harbor --three conditions that, if met, will ordinarily trigger a grant of relief."); Rev. Proc. 2000-15 , sec. 4.02 , 2000-1 C.B. at 448 (titled "Circumstances under which equitable relief under § 6015(f) will ordinarily be granted"). The safe harbor grants relief to a requesting spouse if the requesting spouse meets three conditions.16 Nihiser v. Commissioner , supra ; see Rev. Proc. 2000-15 , sec. 4.02 .


1. First Safe Harbor Condition

The first safe harbor condition is:

At the time relief is requested, the requesting spouse is no longer married to, or is legally separated from, the nonrequesting spouse, or has not been a member of the same household as the nonrequesting spouse at any time during the 12-month period ending on the date relief was requested;

Rev. Proc. 2000-15 , sec. 4.02(1)(a) . Mayor Alioto died in January 1998. Accordingly, we conclude that Mrs. Alioto satisfied the first safe harbor condition.


2. Second Safe Harbor Condition

The second safe harbor condition is:

At the time the return was signed, the requesting spouse had no knowledge or reason to know that the tax would not be paid. The requesting spouse must establish that it was reasonable for the requesting spouse to believe that the nonrequesting spouse would pay the reported liability. If a requesting spouse would otherwise qualify for relief under this section, except for the fact that the requesting spouse had no knowledge or reason to know of only a portion of the unpaid liability, then the requesting spouse may be granted relief only to the extent that the liability is attributable to such portion; * * *

Id. sec. 4.02(1)(b) . This factor is satisfied if the taxpayer reasonably believed when the return was filed that the liability would be paid by the taxpayer's spouse. See Van Arsdalen v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo. 2007-48 (the taxpayer reasonably believed taxes owed would be paid by the spouse); Wiest v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo. 2003-91 (same).

Respondent argued that Mrs. Alioto would have seen or known about certain notices of Federal tax liens and levies that were filed on her community property. Respondent relies on the testimony of Revenue Officer Cheryl Matthews.

We determine the credibility of each witness, weigh each piece of evidence, draw appropriate inferences, and choose between conflicting inferences. See Neonatology Associates, P.A. v. Commissioner , 115 T.C. 43, 84 (2000), affd. 299 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2002); see also Gallick v. Baltimore & O.R. Co. , 372 U.S. 108, 114-115 (1963); Boehm v. Commissioner , 326 U.S. 287, 293 (1945); Wilmington Trust Co. v. Helvering , 316 U.S. 164, 167-168 (1942). We decide whether evidence is credible on the basis of objective facts, the reasonableness of the testimony, and the demeanor of the witness. Quock Ting v. United States , 140 U.S. 417, 420-421 (1891); Wood v. Commissioner , 338 F.2d 602, 605 (9th Cir. 1964), affg. 41 T.C. 593 (1964); Pinder v. United States , 330 F.2d 119, 124-125 (5th Cir. 1964); Concord Consumers Hous. Coop. v. Commissioner , 89 T.C. 105, 124 n.21 (1987). We have evaluated each witness's testimony by observing his or her candor, sincerity, and demeanor and by assigning weight to the elicited testimony. See Neonatology Associates, P.A. v. Commissioner , supra at 84.

We found Ms. Matthews's testimony to be general, vague, conclusory, and/or questionable in certain material respects. Under the circumstances presented here, we are not required to, and generally do not, rely on Ms. Matthews's testimony. See Lerch v. Commissioner , 877 F.2d 624, 631-632 (7th Cir. 1989), affg. T.C. Memo. 1987-295; Geiger v. Commissioner , 440 F.2d 688, 689-690 (9th Cir. 1971), affg. per curiam T.C. Memo. 1969-159; Tokarski v. Commissioner , 87 T.C. 74, 77 (1986). The Court need not accept at face value a witness's testimony that is otherwise questionable. See Archer v. Commissioner , 227 F.2d 270, 273 (5th Cir. 1955), affg. a Memorandum Opinion of this Court dated Feb. 18, 1954; Weiss v. Commissioner , 221 F.2d 152, 156 (8th Cir. 1955), affg. T.C. Memo. 1954-51; Schroeder v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo. 1986-467. This is so even when the testimony is uncontroverted if it is improbable, unreasonable, or questionable. Archer v. Commissioner , supra ; Weiss v. Commissioner , supra ; see Quock Ting v. United States , supra .

