Friday, June 26, 2009

TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION






Additional Actions Are Needed to Protect Taxpayers’ Rights During the Lien Due Process







June 16, 2009



Reference Number: 2009-30-089





This report has cleared the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration disclosure review process and information determined to be restricted from public release has been redacted from this document.



Redaction Legend:

1 = Tax Return/Return Information

3(d) = Identifying Information - Other Identifying Information of an Individual or Individuals



Phone Number | 202-622-6500

Email Address | inquiries@tigta.treas.gov

Web Site | http://www.tigta.gov



June 16, 2009





MEMORANDUM FOR COMMISSIONER, SMALL BUSINESS/SELF-EMPLOYED DIVISION



FROM: Michael R. Phillips /s/ Michael R. Phillips

Deputy Inspector General for Audit



SUBJECT: Final Audit Report – Additional Actions Are Needed to Protect Taxpayers’ Rights During the Lien Due Process (Audit # 200930001)



This report presents the results of our review to determine whether liens issued by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) comply with legal guidelines set forth in Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) Section (§) 6320 (a)[1] and related guidance in the Federal Tax Lien Handbook. The Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration is required by law to determine annually whether lien notices sent by the IRS comply with the legal guidelines in I.R.C. § 6320.[2] This is our eleventh annual audit to determine the IRS’ compliance with the law and with its own related internal guidelines when sending lien notices.

Impact on the Taxpayer

After filing Notices of Federal Tax Lien, the IRS must notify the affected taxpayers in writing, at their last known address,[3] within 5 business days of the lien filings. However, as noted in previous audits, the IRS has not always complied with this statutory requirement and did not always follow its own internal guidelines for notifying taxpayer representatives of the filing of lien notices. Therefore, some taxpayers’ rights to appeal the lien filings may have been jeopardized, and others may have had their rights violated when the IRS did not notify their representatives of lien filings.

Synopsis

The IRS attempts to collect Federal taxes due from taxpayers by sending letters, making telephone calls, and meeting face to face with taxpayers. The IRS has the authority to attach a claim to the taxpayer’s assets for the amount of unpaid tax when the taxpayer neglects or refuses to pay.[4] This claim is referred to as a Federal Tax Lien, which notifies interested parties that a lien exists.

Our review of a statistically valid sample of 125 Federal Tax Lien cases determined that in all 125 cases the IRS mailed lien notices in a timely manner, as required by I.R.C. § 6320 and internal procedures. However, the IRS did not always follow its own regulations and internal guidelines for notifying taxpayers’ representatives of the filing of lien notices. For 8 (30 percent) of the 27 cases in which the taxpayer had an authorized representative at the time of the lien actions, the IRS did not notify the taxpayer’s representative of the lien filing. The IRS did not have an automated process that updated taxpayer representative information directly with the system that generates the lien notices.

When an initial lien notice is returned because it could not be delivered and a different address is available for the taxpayer, the IRS does not always meet its statutory requirement to send the lien notice to the taxpayer’s last known address. For 234 (83 percent) of 283 cases, employees did not research IRS computer systems for different addresses. We also identified 17 cases for which a new lien notice should have been sent to the taxpayer at the updated address because the IRS systems listed the address prior to the lien filing. The 17 cases could involve legal violations because the IRS did not meet its statutory requirement of sending lien notices to the taxpayer’s last known address.

In August 2007, the IRS decentralized the processing of undelivered lien notices by returning them to the employees or functions requesting the lien instead of returning them to a single location. This was done because employees were not always researching undelivered notices timely and the IRS believes that the originating employee is in the best position to address undelivered lien notices. However, instead of improving the process, the number of undelivered notices that were not timely researched increased from 33 percent in Fiscal Year 2008 to nearly 83 percent in Fiscal Year 2009. This occurred, in part, because management oversight was not adequate to ensure undelivered mail was worked timely. In addition, management did not have the information necessary to monitor the processing of undelivered lien notices, which are now being returned to over 450 locations throughout the country instead of 1 centralized site.

To provide a method of monitoring and reviewing undelivered lien notices, the IRS established procedures to enable employees and managers to determine the mail status of lien notices without Automated Lien System (ALS)[5] research. These procedures require employees processing undelivered lien notices to input a specific transaction code with an appropriate action code to the Integrated Data Retrieval System[6] to indicate the reason the lien notice was returned (e.g., undelivered, unclaimed, or refused). This would allow management to monitor and track the status of undelivered lien notices. Our test of undelivered lien notices determined that the IRS is not complying with this procedure. The transaction code and associated action code were not input to the Integrated Data Retrieval System for any of the 283 undelivered lien notices that we sampled. Management recognized this problem prior to our review and began corrective action by revising the Internal Revenue Manual to require employees to enter the undeliverable lien information into the Integrated Data Retrieval System. Because the corrective action occurred after the period of our sample cases, we are not making a recommendation to address this problem. We will assess the effectiveness of the corrective action in next year’s review.

Recommendations

To ensure taxpayers’ representatives receive lien notices, we recommended that the Director, Collection, Small Business/Self-Employed Division, establish an automated process that would systemically upload taxpayer representative information directly from the Centralized Authorization File[7] to the ALS. In addition, the Director, Collection, Small Business/Self-Employed Division, should determine why lien notices were not sent to taxpayers’ representatives in the cases where the lien was initiated after the upload of Centralized Authorization File information to the Automated Collection System was automated and take actions to correct the problem. Also, to ensure accurate notification of lien filings, we recommended that the Director, Collection Policy, Small Business/Self-Employed Division, establish an automated check of a taxpayer’s last known address in the ALS prior to printing a lien notice.

Response

IRS management agreed with all of our recommendations and is taking corrective actions. The Director, Collection, Small Business/Self-Employed Division, will determine the feasibility of establishing an automated process that would systemically upload taxpayer representative information directly from the Centralized Authorization File to the ALS and, if feasible, request and implement programming enhancements. The Director, Collection, also reviewed the cases we identified in this report and has taken appropriate corrective actions. In addition, the Director, Collection, will review current programming of the systems interfacing with the ALS to ensure that taxpayer representative notifications are sent to the ALS for each lien when multiple liens are requested and, if required, prepare and issue memorandums to system owners requiring programming corrections be initiated to ensure that a separate taxpayer representative notification is issued with each lien request. Further, the Director, Collection Policy, will determine if the ALS can accommodate Integrated Data Retrieval System real-time data exchange and, if feasible, initiate programming work requests. Management’s complete response to the draft report is included as Appendix VII.

Copies of this report are also being sent to the IRS managers affected by the report recommendations. Please contact me at (202) 622-6510 if you have questions or Margaret E. Begg, Assistant Inspector General for Audit (Compliance and Enforcement Operations), at (202) 622-8510.





Table of Contents



Background

Results of Review

Lien Notices Were Mailed Timely

The Internal Revenue Service Did Not Comply With Regulations for Notifying Taxpayer Representatives

Recommendation 1:

Recommendation 2:

Ineffective Working of Undelivered Lien Notices Resulted in Potential Violations of Taxpayers’ Rights

Recommendation 3:

Appendices

Appendix I – Detailed Objective, Scope, and Methodology

Appendix II – Major Contributors to This Report

Appendix III – Report Distribution List

Appendix IV – Outcome Measures

Appendix V – Synopsis of the Internal Revenue Service Collection and Lien Filing Processes

Appendix VI – Internal Revenue Service Computer Systems Used in the Filing of Notices of Federal Tax Lien

Appendix VII – Management’s Response to the Draft Report





Abbreviations



ACS
Automated Collection System

ALS
Automated Lien System

CAF
Centralized Authorization File

ICS
Integrated Collection System

IDRS
Integrated Data Retrieval System

I.R.C.
Internal Revenue Code

IRS
Internal Revenue Service

SB/SE
Small Business/Self-Employed






Background



The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) attempts to collect Federal taxes due from taxpayers by sending letters, making telephone calls, and meeting face to face with taxpayers. The IRS has the authority to attach a claim to the taxpayer’s assets for the amount of unpaid tax when the taxpayer neglects or refuses to pay.[8] This claim is referred to as a Federal Tax Lien. The IRS files in appropriate local government offices a Notice of Federal Tax Lien[9] (lien notice), which notifies interested parties that a lien exists.

The IRS must notify taxpayers in writing of the filing of a Federal Tax Lien within 5 business days of the filing.

Since January 19, 1999, Internal Revenue Code Section (I.R.C. §) 6320[10] has required the IRS to notify taxpayers in writing within 5 business days of the filing of a Notice of Federal Tax Lien. The IRS is required to notify taxpayers the first time a Notice of Federal Tax Lien is filed for each tax period. The lien notice, Notice of Federal Tax Lien Filing and Your Right to a Hearing Under IRC 6320[11] (Letter 3172), is used for this purpose and advises taxpayers that they have 30 calendar days, after that 5-day period, to request a hearing with the IRS Appeals office. The lien notice indicates the date on which this 30-day period expires.

The law also requires that the lien notice explain, in simple terms, the amount of unpaid tax, administrative appeals available to the taxpayer, and provisions of the law and procedures relating to the release of liens on property. The lien notice must be given in person, left at the taxpayer’s home or business, or sent by certified or registered mail to the taxpayer’s last known address.[12]

Most lien notices are mailed to taxpayers by certified or registered mail rather than being delivered in person. The IRS Automated Lien System (ALS) generates a certified mail list which identifies each notice that is to be mailed. The notices and a copy of the certified mail list are delivered to the United States Postal Service. A Postal Service employee ensures that all notices are accounted for and date stamps the list and returns a copy to the IRS. The stamped certified mail list is the only documentation the IRS has that certifies the date on which the notices were mailed. A synopsis of the IRS collection and lien filing processes is included in Appendix V.

Depending on employee access, lien requests can be generated using one of three IRS systems: 1) the Integrated Collection System (ICS), 2) the Automated Collection System (ACS), or 3) the ALS. A description of IRS computer systems used in the filing of lien notices is included in Appendix VI.

The IRS has increased the number of Federal Tax Liens it has filed to protect the Federal Government’s interest. As shown in Figure 1, the number of Federal Tax Liens increased sharply in Fiscal Year 2001, decreased slightly in Fiscal Years 2004 and 2005, and has increased each year since then.

Figure 1: Number of Liens Filed From Fiscal Years 2000 - 2008

Figure 1 was removed due to its size. To see Figure 1, please go to the Adobe PDF version of the report on the TIGTA Public Web Page.[13]

The Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration is required to determine annually whether, when filing lien notices, the IRS complied with the law regarding the notifications of affected taxpayers and their representatives.[14] This is our eleventh annual audit to determine whether the IRS complied with the legal requirements of I.R.C. § 6320 and its own related internal guidelines for filing lien notices. In prior years, we reported that the IRS had not yet achieved full compliance with the law and its own internal guidelines. This year, our statistically valid sample did not identify any lien notices that were not mailed in a timely manner. However, we identified potential violations of taxpayer rights because the IRS did not notify the taxpayer’s representative. Our review of a judgmental sample of undelivered lien notices found potential violations of taxpayer rights when the IRS did not use the taxpayer’s last known address. Figure 2 shows the percentages of potential violations of taxpayer rights we identified during our prior annual audits.

Figure 2: Potential Violations of Taxpayer Rights Based on Timely Notification

Figure 2 was removed due to its size. To see Figure 2, please go to the Adobe PDF version of the report on the TIGTA Public Web Page..

We performed our audit work in the Small Business/Self-Employed (SB/SE) Division Office of Collection Policy in Washington, D.C., and the Centralized Lien Unit in Covington, Kentucky, during the period August 2008 through January 2009. We conducted this performance audit in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective. Detailed information on our audit objective, scope, and methodology is presented in Appendix I. Major contributors to the report are listed in Appendix II.





Results of Review



Lien Notices Were Mailed Timely

Our review of a statistically valid sample of 125 lien notices from the ALS did not identify any legal violations with I.R.C. § 6320. I.R.C. § 6320 requires the IRS to notify taxpayers in writing, at their last known address, within 5 business days of the filing of a Notice of Federal Tax Lien.

The majority of lien notices are sent to the taxpayers via certified mail. In order to support the timely notification of taxpayers, IRS procedures require retention of the date-stamped copy of the certified mail lists for 10 years after the end of the processing year. This year, the IRS was able to provide proof for the timely mailing of all 125 lien notices in our statistical sample. This is an improvement over our last year’s audit, in which the IRS could not provide proof of mailing for 3 percent of sampled lien notices.

The Internal Revenue Service Did Not Comply With Regulations for Notifying Taxpayer Representatives

Taxpayer representative information is contained on the Centralized Authorization File (CAF)[15] that is located on the Integrated Data Retrieval System (IDRS).[16] Using the IDRS, employees can research the CAF to identify the types of authorization given to taxpayer representatives.

IRS regulations[17] require that once a taxpayer representative has been recognized as such, he or she must be given copies of all correspondence issued to the taxpayer. This applies to all computer or manually generated notices or other written communications. Employees responsible for making lien filing determinations are to ensure that all appropriate persons, such as those with a taxpayer’s power of attorney, receive a notice of the lien filing and the taxpayer’s appeal rights. Specifically, IRS procedures require that a copy of the notice be sent to the taxpayer’s representative no later than 5 business days after the notice is sent to the taxpayer when a Notice of Federal Tax Lien is filed.

The ACS and the ICS interface with the ALS. In January 2008, the ACS implemented a process that provides CAF information to the ALS during the upload of the lien notice information. When a lien request is initiated on the ICS or the ACS, the taxpayer representative information on these systems is sent to the ALS as part of the lien request, which then generates the lien notice and any taxpayer representative copies. For this upload to be effective, the taxpayer representative data must be current and be on the CAF as well as the ACS or the ICS. For example, if a taxpayer submits a Power of Attorney and Declaration of Representative (Form 2848) to a revenue officer, the revenue officer must forward the Form 2848 to the Centralized Authorization Unit to ensure the representative information is input to the CAF. There is no interface between the ALS and the CAF, so representative information must be manually input to the ALS when a lien request is initiated on the ALS.

Our review of the statistically valid sample of 125 liens determined that 27 cases involved taxpayers with representatives authorized to receive notifications at the time the liens were filed. In 8 (30 percent) of the 27 cases, ALS records did not indicate that the IRS had sent copies of the lien notices to the representatives. Specifically:

Four of the eight liens were initiated in the ACS. ****(1, 3(d))**** The other three liens were initiated after the IRS automated the upload of CAF information to the ACS. IRS management indicated that a lien notice may not have been sent to taxpayer representatives because systemic problems may exist with the automated upload established in January 2008.
****(1)**** of the eight liens were initiated in the ICS. ****(1, 3(d))****
****(1)**** of the eight liens were initiated in the ALS. ****(1, 3(d))****
Taxpayers might be adversely affected if the IRS does not follow requirements to notify both the taxpayers and their representatives of the taxpayers’ rights related to liens. We projected that 45,554 taxpayer representatives may not have been provided lien notices, resulting in potential violations of the taxpayers’ right to have their representative notified of the filing of a lien notice.

In addition to this year’s results, Figure 3 shows the error rates reported on the notification of taxpayer representatives in our last three reports. While the error rate has been reduced from 76 percent in Fiscal Year 2006 to 30 percent in Fiscal Year 2009, the potential for violations still exist in nearly one third of all cases requiring taxpayer representative notification.

Figure 3: Error Rates Reported on Notification of Taxpayer Representatives

Fiscal
Year
Sampled Lien Cases Requiring Representative Notification
Sampled Lien Cases Not Receiving Representative Notification
Error Rate

2006
45
34
76%

2007
25
15
60%

2008
30
12
40%

2009
27
8
30%


Source: Prior and current year results of Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration tests of taxpayer representative notification.

In last year’s report,[18] we recommended that the Director, Collection, SB/SE Division, provide better oversight to ensure that employees notify taxpayer representatives of lien filings and computer enhancements are uploading power-of-attorney information as intended. Management agreed to establish taxpayer representative verification procedures for employees initiating liens. They also agreed to determine if the ACS and the CAF could include programming to match lien notice data with taxpayer representative data prior to sending lien requests to the ALS to ensure the Notice of Federal Tax Lien and the CAF had at least one matching tax period. This would ensure there was no potential for unauthorized disclosure. Management also agreed to identify any computer program enhancements to the lien process. These corrective actions were implemented before our sample selection. However, we did not identify any plans to enhance the automated processes, which would help reduce the number of taxpayer representatives who are not notified of lien filings.

Recommendations

The Director, Collection, SB/SE Division, should:

Recommendation 1: Establish an automated process that would systemically upload taxpayer representative information directly from the CAF to the ALS.

Management’s Response: IRS management agreed with this recommendation and will 1) determine the feasibility of establishing an automated process that would systemically upload taxpayer representative information directly from the CAF to the ALS and 2) if feasible, request and implement programming enhancements.



Recommendation 2: Determine why lien notices were not sent to taxpayers’ representatives in the cases where the lien was initiated after the implementation of the automated CAF process and take appropriate corrective actions to resolve the problem.

Management’s Response: IRS management agreed with this recommendation and has already taken corrective action by reviewing the cases we identified and taking appropriate corrective actions. They will also 1) review current programming of systems interfacing with the ALS with systems owners to ensure taxpayer representative notifications are sent to the ALS for each lien when multiple liens are requested and 2) if required, prepare and issue memorandums to system owners requiring programming corrections be initiated to ensure that a separate taxpayer representative notification is issued with each lien request.

Ineffective Working of Undelivered Lien Notices Resulted in Potential Violations of Taxpayers’ Rights

IRS procedures require that employees send another lien notice to a new address if 1) the originally mailed notice is returned as undelivered mail, 2) research confirms the original lien notice was not sent to the last known address, 3) a different address is available for the taxpayer, and 4) the address was effective prior to the lien notice filing. Employees are responsible for certain actions when notices are returned as undeliverable. For example, they should research the IRS computer system within 5 business days to ensure that the address on the original lien notice is correct. If the employee cannot find a new address on the computer system, the undelivered lien notice will be destroyed and a new notice is not issued.

If the address on the notice is not the last known address and a different address was in effect prior to issuance of the original lien notice, employees should issue a new notice to the better address. A new notice may be created by using an option in the ALS.

We selected a judgmental sample of 283 undelivered lien notices returned to the Cincinnati, Ohio, Service Center for the period November 18 through November 25, 2008. The sample included only returned mail identified as undelivered and did not include returned mail identified as refused or unclaimed. For these 283 notices, we reviewed computer system audit trails to determine whether IRS employees performed timely research to determine whether the addresses were correct on the originally mailed notices. Our results showed that employees are not timely researching IRS computer systems.

In 234 (83 percent) of 283 notices, employees did not perform required research of the IRS computer system for a different address within 5 business days of receipt of the returned notice. This is significantly higher than last year’s review in which employees did not timely perform the research in 33 percent of lien notices. Employees performed the required research within 5 days of receipt of the returned notice for the remaining 49 notices (17 percent).

Our test of undelivered lien notices identified 26 notices where the address on the IRS computer system and the original lien notice did not agree. For 9 (35 percent) of the 26 notices, the address on the IRS computer system was updated after the original lien notice was sent to the taxpayer. Per IRS procedures, no additional action was required. However, for 17 notices (65 percent), the address was updated prior to the issuance of the original lien notice and, according to IRS procedures, a new lien notice should have been sent to the taxpayer at the updated address. These cases could involve potential violations of taxpayer rights because the IRS did not meet its statutory requirement of sending each lien notice to the taxpayer’s last known address.

Lien notices are not sent to the most current addresses on the IDRS because, in part, the user guides and applicable procedures pertaining to the systems that generate lien requests are inconsistent in regards to verifying the current address of the taxpayer prior to preparing a lien. In addition, employees are not always following established procedures for verifying the current address of the taxpayer prior to preparing a lien request. Specifically, ACS procedures do not require the user to verify the taxpayer’s name and address prior to preparing a lien. In addition, the ALS does not perform an automated verification of the taxpayer’s last known address prior to printing the lien notice. Further, management oversight was not adequate to ensure that undelivered mail is worked appropriately. Management also indicated that the routing of the returned mail could have contributed to the cause of the untimely research of the undelivered mail (i.e., not within the required 5 business days of receipt).

In last year’s report, we identified similar conditions and recommended that the IRS provide better oversight to ensure that employees are properly controlling and processing returned mail as undelivered, researching computer systems for correct addresses, and resending lien notices. The IRS agreed to establish proper control and processing of undelivered lien notices and, in August 2007, revised its requirements to return undelivered lien notices to the employee or function requesting the lien. This corrective action was implemented before our sample selection. However, instead of correcting the problem, the number of undeliverable lien notices that were not timely researched by employees increased from 33 percent to nearly 83 percent. This may have occurred because employees were not following procedures designed to establish accountability and visibility in the decentralized environment.

Employees are not following new procedures designed to monitor undeliverable lien notices

In August 2007, the Director, Collection Policy, SB/SE Division, revised procedures for handling undelivered lien notices. The new procedures decentralized the processing of undelivered lien notices by returning them to the employee or function requesting the lien notice instead of returning them to a single location. To provide a method of reviewing undelivered lien notices, the Director, Collection, SB/SE Division, also established procedures to enable employees to determine the mail status of lien notices without ALS research. Specifically, employees handling undelivered lien notices are now required to input a specific IDRS transaction code with an appropriate action code. The transaction code and appropriate action code indicate the reason the lien notice was returned (i.e., undelivered, unclaimed, or refused). These codes are required to be entered into the IDRS after appropriate research of the returned lien notice is performed.

