Thursday, April 30, 2009

New Law on Cancellation of Indebtedness Income

American Recovery and Reinvestment Tax Act of 2009. Under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Tax Act of 2009 ( P.L. 111-5), at the election of the taxpayer, discharge of indebtedness income resulting from the reacquisition after December 31, 2008, and before January 1, 2011, of a corporate or business debt instrument is includible in gross income ratably over a five-tax-year period ( Code Sec. 108(i), added by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Tax Act of 2009 ( P.L. 111-5)).
Income from Discharge of Indebtedness: Deferral of discharge of indebtedness income from reacquisition of debt instruments

At the election of the taxpayer, income from the discharge of indebtedness in connection with the reacquisition after December 31, 2008, and before January 1, 2011, of an applicable debt instrument is includible in gross income ratably over the five-tax-year period beginning with:
 The fifth tax year following the tax year in which the reacquisition occurs for a reacquisition occurring in 2009; and

 The fourth tax year following the tax year in which the reacquisition occurs for a reacquisition occurring in 2010 ( Code Sec. 108(i)(1), as added by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Tax Act of 2009 ( P.L. 111-5)).

Deferral of deduction for OID in debt-for-debt exchanges. If a debt instrument is issued for the applicable debt instrument being reacquired (or is treated as issued under Code Sec. 108(e)(4), which concerns acquisition of indebtedness by a person related to the debtor), and there is any original issue discount (OID) with respect to the debt instrument:
 no deduction otherwise allowable shall be allowed to the issuer with respect to the portion of such OID which (a) accrues before the first tax year in the five-tax-year period in which income from the discharge of indebtedness attributable to the reacquisition of the debt instrument is includible in gross income, and does not exceed the income from the discharge of indebtedness with respect to the debt instrument being reacquired; and

 the aggregate amount of deductions disallowed shall be allowed as a deduction ratably over the five-tax-year period.

If the amount of OID accruing before the first tax year in which the OID income is to be recognized exceeds the income from the discharge of indebtedness with respect to the applicable debt instrument being reacquired, the deductions are be disallowed in the order in which the OID is accrued ( Code Sec. 108(i)(2)(A), as added by P.L. 111-5).

Deemed debt-for-debt exchanges. If any debt instrument is issued by an issuer and the proceeds are used directly or indirectly by the issuer to reacquire an applicable debt instrument of the issuer, the newly issued debt instrument is treated as issued for the debt instrument being reacquired. If only a portion of the proceeds from a debt instrument are used for this purpose, the deferral rules apply to the portion of any OID on the newly issued debt instrument which is equal to the portion of the proceeds from such instrument used to reacquire the outstanding instrument ( Code Sec. 108(i)(2)(B), as added by P.L. 111-5). Thus, if a taxpayer makes the deferral election for a debt-for-debt exchange in which the newly issued debt instrument issued (or deemed issued, including by operation of Reg. §1.108-2(g)) in satisfaction of an outstanding debt instrument of the debtor has OID, then any otherwise allowable deduction for OID with respect to such newly issued debt instrument that (a) accrues before the first year of the five-tax-year period in which the related, deferred discharge of indebtedness income is included in the gross income of the taxpayer, and (b) does not exceed such related, deferred discharge of indebtedness income, is deferred and allowed as a deduction ratably over the same five-tax-year period in which the deferred discharge of indebtedness income is included in gross income (Conference Committee Report for American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009).

This rule can apply in certain cases when a debtor reacquires its debt for cash. If the taxpayer issues a debt instrument and the proceeds of such issuance are used to reacquire a debt instrument of the taxpayer, the newly issued debt instrument is treated as if it were issued in satisfaction of the retired debt instrument. If the newly issued debt instrument has OID, this rule applies. Thus, all or a portion of the interest deductions with respect to OID on the newly issued debt instrument are deferred into the five-tax-year period in which the discharge of indebtedness income is recognized. Where only a portion of the proceeds of a new issuance are used to satisfy outstanding debt, the deferral rule applies to the portion of the OID on the newly issued debt instrument that is equal to the portion of the proceeds of such newly issued instrument used to retire outstanding debt of the taxpayer (Conference Committee Report for American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009).

Applicable debt instrument. An applicable debt instrument is any debt instrument issued by: (i) a C corporation, or (ii) any other person in connection with the conduct of a trade or business by such person ( Code Sec. 108(i)(3)(A), as added by P.L. 111-5). A debt instrument for these purposes is broadly defined to include bonds, debentures, notes, certificates, or any other instrument or contractual arrangement constituting indebtedness within the meaning of Code Sec. 1275(a)(1) (which excludes certain annuity contracts) ( Code Sec. 108(i)(3)(B), as added by P.L. 111-5).

Reacquisition. Reacquisition for these purposes includes any acquisition of an applicable debt instrument by (i) the debtor which issued (or is otherwise the obligor under) the debt instrument, or (ii) a related person to such debtor ( Code Sec. 108(i)(4)(A), as added by P.L. 111-5). The determination of whether a person is related to another person is made in the same manner as Code Sec. 108(e)(4) concerning acquisition of indebtedness by a person related to the debtor ( Code Sec. 108(i)(5)(A), as added by P.L. 111-5.

Acquisition. Acquisition for these purposes includes an acquisition of an applicable debt instrument for cash, the exchange of the debt instrument for another debt instrument (including an exchange resulting from a modification of the debt instrument), the exchange of the debt instrument for corporate stock or a partnership interest, the contribution of the debt instrument to capital, and the complete forgiveness of the indebtedness by the holder of the debt instrument ( Code Sec. 108(i)(4)(B), as added by P.L. 111-5).

Election. The election to defer OID income is to be made on an instrument by instrument basis. Once made, the election is irrevocable. A taxpayer makes an election with respect to a debt instrument by including with its return for the tax year in which the reacquisition of the debt instrument occurs a statement that: (a) clearly identifies the debt instrument, and (b) includes the amount of deferred income under this provision, plus any other information that may be prescribed by the IRS. The IRS is authorized to require reporting of the election (and other information with respect to the reacquisition) for years subsequent to the year of the reacquisition. In the case of a pass-through entity, such as a partnership or S corporation, the election is made at the entity level ( Code Sec. 108(i)(5)(B), as added by P.L. 111-5; Conference Committee Report for American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009).

Coordination with other exclusions. If a taxpayer elects to defer discharge of indebtedness income, the exclusions for discharge under a Chapter 11 bankruptcy, when the taxpayer is insolvent, qualified farm indebtedness, and qualified real property business indebtedness ( Code Sec. 108(a)(1)(A), (B), (C) and (D))) do not apply to the income from the discharge of indebtedness for the tax year of the election or any subsequent tax year ( Code Sec. 108(i)(5)(C), as added by P.L. 111-5). Thus, for example, an insolvent taxpayer may elect to defer income from the discharge of indebtedness rather than excluding the income and reducing tax attributes by a corresponding amount (Conference Committee Report for American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009).

Acceleration of deferred items. In the case of the death of the taxpayer, the liquidation or sale of substantially all the assets of the taxpayer (including in a title 11 bankruptcy or similar case), the cessation of business by the taxpayer, or similar circumstances, any item of income or deduction which is deferred (and has not previously been taken into account) must be taken into account in the tax year in which such event occurs (or in the case of a title 11 bankruptcy or similar case, the day before the petition is filed). This rule applies in the case of the sale or exchange or redemption of an interest in a partnership, S corporation, or other pass-through entity by a partner, shareholder, or other person holding an ownership interest in such entity ( Code Sec. 108(i)(5)(D), as added by P.L. 111-5).

Special rule for partnerships. In the case of a partnership, any income deferred under this provision is to be allocated to the partners in the partnership immediately before the discharge in the manner such amounts would have been included in the distributive shares of the partners under Code Sec. 704 if the income were recognized at such time. Any decrease in a partner's share of partnership liabilities as a result of such discharge is not be taken into account for purposes of Code Sec. 752 (concerning the treatment of certain liabilities) at the time of the discharge to the extent it would cause the partner to recognize gain under Code Sec. 731. Thus, the deemed distribution under Code Sec. 752 is deferred with respect to a partner to the extent it exceeds such partner's basis. Amounts so deferred are taken into account at the same time, and to the extent remaining in the same amount, as income deferred under the provision is recognized by the partner ( Code Sec. 108(i)(6), as added by P.L. 111-5; Conference Committee Report for American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009).

The Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe rules and regulations regarding the application of this provision, including: (a) extending the application of the rules regarding the acceleration of deferred items to other circumstances where appropriate, (b) requiring reporting of the election (and such other information as the Secretary may require) on returns of tax for subsequent tax years, and (c) rules for the application of the provision to partnerships, S corporations, and other pass-through entities including for the allocation of deferred deductions ( Code Sec. 108(i)(7), as added by P.L. 111-5).

Treasury Working on Guidance for New Law Deferring Cancellation of Debt Income
Treasury Associate Tax Legislative Counsel Michael Novey stated on April 29 that the Treasury is actively working on guidance projects on cancellation of debt (COD) income (Code Sec. 108(i)) and applicable high-yield discount obligations (AHYDO) (Code Sec. 163(e)(5)(7)). Both provisions were enacted in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5). Speaking at a D.C. Bar program on the taxation of distressed debt, Novey said that the Treasury may publish initial guidance that can be done most quickly and follow this up with later guidance on other issues.


108(i) DEFERRAL AND RATABLE INCLUSION OF INCOME ARISING FROM BUSINESS INDEBTEDNESS DISCHARGED BY THE REACQUISITION OF A DEBT INSTRUMENT. --

108(i)(1) IN GENERAL. --At the election of the taxpayer, income from the discharge of indebtedness in connection with the reacquisition after December 31, 2008, and before January 1, 2011, of an applicable debt instrument shall be includible in gross income ratably over the 5-taxable-year period beginning with --

108(i)(1)(A) in the case of a reacquisition occurring in 2009, the fifth taxable year following the taxable year in which the reacquisition occurs, and

108(i)(1)(B) in the case of a reacquisition occurring in 2010, the fourth taxable year following the taxable year in which the reacquisition occurs.

108(i)(2) DEFERRAL OF DEDUCTION FOR ORIGINAL ISSUE DISCOUNT IN DEBT FOR DEBT EXCHANGES. --

108(i)(2)(A) IN GENERAL. --If, as part of a reacquisition to which paragraph (1) applies, any debt instrument is issued for the applicable debt instrument being reacquired (or is treated as so issued under subsection (e)(4) and the regulations thereunder) and there is any original issue discount determined under subpart A of part V of subchapter P of this chapter with respect to the debt instrument so issued --

108(i)(2)(A)(i) except as provided in clause (ii), no deduction otherwise allowable under this chapter shall be allowed to the issuer of such debt instrument with respect to the portion of such original issue discount which --

108(i)(2)(A)(i)(I) accrues before the 1st taxable year in the 5-taxable-year period in which income from the discharge of indebtedness attributable to the reacquisition of the debt instrument is includible under paragraph (1), and

108(i)(2)(A)(i)(II) does not exceed the income from the discharge of indebtedness with respect to the debt instrument being reacquired, and

108(i)(2)(A)(ii) the aggregate amount of deductions disallowed under clause (i) shall be allowed as a deduction ratably over the 5-taxable-year period described in clause (i)(I).

If the amount of the original issue discount accruing before such 1st taxable year exceeds the income from the discharge of indebtedness with respect to the applicable debt instrument being reacquired, the deductions shall be disallowed in the order in which the original issue discount is accrued.

108(i)(2)(B) DEEMED DEBT FOR DEBT EXCHANGES. --For purposes of subparagraph (A), if any debt instrument is issued by an issuer and the proceeds of such debt instrument are used directly or indirectly by the issuer to reacquire an applicable debt instrument of the issuer, the debt instrument so issued shall be treated as issued for the debt instrument being reacquired. If only a portion of the proceeds from a debt instrument are so used, the rules of subparagraph (A) shall apply to the portion of any original issue discount on the newly issued debt instrument which is equal to the portion of the proceeds from such instrument used to reacquire the outstanding instrument.

108(i)(3) APPLICABLE DEBT INSTRUMENT. --For purposes of this subsection --

108(i)(3)(A) APPLICABLE DEBT INSTRUMENT. --The term "applicable debt instrument" means any debt instrument which was issued by --

108(i)(3)(A)(i) a C corporation, or

108(i)(3)(A)(ii) any other person in connection with the conduct of a trade or business by such person.

108(i)(3)(B) DEBT INSTRUMENT. --The term "debt instrument" means a bond, debenture, note, certificate, or any other instrument or contractual arrangement constituting indebtedness (within the meaning of section 1275(a)(1)).

108(i)(4) REACQUISITION. --For purposes of this subsection --

108(i)(4)(A) IN GENERAL. --The term "reacquisition" means, with respect to any applicable debt instrument, any acquisition of the debt instrument by --

108(i)(4)(A)(i) the debtor which issued (or is otherwise the obligor under) the debt instrument, or

108(i)(4)(A)(ii) a related person to such debtor.

108(i)(4)(B) ACQUISITION. --The term "acquisition" shall, with respect to any applicable debt instrument, include an acquisition of the debt instrument for cash, the exchange of the debt instrument for another debt instrument (including an exchange resulting from a modification of the debt instrument), the exchange of the debt instrument for corporate stock or a partnership interest, and the contribution of the debt instrument to capital. Such term shall also include the complete forgiveness of the indebtedness by the holder of the debt instrument.

108(i)(5) OTHER DEFINITIONS AND RULES. --For purposes of this subsection --

108(i)(5)(A) RELATED PERSON. --The determination of whether a person is related to another person shall be made in the same manner as under subsection (e)(4).

108(i)(5)(B) ELECTION. --

108(i)(5)(B)(i) IN GENERAL. --An election under this subsection with respect to any applicable debt instrument shall be made by including with the return of tax imposed by chapter 1 for the taxable year in which the reacquisition of the debt instrument occurs a statement which --

108(i)(5)(B)(i)(I) clearly identifies such instrument, and

108(i)(5)(B)(i)(II) includes the amount of income to which paragraph (1) applies and such other information as the Secretary may prescribe.

108(i)(5)(B)(ii) ELECTION IRREVOCABLE. --Such election, once made, is irrevocable.

108(i)(5)(B)(iii) PASS- THRU ENTITIES. --In the case of a partnership, S corporation, or other pass-thru entity, the election under this subsection shall be made by the partnership, the S corporation, or other entity involved.

108(i)(5)(C) COORDINATION WITH OTHER EXCLUSIONS. --If a taxpayer elects to have this subsection apply to an applicable debt instrument, subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), and (D) of subsection (a)(1) shall not apply to the income from the discharge of such indebtedness for the taxable year of the election or any subsequent taxable year.

108(i)(5)(D) ACCELERATION OF DEFERRED ITEMS. --

108(i)(5)(D)(i) IN GENERAL. --In the case of the death of the taxpayer, the liquidation or sale of substantially all the assets of the taxpayer (including in a title 11 or similar case), the cessation of business by the taxpayer, or similar circumstances, any item of income or deduction which is deferred under this subsection (and has not previously been taken into account) shall be taken into account in the taxable year in which such event occurs (or in the case of a title 11 or similar case, the day before the petition is filed).

108(i)(5)(D)(ii) SPECIAL RULE FOR PASSTHRU ENTITIES. --The rule of clause (i) shall also apply in the case of the sale or exchange or redemption of an interest in a partnership, S corporation, or other passthru entity by a partner, shareholder, or other person holding an ownership interest in such entity.

108(i)(6) SPECIAL RULE FOR PARTNERSHIPS. --In the case of a partnership, any income deferred under this subsection shall be allocated to the partners in the partnership immediately before the discharge in the manner such amounts would have been included in the distributive shares of such partners under section 704 if such income were recognized at such time. Any decrease in a partner's share of partnership liabilities as a result of such discharge shall not be taken into account for purposes of section 752 at the time of the discharge to the extent it would cause the partner to recognize gain under section 731. Any decrease in partnership liabilities deferred under the preceding sentence shall be taken into account by such partner at the same time, and to the extent remaining in the same amount, as income deferred under this subsection is recognized.

108(i)(7) SECRETARIAL AUTHORITY. --The Secretary may prescribe such regulations, rules, or other guidance as may be necessary or appropriate for purposes of applying this subsection, including --

108(i)(7)(A) extending the application of the rules of paragraph (5)(D) to other circumstances where appropriate,

108(i)(7)(B) requiring reporting of the election (and such other information as the Secretary may require) on returns of tax for subsequent taxable years, and

108(i)(7)(C) rules for the application of this subsection to partnerships, S corporations, and other pass-thru entities, including for the allocation of deferred deductions.

Labels:

Wednesday, April 29, 2009

abatement of interest 301.6404-2(c)

D.H. Sher, April 29, 2009, T.C. Memo. 2009-86

DAVID HARRIS SHER AND CATHERINE GAIL NEMSER, Petitioners v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.

UNITED STATES TAX COURT. Docket No. 27548-07L. Filed April 28, 2009.
In April 1999 Ps requested an extension of time to file their 1998 Federal income tax return and separately submitted a $70,000 estimated tax payment. Although Ps' 1998 return includes signature dates in July 1999, R did not receive the return until 2004. R assessed the tax reflected on the return, along with additions to tax and interest, in 2004.

In October 2000 Ps filed their 1999 return and paid their 1999 taxes in full. In November 2000, R refunded the $70,000 estimated tax payment that R received in April 1999 and had credited to Ps' account for 1999.

After receiving a notice of deficiency for 2000, Ps filed a 2000 return. R processed this return and assessed tax, additions to tax, and interest in December 2002. Ps later conceded that they omitted income from their 2000 return and agreed to an additional assessment.

Ps submitted an offer-in-compromise (OIC) seeking relief based upon doubt as to collectibility and doubt as to liability, and R rejected it. R's Appeals Office sustained the rejection and rejected a second OIC, affirming that Ps' reasonable collection potential exceeded the amounts offered and concluding that Ps' liability was properly determined and assessed.

R filed a Federal tax lien and notified Ps. Ps requested a CDP hearing, seeking relief from interest and penalties. R's settlement officer sustained the filing of the Federal tax lien.

Held : R's determination is sustained, and Ps are not entitled to any abatement of interest.



MEMORANDUM OPINION


PANUTHOS, Chief Special Trial Judge: This case is before the Court on petitioners' request for judicial review of an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) determination to sustain a Federal tax lien filing.

Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code, as amended.


Background


Some of the facts have been stipulated, and we so find. Petitioners resided in New York when they filed the petition. Petitioners were married at all relevant times, and they filed joint Federal income tax returns for each year in issue.

On April 15, 1999, the IRS received petitioners' request for an extension of time to file their Federal income tax return for taxable year 1998. On April 22, 1999, the IRS received a $70,000 estimated tax payment from petitioners. Petitioners mailed the estimated tax payment separately from the extension request and did not direct the IRS to apply the $70,000 to any particular tax year. The IRS applied the estimated tax payment toward petitioners' account for taxable year 1999.

The record includes petitioners' 1998 Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return. Petitioners' return preparer dated this return July 6, 1999, and petitioners dated their signatures July 10, 1999. The return reports total tax due of $86,417, withholding credits of $5,803, estimated tax payments of $70,000, and a balance due of $10,614. IRS records reflect petitioners' 1998 extension request and the 1998 withholding credit on April 15, 1999. However, IRS records further reflect that the IRS received and processed petitioners' 1998 return on February 26, 2004. The IRS assessed tax, additions to tax, and interest as follows:


Total tax for 1998 $86,417.00

Failure to file addition to tax 18,138.15

Failure to pay addition to tax 20,153.50

Interest 40,111.38



Petitioners filed their 1999 Federal income tax return, with an extension, on October 12, 2000, and included full payment of their 1999 liability with the return. On November 20, 2000, the IRS refunded $70,000 to petitioners as an overpayment for 1999.

With the $70,000 income tax refund, the IRS included a statement explaining that the sum of petitioners' 1999 withholding tax credits and the payment submitted with the 1999 return exactly equaled their 1999 tax liability. The statement listed a $70,000 estimated tax payment made on April 22, 1999, and credited toward taxable year 1999. 1

On receipt of the $70,000 income tax refund check in November 2000, petitioners called the IRS to ask whether there had been some mistake and whether they should cash the check. Apparently because the IRS computer system did not have any record of a liability for 1998 (because the IRS had not yet received or processed a return from petitioners for 1998), an IRS employee told petitioners that the IRS did not have any record of petitioners' having any outstanding liability, that petitioners had overpaid their 1999 taxes, and that the refund was valid. Petitioners did not inform the IRS at any time before cashing the refund check that they wanted the IRS to apply that $70,000 payment to their account for 1998 rather than 1999.

The IRS issued petitioners a notice of deficiency for taxable year 2000, after which petitioners filed a Form 1040 for 2000. The IRS received this late-filed return on August 3, 2002, processed it, and assessed the following on December 9, 2002:


Total tax for 2000 $22,768.00

Failure to file addition to tax 3,561.30

Failure to pay addition to tax 1,187.10

Interest 1,268.93



On December 31, 2002, the IRS informed petitioners that their late-filed 2000 return failed to include certain income. Petitioners ultimately agreed with the IRS that they underreported their income for 2000, and they agreed to the assessment of additional tax, additions to tax, and interest. The IRS assessed the following on December 8, 2003:


Additional tax assessed for 2000 $20,006.00

Additional failure to file addition
to tax 8,767.25

Additional failure to pay addition
to tax 838.40

Additional interest 4,524.74



Petitioners submitted a Form 656, Offer in Compromise (OIC), dated January 10, 2004, in response to the IRS's determination of unreported income on petitioners' 2000 tax return. This OIC does not state which liabilities petitioners sought to compromise, but petitioners offered $17,000 and claimed as grounds for compromise both doubt as to collectibility (DATC) and doubt as to liability (DATL). It appears from the record that the IRS informed petitioners that this OIC could not be processed because the IRS did not have any record of petitioners' filing a tax return for 1998. Petitioners then submitted a 1998 Form 1040, which the IRS processed on February 26, 2004.

Petitioners submitted another OIC in March 2004, again offering to pay $17,000 and claiming both DATC and DATL, but this time listing tax years 1998 and 2000. They explained in a letter to the IRS that it had erroneously applied the $70,000 estimated tax payment they made in April 1999 to taxable year 1999 and erroneously refunded that amount to petitioners in November 2000. Petitioners also explained that they had a large net operating loss (NOL) that they proposed carrying back to offset their 1998 liability.

On January 3, 2005, the OIC reviewer informed petitioners that if there was an error with the application or refund of the estimated tax payment, petitioners might avoided some penalties and interest if they had taken action to inform the IRS of the error when it occurred rather than accepting the refund and cashing the check. The OIC reviewer advised petitioners that the IRS could not agree to petitioners' proposal to reduce their NOL by the amount of the refunded estimated tax payment. He also informed petitioners that they were not entitled to relief under either DATC or DATL and that formal notification of the rejection of their offer would follow.

On March 1, 2005, the IRS rejected petitioners' OIC. The OIC rejection letter recited that an analysis of petitioners' ability to pay dictated rejecting the $17,000 offer because petitioners' reasonable collection potential (RCP) was $161,708.07. The letter also explained that petitioners did not present any information indicating that the amount of tax assessed for 1998 or 2000 was incorrect; rather, petitioners claimed they were not liable for interest and penalties which accrued on the $70,000 portion of their 1998 tax liability that they intended to pay. The letter further stated that "Your failure to return this refund contributed to the accrual of penalties and interest." The IRS considered both collectibility and liability in rejecting petitioners' OIC.

Petitioners timely appealed the rejection of their OIC, challenging the DATC and the DATL conclusions. They complained of two IRS errors: Refunding the $70,000 estimated tax payment; and telling petitioners they had no tax liability. Petitioners also complained that the IRS notified them about the taxes due for 1998 nearly 5 years after they made the estimated tax payment in April 1999. Petitioners sought relief from interest and additions to tax due to the passage of time and due to the errors they ascribe to the IRS. Petitioners also argued that the IRS collectibility calculations did not properly account for the legitimate expenses of living in New York.

In November 2005, apparently as part of the appeal of the rejection of their $17,000 OIC, petitioners offered $28,000 to settle their liabilities for 1998 and 2000, again asserting DATC and DATL. Petitioners made arguments similar to those in their OIC appeal, and they did not assert that they filed their 1998 tax return before February 2004.

On February 9, 2006, the IRS Appeals Office determined that the tax liability was legally due and that petitioners' RCP was $139,277. Appeals noted that the 1998 return was filed February 26, 2004, well after petitioners fully paid their 1999 taxes and received the refund and also well after an IRS employee informed petitioners in 2000 that IRS records indicated that petitioners did not have any outstanding liability. Appeals sustained the rejection of the earlier OIC and rejected the new OIC.

On April 24, 2007, the IRS mailed a Notice of Federal Tax Lien Filing and Your Right to a Hearing Under IRC 6320 (filing notice) to petitioners. The IRS prepared the tax lien on April 13, 2007, and mailed a notice of Federal tax lien (NFTL) to New York County on April 18, 2007. The filing notice states that the lien was filed on April 17, 2007. 2

Petitioners filed a Form 12153, Request for a Collection Due Process or Equivalent Hearing, on May 8, 2007, challenging the lien filing for their liabilities for 1998 and 2000. 3 On that form, petitioners indicated that they sought an OIC as a collection alternative and withdrawal of the lien because: "1) Notification by IRS was late. 2) Amount assessed is wrong. 3) We dispute liability for interest and penalties."

In an attachment to their collection hearing request, petitioners asserted that the IRS failed to notify them within 5 days of filing the lien, and they challenged the underlying tax liability reflected in the filing notice for 1998 and 2000. Petitioners' challenge to the underlying liability for 1998 involved the estimated tax payment that the IRS refunded, the interest and additions to tax on that amount, and the fact that the IRS did not demand payment of their liability for 1998 until 2004. Petitioners' challenge to the liability for 2000 concerned the application of their subsequent year tax refunds. They complain that the IRS applied some of those refunds to 1998 and some to 2000. They also asserted that Appeals finally rejected their OIC on February 9, 2006, but that, as a result of delays in transferring the file from Appeals to Collections, the IRS did not send a new tax due bill until March 12, 2007; that they were told that interest and additions to tax would not accrue during the OIC process; and that they are not liable for all of the assessed and accrued interest and additions to tax.

The settlement officer (SO) assigned to petitioners' collection hearing instructed petitioners to submit certain information required for her to consider collection alternative(s). The SO informed petitioners that she could not consider challenges to the underlying tax liability for either 1998 or 2000 because petitioners received a notice of deficiency and/or had prior opportunities to dispute their liability. She scheduled a telephone conference with petitioners for October 30, 2007.

Petitioners did not submit any of the information the SO requested, and petitioners informed the SO during the collection hearing that they wished to pursue their case in court. Following the hearing, the IRS issued a Notice of Determination Concerning Collection Action(s) Under Section 6320 and/or 6330 (notice of determination), dated November 2, 2007. The SO recited in the notice of determination that petitioners did not provide a statement detailing any collection alternative sought and also did not submit the financial information required for her to consider collection alternatives. The SO explained that she verified that the applicable legal and administrative procedures were followed in the issuance of the Federal tax lien; that she considered the issues petitioners raised in their hearing request and during the conference, and that petitioners' arguments did not support the IRS's withdrawing the lien; that she could not consider challenges to the underlying tax liability because petitioners had prior opportunities to dispute the liability at issue; and that she balanced the need for efficient collection with petitioners' concerns that collection be no more intrusive than necessary. The IRS sustained the filing of the NFTL.

In their petition, petitioners assert:
I request a hearing to establish important facts and to require the IRS to remove interest and penalties from its collection action for the tax year 1998. During the hearing I intend to bring evidence of the following problems with the IRS collection action. 1) That the IRS in filing for a federal tax lien failed to obey proper procedure by not notifying me in writing 5 business days after the filing of a lien. 2) That the IRS has not provided an accurate accounting of liability. 3) That the IRS applied penalties and interest charges in a capricious fashion and that it cannot account for the numbers. 4) That interest and penalties should not have been applied at all considering that late payment of 1998 tax bill was due entirely to IRS error. 4) That the IRS has on a number of occasions misrepresented material facts to us that harmed our situation and led to greater liability. (A detailed explanation can be found on attached request for due process hearing).

Petitioners alleged at trial that they filed their 1998 return in 1999. This was the first time this allegation had been made. Petitioners also asserted that the IRS failed to timely notify them of the lien filing, and they sought to challenge the interest and penalty determinations. 4 Petitioners acknowledge their principal tax liabilities but assert that only reducing the additions to tax and interest can correct the IRS's errors.

The issue for decision is whether respondent abused his discretion in upholding the filing of the NFTL and denying petitioners' request for an abatement of interest.


Discussion


On the record before us, we find that, although petitioners' 1998 return bears signature dates in 1999, petitioners did not file the 1998 return until 2004.



I. Review of Collection Determination

Pursuant to sections 6320(c) and 6330(d)(1), we have jurisdiction to review the IRS's determination that the NFTL was properly filed.

In reviewing the Commissioner's decision to sustain collection actions, where tax liability is properly at issue, the Court reviews the Commissioner's determination of tax liability de novo. Sego v. Commissioner , 114 T.C. 604, 610 (2000); Goza v. Commissioner , 114 T.C. 176, 181-182 (2000). The Court reviews determinations regarding proposed collection actions for abuse of discretion. Sego v. Commissioner , supra at 610; Goza v. Commissioner , supra at 182. An abuse of discretion occurs when the exercise of discretion is without sound basis in fact or law. Murphy v. Commissioner , 125 T.C. 301, 308 (2005), affd. 469 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2006).

At the collection hearing, a taxpayer may raise any relevant issues relating to the unpaid tax or lien filing, including spousal defenses, challenges to the appropriateness of the collection actions, and offers of collection alternatives. In addition, he may challenge the existence or amount of the underlying tax liability, but only if he did not receive a notice of deficiency or otherwise have an opportunity to dispute such liability. Sec. 6330(c)(2)(B) .

In making a determination following a collection hearing, the IRS must consider: (1) Whether the requirements of any applicable law or administrative procedure have been met, (2) any relevant issues the taxpayer raised, and (3) whether the proposed collection action balances the need for efficient collection with legitimate concerns that the collection action be no more intrusive than necessary. Sec. 6330(c)(3) .



II. Procedural Error

At trial petitioners challenged the timing of the filing notice, arguing that the IRS failed to notify them within 5 days of the date the IRS filed the tax lien as required by section 6320(a)(2) .

Although the IRS prepared the tax lien on April 13, 2007, the filing notice states that the IRS filed the tax lien on April 17, 2007. The IRS mailed the NFTL to New York County on April 18, 2007. The IRS then mailed the filing notice to petitioners on April 24, 2007, which is within 5 business days of both April 17 and April 18. The IRS properly notified petitioners of the lien filing. 5



III. Challenges to the Underlying Tax Liabilities

Petitioners submitted an OIC challenging both collectibility and liability. The IRS concluded that petitioners could pay more than the amount of their offer and that the liability, including additions to tax and interest, had been properly assessed on the basis of petitioners' late-filed tax returns. The IRS rejected petitioners' OIC. Petitioners appealed that rejection. The Appeals Office reconsidered the challenges and entertained a new OIC. During the appeal the Appeals officer confirmed that the IRS properly assessed the liabilities and that petitioners' RCP exceeded their offer amounts. Appeals concluded that petitioners' offers were not acceptable.

Section 6330(c)(2)(B) allows a taxpayer to challenge an underlying tax liability in a collection hearing only if he did not receive any notice of deficiency for the liability and he did not otherwise have an opportunity to dispute the underlying tax liability. We have previously held that where a taxpayer received a notice of deficiency and did not file a timely petition, an OIC-DATL made during the later collection hearing was a challenge to the underlying tax liability. Thus, respondent properly refused to consider the underlying tax liability. Sec. 6330(c)(2)(B) ; Baltic v. Commissioner , 129 T.C. 178, 183 (2007).

For tax year 1998 petitioners did not receive a notice of deficiency. 6 For tax year 2000 petitioners received a notice of deficiency but did not file a petition with this Court. For each tax year petitioners challenged the tax liability with their OIC-DATL submissions before the collection proceeding.

It would appear that an OIC-DATL is an opportunity to dispute the underlying tax liability and that the SO did not abuse her discretion by not considering this challenge. Sec. 6330(c)(2)(B) ; see Baltic v. Commissioner , supra ; Lewis v. Commissioner , 128 T.C. 48 (2007); Sego v. Commissioner , supra at 609-611; Goza v. Commissioner , supra at 180-181, 183-184.

Even if petitioners could dispute the tax liability as discussed further below (see discussion on interest abatement), petitioners' failure to designate the period to which the $70,000 payment should be applied would result in a denial of petitioners' claim for relief. 7



IV. Interest Abatement

In the attachment to the collection hearing request, which petitioners also attached to their petition, petitioners seek relief from interest and additions to tax. 8 As discussed, section 6330(c)(2)(B) appears to foreclose the challenge to the underlying tax liability, including the additions to tax. 9 However, we will consider whether the IRS abused its discretion in refusing to abate any of the interest on petitioners' 1998 or 2000 liability. We note that because Congress did not intend the interest abatement statute to be used routinely, we grant abatement only "'where failure to abate interest would be widely perceived as grossly unfair.'" Lee v. Commissioner , 113 T.C. 145, 149 (1999) (quoting H. Rept. 99-426, at 844 (1985), 1986-3 C.B. (Vol. 2) 1, 844, and S. Rept. 99-313, at 208 (1986), 1986-3 C.B. (Vol. 3) 1, 208).

A taxpayer may be entitled to an abatement of interest when an unreasonable error or delay in an IRS employee's performing a ministerial or managerial act causes an error or delay in payment of tax. See sec. 6404(e) . Transferring a case between IRS offices after a request for transfer has been approved and misplacing a taxpayer's file are managerial acts; unreasonable errors or delays in either may be grounds for abatement of interest. See Palihnich v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo. 2003-297; sec. , Examples ( 1 ), ( 6 ), Proced. & Admin. Regs.

To qualify for abatement, the taxpayer must show: (1) An error or delay by the IRS in performing a ministerial or managerial act; (2) a correlation between a specific period of delay in payment and an error or delay by the IRS; and (3) that the taxpayer would have paid the tax liability earlier but for the IRS's error. Braun v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo. 2005-221.

Petitioners identified the period between the final rejection of their OIC, on February 9, 2006, and the issuance of a new tax due bill, on March 12, 2007, as a period of unreasonable delay. 10 However, they have not provided any link between any delay in producing a new tax due bill and their delay in payment. Petitioners were well aware of the principal amounts due for 1998 and 2000, and they knew the amounts of interest and additions to tax which were due before their filing OICs. Even though their attempts to compromise their liabilities had failed, they did not pay any of these amounts while waiting for a new bill from the IRS. Petitioners have not demonstrated that they would have paid their tax liability for 1998 and 2000 earlier but for the IRS's delay in preparing a tax due bill. See id.

It would not be unfair to hold petitioners liable for the interest on their tax liability. Petitioners are not entitled to abatement of interest.



V. Conclusion

The notice of determination indicates that the SO considered relevant issues petitioners raised, whether the IRS met the requirements of applicable law and administrative procedure, and whether the proposed collection action balances collection efficiency and intrusiveness. Petitioners did not raise any spousal defenses or pursue any collection alternatives during the collection hearing. The SO properly determined that petitioners were not entitled to challenge the existence or amount of the underlying tax liability.

The SO satisfied the requirements of sections 6320 and 6330, and we conclude that respondent's decision sustaining the filing of the NFTL was neither erroneous nor an abuse of discretion.

In reaching our holdings, we have considered all the parties' contentions, and to the extent not addressed herein, we conclude that they are irrelevant, moot, or without merit.

To reflect the foregoing,

Decision will be entered for respondent .

1 Petitioners' only estimated tax payment in 1999 was the $70,000 payment the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) received April 22, 1999, and credited toward petitioners' account for 1999.

2 New York County recorded the notice of Federal tax lien on May 14, 2007.

3 The notice of Federal tax lien listed liabilities of $143,164.03 for 1998, $51,740.72 for 2000, and $956.07 for 2003. Petitioners did not challenge the lien filing for 2003 in their collection hearing request.

4 As noted, the IRS assessed taxes, interest, and additions to tax for failure to file and failure to pay. It has not assessed any penalties for either 1998 or 2000.

5 We have made findings as to the relevant dates of the (1) mailing of the NFTL to New York County, (2) mailing of the lien filing notice to petitioners, (3) hearing date request by petitioners, and (4) recordation by New York County. Petitioners did not argue, nor do we conclude, that petitioners were adversely affected by the timing of the recording of the notice of lien since they requested and received administrative review. Further, they filed a timely petition in response to a notice of determination and had a full opportunity for judicial review. See Golub v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo. 2008-122.

6 The IRS is not required to issue a notice of deficiency when the assessment is of taxes determined by the IRS or the taxpayer and based on returns filed by the taxpayer. Montgomery v. Commissioner , 122 T.C. 1, 8 (2004); see also sec. 6201(a)(1) .

7 Finally, as to petitioners' complaint that the IRS applied some of their subsequent year overpayments to offset the 1998 liability when petitioners would have preferred to offset the 2000 liability, sec. 6402(a) allows the IRS to credit any overpayment to any liability owed by a taxpayer. Petitioners will not be heard to challenge the IRS's choice of which liability to offset. See Kalb v. United States , 505 F.2d 506, 509 (2d Cir. 1974).

8 Petitioners assert that the additions to tax and interest for 1998 should be reduced on account of the erroneous refund of their $70,000 estimated tax payment. We have found that petitioners filed their 1998 return in 2004. Respondent assessed and petitioners have not specifically challenged the failure to file addition to tax.

The failure to pay addition to tax accrues at 0.5 percent per month, to a maximum of 25 percent, from the date prescribed for payment of such tax. Sec. 6651(a)(2) . The maximum failure to pay addition to tax, therefore, accrues in 50 months. Petitioners' 1998 tax payment was due Apr. 15, 1999. More than 50 months have clearly elapsed since Apr. 15, 1999, even excluding the 19 months during which the IRS held petitioners' $70,000 estimated tax payment. Respondent has properly assessed the maximum failure to pay addition to tax.

9 As to the additions to tax, even if petitioners could so challenge, they have not shown reasonable cause or good faith for their failure to timely file or pay their taxes for 1998 or 2000. Thus, they are liable for these additions to tax. See sec. 6651(a)(1) and (2).

10 To the extent that petitioners might seek abatement of interest during the 19 months the IRS had petitioner's $70,000 estimated tax payment, such abatement is foreclosed by sec. 6404(e)(1) and (2). Petitioners made their estimated tax payment late and did not challenge the refund in 2000 as erroneous on the grounds that they intended the IRS to apply the estimated tax payment to a different year. Finally, their self-serving testimony is the only evidence they offered of any intent to apply the $70,000 payment toward tax year 1998.

Labels:

Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, as Reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee - Senate Passes Fraud, Tax Evasion Bill
The Senate on April 28 approved, by a 92-4 margin, a measure that would apply the federal international money laundering statute to tax evasion in an effort to stem the spread of financial crimes. The Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Bill of 2009 (Sen 386) amends the federal international money laundering statute to create a new money laundering crime to cover moving money from or through the United States with the intent to engage in tax evasion. This amendment changes the previous understanding of the crime of money laundering, which has focused on punishing financial transactions designed to launder the proceeds of criminal activity.

Under Sen 386, the act of tax evasion itself, without the need or any subsequent financial transaction, would be treated as money laundering. This allows tax evasion to be punishable both under the Internal Revenue Code and under the federal money laundering statute, which carries far greater penalties.

The legislation was originally introduced on February 5, 2009 by Senate Finance Committee ranking member Charles E. Grassley, R-Iowa and Sen. Patrick J. Leahy, D-Vt. The Obama administration on April 20 released an official Statement of Administration Policy (SAP) indicating strong support for the bill and the House Judiciary Committee on April 28 approved a similar measure by voice vote.



Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, as Reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee

April 29, 2009

111th Congress

Calendar No. 28



111th CONGRESS



1st Session



S. 386

To improve enforcement of mortgage fraud, securities fraud, financial institution fraud, and other frauds related to federal assistance and relief programs, for the recovery of funds lost to these frauds, and for other purposes.



IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES



February 5, 2009

Mr. LEAHY (for himself, Mr. GRASSLEY, Mr. KAUFMAN, Ms. KLOBUCHAR, and Mr. SCHUMER) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary



March 5, 2009



Reported by Mr. LEAHY, with an amendment

[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed in italic]



A BILL

To improve enforcement of mortgage fraud, securities fraud, financial institution fraud, and other frauds related to federal assistance and relief programs, for the recovery of funds lost to these frauds, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,



SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the `Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009' or `FERA'.



SEC. 2. AMENDMENTS TO IMPROVE MORTGAGE, SECURITIES, AND FINANCIAL FRAUD RECOVERY AND ENFORCEMENT.

(a) Definition of Financial Institution Amended To Include Mortgage Lending Business- Section 20 of title 18, United States Code, is amended --

(1) in paragraph (8), by striking `or' after the semicolon;

(2) in paragraph (9), by striking the period and inserting `; or'; and

(3) by inserting at the end the following:

`(10) a mortgage lending business (as defined in section 27 of this title) or any person or entity that makes in whole or in part a federally-related mortgage loan as defined in 12 U.S.C. 2602(1).'.

(b) Mortgage Lending Business Defined-

(1) IN GENERAL- Chapter 1 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 26 the following:



`Sec. 27. Mortgage lending business defined

`In this title, the term `mortgage lending business' means an organization which finances or refinances any debt secured by an interest in real estate, including private mortgage companies and any subsidiaries of such organizations, and whose activities affect interstate or foreign commerce.'.

(2) CHAPTER ANALYSIS- The chapter analysis for chapter 1 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

`27. Mortgage lending business defined.'.

(c) False Statements in Mortgage Applications Amended To Include False Statements by Mortgage Brokers and Agents of Mortgage Lending Businesses- Section 1014 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by --

(1) striking `or' after `the International Banking Act of 1978),'; and

(2) inserting after `section 25(a) of the Federal Reserve Act' the following: `or a mortgage lending business whose activities affect interstate or foreign commerce, or any person or entity that makes in whole or in part a federally-related mortgage loan as defined in 12 U.S.C. 2602(1)'.

(d) Major Fraud Against the Government Amended To Include Economic Relief and Troubled Asset Relief Program Funds- Section 1031(a) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by --

(1) inserting after `or promises, in' the following: `any grant, contract, subcontract, subsidy, loan, guarantee, insurance or other form of Federal assistance, including through the Troubled Assets Relief Program, an economic stimulus, recovery or rescue plan provided by the Government, or the Government's purchase of any preferred stock in a company, or'; and

(2) striking `the contract, subcontract' and inserting `such grant, contract, subcontract, subsidy, loan, guarantee, insurance or other form of Federal assistance,'.

(e) Securities Fraud Amended To Include Fraud Involving Options and Futures in Commodities-

(1) IN GENERAL- Section 1348 of title 18, United States Code, is amended --

(A) in the caption, by inserting `and commodities' after `Securities';

(B) by inserting `any commodity for future delivery, or any option on a commodity or a commodity for future delivery, or' after `any person in connection with' ; and

(C) by inserting `any commodity for future delivery, or any option on a commodity or a commodity for future delivery, or' after `in connection with the purchase or sale of'.

(2) CHAPTER ANALYSIS- The item for section 1348 in the chapter analysis for chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting `and commodities' after `Securities'.

(f) Money Laundering Amended To Define Proceeds of Specified Unlawful Activity- Section 1956(c) of title 18, United States Code, is amended --

(1) in paragraph (8), by striking the period and inserting `; and'; and

(2) by inserting at the end the following:

`(9) the term `proceeds' means any property derived from or obtained or retained, directly or indirectly, through the commission of a specified unlawful activity, including the gross receipts of such specified unlawful activity.'.

(g) Making the International Money Laundering Statute Apply to Tax Evasion- Section 1956(a)(2)(A) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by --

(1) inserting `(i)' before `with the intent to promote'; and

(2) adding at the end the following:

`(ii) with the intent to engage in conduct constituting a violation of section 7201 or 7206 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986; or'.



SEC. 3. ADDITIONAL FUNDING FOR INVESTIGATORS AND PROSECUTORS FOR MORTGAGE FRAUD, SECURITIES FRAUD, AND OTHER CASES INVOLVING FEDERAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE.

(a) In General-

(1) AUTHORIZATION- There is authorized to be appropriated to the Attorney General, to remain available until expended, $155,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2010 and 2011, for the purposes of investigations, prosecutions, and civil proceedings involving federal assistance programs and financial institutions, including financial institutions to which this Act and amendments made by this Act apply.

(2) ALLOCATIONS- With respect to fiscal years 2010 and 2011, the amount authorized to be appropriated under paragraph (1) shall be allocated as follows:

(A) Federal Bureau of Investigation: $65,000,000.

(B) The offices of the United States Attorneys: $50,000,000.

(C) The criminal division of the Department of Justice: $20,000,000.

(D) The civil division of the Department of Justice: $15,000,000.

(E) The tax division of the Department of Justice: $5,000,000.

(b) Additional Appropriations for the Postal Inspection Service- There is authorized to be appropriated to the Postal Inspection Service of the United States Postal Service, $30,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2010 and 2011 for investigations involving federal assistance programs and financial institutions, including financial institutions to which this Act and amendments made by this Act apply.

(c) Additional Appropriations for the Inspector General for the Housing and Urban Development Department- There is authorized to be appropriated to the Inspector General of the Department of Housing and Urban Development, $30,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2010 and 2011 for investigations involving Federal assistance programs and financial institutions, including financial institutions to which this Act and amendments made by this Act apply.

(d) Use of Funds- The funds authorized to be appropriated under subsections (a), (b), and (c), shall be limited to cover the costs of each listed agency or department for investigating possible criminal, civil, or administrative violations and for prosecuting criminal, civil, or administrative proceedings involving financial crimes and crimes against Federal assistance programs, including mortgage fraud, securities fraud, financial institution fraud, and other frauds related to Federal assistance and relief programs

(e) Report to Congress- Following the final expenditure of all funds appropriated under this section that were authorized by subsections (a), (b), and (c), the Attorney General, in consultation with the United States Postal Inspection Service and the Inspector General for the Department of Housing and Urban Development, shall submit a joint report to Congress identifying --

(1) the amounts expended under subsections (a), (b), and (c) and a certification of compliance with the requirements listed in subsection (d); and

(2) the amounts recovered as a result of criminal or civil restitution, fines, penalties, and other monetary recoveries resulting from criminal, civil, or administrative proceedings and settlements undertaken with funds authorized by this Act.



SEC. 4. CLARIFICATIONS TO THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT TO REFLECT THE ORIGINAL INTENT OF THE LAW.

(a) Clarification of the False Claims Act- Section 3729 of title 31, United States Code, is amended --

(1) by striking subsection (a) and inserting the following:

`(a) Liability for Certain Acts-

`(1) IN GENERAL- Subject to paragraph (2), any person who --

`(A) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval;

`(B) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved;

`(C) conspires to commit a violation of subparagraph (A), (B), (D), (E), (F), or (G) or otherwise to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved;

`(D) has possession, custody, or control of property or money used, or to be used, by the Government and knowingly delivers, or causes to be delivered, less than all of that money or property;

`(E) is authorized to make or deliver a document certifying receipt of property used, or to be used, by the Government and, intending to defraud the Government, makes or delivers the receipt without completely knowing that the information on the receipt is true;

`(F) knowingly buys, or receives as a pledge of an obligation or debt, public property from an officer or employee of the Government, or a member of the Armed Forces, who lawfully may not sell or pledge property; or

`(G) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement to conceal, avoid, or decrease an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the Government, or knowingly conceals, avoids, or decreases an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the Government,

is liable to the United States Government for a civil penalty of not less than $5,000 and not more than $10,000, as adjusted by the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990 (28 U.S.C. 2461 note; Public Law 104-410), plus 3 times the amount of damages which the Government sustains because of the act of that person.

`(2) REDUCED DAMAGES- If the court finds that --

`(A) the person committing the violation of this subsection furnished officials of the United States responsible for investigating false claims violations with all information known to such person about the violation within 30 days after the date on which the defendant first obtained the information;

`(B) such person fully cooperated with any Government investigation of such violation; and

`(C) at the time such person furnished the United States with the information about the violation, no criminal prosecution, civil action, or administrative action had commenced under this title with respect to such violation, and the person did not have actual knowledge of the existence of an investigation into such violation,

the court may assess not less than 2 times the amount of damages which the Government sustains because of the act of that person.

`(3) COSTS OF CIVIL ACTIONS- A person violating this subsection shall also be liable to the United States Government for the costs of a civil action brought to recover any such penalty or damages.';

(2) by striking subsections (b) and (c) and inserting the following:

`(b) Definitions- For purposes of this section --

`(1) the terms `knowing' and `knowingly' mean that a person, with respect to information --

`(A) has actual knowledge of the information;

`(B) acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information; or

`(C) acts in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information, and no proof of specific intent to defraud is required;

`(2) the term `claim' --

`(A) means any request or demand, whether under a contract or otherwise, for money or property and whether or not the United States has title to the money or property, that --

`(i) is presented to an officer, employee, or agent of the United States; or

`(ii) is made to a contractor, grantee, or other recipient if the United States Government --

`(I) provides or has provided any portion of the money or property requested or demanded; or

`(II) will reimburse such contractor, grantee, or other recipient for any portion of the money or property which is requested or demanded; and

`(B) does not include requests or demands for money or property that the Government has paid to an individual as compensation for Federal employment or as an income subsidy with no restrictions on that individual's use of the money or property; and

`(3) the term `obligation' means a fixed duty, or a contingent duty arising from an express or implied contractual, quasi-contractual, grantor-grantee, licensor-licensee, fee-based, or similar relationship, and the retention of any overpayment.';

(3) by redesignating subsections (d) and (e) as subsections (c) and (d), respectively; and

(4) in subsection (c), as redesignated, by striking `subparagraphs (A) through (C) of subsection (a)' and inserting `subsection (a)(2)'.



SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the `Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009' or `FERA'.



SEC. 2. AMENDMENTS TO IMPROVE MORTGAGE, SECURITIES, AND FINANCIAL FRAUD RECOVERY AND ENFORCEMENT.

(a) Definition of Financial Institution Amended To Include Mortgage Lending Business- Section 20 of title 18, United States Code, is amended --

(1) in paragraph (8), by striking `or' after the semicolon;

(2) in paragraph (9), by striking the period and inserting `; or'; and

(3) by inserting at the end the following:

`(10) a mortgage lending business (as defined in section 27 of this title) or any person or entity that makes in whole or in part a federally related mortgage loan as defined in 12 U.S.C. 2602(1).'.

(b) Mortgage Lending Business Defined-

(1) IN GENERAL- Chapter 1 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 26 the following:



`Sec. 27. Mortgage lending business defined

`In this title, the term `mortgage lending business' means an organization which finances or refinances any debt secured by an interest in real estate, including private mortgage companies and any subsidiaries of such organizations, and whose activities affect interstate or foreign commerce.'.

(2) CHAPTER ANALYSIS- The chapter analysis for chapter 1 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: `27. Mortgage lending business defined.'.

(c) False Statements in Mortgage Applications Amended To Include False Statements by Mortgage Brokers and Agents of Mortgage Lending Businesses- Section 1014 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by --

(1) striking `or' after `the International Banking Act of 1978),'; and

(2) inserting after `section 25(a) of the Federal Reserve Act' the following: `or a mortgage lending business whose activities affect interstate or foreign commerce, or any person or entity that makes in whole or in part a federally related mortgage loan as defined in 12 U.S.C. 2602(1)'.

(d) Major Fraud Against the Government Amended To Include Economic Relief and Troubled Asset Relief Program Funds- Section 1031(a) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by --

(1) inserting after `or promises, in' the following: `any grant, contract, subcontract, subsidy, loan, guarantee, insurance or other form of Federal assistance, including through the Troubled Assets Relief Program, an economic stimulus, recovery or rescue plan provided by the Government, or the Government's purchase of any preferred stock in a company, or'; and

(2) striking `the contract, subcontract' and inserting `such grant, contract, subcontract, subsidy, loan, guarantee, insurance or other form of Federal assistance,'.

(e) Securities Fraud Amended To Include Fraud Involving Options and Futures in Commodities-

(1) IN GENERAL- Section 1348 of title 18, United States Code, is amended --

(A) in the caption, by inserting `and commodities' after `Securities';

(B) by inserting `any commodity for future delivery, or any option on a commodity for future delivery, or' after `any person in connection with'; and

(C) by inserting `any commodity for future delivery, or any option on a commodity for future delivery, or' after `in connection with the purchase or sale of'.

(2) CHAPTER ANALYSIS- The item for section 1348 in the chapter analysis for chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting `and commodities' after `Securities'.

(f) Money Laundering Amended To Define Proceeds of Specified Unlawful Activity-

(1) MONEY LAUNDERING- Section 1956(c) of title 18, United States Code, is amended --

(A) in paragraph (8), by striking the period and inserting `; and'; and

(B) by inserting at the end the following:

`(9) the term `proceeds' means any property derived from or obtained or retained, directly or indirectly, through some form of unlawful activity, including the gross receipts of such activity.'.

(2) MONETARY TRANSACTIONS- Section 1957(f) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by striking paragraph (3) and inserting the following:

`(3) the terms `specified unlawful activity' and `proceeds' shall have the meaning given those terms in section 1956 of this title.'.

(g) Making the International Money Laundering Statute Apply to Tax Evasion- Section 1956(a)(2)(A) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by --

(1) inserting `(i)' before `with the intent to promote'; and

(2) adding at the end the following:

`(ii) with the intent to engage in conduct constituting a violation of section 7201 or 7206 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986; or'.



SEC. 3. ADDITIONAL FUNDING FOR INVESTIGATORS AND PROSECUTORS FOR MORTGAGE FRAUD, SECURITIES FRAUD, AND OTHER CASES INVOLVING FEDERAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE.

(a) In General-

(1) AUTHORIZATION- There is authorized to be appropriated to the Attorney General, to remain available until expended, $165,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2010 and 2011, for the purposes of investigations, prosecutions, and civil proceedings involving Federal assistance programs and financial institutions, including financial institutions to which this Act and amendments made by this Act apply.

(2) ALLOCATIONS- With respect to fiscal years 2010 and 2011, the amount authorized to be appropriated under paragraph (1) shall be allocated as follows:

(A) Federal Bureau of Investigation: $75,000,000 for fiscal year 2010 and $65,000,000 for fiscal year 2011.

(B) The offices of the United States Attorneys: $50,000,000.

(C) The criminal division of the Department of Justice: $20,000,000.

(D) The civil division of the Department of Justice: $15,000,000.

(E) The tax division of the Department of Justice: $5,000,000.

(b) Additional Appropriations for the Postal Inspection Service- There is authorized to be appropriated to the Postal Inspection Service of the United States Postal Service, $30,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2010 and 2011 for investigations involving Federal assistance programs and financial institutions, including financial institutions to which this Act and amendments made by this Act apply.

(c) Additional Appropriations for the Inspector General for the Department of Housing and Urban Development- There is authorized to be appropriated to the Inspector General of the Department of Housing and Urban Development, $30,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2010 and 2011 for investigations involving Federal assistance programs and financial institutions, including financial institutions to which this Act and amendments made by this Act apply.

(d) Additional Appropriations for the United States Secret Service- There is authorized to be appropriated to the United States Secret Service of the Department of Homeland Security, $20,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2010 and 2011 for investigations involving Federal assistance programs and financial institutions, including financial institutions to which this Act and amendments made by this Act apply.

(e) Use of Funds- The funds authorized to be appropriated under subsections (a), (b), (c), and (d) shall be limited to cover the costs of each listed agency or department for investigating possible criminal, civil, or administrative violations and for prosecuting criminal, civil, or administrative proceedings involving financial crimes and crimes against Federal assistance programs, including mortgage fraud, securities fraud, financial institution fraud, and other frauds related to Federal assistance and relief programs

(f) Report to Congress- Following the final expenditure of all funds appropriated under this section that were authorized by subsections (a), (b), (c), and (d) the Attorney General, in consultation with the United States Postal Inspection Service, the Inspector General for the Department of Housing and Urban Development, and the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall submit a joint report to Congress identifying --

(1) the amounts expended under subsections (a), (b), (c), and (d) and a certification of compliance with the requirements listed in subsection (e); and

(2) the amounts recovered as a result of criminal or civil restitution, fines, penalties, and other monetary recoveries resulting from criminal, civil, or administrative proceedings and settlements undertaken with funds authorized by this Act.



SEC. 4. CLARIFICATIONS TO THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT TO REFLECT THE ORIGINAL INTENT OF THE LAW.

(a) Clarification of the False Claims Act- Section 3729 of title 31, United States Code, is amended --

(1) by striking subsection (a) and inserting the following:

`(a) Liability for Certain Acts-

`(1) IN GENERAL- Subject to paragraph (2), any person who --

`(A) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval;

`(B) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim;

`(C) conspires to commit a violation of subparagraph (A), (B), (D), (E), (F), or (G);

`(D) has possession, custody, or control of property or money used, or to be used, by the Government and knowingly delivers, or causes to be delivered, less than all of that money or property;

`(E) is authorized to make or deliver a document certifying receipt of property used, or to be used, by the Government and, intending to defraud the Government, makes or delivers the receipt without completely knowing that the information on the receipt is true;

`(F) knowingly buys, or receives as a pledge of an obligation or debt, public property from an officer or employee of the Government, or a member of the Armed Forces, who lawfully may not sell or pledge property; or

`(G) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement material to an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the Government, or knowingly conceals or knowingly and improperly avoids or decreases an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the Government,

is liable to the United States Government for a civil penalty of not less than $5,000 and not more than $10,000, as adjusted by the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990 (28 U.S.C. 2461 note; Public Law 104-410), plus 3 times the amount of damages which the Government sustains because of the act of that person.

`(2) REDUCED DAMAGES- If the court finds that --

`(A) the person committing the violation of this subsection furnished officials of the United States responsible for investigating false claims violations with all information known to such person about the violation within 30 days after the date on which the defendant first obtained the information;

`(B) such person fully cooperated with any Government investigation of such violation; and

`(C) at the time such person furnished the United States with the information about the violation, no criminal prosecution, civil action, or administrative action had commenced under this title with respect to such violation, and the person did not have actual knowledge of the existence of an investigation into such violation,

the court may assess not less than 2 times the amount of damages which the Government sustains because of the act of that person.

`(3) COSTS OF CIVIL ACTIONS- A person violating this subsection shall also be liable to the United States Government for the costs of a civil action brought to recover any such penalty or damages.';

(2) by striking subsections (b) and (c) and inserting the following:

`(b) Definitions- For purposes of this section --

`(1) the terms `knowing' and `knowingly' --

`(A) mean that a person, with respect to information --

`(i) has actual knowledge of the information;

`(ii) acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information; or

`(iii) acts in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information; and

`(B) require no proof of specific intent to defraud;

`(2) the term `claim' --

`(A) means any request or demand, whether under a contract or otherwise, for money or property and whether or not the United States has title to the money or property, that --

`(i) is presented to an officer, employee, or agent of the United States; or

`(ii) is made to a contractor, grantee, or other recipient, if the money or property is to be spent or used on the Government's behalf or to advance a Government program or interest, and if the United States Government --

`(I) provides or has provided any portion of the money or property requested or demanded; or

`(II) will reimburse such contractor, grantee, or other recipient for any portion of the money or property which is requested or demanded; and

`(B) does not include requests or demands for money or property that the Government has paid to an individual as compensation for Federal employment or as an income subsidy with no restrictions on that individual's use of the money or property;

`(3) the term `obligation' means a fixed duty, or a contingent duty arising from an express or implied contractual, quasi-contractual, grantor-grantee, licensor-licensee, statutory, fee-based, or similar relationship, and the retention of any overpayment; and

`(4) the term `material' means having a natural tendency to influence, or be capable of influencing, the payment or receipt of money or property.';

(3) by redesignating subsections (d) and (e) as subsections (c) and (d), respectively; and

(4) in subsection (c), as redesignated, by striking `subparagraphs (A) through (C) of subsection (a)' and inserting `subsection (a)(2)'.

(b) Effective Date and Application- The amendments made by this section shall take effect on the date of enactment of this Act and shall apply to conduct on or after the date of enactment, except that subparagraph (B) of section 3729(a)(1) of title 31, United States Code, as added by subsection (a)(1), shall take effect as if enacted on June 7, 2008, and apply to all claims under the False Claims Act (31 U.S.C. 3729 et seq.) that are pending on or after that date.



Calendar No. 28



111th CONGRESS



1st Session



S. 386



A BILL

To improve enforcement of mortgage fraud, securities fraud, financial institution fraud, and other frauds related to federal assistance and relief programs, for the recovery of funds lost to these frauds, and for other purposes.

March 5, 2009

Reported with an amendment

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Monday, April 27, 2009

Section 6676 - frivolous tax refund penalty

A taxpayer filing a refund or credit claim for an "excessive amount" is subject to a penalty equal to 20 percent of such excessive amount ( Code Sec. 6676(a), added by the Small Business and Work Opportunity Tax Act of 2007 ( P.L. 110-28). For this purpose, an excessive amount is the amount by which the refund or credit claim exceeds the amount allowable under the Code for the tax year ( Code Sec. 6676(b), added by P.L. 110-28).

The penalty is not imposed if the taxpayer can show that there is a reasonable basis for claiming the excessive refund or credit amount. In addition, the penalty does not apply to claims for refunds or credits related to the earned income credit since such claims are governed by a separate set of rules under Code Sec. 32 ( Code Sec. 6676(a), added by P.L. 110-28). Nor does the penalty apply to any portion of the excessive amount of the claim that is subject to the accuracy-related penalty under Code Sec. 6662 or 6662A, or the fraud penalty imposed under Code Sec. 6663 ( Code Sec. 6676(c), added by P.L. 110-28).

The penalty applies to claims for refunds or credits filed or submitted after May 25, 2007 (Act Sec. 8247(c) of P.L. 110-28).

ERRONEOUS CLAIM FOR REFUND OR CREDIT

6676(a) CIVIL PENALTY. --If a claim for refund or credit with respect to income tax (other than a claim for a refund or credit relating to the earned income credit under section 32) is made for an excessive amount, unless it is shown that the claim for such excessive amount has a reasonable basis, the person making such claim shall be liable for a penalty in an amount equal to 20 percent of the excessive amount.

6676(b) EXCESSIVE AMOUNT. --For purposes of this section, the term "excessive amount" means in the case of any person the amount by which the amount of the claim for refund or credit for any taxable year exceeds the amount of such claim allowable under this title for such taxable year.

6676(c) COORDINATION WITH OTHER PENALTIES. --This section shall not apply to any portion of the excessive amount of a claim for refund or credit which is subject to a penalty imposed under part II of subchapter A of chapter 68.

.01 Added by P.L. 110-28.



Joint Committee Summary of P.L. 110-28 (Small Business and Work Opportunity Tax Act of 2007)


.99 Penalty for filing erroneous claims for refunds or credits. --
Present Law


Present law imposes accuracy-related penalties on a taxpayer in cases involving a substantial valuation misstatement or gross valuation misstatement relating to an underpayment of income tax. 40 For this purpose, a substantial valuation misstatement generally means a value claimed that is at least twice (200 percent or more) the amount determined to be the correct value, and a gross valuation misstatement generally means a value claimed that is at least four times (400 percent or more) the amount determined to be the correct value.

The penalty is 20 percent of the underpayment of tax resulting from a substantial valuation misstatement and rises to 40 percent for a gross valuation misstatement. No penalty is imposed unless the portion of the underpayment attributable to the valuation misstatement exceeds $5,000 ($10,000 in the case of a corporation other than an S corporation or a personal holding company). Under present law, no penalty is imposed with respect to any portion of the understatement attributable to any item if (1) the treatment of the item on the return is or was supported by substantial authority, or (2) facts relevant to the tax treatment of the item were adequately disclosed on the return or on a statement attached to the return and there is a reasonable basis for the tax treatment. Special rules apply to tax shelters.
Explanation of Provision


The provision imposes a penalty on any taxpayer filing an erroneous claim for refund or credit. The penalty is equal to 20 percent of the disallowed portion of the claim for refund or credit for which there is no reasonable basis for the claimed tax treatment. The penalty does not apply to any portion of the disallowed portion of the claim for refund or credit relating to the earned income credit or any portion of the disallowed portion of the claim for refund or credit that is subject to accuracy-related or fraud penalties.
Effective Date


The provision is effective for claims for refund or credit filed after the date of enactment. --Joint Committee on Taxation, Technical Explanation of the Small Business and Work Opportunity Tax Act of 2007 May 25, 2007 (JCX-29-07).

40 Sec. 6662(b)(3) and (h).

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Electing small businesses (ESBs) may elect a three-, four-, or five-year carryback period for 2008 net operating losses (NOLs) by filing Form 1045, Application for Tentative Refund; Form 1139, Corporation Application for Tentative Refund; or an amended return. The IRS has received many claims of carrybacks of NOLs but the taxpayers filing those claims have failed to make valid elections pursuant to Rev. Proc. 2009-19. New guidance prescribes how a taxpayer elects the carryback. Additionally, a taxpayer that initially elected to waive the NOL carryback period may be allowed to revoke that election. When filing Form 1045, Form 1139 or an amended return, the taxpayer should type or print across the top of the appropriate form "Revocation of NOL Carryback Wavier Pursuant to Rev. Proc. 2009-19." The new guidance is effective for NOLs arising in tax years ending after December 31, 2007. Rev. Proc. 2009-19, I.R.B. 2009-14, 747, is modified and, as modified, is superseded.




Rev. Proc. 2009-26 , I.R.B. 2009-19, April 24, 2009.

[ Code Sec. 172]








SECTION 1. PURPOSE

.01 In February 2009, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Tax Act of 2009, Div. B of Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (the Act) was signed into law. Section 1211 of the Act allows an eligible small business (ESB) to elect to carry back a 2008 net operating loss (NOL) for a period of 3, 4, or 5 years to offset taxable income in those preceding taxable years. Prior to the Act, taxpayers generally could carry back an NOL only two taxable years. On March 16, 2009, the Internal Revenue Service and Treasury Department issued Rev. Proc. 2009-19, 2009-14 I.R.B. 747, advising taxpayers how to elect the 3-, 4-, or 5-year carryback.

.02 The Service has received many claims from taxpayers that seek a 3-, 4-, or 5-year carryback but that inadvertently have not made a valid election in accordance with Rev. Proc. 2009-19. These inadvertent failures may be due to the fact that the enactment of §1211 and issuance of Rev. Proc. 2009-19 occurred midway through the current tax return filing season.

.03 To provide certainty to taxpayers and to implement the intent of Congress in providing an extended carryback period, this revenue procedure modifies Rev. Proc. 2009-19 to provide that an ESB may elect a 3-, 4-, or 5-year carryback period simply by filing a Form 1045, Form 1139, or amended return that carries back the NOL for 3, 4, or 5 years. Although Forms 1045 and 1139 ordinarily are due within 12 months after the taxable year of the NOL, §172(b)(1)(H)(iii) requires that the taxpayer elect a 3-, 4-, or 5-year carryback within 6 months after the due date (excluding extensions) of the return for the taxable year of the NOL. Thus, a taxpayer that seeks to make a timely §172(b)(1)(H) election using Form 1045, Form 1139, or an amended return must file the form in advance of its ordinary due date.

.04 This revenue procedure also prescribes: (1) how a taxpayer elects a 3-, 4-, or 5-year carryback if the taxpayer previously filed an election to forgo an NOL carryback period; and (2) how a taxpayer elects a 3-, 4-, or 5-year carryback if the taxpayer is a partner of an ESB that is a partnership, a shareholder of an ESB that is an S corporation, or a sole proprietor.



SECTION 2. BACKGROUND

.01 Section 172(a) allows a deduction equal to the aggregate of the NOL carryovers and carrybacks to the taxable year. Section 172(b)(1)(A)(i) provides that an NOL for any taxable year generally must be carried back to each of the 2 years preceding the taxable year of the NOL. Section 172(b)(3) provides that any taxpayer entitled to a carryback period under §172(b)(1) may make an irrevocable election to relinquish the carryback period with respect to an NOL for any taxable year.

.02 Section 6411(a) provides that a taxpayer may file an application for a tentative carryback adjustment of the tax for the prior taxable year affected by an NOL carryback from any taxable year. Section 6411(a) also provides that the application must be filed on or after the date of filing for the return for the taxable year of the NOL from which the carryback results and within a period of 12 months after that taxable year or, with respect to any portion of a business credit carryback attributable to an NOL from a subsequent taxable year, within a period of 12 months from the end of the subsequent taxable year. Section 6411(b) provides a 90-day period during which the Service will make a limited examination of the application to discover omissions and errors of computation and determine the amount of the decrease in tax attributable to the carryback. The Service may disallow, without further action, any application that contains errors of computation that cannot be corrected within the 90-day period or that contains material omissions. The decrease in tax attributable to the carryback will be applied against unpaid amounts of tax. Any remainder of the decrease will, within the 90-day period, be credited or refunded.

.03 Section 172(b)(1)(H) permits an ESB to carry back its applicable 2008 NOL to 3, 4, or 5 years preceding the taxable year of the NOL, as the ESB elects.

.04 Section 172(b)(1)(H)(iv) provides that the term "eligible small business" has the meaning given by §172(b)(1)(F)(iii), except that §448(c) is applied by substituting "$15 million" for "$5 million" each place it appears. Section 172(b)(1)(F)(iii) provides that a small business is a corporation or partnership that meets the gross receipts test of §448(c) for the taxable year in which the loss arose (or in the case of a sole proprietorship, that would meet such test if the proprietorship were a corporation).

.05 Section 448 generally prohibits certain taxpayers from using the cash receipts and disbursements method of accounting. Section 448(b)(3) provides an exception to this requirement in the case of any corporation or partnership if, for all prior taxable years beginning after December 31, 1985, the entity (or any predecessor) met the $5 million gross receipts test of §448(c). Section 448(c)(1) provides that a corporation or partnership meets the $5 million gross receipts test for any prior taxable year if the average annual gross receipts of the entity for the 3-taxable-year period ending with that prior taxable year does not exceed $5 million. Section 448(c)(2) (aggregation rules) generally provides that all persons treated as a single employer under subsection (a) or (b) of §52 or subsection (m) or (o) of §414 are treated as one person for purposes of §448(c)(1).

.06 The $5 million gross receipts test of §448(c) is applied to a taxpayer's prior taxable year by determining the average annual gross receipts for the 3-year period that ends with that prior taxable year. Under §172(b)(1)(F)(iii), in order to be a small business, a taxpayer must meet the gross receipts test of §448(c) for the taxable year in which the NOL arose. Consequently, to determine if a taxpayer is a small business for purposes of §172(b)(1)(F)(iii), the taxable year in which the NOL arose is the last taxable year of the 3-year period to which the test is applied.

.07 Section 172(b)(1)(H)(ii)(I) provides that the term "applicable 2008 net operating loss" means the taxpayer's NOL for any taxable year ending in 2008. However, under §172(b)(1)(H)(ii)(II), the taxpayer may elect instead to have the term mean the taxpayer's NOL for any taxable year beginning in 2008.

.08 Section 172(b)(1)(H)(iii) provides that any election under §172(b)(1)(H) is required to be made in such a manner as may be prescribed by the Secretary, and must be made by the due date (including extension of time) for filing the taxpayer's return for the taxable year of the NOL. The election is irrevocable and may be made only for one taxable year.

.09 Section 1211(d)(2) of the Act provides that in the case of an applicable 2008 NOL for a taxable year ending before the date of enactment of the Act (February 17, 2009), (A) a previous election made under §172(b)(3) for the NOL may be revoked on or before April 17, 2009; (B) the §172(b)(1)(H) election for the NOL is treated as timely if made on or before April 17, 2009; and (C) an application under §6411(a) with respect to the NOL is treated as timely if filed on or before April 17, 2009.



SECTION 3. SCOPE

This revenue procedure applies to any taxpayer that is an ESB, a partner of a partnership that is an ESB, a shareholder in an S corporation that is an ESB, or a sole proprietor of a business that is an ESB, and that incurred an NOL for any taxable year ending in 2008 or beginning in 2008.



SECTION 4. APPLICATION

.01 Time and manner of making the election under §172(b)(1)(H).

(1) In general. A taxpayer within the scope of this revenue procedure that has an applicable 2008 NOL may make the election under §172(b)(1)(H) by following the procedure described in either section 4.01(2) or section 4.01(3) of this revenue procedure.

(2) Electing on original return. A taxpayer may make the election under §172(b)(1)(H) by attaching a statement to the taxpayer's timely filed federal income tax return for the taxable year in which the applicable 2008 NOL arises. The statement must state that the taxpayer is electing to apply §172(b)(1)(H) and specify the length of the NOL carryback period elected by the taxpayer (3, 4, or 5 years). If the taxpayer's taxable year of the applicable 2008 NOL ends before February 17, 2009, the taxpayer must make the election on or before the later of the due date (including extensions of time) of the taxpayer's return for that taxable year or April 17, 2009.

(3) Electing on an appropriate form. A taxpayer that did not make the election under §172(b)(1)(H) using the procedures of section 4.01(2) of this revenue procedure, and did not elect to forgo the NOL carryback period under §172(b)(3), may make the election under §172(b)(1)(H) as follows:

(a) What to file.

(i) A taxpayer may make the election under §172(b)(1)(H) by filing the appropriate form applying the NOL carryback period chosen by the taxpayer. No statement or label is required with the appropriate form. The appropriate form is:

(A) For corporations: Form 1139, Corporation Application for Tentative Refund, or Form 1120X, Amended U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return.

(B) For individuals: Form 1045, Application for Tentative Refund, or Form 1040X, Amended U.S. Individual Income Tax Return.

(C) For estates or trusts: Form 1045, or amended Form 1041, U.S. Income Tax Return for Estates and Trusts.

(ii) A taxpayer that makes the election under §172(b)(1)(H) by filing an amended return must file the return for the earliest taxable year to which the taxpayer is carrying back the applicable 2008 NOL. The taxpayer should not file an amended return for the applicable 2008 NOL taxable year.

(b) When to file. The appropriate form must be filed on or before the later of the date that is 6 months after the due date (excluding extensions) for filing the taxpayer's return for the taxable year of the applicable 2008 NOL or April 17, 2009.

(c) Additional rules. If a taxpayer makes the election by filing an appropriate form that amends a prior refund claim, the amendment also will apply to a carryback of any alternative tax NOL for the same taxable year. In the case of an amended application for a tentative carryback adjustment, the 90-day period described in §6411(b) will begin on the date the amended application is filed.

.02 Revocation of the election to waive NOL carryback period. A taxpayer within the scope of this revenue procedure that previously elected under §172(b)(3) to forgo the carryback period for an applicable 2008 NOL for a taxable year ending before February 17, 2009, may revoke that election and make the election under §172(b)(1)(H). Any revocation of the election to forgo the NOL carryback period also will apply to a carryback of any alternative tax NOL for the same taxable year. The taxpayer makes the revocation and election by following the procedures of section 4.01(3) of this revenue procedure. In addition, the taxpayer should type or print across the top of the appropriate form "Revocation of NOL Carryback Waiver Pursuant to Rev. Proc. 2009-19." The taxpayer must file the revocation and new election under §172(b)(1)(H) on or before April 17, 2009.

.03 Partnerships, S corporations, and sole proprietorships.

(1) If the taxpayer is a partner in a partnership that qualifies as an ESB, the taxpayer may make the §172(b)(1)(H) election for its distributive share of the qualifying ESB partnership income, gain, loss, and deduction that is both allocable to the taxpayer under §704 and allowed in calculating the taxpayer's applicable 2008 NOL.

(2) If the taxpayer is a shareholder in an S corporation that qualifies as an ESB, the taxpayer may make the §172(b)(1)(H) election for its pro rata share of the qualifying ESB S corporation income, gain, loss, and deduction under §1366 that is allowed in calculating the shareholder's applicable 2008 NOL.

(3) If the taxpayer is an owner of a sole proprietorship that qualifies as an ESB, the taxpayer may make the §172(b)(1)(H) election for the qualifying ESB sole proprietorship income, gain, loss, and deduction that is allowed in calculating the taxpayer's applicable 2008 NOL.

(4) In determining whether a partnership, S corporation, or sole proprietorship qualifies as an ESB, the gross receipts test applies at the partnership, corporate, or sole proprietorship level. The aggregation rules of §448(c)(2) apply to determine whether the partnership, S corporation, or sole proprietorship meets the gross receipts test of §448(c).

(5) The amount of the taxpayer's applicable 2008 NOL that the taxpayer may carry back under §172(b)(1)(H) is limited to the lesser of:

(a) The taxpayer's items of income, gain, loss or deduction that are allowed in calculating the taxpayer's applicable 2008 NOL and are from one or more partnerships, S corporations or sole proprietorships that qualify as ESBs, or

(b) The taxpayer's applicable 2008 NOL.

(6) Examples.

(a) Example 1. Partnerships A, B, and C have average annual gross receipts of $10 million, $12 million, and $14 million, respectively. Partner T owns a 40% interest in each partnership. None of the partnerships is required to be aggregated with any other entity for purposes of the aggregation rules of §448(c)(2). Subject to the limitations in section 4.03(5) of this revenue procedure, Partner T may apply its election under §172(b)(1)(H) to the portion of its applicable 2008 NOL attributable to its distributive share of the income, gain, loss, and deduction of each of Partnerships A, B, and C.

(b) Example 2. The facts are the same as in Example 1, except that Partnerships A and B are under common control within the meaning of §52(b)(1). Accordingly, Partnerships A and B are treated as one person under the aggregation rules of §448(c)(2). Because the aggregated average annual gross receipts of Partnerships A and B exceed $15 million, Partnerships A and B do not qualify as ESBs. Partner T may not apply its election under §172(b)(1)(H) to the portion of its applicable 2008 NOL attributable to its distributive share of the income, gain, loss, and deduction of Partnerships A and B. However, subject to the limitations in section 4.03(5) of this revenue procedure, Partner T may apply its election under §172(b)(1)(H) to the portion of its applicable 2008 NOL attributable to its distributive share of income, gain, loss, and deduction of Partnership C.



SECTION 5. EFFECT ON OTHER DOCUMENTS

Rev. Proc. 2009-19 is modified and, as modified, is superseded.



SECTION 6. EFFECTIVE DATE

This revenue procedure is effective for NOLs arising in taxable years ending after December 31, 2007.



SECTION 7. PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT

The collection of information contained in this revenue procedure has been reviewed and approved by the Office of Management and Budget in accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. 3507) under the following control numbers: 1545-0074 Form 1040 (U.S. Individual Income Tax Return) and Form 1040X (Amended U.S. Individual Income Tax Return); 1545-0123 Form 1120 (U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return); 1545-0132 Form 1120X (Amended U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return);1545-0092 Form 1041 (U.S. Income Tax Return for Estates and Trusts); 1545-0098 Form 1045 (Application for Tentative Refund); 1545-0582 Form 1139 (Corporation Application for Tentative Refund). For further information, please refer to the Paperwork Reduction Act statements accompanying these forms.



DRAFTING INFORMATION

The principal author of this revenue procedure is Seoyeon Park of the Office of the Associate Chief Counsel (Income Tax and Accounting). For further information regarding this notice, contact Ms. Park at (202) 622-4960 (not a toll-free call).

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Sunday, April 26, 2009

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THE AGENDA • TAXESTHE AGENDA
Civil Rights

Defense

Disabilities

Economy

Education

Energy & Environment

Ethics

Family

Fiscal

Foreign Policy

Health Care

Homeland Security

Immigration

Iraq

Poverty

Rural

Seniors & Social Security

Service

Taxes

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Urban Policy

Veterans

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Additional Issues
TAXES
President Obama and Vice President Biden’s tax plan delivers broad-based tax relief to middle class families and cuts taxes for small businesses and companies that create jobs in America, while restoring fairness to our tax code and returning to fiscal responsibility. Coupled with President Obama and Vice President Biden's commitment to invest in key areas like health, clean energy, innovation, and education, their tax plan will help restore bottom-up economic growth that creates good jobs in America and empowers all families to achieve the American dream.

Obama’s Comprehensive Tax Policy Plan for America will:
Cut taxes for 95 percent of workers and their families with a tax cut of $500 for workers or $1,000 for working couples.
Provide generous tax cuts for low- and middle-income seniors, homeowners, the uninsured, and families sending a child to college or looking to save and accumulate wealth.
Eliminate capital gains taxes for small businesses, cut corporate taxes for firms that invest and create jobs in the United States, and provide tax credits to reduce the cost of healthcare and to reward investments in innovation.
Dramatically simplify taxes by consolidating existing tax credits, eliminating the need for millions of senior citizens to file tax forms, and enabling as many as 40 million middle-class Americans to do their own taxes in less than five minutes without an accountant.
Under the Obama-Biden Plan:
Middle class families will see their taxes cut -- and no family making less than $250,000 will see their taxes increase. The typical middle class family will receive well over $1,000 in tax relief under the Obama-Biden plan, and will pay tax rates that are 20 percent lower than they faced under President Reagan.
Families making more than $250,000 will pay either the same or lower tax rates than they paid in the 1990s. Obama will ask the wealthiest two percent of families to give back a portion of the tax cuts they have received over the past eight years to ensure we are restoring fairness and returning to fiscal responsibility. But no family will pay higher tax rates than they would have paid in the 1990s.
The Obama-Biden plan will cut taxes overall, reducing revenues to below the levels that prevailed under Ronald Reagan (less than 18.2 percent of GDP). The plan is a net tax cut -- his tax relief for middle class families is larger than the revenue raised by his tax changes for families over $250,000. Coupled with his commitment to cut unnecessary spending, Obama will pay for this tax relief while bringing down the budget deficit.
Impact of the Obama Tax Plan
WHO TAX CUT
Married couple making $75,000 with two children, one of whom is in college $3,700
[includes $1,000 Making Work Pay; $500 universal mortgage credit; and $4,000 college credit net of current college credits]
Married couple making $90,000 $1,000
[$1,000 Making Work Pay tax credit]
Single parent making $40,000 with two young children and childcare expenses $2,100
[includes $500 Making Work Pay; $500 universal mortgage credit; and $1,100 from expansion of the child care tax credit]
70-year-old widow making $35,000 $1,900
[reflects elimination of income taxes for seniors earning under $50,000]

Source: Calculations based on IRS Statistics of Income. Tax savings is conservative; does not account for up to $500 in savings from expanded Savers Credit and the $2,500 in savings per family from the Obama healthcare plan

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Friday, April 24, 2009

[ Code Sec. 6015]
Equitable innocent spouse relief: Standard of review: De novo review. --
An individual who appealed the IRS' denial of equitable innocent spouse relief for the additional tax imposed on her former husband's distribution from an IRA was entitled to have the matter considered de novo rather than reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. In 2006, Congress amended Code Sec. 6015(f) to provide that the Tax Court had jurisdiction to determine the appropriate relief available to a party seeking equitable innocent spouse relief. This altered both the standard and scope of review from abuse of discretion to de novo review of the matter, with authority to consider matters outside of the administrative record Although the taxpayer should have known about the IRA distribution, she was divorced from her husband shortly after the return was filed, established that she would suffer hardship if relief were not granted, did not receive a significant benefit from the distribution, and complied with all income tax laws in subsequent years. Accordingly, under a de novo review standard, she was found to be entitled to equitable innocent spouse relief from the additional tax.





Suzanne L. Porter a.k.a. Suzanne L. Holman v. Commissioner.

Dkt. No. 13558-06 , 132 TC --, No. 11, April 23, 2009.










P applied for relief from joint and several liability for additional tax under sec. 72(t), I.R.C., related to a distribution her husband received from his individual retirement account. R denied P's application for relief. P petitioned this Court to seek our determination whether she is entitled to relief under sec. 6015(f), I.R.C.



Held: In determining whether P is entitled to equitable relief under sec. 6015(f), I.R.C., we apply a de novo standard of review, not an abuse of discretion standard of review.



Held, further: P is entitled to equitable relief under sec. 6015(f), I.R.C.



HAINES, Judge: Respondent determined that petitioner is not entitled to relief from joint and several income tax liability for 2003 with respect to an early distribution from her ex-husband's individual retirement account (IRA). 1 In Porter v. Commissioner, 130 T.C. 115, 117 (2008), we held that in determining whether petitioner is entitled to relief under section 6015(f), we conduct a trial de novo and we may consider evidence introduced at trial which was not included in the administrative record. We then denied respondent's motion in limine seeking to limit petitioner's right to introduce evidence outside the administrative record. The issues remaining for decision are: (1) Whether in determining petitioner's eligibility for relief under section 6015(f) we use a de novo standard of review or review for abuse of discretion; and (2) whether petitioner is entitled to equitable relief under section 6015(f).





FINDINGS OF FACT



Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found. The stipulation of facts, the exhibits attached thereto, and the stipulation of settled issues are incorporated herein by this reference. At the time she filed her petition, petitioner resided in Maryland.



Petitioner holds a bachelor of science degree in business administration from the University of Maryland. In 1994 she married John S. Porter. Together, they had two children. Sometime in 2002 petitioner was wrongfully discharged from her job with the Federal Government. Before returning to Government employment petitioner was employed as a bus driver.



Petitioner was not aware of Mr. Porter's finances during 2003. They maintained separate checking accounts and credit cards. Petitioner did not review the monthly bank statements, nor did she pick up the daily mail. Mr. Porter was responsible for the home mortgage and car insurance payments. Petitioner was responsible for paying all other home expenses, including groceries, which she paid for with her credit cards.



During 2003 petitioner received $24,285 in wages and unemployment compensation. During 2003 Mr. Porter earned $12,765 in nonemployee compensation. He also received a $10,700 distribution from his IRA. Petitioner did not know of the distribution at the time it was made because Mr. Porter refused to tell petitioner about his income for 2003.



Before 2003 Mr. Porter was responsible for filing the couple's tax returns. He also prepared the couple's 2003 joint Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return. The return reported Mr. Porter's IRA distribution and petitioner's wages and unemployment compensation. Mr. Porter's nonemployee compensation was not reported on the return. He gave the return to petitioner to sign on April 15, 2004, the day it was due. Because Mr. Porter was pressuring her to sign the return quickly so he could get it to the post office, petitioner reviewed the return in haste, ensuring that her own income was properly reported. Six days after petitioner signed the return, on April 21, 2004, she and Mr. Porter legally separated. 2



On June 20, 2005, respondent issued petitioner and Mr. Porter statutory notices of deficiency for 2003. Respondent adjusted their 2003 income to include $12,765 in nonemployee compensation attributable to Mr. Porter. Respondent also adjusted their 2003 income tax to include 10-percent additional tax of $1,070 with respect to Mr. Porter's IRA distribution pursuant to section 72(t)(1). Neither petitioner nor Mr. Porter petitioned this Court for redetermination of the deficiency.



In subsequent years petitioner has complied with all income tax laws. After their separation petitioner discovered that Mr. Porter had not filed their joint Federal income tax return for 2002. Petitioner promptly filed her own return for 2002, choosing married-filing-separately status.



On December 1, 2005, petitioner filed a Form 8857, Request for Innocent Spouse Relief. On June 14, 2006, respondent's Appeals officer issued a final determination regarding petitioner's request for relief. The Appeals officer determined that pursuant to section 6015(c) petitioner was entitled to relief from joint and several liability with respect to the $12,765 in unreported nonemployee compensation. However, petitioner was denied relief under section 6015(b), (c), and (f) from the 10-percent additional tax of $1,070 on Mr. Porter's IRA distribution. The Appeals officer determined that petitioner knew or had reason to know the 10-percent additional tax was not reported on the couple's return. On January 31, 2007, as a result of debt from her marriage, petitioner filed for bankruptcy. 3



Mr. Porter did not intervene in this case, though he was given the opportunity to do so under section 6015(e)(4). See Van Arsdalen v. Commissioner, 123 T.C. 135, 143 (2004). Rather, respondent called him as a witness at trial. He had not previously participated in petitioner's administrative hearing.





OPINION




I. Section 6015(f)


Petitioner contends that under section 6015(f) she qualifies for relief from joint and several liability for the 10-percent additional tax on Mr. Porter's early distribution from his IRA. When a husband and wife file a joint Federal income tax return, they generally are jointly and severally liable for the tax due. Sec. 6013(d)(3); Butler v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 276, 282 (2000). However, a spouse may qualify for relief from joint and several liability under section 6015(b), (c), or (f) if various requirements are met. The parties stipulated that petitioner does not qualify for relief from joint and several liability on the 10-percent additional tax under section 6015(b) or (c).



A taxpayer qualifies for relief under section 6015(f) if relief is not available under section 6015(b) or (c) and, in the light of the facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the taxpayer liable for the tax or deficiency. This Court has jurisdiction to determine whether a taxpayer is entitled to equitable relief under section 6015(f). Sec. 6015(e)(1)(A). Our determination is made in a trial de novo. Porter v. Commissioner, 130 T.C. at 117. Therefore, we may consider evidence introduced at trial which was not included in the administrative record. Both parties submitted evidence at trial which was not available to respondent's Appeals officer.




II. The Standard of Review


We have generally reviewed the Commissioner's denial of relief under section 6015(f) for abuse of discretion. 4 See Jonson v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 106, 125 (2002), affd. 353 F.3d 1181 (10th Cir. 2003); Butler v. Commissioner, supra; cf. Wiener v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-230 (abuse of discretion standard not applied where notice of determination did not recite any analysis or factual determinations to review). In their concurring opinions in Porter v. Commissioner, supra at 142-146, Judges Goeke and Wherry contended that our existing precedent with respect to the standard of review in section 6015(f) cases is no longer applicable in the light of the 2006 amendments to section 6015. Judge Wherry urged the Court to adopt a de novo standard of review when the merits of this case would be decided. 5 Id. at 144.



Congress enacted section 6015 as part of the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206, sec. 3201, 112 Stat. 734. 6 Section 6015(f) provides that the Commissioner "may" grant relief under certain circumstances, suggesting a grant of relief is discretionary. In its original form section 6015(e) granted us jurisdiction to determine appropriate relief under section 6015(b) and (c) but was silent as to our jurisdiction under section 6015(f). In Butler v. Commissioner, supra, we considered whether we had jurisdiction to review the Commissioner's denial of equitable relief under section 6015(f) or whether the granting of relief was committed solely to agency discretion.



In the absence of any clear guidance from Congress, we held that we had jurisdiction to review the Commissioner's determinations but should review for abuse of discretion because of the discretionary language in section 6015(f). Butler v. Commissioner, supra; see Porter v. Commissioner, supra at 143 (Goeke, J. concurring). Under the statutory framework provided by Congress at the time, our adoption of an abuse of discretion standard was appropriate. Porter v. Commissioner, supra at 143 (Goeke, J. concurring).



Our assertion of jurisdiction over cases brought under section 6015(e) and (f) by individuals against whom no deficiency had been asserted was reversed by the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and for the Ninth Circuit. See Bartman v. Commissioner, 446 F.3d 785, 787 (8th Cir. 2006), affg. in part and vacating in part T.C. Memo. 2004-93; Commissioner v. Ewing, 439 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2006), revg. 118 T.C. 494 (2002) and vacating 112 T.C. 32 (2004); see also Billings v. Commissioner, 127 T.C. 7 (2006). However, in 2006 Congress amended section 6015(e)(1) to confirm our jurisdiction to determine the appropriate relief available under section 6015(f). Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-432, div. C, sec. 408(a), 120 Stat. 3061. Given Congress's confirmation of our jurisdiction, reconsideration of the standard of review in section 6015(f) cases is warranted.



Amended section 6015(e)(1) provides that "In the case of an individual against whom a deficiency has been asserted and who elects to have subsection (b) or (c) apply, or in the case of an individual who requests equitable relief under subsection (f)", the Court has jurisdiction "to determine the appropriate relief available to the individual under this section". (Emphasis added.) The use of the word "determine" suggests that Congress intended us to use a de novo standard of review as well as scope of review. In other instances where the word "determine" or "redetermine" is used, as in sections 6213 and 6512(b), we apply a de novo scope of review and standard of review. See Porter v. Commissioner, 130 T.C. at 118-119.