We conclude the evidence that respondent relies on is not credible or probative and is insufficient to conclude that Mrs. Alioto saw or knew about any notices of liens or tax levies. Mrs. Alioto's testimony on this matter, however, was credible. Upon the basis of Mrs. Alioto's credible testimony, we find that Mrs. Alioto never saw or knew about any notices of liens or tax levies or any seizures of property until after Mayor Alioto's death.

Mrs. Alioto credibly testified that she did not learn about the tax liabilities in issue (for 1995 or 1996) until after Mayor Alioto's death and that she was not aware of Mayor Alioto's tax problems or any dispute with regard to the New England Patriots case fees when she signed the 1996 tax return. Mrs. Alioto never met with or spoke with anyone at the accounting firm that prepared Mayor Alioto and Mrs. Alioto's joint tax returns for the years in issue (or for any year she was married to Mayor Alioto). Furthermore, we find Mrs. Alioto's beliefs regarding her financial well-being and solvency --until she learned otherwise after Mayor Alioto's death in 1998 --to be credible.

Mrs. Alioto did not learn of the MSA Mayor Alioto had executed until after his death. At the time the 1995 and 1996 tax returns were filed, Mrs. Alioto did not know or have reason to know that Mayor Alioto had obligated himself to indemnify and defend Angelina with respect to Mayor Alioto and Angelina's outstanding joint Federal and State tax liabilities for 1976 and 1977.

The 1995 return, filed in October 1996 but which Mrs. Alioto did not sign and never discussed with Mayor Alioto, reported a total balance due of $63,115. At that time Mayor Alioto was due legal fees totaling approximately $2.1 million from the New England Patriots case. Mayor Alioto was involved in the New England Patriots case because the case involved Mrs. Alioto's family.

The 1996 return, filed in October 1997, reported a balance due of zero. Mrs. Alioto reviewed the 1996 return, and she saw an estimated tax payment of $838,311 and a total balance due of zero, before she signed it. When Mrs. Alioto signed the 1996 return, she reasonably believed that any tax liability shown on the 1996 return had been paid. Mrs. Alioto knew that Mayor Alioto had earned the New England Patriots case fees, that Mayor Alioto had earned another $1 million fee in 1997, and that Mayor Alioto had a number of other lawsuits that he was attorney of record for in which he would earn additional income. In fall 1997 Mrs. Alioto reasonably believed, on the basis of statements made by Mayor Alioto, that he had cases pending that would bring in more money than he had earned in his entire career.

During August through October 1997 Mayor Alioto and Mrs. Alioto met with an estate planning lawyer to discuss drafting an estate plan for each of them. Mayor Alioto gave the attorney a list of assets and liabilities and their approximate values. The attorney reasonably believed that at that time Mayor Alioto and Mrs. Alioto had a net worth of $16 million. Accordingly, we find that it was reasonable for Mrs. Alioto to believe that her net worth as of October 1997 was $16 million. Mrs. Alioto reasonably believed that she and her husband had a high net worth and that Mayor Alioto earned a lot of money every year that they were married.

In Gonce v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo. 2007-328, we held that the second criterion in Rev. Proc. 2000-15 , sec. 4.02 , that at the time the joint return was signed the requesting spouse had no knowledge or reason to know that the tax would not be paid and that it was reasonable to believe that the nonrequesting spouse would pay the liability, was not satisfied. In Gonce , the taxpayer and her husband reported underpayments on their 2000 and 2001 Federal tax returns, both of which were signed by the taxpayer, of $1,188 and $2,528, respectively. Id. When those returns were filed, the taxpayer knew that her husband always bought on credit and that she and her husband spent more than they made. We concluded that the taxpayer did not show that it was reasonable to rely on her husband to pay the tax due for those years.