Our test of undelivered lien notices determined that employees are not complying with this procedure. None of the 283 undelivered lien notices that we sampled had the transaction code and associated action code input to the IDRS. Management believes that the requirements to enter these codes were not being enforced because, initially, procedures were not consistent. For example, ACS procedures for processing undelivered lien notices did not include any reference to the requirement. Management also indicated that the procedures may not have been clear.

Compliance with these procedures is important because it allows management to review the handling of undelivered lien notices. Undelivered lien notices are being sent back to over 450 Collection function groups throughout the country where the employees or functions that requested the liens are located. The combination of decentralizing the handling of undelivered lien notices and the failure of employees to update taxpayers’ data in the IDRS resulted in management’s inability to ensure and enforce the timely resolution of undelivered lien notices. This contributed to the number of undelivered lien notices that were not researched timely increasing from 33 percent in Fiscal Year 2008 to nearly 83 percent in Fiscal Year 2009.

Further, because employees are not following the procedures to enter the information into the IDRS, information about undelivered mail is limited to the employees working the undelivered mail. IRS management, including Accounts Management organization[19] employees and even Centralized Lien Unit employees, who have access to the ALS, do not have access to information on undelivered lien notices. As a result, Taxpayer Assistance Center[20] employees would not be able to answer taxpayer questions about their Federal Tax Liens.

Management was aware of this condition and issued a memorandum in May 2008 to remind Collection function employees of this requirement. However, an internal review in July 2008 found that transaction and action codes were not entered in all 63 cases the IRS sampled in its review. As a result, in January 2009, management revised Internal Revenue Manual sections specifying the requirement to enter information about undeliverable mail into the IDRS. This corrective action was taken after our sample selection and will be evaluated in next year’s review.

Recommendation

Recommendation 3: To ensure accurate notification of lien filings, the Director, Collection Policy, SB/SE Division, should establish an automated check of a taxpayer’s last known address within the ALS immediately prior to printing a lien notice. This automated check should include an increase in the frequency of updates of IDRS information to reach the ALS to provide more timely updates of taxpayer information.

Management’s Response: IRS management agreed with this recommendation and will 1) determine if the ALS can accommodate IDRS real-time data exchange and 2) if feasible, initiate programming work requests.



Appendix I



Detailed Objective, Scope, and Methodology



Our overall objective was to determine whether liens issued by the IRS comply with legal guidelines set forth in I.R.C. § 6320 (a)[21] and related guidance in the Federal Tax Lien Handbook. To accomplish the objective, we:

I. Determined whether taxpayer lien notices related to 125 Federal Tax Liens filed by the IRS complied with legal requirements set forth in I.R.C. § 6320 (a) and related internal guidelines.

A. Selected a statistically valid sample of 125 Federal Tax Lien cases from the ALS[22] extract of the 711,780 liens filed by the IRS nationwide between July 1, 2007, and June 30, 2008. We used a statistical sample because we wanted to project the number of cases with errors. We used attribute sampling to calculate the minimum sample size (n),[23] which we rounded to 125:

n = (Z2 p(1-p))/(A2)

Z = Confidence Level: 90 percent (expressed as 1.65 standard deviation)

p = Expected Rate of Occurrence: 4 percent (prior reports 5% - 3%)

A = Precision Rate: ±3 percent

B. Validated the ALS extract by comparing the sampled records to online data from the ALS and by reviewing management system evaluations that covered reliability, completeness, and accuracy.

C. Determined whether the sampled liens adhered to legal guidelines regarding timely notifications of lien filings to the taxpayer, the taxpayer’s spouse, or business partners by reviewing data from the ALS, ICS, ACS, IDRS, and the certified mail list.

D. Evaluated the controls and procedures established for transferring, storing, and safeguarding certified mail lists at the Centralized Case Processing function.

E. Determined whether taxpayers’ representatives were provided a copy of the lien due process notice by reviewing data from the ALS, IDRS, ICS, and ACS.

1. Reviewed IDRS screens for CAF indicators (Transaction Code 960) for all sampled cases.

2. Reviewed ALS history screens for accounts with CAF indicators to see if lien notices were mailed to taxpayers’ representatives within 5 business days of mailing the taxpayer’s notice.

F. Validated data from the ACS and the ICS by relying on the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration Data Center Warehouse[24] site procedures that ensure that data received from the IRS are valid. The Data Center Warehouse performs various procedures to ensure that it receives all the records in the ACS, ICS, and IRS databases. In addition, we scanned the data for reasonableness and are satisfied that the data are sufficient, complete, and relevant to the review. All the liens identified are in the appropriate period, and the data appear to be logical.

G. Provided all exception cases to Office of Collection Policy, SB/SE Division, for agreement to potential violations and corrective actions if appropriate.

II. Evaluated the procedures for processing lien notices[25] that are returned as undelivered.

A. Selected a judgmental sample of unprocessed mail containing undelivered lien notices received during the period November 18 through November 25, 2008, and recorded the taxpayer’s name, address, Social Security Number, and serial lien identification number. The judgmental sample included only returned mail identified as undelivered. The population of returned mail identified as undelivered is unknown because the IRS does not record the receipt of undelivered mail. A judgmental sample was used for this reason and the test was conducted to show weaknesses for which management needed to take corrective action.

B. Researched the IDRS using command code INOLES and determined whether the address on the Master File[26] matched the address on the undelivered lien notice for each sampled case.

C. Reviewed IDRS audit trails and determined whether IRS employees timely performed the required IDRS research for resolution of undelivered status for each sampled case.

D. Reviewed the IDRS and verified whether the Transaction Code 971 and corresponding action codes were entered into the IDRS for each sampled case.

III. Determined whether internal guidelines had been implemented or modified since our last review by discussing procedures and controls with appropriate IRS personnel in the National Headquarters.

IV. Determined the status of ICS and ACS system enhancements and any problems encountered.



Appendix II



Major Contributors to This Report



Margaret E. Begg, Assistant Inspector General for Audit (Compliance and Enforcement Operations)

Carl Aley, Director

Timothy Greiner, Audit Manager

Meaghan Shannon, Lead Auditor

Janis Zuika, Senior Auditor

Stephen Elix, Auditor

Curtis Kirschner, Auditor

Jeffrey Williams, Information Technology Specialist



Appendix III



Report Distribution List



Commissioner C

Office of the Commissioner – Attn: Chief of Staff C

Deputy Commissioner for Services and Enforcement SE

Deputy Commissioner, Small Business/Self Employed Division SE:S

Director, Collection, Small Business/Self-Employed Division SE:S:C

Director, Collection Policy, Small Business/Self-Employed Division SE:S:C:CP

Chief Counsel CC

National Taxpayer Advocate TA

Director, Office of Legislative Affairs CL:LA

Director, Office of Program Evaluation and Risk Analysis RAS:O

Office of Internal Control OS:CFO:CPIC:IC

Audit Liaison: Commissioner, Small Business/Self-Employed Division SE:S



Appendix IV



Outcome Measures



This appendix presents detailed information on the measurable impact that our recommended corrective actions will have on tax administration. These benefits will be incorporated into our Semiannual Report to Congress.

Type and Value of Outcome Measure:

· Taxpayer Rights and Entitlements – Potential; 45,554 taxpayer representatives may not have been provided Notices of Federal Tax Lien and Your Right to a Hearing Under I.R.C. § 6320 (Letter 3172),[27] resulting in potential violations of taxpayers’ rights (see page 4).

Methodology Used to Measure the Reported Benefit:

From a statistically valid sample of 125 Federal Tax Lien cases, we identified 8 (30 percent) of 27 cases for which IRS employees did not provide notice to taxpayer representatives, resulting in potential violations of taxpayers’ rights. In the eight cases, the ALS record did not indicate that the IRS had sent copies of the lien notices to the representatives. The sample was selected based on a confidence level of 90 percent, a precision rate of ±3 percent, and an expected rate of occurrence of 4 percent. We projected the findings to the total population provided by the IRS of 711,780 Notices of Federal Tax Lien generated by the ALS between July 1, 2007, and June 30, 2008.

Type and Value of Outcome Measure:

· Taxpayer Rights and Entitlements – Actual; 17 taxpayers were not provided Letters 3172, resulting in potential legal violations of taxpayers’ rights (see page 7).

Methodology Used to Measure the Reported Benefit:

In a judgmental sample of 283 undelivered lien notices, we determined that the IRS did not send notices to the updated addresses of 17 taxpayers. Taxpayer rights could be affected because a taxpayer not receiving a notice or receiving a late notice might be unaware of the right to appeal or might receive less than the 30-calendar day period allowed by the law to request a hearing. In addition, taxpayer rights could be further affected when the taxpayer appeals the filing of the lien and the IRS denies the request for the appeal.



Appendix V



Synopsis of the Internal Revenue Service Collection and Lien Filing Processes



The collection of unpaid tax begins with a series of letters (notices) sent to the taxpayer advising of the debt and asking for payment of the delinquent tax. IRS computer systems are programmed to mail these notices when certain criteria are met. If the taxpayer does not respond to these notices, the account is transferred for either personal or telephone contact.

· IRS employees who make personal (face-to-face) contact with taxpayers are called revenue officers and work in various locations. The ICS[28] is used in most of these locations to track collection actions taken on taxpayer accounts.

· IRS employees who make only telephone contact with taxpayers work in call sites in Customer Service offices. The ACS is used in the call sites to track collection actions taken on taxpayer accounts.

When these efforts have been taken and the taxpayer has not paid the tax liability, designated IRS employees are authorized to file a lien by sending a Notice of Federal Tax Lien[29] to appropriate local government offices. Liens protect the Federal Government’s interest by attaching a claim to the taxpayer’s assets for the amount of unpaid tax. The right to file a Notice of Federal Tax Lien is created by I.R.C. § 6321 (1994) when:

· The IRS has made an assessment and given the taxpayer notice of the assessment, stating the amount of the tax liability and demanding payment.

· The taxpayer has neglected or refused to pay the amount within 10 calendar days after the notice and demand for payment.

When designated employees request the filing of a Notice of Federal Tax Lien using either the ICS or the ACS, the ALS processes the lien filing requests from both Systems. In an expedited situation, employees can manually prepare the Notice of Federal Tax Lien. Even for manually prepared liens, the ALS controls and tracks the liens and initiates subsequent lien notices[30] to notify responsible parties of the lien filings and of their appeal rights. The ALS maintains an electronic database of all open Notices of Federal Tax Lien and updates the IRS’ primary computer records to indicate that a Notice of Federal Tax Lien has been filed.

Most lien notices are mailed to taxpayers by certified or registered mail, rather than delivered in person. To maintain a record of the notices, the IRS prepares a certified mail list (United States Postal Service Form 3877), which identifies each notice that is to be mailed. The notices and a copy of the certified mail list are delivered to the United States Postal Service. A United States Postal Service employee ensures that all notices are accounted for, date stamps the list, and returns a copy to the IRS. The stamped certified mail list is the only documentation the IRS has that certifies the date on which the notices were mailed. IRS guidelines require that the stamped certified mail list be retained for 10 years after the end of the processing year.



Appendix VI



Internal Revenue Service Computer Systems Used in the Filing of Notices of Federal Tax Lien



The Automated Collection System (ACS) is a computerized call site inventory system that maintains balance-due accounts and return delinquency investigations. ACS function employees enter all of their case file information (online) on the ACS. Lien notices requested using the ACS are uploaded to the ALS, which generates the Notices of Federal Tax Lien[31] and related lien notices and updates the IRS’ primary computer files to indicate that Notices of Federal Tax Lien have been filed.

The Automated Lien System (ALS) is a comprehensive database that prints Notices of Federal Tax Lien and lien notices, stores taxpayer information, and documents all lien activity. Lien activities on both ACS and ICS cases are controlled on the ALS by Technical Support or Case Processing functions at the Cincinnati, Ohio, Campus.[32] Employees at the Cincinnati Campus process Notices of Federal Tax Lien and lien notices and respond to taxpayer inquiries using the ALS.

The Integrated Collection System (ICS) is an IRS computer system with applications designed around each of the main collection tasks such as opening a case, assigning a case, building a case, performing collection activity, and closing a case. The ICS is designed to provide management information, create and maintain case histories, generate documents, and allow online approval of case actions. Lien requests made using the ICS are uploaded to the ALS. The ALS generates the Notices of Federal Tax Lien and related lien notices and updates the IRS’ primary computer files to indicate Notices of Federal Tax Lien have been filed.

The Integrated Data Retrieval System (IDRS) is an online data retrieval and data entry system that processes transactions entered from terminals located in campuses and other IRS locations. It enables employees to perform such tasks as researching account information, requesting tax returns, entering collection information, and generating collection documents. The IDRS serves as a link from campuses and other IRS locations to the Master File[33] for the IRS to maintain accurate records of activity on taxpayers’ accounts.



Appendix VII



Management’s Response to the Draft Report



The response was removed due to its size. To see the response, please go to the Adobe PDF version of the report on the TIGTA Public Web Page.



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[1] I.R.C. § 6320 (Supp. V 1999).

[2] I.R.C. § 7803(d)(1)(A)(iii) (Supp. V 1999).

[3] The last known address is that one shown on the most recently filed and properly processed tax return, unless the IRS received notification of a different address.

[4] I.R.C. § 6321 (1994).

[5] See Appendix VI for descriptions of IRS computer systems used in the filing of Notices of Federal Tax Lien.

[6] IRS computer system capable of retrieving or updating stored information; it works in conjunction with a taxpayer’s account records.

[7] The Centralized Authorization File contains information regarding the types of authorization that taxpayers have given representatives for various tax periods within their accounts.

[8] Internal Revenue Code Section 6321 (1994).

[9] Notice of Federal Tax Lien (Form 668(Y) (c); (Rev. 10-1999)), Cat. No. 60025X.

[10] I.R.C. § 6320 (Supp. V 1999).

[11] Notice of Federal Tax Lien Filing and Your Right to a Hearing Under IRC 6320 (Letter 3172 (Rev. 9-2006)), Cat. No. 26767I.

[12] The last known address is that one shown on the most recently filed and properly processed tax return, unless the IRS received notification of a different address.

[13] The IRS Data Book is published annually by the IRS and contains statistical tables and organizational information on a fiscal year basis.

[14] I.R.C. § 7803(d)(1)(A)(iii) (Supp. V 1999).

[15] The CAF contains information about the type of authorizations taxpayers have given their representatives for their tax returns.

[16] IRS computer system capable of retrieving or updating stored information; it works in conjunction with a taxpayer’s account records.

[17] 26 Code of Federal Regulations § 601.506.

[18] Fiscal Year 2008 Statutory Review of Compliance With Lien Due Process Procedures (Reference

Number 2008-30-082, dated March 27, 2008).

[19] The Accounts Management organization is responsible for providing taxpayers with information on the status of their returns, refunds, and for resolving the majority of issues and questions to settle their accounts.

[20] IRS offices with employees who answer questions, provide assistance, and resolve account-related issues for taxpayers face to face.

[21] I.R.C. § 6320 (Supp. V 1999).

[22] See Appendix VI for descriptions of IRS computer systems used in the filing of Notices of Federal Tax Lien.

[23] The formula n = (Z2 p(1-p))/(A2) is from Sawyer’s Internal Auditing - The Practice of Modern Internal Auditing, 4th Edition, pp. 462-464.

[24] A centralized storage and administration of files that provide data and data access services to IRS data.

[25] Notice of Federal Tax Lien Filing and Your Right to a Hearing Under IRC 6320 (Letter 3172 (Rev. 9-2006)), Cat. No. 26767I.

[26] The IRS database that stores various types of taxpayer account information. This database includes individual, business, and employee plans and exempt organizations data.

[27] Notice of Federal Tax Lien Filing and Your Right to a Hearing Under I.R.C. 6320 (Letter 3172 (Rev. 9-2006)), Cat. No. 26767I.

[28] See Appendix VI for detailed descriptions of IRS computer systems used in the filing of Notices of Federal Tax Lien.

[29] Notice of Federal Tax Lien (Form 668(Y) (c); (Rev. 10-1999)), Cat. No. 60025X.

[30] Notice of Federal Tax Lien Filing and Your Right to a Hearing Under IRC 6320 (Letter 3172 (Rev. 9-2006)), Cat. No. 26767I.

[31] Notice of Federal Tax Lien (Form 668(Y) (c); (Rev. 10-1999)), Cat. No. 60025X.

[32] A campus is the data processing arm of the IRS. The campuses process paper and electronic submissions, correct errors, and forward data to the Computing Centers for analysis and posting to taxpayer accounts.

[33] The Master File is the IRS database that stores various types of taxpayer account information. This database includes individual, business, and employee plans and exempt organizations data.

Labels:

Thursday, June 25, 2009

Fraudulent transfer

United States of America, Plaintiff v. Alvin A. Tolbert, Roberta Sue Tolbert, A&R Equity Holdings, Defendants.

U.S. District Court, West. Dist. Ark., Fayetteville Div.; Civ.06-5146, September 13, 2007.

[

Validity of Tax Assessments


4. IRS certificates of assessments for unpaid taxes are sufficient evidence to establish the validity of the assessments and support a summary judgment reducing those assessments to a judgment in favor of the Government. See United States v. Gerards, 999 F.2d 1255, 1256 (8 Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 th U.S. 1193 (1994); United States v. Meisner, 2007 W.L. 203950, *2 (D. Neb. Jan. 25, 2007). In an action to reduce federal tax assessments to judgment, certificates of assessments offered by the Government establish the Government's prima facie case and shift to the taxpayer the burden of proving that the IRS tax assessments are incorrect. See Mattingly v. United States [ 91-1 USTC ¶50,068], 924 F.2d 785, 787 (8 Cir. 1991); Kiesel v. United States [ 77-1 USTC ¶9101], 545 F.2d 1144, 1146 (8 Cir. 1976); Meisner, 2007 W.L. 203950, * 2. th

5. The Government has submitted Certified Form 4340 Certificates of Assessments for Mr. Tolbert's income tax liabilities for the years 1992 through 2002. In response, Mr. Tolbert has submitted copies of IRS 1040 Forms which he completed on August 7, 2007, indicating that he had no wages for the years in question. In an affidavit attached to the forms, Mr. Tolbert explains:
arly meritless. Mr. Tolbert has submitted nothing of substance to challenge the accuracy of the
Attachment of Tax Liens to the Property and Fraudulent Transfer


8. If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay it after demand, the amount owing "shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such person." 26 U.S.C. §6321. The lien "shall arise at the time the assessment is made and shall continue until the liability for the amount so assessed . . . is satisfied." 26 U.S.C. §6322. Thus, on the dates of the assessments for the tax years in question, federal tax liens attached to all of Mr. Tolbert's property.

9. The Government may collect the tax debts of a taxpayer from property that has been fraudulently transferred to another. See United States v. Scherping [ 99-2 USTC ¶50,758], 187 F.3d 796, 804-06(8th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1162 (2000). The Government argues that the conveyance of the subject property from the Tolberts to A & R Equity was a fraudulent conveyance and that the property is therefore subject to the tax liens.

Whether a conveyance may be set aside as fraudulent is determined in accordance with state law. Id. at 804. Under Arkansas law, a transfer of property by a debtor is considered fraudulent if the debtor made the transfer with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor. See Ark. Code Ann. §4-59-204(a)(1). The factors to be considered in determining the intent to defraud include whether:
* the transfer was to an insider;

* the debtor retained possession or control of the property after the transfer;

* the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial debt was incurred;

* the transfer was of substantially all the debtor's assets; and

* the value of the consideration received by the debtor was reasonably equivalent to the value of the property transferred.

See Ark. Code Ann. §4-59-204(b).

10. In the present case, the Tolberts transferred title to the subject property to A & R Equity approximately two months after the IRS sent its first notice to Mr. Tolbert regarding his failure to pay taxes. While the value of the property is in excess of $100,000.00, A & R Equity paid only $10.00 to acquire title to the property. Further, Mr. and Mrs. Tolbert are the sole beneficiaries of the A & R (which stands for Alvin and Roberta Tolbert) Equity trust, the trustee is unknown, and the address for the entity is the Tolberts' residential address. Even more significant is the fact that the Tolberts have continued to reside at the property, have continued to pay the mortgage, taxes, and other bills on the property, and they do not have a lease agreement or pay rent on the property to A & R Equity.

These circumstances clearly demonstrate that title to the subject property was fraudulently conveyed to A & R Equity in an attempt to avoid tax liens attaching to the property. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the transfer should be set aside and that the property is subject to the tax liens. 3

Labels:

Wednesday, June 24, 2009

Tax Havens: International Tax Avoidance and Evasion, June 5, 2009

June 24, 2009

111th CongressCongressional

Research Service



Tax Havens: International Tax Avoidance and Evasion

Jane G. Gravelle

Senior Specialist in Economic Policy

June 5, 2009

Congressional Research Service

7-5700

www.crs.gov

R40623

CRS Report for Congress

Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress



Summary

The federal government loses both individual and corporate income tax revenue from the shifting of profits and income into low-tax countries, often referred to as tax havens. The revenue losses from this tax avoidance and evasion are difficult to estimate, but some have suggested that the annual cost of offshore tax abuses may be around $100 billion per year. International tax avoidance can arise from large multinational corporations who shift profits into low-tax foreign subsidiaries or wealthy individual investors who set up secret bank accounts in tax haven countries.