Nothing in amended section 6015(e) suggests that Congress intended us to review for abuse of discretion. In similar circumstances, Congress expressly provided that we review the Commissioner's determinations for abuse of discretion. Before 1996 the Commissioner was granted the authority to abate assessments of interest in certain circumstances. Sec. 6404(e) (as in effect for tax years beginning on or before July 30, 1996). Under that statutory framework, we lacked jurisdiction to determine whether interest abatement was warranted. See Beall v. United States, 336 F.3d 419, 425 (5th Cir. 2003); 508 Clinton St. Corp. v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 352, 354 (1987). Congress then amended section 6404 by expressly granting us jurisdiction "to determine whether the Secretary's failure to abate interest * * * was an abuse of discretion". (Emphasis added.) Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. 104-168, sec. 302, 110 Stat. 1457 (1996); see Hinck v. United States, 550 U.S. 501 (2007) (holding that this Court is the exclusive forum for judicial review of the Commissioner's refusal to abate interest, abrogating Beall v. United States, supra).



Section 6015(e) was amended in a similar historical context. Sections 6015(f) and 6404(e) are taxpayer relief provisions. Under each provision the decision whether to grant relief (in the form of an interest abatement or relief from joint and several liability) was committed largely to agency discretion, and it had been determined that we lacked jurisdiction over a claim brought by a taxpayer under each provision. See Commissioner v. Ewing, 439 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2006) (Court of Appeals determined that this Court lacked jurisdiction over cases brought under section 6015(f)); 508 Clinton St. Corp. v. Commissioner, supra (this Court lacked jurisdiction over interest abatement claim).



In amending section 6404, Congress provided us jurisdiction over interest abatement cases but expressly limited our jurisdiction to reviewing whether the Commissioner's failure to abate interest was an abuse of discretion. Sec. 6404(h). In amending section 6015(e), Congress provided us jurisdiction over cases brought under section 6015(f). But unlike the amendment to section 6404, the amendment to section 6015(e) gives no indication that we should review the Commissioner's determination for abuse of discretion. Congress's failure to include any such limitation in section 6015(e) when it had previously included the limitation in a similar situation indicates that our jurisdiction is not limited to reviewing the Commissioner's determination for abuse of discretion. See Franklin Natl. Bank v. New York, 347 U.S. 373, 378 (1954) ("We find no indication that Congress intended to make this phase of national banking subject to local restrictions, as it has done by express language in several other instances.").



An abuse of discretion standard of review is also at odds with our decision to decline to remand section 6015(f) cases for reconsideration. Friday v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 220, 222 (2005). Section 6330 is analogous to section 6015(f) insofar as both sections consider economic hardship as a factor in determining whether relief is appropriate. In section 6330(d)(2) Congress provided that the Internal Revenue Service Office of Appeals would retain jurisdiction over collection cases to allow it to consider changes in the taxpayers' circumstances. That Congress did not include a similar provision in section 6015 is consistent with the requirement that we determine whether relief for taxpayers under section 6015(f) is appropriate. See Friday v. Commissioner, supra at 222 ("There is in section 6015 no analog to section 6330 granting the Court jurisdiction after a hearing at the Commissioner's Appeals Office.").



We have always applied a de novo scope and standard of review in determining whether relief is warranted under subsections (b) and (c) of section 6015. See, e.g., Alt v. Commissioner, 119 T.C. 306, 313-316 (2002), affd. 101 Fed. Appx. 34 (6th Cir. 2004). We believe that cases in which taxpayers seek relief under section 6015(f) should receive similar treatment and thus the same standard of review. Given Congress's direction that we determine the appropriate relief available under subsections (b), (c), and (f), there is no longer any reason to apply a different standard of review under subsection (f) than under subsections (b) and (c), and we shall no longer do so.



Accordingly, in cases brought under section 6015(f) we now apply a de novo standard of review as well as a de novo scope of review. Petitioner bears the burden of proving that she is entitled to equitable relief under section 6015(f). See Rule 142(a). The Commissioner analyzes petitions for section 6015(f) relief using the procedures set forth in Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-2 C.B. 296. See Banderas v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-129. The parties have not disputed application of the conditions and factors listed in the revenue procedure.



The Commissioner generally will not grant relief unless the taxpayer meets seven threshold conditions. Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.01, 2003-2 C.B. at 297. Respondent concedes that petitioner meets these conditions. If a taxpayer meets the threshold conditions, the Commissioner considers several factors to determine whether a requesting spouse is entitled to relief under section 6015(f). Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.03, 2003-2 C.B. at 298. We consider all relevant facts and circumstances in determining whether the taxpayer is entitled to relief. Sec. 6015(e) and (f)(1). The following factors are relevant to our inquiry.




III. Factors Relating to Petitioner's Claim for Relief


A. Petitioner and Mr. Porter Are Divorced



Petitioner and Mr. Porter legally separated on April 21, 2004, 6 days after she signed the couple's 2003 return. They divorced on May 16, 2006. This factor favors relief. 7



B. Petitioner Would Suffer Economic Hardship If Relief Were Not Granted



Economic hardship is present if payment of tax would prevent the taxpayer from paying her reasonable basic living expenses. Sec. 301.6343-1(b)(4)(i) and (ii), Proced. & Admin. Regs. The determination varies according to the unique circumstances of the taxpayer. Id.



Petitioner earns a modest income. She is the mother of two children. She has a bachelor of science degree in business administration, and presumably she will be able to be employed for many more years. Because of debts she was left with after her separation and divorce from Mr. Porter, petitioner has been unable to meet her monthly expenses. Consequently, she was forced to file for bankruptcy. If relief were not granted, petitioner would be jointly liable for paying $1,070 plus related interest.



Under these circumstances, we conclude that petitioner would suffer economic hardship if relief were not granted. This factor favors relief.



C. Petitioner Had Reason To Know of the Item Giving Rise to the Deficiency



In the case of an income tax liability resulting from a deficiency, we are less likely to grant relief under section 6015(f) if the requesting spouse knew or had reason to know of the item giving rise to the deficiency. If the requesting spouse did not know or have reason to know, we are more likely to grant relief.



A taxpayer who signs a return is generally charged with constructive knowledge of its contents. Hayman v. Commissioner, 992 F.2d 1256, 1262 (2d Cir. 1993), affg. T.C. Memo. 1992-228. In establishing that a taxpayer had no reason to know, the taxpayer must show that she was unaware of the circumstances that gave rise to the error and not merely unaware of the tax consequences. Bokum v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 126, 145-146 (1990), affd. 992 F.2d 1132 (11th Cir. 1993); Purcell v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 228, 237-238 (1986), affd. 826 F.2d 470, 473-474 (6th Cir. 1987). Section 6015 does not protect a spouse who turns a blind eye to facts readily available to her. Charlton v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 333, 340 (2000); Bokum v. Commissioner, supra. In such instances, we may impute the requisite knowledge to the putative innocent spouse unless she satisfies her duty of inquiry. Hayman v. Commissioner, supra at 1262; Adams v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 300, 303 (1973).



Mr. Porter presented the couple's income tax return to petitioner to sign on April 15, 2004, the day it was due. Petitioner scanned the contents of the return only to ensure that her own income was reported correctly, which it was. Petitioner relied on Mr. Porter to prepare the return properly with respect to his own income. Petitioner's reliance was misplaced. Nevertheless, petitioner signed a return which clearly shows that Mr. Porter received an IRA distribution during 2003. Despite Mr. Porter's reluctance to discuss his finances with petitioner, we presume she knew that Mr. Porter had not reached the age of 591/2, so as to except the distribution from the section 72(t) additional tax.



Accordingly, petitioner had reason to know of Mr. Porter's IRA distribution. This factor favors not granting petitioner relief.



D. Petitioner Did Not Receive a Significant Benefit Beyond Normal Support From the Item Giving Rise to the Deficiency



Receipt by the requesting spouse, either directly or indirectly, of a significant benefit in excess of normal support from the unpaid liability or the item giving rise to the deficiency weighs against relief. Lack of a significant benefit beyond normal support weighs in favor of relief. Normal support is measured by the circumstances of the particular parties. Estate of Krock v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 672, 678-679 (1989).



Mr. Porter testified that he used the proceeds from his IRA distribution to pay petitioner's credit card debt. Petitioner testified that she does not know how Mr. Porter spent the distribution from his IRA but that he did not use the proceeds to pay her credit card debt. We evaluated petitioner's and Mr. Porter's testimonies by observing their candor, sincerity, and demeanor. Mr. Porter was not credible. Petitioner was, and we accept her testimony.



However, even if we were to accept Mr. Porter's testimony that he used the proceeds of the IRA distribution to pay petitioner's credit card debt, he admitted that a portion of the credit card charges related to grocery shopping; i.e. normal support. Petitioner earned a very modest income during 2003 after being wrongfully discharged from her job. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that petitioner used her credit cards for necessary services and supplies in addition to groceries.



We conclude that petitioner did not receive a significant benefit beyond normal support from Mr. Porter's IRA distribution. This factor favors relief.



E. Petitioner Complied With All Income Tax Laws in Subsequent Tax Years



Petitioner has complied with income tax laws in all subsequent years. Furthermore, upon discovering that her husband had neglected to file the couple's joint Federal income tax return for 2002, she promptly filed her own return, choosing married-filing-separately status. This factor favors relief.




IV. Conclusion


Factors favoring relief are that petitioner and Mr. Porter are divorced, that she would suffer hardship if relief were not granted, that she did not receive a significant benefit beyond normal support from the IRA distribution, and that she diligently complied with income tax laws in subsequent years. That petitioner had reason to know of the distribution because it appears on the face of the return favors not granting relief.



Under an abuse of discretion standard, this Court has upheld the Commissioner's denial of relief under section 6015(f) where the taxpayer knew or had reason to know of the item giving rise to the deficiency or that the tax would not be paid. See, e.g., Magee v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-263; Simon v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-220; Sjodin v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-205, vacated 174 Fed. Appx. 359 (8th Cir. 2006); Demirjian v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-22. However, we are no longer restricted to determining whether the Commissioner's determination was an abuse of discretion. Under a de novo standard of review, we take into account all the facts and circumstances and determine whether it is inequitable to hold the requesting spouse liable for the unpaid tax or deficiency.



We recognize that petitioner had reason to know of the IRA distribution because she signed the return and did not inquire into its contents. However, this factor is tempered by the fact that petitioner regularly inquired into Mr. Porter's finances during the preceding year and he refused to answer or answered evasively.



The other factors discussed above which favor relief outweigh petitioner's reason to know of her husband's IRA distribution. Accordingly, petitioner has met her burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence that it would be inequitable to hold her liable for the section 72(t) additional tax on Mr. Porter's IRA distribution.



To reflect the foregoing,



Decision will be entered for petitioner.



Reviewed by the Court.



COLVIN, VASQUEZ, GALE, MARVEL, GOEKE, WHERRY, KROUPA, and PARIS, JJ., agree with this majority opinion.



GALE, J., concurring: I agree with the position taken in the majority opinion that de novo review is the appropriate standard of review in determining entitlement to relief under section 6015(f). 1 I write separately to highlight certain other factors that support that position.



First, the statute is unclear in prescribing a standard of review. While, as the majority acknowledges, the articulation in section 6015(f) that under certain conditions the Secretary "may" relieve an individual of liability is suggestive that review should be for abuse of discretion, the use of "may" in section 6015(f) is not dispositive. Internal Revenue Code sections providing that the Secretary "may" take an action have sometimes been interpreted as mandating review for abuse of discretion, see, e.g., sec. 482; Ballentine Motor Co. v. Commissioner, 321 F.2d 796, 800 (4th Cir. 1963), affg. 39 T.C. 348 (1962); Dolese v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 830, 838 (1984), affd. 811 F.2d 543, 546 (10th Cir. 1987); Foster v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 34, 142-143 (1983), affd. in part and vacated in part on another issue 756 F.2d 1430 (9th Cir. 1985); Ach v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 114, 125-126 (1964), affd. 358 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1966), and sometimes de novo review, see, e.g., sec. 269(a); 2 VGS Corp. v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 563, 595-598 (1977); Capri, Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 162, 178 (1975); D'Arcy-MacManus & Masius, Inc. v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 440, 449 (1975); Indus. Suppliers, Inc. v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 635, 645-646 (1968); Inductotherm Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1984-281, affd. without published opinion 770 F.2d 1071 (3d Cir. 1985).



Moreover, our grant of jurisdiction to review the Secretary's (or Commissioner's) decisions concerning equitable relief is contained not in section 6015(f) but in section 6015(e)(1)(A), which provides that the Tax Court shall have jurisdiction "to determine the appropriate relief available to the individual under this section". This broad phrasing 3 must be compared, as the majority notes, to another discrete grant of jurisdiction to the Court, a mere 2 years earlier, to review the Secretary's decisions not to abate interest. That grant, now codified in section 6404(h)(1), 4 is explicit with respect to the standard of review: "The Tax Court shall have jurisdiction * * * to determine whether the Secretary's failure to abate interest under this section was an abuse of discretion". When the general terms of section 6015(e)(1)(A) are compared with the specificity of the standard enunciated in section 6404(h)(1), Congress's intention regarding the review standard in the former becomes less clear. 5 To suggest that the "may" in section 6015(f) settles the matter in this context puts more freight on that word than it can carry. 6



Second, given the statute's lack of clarity regarding the standard of review, consideration of the legislative history is appropriate. The history of amendments to the joint and several liability relief provisions since the original enactment in 1971 evidences congressional dissatisfaction with the adequacy of relief afforded taxpayers. The 1971 version of "innocent spouse" relief provided relief only in the case of omitted income. See Act of Jan. 12, 1971, Pub. L. 91-679, sec. 1, 84 Stat. 2063. Amendments in 1984 extended relief in the case of erroneous deductions, though the deductions needed to be "grossly erroneous" and the deductions and/or the income omission had to have resulted in a "substantial" understatement of tax on the return. See Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-369, sec. 424(a), 98 Stat. 801. Finding the level of relief afforded by the statute still inadequate, Congress in the 1998 amendments removed the requirement that the deductions claimed be "grossly" erroneous or that the understatement of tax be "substantial" and added provisions allowing elections to allocate liability and establishing equitable relief. See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (RRA 1998), Pub. L. 105-206, sec. 3201(a), 112 Stat. 734.



The pattern of legislative changes designed to make innocent spouse relief more readily available also reflected congressional dissatisfaction with the administration of the statute by the Commissioner. This dissatisfaction reached the apex in 1998, when section 6015(f) was enacted as part of RRA 1998. In a February 11, 1998, Senate Finance Committee hearing on "Innocent Spouse Tax Rules" presaging that legislation, Chairman William V. Roth, Jr., diagnosed the problem with the "innocent spouse" rules as due in significant part to unsatisfactory administration by the IRS.



[T]he agency [IRS] is all too often electing to go after those who would be considered innocent spouses because they are easier to locate, as well as less inclined and able to fight.



Part of these problems reside with the IRS, part of them are the fault of Congress. Though the agency officially acknowledges the status of innocent spouses under current law and has the ability to clear such an individual from his or her tax liability, it rarely does. [IRS Restructuring (Innocent Spouse Tax Rules): Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. 142 (1998) (S. Hrg. 105-529, Fourth Hearing); emphasis added.]



At a February 24, 1998, hearing 7 before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Committee on Ways and Means concerning a Treasury Department Report on Innocent Spouse Relief, 8 Chairman Johnson stated:



As the Congress develops legislation to restructure and reform the Internal Revenue Service, we have learned of a number of disturbing cases in which taxpayers have been grossly mistreated by the IRS. Out of all the horror stories that have surfaced in recent months, none have been more heartbreaking than those involving innocent spouses --taxpayers who in many cases have been left to rear children as single parents, often without child support, only to find that their former spouses have saddled them with a crushing debt. Many of these horror stories have been going on for years without the IRS helping the spouses who are seeking relief from mounting tax liabilities, interest, and penalties. [U.S. Treasury Department Report on Innocent Spouse Relief: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1998).]



Testifying on behalf of the Treasury Department at the hearing, Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy Donald C. Lubick conceded a problem in the Internal Revenue Service's administration of the statute:



Mr. Lubick. I think you've put your finger on what I think is the most disturbing part of this whole problem [inadequacy of current arrangements for innocent spouse relief], which is that --and I think it's produced the most dramatic of the examples; that there have been some particular agents who are hard-nosed and unsympathetic * * *. [ Id. at 28.]



One of the solutions proposed in the Treasury Department report, as described in Assistant Secretary Lubick's testimony, was to "significantly expand taxpayers' procedural opportunities to claim substantive relief under the innocent spouse provisions, by making access to Tax Court routinely available". Id. at 19. Chairman Johnson endorsed the expansion of Tax Court jurisdiction as an important part of the solution to the unsatisfactory results that had been experienced under the statute.



I am particularly pleased to note that the innocent spouse legislative recommendations discussed in the [Treasury and General Accounting Office] reports are included in our House-passed * * * legislation * * *. To summarize, the bill expands the availability of innocent spouse relief by, No. 1, eliminating the various dollar thresholds; No. 2, broadening the definition of eligible tax understatements, and three, providing partial innocent spouse relief in certain situations, and No. 4, providing tax court jurisdiction over denials of innocent spouse relief. [ Id. at 7; emphasis added.]



Given the evidence of congressional dissatisfaction with the IRS's track record in administering the "innocent spouse" rules and of the congressional perception that one solution to the problem was expanded Tax Court jurisdiction, it appears unlikely that Congress intended that a significant portion of the Court's review of the IRS's disposition of innocent spouse claims be circumscribed under the deferential standard inherent in review for abuse of discretion. To conclude otherwise is to turn a tin ear to the strong critique of the Commissioner's record in administering "innocent spouse" relief evidenced in congressional hearings on the subject.



Third, another specific feature of section 6015 countervails the claim that abuse of discretion review was intended for section 6015(f) claims; namely, the provision in section 6015(e)(4) for intervention in a Tax Court proceeding by the spouse not seeking relief. As originally enacted, section 6015(e)(4) provided as follows:



(4) Notice to other spouse. --The Tax Court shall establish rules which provide the individual filing a joint return but not making the election under subsection (b) or (c) with adequate notice and an opportunity to become a party to a proceeding under either such subsection. [RRA 1998 sec. 3201(a).]



Congress therefore contemplated that in Tax Court proceedings for review of section 6015 claims --or, more specifically, claims under subsection (b) or (c) --there would be interventions by nonrequesting spouses resulting in new evidence or argument in the Tax Court proceeding that was not available to the Commissioner as part of the administrative determination.



The 2006 amendments by the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, div. C, sec. 408, 120 Stat. 3061, to clarify the Tax Court's jurisdiction over section 6015(f) cases did not merely modify section 6015(e)(1)(A), as discussed in the majority and dissenting opinions. The 2006 amendments also modified section 6015(e)(4) to read as follows:



(4) Notice to other spouse. --The Tax Court shall establish rules which provide the individual filing a joint return but not making the election under subsection (b) or (c) or the request for equitable relief under subsection (f) with adequate notice and an opportunity to become a party to a proceeding under either such subsection. [Emphasis added.]



Thus, in connection with clarifying the Tax Court's jurisdiction over section 6015(f) cases not involving a deficiency, Congress simultaneously added spousal intervention rights for such cases as part of the 2006 amendments. 9 The conclusion is inescapable that Congress considered intervention rights to be an important component of this Court's review of section 6015 cases, including those under section 6015(f). Intervention rights entail the distinct likelihood that new evidence will surface in the Tax Court proceeding. Yet to review the Commissioner's administrative determination for abuse of discretion on the basis of evidence not available to him would be, at best, anomalous. The Supreme Court has instructed that, in applying an abuse of discretion standard of review, "the focal point for judicial review should be the administrative record already in existence, not some new record made initially in the reviewing court." Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973). By expressly providing for intervenors in section 6015(f) review cases in the Tax Court, Congress contemplated a "new record made initially in the reviewing court" in those cases. Application of an abuse of discretion standard of review is not appropriate in such circumstances.



In addition to the intervenor issue, we must bear in mind problems with the administrative record, our inability to remand, and the fact that a stand-alone nondeficiency petition can bring a section 6015(f) case before us even where there has been no administrative decision. 10



This case is appealable, absent stipulation to the contrary, to the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Under the rule laid down in Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742, 757 (1970), affd. 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971), we abide by that court's precedent. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit disapproves of the odd pairing of a de novo scope of review with an abuse of discretion standard of review. See Sheppard & Enoch Pratt Hosp., Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 32 F.3d 120, 125 (4th Cir. 1994) ("Thus, although it may be appropriate for a court conducting a de novo review of a plan administrator's action to consider evidence that was not taken into account by the administrator, the contrary approach should be followed when conducting a review under either an arbitrary and capricious standard or under the abuse of discretion standard."). 11 That is reason enough to reject that mismatched standard and scope of review in this case.



Given the statute's failure to specifically address the standard of review, Congress's expressed dissatisfaction with the Commissioner's history of administering the "innocent spouse" rules, and the anomalous results of the employment of an abuse of discretion standard of review in section 6015(f) cases, I believe the better interpretation of section 6015 is that it provides for a de novo standard of review in all section 6015 cases, whether under subsection (b), (c), or (f).



COLVIN, MARVEL, GOEKE, WHERRY, KROUPA, and PARIS, JJ., agree with this concurring opinion.



HALPERN and HOLMES, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part.




I. Concurrence


We concur in so much of the majority opinion as holds the appropriate standard of review to be de novo. We do so notwithstanding our dissent in the Court's prior report in this case, Porter v. Commissioner, 130 T.C. 115, 146-147 (2008), holding that the appropriate scope of review is de novo. That holding is now binding on us, and for that reason alone we concur that "it would be incongruous to hold that review is limited to determining whether an appeals officer 'abused his discretion,' but also to conclude that the appeals officer committed such an 'abuse' by failing to weigh information that was never even presented to him." Robinette v. Commissioner, 439 F.3d 455, 460 (8th Cir. 2006) (addressing the scope and standard of review appropriate to judicial review of an Appeals officer's decision under section 6330), revg. 123 T.C. 85 (2004).




II. Dissent


We dissent from the majority's conclusion that petitioner is entitled to equitable relief. In particular we fail to see how the majority can conclude that petitioner would suffer economic hardship if relief were not granted. First, the majority states that economic hardship is present if payment of the tax would prevent the taxpayer from paying her reasonable basic living expenses. Majority op. p. 14. Second, the majority holds that the hardship determination (and certain other determinations) are made with respect to the taxpayer's status "at the time of trial." Majority op. p. 14, note 7. Third, the majority fails to find (and the record contains no evidence of) petitioner's reasonable basic living expenses. Fourth, and most importantly, at the time of trial, petitioner was in bankruptcy, and she was not discharged until almost 7 weeks after the trial concluded, when we assume her solvency and the hardship (if any) resulting from her joint liability to pay $1,070 would be determinable. We fail to see how the majority could determine that payment of that liability would work a hardship before it knew the disposition of her petition in bankruptcy (of which, like her reasonable basic living expenses, the record contains no evidence).



WELLS, J., dissenting: I agree with and have joined Judge Gustafson's thorough and well-reasoned dissent. I respectfully write separately to address an issue that Judge Gustafson does not address in his dissent but is raised by concurring Judges and to point to additional reasons for not abandoning the abuse of discretion standard of review in section 6015(f) cases.



Judges Halpern and Holmes indicate that it would be incongruous to apply the abuse of discretion standard of review on the basis of trial evidence that the "Appeals officer" had never seen. 1 They apparently believe that the Commissioner's exercise of discretion is complete and final before trial. However, in section 6015(f) cases and in other cases where the abuse of discretion standard of review is applied after a trial de novo, I believe that the exercise of discretion that is under review is the Commissioner's position after all of the evidence is in. The final exercise of discretion by the Commissioner typically is a posttrial brief containing the Commissioner's reasons and arguments. Indeed, our experience is that the Commissioner often will grant partial or full relief after considering all of the evidence adduced at trial. When, however, the Commissioner finally argues that relief should be denied after all of the trial evidence is considered, it is that position (i.e., the Commissioner's exercise of discretion at that point) that we review for abuse of discretion.



Additionally, I am concerned that today the Court, on the pretext that a 2006 amendment to section 6015(e) provides an occasion to reconsider our prior rulings, 2 essentially overrules our longstanding precedent that this Court reviews the Commissioner's denial of section 6015(f) relief for abuse of discretion. That precedent originated with our Opinion in Butler v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 276 (2000), and was subsequently reaffirmed in three Court-reviewed Opinions, the latest of which was rendered in this very case less than a year ago. Porter v. Commissioner, 130 T.C. 115 (2008) (Porter I); Ewing v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. 32 (2004), vacated 439 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2006); Cheshire v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 183 (2000), affd. 282 F.3d 326 (5th Cir. 2002).



In overruling this precedent, the majority fails to recognize the opinions of six Courts of Appeals that have affirmed our practice of holding a trial de novo in section 6015(f) relief cases and then applying the abuse of discretion standard of review. Commissioner v. Neal, 557 F.3d 1262, (11th Cir. 2009), affg. T.C. Memo. 2005-201; Capehart v. Commissioner, 204 Fed. Appx. 618 (9th Cir. 2006), affg. T.C. Memo. 2004-268; Alt v. Commissioner, 101 Fed. Appx. 34 (6th Cir. 2004), affg. 119 T.C. 306 (2002); Doyle v. Commissioner, 94 Fed. Appx. 949 (3d Cir. 2004), affg. T.C. Memo. 2003-96; Mitchell v. Commissioner, 292 F.3d 800 (D.C. Cir. 2002), affg. T.C. Memo. 2000-332; Cheshire v. Commissioner, 282 F.3d 326 (5th Cir. 2002). The most recent of these opinions was issued on February 11, 2009, and affirmed what it described as:



the Tax Court's longstanding rule and practice * * * to hold trials de novo in situations where it makes determination and redeterminations, including § 6015(f) cases. To prevail in the trial de novo, the taxpayer petitioner must show that the Commissioner's denial of equitable relief was an abuse of discretion. [ Commissioner v. Neal, supra at 1268; citations omitted.]



These Courts of Appeals do not appear to have any disagreement with the abuse of discretion standard of review in a trial where evidence is taken de novo.



I also would like to address Judge Gale's argument in his concurring opinion that the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit would reject a "mismatched standard and scope of review" in section 6015(f) cases, pursuant to its opinion in Sheppard & Enoch Pratt Hosp., Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 32 F.3d 120 (4th Cir. 1994), and that we are bound to follow that outcome under the rule of Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742, 757 (1970), affd. 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971). I believe that Sheppard is not squarely in point and is distinguishable.



As noted by Judge Gale, Sheppard holds that where an abuse of discretion standard of review is applicable to a plan administrator's action under ERISA, 3 the scope of review is limited to the evidence that was taken into account by the plan administrator at the time it acted. Id. at 25. The Court of Appeals did not hold that it disapproves of any pairing of a de novo scope of review with an abuse of discretion standard of review (a holding that would run headlong into Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522, 532 (1979)), and it made no holding whatsoever about section 6015(f) cases under the Internal Revenue Code. Moreover, under section 6015(f) we are reviewing, pursuant to the statute, the exercise of discretion of a Government agency's administrator who, as mentioned above, appears as the respondent in every case before us, as opposed to a District Court in an ERISA case reviewing a private entity's exercise of discretion conferred in a plan document. 4 Consequently, I believe that the Golsen rule has no bearing on the case before us.



Our review of section 6015(f) cases differs from a District Court's review of a plan administrator's exercise of discretion in another material respect. Under our precedent in Friday v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 220, 222 (2005), we have no authority to remand section 6015(f) cases to the Commissioner, whereas in a case arising under ERISA like Sheppard, a district court has the authority to remand the case to the plan administrator. Sheppard & Enoch Pratt Hosp., Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., supra at 125. In response to the criticism that a limited record can hide an abuse of discretion that results from a plan administrator's failure to consider or admit into the record all of the relevant facts, the Court of Appeals specifies remand as the "proper course" to bring in additional evidence when the record is otherwise lacking: "'If the court [believes] the administrator lacked adequate evidence, the proper course [is] to remand to the trustees for a new determination ... not to bring additional evidence before the district court.'" Id. at 125 (quoting Berry v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 761 F.2d 1003, 1007 (4th Cir. 1985)).



In a section 6015(f) case, however, if this Court finds the factual underpinnings of the Commissioner's determination to be lacking, we have no authority, pursuant to Friday, to remand the case to the Commissioner to bring in additional evidence to allow us to review a sufficient record to test the Commissioner's exercise of discretion which, as mentioned above, continues throughout the case until all of the evidence is in. Accordingly, in a section 6015(f) case, a de novo scope of review, as we held in Porter I, is the only means by which we can supplement an insufficient record.



Finally, I would like to address the venerable principle of stare decisis. For the reasons cited by Judge Gustafson in his dissent and others discussed here, I think that the correct standard to use in reviewing section 6015(f) cases in this Court is abuse of discretion. Consequently, I do not think it is necessary to rely on stare decisis alone as the reason for continuing to review section 6015(f) cases for abuse of discretion. Nonetheless, stare decisis is additional support for not abandoning the abuse of discretion standard. The majority makes no mention of and gives no consideration to that principle or why it should not apply.



Stare decisis should apply in the instant case for reasons stated in the recent opinion of the Supreme Court in John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. ___, ___, 128 S. Ct. 750, 756-757 (2008)(citations and quotation marks omitted):



stare decisis in respect to statutory interpretation has special force, for Congress remains free to alter what we have done. * * *



* * * Justice Brandeis once observed that in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right. To overturn a decision settling one such matter simply because we might believe that decision is no longer right would inevitably reflect a willingness to reconsider others. And that willingness could itself threaten to substitute disruption, confusion, and uncertainty for necessary legal stability. * * *



In sum, the use of an abuse of discretion standard of review in a de novo trial is consistent with this Court's precedent, the opinions of the Courts of Appeals I have cited above, the Supreme Court's holding in Thor Power, and stare decisis.



For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.



COHEN, THORNTON, and GUSTAFSON, JJ., agree with this dissenting opinion.



GUSTAFSON, J., dissenting: I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion, which abandons the abuse-of-discretion standard for the Court's review of the IRS's denial of relief under section 6015(f) and adopts in its place a "de novo" standard of review. In so doing, the majority departs from the better reading of the statute and from very substantial precedent.




I. By Conferring Discretion on the Secretary, Section 6015(f) Calls for the Court To Review the Secretary's Actions for Abuse of That Discretion.


A. Section 6015(f) Confers Discretion On the Secretary.



Section 6015(f) provides that "the Secretary may relieve such individual of such liability". (Emphasis added.) Four features of section 6015 show that this language confers discretion on the Secretary: First, "The word 'may' customarily connotes discretion". 1 Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335, 346 (2005). Second, section 6015(f), rather than simply providing a rule, expressly names an official ("the Secretary") to apply its rule. Most provisions in the Internal Revenue Code simply state a rule and do not repeat in each instance the truism 2 that it will be the Commissioner who applies that rule on behalf of the Government. It is therefore a departure from the norm when a statutory provision does name an official to apply the rule --e.g., by stating that "the Secretary may" impose a given treatment, 3 or that "[t]he Secretary may waive" a certain provision, 4 or that a given treatment shall obtain when it is appropriate "in the opinion of the Secretary", 5 or that a determination of an issue will be made by some specified subordinate of the Secretary. 6 When a statute thus explicitly names the agency decision-maker, this is a further indication 7 that the matter is committed to his or her discretion. This ought to be considered a particularly strong indication where, as with section 6015(f), that feature of the statute contrasts with its neighboring provisions, i.e., subsections (b) and (c). 8 If we level these distinctions and find that all the forms of relief under section 6015 have the same standard of review, notwithstanding their different vocabulary, then we ignore the Congress's use of distinctive language in the various subsections.



Third, section 6015(e) contrasts the discretionary character of section 6015(f) (under which one is said to "request" relief) with the nondiscretionary character of subsections (b) and (c) (under which one is said to "elect" relief). 9 A benefit that may be "elected" is one's right; but a benefit that must be "requested" invokes the discretion of one who may or may not grant the benefit. 10



Fourth, the pertinent language in section 6015(f) is identical to discretionary language in a companion provision, section 66(c) (which grants analogous relief for liability from tax on community income). The same 1998 amendment that created section 6015(f) also added an "equitable relief" provision as the last sentence of section 66(c) (emphasis added):



Under procedures prescribed by the Secretary, if, taking into account all the facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the individual liable for any unpaid tax or any deficiency (or any portion of either) attributable to any item for which relief is not available under the preceding sentence, the Secretary may relieve such individual of such liability.



The language emphasized above is identical to language added by the same amendment to section 6015(f). 11 When reviewing IRS action under this provision in section 66(c), we have reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Bernal v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. 102, 107 (2003); Morris v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-17; Beck v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-198. If this language in section 66(c) granted discretion to the IRS, then the identical language in section 6015(f), enacted at the same time, must have done the same.



B. When a Statute Confers Discretion on an Agency, a Court Reviewing Agency Action Must Defer to That Discretion and Review It Only for Abuse.



The majority acknowledges that section 6015(f) confers discretion on the Secretary, 12 but it then denies that we review the IRS's action for abuse of that discretion, insisting rather that we review "de novo", without enhanced deference to the agency's decision-making. This conception denudes that "discretion" of any effect and contradicts the essence of discretion being granted to an agency. If a Code provision that grants no discretion yields de novo review of an agency's determination, and a Code provision that does grant discretion yields the same de novo review, then the discretion is illusory. The majority's approach effectively relegates the agency's discretion to being relevant only to the agency that exercises it and overlooks that discretion when the agency's action is being reviewed.



Contrary to that approach, it is when agency action is being judicially reviewed that a grant of discretion has its significance. Of course, this Court can properly employ an abuse-of-discretion standard to review IRS action only where the Code has conferred discretion on the IRS. By the same token, where discretion has in fact been conferred, the only proper review is for abuse of that discretion. 13 The majority pays lip service to the grant of discretion in section 6015(f) but then overlooks that discretion with its de novo review.




II. Abandoning the Abuse-of-Discretion Standard Contradicts Uniform Precedent.


The majority acknowledges, majority op. p. 7, that "[w]e have generally reviewed the Commissioner's denial of relief under section 6015(f) for abuse of discretion", majority op. p. 7-8, and it appropriately cites Butler v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 276 (2000), in which we held that this Court had jurisdiction over section 6015(f) and that the standard of review in a section 6015(f) case is for abuse of discretion. Butler so held (as the majority states, majority op. p. 8) "because of the discretionary language in section 6015(f)" (i.e., "the Secretary may relieve" (emphasis added)).



The abuse-of-discretion standard for reviewing denial of relief under section 6015(f) was employed again in Cheshire v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 183, 197-198 (2000), affd. 282 F.3d 326 (5th Cir. 2002), which the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, stating:



Section 6015(f) confers power upon the Secretary and his delegate, the Commissioner, to grant equitable relief where a taxpayer is not entitled to relief under § 6015(b) or (c), but "taking into account all the facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the individual liable for any unpaid tax or any deficiency (or any portion of either)." In this case, Appellant argues that the Commissioner improperly denied her equitable relief with respect to the retirement distributions and the interest income. This court reviews the Commissioner's decision to deny equitable relief for abuse of discretion. [282 F.3d at 338; emphasis added; fn. refs. omitted.]



Similarly, in Mitchell v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-332, affd. 292 F.3d 800 (D.C. Cir. 2002), we held, and the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed, that the Commissioner had not abused discretion in denying section 6015(f) relief. In affirming the use of the abuse-of-discretion standard, the Court of Appeals relied on the language of section 6015(f) and stated:



As the decision whether to grant this equitable relief is committed by its terms to the discretion of the Secretary, the Tax Court and this Court review such a decision for abuse of discretion. See Flores v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 49, 51 & n. 1 (2001); Butler, 114 T.C. at 291-92. We conclude that there was no such abuse, for the reasons given by the Tax Court in its decision * * *. [292 F.3d at 807; emphasis added.]



In Mitchell the Court of Appeals thus cites, inter alia, Flores v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 49, 51 & n.1 (2001), in which the Court of Federal Claims stated that it "has jurisdiction to review whether the Commissioner has abused his discretion under section 6015(f)". Again, in Neal v. Commissioner, 557 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 2009), affg. T.C. Memo. 2005-201, where "[b]oth parties agree[d] that the Tax Court appropriately used an abuse of discretion standard of review", the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed our holding that section 6015(f) calls for an abuse-of-discretion standard of review and a de novo scope of review. In unpublished opinions, the Courts of Appeals for the Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have also affirmed the Tax Court's use of the abuse-of-discretion standard for reviewing section 6015(f) cases. See Capehart v. Commissioner, 204 Fed. Appx. 618 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Mitchell v. Commissioner, 292 F.3d 800 (9th Cir. 2006), affg. T.C. Memo. 2000-332), affg. T.C. Memo. 2004-268; Doyle v. Commissioner, 94 Fed. Appx. 949 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Mitchell), affg. T.C. Memo. 2003-96; Alt v. Commissioner, 101 Fed. Appx. 34 (6th Cir. 2004), affg. 119 T.C. 306 (2002).



This Court's above-cited opinions in Butler, Cheshire, Mitchell, and Neal were decided before 2006 amendments to which the majority attaches importance and which are discussed below; but for the current point it is sufficient to observe that even after that amendment, this Court has consistently used the abuse of discretion standard. 14 See Stolkin v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-211; Alioto v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-185; Nihiser v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-135; Dunne v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-63; Gonce v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-328; Dowell v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-326; Golden v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-299, affd. 548 F.3d 487 (6th Cir. 2008); Billings v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-234; Beatty v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-167; Butner v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-136; Banderas v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-129; Ware v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-112; Farmer v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-74; Van Arsdalen v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-48.



Thus not only this Court but also the Courts of Appeals and the Court of Federal Claims have uniformly applied the abuse-of-discretion standard to review the Commissioner's exercise of the discretion granted to him by the terms of section 6015(f), and until today no court has held otherwise. Indeed, today's majority opinion is at odds with this Court's prior opinion issued less than a year ago in this very case, Porter v. Commissioner, 130 T.C. 115, 122-123 (2008) (Porter I), in which we defended the use of an abuse-of-discretion standard of review with a de novo record scope of review. The Court did state in a footnote that "we need not decide any issue relating to the standard of review", id. at 122, but the opinion concludes with these words, id. at 125:



The measure of deference provided by the abuse of discretion standard is a proper response to the fact that section 6015(f) authorizes the Secretary to provide procedures under which, on the basis of all the facts and circumstances, the Secretary may relieve a taxpayer from joint liability. That approach (de novo review, applying an abuse of discretion standard) properly implements the statutory provisions at issue here and has a long history in numerous other areas of Tax Court jurisprudence.



In making its about-face, the majority does not state today that this Court erred in its original holding in Butler v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 276 (2000), but says rather that in Butler "our adoption of an abuse of discretion standard was appropriate." Majority op. p. 9. 15 However, the majority has undertaken a "reconsideration" that was prompted by the 2006 amendments, to which we now turn.




III. The 2006 Amendment to Section 6015(e) Does Not Implicate the Abuse-of-Discretion Standard.


A. The Background to the 2006 Amendment



Before 2006, requests for section 6015(f) relief could arise in the Tax Court in various procedural contexts. Three of these --i.e.,



[1] as an affirmative defense in deficiency redetermination cases because of section 6213(a),



[2] as a remedy on review of collection due process determinations because of section 6330(d)(1)(A), and



[3] as relief in stand-alone petitions when the Commissioner has asserted a deficiency against a petitioner 16



--were not implicated in the jurisdiction controversy that arose in 2006. However, a fourth procedure is the so-called "nondeficiency stand-alone petition". Where a joint tax return reports a tax liability that the joint taxpayers have not fully paid, and the IRS has not asserted a deficiency, one of the spouses might request relief from that joint liability and, if the relief is denied, might file a petition under section 6015(e)(1). Such nondeficiency stand-alone petitions became a subject of controversy because of language in the first sentence of section 6015(e)(1): "In the case of an individual against whom a deficiency has been asserted". (Emphasis added.) This emphasized language had been added to section 6015(e)(1) in December 2000; and for any petitioner seeking section 6015(f) relief whose jurisdictional basis was section 6015(e), this 2000 amendment raised an obvious question whether the case could proceed in the absence of a deficiency's having been asserted.



As is noted above, it was in Butler that we held that we would use an abuse-of-discretion standard to review the IRS's denial of such relief. Butler itself was a deficiency suit brought pursuant to section 6213(a) by a claimant against whom a deficiency had been asserted, but its reasoning would apply to review of section 6015(f) relief however it arose. Butler was brought and decided before the 2000 amendment that provoked the particular controversy that produced the 2006 amendment on which the majority relies. In any event, cases like Butler --a deficiency suit under section 6213(a) brought by a petitioner who sought relief under section 6015(f) and against whom a deficiency had been asserted --were not implicated in this jurisdictional problem involving section 6015(e)(1).



On the basis of the language added to section 6015(e)(1) in 2000 ("against whom a deficiency has been asserted"), first the Ninth Circuit, in Commissioner v. Ewing, 439 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 2006), revg. 118 T.C. 494 (2002) and vacating 122 T.C. 32 (2004), and then the Eight Circuit, in Bartman v. Commissioner, 446 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 2006), revg. in part T.C. Memo. 2004-93, held that we lacked jurisdiction under section 6015(e)(1) where no deficiency had been asserted against the taxpayer. The Tax Court accepted this analysis in Billings v. Commissioner, 127 T.C. 7 (2006) ( Billings I), 17 and implied that Congress should "identif[y] this as a problem and fix[] it legislatively".



B. The Nature of the 2006 Amendment



Congress did identify and fix the problem. On June 15, 2006, Senators Feinstein and Kyl proposed an amendment that Senator Feinstein characterized as "only minor legislative modifications * * * [to] clarif[y] the statute's original intent" and to "provide a straightforward and uncontroversial solution to the unfair treatment of innocent spouses under current law" that resulted after "[r]ecent decisions of the Eighth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals" ( i.e., Ewing and Bartman). 152 Cong. Rec. S5962-5963 (daily ed. June 15, 2006). Senator Kyl similarly explained that he sought "to clarify the jurisdiction of the U.S. Tax Court in cases involving 'equitable relief' for innocent spouse claims." Id. at S5963. Congress adopted their proposal and amended section 6015(e)(1) to read as follows, by adding the language that is emphasized here: 18



SEC. 6015(e). Petition for Review by Tax Court. --



(1) In general. --In the case of an individual against whom a deficiency has been asserted and who elects to have subsection (b) or (c) apply , or in the case of an individual who requests equitable relief under subsection (f) --



(A) In general. --In addition to any other remedy provided by law, the individual may petition the Tax Court (and the Tax Court shall have jurisdiction) to determine the appropriate relief available to the individual under this section * * *.



(It should be noted that, apart from the language emphasized, all the language quoted above was in the statute before 2006. In particular, the pre-2006 statute gave the Tax Court jurisdiction "to determine the appropriate relief" (emphasis added), and the 2006 amendments made no change to that terminology.)



C. The Inapplicability of the 2006 Amendment to This Case



The gist of the 2006 amendment was to add subsection (f) relief to the provision in section 6015(e) giving jurisdiction to the Tax Court. The amendment responded to court opinions holding that the Tax Court lacked jurisdiction over one category of section 6015(f) cases (nondeficiency stand-alone petitions). The express purpose of the 2006 amendment was to clarify Congress's intent that the Tax Court should have jurisdiction to review all types of section 6015(f) cases. To do this, the 2006 amendment simply added a phrase to the existing provision of section 6015(e). It had no effect on the other types of section 6015(f) cases. It made no change to the discretionary language in section 6015(f).



The language and history of the 2006 amendment show that the amendment had nothing to do with the abuse-of-discretion standard. There is no hint in the legislative history that Congress intended to modify the long line of cases that had previously applied the abuse-of-discretion standard. Thus, after the amendment, we explained its purpose and effect in Billings v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-234 ( Billings II), and stated: "We are mindful that our review of that decision [to deny section 6015(f) relief] is for abuse of discretion. See Butler v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 276, 287-92 (2000)." The 2006 amendment was simply a straightforward clarification of our jurisdiction.



In fact, the majority does not actually argue that the 2006 amendment made any change that drives their conclusion. Rather, the majority simply states that a "reconsideration" of our standard of review that is "warranted" because of "Congress's confirmation of our jurisdiction" in the 2006 amendments. Majority op. p. 9. The 2006 amendments thus appear to be not a justification but an occasion for the majority's decision, and the specific arguments in support of that decision do not actually turn on any statutory language that was changed in 2006. We now turn to those specific arguments.




IV. Abandonment of the Abuse-of-Discretion Standard of Review for Section 6015(f) Cases Is Not Warranted by Any Feature of the Statute.


A. The Word "Determine" in Section 6015(e)



The majority opinion places great importance on the fact that amended section 6015(e) provides the Tax Court with jurisdiction "to determine the appropriate relief available to the individual under this section" (emphasis added) --language that existed before the 2006 amendment and that had been considered in Butler and all the cases after it that applied the abuse-of-discretion standard. The majority now asserts:



The use of the word "determine" suggests that Congress intended us to use a de novo standard of review as well as scope of review. In other instances where the word "determine" or "redetermine" is used, as in sections 6213 and 6512(b), we apply a de novo scope of review and standard of review. See Porter v. Commissioner, 130 T.C. at 118-119. [Majority op. p. 10.]



The cited passage in Porter I does discuss the significance of the word "determine" --albeit for its implications on the scope of review. However, when Porter I came to address the standard of review, it correctly argued at some length, see 130 T.C. at 122-123, for the compatibility of a de novo trial and a review for abuse of discretion. And it could hardly have done otherwise. Anyone who would argue that an abuse-of-discretion standard of review cannot be employed after a de novo trial will promptly confront the Supreme Court's contrary holding in Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522, 533 (1979) (cited, of course, in Porter I), which approved precisely that regime. See also Ewing v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. at 40-41.



In fact, the word "determine" cannot have the significance that the majority infers for the issue of standard of review. The preeminent appearance of a form of the term "determine" is in our principal jurisdictional statute, which authorizes us to give a "redetermination of the deficiency." Sec. 6213(a). In a deficiency suit, however, the standard of review may vary. See Rule 142. It may be that in most deficiency cases we do both conduct the trial de novo and decide the case "de novo", imposing on the taxpayer only a normal burden of proof by the preponderance of the evidence and entertaining only a normal presumption that the Commissioner's determination was correct. However, in some deficiency cases, we do review the Commissioner's determination for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, supra. On the other hand, in some deficiency cases, the burden of proof is on the Commissioner, who must, for example, prove fraud by "clear and convincing evidence." Rule 142(b). In our "redetermination" of a deficiency, we apply the burden of proof and the standard of review called for by the law applicable to the given case.



That the word "determine" does not at all preclude abuse-of-discretion review is made explicit in a statute on which, for a different point, the majority opinion expressly relies: Section 6404(h) explicitly provides, "The Tax Court shall have jurisdiction * * * to determine whether the Secretary's failure to abate interest under this section was an abuse of discretion". (Emphasis added.) As it is used in the Internal Revenue Code, the word "determine" does not imply that an abuse-of-discretion standard of review should be abandoned in favor of "de novo" review.



B. The Comparison to Section 6404



The point that the majority derives from section 6404(h) is that, when Congress wants to impose an abuse-of-discretion standard, it knows how to do so. The majority observes, majority op. pp. 10-11, that when Congress granted jurisdiction for review of the IRS's denial of interest abatement (suggested by the majority as analogous to Congress's confirming jurisdiction in section 6015(e)(1)), 19 it made explicit that we are to determine whether there "was an abuse of discretion". Sec. 6404(h)(1). Clearly, section 6404(h)(1) is the high-water mark of congressional clarity on this issue of standard of review. However, there is a substantial body of case law calling for abuse-of-discretion review in instances where the statute does not include the phrase "abuse of discretion". 20 Manifestly, when Congress wants to impose an abuse-of-discretion standard, it has more than one way to do so. One way it may do so is to refer (as in section 6404(h)(1)) to "abuse of discretion"; but another is to provide (as in section 6015(f)) that "the Secretary may relieve such individual of such liability." (Emphasis added.)



C. The Absence of the Possibility of Remand



The majority states that "[a]n abuse of discretion standard of review is also at odds with our decision to decline to remand section 6015(f) cases for reconsideration. Friday v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 220, 222 (2005)." Majority op. p. 12. Tax jurisprudence would be simpler, and preferable to some, if each tax case called for either abuse-of-discretion review of an agency-level record with a possibility of remand to the agency, or else de novo decision based on a new trial record with no option of agency remand. This neat paradigm is compromised when our system calls for a decision to be based on an agency record but for the court to review the matter de novo, 21 or when our system calls for a decision to be based on a trial de novo but for the court to review for an abuse of discretion 22 --but that is what our system sometimes calls for. If the system would be improved by allowing the Tax Court to remand section 6015(f) cases to the IRS, then Congress will have to enact a "statutory provision[] reserv[ing] jurisdiction to the Commissioner". Friday v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 220, 221 (2005) (denying remand of section 6015 cases).



D. The Comparison to Section 6015(b) and (c)



The majority opines that, since our jurisdiction to decide section 6015(f) cases has now been settled by the 2006 amendments, "there is no longer any reason to apply a different standard of review under subsection (f) than under subsections (b) and (c)". Majority op. p. 13. In fact, as we have already shown, the relief provided in subsection (f) is materially different from the relief provided in subsections (b) and (c) --both in the language of those subsections (see supra note 8) and in the characterization of those forms of relief in section 6015(e) and its amendments made in 2006 (see supra note 9). The Court currently recognizes in Lantz v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. ___, ___ (2009) (slip op. at 23), that Congress "intended that taxpayers have two kinds of remedies" --"traditional" and "equitable". If indeed Congress intended subsection (f) to provide a distinct regime, with an equitable remedy to be "requested" rather than "elected", it is perfectly consistent with that intention that it also intended us to review agency action for an abuse of discretion.



Under section 6015(f), "the Secretary may relieve" from joint liability; but when the Secretary denies such relief, and we review that decision under section 6015(e)(1)(A), we should review for an abuse of discretion. I would so hold.



COHEN, WELLS, FOLEY, THORNTON, and MORRISON, JJ., agree with this dissenting opinion.


1 Unless otherwise indicated, section references are to the Internal Revenue Code, as amended. Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. Amounts are rounded to the nearest dollar.

2 A judgment of absolute divorce was entered on May 16, 2006.

3 A final decree in petitioner's bankruptcy case was issued on May 8, 2007, lifting the automatic stay imposed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. sec. 362(a)(8). Trial was held on Mar. 27, 2007, before the automatic stay was lifted. Respondent was not aware and the Court was not otherwise notified of petitioner's bankruptcy petition. The parties subsequently filed a joint motion for relief from the automatic stay, nunc pro tunc, with the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland. The bankruptcy court granted the joint motion and ordered "that the automatic stay be lifted in order that * * * [petitioner] may seek innocent spouse relief from the United States Tax Court, nunc pro tunc; and * * * that * * * [petitioner's] innocent spouse Tax Court proceedings and any orders and opinions issued therewith are not void as violating the automatic stay."

4 To prevail under this standard of review, the taxpayer has the burden of proving that the Commissioner's determination was arbitrary, capricious, or without sound basis in fact or law. Jonson v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 106, 113, 125 (2002), affd. 353 F.3d 1181 (10th Cir. 2003); Butler v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 276, 291-292 (2000).

5 In Porter v. Commissioner, 130 T.C. 115, 122 n.10 (2008), we expressly reserved any determination regarding the appropriate standard of review in sec. 6015(f) cases because our determination of the proper scope of review was not dependent on the standard of review.

6 Sec. 6015 replaced sec. 6013(e), which provided for a spouse to be relieved from joint and several liability under certain limited circumstances.

7 In analyzing such factors as the taxpayer's marital status, whether the taxpayer would suffer hardship, and whether the taxpayer has complied with income tax laws in subsequent years, our inquiry is directed to the taxpayer's status at the time of trial.

1 It is worth noting that, while 9 Judges have voted "yes" and 8 have voted "no" in this case, two of the "no" votes agree with the majority with respect to the standard of review. Thus, the number of Judges supporting the application of a de novo standard of review is 11 and the number opposing it is 6.

2 The standard of review applied with respect to the "may" language in sec. 269(a) is noteworthy in that the "may" language in the statute had previously been "shall". See Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-272, sec. 235(c)(2), 78 Stat. 126.

3 I emphasize here the entire quoted phrase from sec. 6015(e)(1)(A), not just the verb "determine", on which the majority places singular emphasis.

4 The grant of Tax Court jurisdiction was originally codified as sec. 6404(g)(1). Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2 (TBOR 2), Pub. L. 104-168, sec. 302(a), 110 Stat. 1457 (1996).

5 A similar contrast emerges in the legislative history of secs. 6320 and 6330 as compared to the legislative history of sec. 6015(e)(1)(A). These Code sections were all enacted as part of the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206, secs. 3401 and 3201, 112 Stat. 734, 746. The legislative history underlying secs. 6320 and 6330 specifies that courts are to apply an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing IRS collection determinations and a de novo standard in reviewing determinations of tax liability. H. Conf. Rept. 105-599, at 266 (1998), 1998-3 C.B. 755, 1020; see Giamelli v. Commissioner, 129 T.C. 107, 111 (2007). Thus, the legislative history of sec. 6330 makes clear that, to the extent specified therein, we must apply a deferential standard of review. See Goza v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 176, 181-182 (2000). In contrast, the legislative history underlying sec. 6015(e)(1)(A) does not specify the standard of review. See H. Conf. Rept. 105-599, supra at 250-251, 1998-3 C.B. at 1004-1005.

6 In describing the Secretary's authority to grant equitable relief, the legislative history puts no emphasis on administrative discretion:

The conferees do not intend to limit the use of the Secretary's authority to provide equitable relief to situations where tax is shown on a return but not paid. The conferees intend that such authority be used where, taking into account all the facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to hold an individual liable for all or part of any unpaid tax or deficiency arising from a joint return. * * * [H. Conf. Rept. 105-599, supra at 254, 1998-3 C.B. at 1008.]

7 The Oversight Subcommittee hearing was held after the House had passed its version of RRA 1998 (H.R. 2676, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997)) on Nov. 5, 1997. However, neither the Senate nor the conference version of H.R. 2676 had been considered or passed, and the essential form of sec. 6015(f) as finally enacted did not emerge until the conference version of the legislation.

8 The report had been mandated by Congress in 1996 legislation. See TBOR 2 sec. 401, 110 Stat. 1459.

9 Because of the more expansive retooling of sec. 6015(f) review procedures effected by the 2006 amendments of sec. 6015(e)(4), I agree with the majority's conclusion that the 2006 amendments are cause for the Court to reconsider the standard of review in sec. 6015(f) cases.

The Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit recently upheld this Court's position in Ewing v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. 32 (2004), vacated on other grounds 439 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2006), and Porter v. Commissioner, 130 T.C. 115 (2008), that the scope of review in a sec. 6015(f) review proceeding should not be limited to the administrative record. Commissioner v. Neal, 557 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2009), affg. T.C. Memo. 2005-201. The standard of review was not in issue in Neal, as the parties had agreed that the standard was abuse of discretion.

10 In fact, we have recently applied a de novo standard of review in a sec. 6015(f) case. See Wiener v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-230 ("Because we cannot ascertain what analysis was made by the Appeals officer in reaching his or her determination that petitioner is not entitled to relief under section 6015(f), we cannot review the determination for abuse of discretion. [Fn. ref. omitted.] Instead, we shall examine the trial record de novo to decide whether respondent properly concluded that petitioner is not entitled to relief.").

11 In the sec. 6015(f) context, we have recognized the conceptual difficulty of conducting a trial de novo while at the same time deferring to an administrative determination. See Nihiser v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-135 ("Although rarely employed by district courts in reviewing administrative agency action, a trial de novo typically consists of independent fact-finding and legal analysis unmarked by deference to the original factfinder."); see also Black's Law Dictionary 1544 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "trial de novo" as "A new trial on the entire case * * * conducted as if there had been no trial in the first instance.").

1 Unlike sec. 6330, sec. 6015 does not require a "hearing" before an "Appeals officer" or that a "determination" against the taxpayer be made before filing a petition requesting relief under sec. 6015(f). As noted by Judge Gustafson in his dissent, it is the Secretary, through his delegate the Commissioner, who is vested with the discretion under sec. 6015(f), and it is the Commissioner who appears as the respondent in every case before the Tax Court.

2 As Judge Gustafson's dissent explains, the 2006 amendment had nothing to do with changing the standard of review in sec. 6015(f) cases.

3 ERISA is the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829, codified as amended not in the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C.) but in 29 U.S.C. secs. 1001-1461 (2006).

4 Under the Supreme Court's holding in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989), quoted in Sheppard & Enoch Pratt Hosp., Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 32 F.3d 120, 123 (4th Cir. 1994), the plan administrator's action is reviewed under a de novo standard of review unless the plan document vests the administrator with discretion, in which case, the action is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.

1 The majority so acknowledges. Majority op. p. 8 ("Section 6015(f) provides that the Commissioner 'may' grant relief under certain circumstances, suggesting a grant of relief is discretionary"). See also Kirkendall v. Dept. of the Army, 479 F.3d 830, 870 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Lantz v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. ___, ___ (2009) (slip op. at 26) ("section 6015(f), uses the discretionary term 'may'").

2 See sec. 7801(a)(1) ("the administration and enforcement of this title shall be performed by or under the supervision of the Secretary of the Treasury"); sec. 7803(a)(2) ("The Commissioner shall have such duties and powers as the Secretary may prescribe, including the power to * * * administer, manage, conduct, direct, and supervise the execution and application of the internal revenue laws").

3 See sec. 482; Dolese v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 830, 838 (1984), affd. 811 F.2d 543, 546 (10th Cir. 1987).

4 See former sec. 6659(e); Krause v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. 132, 179 (1992), affd. sub nom. Hildebrand v. Commissioner, 28 F.3d 1024 (10th Cir. 1994).

5 See secs. 446(b), 471(a); Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522, 532 (1979); see also Hernandez-Cordero v. U.S. INS, 819 F.2d 558, 566 & nn.18-24, 570 (5th Cir. 1987) (Rubin, J., dissenting) (appendix listing 169 sections in the United States Code "placing discretion in the opinion of the President, the Attorney General, or a Cabinet Secretary" with the language "in the opinion of").

6 See sec. 6330(c)(3); Goza v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 176, 181-182 (2000).

7 Admittedly, the naming of the official who makes that decision is not, by itself, an infallible marker that discretion has been granted to that official. Rather, for example, section 269(a) provides that "the Secretary may disallow" losses acquired in tax-motivated transactions, but the case law under section 269 does not indicate a special grant of discretion. Cf. United States v. Jefferson Elec. Manufacturing Co., 291 U.S. 386, 397-398 (1934) (the phrase "to the satisfaction of the Secretary" does not "invest the Commissioner with absolute authority or discretion" (emphasis added) but "means that the additional element is not lightly to be inferred but to be established by proof which convinces in the sense of inducing belief"); R.E. Dietz Corp. v. United States, 66 AFTR 2d 5772, 5779, 90-2 USTC par. 50,447, at 85,439 (N.D.N.Y. 1990) (the phrase "'to the satisfaction of the Secretary' * * * may very well indicate that the instant action should have been stylized and litigated as one * * * challenging that determination as arbitrary or capricious or as an abuse of discretion"), affd. 939 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1991).

8 Section 6015(b)(1) provides that "the other individual shall be relieved of liability"; section 6015(b)(2) provides that "such individual shall be relieved of liability"; and section 6015(c) provides that "the individual's liability * * * shall not exceed" his or her allocable portion; but section 6015(f) departs from the pattern to provide that "the Secretary may relieve". (Emphasis added.) As is discussed infra part IV.D, we recognize the difference of these forms of relief in our opinion in Lantz v. Commissioner, supra at ___ (slip op. at 23).

9 To the existing provision of section 6015(e)(1) granting jurisdiction to the Tax Court "[i]n the case of an individual * * * who elects to have subsection (b) or (c) apply", the 2006 amendment (discussed in greater detail below) added "or in the case of an individual who requests equitable relief under subsection (f)". (Emphasis added.) In addition, where existing language in subsection (e)(1)(A)(i)(II) and (B)(i) referred to "elect[ing]" relief under subsections (b) and (c), equivalent amendments were made to add reference to "request[ing]" relief under subsection (f). The majority ignores the difference between "electing" and "requesting" when they state, "Nothing in amended section 6015(e) suggests that Congress intended us to review for abuse of discretion." Majority op. p. 10.

10 To "request" is "to ask * * * to do something" or "to ask * * * for something", whereas to "elect" is "to make a selection of" or "to choose". Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1986). This Court has similarly "defined the legal term 'election'" as the "choice of one of two rights or things". Boardwalk Natl. Bank v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 937, 945 (1960) (quoting Weis v. Commissioner, 30 B.T.A. 478, 488 (1934) ("The term 'election' in its legal sense means the choice of one of two rights or things, to each of which the party choosing has an equal right, but both of which he can not have, * * * as when a man is left to his own free will to take or do one thing or another, which he pleases, * * * a choice between different things, * * * the act of electing or choosing'")); see also Snow v. Alley, 30 N.E. 691, 692 (Mass. 1892) ("Election exists when a party has two alternative and inconsistent rights, and it is determined by a manifestation of a choice"); Black's Law Dictionary 557 (8th ed. 2004) (describing an "election" as "The exercise of choice; esp., the act of choosing from several possible rights or remedies").

11 See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206, sec. 3201(a), (b), 112 Stat. 734, 739. We observe in Lantz v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. at ___ (slip op. at 19-23), that section 6015(f) and the final sentence of section 66(c) are "companion statute[s]".

12 See majority op. p. 11 (under section 6015(f), "the decision whether to grant relief * * * was committed largely to agency discretion"); majority op. p. 8 (the word "may" in section 6015(f) "suggest[s that] a grant of relief is discretionary"). If those statements by the majority are equivocal (qualified as they are by "largely" and "suggest[s]"), then this Court has removed all doubt by lately holding that "a commonsense reading of section 6015 is that the Secretary has discretion to grant relief under section 6015(f)". Lantz v. Commissioner, supra at ___ (slip op. at 28).

13 See Estate of Roski v. Commissioner, 128 T.C. 113, 128 (2007) (noting the Commissioner's concession that "'a discretionary act * * * could only be subject to an abuse of discretion review'").

14 Cf. Wiener v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-230 ("Because we cannot ascertain what analysis was made by the Appeals officer in reaching his or her determination that petitioner is not entitled to relief under section 6015(f), we cannot review the determination for abuse of discretion. Instead, we shall examine the trial record de novo to decide whether respondent properly concluded that petitioner is not entitled to relief" (fn. ref. omitted)).

15 See Porter v. Commissioner, 130 T.C. 115, 143 (2008) (Goeke, J., concurring) ("it was logical for the Court in Butler * * * to find that the standard of review was abuse of discretion because of the discretionary language in section 6015(f)"). As we argue below, nothing material has changed since Butler was decided in 2000; and if the abuse-of-discretion standard was "logical" and "appropriate" then, it remains so today.

16 Billings v. Commissioner, 127 T.C. 7, 18 (2006) ( Billings I).

17 The Tax Court observed in Billings I, 127 T.C. at 17, that this analysis did not deprive the Tax Court of jurisdiction over all section 6015(f) cases, but only over those raised in so-called "nondeficiency stand-alone petitions". . It observed that "innocent spouse relief under all subsections of 6015" ( i.e., including section 6015(f) relief) remained available in deficiency cases under section 6213(a) and in collection due process cases under section 6330(d)(1)(A), as well as in "standalone petitions when the Commissioner has asserted a deficiency against a petitioner." Id. at 18.

18 The Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-432, div. C, sec. 408(a), 120 Stat. 3061. As is discussed supra p. 4 & note 9, these 2006 amendments also added, to the existing references in section 6015(e)(1)(A)(i)(II) and (B)(i) to a taxpayer's "elect[ing]" relief under subsections (b) and (c), new references to a taxpayer "request[ing]" subsection (f) relief. Id. sec. 408(b), 120 Stat. 3062.

19 In this regard, section 6404 is not, in fact, a particularly close analogue to section 6015(e) but is different in two significant respects: First, the 1996 amendment of section 6404 gave the Tax Court jurisdiction where before it had none; but the 2006 amendment of section 6015(e) clarified the Tax Court's jurisdiction as to only one form of section 6015(f) relief, leaving unaffected the Court's preexisting jurisdiction as to other forms. Second, the 1996 amendment of section 6404 created a new review regime; but the 2006 amendment of section 6015(e) presupposed the existence of a body of case law that had consistently recognized an abuse-of-discretion standard of review.

20 See supra notes 3-6.

21 "[T]he standard * * * of review to be employed by the District Court [under section 7428] in examining the determination of the Secretary [as to initial qualification for tax-exempt status] * * * is to be de novo. * * * Normally, the Court's decision will be based on the facts as represented in the administrative record." Inc. Trustees of the Gospel Worker Soc. v. United States, 510 F. Supp. 374, 377 n.6 (D.D.C. 1981), affd. without published opinion 672 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1981).

22 See Porter I, 130 T.C. at 122-123 ("Review for abuse of discretion does not * * * preclude us from conducting a de novo trial. Ewing v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. [32] at 40 [(2004)]" (citing, e.g., cases under secs. 446, 482, and 6404). Remand is not possible in a refund case, see D'Avanzo v. United States, 54 Fed. Cl. 183, 187 (2002), or in a deficiency case; and when these abuse-of-discretion issues arise (as they do) in refund and deficiency cases, remand is not an option.

Labels:

Thursday, April 23, 2009

OFFER IN COMPROMISE DEFAULT UNDER SECTION 7122 - The IRS's finding that an individual had defaulted on his offer in compromise (OIC) and its decision to impose a levy for his original tax liability was not an abuse of discretion. The terms of the OIC required the individual to timely pay all required taxes; therefore, his breach of that condition discharged the IRS's obligation to set aside the original tax liability. His belated payment satisfied the liability, but did not retroactively undo the breach. The IRS properly considered other collection alternatives, accounted for the individual's hardships and weighed whether the levy action was the least intrusive means of collection. Despite being given the opportunity to file a new OIC based on doubt as to collectibility or to pursue an installment plan so as to avoid levy, the individual insisted only on an OIC based on doubt as to liability. Because liability was not at issue, and with no alternative recourse available, the IRS properly proceeded with the levy.


Michael Poindexter, Petitioner-Appellant v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent-Appellee.

U.S. Court of Appeals, 10th Circuit; 08-9008, April 15, 2009.

Unpublished opinion affirming the Tax Court, 95 TCM 1378, Dec. 57,404(M), TC Memo. 2008-99.





Before: Lucero, Porfilio and Anderson, Circuit Judges.


ORDER AND JUDGMENT *


ANDERSON, Circuit Judge: Michael Poindexter settled his delinquent tax liability but later defaulted under the terms of his agreement. His default prompted the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to impose a levy for Mr. Poindexter's entire original tax liability. The Tax Court upheld the Commissioner's decision, and Mr. Poindexter appealed. We have jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a)(1) and now affirm.


I


Mr. Poindexter failed to pay his federal income taxes from 1990 to 1995. Although his total delinquency exceeded $280,000, the Commissioner accepted an offer-in-compromise (OIC) of $120,000. The OIC, accepted on November 21, 1997, required Mr. Poindexter to remain current on his taxes for the next five years or until the deficiency was satisfied. In 2000 and 2001, however, he again fell behind on his taxes. Consequently, the Commissioner notified him on October 22, 2003, that he had thirty days to pay the deficiency or be found in default of the OIC. The Commissioner warned that failure to timely pay the deficiency would result in reinstatement of the entire original tax liability, less payments received. One day after the deadline, Mr. Poindexter requested a six-month extension; the Commissioner answered with a finding of default.

On September 9, 2004, Mr. Poindexter received a "Final Notice - Notice of Intent to Levy and Notice of Your Right to a Hearing" concerning his tax liability from 1993 through 1995. Mr. Poindexter requested a collection due process (CDP) hearing under 26 U.S.C. § 6330, but before the hearing paid his 2000 and 2001 taxes. He therefore urged the Commissioner to reinstate the OIC or accept a new one based on doubt as to liability. The Commissioner refused and on July 14, 2005, issued a final notice of determination. The Commissioner concluded that Mr. Poindexter had defaulted under the OIC and that collection by levy of his unpaid tax liabilities from 1993, 1994, and 1995 was appropriate.

Mr. Poindexter subsequently petitioned the United States Tax Court for review, arguing, among other things, that the Commissioner's finding of default and collection by levy was an abuse of discretion. He claimed that he should have been granted an extension to cure the default and that his breach was immaterial. He also claimed the Commissioner should have accepted a new OIC based on doubt as to liability. The Tax Court rejected these arguments and upheld the Commissioner's decision. In this court, Mr. Poindexter reasserts his arguments that he should have been granted an extension, that there was no material breach, and that the Commissioner refused to consider a new OIC.


II


"We review the Tax Court's conclusions of law de novo and its factual findings for clear error." Lewis v. Comm'r, 523 F.3d 1272, 1274 (10th Cir. 2008). Because the validity of Mr. Poindexter's underlying tax liability was not at issue, the Tax Court reviewed the Commissioner's administrative determinations for an abuse of discretion. See Goza v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 176, 181-82 (2000). Thus, we, too, evaluate the Commissioner's decisions for an abuse of discretion.

Mr. Poindexter first claims he should have been granted a six-month extension to cure the default. He argues that the Internal Revenue Manual affords defaulting taxpayers six months to cure, but he never received that opportunity. This argument fails for at least four reasons. First, the Internal Revenue Manual does not have the force of law and it confers no rights upon taxpayers. See United States v. Lockyer, 448 F.2d 417, 421 (10th Cir. 1971); see also Wheeler v. Comm'r, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) 1194, at *3 n.9 (2006) (noting that the manual "was designed to aid in the internal administration of the Internal Revenue Service, not for the protection of taxpayers; thus, it is not binding upon and confers no rights to taxpayers"). Second, the manual does not require the Commissioner to grant defaulting taxpayers a six-month extension; it simply permits extensions under appropriate circumstances. 1 Third, Mr. Poindexter failed to timely request an extension within thirty days of the Commissioner's warning of default. And fourth, despite his untimely request for an extension of six months, Mr. Poindexter waited more than a year - until December 21, 2004 - to pay his deficiency. Under these circumstances, we perceive no abuse of discretion. Mr. Poindexter's insistence that the Commissioner failed to even consider granting an extension is belied by the record. See, e.g., Ex. 22-J at 2 ("Had the taxpayer paid [the taxes] within 6 months as was requested, I would have considered reinstating the OIC.").

Mr. Poindexter also asserts his breach of the OIC was immaterial because he paid his 2000 and 2001 taxes before the CDP hearing. He acknowledges that timely payment of these liabilities was an express condition of the agreement, but nevertheless contends that no harm was done. This is a meritless argument. The parties agree that timely payment of Mr. Poindexter's taxes was an express condition of the OIC. Consequently, his failure to timely perform discharged the Commissioner's obligation to set-aside the original tax liability. See Robinette v. Comm'r, 439 F.3d 455, 462 (8th Cir. 2006), rev'g 123 T.C. 85 (2004). The question of materiality is relevant only to the extent that timely performance was not an express condition of the agreement, id., which is simply not the case here. Mr. Poindexter's suggestion that we ought to disregard Robinette because his Tax Court petition predated Robinette is patently meritless, as is his contention that we ought to follow the Tax Court's decision reversed by Robinette. And, it is of no consequence that Mr. Poindexter later paid his taxes, because the breach occurred when the taxes were not timely paid. His belated payment did not retroactively undo the breach or render it harmless; it simply satisfied the liability.

Finally, Mr. Poindexter contends the Commissioner failed to consider collection alternatives before imposing the levy. Under the Internal Revenue Code, prior to approving a levy action, the Commissioner must consider proposed collection alternatives such as the substitution of other assets, an installment agreement, or an offer-in-compromise. 26 U.S.C. § 6330(c); see Cox v. Comm'r, 514 F.3d 1119, 1124 (10th Cir. 2008). The Commissioner must also consider "whether any proposed collection action balances the need for the efficient collection of taxes with the legitimate concern of the person that any collection action be no more intrusive than necessary." 26 U.S.C. § 6330(c)(3)(C); Cox, 514 F.3d at 1124. Mr. Poindexter asserts that despite these provisions, the Commissioner refused to consider his proposed OIC based on doubt as to liability "arising out of [the] purported default." Aplt. Br. at 14.

It is worth noting, however, that Mr. Poindexter never actually submitted a new OIC. Instead, his contention concerns the Commissioner's unwillingness to accept an OIC based on doubt as to liability, see 26 C.F.R. § 301.7122-1(b)(1), because liability was not at issue, see R., Doc. 22 at 23-24. Mr. Poindexter stresses that doubt as to liability remained a sound basis for a new OIC since he was contesting his liability flowing from the default. But "a challenge to the Commissioner's determination that a taxpayer was properly deemed in default on an OIC is not a dispute of the underlying tax liability." Ng v. Comm'r, 93 T.C.M. (CCH) 675, at *3 (2007). Hence, the Commissioner correctly recognized that an OIC based on doubt as to liability was unacceptable. To the extent Mr. Poindexter complains that the Commissioner improperly dissuaded him from submitting his OIC based on doubt as to liability, there was no abuse of discretion in discouraging a meritless proposal. See Robinette, 439 F.3d at 464.

In any event, the record amply demonstrates that the Commissioner properly considered other collection alternatives and weighed the propriety of the levy action. Indeed, notes from an appeals officer indicate that the Commissioner considered reinstating the OIC but declined because Mr. Poindexter failed to timely respond to the warning notice, failed to pay his delinquent taxes within the six months he requested, and failed to pay his taxes from 2002, 2003, and 2004. Further, the record indicates that the Commissioner encouraged Mr. Poindexter to file a new OIC based on doubt as to collectibility, see 26 C.F.R. § 301.7122-1(b)(2), due to his divorce, fluctuating income, and bankruptcy petition, but he refused. Similarly, the Commissioner encouraged Mr. Poindexter to pursue an installment plan so as to avoid levy, but Mr. Poindexter insisted only on an OIC based on doubt as to liability. With no remaining alternatives, the Commissioner was compelled to proceed with the levy. In short, we are satisfied that the Commissioner considered collection alternatives, accounted for Mr. Poindexter's hardships, and weighed whether the levy action was the least intrusive means of collection. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the Commissioner's finding of default and imposition of levy.

The judgment of the Tax Court is AFFIRMED.

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.

1 Mr. Poindexter relies on Internal Revenue Manual pt. 5.8.9.4(5) (2001), which provides in part:

If compliance [with an OIC] is not immediately secured, the offer will be evaluated in light of all information submitted by the service center and a decision will be made whether to terminate the offer or to consider temporary adjustment of its terms. If ... [t]he taxpayer can pay the potential defaulted amount in 6 months or less ... [t]hen ... [t]he revenue officer can grant an extension of time to pay for no longer than 6 months. Future deferred payments must be made on time.

Breach of agreement. --Compromises: Breach of agreement

Where the taxpayer failed to plead in the District Court the three-year statute of limitations on assessment as a defense to the Government's suit on an assessment to collect taxes, after the taxpayer had defaulted on payments to be made under a compromise agreement entered into after the three-year limitations period had passed, he could not raise for the first time on appeal the question of whether the compromise agreement was an effective waiver of the limitations period. A waiver of the statute of limitations found in the compromise agreement was fully effective against the taxpayer.

B. Feinberg, CA-3, 67-1 USTC ¶9176, 372 F2d 352.

Similarly, where the taxpayer failed to meet the monthly installment payments under an agreement for compromise of his tax liability. The doctrines of estoppel and modification of contract by subsequent conduct were not applicable merely because the Government did not bring action immediately after the breach of the first installment and before the taxpayer made any other payments.

S. Saladoff, CA-3, 65-2 USTC ¶9645.

On retrial, the trial court properly entered summary judgment for the Government for the amount of taxes proved to be due, where the taxpayer offered no counter proof, and also properly dismissed a separate injunction suit.

R.C. Lane, CA-5, 64-1 USTC ¶9273, 328 F2d 602.

Where the taxpayer failed to file sworn statements of annual income pursuant to the terms of a collateral income agreement which accompanied an agreement for compromise of his tax liability, the compromise agreement was breached and the Government was entitled to revive the original tax liability, subject to credit for previous payments made under the compromise agreement.

R.C. Lane, CA-5, 62-1 USTC ¶9467, 303 F2d 1.

The IRS was not liable for a breach of contract claim with respect to a settlement agreement because the individual bringing suit failed to show the existence of an enforceable contract to settle his outstanding tax liabilities. The IRS agent's written reply to the individual's offer did not constitute a valid offer or counteroffer that could be accepted by the individual to create a binding contract with the IRS. Moreover, the IRS agent was not authorized to enter into any such contract with the individual.

D.W. Jordan, FedCl, 2007-2 USTC ¶50,601.

The IRS properly terminated an offer in compromise (OIC) submitted by the president and majority shareholder of S corporations in connection with his delinquent taxes for five tax years and a trust fund recovery penalty imposed with respect to one of the entities. The taxpayer materially breached his obligation under the OIC when he incurred a delinquent tax liability for a subsequent tax year. As a result, the government was authorized, under the terms of the OIC, to declare the taxpayer in default of the agreement and to pursue collection activities against him. The substantial performance doctrine was irrelevant because the taxpayer failed to timely pay his taxes in order to offset his tax liability for that year with his losses from the following year.

M.J. Roberts, DC Mo., 2002-1 USTC ¶50,173, 225 FSupp2d 1138.

The mere fact that the IRS had cashed money orders tendered by a taxpayer was insufficient to support his claim that the government had breached a settlement agreement. A letter from his counsel indicating that an IRS agent had requested a payment in the amount of those money orders was insufficient to state a claim for breach of settlement agreement absent proof that the taxpayer had been notified in writing of the IRS's acceptance of his offer of compromise.

L.R. Ousley, DC Nev., 98-2 USTC ¶50,827.

A taxpayer who breached the payment terms of his compromise agreement was not entitled to notice of the amount due thereunder before the IRS collected the balance of his original liability. The agreement specifically stated that he would not be entitled to notice in this situation.

D.J. Fortenberry, DC Miss., 82-1 USTC ¶9191.

The government was awarded summary judgment in the suit brought by the taxpayer who protested that taxes he owed were collected after the running of the statute of limitations. The government and the taxpayer had entered into a compromise agreement as to the amount of taxes owed by the taxpayer. A provision of the agreement provided that the statute of limitations would be extended if the taxpayer missed a payment, and the court concluded that, since the taxpayer showed no detriment suffered, the provision was not void as against public policy.

A.J. Parenteau, DC N.J., 74-1 USTC ¶9270.

Although a later, independent decision changed the time for which interest would be payable on accumulated earnings tax deficiencies, the Attorney General had authority to settle three pending cases on the understanding that other suits not filed would be disposed of on the same basis. The compromise settlement could not be abrogated.

D.D.I. Inc., CtCls, 72-2 USTC ¶9703, 467 F2d 497. Cert. denied, 414 US 830.

Taxpayer was estopped from seeking recovery of a payment made in a compromise settlement of income tax assessments against it and some fourteen other parties which was assigned to the extinguishment or abatement of various tax assessments against the taxpayer as transferee. The taxpayer was barred by equitable estoppel from violating the compromise agreement since the agreement represented a so-called package deal, involving several taxpayers in addition to the taxpayer, and the Government, in reliance on the settlement, had permitted the statute to run against the claims against the other taxpayers involved in the settlement and could not recoup, through its right of set-off, against these taxpayers. There was no merit to the taxpayer's contention that all unabated assessments against it were paid in full and not compromised or settled because the Government, at the taxpayer's request, allocated the payment to all unabated transferee claims against the taxpayer.

Cooper Agency, DC S.C., 69-2 USTC ¶9560, 301 FSupp 871. Aff'd, per curiam, CA-4, 70-1 USTC ¶9321, 422 F2d 1331; DC S.C., 71-1 USTC ¶9490, 327 FSupp 948.

The taxpayer failed to fulfill his obligations under an agreement collateral to an executed offer in compromise --where the agreement called for additional consideration to be based on graduated percentages of annual income --by transferring income-producing property held at the time of the agreement without consideration. Contract rules under Tennessee law permit the implication of terms in a contract. Were the promise not to transfer income-producing property held at the time of the agreement not to be implied, the taxpayer could have effectively destroyed the value of the collateral agreement. However, the implied promise did not apply to income-producing property acquired after execution of the collateral agreement.

R.C. Hoskins, DC Tenn., 69-1 USTC ¶9407, 299 FSupp 1229. Aff'd, per curiam, CA-6, 70-1 USTC ¶9382, 425 F2d 1301.

An IRS Appeals officer did not abuse her discretion by sustaining the default of a married taxpayer's offer in compromise (OIC) and determining to proceed with collection. The taxpayer failed to comply with the terms of the OIC, which required him to timely pay all required taxes for five years following its acceptance. Further, the taxpayer failed to timely respond to an IRS letter notifying him that failure to pay the balances due within 30 days would result in a default of the OIC. Finally, the taxpayer did not propose any collection alternatives during his Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing.

M. Poindexter, 95 TCM 1378, Dec. 57,404(M), TC Memo. 2008-99.

The IRS Appeals office did not abuse its discretion by sustaining a levy against a married couple whose repeated violations of the terms of their offer-in-compromise (OIC) resulted in the offer's termination. The couple's failure to keep their tax obligations current during the compliance period was a significant and material breach of the OIC. Moreover, the IRS's failure to send copies of correspondence to the couple's representative did not provide a basis to reject the collection action because the notices were sent to the couple's last know address.

J.E. West, 95 TCM 1116, Dec. 57,333(M), TC Memo. 2008-30.

The IRS did not abuse its discretion in determining that an individual had defaulted on an offer in compromise (OIC) and proceeding with collection of his unpaid tax liability. The taxpayer materially breached the terms of the OIC by incurring a delinquent tax liability for a subsequent tax year. The taxpayer failed to comply with the express terms of the agreement by failing to pay his tax liability for well over a year after it was due, thereby depriving the government of a material financial benefit. The record did not indicate that requiring the taxpayer to strictly comply with the terms of the agreement would result in a disproportionate forfeiture or penalty. Therefore, because the condition that the taxpayer timely pay his taxes was a material part of the OIC agreement, it could not be excused.

W.K. Ng, 93 TCM 675, Dec. 56,809(M), TC Memo. 2007-8.

The IRS may not unilaterally default a joint offer in compromise in the case of a taxpayer-husband that breached his obligations under a separate, but related, offer in compromise on the basis of an oral agreement tying the two offers together. The regulations specifically require that offers in compromise be reduced to writing and thus cannot be altered by an oral agreement.

Field Service Advice Memorandum 200130043, June 25, 2001.

An Appeals officer did not abuse his discretion in cancelling an offer-in-compromise (OIC) agreement, reinstating a taxpayer's original tax bill and sustaining a levy, based on the taxpayer's breach of the OIC. The federal common law of contracts applied in determining whether a taxpayer breached his offer-in-compromise agreement. The OIC agreement required that the taxpayer timely file returns and pay tax for a period of five years. His failure to do so was a breach of an express condition of the agreement that required strict performance. Even without relying on principles of contract law, other federal courts have upheld the IRS's right to cancel an OIC when the taxpayer is in default because of the express language in the agreement. Finally, the IRS provided the taxpayer with several opportunities to become compliant and the only consideration for forgiveness of 95 percent of his tax debt was to timely file and pay his taxes for five years. Thus, the Appeal's officer's decision not to excuse the breach and reinstate the OIC was not an abuse of discretion.

D.W. Trout, Dec. 57,615, 131 TC --, No. 16.

Labels:

IRS Reminds Taxpayers of Tax Savings from Implementing Energy Conservation Measures and Creating New Energy Sources (IR-2009-44; FS-2009-10; Notice 2009-41; TDNR TG-99)
The IRS has released three pieces of guidance regarding energy credits that are available to both individuals and businesses.

IR-2009-44
The IRS has reminded taxpayers of new tax benefits, enacted as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Tax Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5), that are available to individuals and businesses that reduce energy use or to producers that create new energy sources. Taxpayers are encouraged to examine the new tax benefits and determine whether they qualify to claim the energy credit.

Tax credits for energy-efficient improvements or installing alternative energy equipment have been increased and are available to homeowners. Homeowners seeking to claim these credits may rely, temporarily, on existing manufacturer certifications or Energy Star labels in determining which products are qualified until updated certification guidelines are announced within the next several months.

In addition, under provisions relevant to energy producers, taxpayers who place in service facilities that produce electricity from wind or other renewable resources can choose either the energy investment tax credit, the renewable electricity production tax credit, or a grant from the Treasury Department.

FS-2009-10
The IRS has issued a fact sheet summarizing the provisions of the Act that provide new, extended, or increased incentives for taxpayers' efforts to increase energy efficiency. The most in-depth discussion focuses on the residential energy property credit under Code Sec. 25C(a)(2). The credit is available for improvements including the addition of insulation, energy-efficient exterior windows, and energy-efficient heating and air conditioning systems.

While a similar credit was available in 2007, some of the requirements for qualifying improvements have been made more stringent. Some property that qualified for the old credit will not qualify for the new one.

Other credits discussed in the fact sheet include the residential energy efficient property credit (Code Sec. 25D), the plug-in electric drive vehicle credit (Code Sec. 30D), the plug-in electric vehicle credit for smaller vehicles (Code Sec. 30), the credit for plug-in electric drive conversion kits (Code Sec. 30B(a)(5)), the alternative motor vehicle credit (Code Sec. 30B), the renewable energy production tax credit (Code Sec. 45), the energy investment credit (Code Sec. 48), and the credit for alternative fuel vehicle refueling property (Code Sec. 30C).

The fact sheet also notes the increases in the volume limits on new clean renewable energy bonds (Code Sec. 54C), and on qualified energy conservation tax credit bonds (Code Sec. 54D), and the opportunity for businesses to obtain renewable energy grants in place of the energy investment credit or the renewable energy production credit (Code Sec. 48(d)).

Notice 2009-41
The IRS has provided interim guidance relating to the credit provided for residential energy-efficient property under Code Sec. 25D placed in service for tax years beginning after December 31, 2008, and before January 1, 2017.

The P.L. 111-5 amended Code Sec. 25D to set the applicable amount of a taxpayer's credit for expenditures on qualified solar electric property, qualified solar water-heating property; qualified fuel cell property; qualified small wind energy property; and qualified geothermal heat pump property. The credit extends to labor costs for site preparation, assembly, original installation and piping or wiring to connect the property to the dwelling.

Manufacturers may certify to purchasers that the property meets the requirements necessary for claiming the credit under Code Sec. 25D. A certification statement may be packaged with the property, provided in a printable form on the manufacturer's website or in any other manner that permits the taxpayer to retain the certification statement for recordkeeping purposes. Certification statements must contain the name and address of the manufacturer, identification of the property as qualified property mentioned above, and appropriate identifiers of the property.

Additionally, a certification statement must contain a declaration, signed by an individual currently authorized to bind the manufacturer. The guidance identifies the information that must be provided in the certification statement. The manufacturer may provide optional information including descriptions of the property and energy savings capacity. Specifically, for geothermal heat pump property, the manufacturer can state that the property meets the requirements of the Energy Star program.



IR-2009-44
The IRS has reminded taxpayers of new tax benefits, enacted as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Tax Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5), that are available to individuals and businesses that reduce energy use or to producers that create new energy sources. Taxpayers are encouraged to examine the new tax benefits and determine whether they qualify to claim the energy credit.

Tax credits for energy-efficient improvements or installing alternative energy equipment have been increased and are available to homeowners. Homeowners seeking to claim these credits may rely, temporarily, on existing manufacturer certifications or Energy Star labels in determining which products are qualified until updated certification guidelines are announced within the next several months.

In addition, under provisions relevant to energy producers, taxpayers who place in service facilities that produce electricity from wind or other renewable resources can choose either the energy investment tax credit, the renewable electricity production tax credit, or a grant from the Treasury Department.

FS-2009-10
The IRS has issued a fact sheet summarizing the provisions of the Act that provide new, extended, or increased incentives for taxpayers' efforts to increase energy efficiency. The most in-depth discussion focuses on the residential energy property credit under Code Sec. 25C(a)(2). The credit is available for improvements including the addition of insulation, energy-efficient exterior windows, and energy-efficient heating and air conditioning systems.

While a similar credit was available in 2007, some of the requirements for qualifying improvements have been made more stringent. Some property that qualified for the old credit will not qualify for the new one.

Other credits discussed in the fact sheet include the residential energy efficient property credit (Code Sec. 25D), the plug-in electric drive vehicle credit (Code Sec. 30D), the plug-in electric vehicle credit for smaller vehicles (Code Sec. 30), the credit for plug-in electric drive conversion kits (Code Sec. 30B(a)(5)), the alternative motor vehicle credit (Code Sec. 30B), the renewable energy production tax credit (Code Sec. 45), the energy investment credit (Code Sec. 48), and the credit for alternative fuel vehicle refueling property (Code Sec. 30C).

The fact sheet also notes the increases in the volume limits on new clean renewable energy bonds (Code Sec. 54C), and on qualified energy conservation tax credit bonds (Code Sec. 54D), and the opportunity for businesses to obtain renewable energy grants in place of the energy investment credit or the renewable energy production credit (Code Sec. 48(d)).

Notice 2009-41
The IRS has provided interim guidance relating to the credit provided for residential energy-efficient property under Code Sec. 25D placed in service for tax years beginning after December 31, 2008, and before January 1, 2017.

The P.L. 111-5 amended Code Sec. 25D to set the applicable amount of a taxpayer's credit for expenditures on qualified solar electric property, qualified solar water-heating property; qualified fuel cell property; qualified small wind energy property; and qualified geothermal heat pump property. The credit extends to labor costs for site preparation, assembly, original installation and piping or wiring to connect the property to the dwelling.

Manufacturers may certify to purchasers that the property meets the requirements necessary for claiming the credit under Code Sec. 25D. A certification statement may be packaged with the property, provided in a printable form on the manufacturer's website or in any other manner that permits the taxpayer to retain the certification statement for recordkeeping purposes. Certification statements must contain the name and address of the manufacturer, identification of the property as qualified property mentioned above, and appropriate identifiers of the property.

Additionally, a certification statement must contain a declaration, signed by an individual currently authorized to bind the manufacturer. The guidance identifies the information that must be provided in the certification statement. The manufacturer may provide optional information including descriptions of the property and energy savings capacity. Specifically, for geothermal heat pump property, the manufacturer can state that the property meets the requirements of the Energy Star program.

IR-2009-44 April 23, 2009


Tax credits : Energy credit : Qualification for credit .


Energy-Saving Steps This Year May Result in Tax Savings Next Year




IR-2009-44, April 22, 2009

WASHINGTON --The Internal Revenue Service today reminded individual and business taxpayers that many energy-saving steps taken this year may result in bigger tax savings next year.

The recently enacted American Recovery and Reinvestment (ARRA) of 2009 contained a number of either new or expanded tax benefits on expenditures to reduce energy use or create new energy sources.

The IRS encouraged individuals and businesses to explore whether they are eligible for any of the new energy tax provisions. More information on the wide range of energy items is available on the special Recovery section of IRS.gov. For a larger listing of ARRA's energy-related tax benefits, see Fact Sheet 2009-10 .



Tax Credits for Home Energy Efficiency Improvements Increase

Homeowners can get bigger tax credits for making energy efficiency improvements or installing alternative energy equipment.

The IRS also announced homeowners seeking these tax credits can temporarily rely on existing manufacturer certifications or appropriate Energy Star labels for purchasing qualifying products until updated certification guidelines are announced later this spring.

"These new, expanded credits encourage homeowners to make improvements that will make their homes more energy efficient," said IRS Commissioner Doug Shulman. "People can improve their homes and save money over the long run."

ARRA provides for a uniform credit of 30 percent of the cost of qualifying improvements up to $1,500, such as adding insulation, energy-efficient exterior windows, and energy-efficient heating and air conditioning systems. The new law replaces the old law combination available in 2007 of a 10-percent credit for certain property and a credit equal to cost up to a specified amount for other property.

The new law also raised the limit on the amount that can be claimed for improvements placed in service during 2009 and 2010 to $1,500, instead of the $500 lifetime limit under the old law.

In addition, the new law has increased the energy efficiency standards for building insulation, exterior windows, doors, and skylights, certain central air conditioners, and natural gas, propane or oil water heaters placed in service after Feb. 17, 2009.

IRS guidance issued before the enactment of ARRA will be modified in the near future to reflect the new energy efficiency standards. In the meantime, homeowners may continue to rely on manufacturers' certifications that were provided under the old guidance and on Energy Star labels for exterior windows and skylights in determining whether property purchased before June 1, 2009, qualifies for the credit. Manufacturers should not continue to provide certifications for property that fails to meet the new standards.