The facts in the case at bar are diametrically opposed to those in Gonce . Mrs. Alioto credibly testified that Mayor Alioto had paid off over $18 million in debts. Mrs. Alioto reasonably believed, when the returns for 1995 and 1996 were filed, that Mayor Alioto would continue to pay off any debts that he owed. During Mayor Alioto's negotiations with the IRS regarding the Aliotos' outstanding joint tax liabilities for 1995 and 1996, Mayor Alioto worked arduously to protect the well-being and financial interests of Mrs. Alioto. Furthermore, if Mrs. Alioto had seen the 1995 return in October 1996, showing a balance due, she would have expected Mayor Alioto to pay the liability in full as she thought Mayor Alioto paid all their taxes. Mrs. Alioto credibly testified that she did not recall ever being asked to sign a joint tax return with Mayor Alioto that reflected a balance due. Mrs. Alioto credibly testified that had she seen a balance due on any tax return, she would have expected Mayor Alioto to pay it on account of his history of paying off their obligations/debts and the debts of his son.

During the years in issue Mrs. Alioto reasonably believed that Mayor Alioto was a man of wealth, a man who was on top of everything, and a man in control. The credible evidence establishes that Mayor Alioto believed it was his absolute duty to care and provide for his family. From 1980 to 1998 Mrs. Alioto cared for Mayor Alioto and raised their children. During this time Mayor Alioto did not want Mrs. Alioto to work outside the home. Furthermore, Mayor Alioto was in charge of the family finances and tax matters. Mrs. Alioto did not sign the 1995 return and was not aware that any tax was due for 1995 or 1996 until years later. These facts further support the conclusion that Mrs. Alioto did not know, or have reason to know, of the 1995 and 1996 underpayments. See Dowell v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo. 2007-326 (concluding that the taxpayer did not know, or have reason to know because: (1) The requesting spouse did not sign the return for the year in issue; (2) the requesting spouse was not aware that any tax was due for the year in issue until years later; and (3) the nonrequesting spouse handled all tax matters for the couple and did not inform the requesting spouse of financial matters).

Accordingly, we conclude that Mrs. Alioto satisfied the second safe harbor condition.


3. Third Safe Harbor Condition

The third safe harbor condition is:

The requesting spouse will suffer economic hardship if relief is not granted. For purposes of this section, the determination of whether a requesting spouse will suffer economic hardship will be made by the Commissioner or the Commissioner's delegate, and will be based on rules similar to those provided in § 301.6343-1(b)(4) of the Regulations on Procedure and Administration.

Rev. Proc. 2000-15 , sec. 4.02(1)(c) .

Generally, economic hardship exists if collection of the tax liability will cause the taxpayer to be unable to pay reasonable basic living expenses. Butner v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo. 2007-136. The ability to pay reasonable basic living expenses is determined by considering the following nonexclusive factors: (1) The taxpayer's age, employment status and history, ability to earn, and number of dependents; (2) an amount reasonably necessary for food, clothing, housing, medical expenses, transportation, current tax payments, and expenses necessary to the taxpayer's production of income; (3) the cost of living in the taxpayer's geographic area; (4) the amount of property available to satisfy the taxpayer's expenses; (5) any extraordinary circumstances; i.e., special education expenses, a medical catastrophe, or a natural disaster; and (6) any other factor bearing on economic hardship. Sec. 301.6343-1(b)(4) , Proced. & Admin. Regs.; see Gonce v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo. 2007-328; Van Arsdalen v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo. 2007-48. These provisions envision consideration of a taxpayer's retirement needs where appropriate. Van Arsdalen v. Commissioner , supra .

In 1966 Mrs. Alioto received a B.A. in English literature from Manhattanville College of the Sacred Heart in Purchase, New York, and she began work as a third grade teacher in Bedford-Stuyvesant, New York, at an annual salary of $5,400. For the next 3 years Mrs. Alioto worked as an elementary school teacher at P.S. 113 in Harlem, New York. She was paid less than $6,000 per year for this job. From 1971 to 1973 Mrs. Alioto taught emotionally disturbed children in an inner city neighborhood of Boston, Massachusetts. In 1973 Mrs. Alioto was elected a member of the Boston Public School Board. From 1974 to 1980 she served without pay as a member of the Boston Public School Board. During this period Mrs. Alioto went back to school, and in 1980 she earned a Ph.D. in education. From 1980 to 1998 Mrs. Alioto cared for Mayor Alioto, raised their children, and did not work outside the home.