Recent actions by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the G-20 industrialized nations have targeted tax haven countries, focusing primarily on evasion issues. There are also a number of legislative proposals that address these issues including the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act (S. 506, H.R. 1265); draft proposals by the Senate Finance Committee; two other related bills, S. 386 and S. 569; and a proposal by President Obama.

Multinational firms can artificially shift profits from high-tax to low-tax jurisdictions using a variety of techniques, such as shifting debt to high-tax jurisdictions. Since tax on the income of foreign subsidiaries (except for certain passive income) is deferred until repatriated, this income can avoid current U.S. taxes and perhaps do so indefinitely. The taxation of passive income (called Subpart F income) has been reduced, perhaps significantly, through the use of "hybrid entities" that are treated differently in different jurisdictions. The use of hybrid entities was greatly expanding by a new regulation (termed "check-the-box") introduced in the late 1990s that had unintended consequences for foreign firms. In addition, earnings from income that is taxed can often be shielded by foreign tax credits on other income. On average very little tax is paid on the foreign source income of U.S. firms. Ample evidence of a significant amount of profit shifting exists, but the revenue cost estimates vary from about $10 billion to $60 billion per year.

Individuals can evade taxes on passive income, such as interest, dividends, and capital gains, by not reporting income earned abroad. In addition, since interest paid to foreign recipients is not taxed, individuals can also evade taxes on U.S. source income by setting up shell corporations and trusts in foreign haven countries to channel funds. There is no general third party reporting of income as is the case for ordinary passive income earned domestically; the IRS relies on qualified intermediaries (QIs)who certify nationality without revealing the beneficial owners. Estimates of the cost of individual evasion have ranged from $40 billion to $70 billion.

Most provisions to address profit shifting by multinational firms would involve changing the tax law: repealing or limiting deferral, limiting the ability of the foreign tax credit to offset income, addressing check-the-box, or even formula apportionment. President Obama's proposals include a proposal to disallow overall deductions and foreign tax credits for deferred income and restrictions on the use of hybrid entities. Provisions to address individual evasion include increased information reporting, and provisions to increase enforcement, such as shifting the burden of proof to the taxpayer, increased penalties, and increased resources. Individual tax evasion is the main target of the proposed Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act and the Senate Finance Committee proposals; some revisions are also included in President Obama's plan.



Contents

Where Are the Tax Havens?


Formal Lists of Tax Havens



Developments in the OECD Tax Haven List



Other Jurisdictions With Tax Haven Characteristics


Methods of Corporate Tax Avoidance


Allocation of Debt and Earnings Stripping



Transfer Pricing



Contract Manufacturing



Check-the-Box, Hybrid Entities, and Hybrid Instruments



Cross Crediting and Sourcing Rules for Foreign Tax Credits


The Magnitude of Corporate Profit Shifting


Evidence on the Scope of Profit Shifting



Estimates of the Cost and Sources of Corporate Tax Avoidance



Importance of Different Profit Shifting Techniques


Methods of Avoidance and Evasion by Individuals


Tax Provisions Affecting the Treatment of Income by Individuals



Limited Information Reporting Between Jurisdictions



U.S. Collection of Information on U.S. Income and Qualified Intermediaries



European Union Savings Directive


Estimates of the Revenue Cost of Individual Tax Evasion

Alternative Policy Options to Address Corporate Profit Shifting


Broad Changes to International Tax Rules



Repeal Deferral



Targeted or Partial Elimination of Deferral



Allocation of Deductions and Credits with Respect to Deferred Income/Restrictions on Cross Crediting



Formula Apportionment



Eliminate Check the Box, Hybrid Entities, and Hybrid Instruments; Foreign Tax Credit Splitting From Income



Narrower Provisions Affecting Multinational Profit Shifting



Tighten Earnings Stripping Rules



Foreign Tax Credits: Source Royalties as Domestic Income for Purposes of the Foreign Tax Credit Limit, Or Create Separate Basket; Eliminate Title Passage Rule; Restrict Credits for Taxes Producing an Economic Benefit



Transfer pricing



Codify Economic Substance Doctrine



Prevent Dividend Repatriation Through Reorganizations


Options to Address Individual Evasion


Information Reporting



Multilateral Information Sharing or Withholding; International Cooperation



Expanding Bilateral Information Exchange



Unilateral Approaches: Withholding/Refund Approach; Increased Information Reporting Requirements



Other Measures That Might Improve Compliance



Incentives/Sanctions for Tax Havens



Revise the and Strengthen the Qualified Intermediary (QI)Program



Placing the Burden of Proof on the Taxpayer



Treat Shell Corporations as U.S. Firms



Impose Restrictions on Foreign Trusts



Treat Dividend Equivalents as Dividends



Extend the Statute of Limitations



Greater Resources for the Internal Revenue Service to Focus on Offshore



Make Civil Cases Public as a Deterrent



Revise Rules for FBAR (Foreign Bank Account Report)



Joe Doe Summons



Strengthening of Penalties



Address Tax Shelters; Codify Economic Substance Doctrine



Regulate the Rules Used by States to Permit Incorporation



Make Suspicious Activity Reports Available to Civil Side of IRS


Summary of Legislative Proposals


President Obama's International Tax Proposals



Provisions Affecting Multinational Corporations and Other Tax Law Changes



Provision Relating to Individual Tax Evasion



Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, S. 506 and H.R. 1265



Finance Committee Proposal



Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act, S. 386



Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance Act, S. 569




Tables

Table 1. Countries Listed on Various Tax Haven Lists

Table 2. U.S. Company Foreign Profits Relative to GDP, G-7

Table 3. U.S. Foreign Company Profits Relative to GDP, Larger Countries (GDP At Least $10 billion) on Tax Haven Lists and the Netherlands

Table 4. U.S. Foreign Company Profits Relative to GDP, Small Countries On Tax Haven Lists

Table 5. Source of Dividends from "Repatriation Holiday": Countries Accounting for at Least 1% of Dividends



Contacts

Author Contact Information

The federal government loses both individual and corporate income tax revenue from the shifting of profits and income into low-tax countries. The revenue losses from this tax avoidance and evasion are difficult to estimate, but some have suggested that the annual cost of offshore tax abuses may be around $100 billion per year. 1 International tax avoidance can arise from wealthy individual investors and from large multinational corporations; it can reflect both legal and illegal actions.

Tax avoidance is sometimes used to refer to a legal reduction in taxes, while evasion refers to tax reductions that are illegal. Both types are discussed in this report, although the dividing line is not entirely clear. A multinational firm that constructs a factory in Ireland rather than in the United States to take advantage of low Irish corporate tax rates is engaged in avoidance, while a U.S. citizen who sets up a secret bank account in the Caribbean and does not report the interest income is engaged in evasion. There are, however, many activities, particularly by corporations, that are often referred to as avoidance but could be classified as evasion. One example is transfer pricing, where firms charge low prices for sales to low-tax affiliates but pay high prices for purchases from them. If these prices, which are supposed to be at arms-length, are set at an artificial level, then this activity might be viewed by some as evasion, even if such pricing is not overturned in court because evidence to establish pricing is not available.

Most of the international tax reduction of individuals reflects evasion, and this amount has been estimated to range from about $40 billion to about $70 billion a year. 2 This evasion occurs in part because the U.S. does not withhold tax on many types of passive income (such as interest) paid to foreign entities; if U.S. individuals can channel their investments through a foreign entity and do not report the holdings of these assets on their tax returns, they evade a tax that they are legally required to pay. In addition, individuals investing in foreign assets may not report income from them.

Corporate tax reductions arising from profit shifting have also been estimated As discussed below, estimates of the revenue losses from corporate profit shifting vary substantially, ranging from about $10 billion to about $60 billion.

In addition to differentiating between individual and corporate activities, and evasion and avoidance, there are also variations in the features used to characterize tax havens. Some restrictive definitions would limit tax havens to those countries that, in addition to having low or non-existent tax rates on some types of income, also have such other characteristics as the lack of transparency, bank secrecy and the lack of information sharing, and requiring little or no economic activity for an entity to obtain legal status. A definition incorporating compounding factors such as these was used by the Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD) in their tax shelter initiative. Others, particularly economists, might characterize as a tax haven any low-tax country with a goal of attracting capital, or simply any country that has low or non-existent taxes. We address tax havens in their broader sense as well as in their narrower sense in this report.

While international tax avoidance can be differentiated by whether it is associated with individuals or corporations, whether it is illegal evasion or legal avoidance, and whether it arises in a tax haven narrowly defined or broadly defined, it can also be characterized by what measures might be taken to reduce this loss. In general, revenue losses from individual taxes are more likely to be associated with evasion and more likely to be associated with narrowly defined tax havens, while corporate tax avoidance occurs in both narrowly and broadly defined tax havens and can arise from either legal avoidance or illegal evasion. Evasion is often a problem of lack of information, and remedies may include resources for enforcement, along with incentives and sanctions designed to increase information sharing, and possibly a move towards greater withholding. Avoidance may be more likely to be remedied with changes in the tax code.

Several legislative proposals have been advanced that address international tax issues. President Obama has proposed several international corporate tax revisions which relate to multinational corporations, including profit shifting, as well as individual tax evasion. Some of these provisions had earlier been included in a bill introduced in the 110 th Congress by Chairman Rangel of the Ways and Means Committee (H.R. 3970). The Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations has been engaged in international tax investigations since 2001, holding hearings proposing legislation. 3 In the 11 th Congress, the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, S. 506, has been introduced by the Chairman of that committee, Senator Levin, with a companion bill, H.R. 1265, introduced by Representative Doggett. The Senate Finance Committee also has circulated draft proposals addressing individual tax evasion issues. S. 386, introduced by Chairman Leahy of the Senate Judiciary Committee, would expand the money-laundering provisions to include tax evasion, and provide additional funding for the tax division of the Justice Department. S. 569, also introduced by Chairman Levin, would impose requirements on the states for determination of beneficial owners of corporations formed under their laws. This proposal has implications for the potential use of incorporation in certain states as a part of an international tax haven plan.

The first section of this report reviews what countries might be considered tax havens, including a discussion of the Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD) initiatives and lists. The next two sections discuss, in turn, the corporate profit-shifting mechanisms and evidence on the existence and magnitude of profit shifting activity. The following two sections provide the same analysis for individual tax evasion. The report concludes with overviews of alternative policy options and a summary of specific legislative proposals.



Where Are the Tax Havens?

There is no precise definition of a tax haven. The OECD initially defined the following features of tax havens: no or low taxes, lack of effective exchange of information, lack of transparency, and no requirement of substantial activity. 4 Other lists have been developed in legislative proposals and by researchers. There are also a number of other jurisdictions that have been identified as having tax haven characteristics.



Formal Lists of Tax Havens

The OECD created an initial list of tax havens in 2000. A similar list was used in S. 396, introduced in the 110 th Congress, which would treat firms incorporated in certain tax havens as domestic companies; the only difference between this list and the OECD list was the exclusion of the U.S. Virgin Islands from the list in S. 396. Legislation introduced in the 111 th Congress to address tax haven abuse (S. 506, H.R. 1265) uses a different list taken from IRS court filings, but has many countries in common. The definition by the OECD excluded low- tax jurisdictions, some of which are OECD members, that were thought by many to be tax havens, such as Ireland and Switzerland. These countries were included in an important study of tax havens by Hines and Rice. 5 GAO also provided a list. 6

Table 1 lists the countries that appear on various lists, arranged by geographic location. These tax havens tend to be concentrated in certain areas, including the Caribbean and West Indies and Europe, locations close to large developed countries. There are 50 altogether.


Table I. Countries Listed on Various Tax Haven Lists





____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Caribbean/West Indies Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, d,e British
Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, a
Netherlands Antilles, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and
Grenadines, Turks and Caicos, U.S. Virgin Islands a,e

Central America Belize, e Costa Rica, b,c Panama e

Coast of East Asia Hong Kong, a,b,e Macau, a,b,e Singapore b,e

Europe/Mediterranean Andorra, a Channel Islands (Guernsey and Jersey), e Cyprus, e
Gibralter, Isle of Man, e Ireland, a,b,e Liechtenstein, Luxembourg,
a,b Malta, e Monaco, a San Marino, a,e Switzerland a,b

Indian Ocean Maldives, a,d,e Mauritius, a,c,e Seychelles a,e

Middle East Bahrain, Jordan, a,b,e Lebanon a,b,e

North Atlantic Bermuda

Pacific, South Pacific Cook Islands, Marshall Islands, a Samoa, Nauru, c Niue, a,c Tonga,
a,c,d,e Vanuatu

West Africa Liberia

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Sources: Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD), Towards Global Tax
Competition , 2000; Dhammika Dharmapala and James R. Hines, "Which Countries Become Tax Havens?"
December 2006; Tax Justice Network, "Identifying Tax Havens and Offshore Finance Centers:
http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/ldentifying_Tax_Havens_Jul_07.pdf. The OECD's "gray" list
as of April 2, 2009 is posted at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/38/14/42497950.pdf. The countries in
Table I are the same as the countries, with the exception of Tonga, in a recent GAO Report,
International Taxation: Large U.S. Corporations and Federal Contractors with Subsidiaries in
jurisdictions Listed as Tax Havens or Financial Privacy jurisdictions , GAO-09-157, December 2008.

Notes: St. Kitts may also be referred to as St. Christopher. The Channel Islands are sometimes
listed as a group and sometimes Jersey and Guernsey are listed separately. S. 506 and H.R. I 245
specifically mention Jersey, and also refer to Gurensey/Sark/Alderney, the latter two are islands
associated with Guernsey.

a. Not included in S. 506, H.R. 1245.

b. Not included in original OECD tax haven list.

c. Not included in Hines and Rice (1994)

d. Removed from OECD's List; Subsequently determined they should not be included.

e. Not included in OECD's "gray" list as of April 7, 2009. Note that the "gray" list is divided
into countries that are tax havens and countries that are other financial centers. The latter
classification includes three countries listed in Table I (Luxembourg, Singapore, and Switzerland)
and five that are not (Austria, Belgium, Brunei, Chile, and Guatemala). Of the four countries moved
from the "black" to the "gray" list, one, Costa Rica, is in Table I and three, Malaysia, Uruguay
and the Philippines are not.






Developments in the OECD Tax Haven List

The OECD list, the most prominent list, has changed over time. Nine of the countries in Table 1 did not appear on the earliest OECD list. These countries not appearing on the original list tend to be more developed larger countries and include some that are members of the OECD (e.g., Switzerland and Luxembourg).

It is also important to distinguish between OECD's original list and its blacklist. OECD subsequently focused on information exchange and removed countries from a "blacklist if they agree to cooperate." OECD initially examined 47 jurisdictions and identified a number as not meeting the criteria for a tax haven; it also initially excluded six countries with advance agreements to share information (Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, Cyprus, Malta, Mauritius, and San Marino). The 2000 OECD blacklist included 35 countries; this list did not include the six countries eliminated due to advance agreement. The OECD had also subsequently determined that three countries should not be included in the list of tax havens (Barbados, the Maldives, and Tonga). Over time, as more tax havens made agreements to share information, the blacklist dwindled until it included only three countries: Andorra, Liechtenstein, and Monaco.

A study of the OECD initiative on global tax coordination by Sharman, also discussed in a book review by Sullivan, argues that the reduction in the OECD list was not because of actual progress towards cooperation so much as due to the withdrawal of U.S. support in 2001, which resulted in the OECD focusing on information on request and not requiring reforms until all parties had signed on. 7 This analysis suggests that the large countries were not successful in this initiative to rein in on tax havens. A similar analysis by Spencer and Sharman suggests little real progress has been made in reducing tax haven practices. 8

Interest in tax haven actions has increased recently. The scandals surrounding the Swiss bank UBS AG (UBS) and the Liechtenstein Global Trust Group (LGT), which led to legal actions by the United States and other countries, focused greater attention on international tax issues, primarily information reporting and individual evasion. 9 The credit crunch and provision of public funds to banks has also heightened public interest. The tax haven issue was revived recently with a meeting of the G20 industrialized and developing countries that proposed sanctions, and a number of countries began to indicate commitments to information sharing agreements. 10

The OECD currently has three lists: a "white list" of countries implementing an agreed-upon standard, a "gray" list of countries that have committed to such a standard, and a "black" list of countries that have not committed. On April 7, 2009 the last four countries on the "black list, which were countries not included on the original OECD list, Costa Rica, Malaysia, the Philippines and Uruguay, were moved to the "gray" list. 11 The gray list includes countries not identified as tax havens but as "other financial centers." According to news reports, Hong Kong and Macau were omitted from the OECD's list because of objections from China, but are mentioned in a footnote as having committed to the standards; they also noted that a "recent flurry of commitments brought 11 jurisdictions, including Austria, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg Singapore, and Switzerland into the committed category." 12

Many countries that were listed on the OECD's original blacklist protested because of the negative publicity and many now point to having signed agreements to negotiate tax information exchange agreements (TIEA) and some have negotiated agreements. The identification of tax havens can have legal ramifications if laws and sanctions are contingent on that identification, as is the case of some current proposals in the United States and of potential sanctions by international bodies.



Other Jurisdictions With Tax Haven Characteristics

Criticisms have been made by a range of commentators that many countries are tax havens or have aspects of tax havens and have been overlooked. These jurisdictions include major countries such as the United States, the UK, the Netherlands, Denmark, Hungary Iceland, Israel, Portugal, and Canada. Attention has also been directed at three states in the United States, Delaware, Nevada, and Wyoming. Finally there are a number of smaller countries or areas in countries, such as Campione d'Italia, an Italian town located within Switzerland, that have been characterized as tax havens.

A country not on the list in Table 1 , but which is often considered a tax haven, especially for corporations, is the Netherlands, which allows firms to reduce taxes on dividends and capital gains from subsidiaries and has a wide range of treaties that reduce taxes. 13 In 2006, for example, Bono and other members of the U2 band moved their music publishing company from Ireland to the Netherlands after Ireland changed its tax treatment of music royalties. 14

Some have identified the United States and the United Kingdom as having tax haven characteristics. Luxembourg Prime Minister Jean-Claude Junker urged other EU member states to challenge the United States for tax havens in Delaware, Nevada, and Wyoming. 15 One website offering offshore services mentions, in their view, several overlooked tax havens which include the United States, United Kingdom, Denmark, Iceland, Israel, and Portugal's Madeira Island. 16 (Others on their list and not listed in Table 1 were Hungary, Brunei, Uruguay, and Labuan (Malaysia)). 17 In the case of the United States the article mentions the lack of reporting requirements and the failure to tax interest and other exempt passive income paid to foreign entities, the limited liability corporation which allows a flexible corporate vehicle not subject to taxation, and the ease of incorporating in certain states (Delaware, Nevada, and Wyoming).

Another website includes in its list of tax havens Delaware, Wyoming, and Puerto Rico, along with other jurisdictions not listed in Table 1 : the Netherlands, Campione d'Italia, a separate listing for Sark (identified as the only remaining "fiscal paradise"), the United Kingdom, and a coming discussion for Canada. 18 Sark is an island country associated with Guernsey, part of the Channel Islands, and Campione d'Italia is an Italian town located within Switzerland.

The Economist reported a study by a political scientist experimenting with setting up sham corporations; the author succeeded in incorporating in Wyoming and Nevada, as well as the United Kingdom and several other places. 19 Michael McIntyre discusses three U.S. practices that aid international evasion: the failure to collect information on tax exempt interest income paid to foreign entities, the system of foreign institutions that act as qualified intermediaries (see discussion below) but do not reveal their clients, and the practices of states such as Delaware and Wyoming that allow people to keep secret their identities as stockholder or depositor. 20

In a meeting in late April 2009, Eduardo Silva, of the Cayman Islands Financial Services Association, claimed that Delaware, Nevada, Wyoming, and the United Kingdom were the greatest offenders with respect to, among other issues, tax fraud. He suggested that Nevada and Wyoming were worse than Delaware because they permit companies to have bearer shares, which allows anonymous ownership. A U.S. participant at the conference noted that legislation in the United States, S. 569, would require disclosure of beneficial owners in the United States. 21

In addition, any country with a low tax rate could be considered as a potential location for shifting income to. In addition to Ireland, three other countries in the OECD not included in Table 1 have tax rates below 20%: Iceland, Poland, and the Slovak Republic. 22 Most of the eastern European countries not included in the OECD have tax rates below 20%. 23

The Tax Justice Network probably has the largest list of tax havens, and includes some specific cities and areas. 24 In addition to the countries listed in Table 1 , they include in the Americas and Caribbean, New York and Uruguay; in Africa, Mellila, Sao Tome e Principe, Somalia, and South Africa; in the Middle East and Asia, Dubai, Labuan (Malaysia), Tel Aviv, and Taipei; in Europe, Alderney, Belgium, Campione d'Italia, City of London, Dublin, Ingushetia, Madeira, Sark, Trieste, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, and Frankfurt; and in the Indian and Pacific oceans, the Marianas. The only county listed in Table 1 and not included in their list was Jordan.