The new law also eliminates the cap on the 30 percent tax credit for alternative energy equipment, such as solar water heaters, geothermal heat pumps and small wind turbines, installed in a home. The cap generally has been eliminated for these improvements beginning in the 2009 tax year. The IRS today issued Notice 2009-41 , which explains the effects of this change.



Funding Options for Renewable Energy Power Plants

Business taxpayers who place in service facilities that produce electricity from wind and some other renewable resources can choose one of three options to fund the project: a tax credit based on the amount invested, a tax credit based on the energy produced or a grant.

The flexibility to choose among these options was enacted as part of ARRA.

Taxpayers may opt to claim the energy investment tax credit, which generally provides a 30 percent tax credit for investments in energy projects, instead of the production tax credit, which can provide a credit of up to 2.1 cents per kilowatt-hour for electricity produced from renewable sources.

Taxpayers making qualified investments that are placed in service after 2008 and before 2014 (or 2013 for wind facilities) can make an irrevocable election to claim the energy investment tax credit instead of the renewable electricity production tax credit. IRS will issue guidance explaining how to make the election.

Taxpayers also can claim a grant once the property is placed in service instead of claiming either the energy investment tax credit or the renewable energy production tax credit. For qualified renewable energy facilities, the grant is 30 percent of the investment in the facility as long as construction begins in 2009 or 2010 and the property is placed in service before 2014 (2013 for wind facilities). The Treasury Department will issue guidance explaining how the grant works and how to apply.

Taxpayers electing to receive the grant, created by the ARRA, will not be eligible for either of the tax credits. Proceeds from the grants are not includible in the taxpayer's gross income, but the grant amount is subject to recapture if the property is disposed of or otherwise ceases to qualify.

For more information on the renewable electricity production tax credit under Section 45 see Notice 2008-60 and Notice 2008-48 , and for more information on the energy investment tax credit under Section 48 see Notice 2008-68 .


FS-2009-10 April 23, 2009


Credits : Residential energy property credit : Residential energy efficient property credit : Plug-in electric drive vehicle credit : Plug-in electric vehicle credit : Plug-in electric drive conversion kits : Alternative motor vehicle credit : New clean renewable energy bonds : Qualified energy conservation bonds : Renewable energy production tax credit : Investment credit : Renewable energy property credit : Renewable energy grants : Alternative fuel vehicle refueling property credit : Fact sheet .


Energy Provisions of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA)




FS-2009-10, April 2009

The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) provides energy incentives for both individuals and businesses.

Here are some of the key energy provisions in ARRA that may impact taxpayers:

Residential Energy Property Credit ( Section 1121 ): The new law increases the energy tax credit for homeowners who make energy efficient improvements to their existing homes. The new law increases the credit rate to 30 percent of the cost of all qualifying improvements and raises the maximum credit limit to $1,500 for improvements placed in service in 2009 and 2010.

The credit applies to improvements such as adding insulation, energy efficient exterior windows and energy-efficient heating and air conditioning systems.

A similar credit was available for 2007, but was not available in 2008. Homeowners should be aware that the standards in the new law are higher than the standards for the credit that was available in 2007 for products that qualify as "energy efficient" for purposes of this tax credit. The IRS will issue guidance that will allow manufacturers to certify that their products meet these new standards.

Until the guidance is released, homeowners generally may continue to rely on manufacturers' certifications that were provided under the old guidance. For exterior windows and skylights, homeowners may continue to rely on Energy Star labels in determining whether property purchased before June 1, 2009, qualifies for the credit. Manufacturers should not continue to provide certifications for property that fails to meet the new standards.

Residential Energy Efficient Property Credit ( Section 1122 ): This nonrefundable energy tax credit will help individual taxpayers pay for qualified residential alternative energy equipment, such as solar hot water heaters, geothermal heat pumps and wind turbines. The new law removes some of the previously imposed maximum amounts and allows for a credit equal to 30 percent of the cost of qualified property. See Notice 09-41 .

Plug-in Electric Drive Vehicle Credit ( Section 1141 ): The new law modifies the credit for qualified plug-in electric drive vehicles purchased after Dec. 31, 2009. To qualify, vehicles must be newly purchased, have four or more wheels, have a gross vehicle weight rating of less than 14,000 pounds, and draw propulsion using a battery with at least four kilowatt hours that can be recharged from an external source of electricity. The minimum amount of the credit for qualified plug-in electric drive vehicles is $2,500 and the credit tops out at $7,500, depending on the battery capacity. The full amount of the credit will be reduced with respect to a manufacturer's vehicles after the manufacturer has sold at least 200,000 vehicles.

Plug-In Electric Vehicle Credit ( Section 1142 ): The new law also creates a special tax credit for certain low-speed electric vehicles (including those with two and three wheels). The amount of the credit is 10 percent of the cost of the vehicle, up to a maximum credit of $2,500 for purchases made after Feb. 17, 2009, and before Jan. 1, 2012. To qualify, a vehicle must be either a low speed vehicle propelled by an electric motor that draws electricity from a battery with a capacity of 4 kilowatt hours or more or be a two- or three-wheeled vehicle propelled by an electric motor that draws electricity from a battery with the capacity of 2.5 kilowatt hours. A taxpayer may not claim this credit if the plug-in electric drive vehicle credit is allowable.

Conversion Kits ( Section 1143 ): The new law also provided a tax credit for plug-in electric drive conversion kits. The credit is equal to 10 percent of the cost of converting a vehicle to a qualified plug-in electric drive motor vehicle and placed in service after Feb. 17, 2009. The maximum amount of the credit is $4,000. The credit does not apply to conversions made after Dec. 31, 2011. A taxpayer may claim this credit even if the taxpayer claimed a hybrid vehicle credit for the same vehicle in an earlier year.

Treatment of Alternative Motor Vehicle Credit as a Personal Credit Allowed Against AMT ( Section 1144 ): Starting in 2009, the new law allows the Alternative Motor Vehicle Credit, including the tax credit for purchasing hybrid vehicles, to be applied against the Alternative Minimum Tax. Prior to the new law, the Alternative Motor Vehicle Credit could not be used to offset the AMT. This means the credit could not be taken if a taxpayer owed AMT or was reduced for some taxpayers who did not owe AMT.

New Clean Renewable Energy Bonds ( Section 1111 ): The new law increases the amount of funds available to issue new clean renewable energy bonds from the one-time national limit of $800 million to $2.4 billion. These qualified tax credit bonds can be issued to finance certain types of facilities that generate electricity from renewable sources (for example, wind and solar).

Qualified Energy Conservation Bonds ( Section 1112 ): The new law increases the amount of funds available to issue qualified energy conservation bonds from the one-time national limit of $800 million to $3.2 billion. These qualified tax credit bonds can be issued to finance governmental programs to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and other conservation purposes.

Extension of Renewable Energy Production Tax Credit ( Section 1101 ): The new law generally extends the "eligibility dates" of a tax credit for facilities producing electricity from wind, closed-loop biomass, open-loop biomass, geothermal energy, municipal solid waste, qualified hydropower and marine and hydrokinetic renewable energy. The new law extends the "placed in service date" for wind facilities to Dec. 31, 2012. For the other facilities, the placed-in-service date was extended from December 31, 2010 (December 31, 2011 in the case of marine and hydrokinetic renewable energy facilities) to Dec. 31, 2013.

Election of Investment Credit in Lieu of Production Credit ( Section 1102 ): Businesses who place in service facilities that produce electricity from wind and some other renewable resources after Dec 31, 2008 can choose either the energy investment tax credit, which generally provides a 30 percent tax credit for investments in energy projects or the production tax credit, which can provide a credit of up to 2.1 cents per kilowatt-hour for electricity produced from renewable sources. A business may not claim both credits for the same facility.

Repeal of Certain Limits on Business Credits for Renewable Energy Property ( Section 1103 ): The new law repeals the $4,000 limit on the 30 percent tax credit for small wind energy property and the limitation on property financed by subsidized energy financing. The repeal applies to property placed in service after Dec. 31, 2008.

Coordination With Renewable Energy Grants ( Section 1104 ): Business taxpayers also can apply for a grant instead of claiming either the energy investment tax credit or the renewable energy production tax credit for property placed in service in 2009 or 2010. In some cases, if construction begins in 2009 or 2010, the grant can be claimed for energy investment credit property placed in service through 2016, and for qualified renewable energy facilities, the grant is 30 percent of the investment in the facility and the property must be placed in service before 2014 (2013 for wind facilities).

Temporary Increase in Credit for Alternative Fuel Vehicle Refueling Property ( Section 1123 ): The new law modifies the credit rate and limit amounts for property placed in service in 2009 and 2010. Qualified property (other than property relating to hydrogen) is now eligible for a 50 percent credit, and the per-location limit increases to $50,000 for business property (increases to $2,000 for other/residential locations). Property relating to hydrogen keeps the 30 percent rate as before, but the per-business location limit rises to $200,000.

Notice 2009-41

April 23, 2009

Code Sec. 25D

Credits : Residential property : Alternative energy property .

Part III - Administrative, Procedural, and Miscellaneous

Credit for Residential Energy Efficient Property

Notice 2009-41



SECTION 1. PURPOSE

This notice sets forth interim guidance, pending the issuance of regulations, relating to the credit for residential energy efficient property under §25D of the Internal Revenue Code for taxable years beginning after December 31, 2008. Specifically, this notice provides procedures that manufacturers may follow to certify that property satisfies certain conditions of §25D , as well as guidance regarding the conditions under which taxpayers seeking to claim the §25D credit may rely on a manufacturer's certification. The Internal Revenue Service (Service) and the Treasury Department expect that the regulations will incorporate the rules set forth in this notice.



SECTION 2. BACKGROUND

.01 Section 25D provides a tax credit to individuals for residential energy efficient property. Section 1122 of Division B of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, amended section 25D for taxable years beginning after December 31, 2008. The amount of a taxpayer's section 25D credit for a taxable year beginning after December 31, 2008, is equal to the sum of the following:

(1) 30 percent of the qualified solar electric property expenditures made by the taxpayer during the taxable year;

(2) 30 percent of the qualified solar water heating property expenditures made by the taxpayer during the taxable year;

(3) The lesser of --

(i) 30 percent of the qualified fuel cell property expenditures made by the taxpayer during the taxable year; or

(ii) $500 for each half kilowatt of capacity of the qualified fuel cell property to which the expenditures relate;

(4) 30 percent of the qualified small wind energy property expenditures made by the taxpayer during the taxable year; and

(5) 30 percent of the qualified geothermal heat pump property expenditures made by the taxpayer during the taxable year.

.02 Section 25D(g) provides that the credit applies to residential energy efficient property placed in service before January 1, 2017.



SECTION 3. RESIDENTIAL ENERGY EFFICIENT PROPERTY

.01 Meaning of Terms .

(1) Qualified Expenditures . The expenditures for which the credit for residential energy efficient property is allowed (qualified expenditures) are defined as follows:

(a) Qualified solar electric property expenditures are expenditures for property which uses solar energy to generate electricity for use in a qualifying dwelling unit.

(b) Qualified solar water heating property expenditures are expenditures for property which heats water for use in a qualifying dwelling unit if at least half of the energy used by the property for such purpose is derived from the sun, and which is certified for performance by the non-profit Solar Rating Certification Corporation or a comparable entity endorsed by the government of the State in which such property is installed.

(c) Qualified fuel cell property expenditures are expenditures for a fuel cell power plant which has a nameplate capacity of at least 0.5 kilowatt of electricity using an electrochemical process, has an electricity-only generation efficiency greater than 30 percent, and is installed on or in connection with a qualifying dwelling unit.

(d) Qualified small wind energy property expenditures are expenditures for property which uses a wind turbine to generate electricity for use in connection with a qualifying dwelling unit.

(e) Qualified geothermal heat pump property expenditures are expenditures for equipment which uses the ground or ground water as a thermal energy source to heat the dwelling unit or as a thermal energy sink to cool the dwelling unit, meets the requirements of the Energy Star program which are in effect at the time that the expenditure for such equipment is actually made (even if under §25D(e)(8) the expenditure is deemed made at a later time for purposes of determining the taxable year for which a taxpayer may claim the credit), and is installed on or in connection with a qualifying dwelling unit.

(2) Qualifying Dwelling Unit .

(a) Except as provided in section 3.01(2)(b) of this notice, a qualifying dwelling unit is a dwelling unit that is located in the United States and is used as a residence by the taxpayer.

(b) For purposes of section 3.01(1)(c) of this notice (relating to qualified fuel cell property expenditures), a qualifying dwelling unit is a dwelling unit that is located in the United States and is used as a principal residence (within the meaning of section 121 ) by the taxpayer.

.02 Manufacturer's Certification

(1) In General . The manufacturer of property may certify to a taxpayer that the property meets certain requirements that must be satisfied to claim the credit under §25D by providing the taxpayer with a certification statement that satisfies the requirements of section 3.02(3) , (4) and (5) of this notice. The manufacturer may provide the certification statement by including a written copy of the statement with the packaging of the property, in printable form on the manufacturer's website, or in any other manner that will permit the taxpayer to retain the certification statement for tax recordkeeping purposes.

(2) Taxpayer Reliance . Except as provided in section 3.02(7) of this notice, a taxpayer may rely on a manufacturer's certification in determining whether property is eligible for the credit under §25D . A taxpayer is not required to attach the certification statement to the return on which the credit is claimed. However, §1.6001-1(a) of the Income Tax Regulations requires that taxpayers maintain such books and records as are sufficient to establish the entitlement to, and amount of, any credit claimed by the taxpayer. Accordingly, a taxpayer claiming a credit for residential energy efficient property should retain the certification statement as part of the taxpayer's records for purposes of §1.6001-1(a) .

(3) Content of Manufacturer's Certification; Required Information . A manufacturer's certification statement must contain the following:

(a) The name and address of the manufacturer.

(b) Identification of the property as a solar electric property, solar water heating property, fuel cell property, small wind energy property, or geothermal heat pump property.

(c) The make, model number, and any other appropriate identifiers of the property.

(4) Content of Manufacturer's Certification; Optional Information . A manufacturer's certification statement may contain any of the following statements that are applicable:

(a) A statement that the property is made by the manufacturer.

(b) In the case of a solar water heating property, a statement describing the circumstances in which at least half the energy used by the property to heat water for use in a dwelling unit is derived from the sun.

(c) In the case of a solar water heating property, a statement that the property is certified for performance by the non-profit Solar Rating Certification Corporation or a comparable entity endorsed by the government of the State in which such property is installed.

(d) In the case of a fuel cell property, a statement that the property is a fuel cell power plant that has a nameplate capacity of at least 0.5 kilowatt of electricity using an electrochemical process.

(e) In the case of a fuel cell property, a statement that the property is a fuel cell power plant that has an electricity-only generation efficiency greater than 30 percent.

(f) In the case of a fuel cell property, a statement specifying the capacity of the property in half kilowatts.

(g) In the case of a small wind energy property, a statement specifying the capacity of the wind turbine in half kilowatts.

(h) In the case of a geothermal heat pump property, a statement that the property meets the requirements of the Energy Star program that are in effect at the time that the expenditure for such equipment is actually made.

(5) Content of Manufacturer's Certification; Required Declaration . A manufacturer's certification statement must contain a declaration, signed by a person currently authorized to bind the manufacturer in these matters, in the following form:

"Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have examined this certification statement, and to the best of my knowledge and belief, the facts presented are true, correct, and complete."

(6) Manufacturer's Records . A manufacturer that certifies to a taxpayer that a property meets a requirement that must be satisfied to claim the credit under §25D must retain in its records documentation establishing that the property meets the requirement. The manufacturer must, upon request, make such documentation available for inspection by the Service.

(7) Effect of Erroneous Certification or Failure to Satisfy Documentation Requirements . The Service may, upon examination (and after any appropriate consultation with the Department of Energy or the Environmental Protection Agency), determine that a manufacturer's certification that property meets a requirement that must be satisfied to claim the credit under §25D is erroneous. In that event, or if the property's manufacturer fails to satisfy the requirements relating to documentation in section 3.02(6) of this notice, the manufacturer's right to provide a certification on which future purchasers of the property can rely will be withdrawn, and taxpayers purchasing the property after the date on which the Service publishes an announcement of the withdrawal may not rely on the manufacturer's certification. Taxpayers may continue to rely on the certification for properties purchased on or before the date on which the announcement of the withdrawal is published (including in cases in which the property is not installed or the credit is not claimed before the announcement of the withdrawal is published). Manufacturers are reminded that an erroneous certification may result in the imposition of penalties --

(a) Under §7206 for fraud and making false statements; and

(b) Under §6701 for aiding and abetting an understatement of tax liability (in the amount of $1,000 per return on which a credit is claimed in reliance on the certification).

(8) Availability of Certification Information . The Service encourages manufacturers to provide a listing of applicable certification information with respect to their products on their websites to assist taxpayers in determining whether their purchases qualify for the credit for residential energy efficient property.

.03 Additional Requirements . A taxpayer claiming a credit with respect to an expenditure is responsible for determining whether the expenditure appropriately relates to a qualifying dwelling unit (within the meaning of section 3.01(2) of this notice) and cannot rely on a manufacturer's certification for that purpose.

.04 Labor Costs . Section 25D allows the credit for expenditures for labor costs properly allocable to the onsite preparation, assembly, or original installation of residential energy efficient property described in section 3.01 of this notice and for piping or wiring to interconnect such property to the dwelling unit.



SECTION 4. SPECIAL RULES FOR JOINT OCCUPANCY

.01 If a dwelling unit is jointly occupied and used during any calendar year as a residence by two or more individuals, then the maximum amount of qualified fuel cell expenditures which may be taken into account for purposes of §25D(a) by all individuals with respect to the dwelling unit during the calendar year is $1,667 for each half kilowatt of capacity of the fuel cell power plant to which such expenditures relate.

.02 The amount of expenditures taken into account under section 4.01 of this notice by any individual for a taxable year is equal to the lesser of --

(1) The amount of expenditures made by the individual with respect to the dwelling during the calendar year, or

(2) The maximum amount of expenditures that may be taken into account by all individuals under section 4.01 of this notice multiplied by a fraction --

(a) The numerator of which is the amount of expenditures made by the individual with respect to the dwelling during the calendar year, and

(b) The denominator of which is the total expenditures made by all individuals with respect to the dwelling during the calendar year.



SECTION 5. PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT

The collection of information contained in this notice has been reviewed and approved by the Office of Management and Budget in accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. 3507) under control number 1545-2134.

An agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information unless the collection of information displays a valid OMB control number.

The collection of information in this notice is in section 3 . This information is required to be collected and retained in order to ensure that property meets the requirements for the residential energy efficient property credit under §25D . This information will be used to determine whether the property for which manufacturers provide certifications is property that qualifies for the credit. The collection of information is required to obtain a benefit from manufacturers' certification statements that property meets certain requirements that must be satisfied to qualify for the credit. The likely respondents are corporations, partnerships, and individuals.

The estimated total annual reporting burden is 350 hours.

The estimated annual burden per respondent varies from 2 hours to 3 hours, depending on individual circumstances, with an estimated average burden of 2.5 hours to complete the requests for certification required under this notice. The estimated number of respondents is 140.

The estimated annual frequency of responses is on occasion.

Books or records relating to a collection of information must be retained as long as their contents may become material in the administration of any internal revenue law. Generally, tax returns and tax return information are confidential, as required by 26 U.S.C. 6103.



SECTION 6. DRAFTING INFORMATION

The principal author of this notice is Martha S. McRee of the Office of Associate Chief Counsel (Passthroughs & Special Industries). For further information regarding this notice contact Martha S. McRee at (202) 622-3110 (not a toll-free call).

Treasury Department News Release, Treasury Celebrates Earth Day with 13 Energy Tax Credits, Bonds and a New Grant Program, TDNR TG-99

April 23, 2009


Treasury Department news release : Earth Day 2009 : Energy tax credits : Grants . --



April 22, 2009



TG-99


Treasury Celebrates Earth Day with 13 Energy Tax Credits, Bonds and a New Grant Program



Increased Tax Credits for Making Energy Efficiency Home Improvements


WASHINGTON - In confronting the most severe financial crisis in generations, the Obama Administration has focused simultaneously on helping Americans save money while investing in our nation's economic future. To that end and in celebration of Earth Day, the Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) are highlighting today 13 new or expanded energy incentives under the Administration's American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 that provide innovative ways for businesses and consumers to save money while greening America. Also today, Treasury and the IRS are providing a transition safe harbor for consumers and businesses, necessary because of the Recovery Act's increase in energy efficiency standards for home energy saving improvements.

Due to the Recovery Act, homeowners can now claim larger tax credits for installing alternative energy equipment, as the new law eliminates limits on the credits that can be claimed for solar water heaters, wind turbines, and geothermal heat pumps. The Act also provides for a credit of 30 percent of the cost of certain home energy-saving improvements, such as adding insulation, energy-efficient exterior windows, and energy-efficient heating and air conditioning systems. Homeowners can now claim up to $1,500 of these credits during 2009 and 2010, instead of the $500 lifetime limit under the old law.

"These new or expanded energy incentives do two critical things: they increase savings for Americans and they help protect the environment," said Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner. "From day one, this Administration has pursued every option to help ordinary Americans. The 13 energy incentives in the Recovery Act provide $12.7 billion in renewable energy and energy efficiency incentives. These incentives will lead to an increase in jobs at energy-specific businesses, investment in our long-term energy needs, and protect our environment. Those are results we should applaud on Earth Day and throughout the calendar year."

Importantly, through the safe harbor, homeowners can rely on existing manufacturer certifications or appropriate Energy Star labels when seeking to take advantage of the Recovery Act tax credit by purchasing qualifying products until June 1, 2009, and businesses can thus continue to move existing inventory off their shelves.

Andersen Windows of Bayport, Minnesota has now recalled nearly half - 250 of the 560 - workers it laid off in January - a move made possible in part by the tax credit for energy efficient home improvements. Andersen Windows also cites the first-time homebuyer credit as another factor, as this tax credit helps to get existing homes off the market so that builders can start building again.

The 13 energy incentives highlighted today focus on areas as diverse as electric car plug-ins and incentives for businesses to produce electricity from wind energy projects. For more information on these provisions click here or visit IRS.gov.

Credit for Installation of Alternative Fueling Stations: Administrative guidance

The IRS issued interim guidance in Notice 2007-43 with respect to the new qualified alternative fuel vehicle (QAFV) refueling property credit. The credit was added by the Energy Tax Incentives Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-58). The guidance is effective for the period that the credit is effective, that is for property placed in service as QAFV refueling property after December 31, 2005, and on or before December 31, 2009 (December 31, 2014, in the case of property relating to hydrogen). The guidance provides a set of definitions for terms used in Code Sec. 30C, as well as cross-references to existing regulations for defining concepts, such as placed in service. The guidance also provides rules for the computation of the credit and for the treatment of converted and dual-use property, as well as examples to illustrate the rules.
[Full Text --Notice 2007-43]




SECTION 1. PURPOSE

This notice sets forth interim guidance, pending the issuance of regulations, relating to the new qualified alternative fuel vehicle (QAFV) refueling property credit ("Refueling Property Credit") under §30C of the Internal Revenue Code. The Internal Revenue Service and the Treasury Department expect that the regulations will incorporate the rules set forth in this notice.



SECTION 2. BACKGROUND

Section 30C provides a credit for QAFV refueling property. Section 30C(c)(1) provides that QAFV refueling property has the same meaning as under §179A(d) (relating to the deduction allowed for qualified clean-fuel vehicle refueling property placed in service before January 1, 2006) but only with respect to the alternative fuels listed in §30C(c)(1). The credit is available for property that the taxpayer places in service as QAFV refueling property after December 31, 2005, and on or before December 31, 2009 (December 31, 2014, in the case of property relating to hydrogen).



SECTION 3. SCOPE

This notice provides guidance relating to the computation of the Refueling Property Credit and the treatment for purposes of the credit of converted and dual-use refueling property. This notice does not address: (1) the rule under §30C(d)(2) preventing the credit from being used to reduce alternative minimum tax liability; or (2) the rule under §30C(e)(5) requiring recapture of the credit under certain circumstances. The Internal Revenue Service and Treasury Department expect to issue separate guidance relating to these, and other, issues under §30C.



SECTION 4. DEFINITIONS AND CROSS REFERENCES TO APPLICABLE REGULATIONS

.01 Definitions. The following definitions apply for purposes of this notice:

(1) QAFV refueling property. QAFV refueling property is any property (other than a building or its structural components) that meets the following requirements:

(i) The property is not used predominantly outside the United States (or, in the case of property described in §168(g)(4)(G), is property used predominantly in a U.S. possession).

(ii) The property is of a character subject to the allowance for depreciation or is installed on property that is used as the taxpayer's principal residence (within the meaning of §121)).

(iii) The original use of the property begins with the taxpayer.

(iv) The property is used for --

(a) Storing alternative fuel at the point where the fuel is delivered into the fuel tank of a motor vehicle that is propelled by such fuel; or

(b) Dispensing alternative fuel at such point into the fuel tank of a motor vehicle that is propelled by such fuel.

(2) Dual-use property. Dual-use property is refueling property that is used --

(a) To store and/or dispense both alternative fuel and conventional fuel; or

(b) Both to store alternative fuel that is dispensed into the fuel tanks of motor vehicles at the location of the storage facility and to store alternative fuel that is transported to other locations.

(3) Alternative fuel. A fuel is an alternative fuel if --

(i) At least 85 percent of its volume consists of one or more of the following: ethanol, natural gas, compressed natural gas, liquefied natural gas, liquefied petroleum gas, or hydrogen; or

(ii) It is a qualifying biodiesel mixture.

(4) Qualifying biodiesel mixture. A fuel is a qualifying biodiesel mixture if it is a mixture of biodiesel (as defined in §40A(d)(1)) and diesel fuel (as defined in §4083(a)(3)) and the mixture contains at least 20 percent biodiesel. For this purpose, any kerosene in a mixture --

(i) Is disregarded in determining whether the mixture is a mixture of biodiesel and diesel fuel; and

(ii) Is taken into account in determining whether the mixture contains at least 20 percent biodiesel.

(5) Conventional fuel. Conventional fuel is any fuel that is not an alternative fuel. Conventional fuel includes diesel fuel that is not in a qualifying biodiesel mixture and gasoline.

(6) Conventional refueling property. Conventional refueling property is property that is used to dispense or store only conventional fuel.

(7) Fuel tank. The fuel tank of a motor vehicle that is propelled by alternative fuel includes only the tank that supplies fuel to the propulsion engine of the vehicle.

.02 Cross References to Applicable Regulations. The following provisions of the Income Tax Regulations (26 CFR Part 1) apply for purposes of this notice:

(1) Building and structural components. Whether property is a building or a structural component of a building is determined under the principles of §1.48-1(e).

(2) Original use. Whether the original use of property begins with the taxpayer is determined under the principles of §1.48-2.

(3) Placed in service. The year in which property is placed in service and whether the property is placed in service as QAFV refueling property are determined under the principles of §1.46-3(d).

(4) Subject to allowance for depreciation. Whether property is of a character subject to the allowance for depreciation is determined under the principles of §1.48-1(b).

(5) Use outside the United States. Whether property is used predominantly outside the United States is determined under the principles of §1.48-1(g).



SECTION 5. COMPUTATION OF CREDIT

.01 In General. The Refueling Property Credit is equal to 30 percent of the cost of any property that the taxpayer places in service as QAFV refueling property during the taxable year. The credit is limited to $30,000 per property for property of a character subject to the allowance for depreciation and $1,000 per property for other property. (A proposed technical correction would retroactively change this rule so that a single limitation of $30,000 or $1,000 (depending on whether the property is of a character subject to the allowance for depreciation) applies to all QAFV refueling property placed in service at a location during a taxable year.)

.02 Cost of QAFV Refueling Property. The cost of QAFV refueling property is determined under the principles of §1.46-3(a) and (c) and the following rules:

(1) The cost of QAFV refueling property includes all costs that are required under federal tax principles to be capitalized as a cost of the QAFV refueling property. These costs include the cost of acquiring or constructing the QAFV refueling property or of converting conventional refueling property into QAFV refueling property.

(2) The cost of QAFV refueling property does not include costs that are properly allocable to land or to a building and its structural components. Costs properly allocable to land include, but are not limited to, costs related to the acquisition of land on which the QAFV refueling property is located and expenses for permits, legal fees, project management, or engineering to the extent such expenses are related to the land.

(3) The cost of QAFV refueling property does not include any amount that is taken into account under §179 (relating to the election to expense certain depreciable business assets).



SECTION 6. CONVERTED AND DUAL-USE PROPERTY

.01 Converted Refueling Property.

(1) In general. The rules in this section 6.01 apply solely with respect to converted QAFV refueling property. For this purpose, converted QAFV refueling property is QAFV refueling property that was converted from property (including conventional refueling property) that is not QAFV refueling property (non-QAFV property).

(2) Reconditioned or rebuilt property. If converted QAFV refueling property is treated under the principles of §1.48-2 as reconditioned or rebuilt property, the cost of the QAFV refueling property includes the cost of reconditioning or rebuilding the non-QAFV property, but does not include the basis of the non-QAFV property.

(3) Use as QAFV refueling property treated as original use. If converted QAFV refueling property, including any parts that were non-QAFV property before the conversion, is treated under the principles of §1.48-2 as being put to original use when first used as QAFV refueling property, the cost of the QAFV refueling property includes both the adjusted basis of the non-QAFV property immediately before the conversion and the cost of the conversion.

.02 Dual-Use Property.

(1) In general. In the case of dual-use property that is used to store and/or dispense both alternative fuel and conventional fuel, the cost of the dual-use property is taken into account in computing the Refueling Property Credit only to the extent such cost exceeds the cost of equivalent conventional refueling property. For this purpose, equivalent conventional refueling property is conventional refueling property that is not used to store and/or dispense alternative fuel, but is otherwise comparable to the dual-use property and can store and/or dispense the same amount of conventional fuel as the dual-use property.

(2) Storage facilities. In the case of dual-use property that is used both to store alternative fuel that is dispensed into the fuel tanks of motor vehicles at the location of the storage facility and to store fuel that is transported to other locations, the cost of the dual-use property is taken into account in computing the Refueling Property Credit only to the extent such cost exceeds the cost of a storage facility that is equivalent to the dual-use property except that it is used for the sole purpose of storing alternative fuel that is transported to other locations and can store the same amount of alternative fuel as the dual-use property stores for transport to other locations.



SECTION 7. EXAMPLES

.01 Example 1. (i) X, a fuel wholesaler, acquires an additional storage tank to store alternative fuel at its principal place of business and a fuel tanker truck to transport the alternative fuel from its principal place of business to the retail service stations of X 's customers. The fuel tanker truck dispenses alternative fuel into storage tanks at the retail service stations but is not used to dispense the alternative fuel into the fuel tanks of motor vehicles that are propelled by the alternative fuel.

(ii) Neither the storage tank nor the fuel tanker truck is QAFV refueling property within the meaning of section 4.01(1) of this notice. The storage tank is used to store alternative fuel, but it does not store the fuel at the point where the fuel is delivered into the fuel tank of a motor vehicle that is propelled by alternative fuel within the meaning of section 4.01(7) of this notice. Similarly, the fuel tanker truck is used to dispense alternative fuel, but it does not dispense the fuel into the fuel tank of a motor vehicle that is propelled by alternative fuel.

.02 Example 2. (i) The facts are the same as in Example 1, except that X also acquires a pump that is used to dispense alternative fuel from the storage tank into the fuel tanks of X 's fuel tanker trucks. The storage tank has the same capacity as the tank that would have been used for the sole purpose of storing the alternative fuel that is supplied to X 's customers.

(ii) The pump is QAFV refueling property within the meaning of section 4.01(1) of this notice because it is used to dispense alternative fuel into the fuel tanks of X 's fuel tanker trucks. Accordingly, the cost of the pump is taken into account in determining X 's Refueling Property Credit.

(iii) The storage tank is also QAFV refueling property because it is used to store alternative fuel at the point where the fuel is delivered into the fuel tanks of the fuel tanker trucks. In addition, however, the storage tank is dual-use property described in section 6.02(2). Under section 6.02, the cost of the storage tank is taken into account in computing the Refueling Property Credit only to the extent that cost exceeds the cost of the storage tank that would have been used for the sole purpose of storing the alternative fuel that is supplied to X 's customers. Because no increase in the capacity of the storage tank is needed, none of the storage tank's cost is taken into account in computing the amount of the Refueling Property Credit.

.03 Example 3. (i) Y is a retail seller of gasoline. In Year 1, Y acquires and places in service conventional refueling property consisting of a gasoline storage tank. Y claims the allowable depreciation deduction with respect to the gasoline storage tank on its Federal income tax return for Year 1. In Year 2, Y incurs costs of $10,000 to convert the gasoline storage tank into an alternative fuel storage tank and begins using the converted property as QAFV refueling property.

(ii) If, under the principles of §1.48-2, the storage tank is treated as reconditioned or rebuilt property, only the $10,000 incurred to convert the gasoline tank into QAFV refueling property is taken into account for purposes of determining Y 's Refueling Property Credit for Year 2. If, on the other hand, the converted storage tank is treated, under the principles of §1.48-2, as being put to original use when first used as QAFV refueling property, the adjusted basis of the storage tank immediately before its conversion into QAFV refueling property also is taken into account for purposes of determining the credit.



SECTION 8. RECORDKEEPING

Section 6001 provides that every person liable for any tax imposed by the Code, or for the collection thereof, must keep such records, render such statements, make such returns, and comply with such rules and regulations as the Secretary may from time to time prescribe. The books and records required by §6001 must be kept at all times available for inspection by authorized internal revenue officers or employees, and must be retained so long as the contents thereof may become material in the administration of any internal revenue law. Section 1.6001-1(e) of the Procedure and Administration Regulations. In order to satisfy the recordkeeping requirements of §6001 and the regulations thereunder, a taxpayer that claims the Refueling Property Credit must retain adequate books and records so that, for any taxable year, it can be verified from those books and records that the fuel that is dispensed and/or stored meets the definition of alternative fuel contained in §30C(c)(1)(A) or (B) and section 4.01(2) of this notice, and that the refueling property otherwise meets the requirements of §30C and this notice.



SECTION 9. EFFECTIVE DATE

This notice is effective for QAFV refueling property placed in service after December 31, 2005, and on or before December 31, 2009 (December 31, 2014, in the case of property relating to hydrogen).



SECTION 10. DRAFTING INFORMATION

The principal author of this notice is Nicole R. Cimino of the Office of Associate Chief Counsel (Passthroughs and Special Industries). For further information regarding this notice, contact Ms. Cimino at (202) 622-3120 (not a toll-free call).

IRS Notice 2007-43, I.R.B. 2007-22.

Plug-in Electric Vehicle Credit: Synopsis - plug-in electric vehicle credit

A new credit against tax applies for qualified plug-in electric drive motor vehicles placed in service in 2009. The credit is equal to the applicable amount for each new qualified plug-in electric drive motor vehicle placed in service by the taxpayer during 2009 ( Code Sec. 30D(a), as added by the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 ( P.L. 110-343)). The applicable amount is the sum of $2,500, plus an additional $417 for each kilowatt hour of traction battery capacity in excess of four kilowatt hours ( Code Sec. 30D(a)(2), as added by P.L. 110-343). This credit was scheduled to terminate after 2014, however, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Tax Act of 2009 ( P.L. 111-5) overhauls the qualified plug-in electric drive motor vehicle credit, effective for vehicles placed in service after 2009, and makes the credit permanent ( Code Sec. 30D, as amended by P.L. 111-5). The credit for each new qualified plug-in electric drive motor vehicle placed in service by the taxpayer in the tax year after 2009 is equal to the sum of $2,500, and $417 for a vehicle drawing propulsion energy from a battery with at least 5 kilowatt hours of capacity plus $417 for each additional kilowatt hour of capacity in excess of 5 kilowatt hours, up to a maximum aggregate of $5,000 based on kilowatt hour capacity ( Code Sec. 30D(a) and (b), as amended by P.L. 111-5

Generally, the plug-in electric vehicle credit rules are very similar to the rules that apply to the Code Sec. 30B alternative motor vehicle credit. There are credit limits, a credit phaseout, specific requirements applicable to the vehicle, as well as special rules for basis reduction and to prevent a double tax benefit.

This new credit may be claimed by both business and individual taxpayers. The use of placed-in-service language may again cause some confusion for individual taxpayers. When the alternative motor vehicle credit was established, the issue arose as to what date the IRS would consider the placed-in-service date for individuals. Although no pronouncement was every made, the language used in other official announcements led practitioners to conclude that the date of purchase was the placed-in-service date for individuals. It seems that the same placed-in-service date would apply for the new credit.

Electricity Produced from Certain Renewable Resources: Wind energy

A safe harbor is established under which the IRS will respect the allocation of the Code Sec. 45 wind energy production tax credits by partnerships in accordance with Code Sec. 704(b). The IRS intends for the Safe Harbor to simplify the application of Code Sec. 45 to partners and partnerships that own and produce electricity from qualified wind energy facilities.

Rev. Proc. 2007-65, I.R.B. 2007-50, November 21, 2007, as revised by Announcement 2007-112, I.R.B. 2007-50, 1175, December 7, 2007.

Energy Credit: Energy Credit: Performance standards

If no quality and performance standards are in effect at the time of acquisition of business energy property, the property will not have to meet any such standards issued at a later date.

IR-2134, June 8, 1979, 79(10)
Qualifying Advanced Energy Project Credit: Synopsis - credit for qualifying advanced energy projects

A tax credit is allowed for investment in qualifying advanced energy projects. The credit is equal to 30 percent of a taxpayer's qualified investment for the tax year with respect to any qualifying advanced energy project ( Code Sec. 48C(a), added by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Tax Act of 2009 ( P.L. 111-5)).

The credit is part of the investment credit (see ¶4580.01 et seq.) and the basis of any property that is part of a qualifying advanced energy project is included in the credit base for purposes of applying the investment credit at-risk limitation rules under Code Sec. 49 (see ¶4751.01 et seq.) ( Code Secs. 46(5) and 49(a)(1)(C)(v), added by P.L. 111-5).

The credit is not allowed for any qualified investment for which any of the following credits are allowed: (1) the Code Sec. 48 energy credit (see ¶4671.01 et seq.),(2) the qualifying advanced coal project credit under Code Sec. 48A ( ¶4675.01 et seq.), or (3) the Code Sec. 48B qualifying gasification project credit (see ¶4680.01 et seq.) ( Code Sec. 48C(e), added by P.L. 111-5).

For purposes of the credit, a qualified investment for any tax year is the basis of any eligible property placed in service during that tax year that is part of a qualifying advanced energy project ( Code Sec. 48C(b), added by P.L. 111-5). A qualifying advanced energy project is a project that reequips, expands, or establishes a manufacturing facility for the production of certain types of advanced energy property ( Code Sec. 48C(c), added by P.L. 111-5). See ¶4695.021 for a discussion of a qualified investment and a qualifying advanced energy project.

The credit is available only for qualifying projects certified by the IRS under a qualifying advanced energy project program established in consultation with the Secretary of Energy ( Code Sec. 48C(d), as added by P.L. 111-5). See ¶4695.03 for a discussion of the certification procedure under the qualifying advanced energy project program.

The credit applies to periods after February 17, 2009, under rules similar to the transitional rules of Code Sec. 48(m) (as in effect on the day before October 30, 1990, the date of enactment of the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1990 ( P.L. 101-508)) (Act Sec. 1302(d) of P.L. 111-5). See ¶4695.06 for a further discussion of the effective date and transitional rules.
New CREBs: Taxpayers affected

New clean renewable energy bonds (New CREBs) can be issued by public power providers, cooperative electric companies, governmental bodies, clean renewable energy bond lenders, and not-for-profit electric utilities that have received a loan or loan guarantee under the Rural Electrification Act ( Code Sec. 54C(d)(6)).


Energy Conservation Bonds: Synopsis - credit for qualified energy conservation bonds

The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 ( P.L. 110-343) authorized the issuance of $800 million worth of a new type of tax credit bond called qualified energy conservation bonds. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Tax Act of 2009 ( P.L. 111-5) increased the $800-million limit by $2.4 billion to $3.2 billion ( Code Sec. 54D(d), as amended by P.L. 111-5). These tax credit bonds provide a federal subsidy to assist state and local governments in financing the expenses of a laundry list of energy conservation projects, including capital expenditures, research expenditures, expenses for mass commuting facilities, demonstration projects and public education campaigns.

In general, holders of tax credit bonds are entitled to an annual tax credit calculated by multiplying the outstanding face amount of the bonds held by the applicable credit rate, which is set by the IRS. The credit rate is set so that the bonds can be issued at face value with no interest. For qualified energy conservation bonds, however, the annual tax credit is limited to 70 percent of the face amount times the applicable credit rate ( Code Sec. 54D(b)).

The provisions of Code Sec. 54A, which provide mechanical rules for multiple types of tax credit bonds, apply to qualified energy conservation bonds ( Code Sec. 54A(d)(1) and (d)(2)(C)). See ¶4888.01 et seq.

For a discussion of the requirements for qualified bonds, see ¶4908.021. For a discussion of issuers, see ¶4908.03. Allocations of the bond volume cap are discussed at ¶4908.033. Qualified conservation purposes are discussed at ¶4908.035.

Labels:

Wednesday, April 22, 2009

IRS tax lien did not apply to real estate - section 6321
In re Kirk G. Johnson, Debtor. Kirk G. Johnson, Plaintiff v. The Internal Revenue Service of the Department of the Treasury of the United States of America and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Labor and Industry, Defendants.

U.S. Bankruptcy Court, West. Dist. Pa.; 05-35220 TPA, April 16, 2008, 386 BR 171.

[ Code Secs. 6321 and 6871]


A federal tax lien did not attach to a debtor's real property because higher priority liens exceeded the fair market value of the property. The IRS's argument that its lien attached to all of the debtor's real and personal property and that the debtor could not determine to which property the lien attached was rejected. Debtors possess the authority under the Bankruptcy Code to limit secured claims to the value of the collateral. Moreover, lien stripping is engrained in the reorganization process of a Chapter 11 case and to find that lien stripping is not permitted would ignore the existence of this right. Further, there is nothing in Code Sec. 6321 that would protect the IRS from lien stripping. Under the regulations, the "single lien" created by Code Sec. 6321 can be treated as separate liens on separate properties and discharged as to those properties that are valueless because they are subject to liens with a higher priority. Back references: ¶38,136.34 and ¶40,630.107.





MEMORANDUM OPINION


AGRESTI, Bankruptcy Judge: Kirk G. Johnson ("Debtor "), who operates a business proprietorship known as "KJ Transit," filed a voluntary Chapter 11 petition on October 10, 2005 . Among the secured creditors listed on Schedule D accompanying the Debtor's Petition are the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") and the Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry ("Labor") based on their statutory lien positions involving a federal tax lien and a lien for state unemployment compensation taxes, respectively.

The Debtor initiated this adversary proceeding on February 20, 2007 by filing a Complaint to Determine Validity, Priority, and Extent of Liens of the Internal Revenue Service and Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry Against the Debtor's Assets ("Complaint"), essentially alleging that two higher priority liens, one a purchase money mortgage and the other for county real estate tax, in combination, exceed the fair market value of the Debtor's residence such that there is no equity in the residence to which the IRS and Labor liens can attach. The Debtor seeks relief under 11 U.S.C. §506 to the effect that his residence is free and clear of the IRS and Labor liens. The IRS has filed an answer and the Parties have stipulated to all material factual issues, leaving the case ripe for decision as to the legal issue presented. 1 For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant the Debtor the relief he seeks. 2


FACTS


The following is gleaned from the Parties' stipulations of fact. The Debtor owns and resides at real property located at 4008 Turnwood Lane, Coraopolis, Pa. ( "the Real Property"). The Real Property possessed a fair market value of $279,000 as of the date the bankruptcy petition was filed. As of that same date, the Real Property was subject to a purchase money first mortgage lien in the amount of $279,440 held by Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("the MERS Mortgage") and a county real estate tax lien in the amount of $215.61 ("the County Lien"). The MERS Mortgage and the County Lien therefore collectively exceed the fair market value of the Real Property and both of them predate any lien held by the IRS.

The Debtor also owns various items of personal property with a total fair market value of $53,595.83 ("the Personal Property"). Other than the lien of the IRS, the only item of the Personal Property subject to a lien is a 2002 Lincoln Navigator. As of the Petition date, the fair market value of that vehicle was $18,675. At that time the vehicle was subject to a security interest in favor of M.& T. Credit Services, LLC in the amount of $12,221 ("the M&T Lien") superior to the lien of the IRS. Again, leaving aside for the moment the lien of the IRS, the Parties agree that because of the $6,454 of Debtor's equity in this vehicle, as of the Petition date, the Debtor's total equity in all of the Personal Property was $41,374.88.

On February 17, 2006, the IRS filed an Amended Proof of Claim asserting a secured claim in the amount of $178,673.05 against the Debtor and an unsecured priority claim of $2,374.71, for a total claim of $181,047.76. On March 31, 2006, Labor filed a proof of claim asserting a secured claim against the Debtor in the amount of $1,035.59. The Debtor's Amended Chapter 11 Plan was confirmed on May 3, 2007.


Relief Sought by the Debtor


The Debtor seeks a determination that the IRS lien does not attach to the Real Property because there is no equity in that property. The Debtor also asks the Court to find that the IRS possesses a secured claim of only $41,374.88 in the Personal Property (the value of the Personal Property less the amount of the M&T Lien) and that the balance of the IRS claim is unsecured. With respect to the latter request, the matter has been partially resolved. In its portion of the Combined Pre-trial Narrative Statement, the IRS states:
The Internal Revenue Service acknowledges that the amount of its lien exceeds the value of debtor's assets. Accordingly, the Service is willing to stipulate that its claim be allowed as follows: a secured claim of $ 41,374.83, an unsecured priority claim of $ 30,592.52, and a general unsecured claim of $109,079.00.

Combined Pre-Trial Narrative Statement at 3, Document No. 14. The Debtor has accepted this proposed stipulation. See Plaintiff's Brief on Whether a Federal Tax Lien can be Avoided Under Section 506 of the Bankruptcy Code in a Chapter 11 Proceeding at 1, n. 1, Document No. 18. Thus, by voluntary action of the IRS, the IRS lien, and therefore the amount of its secured claim, has been "stripped-down" to $41,374.83 and the Court need not consider that issue further. The remaining question therefore is whether the IRS lien encumbers both the Personal and Real Property, or only the Personal Property.


DISCUSSION


In the bankruptcy setting, the phrase "lien stripping" refers to the process of reducing a secured claim to reflect the value of the underlying collateral. Variants of this phrase are a "stripdown" wherein an undersecured creditor's lien is reduced to the equity value held by the Debtor in the collateral (after the amount of any superior lien is deducted from the fair market value of the collateral), and, a "strip- off" wherein a wholly-unsecured creditor's lien is removed from collateral in which there is no equity value.

In this case, the Debtor was originally seeking a combination of both forms of lienstripping relief. He asked that the IRS tax lien be stripped off the Real Property because there is no equity in that property, and, that the IRS tax lien be stripped down on the Personal Property to the level of available equity in that property, i.e., $41,374.88. As indicated, the IRS has conceded that its secured claim is reduced to $41,374.88 and therefore the latter request is no longer at issue.

The statutory basis for "stripping off" a lien arises from the combination of 11 U.S.C. §§ 506(a) and (d). 3 First, by operation of Section 506(a) an undersecured creditor's allowed claim is bifurcated into secured and unsecured portions. Then, with certain exceptions not applicable here, pursuant to Section 506(d) the lien securing the claim is voided to the extent that it is not an allowed secured claim, effectively stripping the lien "off" to that extent. Although the lien stripping process seems straightforward based on the statutory language, there are two issues that must be considered in making the determination whether the Debtor should be granted relief. First, does Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992), preclude the Court from granting the requested relief in this Chapter 11 case? Second, if that hurdle is cleared, is there some reason why an IRS tax lien should be treated any differently than other liens?


Lien Stripping in Ch. 11-Dewsnup


The Court must first consider whether the decision in Dewsnup, the foremost Supreme Court decision on lien stripping, dictates the outcome in this case. 4 In Dewsnup the Court held that a lien on real property could not be stripped-down in a Chapter 7 case. The Dewsnup Court construed the statutory language of Sections 506(a) and (d) in such a manner as to give effect to the pre-Bankruptcy Code rule in liquidation cases that liens pass through a bankruptcy unaffected. The Court did so because it was not convinced that Congress had intended to depart from that rule when it adopted the Bankruptcy Code. See 502 U.S. at 417. Importantly, however, the Dewsnup Court was careful to limit the holding of the case to the situation squarely before it, i.e., an attempt to strip a lien in a Chapter 7 liquidation case. The Court stated:
Hypothetical applications that come to mind and those advanced at oral argument illustrate the difficulty of interpreting the statute in a single opinion that would apply to all possible fact situations. We therefore focus upon the case before us and allow other facts to await their legal resolution on another day.

Id.

As a result of this limiting language, it is clear that the Dewsnup Court left open the question as to whether the same result would be reached in different circumstances, for instance, in a case under a different chapter of the Bankruptcy Code. Based on this "opening," courts and commentators have examined whether Dewsnup also establishes the rule on the availability of lien stripping in Chapter 11 and 13 cases. A great majority of the courts that have considered the issue in reorganization cases have concluded that the holding in Dewsnup should be limited to Chapter 7 cases and should not prevent lien stripping in reorganization cases. See 4-506 Collier on Bankruptcy, 15 th ed. Rev. ¶506.06[1][c] (2007); Sapos v. Provident Inst. of Savs. in the Town of Boston, 967 F.2d 918, 925 (3 d Cir. 1992) ( Dewsnup Court's interpretation of Section 506 in a Chapter 7 liquidation does not apply in a Chapter 13 reorganization); Wade v. Bradford, 38 F.3d 1126 (10 th Cir. 1994) (Chapter 11 debtors could strip down lien on residence notwithstanding Dewsnup); Harmon v. U.S. Through Farmers Home Admin., 101 F.3d 574 (8 th Cir. 1996) (allowing lien stripping in Chapter 12); In re Jones, 152 B.R. 155, 173 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1998) (categorically prohibiting lien stripping in Chapter 11 would disrupt established pre-Code law).

Many of the courts so limiting the Dewsnup holding have noted that a general prohibition against lien stripping in reorganization cases would be inconsistent with pre-Bankruptcy Code law, and would conflict with key provisions and principles applicable in the reorganization chapters of the Bankruptcy Code. This Court agrees with the majority view and concludes that the holding in Dewsnup does not extend to cases filed under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. 5

The Court reaches this conclusion for a number of reasons, all of them related to the significant differences between liquidations and reorganization proceedings. Quite simply, the possibility of lien stripping has been a long-standing aspect of reorganization cases, one that pre-dates the adoption of the current Bankruptcy Code in 1978. See Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 418-19 (recognizing that pre-Code law permitted involuntary reduction of the amount of the creditor's lien in reorganization proceedings, and citing as examples former 11 U.S.C. §§616(1) and (10) (1976 ed.)) Thus, the Dewsnup Court's stated reluctance to interpret the Bankruptcy Code in such a manner as to effect a major change in pre-Code practice by permitting lien stripping in liquidation cases (without clear evidence of Congressional intent for such a change) is not implicated in a reorganization setting because permitting lien stripping in a reorganization is consistent with pre-Code practice.

Furthermore, the process of lien stripping is ingrained in the reorganization provisions of the Bankruptcy Code to such an extent that any attempt to extend the holding in Dewsnup to Chapter 11 cases would require that numerous provisions of the statute be ignored or construed in a very convoluted manner to achieve that result. For instance, Congress has provided a mechanism under 11 U.S.C. §1111(b) for undersecured creditors to opt out of the claim bifurcation process that would otherwise occur under Section 506(a) and instead be treated as fully secured to the extent of their allowed claims. 6 The very fact that this Section 1111(b) election exists at all presumes that debtors possess the authority under the Bankruptcy Code to limit secured claims to the value of the collateral. To find that lien stripping is not permitted in Chapter 11would thus be to ignore the existence of Section 1111(b) . See In re 680 5 th Ave Assocs., 156 B.R. 726, 731 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993), decision affirmed 169 B.R. 22 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), judgment affirmed 29 F.3d 95 (2d Cir.1994).

Another example of Congress specifically recognizing and approving the existence of lien stripping in Chapter 11 cases surfaced when it passed the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394. Section 206 of that Act amended the Code by adding current 11 U.S.C. §1123(b)(5) which permits a Chapter 11 plan to "modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a claim secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence." This brought Chapter 11 into conformity with Chapter 13, which includes a similar provision to permit the modification of secured claims generally while preventing the modification of home mortgages. 7 Clearly, Section 1123(b)(5) represents an explicit Congressional approval of lien stripping in Chapter 11 cases, subject only to the home mortgage exception. What is most significant for present purposes is the timing of the enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 which included this provision when it was passed two years after Dewsnup was decided. To hold that Dewsnup prevents lien stripping in Chapter 11 cases would be to ignore this clear Congressional intent, something the Court cannot do.

It is also instructive to consider the particular feature of liquidations that seemed to cause the Court in Dewsnup to have concerns about whether lien stripping should be permitted in Chapter 7 cases. The Court noted that the "practical effect" of finding that lien stripping was allowed in Chapter 7 would be that a creditor's interest would be frozen at the judicially determined property valuation, leaving the creditor to lose the benefit of any increase in the value of the property that might occur between then and the time of a foreclosure sale. Instead, the debtor would enjoy the benefit of any such increase-a result some might view as a windfall. See 502 U.S. at 417. The Dewsnup case can thus be interpreted to stand for the proposition that there can be no lien stripping without payment of the debt secured by the lien, and upon failure to so provide, allowing the creditor to purchase the property by credit bid and enjoy any appreciation in value. See In re Dever, 164 B.R. 132, 135 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1994). By contrast, in reorganization cases any lien stripping is coupled with payments under the plan and ownership of the property being vested in the debtor. This has led courts and commentators to note that creditors in reorganization cases thus receive something in exchange for the voiding of their liens, i.e., payment obligations under a plan of reorganization, so that principle of Dewsnup is not violated. See In re Bowen, 174 B.R. 840, 855 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1994); Baxter Dunaway, Law of Distressed Real Estate §29.72 (2007).

To sum up, lien stripping is a fundamental aspect of reorganization proceedings. To bar lien stripping in cases under the reorganization chapters would:
... [I]n essence, gut the sum and substance of the reorganization and rehabilitation of debt concept under the Bankruptcy Code. In such cases, the Debtor would propose a plan for repayment of creditors to the extent of the value of the property securing the creditor's claim, but would still owe the unsecured portion of the claim, post-confirmation, in order to obtain a release of the lien on said property. This would require all plans filed under Chapters 11, 12 and 13 to pay all creditors one hundred percent of their claims in order for the debtor to emerge from bankruptcy with a true "fresh start." Clearly, this has never been the purpose contemplated for Section 506(d).

In re Butler, 139 B.R. 258, 259 (Bankr. E.D. Okl. 1992).

The Court therefore concludes that, in general, lien stripping is permitted in Chapter 11 cases, notwithstanding the decision in Dewsnup. That leads to a question of whether there is something special about an IRS tax lien that would prohibit lien stripping, creating an exception to this process in favor of the IRS. The Court now turns to that issue.


Lien Stripping and the Nature of the IRS Lien


Having concluded that Dewsnup does not preclude lien stripping in a Chapter 11 case, the Court must next consider whether the very nature of an IRS tax lien somehow precludes that from being done in these particular circumstances. In so doing, the Court will operate from the presumption that the IRS lien should be treated the same as any other lien unless there is some contrary statutory law or provision of decisional law requiring different treatment.

The lien of the IRS arises pursuant to a statute which provides:
If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same after demand, the amount (including any interest, additional amount, addition to tax, or assessable penalty, together with any costs that may accrue in addition thereto) shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such person.

26 U.S.C. §6321 . There is nothing apparent from this statutory language which would protect an IRS lien from lien stripping treatment. Furthermore, the Debtor has pointed to a number of cases in which courts have permitted IRS liens to be avoided. For instance, in In re Dever, supra, after a long and thoughtful discussion on various aspects of lien stripping, the court noted that Section 506 does not distinguish between voluntary and involuntary liens. It held that if a voluntary lien is avoidable by a strip down in Chapter 11, then so too should an involuntary one, like an IRS lien. 164 B.R. at 144. The Dever court further stated:
Nothing in Sections 506 or 1129 suggests that IRS liens or claims are totally immune from avoidance or modification. Under the Bankruptcy Code, the IRS is the beneficiary of several specific provisions that reflect Congressional desire to protect the federal fisc. For example, Congress required that all tax obligations must be paid under a Chapter 11 plan within six years of assessment date. Section 1129(a)(9)(C). Certain tax obligations are entitled to priority under Section 507(a)(7). Section 523(a)(1) makes some tax debts nondischargeable. Although none of the obligations here are alleged to be nondischargeable, most debtors facing IRS liens would not be able to walk out of bankruptcy court in complete defiance of their tax obligations. The granting of IRS priorities and the nondischargeable nature of many such obligations are strong evidence that Congress provided an alternative method of realizing on such claims. Reading an IRS exception into Section 506 to prevent avoidance of the liens here is unnecessary and inappropriate.

164 B.R. at 145. See also In re Bowen, supra; In re Butler, supra.

The IRS offers precious little in response to convince the Court otherwise. It argues that the nature of its lien is such that it attaches to all of the Debtor's property, real and personal, and that there "is nothing in the Bankruptcy Code, the Internal Revenue Code, or case law which permits the debtor to determine which of his property is subject to the lien, once the value of that lien has been determined." Defendant Internal Revenue Service's Response to Plaintiff's Brief on Whether a Federal Tax Lien can be Avoided Under 11 U.S.C. §506 in a Chapter 11 Proceeding at 2-3, Document No. 21.

The only case cited by the IRS in support of its position is In re Hoekstra [ 2000-2 USTC ¶50,857], 255 B.R. 285 (E.D. Va. 2000). In that case, the debtors brought an adversary proceeding seeking to avoid junior tax and homeowners' association liens against their townhouse because the two superior liens against the property already exceeded its value. The bankruptcy court had found in favor of the debtors, distinguishing the case from Dewsnup because in that case the property at issue did have some equity, whereas in Hoekstra there was no equity in the townhouse. The bankruptcy court concluded that Dewsnup prohibited only a "strip-down" of an undersecured claim, not a "strip off" of a wholly-unsecured claim. On appeal, the District Court reversed, agreeing with the IRS that Dewsnup governed the outcome of the case, but concluding that the "indivisible" nature of the IRS federal tax lien made what the bankruptcy court had done more analogous to a prohibited strip-down rather than a permitted strip-off . As the Hoekstra court explained:
The bankruptcy court... [ treated] Creditor's federal tax lien as distinct and individual liens as to each component of property underlying the lien. The [bankruptcy] court concluded that "for the purpose of lien avoidance, each item of collateral must be viewed individually... The avoidance of the lien as to that particular parcel does not affect or impair the lien of Creditor as to any other property to which it may have attached." In re Hoekstra [ 2000-1 USTC ¶50,490] 253 B.R. 193, 195. However, the Internal Revenue Code and case law make clear that a federal tax lien is not divisible in this context.

...

Debtors here seek to avoid a portion of a lien where a component of the collateral has no value but other components of collateral have value. The Dewsnup Court's clear prohibition against "stripping down" liens leads this Court to reverse the bankruptcy court's judgment voiding Creditor's lien against the Townhouse.

[ 2000-2 USTC ¶50,857] 255 B.R. at 290, 292.

For a number of reasons, this Court does not find Hoekstra to be particularly relevant or persuasive on the issue presented in the case before it. Perhaps most significantly, Hoekstra was decided in the context of a Chapter 7 liquidation proceeding. As such, the court in Hoekstra was faced with the clearly applicable precedent of Dewsnup and was required to analyze what the debtors were seeking to accomplish in light of that compelling precedent. In sharp contrast, the present case is a reorganization under Chapter 11 and as noted above, the majority view which is now also adopted by this Court, is that Dewsnup does not apply to lien stripping occurring in a reorganization.

The Court is also left unpersuaded by the Hoekstra court's view of the "nature" of the IRS lien. The Hoekstra court stated that the language of 26 U.S.C. §6321 makes clear that there is but a single lien created; not separate liens upon a debtor's real and personal property. [ 2000-2 USTC ¶50,857] 255 B.R. at 290 - 91. It is from this aspect of the Hoekstra decision that the IRS draws its sole decisional support for the position it takes here, that is, because of its "unitary nature", the IRS lien cannot be stripped off the Real Property.

The IRS admits that, other than the Hoekstra decision and the language of Section 6321 itself, it has no other support for its view that the IRS lien is inviolable so long as there is equity value in any of the collateral subject to the lien. In its brief and again at the time of argument, the IRS provided no in depth public policy analysis or Dewsnup-extension argument to support its position under these facts. It simply steadfastly maintained that the language of 28 U.S.C. §6321 required such a result. If this lien inviolability were a consistently held view and practice of the IRS, it might cause the Court pause before ordering relief that runs contrary to such a settled norm. However, the admitted, normal customs of the IRS, carried out pursuant to an enabling statute and regulation, reveals that even the IRS does not treat federal tax liens in the monolithic and indivisible manner that it urges this Court to follow.

26 U.S.C. §6325(b) , which allows for the discharge of property subject to a federal tax lien, provides in relevant part:
(2) Part payment; interest of United States valueless. --Subject to such regulations as the Secretary may prescribe, the Secretary may issue a certificate of discharge of any part of the property subject to the lien if --...

(B) the Secretary determines at any time that the interest of the United States in the part to be so discharged has no value.

In determining the value of the interest of the United States in the part to be so discharged, the Secretary shall give consideration to the value of such part and to such liens thereon as have priority over the lien of the United States.

26 U.S.C. §6325(b)(2)(B) . The IRS has issued regulations which mirror this provision of the Internal Revenue Code. See 26 C.F.R. §301.6325-1(b)(2) . As admitted by the IRS at the time of argument, this statutory provision provides the mechanism for removal of an IRS lien from an affected property simply upon a showing by the taxpayer that no equity exists in the affected property. The Court understands that the weight of authority holds that this partial discharge provision is discretionary with the Secretary of the IRS, although perhaps a denial of discharge by the Secretary is subject to review under a deferential abuse of discretion standard. See, for example, United States v. Polk [ 87-2 USTC ¶9432] 822 F.2d 871, 874 (9 th Cir. 1987). However, the Court finds it highly significant that the statute and accompanying regulations contemplate that the alleged "single lien" created by 26 U.S.C. §6321 can, in effect, be treated as separate liens on separate items of property and discharged as to those items of property which are valueless to the United States because they are subject to other lien(s) with priority. Also at the oral argument, Counsel for the IRS represented that it was common practice for the IRS to actually discharge a federal tax lien as against an item of property that has no value. 8 Given this reality, it would make no sense to deny the Debtor relief in this case based solely on a fiction the IRS itself does not consistently follow, that is, that the IRS lien is so indivisible in nature that a Bankruptcy Court cannot strip it off real property that has no equity value while allowing it to remain on personalty that does have value.


CONCLUSION


It is axiomatic that a central purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is to provide a procedure by which the debtor can "reorder his affairs, make peace with his creditors, and enjoy 'a new opportunity in life with a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of pre-existing debt'." In re Alston, 297 B.R. 410, 417 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2003) (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934)). In reorganization cases that central purpose can often only be accomplished by lien stripping. As the court in Dever observed:
Modifying the rights and interests of secured creditors is at the heart of most reorganizations.... very few Chapter 11 plans seek merely to stretch out or reduce payments to unsecured creditors. Most debtors are currently entering Chapter 11 with their assets fully encumbered, which means that their plans must restructure the secured debt in order to make a meaningful difference in their financial well-being.

164 B.R. at 143. That is certainly the case with the Debtor in the present case. Unless the Court removes the IRS lien from his residence, that lien will remain an anchor dragging him down from achieving the fresh start envisioned by the Code.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds in favor of the Debtor on the matters set forth in his Complaint and will issue an appropriate order.


ORDER


AND NOW, this 16 th day of April, 2008, upon consideration of the Complaint to Determine Validity, Priority and Extent of Liens of the Internal Revenue Service and Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry Against the Debtor's Assets filed by Plaintiff, Kirk G. Johnson t/d/b/a "KJ Transit" at Document No. 1 ("Complaint") and the Answer filed by the Internal Revenue Service of the Department of the Treasury of the United States of America ("Internal Revenue Service") at Document No. 6, for the reasons stated in the foregoing Memorandum Opinion, pursuant to Fed.R.Bankr.P. 7052, after notice and hearing and consideration of the stipulations and argument of Counsel,

It is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the relief requested by the Debtor in his Complaint is GRANTED.

It is FURTHER ORDERED that:

(1) All of the Internal Revenue Service's tax liens against the Debtor's real estate known as 408 Turnwood Lane, Coraopolis, PA 15108 are declared NULL, VOID and REMOVED , the legal description for said real property being found in the Deed recorded in the Office of Recorder of Deeds of Allegheny County at Deed Book Volume 11686, page 585, and more further described as follows:
ALL THAT CERTAIN lot or piece of ground situate in the Township of Moon, County of Allegheny and Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, being Lot No. 915 in the Whispering Woods Plan of Lots, Phase IX, as recorded in the Recorder's Office of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, in Plan Book Volume 198, pages 63-66. BEING designated as Block 925-G, Lot No. 12 in the Deed Registry Office of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania. UNDER AND SUBJECT to easements, rights of way, oil and gas leases, restrictions, reservations, exceptions, agreements and coal and mining rights as set forth in prior instruments of record. ("Real Property")

(2) The Internal Revenue Service's tax liens against the Debtor's personal property are declared NULL, VOID and REMOVED from said personal property to the extent said liens exceed $41,374.88;

(3) Pursuant to Section 507(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code the Internal Revenue Service possesses an allowed unsecured, priority claim in the amount of $30,595.00;

(4) The Internal Revenue Service possesses a general unsecured, nonpriority claim in the amount of $109,079.88; and,

(5) The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Labor and Industry's tax liens against the Debtor's assets, both the Real Property and the personal property, are declared NULL, VOID and REMOVED from said property.

1 Labor was properly served with the Complaint but it has not filed an answer or otherwise responded. Counsel for the Debtor has submitted a letter and e-mail from counsel for Labor indicating that Labor has consented to the relief being sought by the Debtor. Based on Labor's default and the further evidence of its consent, the Debtor will be granted the relief he seeks as against Labor and Labor's claim will be deemed wholly unsecured.

2 The Court's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§157 and 1334 was not at issue. This is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§157(b)(2)(K) and (O). This Opinion constitutes the Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Fed.R.Bankr.P. 7052.

3 Section 506(a) provides:

(a)
(1) An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the estate has an interest, or that is subject to setoff under section 553 of this title, is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such property, or to the extent of the amount subject to setoff, as the case may be, and is an unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such creditor's interest or the amount so subject to setoff is less than the amount of such allowed claim. Such value shall be determined in light of the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of such property, and in conjunction with any hearing on such disposition or use or on a plan affecting such creditor's interest.

(2) If the debtor is an individual in a case under chapter 7 or 13, such value with respect to personal property securing an allowed claim shall be determined based on the replacement value of such property as of the date of the filing of the petition without deduction for costs of sale or marketing. With respect to property acquired for personal, family, or household purposes, replacement value shall mean the price a retail merchant would charge for property of that kind considering the age and condition of the property at the time value is determined.

Section 506(d) provides:

(d) To the extent that a lien secures a claim against the debtor that is not an allowed secured claim, such lien is void, unless --
(1) such claim was disallowed only under section 502(b)(5) or 502(e) of this title; or

(2) such claim is not an allowed secured claim due only to the failure of any entity to file a proof of such claim under Section 501 of this title.

4 The willingness of the IRS to stipulate to a substantial reduction of its lien down to the amount of the Debtor's equity value in the Personal Property would seem to signal its acknowledgment that Dewsnup has no application here and does not restrict the Court's ability to act. Indeed, the IRS has not even made the argument that Dewsnup applies. Nevertheless, the Court does not wish to rest solely on that premise but will independently examine the issue.

5 The courts adopting this majority view have not all arrived at their conclusion by the same route. Some have concluded that the Dewsnup court's limiting construction of Sections 506(a) and (d) is applicable only in the Chapter 7 setting, leaving Section 506 available as a vehicle to permit lien stripping in the reorganization chapters. See, e.g., In re Dever, 164 B.R. 132 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1994). Other courts, however, conclude that the Dewsnup construction of Section 506 must apply in all bankruptcy settings. In this view, Dewsnup does not hold that Section 506(d) prohibits lien stripping in Chapter 7, it holds only that Section 506(d) does not itself provide the authority for a debtor to strip a lien. See, e.g., In re Virello [ 99-1 USTC ¶50,346], 236 B.R. 199, 204 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1999). Thus, in this view, Dewsnup does not prevent lien stripping in reorganization cases because, unlike Chapter 7, those chapters of the Bankruptcy Code do contain provisions that permit lien stripping. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §1123(b)(5) , discussed infra. at 9-11.

In the present case, the Debtor has invoked Section 506 as the basis for relief in his Complaint, which is consistent with the first judicial approach discussed above. (It should also be noted that the IRS has never objected that Section 506 is not a proper vehicle to bring the issue before the Court). However, even if this Court were to follow the second judicial approach it would not deny the Debtor the relief he seeks solely because the Complaint refers only to Section 506 because that would elevate form over substance. The Court would instead treat the matter as tried by consent pursuant to Fed.R.Bankr.P. 7015(b)(2) or grant the Debtor leave to file an amended Complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Bankr.P. 7015 (a)(2). Thus, either way, the Debtor should be granted the relief he seeks.

6 In the context of this case, the IRS never exercised that option. In determining whether an 1111(b) election had occurred in this matter, not only did the Court review the docket of the within Adversary Proceeding but also the main case filings as well. During the course of its review of the main case docket, the Court identified a "Stipulation and Agreement" between the Debtor and the IRS dated April 17, 2007 and filed at Document No. 112 ( "Stipulation") and approved by the Court by Order entered on April 23, 2007 at Document No. 115. Paragraph 3 of the Stipulation states in part:

To the extent that any federal tax liens attach to any property owned by the Debtor as of the date of the filing of the Petition in this case, such property shall remain subject to such federal tax liens until such time as the amount of such liens has been fully satisfied.

Neither of the Parties in the Adversary Proceeding has ever referenced the existence of the Stipulation as an impediment to this Court's ability to grant the relief sought by the Debtor. The Court can only conclude that the Parties agree the Stipulation was not intended to have any effect with respect to the pending Adversary Proceeding, and in particular, was not intended to be a defense available to the IRS. This conclusion is further supported by the language of the Confirmed, Amended Plan subsequently approved by the Court which contains language apparently allowing for the filing of the Complaint in this matter and its ultimate resolution by the Court. See Amended Chapter 11 Plan at ¶ 2.02, filed May 1, 2007 at Document No. 125. In the alternative, Fed.R.Bankr.P. 7012(b) requires every defense to a claim for relief in any pleading to be asserted in the responsive pleading if one is required, as was the case here. Affirmative defenses such as res judicata or waiver, must also be affirmatively pled. Fed.R.Bankr.P. 7008(b). The failure to plead a defense means it has been waived. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h) made applicable in this proceeding pursuant to Fed.R.Bankr.P. 7012(b); In re Hankerson, 133 B.R. 711, 713, n. 1 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991). The IRS, having failed to raise any defense arising from the Stipulation in any of the pleadings (including its Pretrial Narrative Statement and Consolidated Pretrial Narrative Statement) or brief filed in the Adversary Proceeding, has therefore waived any such defense it may otherwise have had related to the Stipulation.

7 See 11 U.S.C. §1322(b)(2) . Note also that the home mortgage exception does not apply to the present case because a "security interest" does not include a statutory tax lien. See 11 U.S.C. §101(51) ; In re Marfin Ready Mix Corp., 220 B.R. 148, 158 n. 10 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1998).

8 At the oral argument the Court inquired why the IRS would not be willing to voluntarily "discharge" the lien as against the Real Property in this case. Counsel for the IRS admitted it frequently does just that in other, non-bankruptcy contexts. The IRS could offer no compelling response to that rather straightforward question other than to note that it wished a legal ruling on the matter.

Legal obligations. --Tax Liens: Property Not Subject to Tax Liens: Legal obligations

Tax liens did not affect the following property.

A portion of the proceeds from a partition sale where the portion was used for the costs and expenses of the partition.

Pollyea, Mo. CA, 58-2 USTC ¶9729, 315 SW2d 460.

A portion of trust income where the income was used for the payment of trustees' attorneys' fees.

C.R. Aley, DC Ill., 56-1 USTC ¶9278.

Amounts that were due from a deceased taxpayer's estate to his surviving spouse and minor children as expenses of the estate.

V.M. Igoe, SCt. Mo., 86-2 USTC ¶9846.

Antecedent child support judgment.

Don King Productions, Inc., CA-2, 91-2 USTC ¶50,474.

A bank's security interest in contract payments arising from a delinquent taxpayer's performance of services to a hospital had priority over the IRS's competing tax lien. The contract between the taxpayer and the hospital qualified as a commercial financial security agreement and the agreement between the bank and the taxpayer was a commercial transactions financing agreement. The bank acquired the hospital contract rights within 45 days of the tax lien filing. Therefore, contract rights were qualified property covered by the bank's security interest and protected by the safe harbor provision regarding after-acquired property.

Plymouth Savings Bank, CA-1, 99-2 USTC ¶50,807, 187 F3d 203.

A bank's security interest in a delinquent subcontractor's accounts receivable from a construction contract had priority over a subsequently filed federal tax lien. The taxpayer had performed part of its contract duties before the tax lien was filed and, thus, had rights to at least a portion of the receivables to which the bank's security interest could attach. Accordingly, the receivables were "in existence" when the tax lien was filed, regardless of whether state (Georgia) law gave the taxpayer an interest in the accounts as soon as the contract arose, or federal law gave the taxpayer an interest in the accounts only after it performed its contract duties.

Whiting-Turner, DC Ga., 2000-1 USTC ¶50,342, 184 FSupp2d 1368.

A federal tax lien did not attach to a debtor's real property because higher priority liens exceeded the fair market value of the property. The IRS's argument that its lien attached to all of the debtor's real and personal property and that the debtor could not determine to which property the lien attached was rejected. There is nothing in Code Sec. 6321 that would protect the IRS from lien stripping. Under the regulations, the "single lien" created by Code Sec. 6321 can be treated as separate liens on separate properties and discharged as to those properties that are valueless because they are subject to liens with a higher priority.

In re Kirk G. Johnson, BC-DC Pa., 2008-1 USTC ¶50,300.


Claims for Income, Estate, and Gift Taxes in Bankruptcy and Receivership Proceedings: Avoidance of liens

An individual lacked the standing to challenge the attachment of a federal tax lien to his disability payments. Except for the per-month exempted amount determined to constitute reasonable living expenses, the payments were the property of the bankruptcy estate.

D.A. Stinnett, CA-7, 2006-2 USTC ¶50,587, 465 F3d 309.

Jurisdiction was lacking over a delinquent lawyer's appeal from a district court's denial of his request for a stay of collection proceedings during the pendency of his bankruptcy petition. The district court had not entered a final decision and the taxpayer could not appeal without posting a bond. The taxpayer's contention that denial of a stay of collection could result in a forced sale of his residence by the IRS and cause irreparable damage to him, provided that he was subsequently absolved from his tax liability, was rejected because there was no evidence that his home was exempt from an IRS tax lien.

H.P. Carlson, CA-7, 2000-2 USTC ¶50,704.

A debtor's claim that the IRS lacked authority to levy her community interest in her husband's and co-debtor's pension fund in order to satisfy outstanding federal income taxes incurred by her husband was properly denied. Her contention that state (California) law gave her an "exclusive" half-interest in the husband's pension benefits was rejected because that law refers to equal interests in the whole of the community property rather than exclusive interests in only half of the community property. Further, by granting creditors recourse against the whole community estate on the debts of only one spouse, California law implicitly establishes that spouse's interest in the whole of the community property, at least to a degree sufficient for the IRS to impose tax liens under the Code.

J.W. McIntyre, CA-9, 2000-2 USTC ¶50,613.

A debtor's completion of the payments due under his Chapter 13 plan did not extinguish IRS tax liens against his property because he failed to take a sufficient affirmative step to modify or extinguish the IRS's liens. The taxpayer failed to effectively challenge the validity or existence of the IRS's liens because he sought no preconfirmation advisory hearing to challenge the liens' validity; requested no valuation hearing; filed no objection to the IRS's proof of claim, which designated a larger amount as secured debt than the figure appearing in the debtor's plan; and did not try to modify the liens in an affirmative way. Furthermore, the taxpayer's failure to provide specific notice to the IRS of his intent to afford its liens less than full protection was deemed fatal to his attempt to extinguish the liens. Because the lack of adequate notice denied the IRS due process, the confirmation order devaluing its claims could not be given preclusive effect.

M. Deutchman, CA-4, 99-2 USTC ¶50,852.

A trustee in bankruptcy could not avoid federal tax liens against a promissory note that was payable to the debtors. Although the trustee was afforded the status of a hypothetical bona fide purchaser, he did not acquire an interest in the note for adequate and full consideration. Thus, the trustee was not a purchaser for purposes of the Code Sec. 6323 exception from liens against securities.

J. Berg, CA-9, 97-2 USTC ¶50,665, 121 F3d 535.

Duplicative notices of tax lien filed by the IRS against life insurance proceeds received by a widow following her husband's death were valid even though the notices covered the same tax assessments. While a notice of tax lien affects the priority of the lien against the claims of third-party creditors, the filing of the notice does not affect the validity of the lien itself. Moreover, Reg. §301.6323(g)-1(a) implicitly authorizes the IRS to file a new notice of an existing lien at any time, regardless of whether the document is an original notice or a refiling. Thus, the IRS did not exceed its authority when it filed the duplicative notices.

H. Bourque, CA-2, 97-2 USTC ¶50,630.

Standard State Bank, CA-8, 90-2 USTC ¶50,485, 905 F2d 185.

Bankrupt married taxpayers' status as hypothetical bona fide purchasers under the Bankruptcy Code did not rise to the level of that of a purchaser under Code Sec. 6323(h)(6); therefore, the taxpayers could not avoid the IRS's tax lien on their money and stock in their corporation. However, the lien was prevented from reaching the assets that the taxpayers had transferred to the corporation. The IRS's alter ego claim was not an affirmative defense; instead, it was a separate claim against the corporation. As a result, the IRS could not obtain a judgment against the corporation because the corporation was not made a party to the instant proceeding. Even if the corporation had been found to be the taxpayers' alter ego, that finding, absent jurisdiction over the corporation, would have been binding only upon the taxpayers.

R.E. Janssen, BAP-8, 97-2 USTC ¶50,860, 213 BR 558.

Under state (Wyoming) law, the IRS properly filed its notice of tax lien in the office of the county clerk of the county where a bankrupt individual's business accounts receivable, cash, security deposit, and vehicles were located. The IRS did not have to comply with the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) when filing the notice of tax lien since, by its terms, the UCC does not apply to statutory liens.

B.A. Straight, BAP-10, 97-1 USTC ¶50,374, 207 BR 217.

A bankruptcy trustee, who was in the position of a bona fide purchaser for value, could avoid a mortgage held by a finance company. The mortgage was defective because the certificate of acknowledgment did not identify the debtors as the mortgagors. However, although the position of the avoided mortgage was preserved for the benefit of the estate, the preservation of the mortgage did not improve the estate's position as it related to an IRS tax lien. The mortgage lien, which was not perfected, could not take precedence over a later, but perfected, tax lien. Therefore, the IRS's lien was superior to the preserved position of the trustee.

S.M. Hastings, BC-DC Ky., 2007-1 USTC ¶50,205.

The Bankruptcy Court upheld the trustee's motion for turnover of the debtor's home, and denied the debtor's motion to compel abandonment of the property, where the debtor claimed that the total tax liens against his home far exceed its value. The court held that the turnover order would facilitate an expeditious sale of the property and provide unsecured creditors with significant benefits.

D.M. Bolden, BC-DC Calif., 2005-2 USTC ¶50,443, 327 BR 657.

Debtors could not avoid a federal tax lien by claiming that the lien attached to an unsecured claim. As a matter of law, the debtors could not strip-down the government's lien. Any federal tax lien attached to the debtors' property and interests and would pass through bankruptcy unaffected.

T. Dippel, BC-DC Fla., 2005-1 USTC ¶50,431.

Debtors' motion to value a tax lien and determine lien extinguishment upon payment was denied. The debtors could not "strip down" an allowed secured claim in a Chapter 7 case. Further, the terms of a prior agreement between the IRS and the debtors as to the value of the secured claim, which reduced the total amount of the secured claim, could not be enforced because the debtors had converted their case to Chapter 7 prior to the entry of the order.

In re S.L. Phillips, BC-DC Fla., 2005-1 USTC ¶50,417.

A bankruptcy court did not err in finding that the notices of federal tax liens (NFTLs) filed by the IRS to secure tax claims against a delinquent debtor violated the automatic stay with respect to the debtor's first chapter 13 bankruptcy. However, the tax liens were rendered avoidable, rather than void. Following the dismissal of that proceeding, the bankruptcy estate's property revested in the taxpayer and the NFTLs "perfected" the liens against that property. Thus, when the debtor filed a second chapter 13 petition, the revested property entered the new bankruptcy estate subject to the government's secured claims for payment of the taxes owing.

G.V. Sanderfer, DC Tenn., 2004-1 USTC ¶50,150.

The bankruptcy court determined that an individual's malpractice settlement was a post-bankruptcy asset and, consequently, not subject to an IRS tax lien. The taxpayer established that the "redressable harm" giving rise to a malpractice claim against his bankruptcy attorney did not occur until after the bankruptcy petition date. Although the taxpayer hired the attorney prior to filing the bankruptcy petitions, his attorney's negligent conduct did not arise until a post-bankruptcy offer in compromise was proposed. The bankruptcy attorney was negligent in computing the correct date proposed in an offer in compromise as to the dischargability of certain tax liens. Because the taxpayer had no property interest in the malpractice claim on the date of his bankruptcy petition, the malpractice settlement was deemed a post-bankruptcy asset.

J. Saunders, DC Fla., 2004-1 USTC ¶50,140.

The IRS was entitled to levy upon funds held by a bankruptcy estate to satisfy a debtor's delinquent tax obligations. Because funds transferred into the bankruptcy estate by a third party as part of an investment plan were determined to be a loan, the debtor was deemed the owner of the transferred funds at the time of the levy. The third party's prior testimony and an examination of the agreement between the third party and the debtor indicated that the transaction constituted a loan. As such, the transferred funds were appropriately subject to an IRS levy.

D. Derrington, DC Wash., 2003-2 USTC ¶50,688, 302 BR 104.

An individual debtor could not avoid tax liens on exempt assets because the bankruptcy avoidance powers were not applicable to tax liens in existence and properly noticed at the time of his bankruptcy filing. The taxpayer contended that the exclusion of property secured by tax liens from assets liable for debts concerned only tax liens that had not been avoided. However, such reasoning was not supported by the language of section 522(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides that liens that can be avoided or voided are treated separately from tax liens. Thus, an exempt asset subject to a debt secured by a tax lien was liable for the debt, despite its exempt status.

J.K. Piper, BC-DC Mass., 2003-1 USTC ¶50,438, 291 BR 20.

Chapter 7 debtors were not entitled to reduce the value of IRS liens to the alleged value of their unencumbered personal assets at the time of the filing of their bankruptcy petition. A Chapter 7 debtor may not use the bankruptcy provisions to "strip down" a nonconsensual federal tax lien to the judicially determined value of the property. Such liens on real property pass through bankruptcy unaffected.

G.H. Carpenter, BC-DC Fla., 2003-1 USTC ¶50,380.

Federal tax liens issued against the property of married debtors applied to property that was exempt from levy. The taxpayers unsuccessfully contended that the terms "lien" and "levy" had the same meaning under Code Sec. 6331 and, thus, the liens did not reach their exempt property. Although the Fourth Circuit had not addressed the issue, the court noted that the issue had arisen before courts within the Fourth Circuit, and those courts issued findings consistent with Seventh and Ninth Circuit opinions that liens and levy should be treated dissimilarly under the statute. Consequently, the tax liens attached to the debtors' exempt, as well as non-exempt, assets.

J.G. Goodykoontz, BC-DC W.Va., 2002-2 USTC ¶50,614, 284 BR 235.

The government carried its burden of proof under the preponderance of the evidence standard that a debtor knowingly and fraudulently failed to report to the court or surrender to the Chapter 7 trustee his remainder interest in a trust and the cash and other property distributions he received from the maturing of his remainder interest pursuant to section 727(d)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code. Accordingly, the taxpayer's Chapter 7 discharge was revoked. The taxpayer's contention that his interest in the trust was nonassignable and not reachable by his creditors and, thus, should not be included in the property of the estate was rejected. Federal tax liens attached to the remainder interest in the trust at the time of the creation of the liens, which predated the bankruptcy.

J.S. Colish, BC-DC N.Y., 2003-1 USTC ¶50,119, 289 BR 523.

A notice of federal tax lien filed by the IRS in Washington, D.C., based on the belief that the taxpayer, who was a debtor in bankruptcy, was out of the country, was invalid because he had returned to the United States and was residing in Florida on the date when the lien was filed. The taxpayer was not required to notify the IRS that he had changed his residence to Florida, and Code Sec. 6323(f)(2)(B) does not permit the IRS to file a notice of federal tax lien in the taxpayer's "last known residence." Instead, the notice had to be filed in the taxpayer's residence. Further, a second notice of tax lien filed in Florida shortly after the bankruptcy court entered its order of dismissal, but prior to the docketing of that order, did not violate the automatic bankruptcy stay. Resolving an issue of first impression, the district court properly determined that the order took effect at the time the judge signed it, not when it was actually docketed.

J.D. Saunders, DC Fla., 99-1 USTC ¶50,445. Aff'd, per curiam, CA-11 (unpublished opinion), 2002-1 USTC ¶50,241. Cert. denied, 3/18/2002.

Married debtors who were equitable owners, but not owners of record, of a residence at the time they filed a bankruptcy petition could not avoid a federal tax lien against the property even though their personal liability for the underlying tax had been discharged. Pursuant to state (Florida) law, the debtors acquired a beneficial or equitable interest in the residence when they entered into a purchase agreement. Their equitable ownership of the residence was evidenced by their possession of the property and their payment of all related expenses. Despite the fact that they did not become owners of the residence until after filing their bankruptcy case, the lien remained attached to their equitable interest and was enforceable following the discharge of their personal liability.

T.G. Ready, BC-DC Fla., 2001-2 USTC ¶50,637.

A debtor corporation's bankruptcy trustee recovered an involuntary transfer of funds from its bank account to the IRS because the IRS failed to show that the levied funds were trust fund taxes and not property of the debtor; a sufficient nexus did not exist between the debtor's tax obligations and the funds transferred. The trust account was used as a general operating account to pay business expenses, including wages. As a result, the transfer of funds was an avoidable preference.

TCB Carpet Services, Inc., DC Ill. (unpublished opinion), 2000-2 USTC ¶50,820, aff'g an unreported Bankruptcy Court decision.

Pro se debtors' postdischarge complaint challenging the imposition of tax liens against their property in connection with five years' worth of unpaid taxes was dismissed. The tax debts were not dischargeable in bankruptcy because the debtors willfully failed to file returns for any of the tax years at issue.

D. Bailey, BC-DC Colo., 2000-2 USTC ¶50,813.

Married debtors could not avoid IRS tax liens because their tax liability was not dischargeable. The taxes were due before the filing of their bankruptcy petition. Moreover, the tax liability would have been assessable after the filing of the bankruptcy petition because the three-year limitations period had not yet expired when they filed the petition.

J. Khoe, DC Calif., 2000-2 USTC ¶50,746.

The government was not entitled to confirmation of the foreclosure sale of a debtor's interest in real property based on the voluntary bankruptcy petition she filed on the morning of the foreclosure sale. Under state (Texas) a valid foreclosure sale, not just an order of foreclosure, was required prior to divesting the taxpayer of her property interests. Since the taxpayer filed the bankruptcy petition before the foreclosure sale took place, she retained her interest in the property.

J.W. Bishop, DC Tex., 2000-2 USTC ¶50,740.

State (Tennessee) law restraints on alienation of a debtor's beneficial interest in a qualified retirement trust did not prevent an IRS tax lien from attaching to the beneficial interest. The Tennessee trust provisions did not affect the status of the beneficial interest as property or rights to which a tax lien could attach. The lien attached to both alienable and inalienable property. Accordingly, the state's restrictions on alienation were not enforceable under nonbankruptcy law, rendering the IRS's claim against the pension rights of the trust valid.

J.L. Berry, dba J&D Enterprises, BC-DC Tenn., 2001-2 USTC ¶50,466.

Federal tax liens attached to, and the IRS had a secured interest in, a debtor's personal property. The debtor unsuccessfully argued that, because her personal property was exempt from levy under Code Sec. 6334, the IRS's tax liens were unsecured. A tax lien may be secured by property of a debtor that is exempt from levy. While certain specified property is exempt from IRS levy, tax liens generally can attach to all of the property of a delinquent taxpayer. A levy involves the immediate seizure of property, while a lien is merely a security interest in property. Thus, the limitation on the IRS's ability to seize the taxpayer's property did not bar the IRS from asserting a security interest in such property.

V.L. Jeffrey, BC-DC Pa., 2001-1 USTC ¶50,387, 261 BR 396.

Married debtors' motion to avoid two federal tax liens pursuant to section 522(f)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code was denied. That provision allows debtors to avoid judicial liens to the extent that they impair exemptions to which the debtors would otherwise be entitled; however, exempt property remains encumbered by perfected prepetition tax liens. Bankruptcy Code section 522 cannot be used to avoid federal tax liens, which do not qualify as judicial liens because they arise by operation of law and not by virtue of any judgment. Moreover, the applicable state (North Carolina) exemptions statute does not apply to claims of the federal government or its agencies; instead, tax liens are governed by exemptions from levy set forth in Code Sec. 6334.

R.R. Morgan, BC-DC N.C., 2000-2 USTC ¶50,596.

A federal tax lien against a townhouse owned by married debtors that was already subject to multiple liens was not void due to lack of value pursuant to section 506 of the Bankruptcy Code; it was merely undersecured. The tax lien on the townhouse was third in priority, and the value of the first two liens exhausted the value of the townhouse, with no remainder left onto which the IRS lien could attach. However, the lien could not be bifurcated into a secured and an unsecured claim. It attached to all of the debtors' personal property and was partially secured by the debtors' personal property. Only one component of the collateral had no value; other components of collateral still had value.

R. Hoekstra, DC Va., 2000-2 USTC ¶50,857, 255 BR 285.

A valid IRS tax lien attached to two parcels of property that a debtor fraudulently conveyed to family members prior to filing for bankruptcy protection. The lien arose at the time of assessment, which preceded both the recording of the deed for the first parcel and the fraudulent transfer and recording of the deed for the second parcel. Following the bankruptcy trustee's recovery of the two properties and his sale of one of the parcels, the tax lien transferred to the debtor's interest in the sale proceeds. The automatic stay did not prevent the creation, perfection, or enforcement of the tax lien against the properties after their return to the bankruptcy estate because the lien attached to the parcels before the fraudulent transfers, the bankruptcy filing, and the trustee's recovery of the properties.

J. McGhee, BC-DC Ky., 2000-1 USTC ¶50,275.

A federal tax lien on a delinquent individual's real and personal property survived the discharge of his underlying tax deficiencies in Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Because section 545 of the Bankruptcy Code gave the bankruptcy trustee the power to avoid liens against the property of the bankruptcy estate, the debtor generally lacked standing to request such relief. Although section 522 gave him limited standing to avoid liens against property that was exempt from his bankruptcy estate, it also provided that tax liens remained valid against exempt property.

J.F. Mulligan, BC-DC N.H., 99-1 USTC ¶50,585.

An ex-wife's residence in a community property state was subject to valid liens to satisfy tax debts of her ex-husband incurred during their marriage. Neither the subsequent transfer of the residence to her as a result of their divorce nor the tortious conduct by the husband affected the validity of the lien on the property, nor was it avoided by her Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan. In addition, liens on her personal property appeared to be fully secured, based on bankruptcy schedules listing the values placed on the property.

M.C. Hegg, BC-DC Ida., 99-1 USTC ¶50,523.