In April 1998 administration of the estate was commenced. Creditors, including the IRS and the California State Franchise Tax Board, filed claims in excess of $74 million against the estate. The claim filed by the IRS in the probate case, including the liabilities in dispute in this case, totaled $4,239,834.34. At that time, Mrs. Alioto was shocked, surprised, and stunned to learn the amounts of the creditors' claims that were being asserted against the estate. After learning the magnitude of the claims against the estate and how much of her community property had already been used to pay Mayor Alioto's separate debts, Mrs. Alioto filed a creditor's claim in the probate proceeding. None of her claim will be paid.

When the IRS employee assigned to Mrs. Alioto's section 6015 case met with Mrs. Alioto's counsel, she was alerted to the number of creditors who had filed claims against the estate and the amounts of additional liabilities being discovered in Mayor Alioto's probate proceedings. Neither the IRS employee assigned to Mrs. Alioto's section 6015 case nor the Collection Division requested a financial statement from Mrs. Alioto.

During 2001 and 2002 Mrs. Alioto or her counsel provided respondent's Appeals Office copies of pleadings filed in the probate court and information about the probate proceedings. During 2002 the probate referee made a final recommendation that Mrs. Alioto's personal residence was community property. The probate judge decided that Mrs. Alioto's personal residence was to be sold to pay Mayor Alioto's creditors. Respondent's Appeals Office was advised of these decisions. Additionally, in January 2003 the Appeals officer assigned to Mrs. Alioto's case inserted into the administrative record a newspaper article that reported that Mrs. Alioto was being forced to sell her personal residence in order to pay Mayor Alioto's debts.

During 1998, Mrs. Alioto earned $50,000. Mrs. Alioto's family health insurance terminated in 1998 (at the time of Mayor Alioto's death). During 1999, Mrs. Alioto earned $179,000 --$30,000 of which was a fee from the estate. For 1999, Mrs. Alioto paid $79,000 in taxes. Mrs. Alioto incurred medical expenses for treating, among other things, her daughter's epilepsy. Mrs. Alioto reasonably estimated that she incurred medical expenses of approximately $22,000 in both 1998 and 1999.

During 2000, Mrs. Alioto secured a position as a fundraiser for the City College of San Francisco (City College). She still was employed in that position by City College as of the time of trial. However, this position is a year-to-year job with no tenure --Mrs. Alioto could lose her job at any time, especially if the chancellor or trustees of City College (who are elected every 2 years) changed.

In 2003 Mrs. Alioto earned $121,000. Mrs. Alioto received a 4-percent raise in 2004, but she received no raises before 2004. To have pension "rights" at City College, Mrs. Alioto would have to work for 10 years (until she was age 67).

In December 2, 2004, respondent served on the Clerk of the San Francisco Superior Court, Bank of the West, Oakland, California, Mrs. Alioto, and her counsel separate notices of levy with a total amount due of $1,628,235.48. The notices of levy indicated that $129,842.97 was for her 1995 tax year and that $1,498,392.51 was for her 1996 tax year.

As of the date of trial Mrs. Alioto had approximately $7,000 in a savings account and $99,000 deposited in retirement plans and did not own a car. The Social Security Administration estimated her benefits will be $600 per month. In June 2008 Mrs. Alioto turned 64 years old. As of December 20, 2006, Mrs. Alioto's balances due for 1995 and 1996 were $153,501 and $1,832,010, a very substantial sum given her financial situation. The liabilities in issue would cause Mrs. Alioto significant hardship, and she provided sufficient information to show her liabilities significantly exceeded her assets. See Farmer v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo. 2007-74.

Considering Mrs. Alioto's age, employment status and history, ability to earn, and number of dependents; the amounts reasonably necessary for food, clothing, housing, medical expenses, transportation, current tax payments, and expenses necessary to her production of income; the cost of living in her geographic area; and the amount of property available to satisfy her expenses, we find that she would suffer economic hardship because payment of the underlying liabilities would prevent her from paying reasonable basic living expenses. See sec. 301.6343-1(b)(4) , Proced. & Admin. Regs.; see also Butner v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo. 2007-136; Farmer v. Commissioner , supra . Accordingly, we conclude that Mrs. Alioto has satisfied the third safe harbor condition.