Methods of Corporate Tax Avoidance

U.S. multinationals are not taxed on income earned by foreign subsidiaries until it is repatriated to the U.S. parent as dividends, although some passive and related company income that is easily shifted is taxed currently under anti-abuse rules referred to as Subpart F. (Foreign affiliates or subsidiaries that are majority owned U.S. owned are referred to as controlled foreign corporations, or CFCs, and many of these related firms are wholly owned.) Taxes on income that is repatriated (or, less commonly, earned by branches and taxed currently) is allowed a credit for foreign income taxes paid. (A part of a parent company treated as a branch is not a separate entity for tax purposes, and all income is part of the parent's income.)

Foreign tax credits are limited to the amount of tax imposed by the United States, so that they, in theory, cannot offset taxes on domestic income. This limit is imposed on an overall basis, allowing excess credits in high-tax countries to offset U.S. tax liability on income earned in low-tax countries, although separate limits apply to passive and active income. Other countries either employ this system of deferral and credit or, more commonly, exempt income earned in foreign jurisdictions. Most countries have some form of anti-abuse rules similar to Subpart F.

If a firm can shift profits to a low-tax jurisdiction from a high-tax one, its taxes will be reduced without affecting other aspects of the company. Tax differences also affect real economic activity, which in turn affects revenues, but it is this artificial shifting of profits that is the focus of this report. 25

Since the United States taxes all income earned in its borders as well as imposing a residual tax on income earned abroad by U.S. persons, tax avoidance relates both to U.S. parent companies shifting profits abroad to low-tax jurisdictions and the shifting of profits out of the United States by foreign parents of U.S. subsidiaries. In the case of U.S. multinationals, one study suggested that about half the difference between profitability in low-tax and high-tax countries, which could arise from artificial income shifting, was due to transfers of intellectual property (or intangibles) and most of the rest through the allocation of debt. 26 However, a study examining import and export prices suggests a very large effect of transfer pricing in goods (as discussed below). 27 Some evidence of the importance of intellectual property can also be found from the types of firms that repatriated profits abroad following a temporary tax reduction enacted in 2004; a third of the repatriations were in the pharmaceutical and medicine industry and almost 20% in the computer and electronic equipment industry. 28



Allocation of Debt and Earnings Stripping

One method of shifting profits from a high-tax jurisdiction to a low-tax one is to borrow more in the high-tax jurisdiction and less in the low-tax one. This shifting of debt can be achieved without changing the overall debt exposure of the firm. A more specific practice is referred to as earnings stripping where either debt is associated with related firms or unrelated debt is not subject to tax by the recipient. As an example of the former earnings stripping method, a foreign parent may lend to its U.S. subsidiary. Alternatively, an unrelated foreign borrower not subject to tax on U.S. interest income might lend to a U.S. firm.

The U.S. tax code currently contains provisions to address interest deductions and earnings stripping. It applies an allocation of the U.S. parent's interest for purposes of the limit on the foreign tax credit. The amount of foreign source income is reduced when part of U.S. interest is allocated and the maximum amount of foreign tax credits taken is limited, a provision that affects firms with excess foreign tax credits. 29 There is no allocation rule, however, to address deferral, so that a U.S. parent could operate its subsidiary with all equity finance in a low-tax jurisdiction and take all of the interest on the overall firm's debt as a deduction. A bill introduced in 2007 (H.R. 3970) by Chairman Rangel of the Ways and Means Committee would introduce such an allocation rule, so that a portion of interest and other overhead costs would not be deducted until the income is repatriated. 30 This provision is also included in President Obama's proposals for international tax revision.

While allocation-of-interest approaches could be used to address allocation of interest to high-tax countries in the case of U.S. multinationals, they cannot be applied to U.S. subsidiaries of foreign corporations. To limit the scope of earnings stripping in either case, the United States has thin capitalization rules. (Most of the United States' major trading partners have similar rules.) A section of the Internal Revenue Code (163(j)) applies to a corporation with a debt-to-equity ratio above 1.5 to 1 and with net interest exceeding 50% of adjusted taxable income (generally taxable income plus interest plus depreciation). Interest in excess of the 50% limit paid to a related corporation is not deductible if the corporation is not subject to U.S. income tax. This interest restriction also applies to interest paid to unrelated parties that are not taxed to the recipient.

The possibility of earnings stripping received more attention after a number of U.S. firms inverted, that is, arranged to move their parent firm abroad so that U.S. operations became a subsidiary of that parent. The American Jobs Creation Act (AJCA) of 2004 addressed the general problem of inversion by treating firms that subsequently inverted as U.S. firms. During consideration of this legislation there were also proposals for broader earnings stripping restrictions as an approach to this problem that would have reduced the excess interest deductions. This general earnings stripping proposal was not adopted. However, the AJCA mandated a Treasury Department study on this and other issues; that study focused on U.S. subsidiaries of foreign parents and was not able to find clear evidence on the magnitude. 31

An noted in the Treasury's mandated study, there is relatively straightforward evidence that U.S. multinationals allocate more interest to high-tax jurisdictions, but it is more difficult to assess earnings stripping by foreign parents of U.S. subsidiaries, because the entire firm's accounts are not available. The Treasury study focused on this issue and used an approach that had been used in the past of comparing these subsidiaries to U.S. firms. The study was not able to provide conclusive evidence about the shifting of profits out of the United States due to high leverage rates for U.S. subsidiaries of foreign firms but did find evidence of shifting for inverted firms.



Transfer Pricing

The second major way that firms can shift profits from high-tax to low-tax jurisdictions is through the pricing of goods and services sold between affiliates. To properly reflect income, prices of goods and services sold by related companies should be the same as the prices that would be paid by unrelated parties. By lowering the price of goods and services sold by parents and affiliates in high-tax jurisdictions and raising the price of purchases, income can be shifted.

An important and growing issue of transfer pricing is with the transfers to rights to intellectual property, or intangibles. If a patent developed in the U.S. is licensed to an affiliate in a low-tax country (such as one in Ireland) income will be shifted if the royalty or other payment is lower than the true value of the license. For many goods there are similar products sold or other methods (such as cost plus a mark up) that can be used to determine whether prices are set appropriately. Intangibles, such as new inventions or new drugs, tend not to have comparables, and it is very difficult to know the royalty that would be paid in an arms-length price. Therefore, intangibles represent particular problems for policing transfer pricing.

Investment in intangibles is favorably treated in the United States because costs, other than capital equipment and buildings, are expensed for research and development, which is also eligible for a tax credit. In addition, advertising to establish brand names is also deductible. Overall these treatments tend to produce an effective low, zero, or negative tax rate for overall investment in intangibles. Thus, there are significant incentives to make these investments in the United States. On average, the benefit of tax deductions or credits when making the investment tend to offset the future taxes on the return to the investment. However, for those investments that tend to be successful, it is advantageous to shift profits to a low-tax jurisdiction, so that there are tax savings on investment and little or no tax on returns. As a result, these investments can be subject to negative tax rates, or subsidies, which can be significant.

Transfer pricing rules with respect to intellectual property are further complicated because of cost sharing agreements, where different affiliates contribute to the cost. 32 If an intangible is already partially developed by the parent firm, affiliates contribute a buy-in payment. It is very difficult to determine arms length pricing in these cases where a technology is partially developed and there is risk associated with the expected outcome. One study found some evidence that firms with cost sharing arrangements were more likely to engage in profit shifting. 33



Contract Manufacturing

When a subsidiary is set up in a low-tax country and profit shifting occurs, as in the acquisition of rights to an intangible, a further problem occurs: this low-tax country may not be a desirable place to actually manufacture and sell the product. For example, an Irish subsidiary's market may be in Germany and it would be desirable to manufacture in Germany. But to earn profits in Germany with its higher tax rate does not minimize taxes. Instead the Irish firm may contract with a German firm as a contract manufacturer, who will produce the item for cost plus a fixed markup. Subpart F taxes on a current basis certain profits from sales income, so the arrangement must be structured to qualify as an exception from this rule. There are complex and changing regulations on this issue. 34



Check-the-Box, Hybrid Entities, and Hybrid Instruments

Another technique for shifting profit to low-tax jurisdictions was greatly expanded with the "check-the-box" provisions. These provisions were originally intended to simplify questions of whether a firm was a corporation or partnership. Their application to foreign circumstances, through the "disregarded entity" rules has led to the expansion of hybrid entities, where an entity can be recognized as a corporation by one jurisdiction but not by another. For example, a U.S. parent's subsidiary in a low-tax country can lend to its subsidiary in a high-tax country, with the interest deductible because the high-tax country recognizes the firm as a separate corporation. Normally, interest received by the subsidiary in the low-tax country would be considered passive or "tainted" income subject to current U.S. tax under Subpart F. However, under check-the-box rules, the high-tax corporation can elect to be disregarded as a separate entity, and thus from the perspective of the United States there is no interest income paid because the two are the same entity. Check-the-box and similar hybrid entity operations can also be used to avoid other types of Subpart F income, for example from contract manufacturing arrangements. According to Sicular, this provision, which began as a regulation, has been effectively codified, albeit temporarily. 35

Hybrid entities relate to issues other than Subpart F. For example, a reverse hybrid entity can be used to allow U.S. corporations to benefit from the foreign tax credit without having to recognize the underlying income. As an example, a U.S. parent can set up a holding company in the Netherlands that is treated as a disregarded entity, and the holding company can own a corporation that is treated as a partnership in a foreign jurisdiction. Under flow through rules, the holding company is liable for the foreign tax and, because it is not a separate entity, the U.S. parent corporation is therefore liable, but the income can be retained in the foreign corporation that is viewed as a separate corporate entity from the U.S. point of view. In this case, the entity is structured so that it is a partnership for foreign purposes but a corporation for U.S. purposes. 36

In addition to hybrid entities that achieve tax benefits by being treated differently in the U.S. and the foreign jurisdiction, there are also hybrid instruments that can avoid taxation by being treated as debt in one jurisdiction and equity in another. 37



Cross Crediting and Sourcing Rules for Foreign Tax Credits

Income from a low-tax country that is received in the United States can escape taxes because of cross crediting: the use of excess foreign taxes paid in one jurisdiction or on one type of income to offset U.S. tax that would be due on other income. In some periods in the past the foreign tax credit limit was proposed on a country-by-country basis, although that rule proved to be difficult to enforce given the potential to use holding companies. Foreign tax credits have subsequently been separated into different baskets to limit cross crediting; these baskets were reduced from nine to two (active and passive) in the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-357).

Because firms can choose when to repatriate income, they can arrange realizations to maximize the benefits of the overall limit on the foreign tax credit. That is, firms that have income from jurisdictions with taxes in excess of U.S. taxes can also elect to realize income from jurisdictions with low taxes and use the excess credits to offset U.S. tax due on that income. Studies suggest that between cross crediting and deferral, U.S. multinationals typically pay virtually no U.S. tax on foreign source income. 38

This ability to reduce U.S. tax due to cross crediting is increased, it can be argued, because income that should be considered U.S. source income is treated as foreign source income, thereby raising the foreign tax credit limit. This includes income from U.S. exports which is U.S. source income, because a tax provision (referred to as the title passage rule) allows half of export income to be allocated to the country in which the title passes. Another important type of income that is considered foreign source and thus can be shielded with foreign tax credits is royalty income from active business, which has become an increasingly important source of foreign income. This benefit can occur in high-tax countries because royalties are generally deductible from income. (Note that the shifting of income due to transfer pricing of intangibles, advantageous in low-tax countries, is a different issue.) Interest income is another type of income that may benefit from this foreign tax credit rule.

Since all of this income arises from investment in the United States, one could argue that this income is appropriately U.S. source income, or that, failing that, it should be put in a different foreign tax credit basket so that excess credits generated by dividends cannot be used to offset such income. Two studies, by Grubert and by Grubert and Altshuler have discussed this sourcing rule in the context of a proposal to eliminate the tax on active dividends. 39 In that proposal, the revenue loss from exempting active dividends from U.S. tax would be offset by gains from taxes on royalties.



The Magnitude of Corporate Profit Shifting

This section examines the evidence on the existence and magnitude of profit shifting and the techniques that are most likely to contribute to it.



Evidence on the Scope of Profit Shifting

There is ample, and simple, evidence that profits appear in countries inconsistent with an economic motivation. This section first examines the profit share of income of controlled corporations compared to the share of gross domestic product. 40 The first set of countries, acting as a reference point, are the remaining G-7 countries that are also the United States' major trading partners. They account for 32% of pre-tax profits and 38% of rest-of-world gross domestic product. The second group of countries are larger countries from Table 1 (with GDP of at least $10 billion), plus the Netherlands, which is widely considered a tax conduit for U.S. multinationals because of their holding company rules. These countries account for about 30% of earnings and 5% of rest-of-world GDP. The third group of countries are smaller countries listed in Table 1 , with GDP less than $10 billion. These countries account for 14% of earnings and less than 1% of rest-of-world GDP.

As indicated in Table 2 , income to GDP ratios in the large G-7 countries range from 0.2% to 2.6%, the latter reflecting in part the United States' relationships with perhaps its closest trading partners. Overall, this income as a share of GDP is 0.6%. Outside the United Kingdom and Canada, they are around 0.2 to 0.3% and do not vary with country size (Japan, for example, has over twice the GDP of Italy). Note also that Canada and the United Kingdom have also appeared on some tax haven lists and the larger income shares could partially reflect that. 41


Table 2. U.S. Company Foreign Profits Relative to GDP, G-7





____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Profits of U.S. Controlled Foreign Corporations
Country as a Percentage of GDP

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Canada 2.6

France 0.3

Germany 0.2

Italy 0.2

Japan 0.3

United Kingdom 1.3

Weighted Average 0.6

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Source: CRS calculations, see text




Table 3 reports the share for the larger tax havens listed in Table 1 for which data are available, plus the Netherlands. In general, U.S. source profits as a percentage of GDP are considerably larger than those in Table 2 . In the case of Luxembourg, these profits are 18% of output. Shares are also very large in Cyprus and Ireland. In all but two cases, the shares are well in excess of those in Table 2 .


Table 3. U.S. Foreign Company Profits Relative to GDP, Larger Countries (GDP At Least $10 billion) on Tax Haven Lists and the Netherlands





____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Profits of U.S. Controlled Corporations as a
Country Percentage of GDP

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Costa Rica 1.2

Cyprus 9.8

Hong Kong 2.8

Ireland 7.6

Luxembourg 18.2

Netherlands 4.6

Panama 3.0

Singapore 3.4

Switzerland 3.5

Taiwan 0.7

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Source: CRS calculations, see text




Table 4 examines the small tax havens listed in Table 1 for which data are available. In three of the islands off the U.S. coast (in the Caribbean and Atlantic) profits are multiples of total GDP. Profits are well in excess of GDP in four jurisdictions. In other jurisdictions they are a large share of output. These numbers clearly indicate that the profits in these countries do not appear to derive from economic motives related to productive inputs or markets, but rather reflect income easily transferred to low-tax jurisdictions.


Table 4. U.S. Foreign Company Profits Relative to GDP, Small Countries On Tax Haven Lists





____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Profits of U.S. Controlled Corporations as a
Country Percentage of GDP

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Bahamas 43.3

Barbados 13.2

Bermuda 645.7

British Virgin Islands 354.7

Cayman Islands 546.7

Guernsey 11.2

Jersey 35.3

Liberia 61.1

Malta 0.5

Marshall Islands 339.8

Mauritius 4.2

Netherland Antilles 8.9

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Source: CRS calculations, see text




Evidence of profit shifting has been presented in many other studies. Grubert and Altshuler report that profits of controlled foreign corporations in manufacturing relative to sales in Ireland are three times the group mean. 42 GAO reported higher shares of pretax profits of U.S. multinationals than of value added, tangible assets, sales, compensation or employees in low-tax countries such as Bermuda, Ireland, the UK Caribbean, Singapore, and Switzerland. 43 Martin Sullivan reports the return on assets for 1998 averaged 8.4% for U.S. manufacturing subsidiaries, but with returns of 23.8% in Ireland, 17.9% in Switzerland, and 16.6% in the Cayman Islands. 44 More recently, he noted that of the ten countries that accounted for the most foreign multinational profits, the five countries with the highest manufacturing returns for 2004 (the Netherlands, Bermuda, Ireland, Switzerland, and China) all had tax rates below 12% while the five countries with lower returns (Canada, Japan, Mexico, Australia, and the United Kingdom) had tax rates in excess of 23%. 45 Anumber of econometric studies of this issue have been done. 46



Estimates of the Cost and Sources of Corporate Tax Avoidance

There are no official estimates of the cost of international corporate tax avoidance, although a number of researchers have made estimates; nor are there official estimates of the individual tax gap. 47 In general, the estimates are not reflected in the overall tax gap estimate. The magnitude of corporate tax avoidance has been estimated through a variety of techniques and not all are for total avoidance. Some address only avoidance by U.S. multinationals and not by foreign parents of U.S. subsidiaries. Some focus only on a particular source of avoidance.

Estimates of the potential revenue cost of income shifting by multinational corporations varies considerably, with estimates as high as $60 billion. The only study by the IRS in this area is an estimate of the international gross tax gap (not accounting for increased taxes collected on audit) related to transfer pricing based on audits of returns. They estimated a cost of about $3 billion, based on examinations of tax returns for 1996-1998. 48 This estimate would reflect an estimate not of legal avoidance, but of non-compliance, and for reasons stressed in the study has a number of limitations. One of those is that an audit does not detect all non-compliance, and it would not detect avoidance mechanisms which are, or appear to be, legal.

Some idea of the potential magnitude of the revenue lost from profit shifting by U.S. multinationals might be found in the estimates of the revenue gain from eliminating deferral. If most of the profit in low-tax countries has been shifted there to avoid U.S. tax rates, the projected revenue gain from ending deferral would provide an idea of the general magnitude of the revenue cost of profit shifting by U.S. parent firms. The Joint Committee on Taxation projects the revenue gain from ending deferral to be about $11 billion in FY2010. 49 This estimate could be either an overstatement or an understatement of the cost of tax avoidance. It could be an overstatement because some of the profits abroad accrue to real investments in countries that have lower tax rates than the United States and thus do not reflect artificial shifting. It could be an understatement because it does not reflect the tax that could be collected by the United States rather than foreign jurisdictions on profits shifted to low-tax countries. For example, Ireland has a tax rate of 12.5% and the United States a 35% rate, so that ending deferral (absent behavioral changes) would only collect the excess of the U.S. tax over the Irish tax on shifted revenues, or about two thirds of lost revenue.

The Administration's estimates for ending deferral are slightly larger, over $14 billion. 50 Altshuler and Grubert estimate for 2002 that the corporate tax could be cut to 28% if deferral were ended, and based on corporate revenue in that year the gain is about $11 billion. 51 That year was at a low point because of the recession; if the share remained the same, the gain would be around $13 billion for 2004 and $26 billion for 2007. All of these estimates are based on tax data.

Researchers have looked at differences in pretax returns and estimated the revenue gain if returns were equated. This approach should provide some estimates of the magnitude of overall profit-shifting for multinationals, whether through transfer pricing, leveraging, or some other technique. Martin Sullivan, using Commerce Department data, estimates that, based on differences in pre-tax returns, the cost for 2004 was between $10 and $20 billion. Sullivan subsequently reports an estimated $17 billion increase in revenue loss from profit shifting between 1999 and 2004, which suggests that earlier number may be too small. 52 Sullivan suggests that the growth in profit shifting may be due to check-the-box. Christian and Schultz, using rate of return on assets data from tax returns, estimated $87 billion was shifted in 2001, which, at a 35% tax rate, would imply a revenue loss of about $30 billion. 53 As a guide for potential revenue loss from avoidance, these estimates suffer from two limits. The first is the inability to determine how much was shifted out of high-tax foreign jurisdictions rather than the United States, which leads to a range of estimates. At the same time, if capital is mobile, economic theory indicates that the returns should be lower, the lower the tax rate. Thus the results could also understate the overall profit shifting and the revenue loss to the United States.

Pak and Zdanowicz examined export and import prices, and estimated that lost revenue due to transfer pricing of goods alone was $53 billion in 2001. 54 This estimate should cover both U.S. multinationals and U.S. subsidiaries of foreign parents, but is limited to one technique. Kimberly Clausing, using regression techniques on cross country data, which estimated profits reported as a function of tax rates, estimated that revenues of over $60 billion are lost for 2004 by applying a 35% tax rate to an estimated $180 billion in corporate profits shifted out of the United States. 55 She estimates that the profit shifting effects are twice as large as the effects from shifts in actual economic activity. This methodological approach differs from others which involve direct calculations based on returns or prices and is subject to the econometric limitations with cross country panel regressions. In theory, however, it had an overall of coverage of shifting (that is both outbound by U.S. parents of foreign corporations and inbound by foreign parents of U.S. corporations and covering all techniques).