A notice of federal tax lien against a debtor's IRA account filed prior to the filing of his bankruptcy petition survived the bankruptcy court's discharge despite the discharge of the debtor's personal liability for the underlying tax assessment. The federal tax lien notice was properly filed pursuant to state (Ohio) law in the office of the county recorder of the county in which the property was situated. Furthermore, although the debtor claimed that the IRA funds were exempt, that fact alone did not alter the enforcement of the prepetition federal tax lien on those funds after discharge.

J.O. Deppisch, BC-DC Ohio, 99-1 USTC ¶50,429, 227 BR 806.

Married debtors were not entitled to avoid a tax lien that they had stipulated was valid. Because they stipulated that the lien amount did not include interest and penalties, they could not argue that the lien was invalid because it included interest and penalties.

E.L. Polston, BC-DC Pa., 99-1 USTC ¶50,377.

Prepetition levies that were made against bankrupt taxpayers less than 90 days before they filed their Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition could not be avoided as preferential transfers. The levies did not allow the government to receive more than it would have under a Chapter 7 bankruptcy because the government's fully secured and perfected claim exceeded the amounts that were collected. Also, the taxpayer's status as debtors in possession did not allow them to avoid the lien because it was recorded before they filed their bankruptcy petition. However, they could avoid post-petition garnishments that were issued in violation of the automatic stay.

J.M. Kohout, BC-DC Ohio, 99-1 USTC ¶50,322.

The IRS could levy upon funds held by a bankruptcy trustee that were due the debtor. The trustee was not required to return the funds to the debtor in accordance with 11 USC 1326(a)(2) because the plan was confirmed and, accordingly, that provision of the Bankruptcy Code was inapplicable. The plan was not analogous to an unconfirmed plan merely because the IRS appealed from an order overruling its objection to the debtor's plan.

J.D. Mishler, Jr., BC-DC Fla., 98-2 USTC ¶50,652, 223 BR 17.

The IRS was entitled to levy against a residence held by married debtors as trustees for their son in order to satisfy their tax liabilities. Although under state (Pennsylvania) law, title to the residence may have vested in the son when his parents created the trust, the parents were the true equitable owners of the house, and the trust held the property merely as their nominee. The trust was originally created to safeguard the residence from future creditors. The debtors paid the mortgage and all other related expenses and took advantage of federal tax deductions as if they owned the home.

E.T. Richards, Jr., DC Pa., 99-1 USTC ¶50,317.

Summary judgment was denied to married debtors and the IRS regarding attachment of an IRS lien to the debtors' residence. Their transfer of the deed to themselves as trustees for their son created a passive trust under state (Pennsylvania) law. The IRS could not characterize the transfer as fraudulently executed to avoid tax liability, since the debtors had paid a tax debt prior to the transfer. However, material facts remained in dispute with respect to the IRS's contention that the trust was a nominee/alter ego of the debtors.

E.T. Richards, Jr., BC-DC Pa., 98-1 USTC ¶50,367.

A transfer to the IRS of a debtor's interest in compensation owed to him was not avoidable by him as a preferential transfer of exempt property avoidable by a trustee. Although the notices of levy were served within the 90 days preceding the filing of the taxpayer's bankruptcy petition, at a time when the taxpayer was presumed insolvent, section 522(c)(2)(B) of the bankruptcy code prohibits a debtor from avoiding a properly filed prepetition tax lien on property claimed exempt, even in circumstances where the lien is subject to avoidance by a trustee.

J.C. Forrest, BC-DC Okla., 98-1 USTC ¶50,187. Aff'd, BAP-10 (unpublished opinion), 98-1 USTC ¶50,391.

An IRS tax lien on an individual's property claimed as exempt in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding included tax penalties and statutory additions and was not avoidable. Since the Bankruptcy Code does not distinguish between taxes, interest and penalties, the lien was comprised of the total amount. Further, the Bankruptcy Code specifically excepts tax liens from the effects of the exemption and avoidance provisions.

R.E. Savage, BC-DC Ga., 97-2 USTC ¶50,997.

Amounts obtained by the IRS through a levy on a bankrupt individual's social security benefits did not constitute a preferential transfer that was avoidable by the debtor because the transfer occurred more than 90 days prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition. The IRS was deemed to have been secured with respect to the benefits on the effective date of the tax lien, which was more than two years prior to the petition date, not at the time of the actual levy.

F. Roberts, BC-DC Ore., 97-2 USTC ¶50,843.

A prepetition federal tax lien against a debtor's homestead property was not avoidable in bankruptcy because Section 522(c)(2)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code prohibits the avoidance of properly filed tax liens on exempt property. That provision overrides the general exemption and avoidance powers granted in Section 522(h) of the Bankruptcy Code.

J.K. Bearden, BC-DC Okla., 97-2 USTC ¶50,836.

Although debtors' personal liability for taxes had been discharged in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding, the IRS's tax liens survived and attached to the debtors' prepetition property and rights to property. Even though bankruptcy is defined as a fresh start for debtors, Congress intended that valid tax liens would survive bankruptcy. The debtors could not employ the expansive powers under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code to avoid the tax liens in their Chapter 7 case.

M. Avola, BC-DC N.J., 97-2 USTC ¶50,813.

Similarly.

N.A. Alfano, DC N.Y., 99-1 USTC ¶50,303, 34 FSupp 827.

Since the IRS filed a timely proof of claim in bankruptcy and a lien against the debtor's individual retirement account was perfected at the time of the debtor's bankruptcy filing, it was enforceable against a bona fide purchaser and, thus, could not be avoided by the bankruptcy trustee. The reasoning of In re Carrens ( 96-1 USTC ¶50,294) was adopted. The debtor failed to establish that the IRS proof of claim was not entitled to a presumption of correctness.

T.D. Aylward, BC-DC Fla., 97-2 USTC ¶50,796.

A bankruptcy trustee could not avoid a perfected IRS tax lien against a debtor's real and personal property. Although the trustee held the status of a hypothetical bona fide purchaser of the property subject to the lien for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code, she did not qualify as a purchaser under Code Sec. 6323.

D.L. Linn, BC-DC Fla., 97-2 USTC ¶50,791.

A debtor's motion for an order directing the IRS to release a lien against property that had a value of zero was denied. An IRS stipulation that its claim was unsecured, in response to the debtor's objections to its proof of claim, did not constitute an agreement to remove the lien; rather it reflected the fact that the IRS would be treated as an unsecured creditor in bankruptcy because there was no equity in the collateral to which its lien attached. Similarly, the IRS's amended proof of claim, which listed only unsecured debts, did not mandate that the IRS release the lien. The debtor's Chapter 13 confirmation plan, which identified the IRS's claim as unsecured, did not provide a basis for avoiding the lien because it did not specifically direct such action.

S.O. Pearson, BC-DC Ohio, 97-2 USTC ¶50,757.

A debtor unsuccessfully sought to avoid IRS tax liens against his property. The liens were accorded priority because they were imposed with respect to delinquent taxes and interest in connection with a return filed by the debtor within the three-year period preceding his bankruptcy filing. The debtor had been granted an extension of time for filing his return, and the extended due date was less than three years before the bankruptcy petition was filed.

G.D. Bishop, BC-DC Ga., 97-2 USTC ¶50,664.

An IRS tax lien attached to a debtor's Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) account. Although the TSP statute (5 U.S.C. §8431, et seq.) contains anti-alienation provisions, it cannot be interpreted as proscribing a tax levy on a TSP account. Since a lien is a less invasive collection measure than, and operates in conjunction with, a levy, Congress probably did not intend to allow a TSP account to be subject to a levy but not to a lien. Thus, the TSP statute was construed as not preventing the attachment of a tax lien. The lien did not transfer the debtor's title, possession, or interest in the account and, therefore, did not result in alienation of the debtor's property. Even though the IRS had not perfected the lien by levy or judgment, it was still enforceable.

C. Jones, BC-DC D.C., 97-1 USTC ¶50,408.

A bankruptcy trustee could not avoid valid and enforceable federal tax liens against a debtor's intangible personal property interest in his vested right to receive annuity payments under Code Sec. 6323(b) because the debtor's right to receive the payments did not fall within any of the statutorily protected categories of property.

T.H. Stringer, Jr., BC-DC Okla., 97-1 USTC ¶50,206.

A tax lien on the proceeds of a debtor's account receivable was avoidable by the trustee of the debtor's bankruptcy estate because the IRS failed to record and perfect its lien by filing a notice of federal tax lien. A notice of levy served upon a corporation that owed the account receivable to the debtor was not sufficient to perfect the IRS's interest in the proceeds. The trustee could also avoid the IRS's unperfected lien in his capacity as lien creditor under section 544 of the Bankruptcy Code.

HDI Partners, BC-DC Fla., 97-1 USTC ¶50,102, 215 BR 543.

A church in bankruptcy was determined under state (Texas) law to be the alter ego of individuals; therefore, the IRS properly levied church funds to satisfy the individuals' tax liabilities. First Amendment protection did not automatically shield assets held in the name of the church from satisfying the tax liability of the individuals. Further, the IRS did not have to articulate a reasonable belief in the need for an inquiry concerning the church because it was investigating the individuals' tax liability, not that of the church. Funds seized under a pre-petition levy from the church's bank account and from an oil company that made deposits into the account never became property of the church's bankruptcy estate; therefore, the church had no interest in the funds. Also, funds seized under a post-petition levy from the company were not property of the bankruptcy estate because the placing of title to the assets in the name of the church was a sham. Therefore, the seized funds were not turned over to the church but were released to the IRS.

Faith Missionary Baptist, BC-DC Tex., 95-1 USTC ¶50,075, 174 BR 454.

After a discharge in a bankruptcy proceeding was entered, property claimed as exempt under Sec. 522 of the Bankruptcy Code and Rhode Island state law remained available to satisfy the debt to the IRS, since notice of the tax lien had been properly filed.

F. Quillard, BC-DC R.I., 93-1 USTC ¶50,110, 150 BR 291.

Debtor-taxpayers were unable to avoid IRS tax liens as to assessed tax penalties attached to exempt property (the debtor's homestead) in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding. In so holding, the bankruptcy court disagreed with a district court's reasoning in J.W. Carlton, DC, 82-1 USTC ¶9400, 19 BR 73, by noting that the language of §724(a) of the Bankruptcy Code does not preclude the use of the tax avoidance rule by the debtor himself to avoid tax liens on exempt property merely because the property is not part of the bankruptcy estate. However, the court did agree with the district court's interpretation of the purpose of the tax avoidance rule. Moreover, the court pointed out that even though §724 would have permitted debtors to avoid tax liens, §522(c)(2)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code, which governs the dischargeability of tax penalty liens on exempt property, does not. Pursuant to that provision, if notice was properly filed a lien cannot be avoided. As a result, the court concluded that since notice was properly filed by the IRS and the provision did not distinguish between taxes, interest, and penalties, the lien was still in force as to those portions of the tax debt.

G.L. Gerulis, BC-DC Minn., 85-2 USTC ¶9753, 56 BR 283.

A bankruptcy trustee could not avoid liens that secured payment from property (the debtors' homestead) that was not part of the bankruptcy estate. The purpose of the "lien avoidance" rule is to protect unsecured creditors from the debtor's wrongdoing and avoidance of liens on property that is not part of the estate would not aid those creditors.

J.W. Carlton, DC N.M., 82-1 USTC ¶9400, 19 BR 73.

A federal tax lien did not attach to a debtor's real property because higher priority liens exceeded the fair market value of the property. The IRS's argument that its lien attached to all of the debtor's real and personal property and that the debtor could not determine to which property the lien attached was rejected. Debtors possess the authority under the Bankruptcy Code to limit secured claims to the value of the collateral. Moreover, lien stripping is engrained in the reorganization process of a Chapter 11 case and to find that lien stripping is not permitted would ignore the existence of this right.

In re Kirk G. Johnson, BC-DC Pa., 2008-1 USTC ¶50,300.

Labels:

Innocent spouse 2 year limitation

Chief Counsel Notice CC-2009-012

April 22, 2009

Chief Counsel Notice : Innocent spouse relief : Equitable relief .

Department of the Treasury

Internal Revenue Service

Office of Chief Counsel



Notice

CC-2009-012

April 17, 2009

Subject: Tax Court Cases with the Lantz Two-Year Rule Issue
Cancel Date : Effective until further notice



Purpose

This Notice provides direction for cases docketed with the Tax Court when the petitioner requests relief under section 6015(f) more than two years after the first collection activity.



Discussion

A spouse must request relief from joint and several liability under section 6015(b) or (c) no later than two years from the date of the Service's first collection activity against the requesting spouse ("two-year rule") taken on or after July 22, 1998. See section 6015(b)(1)(E) and (c)(3)(B). The two-year rule has been incorporated into Treas. Reg. § 1.6015-5(b)(1) and extended to claims for equitable relief under section 6015(f). In Lantz v. Commissioner , 132 T.C. No. 8 (April 7, 2009), the Tax Court held that the regulation's application of a two-year rule to claims for relief under section 6015(f) is an invalid interpretation of section 6015(f). Under Lantz , the Tax Court now will consider whether a requesting spouse is entitled to relief under section 6015(f) regardless of the time elapsed between the collection activity and the filing of the claim for relief.



A. Motions for Summary Judgment

Pending further notice, Chief Counsel attorneys should not file motions for summary judgment arguing that the petitioner's claim for relief under section 6015(f) was untimely under section 1.6015-5(b)(1). If the petitioner also requested relief under section 6015(b) or (c), attorneys should file a motion for partial summary judgment based on section 6015(b)(1)(E) or (c)(3)(B), respectively. See Mannella v. Commissioner , 132 T.C. No. 10 (April 13, 2009).



B. Trial of Section 6015(f) Issues

Chief Counsel attorneys should continue to argue that relief under section 6015(f) is unavailable in all section 6015(f) cases in which the petitioner's claim for relief under section 6015(f) was filed more than two years after the Service's first collection activity against the petitioner. Attorneys should raise the two-year rule issue whenever appropriate ( e.g. , in the pre-trial memo, at trial, and on brief), noting the Service's disagreement with the holding in the Lantz opinion.

Attorneys should request that the Cincinnati Centralized Innocent Spouse Operations (CCISO) unit consider the merits of the section 6015(f) claims in any docketed cases when the Service's denial of section 6015(f) relief was based solely on the two-year rule, without consideration of the merits of the claim for relief. The request for CCISO to make a determination regarding relief should be sent to:
IRS- CCISO

Stop 840F

P.O. Box 120053

Attn: Department One Manager

Covington, KY 41012

If overnight mail is used, the file should be sent to the following street address:
IRS- CCISO

201 West Rivercenter Boulevard

Stop 840F

Attn: Department One Manager

Covington, KY 41011

Requests should be marked "EXPEDITE-TAX COURT CASE PENDING" and include the Form 8857, the Tax Court petition, and any other relevant documents. The request should specify that CCISO provide the results of their consideration directly to Counsel and should not issue a new determination letter.

In newly-docketed cases, if the administrative file has not yet been requested and the two-year rule issue is present, the administrative file should be requested only after CCISO completes its determination on the merits. During the pendency of CCISO's determination, attorneys should request that CCISO telefax the claim for relief from joint and several liability (Form 8857) with all the attachments, along with the Final Notice of Determination, so that a timely answer can be filed.

Questions regarding submitting requests for determinations and the status of the requests can be made by telephoning CCISO at (859) 669-3477. If a case is on a trial calendar less than 60 days away, a Motion for Continuance may be appropriate in order to give the Service sufficient time to review the merits of the claim.

If CCISO determines the petitioner is entitled to relief, the attorney should consult with Branch 1 or 2 of Procedure and Administration concerning the best course of action. If CCISO determines the petitioner is not entitled to relief, a status report should be submitted to the Tax Court setting forth the Service's determination and attaching CCISO's written analysis as an exhibit.

Questions concerning this Notice, including how to proceed if a case with this issue has already been submitted, should be directed to Branch 1 or 2 of Procedure and Administration at (202) 622-4910 or (202) 622-4940, respectively.
/s/

Deborah A. Butler

Associate Chief Counsel

(Procedure and Administration)

Labels:

Tuesday, April 21, 2009

A doctor was a common law employee rather than an independent contractor and was not entitled to deduct claimed business expenses on Schedule C. He entered into an employment contract that expressly identified him as an employee. Further, he received a fixed salary without regard to the medical fees he generated, paid vacations, employee benefits, and reimbursement for expenses. He participated in an employee retirement plan, and received Forms W-2 reporting his compensation. He was required to work normal office hours, maintained a long-term relationship with his employer, and did not perform medical services for a fee except for patients assigned by his employer. The employer provided his office space, paid for hospital staff privileges and provided a substantial portion of his medical equipment. Although the taxpayer substantiated that he paid legal fees and professional dues in connection with his employment, they were miscellaneous itemized deductions and the two-percent limitation prevented any deduction of these expenses for the tax year at issue.


T.C. Summary Opinion 2009-53]
Walter N. Maimon v. Commissioner.

Docket No. 8008-07S . Filed April 20, 2009.



GOEKE, Judge: This case is before the Court pursuant to the provisions of section 7463 of the Internal Revenue Code in effect at the time the petition was filed. 1 Pursuant to section 7463(b), the decision to be entered is not reviewable by any other court, and this opinion shall not be treated as precedent for any other case.

Respondent determined an $11,793 Federal income tax deficiency for 2004. The issues for decisions are: (1) Whether petitioner was an independent contractor for 2004 entitled to report income and expenses on a Schedule C, Profit or Loss From Business; and (2) should we determine that petitioner is an employee, whether petitioner is entitled to miscellaneous itemized deductions of $24,615 for 2004.


Background

The stipulation of facts and the accompanying exhibits are incorporated by this reference. Petitioner resided in Ohio at the time of filing his petition.

Petitioner is a medical doctor and specializes in head and neck surgery, otolaryngology, and facial plastic surgery. During 2004 petitioner provided medical services to patients through Dayton Head and Neck Surgeons, Inc. (DHN). Petitioner's biographical information is listed on DHN's Web site under the Web page designated "Physicians and Professional Staff". Petitioner joined DHN as a shareholder in 1999. Before joining DHN, petitioner was in sole practice for approximately 10 years.

On July 1, 2001, petitioner and seven other doctors executed a shareholders' agreement and close corporation agreement (shareholder agreement) with each doctor an equal shareholder. The physician shareholders of DHN had different areas of specialty and organized DHN to share overhead and operating expenses and agreed to share revenues equally. On that same date, petitioner executed an employment agreement with DHN effective until June 30, 2004. Thereafter, the employment agreement would be automatically renewed for additional 1-year terms unless the employee resigned, died, became disabled, or was terminated by DHN. The employment agreement expressly identified petitioner as an "employee" of DHN and provided that he agreed to serve as an officer and member of the board of directors. The terms of the employment agreement provided:

the Employee shall, under the supervision of the physician members of the Corporation's Board of Directors, devote his working time, skill and experience to advancing and rendering profitable the interests of the Corporation * * *.

The employment agreement placed additional requirements on petitioner relating to: (1) Maintaining and improving DHN's standing within the community; (2) maintaining telephone service and other appropriate equipment at his residence; (3) attending annual continuing education courses; and (4) maintaining hospital staff privileges. The employment agreement provided that DHN would reimburse petitioner for the costs of continuing education courses, hospital staff dues, professional societies, professional publications, and other professional expenses in accordance with policies established by the board of directors. The employment agreement also provided for paid vacation leave for petitioner and required DHN to maintain malpractice insurance on petitioner.

Under the terms of the employment agreement, petitioner agreed that all patients that he treated were regarded as DHN's patients and all records and files, including patient files, were considered the property of DHN. Petitioner further agreed that DHN was entitled to "receive any and all fees arising out of his rendition of medical services." DHN agreed to pay petitioner an annual base salary of $253,000 with increases set by the board of directors. Petitioner's annual base salary in 2004 remained at $253,000. Petitioner was also eligible to receive annual bonuses. The bonus was based on DHN's net annual profits and not on petitioner's individual performance. The employment agreement provided that petitioner would receive the same amount of total annual compensation, consisting of the base salary and bonus, as the other physician shareholders. Finally, under the terms of the employment agreement, petitioner would receive "supplemental bonus compensation" of $30,076 during the period ending December 31, 2004, in consideration of petitioner's senior status with DHN.

During 2001 through 2007 DHN employed receptionists to schedule patient appointments for its doctors, processed insurance claims for patients, billed and collected money from patients for medical services its doctors and medical staff performed, accepted assignments for all Medicare and Medicaid patients, required new patients to complete paperwork relating to patient information and insurance information, and required returning patients to complete a health history form, including for petitioner and petitioner's patients. By signing the paperwork, the patient authorized DHN: (1) To provide diagnostic and treatment services to the patient; (2) to submit claims to the patient's insurance carrier or its intermediaries for all covered services the doctor rendered and authorized and directed the patient's insurance carrier to issue payment directly to DHN; and (3) to furnish complete information to the patient's insurance carrier or its intermediaries regarding services rendered. DHN provided patients, including petitioner's, with a "Notice of Privacy Practices" and required them to sign a "Privacy Practices Acknowledgement". Petitioner had a personal scheduler assigned to him who scheduled his appointments and surgical procedures. Although petitioner chose this person, the person was paid by DHN. Petitioner managed his patient records and provided billing codes to DHN's billing staff to prepare patient billing statements.

DHN leased real properties where it provided medical services at five office locations in Ohio. In 2004 petitioner saw patients at two of these office locations --in Centerville, Ohio, and Dayton, Ohio. Petitioner performed surgery at Miami Valley Hospital and Kettering Medical Center. DHN also leased medical, communication, and computer equipment and other fixtures for use at its office locations. In 2004 DHN maintained office hours on Monday through Friday from 8:30 a.m to 5 p.m. Petitioner was required to work nine half-day shifts, or 4-1/2 days, per week during these set office hours. Petitioner could choose his half-day off each week. Petitioner was required to be on call on a rotating basis to accept assignments DHN scheduled at night and on Sundays and holidays. Petitioner could pay another doctor from DHN to take his turn on call. The doctors were not required to see a specific number of patients. The number of patients per hour varied among the doctors and depended in part on the doctor's specialty. Petitioner was paid a prorated portion of his annual salary biweekly and received the same amount of compensation regardless of the number of patients that he saw during the biweekly pay period.

The shareholder and employment agreements provided that DHN had the right to terminate petitioner upon a vote of all, except one, of the shareholders. The agreements did not require DHN to have cause for petitioner's termination. Upon termination, petitioner had the right to a wage continuation payment of $120,000 for past services, subject to certain conditions, in addition to his accrued but unpaid base salary, a prorated annual bonus, and earned and unpaid balance of the supplemental bonus compensation. The employment agreement required petitioner to give DHN 60 days' notice to terminate his relationship with DHN. Petitioner's failure to give 60 days' notice could result in the forfeiture of his right to payments upon termination.

Petitioner participated in DHN's employee retirement benefit plan. For 2004 DHN made contributions to the plan on petitioner's behalf. Petitioner did not report these contributions as income for 2004. Nor did petitioner report earnings on the account balance as income for 2004. For 2004 petitioner received paid vacation and holidays from DHN. DHN also provided medical insurance and disability insurance to petitioner and paid petitioner's premiums for both policies during 2004. DHN also paid the premiums for petitioner's malpractice liability insurance during 2004.

For 2004 petitioner received a Form W-2, Wage and Tax Statement, from DHN reporting $409,300 in compensation paid to petitioner as "Wages, tips, other compensation" in box 1. DHN did not check the box on the Form W-2 to indicate that petitioner was a statutory employee. In 2004 DHN withheld Federal, State, and local income taxes and Social Security and Medicare taxes from the compensation paid to petitioner. Petitioner did not pay any self-employment taxes for 2004. Petitioner did not receive compensation from any other source during 2004 for providing medical services, and petitioner did not perform medical services for a fee outside of his relationship with DHN.

For 2004 petitioner filed a Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, and left blank line 7 "Wages, salaries, tips, etc." He attached Schedule C to his 2004 return and reported "physician" as his principal business or profession. On the Schedule C petitioner reported gross receipts or sales of $409,300, the wage amount shown on the Form W-2 DHN issued. He checked the box to incorrectly indicate that the statutory employee box was checked on his Form W-2.

During 2004 petitioner paid legal fees of $22,155 in connection with a lawsuit filed against him, among others, for medical negligence. In 2004 petitioner settled the lawsuit for $1.4 million with his malpractice insurer's agreeing to pay $400,000 and petitioner's agreeing to pay $1 million. Petitioner paid the $1 million settlement during 2005. During 2004 petitioner paid membership dues of $440 to the American College of Surgeons Professional Association. Petitioner reported total expenses of $24,615, consisting of legal fees of $24,175 and professional dues of $440, on the Schedule C.

In September 2006 petitioner requested that DHN issue an amended Form W-2 for 2004. DHN's business manager informed petitioner that the issuance of an amended Form W-2 was not appropriate, and petitioner did not receive the requested amended Form W-2 from DHN. For the years 2001 to 2003 and 2005 to 2006 petitioner received Forms W-2 from DHN reporting his compensation as "Wages, tips, other compensation" and the withholding of Federal, State, and local income taxes and Social Security and Medicare taxes. For 2001 to 2003 petitioner reported the compensation received from DHN on Form 1040, line 7, "Wages, salaries, tips, etc.", on Form 1040 and did not file a Schedule C with his returns. For 2005 petitioner reported the compensation received from DHN on line 7 "Wages, salaries, tips, etc." and attached a Schedule C to the return. The Schedule C did not report any gross receipts or sales but claimed expenses of over $1 million, including the $1 million settlement payment for the medical negligence lawsuit. For 2006 petitioner attached a Schedule C to his return and reported gross receipts and sales of $507,944, which is $50 less than the amount shown as compensation on his Form W-2 from DHN and claimed expenses of $992. Petitioner checked the box on line 1 of the 2006 Schedule C to incorrectly indicate that his Form W-2 identified him as a statutory employee.


Discussion

Petitioner contends that he is an independent contractor for Federal income tax purposes and is entitled to deduct business expenses on Schedule C. An individual performing services as an employee may deduct expenses incurred in the performance of services as an employee as miscellaneous itemized deductions on Schedule A, Itemized Deductions, to the extent the expenses exceed 2 percent of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income. Secs. 62(a)(2), 63(a), (d), 67(a) and (b), 162(a). An individual who performs services as an independent contractor is entitled to deduct expenses incurred in the performance of services on Schedule C and is not subject to the 2-percent limitation imposed on miscellaneous itemized deductions. Although petitioner claimed on his 2004 return that he was a statutory employee, he has acknowledged that he does not qualify as a statutory employee as defined in section 3121(d).



I. Employment Classification
Respondent contends that petitioner was an employee of DHN because he was an officer of DHN and under the common law definition of employee. Although petitioner agreed in his employment and shareholder agreements to serve as an officer, petitioner credibly testified that he did not in fact serve as an officer during 2004. Neither the shareholder nor the employment agreement assigned any official responsibilities to petitioner. Respondent has not identified any such duties assigned to petitioner. However, a determination of whether petitioner was an officer is not necessary because we find below that he was a common law employee of DHN.

Whether an individual is an employee or an independent contractor is a factual question to which common law principles apply. Weber v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. 378, 386 (1994), affd. 60 F.3d 1104 (4th Cir. 1995). Guidelines for determining the existence of an employment relationship are found in three substantially similar sections of the regulations: Sections 31.3121(d)-1, 31.3306(i)-1, and 31.3401(c)-1, Employment Tax Regs., relating to FICA, FUTA, and income tax withholding, respectively, that adopt the common law definition of an employee. Under the common law, an employer-employee relationship exists when the principal has the right to control and direct the service provider, not only as to the result to be accomplished but also as to the details and means by which that result is accomplished. Secs. 31.3121(d)-1(c)(2), 31.3306(i)-1(b), Employment Tax Regs.; see also sec. 31.3401(c)-1(b), Employment Tax Regs. Factors that are relevant in evaluating whether a worker is a common law employee or an independent contractor include: (1) The degree of control the principal exercised; (2) which party invests in work facilities the worker used; (3) the worker's opportunity for profit or loss; (4) whether the principal can discharge the worker; (5) whether the work is part of the principal's regular business; (6) the permanency of the relationship; and (7) the relationship the parties believed they were creating. Ewens & Miller, Inc. v. Commissioner, 117 T.C. 263, 270 (2001); Weber v. Commissioner, supra at 387. All of the facts and circumstance of each case are considered, and no single factor is dispositive. Ewens & Miller, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra at 270.

A. Degree of Control

While no single factor is dispositive, the degree of control the alleged employer exercised over the details of the work is the "crucial test" in determining employment status. Weber v. Commissioner, supra at 387. An employment relationship exists where the principal has the right to control the details, manner, or method of the individual's work. Sec. 31.3121(d)-1(c)(2), Employment Tax Regs. In contrast, an independent contractor is hired to accomplish a specific result, and the principal has the right only to specify the result it desires. Id. It is not necessary for the principal to actually exercise control; it is sufficient if the principal has the right to control. Weber v. Commissioner, supra at 387; Potter v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-356. The employer need not stand over the individual and direct every detail of the individual's work. Weber v. Commissioner, supra at 388.

Petitioner maintains that Ohio State law prohibits DHN from exercising control over him in matters relating to patient care and treatment. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. sec. 1785.03 (LexisNexis 2004). DHN did not control or supervise petitioner's medical judgment, including patient diagnoses, what medications to prescribe, or what treatments or procedures to perform. Petitioner had discretion to schedule the length of his patient appointments, to consult with physicians outside of DHN, and to determine whether to continue to treat a patient. Petitioner also maintained the ability to choose outside pathologists, laboratories, and other medical services and to choose the hospitals or surgical centers where he would maintain hospital privileges. Petitioner also chose the hospital personnel to assist him, but neither petitioner nor DHN paid the hospital staff.

The degree of control necessary to find employee status varies with the nature of the services the worker provides. See Ewens & Miller, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra at 270; Youngs v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-94, affd. without published opinion 98 F.3d 1348 (9th Cir. 1996). The threshold level of control necessary to find employee status is lower when applied to professional services than when applied to nonprofessional services. Profl. & Executive Leasing, Inc. v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 225, 234 (1987), affd. 862 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1988); James v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 1296, 1301 (1956). An alleged employer's control over professional services "must necessarily be more tenuous and general than the control over nonprofessional employees." James v. Commissioner, supra at 1301.

We do not agree that petitioner was not subject to DHN's control. Petitioner was required to work 4-1/2 days during office hours DHN set. Although petitioner chose his half-day off, he did not have the flexibility in his schedule that is indicative of an independent contractor. The employment agreement provided that petitioner would render medical services "under the supervision of the physician members" of DHN. Petitioner agreed that all patients belonged to DHN and was required to submit patient records to DHN for billing and insurance purposes. Petitioner did not provide medical services outside of his relationship with DHN.

Although petitioner exercised his medical judgment when rendering medical services, his methods were directed by professional standards set by the medical community. Because of the lower measure of control applicable to professionals, the fact that DHN did not control his patient diagnoses and treatments does not preclude a finding that DHN exercised sufficient control over petitioner to establish an employment relationship. See James v. Commissioner, supra; Chaplin v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-58. We find that DHN had a right of control over petitioner sufficient to find an employment relationship.

B. Investment in Facilities

The fact that a worker provides his own equipment indicates independent contractor status. Ewens & Miller, Inc. v. Commissioner, 117 T.C. at 271. Petitioner provided medical services only at offices DHN leased and at hospitals or surgical facilities where he had staff privileges. The employment agreement provided that DHN would pay for petitioner's hospital staff dues. Petitioner did not provide medical services outside of facilities provided or paid for by DHN. DHN also provided clerical, central billing, and purchasing staff.

Petitioner testified that he provided some specialized equipment that he used to treat patients. However, DHN also leased medical, communications, and computer equipment and other fixtures for use in its office locations. Similarly, the hospitals and medical centers where petitioner performed procedures provided necessary equipment. Petitioner did not quantify his investment in equipment relative to DHN's. Any investment by petitioner is offset by DHN's investment in office locations and equipment and payment of hospital dues. Moreover, petitioner did not use the equipment to provide medical services for a fee outside of his relationship with DHN. This factor supports employment status.

C. Opportunity for Profit or Loss

An opportunity for profit or loss indicates nonemployee status. Simpson v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 974, 988 (1975). On the other hand, earning an hourly wage or fixed salary indicates an employer-employee relationship exists. Kumpel v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-265.

Pursuant to the employment agreement, petitioner agreed that DHN was entitled to any fees arising from his medical services. The employment agreement guaranteed petitioner a base salary regardless of the number of patients he saw or the amount of medical fees he generated. There was no requirement to generate a certain level of patient fees to receive a bonus or an increase in base salary. Rather, petitioner received bonuses based on the annual net profits of DHN and not on the amount of medical fees he personally generated. The employment agreement provided that each shareholder physician would receive the same amount of total annual compensation. If petitioner increased the amount of medical fees he generated, the increase would be shared equally by all the doctors at DHN. His opportunity for profit was as a shareholder of DHN rather than from rendering medical services. Further, petitioner did not perform any medical services for a fee outside of his relationship with DHN where he could have an opportunity for profit.

Petitioner had some risk of loss as a shareholder of DHN if DHN operated at a loss. The fact that petitioner incurred an individual loss on the settlement was a business decision he made, but it supports a finding that he held a risk of loss. Therefore, this factor on the whole favors independent contractor status.

D. Right To Terminate the Relationship

In determining employment status, courts consider the manner in which the relationship can be terminated; i.e., by one or both parties, at any time, with or without notice. Ewens & Miller, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra at 273. The right to discharge a worker, and the worker's right to quit, at any time indicate employee status.

Under the terms of the shareholder and employment agreements DHN had the right to discharge petitioner by vote of all except one of the shareholders with or without cause and without notice. Upon termination, DHN would be required to pay petitioner a "wage continuation payment" of $120,000 for his prior services to DHN. Similarly, petitioner could terminate his relationship with DHN with or without cause although he was required to give 60 days' notice of his resignation. A unilateral notice requirement on the part of the worker does not support independent contractor status. Chaplin v. Commissioner, supra (notice requirement did not indicate employee status). But see Levine v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-86 (notice by alleged employer supports independent contractor status).

Petitioner's right to receive a wage continuation payment upon termination is at best a neutral factor. The employment agreement provided that the payment would be for past services. It would not constitute a payment for breach of contract or petitioner's right to perform future services under the contract. Both parties to the employment agreement had the right to terminate the relationship with or without cause, and DHN could terminate the relationshipwithout notice. This factor supports a finding of employment status.

E. Integral Part of Regular Business

Integration of a worker's services into the business operations of the alleged employer indicates employee status. DHN is in the business of providing medical services. Petitioner, as a physician member, is integrally involved in that business. This factor supports a finding that petitioner was an employee of DHN.

F. Permanency of Relationship

A continuing relationship indicates an employment relationship while a transitory relationship weighs in favor of independent contractor status. Ewens & Miller, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra at 273. The parties' contemplation of a continuing relationship indicates an employment relationship. Ellison v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 142, 155 (1970). In contrast, a relationship established to accomplish a specified objective is indicative of an independent contractor relationship. Id.

In his pretrial memorandum petitioner acknowledged that the doctors at DHN intended a long-lasting relationship but argues this fact is not significant. Petitioner had a long-term relationship with DHN. He joined DHN as a shareholder in 1999. The employment agreement contemplated an initial 3-year term with automatic 1-year renewals thereafter. Given the continuing nature of the relationship, this factor supports a finding of employee status.

G. Intent of the Parties

The parties clearly intended to create an employment relationship. The employment agreement expressly identified petitioner as an employee of DHN. DHN reported petitioner's compensation on Form W-2 and withheld income, Social Security, and Medicare taxes consistent with this expressed intent. Petitioner did not make quarterly estimated tax payments. For the years 2001 through 2003 DHN similarly reported petitioner's compensation on Forms W-2 and withheld taxes. For these years petitioner reported his compensation from DHN as wages on line 7 of his Forms 1040 and did not report the income or his expenses on Schedule C as he did for 2004.

DHN provided employment benefits to petitioner, including paid vacation and holidays, medical and disability insurance, participation in a retirement plan, and malpractice insurance. DHN also agreed to reimburse petitioner for the cost of continuing education classes. Petitioner did not include in gross income DHN's contributions to his retirement account. DHN refused to issue an amended Form W-2 to petitioner to indicate that he was a statutory employee. This factor supports a finding of an employment relationship.

H. Conclusion

We find that petitioner is a common law employee of DHN. Petitioner entered into a contract with DHN that expressly identified him as an employee. Consistent with that intent, petitioner received a fixed salary without regard to the medical fees he generated, received paid vacations, employee benefits, and reimbursement for expenses, participated in an employee retirement plan, and received Forms W-2 reporting his compensation. Petitioner was required to work normal office hours, maintained a long-term relationship with DHN, and did not perform medical services for a fee except for his DHN patients. DHN provided his office space, paid for hospital staff privileges, and provided a substantial portion of his medical equipment. Petitioner accepted his employee classification with DHN for prior years as defined in the employment agreement but sought to change that treatment once faced with the enormous expense from the employment-related lawsuit and settlement in 2004 and 2005. The fact that petitioner was a medical professional with discretion to exercise his professional judgment in patient care and treatment does not negate the strong evidence that shows that he was a common law employee of DHN.

As a common law employee, petitioner must report his compensation from DHN on Form 1040, line 7 and is not entitled to deduct the claimed business expenses on Schedule C. He must claim the expenses on Schedule A as unreimbursed employee business expenses subject to the 2-percent limitation for miscellaneous itemized expenses.



II. Miscellaneous Itemized Deduction
We find that petitioner has substantiated that he paid legal fees of $22,155 and professional dues of $440 during 2004. Petitioner is entitled to deduct these expenses incurred in connection with his employment as itemized deductions subject to the 2-percent limitation of section 67(a). However, the 2-percent limitation denies any deduction of these expenses for 2004.

To reflect the foregoing,

Decision will be entered for respondent.

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the year at issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure, unless otherwise indicated.


Employer-Employee Relationship: Independent contractors

An individual taxpayer's work relationship with the State Department under two personal service contracts was that of an independent contractor and, as such, the taxpayer was entitled to deduct a contribution to her simplified employee pension. Although some of the evidence indicated an employee status, the totality of the facts pointed toward an independent contractor status. The taxpayer was responsible for planning and carrying out the projects and the State Department had little control over the taxpayer's work. In addition, the taxpayer was not entitled to most of the benefits available to the full-time employees. Finally, the special skills required under the contracts, the transitory character of the work relationship, and the right of both parties to terminate the contacts without cause upon a 30-day notice, further supported the taxpayer's independent contractor status.

L.B. Levine, 89 TCM 1063, Dec. 55,997(M), TC Memo. 2005-86.

A rehabilitation hospital failed to demonstrate that its psychologists were independent contractors rather than employees because it had the right to control the means and methods by which they performed their work. Although the taxpayer did not provide the psychologists with significant employee benefits and they had control over the specific times they worked, they were hired at an hourly or yearly rate, were required to work for a set period per year, and performed all of their work on its premises. The taxpayer provided significant support services, paid for required training and conferences, and provided billing services. Moreover, only the director of psychological services had any role over the process of hiring or firing support staff.

Kentfield Medical Hospital Corp., DC Calif., 2002-2 USTC ¶50,542, 215 FSupp2d 1064.

A bankruptcy court had no jurisdiction to determine whether an attorney improperly characterized his sole proprietorship as an S corporation and his employees as independent contractors to avoid paying employment taxes. The bankruptcy court was considering the taxpayer's liability for the trust fund recovery penalty and the underlying tax issues were not in its jurisdiction.

R.A. Smith, DC Hawaii, 99-2 USTC ¶50,998, 243 BR 89. Aff'd on another issue, CA-9 (unpublished opinion), 2001-1 USTC ¶50,156, 246 F3d 676.

A vehicle transportation corporation's treatment of its drivers as independent contractors for federal tax purposes was determined to be improper. The taxpayer maintained considerable control over the drivers, integrated their services into its business operations, and provided them with necessary equipment. The fact that the drivers signed independent contractor agreements was not dispositive as to their correct classification for federal tax purposes.

Leb's Enterprises, Inc., DC Ill., 2000-1 USTC ¶50,182.

A bricklayer was liable for self-employment tax on unreported income that he received from a corporation in connection with the purchase and sale of used automobile parts. Although the corporation issued him payroll checks and Forms W-2 in connection with his wages, he did not receive the unreported income in the capacity of an employee. The corporation did not have the right to control his activities, he was not obligated to devote his time to the corporation, and the corporation did not supply him with equipment, training or workspace. Accordingly, he received the unreported income as an independent contractor.

M. Vetrano, 79 TCM 1853, Dec. 53,845(M), TC Memo. 2000-128.

Workers at a major software company who were deemed by the IRS to be common-law employees qualified for benefits under the terms of the company's cash or deferred arrangement (CODA). Under the terms of the CODA, employees, including common-law employees, were eligible to participate in the CODA if they were on the U.S. payroll of the employer. Because the common-law employees were paid through the accounts receivable department and not the payroll department, the employer excluded them from the CODA. The CODA could be reasonably read to extend eligibility to the common-law employees. The fact that the company did not intend to provide benefits to workers who it thought were independent contractors did not make the common-law employees ineligible for the CODA.

D. Vizcaino, CA-9, 96-2 USTC ¶50,533, 97 F3d 1187.

On rehearing en banc, the court arrived at substantially the same conclusion as above. In the suit on rehearing, the software company had conceded that the workers were employees rather than independent contractors. Thus, the company's rationale for rejecting the worker's participation in the plan was invalid.

D. Vizcaino, on rehearing en banc, CA-9, 97-2 USTC ¶50,572, 120 F3d 1006. Cert. denied, 1/2/98.

On remand, because the question of whether the temporary employees were not common-law employees had never been presented or argued, the class remained as it was originally defined, until the employer properly presented the issue of whether the temporary employees were common-law employees. The class as originally certified included workers the employer had classified as temporary employees and paid through temporary employment agencies, as well as workers whom the employer had paid directly as independent contractors.

D. Vizcaino, DC Wash., 98-1 USTC ¶50,240.

In a subsequent action, the temporary workers were held to be common-law employees of the company before and after they were transferred from independent contractor status to temporary employment agencies. The workers had no contact with their respective temporary agencies except to receive their paychecks and Forms W-2, signed agreements with, or involving, a temporary agency at the company's command and their work relationship with the company appeared to be indefinite. Moreover, all workers who, like the named parties, were retroactively reclassified by the company as employees and later transferred to temporary employment agencies were included in the class definition.

D. Vizcaino, DC Wash., 98-2 USTC ¶50,595.

In the above case a petition for mandamus by the employees to enforce the appellate court's mandate regarding the composition of the class and overturn the orders that reduced the class was granted. A federal district court's order in a class action suit limiting membership in the plaintiff class, conflicted with the appellate court's mandate that all of a corporation's common law employees were entitled to participate in the company's employee stock purchase plan (ESPP) both before and after their conversion to temporary employee status in essentially the same jobs.

D. Vizcaino, CA-9, 99-1 USTC ¶50,531, 173 F3d 713; granting mandamus to enforce 97-2 USTC ¶50,572, 120 F3d 1006. Cert. denied, 1/10/2000.

Taxpayer's declaration that his employees were independent subcontractors was not determinative where he retained the right of control over their activities, making them employees subject to income tax withholding.

H.W. Polk, CA-9, 77-1 USTC ¶9335, 550 F2d 566.

A world-renowned specialist in malariology working in Pakistan with its Ministry of Health was an independent contractor rather than an employee of a U.S. agency. Despite having a personal service contract with the agency, which provided for tax withholding, report schedules and leave accrual, the agency did not supervise or have actual control over the doctor's work for the Pakistani government and it lacked the intent to retain control over his work.

W. Chin, CA-9, 95-1 USTC ¶50,302.

A jury determined that salesmen for a fence construction firm were employees subject to withholding. However, it was further determined that men who set the posts and built the fences were independent contractors.

R.J. King, DC Tex., 71-2 USTC ¶9652.

A jury found that auto repairmen were independent contractors.

E & W Auto, Inc., DC, 75-1 USTC ¶9295.

Except for two salaried men, exterminators were independent contractors. These men, rather than the employer, determined the details and means by which they accomplished the performance of their jobs.

W.C. Lieb, Jr., d/b/a AAA Exterminator, DC, 77-1 USTC ¶9356, 438 FSupp 1015.

Marketing directors engaged in the course of sales operations were found to be employees and not independent contractors.

World Market Center, Inc., DC, 77-1 USTC ¶9277.

The taxpayer's characterization of certain individuals as employees, rather than as independent contractors, on his tax returns was binding.

R.A. Clark, DC, 77-1 USTC ¶9397.

A bankrupt bicycle assemly company was an employer for purposes of the liability for withholding and depositing federal income and employment taxes. The workers were employees and were subject to the will and control of the company. It was not necessary that the employer actually direct or control the manner in which the services were performed; it was sufficient that the employer had the right to do so. The company developed customers, billed the stores directly for the work performed, and paid the employees for work completed. In addition, the employment agreement which stated that the employees were independent contractors contained a noncompetition clause that was consistent with an employer/employee relationship and not with independent contractor status.

Associated Bicycle Service, Inc., BC-DC Ind., 91-1 USTC ¶50,134, 128 BR 436.

A corporation was not liable for failing to withhold federal social security and unemployment taxes for non-owner real estate appraisers it retained and classified as independent contractors. Thus, the company was entitled to a refund of taxes and interest on such taxes it paid. The treatment of appraisers as independent contractors was a long-standing recognized practice of a significant segment of the appraisal industry. Additionally, common law requirements for classification as independent contractors were met. The appraisers were distinguishable from other appraisers who owned interests in the company and were considered company employees because the latter had managerial control and performed substantial duties distinct from the non-owner appraisers.

REAG, Inc., DC Okla., 92-2 USTC ¶50,475, 801 FSupp 494 (Nonacq.).

Genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment as to whether a corporation that installed cable-television connections could be assessed employment taxes related to installers treated as independent contractors. Although the corporation claimed that it did not retain control to direct the means by which the installers performed their services, other evidence indicated that the corporation trained the installers and could unilaterally terminate them.

Prince Cable, Inc., DC Del., 98-1 USTC ¶50,377.

Carpet installers who provided services for a floor covering company qualified as independent contractors; thus, the company was not liable for employment taxes with regard to those workers. The company maintained little control over the installers. It contracted with them on a per job basis. Also, the installers negotiated prices for jobs, could turn a job down, and were free to work for other companies during the same time period that they worked for the company. However, the company was the statutory employer of the installers' helpers and liable for employment taxes that should have been withheld and paid but were not.

Consolidated Flooring Services, FedCl, 97-2 USTC ¶50,680, 38 FedCl 450, supplemented by Consolidated Flooring Services, FedCl, 99-1 USTC ¶50,434, 42 FedCl 878.

In a subsequent decision on the case, the court clarified that employment tax withholding and payment obligations included withholding income taxes and the employee's portion of FICA taxes, and payment of the employer's portion of FICA and FUTA taxes.

Consolidated Flooring Services, FedCl, 99-1 USTC ¶50,434, 42 FedCl 878 supplementing Consolidated Flooring Services, FedCl, 97-2 USTC ¶50,680, 38 FedCl 450.

A corporation was not liable for failing to withhold employment taxes for one of its director/shareholders because he was an independent contractor. The board of directors did not have control over the director. The corporation consistently treated him as an independent contractor, as it never paid employment taxes on amounts paid to him, and he reported all amounts received from the corporation as self-employment income on his federal income tax returns. Furthermore, the corporation did not train him, pay him during regular payroll periods or give him any fringe benefits. Although the individual held the title of treasurer, he performed only minor services as treasurer.

Seeds, Inc., DC Wash., 98-2 USTC ¶50,767.

The pastor of a church was an independent contractor and not an employee of the church because he was subject to the control of the church only as to the result to be accomplished by his work and not as to the means and methods for accomplishing the work. The minister was not supervised by anyone, and he was not evaluated regularly. He could hire, supervise and fire assistants as he saw fit and had the power to adjust his own salary.

R.A. Shelley, 68 TCM 584, Dec. 50,090(M), TC Memo. 1994-432.

A foreign missionary was an independent contractor, not an employee, because the ministry did not exercise the requisite degree of control over his work. The offices that coordinated the efforts of the missionaries did not provide the taxpayer with professional training and did not assign him to a particular location or project. Taxpayer set his own work days, hours, and rate of pay and was not directly supervised by anyone. He used his personal car and telephone to raise funds and hired and paid his own assistants. Since the taxpayer was not guaranteed minimum compensation and forfeited any funds raised upon resignation, he had some opportunity for profit and risk of loss. Finally, the ministry lacked the power to discharge the taxpayer and both parties believed they had established an independent contractor relationship.

R.G. Greene, 72 TCM 1406, Dec. 51,675(M), TC Memo. 1996-531.

A make-up artist was an employee of the companies for which she provided services. The companies reported her compensation as wage income on Forms W-2, controlled the performance of her services, and considered her to be an employee. Moreover, she did not qualify as a "statutory employee" under Code Sec. 3121(d)(3).

P.M. Kelly, 77 TCM 1920, Dec. 53,356(M), TC Memo. 1999-140.

An individual who operated a trucking company improperly classified its truck drivers as independent contractors. He maintained considerable control over the truck drivers even though he left the day-to-day details to them. The drivers also testified that they reported the income they earned as wages on their tax returns.

R.P. Day, 80 TCM 834, Dec. 54,150(M), TC Memo. 2000-375.

A property management company acting as an independent contractor in the care and operation of improved real estate for the owner is the employer of individuals engaged by the company to perform services on the property.

Rev. Rul. 70-266, 1970-1 CB 204.

Agents operating bulk plants for oil companies that do not have control or right of control over details and means of operation sufficient to establish an employer-employee relationship are regarded as independent contractors for withholding purposes.

Rev. Rul. 70-446, 1970-2 CB 215.

Individuals performing services for a company in the construction of a Federal project under a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract with the United States Department of Navy are employees of the company.

Rev. Rul. 71-356, 1971-2 CB 350.

Individuals operating retail liquor agencies under agency agreements with a regulator of alcoholic beverages were not employees for federal employment tax purposes. The individuals were independent contractors because they were responsible for providing all of the supplies and for carrying the financial burden of the agency, received a commission on a monthly basis rather than an hourly wage, were not required to follow a routine or schedule, and were free to work for others.

IRS Letter Ruling 9419005, January 28, 1994.

Although a member of an employer association that supplied workers to companies possessed and exercised direction and control over the workers and provided them with compensation and benefits, it was not the workers' common law employer because its administrative responsibilities were limited and its services were similar to those of a payroll agent. However, the taxpayer was the employer under Code Sec. 3401(d)(1) with respect to compensation that it paid to the workers because, as a third party, it paid the workers from its own funds and was reimbursed its client companies. For purposes of determining the workers' wages under Code Secs. 3121(a)(1) and 3306(b)(1), the entity was not the employer. Rather, a separate wage base applied to compensation paid to the workers for the services performed for each company.

IRS Letter Ruling 199918056, November 12, 1998.

The IRS has released a fact sheet reminding businesses to properly classify their workers for tax purposes.

IRS Fact Sheet FS-2006-21, June 14, 2006.

An individual hired to do tiling work as a part of a condominium renovation was not an employee, but, rather, was an independent contractor liable for self-employment tax. The taxpayer was hired to do the work at a set price, and the cost of the materials necessary for the tile work was borne by him; only the tile itself was provided by the party performing the renovation. The taxpayer's degree of control over his own work, the fact that he provided his own tools and materials, his risk of loss on the project, the fact that he could not be discharged from the job, the lack of permanency in the relationship and the lack of intent to form an employer-employee relationship were consistent with independent contractor status. Only the fact that the taxpayer's work was integral to the renovation of the condominium indicated an employer-employee relationship.

U.V. Jones, Dec. 57,071(M), TC Memo. 2007-249.

The IRS has released a new form for workers that have been misclassified as independent contractors. Workers who were classified as independent contractors by their employers, but should have been classified as employees, should now file a Form 8919, Uncollected Social Security and Medicare Tax on Wages, starting with the 2007 tax year, if they also meet at least one of several criteria included in the guidance. Previously, misclassified workers have been required to file Form 4137, Social Security and Medicare Tax on Unreported Tip Income, for this purpose. While misclassified workers will no longer be using this form, it should still be used by certain tipped individuals.

IRS News Release IR-2007-203.


IRS News Release IR-2007-203 , December 20, 2007.

[ Code Sec. 3401]


Employer/employee relationship: Worker classification: Withholding. --
The IRS has released a new form for workers that have been misclassified as independent contractors. Workers who were classified as independent contractors by their employers, but should have been classified as employees, should now file a Form 8919, Uncollected Social Security and Medicare Tax on Wages, starting with the 2007 tax year if they meet at least one of several criteria included in the guidance. Back references: ¶33,538.01, ¶33,538.021, ¶33,538.022, ¶33,538.026 and ¶33,538.5057.



The Internal Revenue Service has developed a new form for employees who have been misclassified as independent contractors by an employer. Form 8919, Uncollected Social Security and Medicare Tax on Wages, will now be used to figure and report the employee's share of uncollected social security and Medicare taxes due on their compensation.

Generally, a worker who receives a Form 1099 for services provided as an independent contractor must report the income on Schedule C and pay self-employment tax on the net profit, using Schedule SE. However, sometimes the worker is incorrectly treated as an independent contractor when they are actually an employee. When this happens, Form 8919 will be used beginning for tax year 2007 by workers who performed services for an employer but the employer did not withhold the worker's share of social security and Medicare taxes.

In addition, the worker must meet one of several criteria indicating they were an employee while performing the services. The criteria include:
 The worker has filed Form SS-8, Determination of Worker Status for Purposes of Federal Employment Taxes and Income Tax Withholding, and received a determination letter from the IRS stating they are an employee of the firm.

 The worker has been designated as a section 530 employee by their employer or by the IRS prior to January 1, 1997.

 The worker has received other correspondence from the IRS that states they are an employee.

 The worker was previously treated as an employee by the firm and they are performing services in a similar capacity and under similar direction and control.

 The worker's co-workers are performing similar services under similar direction and control and are treated as employees.

 The worker's co-workers are performing similar services under similar direction and control and filed Form SS-8 for the firm and received a determination that they were employees.

 The worker has filed Form SS-8 with the IRS and has not yet received a reply.

By using Form 8919, the worker's social security and Medicare taxes will be credited to their social security record. To facilitate this process, the IRS will electronically share Form 8919 data with the Social Security Administration.

In the past, misclassified workers often used Form 4137 to report their share of social security and Medicare taxes. Misclassified workers should no longer use this form. Instead, Form 4137 should now only be used by tipped employees to report social security and Medicare taxes on allocated tips and tips not reported to their employers.

Labels:

Monday, April 20, 2009

A "Hoyt partnership" limited partner's tax liabilities were not discharged in bankruptcy because the tax matters partner (TMP) validly extended the statute of limitations on assessment. The limitations period for the first three tax years was extended because the TMP filed a Tax Court petition and, therefore, the assessment period was tolled until the Tax Court issued a decision. The taxpayer's argument that the TMP had a serious conflict of interest that rendered the Tax Court petition invalid was rejected. Under the taxpayer's theory, the IRS could be barred from assessing properly owed taxes merely because the tax court was unable to adjudicate the petition before the limitations period had run. Therefore, the district court properly determined that the taxpayer's tax liability for this period was not discharged. However, the district court improperly determined that the taxpayer's liabilities for the second three-year period at issue were discharged because the TMP validly extended the assessment period. The TMP did not have a disabling conflict of interest because there was no evidence that the TMP had cause to prefer his own interests above his fiduciary duties and that the IRS knew that his actions were more than likely contrary to the wishes and interests of the limited partners.



In the Matter of Elvin L. Martinez Debtor. United States of America, Appellee-Cross-Appellant v. Elvin L. Martinez, Appellant-Cross-Appellee.

U.S. Court of Appeals, 5th Circuit; 07-31163, April 3, 2009.

Affirming in part and reversing in part a DC La. decision, 2005-2 USTC ¶50,524.

[ Code Secs. 6229, 6231 and 6501]





Before: Reavely, Barksdale and Garza, Circuit Judges.

REAVLEY, Circuit Judge: This appeal presents questions of a limitation bar to income tax adjustments for limited partnerships and the effectiveness of extensions executed by the tax matters partner. Debtor Elvin L. Martinez seeks to avoid tax liabilities associated with various partnerships for the years 1987 through 1993, which he contends were discharged in his personal bankruptcy because the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) failed to assess the taxes within the three-year limitations period for doing so. The issue on appeal is whether the limitations period was tolled by actions of the tax matters partner, Walter J. Hoyt, III. The bankruptcy court determined that for the years 1990 to 1993 Hoyt's challenge to the taxes in the tax court precluded the IRS from assessing any tax until completion of those proceedings, and therefore the later assessments for those years were not filed outside the limitations period, and Martinez's liabilities were not discharged. For the years 1987 to 1989, however, the court determined that Hoyt's consents on behalf of the partnership to extend the limitations period were invalid because Hoyt had a disabling conflict of interest of which the IRS was aware, and therefore Martinez's tax liabilities were discharged in bankruptcy. Martinez and the Government cross appeal from the district court's order affirming the bankruptcy court. We AFFIRM the district court's judgment with respect to the years 1990 to 1993, but we REVERSE with respect to the years 1987 to 1989.




I.


Beginning in the 1970s Walter J. Hoyt, III, formed scores of limited partnerships, ostensibly to engage in the business of breeding cattle and sheep. Although the partnerships owned real livestock, they actually served as abusive tax shelters from which individual tax savings could be achieved through partnership deductions and losses. Hoyt promoted the partnerships to investors around the country, much to his personal gain.

The partnership interests consisted of "units" purchased by investors with cash and promissory notes. The partners also used notes to buy the cattle from Hoyt's family-run cattle operation, which then acted as manager of the herds. The cattle purportedly would produce calves, which could be sold to cover the partnership costs. The herds would also increase in size through the purchase of additional mature cattle. Partnership losses and credits would be passed through to the individual partners to reduce their personal tax liabilities to zero and to obtain tax refunds. The refunds were used to cover the cost of the investors' investment and to make payments on the promissory notes. Hoyt was the general partner and prepared all of the tax returns for both the partnerships and most of the individual partners through his tax preparation firm.

Since 1980, the IRS and other government agencies had been investigating Hoyt's partnerships because of the suspicion that Hoyt routinely overvalued the cattle in order to achieve excessive depreciation, overstated the number of cattle in existence, and commingled the herd among the different partnerships. In 1989 the IRS unsuccessfully challenged Hoyt's partnerships in Bales v. Commissioner, 1 where the tax court held that the partnerships were not shams and that the individual partners were entitled to claim their allowable share of partnership losses. The IRS conducted criminal investigations of Hoyt from April 1984 to August 1987, and from July 1989 to October 1990. In each case the Government decided not to prosecute Hoyt. Hoyt was also investigated from August 1993 to October 1993 and again in September 1995, but each investigation ended without a prosecution. The Government was unable to prevail against Hoyt until 2001, when he was convicted of conspiracy, mail fraud, bankruptcy fraud, and money laundering in connection with partnership activities.

Debtor Martinez became an investor and partner with Hoyt in 1985 and remained involved in four partnerships until 1994. Hoyt was the designated tax matters partner for all of the partnerships and acted accordingly as liaison with the IRS in administrative and litigation proceedings on tax matters concerning the partnerships. 2 Beginning in 1988, the IRS sent numerous notices to Martinez about its concerns with Hoyt's activities and the claimed deductions and losses on partnerships returns. The notices stated the IRS's belief that purported tax shelter deductions and/or credits were not allowable and that, if claimed, the IRS planned to disallow them. The notices also informed Martinez that the Internal Revenue Code provided for penalties against partners for negligence, overvaluation, and understatement of income on partnership returns, and that if Hoyt claimed the deductions and credits Martinez might wish to seek an adjustment himself. The IRS also sent several notices in 1992 informing Martinez of problems with claimed deductions for passive losses that Hoyt advocated, and it suggested that Martinez might wish to file an amended personal return or consult with an accountant or attorney. Martinez did not respond to the IRS's notices and instead forwarded them to Hoyt.

Generally, when the IRS disagrees with a partnership's claim on a return it has three years in which to audit the return and issue a deficiency notice, known as a Notice of Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment. 3 The period for the tax assessment is then extended for one year after the adjustment. 4 In the instant case, the IRS disagreed with Hoyt's partnership returns for the tax years 1987 to 1989 but was unable to issue timely adjustments. Hoyt, acting as the tax matters partner, granted the IRS extensions of the three-year limitations period, however. The validity of the subsequent adjustments hinges on the validity of the extensions.

The extensions were signed from February 1991 to March 1993. Hoyt granted the first extension of the limitations period for 1987 because an IRS team was already conducting an audit for the years 1980-1986, and he wished to delay the 1987 audit until the earlier examination was complete. In December 1991 the IRS then asked Hoyt to agree to a second extension. It believed that without that extension it would have to close its audit and issue adjustments with blanket disallowances of all claimed deductions, but it wished to avoid that circumstance and wanted to obtain further documentation from Hoyt.

At about the same time that it asked for the extension, the IRS also informed Hoyt that it was considering assessing preparer penalties against him. Hoyt responded that he would grant the extensions to issue the adjustments if the IRS would agree to extend the limitations period for assessing the preparer penalties. The IRS finally agreed as part of a settlement in other litigation involving Hoyt's partnerships occurring in federal court in Oregon, where the IRS was seeking to conduct a physical headcount of the cattle. Hoyt agreed to the extensions and gave the IRS until December 31, 1993, to issue the adjustments for the 1987 to 1989 tax years. The IRS issued them before that deadline.

For the tax years 1990 to 1993, the IRS did not need any extensions and issued timely adjustments disagreeing with Hoyt's partnership returns. Hoyt challenged all of the adjustments from 1987 to 1993 by filing petitions in the tax court contesting them. Those challenges were still being litigated at the time the instant action was filed.

In August 2002 Martinez filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. The bankruptcy court issued a discharge, and the case was closed. The IRS subsequently sent notices of tax deficiency to Martinez for the years 1987 through 1993 in connection with improperly claimed deductions from his membership in Hoyt's partnerships. Martinez then reopened the bankruptcy case in October 2003 to claim that all of his tax liabilities had been discharged. Martinez's theory was that Hoyt had acted under a disabling conflict of interest when, as tax matters partner, Hoyt granted the IRS extensions of the limitations period for the 1987 to 1989 tax years and when he challenged the IRS's adjustments in the tax court for the 1990 to 1993 tax years. He reasoned that any taxes sought by the IRS were therefore no longer assessable and had been discharged by the bankruptcy proceeding.

After a two-day trial, the bankruptcy court issued a decision separately analyzing the two time periods. First, with respect to 1990 to 1993, the court held that the IRS issued valid adjustments, which Hoyt then challenged by filing timely tax court petitions. Once those petitions were entered on the tax court docket, said the court, the IRS was statutorily precluded from assessing a tax until the conclusion of the tax court proceedings, regardless of any alleged conflict of interest. Because those proceedings were still pending, the court held that the limitations period had been tolled and the tax liabilities for 1990 to 1993 were not discharged.

Second, with respect to 1987 to 1989, the bankruptcy court held that the taxes were no longer assessable and were discharged because when Hoyt had signed the extensions of the limitations period he had a disabling conflict of interest and had breached his fiduciary duty to his partners as the tax matters partner. The court found that internal IRS documents showed that Hoyt was committing fraud and deceiving his partners through his control over all aspects of the partnerships and tax documents. Hoyt's activity included preparing individual partner tax returns reflecting partnership losses when there were problems with shortages of cattle inventory and overvaluation of cattle. The court noted that the IRS was considering imposing return preparer penalties on Hoyt in December 1991 at the same time that it asked Hoyt to sign the extension of the limitations period for the 1987 to 1989 tax years. The court also found that Hoyt attempted to extract a quid pro quo for his agreement to sign the extensions because he conditioned the extensions on the IRS agreeing to extend the limitations period for the assessment of preparer penalties. The court referred to the transcript from the Oregon district court proceedings where Hoyt consented to the extension after the IRS agreed to forbear assessing preparer penalties until the adjustments issued. Finally, the court concluded that Hoyt was attempting to stall the IRS investigations and the issuance of the adjustments, and it noted that the IRS was concerned about issuing them without obtaining extensions. The court concluded that a delay benefitted Hoyt personally but was contrary to the interests of the partners. The court held that Hoyt was not acting in the interests of his partners when dealing with the IRS, and the extensions of the limitations period were therefore invalid because the IRS knew of the conflict. Because the extensions were invalid, the court held that the limitations period had run and the taxes for 1987 to 1989 were not properly assessable after Martinez filed the bankruptcy petition and were discharged.

Martinez and the Government cross appealed to the district court, which affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision. Both parties now cross appeal to this court.




II.


We review a district court's affirmance of a bankruptcy court decision by applying the same standard of review to the bankruptcy court decision that the district court applied. In re OCA, Inc. 5 "We thus generally review factual findings for clear error and conclusions of law de novo." 6

Ordinarily, a discharge in bankruptcy does not apply to certain specified tax debts. 7 The bankruptcy court held, and we agree, that these non-dischargeable tax debts include taxes that are still assessable after the commencement of the bankruptcy petition, including those taxes for which a tax court case was pending at the time of the bankruptcy filing. 8 The question therefore is whether Martinez's tax liabilities for all years at issue, 1987 to 1993, were still assessable at the time he filed his bankruptcy petition in 2002. That question requires reference to the tax laws governing partnerships.

The partnerships at issue are subject to the Tax Equity Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), which prescribes the administrative and litigation procedures for addressing partnership tax issues. 9 Under TEFRA, partnerships file informational returns showing partnership income, gains, losses, deductions, and credits, while individual partners report their pro rata share of tax on individual returns. Weiner v. United States. 10 Items which are more appropriately determined at the partnership level than at the individual partner level are treated as "partnership items" for tax treatment at the partnership level, and all other items are treated as nonpartnership items. 11

While dealing with partnership items, the IRS generally consults with the partnership's tax manager, who is typically designated by the partners and has the authority in most instances to bind the partnership. 12 When proposing adjustments to taxes at the partnership level as a result of an audit, the IRS issues a notice of adjustment, which is the equivalent of a statutory notice of deficiency given to an individual. 13 The IRS has three years from the later of (1) the date the partnership return is filed or (2) the date that the partnership return is due, to issue an adjustment for a given tax year. 14 This three-year period may be extended, however, by agreement between the IRS and the tax matters partner. 15

After the IRS issues an adjustment, the tax matters partner has 90 days to seek a readjustment by filing a petition in the tax court, the Court of Federal Claims, or a United States district court. 16 When a petition is filed in tax court, the limitations period for assessing a tax is suspended until the decision of the tax court becomes final and for one year thereafter. 17




III.


With these background principles in mind, we address first Martinez's appeal before turning to the Government's cross appeal. Martinez appeals the district court's decision to affirm the bankruptcy court concerning the tax years 1990 to 1993. He contends that although Hoyt filed tax court petitions challenging the IRS's adjustments for 1990 to 1993, Hoyt had a serious conflict of interest with his partners that barred him from acting on behalf of the partnership. He reasons that the 1990 to 1993 petitions were therefore invalid and did not toll the limitations period for assessing taxes for those years. Because the limitations period had run by the time he filed his bankruptcy petition, Martinez contends that his tax liability for those years was discharged. We have little trouble disposing of this part of the case.

As noted above, the three-year statute of limitations for assessing a tax attributable to partnership items is suspended when a tax court petition is filed. 18 What is more, once a tax court proceeding has begun the IRS is expressly prohibited by statute from assessing a tax until the decision of the tax court becomes final. 19 This statutory scheme provides no room for Martinez's argument, as he does not contest that the IRS issued timely adjustments or that Hoyt filed timely challenges in the tax court. Once Hoyt invoked the tax court process to contest the adjustments, the limitation period was suspended until that process was concluded, regardless of the validity of Hoyt's status as tax matters partner or the existence of any deficiency in the petitions. We are not the first court to so hold.

The Ninth Circuit has similarly held that a tax assessment was not barred by the limitations period where a tax matters partner filed a tax petition on behalf of a partnership at the time that his status was a legal nullity due to his previously filing a personal bankruptcy petition. O'Neill v. United States. 20 Although the tax court later dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit held that the petition "served to suspend the limitation period because there was an existing unresolved matter before the Tax Court." 21 The Ninth Circuit followed the reasoning of a Second Circuit case that addressed a predecessor tax provision and concluded that a petition placed on the docket of the Board of Tax Appeals suspended the limitations period even though the petition was later determined to have a jurisdictional defect. See Am. Equitable Assurance Co. v. Helvering. 22

Although Martinez argues that O'Neill and American Equitable are distinguishable because they did not involve a tax manager's alleged conflict of interest, their reasoning is applicable. Whether a tax matters partner actually has a disabling conflict of interest when he files tax petitions would by necessity be an issue addressable by the tax court when considering the petitions. But because the IRS may not assess a tax while the tax court proceedings are pending, see § 6225(a), under Martinez's theory, the IRS could be barred from assessing a properly owed tax merely if the tax court is fortuitously unable to adjudicate the petition before the limitations period has run. We agree with the Ninth Circuit that "this is not what Congress intended." 23 We therefore conclude that the bankruptcy court and the district court properly determined that the limitations period was tolled for the 1990 to 1993 tax years, and Martinez's tax liability for those years was therefore not discharged in the bankruptcy proceeding.




IV.


We turn now to the Government's cross appeal. The Government challenges the determination below that Hoyt was acting under a disabling conflict of interest that rendered invalid the extensions for the limitations period on the 1987 to 1989 tax years. We have not previously addressed whether a conflict between a tax matters partner and the remaining partners may disable the tax manager's actions with respect to the partnership and, if so, the parameters of such a conflict. We agree with other circuits that have addressed the matter and determine that there may be times when a tax matters partner's actions beneficial to himself are so contrary to the interests of the partnership that they are rendered null with respect to the partners. But we hold that under the circumstances present the court should not burden the IRS with a decision so as to nullify actions taken with the tax matters partner.

It is settled law that a tax matters partner owes a fiduciary duty to his partners. 24 In light of this fiduciary duty, other circuits have held that when he has a severe conflict of interest with his partners that is known to the IRS, he may not bind the individual partners and the partnership by his dealings with the Government. 25

The tax matters partner "is the central figure of partnership proceedings" and "serves as the focal point for service of all notices, documents and orders on the partnership." 26 He is required to keep the remaining partners informed of administrative and judicial proceedings, and his actions may be binding on the partnership. 27 He serves as the representative of all partners vis á vis the IRS. 28 As explained by the tax court, "[t]he detailed statutory procedures for partnership level audits and litigation contemplate the continual presence of one tax matters partner, and the procedures cannot operate unless the tax matters partner is capable of acting on the partnership's behalf regardless of his personal tax posture." 29 If the tax manager's fiduciary duty to his partners is compromised by a conflict with his own tax situation, his actions are properly voided in order to protect those partner and partnership interests otherwise served by him. 30

We are unpersuaded by the Government's contention that because Treasury regulations governing the designation and removal of a tax matters partner do not specify that a conflict of interest is a reason for removing him, deference to the regulations makes it improper to hold that the IRS may not rely on a conflicted tax manager's grant of an extension of the limitations period. 31 The Internal Revenue Code grants the Secretary authority to promulgate regulations that serve the efficient administration of the tax laws. 32 But the absence of a specific regulation addressing conflicts of interest does not mean that a tax matters partner's actions may bind the partnership irrespective of a conflict. We agree with the Second Circuit that "[t]he elimination of conflicts, even if not addressed in the existing regulations, is surely an appropriate concern to the effective and efficient administration of the tax laws." 33 Thus, "where serious conflicts exist, a [tax matters partner] may be barred from acting on behalf of the partnership," 34 and we may not ignore an egregious situation and defer to the IRS the discretion to choose whether to rely on a tax matters partner's position that is known to be adverse to that of the partnership.

The Second Circuit was addressing such a conflict in Transpac Drilling. The court there found that a disabling conflict of interest invalidated three tax managers' consents to extend the limitations period even though the IRS chose not to exercise its regulatory authority to remove the tax matters partners. In that case, the IRS was conducting civil audits of multiple partnerships as illegitimate tax shelters at the same time that there were ongoing criminal investigations of the partnerships' promoter and three tax matters partners. 35 The IRS initially sought extensions of the statute of limitations for the civil audits from the limited partners, who refused to grant the extensions. 36 The IRS then requested the extensions from the tax managers, who knew that they were being investigated and who were also cooperating with the Government in its case against the promoter. 37 The tax managers granted the extensions. The Second Circuit held that the extensions were invalid because the criminal investigations gave the tax matters partners "powerful incentive to ingratiate themselves to the government" and created "overwhelming pressure ... to ignore their fiduciary duties to the limited partners." 38 The court found "especially disquieting" the fact that the IRS knew the limited partners did not want to grant extensions before it asked the tax managers to give it what the partners had already denied. 39

The Second Circuit subsequently clarified that its holding in Transpac Drilling was based on the presence of a clear and actual conflict. Madison Recycling Assocs. v. Comm'r. 40 In Madison Recycling, the court found no disabling conflict of interest where there was no evidence that the tax matters partner had incentive to ingratiate himself to the IRS, either because he was a prospective witness seeking immunity or was a known target of a criminal investigation. 41 The court concluded that unless the tax matters partner was aware of the existence or prospect of a criminal investigation, it could not see how his personal concerns could have influenced him and prevented the proper discharge of his fiduciary duties to the limited partners. 42 Thus, a disabling conflict of interest will be shown only when the tax matters partner has cause to prefer his own interests above his fiduciary duties, and the IRS knows that his actions are more than likely contrary to the wishes and interests of the limited partners.

In the instant case, we find that the circumstances do not support a similar finding that Hoyt acted under a disabling conflict when he granted the extensions to the IRS. Unlike Transpac Drilling, where the "facts of the matter [spoke] for themselves," here the same sort of overwhelming circumstances and knowledge by the IRS that made inescapable a finding of a conflict are absent. 43 There is no indication that the IRS attempted to obtain extensions from the partners before turning to Hoyt, or that the partners were opposed to the extensions. Hoyt was also not under criminal investigation at the time that he executed the extensions of the limitations period. Although he had been under criminal investigation earlier, that fact alone does not create a disabling conflict. 44 Moreover, there is no indication that when he granted the extensions Hoyt feared another criminal investigation, and there is no evidence of Hoyt's thought process that would indicate a desire to "ingratiate [himself] to the government." 45

The bankruptcy court held that Hoyt was operating under a disabling conflict of interest for three reasons. It inferred from each that Hoyt was not acting in the interests of his partners when dealing with the IRS and that the IRS knew this fact. First, the court found that Hoyt was defrauding his partners. The court cited internal IRS memoranda detailing Hoyt's fraudulent accounting practices, including the overvaluation of cattle and over counting of the livestock. The documentation does show that the IRS viewed Hoyt's partnerships and accounting practices as mere shams to perpetuate his cattle operations and fraudulently avoid taxes. Many of the documents cited by the court, however, predated or were close in time to the tax court's decision in Bales. In that case, the IRS challenged, inter alia, Hoyt's depreciation methods and his valuation of cattle, as well as the partners' ability to claim deductions for partnership losses on their returns. 46 The tax court rejected the IRS's position and concluded that the cattle partnerships were profit-seeking businesses rather than economic shams and that the partners were permitted their allowable share of partnership items and losses. 47 Although Hoyt may ultimately have defrauded his partners and the IRS in connection with the partnerships, at the time that the IRS was seeking the extensions in this case, it had already been rebuffed in its effort to prove this fact. Testimony at trial revealed that the IRS believed the Bales case had partly legitimized Hoyt's operations and affected how it viewed the case. Although it believed the partnerships were shams, the IRS also believed as a direct result of Bales that it had to obtain much stronger evidence to perform a successful audit. It is therefore not obvious that the IRS should have known at the time of the extensions that Hoyt had a disabling conflict with respect to the partnerships at issue in this case.

The bankruptcy court noted that on December 12, 1991, the IRS notified Hoyt that it was considering imposing return preparer penalties for willful or reckless conduct. This notice to Hoyt concerned returns for the 1989 and 1990 tax years and was almost two years after the Bales decision. It is not clear, however, that the potential for assessment of preparer penalties on Hoyt tainted Hoyt's grant of an extension of the limitations period. We do not think the mere risk of preparer penalties in this case, unlike say an indictment, provided the kind of "powerful incentive" for Hoyt to act contrary to his partners' interest. We do not hold that a threat of penalties may never cause a conflict between a TMP and his partners. But here Hoyt had been battling the IRS for over a decade and had previously prevailed in Bales. It is therefore not apparent that the IRS viewed its threat of penalties, apart from a criminal investigation, as causing overwhelming pressure for Hoyt to ignore his fiduciary duties.

The bankruptcy court's second basis for finding a disabling conflict was that Hoyt attempted to extract a quid pro quo from the IRS in connection with the preparer penalties. Hoyt agreed to extensions of the limitations period for the 1987 to 1989 tax years in February 1991, July 1992, and March 1993. The extension that was eventually granted in July 1992 originated with the IRS's request in December 1991, at the same time that the IRS had threatened to impose the preparer penalties for 1989 and 1990. Hoyt said he would not agree to an extension unless the IRS agreed to extend the limitations period for assessing preparer penalties against him and other preparers who worked for him, including his brother-in-law Henry Nathaniel. On its face, this request made little sense because, if granted, it would merely give the IRS more time to assess penalties against Hoyt. Nevertheless, the IRS refused to connect an extension of the limitations period for issuing the adjustments for 1987 to 1989 with an extension on the time for assessing preparer penalties. 48 Subsequently, however, in June 1992 the IRS agreed to forbear assessing penalties until the time for issuing the adjustments, and Hoyt signed the extensions in July 1992.

We find this purported quid pro quo insufficient to substantiate a conflict under the facts of this case. IRS revenue agent Norm Johnson testified that at the time the IRS agreed to Hoyt's request it had already determined that it would not seek preparer penalties against Hoyt. Agent Johnson testified that it therefore did not matter to the IRS whether to extend the preparer penalties because it believed they were not worth pursuing. He also explained that in July 1992 the IRS could not have assessed preparer penalties against Hoyt because the audits upon which the penalties would have been based were incomplete. In other words, under the normal process for assessing preparer penalties it would be premature to seek penalties before the audits were sufficiently complete to know that penalties were appropriate. In order for there to be a true quid pro quo, the parties must each exchange valuable concessions. See United States v. Robinson. 49 There must be a mutuality of advantage and a mutuality of disadvantage. 50 That did not exist here because the IRS essentially gave up nothing, and Hoyt obtained nothing of true value.

The bankruptcy court correctly noted that Hoyt apparently believed he was receiving something of value, but Hoyt's perception does not necessarily mean that he was acting in conflict with his partners. Agent Johnson testified that although the partnerships derived no benefit from delaying preparer penalties against Hoyt, there was also no harm, and Martinez fails to identify sufficiently a detriment to the partnerships. 51 Given that Hoyt obtained nothing of true value and that what he did obtain was not contrary to the interests of the partnerships, we think the alleged quid pro quo is too slender a reed to support a conclusion that the IRS knew Hoyt was placing his interests above those of his partners.

The final basis for the bankruptcy court's finding of a conflict was that Hoyt was attempting to stall the IRS and delay the issuance of the final adjustments. This finding was based on the conclusion that it was in Hoyt's interest to delay the issuance of the adjustments as long as possible, but it was in the partners' interest to have the proceedings completed quickly. The court relied in part on a Ninth Circuit decision that also involved Hoyt and allegedly invalid extensions on the limitations period for issuing adjustments. See River City Ranches # 1 Ltd. v. Comm'r. 52

That case, known as River City Ranches II, concerned similar extensions that Hoyt granted to the IRS but for different partnerships. The Ninth Circuit remanded to the tax court for discovery on whether Hoyt acted under a disabling conflict. 53 Although it did not hold that there was a conflict, the Ninth Circuit speculated that the partners might have opposed an extension on the limitations period and preferred quickly issued adjustments because the sooner the IRS issued them, the more difficult it would be for the IRS to defend them. 54 It also noted that even if the IRS was able to defend the adjustments, it would be in the partners' interest to avoid delay in order to minimize penalties and interest. 55 Finally, the court reasoned that it would be in the partners' interest to learn from the adjustments that Hoyt was "looting the partnerships," noting that adjustments issued for other partnerships had prompted partners to withdraw and initiate civil suits against Hoyt. 56 In contrast, the court noted that Hoyt's preference would be to delay the issuance of adjustments in order to avoid tension with his partners and perpetuate his fraud for as long as possible. 57 Here, the bankruptcy court found this reasoning persuasive and held that Hoyt's pattern of delay and non-cooperation with the IRS indicated a disabling conflict of interest in granting the extensions.

Although in hindsight Hoyt may have wanted to delay the adjustments for his own reasons, we think that in light of all the circumstances the grant of the extensions was not the kind of action that should have prompted the IRS to believe that Hoyt's interests were contrary to those of his partners. We think it is incorrect to say categorically that the partners and Hoyt had divergent interests as to when the adjustments were issued. Any difficulty that the IRS might have had in subsequent tax court proceedings in defending adjustments issued without an extension could have benefitted both Hoyt and the partners because, as in the Bales case, a loss by the IRS would allow Hoyt's business to continue and allow the partners to take their deductions. Furthermore, both Hoyt and the partners would still risk losing any subsequent tax court proceedings because the IRS could have continued to press the adjustments and urge the tax court to determine partnership items. See PAA Mgmt., Ltd. v. United States. 58 But Agent Johnson testified that the extensions for the adjustments could have been beneficial to the partners (as well as Hoyt) because they could have given the partnerships more time to document and support any legitimate deductions. In short, we think the speculation about the effect of the adjustments cuts both ways, and we are not willing to hold as a matter of law that there was a disabling conflict.

We are also not persuaded that the adjustments necessarily would have given the partners notice of Hoyt's fraud so as to influence a decision to take protective action. In this case, the IRS sent numerous notices to Martinez informing him of its view that Hoyt had taken improper deductions in preparing the partnership returns. Martinez contends that there was no specific notice of Hoyt's lying about the value and number of cattle. Beginning in 1988, however, the IRS informed Martinez that it believed Hoyt's claimed deductions and credits were not allowable, and it referred to penalties for overvaluation. It also advised Martinez that he may wish to seek his own adjustment or to consult with an accountant or attorney. The record contains an affidavit from Martinez showing that as late as September 1993 Martinez maintained, based in part on the Bales case, that the partnerships were not abusive tax shelters. He specifically referred to his belief that the cattle had not been overvalued. Martinez also testified before the bankruptcy court that he was aware the IRS took the position that there was a problem with the size of the cattle herd. Yet Martinez took no action of his own to address these matters. We therefore do not see that the IRS knew Martinez's interests diverged from those of Hoyt or that he had a significant conflict with Hoyt over adjustments issued without an extension. 59

The evidence here showed that the IRS firmly believed Hoyt was dishonest and held that belief almost from the time it began auditing him in 1980. But the IRS's ability to deal with a tax matters partner and rely on his actions on behalf of the partnership is critical for the effective operation of the current tax system. The circumstances here did not reveal to the IRS a substantial gulf between the tax matters partner's interests and the interests of the partners. The grant of an extension on the limitations period is often "a routine accommodation --signing a waiver in order to avoid immediate assessment by the IRS." 60 We do not think the totality of the circumstances in this case clearly revealed to the IRS the tax matters partner's inherent conflict and incentive to breach his fiduciary duty to the partnership.

For the foregoing reasons we AFFIRM the district court's affirmance of the bankruptcy court's holding that Martinez's tax liabilities were not discharged for the years 1990 to 1993. We REVERSE the court's holding that the tax matters partner's grant of extensions of the limitations period were invalid and that Martinez's tax liabilities were discharged for the years 1987 to 1989. It is the judgment of this court that none of these tax liabilities has been discharged.

1 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 431, 1989 WL 123005 (1989).

2 See 26 U.S.C. § 6231(a)(7); 26 C.F.R. § 301.6231(a)(7)-1.

3 See 26 U.S.C. § 6229(a).

4 See 26 U.S.C. § 6229(a) & (d).

5 551 F.3d 359, 366 (5th Cir. 2008).

6 Id.

7 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(A).

8 See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8); Matter of Johnson, 146 F.3d 252, 256-57 & n.9 (5th Cir. 1998). Section 523(a)(1)(A) of the bankruptcy code excludes from discharge taxes specified in § 507(a)(8), which includes "allowed unsecured claims of governmental units, only to the extent that such claims are for ... (A) a tax on or measured by income or gross receipts ... (iii) other than a tax ... not assessed before, but assessable, under applicable law or by agreement, after, the commencement of the case."

9 See Pub. L. No. 97-248, §402(a), 96 Stat. 648, 653 (1982) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 6221-23).

10 389 F.3d 152, 154 (5th Cir. 2004).

11 Id.; see also 26 U.S.C. §§ 6221, 6231(a)(3) & (a)(4).

12 See 26 U.S.C. § 6224(c)(3). The tax matters partner is generally defined as "the general partner designated as the tax matters partner as provided in regulations" or, if no general partner has been so designated, as "the general partner having the largest profits interest in the partnership at the close of the taxable year involved." 26 U.S.C. § 6231(a)(7).

13 26 U.S.C. § 6223(a); see PAA Mgmt., Ltd. v. United States, 962 F.2d 212, 214 (2d Cir. 1992).

14 26 U.S.C. § 6229(a). The statute provides:

General rule. --Except as otherwise provided in this section, the period for assessing any tax imposed by subtitle A with respect to any person which is attributable to any partnership item (or affected item) for a partnership taxable year shall not expire before the date which is 3 years after the later of --


(1) the date on which the partnership return for such taxable year was filed, or



(2) the last day for filing such return for such year (determined without regard to extensions).


Id.

15 26 U.S.C. § 6229(b).

16 26 U.S.C. § 6226(a).

17 26 U.S.C. § 6229(d).

18 Id.

19 26 U.S.C. § 6225(a). The statute provides in relevant part:

Restriction on assessment and collection. --Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, no assessment of a deficiency attributable to any partnership item may be made (and no levy or proceeding in any court for the collection of any such deficiency may be made, begun, or prosecuted) before --


(1) the close of the 150th day after the day on which a notice of a final partnership administrative adjustment was mailed to the tax matters partner, and



(2) if a proceeding is begun in the Tax Court under section 6226 during such 150-day period, the decision of the court in such proceeding has become final.


Id.

20 44 F.3d 803, 805-06 (9th Cir. 1995).

21 Id. at 806.

22 68 F.2d 46, 47 (2d Cir. 1933).

23 O'Neill, 44 F.3d at 806. See also Martin v. Comm'r, 436 F.3d 1216, 1223-24 (10th Cir. 2006) (addressing tolling under 26 U.S.C. § 6503, the analogous statute applicable to the limitations period as applied to an individual taxpayer, and holding that "the placing of a proceeding on the docket of the tax court, not the manner in which such a proceeding is resolved, is key to tolling the running of the statute of limitations").

24 See Phillips v. Comm'r, 272 F.3d 1172, 1175 (9th Cir. 2002) ; Transpac Drilling Venture 1982-12 v. Comm'r, 147 F.3d 221, 225 (2d Cir. 1998); Computer Programs Lambda, Ltd. v. Comm'r, 89 T.C. 198, 205 (1987).

25 See Phillips, 272 F.3d at 1175; Transpac Drilling, 147 F.3d at 227-28.

26 Lambda, 89 T.C. at 205.

27 Id.; see also 26 U.S.C. § 6229(b)(1)(B) (providing that the limitations period for assessing a tax attributable to partnership items may be extended "with respect to all partners, by an agreement entered into by the Secretary and the tax matters partner").

28 See Transpac Drilling, 147 F.2d at 225 ( "By centralizing tax-related proceedings of the partnership in one person or entity, Congress created a statutory analogue of the class representative in class action proceedings.").

29 Lambda, 89 T.C. at 205.

30 See Phillips, 272 F.3d at 1175 ( "Trust law, generally, invalidates the transaction of a trustee who is breaching his trust in a transaction in which the other party is aware of the breach." (citing RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS §§ 288-297)); Transpac Drilling, 147 F.3d at 225 (noting that "limited partners secure their due process protection as a result of the fact that the TMP stands in a fiduciary relationship toward them").

31 See Treas. Reg. § 301.6231(a)(7)-1 (providing for designation and termination of a tax matters partner).

32 See Transpac Drilling, 147 F.3d at 227; see also 26 U.S.C. § 6231(c) (authorizing the Secretary to determine areas of "special enforcement consideration[]."

33 Transpac Drilling, 147 F.3d at 228 n.9.

34 Id. at 227.

35 Id. at 223-24.

36 Id. at 224.

37 Id. at 223-24.

38 Id. at 227.

39 Id.

40 295 F.3d 280, 288 (2d Cir. 2002).

41 Id. at 289.

42 Id.

43 See Transpac Drilling, 147 F.3d at 227 ( "That the TMPs' interests and those of the ones who would be bound by their actions were in severe conflict cannot be doubted.").

44 See River City Ranches # 1 Ltd. v. Comm'r, 401 F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th Cir. 2005) ( River City Ranches II); Phillips, 272 F.3d at 1174.

45 Transpac Drilling, 147 F.3d at 227.

46 See Bales, 1989 WL 123005, at *1.

47 Id. at *27-29.

48 In fact, according to the trial testimony, the IRS went forward and assessed certain penalties against Nathaniel.

49 582 F.2d 1356, 1366 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc).

50 Id.

51 See Madison Recycling, 295 F.3d at 288 (noting that the tax payer must show that an extension of the limitations period is invalid and that the burden of persuasion "remains always with the taxpayer").

52 401 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2005).

53 Id. at 1143.

54 Id.

55 Id.

56 Id.

57 Id.

58 962 F.2d 212, 218-19 (2d Cir. 1992) ( "The FPAA is not 'final' in the sense that its issuance necessarily obviates the need for further information, brings the curtain down on the IRS's administrative or investigative role, or muzzles the IRS from requesting that the court invoke its authority finally to determine partnership items.").

59 Following the Ninth Circuit's remand in River City Ranches II, the tax court found that Hoyt had a disabling conflict when granting extensions on the limitations period but ruled in favor of the Government on other grounds. See River City Ranches #1 Ltd. v. Comm'r, 94 T.C.M. (CCH) 1, 2007 WL 1891595 (2007) ( River City Ranches III). The tax court found a conflict essentially by adopting the reasoning upon which the Ninth Circuit had speculated in River City Ranches II, i.e. that it was in the partners' interest to have the adjustments issued sooner rather than later. The tax court cited the cattle headcount as evidence of the IRS's knowledge of Hoyt's fraud but cited no evidence establishing what was in the partners' interest. See id. at *13-14. In this case, as noted above, Agent Johnson testified that the extensions on the adjustments could have benefitted the partners by giving the partnerships a chance to document legitimate deductions. He also testified that matters are typically settled at the administrative level faster than if a case proceeds to tax court. That being so, it could have been in the partners interest to extend the audits and adjustments because they might reach a quicker settlement and thereby realize savings of interest and penalties. It is not so speculative to think the extension of the adjustments potentially could have resulted in this benefit to the partners given that the tax court cases for the 1987 to 1989 tax years were still pending when Martinez filed the instant adversary action in 2003. In any event, we note that the Ninth Circuit recently affirmed the tax court's decision in River City Ranches III but did not reach the question of Hoyt's conflict of interest. River City Ranches v. Comm'r, 2009 WL 498662, at *2 n.6 (9th Cir. Feb. 26, 2009) (unpublished).

60 Phillips, 272 F.3d at 1175.

Friday, April 17, 2009

Joseph B. Williams, III v. Commissioner

Dkt. No. 2202-08 , TC Memo. 2009-81, April 16, 2009.

In determining whether the normal three-year statute of limitations on assessment under Code Sec. 6501(a) applied, or whether an assessment could be made at any time under Code Sec. 6501(c)(1) because an individual filed false or fraudulent returns, his prior criminal conviction collaterally estopped him from relitigating the issue of whether he fraudulently underpaid his income taxes in each of the years for which he entered a guilty plea. Although the taxpayer maintained that his prior tax-evasion plea meant only that he committed evasion at some point, and not necessarily in each of the years for which he entered the plea, his allocution at the time his plea was entered acknowledged tax evasion in all of the years. His prior criminal conviction collaterally estopped a taxpayer from relitigating the issue of whether he fraudulently underpaid his income taxes in each of the years for which he entered a guilty plea. Although the taxpayer maintained that his prior tax-evasion plea only admitted that he committed evasion at some point, and not necessarily in each of the years for which he entered the plea, his allocution at the time his plea was entered acknowledged tax evasion in all of the years. Accordingly, the Code Sec. 6663(a) fraud penalty could be imposed.