B. Conclusion

Mrs. Alioto satisfies the safe harbor conditions in Rev. Proc. 2000-15 , sec. 4.02 . Accordingly, respondent's determination that Mrs. Alioto did not qualify for relief pursuant to section 6015(f) was an abuse of discretion; i.e., it was arbitrary, capricious, and without sound basis in law or fact.

To reflect the foregoing,

An appropriate order and decision will be entered .

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.

2 In her petition, petitioner sought relief pursuant to sec. 6015 for 1993, 1994, 1995, and 1996. Since the petition was filed, respondent has collected amounts (payments from the Estate of Joseph Alioto) that fully satisfied the liabilities for 1993 and 1994, and the parties agree that these years are no longer at issue in this case.

3 From Jan. 8, 1968, through Jan. 8, 1976, petitioner's husband Joe Alioto served as mayor of San Francisco, California.

4 Mayor Alioto and Angelina, however, were jointly liable for this amount for 1976.

5 We use the term "premarital" for convenience. The 1976 and 1977 tax liabilities are "premarital" as regards petitioner (i.e., they predate petitioner's marriage to Mayor Alioto).

6 The same is true for Mrs. Alioto's 1993 and 1994 tax years, no longer in issue. Petitioner, however, does not contend that the 1993, 1994, and 1995 returns were not joint returns because she did not sign them.

7 Mrs. Alioto's father was a former owner of the New England Patriots.

8 We use the term "separate" for convenience. The 1976 and 1977 tax liabilities are "separate" as regards petitioner (i.e., they predate Mrs. Alioto's marriage to Mayor Alioto).

9 Mrs. Alioto could lose this job at any time --especially if the chancellor or trustees of City College (who are elected every 2 years) change.

10 On Oct. 3, 1997, the Alioto Living Trust document was executed.

11 Not including the IRS, the amount of outstanding creditors' claims as of Nov. 30, 2003, totaled $2,477,504.99.

12 The granting of a motion for reconsideration rests within the discretion of the Court, and we will not grant a motion for reconsideration unless the party seeking reconsideration shows unusual circumstances or substantial error. See, e.g., Alexander v. Commissioner , 95 T.C. 467, 469 (1990), affd. without published opinion sub nom. Stell v. Commissioner , 999 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1993).

13 In "Ewing I", Ewing v. Commissioner , 118 T.C. 494 (2002), revd. 439 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2006), we held that the Court had jurisdiction to determine whether equitable relief was available to taxpayer for underpayment of tax shown on joint return (i.e., over "stand-alone" sec. 6015(f) cases).

14 We note that if we were limited to reviewing the administrative record, it is likely that the outcome in this case would be different.

15 Rev. Proc. 2000-15 , 2000-1 C.B. 447, has been superseded by Rev. Proc. 2003-61 , 2003-2 C.B. 296. The new revenue procedure applies only to requests for relief filed on or after Nov. 1, 2003, or those pending on Nov. 1, 2003, for which no preliminary determination letter has been issued as of that date. Id. sec. 7 , 2003-2 C.B. at 299. In May 2003 respondent determined Mrs. Alioto was not eligible for sec. 6015 relief. Accordingly, we apply Rev. Proc. 2000-15 , supra , to this case.

16 Relief that the Commissioner ordinarily grants pursuant Rev. Proc. 2000-15 , sec. 4.02(1) , 2000-1 C.B. at 448, is subject to the limitations set forth in Rev. Proc. 2000-15 , sec. 4.02 , 2000-1 C.B. at 448 --(a) if the return is or has been adjusted to reflect an understatement of tax, relief will be available only to the extent of the liability shown on the return before any such adjustment; and (b) relief will only be available to the extent that the unpaid liability is allocable to the nonrequesting spouse. Respondent did not address Rev. Proc. 2000-15 , sec. 4.02(2) , on brief. Accordingly, we deem that respondent has waived any issue regarding Rev. Proc. 2000-15 , sec. 4.02(2) . See Petzoldt v. Commissioner , 92 T.C. 661, 683 (1989); Levert v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo. 1989-333, affd. without published opinion 956 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1992).
buse of discretion - innocent spouse - section 6015

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