Clausing and Avi-Yonah estimate the revenue gain from moving to a formula apportionment based on sales that is on the order of $50 billion per year because the fraction of worldwide income in the United States is smaller than the fraction of worldwide sales. 56 While this estimate is not an estimate of the loss from profit shifting (since sales and income could differ for other reasons) it is suggestive of the magnitude of total effects from profit shifting. A similar result was found by another study that applied formula apportionment based on an equal weight of assets, payroll, and sales. 57

It is very difficult to develop a separate estimate for U.S. subsidiaries of foreign multinational companies because there is no way to observe the parent firm and its other subsidiaries. Several studies have documented that these firms have lower taxable income and that some have higher debt to asset ratios than domestic firms. There are many other potential explanations these differing characteristics, however, and domestic firms that are used as comparisons also have incentives to shift profits when they have foreign operations. No quantitative estimate has been made. 58 However some evidence of earnings stripping for inverted firms was found. 59



Importance of Different Profit Shifting Techniques

Some studies have attempted to identify the importance of techniques used for profit shifting. Grubert has estimated that about half of income shifting was due to transfer pricing of intangibles and most of the remainder to shifting of debt. 60 In a subsequent study, Altshuler and Grubert find that multinationals saved $7 billion more between 1997 and 2002 due to check the box rules. 61 Some of this gain may have been at the cost of high-tax host countries rather than the United States, however.

Some of the estimates discussed here conflict with respect to the source of profit shifting. The Pak and Zdanowich estimates suggest that transfer pricing of goods is an important mechanism of tax avoidance, while Grubert suggests that the main methods of profit shifting are due to leverage and intangibles. The estimates for pricing of goods may, however, reflect errors, or money laundering motives rather than tax motives. Much of the shifting was associated with trade with high-tax countries; for example, Japan, Canada, and Germany accounted for 18% of the total. 62 At the same time, about 14% of the estimate reflected transactions with countries that appear on tax haven lists: the Netherlands, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Ireland.

Some evidence that points to the importance of intangibles and the associated profits in tax haven countries can be developed by examining the sources of dividends repatriated during the "repatriation holiday" enacted in 2004. 63 This provision allowed, for a temporary period, dividends to be repatriated with an 85% deduction, leading to a tax rate of 5.25%. The pharmaceutical and medicine industry accounted for $99 billion in repatriations or 32% of the total. The computer and electronic equipment industry accounted for $58 billion or 18% of the total. Thus these two industries, which are high tech firms, accounted for half of the repatriations. The benefits were also highly concentrated in a few firms. According to a recent study, five firms (Pfizer, Merck, Hewlett-Packard, Johnson & Johnson, and IBM) are responsible for $88 billion, over a quarter (28%) of total repatriations. 64 The top ten firms (adding Schering-Plough, Du Pont, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Eli Lilly, and PepsiCo) accounted for 42%. The top 15 (adding Procter and Gamble, Intel, Coca-Cola, Altria, and Motorola accounted for over half (52%). These are firms that tend to, in most cases, have intangibles either in technology or brand names.

Finally, as shown in Table 5, which lists all countries accounting for at least 1% of the total of eligible dividends (and accounting for 87% of the total), most of the dividends were repatriated from countries that appear on tax haven lists.


Table 5. Source of Dividends from "Repatriation Holiday": Countries Accounting for at Least I% of Dividends





____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Country Percentage of Total

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Netherlands 28.8

Switzerland 10.4

Bermuda 10.2

Ireland 8.2

Luxembourg 7.5

Canada 5.9

Cayman Islands 5.9

United Kingdom 5.1

Hong Kong 1.7

Singapore 1.7

Malaysia 1.2

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Source: Internal Revenue Service






Methods of Avoidance and Evasion by Individuals

Individual evasion of taxes may take different forms and they are all facilitated by the growing international financial globalization and ease of making transactions on the Internet. Individuals can purchase foreign investments directly (outside the United States), such as stocks and bonds, or put money in foreign bank accounts and simply not report the income (although it is subject to tax under U.S. tax law). There is little or no withholding information on individual taxpayers for this type of action. They can also use structures such as trusts or shell corporations to evade tax on investments, including investments made in the United States, which may take advantage of U.S. tax laws that exempt interest income and capital gains of non-residents from U.S. tax. Rather than using withholding or information collection the United States largely relies on the Qualified Intermediary (QI) program where beneficial owners are not revealed. To the extent any information gathering from other countries is done it is through bilateral information exchanges rather than multilateral information sharing. The European Union has developed a multilateral agreement but the United States does not participate.



Tax Provisions Affecting the Treatment of Income by Individuals

The ability of U.S. persons (whether firms or individuals) to avoid tax on U.S. source income that they would normally be subject to arises from U.S. rules that do not impose withholding taxes on many sources of income. In general interest and capital gains are not subject to withholding. Dividends, non-portfolio interest (such as interest payments by a U.S. subsidiary to its parent), capital gains connected with a trade or business, and certain rents are subject to tax, although treaty arrangements widely reduce or eliminate the tax on dividends. In addition, even when dividends are potentially subject to a withholding tax, new techniques have developed to transform, through derivatives, those assets into exempt interest. 65

The elimination of tax on interest income was unilaterally initiated by the United States in 1984, and other countries began to follow suit. 66 Currently, fears of capital flight are likely to keep countries from changing this treatment. However, it has been accompanied with a lack of information reporting and lack of information sharing that allows U.S. citizens, who are liable for these taxes, to avoid them whether on income invested abroad or income invested in the United States channeled through shell corporations and trusts. Citizens of foreign countries can also evade the tax, and the U.S. practice of not collecting information contributes to the problem.

Based on actual tax cases, Guttenberg and Avi-Yonah describe a typical way that U.S. individuals can easily evade tax on domestic income through a Cayman Islands operation using current technology with little expense with current technology. The individual, using the Internet, can open a bank account in the name of a Cayman corporation that can be set up for a minimal fee. Money can be electronically transferred without any reporting to tax authorities, and investments can be made in the United States or abroad. Investments by non-residents in interest bearing assets and most capital gains are not subject to a withholding tax in the United States. 67

In addition to corporations, foreign trusts can be used to accomplish the same approach. Trusts may involve a trust protector who is an intermediary between the grantor and the trustees, but whose purpose may actually be to carry out the desires of the grantor. Some taxpayers argue that these trusts are legal but in either case they can be used to protect income from taxes, including those invested in the United States, from tax, while retaining control over and use of the funds.



Limited Information Reporting Between Jurisdictions

In general, the international taxation of passive portfolio income by individuals is easily subject to evasion because there is no multilateral reporting of interest income. Even in those cases where bilateral information sharing treaties, referred to as Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs) are in place, they have limits. As pointed out by Avi-Yonah most of these agreements are restricted to criminal matters, which are a minor part of the revenues involved and pose difficult issues of evidence. Also, these agreements sometimes require that the activities related to the information being sought constitute crimes in both countries which can be a substantial hurdle in cases of tax evasion. The OECD has adopted a model agreement with the "dual criminality" requirements. 68 TIEAs usually allow for information only upon request, requiring the United States and other countries to identify the potential tax evaders in advance and they do not override bank secrecy laws.

In some cases the countries themselves have little or no information of value. One article, for example, discussing the possibility of an information exchange agreement with the British Virgin Islands, a country with more than 400,000 registered corporations, where laws require no identification of shareholders or directors, and require no financial records, noted: "Even if the BVI signs an information exchange agreement, it is not clear what information could be exchanged." 69



U.S. Collection of Information on U.S. Income and Qualified Intermediaries

Under the Qualified Intermediary (QI) program the United States itself does not require U.S. financial institutions to identify the true beneficiaries of interest and exempt dividends. The IRS has set up a Qualified Intermediary (QI) Program in 2001, under which foreign banks that received payments certify the nationality of their depositors and reveal the identity of any U.S. citizens. 70 However, although QIs are supposed to certify nationality, 71 apparently some rely on self certification. 72 They are also subject to audit. However, UBS, the Swiss bank involved in a tax abuse scandal that helped clients set up offshore plans, was a QI, and that event has raised some questions about the QI program.

A non-qualified intermediary must disclose the identity of its customers to obtain the exemption for passive income such as interest and or the reduced rates arising from tax treaties, but there are also questions about the accuracy of disclosures.



European Union Savings Directive

The European Union, in its savings directive, has developed among their members an option of either information reporting or a withholding tax. The reporting or withholding option covers the member countries as well as some other countries. Three states, Austria, Belgium, and Luxembourg have elected the withholding tax. While this multilateral agreement aids these countries' tax administration, the United States is not a participant.



Estimates of the Revenue Cost of Individual Tax Evasion

While there are a number of different approaches that have been used to estimate corporate tax avoidance, all of these approaches rely on data reported on assets and income. For individual evasion, estimates are much more difficult because the initial basis of the estimate is the amount of assets held abroad whose income is not reported to the tax authorities. In addition to this estimate, the expected rate of return and tax rate are needed to estimate the revenue cost.

Guttentag and Avi-Yonah estimate a value of $50 billion in individual tax evasion, based on an estimate of holdings by high net worth individuals invested outside the United States at $1.5 trillion. 73 Using a rate of return of 10% and a tax rate of approximately a third, they obtain an estimate of $50 billion. They also summarize two other estimates in 2002 of $40 billion for the international tax gap by the IRS and $70 billion by an IRS consultant.

Dharmapala suggests that this cost is overestimated. 74 To the extent that the earnings are interest, he argues that the 10% rate of return is too high, while if it is dividends and capital gains, the tax rate is too high. Using a tax rate of 15% (currently applicable to capital gains and dividends) would lead to about $23 billion. In the case of equity investments, if a third of the return is in dividends and half of capital gains is never realized, the tax rate would be 10% or about $15 billion assuming the 10% return. During 2002 and beginning in 2011, however, the tax rate on capital gains and dividends is 20%, indicating a loss of $20 billion rather than $15 billion. Dharmapala argues that 2% is a more reasonable rate for interest returns. Since investors can earn tax free returns in the neighborhood of 4% to 5% on domestic state and local bonds, that argument is not persuasive. To yield a 5% after-tax return at a 35% tax rates would require a pre-tax yield of about 7.7%. The estimate would then be $40 billion.

The Tax Justice Network has estimated a worldwide revenue loss for all countries of $255 billion from individual tax evasion, basically using a 7.5% return and a 30% tax rate. 75 These assumptions would be consistent with a $33 billion loss for the United States using the $1.5 trillion figure.



Alternative Policy Options to Address Corporate Profit Shifting

Since much of the corporate tax revenue loss arises from activities that either are legal or appear to be so, it is difficult to address these issues other than with changes in the tax law Outcomes would likely be better if there is international cooperation. Currently, the possibilities for international cooperation appear to play a bigger role in options for dealing with individual evasion than with corporate avoidance.



Broad Changes to International Tax Rules

The first set of provisions would introduce broad changes in international tax rules, and include significant restrictions in deferral or allocation of income and capital.



Repeal Deferral

One approach to mitigate the rewards of profit shifting is to repeal deferral, or to institute true worldwide taxation of foreign source income Firms would be subject to current tax on the income of their foreign subsidiaries, although they would continue to be able to take foreign tax credits. According to estimates cited above, this change currently would raise from $11 to $14 billion per year.

Many of the issues surrounding the repeal of deferral have focused on the real effects of repeal on the allocation of capital. Traditionally, economic analysis has suggested that eliminating deferral would increase economic efficiency, although recently some have argued that this gain would be offset by the loss of production of some efficient firms from high-tax countries. Some have also argued for retaining the current system or moving in the other direction to a territorial tax. These economic issues are discussed in detail in another CRS report. 76

Repeal of deferral would largely eliminate the value of the planning techniques discussed in this report. There are concerns, however, that firms could avoid the effects of repeal by having their parent incorporate in other countries that continue to allow deferral. The most direct and beneficial to reducing firms' tax liabilities of these planning approaches, inversion, has been addressed by legislation in 2004. 77 Mergers would be another method to counter the implementation of deferral, although mergers involve real changes in organization that would not likely be undertaken to gain a small tax benefit. Another possibility is that more direct portfolio investment (i.e. buying shares of stock by individual investors) in foreign corporations will occur. There has been a significant growth in this direct investment, although the evidence suggests this investment has been due to portfolio diversification and not tax avoidance. 78



Targeted or Partial Elimination of Deferral

More narrow proposals to address deferral and tax avoidance would tax income in tax havens currently, or tax some additional income of foreign subsidiaries. They include:


Ÿ Eliminating deferral for specified tax havens.



Ÿ Eliminating deferral in countries with tax rates that are below the U.S. rate by a specified proportion.



Ÿ Eliminating deferral for income on the production of goods that are in turn imported into the United States.



Ÿ Eliminate deferral for income on the production of goods that are exported.



Ÿ Requiring a minimum payout share.


Restricting current taxation to tax havens would likely address some of the problems associated with transfer pricing and leveraging, without ending deferral entirely. Defining a tax haven under those circumstances would be crucial. A bill introduced in the 110 th Congress, S. 396, which defined as a U.S. firm any U.S. subsidiary in a tax haven not engaged in an active business, had a list of countries that was the same as the original OECD tax haven list, except for the U.S. Virgin Islands. Some countries, such as Ireland, that are often considered tax havens, would not be subject to such provisions, leaving some scope for corporate tax avoidance. In addition, firms could shift some operations to other lower tax countries and increase the amount of foreign tax credits available, which would be a loss to U.S. revenue. Some concerns have also been expressed that listing specific tax haven countries would make cooperative approaches, such as tax information sharing treaties, more difficult.

An alternative, which would not require identifying particular countries, would be to restrict deferral based on a tax rate that is lower than the U.S. rate by a specified amounts. For example, the French, who generally have a territorial tax, tax income earned in jurisdictions with tax rates 1/3 lower than the French rate. For the U.S., whose tax rate is similar to the French rate, this ratio would indicate a tax rate lower than 24%.

Another proposal directed to "runaway" plans would eliminate deferral for investments abroad that produce exports into the United States. S. 1284, also in the 110 th Congress, would impose current taxation on such activities by expanding Subpart F income to include income attributable to imports into the United States of goods produced by foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms. The main problem with this proposal is administering it, which would include tracing selling to a third party for resale.

A somewhat different and more restrictive proposal was made by Senator Kerry during the 2004 presidential campaign. He proposed to eliminate deferral except in the case where income is produced and sold in the controlled foreign corporation's (CFC's) jurisdiction. This approach would, like deferral in general, be likely to significantly restrict opportunities for artificial profit shifting, since most of the income in tax haven or low-tax jurisdictions do not arise from real activity; indeed, these jurisdictions are too small in many cases to provide a market. As with the previous proposal, however, the administration of such a plan would be difficult.

A final option that would not go as far as eliminating deferral altogether would be to require some minimum share to be paid out.



Allocation of Deductions and Credits with Respect to Deferred Income/Restrictions on Cross Crediting

A proposal that does not end deferral but makes the shifting of profits from high-tax countries less attractive is a provision to allocate deductions and credits, so as to deny those benefits until income is repatriated. This approach was included in a tax reform bill introduced by Chairman Rangel of the Ways and Means Committee in 2007 (H.R. 3970) and is included in the current proposals by President Obama. Under this proposal, a portion of certain overall deductions, such as interest or overhead, that reflects the share of foreign deferred income, would be disallowed. The foreign tax credit allocation rule would allow credits for the share of foreign taxes paid that is equal to the share of foreign source income repatriated. Disallowed deductions and credits would be carried forward. (President Obama's proposal does not allocate research and experimental expenses).

The allocation-of-deductions provision would decrease the tax benefits of sheltering income in low-tax jurisdictions and encourage repatriation of income relative to current law and presumably reduce profit shifting, as well as decreasing benefits of real investment abroad. The foreign tax credit allocation rule could have a variety of effects. It would make foreign investment abroad less attractive because it would increase the tax on income when eventually repatriated, it would discourage investment in low-tax jurisdictions that could no longer be sheltered by foreign tax credits, and it would discourage repatriation of earnings on existing activities because of the potential tax to be collected.

The allocation of credits accomplishes some of the restrictions on cross crediting that could also be achieved by increasing the number of baskets. As discussed below, one possible separate basket would be for active royalties. Another possibility would be to impose a per country limit with a separate basket for each country (and baskets within each for passive, active, etc. income).



Formula Apportionment

Another approach to addressing income shifting is through formula apportionment, which would be a major change in the international tax system. With formula apportionment, income would be allocated to different jurisdictions based on their shares of some combination of sales, assets, and employment. This approach is used by many states in the United States and by the Canadian provinces to allocate income. (In the past, a three factor apportionment was used, but some states have moved to a sales based system.) Studies have estimated a significant increase in taxes from adopting formula apportionment. Slemrod and Shackleford estimate a 38% revenue increase from an equally weighted three factor system. 79 A sales based formula has been proposed by Avi-Yonah and Clausing that they estimate would raise about 35% of additional corporate revenue, or $50 billion annually over the 2001-2004 period. 80

The ability of a formula apportionment system to address some of the problems of shifting income becomes problematic with intangible assets. 81 If all capital were tangible capital, such as buildings and equipment, a formula apportionment system based on capital would at least lead to the same rate of return for tax purposes across high-tax and low-tax jurisdictions. Real distortions in the allocation of capital would remain, since capital would still flow to low-tax jurisdictions, but paper profits could not be shifted. An allocation system based on assets becomes more difficult when intangible assets are involved. It is probably as difficult to estimate the stock of intangible investment (given lack of information on the future pattern of profitability) as it is to allocate it under arms length pricing. In the case of an allocation based on sales, profits that might appropriately be associated with domestic income as they arise from domestic investment in R&D would be allocated abroad. Moreover, new avenues of tax planning, such as selling to an intermediary in a low-tax country for resale, would complicate the administration of such a plan. Whether the benefits are greater than the costs is in some dispute.

One problem is that if the Untied States adopted the system there could be double taxation of some income and no taxation of other income unless there were a multinational plan. The European Union has been considering a formula apportionment, based on property, gross receipts, number of employees and cost of employment. This proposal and the consequences for different countries are discussed by Devereux and Loretz. 82 If the European Union adopted such a plan it would be easier for the United States to adopt a similar apportionment formula without as much risk of double or no taxation with respect to its major trading partners.



Eliminate Check the Box, Hybrid Entities, and Hybrid Instruments; Foreign Tax Credit Splitting From Income

A number of proposals have been made to eliminate check the box, and in general to adopt rules that would require that legal entities be characterized in a consistent manner by the United States and the country where the entity is established. This proposal has been made by McIntyre. 83 In general rules to require that legal entities be characterized in a consistent manner by the U.S. and by the country where established and that tax benefits that arise from inconsistent treatment of instruments be denied would address this particular class of provisions that undermine Subpart F and the matching of credits and deductions with income. President Obama's proposal includes a provision that disallows a subsidiary to treat a subsidiary chartered in another country as a disregarded entity. It also includes a provision to prevent foreign tax credits without the associated income, which can currently be accomplished with reverse hybrids.



Narrower Provisions Affecting Multinational Profit Shifting

A number of more narrow provisions could be considered that would be more focused on preventing abuses and have fewer consequences for the overall structure of international corporate taxation.



Tighten Earnings Stripping Rules

In the American Jobs Creation Act a further restriction on earnings stripping rules was considered as an alternative to the anti-inversion measure. These provisions were not enacted, but were to be studied in a Treasury report. The 2004 House proposal would have raised revenue by dropping the debt to asset share test and lowering the interest share standard to 25% for ordinary debt, 50% for guaranteed debt, and 30% overall. In general, further restrictions on earnings stripping could be considered to address shifting through debt for U.S. subsidiaries of foreign parents.

President Obama's plan includes dropping the asset test and lowering the interest share standard to 25% for inverted firms, with respect to related party non-guaranteed debt.



Foreign Tax Credits: Source Royalties as Domestic Income for Purposes of the Foreign Tax Credit Limit, Or Create Separate Basket; Eliminate Title Passage Rule; Restrict Credits for Taxes Producing an Economic Benefit

As noted above, one of the issues surrounding the cross-crediting of the foreign tax credit is the use of excess credits to shield royalties from U.S. tax on income that could be considered U.S. source income. Two options might be considered to address that issue: sourcing these royalties as domestic income for purposes of the credit or putting them into a separate foreign tax credit basket. 84 The same issue applies to the provision that allows half of the income from exports to be allocated to the country in which the title passes. President Obama's proposal includes a provision to restrict the crediting of taxes that are in exchange for an economic benefit (such as payments that are the equivalent of royalties).



Transfer pricing

Michael McIntyre has suggested some other proposals to deal with transfer pricing, which include making transfer pricing penalties nearly automatic for taxpayers who have not kept contemporaneous records. He also suggests use of some type of formula apportionment plan as a default for transfer pricing for non-complying taxpayers so the IRS does not have to conduct a detailed transaction by transaction assessment for the court.

President Obama's proposals would address some of the transfer pricing issues associated with the transfer of intangibles, by clarifying that intangibles include workforce in place, goodwill, and going concern value and that they are valued at their highest and best use. The plan would allow the IRS Commissioner to aggregate intangibles if that leads to a more appropriate value.

These proposals would likely have small effects. Any significant solution to the transfer pricing problem, especially for intangibles, is difficult to entertain short of an elimination of deferral.