Exceptions to Period of Limitations: Fraud: Conviction in criminal proceedings

The IRS failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the taxpayer's relatively small misstatements of income for the years 1962 through 1965 were due to fraud. The taxpayer's mental illness, although not severe enough to prevent him from functioning as an attorney and as a state legislator, was severe enough to provide a non-fraudulent reason for his failure to maintain accurate books and records and to report all of his income. In addition, fraud for these years could not be inferred from the taxpayer's conviction for tax evasion for subsequent years because the circumstances giving rise to those convictions were markedly different from the circumstances in the years 1962 through 1965. However, his conviction for criminal tax evasion collaterally estopped him from denying civil tax fraud for 1966-1970.

B. Klein, CA-10, 89-2 USTC ¶9429, 880 F2d 260.

The Tax Court's ruling that taxpayer's prior conviction for willfully filing false returns with intent to avoid tax could form the basis for collateral estoppel in subsequent civil proceedings involving imposition of fraud penalties was vacated where the actions by the criminal court could be construed as interfering with taxpayer's right of appeal, thus tainting the finality of the criminal conviction. Cause remanded to determine whether fraud existed for the years 1950-1952.

T. Worcester, CA-1, 67-1 USTC ¶9112, 370 F2d 713.

On remand, the Tax Court determined that fraud existed for the years 1950-1952.

T. Worcester, 26 TCM 506, Dec. 28,461(M), TC Memo. 1967-107.

A plea of guilty to filing a fraudulent tax return was an admission by taxpayer against his interest and proof of his liability for that year.

W.H. Buschman, DC, 62-2 USTC ¶9552, 208 FSupp 531.

A taxpayer was estopped, by reason of a prior conviction for criminal tax evasion, from denying that he filed false and fraudulent federal income tax returns. Thus, the six-year limitations period applied.

R.A. Frey, 75 TCM 2546, Dec. 52,759(M), TC Memo. 1998-226.

The assessment of a deficiency against a taxpayer who was convicted of filing a false tax return was barred by the statute of limitations. Although the criminal conviction estopped the taxpayer from denying that he willfully attested to a false return, it did not establish, as a matter of law, that he intended to evade tax.

J.J. Maloney, 75 TCM 2466, Dec. 52,737(M), TC Memo. 1998-209.

A notice of deficiency sent to a certified public accountant who had been convicted of filing a false tax return and of forgery was timely although it was sent more than three years after the false return was filed.

A.C. Bingham, 75 TCM 1975, Dec. 52,617(M), TC Memo. 1998-102. Aff'd, CA-9 (unpublished opinion), 99-2 USTC ¶50,811.

Although the return in question was a joint return, the wife was not collaterally estopped from denying omission of income, where only her husband, not herself, had been convicted of tax fraud relative to the taxable year at issue.

C.R. Considine, 68 TC 52, Dec. 34,365.

A criminal conviction for filing false tax returns for the years 1959 through 1962 estopped the taxpayer from denying in a civil proceeding that any of the joint returns filed by him and his wife for these years were false and fraudulent or that a part of the underpayment, if any, was due to fraud with intent to evade tax.

H.M. Rodney, 53 TC 287, Dec. 29,844.

Similarly.

D.E. Bartone, DC, 78-1 USTC ¶9290.

C.B.C. Super Markets, Inc., 54 TC 882, Dec. 30,081 (Acq.).

C. Zukowski, Jr., 59 TCM 33, Dec. 46,431(M), TC Memo. 1990-113.

J. Bell, 54 TCM 753, Dec. 44,237(M), TC Memo. 1987-501.

W.A. Golchman, 54 TCM 679, Dec. 44,225(M), TC Memo. 1987-489.

R.E. Cleveland, 46 TCM 257, Dec. 40,157(M), TC Memo. 1983-299.

S.A. Aslam, 41 TCM 1217, Dec. 37,806(M), TC Memo. 1981-159.

C. Michalowski, 35 TCM 827, Dec. 33,879(M), TC Memo. 1976-192.

W.R. Ming, Jr., Est., 35 TCM 522, Dec. 33,770(M), TC Memo. 1976-115.

J.W. Flanagan, 35 TCM 528, Dec. 33,771(M), TC Memo. 1976-116.

C. Smith, 35 TCM 512, Dec. 33,766(M), TC Memo. 1976-114.

The statute of limitations did not bar the assessment of transferee liability with respect to two shareholders who pleaded guilty to filing false corporate returns for an adult entertainment business. Taxes could be assessed at any time in circumstances where false returns were filed.

J.A. Wiltzius, 73 TCM 2243, Dec. 51,924(M), TC Memo. 1997-117.

An individual who pleaded guilty to criminal tax evasion was collaterally estopped from contesting his liability for civil fraud and the application of the six-year statute of limitations.

J.R. Taylor, 73 TCM 2028, Dec. 51,887(M), TC Memo. 1997-82. Aff'd, CA-9 (unpublished opinion), 2001-1 USTC ¶50,441.

The IRS was not barred by the statute of limitations from assessing tax against an IRS agent because the agent, who had been convicted of criminal conspiracy to bribe, fraudulently failed to report bribery income during the tax year.

W. Kale, 71 TCM 2854, Dec. 51,311(M), TC Memo. 1996-197.

An attorney who pleaded guilty to charges of tax evasion and other offenses for a year that was not before the Tax Court and who admitted, in his allocution hearing, that he had willfully evaded taxes for the preceding five years, was liable for the assessed fraud penalties. The delinquent tax returns filed by the attorney established the existence of underpayments for all of the tax years at issue, and statements made by him at the allocution hearing constituted an admission of fraud. The statute of limitations did not bar assessment and collection of taxes and penalties in light of the attorney's fraudulent conduct.

V. Catalfo, 69 TCM 2075, Dec. 50,518(M), TC Memo. 1995-106.

Conviction of a gambler in criminal proceedings for tax evasion was a factor in finding that assessments were not barred by the statute of limitations.

J.H. Boyer, 17 TCM 860, Dec. 23,173(M), TC Memo. 1958-172.

Fraud was held proved where a high-ranking operator of a numbers lottery omitted reporting large amounts of gambling income. The absence of records concealed, and doubtlessly was intended to conceal, income from unlawful gambling. The taxpayer's conviction of a felony under state law was evidence of federal tax fraud.

A. Gerardo, 34 TCM 1480, Dec. 33,515(M), TC Memo. 1975-341. Rev'd and rem'd on other issues, CA-3, 77-1 USTC ¶9322, 552 F2d 549.

Prior criminal conviction was compelling evidence of fraud in civil case.

M.L. Corson, 24 TCM 1107, Dec. 27,516(M), TC Memo. 1965-214.

Admissions concerning a taxpayer's understatement of income, failure to maintain adequate records and refusal to cooperate with the IRS proved that she filed fraudulent tax returns and was liable for fraud penalties. Further, the court noted that she had pleaded guilty to charges of filing a false return with respect to one tax year at issue.

L.R. Palmer, 77 TCM 1583, Dec. 53,302(M), TC Memo. 1999-89.

A taxpayer who pleaded guilty to a conspiracy scheme to evade payment of gasoline excise taxes was collaterally estopped by his criminal convictions from denying that he acted fraudulently. The fraud established by the criminal conviction allowed the IRS to assess the taxes at any time.

M. Pikover, DC Calif., 2001-2 USTC ¶50,702.

The Anti-Injunction Act barred a taxpayer's suit seeking to restrain the IRS from pursuing collection activities regarding his unpaid taxes absent proof that the government would be unable to prevail in the litigation. His contention that the IRS's collection efforts were barred by the statute of limitations was rejected in light of his guilty plea to tax evasion charges; as a result of his fraudulent actions, taxes could be assessed at any time. Thus, no exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act applied or were alleged, and the taxpayer's claim was dismissed.

M. Katz, DC Tex., 2003-1 USTC ¶50,361.

The IRS could not rely on a taxpayer's conviction under Code Sec. 7206 to establish fraud in order to extend the limitations period to collect its assessments. Rather, the IRS had to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the taxpayer intended to evade tax. Since the typical indicia of intent to evade tax were not present, the IRS's assessments were barred by the statute of limitations.

P. McGowan, 87 TCM 1421, Dec. 55,669(M), TC Memo. 2004-146. Aff'd, CA-11 (unpublished opinion), 2006-2 USTC ¶50,456.

See also ¶38,967.322.

The owner of an accounting firm lacked fraudulent intent with respect to tax underpayments on his personal returns for two years and on his firm's returns for two years, so the statute of limitations barred the IRS from assessing deficiencies and penalties for those years. Although the individual was highly educated and experienced in auditing and finance and was previously convicted of tax evasion and filing false returns for three other years, there was no proof that he possessed a specific intent to evade a tax owed for the years at issue. For the three years for which the individual was criminally convicted of tax evasion and filing false returns, he was collaterally estopped from denying fraud and the amounts of his tax deficiencies were redetermined.

T.J. Barrow, Dec. 57,594(M), TC Memo. 2008-264.

P filed tax returns for 1993 through 2000. He was later charged with tax evasion under I.R.C. sec. 7201 for all 8 years. By agreement P pleaded guilty to one count of tax evasion in a superseding criminal information as to all 8 years. By a notice of deficiency issued in October 2007, R determined deficiencies and fraud penalties for all 8 years. P filed a petition in this Court in which he asserted that he merely pleaded guilty to tax evasion in some indeterminate year or years during the span of 1993 through 2000, not for all 8 years nor for any given year therein. R moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of P's fraud for all 8 years.

Held: The superseding criminal information, P's allocution and plea, and the conviction all explicitly assert tax evasion in all 8 years.

Held, further, P's conviction for tax evasion under I.R.C. sec. 7201 for 1993 through 2000 collaterally estops him for each of those years from denying civil fraud for purposes of the statute of limitations, see I.R.C. sec. 6501(c)(1), and the fraud penalty, see I.R.C. sec. 6663(a).


MEMORANDUM OPINION

GUSTAFSON, Judge: Petitioner Joseph Bryan Williams, III, was charged with tax crimes for each of the 8 years 1993 through 2000. He pleaded guilty and was convicted for all 8 years. Subsequently, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued to Mr. Williams a statutory notice of deficiency pursuant to section 6212, 1 showing the IRS's determination of deficiencies in income tax and accompanying fraud and accuracy-related penalties under sections 6663 and 6662, respectively, for all 8 of those years.

Mr. Williams petitioned this Court, pursuant to section 6213(a), to redetermine those deficiencies. We previously decided several threshold jurisdictional issues, see Williams v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. ___ (2008), and the case is now before us on respondent's motion for partial summary judgment pursuant to Rule 121. The issue for decision is whether respondent is entitled to partial summary judgment 2 because Mr. Williams's guilty plea to criminal tax evasion under section 7201 with respect to tax years 1993 through 2000 collaterally estops him from contesting that he fraudulently underpaid his income taxes for all 8 of the tax years at issue. Mr. Williams acknowledges that he is liable for civil tax fraud on the basis of his criminal conviction, but he opposes the motion by arguing that the conviction does not make him liable in every one of the 8 years, but in only some of them (yet to be decided). However, the criminal charge, Mr. Williams's allocution and plea, and the conviction all explicitly assert tax evasion in all 8 years, and respondent's motion will be granted.


Background

The following facts are not in dispute and are derived from the pleadings, the parties' motion papers, and the supporting exhibits attached thereto.



Mr. Williams's Business Activity
During the years at issue, Mr. Williams was an oil trader for Mobil Oil, who traveled to foreign countries. In 1993 Mr. Williams opened two bank accounts at Banque Indosuez in Switzerland in the name of ALQI Holdings, Ltd. (ALQI), a British Virgin Islands corporation (the ALQI accounts). From 1993 through 2000, more than $7 million was deposited in the ALQI accounts, and more than $800,000 in interest was earned on those deposits.

Respondent alleges that these deposits and the interest thereon were current income to Mr. Williams in the tax years received or earned. Mr. Williams disagrees and alleges that these amounts were not taxable to him until ALQI distributed them to him.



The Examination and Criminal Information
For each of the 8 tax years 1993 through 2000, Mr. Williams filed a Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, that did not reflect the deposits to or interest on the ALQI accounts. He filed the return for each year in the succeeding year, and he filed the latest of them (for 2000) in May 2001. 3

The IRS conducted an investigation of Mr. Williams and ALQI, which culminated in Mr. Williams's being charged in April 2003. The superseding criminal information (to which Mr. Williams later pleaded guilty) stated two counts: (1) one count of conspiracy to defraud the IRS, in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 371 (the conspiracy count), and (2) one count of criminal tax evasion with respect to each of the 8 tax years 1993 through 2000, in violation of section 7201 of the Internal Revenue Code (the tax evasion count). 4 The tax evasion count alleged tax evasion in all 8 years, as follows:


COUNT TWO
(Tax Evasion)
* * * * * * *

(17) From in or about 1993, through in or about April 2001, in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere, J. BRYAN WILLIAMS, the defendant, unlawfully, willfully and knowingly did attempt to evade and defeat a substantial part of the income tax due and owing by J. BRYAN WILLIAMS and his spouse to the United States of America for the calendar years 1993 through 2000, by various means, including, among others by (a) arranging for approximately $7.98 million in payments which were income to Williams to be made into the secret Alqi accounts in Switzerland he controlled; and (b) preparing and causing to be prepared, signing and causing to be signed, and filing and causing to be filed, false and fraudulent U.S. Individual Income Tax Returns, Form 1040, for the calendar years 1993 through 2000, on which he failed to disclose his interest in the secret Alqi bank accounts in Switzerland, and on which, in the years set forth below, he failed to report the approximate amounts of income set forth below, and upon which income there was a substantial additional tax due and owing to the United States of America:



Approximate Amount of
Calendar Year Income

1993 $1,029,518.72

1994 752,479.52

1995 998,723.14

1996 3,917,762.57

1997 1,670,891.49

1998 133,371.90

1999 109,167.59

2000 256,234.64


(Title 26, United States Code, Section 7201).

[Emphasis added.]



Mr. Williams's June 2003 Guilty Plea and Conviction
On June 12, 2003, Mr. Williams entered a plea of guilty to one count of conspiracy to defraud the IRS in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 371 and to one count of criminal tax evasion with respect to the 8 tax years 1993 through 2000, in violation of section 7201.

In the course of taking the guilty plea, the District Court judge asked Mr. Williams for a specific allocution as to what crimes he committed. We quote here from Mr. Williams's allocution, emphasizing language that acknowledged tax evasion in all 8 years at issue:

THE DEFENDANT: In 1993, with the assistance of a banker at Bank Indosuez, I opened two bank accounts in the name of a corporation Alqi Holdings, Ltd. Alqi was created at that time as a British Virgin Islands Corporation. The purpose of that account was to hold funds and income I received from foreign sources during the years 1993 to 2000.

Between 1993 and 2000, more than seven million dollars was deposited in the Alqi accounts and more than $800,000 in income was earned on those deposits.

I knew that most of the funds deposited into the Alqi accounts and all the interest income were taxable income to me. However, the calendar year tax returns for '93 through 2000, I chose not to report the income to my --to the Internal Revenue Service in order to evade substantial taxes owed thereon, until I filed my 2001 tax return.

* * * * * * *

I knew what I was doing was wrong and unlawful. I, therefore, believe that I am guilty of evading the payment of taxes for the tax years 1993 through 2000. I also believe that I acted in concert with others to create a mechanism, the Alqi accounts, which I intended to allow me to escape detection by the IRS. Therefore, I am --I believe that I'm guilty of conspiring with the people would whom I dealt regarding the Alqi accounts to defraud the United States of taxes which I owed.

At the allocution hearing, the court and counsel also discussed separately Mr. Williams's plea to the conspiracy count, as to which reservations were stated on his behalf:

MR. SHERTLER [Defense Counsel]: And, your honor, may I --we're not adopting or accepting the facts as stated in the conspiracy count, which I think is the recitation of what was in the original indictment in this case. What we have agreed is that Mr. Williams would plead guilty to conspiracy counts, but based upon the factual allocution, which he has given to this Court.

* * * * * * *

* * * [B]ut we are not adopting the facts that are stated in that [conspiracy] count. And I think that Mr. Neiman [the prosecutor] is correct, he could plead guilty to the conspiracy counts based on different facts, as long as your Honor is satisfied with the allocution.

THE COURT: Well, that's exactly where we are at the moment. But I think I am --and I, if you have any other questions, Mr. Neiman, that you want to put to him, in addition to those he's recited, it's your turn.

MR. NEIMAN [Prosecutor]: No, your Honor. I believe that the plea allocution that was given was sufficient. I believe Mr. Williams acknowledged getting two the million dollar payment, which is what's charged in count one [the conspiracy count], and not reporting it.

THE COURT: And, in fact, has allocuted with respect to the elements in count two [the tax evasion count] as well.

MR. NEIMAN [Prosecutor]: I believe that's correct, you Honor.

THE COURT: Very well. I will accept the plea and find that you are fully competent and capable of entering an informed plea, and that your guilty plea is a knowing and a voluntary one and supported by an independent basis in fact containing each and every essential element of the offense, and the Clerk will enter the guilty plea. [Emphasis added.]

A judgment of conviction on both the conspiracy count and the tax evasion count was entered against Mr. Williams and became final on October 22, 2003.

On October 29, 2007, the IRS issued to Mr. Williams a statutory notice of deficiency pursuant to section 6212, showing the IRS's determination of the following deficiencies and accompanying fraud and accuracy-related penalties under sections 6663 and 6662, respectively, for all 8 of those years:



Penalty

Year Deficiency Sec. 6663 Sec. 6662

1993 $417,652 $313,038.00 ---

1994 304,740 226,206.75 ---

1995 417,354 313,015.50 ---

1996 1,572,673 1,179,504.75 ---

1997 809,620 511,143.00 $25,619.20

1998 52,733 39,549.75 ---

1999 113,049 33,395.25 13,704.40

2000 120,391 74,093.25 4,320.00





Proceedings in This Court
Mr. Williams petitioned this Court pursuant to section 6213(a) to redetermine those asserted deficiencies. Respondent moved for partial summary judgment, asking the Court to hold that Mr. Williams is liable for civil fraud in each of the 8 years 1993 through 2000.

Mr. Williams does not dispute that he committed tax fraud and owes Federal income taxes and interest and penalties thereon. However, Mr. Williams argues that he merely pleaded guilty to criminal tax evasion in some indeterminate year or years during the span of 1993 through 2000, not for all of the years nor for any given year therein. Thus, Mr. Williams's dispute is limited to when (i.e., for what tax years) he owes Federal income taxes:

The basis for this opposition [to the IRS's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment] is narrow and limited. Mr. Williams pled guilty to tax evasion in U.S. v. Williams, Criminal No. 03 CR 406 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). Consequently, the IRS has the authority, under 26 U.S.C. Section 6663, to impose a civil fraud penalty as a percentage of the tax that was evaded by fraudulent means. As indicated in the Petition and subsequent pleadings, the principal issue in this case is not that Mr. Williams doesn't owe taxes or penalties, but when the taxes and penalties were incurred. This Court must make findings relating to the amount and year that such taxes and penalties were incurred. Then, based on those findings, the IRS can compute the interest owed. The difference in the amount of interest will vary by many millions of dollars based on this Court's determination of when the income is to be recognized. [Emphasis added.]

About his guilty plea, Mr. Williams explains that he --

viewed those allegations [in the criminal information] as factually incorrect, but he was willing to plead guilty to Tax Evasion as described by him during his allocution to the Court. * * * [B]oth the prosecutor and the judge accepted Mr. Williams' plea on the facts that he described and not on the Superseding Information that he rejected * * *. * * * Given this explicit rejection of the facts alleged in the Superseding Information by Mr. Williams and the acceptance of that rejection by both the Court and the Prosecutor, it is clear that the Superseding Criminal Information cannot have a collateral estoppel impact on subsequent litigation. The only facts capable of establishing a collateral estoppel impact are those facts expressly affirmed in Mr. Williams' allocution.


Discussion




I. Standard for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is intended to expedite litigation and avoid unnecessary and expensive trials. Fla. Peach Corp. v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 678, 681 (1988). The Court may grant full or partial summary judgment where there is no genuine issue of any material fact and a decision may be rendered as a matter of law. Rule 121(b); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Sundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 518, 520 (1992), affd. 17 F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 1994). The moving party bears the burden of proving that no genuine issue of material fact exists, and the Court will view any factual material and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Sundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner, supra at 520; Dahlstrom v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 812, 821 (1985). If there exists any reasonable doubt as to the facts at issue, the motion must be denied. Sundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner, supra at 520 (citing Espinoza v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 412, 416 (1982) ("The opposing party is to be afforded the benefit of all reasonable doubt, and any inference to be drawn from the underlying facts contained in the record must be viewed in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment")).

The issue of whether Mr. Williams fraudulently underpaid his Federal income taxes in 1993 through 2000 can be resolved on the basis of the undisputed facts.



II. Mr. Williams's Liability for Civil Tax Fraud
Respondent moves for partial summary judgment on the grounds that Mr. Williams is collaterally estopped from contesting that he fraudulently underpaid his Federal income taxes in 1993 through 2000 because his guilty plea for criminal tax evasion under section 7201 as to the years 1993 through 2000 is conclusive and binding as to those tax years.

A. To Prevail in This Case, the IRS Must Prove Fraud.

Mr. Williams's fraud is the threshold issue in this case, not only because his liability for the fraud penalty depends on it, but also because fraud affects the period of limitations for assessment of his liability for the tax deficiencies. Generally, the IRS must assess a deficiency within 3 years of the date on which the tax return that relates to such deficiency was filed. Sec. 6501(a). For the tax years 1993 through 2000, Mr. Williams's latest-filed return (for 2000) was filed May 15, 2001. However, it was not until more than 6 years later --on October 29, 2007 --that the IRS issued to Mr. Williams a notice of deficiency, which is the first step in the process of assessing a deficiency. If the general rule of section 6501(a) applied, then the IRS would have failed to assess the deficiency within the period of limitations and would be barred from assessing and collecting any of the deficiencies or additions to tax for the 8 tax years at issue. However, if the deficiency was determined "[i]n the case of a false or fraudulent return with the intent to evade tax," then the IRS may assess such deficiency "at any time." Sec. 6501(c)(1). Thus, we decide as a threshold matter whether Mr. Williams is liable for fraud under section 6663.

Respondent bears the burden of proving the existence of civil tax fraud. See sec. 7454(a); Rule 142(b). If respondent fails to prove fraud, then the statute of limitations will prevent respondent from assessing and collecting any of the deficiencies or additions to tax. See sec. 6501(a). The particular issue implicated in respondent's pending motion is whether Mr. Williams is liable for fraud for all 8 years, or whether he is liable for fraud merely for some indeterminate time within the span of those 8 years.

B. Collateral Estoppel Bars Relitigation of Fraud

1. Conviction for Attempting To Evade or Defeat Tax Establishes Fraud.

Respondent asserts that Mr. Williams's conviction on one count of criminal tax evasion under section 7201 with respect to tax years 1993 through 2000 collaterally estops him from contesting that he fraudulently underpaid his income taxes in those tax years. In Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-154 (1979), the Supreme Court explained the doctrine of collateral estoppel as follows:

Under collateral estoppel, once an issue is actually and necessarily determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, that determination is conclusive in subsequent suits based on a different cause of action involving a party to the prior litigation.

When the prior determination was in a criminal case, and the subsequent suit is civil, this same principle applies. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (to which an appeal in this case would lie) has held that "a defendant is precluded [by collateral estoppel] from retrying issues [in a criminal information] necessary to his plea agreement in a later civil suit". United States v. Wight, 839 F.2d 193, 196 (4th Cir. 1987); see also Arctic Ice Cream Co. v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 68, 75 (1964) ("a plea of guilty * * * is a conclusive judicial admission of all of the essential elements of the offense which the indictment charges").

The three Code sections involved in this collateral estoppel question are section 7201 (defining the crime of "attempt[ing] * * * to evade or defeat any tax"), section 6501(c)(1) (extending indefinitely the period of limitation for assessment of tax "[i]n the case of a false or fraudulent return with the intent to evade tax"), and section 6663(a) (imposing a civil penalty for underpayments "due to fraud"). Mr. Williams was previously convicted of "attempt[ing] * * * to evade or defeat" his income tax liability for 1993 through 2000 (under section 7201), whereas the issues now before us are whether he filed "false or fraudulent return[s] with the intent to evade tax" (under section 6501(c)(1)), and whether he had tax underpayments "due to fraud" (under section 6663). Though the "evade or defeat" wording of the criminal statute does not include the "fraud" vocabulary of the two civil statutes, an evasion conviction establishes fraud. We have repeatedly held that "[a] taxpayer is collaterally estopped from denying civil tax fraud under * * * [the predecessor of section 6663] when convicted for criminal tax evasion under section 7201 for the same taxable year." DiLeo v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 858, 885 (1991), affd. 959 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1992). 5 Because Mr. Williams was convicted of tax evasion for 1993 through 2000, he is estopped from contesting the essential elements of criminal tax evasion with respect to tax years 1993 through 2000, which are "identical" to the elements of civil tax fraud. Uscinski v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-200.

Mr. Williams does not dispute wholesale this operation of collateral estoppel in litigation under the Internal Revenue Code. He concedes that his guilty plea and conviction collaterally estop him from contesting that he fraudulently underpaid his taxes sometime within 1993 to 2000, but he disputes that he is estopped from denying tax fraud for the entire period or for any given year therein.

2. Mr. Williams's Arguments Against Collateral Estoppel Lack Merit.

Mr. Williams contends that his criminal conviction should estop him from denying only the generality that he committed tax fraud at some time within 1993 to 2000 --not for every year in that period, nor even in any given year therein --because (he says): (I) the District Court did not "actually and necessarily" determine, and the parties did not agree, that he committed criminal tax evasion in each and every one of the 8 tax years at issue, because he merely pleaded guilty to criminal tax evasion sometime within 1993 to 2000, not for the entire period or any given year therein; (ii) respondent relies on the contents of the superseding criminal information to invoke collateral estoppel, but Mr. Williams did not adopt the contents of the superseding criminal information or allocute to specific facts in his guilty plea that could estop him from denying criminal tax evasion in any given year; and (iii) the utility of ruling on whether he fraudulently underpaid his income taxes in any given year before determining the amount of tax evaded is negligible and does not materially advance the resolution of this case.

a. Tax Years Covered by the Guilty Plea

Mr. Williams alleges that the District Court did not (in the language of Montana) "actually and necessarily" determine --and the parties did not agree --that he committed criminal tax evasion in each and every one of the 8 tax years at issue. Instead, Mr. Williams argues that he merely pleaded guilty to criminal tax evasion at some point within 1993 through 2000.

Mr. Williams properly cites Montana v. United States, supra at 153-154, for the proposition that collateral estoppel applies once an issue is "actually and necessarily" determined. However, by accepting Mr. Williams's guilty plea and entering a judgment of conviction against him, the District Court did "actually and necessarily" determine that he committed criminal tax evasion in each tax year from 1993 through 2000. The plain language of the tax evasion count of the superseding criminal information, to which Mr. Williams pleaded guilty and for which he was convicted, states:

J. BRYAN WILLIAMS, the defendant, unlawfully, willfully and knowingly did attempt to evade and defeat a substantial part of the income tax due and owing by J. BRYAN WILLIAMS and his spouse to the United States of America for the calendar years 1993 through 2000". [Emphasis added.]

Mr. Williams personally and explicitly admitted his guilt with equivalent language, stating at his plea hearing: "I * * * believe that I am guilty of evading the payment of taxes for the tax years 1993 through 2000." Thus, there is no question that, when the court accepted his plea and found him guilty, Mr. Williams was convicted of criminal tax evasion "for the calendar years 1993 through 2000".

b. Rejection of Superseding Criminal Information and Allocution to Specific Facts

If a defendant pleads guilty but denies particular allegations in the indictment or criminal information, then it is possible that collateral estoppel may not bind the defendant to those denied allegations, 6 and Mr. Williams attempts to invoke such an exception here. He asserts that he did not allocute or admit to any specific facts in the superseding criminal information that could estop him from denying that he committed criminal tax evasion in any of the 8 tax years at issue. Instead, Mr. Williams argues that he merely pleaded guilty to having committed criminal tax evasion at some point within the span of 1993 through 2000, and that he denied the prosecutor's particular allegations. He bases this argument, in large part, on two statements (quoted above) that his defense counsel made about the conspiracy count at his plea hearing, to the effect that "we're not adopting or accepting the facts as stated in the conspiracy count," and that "we are not adopting the facts that are stated in that [conspiracy] count."

Mr. Williams's plea agreement explicitly provides that he agreed to plead guilty to both counts of the superseding criminal information. Thus, the allegations in both counts of the superseding criminal information are arguably necessary to Mr. Williams's plea agreement, and he might be precluded here from retrying even the facts underlying the conspiracy count.

However, the facts most relevant here are not the facts of the conspiracy count but the facts of the tax evasion count. Even if Mr. Williams had sufficiently denied the facts of the conspiracy count so as to be free to dispute those facts in subsequent litigation, neither Mr. Williams nor his defense counsel denied in whole or in part the facts underlying the tax evasion count of the superseding criminal information, which charged him with criminal tax evasion. Both of the above statements that Mr. Williams cites as his denial of the contents of the superseding criminal information explicitly refer to the conspiracy count, and that count alone. Mr. Williams did not specifically deny any particular fact, allegation, or issue in the tax evasion count of the superseding criminal information at his plea hearing or otherwise. Thus, Mr. Williams is estopped from denying the contents of the tax evasion count, including the charge that he "unlawfully, willfully and knowingly did attempt to evade and defeat a substantial part of the income tax due and owing by J. BRYAN WILLIAMS and his spouse to the United States of America for the calendar years 1993 through 2000". (Emphasis added.)

In fact, Mr. Williams did allocute to specific facts at his plea hearing that belie his claim that he denied that (or reserved whether) he committed criminal tax evasion in each and every one of the 8 tax years at issue. In response to the District Court judge's question as to "what he did", Mr. Williams stated (as is quoted above) --

 that he "received [income] from foreign sources during the years 1993 to 2000";

 that "the funds * * * and all the interest income were taxable income to me. However, [on] the calendar year tax returns for '93 through 2000, I chose not to report the income * * * to the Internal Revenue Service in order to evade substantial taxes owed thereon"; and

 that he was "guilty of evading the payment of taxes for the tax years 1993 through 2000."

c. Utility of Resolving Tax Fraud Issue

Respondent has moved only for partial summary judgment. Respondent requests a holding that Mr. Williams committed fraud but defers the question of the amount of his liability. Mr. Williams argues that it serves little or no purpose for this Court to rule on whether an underpayment in any of the tax years at issue is due to fraud before it has determined the amount, if any, of such underpayment. He argues that "the utility of such a ruling is negligible and not worth the time and resources of the Court and counsel", because "it does not materially advance the litigation, nor does it narrow the issues." However, a holding on whether Mr. Williams committed fraud does narrow the issues before this Court, and we have previously ruled on the fraud issue before resolving the amount of the underpayment in other tax fraud cases. See, e.g., Uscinski v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-200.

Therefore, we hold that respondent has shown that he is entitled to summary judgment with respect to the issue of whether collateral estoppel applies to establish civil tax fraud in each tax year from 1993 through 2000. We hold that the statute of limitations does not bar assessment of Mr. Williams's tax liability for those years, and that he will be liable for the fraud penalty. However, the issue of the amounts of the deficiencies of tax and penalties for 1993 through 2000, and the issue of accuracy-related penalties, remain for trial.

To reflect the foregoing,

An appropriate order will be issued.

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all citations to sections refer to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (26 U.S.C.), as amended, and all citations to Rules refer to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.

2 Respondent seeks summary judgment for all 8 of the tax years at issue, but only as to the issue of whether Mr. Williams fraudulently underpaid his income taxes, not as to the actual amounts of tax deficiency and penalties.

3 Mr. Williams filed his return for 1993 on April 15, 1994; for 1994 on April 17, 1995; for 1995 on April 15, 1996; for 1996 on April 15, 1997; for 1997 on April 15, 1998; for 1998 on April 15, 1999; for 1999 on April 17, 2000; and for 2000 on May 15, 2001.

4 While Mr. Williams seems to use the terms "criminal information" and "indictment" interchangeably, both at his plea hearing and in his pleadings and motion papers herein, the procedure employed in Mr. Williams's case was a criminal information. An indictment is "[t]he formal written accusation of a crime, made by a grand jury and presented to a court for prosecution against the accused person", whereas an information is "[a] formal criminal charge made by a prosecutor without a grand-jury indictment." Black's Law Dictionary 788, 795 (8th ed. 2004). These are different procedures, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 7, but the difference is not material either to the application of collateral estoppel to a conviction or to the outcome of this case, see infra pt. II.B.1.

5 See also Amos v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 50, 55 (1964), affd. 360 F.2d 358 (4th Cir. 1965); Arctic Ice Cream Co. v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 68, 74-76 (1964). Because a conviction for criminal tax evasion under section 7201 conclusively establishes civil tax fraud under section 6663 in the same tax year, the unlimited statute of limitations of section 6501(c)(1) is also applicable. See DiLeo v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 858, 885 (1991), affd. 959 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1992); Amos v. Commissioner, supra at 55.

6 See United States v. Tolson, 988 F.2d 1494, 1501 n.6 (7th Cir. 1993) ("absent evidence that the defendant reserved the issue in the plea, he may not challenge the facts in the indictment and plea agreement") (citing United States v. Gilliam, 987 F.2d 1009, 1014 (4th Cir. 1993) ("a plea of guilty to an indictment containing an allegation of the amount of drugs for which a defendant is responsible may, in the absence of a reservation by the defendant of his right to dispute the amount at sentencing, constitute an admission of that quantity for sentencing purposes")).

Conviction estops denial of fraud. --Fraud Penalty: Criminal Fraud: Conviction estops denial of fraud

An individual who pleaded guilty to a charge of criminal tax evasion for one tax year in return for a dismissal of charges for other years was collaterally estopped from denying that he had underpaid his taxes and that the underpayment was due to fraud. The criminal conviction established that part of the underpayment for the tax year at issue was attributable to fraud. Collateral estoppel applied regardless of whether the conviction arose from a trial on the merits or a plea of guilty.

J.C. Stepien, 71 TCM 1688, Dec. 51,108(M), TC Memo. 1996-6.

Conviction of fraud estops taxpayer from denying applicability of fraud penalty.

J.W. Amos, CA-4, 66-1 USTC ¶9130, 360 F2d 358.

J.H. Moore, CA-4, 66-1 USTC ¶9399, 360 F2d 353.

H.M. Plunkett, CA-7, 72-2 USTC ¶9541, 465 F2d 299.

A.H. Fontneau, CA-1, 81-2 USTC ¶9557, 654 F2d 8.

P.F. Gray, Jr., CA-6, 83-1 USTC ¶9391.

N.M. Blohm, CA-11, 93-2 USTC ¶50,518.

W.D. Zack, CA-6, 2002-1 USTC ¶50,430.

I.A. Schiff, CA-9, 2006-2 USTC ¶50,566.

S.N. Inman, DC, 70-1 USTC ¶9427.

T.K. Considine, CtCls, 81-1 USTC ¶9280, 645 F2d 925. Cert. denied, 103 SCt 79.

G.D. Strachan, 48 TC 335, Dec. 28,503.

C.R. Considine, 68 TC 52, Dec. 34,365.

G.D. Brooks, 82 TC 413, Dec. 41,043.

D.M. Castillo, 84 TC 405, Dec. 41,940.

J. Casner, Jr., 23 TCM 1683, Dec. 27,016(M), TC Memo. 1964-277.

J. Turnbull, 25 TCM 440, Dec. 27,910(M), TC Memo. 1966-77.

G.W. Vardine, 28 TCM 325, Dec. 29,506(M), TC Memo. 1969-57.

B. Sandler, 29 TCM 248, Dec. 29,992(M), TC Memo. 1970-55.

J.P. Abraham, 29 TCM 1401, Dec. 30,406(M), TC Memo. 1970-304.

S. Turznski, 31 TCM 617, Dec. 31,436(M), TC Memo. 1972-136. Aff'd, CA-7, in unpublished opinion, 8/1/74.

M.G. Whitfield, 31 TCM 654, Dec. 31,441(M), TC Memo. 1972-139.

H.H. McGuire, 32 TCM 222, Dec. 31,871(M), TC Memo. 1973-51.

J.B. Moody, 32 TCM 999, Dec. 32,162(M), TC Memo. 1973-216.

R.L. Barksdale, 34 TCM 726, Dec. 33,222(M), TC Memo. 1975-159.

R.L. Lemelin, 34 TCM 744, Dec. 33,237(M), TC Memo. 1975-166.

J.V. Keogh, 34 TCM 844, Dec. 33,279(M), TC Memo. 1975-197.

J.W. Timek, 35 TCM 1622, Dec. 34,118(M), TC Memo. 1976-357. Aff'd CA-2, 77-2 USTC ¶9690.

S.M. Stone, 36 TCM 621, Dec. 34,409(M), TC Memo. 1977-147.

W.L. Church, 37 TCM 1236, Dec. 35,309(M), TC Memo. 1978-295.

T.M. Fahey, 38 TCM 62, Dec. 35,822(M), TC Memo. 1979-20.

J.E. Nielson, 41 TCM 154, Dec. 37,330(M), TC Memo. 1980-453.

M.J. Waterman, 41 TCM 695, Dec. 37,608(M), TC Memo. 1981-7.

C.L. Stephens, 41 TCM 964, Dec. 37,713(M), TC Memo. 1981-85.

G.F. Brown, 42 TCM 579, Dec. 38,116(M), TC Memo. 1981-406.

B.L. Goldenberg, 42 TCM 1397, Dec. 38,336(M), TC Memo. 1981-589.

H.B. Gaar, Jr., 43 TCM 29, Dec. 38,476(M), TC Memo. 1981-696.

B.J. Stouffer, II, 43 TCM 341, Dec. 38,735(M), TC Memo. 1982-29.

A.D. Passero, 43 TCM 1166, Dec. 38,966(M), TC Memo. 1982-218.

R.E. Cleveland, 46 TCM 257, Dec. 40,157(M), TC Memo. 1983-299.

L.D. Poor, 47 TCM 811, Dec. 40,904(M), TC Memo. 1984-3.

L. Stobaugh, 47 TCM 1227, Dec. 41,041(M), TC Memo. 1984-112.

M. Stern, 48 TCM 605, Dec. 41,368(M), TC Memo. 1984-383.

P.J. Lahr, 48 TCM 1029, Dec. 41,467(M), TC Memo. 1984-472. Aff'd on other issues, CA-9, 1/24/86.

R.W. Lowry, 49 TCM 1246, Dec. 42,033(M), TC Memo. 1985-185.

American Insulation Corp., 50 TCM 850, Dec. 42,328(M), TC Memo. 1985-436.

C. Murillo, 52 TCM 1008, Dec. 43,490(M), TC Memo. 1986-544.

L. Astuto, 53 TCM 614, Dec. 43,849(M), TC Memo. 1987-200.

A.R. King, III, 53 TCM 1217, Dec. 43,999(M), TC Memo. 1987-311.

W.A. Golchman, 54 TCM 679, Dec. 44,225(M), TC Memo. 1987-489.

K.H. Brown Est., 55 TCM 1249, Dec. 44,882(M), TC Memo. 1988-297.

T. McKinon, 55 TCM 1345, Dec. 44,923(M), TC Memo. 1988-323.

J.L. Huff, 56 TCM 838, Dec. 45,214(M), TC Memo. 1988-564.

A. Brunner, 56 TCM 1079, Dec. 45,427(M), TC Memo. 1989-24.

E. Sullivan, 56 TCM 1114, Dec. 45,434(M), TC Memo. 1989-30. Aff'd, CA-3 (unpublished opinion 5/29/90).

W.R. Chermack, 56 TCM 1215, Dec. 45,474(M), TC Memo. 1989-57.

S. Felak, Jr., 58 TCM 324, Dec. 46,069(M), TC Memo. 1989-543.

M.J. Kingsley, 58 TCM 1428, Dec. 46,384(M), TC Memo. 1990-79.

F.A. Carroll, 59 TCM 796, Dec. 46,628(M), TC Memo. 1990-279.

D.E. Parks, 59 TCM 803, Dec. 46,630(M), TC Memo. 1990-281.

F.B. Vicknair, Jr., 60 TCM 517, Dec. 46,803(M), TC Memo. 1990-434.

L.D. Barnette, 60 TCM 997, Dec. 46,923(M), TC Memo. 1990-535.

W.H. Wilson, Jr., 60 TCM 1366, Dec. 47,015(M), TC Memo. 1990-616.

W.J. Fisher, 62 TCM 459, Dec. 47,550(M), TC Memo. 1991-390.

C.M. Carlson, 65 TCM 1880, Dec. 48,855(M), TC Memo. 1993-48.

W.J. McCullough, 65 TCM 1984, Dec. 48,880(M), TC Memo. 1993-70.

J.L. McCall, 65 TCM 2113, Dec. 48,908(M), TC Memo. 1993-95.

W. Franklin, 65 TCM 2497, Dec. 49,008(M), TC Memo. 1993-184.

D.W. Linker, 65 TCM 3019, Dec. 49,118(M), TC Memo. 1993-279.

R. Sturman, 66 TCM 358, Dec. 49,207(M), TC Memo. 1993-355.

E. Redd, 66 TCM 1425, Dec. 49,428(M), TC Memo. 1993-556.

R.W. Harrison, Jr., 66 TCM 1566, Dec. 49,465(M), TC Memo. 1993-587.

J.R. Williams, Jr., 68 TCM 1172, Dec. 50,229(M), TC Memo. 1994-560.

G. Weber, Sr., 69 TCM 2216, Dec. 50,541(M), TC Memo. 1995-125.

H. Deletis, Jr., 70 TCM 1090, Dec. 50,967(M), TC Memo. 1995-512.

B.P. Cadwell, 70 TCM 1318, Dec. 51,000(M), TC Memo. 1995-541.

A. Walters, 70 TCM 1324, Dec. 51,002(M), TC Memo. 1995-543.

E. Wynn, 70 TCM 1646, Dec. 51,073(M), TC Memo. 1995-609.

W. Thomas, 72 TCM 1110, Dec. 51,622(M), TC Memo. 1996-483.

R.K. Lahodny, 73 TCM 1689, Dec. 51,813(M), TC Memo. 1997-12.

J.E. Stafford, 73 TCM 1848, Dec. 51,852(M), TC Memo. 1997-50. Aff'd, per curiam, on another issue, CA-5 (unpublished opinion), 98-2 USTC ¶50,496.

M.J. Fitzpatrick, 73 TCM 2479, Dec. 51,970(M), TC Memo. 1997-158.

T.G. Roots, 73 TCM 2609, Dec. 52,000(M), TC Memo. 1997-187.

M.J. Heun, 73 TCM 3008, Dec. 52,086(M), TC Memo. 1997-265.

A. Donnora, 75 TCM 2348, Dec. 52,711(M), TC Memo. 1998-187.

R.A. Frey, 75 TCM 2548, Dec. 52,759(M), TC Memo. 1998-226.

D.T. Madge, 80 TCM 804, Dec. 54,144(M), TC Memo. 2000-370. Aff'd, per curiam, on another issue, CA-8 (unpublished opinion), 2001-2 USTC ¶50,761.

S.M. Zamzam, 80 TCM 808, Dec. 54,145(M), TC Memo. 2000-371. Aff'd, per curiam, CA-4 (unpublished opinion), 2002-1 USTC ¶50,180.

L.J. Moore, 81 TCM 1442, Dec. 54,291(M), TC Memo. 2001-77.

R.P. Console, 82 TCM 479, Dec. 54,471(M), TC Memo. 2001-232. Aff'd, CA-3 (unpublished opinion) 2003-2 USTC ¶50,593.

Y. Yang-Wu, 83 TCM 1363, Dec. 54,681(M), TC Memo. 2002-68.

M.C. Wilson, 84 TCM 321, Dec. 54,876(M), TC Memo. 2002-234.

S.C. Carter, 86 TCM 229, Dec. 55,258(M), TC Memo. 2003-235.

H.J. Uscinski, 92 TCM 285, Dec. 56,626(M), TC Memo. 2006-200.

In cases that probably will no longer be followed, it was held that criminal conviction does not estop taxpayer from denying fraud penalty.

S.L. Anderson, DC, 66-1 USTC ¶9441, 245 FSupp 177.

M.J. Safra, 30 TC 1026, Dec. 23,126 (Nonacq.).

R.F. Smith, 31 TC 1, Dec. 23,197 (Acq.).

H.L. Blackwell, 20 TCM 599, Dec. 24,816(M), TC Memo. 1961-124.

W.F. Slater Est., 21 TCM 1355, Dec. 25,733(M), TC Memo. 1962-256.

A prior criminal conviction for fraudulent failure to file income tax returns and to pay the taxes due estops the taxpayer from seeking a refund of the civil penalties assessed for the same fraudulent action. This is true even in the case of a fraudulent joint return where one party to the return was not prosecuted and is a party to the refund suit merely because he signed the joint return.

Lefkowitz, 64-2 USTC ¶9623, 334 F2d 262. Cert. denied, 379 US 962.

O.K. Armstrong, CtCls, 66-1 USTC ¶9119, 354 F2d 274.

An individual who had pleaded guilty to charges of tax evasion for one of the three years in dispute was estopped from denying that he had filed fraudulent returns. The fact that he faced numerous personal and legal problems at the time was not a sufficiently special circumstance to waive collateral estoppel.

J.G. Paschal, CA-3 (unpublished opinion), 96-1 USTC ¶50,013.

A self-employed manufacturer's representative was not collaterally estopped by his Code Sec. 7203 criminal conviction from denying that his failure to file returns was willful. The IRS had not raised the affirmative defense of collateral estoppel with respect to the addition to tax for fraud. The taxpayer's suspicious actions concerning bank deposits and accounts were not sufficient individually to prove fraud but provided support for the IRS's determination of fraud.

P.E. Niedringhaus, 99 TC 202, Dec. 48,411.

A corporation was not collaterally estopped by a stockholder's conviction for filing and causing it to file false and fraudulent returns. It was not a party to the criminal proceeding and did not participate in his defense.

C.B.C. Supermarkets, Inc., 54 TC 882, Dec. 30,081 (Nonacq.).

American Lithofold Corp., 55 TC 904, Dec. 30,681.

Although the taxpayer, a traffic court clerk, was estopped from denying participation in a bribery scheme because of conclusions of law entered by a Federal district court, he was not collaterally estopped by the findings of the court as to the specific amounts of money he received. However, based on reasonable inferences drawn from the circumstances of the case, and in light of the taxpayer's credible testimony, the Tax Court concluded that he lacked the specific intent to avoid the payment of tax.

R.C. Cipparone, 49 TCM 1492, Dec. 42,090(M), TC Memo. 1985-234.

An IRS agent who was convicted of conspiracy to bribe was not collaterally estopped from denying that he received bribes. The jury had not been required to find that the agent actually received bribe payments in the amounts that the IRS included in his income.

W. Kale, 71 TCM 2854, Dec. 51,311(M), TC Memo. 1996-197.

An individual who pleaded guilty to charges of criminal fraud was collaterally estopped from contesting the IRS's determination that he was liable for the fraud penalty. The individual's allegation that his guilty plea was coerced and involuntary did not constitute an exceptional circumstance. An appellate court that affirmed his conviction was not persuaded by his arguments, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied review. As a result, the criminal conviction was final.

J.R. Taylor, 73 TCM 2028, Dec. 51,887(M), TC Memo. 1997-82.

An individual who was convicted of criminal tax evasion was collaterally estopped from denying that he had underpaid his taxes for the years at issue and that part of those underpayments were due to fraud. The IRS was not required to prove the exact amounts of the underpayments or the taxes owed as an element of the criminal proceeding; consequently, the individual was not precluded from contesting the amounts of the deficiencies. No exception to the application of collateral estoppel was warranted by the individual's alleged ineffective assistance of counsel at the criminal trial.

H. Wapnick, 73 TCM 2317, Dec. 51,941(M), TC Memo. 1997-133.

A medical practice was liable for the additions to tax for fraud for the tax years in issue. The conviction of the doctor for criminal fraud for one tax year collaterally estopped it from denying civil fraud in a subsequent suit.

Richard A. Cole, M.D., Inc., 76 TCM 1055, Dec. 53,004(M), TC Memo. 1998-452.

The fraud penalty was imposed on a former state senator whose conviction for criminal tax evasion collaterally estopped him from denying that he had fraudulently underpaid his taxes. The elements for criminal and civil tax fraud were virtually identical, the criminal and civil proceedings involved the same parties, and it was immaterial that his conviction resulted from a guilty plea, rather than a trial. Also, the record did not support his claim that language in his plea agreement barred the government from asserting collateral estoppel or imposing penalties and interest.

J.L. Boettner, Jr., 76 TCM 622, Dec. 52,905(M), TC Memo. 1998-359.

An individual who voluntarily pleaded guilty to the charge of violating Code Sec. 7201 and was convicted of income tax evasion by a federal district court was collaterally estopped from denying in his Tax Court proceeding that some part of his tax underpayment was due to fraud. A clarification to his plea agreement indicating that the tax issues were not resolved did not prevent the application of collateral estoppel, because the district court subsequently entered judgment against the taxpayer for tax evasion.

J.S. Fagan, 82 TCM 443, Dec. 54,457(M), TC Memo. 2001-222.

When a petition is filed with the Board, it is its duty to review the administrative action of the Commissioner in determining a deficiency and penalties (here fraud and failure to file). It is not relieved of this duty by the fact that, in a criminal proceeding, the taxpayer was sentenced to pay and did pay the amount determined as the tax by the court.

Epstein, 34 BTA 925, Dec. 9461.

Fraud penalties were imposed against an attorney who admitted to having understated taxable income from his law practice by overstating business expenses. He was collaterally estopped from challenging the IRS's determination of a fraud penalty for one tax year because he had pleaded guilty to tax evasion charges.

D.R.. Cooley, 86 TCM 1025, Dec. 55,558(M), TC Memo. 2004-49.

A taxpayer was liable for penalties for fraud, under Code Sec. 6663, based on admissions he had made while pleading guilty in a criminal case and on his conviction in that case. The taxpayer was estopped from challenging the IRS's determination that he had taxable income and that he had filed a false tax return with the intent to evade income tax for that year. The taxpayer's guilty plea and conviction for attempting to evade or defeat the tax, under Code Sec. 7201, conclusively established fraud in the subsequent civil tax fraud proceeding.

J. Marretta, 87 TCM 1371, Dec. 55,649(M), TC Memo. 2004-128.

Because the elements of criminal tax evasion and civil tax fraud are identical, an attorney's prior conviction under Code Sec. 7201 conclusively established the elements necessary for finding fraud under Code Sec. 6663. His prior conviction collaterally estopped him from denying in the civil tax proceeding: (1) that his failure to report funds received from a former client resulted in an underpayment in his income tax; and (2) that at least part of the underpayment was due to fraud within the meaning of Code Sec. 6663. However, the IRS failed to carry its initial burden to show that there was no triable issue of fact with respect to the precise amount of the attorney's unreported income for the year at issue.

The sole owner of an S corporation who pled guilty to criminal tax evasion for failure to report in excess of $650,000 of corporate income was liable for the civil fraud penalty and was collaterally estopped from denying fraud. He argued that he suffered from diminished mental capacity based on the fact that in his criminal proceeding the government stipulated, and the sentencing court found, diminished capacity resulting from his bipolar disorder but that diminished capacity did not serve as a basis for waiving collateral estoppel.

C. Montalbano, 94 TCM 499, Dec. 57,183(M), TC Memo. 2007-349.

A married couple was collaterally estopped from contesting their liability for civil fraud penalty after they were convicted of wilfully attempting to evade taxes under Code Sec. 7201. The couple admitted that they did not report the gain from the sale of their property on their Form 1040 but that they reported the gain on Form 1041 for one of the two trusts they created prior to the sale of the property. They asserted that their individual tax return did not contain a false statement when read in conjunction with the trust's return, thus, claiming that they should not be held liable for the civil fraud penalty. However, their conviction under Code Sec. 7201 conclusively established fraud in their subsequent civil tax fraud proceeding through the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

J.E. Christians, Dec. 57,543(M), TC Memo. 2008-220.

An individual who pled guilty to willfully attempting to evade or defeat his tax liability was properly held liable for the civil fraud penalty and was collaterally estopped from denying civil fraud. His argument that his guilty plea was the result of an understanding that he suffered from a diminished mental capacity when he committed tax evasion and should be allowed to litigate that the diminished capacity prevented him from forming the specific intent to commit fraud was without merit. The individual admitted to each element of tax evasion, and his conviction established that his diminished mental capacity did not prevent him from forming the specific intent to commit tax evasion.

C. Montalbano, CA-11, 2009-1 USTC ¶50,153.

Labels:

Thursday, April 16, 2009

Abusive tax shelters: Tax-avoidance schemes: Injunctive relief: Interference with internal revenue laws: First Amendment right to free speech: Customer list. --
An individual was properly enjoined from promoting, organizing or selling abusive tax-avoidance materials. His conduct was subject to penalty under Code Sec. 6700, and injunctive relief was appropriate to prevent recurrence of such conduct and to prevent the individual from continuing to unlawfully interfere with the enforcement of IRS laws. Moreover, the individual knew or had reason to know that his statements were false or fraudulent, and the alleged effectiveness of the tax avoidance packages was material to their sale. The injunction prohibiting the individual from engaging in false commercial speech did not violate his First Amendment right to free speech. Selling methods to avoid tax liability was false advertising; therefore, it received no First Amendment protection. The individual was also required to provide the government with a list of persons who purchased the tax avoidance materials, The individual's customers relied on the tax avoidance packages and failed to file tax returns, thereby exposing themselves to increased tax and criminal liability. Production of the customer list was in the public interest so that the government could warn the customers of the falsity and ineffectiveness of the individual's claims and enforce the income tax laws. Moreover, such an order did not violate the customers' First Amendment rights since commercial transactions do not entail the same rights of association as do political meetings. Back references: ¶2900.132,




United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, Cross-Appellant v. William J. Benson, Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellee.

U.S. Court of Appeals, 7th Circuit; 08-1312, 08-1586, April 6, 2009.

Affirming 2005-1 USTC ¶50,398; affirming in part, reversing and remanding in part 2007-2 USTC ¶50,846.

[ Code Secs. 6700 and 7408]



Before: Bauer, Ripple and Evans, Circuit Judges.

BAUER, Circuit Judge: The district court enjoined William J. Benson, a "tax protester," from promoting, organizing, or selling his "Reliance Defense Package" and "16th Amendment Reliance Package," which were based on the false premise that customers could stop paying federal income taxes and avoid or defeat prosecution by relying on the materials in the Packages. However, the court denied the government's request to require Benson to divulge a list of his customers. We affirm the injunction, but reverse as to the customer list, and remand for further appropriate proceedings.




I. BACKGROUND


Benson wrote a book titled, The Law That Never Was, in which he claims that the Sixteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution was never properly ratified. Benson packaged his book with several excerpts from state legislative histories and records from the national archives as well as court cases and other materials to create what he called the "Reliance Defense Package." He advertised the Package and its component parts for sale on his website, www.thelawthatneverwas.com. The entire Package was offered for sale for $3500. Benson branded a similar set of materials as the "16th Amendment Reliance Package," which was promoted and offered for sale on the website of the Free Enterprise Society.

The details of Benson's promotional claims will be more thoroughly discussed below, but they can be boiled down to two theories. Benson's first and primary theory was that the Sixteenth Amendment was never properly ratified because several states intentionally attempted to modify the language of the proposed amendment and so did not ratify the actual amendment proposed by Congress. Without the Sixteenth Amendment, Benson explained, the federal income tax system is unconstitutional according to the Supreme Court. See Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895). Benson stated that he does not file an income tax return and that his customers may choose to do the same.

Benson's second theory, which was alluded to on Benson's website and more thoroughly discussed in the Reliance Defense Package itself, was that an individual could not be successfully prosecuted if he truly believed he was not required to pay income taxes. Benson claimed that the Supreme Court held in Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991) "that when a defendant had a goodfaith belief he was not required to file, he must be permitted to present that belief to the jury." Benson also cited United States v. Powell, 955 F.2d 1206 (9th Cir. 1991) for the principle that the defendants' conviction for failing to file tax returns "could not be sustained if the [defendants] sincerely believed they were not required to file --whatever their foundation for that belief." And Benson promised that the Reliance Defense Package would allow customers to develop that sincere belief.

At the government's request, the district court granted summary judgement and issued an injunction against Benson; however the district court denied the part of the requested injunction that would have required Benson to turn over his customer list. 1




II. DISCUSSION


On appeal, Benson claims that he did not violate the statute the district court relied on to grant the injunction. He also argues that the injunction violates his First Amendment rights. The government counters that there was ample statutory and constitutional support for the injunction. The government's cross-claim contends that the district court erred by not requiring Benson to produce a list of his customers. We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo and its decision to grant an injunction for abuse of discretion. United States v. Raymond, 228 F.3d 804, 810 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Kaun, 827 F.2d 1144, 1148 (7th Cir. 1987).



A. Statutory Authority for the Injunction

A district court is authorized to enter an injunction against any person if it finds "(1) that the person has engaged in any [conduct subject to penalty under 26 U.S.C. § 6700], and (2) that injunctive relief is appropriate to prevent recurrence of such conduct." 26 U.S.C. § 7408(b).



1. Violation of 26 U.S.C. § 6700

Section 6700 imposes a penalty on any person who (1) organizes (or assists in the organization of) any plan or arrangement, or participates (directly or indirectly) in the sale of any interest in an entity or plan or arrangement, and (2) in connection with such organization or sale, makes or furnishes a statement with respect to the allowability of any deduction or credit, the excludability or any income, or the securing of any other tax benefit by reason of holding an interest in the entity or participating in the plan or arrangement (3) which the person knows or has reason to know is false or fraudulent (4) as to any material matter. 26 U.S.C. § 6700(a).

Benson claims that he was simply urging political action and was not promoting any plan because he did not engage in affirmative conduct such as offering to help prepare trusts, false W-4 forms, false income tax returns, letters to harass the IRS, claims for tax refunds, etc., as some tax protestors have in the past. Benson is wrong, both legally and factually.

First, the definition of a plan for purposes of § 6700 is broad. Raymond, 228 F.3d at 811 ("any 'plan or arrangement' having some connection to taxes" (citing Kaun, 827 F.2d at 1147)). Courts have not been hesitant in finding tax protesters' activities to qualify as plans. Kaun, 827 F.2d at 1148 ("words 'any other plan or arrangement' are clearly broad enough to include a tax protester group"); Raymond, 228 F.3d at 811-12 (sale of program that told customers they could legally refuse to pay federal income tax was sale of an interest in a plan under § 6700); United States v. Schulz, 529 F. Supp. 2d 341, 348 (N.D.N.Y. 2007) (instruction guide on stopping employer withholdings was plan or arrangement), aff'd, 517 F.3d 606, 607 (2d Cir. 2008). Benson's plan was simpler than some prior tax protester schemes, but its purpose was the same --to evade tax liability. Instead of filing false tax returns, Benson's plan encouraged customers not to file a tax return at all. Such a don't-do-it-yourself kit does not require forms or filings. Here, the devil is not in the details. Like every other tax protester, Benson was selling an illegal method by which to avoid paying taxes; the details of that method are immaterial.

Second, Benson's materials were prepared in such a way so that the entirety of either Package could be sent to the IRS if they began an investigation. The Reliance Defense Package included a customized Reliance Letter, which concluded:


It is insanely unrealistic for someone like [ customer's name] to believe that he would be required to file any forms with any state taxing agency or the Federal Government, when the 16th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution is an absolute complete total fraud as proven by The Law That Never Was Volume I and in excess of 17,000 documents etc. that [ customer's name] relies on as his STATE OF MIND, FRAME OF MIND RELIANCE, AND BELIEF. The entire Reliance Program shall become a part of his permanent record.


Therefore, Benson was providing his customers with something to send to the IRS in an effort to avoid paying taxes. At least one taxpayer submitted the Reliance Letter and several other elements of the Reliance Defense Package along with the entire 16th Amendment Reliance Package to the IRS when questioned about failing to file an income tax return. The only distinction between Benson's plan and other plans is that Benson's materials were to be utilized after the IRS launched an investigation. So Benson did organize a plan or arrangement and participated in the sale of an interest in the plan or arrangement. 26 U.S.C. § 6700(a)(1).

Benson made numerous statements about the tax benefits to be enjoyed by customers as a result of purchasing his materials and participating in his plan or arrangement. 26 U.S.C. § 6700(a)(2)(A). In promoting his materials, Benson claimed that he "discovered that the 16th Amendment was not ratified" and to have documents "proving that the 16th Amendment ... is an absolute, complete, total fraud." Benson also claimed on his website that:


After serving time in federal prison for not paying his United States income taxes, Bill Benson still does not pay income taxes and yet our federal government chooses not to arrest him. Why? Because now he can use this book, which he has written: 'THE LAW THAT NEVER WAS' in his defense.


Benson marketed the Reliance Defense Package on his website as a "compendium of information giving you the education and choice toward not filing an Income tax return. This compendium will give you the education to say 'Based on my state-of-mind, frame of mind, reliance and belief I am obeying the dictates of Constitutional Law.' " Benson boasted that "[t]o date, the IRS has steadfastly refused to prosecute any person standing on this defense. Why do they do this? Because they know they cannot win!!" Benson also stated that "included in your Package will be numerous DVDs and many other references proving that you are not a taxpayer!"

Benson knew or had reason to know that his statements were false or fraudulent. 26 U.S.C. § 6700(a)(2)(A). Benson's claim to have discovered that the Sixteenth Amendment was not ratified has been rejected by this Court in Benson's own criminal appeal. United States v. Benson, 941 F.2d 598, 607 (7th Cir. 1991) ("In Thomas, we specifically examined the arguments made in The Law That Never Was, and concluded that 'Benson ... did not discover anything.' " (quoting United States v. Thomas, 788 F.2d 1250, 1253 (7th Cir. 1986))). "[W]e have repeatedly rejected the claim that the Sixteenth Amendment was improperly ratified. One would think this repeated rejection of Benson's Sixteenth Amendment argument would put the matter to rest." Benson, 941 F.2d at 607 (citations omitted).

Benson knows that his claim that he can rely on his book to prevent federal prosecution is equally false because his attempt to rely on his book in his own criminal case was ineffective. Benson, 941 F.2d at 607. Benson's book has been repeatedly discredited by the courts. Miller v. United States, 868 F.2d 236, 241 (7th Cir. 1989) ("We find it hard to understand why the long and unbroken line of cases upholding the constitutionality of the sixteenth amendment generally, and those specifically rejecting the argument advanced in The Law That Never Was, have not persuaded Miller and his compatriots to seek a more effective forum for airing their attack on the federal income tax structure." (citations omitted)).

Benson's statement that the government cannot successfully prosecute any person choosing not to file a tax return based on his belief that he is obeying the dictates of constitutional law is also false. This argument seems to be derived from Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991), as discussed above. But Cheek only supports a defense that the defendant misunderstood the requirements of the tax code, not that he believed those requirements to be unconstitutional. Id. at 205-06 ("Claims that some of the provisions of the tax code are unconstitutional are submissions of a different order [from a good-faith misunder-standing of the law]... . [D]efendant's views about the validity of the tax statutes are irrelevant to the issue of willfulness ... ."); United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 955-56 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating that Cheek held that "judges may rebuff defenses based on erroneous constitutional beliefs (such as that the 16th Amendment was not properly ratified)").

Benson argues that because he made no false statements, materiality is not at issue. We obviously disagree with Benson's premise and so must decide whether Benson's false statements pertained to a material matter. 26 U.S.C. § 6700(a)(2)(A). There is no matter more material to the sale of a tax avoidance package than whether the package effectively allows customers to avoid taxes. Benson's program was organized and promoted as a golden ticket whereby purchasers could avoid income tax liability and criminal liability. Benson's false statements regarding the vulnerability of the Sixteenth Amendment and the ability of his customers to refuse to pay taxes without being prosecuted were material because they would have a "'substantial impact' on the decision to purchase [his] tax package." United States v. Gleason, 432 F.3d 678, 683 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Buttorff, 761 F.2d 1056, 1062 (5th Cir. 1985); see also United States v. White, 769 F.2d 511, 515 (8th Cir. 1985) (material because "taxpayers who have been or are now being audited by the IRS or are involved in litigation because they relied upon appellant's representations should certainly have been informed about their complete lack of merit"). Even if some of Benson's followers purchased the Packages for educational purposes or to take political action, as Benson claims, it is hard to believe they would have bought the materials knowing they were false.



2. Likelihood of Recurrence

In determining whether an injunction is appropriate to prevent recurrence of the illegal conduct, the court must consider the totality of the circumstances including:


(1) the gravity of harm caused by the offense; (2) the extent of the defendant's participation and his degree of scienter; (3) the isolated or recurrent nature of the infraction and the likelihood that the defendant's customary business activities might again involve him in such [a] transaction; (4) the defendant's recognition of his own culpability; and (5) the sincerity of his assurances against future violations.


Raymond, 228 F.3d at 813 (quoting Kaun, 827 F.2d at 1149-50) (internal quotations omitted). Lengthy discussion of this matter is not warranted. Reliance on Benson's false promises has deprived the government of revenue and has harmed Benson's customers who were deceived by the "siren call of the tax protester movement." United States v. Engh, 330 F.3d 954, 956 (7th Cir. 2003). Benson was at the heart of this scheme, which he knew or should have known had been thoroughly rejected by the courts. His violation of § 6700 was not isolated, but continuous since his false assurances about the efficacy of his products were posted on his website. Benson does not acknowledge his culpability, and, despite any assurances to the district court, he is not likely to stop without an injunction. The district court adequately examined the necessary factors and did not abuse its discretion in concluding that an injunction was necessary. See Kaun, 827 F.2d at 1148.



B. First Amendment

Of course, even though the injunction was properly granted under 26 U.S.C. § 7408, it still must meet the standards of the First Amendment. Benson claims that the injunction is a violation of his constitutional right to engage in political expression and that the government is trying to squelch his view that the Sixteenth Amendment was never ratified. The government contends that the injunction enjoins false commercial speech, which receives no First Amendment protection.

The First Amendment provides broad protection to speech, but not all speech. Commercial speech receives lesser protection and false or misleading commercial speech receives no protection at all. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 562-63 (1980). "For commercial speech to come within [the protection of the First Amendment], it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading." Id. at 566. When deciding if speech is commercial, appropriate considerations include whether: (1) the speech is an advertisement; (2) the speech refers to a specific product; and (3) the speaker has an economic motivation for the speech. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-67 (1983).

There is some debate about what the injunction in this case actually prohibits. Benson repeatedly asserts that it prevents him from distributing court opinions, legislative journals, and other public records, and from speaking about or expressing an opinion about those documents. We interpret the injunction as the government did at oral argument: that it prohibits "false statements made in connection with the sale of a product." The government clarified that the injunction does not prevent Benson from promoting his opinion in the public square. Neither is Benson prohibited from selling his book, The Law That Never Was, according to the government's brief. 2 Therefore, Benson is not prohibited from distributing his opinion that the Sixteenth Amendment was not ratified or public documents that he believes support his claim --both of which are contained in his book.

What Benson is prohibited from is engaging in unprotected false commercial speech. This interpretation is evidenced in the language of the injunction the government originally requested, prohibiting Benson


from directly or indirectly, by means of false, deceptive, or misleading commercial speech:



(1) Organizing, promoting, marketing, or selling ... the tax shelter, plan, or arrangement known as "The Reliance Defense Package," or any other abusive tax shelter, plan or arrangement that incites taxpayers to attempt to violate the internal revenue laws ... ;



(2) Engaging in any conduct subject to penalty under IRC § 6700, i.e., making or furnishing, in connection with the organization or sale of an abusive tax shelter, plan, or arrangement, a statement [he] know[s] or [has] reason to know is false or fraudulent as to any material matter; and



(3) Engaging in any conduct that interferes with the administration and enforcement of the internal revenue laws;


(emphasis added). We read the injunction issued in this spirit. Therefore, the injunction prohibits "only false, deceptive or misleading commercial speech that is related to the provision of tax advice." Raymond, 228 F.3d at 815 (citing Kaun, 827 F.2d at 1152).

Benson was engaged in false commercial speech. As detailed above, Benson made many false statements about the benefits of buying his materials. Specifically, Benson promised potential customers that his products would free them from taxation and protect them from, or defend them in the event of, prosecution. These false statements were made for the purpose of promoting the sale of his materials and were therefore commercial. Benson purported to be selling a way to avoid tax liability; what he was actually selling was a way to increase tax and criminal liability for failing to pay taxes. That is false advertising, which may be banned consistent with the First Amendment. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982) ("Misleading advertising may be prohibited entirely."); see United States v. Schiff, 379 F.3d 621, 630 (9th Cir. 2004) ("An advertisement is fraudulent when it misleads customers about the benefit of the offered product.").

To the extent that the injunction prohibits Benson from actually selling the Packages, as opposed to falsely advertising for their sale, this is appropriate because the sale of the Packages inherently involves false commercial speech. Their very names, Reliance Defense Package and 16th Amendment Reliance Package, imply that a customer may properly rely on the materials he is about to buy. And since the customer must know that he is buying information about taxes, he is being made to believe that he is buying a theory or defense on which he may rely as it pertains to his taxes. This belief is false. "Because the injunction at issue merely restrains [Benson] from advertising, marketing, and selling materials that are based on false and misleading theories under the guise of tax advice, [Benson's] First Amendment claim fails." Kaun, 827 F.2d at 1152.

Benson argues that he was simply encouraging the public to take political action. Nothing in this opinion prohibits him from doing as much. The government explains in its brief that the injunction "leaves Benson free to communicate a political message." Benson may openly share his views about the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment or the tyranny of the federal government and IRS. It is not illegal for Benson to urge his followers to take political action. What is illegal, and enjoined, is for Benson to try to sell something he does not posses --the golden ticket of tax evasion without consequences. Therefore, according to our great tradition of tolerating nutty opinions, the marketplace of ideas remains open to Benson; the commercial marketplace, however, is appropriately limited to speech that is not deceptive. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771-72 (1976) (First Amendment "does not prohibit the State from insuring that the stream of commercial information flow cleanly as well as freely"). 3



C. Customer List

The government contends that the district court should have required Benson to provide the government with a list of names and identifying information of persons who purchased the Reliance Defense Package or the 16th Amendment Reliance Package from Benson. Benson argues that the district court acted properly because requiring him to turn over his customer list is not authorized by any statute and would violate the First and Fifth Amendments. We review a district court's decision to grant or deny an injunction for an abuse of discretion. Kaun, 827 F.2d at 1148. However, "[a] district court by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law." Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996).

The district court denied the requested customer list order because it determined the order was not related to preventing future misconduct by Benson and was beyond the scope of Benson's wrongdoing. Whether true or not, the district court's observations are not relevant under the applicable law. District courts possess jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C. § 7402(a) to "issue ... writs and orders of injunction ... and such other orders ... as may be necessary or appropriate for the enforcement of the internal revenue laws." 4

The government has identified seven individuals who have received Benson's materials and have failed to file income tax returns. Reliance on Benson's materials has and will continue to irreparably harm Benson's customers, who have exposed themselves to increased tax and criminal liability, and the government, which is "not receiving required tax payments and [is] forced to expend resources to [identify and] collect the unpaid taxes." United States v. Schulz, 517 F.3d 606, 607-08 (2d Cir. 2008). Without a customer list, it is unlikely that the government will identify each of Benson's customers who followed his advice before the statute of limitations has run. Benson will not be harmed by identifying his customers and it will serve the public interest for the government to receive a full list of Benson's customers, both to warn them of the falsity and ineffectiveness of Benson's claims, and to enforce the income tax laws. Production of Benson's customer list is also proper to monitor compliance with the injunction's requirement that Benson "mail ... a copy of the injunction order to every person and entity to whom he sold or furnished the [Packages]." See id. We note that this is not the first time a promoter of false tax schemes has been required to divulge his customer list. E.g. United States v. Bell, 414 F.3d 474, 485 (3d Cir. 2005); Schulz, 517 F.3d at 607-08; United States v. Kotmair, Civ. No. WMN-05-1297, 2006 WL 4846388 at *7-8 (D. Md. Nov. 29, 2006), aff'd, 234 Fed. Appx. 65, 65-66 (4th Cir. 2007); United States v. Harkins, 355 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1182 (D. Or. 2004); United States v. Stephenson, 313 F. Supp. 2d 1054, 1061 (W.D. Wash. 2004).

Such an order will not infringe on the First Amendment rights of Benson's customers. Benson's attempt to analogize this case to NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) is misplaced. Benson operated an Internet marketing scheme, not a membership organization. As in Bell, 414 F.3d at 485, Benson's "operation was primarily a commercial enterprise, not a political group. Producing a customer list does not offend the First Amendment because commercial transactions do not entail the same rights of association as political meetings." Benson's claim that divulging his customer list will violate his customers' right to receive and read what they choose also falls short. The government acknowledges that Benson's customers are free to receive, possess, read, and speak about materials from Benson and others challenging the validity of the Sixteenth Amendment or protesting the federal tax system. Additionally, as the government suggests, we expect the district court to enter an appropriate protective order to prevent public disclosure of the customers' identities.

Finally, Benson's Fifth Amendment claim need not delay us because the government asked the district court to issue an order of immunity in connection with Benson's compelled act of producing his customer list. The government's brief indicates that it remains open to this solution and we expect the district court to issue such an order upon remand, thereby eliminating Benson's Fifth Amendment claim.




III. CONCLUSION


For the reasons discussed above, we AFFIRM the injunction imposed by the district court, but REVERSE as to the customer list, and REMAND for further appropriate proceedings.

1 The injunction reads in part:

The defendant, William J. Benson, individually and doing business as Constitutional Research Associates, and anyone in active concert or participation with him, are permanently enjoined from:


(a) promoting, organizing or selling the "Reliance Defense Package" or "16 Amendment Reliance Pack- th age," which are abusive tax shelters, plans, or arrangements that advise or assist customers to attempt to evade the assessment or collection of their correct federal tax;



(b) promoting, organizing or selling (or helping others to promote, organize, or sell) any other tax shelter, plan, or arrangement that incites or assists others to attempt to violate the internal revenue laws or unlawfully evade the assessment or collection of their federal tax liabilities or unlawfully claim improper tax refunds;



(c) making or furnishing (in connection with organizing, promoting, or selling any plan or arrangement) false statements about the excludability of any income or the securing of any other tax benefit by reason of participating in the plan or arrangement;



(d) engaging in any other activity subject to penalty under the Internal Revenue Code; and



(e) engaging in any other conduct that interferes with the administration or enforcement of the internal revenue laws.


2 While Benson may sell his book, he may not promote its sale by claiming the ability to rely on it to avoid prosecution as he used to do on his website, or by making any other false promises.

3 Because we find that the injunction properly enjoins Benson from engaging in false or misleading commercial speech, we do not need to consider the alternate theory of whether the injunction is proper because it prohibits commercial "speech proposing an illegal transaction, which a government may regulate or ban entirely." Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 496 (1982) (citations omitted); Buttorff, 761 F.2d at 1066 ( "Appellant's promotion of his trust does advocate the attempt to take tax benefits repeatedly declared invalid by the courts.").

4 Section 7402(a) makes clear that the remedies it provides "are in addition to and not exclusive of any and all other remedies of the United States in such courts or otherwise to enforce" the tax laws. The government was not required to seek the customer list through an administrative process as Benson argues.

Labels:

Wednesday, April 15, 2009

In the Benson case the six-year statute of limitations provided by Code Sec. 6501(e) applied to deficiencies assessed against a couple because the couple omitted more than 25 percent of their gross income from their returns. The couple's argument that their tax position was not an "omission" of gross income, but a "recharacterization" of the amounts was rejected. In reporting their gross income, the couple failed to disclose disbursements and transfers from two subchapter S corporations that were held to be constructive dividends. Their failure to report the dividends in their tax returns did not result from an overstatement of basis or other technical miscalculation, nor were the amounts accounted for elsewhere in their returns.





U.S. Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit; 07-72272, March 31, 2009.

Affirming the Tax Court, 91 TCM 925, Dec. 56,461(M), TC Memo. 2006-55.

[ Code Sec. 6501]








OPINION


FARRIS, Senior Circuit Judge: Burton and Elizabeth Benson, husband and wife, filed joint tax returns between September 1994 and December 1995 for the years 1989, 1990, 1993, and 1994. 1 Burton was a retired Navy admiral and engineer, and was the 100 percent owner of Energy Research and Generation. ERG, a subchapter C corporation, filed its own tax returns and paid its own taxes. Burton Benson also owned a controlling interest --varying between one-half and two-thirds in the years at issue --in New Process Industries. NPI was a subchapter S corporation, or a passthrough entity, and therefore filed information returns. For tax purposes, its income was attributable to its equity partners.

NPI had no employees, and no written contracts with ERG, but did maintain a bank account, certain patent rights, and three parcels of real property in Oakland, California. During the period at issue, ERG transferred millions of dollars to NPI. In 1989, ERG received $483,098 from Hercules Aerospace Co. for an equipment purchase, then transferred the money to NPI. In 1990, NPI bought patent rights from ERG, and then immediately licensed the rights back to ERG in a retroactive licensing agreement. The result was that, in each relevant year, 10 percent of ERG's profits flowed to NPI for "royalties." The remainder of ERG's profits in each relevant year, less about $75,000, flowed to NPI for "engineering services." In each relevant year, ERG also paid rent to NPI for the use of real property at two plants.

These transactions were without economic substance. NPI had no relation to the Hercules transaction; the licensing agreement made no economic sense for ERG; there was no evidence that NPI had performed engineering services sufficient to justify the transfers; and ERG paid rent far in excess of its contractual obligations. Thus, these transactions functioned only to funnel money from ERG to NPI. Benson then used NPI's bank account funds for the "sole and exclusive benefit of himself and his family." Benson v. Comm'r, 88 T.C.M. (CCH) 520 (2004).

Where a corporation provides an economic benefit to a shareholder with no expectation of reimbursement, the benefit is a "constructive dividend" and is taxable income. Inland Asphalt Co. v. Comm'r, 756 F.2d 1425, 1429 (9th Cir. 1985). ERG's payments to NPI were constructive dividends to the Bensons.

The Bensons also received constructive dividends directly from ERG, without passing through NPI. These dividends included a corporate paid life insurance policy; corporate paid car expenses; "directors' fees" paid directly to Benson family members; corporate paid non-business travel expenses; corporate paid legal fees for personal matters; corporate paid recreational expenses drawn from the "ERG-Recreation Fund"; and finally the imputed value of ERG's purchase of a large plot of real estate immediately adjacent to the Bensons' personal residence.

Of the Bensons' tax returns for each of the years at issue, none reported the constructive dividends. Of NPI's information returns for each of the same years, none reported the constructive dividends. In some instances, the NPI returns referred to relevant transactions, but these references were incomplete, misleading, or otherwise ambiguous. Transfers pursuant to the exclusive licensing agreement were labeled as "royalties," the purported engineering services labeled as "engineering services," and the excessive rent labeled as "rent."

As a result of these deficiencies, the Internal Revenue Service opened investigations of the Bensons' 1993 return in August 1995, and their other returns in March 1997. The Service referred the Bensons' audits to its criminal investigation division in May 1997, but in August 2000, the Department of Justice declined to prosecute.

In September 2000, more than three but fewer than six years after the returns were received, the Commissioner issued the Bensons notices of alleged fraud and deficiency for tax years 1989, 1990, and 1993. About a year later, the Commissioner issued a notice of deficiency for tax year 1994.

The Bensons challenged the Commissioner's determinations in the Tax Court. The Tax Court found no evidence of fraud, but mostly upheld the Commissioner's substantive deficiency determinations. In addition to the constructive dividends, the Bensons failed to report miscellaneous income, including forgiveness of debt and dividend income from an account in their son's name, and had made certain improper deductions. Altogether, the Tax Court's found that the Bensons' "omitted" gross income of $629,177 in 1989; $456,500 in 1990; $3,831,923 in 1993; and $469,713 in 1994. Based on these figures, the total deficiencies were $139,889 for 1989; $104,701 for 1990; $1,496,254 for 1993; and $140,714 for 1994.

The Bensons filed a motion for reconsideration on the grounds that the Commissioner's assessment was time-barred by 26 U.S.C. § 6501(a)'s customary three-year statute of limitations. In response, the Tax Court issued a supplemental opinion. It held that, because the income "omitted" was more than 25 percent of the Bensons' reported gross income for each relevant year, the six-year statute of limitations applied under § 6501(e). 2 The court further found that, although the Bensons' misleading entries may have provided a "clue" about deficiencies, the entries did not adequately apprise the Commissioner of the nature or amount of the deficiencies, and therefore, the "adequate disclosure" or "safe harbor" clause of § 6501(e)(1)(A)(ii) did not apply. 3 The Bensons timely bring this appeal.

[1] Interpretation of 26 U.S.C. § 6501 is a question of law that we review de novo. Maciel v. Comm'r, 489 F.3d 1018, 1027 (9th Cir. 2007). Section 6501(a) requires the IRS, after a return is filed, to assess taxes within three years. 26 U.S.C. § 6501(a). However, if the return omits gross income totaling more than 25 percent of the amount stated in the return, § 6501(e) extends the statute of limitations to six years. 26 U.S.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A). The three-year limit under § 6501(a) would bar assessment of deficient taxes for the Bensons' 1989, 1990, 1993, and 1994 returns. The six-year limit under § 6501(e) would not. The question is therefore whether the IRS is entitled to the six-year limit for those returns.

On appeal, the Bensons' do not dispute that for each of these years, their return did not properly account for income in excess of 25 percent of the income stated on the return. Nor do they dispute the Tax Court's computations or figures. Instead, the Bensons contend that their tax position was not an "omission" of gross income under the statute, but a "recharacterization" of the amounts in question.

[2] In Colony, Inc. v. Comm'r, 357 U.S. 28, 36-38 (1958), the Supreme Court held that the extended limitations period in the predecessor statute to § 6501(e)(1)(A) did not apply where a taxpayer understated gross profits he earned on the sale of real property, because he erroneously overstated his basis in the property. The court explained that the extended limitations period was meant to address "the specific situation where a taxpayer actually omitted some income receipt or accrual in his computation of gross income, and not more generally to errors in that computation arising from other causes." Id. at 33.

[3] The Court defined "omit" to mean "to leave out or unmentioned." Id. at 32; see also Bakersfield Energy Partners, LP v. Comm'r, 128 T.C. 207, 213 (2007) (distinguishing between an overstatement of basis in an asset sold and an "omission" under § 6501(e)); Grapevine Imports, Ltd. v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 505, 512 (2007) (holding that an overstated basis in property sold did not create "omitted" gross income).

[4] In reporting their gross income, the Bensons left out the ERG disbursements and NPI transfers that were later held to be constructive dividends. The Bensons' failure to report the dividends in their tax returns did not result from an overstatement of basis or other technical miscalculation, nor were the amounts accounted for elsewhere in the returns. Rather, the Bensons did not include these amounts in their returns at all. Thus, under the Supreme Court's definition in Colony, the Bensons "omitted" gross income, and the extended limitations period applies.

The Bensons' reliance on our precedents' interpretation of the statutory language is misplaced. In Slaff v. Comm'r, 220 F.2d 65 (9th Cir. 1955), a case we decided before Colony but which was cited approvingly therein, we held that the extended limitations period did not apply to a taxpayer who erroneously reported that he owed no taxes on income accrued overseas. The extended period did not apply because the taxpayer made "full disclosure" of the disputed amounts, actually writing on his return: "income received $3,300; exempt ... therefore no taxable income." Id. at 68. Similarly, in Lawrence v. Comm'r, 258 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1958), we held that although a taxpayer did not include certain income as taxable, the extended limitations period did not apply because the taxpayer "made a full disclosure of his 'position' with respect to his gross income on his income tax return."

[5] These cases indicate that the extended limitations period does not apply where a taxpayer made an error in his or her computation of gross income, yet fully disclosed the amounts underlying the error elsewhere in the tax return. These cases do not preclude application of the extended limitations period here. Unlike the taxpayers in Slaff and Lawrence, the Bensons did not disclose any of the amounts underlying their error.

[6] The Bensons argue that it would be "absurd to think" they should be required to report amounts which, according to their tax position at the time they filed their returns, were not gross income. Only after they had filed their tax returns, they observe, were the various ERG and NPI transfers construed to be gross income. However, it is undisputed that the Bensons' tax position was erroneous. The amounts were "properly includible" as gross income pursuant to § 6501(e)(1)(A), irrespective of the Bensons' mistaken belief to the contrary.

The Bensons also argue that Colony can be read to preclude the application of the extended limitations period because the Commissioner was able to discover the unreported income, despite their omissions. For this proposition, the Bensons cite the Court's language stating that the extended limitations period was meant to give the Commissioner additional time to "investigate tax returns in cases where, because of a taxpayer's omission to report some taxable item, the Commissioner is at a special disadvantage in detecting errors." Colony, 357 U.S. at 36. The Bensons argue that the Commissioner was at no such special disadvantage here, as evidenced by the fact that the Commissioner actually detected the errors, and therefore the six-year period should not apply. However, the Supreme Court's gloss on the statutory language does not alter the statute's plain language, which simply provides that the Commissioner is afforded extra time whenever a taxpayer "omits" a certain amount from his or her gross income. 26 U.S.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A). The Bensons omitted the constructive dividends from their tax returns.

AFFIRMED.

1 We base our factual discussion on the Tax Court's unchallenged findings of fact in its 2004 memorandum opinion.

2 The statute reads, in pertinent part: "If the taxpayer omits from gross income an amount properly includible therein which is in excess of 25 percent of the amount of the gross income stated in the return, the tax may be assessed ... at any time within 6 years after the return was filed." 26 U.S.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A).

3 The Bensons do no challenge the Tax Court's ruling under § 6501(e)(1)(A)(ii) on appeal.

Labels:

Tuesday, April 14, 2009

IR-2009-41

April 14, 2009

Code Sec. 34

Code Sec. 671

Code Sec. 3401

Code Sec. 6011

Code Sec. 6404

Code Sec. 7206

The Internal Revenue Service today issued its 2009 "dirty dozen" list of tax scams, including schemes involving phishing, hiding income offshore and false claims for refunds.

Code Sec. 7804



Beware of IRS' 2009 "Dirty Dozen" Tax Scams


IR-2009-41 , April 13, 2009

WASHINGTON --The Internal Revenue Service today issued its 2009 "dirty dozen" list of tax scams, including schemes involving phishing, hiding income offshore and false claims for refunds.

"Taxpayers should be wary of scams to avoid paying taxes that seem too good to be true, especially during these challenging economic times," IRS Commissioner Doug Shulman said. "There is no secret trick that can eliminate a person's tax obligations. People should be wary of anyone peddling any of these scams."

Tax schemes are illegal and can lead to problems for both scam artists and taxpayers who risk significant penalties, interest and possible criminal prosecution.

The IRS urges taxpayers to avoid these common schemes:



Phishing

Phishing is a tactic used by Internet-based scam artists to trick unsuspecting victims into revealing personal or financial information. The criminals use the information to steal the victim's identity, access bank accounts, run up credit card charges or apply for loans in the victim's name.

Phishing scams often take the form of an e-mail that appears to come from a legitimate source, including the IRS. The IRS never initiates unsolicited e-mail contact with taxpayers about their tax issues. Taxpayers who receive unsolicited e-mails that claim to be from the IRS can forward the message to phishing@irs.gov . Further instructions are available at IRS.gov. To date, taxpayers have forwarded scam e-mails reflecting thousands of confirmed IRS phishing sites. If you believe you have been the target of an identity thief, information is available at IRS.gov.



Hiding Income Offshore

The IRS aggressively pursues taxpayers and promoters involved in abusive offshore transactions. Taxpayers have tried to avoid or evade U.S. income tax by hiding income in offshore banks, brokerage accounts or through other entities. Recently, the IRS provided guidance to auditors on how to deal with those hiding income offshore in undisclosed accounts. The IRS draws a clear line between taxpayers with offshore accounts who voluntarily come forward and those who fail to come forward.

Taxpayers also evade taxes by using offshore debit cards, credit cards, wire transfers, foreign trusts, employee-leasing schemes, private annuities or life insurance plans. The IRS has also identified abusive offshore schemes including those that involve use of electronic funds transfer and payment systems, offshore business merchant accounts and private banking relationships.



Filing False or Misleading Forms

The IRS is seeing scam artists file false or misleading returns to claim refunds that they are not entitled to. Frivolous information returns, such as Form 1099-Original Issue Discount (OID), claiming false withholding credits are used to legitimize erroneous refund claims. The new scam has evolved from an earlier phony argument that a "strawman" bank account has been created for each citizen. Under this scheme, taxpayers fabricate an information return, arguing they used their "strawman" account to pay for goods and services and falsely claim the corresponding amount as withholding as a way to seek a tax refund.



Abuse of Charitable Organizations and Deductions

The IRS continues to observe the misuse of tax-exempt organizations. Abuse includes arrangements to improperly shield income or assets from taxation and attempts by donors to maintain control over donated assets or income from donated property. The IRS also continues to investigate various schemes involving the donation of non-cash assets, including easements on property, closely-held corporate stock and real property. Often, the donations are highly overvalued or the organization receiving the donation promises that the donor can purchase the items back at a later date at a price the donor sets. The Pension Protection Act of 2006 imposed increased penalties for inaccurate appraisals and new definitions of qualified appraisals and qualified appraisers for taxpayers claiming charitable contributions.



Return Preparer Fraud

Dishonest return preparers can cause many headaches for taxpayers who fall victim to their ploys. Such preparers derive financial gain by skimming a portion of their clients' refunds and charging inflated fees for return preparation services. They attract new clients by promising large refunds. Taxpayers should choose carefully when hiring a tax preparer . As the saying goes, if it sounds too good to be true, it probably is. No matter who prepares the return, the taxpayer is ultimately responsible for its accuracy. Since 2002, the courts have issued injunctions ordering dozens of individuals to cease preparing returns, and the Department of Justice has filed complaints against dozens of others, which are pending in court.



Frivolous Arguments

Promoters of frivolous schemes encourage people to make unreasonable and unfounded claims to avoid paying the taxes they owe. The IRS has a list of frivolous legal positions that taxpayers should stay away from. Taxpayers who file a tax return or make a submission based on one of the positions on the list are subject to a $5,000 penalty. More information is available on IRS.gov.



False Claims for Refund and Requests for Abatement

This scam involves a request for abatement of previously assessed tax using Form 843 , Claim for Refund and Request for Abatement. Many individuals who try this have not previously filed tax returns. The tax they are trying to have abated has been assessed by the IRS through the Substitute for Return Program. The filer uses Form 843 to list reasons for the request. Often, one of the reasons given is "Failed to properly compute and/or calculate Section 83 -Property Transferred in Connection with Performance of Service."



Abusive Retirement Plans

The IRS continues to uncover abuses in retirement plan arrangements, including Roth Individual Retirement Arrangements (IRAs). The IRS is looking for transactions that taxpayers are using to avoid the limitations on contributions to IRAs as well as transactions that are not properly reported as early distributions. Taxpayers should be wary of advisers who encourage them to shift appreciated assets into IRAs or companies owned by their IRAs at less than fair market value to circumvent annual contribution limits. Other variations have included the use of limited liability companies to engage in activity which is considered prohibited.



Disguised Corporate Ownership

Some taxpayers form corporations and other entities in certain states for the primary purpose of disguising the ownership of a business or financial activity. Such entities can be used to facilitate underreporting of income, fictitious deductions, non-filing of tax returns, participating in listed transactions, money laundering, financial crimes, and even terrorist financing. The IRS is working with state authorities to identify these entities and to bring the owners of these entities into compliance.



Zero Wages

Filing a phony wage- or income-related information return to replace a legitimate information return has been used as an illegal method to lower the amount of taxes owed. Typically, a Form 4852 (Substitute Form W-2) or a "corrected" Form 1099 is used as a way to improperly reduce taxable income to zero. The taxpayer also may submit a statement rebutting wages and taxes reported by a payer to the IRS. Sometimes fraudsters even include an explanation on their Form 4852 that cites statutory language on the definition of wages or may include some reference to a paying company that refuses to issue a corrected Form W-2 for fear of IRS retaliation. Taxpayers should resist any temptation to participate in any of the variations of this scheme.



Misuse of Trusts

For years, unscrupulous promoters have urged taxpayers to transfer assets into trusts. While there are many legitimate, valid uses of trusts in tax and estate planning, some promoted transactions promise reduction of income subject to tax, deductions for personal expenses and reduced estate or gift taxes. Such trusts rarely deliver the promised tax benefits and are being used primarily as a means to avoid income tax liability and hide assets from creditors, including the IRS.

The IRS has recently seen an increase in the improper use of private annuity trusts and foreign trusts to divert income and deduct personal expenses. As with other arrangements, taxpayers should seek the advice of a trusted professional before entering into a trust arrangement.



Fuel Tax Credit Scams

The IRS is receiving claims for the fuel tax credit that are unreasonable. Some taxpayers, such as farmers who use fuel for off-highway business purposes, may be eligible for the fuel tax credit. But some individuals are claiming the tax credit for nontaxable uses of fuel when their occupation or income level makes the claim unreasonable. Fraud involving the fuel tax credit is considered a frivolous tax claim, potentially subjecting those who improperly claim the credit to a $5,000 penalty.



How to Report Suspected Tax Fraud Activity

Suspected tax fraud can be reported to the IRS using Form 3949-A , Information Referral. Form 3949-A is available for download from the IRS Web site at IRS.gov. The completed form or a letter detailing the alleged fraudulent activity should be addressed to the Internal Revenue Service, Fresno, CA 93888. The mailing should include specific information about who is being reported, the activity being reported, how the activity became known, when the alleged violation took place, the amount of money involved and any other information that might be helpful in an investigation. The person filing the report is not required to self-identify, although it is helpful to do so. The identity of the person filing the report can be kept confidential.

Whistleblowers also may provide allegations of fraud to the IRS and may be eligible for a reward by filing Form 211 , Application for Award for Original Information, and following the procedures outlined in Notice 2008-4 , Claims Submitted to the IRS Whistleblower Office under Section 7623 .

Labels:

Monday, April 13, 2009

Reasonable cause - failure to file - entity

IRS Letter Ruling 200915045

LTR Report Number 1676, April 15, 2009 IRS REF: Symbol: CCA_2009021816043926 [Code Sec. 6651]

February 18, 2009

From: *****

Sent: Wednesday, February 18, 2009 4:04:41 PM

To: *****

Cc: *****

Subject: Reasonable Cause Defense to Penalty

I am following up on our conversation of a few weeks ago regarding your questions about reasonable cause where an employee has committed acts that possibly inhibited an entity from properly filing or reporting their correct tax liability.

To determine what test a court might apply in this case, there are several cases that address the standard for reasonable cause in the employment tax area which are analogous to your facts and from which we can extrapolate a standard. In nearly all of the case I looked at an employee or outside accountant hired by the entity had embezzled money or had taken some action so that the company had not timely paid their employment taxes and the IRS asserted that a penalty was due under sections 6651(a) and 6656. See e.g., Pediatric Affiliates, P.A. v. United States , 2006 WL 454374 (D.N.J. 2006)(reliance on outside accounting service did not render taxpayer unable to fulfill its tax obligations); Classic Printing v. United States , 2001 WL 283799 (M.D. Pa. 2001)(taxpayer failed to exercise ordinary care and prudence by failing to insure its tax obligations were met and putting in place controls to oversee employee handling these obligations); Conklin Brothers of Santa Rosa, Inc. v. United States , 986 F.2d 315 (9 th Cir. 1993) [ 93-1 USTC ¶50,116 ] (employee's concealment of failure to timely file and pay employment taxes did not create a disability that prevented the use of ordinary business care and prudence as the employee was subject to supervision by the company's president). In none of these cases did the court find the facts supported a finding of reasonable cause.

The Supreme Court established a bright line rule in United States v. Boyle , 469 U.S. 241 [ 85-1 USTC ¶13,602 ] that a taxpayer's reliance on an agent to file a timely return when the due date of the return was ascertainable by the taxpayer does not constitute reasonable cause excusing the taxpayer from the statutory penalties for late filing. The Supreme Court went on to state that to be excused from the failure to timely pay taxes owed a taxpayer must be able to show that the failure (1) did not result from willful neglect, and (2) was due to reasonable cause. Id. at 244. Willful neglect is a "conscious, intentional failure or reckless indifference." Id. at 245. Reasonable cause exists if the taxpayer exercised "ordinary business care and prudence, but nevertheless was unable to file the return within the prescribed time." Id. at 246. Your facts do not suggest that there is any willful neglect, leaving only the issue of reasonable cause to be resolved.

What elements constitute reasonable cause is a question of law and whether those elements exist is a question of fact. Id. at 249. Because the duty to file and pay taxes has been imposed by Congress on the entity, the entity cannot rely solely on its agent to comply with the tax laws to avoid its obligations. The cases referenced above made clear that an entity has a obligation to exercise ordinary business care and prudence and must, therefore, properly oversee its employees. As I recall, there were facts in your case that suggested that a CFO oversaw the employees maintaining the books and records and, the CFO, while not a tax specialist should have know there were at least some accounting irregularities. Under the cases referenced above, these facts suggest reasonable cause may not be established by the taxpayer.

One case did distinguish between an entity's misplaced reliance on an agent versus a taxpayer's disability to comply with its tax obligations. The court in In the Matter of American Biomaterials Corp., 954 F.2d 919 (3 rd Cir. 1992) [ 92-1 USTC ¶50,194 ] found that the criminal acts of the CFO and CEO, which caused the company's failure to fulfill its tax obligations, did not automatically make the company liable for the penalties resulting from the failure to pay taxes. The government had argued that the malfeasance of its agents should be imputed onto the entity and, therefore, no reasonable cause could exist as a matter of law. The court, however, did not address the issue of whether the corporation had adequate internal controls in place so as to establish ordinary business case. Cf. Janice Leather Imports, Ltd. v. United States , 391 Supp. 1235 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) [ 74-2 USTC ¶9607 ].

Ultimately it is the agent's determination based on this legal standard to determine whether there are sufficient facts to support a finding a reasonable cause. These cases did not address whether the taxpayer came forward regarding their tax obligations. The forthright nature of the taxpayer may be a fact that appeals, or other fact finder, may consider and, therefore, represents a potential litigation hazard. But, at the exam level the decision is whether the facts support a penalty or not.

Please let me know if you have any further questions.

Reasonable cause. --Addition for Failure to File Tax Return or Pay Tax: Reasonable cause

The imposition of the penalty is not mandatory if reasonable cause for not filing is shown.

Kirchner, 46 BTA 578, Dec. 12,433 (Acq.).

McCream, 7 TCM 584, Dec. 16,564(M). Aff'd per curiam, CA-6, 50-2 USTC ¶9481, 184 F2d 842.

If the cause assigned is carelessness, oversight, or other trivial cause, the penalty will be assessed.

T.D. 2584, Nov. 20, 1917.

F.W. Carver, 11 TCM 995, Dec. 19,231(M).

J.D. Stice, 39 TCM 894, Dec. 36,731(M), TC Memo. 1980-14.

The Tax Court erred when it found the taxpayer liable for a late filing penalty and discounted his history of timely tax filings, his use of an accounting firm for the timely preparation of his return, and the inadvertent omission of a trusted employee to mail his return. A failure to excuse the late filing, and thereby apply a per se rule, would totally vitiate the meaning of the term "reasonable cause" and, in effect, strike that language from Code Sec. 6651.

G.C. Willis, CA-4, 84-2 USTC ¶9555.

The Tax Court abused its discretion in approving the IRS's imposition of penalties for failure to file tax returns and for failure to pay estimated tax. The husband, who had pro se status, should have been given the opportunity to explain whether his failure to timely file was due to reasonable cause.

G.L. Moretti, CA-2, 96-1 USTC ¶50,162, 77 F3d 637.

A corporation was entitled to a refund of a tax overpayment that was erroneously applied by the government and resulted in the imposition of fuel tax penalties. The corporation's filing and payment of tax under the wrong taxpayer identification number was an innocent error and constituted reasonable cause.

Gandy Nursery, Inc., DC Tex., 2001-1 USTC ¶50,266.

A corporation was liable for penalties for its failure to timely pay and deposit employment taxes absent a showing of reasonable cause for its noncompliance with the tax laws. Having intentionally failed to timely pay over the employment taxes, the corporation did not exercise ordinary business care and prudence. Its request for an abatement of penalties was rejected.

Q.E.D., Inc., FedCl, 2003-1 USTC ¶50,213.

Penalties for failure to timely file were properly imposed on domestic corporations that did not report or withhold taxes on payments made to related foreign corporations. None of the following constituted reasonable cause: the legal provisions governing the reporting and withholding requirements were highly complicated and susceptible to honest and reasonable misunderstanding, because there was no evidence that the taxpayers were not aware of their filing obligations; the treatment of several of the payments as loans, because no evidence was provided to support the loan characterization; the availability of an exemption under the U.S.-Netherlands income tax treaty, because there was no evidence of reliance on the treaty; efforts to comply with the law, because they were made years after the obligations arose, and only after prompting by an IRS agent; and reliance on a tax professional, because there was no evidence that an attorney and an uncertified accountant employed by a tax service possessed sufficient relevant expertise to warrant reliance on their judgment.

Ellwest Stereo Theatres of Memphis, Inc., 70 TCM 1655, Dec. 51,074(M), TC Memo. 1995-610.

A nonfiler was properly assessed failure to file penalties. Her attempts to secure explanations from the IRS with regard to her position were not a reasonable basis for her decision to discontinue filing tax returns.

A.M. Rogers, 81 TCM 1078, Dec. 54,225(M), TC Memo. 2001-20. Aff'd on unspecified issues, CA-5 (unpublished opinion), 2002-1 USTC ¶50,311, 281 F3d 1278.

The IRS was not obligated to consider a taxpayer's overpayment in calculating additions to tax for failure to timely file. In stipulations, the taxpayer conceded that none of the overpayment could constitute a payment or credit against his subsequent underpayment in the next year. Moreover, the individual did not establish that his failure to file was due to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect. The taxpayer was an experienced and successful businessman who was aware of his duty to file timely his returns and pay timely any tax liability reflected in those returns; and the record established that he made no effort to determine timely his tax obligations for the year at issue.

R.A. Mason, 81 TCM 1283, Dec. 54,270(M), TC Memo. 2001-58.

Taxpayer was liable for penalties for failure to timely file his returns, as even if his name was misspelled, as he contended, on several Forms 1099, his social security number was accurately printed on each form. Thus, it should have been obvious to the taxpayer that he was taxable on the amounts.

E. O'Toole, 84 TCM 471, Dec. 54,911(M), TC Memo. 2002-265.

Bank holiday in a taxpayer's community was no ground for avoiding penalty for delinquency.

Special Ruling, Feb. 28, 1933.

The IRS could assess an addition to tax for late filing, even though a service center's director determined that a taxpayer's failure to file its tax return and pay its taxes on time was due to a reasonable cause. The determination of reasonable cause by the director of a service center is an administrative action that can be reviewed. The IRS had no binding agreement with the taxpayer concerning the finality of the initial determination of reasonable cause.

IRS Letter Ruling 9111005, December 6, 1990.

Reasonable cause for failure to file was not shown.

Charlotte's Office Boutique, Inc., CA-9, 2005-2 USTC ¶50,593.

T. Thomas, 84 TCM 178, Dec. 54,840(M), TC Memo. 2002-200.

C.K. Nunn, 84 TCM 403, Dec. 54,895(M), TC Memo. 2002-250.

W. Pratt, 84 TCM 523, Dec. 54,929(M), TC Memo. 2002-279.

P.H. Witcher, 84 TCM 582, Dec. 54,945(M), TC Memo. 2002-292.

G.J. Mantakounis, 84 TCM 652, Dec. 54,962(M), TC Memo. 2002-306.

W. Maher, 85 TCM 1053, Dec. 55,093(M), TC Memo. 2003-85.

R.E. Crittendon, 85 TCM 1548, Dec. 55,201(M), TC Memo. 2003-186.

S.P. Arnold, 86 TCM 341, Dec. 55,284(M), TC Memo. 2003-259.

F.C. Kumpel, 86 TCM 358, Dec. 55,291(M), TC Memo. 2003-265.

W.H. Johnston, 87 TCM 125, Dec. 55,624(M), TC. Memo. 2004-107.

R.W. Coulton, 90 TCM 154, Dec. 56,122(M), TC Memo. 2005-199.

J.M. Thomas, 90 TCM 477, Dec. 56,187(M), TC Memo. 2005-258.

J.H. Jordan, 90 TCM 506, Dec. 56,197(M), TC Memo. 2005-266.

D. Cote, 91 TCM 1288, Dec. 56,548(M), TC Memo. 2006-129.

N.W. Klootwyk, 91 TCM 1290, Dec. 56,549(M), TC Memo. 2006-130.

R.D. Braun, 91 TCM 1198, Dec. 56,528(M), TC Memo. 2006-110.

N.R. Escandon, Dec. 56,942(M), TC Memo. 2007-128.

M. Alemasov, Dec. 56,944(M), TC Memo. 2007-130.

D. Zisskind, 93 TCM 1037, Dec. 56,874(M), TC Memo. 2007-69.

S.R. Olmos, 93 TCM 1084, Dec. 56,891(M), TC Memo. 2007-82.

T. Miles, DC D.C., 2007-1 USTC ¶50,414.

B.K. Bhattacharyya, 93 TCM 711, Dec. 56,820(M), TC Memo. 2007-19.

An attorney and his wife were liable for additions to tax for their failure to timely file their return. Neither the taxpayers' replacement of their accountant nor natural disasters occurring in the areas where they lived and owned property established reasonable cause for their late filing because they were able to continue performing other business and personal activities. Moreover, a press release allowing victims of hurricane disasters in the taxpayers' locale an automatic extension of time did not apply to them because their return was not normally due on October 15th, as the release stipulated.

C.R. Godwin, 86 TCM 451, Dec. 55,320(M), TC Memo. 2003-289. Aff'd, per curiam, CA-11 (unpublished opinion), 2005-2 USTC ¶50,462.

Late filing penalties were imposed against an individual where the IRS established, through the introduction of copies of his two tax returns, that they were both delinquent. The taxpayer offered no evidence to show that his untimely filings were due to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect.

I. Israel, 86 TCM 694, Dec. 55,374(M), TC Memo. 2003-338.

A corporate controller's alleged embezzlement was not reasonable cause for a corporation's failure to pay its employment taxes for twelve consecutive quarters. During that period, the corporation deducted money from its employees' paychecks and failed to remit the money to the IRS. Furthermore, the corporation admitted that it consciously failed to pay the IRS, choosing instead to pay other, more pressing, bills. Therefore, the corporation was not entitled to an abatement of the trust fund penalty.

Pacific Wallboard & Plaster Co., DC Ore., 2004-1 USTC ¶50,248, 319 FSupp2d 1187.

An estate was liable for an addition to tax under Code Sec. 6651(a)(2) for failure to timely pay its federal estate tax without a showing that the failure to pay was due to reasonable cause and not willful neglect. The estate had failed to exercise ordinary business care and prudence in waiting more than a year to transmit escrowed funds to the IRS. Furthermore, the executor's "plan" to raise capital to pay the estate tax did not constitute a serious attempt to pay the tax timely. Moreover, the executor's method of selling certain estate properties demonstrated a lack of ordinary business care and prudence, the executor was unable to demonstrate that pending litigation imposed an extraordinary administrative burden on the estate and the estate neglected to seriously pursue other sources of potential financing or income to pay the tax, such as a loan.

A. Hartsell Est., 88 TCM 267, Dec. 55,751(M), TC Memo. 2004-211.

A staffing company was not entitled to an abatement of penalties for failure to pay employment taxes. The company attempted to expand, paying expenses toward that goal rather than its payroll obligation. The undisputed evidence showed that the company did not exercise ordinary care and prudence in arranging to pay its tax liability.

Staff It Inc., DC Tex., 2006-1 USTC ¶50,188.

A taxpayer was liable for penalty for failure to timely file his tax return for the year at issue because his illness did not constitute reasonable cause. The taxpayer continued to perform his normal business operations. He continued to work extensive hours, operated business in two states, signed all timely filed employment tax returns, filed annual reports with the appropriate State governments, and received his full wages for the year.

J. Rappaport, 91 TCM 1079, Dec. 56,498(M), TC Memo. 2006-87.

The IRS properly imposed on an estate a late-filing penalty and a late-payment penalty for the estate's failure to timely file its tax returns and pay its taxes within the extended filing deadline. The estate offered no evidence to support a determination that it had reasonable cause for its failure to timely file or pay. The arguments by the executor of the estate that the estate qualified for the reasonable cause exception to the penalty due to its reliance on the advice of an IRS attorney were vague and unsubstantiated. The estate also did not provide any evidence to support its claim that it exercised ordinary business care and prudence.

D.T. Welch, DC N.J., 2006-1 USTC ¶50,351.

A tax protestor failed to file returns because he frivolously believed his pension income to be nontaxable "labor property" received in exchange for rendering services. A penalty was imposed for failure to file and the individual's tax protestor argument indicated that his failure to file was willful and not a reasonable cause not to file.

H. Link, 92 TCM 23, Dec. 56,565(M), TC Memo. 2006-146.

An individual failed to prove any basis for abatement of failure to pay penalties assessed. Although she claimed that her failure to report royalty income was due to her reliance on a tax professional's advice, there was no evidence of such advice or that she relied upon or followed any advice. Moreover, she claimed that her prolonged mental illness and personal problems during the tax years at issue warranted abatement. However, her counsel's affidavits submitted to support her claim were inadmissible because the counsel was not qualified to offer mental health opinions or permitted to provide expert testimony on this matter.

J.L. Meisner, DC Neb., 2007-1 USTC ¶50,344.

A staffing company was not entitled to an abatement of penalties for failure to file returns and pay payroll taxes. The company failed to show that the financial hardships it suffered constituted reasonable cause for its failure to file or pay. It did not exercise ordinary business care and prudence because, despite financial difficulties, it continued to pay other creditors, employees, contractors, officer-stockholders and operating expenses in preference to its payroll tax obligations. In addition, although financial difficulties might have affected its ability to pay taxes, those difficulties had no discernible effect on the company's ability to file returns.

Staff IT, Inc., CA-5, 2007-1 USTC ¶50,403.

The taxpayers had to pay additional tax for failure to timely file their tax returns. The husband, who was an accountant and tax preparer, could not claim reasonable cause due to an illness where he was able to prepare his clients' returns during the period at issue.

E.W. Arnold, 93 TCM 1432, Dec. 56,985(M), TC Memo. 2007-168.

A nonfiler was liable for the penalty for failing to file returns because he did not establish reasonable cause. He claimed that his belief that he was not required to file a return was based on his careful review of the law, but it did not appear that he had conducted such a review or sought advice from a competent tax professional.

P.E. Ballmer, 94 TCM 338, Dec. 57,122(M), TC Memo. 2007-295.

A married couple, sole proprietors of a concrete company and a complex business structure consisting of various complex trusts and limited partnerships, and their return preparer admitted they knew the couple's return was untimely filed. Consequently, the addition to tax for failure to timely file was sustained without further comment.

R.L. Tarter, 94 TCM 408, Dec. 57,150(M), TC Memo. 2007-320.

A taxpayer was liable for additions to tax as determined by the IRS for failure to file tax returns and pay taxes for all tax years at issue. The taxpayer was an attorney and was fully aware of his obligation to file returns and that he had unpaid tax liabilities. In spite of personal adversity that he encountered, including a divorce and the collapse of his employer, he succeeded in generating substantial income. Consequently, his personal obstacles did not rise to a level amounting to reasonable cause for failure to file his return or pay the tax liabilities.

C. Klein, 94 TCM 423, Dec. 57,156(M), TC Memo. 2007-325.

An individual was liable for an addition to tax for failure to file a timely return under Code Sec. 6651(a)(1) and for failure to pay his tax liability under Code Sec. 6651(a)(2). His only explanation for failing to file was that he was not sure that he was required to file, which does not constitute reasonable cause. A statement that he would pay his tax liabilities when the IRS would take action against the nonparty organization did not establish that he failed to pay his tax liabilities due to a reasonable cause.

C.J. Pearson, 94 TCM 471, Dec. 57,175(M), TC Memo. 2007-341.

A husband and wife were liable for a late-filing penalty because they did not establish that, despite the husband's health problems, and their ongoing correspondence with both the IRS and their financial institutions concerning an IRA distribution, their failure to file a return was due to reasonable cause.

R.M. Kopty, 94 TCM 480, Dec. 57,177(M), TC Memo. 2007-343.

An individual was liable for additions to tax for failure to timely file his tax returns because he did not have reasonable cause for such failure. Although he claimed that emotional distress caused by marital discord was reasonable cause for his failure to timely file, he did not provide evidence indicating that such stress caused him to be incapacitated and unable to prepare his returns on the dates they were due.

R.B. Talmage, 95 TCM 1122, Dec. 57,338(M), TC Memo. 2008-34.

A married couple was not subject to penalties for failure to timely pay their taxes from when the couple first attempted to make payment until they stopped payment on the lost check. Their bank statements established that they had issued a check to the IRS in April, which the IRS never received. Therefore, they made a good faith effort to remit their tax liability before the deadline and the lost check constituted a reasonable cause for the abatement for that period.

R. DeSabato, Jr., DC Mass., 2008-1 USTC ¶50,219, 538 FSupp2d 422.

Married taxpayers were liable for additions to tax under Code Sec. 6651(a)(1) because they did not have reasonable cause for their failure to timely file their income tax returns.

J.D. Dunne, 95 TCM 1236, Dec. 57,368(M), TC Memo. 2008-63.

Penalties were properly imposed on a corporate subsidiary for unpaid taxes under the Railroad Retirement Tax Act (RRTA) and the Railroad Unemployment Repayment Tax Act (RURTA) because it did not show reasonable cause for its failure to pay the taxes owed. Because the penalties accrued only after the IRS had given notice and demand of taxes due, and because the IRS had, by then, ruled that the corporation was liable for these taxes, the corporation could not rely on a previous ruling ruling to the contrary.

Trans-Serve, Inc., CA-5, 2008-1 USTC ¶50,238, 521 F3d 462.

A taxpayer was liable for penalties for failing to file a timely return and failing to pay income tax when due. Her belief that she could not file the return or pay the taxes until her late husband's employer prepared and filed her returns for the previous two tax years did not constitute reasonable cause.

S.T. Bray, 95 TCM 1417, Dec. 57,418(M), TC Memo. 2008-113.

An individual was liable for the addition to tax for failure to timely file his return. The taxpayer did not show that his failure to timely file was due to reasonable cause. Although he had a long history of alcoholism and drug addiction, he was not hospitalized and he did not present medical records or any evidence of his incapacity. Thus, he failed to show that he was incapacitated during the time the return should have been filed.

M. Hazel, 95 TCM 1528, Dec. 57,444(M), TC Memo. 2008-134.

An individual who failed to file tax returns and report taxable income he received from his business activities, which included fraudulent investment schemes, was liable for additions to tax for fraudulent failure to file under Code Sec. 6651(f). The taxpayer's intent to evade tax was established by his failure to maintain adequate books and records or to submit records of his income-producing activities to the IRS and by his false and misleading statements made to IRS revenue agents during examination of his income tax liabilities.

D.N. Gross, Dec. 57,541(M), TC Memo. 2008-218.

A taxpayer who filed a joint return almost four years late, and habitually filed prior years tax returns at least three years late, was liable for the late filing and payment penalties because he did not show reasonable cause for his failures. Although his wife suffered from a severe case of Lyme disease, he maintained his business interests with no disruption during the illness period and his history of late filings mitigated against a showing of reasonable cause. Moreover, the taxpayer's incorrect belief that he was in an overpayment position did not constitute reasonable cause for his failures.

T.P. Ruggeri, Dec. 57,637(M), TC Memo. 2008-300.

A blues singer was liable for the penalty for failing to timely pay her taxes absent evidence that she had reasonable cause. She offered no evidence for her claim that she was unable to pay because of a bad investment, and her evidence regarding her ill health related to other tax years.

C. Taylor, Dec. 57,729(M), TC Memo. 2009-27.

Labels:

Offer in Compromise - tax lien issue

Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent.
U.S. Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit; 07-73619, March 26, 2009.

Unpublished opinion affirming an unreported Tax Court decision.

[ Code Sec. 7122]


The Tax Court properly upheld the IRS's determination of an individual's federal income tax liability. The notice of federal tax lien was not prematurely filed because the IRS had considered the individual's offer in compromise and gave him ample notice before issuing the lien. Furthermore, the individual's charitable contributions were not "necessary expenses" with respect to his proposed offer in compromise.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT. NOT FOR PUBLICATION. No. 07-73619. Tax Ct. No. 10251-06L. Appeal from a Decision of the United States Tax Court. Submitted March 18, 2009 ** .


MEMORANDUM *


Gerry E. Freeman appeals pro se from the order of the United States Tax Court, following a bench trial, upholding a determination of federal income taxes owed for tax year 2004. We have jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a). We review de novo the Tax Court's legal conclusions and for clear error its findings of fact. Charlotte's Office Boutique v. Comm'r, 425 F.3d 1203, 1211 (9th Cir. 2005). We affirm.

Freeman contends that the notice of a federal tax lien for his 2004 tax obligation of $10,522.35 had been prematurely filed because the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) had failed to consider his offer in compromise to settle his 2003 and 2004 tax obligations for $2905. We disagree. The record supports the Tax Court's findings that the IRS considered Freeman's offer in compromise. See 26 U.S.C. § 7122 (establishing basic guidelines for officers to consider while determining whether an offer in compromise should be accepted).

The record also indicates that the IRS gave Freeman ample notice before it issued the tax lien. See Hansen v. United States, 7 F.3d 137, 138 (9th Cir. 1993) (per curiam).

Freeman also contends that the Tax Court erred by rejecting his claim that his tax liabilities should be offset by necessary expenses consisting of his charitable donations of $471.75 per month, which he considers essential to his health and welfare. While 26 U.S.C. § 170 allows deductions for charitable contributions made to qualified organizations, Davis v. United States, 861 F.2d 558, 561 (9th Cir. 1988), the Tax Court did not err by concluding that these charitable contributions do not meet the "necessary expense" test during an offer in compromise under the Internal Revenue Manual. See also In re Tuss, 360 B.R. 684, 698 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2007)(listing approved necessary expenses).

Accordingly, the Tax Court is

AFFIRMED.

** The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision withoutoral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedentexcept as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

Acceptance of offer. --Compromises: Acceptance of offer

An IRS Appeals officer did not abuse her discretion when she refused a corporation's offer-in-compromise regarding its unpaid employment taxes. Her rejection of the offer as nonprocessable and inadequate was in accordance with the Internal Revenue Code and Treasury regulations. The corporation was not current on the payment of its estimated tax for the prior two periods. Its failure to timely pay taxes owed was a reasonable basis for the Appeals officer to reject its offer-in-compromise relating to other unpaid taxes.

Christopher Cross, Inc., CA-5, 2006-2 USTC ¶50,524, 461 F3d 610.

The IRS did not abuse its discretion by refusing to accept a couple's offer in compromise on an alternative minimum tax liability they incurred for exercising incentive stock options.

R.J. Speltz, CA-8, 2006-2 USTC ¶50,403.

An Appeals officer's determination to reject an individual's offer in compromise and sustain a levy to collect trust fund recovery penalties was not an abuse of discretion. The record established that the determination complied with all the requirements of the Internal Revenue Code and the Treasury Regulations. Moreover, the Appeals officer sustained the levy only after a complete review of the individual's financial information and after determining that the individual's offer in compromise was insufficient. The taxpayer conceded that IRS was not required to negotiate an acceptable offer in compromise.

R.E. Marshall, DC Fla., 2007-2 USTC ¶50,802.

The IRS was not liable for a breach of contract claim with respect to a settlement agreement because the individual bringing suit failed to show the existence of an enforceable contract to settle his outstanding tax liabilities. The IRS agent's written reply to the individual's offer did not constitute a valid offer or counteroffer that could be accepted by the individual to create a binding contract with the IRS. Moreover, the IRS agent was not authorized to enter into any such contract with the individual.

D.W. Jordan, FedCl, 2007-2 USTC ¶50,601.

The government was not estopped from collecting an individual's unpaid taxes merely because he alleged that an IRS employee advised or enticed him to file offers-in-compromise relating to his tax liabilities.

J.C. Ryals, DC Fla., 2006-1 USTC ¶50,293.

The IRS could not be compelled to accept an offer in compromise submitted by a company after the commencement of a bankruptcy proceeding but before the filing of a proposed Chapter 11 plan. Rev. Proc. 2003-71, 2003-2 CB 517, which directs IRS personnel to treat any offer in compromise as nonprocessable if the taxpayer has a bankruptcy case pending, does not violate a clear nondiscretionary duty on the part of the IRS.

1900 M Restaurant Associates, Inc., BC-DC D.C., 2005-1 USTC ¶50,313, 319 BR 302.

The IRS did not abuse its discretion in refusing to accept an individual's multiple offers to compromise her liability for the trust fund recovery penalty. The taxpayer's first offer was for significantly less than her collection potential, and she failed to explain why the IRS's two counter offers would pose a hardship. In calculating its counter offers, the IRS took into consideration the taxpayer's age and numerous medical problems. The IRS also offered to forgo collection until the taxpayer's financial situation improved, or the collection action expired. The taxpayer made the second offer at a Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing, arguing that there was doubt as to her liability for the penalty.

A. Siquieros, DC Tex., 2005-1 USTC ¶50,244. Aff'd, per curiam, CA-5 (unpublished opinion), 2005-1 USTC ¶50,245, 124 FedAppx 279.

A taxpayer was not entitled to monetary damages resulting from the IRS's referral of a collection action against the taxpayer to the Department of Justice (DOJ) while one or more offers in compromise were allegedly pending. The IRS's referral of the taxpayer's case to the DOJ predated temporary regulations precluding any levy to collect outstanding tax debts while an offer in compromise for those tax debts is pending and final regulations, Reg. §301.7122-1(g)(6), prohibiting the referral of cases to the DOJ for the collection of unpaid taxes through judicial proceedings while an offer in compromise is pending. The IRS's failure to include provisions preventing referral of such cases to the DOJ in the temporary regulations was not actionable under the Taxpayer Bill of Rights ( P.L. 104-168), as codified under Code Sec. 7433(a). There was also no proof that there were any offers in compromise pending when the taxpayer's case was referred to the DOJ. At least six offers in compromise submitted by the taxpayer were rejected or returned as "unprocessable." Documents evidencing the IRS's acceptance of an offer in compromise submitted by the taxpayer's accountant on behalf of the taxpayer were forgeries.

J.R. Evseroff, DC N.Y., 2005-1 USTC ¶50,112.

Married debtors' tender of a check to the government did not constitute an offer in compromise that would have discharged their tax liability. The government and the debtors agreed that an offer to compromise the tax liability of the debtors was never accepted in writing by an authorized official. Moreover, a certificate of assessment reflected that the debtors' offer in compromise was rejected.

L.M. Smallwood, BC-DC Ark., 2002-1 USTC ¶50,166.

A proposed tax levy and collection action against an individual was not barred because the government failed to entertain a settlement or other compromise of her liability. The taxpayer failed to assert any Internal Revenue Code provision that establishes the government's legal obligation to compromise its action against her. The government has discretion to accept or reject any offer in compromise of a tax liability but is not legally obligated to even consider such an offer.

D.G. Asbury, DC Pa., 2002-1 USTC ¶50,117.

A Cayman Islands corporation's suit for refund of federal withholding taxes was dismissed, with prejudice, in accordance with a closing agreement with the government. A letter sent by the taxpayer that purported to modify its settlement offer to include an offer-in-compromise with regard to tax years not at issue was ineffective. The taxpayer presented no evidence that the proper parties received the letter before the government accepted its offer.

Inverworld, Ltd., DC D.C., 2001-1 USTC ¶50,350. Aff'd, per curiam, CA-D.C. (unpublished opinion), 2002-1 USTC ¶50,113, 22 FedAppx 5.

The co-owner of property foreclosed by a federal tax lien failed to show that he and the government had reached a settlement to release the property from the lien. There was no evidence that the government accepted his offer in compromise.

E.F. Ressler, DC Ala., 98-1 USTC ¶50,417.

Correspondence between a mutual insurance corporation and the government did not reflect an intention that the filing of a stipulation of dismissal would be a condition precedent to the completion of settlement negotiations. Because the parties entered into a valid settlement agreement, the government's acceptance letter merely stated that a stipulation of dismissal would "reflect" the agreement which had already been reached. As such, a stipulation was not essential to the validity of the parties' settlement agreement.

Principal Mutual Life Insurance Co., FedCl, 93-2 USTC ¶50,480, 29 FedCl 157. Aff'd on another issue, CA- FC, 95-1 USTC ¶50,160, 50 F3d 1021.

The IRS was not estopped from denying that it settled tax liabilities, even though it retained money offered as a settlement, because the procedures set forth for settling disputes were not followed. Since the statutory requirements were not followed, there could be no settlement, and thus no estoppel.

W.F. Brooks, DC W.Va., 86-2 USTC ¶9548.

A taxpayer's offer of compromise that contained a waiver of limitations was rejected by the IRS, and, therefore, the IRS could not assert that it accepted the portion of the offer containing the waiver.

G. Hamm, DC Ky., 79-2 USTC ¶9731.

The Commissioner effectively accepted an offer to compromise a refund claim when he mailed the taxpayer's attorney a letter accepting the offer and informing the taxpayer that the refund settlement would be credited against the unpaid tax liability of a later tax year. The court rejected the taxpayer's argument that the IRS letter constituted a counteroffer rather than an acceptance because it materially altered the terms of the offer.

J.P. Kehoe, DC N.Y., 79-2 USTC ¶9524.

There was no acceptance of a compromise settlement, which was negotiated during the trial, where the government's acceptance was not timely and unequivocal and where the taxpayer's counsel decided not to accept the settlement offer. Therefore, the taxpayer was not bound by the settlement agreement.

B.R. Kurio, DC Tex., 71-1 USTC ¶9112.

The IRS did not abuse its discretion when it refused married taxpayers' offer in compromise even though their tax liability arose from the application of the alternative minimum tax (AMT) as a result of the exercise of an incentive stock option on stock which then fell precipitously in value. The taxpayers had the ability to meet their obligation in full (albeit with a substantial reduction in their standard of living). The fact that their tax bill was much higher than the value of what they ended up receiving was not a reason for the IRS to accept the taxpayers' offer. The IRS was precluded from accepting an offer in compromise that would undermine compliance with the tax laws. Whether or not AMT is unfair is a question for Congress, not the IRS.

R.J. Speltz, 124 TC 165, Dec. 55,961.

Disallowance of tithes as allowable expenses in determining a taxpayer's ability to pay outstanding tax liabilities for purposes of an offer in compromise was not an abuse of an IRS Appeals officer's discretion even though the taxpayer argued that tithes were required as a condition of employment. At the Appeals hearing, the taxpayers were given the opportunity to substantiate that the husband was a minister but they failed to do so and the court was not persuaded that tithing was a condition of employment.

B.M. Pixley, 123 TC 269, Dec. 55,744.

An IRS Appeals officer did not abuse her discretion in rejecting an individual's offers-in-compromise where those offers did not provide for an immediate payment equal to the available cash value of the taxpayer's life insurance policies. The court found no authority requiring the IRS to accept less than the full value on the grounds suggested by the taxpayer, that he and his wife are "in their older years."

L.D. McClanahan, 95 TCM 1625, Dec. 57,478(M), TC Memo. 2008-161.

The IRS did not abuse its discretion when it rejected multiple offers-in-compromise submitted by a married couple; therefore, a proposed levy and filing of a federal tax lien were appropriate. The offers contained a number of defects with regard to the taxpayers' reasonable collection potential, which was largely based on the amount they could realize from the equity in their home. The IRS found that their initial offer used outdated appraisals for the home and questioned the validity of a second mortgage on the property held by husband's father, which was recorded shortly before the filing of the notice of federal tax lien. The taxpayers' second offer, based on a recommendation by an IRS Appeals officer, was also insufficient. The IRS's Engineering Group had found that the market value of the taxpayers' home could be 30 percent to 40 percent higher than that stated in the second offer.

W.G. Schwartz, 95 TCM 1427, Dec. 57,424(M), TC Memo. 2008-117.

The Appeals office did not abuse its discretion when it rejected an individual's offer-in-compromise (OIC) and sustained the IRS's notice of federal tax lien. The Appeals officer properly concluded that the offer was inadequate because it failed to include the value of an interest in real property that was awarded to her as part of her divorce settlement. The taxpayer failed to provide an adequate explanation as to why the property interest was not included when it constituted a dissipated asset that should have been included in her OIC.

J.L. Ashlock, 95 TCM 1220, Dec. 57,363(M), TC Memo. 2008-58.

The IRS Appeals Office did not abuse its discretion by rejecting a married couple's offer-in-compromise where the taxpayers had underreported their income for several tax years due to claimed losses and credits from Hoyt partnership tax shelter investments. The taxpayers argued that their offer should have been accepted because of their age, health and anticipated postretirement earnings. However, the court found that the taxpayers failed to show that payment of more than they offered would render them unable to meet their basis living expenses in retirement.

R. Bergevin, 95 TCM 1031, Dec. 57,307(M) , TC Memo. 2008-6.

An IRS Appeals officer abused her discretion by including the full amount of an individual's dissipated assets in his net realizable equity (NRE) during her evaluation of his offer-in-compromise. His NRE should not have included amounts paid for: attorney's fees incurred in the representation in his tax case; attorney's fees incurred in a civil lawsuit he filed for unpaid wages; an estimated tax payment made for one of the tax years at issue; and a lump-sum payment of delinquent child support.

D.L. Samuel, 94 TCM 392, Dec. 57,141(M), TC Memo. 2007-312.

The IRS did not abuse its discretion in rejecting an individual's offer-in-compromise (OIC). The OIC was for less than one-third of his total tax liability and the individual's assets and income were valued at more than the full amount of his assessed tax liability. The individual, while lacking sufficient income to fund an installment agreement, held a one-half interest in two parcels of real estate. The value of the individual's interest in the real estate exceeded the amount of his tax liability. The individual's argument that he owed his brother, who owned the other half interest in the real estate, more than the value of his interest, was rejected because it was unsupported by evidence of such liability.

W.A. Mootz, 94 TCM 362, Dec. 57,131(M), TC Memo. 2007-303.

The IRS Appeals Office did not abuse its discretion in rejecting a married couple's offer-in-compromise where the taxpayers had underreported their income for several tax years due to claimed losses and credits from Hoyt partnership tax shelter investments. The IRS Appeals officer considered all of the evidence submitted, and reasonably applied the guidelines for evaluating an offer-in-compromise. The offer was unacceptable because, among other reasons, the taxpayers were not forthcoming in establishing their financial status, acceptance of the offer would undermine compliance with the tax laws by taxpayers in general, and the taxpayers had the financial wherewithal to pay more than the offered amount. The officer adequately considered the taxpayers' unique facts and circumstances, and the taxpayers did not show that requiring them to pay more than the offer amount would result in an economic hardship. Public policy did not demand that the taxpayers' offer be accepted because they were victims of fraud, and acceptance of the offer would not enhance voluntary compliance by other taxpayers.

M. Smith, 93 TCM 1047, Dec. 56,880(M), TC Memo. 2007-73.

Refusal to accept a married couple's offer-in-compromise was not an abuse of discretion. The taxpayers did not demonstrate either that they would suffer economic hardship from the proposed collection method or that public policy and equity reasons weighed in favor of accepting their offer. The case was not a "longstanding" case in which forgiveness of penalties and interest was appropriate, and there was no evidence that the IRS Appeals officer failed to give adequate consideration to the taxpayers' unique facts and circumstances. Public policy did not demand acceptance of the offer because the taxpayers were victims of a shelter promoter's fraud. Acceptance of the compromise would reduce the risks involved in investing in tax shelters, undermining voluntary compliance with the tax laws.

G. Hansen, 93 TCM 983, Dec. 56,861(M), TC Memo. 2007-56.

Rejection of a taxpayer's offer in compromise was not an abuse of discretion where the financial information provided by the taxpayer conflicted with the implications of the terms of the taxpayer's marital settlement and separation agreement. The information provided did not explain the inconsistencies with regard to the ownership of various assets; thus, it was not sufficient to permit a reasonable analysis of the taxpayer's offer.

J.J. Kerr, 93 TCM 932, Dec. 56,846(M), TC Memo. 2007-43.

The IRS's rejection of an offer-in-compromise from investors in a cattle-breeding tax shelter was not arbitrary, capricious or without sound basis in fact or law, and the IRS was allowed to proceed with its collection action. The IRS did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the offer despite the taxpayer's claim of special circumstances or economic hardship. The IRS was not required to address every aspect of the taxpayers' special circumstances in the notice of determination and its calculation of the taxpayers' reasonable collection potential far exceeded the taxpayers' offer. In addition, the IRS was not required to accept the taxpayer's offer based on considerations of public policy or equity. The longstanding nature of the taxpayers' case did not require acceptance of the offer-in-compromise, the IRS could rely on an example in the Internal Revenue Manual that was similar although not identical to the taxpayers' case, and the IRS did not have to consider all of the taxpayers' equitable facts, including their claim that they were victims of fraud. Finally, the taxpayers' other arguments regarding compromise of penalties and interest, the IRS's alleged failure to provide the court with sufficient information, the IRS's deadline for submission of information, the husband's pending innocent spouse claim and the IRS's alleged failure to balance the need for efficient tax collection of taxes with the concern that collection be no more intrusive than necessary were rejected.

C. Andrews Est., 93 TCM 891, Dec. 56,831(M), TC Memo. 2007-30.

The IRS's rejection of an offer-in-compromise from investors in a cattle-breeding tax shelter was not arbitrary, capricious or without sound basis in fact or law, and the IRS was allowed to proceed with its collection action. The IRS did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the offer despite the taxpayer's claim of exceptional circumstances. In addition, the IRS was not required to accept the taxpayer's offer based on considerations of public policy or equity. The longstanding nature of the taxpayers' case did not require acceptance of the offer, the IRS could rely on an example in the Internal Revenue Manual that was similar although not identical to the taxpayers' case, and the IRS did not have to consider the taxpayers' claim that they were victims of fraud. Finally, the taxpayers' other arguments regarding compromise of penalties and interest, the IRS's alleged failure to provide the court with sufficient information, the IRS's refusal to delay the Code Sec. 6330 hearing, the wife's pending innocent spouse claim, and the IRS's alleged failure to balance the need for efficient tax collection with the concern that collection be no more intrusive than necessary were rejected.

G. Freeman, 93 TCM 879, Dec. 56,829(M), TC Memo. 2007-28.

The IRS's rejection of an offer-in-compromise from investors in a cattle-breeding tax shelter was not arbitrary, capricious or without sound basis in fact or law, and the IRS was allowed to proceed with its collection action. The IRS did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the offer despite the taxpayers' claim of special circumstances or economic hardship. The IRS was not required to address every aspect of the taxpayers' special circumstances in the notice of determination and its calculation of the taxpayers' reasonable collection potential far exceeded the taxpayers' offer. In addition, the IRS was not required to accept the taxpayers' offer based on considerations of public policy or equity. The longstanding nature of the taxpayers' case did not require acceptance of the offer, the IRS could rely on an example in the Internal Revenue Manual that was similar although not identical to the taxpayers' case, and the IRS did not have to consider the taxpayers' claim that they were victims of fraud. Finally, the taxpayers' other arguments regarding compromise of penalties and interest, the IRS's alleged failure to provide the court with sufficient information, the IRS's refusal to delay the Code Sec. 6330 hearing, and the IRS's alleged failure to balance the need for efficient tax collection with the concern that collection be no more intrusive than necessary were rejected.

R. Carter, 93 TCM 861, Dec. 56,826(M), TC Memo. 2007-25.

An IRS Appeals officer did not abuse her discretion in rejecting a taxpayer's offer-in-compromise. The Appeals officer correctly concluded that acceptance of the offer-in-compromise would not promote effective tax administration. Further, she did not abuse her discretion in determining that the taxpayer's real property had a value in excess of the amount indicated by the taxpayer, which was based on an outdated appraisal, and she correctly determined that the reasonable collection potential was greater than the taxpayer's offer amount.

G.W. McDonough, 92 TCM 386, Dec. 56,665(M), TC Memo. 2006-234.

The IRS did not abuse its discretion when it rejected an elderly couple's compromise offer that amounted to less than half of their estimated tax liability. The IRS was not required to compromise the couple's tax liability in order to promote effective tax administration based on economic hardship, public policy or equity grounds because the taxpayers had sufficient assets to pay the tax owed and still meet their necessary living expenses for the foreseeable future. Further, it did not abuse its discretion in disregarding the couple's speculative future medical expenses. In addition, the IRS was not required to accept the offer based on the taxpayers' claim that they were the victims of fraud because the couple's situation was typical of many tax shelter participants who claimed deductions, obtained tax advantages and were now required to pay their tax liability. Thus, the IRS's determination to reject the offer-in-compromise was not arbitrary, capricious, or without a sound basis in fact or law, and it was not abusive or unfair to the taxpayers.

D. Clayton, 92 TCM 222, Dec. 56,612(M), TC Memo. 2006-188.

IRS representatives did not accept or intend to accept the offer of a husband and wife to settle their tax deficiency case. The IRS appeals officer to whom the offer letter was sent did not make a written or oral response, and did not accept the offer. The IRS's counsel in the case did not accept the offer, where the offer was not made to him, he was unaware of its specifics, and the appeals officer conducted the negotiations. Although it was disputed whether the IRS's counsel had told taxpayers' counsel that a settlement had been reached, IRS counsel's statement was, at best, his understanding of the intent or actions of the appeals officer or her office.

R.R. Smith, 92 TCM 219, Dec. 56,611(M), TC Memo. 2006-187.

The IRS's refusal of an individual's offer to compromise her alternative minimum tax (AMT) liability, which arose from the exercise of incentive stock options (ISO), was not an abuse of discretion. The fact that the taxpayer's AMT liability was much higher than the value of income she actually received, was not a reason for the IRS to accept her offer. Any inequity in the application of the AMT in situations such as the taxpayer's is a question for Congress to resolve and not the IRS.

C. Wai, 92 TCM 181, Dec. 56,602(M), TC Memo. 2006-179.

An IRS Appeals officer did not abuse her discretion in rejecting an taxpayer's offer-in-compromise. The Appeals officer's rejection of the offer-in-compromise was justified because the disclosure that the taxpayer had incurred additional tax liability without making payment suggested that the taxpayer preferred consumption over meeting his legal obligations. The Appeals officer had also agreed to allow a collection alternative if the taxpayer met certain conditions, but the taxpayer did not agree to those conditions. Finally, collection of the full tax liability would not have caused the taxpayer and his family financial hardship. Delaying his retirement plans was not considered a hardship.

J.G. Dostal, 90 TCM 496, Dec. 56,194(M), TC Memo. 2005-264.

An IRS Appeals officer's determination to proceed with collection of an individual's unpaid tax liability was not an abuse of discretion. Although the taxpayer's allegation of economic hardship was worthy of review, the taxpayer's substantial equity in his home, against which he could borrow, weighed against a finding of economic hardship. Accordingly, the IRS did not abuse its discretion by rejecting the taxpayer's offer to compromise.

K. Hawkins,, 89 TCM 1075, Dec. 55,999(M), TC Memo. 2005-88.

A settlement agreement between an individual and the IRS did not allow the taxpayer to claim business losses related to his wife's furniture business in a specific tax year. The IRS disallowed the losses, categorizing the expenses as start-up costs required to be capitalized. The IRS and the taxpayer reached a settlement for that year that included, in part, the disallowance of the business loss. The taxpayer argued, however, that the prior to signing the settlement an agreement was reached to allow the loss in the following year. Although the IRS agreed that the loss might be allowed in a subsequent year, there was no assent to allow the loss in any specific tax year. Moreover, the settlement did not contain any express agreement as to the business losses. Therefore, there was no binding agreement as to the losses.

K.J. Barela, 88 TCM 65, Dec. 55,707(M), TC Memo. 2004-175.

An IRS Appeals officer abused his discretion in denying a couple's offer in compromise on the grounds that the taxpayers had inadequate income to meet their living expenses and pay the proposed monthly payments. The officer appeared to rely exclusively on the IRS's prescribed schedule of national and local average living expenses to determine that the taxpayers' basic living expenses exceeded their monthly income. However, all of the facts and circumstances, including the schedule of actual expenses submitted by the taxpayers, should have been considered in determining whether the taxpayers could pay both their expenses and the installment payments ( Code Sec. 7122(c)(2)). The filing of the federal tax liens to secure the IRS's interest in the unpaid tax liability was not an abuse of discretion.

M. Fowler, 88 TCM 17, Dec. 55,689(M), TC Memo. 2004-163.

Married taxpayers' challenge to an adverse Collection Due Process determination was rejected because they failed to establish an abuse of discretion on the part of the IRS. The officer's determination that the taxpayers had some ability to pay was supported by their proposed offer in compromise. In light of the unresolved question regarding the taxpayers' ownership of real property, the rejection of their proposed offer in compromise was sustained.

D.G. Willis, 86 TCM 506, Dec. 55,334(M), TC Memo. 2003-302.

A married couple's offer to settle their tax liability for the amount of their deficiency, but excluding penalties and interest, did not constitute a binding compromise agreement. The taxpayers had received an oral confirmation from the IRS auditor that their offer had been accepted; however, the auditor believed their offer was a request for additional time to pay. In fact, the taxpayers had not submitted the offer on the appropriate form and had not received a written confirmation that the offer was accepted. Further, there was no mutual assent to the offer since the auditor misunderstood the nature of their request.

J. Ringgold, 86 TCM 28, Dec. 55,218(M), TC Memo. 2003-199.

The IRS's action in cashing a check submitted by an exempt association with a letter that purported to be an offer in compromise did not amount to an acceptance of the entity's offer and did not bar the IRS from asserting that its income activity gave rise to unrelated business taxable income. Rather, the letter merely constituted a settlement offer to resolve the dispute resulting from the IRS audit of the taxpayer for three of the tax years in issue. Moreover, no compromise was effected because the letter failed to meet the specific requirements of Code Sec. 7122.

Education Athletic Assoc., Inc., 77 TCM 1525, Dec. 53,284(M), TC Memo. 1999-75.

Married taxpayers who were assessed deficiencies did not have a binding settlement agreement with the IRS regarding the years at issue. Although the taxpayers submitted several Forms 656, Offer in Compromise in Any Civil or Criminal Case, and District Director's Recommendation, the IRS never accepted any of their settlement offers. An IRS employee's signing of the forms to indicate that the IRS accepted the taxpayers' waiver of the limitations period did not constitute an acceptance of their offers. Further, the IRS employee and the taxpayers' accountant testified that the IRS employee never orally agreed to accept the taxpayers' proposals. Since the husband had a history of dishonest, criminal behavior, his testimony with respect to the alleged oral agreement lacked credibility. Thus, the taxpayers failed to establish that a binding agreement existed.

D.L. Streck, 74 TCM 545, Dec. 52,240(M), TC Memo. 1997-407. Aff'd, CA-6 (unpublished opinion), 99-2 USTC ¶50,650.

The IRS and an investor did not enter into a binding settlement agreement on deficiencies related to a tax shelter because the parties did not mutually assent to a settlement. The taxpayer failed to indicate his belief that a settlement agreement had been entered into until six months after he received written indications that the IRS did not believe that a settlement agreement existed.

T.W. Heil, 68 TCM 513, Dec. 50,071(M), TC Memo. 1994-417.

The government was not bound by an alleged proposed settlement between a former attorney and his wife and the IRS. A proposed decision document did not conform to the formalities required to execute a binding settlement. Even if the document constituted a formal settlement offer, there was no evidence that the taxpayers executed the agreement. Moreover, the IRS never executed the agreement, and no such document was filed with the Tax Court.

B.J. O'Sullivan, 68 TCM 407, Dec. 50,046(M), TC Memo. 1994-395. Aff'd, CA-9 (unpublished opinion), 96-2 USTC ¶50,496.

A notice of deficiency was not invalidated on account of a prior assessment where it was sent to a taxpayer who, along with her husband (who was also her business partner), had signed a Form 870-L(AD) settlement offer that was not signed by the IRS until after the husband filed for bankruptcy. The settlement agreement was void as to both spouses because acceptance of the offer was precluded by the automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code.

N.J. Gillian, 66 TCM 398, Dec. 49,218(M), TC Memo. 1993-366.

In a case involving a delinquent taxpayer who entered into a compromise agreement with the IRS to discharge the federal tax lien on her home in order to facilitate its sale, and who subsequently sought to compromise her tax liability after a collateral agreement was signed, Chief Counsel determined that the Service could accept the offer. The taxpayer submitted a separate offer in compromise conditioned on the Service's release of the mortgage on her home. However, acceptance of such an offer did not require the IRS to release the mortgage. A collateral agreement in which the taxpayer grants additional security to the IRS creates an independent cause of action and, thus, the original unpaid taxes giving rise to the statutory liens remain as separate liabilities. Absent language to the contrary in the compromise agreement, the mortgage remains unaffected.

IRS Letter Ruling 200133028, July 17, 2001.

Chief Counsel determined that a Compliance Area Director is entitled to compromise a case notwithstanding an opinion by Associate Area Counsel that opposed acceptance of a taxpayer's offer based upon a purported economic hardship that would ensue from collection in full. Although Code Sec. 7122(b) requires the opinion of the Associate Area Counsel whenever an offer in compromise is made, the opinion need not favor acceptance of the compromise in order for the IRS to accept the offer. The ultimate determination of whether an offer is accepted lies with the Area Director or other delegated official. However, an offer may not be accepted unless one of the bases for compromise recognized by Reg. 301.7122-1T has been established.

CCA Letter Ruling 200128054, May 29, 2001.

The IRS could exercise its discretion to accept an offer in compromise in spite of the fact that processability rules pertaining to deposit, payment and filing of employment taxes changed prior to acceptance of the offer. Chief Counsel determined that the in-business corporation could not compel the IRS to apply the former rule that it demonstrated compliance by showing that it had been current in the preceding two quarters, rather than demonstrating compliance by having timely filed and timely deposited the previous two quarters' taxes. Nothing in the Internal Revenue Code or regulations prevented the Service from exercising its discretion to process an offer based on criteria that existed when the offer was first submitted.

CCA Letter Ruling 200137001, April 12, 2001.

The government's letter to an individual did not constitute an acceptance of his settlement offer. The letter did not mirror the terms of the offer because it made no reference to the interest that would accrue if the individual failed to pay the settlement amount within 120 days of acceptance. Instead, it provided that the offer would be accepted on condition that payment is made within 120 days; therefore, the letter altered the terms of the offer and was construed as a counteroffer.

E.A. Brinskele, FedCl, 2008-2 USTC ¶50,493.

An Appeals officer's determination to reject an offer in compromise and sustain a levy to collect trust fund recovery penalties was not an abuse of discretion. The record established that the determination complied with all the requirements of the Internal Revenue Code, the Treasury Regulations and the Internal Revenue Manual. The Appeals officer sustained the levy only after a complete review of individual's financial records, and after determining that the offer in compromise was insufficient. Moreover, the taxpayer conceded that the IRS was not required to negotiate an acceptable offer in compromise.

R.E. Marshall, CA-11, 2008-2 USTC ¶50,662.


[Full Text --Rev. Proc. 2003-71]




SECTION 1. PURPOSE

The purpose of this revenue procedure is to explain the procedures applicable to the submission and processing of offers to compromise a tax liability under section 7122 of the Internal Revenue Code. These procedures reflect changes to the law made by the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Public Law 105-206 (112 Stat. 685, 764).



SECTION 2. BACKGROUND

.01 Section 7122 permits the Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate to compromise any civil or criminal liability arising under the internal revenue laws before the case is referred to the Department of Justice for prosecution or defense.

.02 The Secretary has developed guidelines and procedures for the submission and evaluation of offers to compromise under section 7122. These guidelines can be found in § 301.7122-1 of the Regulations on Procedure and Administration, the Internal Revenue Manual, and various forms and publications issued by the Internal Revenue Service (Service). This revenue procedure supplements and clarifies the procedures identified in § 301.7122-1.

.03 This revenue procedure includes provisions relating to the offer in compromise application fee, required under § 300.3 of the Regulations on User Fees and effective November 1, 2003.



SECTION 3. SCOPE

This revenue procedure applies to all offers to compromise a civil or criminal liability under section 7122 submitted to the Service, except for those offers submitted directly to the Office of Appeals. This revenue procedure does not apply to offers to compromise a tax liability after a case involving a civil or criminal liability has been referred to the Department of Justice for prosecution or defense.



SECTION 4. SUBMITTING AN OFFER TO COMPROMISE

.01 An offer to compromise a tax liability must be submitted in writing on the Service's Form 656, Offer in Compromise. None of the standard terms may be stricken or altered, and the form must be signed under penalty of perjury. The offer should include all liabilities to be covered by the compromise, the legal grounds for compromise, the amount the taxpayer proposes to pay, and the payment terms. Payment terms include the amounts and due dates of the payments. The offer should also contain any other information required by Form 656. The Service occasionally revises Form 656 and may require offers to be submitted on the most recent version of the form. The most recent version of the form and instructions are available on the Service's website at www.irs.gov.

.02 An offer to compromise a tax liability should set forth the legal grounds for compromise and should provide enough information for the Service to determine whether the offer fits within its acceptance policies.

(1) Doubt as to liability. Doubt as to liability exists where there is a genuine dispute as to the existence or amount of the correct tax liability under the law. Doubt as to liability does not exist where the liability has been established by a final court decision or judgment concerning the existence of the liability.

An offer to compromise based on doubt as to liability generally will be considered acceptable if it reasonably reflects the amount the Service would expect to collect through litigation. This analysis includes consideration of the hazards of litigation that would be involved if the liability were litigated. The evaluation of the hazards of litigation is not an exact science and is within the discretion of the Service.

(2) Doubt as to collectibility. Doubt as to collectibility exists in any case where the taxpayer's assets and income cannot satisfy the full amount of the liability.

An offer to compromise based on doubt as to collectibility generally will be considered acceptable if it is unlikely that the tax can be collected in full and the offer reasonably reflects the amount the Service could collect through other means, including administrative and judicial collection remedies. See Policy Statement P-5-100. This amount is the reasonable collection potential of a case. In determining the reasonable collection potential of a case, the Service will take into account the taxpayer's reasonable basic living expenses. In some cases, the Service may accept an offer of less than the total reasonable collection potential of a case if there are special circumstances.

(3) Promotion of effective tax administration.

(a) The Service may compromise to promote effective tax administration where it determines that, although collection in full could be achieved, collection of the full liability would cause the taxpayer economic hardship. Economic hardship is defined as the inability to pay reasonable basic living expenses. See § 301.6343-1(d). No compromise may be entered into on this basis if compromise of the liability would undermine compliance by taxpayers with the tax laws.

An offer to compromise based on economic hardship generally will be considered acceptable when, even though the tax could be collected in full, the amount offered reflects the amount the Service can collect without causing the taxpayer economic hardship. The determination to accept a particular amount will be based on the taxpayer's individual facts and circumstances.

(b) If there are no other grounds for compromise, the Service may compromise to promote effective tax administration where compelling public policy or equity considerations identified by the taxpayer provide a sufficient basis for compromising the liability. Compromise will be justified only where, due to exceptional circumstances, collection of the full liability would undermine public confidence that the tax laws are being administered in a fair and equitable manner. The taxpayer will be expected to demonstrate circumstances that justify compromise even though a similarly situated taxpayer may have paid his liability in full. No compromise may be entered into on this basis if compromise of the liability would undermine compliance by taxpayers with the tax laws.

An offer to compromise based on compelling public policy or equity considerations generally will be considered acceptable if it reflects what is fair and equitable under the particular facts and circumstances of the case.

.03 The offer should include all information necessary to verify the grounds for compromise. Except for offers to compromise based solely on doubt as to liability, this includes financial information provided in a manner approved by the Service. Individual or self-employed taxpayers must submit a Form 433-A, Collection Information Statement for Wage Earners and Self-Employed Individuals, together with any attachments or other documentation required by the Service. Corporate or other business taxpayers must submit a Form 433-B, Collection Information Statement for Businesses, together with any attachments or other documentation required by the Service. The Service may require the corporate officers or individual partners of a business taxpayer to complete a Form 433-A.

.04 An offer to compromise a tax liability should be mailed to the appropriate address listed on Form 656. The Service may, in its discretion, receive offers to compromise in other manners. Simply because the Service has received an offer does not mean that it has accepted the offer for processing such that the offer is considered pending within the meaning of section 6331(k)(1). Accepting an offer for processing is addressed in Section 5.01 of this revenue procedure.

.05 If a deposit is submitted with the offer to compromise and the taxpayer authorizes application of a deposit to tax liabilities, it will be credited to the taxpayer's account as of the day the deposit is first received.



SECTION 5. WHEN AN OFFER BECOMES PENDING AND RETURN OF OFFERS

.01 Section 6331(k)(1) generally prohibits the Service from making a levy on a taxpayer's property or rights to property while an offer to compromise a liability is pending with the Service, for 30 days after the rejection of an offer to compromise, or while an appeal of a rejection is pending. The statute of limitations on collection is suspended while levy is prohibited. An offer to compromise becomes pending when it is accepted for processing. The Service accepts an offer to compromise for processing when it determines that: the offer is submitted on the proper version of Form 656 and Form 433-A or B, as appropriate; the taxpayer is not in bankruptcy; the taxpayer has complied with all filing and payment requirements listed in the instructions to Form 656; the taxpayer has enclosed the application fee, if required; and the offer meets any other minimum requirements established by the Service. A determination that the offer meets these minimum requirements means that the offer is processable.

.02 A determination is made to accept an offer to compromise for processing when a Service official with delegated authority to accept an offer for processing signs the Form 656. The date the Service official signs the Form 656 is recorded on the Service's computers. As of this date, levy is prohibited unless the Service determines that collection of the liability is in jeopardy.

.03 If the Service determines that an offer to compromise a liability does not meet the minimum requirements the Service has established for a processable offer, the offer to compromise is not processable and may be returned to the taxpayer. Because the offer to compromise was never accepted for processing, it was never pending and levy was never prohibited.

.04 If an offer to compromise accepted for processing does not contain sufficient information to permit the Service to evaluate whether the offer should be accepted, the Service will request that the taxpayer provide the needed additional information. These requests for information are described in Section 6 below. If the taxpayer does not submit the additional information that the Service has requested within a reasonable time period after such a request, the Service may return the offer to the taxpayer. The Service also may return the offer after it has been accepted for processing if:

(1) The Service determines that the offer was submitted solely to delay collection;

(2) The taxpayer fails to file a return or pay a liability;

(3) The taxpayer files for bankruptcy;

(4) The offer is no longer processable; or

(5) The offer was accepted for processing in error.

When an offer is returned under this Section 5.04, the Service will not refund the application fee submitted with the offer unless the offer was accepted for processing in error.

.05 If a determination is made to return the offer to compromise as described in Sections 5.03 and 5.04, the return of the offer does not constitute a rejection. The taxpayer is not entitled to appeal the matter to Appeals under the provisions of § 301.7122-1(f)(5). If the Service initiates collection action following a return of an offer to compromise, the taxpayer may be able to appeal the collection action under section 6320, section 6330, or under the Collection Appeals Program.

.06 An offer to compromise is considered to be returned on the day the Service mails, or personally delivers, a written letter to the taxpayer informing the taxpayer of the decision to return the offer. An offer returned following acceptance for processing is deemed pending only for the period between the date the offer is accepted for processing and the date the offer is returned. The Service may levy to collect the liability that was the subject of the offer anytime after it returns the offer to the taxpayer.



SECTION 6. CASE BUILDING, INVESTIGATION, AND EVALUATION

.01 Once the Service accepts an offer to compromise for processing, it begins to gather the basic information necessary to begin evaluating the offer. During this initial processing, the Service may contact the taxpayer to secure information or documentation that was incorrect or omitted from the offer documents.

.02 After all of the basic information has been obtained from the taxpayer, the Service evaluates the information and determines whether the taxpayer's offer is acceptable. In the course of evaluating the offer to compromise, the Service may request additional information or documentation from the taxpayer.

.03 The decision whether and when to accept an offer to compromise a liability is within the discretion of the Service. In keeping with Policy Statement P-5-100, an offer will only be accepted if it is determined to be in the best interest of both the taxpayer and the Service. In addition to the criteria discussed in Section 4.02, the Service may take into account public policy and tax administration concerns in determining whether an offer to compromise is acceptable.

.04 For all offers to compromise, except for those based solely on doubt as to liability, the Service verifies the taxpayer's income and assets according to the Service's policies and procedures. Verification allows the Service to determine whether or not the taxpayer can fully pay the liability and, if not, to determine the reasonable collection potential of the liability.

(1) The Service uses a variety of sources to verify the taxpayer's valuation of the taxpayer's property. The Service relies on internal sources, such as its computer databases or other records, public and electronic sources, such as state motor vehicle records and credit bureau reports, and taxpayer supplied documentation.

(2) Section 7122 requires the Service to prescribe and publish guidelines to ensure that taxpayers entering into a compromise have an adequate means to provide for basic living expenses. The amount of basic living expenses will be determined based on an evaluation of the individual facts and circumstances presented by the taxpayer's case. The Service maintains a schedule of national and local allowances to account for the basic living expenses of taxpayers seeking to compromise. To determine whether an offer is adequate, the Service uses these schedules to analyze the income and expenses of the taxpayer to determine the monthly income available to pay the liability. These schedules are available in the Financial Analysis Handbook, IRM 5.15, and on the Service's website at www.irs.gov. The schedules are not applied when doing so would leave the taxpayer without adequate means to provide for basic living expenses.

(3) For purposes of evaluating an offer to compromise, the Service allows expenses only to the extent it determines they are necessary for the health and welfare of the taxpayer or the taxpayer's family or are necessary for the production of income.



SECTION 7. WITHDRAWING AN OFFER TO COMPROMISE

.01 The taxpayer may withdraw an offer to compromise a liability anytime prior to acceptance of the offer. An offer that has been withdrawn is no longer pending and the Service may levy to collect the liability that was the subject of the offer. When an offer is withdrawn the Service will not refund the application fee submitted with the offer.

.02 The taxpayer may withdraw an offer to compromise by delivery of written notification of the withdrawal in person, by mail, or by fax. An offer assigned to Centralized Offer in Compromise Units, however, may not be withdrawn by personal delivery, because documents cannot be personally delivered to these units. A taxpayer may also request withdrawal of an offer telephonically. A notice of intent to withdraw an offer should be directed to the Service office assigned to the case.

(1) If the taxpayer withdraws an offer to compromise by personal delivery, the offer will be considered withdrawn when written notification of the withdrawal is received by the Service.

(2) If the taxpayer withdraws an offer to compromise by mailing written notification of the withdrawal via U.S. certified mail, the offer will be considered withdrawn on the date the Service receives the certified mail.

(3) In all other cases, including withdrawal by non-certified mail, fax, or phone, the offer will be considered withdrawn on the date the Service mails, or personally delivers, a written letter to the taxpayer acknowledging the withdrawal.



SECTION 8. ACCEPTING AN OFFER TO COMPROMISE

.01 An offer to compromise has not been accepted until the Service issues written notification of acceptance to the taxpayer. Acceptance is effective as of the date on the acceptance letter.

.02 Acceptance of an offer to compromise will conclusively settle the liability of the taxpayer specified in the offer. Compromise with one taxpayer does not extinguish the liability of any person not named in the offer who is also liable for the tax to which the offer relates. The Service may take action to collect from any person not named in the offer.



SECTION 9. REJECTING AN OFFER TO COMPROMISE

.01 An offer to compromise has not been rejected until the Service issues written notification of rejection to the taxpayer. Section 7122(d) requires the Service to conduct an independent administrative review before the rejection of an offer to compromise is communicated to the taxpayer. The Service reviews each case to determine if the proposed rejection is reasonable based on the facts and circumstances of the case. Rejection is effective as of the date on the rejection letter. When an offer is rejected the Service will not refund the application fee submitted with the offer.

.02 The taxpayer may appeal the rejection of an offer to compromise to Appeals. The taxpayer must timely file the appeal with the Service office that rejected the offer. An appeal is timely filed if it is delivered to the Service or postmarked within thirty days from the date of the letter of rejection.

.03 Pursuant to section 6331, the Service may not make a levy on the taxpayer's property or rights to property for thirty days following the rejection of an offer to compromise or while an appeal of a rejection is pending.



SECTION 10. EFFECT ON OTHER DOCUMENTS

Rev. Proc. 96-38 is obsoleted.



SECTION 11. EFFECTIVE DATE

This revenue procedure is effective August 21, 2003, the date this revenue procedure was announced by news release, except that the provisions relating to the offer in compromise application fee are not effective for offers submitted prior to November 1, 2003.



SECTION 12. DRAFTING INFORMATION

The principal author of this revenue procedure is Sheara L. Krvaric of the Office of the Associate Chief Counsel (Procedure and Administration), Collection, Bankruptcy & Summonses Division. For further information regarding this revenue procedure contact Branch 2 of Collection, Bankruptcy & Summonses on (202) 622-3620 (not a toll free call).

Rev. Proc. 2003-71, 2003-2 CB 517 , obsoleting Rev. Proc. 96-38, 1996-2 CB 44.

The IRS Commissioner did not abuse his discretion by rejecting a married couple's offer-in-compromise based on economic hardship and exceptional circumstances. The couple's considerable accumulation of wealth and the speculative nature of their medical expenses did not support their argument that medical expenses for the husband's progressive dementia would bankrupt them in about a decade. The couple's ability to pay basic living expenses would not be impaired by significantly greater health care expenses. Further, the legislative history did not support the conclusion that denial of the offer was an abuse of discretion nor was the IRS Appeals officer required to negotiate with the couple on their offer.

C.G. Fargo, CA-9, 2006-1 USTC ¶50,326, 447 F3d 706.

Followed.

The IRS was not arbitrary and capricious when it rejected an offer in compromise made with respect to a deficiency arising from the taxpayers' participation in a Hoyt partnership. The IRS properly followed its guidelines when it determined that the taxpayers' offer did not qualify as an offer to promote effective tax administration because the taxpayers did not have sufficient assets to pay the full amount of their liability; and that the offer was too low, in relation to the deficiency and to the taxpayers' assets, to qualify as an offer due to doubts as to collectibility with special circumstances. The taxpayers' case was not a "longstanding" case that was entitled to special treatment with respect to interest and penalties; C.G. Fargo, CA-9, 2006-1 USTC ¶50,326, 447 F3d 706, followed. The IRS Appeals Officer who rejected the offer did not fail to consider the taxpayers' alleged unique circumstances; fail to balance efficient collection against the use of the least intrusive means possible; or fail to consider their request to abate interest. She was not required to discuss her decision with the taxpayers before she issued her notice of determination. The taxpayers failed to support their claim that they would suffer severe economic hardship if they had to pay more than the offered amount. Their claim that they were the victims of fraud did not obligate the IRS to accept their offer based on public policy, especially since acceptance would tend to undermine voluntary tax compliance. Finally, the taxpayers' claim that their assessment was untimely was frivolous.

R.D. Catlow, 93 TCM 946, Dec. 56,850(M), TC Memo. 2007-47.

The IRS did not abuse its discretion when it rejected a delinquent corporation's proposed offer in compromise. An IRS agent properly considered the taxpayer's other tax liabilities in assessing its ability to pay its federal liabilities, and she did not abuse her discretion when she concluded that the taxpayer did not demonstrate the ability to make the payments proposed in the offer, despite its improving financial condition.

Action Employment Resources, Inc., CA-9, 2006-1 USTC ¶50,130, 158 FedAppx 67.

The trial court properly determined that the IRS did not abuse its discretion when it attempted to collect unpaid employment taxes and penalties owed by an individual through the levy process. Although the taxpayer filed a formal offer in compromise to settle his tax liability, he did not supply the financial information that the IRS requested and believed necessary to evaluate the offer in compromise. The IRS was also justified in requesting financial information about the taxpayer's spouse since it appeared that the taxpayer may have transferred some of his assets to his spouse and since the IRS needed to verify each spouse's responsibility for the couple's living expenses. Further, the IRS's failure to negotiate and make a counteroffer during consideration of the compromise offer did not violate the taxpayer's due process rights since the taxpayer did not provide requested financial information.

R.E. Olsen, CA-1, 2005-2 USTC ¶50,637, 414 F3d 144.

An individual could not overcome the government's motion for summary judgment on his claim that an IRS Appeals officer was not aware of the taxpayer's "separate property" contention with respect to levied property. The officer's decision to proceed with collection was based on the taxpayer's failure to make an offer in compromise. That the Appeals officer insisted on the filing of returns for the tax years at issue as a condition for processing and considering an offer in compromise did not create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the IRS abused its discretion in issuing notice of determination. The taxpayer was charged with the knowledge that the officer's oral representations were not binding, and that a written offer was necessary.

A. Richter, DC Calif., 2002-2 USTC ¶50,607.

The IRS was entitled to reject married taxpayers' offer in compromise of their tax liability because under Code Sec. 7122 it has discretion as to whether it will accept such an offer.

A.C. Addington, DC W.Va., 99-1 USTC ¶50,441.

The IRS Appeals Office did not abuse its discretion by rejecting a married couple's offer-in-compromise where the taxpayers had underreported their income for several tax years due to claimed losses and credits from Hoyt partnership tax shelter investments. The taxpayers argued that their offer should have been accepted because of their age, health and anticipated postretirement earnings. However, the court found that the taxpayers failed to show that payment of more than they offered would render them unable to meet their basis living expenses in retirement.

R. Bergevin, 95 TCM 1031, Dec. 57,307(M) , TC Memo. 2008-6.

A taxpayer and his late wife's estate failed to establish that the IRS abused its discretion by refusing to grant them additional time to submit an offer in compromise (OIC) because the Commissioner is not required to wait a certain length of time before proceeding with a levy. The IRS also did not abuse its discretion in proceeding with a levy because the taxpayers repeatedly delayed the proceedings and failed to remit the necessary financial information required for an installment agreement or OIC.

M.A. Gazi, 94 TCM 474, Dec. 57,176(M), TC Memo. 2007-342.

The IRS Appeals Office did not abuse its discretion in rejecting a married couple's offer-in-compromise where the taxpayers had underreported their income for several tax years due to claimed losses and credits from Hoyt partnership tax shelter investments. The IRS Appeals officer considered all of the evidence submitted, and reasonably applied the guidelines for evaluating an offer-in-compromise. The offer was unacceptable because, among other reasons, the taxpayers were not forthcoming in establishing their financial status, acceptance of the offer would undermine compliance with the tax laws by taxpayers in general, and the taxpayers had the financial wherewithal to pay more than the offered amount. The officer adequately considered the taxpayers' unique facts and circumstances, and the taxpayers did not show that requiring them to pay more than the offer amount would result in an economic hardship. Public policy did not demand that the taxpayers' offer be accepted because they were victims of fraud, and acceptance of the offer would not enhance voluntary compliance by other taxpayers.

M. Smith, 93 TCM 1047, Dec. 56,880(M), TC Memo. 2007-73.

The IRS did not abuse its discretion when it rejected an elderly couple's compromise offer that amounted to less than half of their estimated tax liability. The IRS was not required to compromise the couple's tax liability in order to promote effective tax administration based on economic hardship or public policy or equity grounds because the taxpayers were able to pay more than the amount that they offered. The IRS determined that the taxpayers had sufficient equity in their assets to pay the tax amounts owed and still meet their necessary living expenses for the foreseeable future. Further, it did not abuse its discretion in disregarding the couple's speculative future medical expenses. In addition, the IRS was not required to accept the offer based on the taxpayers' claim that they were the victims of fraud because the couple's situation was typical of many tax shelter participants who claimed deductions, obtained tax advantages and were now required to pay their tax liability. Thus, the IRS's determination to reject the offer-in-compromise was not arbitrary, capricious, or without a sound basis in fact or law, and it was not abusive or unfair to the taxpayers.

D. Clayton, 92 TCM 222, Dec. 56,612(M), TC Memo. 2006-188.

An IRS Appeals officer's refusal to accept a married couple's offer in compromise regarding tax liabilities arising from a tax shelter investment was sustained. His determination that the taxpayers' resources were sufficient to warrant collection of the entire outstanding liability was not an abuse of discretion. The possibility that they might sustain a substantial economic hardship in the future did not bar a finding that they could pay their taxes. The delay in informing the taxpayers of their pending tax liability was attributable to the deliberate pace at which the TEFRA partnership audit of their tax shelter progressed. The IRS was not compelled to accept their settlement offer because it is generally their tax matters partner's responsibility to keep them informed. Finally, the mere fact that one participant in the same tax shelter was granted an interest abatement did not establish that the Appeals officer acted improperly in denying this offer in compromise.

C.G. Fargo, 87 TCM 815 , Dec. 55,514(M), TC Memo. 2004-13.

An IRS Appeals officer properly rejected an individual's offer in compromise for $100 to settle his unpaid tax liabilities in three years. The taxpayer offered no evidence to indicate that a rejection of his offer was an abuse of discretion. The Appeals officer properly reviewed the financial records of the taxpayer and his mother, whom the taxpayer supported. Moreover, the Appeals officer's refusal to refer the taxpayer's offer to IRS collection personnel for further evaluation did not constitute an abuse of discretion. As a result, the Tax Court upheld the IRS's Collection Due Process determination.

J.L. Tillman, 87 TCM 806, Dec. 55,509(M), TC Memo. 2004-8.

In consolidated cases, the IRS did not abuse its discretion in rejecting offers in compromise submitted by individuals who challenged their underlying tax liabilities as transferees of a corporation for its tax liability. Each taxpayer previously had entered into a stipulated decision agreeing to transferee liability and there was no doubt as to the taxpayers' liabilities within the meaning of the applicable regulations or otherwise. Thus, the IRS reasonably rejected the offers in compromise on grounds that the transferee liabilities had been determined in the transferee liability cases and that the taxpayers did not comply with filing requirements.

D.L. Oyer, 85 TCM 1510, Dec. 55,193(M), TC Memo. 2003-178.

Individual taxpayers were not entitled to loss deductions on account of their book tax shelters notwithstanding an IRS policy statement that, according to the taxpayers, gave them the right to settle the book shelter issue by being allowed deductions to the extent of their cash investment. The policy statement issue was not timely raised. Furthermore, the policy statement did not grant settlement rights to taxpayers but rather described procedures for arriving at such settlements.

R. Helstoski, 60 TCM 233, Dec. 46,748(M), TC Memo. 1990-382.

The IRS has identified 43 frivolous positions that have been deemed frivolous by courts or have no basis for validity in existing law. These positions are determined to be frivolous for purposes of the Code Sec. 6702(a) penalty for filing frivolous tax returns, and the Code Sec. 6702(b) penalty for filing specified frivolous submissions, which include applications for offers in compromise. Included in the list are four new positions that relate to a misinterpretation of the Ninth Amendment regarding objections to military spending, erroneous claims that taxes are owed only by persons with a fiduciary relationship to the U.S. or IRS, a nonexistent "Mariner's Tax Deduction," or something similar, related to invalid deductions for meals and misuse or excessive use of the credit for fuels under Code Sec. 6421.

Notice 2008-14, I.R.B. 2008-4, 310; modifying and superseding Notice 2007-30, I.R.B. 2007-14, 883.

IRS News Release, IR-2008-8, January 14, 2008.

The IRS has announced that a revised taxpayer application for an offer in compromise (OIC), the Form 656 package, is now available. The new form reflects procedural changes to the OIC program made by the Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005 ( P.L. 109-222). The changes to the Form 656 package include new payment terms and offer submission rules, a processability checklist, a matrix to assist taxpayers in determining the number of forms and payments that must be submitted to the IRS, a checklist of items and documents that must be completed prior to submitting an OIC, and a new payment voucher to be used to remit required partial payments to the IRS.

IRS News Release, IR-2007-50, March 5, 2007.

IRS Fact Sheet FS-2007-16, March 5, 2007.

The IRS has issued guidance outlining the protections in place for the new private debt collection program in connection with administrative review. If the taxpayer proposes an installment agreement to the private collection agency (PCA) and the IRS rejects the proposed installment agreement, the taxpayer may appeal the rejection to the IRS. If the IRS assigns a PCA to monitor an installment agreement and the PCA determines the taxpayer is in default, the taxpayer may appeal to the IRS if the installment agreement is terminated. In both situations, the taxpayer must first appeal to the IRS office supervising the PCA's day-to-day work, but if not satisfied the taxpayer may continue the appeal to the IRS Office of Appeals, pursuant to the IRS review procedures for installment agreements and compromises.

Announcement 2006-63, I.R.B. 2006-37, 445.

The IRS issued information and guidance on the major changes made to the offer in compromise program by the Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-222) which tightened the rules for lump-sum and periodic payment offers received by the IRS on or after July 16, 2006. Taxpayers submitting requests for lump-sum OICs must include a payment of 20 percent of the amount offered. A lump-sum OIC is an offer of payments made in five or fewer installments. Taxpayers submitting requests for periodic-payment OICs must include the first proposed installment payment with their application and continue making payments under the terms proposed while the offer is being evaluated. The IRS will treat the payments as payments of tax, rather than refundable deposits under Code Sec. 7809(b) or Reg. §301.7122-1(h). Unless a waiver applies, failure to pay the 20 percent on a lump-sum offer, or the first installment payment on a periodic payment offer may result in the IRS returning the offer to the taxpayer as nonprocessable. Taxpayers qualifying as low-income or filing an offer based solely on doubt as to liability can receive a waiver of the new partial payment requirements. The IRS will deem an OIC accepted that is not withdrawn, returned or rejected within 24 months after receipt of the offer. When submitting Form 656, taxpayers must include user fee of $150 unless they qualify for a waiver. Offers are submitted using Form 656, Offers in Compromise. Taxpayers may continue to use the 2004 revision of the form until the new version, revised to reflect the new law, is available.

Notice 2006-68, I.R.B. 2006-31, 105.

IRS News Release, IR-2006-106, July 11, 2006.

IRS Fact Sheet FS-2006-22, July 11, 2006.

A new check-the-box disclosure authorization for the appointment of a third party to discuss and obtain information to facilitate the initial processing of an offer in compromise was added July 2004 to Form 656. This authorization is limited to this specific purpose and does not authorize the designated party to represent the taxpayer before the IRS or during a Collection Due Process hearing.

Announcement 2005-6, I.R.B. 2005-4, 377.

The IRS is warning taxpayers to beware of tax practitioners who encourage the use of an offer in compromise as a way to settle tax claims for "pennies on the dollar." The IRS's warning targets the actions of "unscrupulous promoters" who charge excessive fees when there is no chance that the taxpayer will qualify for the offer in compromise. Although the IRS has the authority to settle tax claims for less than their full amount, an offer in compromise may be considered only after other options, such as an installment agreement, are considered.

IRS News Release, IR-2004-130, October 25, 2004.

A revised taxpayer application for an offer in compromise (OIC), the Form 656 package, is now available. The revised form provides a signature block for paid preparers and also includes a Form 656-A, Income Certification for OIC Application Fee, and a worksheet to help taxpayers determine if they qualify for the income exception to $150 application fee. Other features of the new package include a checklist to determine eligibility for an OIC, an OIC process step-by-step guide, a third-party designee section and a summary checklist. The package can be obtained from the IRS by calling 1-800-829-3676 or by going to the IRS website "www.irs.gov.".

IRS News Release, IR-2004-129, October 25, 2004.

The IRS has issued a consumer alert advising taxpayers to beware of promoters' claims that tax debts can be settled for "pennies on the dollar" through the IRS Offer in Compromise Program. According to the IRS, some promoters are inappropriately advising indebted taxpayers to apply for an offer in compromise before exhausting other payment options, such as monthly installment agreements.

IRS News Release, IR-2004-17, February 3, 2004.

Beginning on November 1, 2003, the IRS will charge, with certain exceptions, a $150 application fee for the processing of offers in compromise (OICs). Individuals whose monthly income falls at or below levels based on the Department of Health and Human Services guidelines, and taxpayers that file OICs based solely on doubt as to liability, will be exempt from the fee. Individuals claiming the poverty guideline exception must certify their eligibility using Form 656-A, Offer in Compromise Application Fee Instructions and certification. To submit an OIC, taxpayers are to use the May 2001 version of Form 656, Offer in Compromise. The application fee for OICs that do not qualify for an exception must be submitted using a check or money order payable to the United States Treasury.

IRS News Release, IR-2003-124, October 23, 2003.

Chief Counsel concluded that a Code Sec. 7122 compromise would not legally bind a minor in a compromise agreement with the IRS. A minor child may repudiate, avoid or disaffirm a contract under state laws; thus, Chief Counsel advised against the IRS entering into compromise agreements with minors. Moreover, status as the legal guardian of a minor's property does not include the capacity to compromise the minor's tax liability.

CCA Letter Ruling 200220026, March 28, 2002.

Chief Counsel provided background information regarding Code Sec. 7122 and its legislative history as they relate to Chief Counsel Notice CC-2001-036. The notice set forth procedures to be followed by Associate Chief Counsel (SB/SE) offices when issuing the statutorily required opinion in offer in compromise cases. It also clarified procedures for the review of offers based on doubt as to collectibility and/or liability. Further, the notice added procedures and standards for the review of offers based upon the promotion of effective tax administration.

CCA Letter Ruling 200131029, July 2, 2001.

Chief Counsel concluded that the IRS need not require that individual offers in compromise submitted by married taxpayers specify that the offers were made in conjunction with each other in order to protect the collectability of the couple's joint and separate liabilities. Moreover, the offers did not have to specify that a failure to pay the entire amount of either offers would result in a default of both offers.

CCA Letter Ruling 200051043, October 26, 2000.

The government was entitled to reduce to judgment federal income, employment and unemployment taxes assessed against an individual. . Because the individual failed to timely appeal the denial of his offer in compromise to the IRS Office of Appeals, he could not later request a review of that denial in the district court.

D.L. Kadunce, DC Pa., 2008-2 USTC ¶50,669.

With the start of the 2009 tax filing season, the IRS has announced steps to help financially distressed taxpayers receive their refunds faster, as well as provided additional help to individuals who are struggling to meet their tax obligations. Several suggestions are offered to taxpayers who owe back taxes, such as additional review of offers-in-compromise and expedited levy releases.

IRS News Release IR-2009-2.

Labels:

Thursday, April 9, 2009

The Schroer case, decided in January, deals with the 25% failure to file penalty. Given the lack of money to pay taxes this year, keep in mind that the returns should be filed even there is insufficient money to pay the tax liability. The court held that the individual failed to exercise ordinary business care and prudence; thus, he did not justify his inability to file returns and pay his taxes on time. His difficulties meeting his tax obligations did not constitute reasonable cause for his failure to pay because they resulted from his willful neglect to conserve sufficient assets in marketable form to satisfy his tax liabilities. He voluntarily chose not to pay estimated taxes when due and made a conscious decision to put his personal financial interests ahead of his tax obligations. The birth of the individual's children and his wife's post-partum problems did not qualify as mental and emotional hardships. Further, the individual did not show that the records necessary to prepare the tax returns on time were not available because he had complete control over those records. This case also has an interesting discussion of “financial hardship” as reasonable cause that I think is a “must read” for all return preparers.


Steven C. Schroer, Plaintiff v. United States of America, Defendant.

U.S. District Court, Dist. Colo.; Civil Case No. 07-cv-00690-LTB-BNB, January 21, 2009.






ORDER


BABCOCK, Judge: This case is before me on the recommendation of the magistrate judge that defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc 71) be granted. Plaintiff has filed specific written objections to the magistrate judge's recommendation. I have, therefore, reviewed the recommendation de novo in light of the file and record in this case. On de novo review I conclude that the magistrate judge has correctly applied the standards under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 in finding and concluding that the motion for summary judgment should be granted. Having considered the full, exhaustive and well-reasoned recommendation de novo in light of plaintiff's detailed, specific written objections, I conclude that the magistrate judge's recommendation is correct. Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc 71) is GRANTED and that judgment enter dismissing plaintiff's complaint against defendant.

Dated at Denver, Colorado this 21st day of January 2009.


RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE


BOLAND, United States Magistrate Judge: This matter arises on the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. # 71, filed 7/14/2008] and supporting brief and materials [Doc. # 72, filed 7/14/2008]. I respectfully RECOMMEND that the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED.

The plaintiff is a taxpayer who seeks the refund of tax penalties and interest assessed by and paid to the United States for the tax years 2000, 2001, and 2002. The plaintiff claims that penalties in the amount of $133,928.11 were improperly assessed. Complaint [Doc. # 1, filed 4/5/2007] at ¶ ¶9, 11, and 13. 1 The United States seeks an order of summary judgment in its favor, denying the plaintiff's claim for a refund. Brief In Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. # 72] ("Defendant's Brief") at p.25.


I.


The parties do not seriously dispute the applicable law. The authority of the United States to assess penalties against taxpayers for failure to timely file tax returns and failure to timely pay taxes is set out at 26 U.S.C. § 6651(a)(1) and (2):
§ 6651. Failure to file tax return or to pay tax

(a) Addition to the tax. --In case of failure --

(1) to file any return required ... on the date prescribed therefor (determined with regard to any extension of time for filing), unless it is shown that such failure is due to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect, there shall be added to the amount required to be shown as tax on such return 5 percent of the amount of such tax if the failure is for not more than 1 month, with an additional 5 percent for each additional month or fraction thereof during which such failure continues, not exceeding 25 percent in the aggregate;

(2) to pay the amount shown as tax on any return specified in paragraph (1) on or before the date prescribed for payment of such tax (determined with regard to any extension of time for payment), unless it is shown that such failure is due to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect, there shall be added to the amount shown as tax on such return 0.5 percent of the amount of such tax if the failure is for not more than 1 month, with an additional 0.5 percent for each additional month or fraction thereof during which such failure continues, not exceeding 25 percent in the aggregate... .

The Supreme Court considered generally the meaning of § 6651 in United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241 (1985), and held:
A Treasury Regulation provides that, to demonstrate "reasonable cause," a taxpayer filing a late return must show that he "exercised ordinary business care and prudence and was nevertheless unable to file the return within the prescribed time." 26 C.F.R. § 301.6651-1(c)(1) (1984).

* * *

Congress' purpose in the prescribed civil penalty was to ensure timely filing of tax returns to the end that tax liability will be ascertained and paid promptly. The relevant statutory deadline provision is clear... . To escape the penalty, the taxpayer bears the heavy burden of proving both (1) that the failure did not result from "willful neglect," and (2) that the failure was "due to reasonable cause." 26 U.S.C. § 6651(a)(1).

The meaning of these two statutory standards has become clear over the near-70 years of their presence in the statutes. As used here, the term "willful neglect" may be read as meaning a conscious, intentional failure or reckless indifference... . Like "willful neglect," the term "reasonable cause" is not defined in the Code, but the relevant Treasury Regulation calls on the taxpayer to demonstrate that he exercised "ordinary business care and prudence" but nevertheless was "unable to file the return within the prescribed time." 26 C.F.R. § 301,6651(c)(1) (1984).

* * *

Congress obviously intended to make absence of fault a prerequisite to avoidance of the late-filing penalty. A taxpayer seeking a refund must therefore prove that his failure to file on time was the result neither of carelessness, reckless indifference, nor intentional failure.

* * *

The time has come for a rule with as "bright" a line as can be drawn consistent with the statute and implementing regulations. Deadlines are inherently arbitrary; fixed dates, however, are often essential to accomplish necessary results. The Government has millions of taxpayers to monitor, and our system of selfassessment in the initial calculation of a tax simply cannot work on any basis other than one of strict filing standards. Any less rigid standard would risk encouraging a lax attitude toward filing dates. Prompt payment of taxes is imperative to the Government, which should not have to assume the burden of unnecessary ad hoc determinations.

Id. at 245-49 (footnotes and internal quotations and citations omitted, except as noted).

Unless both reasonable cause and a lack of willful neglect are established, imposition of the penalties specified in § 6651 is mandatory. Carlson v. United States, 126 F.3d 915, 921 (7th Cir. 1997). See Fran Corp. v. United States, 164 F.3d 814, 816 (2d Cir. 1999)(stating that "[t]he IRS imposes mandatory penalties for failure to file returns [or] pay taxes ... unless the taxpayer can demonstrate that such failure was due to 'reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect'"). In addition:
"Failure to pay will be considered to be due to reasonable cause to the extent that the taxpayer has made a satisfactory showing that he exercised ordinary business care and prudence in providing for payment of his tax liability and was nevertheless either unable to pay the tax or would suffer an undue hardship ... if he paid on the due date." 26 C.F.R. § 301.6651-1(c)(1).