Codify Economic Substance Doctrine

A final proposal that does not focus specifically on international tax avoidance and evasion but is relevant to these issues is a codification of the economic substance doctrine. Firms that enter into tax savings arrangements that are found not to have economic substance can have their tax benefits disallowed by the courts under what has become known as the economic substance doctrine. The doctrine is sometimes interpreted differently by different courts and recent legislative proposals have sought to make the doctrine more uniform through statute. Generally these proposals would require a transaction to meet both an objective test (profit was made) and a subjective test (profit was intended). Penalties are also imposed. Supporters argue that the stricter test will not only reduce tax avoidance but also make treatment more consistent across the courts. Some tax attorneys are concerned that more specific rules might provide a roadmap to structuring arrangements that will pass the test. President Obama's budget proposals include a two-part statutory standard.



Prevent Dividend Repatriation Through Reorganizations

President Obama's plan would revise the rule on reorganizations when property as well as stock is received to treat distributions as dividends in the case of cross border transactions.



Options to Address Individual Evasion

Most of the options for addressing individual evasion involve more information reporting and additional enforcement. There are options that would involve fundamental changes in the law, such as shifting from a residence to a source basis for passive income. That is, the United States would tax this passive income earned in its borders, just as is the case for corporate and other active income. This change involves, however, many other economic and efficiency effects that are probably not desirable. The remainder of the proposals discussed here do not involve any fundamental changes in the tax itself, but rather focus on administration and enforcement.

The options discussed below are drawn from many sources, including academics and practitioners, organizations, and the Internal Revenue Service, and contained in legislative proposals; citations to these sources are provided at this point and legislative proposals are summarized in the next section. 85



Information Reporting

Expanded information reporting can involve multilateral efforts, changes in the current bilateral treaties, or unilateral changes.



Multilateral Information Sharing or Withholding; International Cooperation

The option that appears likely to recover most of the revenues would be to join in the European Union Directive, which would require information reporting on all income paid to foreign entities by U.S. banks and other institutions. If the beneficial owner cannot be identified, withholding could be imposed (a refund would be allowed if evidence of reporting to the home country could be shown). This approach has been proposed by the Tax Justice Network, which also suggests expanding the treaty to other tax havens. If the European Union is receptive, it would benefit other countries by reporting income paid to foreign nationals and benefit the U.S. by achieving third party information reporting on foreign investments of U.S. citizens.

Avi-Yonah and Avi-Yonah and Guttentag have suggested that current Treasury policy is to focus on bilateral agreements to achieve information exchange, but that the United States should also focus on cooperation with the OECD and G-20 and other appropriate organizations to improve information and persuade tax havens to enter into exchanges based on the OECD model. Shay suggests this approach as well and particularly references electronic information exchange.

The Tax Justice Network has proposed that the United Nations develop a global tax cooperation standard, set up a panel to determine compliant states, and deny recognition to non-compliant jurisdictions. They have also suggested that the IMF and Word Bank country assessments address tax compliance.



Expanding Bilateral Information Exchange

A number of commentators have suggested an increase in the scope of bilateral information treaties to provide for regular and automatic exchanges of information. This would require the U.S. banks to increase their collection of information.

Avi-Yonah and Avid-Yonah and Guttentag suggest adopting the model OECD bilateral Tax Information Exchange Agreement (TIEA). This information exchange would relate to civil as well as criminal issues, it would not require suspicion of a crime other than tax evasion, and would override tax haven bank secrecy laws. Non-tax havens could be induced to make such agreements to obtain information, and thus, such a change would require collection of information on interest payments by banks and financial institutions. Treasury has proposed only 16 countries, but Avi-Yonah and Guttenberg suggest no reason to restrict the provision in this way. Treasury could use existing authority not to exchange information that might be misused by non-democratic foreign governments.

Martin Sullivan suggests that automatic information exchange might be the only way to stop evasion, which would require renegotiating existing agreements and a major policy change. He notes that that the proposed Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act (S. 506, H.R. 1265) requires automatic information exchange for a country to stay off the tax haven list.



Unilateral Approaches: Withholding/Refund Approach; Increased Information Reporting Requirements

This step is one that the United States could undertake without multilateral or bilateral cooperation, namely imposing withholding taxes on interest income and other exempt income received from U.S. sources by foreign intermediaries and providing a refund upon proof that the beneficial recipient was eligible. Avi-Yonah suggests this change with the hope that it would be adopted multilaterally.

A variation of this approach would be to require disclosure of the names of customers including beneficial owners, with withholding imposed if disclosure was not forthcoming. Such a proposal has been made by Michael McIntyre.

President Obama's proposals would impose withholding requirements with a refund mechanism, but only on non-qualified intermediaries.

The proposed Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act would require banks and QIs to file 1099 information returns for U.S. owners, based on beneficial ownership, which they are already required to know under anti-money-laundering rules. Also, any financial institution that establishes a trust, corporation, or bank account in a tax haven country would be required to report it to the IRS. President Obama's proposals appear to contain similar provisions. President Obama's proposals also include provisions to require information reporting by U.S. financial intermediaries and qualified intermediaries on transfers of funds and by U.S. persons and qualified intermediaries on the formation or acquisition of a foreign entity.

The proposed Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act would also require reporting by U.S. shareholders and persons forming, sending or receiving assets from Passive Foreign Investment Corporations (PFICs).



Other Measures That Might Improve Compliance



Incentives/Sanctions for Tax Havens

Avi-Yonah and Avi-Yonah and Guttenberg suggest a carrot and stick approach to tax havens. They argue that little of the benefit of tax havens flows to their sometimes needy residents, but rather to the professionals providing banking and legal services, who often live elsewhere. They suggest transitional aid to move away from these offshore activities. For non-cooperating tax havens, they suggest the Treasury use its existing authority to deny benefits of the interest exemption. They suggest that tax havens cannot continue to exist unless the wealthy countries permit it, because funds are not productive in tax havens.

The proposed Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act would extend to tax enforcement the sanctions of the Patriot Act used to impose penalties for money laundering and terrorist financing. Sanctions vary in severity and range from increased reporting on transactions to prohibitions. Sullivan points out that the U.S. government has used the Patriot Act sparingly, however, and questions whether this change would be a credible threat.

Blessing suggests that sanctions should be multilateral rather than unilateral.



Revise the and Strengthen the Qualified Intermediary (QI)Program

Several proposals relating to the QI program, which were discussed by witnesses at a Ways and Means Committee hearing on March 31, 2009, were reported by Sullivan. Some of these provisions are also included in the proposed Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act. If enough effective revisions could be made in the QI program, a great deal of potential information about U.S. taxpayers' income would be obtained. These proposals include the following. QIs would be required to inquire about and independently verify the ownership of foreign corporations and similar entities, information that they already must acquire to deal with money laundering. QIs would also be required to report any non-U.S. income of U.S. taxpayers. QIs would be required to submit information electronically, and IRS would be given resources to handle and use this information. The current exemption from withholding rules for bearer bonds (where no registration occurs) would be eliminated. Another possible change is to require QIs to share information about foreign customers to U.S. treaty partners (although one witness warned that this might be too severe a requirement). Finally, external audits of QIs would be strengthened by requiring QIs to promptly notify the IRS of any material failure in oversight, improve the evaluation of risk of circumvention of U.S. taxes by U.S. persons, and require audit oversight by a U.S. auditor.

Blum emphasizes the problem of accepting a shell corporation as the beneficial owner, and says this loophole in the law should be closed. He also suggests that penalties for failure to enforce should include withholding of capital gains as well as interest and dividends.

McIntyre stresses that audits of the QIs should be done by firms that do not at the same time sell tax shelters. Avi-Yonah and Avi-Yonah and Guttentag also suggest that IRS should require U.S. payors to issue form 1099s when they know or have reason to suspect the beneficial owner is a U.S. citizen (rather than the W8-BEN which provides evidence of foreign status).

President Obama's proposals would revise the treatment of non-qualified intermediaries. As noted above, the proposal includes a withholding/refund mechanism for non-qualified intermediaries. It would require that QIs can qualify only if all of their affiliates are QIs and, as noted above, increase information reporting by QIs.



Placing the Burden of Proof on the Taxpayer

An important part of the Stop Tax Haven Abuse proposal is to place the burden of proof in court on the taxpayer; this approach was also suggested by Blum. As noted above, there is also a shift in the burden of proof for accounts with non-qualified intermediaries for filing an FBAR (Foreign Bank and Financial Account Report).

President Obama's proposal would create a presumption that the funds in foreign accounts are large enough to require an FBAR which is required when amounts exceed $10,000. It would treat failure to file for amounts in excess of $200,000 as willful, which permits criminal penalties and larger civil penalties.



Treat Shell Corporations as U.S. Firms

The Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act includes a provision to treat any firm that is publicly traded or has assets over $50 million as a U.S. corporation. This provision would include hedge funds but would not affect subsidiaries of multinational firms because decisions are made by the parent firm. Sullivan argues that such a provision would have a devastating effect on the U.S. hedge fund industry, where offshore firms generally attract tax exempt U.S. investors and foreigners who wish to avoid filing tax returns, as well as U.S. tax evaders, and that legislative relief for U.S. tax exempt investors (pension funds, university endowments) would be likely.



Impose Restrictions on Foreign Trusts

The proposed Stop Tax Haven Abuse Acts would impose further restrictions on foreign trusts, by providing that any powers held by trust protectors would be attributed to the trust grantor, providing that any U.S. person who benefits from the trust will be treated as a formal beneficiary even if not named, providing that a future or contingent beneficiary be treated as a current one, and treating loans of assets and property as distributions. The Senate Finance Committee draft would expand the definition of contributions to include items such as art and jewelry.



Treat Dividend Equivalents as Dividends

As noted earlier, the withholding tax on dividends has been avoided with the use of derivatives and other arrangements to re-characterize them as interest. The proposed Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act would treat dividend equivalents as dividends. Proposals for change in this area were also made by Avi-Yonah. President Obama's plan treats equity swaps as dividends.



Extend the Statute of Limitations

Extensions in the statute of limitations are saidby some to be needed due to the complexity of the international cases and difficulty of obtaining information. Extension has been proposed by numerous commentators, is supported by the IRS officials and is included in the proposed Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, proposals discussed by the Senate Finance Committee, and proposals made by President Obama. These legislative proposals would extend the statute of limitations from three years to six years, but Blum also suggests the possibility of ten years.



Greater Resources for the Internal Revenue Service to Focus on Offshore

Numerous suggestions have been made to expand IRS resources for combating overseas tax abuses. President Obama's proposal, for example, has proposed to fund 800 new positions to combat international abuses.

Blum says that agents should not be pressured to give up difficult cases because of short term performance goals based on closing cases and collecting revenues.



Make Civil Cases Public as a Deterrent

Blum suggests all settlements involving offshore schemes in excess of $1 million should be excluded from the restrictions of Section 6103 that require settled civil cases to be confidential. He argues that no one knows about these cases and thus taxpayers think the possibility of being caught is small.



Revise Rules for FBAR (Foreign Bank Account Report)

Blum argues that language in the FBAR should be clarified to make it easier for the Justice Department to pursue cases; the proposed Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act would change the disclosure rules to make this information easier to use. The FBAR report on foreign bank accounts is filed separately from the tax return; individuals must check a box to indicate whether or not they have these accounts. It is possible that a reporting requirement on the tax return would increase the visibility and force of this requirement. The Senate Finance Committee would require this report to be filed with the tax return and require due diligence on the part of tax preparers to determine if it should be filed. (Note also, as discussed below, that some of the strengthened penalties relate to FBAR.) President Obama's plan would require the information from the FBAR to also be reported on the tax return and any transfer of funds that sums to more than $10,000 would also be reported.



Joe Doe Summons

A provision in the proposed Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act would make it easier to issue John Doe summons where the IRS does not know the names of taxpayers and now must ask courts for permission to serve the summons. This section provides that in any case involving offshore secret accounts, the court is to presume tax compliance is at issue, to relieve the IRS of the obligation when the only records sought are U.S. bank records, and to issue John Doe summons for large investigative projects without addressing each set of summons separately.



Strengthening of Penalties

Increased penalties are included in the proposed Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, the Finance Committee Draft and President Obama's proposals. Among the penalty provisions in various proposals are: increased penalties for failure to file FBARs; basing the FBAR penalty on the highest amount in period rather than on a particular day; and increased penalties on abusive tax shelters, failure to file information on foreign trusts, and certain offshore transactions. President Obama's proposals would double accuracy related penalties for foreign transactions and increase penalties for trusts and permit them to be imposed if the amount in the trust cannot be established.

The proposed Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act also includes a provision that legal opinions that take the position that a transaction is more likely than not to prevail for tax purposes will no longer shield taxpayers from penalties.

S. 386, the Fraud Recovery and Investment Act. would introduce criminal penalties. Some tax attorneys have questioned whether these proposals are too harsh or might undermine amnesty or voluntary compliance. 86



Address Tax Shelters; Codify Economic Substance Doctrine

The proposed Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act would make a number of additional changes addressing tax shelters, including prohibiting the patenting of tax shelters, developing an examination procedure so that bank regulators could detect questionable tax activities, disallowing fees contingent on tax savings, removing communication barriers between enforcement agencies, codifying regulations, making it clear that prohibition of disclosure by tax preparers does not prevent congressional subpoenas, and providing standards for tax shelter opinion letters.

It would also codify the economic substance doctrine. This proposal is discussed among options for reducing corporate tax avoidance, but would also be applicable to individual evasion issues.



Regulate the Rules Used by States to Permit Incorporation.

Blum suggests that all U.S. Limited Liability Companies (LLCs) have a taxpayer ID number, a requirement not imposed in Delaware and other states that keep no records of ownership. S. 569 would tighten regulations to require record-keeping and identification of beneficial owners of corporations and LLCs and commission a study of partnerships and trusts.



Make Suspicious Activity Reports Available to Civil Side of IRS

The proposal that information on suspicious activity reports filed by financial institutions under anti-money laundering acts be made available to the civil side of IRS was made by Blum, who indicated that agency policy at the top levels had prohibited this information sharing. It is included in a provision in the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act.



Summary of Legislative Proposals

This section summarizes current legislative proposals that are designed to address or have consequences for international tax evasion and avoidance.



President Obama's International Tax Proposals 87

President Obama's international proposals include several proposals that relate to multinational corporations: allocation of deductions and credits, a restriction on use of foreign tax credits when associated income is not recognized, and a restriction on check-the-box. They also include proposals addressing individual tax evasion. Overall these provisions are projected to raise $210 billion for FY2010-2019. The provisions are discussed in the order in which they are presented unless otherwise noted, since revenue effects depend on that order. Note also that the budget proposes additional resources for the IRS for international enforcement.



Provisions Affecting Multinational Corporations and Other Tax Law Changes



Hybrid Entities and Check-the Box

The most significant provision based on revenue gain is a revision directed at hybrid entities and check-the-box. This provision requires that a corporation cannot disregard a subsidiary corporation unless it is incorporated in the same jurisdiction. This rule does not apply to the parent and its first level subsidiary. Thus, a U.S. parent with a subsidiary in Ireland could treat that subsidiary as a branch (disregard it as a separate entity). The Irish subsidiary, however, could not treat its German subsidiary as a disregarded entity. This provision is projected to raise $86.5 billion for FY2010-2019. 88



Allocation of Deductions and Credits

Two of these proposals would allocate deductions and credits, so as to deny those benefits until income is repatriated. This approach was included in a tax reform bill introduced by Chairman Rangel of the Ways and Means Committee in 2007 (H.R. 3970). A portion of overall deductions, such as interest, that reflects the share of foreign deferred income, would be disallowed until the income is repatriated. The foreign tax credit allocation rule would allow credits for the share of foreign taxes paid that is equal to the share of foreign source income repatriated, a provision the discussion of the proposals refers to as pooling. Disallowed deductions and credits would be carried forward. The proposal specifically excludes deductions for research and experimentation from the allocation rule.

The revenue gain for FY2010-2019 is $60.1 billion for the deduction allocation and $24.5 billion for the foreign tax credit pooling.



Limiting the Foreign Tax Credit; Reverse Hybrids

Another provision aimed at multinational corporations would disallow foreign tax credits when the associated income is not received, as can occur with reverse hybrids. A matching rule would apply. This provision is estimated to raise $18.5 billion in revenue for FY2010-2019.



Transfer Pricing of Intangibles

The proposal would clarify several rules that are relevant to the transfer of intangibles. First, it would clarify that intangibles include workforce in place, goodwill, and going concern value. Second, it would allow the IRS commission to aggregate intangibles if that leads to a more appropriate value. Finally, it would clarify that intangibles are to valued at their highest and best as it would be by a willing buyer and seller with reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts. This provision is projected to raise $2.9 billion for FY 2-10-2019.



Earnings Stripping by Inverted Firms

The proposal would apply the provisions on earnings stripping discussed in 2004 to inverted firms. For these firms the debt-to-equity safe harbor would be eliminated and non-guaranteed related party debt would not be deductible when debt exceeded the 25% threshold This provision is projected to raise $1.2 billion for FY2010-FY2019.



Prevent Repatriation of Earnings in Cross Border Transactions

The plan includes a proposal to require that distributions that are characterized as reorganizations but are in the nature of a dividend repatriation are subject to tax. This issue arises within the framework of an exchange of stock on the one hand for stock and property (called "boot") and rules that provide the minimum of gain be based on the boot or overall gain. This proposal is projected to raise $297 million from FY2010-2019.



Repeal 80/20 Rules

This provision is related to dividends and affects individuals. Under current law, withholding is applied to interest and dividends paid by corporations, but there is an exception for firms who have 80% of their income from active foreign operations. This provision would repeal that exception, raising projected revenues of $1.2 billion for FY2010-2019.



Treat Equity Swaps as Dividends

This provision addresses the problem of disguising dividends that are subject to taxation as interest that is not. This provision, which would generally treat equity swaps as dividends, would raise $1.4 billion for FY2010-2019.



Foreign Tax Credits for Dual Capacity Taxpayers

This provision would disallow a foreign tax credit for taxes paid where there is an income tax that is paid in part to receive a benefit (i.e. the firm is paying a tax in a dual capacity) unless the income tax is generally imposed on the country's own residents as well as foreign persons. The current rule does not require the tax to be imposed on the country's residents. This provision typically relates to taxes being substituted for royalties in oil producing countries; there is a provision that it will not abrogate any existing treaties. This provision is projected to raise $4.5 billion for FY2010-2019.



Economic Substance Doctrine

Although not included with the international proposals, the proposal includes a codification of the economic substance doctrine, that requires both a subjective (profit intended) and objective (profit achieved) test.



Provision Relating to Individual Tax Evasion

The President's proposal includes a number of provisions relating to individual evasion including reporting of information, withholding and various penalties. Overall these provisions are projected to raise revenues of $8.7 billion from FY2010 to FY2019.



Qualified Intermediaries

Qualified Intermediaries would be required to identify all account holders that are U.S. persons and file 1099s information forms relative to them. All related firms of a QI wouldbe required to be QIs. QIs would also have to report on the transfer of funds and the forming or acquisition of foreign entities (along with U.S. third party reporting discussed below).



Nonqualified Intermediaries

Nonqualified intermediaries would be required to withhold 30% on periodic payments (these payments are termed FDAP for fixed or determinable annual or periodic payments) and 20% on gross gains from sale; exempt taxpayers would have to apply for refunds. Some exceptions are allowed.



Other Increased Third Party Reporting

U.S. financial intermediaries and qualified intermediaries would be required to report financial transfers. U.S. person and qualified intermediaries would be required to report the formation or establishment of a foreign entity,



Additional Information Reported on Tax Returns

Individuals who are required to file an FBAR (Foreign Bank and Financial Account Reports) would also be required to report this information on the tax return. They would also be required to report any transfer of funds to a foreign entity, unless they are less than $10,000.



Burden of Proof and Presumption Provisions

The proposal contains a number of provisions that provide evidentiary presumptions (shifts in the burden of proof). If an individual has a foreign account it is presumed to be large enough to require filing an FBAR. If a person has an account of over $200,000 it is presumed that failure to file is willful (which opens the possibility of criminal as well as higher civil penalties). If a payment subject to withholding is made to a foreign person on an FDAP, the presumption is that that person is not eligible for withholding.



Statute of Limitations

The statute of limitations for cross border transactions is extended from three to six years.



Penalties

The 20% accuracy related penalty that already applies would be increased to 40% for transactions involving foreign accounts where the taxpayer failed to disclose reportable information. A reasonable cause exception would not be available. In the case of failure to report or underreporting foreign trusts, the initial penalty is 35% of the trust amount. If the failure to report continues for ninety days an additional penalty of $10,000 is imposed for each 30-day period, but the total cannot exceed the amount of the trust. This provision would change the initial penalty from 35% of the trust amount to the greater of 35% or $10,000. The $10,000 for each 30-day period would be continued indefinitely, with a refund of any excess when the taxpayer does report. This proposal addresses the problem of the IRS not being able to assess a penalty because it cannot determine the amount in the account.



Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, S. 506 and H.R. 1265 89

This bill has been introduced in the Senate by Senator Carl Levin and in the House by Representative Lloyd Doggett.