In considering whether a taxpayer exercised ordinary business care and prudence, a court should consider all facts and circumstances of the taxpayer's situation, including the amount and nature of expenditures in light of income received prior to the date payment was due. A taxpayer exercises ordinary business care and prudence if he makes reasonable efforts to conserve sufficient assets in marketable form to satisfy his tax liability and nevertheless was unable to pay all or a portion of the tax when it became due. "Undue hardship" means more than mere inconvenience. It must be substantial financial hardship, for example, loss due to the sale of property at a sacrifice price.

Carlson, 126 F.3d at 921 (internal citations and quotations omitted, except as noted). "If a market exists, the sale of property at the current market price is not ordinarily considered as resulting in an undue hardship." East Wind Industries, Inc. v. United States, 196 F.3d 499, 505 (3d Cir. 1999) ( quoting Treas. Reg. § 1.6161-1(b)).

Financial difficulties may, under some circumstances, establish reasonable cause for a failure to pay taxes. Fran Corp., 164 F.3d at 820. Applicable Treasury Regulations "clearly require a factual assessment of the taxpayer's financial situation to determine whether [he] has exercised ordinary business care and prudence in responding to competing financial obligations." Id. at 819. Accord Parcc Health Care, Inc. v. United States, 238 F. Supp. 2d 435, 441 (D. Conn. 2002).


II.


The plaintiff is proceeding pro se, and the pleadings of a pro se litigant ordinarily must be afforded a liberal construction, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972), although he must comply with the fundamental requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). In this case, however, Mr. Schroer is a lawyer licensed to practice in this court, and he reports that his law practice involves litigation with a prestigious Chicago law firm. Schoer Decl. at ¶¶ 15-17, 79. Under these facts, I do not afford Mr. Schroer's submissions any special construction. Smith v. Plati, 258 F.3d 1167, 1174 (10th Cir. 2001).

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and that party must be afforded the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). Rule 56(c), Fed. R. Civ. P., provides that summary judgment should be entered if the "pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." A genuine issue of material fact exists "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating by reference to portions of the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits the absence of genuine issues of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 447 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The party opposing the motion is then required to go beyond the pleadings and designate evidence of specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324. Only admissible evidence may be considered when ruling on a motion for summary judgment. World of Sleep, Inc. v. La-Z-Boy Chair Co., 756 F.2d 1467, 1474 (10th Cir. 1985). Affidavits must be based on personal knowledge and must set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence. Murray v. City of Sapulpa, 45 F.3d 1417, 1422 (10th Cir. 1995) (internal quotations and citations omitted). "Conclusory and self-serving affidavits are not sufficient." Id.

To avoid a late penalty under § 6651, the taxpayer bears the burden of proof to establish that the failure to timely file a return and/or pay taxes was both due to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect. Craddock, 149 F.3d at 1254-55. "Whether the elements that constitute 'reasonable cause' are present is a question of fact. What elements constitute 'reasonable cause' is a question of law." Id. at 1255.


III.


I find from the parties' briefs and supporting documents that the following facts material to the resolution of the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment are undisputed:

(1) For tax year 2000, Mr. Schroer received cash compensation from his employment in an amount exceeding $332,000. Exh. A-11 Part II [Doc. # 73-15] at pp.9 and 13 of 113. 2

(2) The Schroers' federal income tax return for tax year 2000 was due to be filed on October 15, 2001. Exh. A-34 [Doc. # 73-40] at p. 3 of 7. The return was not filed until August 18, 2002. Exh. A-14 [Doc. # 73-18] at p. 3 of 20.

(3) The Schroers owed federal income tax for tax year 2000 in the amount of $192,994. Exh. A-14 [Doc. # 73-18]. With the exception of $21,000 withheld in connection with the early withdrawal of retirement funds, Exh. A-14 [Doc. # 73-18] Form 2210 at Part II: line11, the Schroers did not pay any of that tax liability through withholding or estimated payments when due in 2000 and early 2001. Id. at Form 2210, Part III: line16.

(4) The Schroers were assessed a late filing penalty for tax year 2000 of $38,835.00, and were assessed a penalty for failure to timely pay their taxes for tax year 2000 of $18,904.00. Exh. A-34 [Doc. # 73-40] at pp. 3 and 5 of 7.

(5) For tax year 2001, Mr. Schroer received cash compensation from his employment in an amount exceeding $225,000. Exh. A-11 Part II [Doc. # 73-15] at pp.19-28 of 113.

(6) The Schroers' federal income tax return for tax year 2001 was due to be filed on October 15, 2002. Exh. A-35 [Doc. # 73-41] at p.3 of 8. The return was not filed until April 15, 2003. Exh. A-16 [Doc. # 73-20] at p.3 of 19.

(7) The Schroers owed federal income tax for tax year 2001 in the amount of $143,157. Exh. A-16 [Doc. # 73-20]. The Schroers did not pay any of that tax liability through withholding or estimated payments when due in 2001 and early 2002. Exh. A-16 [Doc. # 73-20] Form 2210 at Part III: line16.

(8) The Schroers were assessed a late filing penalty for tax year 2001 of $28,355.86, and were assessed a penalty for failure to timely pay their taxes for tax year 2001 of $21,814.39. Exh. A-35 [Doc. # 73-41] at pp. 3, 5, and 6 of 8.

(9) For tax year 2002, Mr. Schroer received cash compensation from his employment in an amount exceeding $309,000. Exh. A-11 Part II [Doc. # 73-15] at pp.31-37 of 113.

(10) The Schroers' federal income tax return for tax year 2002 was due to be filed on August 15, 2002. Exh. A-36 [Doc. # 73-42] at p.3 of 7. The return was not filed until October 14, 2003. Exh. A-18 [Doc. # 73-22] at p.3 of 12.

(11) The Schroers owed federal income tax for tax year 2002 in the amount of $105,997.00. Exh. A-18 [Doc. # 73-22]. The Schroers did not pay any of that tax liability through withholding or estimated payments when due in 2002 and early 2003. Exh. A-37 [Doc. # 73-43] Form 2210 at Part III: line 17.

(12) The Schroers were assessed a late filing penalty for tax year 2002 of $13,846.81; assessed a penalty for failure to timely pay their taxes for tax year 2002 of $8,744.05; and assessed an estimated tax penalty of $3,428.00. Exh. A-36 [Doc. # 73-42] at pp. 3 and 5 of 7.

(13) Mr. Schroer had a history prior to tax year 2000 of incurring penalties for failing to timely file his tax returns and failing to timely pay his taxes, as follows:

(a) For tax year 1991, Mr. Schroer's tax return was filed in October 1992; he did not make any substantial payment against his 1991 tax liability until January 1993; and he did not completely discharge his tax liability until September 1993. He was assessed a penalty for failure to timely pay his 1991 taxes of $2,312.70. Exh. A-1 [Doc. # 73-2].

(b) For tax year 1992, Mr. Schroer's tax return was filed in October 1993; he did not make any substantial payment against his 1992 tax liability until March 1994; and he did not completely discharge his tax liability until September 1994. He was assessed a penalty for failure to timely pay his 1992 taxes of $3,137.49. Exh. A-2 [Doc. # 73-3].

(c) For tax year 1993, Mr. and Mrs. Schroer filed a joint return in October 1994; they did not make any substantial payment against their 1993 tax liability until February 1995; and they did not completely discharge their tax liability until June 1995. They were assessed penalties of $4,592.55, including a late filing penalty of $2,122.53, and penalties for failure to timely pay their 1993 taxes of $2,470.02. Exh. A-3 [Doc. # 73-4].

(d) For tax year 1994, Mr. and Mrs. Schroer filed a joint return in October 1995; they did not make any substantial payment against their 1994 tax liability until February 1996; and they did not completely discharge their tax liability until June 1996. They were assessed penalties of $5,333.91, including an estimated tax penalty of $2,419.83, and penalties for failure to timely pay their 1994 taxes of $2,914.08. Exh. A-4 [Doc. # 73-5].

(e) For tax year 1995, Mr. and Mrs. Schroer filed a joint return in October 1996; but they did not completely discharge their tax liability until January 1997. They were assessed penalties of $4,099.11, including an estimated tax penalty of $2645.07, and a penalty for failure to timely pay their 1995 taxes of $1,454.04. Exh. A-5 [Doc. # 73-6].

(f) For tax year 1996, Mr. and Mrs. Schroer filed a joint return in October 1997; they did not make any substantial payment against their 1996 tax liability until February 1998; and they did not completely discharge their tax liability until May 1998. They were assessed penalties of $6,727.99, including an estimated tax penalty of $1,737.00, and penalties for failure to timely pay their 1996 taxes of $4,990.99. Exh. A-6 [Doc. # 73-7].

(g) For tax year 1997, Mr. and Mrs. Schroer filed a joint return in October 1998; they did not make any substantial payment against their 1993 tax liability until February 1999, when they completely discharge their tax liability. They were assessed penalties of $7,028.39, including an estimated tax penalty of $3,633.02, and penalties for failure to timely pay their 1997 taxes of $3,395.37. Exh. A-7 [Doc. # 73-8].

(h) For tax year 1998, Mr. and Mrs. Schroer filed a joint return in November 1999; they did not make any substantial payment against their 1993 tax liability until February 2000, when they completely discharge their tax liability. They were assessed penalties of $8,837.99, including an estimated tax penalty of $2,087.00, a late filing penalty of $4,190.29, and penalties for failure to timely pay their 1998 taxes of $2,560.70. Exh. A-8 [Doc. # 73-9].

(i) For tax year 1999, Mr. and Mrs. Schroer filed a joint return in October 2000; they did not make any substantial payment against their 1999 tax liability until January 2001; and they did not completely discharge their tax liability until early 2002. They were assessed penalties of $8,202.66, including an estimated tax penalty of $1,661.00, late filing penalties of $3,635.83, and penalties for failure to timely pay their 1999 taxes of $2,905.83. Exh. A-9 [Doc. # 73-10].

(14) The Schroers entered into a contract to sell their Chicago home to Brent and Phoebe Stark for $675,000. Schroer Decl. [Doc. # 94] at ¶24. Because this was a private sale which did not involve any realtors, Mr. Schroer valued the sales contract with the Starks at $725,000. Id. The sale was to close on July 14, 2001. Id.

(15) With respect to the anticipated proceeds from the sale of his Chicago home, Mr. Schroer states: "[W]e could realize as much as $300,000 or more in equity from the sale of the Evanston home. That amount would have been more than enough to catch up on expected 2000 taxes to become due in 2001 as well as for 2001 taxes to become due in 2002." Id. at ¶23.

(16) On June 29, 2001, the Starks breached the contract to purchase the Schroers' home. Id. at ¶ ¶27-28.

(17) The Schroers sold their Chicago home, with the assistance of realtors, in June 2002 for $645,000. Id. at ¶31.

(18) In June 2001, one year prior to the closing of the sale on their Chicago home, the Schroer's purchased a home in Boulder, Colorado, for $655,000.00. Exh. A-22 [Doc. # 73-26].

(19) In mid-2001, Mr. Schroer had "around $600,000 worth of retirement funds, which were not liquid." Exh. A-10 Part II [Doc. # 73-13] at p.43 of 96.

(19) In late May or early June 2001, Mr. Schroer withdrew $139,000 of retirement funds to make the down payment on the Boulder home, with the intention of using funds from the sale of the Chicago home to "rollover" into the retirement account to avoid adverse tax consequences from the withdrawal. Id. at pp. 43 of 96 through 46 of 96.


IV.


The imposition of penalties due to a taxpayer's failure to timely file a tax return and failure to timely pay taxes is mandatory unless the taxpayer can show that the failure "is due to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect." 26 U.S.C. § 6651(a)(1) and (2); Carlson, 126 F.3d at 921. In this case, the United States claims that some or all of the Schroers' failures to file and pay resulted from "willful neglect," Defendant's Brief at p.20, but for purposes of summary judgment it limits its arguments to a contention that Mr. Schroer cannot show any "reasonable cause" for his failures. Id. Mr. Schroer bears the burden of showing "reasonable cause." Craddock, 149 F.3d at 1254-55.

Mr. Schroer argues that reasonable cause exists for his failure to file tax returns and pay his taxes for tax years 2000, 2001, and 2002, based primarily on the buyers' breach of their contract to purchase Mr. Schroer's Chicago home. According to Mr. Schroer:
4. For reasons beyond my control, due to a severe unexpected downturn in income from 1996-2002, ... I was faced with a financial crisis by late 2000. In spite of my best efforts and a reasonable, prudent plan to solve the problem, a specific event in 2001 beyond my control was the proximate and real cause of the circumstances giving rise to the penalties now at issue.

5. More specifically, the government's brief entirely ignores the key causative event which caused the problems at issue relating to the timeliness of my 2000-2002 tax payments and filings. It was a particular event --a breach of contract occurring on June 29, 2001 --(and certainly not unrelated events from years earlier (1991-1996) that the government's brief so heavily focuses on while ignoring the relevant event) which was the legal cause of the penalties now at issue.

6. I made specific provision for timely payment of the balance of my 2000 taxes and other obligations due in 2001 and/or 2002 through a contract dated February 20, 2001, for the sale of my home in Evanston, Illinois, where I then lived. The contract was entered into prior to the April 15 original due date of my 2000 tax return. The sale was to close no later than July 14, 2001. My 2000 tax return was not due until at least August 15, 2001 (and an additional extension until October 15, 2001 was also available), so a closing by July 14, 2001, would have allowed me ample time to file and pay my 2000 taxes on a timely basis. The proceeds of a closing on July 14, 2001, would have resulted in freeing-up of home equity approaching $300,000, which was far more than my then-pending 2000 tax liability and sufficient to provide for my 2001 tax liability (which was not due until April 2002), and also freed assets for payment of 2002 taxes.

Schroer Decl. [Doc. 94] at ¶ ¶4-6.

In addition, Mr. Schroer relies on the downturn in his salary to support his claim of reasonable cause. In 1996 he joined the law firm of Fitch, Even, Tabin & Flannery ("FET&F"), with an assurance of an "initial partnership income of $300,000, which could also be expected to increase on an ongoing basis." Id. at ¶15. Rather than increasing, as Mr. Schroer expected, his income decreased, as follows:


Year Income

1996 $300,000

1997 256,858

1998 222,823

1999 166,933



Schroer Decl. [Doc 94] at ¶17. 3

In July 1997 and January 2000, Mr. Schroer's sons were born, "adding personal stress as well as financial burden." Id. at ¶21. Associated with that, Mr. Schroer's wife suffered "significant post partum issues following the birth of our second son... ." Id. Again according to Mr. Schroer, however:
[T]he health problems of taxpayer's wife have never been argued as a separate basis for abatement or refund of penalties, but rather as part of the entirety of the facts and circumstances which must be considered in this case as relevant to the plaintiff's state of mind ... .

Id.

Mr. Schroer also claims that reasonable cause exists for his failure to file tax returns because the records necessary to prepare the returns were not available:
The need to re-market the Illinois house and "stage" it required moving and shuffling of furniture, furnishings and other materials including records which had to be boxed and prepared for moving. Because records were unavailable, I filed a request for extension of time to file my 2000 tax return until August 15, 2001, and also obtained an additional extension until October 15, 2001. However, the records (both records for 2000 and partial year 2001) remained in boxes in Illinois until sometime in October 2001. At that time, out of desperation, my wife and I finally decided that the circumstance in Colorado was beginning to significantly damage our family's quality of life, and we arranged for moving of the contents of our Illinois house to Colorado. When the moving van arrived, because the Colorado house was much smaller than the Illinois house, the garage was literally stacked with furniture and boxes from floor to ceiling, and the financial records were not reasonably accessible or organized. For practical purposes, the records needed to prepare my 2000 tax return remained unavailable until the summer of 2002. In any event, filing of a return appeared a futile, useless exercise to me, since until the closing of the Illinois house in June 2002, I simply had no ability to pay the accrued taxes. I was financially paralyzed and in a state of shock.

Id. at ¶34.

Mr. Schroer's difficulties, separately and taken together, do not constitute reasonable cause to excuse his failure to timely file his federal tax returns and timely pay his federal taxes.

The cases have made clear that "[a] taxpayer exercises ordinary business care and prudence if he makes reasonable efforts to conserve sufficient assets in marketable form to satisfy his tax liability and nevertheless was unable to pay all or a portion of the tax when it became due." Carlson, 126 F.3d at 921. Mr. Schroer claims that he made such a reasonable effort by entering into the contract for the sale of his Chicago home, which was unexpectedly breached by the purchasers through no fault of Mr. Schroer. A similar argument was made and rejected in In re Hopkins, 1991 WL 289179 (Bkrtcy. Colo. October 22, 1991). In Hopkins, the taxpayers asserted reasonable cause existed under 26 U.S.C. § 6651 for their failure to pay taxes because their cartage business failed when its sole contract (and the taxpayers' sole source of income) was terminated upon 30 days notice. Hopkins, 1991 WL 289179 at *1. The taxpayers attempted to obtain another contract to replace the one terminated, but were unsuccessful. Id. The court held that these facts did not constitute reasonable cause to justify the late payment of taxes, stating:
The cause of the inability of the Plaintiffs to pay their estimated taxes lies not with the cancellation of their cartage contract. Rather it lies in their neglect to set aside sufficient funds, as those funds were being earned, to pay their estimated taxes when due.

Id. at *2 (original emphasis).

Similarly in this case, Mr. Schroer's inability to pay his taxes when due was not the result of the failure of the contract for the sale of his Chicago home. It was the result of his failure to conserve sufficient assets in marketable form to satisfy his tax liability, by setting aside earnings as they came in or otherwise. The Schroers' tax liability in 2000 was approximately $192,994. Exh. A-14 [Doc. # 73-18]. For that year, Mr. Schroer's cash compensation was $332,000. Exh. A-11 Part II [Doc. # 73-15] at pp.9 and 13 of 113. The Schroers' tax liability in 2001 was $143,157. Exh. A-16 [Doc. # 73-20]. For that year, Mr. Schroer's cash compensation exceeded $225,000. Exh. A-11 Part II [Doc. #73-15] at p. 19-28 of 113. The Schroers' tax liability in 2002 was $105,997. Exh. A-18 [Doc. # 73-22]. For that year, Mr. Schroer's cash compensation was $309,000. Exh. A-11 Part II [Doc. #73-15] at pp.31-37 of 113. It is clear that Mr. Schroer received enough compensation in each of the three tax years in question to pay the taxes when due, had he made reasonable efforts to conserve sufficient assets in a marketable form. He did not.

The Supreme Court held in the Boyle case that "Congress obviously intended to make absence of fault a prerequisite to avoidance of the late-filing penalty. A taxpayer seeking a refund must therefore prove that his failure to file on time was the result neither of carelessness, reckless indifference, nor intentional failure." 469 U.S. at 247. Mr. Schroer certainly is not without fault in connection with his failure to pay his federal taxes on time. To the contrary, Mr. Schroer's difficulties in meeting his tax obligations was the result of his conscious and intentional financial planning. Mr. Schroer explained that planning in his Declaration, as follows:
63. I began paying estimated taxes in about 1983, when I first became a partner in my then-law firm, Faegre & Benson in Minneapolis... . Upon becoming a partner, my periodic (monthly) income did not increase, but payroll deductions for withholding taxes were no longer taken. Generally in the 1980's, I was given advances during a calendar year approximately 60% of my total income from the prior year. The balance would then be paid in a lump sum after year-end. This arrangement meant that in-year cash flow was substantially smaller than year-end income was expected to be. Thus, paying quarterly estimated taxes would substantially disrupt and reduce in-year cash flow out of proportion to the expected total income, the bulk of which was not expected actually to be received until January of the next year.

64. One means of raising funds in-year to make estimated tax payments was by borrowing. However, interest rates at that time for lines of credit for such purposes were expensive, commonly 8-10% or substantially more in some periods as I recall.

65. In the mid-1980's, I had discussions with a number of people, including colleagues and other professionals about a prudent way to deal with payment of estimated taxes. Among the people whom I remember discussing this subject with in the mid-1980's was Mitch Goldstein, then a prominent tax partner at Faegre & Benson in Minneapolis, and Nate Bergeland, then a certified financial planner also in the Minneapolis area. I came to understand that many professionals considered it financially prudent not to make estimated quarterly tax payments during the year, but rather to make larger, lump sum payments at year-end to cover yearly taxes. It was considered prudent to do so because the penalties under the tax code for underestimating quarterly payments were relatively low, and that a taxpayer could properly come out better financially by leaving in-year income (if any excess was available) in common investments which yielded returns greater than the tax penalty rates for underestimating taxes during the year. Although I do not have a specific memory of my practice in this regard during the 1980's ... my best recollection is that I made quarterly tax payments when my in-year finances permitted, but often made a lump-sum tax payment at year end larger than quarterly estimates to cover the entire year's tax liability.

66. ... During tax years 2000-2002, I reported and paid total taxes of $193,600, $130,993, and $102,569, respectively. During the same three years, I reported and paid penalties for underestimating taxes in the amount of $4,429, $3,332, and $3,428, respectively. The penalties average 2.6% of total taxes, which was a far lower percentage than I would have paid had I borrowed money to pay all quarterly payments in-year, and also less than the rate of return that I was earning on my retirement savings. For example, [during 1991-1998] [m]y investments were concentrated in the "Growth Balanced Fund," which reported annual yields as high as 29.1% (1991) and a five-year average return of 15.77%. Thus, from a financial perspective, a reasonable jury should conclude that it was more prudent to pay the relatively low underestimate penalty established by congress [sic] than to borrow money at a higher rate of interest, or to reduce investments yielding much higher returns to make estimated payments as a rigid practice.

Schroer Decl. at ¶ ¶63-66.

Mr. Schroer made the conscious decision to put his personal financial interests ahead of his obligation to pay his federal income taxes. He could have borrowed money to pay his taxes when due, pending final distribution of his earned income. Or he could have saved money from current earnings or from a previous year so as to have a reserve to pay his taxes as they came due. He chose instead generally not to pay estimated taxes when due, and to face a large yearend tax bill, including estimated tax penalties, so as not to "disrupt and reduce in-year cash flow" and to use his money to invest in retirement accounts that earned high rates of return. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that Mr. Schroer was without fault when in 2000, 2001, and 2002, his financial plan failed to work. Mr. Schroer's conduct runs directly afoul of the Supreme Court's admonition:
Deadlines are inherently arbitrary; fixed dates, however, are often essential to accomplish necessary results. The Government has millions of taxpayers to monitor, and our system of selfassessment in the initial calculation of a tax simply cannot work on any basis other than one of strict filing standards. Any less rigid standard would risk encouraging a lax attitude toward filing dates. Prompt payment of taxes is imperative to the Government, which should not have to assume the burden of unnecessary ad hoc determinations.

Boyle, 469 U.S. at 249.

Throughout the time period 2000 through 2002, while the Schroers failed to timely file tax returns and timely pay taxes, the family continued to live a privileged lifestyle. They purchased a home in Boulder for $655,000, Exh. A-22 [Doc. # 73-26]; purchased new furniture, Exh. A-24 Part II [Doc. #73-30] at pp.21-23 of 54; purchased a new Ford Explorer, Exh. A-10 Part II [Doc. # 73-13] at pp.29-30 of 96; purchased a 160 acre hunting property in North Dakota, Exh. A-10 Part I [Doc. # 73-12] at pp.79-81 of 98; and enrolled the children in a private school. Exh. A-24 Part II [Doc. #73-30] at pp.33-34 of 54.

Under similar facts, the court in Carlson v. United States, 126 F.3d 915, 922 (7th Cir. 1997), held that the taxpayers had failed to show reasonable cause for their late payment of taxes, stating:
The Carlsons provided no evidence that they exercised ordinary care and prudence in regard to their 1990, 1991, and 1992 income taxes. They presented no evidence that they attempted to conserve assets to meet their tax obligations. Paying taxes is one of only two sure things in life, yet the Carlsons allowed their tax liabilities to build over 3 years without taking significant steps to reduce or meet those liabilities. For instance, the Carlsons did not set aside funds out of Mr. Carlson's draw from his firm, make periodic payments when they could, seek financing during those years, or sell their Indiana property, which would have satisfied a large chunk of the IRS' bill.

A premise of the federal income tax is to tax income already earned. Unless other sources are available, such as savings or liquid investments, a taxpayer may be required to apply his earnings in one year to that year's taxes. In any event, reliance on a speculative financial transaction like the sale of real property at a given price and time, when that transaction ultimately fails, does not constitute reasonable cause for the failure to pay taxes when due. That is the lesson of Jacobs, 490 F.3d at 927 (holding that no reasonable cause existed for the failure timely to pay taxes where the taxpayer used income for substantial personal expenditures and to pay other debts, but not to pay his taxes); Fran Corp., 164 F.3d at 819-20 (holding that no reasonable cause existed for the late payment of taxes where the taxpayer continued to pay rent to its president notwithstanding a sizeable debt owed by the president to the taxpayer which could have been used to offset the rent; leased and repaired a luxury automobile not essential to the taxpayer's business; paid "lavish and extravagant" entertainment expenses; and paid other creditors not essential to the taxpayer's business while failing to pay its taxes); and Hopkins, 1991 WL 289179 at *2 (finding no reasonable cause to excuse late payment of taxes where taxpayers failed to set aside funds as they were being earned to pay their taxes).

The birth of Mr. Schroer's sons in 1997 and 2000, and his wife's post partum problems after the birth of their second son, do nothing to advance his claim of reasonable cause for failing to timely file returns and pay taxes. Many taxpayers have children, often more than two, and that cannot be the basis for excusing late filing and payment. Although mental and emotional hardship caused by the serious illness of a family member may result in a finding of reasonable cause, the illness of Mrs. Schroer certainly does not meet that standard. In the Carlson case, for example, the court held that the financial and mental strain caused by the taxpayers' son's manic depressive schizophrenia did not create reasonable cause, reasoning:
[T]he type of illness or debilitation that might create reasonable cause is one that because of severity or timing makes it virtually impossible for the taxpayer to comply --things like emergency hospitalization or other incapacity occurring around tax time.

Carlson, 126 F.3d at 923. Mr. Schroer makes no such argument or showing here.

Nor has Mr. Schroer made a sufficient showing that the records necessary to prepare the tax returns on time were not available. The records were in boxes, sometimes in Chicago, sometimes in a garage in Boulder "stacked with furniture and boxes from floor to ceiling, and ... not reasonably accessible or organized." Schroer Decl. [Doc. # 94] at ¶34. There is no evidence that anyone other than Mr. Schroer packed the boxes, however, or that Mr. Schroer lacked the ability to control how the boxes were packed and organized. Mr. Schroer admits that he had control over the boxes and the ability to order them transported from Chicago to Boulder when necessary to prevent further damage to the "family's quality of life." Id. The fact that the boxes were voluntarily maintained in Chicago, and that they were later stored in a crowded garage in Boulder, is insufficient to show that the records were unavailable to constitute reasonable cause under 26 U.S.C. § 6651(a)(1).

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that reasonable cause to excuse a late filing did not exist under conditions substantially more extreme than those presented here by Mr. Schroer. In Craddock, 149 F.3d at 1252-53, the taxpayer argued that he could not timely file his returns because (1) his business had experienced exponential growth and increased complexity; (2) he had purchased a new accounting system that failed to perform as quickly and effectively as represented; (3) his accounting department had experienced a high rate of personnel turnover; (4) extensive audits of prior years' tax returns had diverted the efforts of his accounting department; and (5) the company had converted its accounting procedures from the accrual to the cash basis. The circuit court reversed the lower court's determination that these facts created reasonable cause for the late filing of tax returns, holding:
Mr. Craddock failed to exercise "ordinary business care and prudence" in ensuring his returns were timely filed and failed to show that he was "unable" to file the returns on time. Mr. Craddock's reasons for his failure to timely file, such as his records or information could not be assimilated fast enough, his accounting staff was overworked, and his computer system was inefficient, are not reasonable cause. A taxpayer is expected in the exercise of ordinary business care and prudence ... not [to] take on such a load that he could not fulfill his own legal obligations within the required time. In addition, the unavailability of business records, unless such records are destroyed, is generally not a reasonable cause for failure to file a tax return. The complexity of one's affairs also does not give [rise] to reasonable cause. Nor does the preoccupation with audits constitute reasonable cause.

Id. at 1255 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Even under these extreme circumstances, the circuit court ruled that "[b]y allowing Mr. Craddock's situation to constitute 'reasonable cause,' we would open a Pandora's Box of excuses which would effectively erode tax return filing deadlines." Id. at 1257 n.11.

Mr. Schroer makes special arguments with respect to the penalties charged in connection with his 2002 taxes. First, Mr. Schroer argues:
39. Following the closing of the sale of my Illinois home, I promptly made a payment to the IRS in the amount of $125,000 in August 2002... . Subsequently, in early December 2002, I made an additional payment of $17,000. Both of these payments in 2002 were applied by the IRS to my 2000 liability. The IRS gave me no advice that the payments might be applied any other way.

40. I did not then know that my payments in 2002 could have been designated as payments from my 2002 taxes (rather than overdue 2000 and 2001 taxes). I therefore did not know that, if my payments in 2002 were so applied, there would be no subsequent penalties assessed for 2002 for late payment ($8,744 plus interest), underestimate of taxes ($3,427 plus interest) or late filing ($13,847 plus interest). The IRS did not so advise me.

41. I now understand that there was no reason for me to allocate my payments aggregating $142,000 in 2002 to my 2000 taxes, rather than my 2002 taxes, and there were compelling reasons not to. Specifically, as the government's own calculations show, the penalties for year 2000 reached their maximum of 22.5% (for late filing), five months after the nominal filing date... . Thus, my late filing penalties for 2000 had reached their maximum amount, and it did not matter if I paid them sooner of later, and there was no reason to allocate any of my 2002 payments for that purpose.

42. The IRS could assess and collect penalties for 2002 totaling $26,018.86 for tax year 2002, only because it had first applied my August and December 2002 payments in that year to my year 2000 tax accounts.

Schroer Decl. [Doc. # 94] at ¶ ¶39-42.

The uncontroverted evidence establishes that the $125,000 payment made by Mr. Schroer was enclosed with his tax return for tax year 2000 and was accompanied by a letter which stated:
Filed herewith is my year 2000 form 1040, with schedules and attachments. Also enclosed is my check in the amount of $125,000, which is all I am presently able to pay.

Exh. A-14 [Doc. # 73-18]. "Delivery of a check with a tax return is generally sufficient to designate the payment toward the liability for the period of the return." Baimbridge v. United States, 335 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1095 (S.D. Calif. 2004). In any event, the letter makes clear that Mr. Schroer intended the $125,000 payment to be applied to the tax year 2000 liability, and under those circumstances, "when a taxpayer designates a particular liability to which a voluntary payment should be applied, the IRS must apply the payment to the specified liability." Id. With respect to the $17,000 payment, Mr. Schroer made no indication as to the tax year's liability against which it should be applied. "It is well established that in the absence of a direction by the taxpayer the IRS can apply a payment to any outstanding liability of the taxpayer." Wood v. United States, 808 F.2d 411, 416 (5th Cir. 1987)(internal citations omitted); Baimbridge, 335 F. Supp. 2d at 1095 (stating that "[t]he IRS may allocate an undesignated voluntary payment to whatever liability is in the government's best interest").

Mr. Schroer also argues that in late 2002 he engaged the services of tax advisors at JK Harris & Co. Schroer Decl. [Doc. # 94] at ¶44. Mr. Schroer claims that he directed his tax advisors to obtain an extension of the filing deadline for his 2002 tax return, id. at ¶48, although he does not indicate the length of the extension he expected. Other materials contained in the notes maintained by JK Harris indicate that Mr. Schroer did not expect an extension including, for example, his inquiry that "[y]our [JK Harris'] e-mail does not confirm the filing of my 02 Fed/state tax returns when due on Aug. 15. Please confirm same and send me copies." Id. at ¶51. Regardless, Mr. Schroer cannot pass the blame to JK Harris for failing to obtain an extension, and thereby escape the imposition of late filing penalties. As the Supreme Court stated in Boyle:
Congress has charged the [taxpayer] with an unambiguous, precisely defined duty to file the return within [a specified time]; extensions are granted fairly routinely. That the [tax advisor], as the [taxpayer's] agent, was expected to attend to the matter does not relieve the principal of his duty to comply with the statute.

* * *

[O]ne does not have to be a tax expert to know that tax returns have fixed filing dates and that taxes must be paid when they are due. In short, tax returns imply deadlines.

* * *

It requires no special training or effort to ascertain a deadline and make sure that it is met. The failure to make a timely filing of a tax return is not excused by the taxpayer's reliance on an agent, and such reliance is not "reasonable cause" for a late filing under § 6651(a)(1).

469 U.S. at 252.

Similarly, in Twin City Construction Co. of Fargo v. United States, 515 F. Supp 767 (D. N.D. 1981), a taxpayer sought to establish reasonable cause for the late filing of his return based on his tax advisor's failure to obtain an extension. The court rejected the argument, reasoning:
Plaintiff [taxpayer] argues that the cases dealing with late filing of returns are distinguishable from the instant case where an application for an extension of time is untimely filed... . Plaintiff contends that as opposed to a tax return which must be personally signed by the taxpayer, an application for an extension of time to file can be signed by a certified public accountant. Plaintiff's argument is misplaced. First, the IRS imposed the penalty, not for an untimely filing of the application for extension, but rather for the late filing of the return and delinquent payment of the tax. The latter duty is clearly nondelegable where the taxpayer knows of his filing obligation and of the due date. Furthermore, an application for extension is not complete until the taxpayer submits payment for one-half of its estimated tax liability. Finally, if it does not constitute reasonable cause for a taxpayer to rely on his accountant to timely file his income tax return when the taxpayer knows he is legally required to file a return and knows when it must be filed, it would be anomalous to say that it constitutes reasonable cause for the same taxpayer to rely on his accountant to file an application for an extension.

Id. at 770.

Finally, Mr. Schroer argues that JK Harris obtained an oral extension of the filing deadline from Revenue Officer Steven C. Peterson. According to Mr. Schroer:
57. Finally, on October 6, 2003, JKH representative Bauman had a conversation with Revenue Officer Peterson. Peterson "asked when the 2002 return will be filed." Asking RO Peterson to hold, Bauman agreed to call (while Peterson was waiting) the JKH tax preparer, Sonja Cromwell, to get an answer to that question, and "RO [Peterson] agreed." After speaking to Cromwell, Bauman told Peterson that "we could get the completed returns to him by Next Friday." And the IRS expressly so agreed: "RO [Revenue Officer Peterson] stated he will give us until Monday, October 20, 2003 to have the return in his office." ... Thus, Mr. Peterson, the IRS' agent, granted the extension until October 20, 2003.

Schroer Decl. [Doc. # 94] at ¶57.

The portion of the Client Notes quoted by Mr. Schroer in support of this argument is taken out of context. To the contrary, the Client Notes, when read in context, make it clear that Revenue Officer Peterson agreed only to delay collection and enforcement actions against Mr. Schroer, and not to extend filing deadlines. Specifically, Mr. Bauman recorded his understanding of the agreement with Revenue Officer Peterson and reported it to Mr. Schroer in an e-mail, which states:
I spoke with the IRS RO Mr. Peterson today. He is willing to hold off on levy action to allow time to:

1. Straighten out the confusion over the Lien Subordination/Refinance of your home. The RO wants a copy of the Request with all attachments.

2. Provide him with an address for your Benson Keough so he can levy it for $100,000. The RO said he will not levy the other accounts so they can be used to pay your Federal & State taxes on the withdrawn funds.

3. File your ORIGINAL 2002 Form 1040 with him for processing.

* * *

All of the above MUST be in the RO's office by 10/20/03 or the RO said he will send out levies (plural). If there is a problem, I am to call the RO back to inform him.

Schroer Decl. at Exh. 8 [Doc. # 94-9], p. 11 of 13 (emphasis added). Mr. Bauman's e-mail to Mr. Schroer is consistent with Revenue Officer Peterson's recollection of the agreement. See Declaration of Steven C. Peterson [Doc. # 98, filed 9/8/2008] at ¶ ¶7-8.

Nothing done by Revenue Officer Peterson establishes reasonable cause for the late filing of the Schroers' 2002 tax return.

The undisputed facts establish that the Schroers failed to exercise ordinary business care and prudence in their financial affairs to justify their failures to timely file tax returns and to timely pay taxes for years 2000, 2001, and 2002. Consequently, Mr. Schroer's claim for a refund of the penalties and interest assessed and paid is barred, and the United States is entitled to the entry of summary judgment in its favor as a matter of law.


V.


I respectfully RECOMMEND that the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED.

FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), the parties have 10 days after service of this recommendation to serve and file specific, written objections. A party's failure to serve and file specific, written objections waives de novo review of the recommendation by the district judge, Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 147-48 (1985), and also waives appellate review of both factual and legal questions. Makin v. Colorado Dept. of Corrections, 183 F.3d 1205, 1210 (10th Cir. 1999); Talley v. Hesse, 91 F.3d 1411, 1412-13 (10th Cir. 1996). A party's objections to this recommendation must be both timely and specific to preserve an issue for de novo review by the district court or for appellate review. United States v. One Parcel of Real Property, 73 F.3d 1057, 1060 (10th Cir. 1996).

1 The unrefuted tax records submitted by the United States in support of its motion for summary judgment establish that penalties in the following amounts were assessed against and paid by the Schroers: (1) with respect to tax year 2000, the IRS assessed a failure-to-timely-file penalty of $38,835, and failure-to-timely-pay penalties totaling $18,904.00; (2) with respect to tax year 2001, the IRS assessed a failure-to-timely-file penalty of $28,355.86, and failure-totimely-pay penalties of $21,814.39; and (3) with respect to tax year 2002, the IRS assessed a failure-to-timely-file penalty of $13,846.81, failure-to-timely-pay penalties totaling $8,744.05, and an estimated tax penalty of $3,428.00. See Exh. A-34 [Doc. #73-40] (concerning tax year 2000); Exh. A-35 [Doc. # 73-41] (concerning tax year 2001); and Exh. A-36 [Doc. # 73-42] (concerning tax year 2002).

2 Page references are to the page numbers attached to a document by the court's CM/ECF system.

3 Mr. Schroer's income significantly increased beginning in 2000, when he earned $413,662. In 2001, his income dipped to $263,967; and in 2002, his income rose again to $403,645. Exh A-11 Part II [Doc. # 73-15] at pp.10, 26, and 34 of 113.

Labels:

Wednesday, April 8, 2009

The Fields case below is a tax lien/nominee case. I do not question this decision. It is a “heads up” on nominee issues. In other cases, the IRS is aggressive in finding “nominees” even when the transfer took place well before the IRS tax lien. It is important to be aware of this issue. If there is a tax lien on your home, consider alternatives to resolve the tax lien such as an Offer in Compromise or an Installment Agreement. The IRS does forclose on homes

United States of America, Plaintiff v. Henry Fields, et al., Defendants.

U.S. District Court, So. Dist. Miss., Jackson Div.; Civ. 3:06CV697 DPJ-JCS, March 9, 2009.

--
ORDER


JORDAN III, United States District Judge: This cause is before the Court on motion of Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff Regions Bank ("Regions" or "the bank") for summary judgment [55]. Plaintiff, the United States of America, has responded in opposition to Regions' motion and has filed its own motion for summary judgment [65]. Having fully considered the parties' submissions and the applicable authorities, the Court finds that Regions' motion should be denied and the United States' motion should be granted.



I. Facts/Procedural History

This dispute arises from the failure of Defendants Henry and Cynthia Fields to fully pay their federal taxes from 1994 through 2004. By 2004, the IRS had assessed and recorded federal income tax liabilities against Henry and Cynthia Fields in excess of $461,000 and federal employment and unemployment tax liabilities against Henry Fields in excess of $691,000.

In addition to seeking judgment as to the tax debt, the United States also seeks to foreclose its federal tax liens on an approximately two-acre parcel of real property located in Hinds County, Mississippi, on which Henry Fields built a house. Although Fields built the house for his family's residence, he was a co-tenant with an undivided one-sixth (1/6) interest in the land. His five siblings owned the remaining five-sixths (5/6) interest.

In July 2004, approximately four years after completing construction on his home, Henry Fields attempted to obtain a loan from Union Planters Bank (a predecessor to Defendant Regions). There is no dispute in the record that Henry Fields mentioned the home to a bank officer as potential collateral, but the bank informed him that the tax liens would preclude the loan. Henry Fields claims, without contradiction, that Union Planters then told him that if he transferred the property to someone else, the bank could make the loan to the new owner using the same property as collateral. Within a week, Fields did just that.

On July 20, 2004, Henry Fields and his five siblings executed a quitclaim deed transferring ownership to Fields' teenage son Eric. Ten days later, on July 30, 2004, the teenager mortgaged the property to Union Planters under a deed of trust to secure a $100,000 line of credit, which Eric quickly exhausted by paying his father's employees, purchasing work-related trucks and paying the family's bills. Eric Fields thereafter defaulted on the loan, prompting collection efforts by the bank.

The United States sued Henry, Cynthia and Eric Fields, the five siblings, Regions (as the successor to Union Planters Bank), and other individuals who are not relevant to the pending motions. After answering the Complaint, Regions moved for summary judgment claiming that it has a priority interest as to five-sixth (5/6) of the two-acres it took as collateral for Eric Fields' line of credit. The United States responded and filed its own motion for summary judgment asking the Court to 1) enter judgment against Henry and Cynthia Fields for the outstanding tax liabilities and 2) enter an order that the two-acre parcel of property be sold with the entire proceeds applied to the outstanding tax liens. 1



II. Analysis



A. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is warranted under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when evidence reveals no genuine dispute regarding any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. "The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of 'informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.'" Washburn v. Harvey, 504 F.3d 505, 508 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)); see also Custer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 503 F.3d 415, 422 (5th Cir. 2007) (noting that the moving party bears the "burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue of material fact"). "The non-moving party must then come forward with specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial." Washburn, 504 F.3d at 508.

There are currently two motions for summary judgment pending in this action; one filed by Plaintiff, and one filed by Regions. While Regions and Plaintiff have responded to each others' motions, the remaining Defendants, including Henry, Cynthia, and Eric Fields, have not. Thus, a number of the issues raised in the motions are unopposed. 2

The lack of response will not alone justify granting the pending motions. See Uniform Local Rule 7.2(C)(2) (establishing that summary judgment motions may not be granted as unopposed). As explained by the Fifth Circuit, district courts must first consider the record.
[I]f the moving party fails to establish by its summary judgment evidence that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment must be denied --even if the non-movant has not responded to the motion. But where the movant's summary judgment evidence does establish its right to judgment as a matter of law, the district court is entitled to grant summary judgment, absent unusual circumstances.

McDaniel v. Sw. Bell Tel., 979 F.2d 1534, 1992 WL 352617, at *1 (5th Cir. 1992) (unpublished table decision) (citations omitted) (affirming summary judgment where counsel failed to file timely response).

In other words, the Court cannot grant a summary judgment motion for the mere lack of response, but if the record establishes that the movant met its burden under Rule 56(c), then the absence of responsive affidavits or other record evidence creating a genuine issue for trial will justify an order granting the motion. Id.; see also Sanders v. Bell Helicopter Textron Inc., 199 F. App'x 309, 310 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding that record supported summary judgment where nonmovant failed to respond); Stewart v. City of Bryan Public Works, 121 F. App'x 40, 42 (5th Cir. 2005) (same); Ahart v. Vickery, 117 F. App'x 344, 344 (5th Cir. 2004) (same).



B. Substantive Issues



1. Judgment as to Tax Liens

The United States has presented properly authenticated Certificates of Assessments, Payments and other Specified Matters as to the claimed debt. These government forms constitute admissible evidence, and it is well settled that federal tax assessments are presumptively valid. See, e.g., Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). Accordingly, the Government met its burden under Rule 56(c). The Fields did not respond to the motion and informed the Court during the motion hearing that they have no records of the alleged debt. As such, there is nothing in the record to controvert the assessments or to suggest that the United States failed to follow the statutory procedures necessary to establish a tax lien on the property. See McCarty v. United States, 929 F.2d 1085, 1089 (5th Cir. 1991). The United States is entitled to reduce the assessments to judgment. Id.



2. Sale of the Two-Acre Parcel

Plaintiff's motion also seeks the sale of the disputed two-acre parcel. None of the property owners responded to the motion or offered any argument during the motion hearing. For its part, Regions agrees that the property should be sold, but claims that its lien on the property is superior to the federal tax lien. Regions first claims that it was a bona fide purchaser for value and alternatively asserts that five-sixths (5/6) of the interest Eric Fields obtained through the quitclaim deed was unencumbered by the tax lien against his father. According to Regions, it is therefore entitled to five-sixths (5/6) of the proceeds from the sale of the property. Neither argument prevails.

Under Mississippi law, an "innocent purchaser must prove (1) valuable consideration; (2) the presence of good faith; and (3) the absence of notice of the adverse interest." Wicker v. Harvey, 937 So. 2d 983, 992 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006). That a purchaser is a bona fide purchaser for value constitutes "an affirmative defense and must be sustained by competent proof." Memphis Hardwood Flooring Co. v. Daniel, 771 So. 2d 924, 933 (Miss. 2000). In this case, Regions (through its predecessor Union Planters Bank) paid valuable consideration when it extended the line of credit. Regions fails, however, to otherwise establish this affirmative defense.

First, there is a distinct absence of good faith. The Mississippi Court of Appeals has explained that its analysis of good faith is "guided by the definition of good faith, defined in part as 'absence of intent to defraud or to seek unconscionable advantage.'" In re Estate of Wheeler, 958 So. 2d 1266, 1273 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 701 (7th ed. 2000)). In this case, the parties agree that Union Planters refused to accept the property as collateral for a loan to Henry Fields due to the Government's pre-existing tax liens. However, bank officers informed Fields that he could circumvent the problem by simply transferring the property to someone else who would then use the collateral to obtain the loan (presumably as Fields' proxy). Specifically, Henry Fields testified that the bank recommended the transfer "because that was the only way they were going to be able to close the loan." Henry Fields Depo. at 50-51. After Eric obtained title to the property, the bank issued the teenager a $100,000 line of credit that was largely used for the same purposes as the loan his father requested.

On its face, the transaction lacks good faith and demonstrates an attempt to gain an unconscionable advantage over the Government's pre-existing liens. Other facts further prove the point. For example, the deposition testimony suggests that the bank officer believed Henry Fields owned the property when the transfer scheme was recommended. There is no record evidence suggesting that the loan officer thought, at that time, that five-sixths (5/6) of the property might not be subject to the tax lien. If the bank would not accept the collateral when it believed Fields was the owner, then how could it in good faith state that it would accept the same collateral if transferred to a third party who would obtain the loan on Fields' behalf? This and other evidence demonstrates an attempt to subvert the Government's tax lien.

Regions also fails to establish an absence of notice. Under Mississippi law,
when, in respect to a matter in which he has a material interest, a person has knowledge of such facts as to excite the attention of a reasonably prudent man and to put him upon guard and thus to incite him to inquiry, he is chargeable with notice, equivalent in law to knowledge, of all those further relevant facts which such inquiry, if pursued with reasonable diligence, would have disclosed.

Wicker, 937 So. 2d at 993 (citations omitted) (holding that purchaser who was told of potential boundary dispute was on notice and was not a bona fide purchaser for value). In this case, Regions knew the property was subject to tax liens when it recommended the transfer of title. Regions has the burden of establishing this affirmative defense, and the record before the Court fails as a matter of law. 3

Regions' second argument is that five-sixths (5/6) of the interest Eric obtained in the property was not subject to the federal tax liens because the land was transferred by the non-liable siblings. This too fails. As an initial point, Regions is probably correct that prior to July 20, 2004, Henry Fields merely held an undivided interest in the two acres with his five siblings. However, the point is of limited relevance because all of the owners executed a quitclaim deed in favor of Eric Fields on July 20, 2004. As of that date, Eric Fields was the only person with legal title to the two acres and the home. Ten days later, on July 30, 2004, Eric signed the deed of trust with the bank. As explained below, the Government's tax liens attached to 100% of the two acres ten days before the bank acquired its interest, because Eric Fields obtained the property as his father's nominee on July 20, 2004. The United States therefore obtained a priority interest. See Read v. U.S. ex rel. Dept. of Treasury, 169 F.3d 243, 252 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting the "general rule" that "competition for priority between tax liens and other encumbrances is determined on the basis of first in time, first in right").

The analysis appropriately begins with the statutory basis for the Government's liens. Title 26 U.S.C. § 6321 provides:
If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same after demand, the amount (including any interest, additional amount, addition to tax, or assessable penalty, together with any costs that may accrue in addition thereto) shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such person.

26 U.S.C. § 6321. As noted by the United States Supreme Court, "[s]tronger language could hardly have been selected to reveal a purpose to assure the collection of taxes." Glass City Bank v. United States, 326 U.S. 265, 267 (1945). Significantly, "Congress meant to reach every interest in property that a taxpayer might have, " United States v. National Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713, 719 (1985), and that includes "not only [] property owned by the debtor at the time the lien attaches, but also to after-acquired property until the tax liability is satisfied." In re Orr, 180 F.3d 656, 660 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Glass City Bank, 326 U.S. at 267-69). Accordingly, if Henry Fields acquired full interest in the property after the liens attached, then the liens would expand to encompass the property as a whole pursuant to § 6321.

"Property," as defined by the statute, includes "not only the property and rights to property owned by the delinquent taxpayer, but also property held by a third party if it is determined that the third party is holding the property as a nominee ... of the delinquent taxpayer." Spotts v. United States, 429 F.3d 248, 251 (6th Cir. 2005). Under the nominee theory, the IRS can seize property to which a third person has legal title if the taxpayer actually has "beneficial ownership of the property." Oxford Capital Corp. v. United States, 211 F.3d 280, 284 (5th Cir. 2000).

Whether property is held by a taxpayer's nominee is determined by reference to state law, but when the law of the forum state does not set forth a test for determining whether an entity is the nominee of another, the court is "guided by the common-law factors generally applied by federal courts to determine the existence of a nominee relationship." May v. United States, No. 07-10531, 2007 WL 3287513, at *2 (11th Cir. Nov. 8, 2007) (citing Battle v. United States, No. 9:06cv109, 2007 WL 1424553, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 7, 2007) (same); Cody v. United States, 348 F. Supp. 2d 682, 694 (E.D. Va. 2004) (same)).

Here, none of the parties have directed the Court to any Mississippi law which would provide guidance as to the standards for determining nominee ownership. Accordingly, the Court turns to federal precedent and notes that the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized the following factors as applied by other federal courts:
(a) No consideration or inadequate consideration paid by the nominee; (b) Property placed in the name of the nominee in anticipation of a suit or occurrence of liabilities while the transferor continues to exercise control over the property; (c) Close relationship between transferor and the nominee; (d) Failure to record conveyance; (e) Retention of possession by the transferor; and (f) Continued enjoyment by the transferor of benefits of the transferred property.

Oxford Capital Corp., 211 F.3d at 284 n.1 (citing Towe Antique Ford Found. v. Internal Revenue Servs., 791 F. Supp. 1450, 1454 (D. Mont. 1992), aff'd without opinion, 999 F.2d 1387 (9th Cir. 1993)). The Court will examine each factor in the order they are listed.

First, although the quitclaim deed states that Eric Fields paid ten dollars for the land and the home his father spent five years building, there is no dispute that the teenager paid nothing. Second, it is apparent from the record that Henry Fields, at the suggestion of Union Planters, arranged to have the quitclaim deed executed in his son's favor to avoid the consequences of the tax liens and enable the bank to close the loan. Third, the relationships between the transferors and the transferee were obviously close. Fourth, the deed was recorded. Fifth, Henry Fields retained the same level of possession he enjoyed before the transfer. There is no dispute that the living arrangements within the home stayed the same after title was transferred to Eric Fields. The family members stayed in the same rooms, no rent was paid to the new owner, and bills were sent to the same addressees and paid by the family in the same manner as before the transfer. In other words, nothing changed. Finally, the record evidence is undisputed that Henry Fields continued enjoyment of the benefits of the property after the transfer. Accordingly, the Court finds as a matter of law that these factors demonstrate a nominee relationship between Eric and Henry Fields as of the July 20, 2004 transfer.

Regions contended at the motion hearing that nominee status cannot exist because Henry Fields never held title to his siblings' interests in the property and could not, therefore, have transferred those interests to his son. This same argument was rejected by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Holman v. United States, where a delinquent taxpayer's wife transferred full title to the couple's home to herself and a third party. 505 F.3d 1060 (10th Cir. 2007). The district court ruled that because the taxpayer had never transferred legal title to the property, the transferee could not be considered the taxpayer's nominee. The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the lack of transfer from the delinquent taxpayer to the third party was not sufficient to defeat enforcement of the nominee lien. Id. at 1066. In doing so, the court noted:
Although in many instances the delinquent taxpayer will have transferred legal title to a third party, an actual transfer of legal title is not essential to the imposition of a nominee lien. A delinquent taxpayer who has never held legal title to a piece of property but who transfers money to a third party and directs the third party to purchase property and place legal title in the third party's name may well enjoy the same benefits of ownership of the property as a taxpayer who has held legal title. In both instances, the third party may be the taxpayer's nominee.

Id. at 1065. The court further observed that it and other courts had "recognized that a tax lien may be enforced when the taxpayer has never held legal title to the property but has directed that title be placed in a third party's name." Id. (citing United States v. Miller Bros. Const. Co., 505 F.2d 1031, 1036 (10th Cir. 1974); Scoville v. United States, 250 F.3d 1198, 1202-03 (8th Cir. 2001)).

The present case is analogous. Although Henry Fields never paid his siblings to transfer their interests to Eric, there was no need for payment. The record is undisputed that upon Henry Fields' request, the siblings readily transferred their interests to Eric without consideration and without so much as an explanation as to why their brother wanted the property in his son's name. Henry Fields Depo. at 48. In this regard, Henry Fields directed the transfer to his son to avoid the impediment created by the federal tax liens. Thereafter, he continued to enjoy the same benefits of possession he held before the transfer.

The Court concludes that the United States has met its burden under Rule 56(c) of establishing that Eric was Henry's nominee with respect to the disputed two-acre parcel. Because § 6321 applies to after-acquired property, the Government's liens reached 100% of the property ten days before Eric Fields executed the deed of trust in favor of the bank. The United States was first in time, and the entire two-acre parcel is therefore subject to the government's tax liens. See Read, 169 F.3d at 252 (noting that priority interests are determined by "first in time, first in right"). As such, the Court grants the United States' motion seeking foreclosure and denies Regions' motion seeking five-sixths (5/6) of the proceeds. 4



III. Conclusion

The Court concludes that Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment should be granted to the extent it was not voluntarily withdrawn and that Regions' motion for summary judgment should be denied. The Court finds as follows:

Plaintiff's request for a judgment regarding the tax liabilities is granted in the amount of $691,580.88 as to Henry Fields and $461,126.14 as to Henry and Cynthia Fields, plus additional interest and penalties accruing from March 27, 2008; and

Plaintiff's request for an order directing a sale of the two acre property with the proceeds applied to the tax liens is granted.

The United States is directed to submit a proposed judgment and a proposed order directing the sale within five (5) days of entry of this order.

SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this the 9 th day of March, 2009.

1 During oral argument, the United States informed the Court that it would voluntarily dismiss a portion of the relief originally sought in its Complaint and summary judgment motion. More specifically, the Government no longer seeks to foreclose on other property Fields owns as a co-tenant with his siblings. Once the Government files that motion, the Court will grant it with a separate order.

2 Henry Fields, his immediate family, and his siblings, all answered the Complaint through counsel. However, their attorney withdrew and they now represent themselves. Although the family members have generally failed to defend the case, they did appear when these motions were heard on March 5, 2009, and the Court granted them an opportunity to address the motions.

3 Regions observed in its reply that "there are no disputes as to any material issues of fact." Brief of Defendant, Regions Bank in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and in Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [68] at 2.

4 Though not relevant to the legal analysis, Regions is not without recourse as the Court previously granted judgment in Regions' favor as to Eric Fields and his co-signer.

Labels:

Tuesday, April 7, 2009

Trust fund penalty - quick assessment

Caroline McCall, Petitioner v. Commissioner; Craig Gebo, Petitioner v. Commissioner.

Dkt. No. 26790-06L , 26791-06L , TC Memo. 2009-75, April 6, 2009.


MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION

MARVEL, Judge: In these consolidated cases petitioners, pursuant to section 6330, 1 seek review of respondent's determinations to proceed with collection of trust fund recovery penalties for the taxable periods ending September 30 and December 31, 2001 (the periods at issue).

We consolidated the cases for purposes of trial, briefing, and opinion. The issues for decision 2 are whether respondent made invalid jeopardy assessments against petitioners and whether respondent abused his discretion by determining that petitioners were not entitled to a streamlined installment agreement.


FINDINGS OF FACT

Some of the facts have been stipulated. We incorporate the stipulation of facts into our findings by this reference. Petitioners resided in California when the petitions were filed.

Respondent issued Letters 1153, Trust Funds Recovery Penalty Letter, to petitioners notifying them of proposed trust fund recovery penalty assessments, and petitioners filed an administrative appeal with respect to the proposed assessments. On December 13, 2005, respondent's Appeals Office made final administrative determinations upholding the proposed assessments. On the same date, the cases were sent to one of respondent's revenue officers, as reflected in Forms 5402, Appeals Transmittal and Case Memo, with the recommendation that respondent make quick assessments against petitioners for the trust fund recovery penalties.

Petitioners' cases were assigned to Lorna Canady (Ms. Canady), who was responsible for reviewing and forwarding to respondent's revenue accounting collection system (RACS), a department in the Ogden Service Center responsible for processing assessments, the documents necessary for assessing the trust fund recovery penalties. On December 20, 2005, respondent assessed trust fund recovery penalties of $16,581.64 and $14,216.84. On February 14, 2006, respondent sent petitioners Letters 1058, Notice of Intent To Levy and Notice of Your Right to a Hearing, with respect to the assessed trust fund recovery penalties. Petitioners timely requested a hearing with respondent's Appeals Office (collection hearing) and their cases were assigned to Settlement Officer Raymundo Jacquez (Mr. Jacquez).

During the collection hearing process Mr. Jacquez sent petitioners' counsel "IMF MCC Transcript-IMF Literal" of petitioners' tax accounts for the periods at issue (disputed transcripts) showing that on December 20, 2005, respondent made jeopardy assessments of $16,581.64 and $14,216.84. After petitioners' counsel questioned the validity of the jeopardy assessments, Mr. Jacquez requested petitioners' trust fund recovery penalty files and reviewed the documents in the files. In a letter to petitioners' counsel Mr. Jacquez assured him that respondent had not made jeopardy assessments against petitioners and that the disputed transcripts contained an internal clerical error. Mr. Jacquez explained that the error did not materially affect petitioners' rights.

Petitioners' counsel also informed Mr. Jacquez that petitioners wanted to resolve their unpaid liabilities through a streamlined installment agreement. Because petitioners' unpaid assessed liabilities were not $25,000 or less, as required to qualify for a streamlined installment agreement, Mr. Jacquez gave petitioners an opportunity to pay within 10 days the amount of their unpaid liabilities exceeding $25,000. Petitioners did not remit any payment by the deadline, and Mr. Jacquez gave them an additional 10 days to submit payment. Petitioners submitted two checks for the amount of the unpaid liabilities exceeding $25,000 but conditioned the deposit of the checks on the resolution of the jeopardy assessment issue. Mr. Jacquez returned the checks because of the condition petitioners imposed. He explained that petitioners had missed the second deadline to submit payment for consideration of a streamlined installment agreement and that they did not submit financial information for consideration of other collection alternatives. Mr. Jacquez stated that he would recommend sustaining respondent's collection actions.

On November 21, 2006, respondent's Appeals Office sent each petitioner a Notice of Determination Concerning Collection Action(s) Under Section 6320 and/or 6330 sustaining respondent's proposed collection actions. An attachment to the notices of determination stated that research of official records and transcripts established that the assessments were not jeopardy assessments and that petitioners were not entitled to any collection alternatives, including the streamlined installment agreement, because they had not provided Mr. Jacquez with the requested payments or financial information. Petitioners timely filed petitions contesting respondent's determinations.


OPINION




I. Section 6330
The Secretary is authorized to collect tax by levy upon the taxpayer's property if any taxpayer liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay such tax within 10 days after notice and demand for payment. Sec. 6331(a). Section 6330(a) requires the Secretary to send written notice to the taxpayer of the taxpayer's right to request a section 6330 hearing before a levy is made. If the taxpayer makes a timely request for a hearing, a hearing shall be held by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Office of Appeals. Sec. 6330(b).

At the hearing a taxpayer may raise any relevant issue, including appropriate spousal defenses, challenges to the appropriateness of the collection action, and collection alternatives, such as an installment agreement. Sec. 6330(c)(2)(A). Additionally, the taxpayer may contest the validity of the underlying tax liability, but only if the taxpayer did not otherwise have an opportunity to dispute the tax liability. Sec. 6330(c)(2)(B).

Following a hearing the Appeals Office must issue a notice of determination regarding the appropriateness of the proposed levy action. In making a determination, the Appeals Office must consider: (1) The verification presented by the Secretary that the requirements of applicable law and administrative procedures have been met; (2) the relevant issues raised by the taxpayer; and (3) whether the proposed collection action appropriately balances the need for efficient collection of taxes with a taxpayer's concerns regarding the intrusiveness of the proposed collection action. Sec. 6330(c)(3). If the taxpayer disagrees with the Appeals Office's determination, the taxpayer may seek judicial review by petitioning this Court. 3 Sec. 6330(d).



II. Assessments
A. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

Section 6330(d)(1) grants this Court jurisdiction to review determinations made by the Appeals Office in the collection hearing, including the Appeals Office's determinations that the requirements of applicable law and administrative procedures have been met. See sec. 6330(c)(1). In the notices of determination the Appeals Office determined that all requirements of applicable law and administrative procedures were satisfied and that the assessments were valid. Thus, we have jurisdiction to review the Appeals Office's determinations that respondent followed legal and administrative procedural requirements in assessing the trust fund recovery penalties.

Although the Court generally will review a determination of the Appeals Office for abuse of discretion when, as in these cases, the tax liability is not at issue, see Lunsford v. Commissioner, 117 T.C. 183, 185 (2001), respondent concedes his determination regarding the assessments is subject to de novo review. In accordance with respondent's concession, we shall examine the trial record de novo to decide whether respondent made invalid jeopardy assessments against petitioners.

B. Burden of Proof

Generally, the Commissioner's determination is presumed correct, and the taxpayer bears the burden of proving that the determination is erroneous. Rule 142(a)(1); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). Petitioner contends, however, that respondent should bear the burden of proving the assessments were valid. In support of their contention, petitioners cite Cohen v. Commissioner, 266 F.2d 5 (9th Cir. 1959), remanding T.C. Memo. 1957-172, and Estate of Mitchell v. Commissioner, 250 F.3d 696 (9th Cir. 2001), affg. in part, vacating in part and remanding 103 T.C. 520 (1994) and T.C. Memo. 1997-461.

In Cohen the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated:

When the Commissioner's determination has been shown to be invalid, the Tax Court must redetermine the deficiency. The presumption as to the correctness of the Commissioner's determination is then out of the case. The Commissioner and not the taxpayer then has the burden of proving whether any deficiency exists and if so the amount. It is not incumbent upon the taxpayer under these circumstances to prove that he owed no tax or the amount of the tax which he did owe. [ Cohen v. Commissioner, supra at 11; fn. refs. and citation omitted.]

Cohen, however, is distinguishable from this case. Cohen involved a redetermination of a deficiency that the taxpayers established was erroneous and arbitrary. Id. As the Court of Appeals recognized in Cohen, the burden is on the taxpayer to show that the Commissioner's determination is invalid. Id. If the taxpayer does so, then the Commissioner must come forward with proof of the tax owed by the taxpayer. Id.

Petitioners have not shown and do not argue that respondent's determinations of the trust fund recovery penalties were erroneous or arbitrary. At most, petitioners have shown that a labeling error occurred on the disputed transcripts. They have not proven that respondent acted arbitrarily or erroneously with respect to the assessment of the trust fund recovery penalties.

The other case upon which petitioners rely, Estate of Mitchell v. Commissioner, supra, is also distinguishable. In Estate of Mitchell the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the burden of proof shifted to the Commissioner because the taxpayer established that the Commissioner's determination of a tax deficiency was arbitrary and excessive. Id. at 702. Again, petitioners have not proven respondent acted arbitrarily.

The cases petitioners cite do not apply here. The burden of proof remains with petitioners. 4 See Rule 142(a)(1).

C. Applicable Law

1. Trust Fund Recovery Penalty

Section 6672(a) imposes a penalty (commonly known as a trust fund recovery penalty) on any person required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over tax who willfully fails to do so or who willfully attempts to evade or defeat any such tax. The penalty applies to an officer or employee of a corporation or a member or employee of a partnership who is under a duty to perform the actions described in section 6672(a) and who willfully fails to do so. Sec. 6671(b). The penalties are assessed and collected in the same manner as taxes. Sec. 6671(a).

Before a trust fund recovery penalty can be assessed, the Secretary must notify the taxpayer in writing by mail to the taxpayer's last known address or in person at least 60 days before giving notice and demand for payment that the taxpayer shall be subject to an assessment of such penalty. Sec. 6672(b)(1) and (2). If the taxpayer is properly notified before the expiration of the period of limitations for making assessments under section 6501, 5 the period of limitations for making an assessment of the trust fund recovery penalty shall not expire before the later of the date 90 days after the date the notice was mailed or delivered or, if there is a timely protest of the proposed assessment, the date 30 days after the Secretary makes a final administrative determination with respect to such protest. Sec. 6672(b)(3). However, the notification procedures do not apply to a jeopardy assessment. Sec. 6672(b)(4).

2. Jeopardy and Quick Assessments

The Secretary is authorized and required to make the assessments of all taxes, including assessable penalties. Sec. 6201(a). Assessments are made by recording the liability of the taxpayer in the Office of the Secretary in accordance with rules or regulations prescribed by the Secretary. Sec. 6203. The Secretary, at any time within the period prescribed for assessment, may make a supplemental assessment whenever it is ascertained that any assessment is imperfect or incomplete in any material respect. Sec. 6204(a).

The Secretary is authorized to assess a deficiency immediately if the Secretary believes that the assessment or collection of the deficiency will be jeopardized by delay, and notice and demand shall be made by the Secretary for the payment thereof. Sec. 6861(a). This immediate assessment is known as a jeopardy assessment. Assessment or collection of a deficiency is determined to be in jeopardy if one of the following conditions exist: (1) The taxpayer is or appears to be designing quickly to depart from the United States or to conceal himself or herself; (2) the taxpayer is or appears to be designing quickly to place property beyond the reach of the Government; or (3) the taxpayer's financial solvency is or appears to be imperiled. Sec. 301.6861-1(a), Proc. & Admin. Regs.; sec. 1.6851-1(a), Income Tax Regs. A jeopardy assessment may not be made unless the IRS Chief Counsel (or his delegate) gives written approval of the assessment. Sec. 7429(a)(1)(A).

Within 5 days after a jeopardy assessment is made, the Secretary must provide the taxpayer with a written statement of information on which the Secretary relied in making the jeopardy assessment. Sec. 7429(a)(1)(B). The taxpayer has 30 days from the date the taxpayer is given the written statement to request an administrative review of the assessment. Sec. 7429(a)(2). After the administrative review, the taxpayer may seek judicial review of the assessment in a U.S. District Court. Sec. 7429(b)(1) and (2).

In contrast, a quick assessment is an internal administrative term used to identify assessments made, for example, when the period of limitations on assessment will soon expire, Internal Revenue Manual (IRM) pt. 4.4.25.2.2 (Feb. 8, 1999). Under the IRM, a quick assessment of a trust fund recovery penalty is made when the period of limitations on assessment will expire in 30 days, IRM pt. 5.7.6.4(1) (Apr. 13, 2006). Unlike a jeopardy assessment, a quick assessment does not require Chief Counsel approval, and there is no requirement to provide the taxpayer written notice of information on which the Secretary relied in making the quick assessment within 5 days after the assessment.

D. Analysis

Petitioners argue that the December 20, 2005, assessments are invalid jeopardy assessments and must be abated. In support of their argument, petitioners introduced into evidence the disputed transcripts provided to them during the collection hearing, showing respondent made jeopardy assessments. Respondent, however, argues that the disputed transcripts reflected quick assessments that were mislabeled as jeopardy assessments. Respondent contends that the mislabeling error does not render the assessments invalid.

At trial both parties presented the testimony of several of respondent's employees regarding the assessments made against petitioners, and we find their testimony credible. Ms. Canady, a tax technician responsible for reviewing documents necessary for requesting and making assessments and for forwarding those documents to RACS so that assessments can be made, testified that she followed all procedures for making valid quick assessments of trust fund recovery penalties. Her testimony included the following. Ms. Canady received from a revenue officer Forms 2749, Request for Trust Fund Recovery Penalty Assessment, requesting quick assessments for the periods at issue. She also received from respondent's Appeals Office the Forms 5402 recommending that respondent make quick assessments. Ms. Canady prepared Forms 2859, Request for Quick or Prompt Assessment, requesting quick assessments against petitioners of $16,581.64 and $14,216.84 for the periods at issue, and her manager signed the forms on December 15, 2005. Ms. Canady signed Forms 3210, Document Transmittal, requesting quick assessments for the periods at issue, and on December 15, 2005, Ms. Canady sent by facsimile to RACS the Forms 2749, 5402, 2859, and 3210. On or around December 21, 2005, RACS returned to Ms. Canady the Forms 3210 with RACS's date stamp, handwritten notations of the document locator numbers 6 and assessment date, a signature showing the Forms 3210 were received and verified, and an acknowledgment date of December 20, 2005. She also received from RACS certain billing statements for the periods at issue showing assessments were made on December 20, 2005. Ms. Canady reviewed the billing statements to determine that petitioners' names and addresses, the document locator numbers, and the assessment amounts were correct and then mailed two copies to petitioners.

Respondent introduced into evidence the Forms 2749, 5402, 2859, and 3210, and the billing statements, that Ms. Canady either prepared or reviewed in the process of requesting assessments against petitioners, and none of the forms or the billing statements indicates that jeopardy assessments were requested or made. In addition, Ms. Canady, who is not authorized to make jeopardy assessments, credibly testified that when she received the documents from RACS after respondent made the assessments, nothing indicated that respondent made jeopardy assessments.

Tim Mathers, respondent's court witness coordinator in criminal investigations, whose duties include ordering returns from files, preparing certified transcripts in preparation for trial, and testifying at trials, testified about the document locator numbers that were assigned to petitioners' assessments. He testified that the document locator numbers on the disputed transcripts, despite the jeopardy assessment notations, reflected trust fund recovery penalty quick assessments. Mr. Jacquez also testified that the document locator numbers assigned to the assessments in these cases indicated that respondent made quick assessments. Mr. Jacquez testified that during the collection hearing he reviewed the revenue officer's case history and the various transaction codes relating to assessments and determined that there were no jeopardy assessments.

All testimonial and documentary evidence, except the disputed transcripts given to petitioners' counsel during the collection hearing, indicates that all procedures were followed to request and make quick assessments against petitioners. All of respondent's witnesses at trial credibly testified that respondent made quick assessments rather than jeopardy assessments. Petitioners did not introduce any testimony or documents other than the disputed transcripts to support their contention that respondent made jeopardy assessments against petitioners.

We also note that petitioners have not shown that they were prejudiced by the error on the disputed transcripts. Before respondent assessed the trust fund recovery penalties, petitioners received Letters 1153 notifying them of the proposed assessments, and they requested and received an administrative hearing with respondent's Appeals Office regarding the trust fund recovery penalties. Because jeopardy assessments may be assessed immediately, see sec. 6861(a), petitioners would not have received preassessment notices or had the opportunity for a preassessment administrative hearing if the assessments that were made had been jeopardy assessments, see sec. 6672(b)(4). In addition, petitioners received a collection hearing under section 6330 before levy, which strongly suggests that quick assessments and not jeopardy assessment were made. 7 Despite the jeopardy assessment entry on the disputed transcripts, petitioners have received all notices and rights to which they were entitled under sections 6672 and 6330.

The record provides ample grounds for concluding that valid quick assessments were made against petitioners for the periods at issue and that the entry on the disputed transcripts regarding a jeopardy assessment is an error that does not invalidate the assessments. 8 We so hold.



III. Collection Alternatives
Petitioners argue that if we conclude that the assessments are valid, we should remand the case to the Appeals Office so that petitioners can enter into a streamlined installment agreement. 9 Specifically, petitioners argue that because of the assessment issue, Mr. Jacquez did not give proper attention to collection alternatives.

We review respondent's Appeals Office determination with respect to collection alternatives for an abuse of discretion. See Lunsford v. Commissioner, 117 T.C. at 185; Sego v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 604, 610 (2000); Goza v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 176, 182 (2000). In reviewing for an abuse of discretion, we do not conduct an independent review of whether any collection alternative proposed by a taxpayer was acceptable or substitute our judgment for that of the Appeals Office. Rather, we must uphold the Appeals Office determination unless it is arbitrary, capricious, or without sound basis in fact or law. See, e.g., Murphy v. Commissioner, 125 T.C. 301, 320 (2005), affd. 469 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2006); Hansen v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-56; Catlow v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-47.

Section 6159(a) authorizes the Secretary to enter into written agreements with any taxpayer under which such taxpayer is allowed to make payment on any tax in installment payments if the Secretary determines that such agreement will facilitate full or partial collection of such liability. A streamlined installment agreement is an installment agreement that may be processed quickly and without financial analysis or managerial approval and is available for taxpayers whose aggregate unpaid balance of assessments is $25,000 or less. IRM pt. 5.14.5.1(1) (Mar. 30, 2002); IRM pt. 5.14.5.2(1) (July 12, 2005). Accepting or rejecting an installment agreement proposed by a taxpayer is within the discretion of the Commissioner. 10 See sec. 301.6159-1(b)(1)(i), Proced. & Admin. Regs.

During the collection hearing, after petitioners requested a streamlined installment agreement, Mr. Jacquez gave petitioners the opportunity to submit a payment for the amount of assessed trust fund recovery penalties that exceeded $25,000, as required for a streamlined installment agreement. Petitioners submitted two checks that could not be deposited, and Mr. Jacquez returned those checks because he was not authorized to hold checks. Because petitioners' outstanding liability exceeded $25,000, petitioners could not enter into a streamlined installment agreement. Therefore, Mr. Jacquez did not abuse his discretion in rejecting the streamlined installment agreement.

In addition, petitioners did not provide the requested financial information that Mr. Jacquez needed to consider other collection alternatives such as a regular installment agreement or an offer-in-compromise. Accordingly, we conclude that he did not abuse his discretion by not considering other collection alternatives. See, e.g., Prater v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-241. Therefore, respondent's determinations to proceed with the proposed collection actions were not an abuse of discretion.

We have considered all arguments raised by either party, and to the extent not discussed, we find them to be irrelevant, moot, or without merit.

To reflect the foregoing,

Decisions will be entered for respondent.

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.

2 The parties raised several evidentiary issues at trial, and we reserved ruling on some of them. By order dated Mar. 12, 2009, we resolved the remaining issues.

3 Before the enactment of the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (PPA), Pub. L. 109-280, sec. 855, 120 Stat. 1019, we had jurisdiction to review the Commissioner's determinations in cases where the underlying tax liability was of a type that normally fell within our deficiency jurisdiction. See, e.g., Zapara v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 215, 227 (2006), supplementing 124 T.C. 223 (2005). However, the PPA, which applies to determinations made after Oct. 16, 2006, expanded our jurisdiction to review the Commissioner's collection determinations with respect to any type of underlying tax, including trust fund recovery penalties. Ginsberg v. Commissioner, 130 T.C. 88, 91-92 (2008). Because the determinations in these cases were made after Oct. 16, 2006, we have jurisdiction to review respondent's determinations to proceed with the enforced collection of the trust fund recovery penalties.

4 Petitioners do not contend that sec. 7491(a), which shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner if its requirements are met, applies, and the record does not contain sufficient evidence to establish that petitioners satisfy the sec. 7491(a) requirements.

5 Sec. 6501 generally requires that the Commissioner assess tax within 3 years after the taxpayer files a return.

6 Document locator numbers are numbers assigned to all transactions, including assessments, posted on respondent's integrated data retrieval system.

7 In cases where the Secretary has made a finding that the collection of tax is in jeopardy, sec. 6330 does not apply except that the taxpayer is given the opportunity for a collection hearing within a reasonable time after the levy. See sec. 6330(f)(1); Zapara v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. at 241.

8 Our conclusion is in accordance with Dallin v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 589, 601 (2004). In Dallin the Court of Federal Claims held that a trust fund recovery penalty assessment on a Form 4340, Certificate of Assessments, Payments, and Other Specified Matters, that was mislabeled as a jeopardy assessment, instead of a quick assessment, did not render the assessment invalid where the assessment was otherwise valid.

9 Petitioners do not argue that the burden of proof shifts to respondent with respect to our review of respondent's determination regarding collection alternatives, and accordingly, the burden of proof remains with petitioners. See Rule 142(a).

10 Although not applicable here, sec. 6159(c) requires the Secretary to enter into an installment agreement in certain circumstances generally involving tax liabilities of less than $10,000.



Failure to Collect and Pay Over Tax, or Attempt to Evade or Defeat Tax: Collection Due Process hearings

An IRS appeals officer did not abuse his discretion when he determined that the IRS could levy upon an individual taxpayer's two individual retirement accounts (IRAs) to satisfy the taxpayer's outstanding liability for the trust fund recovery penalty. The taxpayer unsuccessfully contended that the IRS had to either enter an installment agreement for payment of the penalty or wait until the sale of his residence and apply the proceeds to the liability, rather than levy upon his IRAs. Thus, the taxpayer was not entitled to a stay pending the sale of the residence and the government was entitled to summary judgment.

B.W. Sillavan, DC Ala., 2002-1 USTC ¶50,236.

The IRS may consider the merits of a responsible person's challenged to the imposition of the trust fund recovery penalty in a Collection Due Process (CDP) or equivalent hearing if the individual has not had a previous opportunity to contest his or her liability. For example, responsible persons who have received the 60-day preliminary notice of the IRS's proposed assessment and an opportunity to request an appeals conference, as required by Code Sec. 6672(b), may not contest liability for the trust fund recovery penalty in a CDP hearing.

CCA Letter Ruling 200048043, October 16, 2000.

The district court had jurisdiction under Code Sec. 6330 to review an individual's liability for the trust fund recovery penalty. The issue of the individual's liability was not properly raised during his Collection Due Process hearing because he had received a valid deficiency notice and had ample opportunity to challenge his tax liability.

M.F. Pelliccio, DC Conn., 2003-1 USTC ¶50,293, 253 FSupp2d 258.

Followed.

An individual who claimed that trust fund recovery penalties assessed against him by the IRS had been paid failed to provide evidence of payment, or that the IRS had erred in its calculations. The taxpayer timely requested a Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing and raised only the issue of payment at that hearing. Thus, that was the only issue that could be addressed on appeal.

P.J. Moran, DC Ill., 2004-2 USTC ¶50,417.

Labels:

Friday, April 3, 2009

Revamps Mark-to-Market Rules
The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) acted on April 2 to modify the fair value ("mark to market") and other-than-temporary-impairment rules. The hard-hit U.S. banking and financial services sector immediately welcomed the news. The board is expected to take final action in the near future.

Quick Action
The FASB was under great pressure from Congress to act quickly, Jay D. Hanson, chair, Accounting Standards Executive Committee, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) told CCH. At a hearing on March 12, members of the House Financial Services Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises were very critical of the fair value measurement rule and put pressure on the FASB to modify and clarify the rule by the beginning of April, or face legislation that would modify or suspend it altogether. This echoes past calls by lawmakers to suspend fair value accounting (TAXDAY, 2008/10/02, M.1). In mid-March, FASB chair Frank Herzog told Congress that the FASB would issue a proposal within three weeks.

Fair Value Measurements
The controversial fair value measurement rule is explained in FASB Statement 157, Fair Value Measurements (FAS 157), which establishes a definition of fair value and a framework for measuring fair value under U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). Accounting standards generally require that financial instruments be measured on a financial institution's balance sheet at fair value. In the current global economic crisis, these standards have required banks and other financial institutions to write down certain assets to very low market levels, prompting some to blame fair value accounting for bank and financial institution failures and the worsening of the financial crisis.

Relaxed Rules
On March 17, the FASB issued a proposed change to the fair value rule and solicited comments, which were due by April 1. On April 2, the FASB met and discussed those comment letters and decided to make significant modifications to the fair value accounting rule. The changes allow officials at companies, including banks and other financial institutions, to use their judgment to a greater extent in determining the fair value of their investments and to avoid writing down losses on impaired investments, including collateralized debt obligations (CDOs).

The new rules will also require reporting companies to provide increased disclosures on their valuation techniques and any changes in such techniques. The new rule will include additional factors for determining whether a market is inactive and permit an entity to base its conclusion about whether a transaction is orderly on the weight of the evidence.

The Board's action addressed proposed FSP FAS 157-e, Determining Whether a Market Is Not Active and a Transaction Is Not Distressed, and proposed FSP FAS 115-a, FAS 124-a, and EITF 99-20-b, Recognition and Presentation of Other-Than-Temporary Impairments.

"Today's action relates to how to measure value when the market is not active and also to the concept of accounting for other-than-temporary impairment," Hanson explained. The FASB's original proposal relating to measurement when the market is not active resulted in significant "push back," he noted.

Other-than-Temporary Impairment
In a related decision, the FASB decided that a change in existing guidance for determining whether the impairment in a security is other than temporary should be limited to debt securities. This decision also permits an entity, when valuing a debt security, to assert that it does not have the intent to sell the security and it is more likely that not that it will not have to sell the security before recovery of its cost basis. These changes give reporting entities more flexibility in valuation.

"The concept of other-than-temporary impairment is difficult to conceptualize," Hanson explained. In today's market there is some portion of that decline in value that is related to market uncertainty and the general credit-worthiness of the company.

"Under the FASB's action, only the part that relates to credit has to go through the income statement," Hanson said. Additionally, to the extent that a bank has already taken some losses, they can do an accumulated catch-up adjustment, he pointed out.

Effective Date
The relaxed rules take effect for interim and annual financial statement reporting periods ending after June 15, 2009, but companies are permitted to adopt these new rules for interim and annual periods ending after March 15, 2009. The relaxed rules can be applied prospectively only and cannot be adopted retroactively.

Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Summary of Board Decisions: Determining Whether a Market Is Not Active and a Transaction Is Not Distressed

April 3, 2009

Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) : Mark to market rules : Other-than-temporary impairments (OTTI) .



SUMMARY OF BOARD DECISIONS

Summary of Board decisions are provided for the information and convenience of constituents who want to follow the Board's deliberations. All of the conclusions reported are tentative and may be changed at future Board meetings. Decisions are included in an Exposure Draft for formal comment only after a formal written ballot. Decisions in an Exposure Draft may be (and often are) changed in redeliberations based on information provided to the Board in comment letters, at public roundtable discussions, and through other communication channels. Decisions become final only after a formal written ballot to issue a final standard.



April 2, 2009 Board Meeting

Determining whether a market is not active and a transaction is not distressed . The Board discussed comment letters received on proposed FSP FAS 157-e, Determining Whether a Market Is Not Active and a Transaction Is Not Distressed. In response to comment letters and additional feedback received, the Board decided to make significant revisions to the proposed FSP. The Board decided that the final FSP would
1. Affirm that the objective of fair value when the market for an asset is not active is the price that would be received to sell the asset in an orderly transaction (that is, not a forced liquidation or distressed sale) between market participants at the measurement date under current market conditions (that is, in the inactive market).

2. Clarify and include additional factors for determining whether there has been a significant decrease in market activity for an asset when the market for that asset is not active.

3. Eliminate the proposed presumption that all transactions are distressed (not orderly) unless proven otherwise. The FSP will instead require an entity to base its conclusion about whether a transaction was not orderly on the weight of the evidence.

4. Include an example that provides additional explanation on estimating fair value when the market activity for an asset has declined significantly.

5. Require an entity to disclose a change in valuation technique (and the related inputs) resulting from the application of the FSP and to quantify its effects, if practicable.

6. Apply to all fair value measurements when appropriate.

The Board also affirmed its previous decision that the FSP would be applied prospectively and that retrospective application would not be permitted. The Board decided that the FSP would be effective for interim and annual periods ending after June 15, 2009, with early adoption permitted for periods ending after March 15, 2009. The Board decided that an entity early adopting this FSP must also early adopt FSP FAS 115-2, FAS 124-2, and EITF 99-20-2, Recognition and Presentation of Other-Than-Temporary Impairments. Additionally, if the entity elects to early adopt FSP FAS 107-1 and APB 28-1, Interim Disclosures about Fair Value of Financial Instruments, it must also elect to early adopt this FSP and FSP FAS 115-2, FAS 124-2, and EITF 99-20-2.

The Board directed the staff to proceed to a draft of the final FSP for vote by written ballot.

Recognition and presentation of other-than-temporary impairments. [This summary of decisions will be posted as soon as it is available.]

Interim disclosures about fair value of financial instruments . The Board redeliberated proposed FSP FAS 107-b and APB 28-a, Interim Disclosures about Fair Value of Financial Instruments , in light of comments received and decided to proceed to a final FSP. The final FSP will amend FASB Statement No. 107, Disclosures about Fair Value of Financial Instruments, to require an entity to provide disclosures about fair value of financial instruments in interim financial information.

The Board affirmed its previous decision that the FSP would apply to all financial instruments within the scope of Statement 107. The Board also affirmed its previous decision to require entities to disclose the method(s) and significant assumptions used to estimate the fair value of financial instruments, in both interim financial statements as well as annual financial statements.

The Board decided that only public entities would be required to provide the fair value disclosures in interim financial information.

The Board decided that the FSP would be effective for interim and annual periods ending after June 15, 2009, with early adoption permitted for periods ending after March 15, 2009. The Board decided that an entity may early adopt this FSP only if it also elects to early adopt FSP FAS 157-4, Determining Whether a Market Is Not Active and a Transaction Is Not Distressed, and FSP FAS 115-2, FAS 124-2, and EITF 99-20-2, Recognition and Presentation of Other-Than-Temporary Impairments .

The Board directed the staff to proceed to a draft of the final FSP for vote by written ballot.

Insurance contracts . The Board continued deliberating the joint project on accounting for insurance contracts by discussing what cash flows an entity would use in measuring the fulfillment value of an insurance contract.

The Board agreed that a measurement of the fulfillment value of an insurance contract should use expected cash flows rather than a best estimate of cash flows. The Board also agreed that those expected cash flows should be updated each period.

The Board discussed whether market inputs should be part of the measurement of cash flows when a fulfillment value notion is used. The Board agreed that the measurement of cash flows should consider all available information that represents the fulfillment of the insurance contract. All available information includes, but is not limited to, industry data, historical data of an entity's costs, and market inputs when those inputs are relevant to the fulfillment of the contract.

Conceptual framework: objective and qualitative characteristics . The Board reviewed responses to the Exposure Draft, Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting: The Objective of Financial Reporting and Qualitative Characteristics and Constraints of Decision-Useful Financial Reporting Information, and tentatively affirmed the proposals in the chapter on Objective, including the proposals on the objective of financial reporting and the primary user group. The Board decided to clarify that financial reports do not necessarily exclude forward-looking or prospective information. The description of an economic phenomenon should be amended to reflect this decision.

The Board directed the staff to proceed to drafting:
1. The final versions of the chapters on the objective of financial reporting and the qualitative characteristics of and constraints on financial reporting

2. The Exposure Draft on the reporting entity concept.
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Summary of Board Decisions: Recognition and Presentation of Other-Than-Temporary Impairments (OTTI)

April 3, 2009

Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) : Mark to market rules : Other-than-temporary impairments (OTTI) .

Recognition and presentation of other-than-temporary impairments. The Board discussed comment letters received on proposed FSP FAS 115-a, FAS 124-a, and EITF 99-20-b, Recognition and Presentation of Other-Than-Temporary Impairments. The Board made the following decisions in response to comment letters and additional feedback received:



Scope
1. The Board decided that the change to existing guidance for determining whether an impairment is other than temporary should be limited to debt securities.



Recognition
2. The Board decided to replace the existing requirement that the entity's management assert it has both the intent and ability to hold an impaired security until recovery with a requirement that management assert

a. It does not have the intent to sell the security; and

b. It is more likely than not it will not have to sell the security before recovery of its costs basis.

3. The guidance will incorporate examples of factors from existing literature that should be considered in determining whether a debt security is other-than-temporarily impaired and how those factors interact with the requirement to assert that the entity does not intend to sell the security and it is more likely than not that the entity will not have to sell the security before recovery of its cost basis.

4. When an entity does not intend to sell the security and it is more likely than not that the entity will not have to sell the security before recovery of its cost basis, it will recognize the credit component of an other-than-temporary impairment of a debt security in earnings and the remaining portion in other comprehensive income.

5. An entity will be required to recognize noncredit losses on held-to-maturity debt securities in other comprehensive income and amortize that amount over the remaining life of the security in a prospective manner by offsetting the recorded value of the asset unless the security is subsequently sold or there are additional credit losses.

6. The FSP will include guidance stipulating that credit losses should be measured on the basis of an entity's estimate of the decrease in expected cash flows, including those that result from an increase in expected prepayments.

7. The guidance will clarify that existing premiums or discounts and subsequent changes in estimated cash flows or fair value should continue to be accounted for in accordance with existing guidance (for example, EITF Issue No. 99-20, "Recognition of Interest Income and Impairment on Purchased Beneficial Interests and Beneficial Interests That Continue to Be Held by a Transferor in Securitized Financial Assets").



Presentation
8. An entity will be required to present the total other-than-temporary impairment in the statement of earnings with an offset for the amount recognized in other comprehensive income.

9. An entity will be required to present separately in the financial statement where the components of other comprehensive income are reported, amounts recognized in accumulated other comprehensive income related to the noncredit portion of other-than-temporary impairments recognized for available-for-sale and held-to-maturity debt securities.



Disclosures
10. The disclosure requirements of FASB Statement No. 115, Accounting for Certain Investments in Debt and Equity Securities, and FSP FAS 115-1 and FAS 124-1, The Meaning of Other-Than-Temporary Impairment and Its Application to Certain Investments, will be modified to require an entity to provide the following:

a. The cost basis of available-for-sale and held-to maturity debt securities by major security type

b. The methodology and key inputs, such as performance indicators of the underlying assets in the security, loan to collateral value ratios, third-party guarantees, levels of subordination, and vintage, used to measure the portion of an other-than-temporary impairment related to credit losses by major security type

c. A rollforward of amounts recognized in earnings for debt securities for which an other-than-temporary impairment has been recognized and the noncredit portion of the other-than-temporary impairment that has been recognized in other comprehensive income.

11. Statement 115 and FSP FAS 115-1 and FAS 124-1 will also be modified to require that major security classes be based on the nature and risks of the security and additional types of securities will be included in the list of major security types listed in Statement 115.

12. The above additional disclosures, as well as all existing Statement 115 and FSP FAS 115-1 and FAS 124-1 disclosures, will be required for interim periods

When adopting the new guidance, an entity will be required to record a cumulative-effect adjustment as of the beginning of the period of adoption to reclassify the noncredit component of a previously recognized other-temporary impairment from retained earnings to accumulated other comprehensive income if the entity does not intend to sell the security and it is not more likely than not that the entity will be required to sell the security before recovery. The cost basis used to calculate accretable yield will also be adjusted to reflect this adjustment (that is, the entity will no longer accrete the noncredit component of a previously recognized other-than-temporary impairment through earnings).

The Board decided that the FSP will be effective for interim and annual periods ending after June 15, 2009, with early adoption permitted for periods ending after March 15, 2009. The Board decided that an entity may early adopt this FSP only if it also elects to early adopt FSP FAS 157-4, Determining Whether a Market Is Not Active and a Transaction Is Not Distressed. Additionally, if the entity elects to early adopt FSP FAS 107-1 and APB 28-1, Interim Disclosures about Fair Value of Financial Instruments, or FSP FAS 157-4, it must also elect to early adopt this FSP.

The Board directed the staff to proceed to a draft of the final FSP for vote by written ballot.



American Bankers Association (ABA) Welcomes Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Guidance on Mark-to-Market Accounting and Impairment Rules

April 3, 2009

American Bankers Association (ABA) : Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) : Mark to market rules : Other-than-temporary impairments (OTTI) .