Section 101 would provide a burden of proof change. It would require the taxpayer involved in offshore secrecy jurisdictions to produce evidence, based on the presumption that the taxpayer is in control, that funds or other property are not taxable income, and that the account is not large enough to trigger a reporting threshold. (The bill also addresses securities law issues.) This section also contains the list of 34 tax haven jurisdictions taken from IRS court filings, and provides Treasury with the authority to add or remove jurisdictions. An important standard for being excluded from the list is an effective, and automatic, exchange of information.

Section 102 would expand the provisions in the Patriot Act of 2001, which gave Treasury the authority to require domestic financial institutions to take special measures (including providing information and prohibiting transactions) with respect to foreign jurisdictions relating to money laundering to cover instances of impeding U.S. tax enforcement.

Section 103 would require a publicly traded corporation or one with gross assets of $50 million or more whose management and control occurs primarily in the United States to be treated as a U.S. company. This provision is directed at shell corporations, including hedge funds and investment management businesses, set up in jurisdictions such as the Cayman Islands. It would not apply to subsidiaries of U.S. corporations simply because some decisions are made at the parent headquarters, but would still apply to shell subsidiaries.

Section 104 would extend the limit on audit periods from three years to six years for offshore jurisdictions with secrecy laws.

Section 105 would require U.S. financial institutions and brokers to file 1099 forms for any foreign account when they know the beneficial owner is a U.S. person. It would also require these institutions to report to the IRS when they set up offshore accounts and entities.

Section 106 addresses potential trust abuses. Foreign trusts have employed liaisons called trust protectors as a way for shielding U.S. taxpayers exercising control over the trust; the legislation provides that any powers held by a trust protector would be attributed to the trust grantor. It also provides that any U.S. person benefitting from a trust is treated as a beneficiary even if not named in the trust instrument, that future or contingent beneficiaries are treated as current ones, and that loans of assets and property as well as cash or security are treated as trust distributions.

Section 107 addresses legal opinions, stating that an activity is more likely than not to survive challenge by the IRS, which are used to shield taxpayers from large penalties. The legislation provides that a legal opinion of this nature would not apply in an offshore secrecy jurisdiction, providing exceptions to protect legitimate operations.

Section 108 would prevent dividend equivalents from escaping the dividend withholding tax.

Section 109 addresses reporting by passive foreign investment corporations (PFICs) by codifying proposed regulations regarding PFIC reporting by direct or indirect shareholders who are U.S. persons, and also requiring reporting by U.S. persons who directly or indirectly cause the PFIC to be formed or sent or receive assets.

Some of the sections of title II of the bill affect securities law rather than tax issues. Some provisions are tax-related, however.

Section 204 addresses an IRS John Doe summons where the IRS does not know the names of taxpayers and now must ask courts for permission to serve the summons. This section provides that in any case involving offshore secret accounts, the court is to presume tax compliance is at issue, to relieve the IRS of the obligation when the only records sought are U.S. bank records, and to allow them to issue John Doe summonses for large investigative projects without addressing each set of summonses separately.

Section 205 would address issues relating to the Foreign Bank and Financial Account Report (FBAR) requirement for a person controlling a foreign financial account of over $10,000. This is a additional rule from the requirement to report this information on the tax return, and IRS is now charged with enforcing this FBAR requirement. This provision would amend tax disclosure rules to more easily permit IRS to use tax data., change the penalty to refer to the highest average in the account during a year (and not on a specific day), and allow IRS access to information on Suspicious Activity Reports (SAR).

The last title of the bill relates to abusive tax shelters, and contains several provisions. It would strengthen penalties, prohibit the patenting of tax shelters, require development of an examination procedure so that bank regulators could detect questionable tax activities, disallow fees contingent on tax savings for tax shelters, remove communication barriers between enforcement agencies, codify regulations and make it clear that prohibition of disclosure by tax preparers does not prevent congressional subpoenas, and provide standards for tax shelter opinion letters. It would also codify the economic substance doctrine, to require both an objective and subjective test for economic substance.



Finance Committee Proposal

A draft of this proposal was circulated on March 12 and has been discussed by Sullivan. 90


Ÿ It would require entities transferring funds offshore to report to the IRS the amount, destination, and account information. Publicly traded companies would be excluded.



Ÿ The statute of limitations would be extended from three to six years for tax returns that report or should have reported certain international transactions.



Ÿ It would require the foreign bank and financial account report (FBAR) to be filed with the tax returns.



Ÿ Tax preparers would be required to ask due diligence questions to determine whether an FBAR should be filed.



Ÿ The foreign trust failure-to-file penalty would be increased to a $10,000 minimum and the definition of property considered to be a distribution for foreign trusts would be expanded, and would include artwork and jewelry.



Ÿ Fines and penalties on payments attributable to certain offshore transactions would be doubled.



Ÿ A provision in the Heroes Earnings Assistance and Relief Tax Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-245) would be modified to require offshore entities that hire workers under a government contract be treated as American employers by establishing a rule that any individual who performs at least 100 hours of service a month is an employee and not an independent contractor.




Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act, S. 386

This proposal, introduced by the Chairman Leahy of the Senate Judiciary Committee, includes a provision to apply the international money laundering statute to tax evasion, and set aside funds for the Justice Department to pursue financial fraud, including funds to the tax division. It has been passed by the Senate. The House version of the bill, H.R. 1748, does not include the tax provision but does include additional funds.



Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance Act, S. 569

This proposal would establish uniform requirements for states relating to the disclosure of beneficial owners of corporations and limited liability companies, including updating and maintenance of information after terminating, imposing additional requirements for those not U.S. citizens or permanent residents, providing penalties, and updating of such disclosures. It also authorizes a study of requirements of partnerships, trusts, and other legal entities. This bill is relevant, among other things, to issues raised about the use of states as international tax havens.



Author Contact Information

Jane G. Gravelle

Senior Specialist in Economic Policy

jgravelle@crs.loc.gov, 7-7829

1 See U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Investigations, Staff Report on Dividend Tax Abuse , September 11, 2008.

2 Joseph Guttentag and Reven Avi-Yonah, "Closing the International Tax Gap, In Max B. Sawicky, ed. Bridging the Tax Gap: Addressing the Crisis in Federal Tax Administration , Washington, D.C., Economic Policy Institute, 2005.

3 For a chronology, see Martin Sullivan, "Proposals to Fight Offshore Tax Evasion, Part 3," Tax Notes May 4, 2009, p. 517.

4 Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation, Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue , 1998, p. 23.

5 J.R. Hines and E.M. Rice, "Fiscal Paradise: Foreign Tax havens and American Business," Quarterly Journal of Economics , vol. 109, February 1994, pp. 149-182.

6 Government Accountability Office, International Taxation: Large U.S. Corporations and Federal Contractors with Subsidiaries in Jurisdictions Listed as Tax Havens or Financial Privacy Jurisdictions, GAO-op-157, December 2008.

7 J. C. Sharman, Havens in a Storm, The Struggle for Global Tax Regulation , Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 2006; Martin A. Sullivan, "Lessons From the Last War on Tax Havens," Tax Notes , July 30, 2007, pp. 327-337.

8 David Spencer and J.C. Sharman, International Tax Cooperation, Journal of International Taxation , published in three parts in December 2007, pp. 35-49, January 2008, pp. 2744, 64, February 2008, pp. 39-58.

9 For a discussion of these cases see Joint Committee on Taxation Tax Compliance and Enforcement Issues With Respect to Offshore Entities and Accounts , JCX-23-09, March 30, 2009. The discussion of UBS begins on p. 31 and the discussion of LGT begins on p. 40. This document also discusses the inquiries of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Homeland Security Committee relating to these cases.

10 Anthony Faiola and Mary Jordan, "Tax-Haven Blacklist Stirs Nations: After G-20 Issues mandate, Many Rush to Get Off Roll," Washington Post , April 4, p. A7.

11 This announcement by the OECD was posted at http://www.oecd.org/document/0/0,3343,en_2649_34487_42521280_1_1_1_1,00.html.

12 David D. Stewart, "G-20 Declares End to Bank Secrecy as OECD Issues Tiered List," Tax Notes , April 6, 2009, pp. 38-39.

13 Micheil van Dijk, Francix Weyzig, and Richard Murphy, The Netherlands: A Tax Haven? SOMO (Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations), Amersterdam, 2007.

14 Fergal O'Brien, "Bono, Preacher on Poverty, Tarnishes Halo Irish Tax Move," October 15, 2006, Bloomberg.com, http://bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&refer=home&sid=aef6sR60oDgM#.

15 Charles Gnaedinger, "Luxembourg P.M Calls out U.S. States as Tax Havens" Tax Notes International , April 6, 2009, p. 13.

16 http://www.offshore-fox.com/offshore-corporations/offshore-corporations_0401.html.

17 Another offshore website lists in addition to the countries in Table 1 Austria, Campione d'Italia, Denmark, Hungary, Iceland, Madeira, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, Brunei, Dubai, Lebanon, Canada, Puerto Rico, South Africa, New Zealand, Labuan, Uruguay, and the United States. See http://www.mydeltaquest.com/english/.

18 http://www.offshore-manual.com/taxhavens/.

19 "Haven Hypocrisy," The Economist , March 26, 2008.

20 Michael McIntyre, "A Program for International Tax Reform," Tax Notes , February 23, 2009, pp. 1021-1026.

21 Charles Gnaedinger, "U.S., Cayman Islands Debate Tax Haven Status," Tax Notes , May 4, 2009, p. 548-545.

22 http://www.oecd.org/document/60/0,3343,en_2649_34897_1942460_1_1_1_1,00.html.

23 For tax rates see http://www.worldwide-tax.com/index.asp#partthree.

24 Tax Justice Network, Tax Us if You Can , September, 2005.

25 Effects on economic activity are addressed in CRS Report RL34115, Reform of U.S. International Taxation: Alternatives , by Jane G. Gravelle.

26 Harry Grubert, "Intangible Income, Intercompany Transactions, Income Shifting and the Choice of Locations," National Tax Journal , vol. 56, March 2003, Part II, pp. 221-242.

27 Simon J. Pak and John S. Zdanowicz, U.S. Trade With the World, An Estimate of 2001 Lost U.S. Federal Income Tax Revenues Due to Over-Invoiced Imports and Under-Invoiced Exports , October 31, 2002

28 CRS Report R40178, Tax Cuts on Repatriation Earnings as Economic Stimulus: An Economic Analysis , by Donald J. Marples and Jane G. Gravelle.

29 In 2004 the interest allocation rules were changed to allocate worldwide interest, but the implementation of that provision was delayed and has not yet taken place. See CRS Report RL34494, The Foreign Tax Credit's Interest Allocation Rules , by Jane G. Gravelle and Donald J. Marples.

30 See CRS Report RL34249, The Tax Reduction and Reform Act of 2007: An Overview, by Jane G. Gravelle.

31 U.S. Department of Treasury, Report to Congress on Earnings Stripping, Transfer Pricing and U.S. Income Tax Treaties, November 2007.

32 The Treasury Department recently issued new proposed regulations relating to cost sharing arrangements. See Treasury Decision 9441, Federal Register, vol. 74, No. 2, January 5, 2009, pp. 340-391. These rules include a periodic adjustment which would, among other aspects, examine outcomes. See "Cost Sharing Periodic Payments Not Automatic, Officials Say," Tax Notes , February 23, 2009, p. 955.

33 Michael McDonald, "Income Shifting from Transfer Pricing: Further Evidence from Tax Return Data," U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Tax Analysis, OTA Technical Working Paper 2, July 2008.

34 See for example William W. Chip, "'Manufacturing' Foreign Base Company Sales Income," Tax Notes, November 19, 2007, p. 803-808.

35 See David R. Sicular, "The New Look-Through Rule: W(h)ither Subpart F? Tax Notes, April 23, 2007, pp. 349-378 for a discussion of the look-through rules under Section 954(c)(6).

36 For a discussion of reverse hybrids see Joseph M. Calianno and J. Michael Cornett, "Guardian Revision: Proposed Regulations Attach Guardian and Reverse Hybrids," Tax Notes International, October 2006, pp. 305-316.

37 See Sean Foley, "U.S. Outbound: Cross border Hybrid Instrument Transactions to gain Increased Scrutiny During IRS Audit," http://www.internationaltaxreview.com/?Page=10&PUBID=35&ISS=24101&SID=692834&TYPE=20. Andrei Kraymal, International Hybrid Instruments: Jurisdiction Dependent Characterization, Houston Business and Tax Law Journal , 2005, http://www.hbtlj.org/v05/v05Krahmalar.pdf

38 Government Accountability Office, U.S. Multinational Corporations: Effective Tax Rates are Correlated With Where Income is Reported, GAO-08-950, August 2008.

39 Harry Grubert, "Tax Credits, Source Rules, Trade and electronic Commerce: Behavioral Margins and the Design of International Tax Systems. Tax Law Review , vol. 58, January 2005; also issued as a CESIFO Working Paper (No. 1366), December 2004.; Harry Grubert and Rosanne Altshuler, "Corporate Taxes in a World Economy: Reforming the Taxation of Cross-Border Income," in John W. Diamond and George Zodrow, eds., Fundamental Tax Reform: Issues, Choices and Implications , Cambridge, MIT Press, 2008.

40 Data on earnings and profits of controlled foreign corporations are taken from Lee Mahoney and Randy Miller, Controlled Foreign Corporations 2004, Internal Revenue Service Statistics of Income Bulletin , Summer 2008, http://www.irs.ustreas.gov/pub/irs-soi/04coconfor.pdf Data on GDP from Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook , https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook. Most GDP data are for 2008 and based on the exchange rate but for some countries earlier years and data based on purchasing power parity were the only data available.

41 One offshore website points out that Canada can be desirable as a place to establish a holding company; see Shelter Offshore,http://www.shelteroffshore.com/index.php/offshore/more/canada_offshore.

42 Harry Grubert and Rosanne Altshuler, "Corporate Taxes in a World Economy: Reforming the Taxation of Cross-Border Income," in John W. Diamond and George Zodrow, eds., Fundamental Tax Reform: Issues, Choices and Implications , Cambridge, MIT Press, 2008.

43 Government Accountability Office, U.S. Multinational Corporations: Effective Tax Rates are Correlated With Where Income is Reported , GAO-08-950, August 2008.

44 Martin Sullivan, U.S. Citizens Hide Hundreds of Billions in the Caymans, Tax Notes , May 24, 2004, p. 96.

45 Martin Sullivan, "Extraordinary Profitability in Low-Tax Countries," Tax Notes , August 25, 2008, pp. 724-727.

46 See James R. Hines, Jr., "Lessons from Behavioral Responses to International Taxation," National Tax Journal , vol. 52 (June 1999): 305-322, and Joint Committee on Taxation, Economic Efficiency and Structural Analyses of Alternative U.S. Tax Policies for Foreign Direct Investment, JCX-55-08, June 25, 2008 for reviews. Studies are also discussed in U.S. Department of Treasury, The Deferral of Income of Earned Through Controlled Foreign Corporation , May, 2000, http://www.treas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/subpartf.pdf

47 This point is made by The Treasury Inspector General for Tax administration, "A Combination of Legislative Actions and Increased IRS Capability and Capacity are Required to Reduce the Multi-billion Dollar U.S. International Tax Gap," January 27 2009, 2009-I-R001.

48 U.S. Department of the Treasury, IRS, Report on the Application and Administration of Section 482, 1999.

49 Joint Committee on Taxation, Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for 2008-2012 , October 31, 2008.

50 Budget for FY2010, Analytical Perspectives , p. 293.

51 Harry Grubert and Rosanne Altshuler, "Corporate Taxes in the World Economy," in Fundamental Tax Reform: Issues, Choices, and Implications ed. John W. Diamond and George R. Zodrow, Cambridge, MIT Press, 2008.

52 "Shifting Profits Offshore Costs U.S. Treasury $10 Billion or More," Tax Notes , September 27, 2004, pp. 1477-1481; "U.S. Multinationals Shifting Profits Out of the United States," Tax Notes , March 10, 2008, pp. 1078-1082. $75 billion in profits is artificially shifted abroad. If all of that income were subject to U.S. tax, it would result in a gain of $26 billion for 2004. Sullivan acknowledges that there are many difficulties in determining the revenue gain. Some of this income might already be taxed under Subpart F, some might be absorbed by excess foreign tax credits, and the effective tax rate may be lower than the statutory rate. Sullivan concludes that an estimate of between $10 billion and $20 billion is appropriate. Altshuler and Grubert suggest that Sullivan's methodology may involve some double counting; however, their own analysis finds that multinationals saved $7 billion more between 1997 and 2002 due to check the box rules. Some of this gain may have been at the cost of high-tax host countries rather than the United States, however. See Rosanne Altshuler and Harry Grubert, "Governments and Multinational Corporations in the Race to the Bottom," Tax Notes International , February 2006, pp. 459-474.

53 Charles W. Christian and Thomas D. Schultz, ROA-Based Estimates of Income Shifting by Multinational Corporations, IRS Research Bulletin , 2005 http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/05christian.pdf

54 Simon J. Pak and John S. Zdanowicz, U.S. Trade With the World, An Estimate of 2001 Lost U.S. Federal Income Tax Revenues Due to Over-Invoiced Imports and Under-Invoiced Exports , October 31, 2002.

55 Multinational Firm Tax Avoidance and U.S. Government Revenue, Kimberly Clausing, Working Paper, March 2008. Her method involved estimating the profit differentials as a function of tax rate differentials over the period 1982-2004 and then applying that coefficient to current earnings.

56 Kimberly A. Clausing and Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Reforming Corporate Taxation in a Global Economy: A Proposal to Adopt Formulary Apportionment , Brookings Institution: The Hamilton Project, Discussion paper 2007-2008, June 2007.

57 Douglas Shackelford and Joel Slemrod, "The Revenue Consequences of Using Formula apportionment to Calculate U.S. and Foreign Source Income: A Firm Level Analysis," International Tax and Public Finance , vol. 5, no. 1, 1998, pp. 41-57.

58 These studies are discussed and new research presented in U.S. Department of Treasury, Report to Congress on Earnings Stripping, Transfer Pricing and U.S. Income Tax Treaties , November 2007. One study used a different approach, examining taxes of firms before and after acquisition by foreign versus domestic acquirers, but the problem of comparison remains and the sample was very small; that study found no differences. See Jennifer L. Blouin, Julie H. Collins, and Douglas A. Shackelford, "Does Acquisition by Non-U.S. Shareholders Cause U.S. firms to Pay Less Tax?" Journal of the American Taxation Association , Spring 2008, pp. 25-38. Harry Grubert, Debt and the Profitability of Foreign Controlled Domestic Corporations in the United States, Office of Tax Analysis Technical Working Paper No. 1, July 2008, http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/otapapers/otatech2008.shtml#2008.

59 In addition to the 2007 Treasury study cited above, see Jim A. Seida and William F. Wempe, "Effective Tax Rate Changes and Earnings Stripping Following Corporate Inversion," National Tax Journal , vol. 57, December 2007, pp. 805-828. They estimated $0.7 billion of revenue loss from four firms that inverted. Inverted firms may, however, behave differently from foreign firms with U.S. subsidiaries.

60 Harry Grubert, "Intangible Income, Intercompany Transactions, Income Shifting, and the Choice of Location," National Tax Journal , Vo. 56,March 2003, Part 2.

61 Rosanne Altshuler and Harry Grubert, "Governments and Multinational Corporations in the Race to the Bottom," Tax Notes International , February 2006, pp. 459-474.

62 Data are presented in "Who's Watching our Back Door?" Business Accents , Florida International University, Fall 2004, pp. 26-29.

63 Data are taken from Melissa Redmiles, "The One-Time Dividends-Received Deduction," Internal Revenue Service Statistics of Income Bulletin , Spring 2008, http://www.irs.ustreas.gov/pub/irs-soi/08codivdeductbul.pdf.

64 Rodney P. Mock and Andreas Simon, "Permanently Reinvested Earnings: Priceless," Tax Notes , November 17, 2008, pp. 835-848.

65 See Joint Committee on Taxation Tax Compliance and Enforcement Issues With Respect to Offshore Entities and Accounts , JCX-23-09, March 30, 2009, p. 6 for a discussion.

66 This history is described by Reuven Avi-Yonah in testimony before the Committee on Select Revenue Measures of the Ways and Means Committee, March 5, 2008.

67 Joseph Guttentag and Reven Avi-Yonah, "Closing the International Tax Gap," in Max B. Sawicky, ed. Bridging the Tax Gap: Addressing the Crisis in Federal Tax Administration , Washington, D.C., Economic Policy Institute, 2005.

68 Testimony of Reuven Avi-Yonah, Subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures, Ways and Means Committee, March 31,2009.

69 "Brown Pushes U.K. Tax havens On OECD Standards" Tax Notes International , April 20, 2009, pp. 180-181.

70 A very clear and brief explanation of the origin of the QI program and of the requirements can be found in Martin Sullivan, "Proposals to Fight Offshore Tax Evasion," Tax Notes , April 20, 2009, pp. 264-268.

71 For additional discussion of the QI program, see Joint Committee on Taxation, Tax Compliance and Enforcement Issues With Respect to Offshore Entities and Accounts , JCX-23-09, March 30, 2009.