ABA WELCOMES FASB GUIDANCE ON MARK-TO-MARKET ACCOUNTING AND IMPAIRMENT RULES



Concerned about inconsistent application for "held to maturity" securities


WASHINGTON - The American Bankers Association commends the Financial Accounting Standards Board today for finally offering new guidance on mark-to-market accounting and impairment. ABA expressed concern however, that FASB has not done enough to fully repair the accounting rules for securities classified as "held to maturity."

The FASB voted this morning to approve new guidance that will provide much needed clarification in estimating market values in illiquid markets. This guidance will allow banks and their auditors to use judgment when valuing illiquid assets that are required to be marked down to market prices under current accounting rules.

"Today's decision should improve information for investors by providing more accurate estimates of market values," said Edward Yingling, president and CEO of ABA.

ABA has for years warned of the pro-cyclical nature of mark-to-market accounting and has pushed for immediate repairs to this rule since March 2008.

FASB also voted this morning to improve the accounting for debt securities that are required to be classified as "impaired." Under the new guidance, impairment that is reflected in earnings will be more closely linked with actual credit losses -rather than market losses.

"We are pleased that FASB has now taken steps to improve the accounting for Other Than Temporary Impairment, which is generally agreed to have been problematic for many years' earnings," said Yingling. "Requiring that credit losses be reported in earnings provides a more realistic picture of losses.

ABA is disappointed that FASB is still requiring market losses to be recorded for "held to maturity" securities, which should never be subject to market volatility. "To prevent further confusion as to the nature of these losses, it will be important for FASB to consider this during the next phase of its project on financial instruments," said Yingling.

American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) Accounting Standards Executive Committee Comment Letter to Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)

April 3, 2009

American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) : Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) : Mark to market rules : Other-than-temporary impairments (OTTI) .

April 1, 2009

Mr. Russell Golden

Technical Director

Financial Accounting Standards Board

401 Merritt 7

Norwalk, CT 06856-5116

Dear Mr. Golden:

The Accounting Standards Executive Committee (AcSEC) of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants is pleased to offer comments on the FASB's Proposed Staff Positions (1) FSP FAS 115-a, FAS 124-a, and EITF 99-20-b, Recognition and Presentation of Other-Than-Temporary Impairments, and (2) FSP FAS 157-e, Determining Whether a Market is Not Active and a Transaction is Not Distressed .

Accounting standards are a keystone of our financial reporting system and are designed to provide neutral, relevant, transparent information to those who rely on and make decisions based on that information. We appreciate that FASB operates in that spirit, which is one reason why we believe that accounting standards are most effectively set by the private sector FASB.

The current financial crisis highlights the challenges associated with the exit price notion (described in FASB Statement No. 157, Fair Value Measurements ) in a market that is not active. We encourage the FASB to continue to refine fair value measurement guidance as application issues are identified, and to complete the other related fair value projects currently on its agenda.



Proposed FSP FAS 115-a, FAS 124-a, and EITF 99-20-b

Overall, AcSEC supports the issuance of this FSP. We offer the following comments for the Board's consideration.
 We believe equity securities should not be included in the scope of the FSP. The primary reasons we believe they should be excluded are (1) the changes proposed in the FSP related to including only a portion of the impairment of debt securities in earnings does not apply to equity securities and (2) the changes to the "intent and ability to hold" assertion, as discussed further below, has added significant confusion as to the Board's intentions. Further, the FSP should clarify whether perpetual preferred securities should be treated as debt or equity securities for purposes of this FSP.

 Paragraph A3 amends paragraph 15 of FSP FAS 115-1 to say that "in determining the amount of the total impairment related to credit losses the reporting entity shall use its best estimate of the amount of the impairment that relates to an increase in the credit risk associated with the specific instrument." It further states that the measurement methodology in FASB Statement No. 114, Accounting By Creditors for Impairment of a Loan , is one way of doing that estimate. We believe that FASB should identify other appropriate methods if it intends that FASB Statement No. 114 is not the only methodology that could be used. Failure to do so in this FSP may lead to inconsistent application and further requests for implementation guidance. Also, we note that the FSP's description of the measurement of a decline in fair value attributed to an increase in the credit risk associated with an instrument may differ from a measurement of a credit loss under FASB Statement No. 114 due to widening credit spreads.

 There is substantial confusion regarding the intent and expectations of FASB proposing a "more-likely-than-not" test (as opposed to the current "intent and ability to hold" test) for determining whether an other than temporary impairment exists. For example, some believe the proposed language is a significant change that will have a great impact and substantially extend the period of time an impairment is considered temporary, while others believe the wording change is not meant to create a significant change in practice as compared to current requirements. We recommend that FASB clarify the intention of the proposed language as it relates to the current literature.



Proposed FSP FAS 157-e

Overall, AcSEC does not support the issuance of this FSP as it is constructed. We believe that the FSP's presumption that transactions in a market that is not active are distressed is inconsistent with the objectives of the fair value measurements standard (FASB Statement No. 157), and the FSP may lead to measurements that ignore observable data and do not represent fair value. We are unable to reconcile the fair value objective in the FSP to the underlying exit price notion embedded in FASB Statement No. 157.

Further, even if the FSP eliminates the presumption, AcSEC believes the practical effects of the FSP could result in ignoring transaction prices in situations in which those prices might be the best representation of an exit price for purposes of measuring fair value. AcSEC also believes that if a level 3 measurement is necessary, the FSP should make clear the objectives of that measurement and illustrate how those objectives are achieved in the FSP example.

AcSEC also is concerned about unforeseen unintended consequences of this FSP. For example, we appreciate that one of the immediate concerns of those calling for this FSP relates to securities and financial instruments tied to mortgages. We are concerned that this FSP might lead to unnecessary, unforeseen accounting issues for financial assets that are not tied to mortgages.

********

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the proposed FSPs. As noted in the opening to this letter, the current financial crisis highlights the challenges with fair value measurements. The Board may wish to acknowledge that (a) the FSPs are designed to be temporary standards during a time of financial crisis and that ultimately these issues will be addressed by the Board in longer term, more comprehensive projects, (b) FASB will continue to address application issues as they develop, and (c) FASB will review the results of the changes from these FSPs in the coming months and years to assess whether they accomplished their objectives. The Board may also wish to explicitly acknowledge that all parties with a voice in the financial reporting system need to (1) support the professional judgments made in good faith by preparers and auditors as they implement and audit, respectively, fair value measurements and (2) invest sufficient resources to produce and verify credible valuation inputs and results. We also encourage the Board to conduct a series of web casts as soon as possible after the final decisions on the direction of these FSPs to assist all interested parties understand the implications.

We are available to discuss our comments with Board members or staff at their convenience.

Sincerely,

Jay D. Hanson

Chairman

Accounting Standards Executive Committee

American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) Statement on Today's Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Action on Fair Value

April 3, 2009

American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) : Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) : Mark to market rules : Other-than-temporary impairments (OTTI) .


AICPA STATEMENT ON TODAY'S FASB ACTION ON FAIR VALUE


New York, New York (April 2, 2009) - Barry C. Melancon, president and CEO of the AICPA, issued the following statement on FASB's actions today on mark-to-market accounting:

"The FASB today made some difficult decisions on challenging issues related to fair value accounting in an economic climate unlike any other in memory for most Americans. Now all participants in the financial reporting system have an obligation to move forward and provide the most transparent and reliable information on hard-to-value assets so that our capital markets can use that information to allocate capital efficiently," Melancon said.

"Likewise, we encourage all participants in the financial reporting system, including regulators, to exhibit a strong spirit of cooperation as financial statement preparers and auditors use reasonable, good-faith judgment when valuing and auditing financial assets in illiquid markets," Melancon said.

"Independent, private-sector standard setting of accounting is critical to a free-market economy and everyone involved in the financial reporting system should be committed to that principle. We unequivocally support FASB's continuing independence," Melancon emphasized.

"We understand that not all stakeholders will be happy with the outcome. AICPA committees have expressed their reasonable and well thought-out views on both sides of this proposal by FASB," he said.

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Thursday, April 2, 2009

Joint Committee on Taxation Disclosure Report for Public Inspection Pursuant to Internal Revenue Code Sec. 6103(p)(3)(C) for Calendar Year 2008

April 2, 2009

111th Congress


DISCLOSURE REPORT FOR PUBLIC INSPECTION PURSUANT TO INTERNAL REVENUE CODE SECTION 6103(p)(3)(C) FOR CALENDAR YEAR 2008


Prepared by the INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE

Published by the Staff of the JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION

April 1, 2009

JCX-24-09




INTRODUCTION


Section 6103(p)(3)(C) of the Internal Revenue Code provides that the Secretary of the Treasury shall, within 90 days after the close of each calendar year, furnish to the Joint Committee on Taxation for disclosure to the public a report which provides with respect to each Federal agency and certain other entities the number of: (1) requests for disclosure of returns and return information (as such terms are defined in section 6103(b)); (2) instances in which returns and return information were disclosed pursuant to such requests or otherwise; and (3) taxpayers whose returns, or return information with respect to whom, were disclosed pursuant to such requests. 1 In addition, the report must describe the general purposes for which such requests were made.

Pursuant to section 6103(p)(3)(C), the Internal Revenue Service prepared a disclosure report for public inspection covering calendar year 2008. This document sets forth the report of the Internal Revenue Service. 2

Disclosure Report for Public Inspection Pursuant to 26 USC Section 6103(p)(3)(C)

Internal Revenue Service

Calendar Year 2008


Calendar Year 2008 Volume of Disclosures of Tax Returns and/or Return Information Required to be Accounted for Pursuant to 26 U.S.C. sec. 6103(p)(3)(A)





_____________________________________________________________________________________
Disclosure IRC Section 6103 Bulk Master File Other Total Number of
To/For Subsection Data Disclosures (*) Disclosures

_____________________________________________________________________________________
Tax Checks (c) 11,001 11,001

_____________________________________________________________________________________
States (d) 3,182,927,345 73,905,175 3,256,832,520

_____________________________________________________________________________________
Congressional (f) 260,592,773 260,592,773
Committees
and/or their
agents
(including GAO)

_____________________________________________________________________________________
US Attorneys (i)(1) 47,275 47,275
DEA 48 48
FBI 214 214
Other 672 672

_____________________________________________________________________________________
US Attorneys (i)(2) 1,271 1,271

_____________________________________________________________________________________
FBI (i)(3)(A) 31 31
FBI (i)(3)(B) 4 4
Other (i)(3)(C)

_____________________________________________________________________________________
Other (i)(7)(A)

_____________________________________________________________________________________
Other (i)(7)(B)

_____________________________________________________________________________________
US Attorneys (i)(7)(C)

_____________________________________________________________________________________
Government
Accountability

Office (i)(8) 3,030 3,030

_____________________________________________________________________________________
Bureau of Census (j)(l)(A) 1,842,087,625 1,842,087,625
(j)(l)(B) 207,882 207,882
Bureau of
Economic
Analysis

_____________________________________________________________________________________
Department of (j)(5) 2,595,691 2,595,691
Agriculture

_____________________________________________________________________________________
Congressional (j)(6) 4,410,438 4,410,438
Budget Office

_____________________________________________________________________________________
Foreign (k)(4) 1,904,022 1,904,022
Countries
Tax Treaty
Authority

_____________________________________________________________________________________
Department of (l)(2) 961 961
Labor
Pension Benefit
Guaranty
Corporation

_____________________________________________________________________________________
Federal Agencies (l)(3) 216 216

_____________________________________________________________________________________
Department of (l)(4)(A) 271 271
Treasury
Employees

_____________________________________________________________________________________
Child Support (l)(6) 14,856,897 14,856,897
Enforcement
Agencies

_____________________________________________________________________________________
Medicare Premium (l)(20) 40,431,964 40,431,964
Subsidy
Adjustment

_____________________________________________________________________________________
TOTALS: 5,348,110,615 75,874,191 5,423,984,806

_____________________________________________________________________________________
(*) Other Disclosures - disclosures made by furnishing transcripts of records,
permitting inspection of records, furnishing photocopies of records, oral
disclosures, and disclosures by means of correspondence without furnishing a copy of
the record. Also includes disclosures from locally automated files.







Explanation of Internal Revenue Code Section 6103 (General Purpose for Disclosure)





IRC Section 6103
Subsection Purpose of Disclosure

(c) Disclosure of returns and return information to the designee of the
taxpayer.

(d) Disclosure to State tax officials having responsibility for
administering State tax law.

(f) Disclosure to Committees of Congress or their agents (including
Government Accountability Office).

(i)(1) Disclosure of returns or return information to Federal officers or
employees upon the grant of an ex parte order by a Federal district
court judge or magistrate for use in Federal non-tax criminal
investigations.

(i)(2) Disclosure of return information other than taxpayer return
information to Federal officers or employees for use in Federal
non-tax criminal investigations, upon request by the head of the
agency or Inspector General thereof (or designated officials of the
Department of Justice).

(i)(3)(A) Disclosure of return information other than taxpayer return
information to apprise appropriate Federal officials of potential
violations of Federal criminal law.

(i)(3)(B) Disclosure of return information in situations involving the
imminent threat of death or physical injury to any individual.
Disclosure is made to Federal or State law enforcement. Also,
includes disclosure to Federal law enforcement in situations
involving flight from Federal prosecution.

(i)(3)(C) Disclosure of return information other than taxpayer return
information in situations that may be related to a terrorist
incident, threat or activity.

(i)(7)(A) Disclosure of return information other than taxpayer return
information to officers and employees of any Federal law
enforcement agency personally and directly engaged in the response
to or investigation of any terrorist incident, threat, or activity.

(i)(7)(B) Disclosure of return information other than taxpayer return
information to Federal agencies engaged in the collection or
analysis of intelligence and counterintelligence information or
investigation concerning any terrorist incident, threat, or
activity upon receipt of a valid written request by the Secretary.

(i)(7)(C) Disclosure to a Federal law enforcement or Federal intelligence
agency engaged in any investigation, response to, or analysis of
information concerning a terrorist incident, threat, or activity
upon grant of an ex parte court order by a Federal district court
judge or magistrate.

(i)(8) Disclosure to the Government Accountability Office for making
audits of the Internal Revenue Service.

(j)(l)(A) Disclosure of return information to the Bureau of the Census in
activities allowed by law.

(j)(l)(B) Disclosure to Department of Commerce of corporation information for
statistical use by the Bureau of Economic Analysis in activities
allowed by law.

(j)(5) Disclosure of return information to the Department of Agriculture
structuring, preparing, and conducting the Census of Agriculture as
allowed by law.

(j)(6) Disclosure to the Congressional Budget Office for long-term
modeling of the Social Security and Medicare programs.

(k)(4) Disclosure of returns or return information to the competent
authority of a foreign government that has a tax convention or
bilateral information exchange agreement with the United States.

(l)(2) Disclosure of returns and return information to the Department of
Labor and Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation for administration
of Titles I and IV of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974.

(l)(3) Disclosure of tax delinquent account indicator to Federal agencies
to determine credit worthiness of a Federal loan applicant.

(l)(4)(A) Disclosure of returns and return information for use in personnel
or claimant representative matters by employees of the Department
of the Treasury or practitioners who are the subject of such
matters, or their representatives.

(l)(6) Disclosure of return information to Federal, State, and local child
support enforcement agencies for use in establishing and collecting
child support obligations from and locating individuals owing such
obligations.

(l)(20) Disclosure of return information to the Commissioner of Social
Security for use in establishing the appropriate amount of any
Medicare part B premium adjustment under section 1839 of the Social
Security Act.




1 Unless otherwise stated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.

2 This document may be cited as follows: Joint Committee on Taxation, Disclosure Report for Public Inspection Pursuant to Internal Revenue Code Section 6103(p)(3)(C) for Calendar Year 2008 (JCX-24-09), April 1, 2009. This document also is available at www.jct.gov.

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Wednesday, April 1, 2009

S. 506 was proposed to restrict the use of offshore tax havens and abusive tax shelters to inappropriately avoid Federal taxation, and for other purposes.
Focuses on Internationa - hearings were held on this proposed legislation

March 5, 2009

111th Congress111th CONGRESS

1st Session

S. 506

To restrict the use of offshore tax havens and abusive tax shelters to inappropriately avoid Federal taxation, and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

March 2, 2009

Mr. LEVIN (for himself, Mr. WHITEHOUSE, Mrs. MCCASKILL, and Mr. NELSON of Florida) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Finance

A BILL

To restrict the use of offshore tax havens and abusive tax shelters to inappropriately avoid Federal taxation, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,



SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; ETC.

(a) Short Title- This Act may be cited as the 'Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act'.

(b) Amendment of 1986 Code- Except as otherwise expressly provided, whenever in this Act an amendment or repeal is expressed in terms of an amendment to, or repeal of, a section or other provision, the reference shall be considered to be made to a section or other provision of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.

(c) Table of Contents- The table of contents of this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; etc.

TITLE I --DETERRING THE USE OF TAX HAVENS FOR TAX EVASION

Sec. 101. Establishing presumptions for entities and transactions involving offshore secrecy jurisdictions.

Sec. 102. Authorizing special measures against foreign jurisdictions, financial institutions, and others that impede United States tax enforcement.

Sec. 103. Treatment of foreign corporations managed and controlled in the United States as domestic corporations.

Sec. 104. Allowing more time for investigations involving offshore secrecy jurisdictions.

Sec. 105. Reporting United States beneficial owners of foreign owned financial accounts.

Sec. 106. Preventing misuse of foreign trusts for tax evasion.

Sec. 107. Limitation on legal opinion protection from penalties with respect to transactions involving offshore secrecy jurisdictions.

Sec. 108. Closing the offshore dividend tax loophole.

Sec. 109. Reporting of activities with respect to passive foreign investment companies.

TITLE II --OTHER MEASURES TO COMBAT TAX HAVEN AND TAX SHELTER ABUSES

Sec. 201. Penalty for failing to disclose offshore holdings.

Sec. 202. Deadline for anti-money laundering rule for hedge funds and private equity funds.

Sec. 203. Anti-money laundering requirements for formation agents.

Sec. 204. Strengthening summons in cases involving offshore secrecy jurisdictions.

Sec. 205. Improving enforcement of foreign financial account reporting.

TITLE III --COMBATING TAX SHELTER PROMOTERS

Sec. 301. Penalty for promoting abusive tax shelters.

Sec. 302. Penalty for aiding and abetting the understatement of tax liability.

Sec. 303. Tax planning inventions not patentable.

Sec. 304. Prohibited fee arrangement.

Sec. 305. Preventing tax shelter activities by financial institutions.

Sec. 306. Information sharing for enforcement purposes.

Sec. 307. Disclosure of information to Congress.

Sec. 308. Tax opinion standards for tax practitioners.

Sec. 309. Denial of deduction for certain fines, penalties, and other amounts.

TITLE IV --REQUIRING ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE

Sec. 401. Clarification of economic substance doctrine.

Sec. 402. Penalty for understatements attributable to transactions lacking economic substance, etc.

Sec. 403. Denial of deduction for interest on underpayments attributable to noneconomic substance transactions.

TITLE I --DETERRING THE USE OF TAX HAVENS FOR TAX EVASION



SEC. 101. ESTABLISHING PRESUMPTIONS FOR ENTITIES AND TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING OFFSHORE SECRECY JURISDICTIONS.

(a) Presumptions for Internal Revenue Code of 1986-

(1) IN GENERAL- Chapter 76 is amended by inserting after section 7491 the following new subchapter:

'Subchapter F --Presumptions for Certain Legal Proceedings

'Sec. 7492. Presumptions pertaining to entities and transactions involving offshore secrecy jurisdictions.



'SEC. 7492. PRESUMPTIONS PERTAINING TO ENTITIES AND TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING OFFSHORE SECRECY JURISDICTIONS.

'(a) Control- For purposes of any United States civil judicial or administrative proceeding to determine or collect tax, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that a United States person (other than an entity with shares regularly traded on an established securities market) who directly or indirectly formed, transferred assets to, was a beneficiary of, had a beneficial interest in, or received money or property or the use thereof from an entity, including a trust, corporation, limited liability company, partnership, or foundation (other than an entity with shares regularly traded on an established securities market), formed, domiciled, or operating in an offshore secrecy jurisdiction, exercised control over such entity. The presumption of control created by this subsection shall not be applied to prevent the Secretary from determining or arguing the absence of control.

'(b) Transfers of Income- For purposes of any United States civil judicial or administrative proceeding to determine or collect tax, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that any amount or thing of value received by a United States person (other than an entity with shares regularly traded on an established securities market) directly or indirectly from an account or entity (other than an entity with shares regularly traded on an established securities market) in an offshore secrecy jurisdiction, constitutes income of such person taxable in the year of receipt, and any amount or thing of value paid or transferred by or on behalf of a United States person (other than an entity with shares regularly traded on an established securities market) directly or indirectly to an account or entity (other than an entity with shares regularly traded on an established securities market) in any such jurisdiction represents previously unreported income of such person taxable in the year of the transfer.

'(c) Rebutting the Presumptions- The presumptions established in this section may be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence, including detailed documentary, testimonial, and transactional evidence, establishing that --

'(1) in subsection (a), such taxpayer exercised no control, directly or indirectly, over such entity at the time in question, and

'(2) in subsection (b), such amounts or things of value did not represent income related to such United States person.

Any court having jurisdiction of a civil proceeding in which control of such an offshore entity or the income character of such receipts or amounts transferred is an issue shall prohibit the introduction by the taxpayer of any foreign based document that is not authenticated in open court by a person with knowledge of such document, or any other evidence supplied by a person outside the jurisdiction of a United States court, unless such person appears before the court.'.

(2) The table of subchapters for chapter 76 is amended by inserting after the item relating to subchapter E the following new item:

'subchapter f --presumptions for certain legal proceedings'.

(b) Definition of Offshore Secrecy Jurisdiction- Section 7701(a) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

'(50) OFFSHORE SECRECY JURISDICTION-

'(A) IN GENERAL- The term 'offshore secrecy jurisdiction' means any foreign jurisdiction which is listed by the Secretary as an offshore secrecy jurisdiction for purposes of this title.

'(B) DETERMINATION OF JURISDICTIONS ON LIST- A jurisdiction shall be listed under paragraph (A) if the Secretary determines that such jurisdiction has corporate, business, bank, or tax secrecy rules and practices which, in the judgment of the Secretary, unreasonably restrict the ability of the United States to obtain information relevant to the enforcement of this title, unless the Secretary also determines that such country has effective information exchange practices.

'(C) SECRECY OR CONFIDENTIALITY RULES AND PRACTICES- For purposes of subparagraph (B), corporate, business, bank, or tax secrecy or confidentiality rules and practices include both formal laws and regulations and informal government or business practices having the effect of inhibiting access of law enforcement and tax administration authorities to beneficial ownership and other financial information.

'(D) INEFFECTIVE INFORMATION EXCHANGE PRACTICES- For purposes of subparagraph (B), a jurisdiction shall be deemed to have ineffective information exchange practices unless the Secretary determines, on an annual basis, that --

'(i) such jurisdiction has in effect a treaty or other information exchange agreement with the United States that provides for the prompt, obligatory, and automatic exchange of such information as is forseeably relevant for carrying out the provisions of the treaty or agreement or the administration or enforcement of this title,

'(ii) during the 12-month period preceding the annual determination, the exchange of information between the United States and such jurisdiction was in practice adequate to prevent evasion or avoidance of United States income tax by United States persons and to enable the United States effectively to enforce this title, and

'(iii) during the 12-month period preceding the annual determination, such jurisdiction was not identified by an intergovernmental group or organization of which the United States is a member as uncooperative with international tax enforcement or information exchange and the United States concurs in such identification.

'(E) INITIAL LIST OF OFFSHORE SECRECY JURISDICTIONS- For purposes of this paragraph, each of the following foreign jurisdictions, which have been previously and publicly identified by the Internal Revenue Service as secrecy jurisdictions in Federal court proceedings, shall be deemed listed by the Secretary as an offshore secrecy jurisdiction unless delisted by the Secretary under subparagraph (F)(ii):

'(i) Anguilla.

'(ii) Antigua and Barbuda.

'(iii) Aruba.

'(iv) Bahamas.

'(v) Barbados.

'(vi) Belize.

'(vii) Bermuda.

'(viii) British Virgin Islands.

'(ix) Cayman Islands.

'(x) Cook Islands.

'(xi) Costa Rica.

'(xii) Cyprus.

'(xiii) Dominica.

'(xiv) Gibraltar.

'(xv) Grenada.

'(xvi) Guernsey/Sark/Alderney.

'(xvii) Hong Kong.

'(xviii) Isle of Man.

'(xix) Jersey.

'(xx) Latvia.

'(xxi) Liechtenstein.

'(xxii) Luxembourg.

'(xxiii) Malta.

'(xxiv) Nauru.

'(xxv) Netherlands Antilles.

'(xxvi) Panama.

'(xxvii) Samoa.

'(xxviii) St. Kitts and Nevis.

'(xxix) St. Lucia.

'(xxx) St. Vincent and the Grenadines.

'(xxxi) Singapore.

'(xxxii) Switzerland.

'(xxxiii) Turks and Caicos.

'(xxxiv) Vanuatu.

'(F) MODIFICATIONS TO LIST- The Secretary --

'(i) shall add to the list under paragraph (A) jurisdictions which meet the requirements of paragraph (B), and

'(ii) may remove from such list only those jurisdictions which do not meet the requirements of paragraph (B).'.

(c) Presumptions for Securities Law Purposes- Section 21 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78u) is amended by adding at the end the following the following new subsection:

'(j) Presumptions Pertaining to Control and Beneficial Ownership-

'(1) CONTROL- For purposes of any civil judicial or administrative proceeding under this title, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that a United States person (other than an entity with shares regularly traded on an established securities market) who directly or indirectly formed, transferred assets to, was a beneficiary of, had a beneficial interest in, or received money or property or the use thereof from an entity, including a trust, corporation, limited liability company, partnership, or foundation (other than an entity with shares regularly traded on an established securities market), formed, domiciled, or operating in an offshore secrecy jurisdiction (as defined in section 7701(a)(50) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986), exercised control over such entity. The presumption of control created by this paragraph shall not be applied to prevent the Commission from determining or arguing the absence of control.

'(2) BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP- For purposes of any civil judicial or administrative proceeding under this title, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that securities that are nominally owned by an entity, including a trust, corporation, limited liability company, partnership, or foundation (other than an entity with shares regularly traded on an established securities market), formed, domiciled, or operating in an offshore secrecy jurisdiction (as so defined), are beneficially owned by any United States person (other than an entity with shares regularly traded on an established securities market) who directly or indirectly exercised control over such entity. The presumption of beneficial ownership created by this paragraph shall not be applied to prevent the Commission from determining or arguing the absence of beneficial ownership.'.

(d) Presumption for Reporting Purposes Relating to Foreign Financial Accounts-Section 5314 of title 31, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

'(d) Rebuttable Presumption- For purposes of this section, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that any account with a financial institution formed, domiciled, or operating in an offshore secrecy jurisdiction (as defined in section 7701(a)(50) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986) contains funds in an amount that is at least sufficient to require a report prescribed by regulations under this section.'.

(e) Regulatory Authority and Effective Date-

(1) REGULATORY AUTHORITY- Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission shall each adopt regulations or other guidance necessary to implement the amendments made by this section. The Secretary and the Chairman may by regulation or guidance provide that the presumption of control shall not extend to particular classes of transactions, such as corporate reorganizations or transactions below a specified dollar threshold, if either determines that applying such amendments to such transactions is not necessary to carry out the purposes of such amendments.

(2) EFFECTIVE DATE- The amendments made by this section shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act.



SEC. 102. AUTHORIZING SPECIAL MEASURES AGAINST FOREIGN JURISDICTIONS, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, AND OTHERS THAT IMPEDE UNITED STATES TAX ENFORCEMENT.

Section 5318A of title 31, United States Code, is amended --

(1) by striking the section heading and inserting the following:

'Sec. 5318A. Special measures for jurisdictions, financial institutions, or international transactions that are of primary money laundering concern or impede United States tax enforcement';

(2) in subsection (a), by striking the subsection heading and inserting the following:

'(a) Special Measures To Counter Money Laundering and Efforts To Impede United States Tax Enforcement- ';

(3) in subsection (c), by striking the subsection heading and inserting the following:

'(c) Consultations and Information To Be Considered in Finding Jurisdictions, Institutions, Types of Accounts, or Transactions To Be of Primary Money Laundering Concern or To Be Impeding United States Tax Enforcement- ';

(4) in subsection (a)(1), by inserting 'or is impeding United States tax enforcement' after 'primary money laundering concern';

(5) in subsection (a)(4) --

(A) in subparagraph (A) --

(i) by inserting 'in matters involving money laundering,' before 'shall consult'; and

(ii) by striking 'and' at the end;

(B) by redesignating subparagraph (B) as subparagraph (C); and

(C) by inserting after subparagraph (A) the following:

'(B) in matters involving United States tax enforcement, shall consult with the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service, the Secretary of State, the Attorney General of the United States, and in the sole discretion of the Secretary, such other agencies and interested parties as the Secretary may find to be appropriate; and';

(6) in each of paragraphs (1)(A), (2), (3), and (4) of subsection (b), by inserting 'or to be impeding United States tax enforcement' after 'primary money laundering concern' each place that term appears;

(7) in subsection (b), by striking paragraph (5) and inserting the following:

'(5) PROHIBITIONS OR CONDITIONS ON OPENING OR MAINTAINING CERTAIN CORRESPONDENT OR PAYABLE-THROUGH ACCOUNTS OR AUTHORIZING CERTAIN PAYMENT CARDS- If the Secretary finds a jurisdiction outside of the United States, 1 or more financial institutions operating outside of the United States, or 1 or more classes of transactions within or involving a jurisdiction outside of the United States to be of primary money laundering concern or to be impeding United States tax enforcement, the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Attorney General of the United States, and the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, may prohibit, or impose conditions upon --

'(A) the opening or maintaining in the United States of a correspondent account or payable-through account; or

'(B) the authorization, approval, or use in the United States of a credit card, charge card, debit card, or similar credit or debit financial instrument by any domestic financial institution, financial agency, or credit card company or association, for or on behalf of a foreign banking institution, if such correspondent account, payable-through account, credit card, charge card, debit card, or similar credit or debit financial instrument, involves any such jurisdiction or institution, or if any such transaction may be conducted through such correspondent account, payable-through account, credit card, charge card, debit card, or similar credit or debit financial instrument.'; and

(8) in subsection (c)(1), by inserting 'or is impeding United States tax enforcement' after 'primary money laundering concern';

(9) in subsection (c)(2)(A) --

(A) in clause (ii), by striking 'bank secrecy or special regulatory advantages' and inserting 'bank, tax, corporate, trust, or financial secrecy or regulatory advantages';

(B) in clause (iii), by striking 'supervisory and counter-money' and inserting 'supervisory, international tax enforcement, and counter-money';

(C) in clause (v), by striking 'banking or secrecy' and inserting 'banking, tax, or secrecy'; and

(D) in clause (vi), by inserting ', tax treaty, or tax information exchange agreement' after 'treaty';

(10) in subsection (c)(2)(B) --

(A) in clause (i), by inserting 'or tax evasion' after 'money laundering'; and

(B) in clause (iii), by inserting ', tax evasion,' after 'money laundering'; and

(11) in subsection (d), by inserting 'involving money laundering, and shall notify, in writing, the Committee on Finance of the Senate and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives of any such action involving United States tax enforcement' after 'such action'.



SEC. 103. TREATMENT OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS MANAGED AND CONTROLLED IN THE UNITED STATES AS DOMESTIC CORPORATIONS.

(a) In General- Section 7701 (relating to definitions) is amended by redesignating subsection (o) as subsection (p) and by inserting after subsection (n) the following new subsection:

'(o) Certain Corporations Managed and Controlled in the United States Treated as Domestic for Income Tax-

'(1) IN GENERAL- Notwithstanding subsection (a)(4), in the case of a corporation described in paragraph (2) if --

'(A) the corporation would not otherwise be treated as a domestic corporation for purposes of this title, but

'(B) the management and control of the corporation occurs, directly or indirectly, primarily within the United States, then, solely for purposes of chapter 1 (and any other provision of this title relating to chapter 1), the corporation shall be treated as a domestic corporation.

'(2) CORPORATION DESCRIBED-

'(A) IN GENERAL- A corporation is described in this paragraph if --

'(i) the stock of such corporation is regularly traded on an established securities market, or

'(ii) the aggregate gross assets of such corporation (or any predecessor thereof), including assets under management for investors, whether held directly or indirectly, at any time during the taxable year or any preceding taxable year is $50,000,000 or more.

'(B) GENERAL EXCEPTION- A corporation shall not be treated as described in this paragraph if --

'(i) such corporation was treated as a corporation described in this paragraph in a preceding taxable year,

'(ii) such corporation --

'(I) is not regularly traded on an established securities market, and

'(II) has, and is reasonably expected to continue to have, aggregate gross assets (including assets under management for investors, whether held directly or indirectly) of less than $50,000,000, and

'(iii) the Secretary grants a waiver to such corporation under this subparagraph.

'(C) EXCEPTION FROM GROSS ASSETS TEST- Subparagraph (A)(ii) shall not apply to a corporation which is a controlled foreign corporation (as defined in section 957) and which is a member of an affiliated group (as defined section 1504, but determined without regard to section 1504(b)(3)) the common parent of which --

'(i) is a domestic corporation (determined without regard to this subsection), and

'(ii) has substantial assets (other than cash and cash equivalents and other than stock of foreign subsidiaries) held for use in the active conduct of a trade or business in the United States.

'(3) MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL-

'(A) IN GENERAL- The Secretary shall prescribe regulations for purposes of determining cases in which the management and control of a corporation is to be treated as occurring primarily within the United States.

'(B) EXECUTIVE OFFICERS AND SENIOR MANAGEMENT- Such regulations shall provide that --

'(i) the management and control of a corporation shall be treated as occurring primarily within the United States if substantially all of the executive officers and senior management of the corporation who exercise day-to-day responsibility for making decisions involving strategic, financial, and operational policies of the corporation are located primarily within the United States, and

'(ii) individuals who are not executive officers and senior management of the corporation (including individuals who are officers or employees of other corporations in the same chain of corporations as the corporation) shall be treated as executive officers and senior management if such individuals exercise the day-to day responsibilities of the corporation described in clause (i).

'(C) CORPORATIONS PRIMARILY HOLDING INVESTMENT ASSETS- Such regulations shall also provide that the management and control of a corporation shall be treated as occurring primarily within the United States if --

'(i) the assets of such corporation (directly or indirectly) consist primarily of assets being managed on behalf of investors, and

'(ii) decisions about how to invest the assets are made in the United States.'.

(b) Effective Date- The amendments made by this section shall apply to taxable years beginning on or after the date which is 2 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.



SEC. 104. ALLOWING MORE TIME FOR INVESTIGATIONS INVOLVING OFFSHORE SECRECY JURISDICTIONS.

(a) In General- Section 6501(c) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

'(11) RETURNS INVOLVING OFFSHORE SECRECY JURISDICTIONS- In the case of a return for a year in which the taxpayer directly or indirectly formed, owned, transferred assets to, was a beneficiary of, had a beneficial interest in, or received money or property or the use thereof from a financial account or an entity (other than an entity with shares regularly traded on an established securities market), including a trust, corporation, limited liability company, partnership, or foundation formed, located, domiciled or operating in an offshore secrecy jurisdiction, the tax may be assessed, or a proceeding in court for the collection of such tax may be begun without assessment, at any time within 6 years after the return was filed.'.

(b) Effective Date- The amendment made by this section shall apply to --

(1) returns filed after the date of the enactment of this Act, and

(2) returns filed on or before such date if the period specified in section 6501 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (determined without regard to the amendments made by subsection (a)) for assessment of such taxes has not expired as of such date.



SEC. 105. REPORTING UNITED STATES BENEFICIAL OWNERS OF FOREIGN OWNED FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS.

(a) In General- Subpart B of part III of subchapter A of chapter 61 is amended by inserting after section 6045B the following new sections:



'SEC. 6045C. RETURNS REGARDING UNITED STATES BENEFICIAL OWNERS OF FOREIGN OWNED FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS.

'(a) Requirement of Return- If --

'(1) any withholding agent under sections 1441 and 1442 has the control, receipt, custody, disposal, or payment of any amount constituting gross income from sources within the United States of any foreign entity, including a trust, corporation, limited liability company, partnership, or foundation (other than an entity with shares regularly traded on an established securities market), and

'(2) such withholding agent determines for purposes of titles 14, 18, or 31 of the United States Code that a United States person has any beneficial interest in the foreign entity or in the account in such entity's name (hereafter in this section referred to as 'United States beneficial owner'), then the withholding agent shall make a return according to the forms or regulations prescribed by the Secretary.

'(b) Required Information- For purposes of subsection (a) the information required to be included on the return shall include --

'(1) the name, address, and, if known, the taxpayer identification number of the United States beneficial owner,

'(2) the known facts pertaining to the relationship of such United States beneficial owner to the foreign entity and the account,

'(3) the gross amount of income from sources within the United States (including gross proceeds from brokerage transactions), and

'(4) such other information as the Secretary may by forms or regulations provide.

'(c) Statements To Be Furnished to Beneficial Owners With Respect to Whom Information Is Required To Be Reported- A withholding agent required to make a return under subsection (a) shall furnish to each United States beneficial owner whose name is required to be set forth in such return a statement showing --

'(1) the name, address, and telephone number of the information contact of the person required to make such return, and

'(2) the information required to be shown on such return with respect to such United States beneficial owner.

The written statement required under the preceding sentence shall be furnished to the United States beneficial owner on or before January 31 of the year following the calendar year for which the return under subsection (a) was required to be made. In the event the person filing such return does not have a current address for the United States beneficial owner, such written statement may be mailed to the address of the foreign entity.



'SEC. 6045D. RETURNS BY FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS REGARDING ESTABLISHMENT OF ACCOUNTS AND CREATION OF ENTITIES IN OFFSHORE SECRECY JURISDICTIONS.

'(a) Requirement of Return- Any financial institution directly or indirectly --

'(1) opening a bank, brokerage, or other financial account, or

'(2) forming or acquiring an entity, including a trust, corporation, limited liability company, partnership, or foundation (other than an entity with shares regularly traded on an established securities market), in an offshore secrecy jurisdiction at the direction of, on behalf of, or for the benefit of a United States person shall make a return according to the forms or regulations prescribed by the Secretary.

'(b) Required Information- For purposes of subsection (a) the information required to be included on the return shall include --

'(1) the name, address, and taxpayer identification number of such United States person,

'(2) the name and address of the financial institution at which a financial account is opened, the type of account, the account number, the name under which the account was opened, and the amount of the initial deposit,

'(3) the name and address of an entity formed or acquired, the type of entity, and the name and address of any company formation agent or other professional employed to form or acquire the entity, and

'(4) such other information as the Secretary may by forms or regulations provide.

'(c) Statements To Be Furnished to United States Persons With Respect to Whom Information Is Required To Be Reported- A financial institution required to make a return under subsection (a) shall furnish to each United States person whose name is required to be set forth in such return a statement showing --

'(1) the name, address, and telephone number of the information contact of the person required to make such return, and

'(2) the information required to be shown on such return with respect to such United States person.

The written statement required under the preceding sentence shall be furnished to such United States person on or before January 31 of the year following the calendar year for which the return under subsection (a) was required to be made.

'(d) Exemption- The Secretary may by regulations exempt any class of United States persons or any class of accounts or entities from the requirements of this section if the Secretary determines that applying this section to such persons, accounts, or entities is not necessary to carry out the purposes of this section.'.

(b) Penalties-

(1) RETURNS- Section 6724(d)(1)(B) is amended by redesignating clauses (v) through (xxiii) as clauses (vii) through (xxv), respectively, and by inserting after clause (iv) the following new clauses:

'(v) section 6045C(a) (relating to returns regarding United States beneficial owners of foreign owned financial accounts),

'(vi) section 6045D(a) (relating to returns by financial institutions regarding establishment of accounts and creation of entities in offshore secrecy jurisdictions),'.

(2) PAYEE STATEMENTS- Section 6724(d)(2) is amended by redesignating subparagraphs (K) through (FF) as subparagraphs (M) through (HH), respectively, and by inserting after subparagraph (J) the following new subparagraphs:

'(K) section 6045C(c) (relating to returns regarding United States beneficial owners of foreign owned financial accounts),

'(L) section 6045D(c) (relating to returns by financial institutions regarding establishment of accounts and creation of entities in offshore secrecy jurisdictions),'.

(c) Clerical Amendment- The table of sections for such subpart is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 6045B the following new items:

'Sec. 6045C. Returns regarding United States beneficial owners of foreign owned financial accounts.

'Sec. 6045D. Returns by financial institutions regarding establishment of accounts and creation of entities in offshore secrecy jurisdictions.'.

(d) Additional Penalties-

(1) ADDITIONAL PENALTIES ON BANKS- Section 5239(b)(1) of the Revised Statutes (12 U.S.C. 93(b)(1)) is amended by inserting 'or any of the provisions of section 6045D of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986,' after 'any regulation issued pursuant to,'.

(2) ADDITIONAL PENALTIES ON SECURITIES FIRMS- Section 21(d)(3)(A) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78u(d)(3)(A)) is amended by inserting 'any of the provisions of section 6045D of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986,' after 'the rules or regulations thereunder,'.

(e) Regulatory Authority and Effective Date-

(1) REGULATORY AUTHORITY- Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury shall adopt regulations, forms, or other guidance necessary to implement this section.

(2) EFFECTIVE DATE- Section 6045C of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (as added by this section) and the amendment made by subsection (d)(1) shall take effect with respect to amounts paid into foreign owned accounts after December 31 of the year of the date of the enactment of this Act. Section 6045D of such Code (as so added) and the amendment made by subsection (d)(2) shall take effect with respect to accounts opened or entities formed or acquired after December 31 of the year of the date of the enactment of this Act.



SEC. 106. PREVENTING MISUSE OF FOREIGN TRUSTS FOR TAX EVASION.

(a) Attribution of Trust Protector Powers to Grantors- Section 672 is amended by redesignating subsection (f) as subsection (g) and by inserting after subsection (e) the following new subsection:

'(f) Grantor Treated as Holding Any Power or Interest of Trust Protector or Enforcer- For purposes of this subpart, a grantor shall be treated as holding any power or interest held by any trust protector or trust enforcer or similar person appointed to advise, influence, oversee, or veto the actions of the trustee.'.

(b) Treatment of United States Recipients of Foreign Trust Assets as Trust Beneficiaries- Section 679 is amended by redesignating subsections (c) and (d) as subsections (d) and (e), respectively, and by inserting after subsection (b) the following new subsection:

'(c) Certain United States Persons Treated as Beneficiaries- Any United States person receiving from a foreign trust cash or other property, or receiving the use thereof, shall be treated as a beneficiary of such trust regardless of whether such person is a named beneficiary, except to the extent that such person paid fair market value for the benefit received.'.

(c) Treatment of Foreign Trust Transfers of Real Estate, Artwork, or Jewelry Consistently With Transfers of Securities- Section 643(i)(1) is amended by striking 'or marketable securities' and inserting 'or other property, including real estate, marketable securities, artwork, jewelry, and other personal property,'.

(d) Treatment of Trusts With Future or Contingent United States Beneficiaries- Section 679(a)(1) is amended --

(1) by inserting 'or for any subsequent year' after 'such year', and

(2) by inserting '(including a contingent beneficiary)' after 'beneficiary'.



SEC. 107. LIMITATION ON LEGAL OPINION PROTECTION FROM PENALTIES WITH RESPECT TO TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING OFFSHORE SECRECY JURISDICTIONS.

(a) In General- Section 6664 is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

'(e) Certain Opinions May Not Be Relied Upon- For purposes of this part, an opinion of a tax advisor may not be relied upon to establish that there was reasonable cause for any portion of an underpayment, or that the taxpayer acted in good faith with respect to such portion, if such portion is attributable to a transaction any part of which involves an entity or financial account in an offshore secrecy jurisdiction.'.

(b) Regulatory Authority- The Secretary of the Treasury may by regulation or guidance provide that subsection (e) of section 6664 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as added by subsection (a), does not apply to legal opinions that express a confidence level that substantially exceeds the 'more likely than not' confidence level; or that such subsection does not apply to classes of transactions, such as corporate reorganizations, where the Secretary determines that applying such subsection to such transactions is not necessary to carry out the purposes of such subsection.



SEC. 108. CLOSING THE OFFSHORE DIVIDEND TAX LOOPHOLE.

(a) In General- Section 871 is amended by redesignating subsection (l) as subsection (m) and by inserting after subsection (k) the following new subsection:

'(l) Treatment of Dividend Equivalents and Substitute Dividend Payments-

'(1) IN GENERAL- For purposes of this section and section 881 --

'(A) the term 'dividend' shall include dividend equivalents and substitute dividends,

'(B) a dividend equivalent with respect to the stock of one or more domestic corporations shall be treated as sourced within the United States, and

'(C) a substitute dividend payment shall be sourced in the same manner as a dividend distribution with respect to the transferred security to which the substitute dividend relates.

'(2) DIVIDEND EQUIVALENT- For purposes of this subsection --

'(A) IN GENERAL- The term 'dividend equivalent' includes any payment that is made pursuant to a notional principal contract and is contingent upon, or is referenced to, the payment of a dividend on stock or the payment of a dividend on property that is substantially similar or related to stock (determined in a manner similar to the manner under section 246(c)(4)(C)).

'(B) NOTIONAL PRINCIPAL CONTRACT- For purposes of subparagraph (A), the term 'notional principal contract' means a financial instrument that provides for the payment of amounts by 1 party to another at specified intervals calculated by reference to a specified index upon a notional principal amount in exchange for specified consideration or a promise to pay similar amounts.

'(3) SUBSTITUTE DIVIDEND- For purposes of this subsection --

'(A) IN GENERAL- The term 'substitute dividend' means a payment, made to the transferor of a security in a securities lending transaction or a sale-repurchase transaction, of an amount equivalent to a dividend distribution which the owner of the transferred security is entitled to receive during the term of the transaction.

'(B) SECURITIES LENDING TRANSACTION- For purposes of subparagraph (A), the term 'securities lending transaction' means a transfer of 1 or more securities that is described in section 1058(a) or a substantially similar transaction.

'(C) SALE-REPURCHASE TRANSACTION- For purposes of subparagraph (A), the term 'sale-repurchase transaction' means an agreement under which a person transfers a security in exchange for cash and simultaneously agrees to receive substantially identical securities from the transferee in the future in exchange for cash.

'(4) COORDINATION WITH TAX TREATIES- The meaning of the term 'dividend' in any income tax convention shall be construed to include dividend equivalents and substitute dividends in accordance with this section.

'(5) PREVENTION OF OVER-WITHHOLDING- In the case of any dividend equivalent or substitute dividend that is subject to withholding under this section or section 881, the Secretary may by regulation reduce such withholding, but only to the extent that the taxpayer can establish that the dividend for which the payment to be withheld upon is a dividend equivalent or a substitute dividend that was previously withheld upon under this section or under section 881.'.

(b) Regulations-

(1) PROPOSED RULE- Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury (or the Secretary's designee) shall issue proposed regulations relating to section 871(l) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (as added by this section).

(2) FINAL RULE- Not later than 150 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury (or the Secretary's designee) shall issue final regulations relating to such section.

(3) MATTERS INCLUDED- The regulations issued pursuant to this subsection shall require the imposition of withholding --

(A) in cases where dividend equivalent payments under notional principal contracts are netted with other payments under the same instrument,

(B) in cases where fees and other payments are netted to disguise the characterization of a payment as a substitute dividend, and

(C) in cases where option or forward contracts (or similar arrangements) achieve the same or substantially similar economic results as the notional principal contracts covered under section 871(l) of such Code.

(c) Qualified Intermediaries- The Secretary of the Treasury (or the Secretary's designee) shall ensure that any qualified intermediary withholding agreement that the United States enters into or renews after the date of the enactment of this Act with a foreign financial institution or foreign branch of a United States financial institution conforms with the amendments made by this section to ensure appropriate withholding related to dividend equivalents and substitute dividends.

(d) Effective Date- The amendments made by this section shall apply to payments made on or after the date that is 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(e) Rule of Construction- Nothing in this section or the amendments made by this section shall be construed to limit the authority of the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service to collect taxes, interest, and penalties on dividend equivalent or substitute dividend payments (as defined in section 871(l) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986) made prior to the date of the enactment of this Act in connection with swap agreements, stock loan transactions, or other financial transactions involving nonresident aliens or foreign corporations.



SEC. 109. REPORTING OF ACTIVITIES WITH RESPECT TO PASSIVE FOREIGN INVESTMENT COMPANIES.

(a) In General- Section 1298 is amended by redesignating subsection (f) as subsection (g) and by inserting after subsection (e) the following new subsection:

'(f) Reporting Requirement- Each person who is a shareholder of, or who directly or indirectly forms, transfers assets to, is a beneficiary of, has a beneficial interest in, or receives money or property or the use thereof from, a passive foreign investment company shall file a report containing such information as the Secretary may require.'.

(b) Conforming Amendment- Subsection (e) of section 1291 is amended by striking ', (d), and (f)' and inserting 'and (d)'.

(c) Effective Date- The amendments made by this section take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act.



TITLE II --OTHER MEASURES TO COMBAT TAX HAVEN AND TAX SHELTER ABUSES



SEC. 201. PENALTY FOR FAILING TO DISCLOSE OFFSHORE HOLDINGS.

(a) Securities Exchange Act of 1934- Section 21(d)(3)(B) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78u(d)(3)(B)) is amended by adding at the end the following:

'(iv) FOURTH TIER- Notwithstanding clauses (i), (ii), and (iii), the amount of the penalty for each such violation shall not exceed $1,000,000 for any person if the violation described in subparagraph (A) involved a knowing failure to disclose any holding or transaction involving equity or debt instruments of an issuer and known by such person to involve a foreign entity, including any trust, corporation, limited liability company, partnership, or foundation that is directly or indirectly controlled by such person, and which would have been otherwise subject to disclosure by such person under this title.'.

(b) Securities Act of 1933- Section 20(d)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. 77t(d)(2)) is amended by adding at the end the following:

'(D) FOURTH TIER- Notwithstanding subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C), the amount of penalty for each such violation shall not exceed $1,000,000 for any person, if the violation described in paragraph (1) involved a knowing failure to disclose any holding or transaction involving equity or debt instruments of an issuer and known by such person to involve a foreign entity, including any trust, corporation, limited liability company, partnership, or foundation, directly or indirectly controlled by such person, and which would have been otherwise subject to disclosure by such person under this title.'.

(c) Investment Company Act of 1940- Section 9(d)(2) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-9(d)(2)) is amended by adding at the end the following:

'(D) FOURTH TIER- Notwithstanding subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C), the amount of penalty for each such violation shall not exceed $1,000,000 for any person, if the violation described in paragraph (1) involved a knowing failure to disclose any holding or transaction involving equity or debt instruments of an issuer and known by such person to involve a foreign entity, including any trust, corporation, limited liability company, partnership, or foundation, directly or indirectly controlled by such person, and which would have been otherwise subject to disclosure by such person under this title.'.

(d) Investment Advisers Act of 1940- Section 203(i)(2) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80b-3(i)(2)) is amended by adding at the end the following:

'(D) FOURTH TIER- Notwithstanding subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C), the amount of penalty for each such violation shall not exceed $1,000,000 for any person, if the violation described in paragraph (1) involved a knowing failure to disclose any holding or transaction involving equity or debt instruments of an issuer and known by such person to involve a foreign entity, including any trust, corporation, limited liability company, partnership, or foundation, directly or indirectly controlled by such person, and which would have been otherwise subject to disclosure by such person under this title.'.



SEC. 202. DEADLINE FOR ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING RULE FOR HEDGE FUNDS AND PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS.

(a) In General-

(1) PROPOSED RULE- Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Chairman of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, shall publish a proposed rule in the Federal Register requiring unregistered investment companies, including hedge funds or private equity funds, to establish anti-money laundering programs and submit suspicious activity reports under subsections (g) and (h) of section 5318 of title 31, United States Code.

(2) FINAL RULE- Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury shall publish a final rule in the Federal Register on the matter described in paragraph (1).

(b) Contents- The final rule published under this section --

(1) shall require, at a minimum, that to safeguard against terrorist financing and money laundering, all unregistered investment companies shall --

(A) use risk-based due diligence policies, procedures, and controls that are reasonably designed to ascertain the identity of any foreign person (including the nominal and beneficial owner or beneficiary of a foreign corporation, partnership, trust, or other foreign entity) planning to supply or supplying funds to be invested with the advice or assistance of that unregistered investment company; and

(B) be subject to section 5318(k)(2) of title 31, United States Code; and

(2) may incorporate aspects of the proposed rule for unregistered investment companies published in the Federal Register on September 26, 2002 (67 Fed. Reg. 60617) (relating to anti-money laundering programs).

(c) Definitions- In this section --

(1) the terms 'investment company' and 'issuer' have the same meanings as in section 2 of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-2); and

(2) the term 'unregistered investment company' means an issuer that would be an investment company, but for the exclusion under paragraph (1) or (7) of section 3(c) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-3(c)).



SEC. 203. ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING REQUIREMENTS FOR FORMATION AGENTS.

(a) Anti-Money Laundering Obligations for Formation Agents- Section 5312(a)(2) of title 31, United States Code, is amended, by --

(1) in subparagraph (Y), by striking 'or' at the end;

(2) by redesignating subparagraph (Z) as subparagraph (AA); and

(3) by inserting after subparagraph (Y) the following:

'(Z) persons involved in forming new corporations, limited liability companies, partnerships, trusts, or other legal entities; or'.

(b) Deadline for Anti-Money Laundering Rule for Formation Agents- Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, after consulting with the Attorney General of the United States, the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service, and Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Secretary of the Treasury shall publish a proposed rule in the Federal Register requiring persons described in section 5312(a)(2)(Z) of title 31, United States Code, as added by this section, to establish anti-money laundering programs under subsection (h) of section 5318 of that title. The Secretary shall publish such rule in final form in the Federal Register not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.



SEC. 204. STRENGTHENING SUMMONS IN CASES INVOLVING OFFSHORE SECRECY JURISDICTIONS.

(a) In General- Subsection (f) of section 7609 is amended to read as follows:

'(f) Additional Requirement in the Case of a John Doe Summons-

'(1) GENERAL RULE- Any summons described in subsection (c)(1) which does not identify the person with respect to whose liability the summons is issued may be served only after a court proceeding in which the Secretary establishes that --

'(A) the summons relates to the investigation of a particular person or ascertainable group or class of persons,

'(B) there is a reasonable basis for believing that such person or group or class of persons may fail or may have failed to comply with any provision of any internal revenue law, and

'(C) the information sought to be obtained from the examination of the records or testimony (and the identity of the person or persons with respect to whose liability the summons is issued) is not readily available from other sources.

'(2) EXCEPTION- Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any summons which specifies that it is limited to information regarding a United States correspondent account (as defined in section 5318A(e)(1)(B) of title 31, United States Code) or a United States payable-through account (as defined in section 5318A(e)(1)(C) of such title) of a financial institution in an offshore secrecy jurisdiction.

'(3) PRESUMPTION IN CASES INVOLVING OFFSHORE SECRECY JURISDICTIONS- For purposes of this section, in any case in which the particular person or ascertainable group or class of persons have financial accounts in or transactions related to offshore secrecy jurisdictions, there shall be a presumption that there is a reasonable basis for believing that such person or group or class of persons may fail or may have failed to comply with provisions of internal revenue law.

'(4) PROJECT JOHN DOE SUMMONSES-

'(A) IN GENERAL- Notwithstanding the requirements of paragraph (1), the Secretary may issue a summons described in paragraph (1) if the summons --

'(i) relates to a project which is approved under subparagraph (B),

'(ii) is issued to a person who is a member of the group or class established under subparagraph (B)(i), and

'(iii) is issued within 3 years of the date on which such project was approved under subparagraph (B).

'(B) APPROVAL OF PROJECTS- A project may only be approved under this subparagraph after a court proceeding in which the Secretary establishes that --

'(i) any summons issues with respect to the project will be issued to a member of an ascertainable group or class of persons, and

'(ii) any summons issued with respect to such project will meet the requirements of subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C) of paragraph (1).

'(C) EXTENSION- Upon application of the Secretary, the court may extend the time for issuing such summonses under subparagraph (A)(i) for additional 3-year periods, but only if the court continues to exercise oversight of such project under subparagraph (D).

'(D) ONGOING COURT OVERSIGHT- During any period in which the Secretary is authorized to issue summonses in relation to a project approved under subparagraph (B) (including during any extension under subparagraph (C)), the Secretary shall report annually to the court on the use of such authority, provide copies of all summonses with such report, and comply with the court's direction with respect to the issuance of any John Doe summons under such project.'.

(b) Jurisdiction of Court-

(1) IN GENERAL- Paragraph (1) of section 7609(h) is amended by inserting after the first sentence the following new sentence: 'Any United States district court in which a member of the group or class to which a summons may be issued resides or is found shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine the approval of a project under subsection (f)(4)(B).'.

(2) CONFORMING AMENDMENT- The first sentence of section 7609(h)(1) is amended by striking '(f)' and inserting '(f)(1)'.

(c) Effective Date- The amendments made by this section shall apply to summonses issued after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(d) GAO Report- Not later than the date which is 5 years after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General of the United States shall issue a report on the implementation of section 7609(f)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as added by this section.



SEC. 205. IMPROVING ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN FINANCIAL ACCOUNT REPORTING.

(a) Clarifying the Connection of Foreign Financial Account Reporting to Tax Administration- Paragraph (4) of section 6103(b) (relating to tax administration) is amended by adding at the end the following new sentence:

'For purposes of clause (i), section 5314 of title 31, United States Code, and sections 5321 and 5322 of such title (as such sections pertain to such section 5314), shall be considered to be an internal revenue law.'.

(b) Simplifying the Calculation of Foreign Financial Account Reporting Penalties- Section 5321(a)(5)(D)(ii) of title 31, United States Code, is amended by striking 'the balance in the account at the time of the violation' and inserting 'the highest balance in the account during the reporting period to which the violation relates'.

(c) Clarifying the Use of Suspicious Activity Reports Under the Bank Secrecy Act for Civil Tax Law Enforcement- Section 5319 of title 31, United States Code, is amended by inserting 'the civil and criminal enforcement divisions of the Internal Revenue Service,' after 'including'.



TITLE III --COMBATING TAX SHELTER PROMOTERS



SEC. 301. PENALTY FOR PROMOTING ABUSIVE TAX SHELTERS.

(a) Penalty for Promoting Abusive Tax Shelters- Section 6700 (relating to promoting abusive tax shelters, etc.) is amended --

(1) by redesignating subsections (b) and (c) as subsections (d) and (e), respectively,

(2) by striking 'a penalty' and all that follows through the period in the first sentence of subsection (a) and inserting 'a penalty determined under subsection (b)', and

(3) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new subsections:

'(b) Amount of Penalty; Calculation of Penalty; Liability for Penalty-

'(1) AMOUNT OF PENALTY- The amount of the penalty imposed by subsection (a) shall not exceed 150 percent of the gross income derived (or to be derived) from such activity by the person or persons subject to such penalty.

'(2) CALCULATION OF PENALTY- The penalty amount determined under paragraph (1) shall be calculated with respect to each instance of an activity described in subsection (a), each instance in which income was derived by the person or persons subject to such penalty, and each person who participated in such an activity.

'(3) LIABILITY FOR PENALTY- If more than 1 person is liable under subsection (a) with respect to such activity, all such persons shall be jointly and severally liable for the penalty under such subsection.

'(c) Penalty Not Deductible- The payment of any penalty imposed under this section or the payment of any amount to settle or avoid the imposition of such penalty shall not be considered an ordinary and necessary expense in carrying on a trade or business for purposes of this title and shall not be deductible by the person who is subject to such penalty or who makes such payment.'.

(b) Conforming Amendment- Section 6700(a) is amended by striking the last sentence.

(c) Effective Date- The amendments made by this section shall apply to activities after the date of the enactment of this Act.



SEC. 302. PENALTY FOR AIDING AND ABETTING THE UNDERSTATEMENT OF TAX LIABILITY.

(a) In General- Section 6701(a) (relating to imposition of penalty) is amended --

(1) by inserting 'the tax liability or' after 'respect to,' in paragraph (1),

(2) by inserting 'aid, assistance, procurement, or advice with respect to such' before 'portion' both places it appears in paragraphs (2) and (3), and

(3) by inserting 'instance of aid, assistance, procurement, or advice or each such' before 'document' in the matter following paragraph (3).

(b) Amount of Penalty- Subsection (b) of section 6701 (relating to penalties for aiding and abetting understatement of tax liability) is amended to read as follows:

'(b) Amount of Penalty; Calculation of Penalty; Liability for Penalty-

'(1) AMOUNT OF PENALTY- The amount of the penalty imposed by subsection (a) shall not exceed 150 percent of the gross income derived (or to be derived) from such aid, assistance, procurement, or advice provided by the person or persons subject to such penalty.

'(2) CALCULATION OF PENALTY- The penalty amount determined under paragraph (1) shall be calculated with respect to each instance of aid, assistance, procurement, or advice described in subsection (a), each instance in which income was derived by the person or persons subject to such penalty, and each person who made such an understatement of the liability for tax.

'(3) LIABILITY FOR PENALTY- If more than 1 person is liable under subsection (a) with respect to providing such aid, assistance, procurement, or advice, all such persons shall be jointly and severally liable for the penalty under such subsection.'.

(c) Penalty Not Deductible- Section 6701 is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

'(g) Penalty Not Deductible- The payment of any penalty imposed under this section or the payment of any amount to settle or avoid the imposition of such penalty shall not be considered an ordinary and necessary expense in carrying on a trade or business for purposes of this title and shall not be deductible by the person who is subject to such penalty or who makes such payment.'.

(d) Effective Date- The amendments made by this section shall apply to activities after the date of the enactment of this Act.



SEC. 303. TAX PLANNING INVENTIONS NOT PATENTABLE.

(a) In General- Section 101 of title 35, United States Code, is amended --

(1) by striking 'Whoever' and inserting '(a) Patentable Inventions-Whoever', and

(2) by adding at the end the following:

'(b) Tax Planning Inventions-

'(1) UNPATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER- A patent may not be obtained for a tax planning invention.

'(2) DEFINITIONS- For purposes of paragraph (1) --

'(A) the term 'tax planning invention' means a plan, strategy, technique, scheme, process, or system that is designed to reduce, minimize, determine, avoid, or defer, or has, when implemented, the effect of reducing, minimizing, determining, avoiding, or deferring, a taxpayer's tax liability or is designed to facilitate compliance with tax laws, but does not include tax preparation software and other tools or systems used solely to prepare tax or information returns,

'(B) the term 'taxpayer' means an individual, entity, or other person (as defined in section 7701 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986),

'(C) the terms 'tax', 'tax laws', 'tax liability', and 'taxation' refer to any Federal, State, county, city, municipality, foreign, or other governmental levy, assessment, or imposition, whether measured by income, value, or otherwise, and

'(D) the term 'State' means each of the several States, the District of Columbia, and any commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States.'.

(b) Applicability- The amendments made by this section --

(1) shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act,

(2) shall apply to any application for patent or application for a reissue patent that is --

(A) filed on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, or

(B) filed before that date if a patent or reissue patent has not been issued pursuant to the application as of that date, and

(3) shall not be construed as validating any patent issued before the date of the enactment of this Act for an invention described in section 101(b) of title 35, United States Code, as added by this section.



SEC. 304. PROHIBITED FEE ARRANGEMENT.

(a) In General- Section 6701, as amended by this Act, is amended --

(1) by redesignating subsections (f) and (g) as subsections (g) and (h), respectively,

(2) by striking 'subsection (a).' in paragraphs (2) and (3) of subsection (g) (as redesignated by paragraph (1)) and inserting 'subsection (a) or (f).', and

(3) by inserting after subsection (e) the following new subsection:

'(f) Prohibited Fee Arrangement-

'(1) IN GENERAL- Any person who makes an agreement for, charges, or collects a fee which is for services provided in connection with the internal revenue laws, and the amount of which is calculated according to, or is dependent upon, a projected or actual amount of --

'(A) tax savings or benefits, or

'(B) losses which can be used to offset other taxable income, shall pay a penalty with respect to each such fee activity in the amount determined under subsection (b).

'(2) RULES- The Secretary may issue rules to carry out the purposes of this subsection and may provide exceptions for fee arrangements that are in the public interest.'.

(b) Effective Date- The amendments made by this section shall apply to fee agreements, charges, and collections made after the date of the enactment of this Act.



SEC. 305. PREVENTING TAX SHELTER ACTIVITIES BY FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.

(a) Examinations-

(1) DEVELOPMENT OF EXAMINATION TECHNIQUES- Each of the Federal banking agencies and the Commission shall, in consultation with the Internal Revenue Service, develop examination techniques to detect potential violations of section 6700 or 6701 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, by depository institutions, brokers, dealers, and investment advisers, as appropriate.

(2) IMPLEMENTATION- Each of the Federal banking agencies and the Commission shall implement the examination techniques developed under paragraph (1) with respect to each of the depository institutions, brokers, dealers, or investment advisers subject to their enforcement authority. Such examination shall, to the extent possible, be combined with any examination by such agency otherwise required or authorized by Federal law.

(b) Report to Internal Revenue Service- In any case in which an examination conducted under this section with respect to a financial institution or other entity reveals a potential violation, such agency shall promptly notify the Internal Revenue Service of such potential violation for investigation and enforcement by the Internal Revenue Service, in accordance with applicable provisions of law.

(c) Report to Congress- The Federal banking agencies and the Commission shall submit a joint written report to Congress in 2010 and 2013 on their progress in preventing violations of sections 6700 and 6701 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, by depository institutions, brokers, dealers, and investment advisers, as appropriate.

(d) Definitions- For purposes of this section --

(1) the terms 'broker', 'dealer', and 'investment adviser' have the same meanings as in section 3 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78c);

(2) the term 'Commission' means the Securities and Exchange Commission;

(3) the term 'depository institution' has the same meaning as in section 3(c) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1813(c));

(4) the term 'Federal banking agencies' has the same meaning as in section 3(q) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1813(q)); and

(5) the term 'Secretary' means the Secretary of the Treasury.



SEC. 306. INFORMATION SHARING FOR ENFORCEMENT PURPOSES.

(a) Promotion of Prohibited Tax Shelters or Tax Avoidance Schemes- Section 6103(h) (relating to disclosure to certain Federal officers and employees for purposes of tax administration, etc.) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

'(7) DISCLOSURE OF RETURNS AND RETURN INFORMATION RELATED TO PROMOTION OF PROHIBITED TAX SHELTERS OR TAX AVOIDANCE SCHEMES-

'(A) WRITTEN REQUEST- Upon receipt by the Secretary of a written request which meets the requirements of subparagraph (B) from the head of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, an appropriate Federal banking agency as defined under section 1813(q) of title 12, United States Code, or the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, a return or return information shall be disclosed to such requestor's officers and employees who are personally and directly engaged in an investigation, examination, or proceeding by such requestor to evaluate, determine, penalize, or deter conduct by a financial institution, issuer, or public accounting firm, or associated person, in connection with a potential or actual violation of section 6700 (promotion of abusive tax shelters), 6701 (aiding and abetting understatement of tax liability), or activities related to promoting or facilitating inappropriate tax avoidance or tax evasion. Such disclosure shall be solely for use by such officers and employees in such investigation, examination, or proceeding. In the discretion of the Secretary, such disclosure may take the form of the participation of Internal Revenue Service employees in a joint investigation, examination, or proceeding with the Securities Exchange Commission, Federal banking agency, or Public Company Accounting Oversight Board.

'(B) REQUIREMENTS- A request meets the requirements of this subparagraph if it sets forth --

'(i) the nature of the investigation, examination, or proceeding,

'(ii) the statutory authority under which such investigation, examination, or proceeding is being conducted,

'(iii) the name or names of the financial institution, issuer, or public accounting firm to which such return information relates,

'(iv) the taxable period or periods to which such return information relates, and

'(v) the specific reason or reasons why such disclosure is, or may be, relevant to such investigation, examination or proceeding.

'(C) FINANCIAL INSTITUTION- For the purposes of this paragraph, the term 'financial institution' means a depository institution, foreign bank, insured institution, industrial loan company, broker, dealer, investment company, investment advisor, or other entity subject to regulation or oversight by the United States Securities and Exchange Commission or an appropriate Federal banking agency.'.

(b) Financial and Accounting Fraud Investigations- Section 6103(i) (relating to disclosure to Federal officers or employees for administration of Federal laws not relating to tax administration) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

'(9) DISCLOSURE OF RETURNS AND RETURN INFORMATION FOR USE IN FINANCIAL AND ACCOUNTING FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS-

'(A) WRITTEN REQUEST- Upon receipt by the Secretary of a written request which meets the requirements of subparagraph (B) from the head of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission or the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, a return or return information shall be disclosed to such requestor's officers and employees who are personally and directly engaged in an investigation, examination, or proceeding by such requester to evaluate the accuracy of a financial statement or report, or to determine whether to require a restatement, penalize, or deter conduct by an issuer, investment company, or public accounting firm, or associated person, in connection with a potential or actual violation of auditing standards or prohibitions against false or misleading statements or omissions in financial statements or reports. Such disclosure shall be solely for use by such officers and employees in such investigation, examination, or proceeding.

'(B) REQUIREMENTS- A request meets the requirements of this subparagraph if it sets forth --

'(i) the nature of the investigation, examination, or proceeding,

'(ii) the statutory authority under which such investigation, examination, or proceeding is being conducted,

'(iii) the name or names of the issuer, investment company, or public accounting firm to which such return information relates,

'(iv) the taxable period or periods to which such return information relates, and

'(v) the specific reason or reasons why such disclosure is, or may be, relevant to such investigation, examination or proceeding.'.

(c) Effective Date- The amendments made by this section shall apply to disclosures and to information and document requests made after the date of the enactment of this Act.



SEC. 307. DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION TO CONGRESS.

(a) Disclosure by Tax Return Preparer-

(1) IN GENERAL- Subparagraph (B) of section 7216(b)(1) (relating to disclosures) is amended to read as follows:

'(B) pursuant to any 1 of the following documents, if clearly identified:

'(i) The order of any Federal, State, or local court of record.

'(ii) A subpoena issued by a Federal or State grand jury.

'(iii) An administrative order, summons, or subpoena which is issued in the performance of its duties by --

'(I) any Federal agency, including Congress or any committee or subcommittee thereof, or

'(II) any State agency, body, or commission charged under the laws of the State or a political subdivision of the State with the licensing, registration, or regulation of tax return preparers.'.

(2) EFFECTIVE DATE- The amendment made by this subsection shall apply to disclosures made after the date of the enactment of this Act pursuant to any document in effect on or after such date.

(b) Disclosure by Secretary- Paragraph (2) of section 6104(a) (relating to inspection of applications for tax exemption or notice of status) is amended to read as follows:

'(2) INSPECTION BY CONGRESS-

'(A) IN GENERAL- Upon receipt of a written request from a committee or subcommittee of Congress, copies of documents related to a determination by the Secretary to grant, deny, revoke, or restore an organization's exemption from taxation under section 501 shall be provided to such committee or subcommittee, including any application, notice of status, or supporting information provided by such organization to the Internal Revenue Service; any letter, analysis, or other document produced by or for the Internal Revenue Service evaluating, determining, explaining, or relating to the tax exempt status of such organization (other than returns, unless such returns are available to the public under this section or section 6103 or 6110); and any communication between the Internal Revenue Service and any other party relating to the tax exempt status of such organization.

'(B) ADDITIONAL INFORMATION- Section 6103(f) shall apply with respect to --

'(i) the application for exemption of any organization described in subsection (c) or (d) of section 501 which is exempt from taxation under section 501(a) for any taxable year and any application referred to in subparagraph (B) of subsection (a)(1) of this section, and

'(ii) any other papers which are in the possession of the Secretary and which relate to such application, as if such papers constituted returns.'.

(c) Effective Date- The amendments made by this section shall apply to disclosures and to information and document requests made after the date of the enactment of this Act.



SEC. 308. TAX OPINION STANDARDS FOR TAX PRACTITIONERS.

Section 330(d) of title 31, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:

'(d) The Secretary of the Treasury shall impose standards applicable to the rendering of written advice with respect to any listed transaction or any entity, plan, arrangement, or other transaction which has a potential for tax avoidance or evasion. Such standards shall address, but not be limited to, the following issues:

'(1) Independence of the practitioner issuing such written advice from persons promoting, marketing, or recommending the subject of the advice.

'(2) Collaboration among practitioners, or between a practitioner and other party, which could result in such collaborating parties having a joint financial interest in the subject of the advice.

'(3) Avoidance of conflicts of interest which would impair auditor independence.

'(4) For written advice issued by a firm, standards for reviewing the advice and ensuring the consensus support of the firm for positions taken.

'(5) Reliance on reasonable factual representations by the taxpayer and other parties.

'(6) Appropriateness of the fees charged by the practitioner for the written advice.

'(7) Preventing practitioners and firms from aiding or abetting the understatement of tax liability by clients.

'(8) Banning the promotion of potentially abusive or illegal tax shelters.'.



SEC. 309. DENIAL OF DEDUCTION FOR CERTAIN FINES, PENALTIES, AND OTHER AMOUNTS.

(a) In General- Subsection (f) of section 162 (relating to trade or business expenses) is amended to read as follows:

'(f) Fines, Penalties, and Other Amounts-

'(1) IN GENERAL- Except as provided in paragraph (2), no deduction otherwise allowable shall be allowed under this chapter for any amount paid or incurred (whether by suit, agreement, or otherwise) to, or at the direction of, a government or entity described in paragraph (4) in relation to the violation of any law or the investigation or inquiry by such government or entity into the potential violation of any law.

'(2) EXCEPTION FOR AMOUNTS CONSTITUTING RESTITUTION- Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any amount which --

'(A) the taxpayer establishes constitutes restitution (including remediation of property) for damage or harm caused by or which may be caused by the violation of any law or the potential violation of any law, and

'(B) is identified as restitution in the court order or settlement agreement.

Identification pursuant to subparagraph (B) alone shall not satisfy the requirement under subparagraph (A). This paragraph shall not apply to any amount paid or incurred as reimbursement to the government or entity for the costs of any investigation or litigation.

'(3) EXCEPTION FOR AMOUNTS PAID OR INCURRED AS THE RESULT OF CERTAIN COURT ORDERS- Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any amount paid or incurred by order of a court in a suit in which no government or entity described in paragraph (4) is a party.

'(4) CERTAIN NONGOVERNMENTAL REGULATORY ENTITIES- An entity is described in this paragraph if it is --

'(A) a nongovernmental entity which exercises self-regulatory powers (including imposing sanctions) in connection with a qualified board or exchange (as defined in section 1256(g)(7)), or

'(B) to the extent provided in regulations, a nongovernmental entity which exercises self-regulatory powers (including imposing sanctions) as part of performing an essential governmental function.

'(5) EXCEPTION FOR TAXES DUE- Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any amount paid or incurred as taxes due.'.

(b) Effective Date- The amendment made by this section shall apply to amounts paid or incurred on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, except that such amendment shall not apply to amounts paid or incurred under any binding order or agreement entered into before such date. Such exception shall not apply to an order or agreement requiring court approval unless the approval was obtained before such date.



TITLE IV --REQUIRING ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE



SEC. 401. CLARIFICATION OF ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE DOCTRINE.

(a) In General- Section 7701, as amended by section 103, is amended by redesignating subsection (p) as subsection (q) and by inserting after subsection (o) the following new subsection:

'(p) Clarification of Economic Substance Doctrine; Etc-

'(1) GENERAL RULES-

'(A) IN GENERAL- In any case in which a court determines that the economic substance doctrine is relevant for purposes of this title to a transaction (or series of transactions), such transaction (or series of transactions) shall have economic substance only if the requirements of this paragraph are met.

'(B) DEFINITION OF ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE- For purposes of subparagraph (A) --

'(i) IN GENERAL- A transaction has economic substance only if --

'(I) the transaction changes in a meaningful way (apart from Federal tax effects) the taxpayer's economic position, and

'(II) subject to clause (iii), the taxpayer has a substantial purpose (other than a Federal tax purpose) for entering into such transaction.

'(ii) SPECIAL RULE WHERE TAXPAYER RELIES ON PROFIT POTENTIAL- A transaction shall not be treated as having economic substance solely by reason of having a potential for profit unless the present value of the reasonably expected pre-Federal tax profit from the transaction is substantial in relation to the present value of the expected net Federal tax benefits that would be allowed if the transaction were respected. In determining pre-Federal tax profit, there shall be taken into account fees and other transaction expenses and to the extent provided by the Secretary, foreign taxes.

'(iii) SPECIAL RULES FOR DETERMINING WHETHER NON-FEDERAL TAX PURPOSE-For purposes of clause (i)(II) --

'(I) a purpose of achieving a financial accounting benefit shall not be taken into account in determining whether a transaction has a substantial purpose (other than a Federal tax purpose) if the origin of such financial accounting benefit is a reduction of Federal tax, and

'(II) the taxpayer shall not be treated as having a substantial purpose (other than a Federal tax purpose) with respect to a transaction if the only such purpose is the reduction of non-Federal taxes and the transaction will result in a reduction of Federal taxes substantially equal to, or greater than, the reduction in non-Federal taxes because of similarities between the laws imposing the taxes.

'(2) DEFINITIONS AND SPECIAL RULES- For purposes of this subsection --

'(A) ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE DOCTRINE- The term 'economic substance doctrine' means the common law doctrine under which tax benefits under subtitle A with respect to a transaction are not allowable if the transaction does not have economic substance or lacks a business purpose.

'(B) EXCEPTION FOR PERSONAL TRANSACTIONS OF INDIVIDUALS- In the case of an individual, this subsection shall apply only to transactions entered into in connection with a trade or business or an activity engaged in for the production of income.

'(3) OTHER PROVISIONS NOT AFFECTED- Except as specifically provided in this subsection, the provisions of this subsection shall not be construed as altering or supplanting any other rule of law or provision of this title, and the requirements of this subsection shall be construed as being in addition to any such other rule of law or provision of this title.

'(4) REGULATIONS- The Secretary shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of this subsection. Such regulations may include exemptions from the application of this subsection.'.

(b) Effective Date- The amendments made by this section shall apply to transactions entered into after the date of the enactment of this Act.



SEC. 402. PENALTY FOR UNDERSTATEMENTS ATTRIBUTABLE TO TRANSACTIONS LACKING ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE, ETC.

(a) In General- Subchapter A of chapter 68 is amended by inserting after section 6662A the following new section:



'SEC. 6662B. PENALTY FOR UNDERSTATEMENTS ATTRIBUTABLE TO TRANSACTIONS LACKING ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE, ETC.

'(a) Imposition of Penalty- If a taxpayer has an noneconomic substance transaction understatement for any taxable year, there shall be added to the tax an amount equal to 30 percent of the amount of such understatement.

'(b) Reduction of Penalty for Disclosed Transactions- Subsection (a) shall be applied by substituting '20 percent' for '30 percent' with respect to the portion of any noneconomic substance transaction understatement with respect to which the relevant facts affecting the tax treatment of the item are adequately disclosed in the return or a statement attached to the return.

'(c) Noneconomic Substance Transaction Understatement- For purposes of this section --

'(1) IN GENERAL- The term 'noneconomic substance transaction understatement' means any amount which would be an understatement under section 6662A(b)(1) if section 6662A were applied by taking into account items attributable to noneconomic substance transactions rather than items to which section 6662A would apply without regard to this paragraph.

'(2) NONECONOMIC SUBSTANCE TRANSACTION- The term 'noneconomic substance transaction' means any transaction if there is a lack of economic substance (within the meaning of section 7701(p)(1)(B)) for the transaction giving rise to the claimed benefit.

'(d) Rules Applicable to Assertion, Compromise, and Collection of Penalty-

'(1) IN GENERAL- Only the Chief Counsel for the Internal Revenue Service may assert a penalty imposed under this section or may compromise all or any portion of such penalty. The Chief Counsel may delegate the authority under this paragraph only to an individual holding the position of chief of a branch within the Office of the Chief Counsel for the Internal Revenue Service.

'(2) SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS-

'(A) ASSERTION OF PENALTY- The Chief Counsel for the Internal Revenue Service (or the Chief Counsel's delegate under paragraph (1)) shall not assert a penalty imposed under this section unless, before the assertion of the penalty, the taxpayer is provided --

'(i) a notice of intent to assert the penalty, and

'(ii) an opportunity to provide to the Commissioner (or the Chief Counsel's delegate under paragraph (1)) a written response to the proposed penalty within a reasonable period of time after such notice.

'(B) COMPROMISE OF PENALTY- A compromise shall not result in a reduction in the penalty imposed by this section in an amount greater than the amount which bears the same ratio to the amount of the penalty determined without regard to the compromise as --

'(i) the reduction under the compromise in the noneconomic substance transaction understatement to which the penalty relates, bears to

'(ii) the amount of the noneconomic substance transaction understatement determined without regard to the compromise.

'(3) RULES RELATING TO RELEVANCY REQUIREMENT-

'(A) DETERMINATION OF RELEVANCE BY CHIEF COUNSEL- The Chief Counsel for the Internal Revenue Service (or the Chief Counsel's delegate under paragraph (1)) may assert, compromise, or collect a penalty imposed by this section with respect to a noneconomic substance transaction even if there has not been a court determination that the economic substance doctrine was relevant for purposes of this title to the transaction if the Chief Counsel (or delegate) determines that either was so relevant.

'(B) FINAL ORDER OF COURT- If there is a final order of a court that determines that the economic substance doctrine was not relevant for purposes of this title to a transaction (or series of transactions), any penalty imposed under this section with respect to the transaction (or series of transactions) shall be rescinded.

'(4) APPLICABLE RULES- The rules of paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 6707A(d) shall apply to a compromise under paragraph (1).

'(e) Coordination With Other Penalties- Except as otherwise provided in this part, the penalty imposed by this section shall be in addition to any other penalty imposed by this title.

'(f) Cross References-

'(1) For coordination of penalty with understatements under section 6662 and other special rules, see section 6662A(e).

'(2) For reporting of penalty imposed under this section to the Securities and Exchange Commission, see section 6707A(e).'.

(b) Coordination With Other Understatements and Penalties-

(1) The second sentence of section 6662(d)(2)(A) is amended by inserting 'and without regard to items with respect to which a penalty is imposed by section 6662B' before the period at the end.

(2) Subsection (e) of section 6662A is amended --

(A) in paragraph (1), by inserting 'and noneconomic substance transaction understatements' after 'reportable transaction understatements' both places it appears,

(B) in paragraph (2)(A) --

(i) by inserting '6662B or' before '6663' in the text, and

(ii) by striking 'penalty' in the heading and inserting 'and economic substance penalties',

(C) in paragraph (2)(B) --

(i) by inserting 'and section 6662B' after 'This section', and

(ii) by striking 'penalty' in the heading and inserting 'and economic substance penalties',

(D) in paragraph (3), by inserting 'or noneconomic substance transaction understatement' after 'reportable transaction understatement', and

(E) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

'(4) NONECONOMIC SUBSTANCE TRANSACTION UNDERSTATEMENT- For purposes of this subsection, the term 'noneconomic substance transaction understatement' has the meaning given such term by section 6662B(c).'.

(3) Subsection (e) of section 6707A is amended --

(A) by striking 'or' at the end of subparagraph (B), and

(B) by striking subparagraph (C) and inserting the following new subparagraphs:

'(C) is required to pay a penalty under section 6662B with respect to any noneconomic substance transaction, or

'(D) is required to pay a penalty under section 6662(h) with respect to any transaction and would (but for section 6662A(e)(2)(B)) have been subject to penalty under section 6662A at a rate prescribed under section 6662A(c) or to penalty under section 6662B,'.

(c) Clerical Amendment- The table of sections for part II of subchapter A of chapter 68 is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 6662A the following new item:

'Sec. 6662B. Penalty for understatements attributable to transactions lacking economic substance, etc.'.

(d) Effective Date- The amendments made by this section shall apply to transactions entered into after the date of the enactment of this Act.



SEC. 403. DENIAL OF DEDUCTION FOR INTEREST ON UNDERPAYMENTS ATTRIBUTABLE TO NONECONOMIC SUBSTANCE TRANSACTIONS.

(a) In General- Section 163(m) (relating to interest on unpaid taxes attributable to nondisclosed reportable transactions) is amended --

(1) by striking 'attributable' and all that follows and inserting the following: 'attributable to --

'(1) the portion of any reportable transaction understatement (as defined in section 6662A(b)) with respect to which the requirement of section 6664(d)(2)(A) is not met, or

'(2) any noneconomic substance transaction understatement (as defined in section 6662B(c)).', and

(2) by inserting 'and noneconomic substance transactions' in the heading thereof after 'transactions'.

(b) Effective Date- The amendments made by this section shall apply to transactions after the date of the enactment of this Act in taxable years ending after such date.
Edward Kleinbard, chief of staff, Joint Committee on Taxation, told tax practitioners that the limits on the current tax withholding system make it difficult to enforce international tax compliance. Kleinbard spoke at the Tax Executive Institute's 59th Midyear Conference in Washington, D.C., on March 31.

With respect to international tax enforcement, Kleinbard commented that "the global recession and the UBS scandal have created a Katrina-type moment. There is a push to improve tax enforcement and deter tax havens." Kleinbard emphasized that, for the first time, international tax enforcement is an agenda item at the G-20 summit.

Potential Solutions
Kleinbard stated that international tax enforcement requires a "coordinated global effort." Countries should collect all income information within their jurisdiction. In the alternative, Kleinbard suggested the withholding of U.S. tax from all investment income, with the investor seeking resolution if the income was wrongfully withheld.

Kleinbard admitted that both suggestions are "distasteful, intrusive and impose burdens." However, he added that taking such steps may be unavoidable in order to address the fundamental concerns of all countries.

Congressional Initiatives
Kleinbard described congressional action to combat offshore tax havens, including the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act (Sen 506). The bill would blacklist 34 countries and impose new reporting obligations on banks when a U.S. customer establishes a foreign bank account.

In addition, the Senate Finance Committee has prepared a discussion draft of a tax compliance bill. According to Kleinbard, the draft bill includes new due diligence requirements for tax return preparers. The bill also would include the Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR) rules in the tax code, Kleinbard explained.

Treasury/IRS Actions
The Treasury has entered into a new information exchange agreement with Belgium that would require Belgium to abandon its bank secrecy laws, Kleinbard remarked. Treasury has also given Liechtenstein a year to change its bank secrecy laws under an information exchange agreement, he added.

Kleinbard observed that the IRS has announced an "amnesty program" for people with offshore banks accounts (TAXDAY, 2009/03/27, I.3). Kleinbard further mentioned that the IRS is revising the qualified intermediary program to include reporting of all income of U.S. customers, not just U.S. source income.
IRS Announces New Voluntary Disclosure Terms for Offshore Account Holders, Sets Six-Month Deadlines
The IRS has announced new steps to coax U.S. taxpayers with undisclosed foreign bank accounts to come forward. In return for paying back taxes for the past six years, plus interest and a set of stiff penalties, the IRS will promise not to bring criminal charges or the 75-percent fraud penalty. IRS Commissioner Douglas H. Shulman announced this policy shift and clarification at a press briefing from his Washington, D.C. offices on March 26, at which he also released internal IRS documents that put the plan into motion.

"We believe the guidance represents a firm, but fair, resolution of these cases and will provide consistent treatment for taxpayers," Shulman explained. "The goal is to have a predictable set of outcomes to encourage people to come forward and take advantage of our voluntary disclosure practice while they still can." He set a deadline of six months for disclosures under the terms of the guidance, at which time the program will be re-evaluated.

The IRS has issued a series of three memoranda, and has revised the Internal Revenue Manual (IRM), to reflect updated policies concerning voluntary disclosure, primarily in connection with offshore transactions. Voluntary disclosure occurs when a taxpayer timely discloses information necessary to determine or correct the taxpayer's liability. The IRM continues to provide that its voluntary disclosure practices do not create any substantive or procedural rights for taxpayers, but are a matter of internal IRS practice.

Voluntary Disclosure Terms
Shulman emphasized that the terms being offered for the disclosure of offshore accounts are an outgrowth of current policy and carry penalties at a level consistent with voluntary disclosure programs in the past. Within this framework, Shulman enumerated the amounts that would need to be paid by taxpayers with heretofore undisclosed offshore accounts who "come clean" under the program:

--Back taxes due on newly disclosed assets for the last six years;

--Interest due on these back taxes for the last six years;

--A 20-percent accuracy-related under Code Sec. 6662 or a 25-percent delinquency penalty under Code Sec. 6651 for each tax year at issue; and

Looking to the past six years, a 20-percent penalty on the total balance of all the taxpayer's foreign bank accounts or assets during the year among the past six in which the accounts had their highest aggregate value.

CCH Comment. This latter penalty is reduced to 5 percent for passive investors in certain transactions.

While Shulman observed that the penalties demanded under the program are not insubstantial, he pointed to several advantages to participating taxpayers regarding what the IRS will not do:

--The IRS will not pursue charges of criminal tax evasion against taxpayers who voluntarily disclose their offshore assets under this new policy; and

--The IRS will not pursue other penalties against participating taxpayers, such as the Code Sec. 6663 fraud penalties (75-percent of the unpaid tax) or the statutory penalty for willful failure to file a TD F 90-22.1, Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts Report, (FBAR) (the greater of $100,000 or 50-percent of the foreign account balance) that both annually apply to undisclosed accounts and assets during the relevant tax years.

Shulman also touted the advantage to offshore account holders of "getting the matter behind them" and giving them certainty as to their tax liability.

In a follow-up comment, an IRS spokesman emphasized that "it is too late for any taxpayer who is under criminal investigation to make a voluntary disclosure. The IRS cannot discuss specific situations, but the voluntary disclosure process does not apply when the IRS has information related to a specific taxpayer from a criminal enforcement action."

CCH Comment. The issue apparently remains unclear as to whether taxpayers recently disclosed by the Swiss Bank, UBS, as holding undisclosed bank accounts in Switzerland may successfully participate in this initiative. The IRS provided reporters during the March 26 briefing a copy of Section 9.5.11.9 of the Internal Revenue Manual that holds taxpayers to have timely participated in the voluntary disclosure program if they disclose before the IRS has initiated a civil or criminal examination or notified the taxpayer of such an investigation. Their failure to disclose their accounts/assets before the IRS received notice under the UBS deferred prosecution agreement may, therefore, be irrelevant.

Other Documents Provided
In addition to the announcement of its penalty framework for voluntary disclosures of offshore accounts, the IRS also provided reporters with the following documents:

Offshore Case Development. An SBSE memorandum provides that field personnel should give priority treatment to offshore transactions and entities during examinations, with a special emphasis on detecting unreported income. Examiners are instructed to use all tools, including interviewing taxpayers, making third party contacts, and timely issuing summonses in order to gather information and make determinations about applicable penalties. Managers are asked to ensure that income and penalty considerations are fully developed and documented. The memorandum also advises that as of March 23, 2009, taxpayers will no longer be permitted to minimize penalties through the Last Chance Compliance Initiative (LCCI). Relevant portions of the IRM addressing the LCCI are in the process of being obsoleted. Taxpayers in open examinations where LCCI terms have been offered will be able to resolve their cases under LCCI if they respond to the examiner within 15 days of their prior notification.

Voluntary Disclosure. Another SBSE memorandum addresses a change in the processing of voluntary disclosure requests containing offshore issues. Such requests will continue to be initially screened by Criminal Investigation (CI) to determine eligibility for voluntary disclosure and, if involving only domestic issues, will be forwarded to Area Planning and Special Programs for civil processing. Voluntary disclosure eligibility for offshore issues, including those in current inventory, will be initially screened by CI, and forwarded to the Philadelphia Offshore Identification Unit (POIU) for processing.

For submitted, but as yet unresolved, disclosure requests forwarded to the POIU, an internal LMSB memorandum sets forth a liability and penalty framework to be used for processing such cases during the next six months. POIU is authorized to assess all taxes and interest going back six years, or the period of existence of an account/entity if shorter, require the taxpayer to file or amend all returns, and impose an applicable penalty as set forth in the memorandum.

Finally, the Internal Revenue Manual (IRM) has been updated to reflect the initial evaluation of voluntary disclosure requests by CI. Minor revisions to the examples of what constitutes voluntary and not voluntary disclosures have also been made.

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