72 Martin A. Sullivan, "Proposals to Fight Offshore Tax Evasion," Tax Notes , April 20, 2009.

73 Joseph Guttentag and Reven Avi-Yonah, "Closing the International Tax Gap," in Max B. Sawicky, ed. Bridging the Tax Gap: Addressing the Crisis in Federal Tax Administration , Washington, D.C., Economic Policy Institute, 2005.

74 Dhammika Dharmapala, "What Problems and Opportunities are Created by Tax Havens?" Oxford Review of Economic Policy Issues , Vo. 24, Winter 2008, pp. 661-679.

75 Tax Justice Network, Tax Us If You Can , September, 2005.

76 CRS Report RL34125, Mortality of Americans Age 65 and Older: 1980 to 2004 , by Andrew R. Sommers.

77 Firms with 80% continuity of ownership would be treated as U.S. firms and firms with at least 60% continuity of ownership would be subject to tax on the transfer of assets for the next ten years.

78 See CRS Report RL34125, Mortality of Americans Age 65 and Older: 1980 to 2004 , by Andrew R. Sommers, CRS Report RL34115, Reform of U.S. International Taxation: Alternatives , by Jane G. Gravelle. See also International Corporate Tax Reform Proposals: Issues and Proposals, Forthcoming, Florida Tax Review , by Jane G. Gravelle.

79 Douglas Shackelford and Joel Slemrod, "The Revenue Consequences of Using Formula apportionment to Calculate U.S. and Foreign Source Income: A Firm Level Analysis," International Tax and Public Finance , vol. 5, no. 1, 1998, pp. 41-57.

80 Kimberly A. Clausing and Reuven A. Avi-Yonah, Reforming Corporate Taxation in a Global Economy: A Proposal to Adopt Formulary Apportionment , Brookings Institution: The Hamilton Project, Discussion paper 2007-08, June 2007.

81 These and other issues are discussed by Rosanne Altshuler and Harry Grubert, "Formula Apportionment: Is it Better than the Current System and Are There Better Alternatives?" Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation, Working paper 09/01.

82 Michael P. Devereux and Simon Loretz, "The Effects of EU formula Apportionment on Corporate Tax Revenues," Fiscal Studies , Vol. 29, no. 1, pp. 1-33. http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/119399105/PDFSTART?CRETRY=1&SRETRY=0.

83 Michael McIntyre, "A Program for International Tax Reform," Tax Notes , February 23, 2009, pp. 1021-1026.

84 Harry Grubert, "Tax Credits, Source Rules, Trade and electronic Commerce: Behavioral Margins and the Design of International Tax Systems," Tax Law Review , vol. 58, January 2005; also issued as a CESIFO Working Paper (No. 1366), December 2004.; Harry Grubert and Rosanne Altshuler, "Corporate Taxes in a World Economy: Reforming the Taxation of Cross-Border Income," in John W. Diamond and George Zodrow, eds., Fundamental Tax Reform: Issues, Choices and Implications , Cambridge, MIT Press, 2008.

85 For discussions of various proposals listed see Tax Justice Network, "Ending the Offshore Secrecy System," March 2009, http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/TJN_0903_Action_Plan_for_G-20.pdf; testimony of Reuven Avi-Yonah, Peter Blessing, Stephen Shay, and Douglas Shulman before the Subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures of the Ways and Means Committee, March 31, 2009; Martin Sullivan, "Proposals to Fight Offshore Tax Evasion," Tax Notes , part 1, April 20, 2009, pp. 264-268; part 2: April 27, 2009, pp. 371-373; part 3, May 4, 2009, pp. 516-520; Reuven Avi-Yonah, Testimony before the Committee on Select Revenue Measures of the Ways and Means Committee, March 5, 2008; Testimony of Jack A. Blum and, Testimony on the Cayman Islands and Offshore Tax Issues before the Senate finance Committee, July 24, 2008; Michael McIntyre, "A Program for International Tax Reform," Tax Notes , February 23, 2009, pp. 1021-1026.

86 See Jeremiah Coder, "Proposed offshore Crime Legislation Worries Defense Bar," Tax Notes Today , March 23, 2009. The attorneys are concerned that money laundering charges would not have to be approved through the Department of Justice's tax division, that penalties of up to 20 years gives prosecutors too much power, that the provisions may trap taxpayers who want to participate in IRS voluntary disclosure, and that they would also discourage the "quiet disclosure" where taxpayers simply report past information.

87 A summary was posted at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/LEVELING-THE-PLAYING-FIELD-CURBING-TAX-HAVENS-AND-REMOVING-TAX-INCENTIVES-FOR-SHIFTING-JOBS-OVERSEAS/.

88 A discussion of these provisions and revenue estimates can be found in the Treasury's Green Book, General Explanations of the Administration's Fiscal Year 2010 Revenue Proposals, http://www.treas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/grnbk09.pdf.

89 For a more detailed explanation of the bill see Senator Levin's Introductory Remarks, March 3, 2009. This proposal has also been discussed by Martin Sullivan, "Proposals to Fight Offshore Tax Evasion, Part 3," Tax Notes , May 4, 2009, pp. 516-520.

90 See Committee on Finance News Release, March 12, 2009, http://finance.senate.gov/press/Bpress/2009press/prb031209b.pdf; See also Martin A. Sullivan, "Proposals to fight Offshore Tax Evasion, Part 2," Tax Notes , April 27, 2009, pp. 371-373/.

Labels:

Tuesday, June 23, 2009

IRC §183: Activities Not Engaged in For Profit Audit Technique Guide, June 19, 2009

June 23, 2009

Internal Revenue Service : Audit Technique Guide : Hobby losses .



IRC § 183: Activities Not Engaged in For Profit (ATG)

NOTE: This document is not an official pronouncement of the law or the position of the Service and can not be used, cited, or relied upon as such. This guide is current through the publication date. Since changes may have occurred after the publication date that would affect the accuracy of this document, no guarantees are made concerning the technical accuracy after the publication date.

Audit Guide Rev. 6/09



Table of Contents

Chapter One: Introduction and Overview
 Purpose of Guide

 Objectives of Guide

 IRC §183 Overview

 Taxpayer's Subject to IRC § 183 Activities Not Engaged in For Profit

 Presumption that Activity is Engaged in for Profit

 Election to Postpone Determination

Chapter 2: Examination Techniques
 Examination Techniques Overview

 Pre-audit Analysis

 Information Document Request

 Initial Interview

 Place of Examination

 Business/Activity Tour

 Factual Development

 Income Tax Savings Benefit Analysis

Chapter 3: Supporting Law
 Internal Revenue Code

 Treasury Regulations

 Revenue Rulings

 Case Law

Chapter 4: Report Writing
 Calculating the Examination Adjustments under IRC § 183

 RGS Input

 Taxpayer Penalties

 Return Preparer Penalties

 Unagreed Reports

 Alternative positions

 Inadequate Books and Records

Appendix
 Appendix A - Treas. Regs. § 1.183-2(b)

 Appendix B - Suggested Interview Questions for Each of 9 Relevant Factors

 Appendix C - Tax Savings Benefit Analysis

 Appendix D - Comparative Analysis Income Expense and Losses

 Appendix E - Example of an IDR for a Yacht Charter Activity



Chapter 1: Introduction and Overview



Purpose of Guide

This audit technique guide (ATG) has been developed to provide guidance to Revenue Agents and Tax Compliance Officers in pursuing the application of Internal Revenue Code (IRC) § 183, Activities Not Engaged in for Profit (sometimes referred to as the "hobby loss rule").

The purpose of the guide is to:
 assist in distinguishing between a business activity (where deductions may be allowable under IRC § 162); a non-business "for profit" activity (where deductions may be allowable under IRC § 212; an activity not engaged in for profit (where deductions are strictly limited by specific rules contained in IRC § 183); and a personal activity (where deductions are generally disallowed by IRC § 262, except to the extent not otherwise allowable),

 provide examination techniques,

 supply applicable law, and

 provide written guidance in report writing.

This guide is not designed to be all inclusive.

This guide is not legal precedent and should not be relied upon as such. It is not designed to remove the discretion given to managers and examiners in the application of a variety of audit techniques or procedures appropriate to any given examination.



Objectives of Guide

Upon completion of this audit techniques guide, the examiner will be able to:

1. Determine when and to whom IRC § 183 may be asserted,

2. Identify and develop relevant factors for making an IRC § 183 determination, and

3. Compute the examination adjustments when a determination is made that an activity is not engaged in for profit.



IRC § 183 Overview

A number of taxpayers who have significant income from other sources reduce their taxable income by reporting losses from activities that may or may not be engaged in for profit. It is up to IRS examiners to make a factual determination whether an activity is engaged in for profit.

On September 27, 2007, the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) issued a report entitled "Significant Challenges Exist in Determining Whether Taxpayers With Schedule C Losses are Engaged in Tax Abuse." The review looked at high income Small Business/Self-Employed (SB/SE) taxpayers (total income sources of $100,000 or greater) who claimed business losses using a U.S. Individual Income Tax Return (Form 1040) Profit or Loss From Business (Schedule C) for activities considered to be not-for-profit. The results of the audit found the following:
"In general, if a taxpayer has hobby income and expenses, the expense deduction should be limited to the hobby income amount. About 1.5 million taxpayers, many with significant income from other sources, filed form 1040 Schedules C showing no profits, only losses, over consecutive Tax Years 2002 - 2005 (4 years); 73 percent of these taxpayers were assisted by tax practitioners. By claming these losses to reduce their taxable incomes, about 1.2 million of the 1.5 million taxpayers potentially avoided paying $2.8 billion in taxes in Tax Year 2005. Changes are needed to prevent taxpayers from continually deducting losses in potentially not-for-profit activities to reduce their tax liabilities."

It is important to note that the report limited their review to Schedule C's with four years of consecutive losses and to total income sources of $100,000 or greater. It did not cover Schedule F farm activities nor did it cover any type of entity other than the 1040.

IRC § 183 generally limits deductions, in the case of an activity engaged in by a taxpayer, if the activity is not engaged in for profit. The term "activity not engaged in for profit" is defined by IRC § 183(c) to mean any activity, other than one with respect to which deductions are allowable for the taxable year under IRC § 162 or under paragraphs (1) or (2) of IRC § 212. IRC § 183 applies to individuals, partnerships, S corporations, trusts and estates. It does not apply to C corporations.

The determination of whether an activity is an activity not engaged in for profit is a factual determination. Neither the Code nor the Regulations provide an absolute definition. They instead serve to provide guidance in formulating the facts necessary to determine whether an activity is a not for profit activity. Historically, IRC § 183 has been a difficult issue to pursue.

The first "hobby loss" provision in the Internal Revenue Code was enacted by the Revenue Act of 1943 as IRC § 270. The act was intended to limit the ability of individuals with multiple sources of income to apply losses incurred in "side-line" diversions to reduce their overall tax liabilities. IRC § 270 was repealed by the Tax Reform Act of 1969 effective for tax years beginning after December 31, 1969, and replaced with IRC § 183.

Generally, the Code allows individuals to deduct expenses which are incurred (1) in a trade or business (IRC § 162); or (2) for the production or collection of income, or for the management, conservation or maintenance of property held for the production of income (IRC § 212).

For the expenses to be deductible under IRC §§ 162 or 212, the taxpayer must engage in or carry on an activity to which the expenses relate with an actual and honest objective of making a profit. Keanini v. Comr ., 94 T.C. 41 (1990) (citing Golanty v. Comr ., 72 T.C. 411, 425 (1979), aff'd without published opinion, 647 F.2d 170 (9th Cir. 1981)); Dreicer v. Comr ., 78 T.C. 642 (1982), aff'd without opinion, 702 F.2d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 1983).

Taxpayers bear the burden of proving that they engaged in the activity with an actual and honest objective of realizing a profit. Hendricks v. Comr ., 32 F.3d 94 (4th Cir. 1994), aff'g T.C. Memo 1993-396, Comr. v. Groetzinger , 480 U.S. 23, 35 (1987); Bot v. Comr ., 353 F.3d 595, 599 (8th Cir. 2003), aff'g 118 T.C. 138 (2002); Am. Acad. Of Family Physicians v. U.S. , 91 F.3d 1155, 1157-58 (8th Cir. 1996).

The taxpayer must devote time to the business in the honest belief that the business will sometime in the future become profitable. It is necessary for the taxpayer to show what their projected profit is expected to be.

If an activity is not engaged in for profit, IRC § 183(b) allows a taxpayer the deductions that would be allowable without regard to whether or not the activity is engaged in for profit. If the gross income derived from the activity for the taxable year exceeds these deductions, IRC § 183(b) also allows a taxpayer to deduct the amounts that would be allowable as deductions if the activity were engaged in for profit, to the extent of any remaining gross income.

Treas. Regs. § 1.183-1(e) provides that for purposes of IRC § 183, gross income includes the total of all gains from the sale, exchange or other disposition of property and all other gross receipts derived from such activity. It also provides that gross receipts from the activity may be reduced by cost of goods sold to determine gross income.

It is generally to the taxpayer's advantage to determine gross income based on gross profit (gross receipts less cost of goods sold). The examiner should ensure that cost of goods sold is reduced by any personal expenses or nondeductible items prior to making the gross income computation.

Making a determination as to whether an activity is not for profit has more implications than whether the loss will be allowed to offset other income. Many other areas on the tax return can be affected by this determination including but not limited to:
 self-employment tax

 deductions for health insurance premiums

 alternative minimum tax (AMT)

 itemized deductions

 adjusted gross income (AGI)

 personal exemption phase out

 Roth IRA contributions

The determination of the proper amount of adjusted gross income can affect many items on the return, including but not limited to rental losses, medical expenses, casualty losses, miscellaneous deductions, the adoption expense credit and interest on education loans.

Also, when there is an IRC § 183 problem, the taxpayer may be subject to AMT since miscellaneous itemized deductions (where many not for profit expenses end up) are not deductible for AMT purposes.

Whether or not an activity is presumed to be operated for profit requires an analysis of the facts and circumstances of each case. Deciding whether a taxpayer operates an activity with an actual and honest profit motive typically involves applying the nine non-exclusive factors contained in Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b). Those factors are:
1. the manner in which the taxpayer carried on the activity,

2. the expertise of the taxpayer or his or her advisers,

3. the time and effort expended by the taxpayer in carrying on the activity,

4. the expectation that the assets used in the activity may appreciate in value,

5. the success of the taxpayer in carrying on other similar or dissimilar activities,

6. the taxpayer's history of income or loss with respect to the activity,

7. the amount of occasional profits, if any, which are earned,

8. the financial status of the taxpayer, and

9. elements of personal pleasure or recreation.

No single factor controls, other factors may be considered, and the mere fact that the number of factors indicating the lack of a profit objective exceeds the number indicating the presence of a profit objective (or vice versa) is not conclusive. For example, if five factors say the activity is not for profit, but four are on the profit side, the activity still could be determined to be engaged in for profit. More weight is given by the courts to objective facts than to the taxpayer's statement of his or her intent. Dreicer v. Comr ., 78 T.C. 642 (1982).

A profit objective in an earlier year does not automatically provide a taxpayer a blank check with regard to losses incurred in later years. For example, in a later year an activity may be treated as an activity not engaged in for profit even though in an earlier year the activity may have been conducted by the taxpayer with a profit objective. See Daugherty v. Comr. , T.C. Memo 1983-188; Dennis v. Comr. , T.C. Memo 1984-4.

An examiner should not tell a taxpayer that, because he is involved in a particular business activity, it is not possible to make a profit and his/her losses are therefore disallowed. Each taxpayer is entitled to be evaluated by a fair, impartial examiner so that a fully reasoned determination of whether an activity is engaged in for profit can be made.

IRC § 183(d) is a safe harbor for the taxpayer. It allows a presumption that the taxpayer is engaged in for profit if in 3 of 5 consecutive years (2 of 7 in the case of breeding, training, showing or racing of horses), the activity is profitable. This is covered in more detail below.

IRC § 183(e) allows the taxpayer to elect to postpone the determination as to whether the IRC § 183(d) presumption applies. This is also covered in more detail below.

IRC §162 allows as a deduction "all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business. A bona fide business must truly exist prior to claiming expenses under IRC § 162. An expense may qualify as ordinary and necessary if it is appropriate and helpful in carrying on a trade or business, is commonly and frequently incurred in the type of business conducted by the taxpayer, and is not a capital expenditure." Welch v. Helvering , 290 U.S. 111 (1933).

A trade or business expense deduction under IRC § 162, however, is not permitted with respect to a taxpayer's residence unless specifically permitted in certain limited circumstances by IRC § 280A. An examiner should consult the rules of IRC § 280A (which generally supersede the IRC § 183 rules) if the taxpayer's deductions are suspect and involve a personal residence. See e.g., Rev. Rul. 2004-32.



Multiple Activities

Treas. Regs. § 1.183-1(d) provides that if a taxpayer engages in two or more separate activities, deductions and income from each separate activity are not aggregated either in determining whether a particular activity is engaged in for profit or in applying IRC § 183. Multiple undertakings may be treated as one activity if the undertakings are sufficiently interconnected.

The regulations define an activity and provide that where the taxpayer is engaged in several undertakings, each of these may be a separate activity, or several undertakings may constitute one activity. In ascertaining the activity or activities of the taxpayer, all the facts and circumstances of the case must be taken into account. Generally, the most significant facts and circumstances in making this determination are the degree of organizational and economic interrelationship of various undertakings, the business purpose which is (or might be) served by carrying on the various undertakings separately or together in a trade or business or in an investment setting, and the similarity of various undertakings. Generally, the Commissioner will accept the characterization by the taxpayer of several undertakings either as a single activity or as separate activities. The taxpayer's characterization will not be accepted, however, when it appears that his characterization is artificial and cannot be reasonably supported under the facts and circumstances of the case.

If the taxpayer engages in two or more separate activities, deductions and income from each separate activity are not aggregated either in determining whether a particular activity is engaged in for profit or in applying IRC § 183.



Farming Activities and Farmland Appreciation

Where land is purchased or held primarily with the intent to profit from increase in its value, and the taxpayer also engages in farming on such land, the farming and the holding of the land will ordinarily be considered a single activity only if the farming activity reduces the net cost of carrying the land for its appreciation in value. Thus, the farming and holding of the land will be considered a single activity only if the income derived from farming exceeds the deductions attributable to the farming activity which are not directly attributable to the holding of the land (that is, deductions other than those directly attributable to the holding of the land such as interest on a mortgage secured by the land, annual property taxes attributable to the land and improvements, and depreciation of improvements to the land). Treas. Regs. § 1.183-1(d).

Some courts have avoided the restrictive rule discussed in the preceding paragraph by finding that the taxpayer did not purchase or hold the land primarily with the intent to profit from increase in its value. Instead, these courts have found the taxpayer purchased and held the land for farming. See e.g., Engdahl v. Comr ., 72 T.C. 659 n.4 (1979), acq. 1979-C.B.1. On distinguishable facts, an opposite conclusion was reached in Burrus v. Comr ., T.C. Memo 2003-285.



Taxpayer's Subject to IRC § 183 Activities Not Engaged in For Profit

The IRC § 183 activities not engaged in for profit rules applies to (1) individuals; (2) S corporations; (3) partnerships; (4) and trusts and estates. IRC § 183 does not apply to C corporations.



Individuals

The provisions under IRC § 183(a) specifically applies to individuals.



S corporations

The provisions under IRC § 183(a) specifically applies to S corporations. Treas. Regs. §1.183-1(f) provides that IRC § 183 and this section shall be applied in determining the allowable deductions of an electing small business corporation.



Partnerships

Rev. Rul. 77-320 holds that IRC § 183 of the Code applies to the activities of a partnership, and the provisions of IRC § 183 are applied at the partnership level and reflected in the partners' distributive shares. IRC § 703(a) provides in general that the taxable income of a partner shall be computed in the same manner as in the case of an individual.



Trusts and Estates

Treas. Reg. § 1.183-1(a) states that "Pursuant to § 641(b), the taxable income of an estate or trust is computed in the same manner as in the case of an individual with certain exceptions not here relevant. Accordingly, where an estate or trust engages in an activity or activities which are not for profit, the rules of IRC § 183 apply in computing the allowable deductions of such trust or estate."



C Corporations

The provisions of IRC § 183 do not apply to C corporations.



Presumption that Activity is Engaged in for Profit

IRC § 183(d) provides a presumption that an activity is engaged in for profit if the activity is profitable for 3 years of a consecutive 5 year period or 2 years of a consecutive 7 year period for activities that consist of breeding, showing, training, or racing horses.

This presumption rule applies only after an activity incurs a third profitable (or second) profitable year within a 5 year (or 7 year) presumption period that begins with the first profitable year.

Note: Treasury Regulation § 1.183-1(c) has not been updated to reflect the 1986 amendment increasing the number of profit years required from two to three out of five years for activities other than horse racing, breeding or showing).

Example 1 - A taxpayer has the following profits and losses with a car racing activity (5 year presumption period):
Example 1 profits and losses



____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Tax Year Gain or (Loss)

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
2000 (30,000)

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
2001 5000

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
2002 (60,000)

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
2003 2,000

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
2004 5,000

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
2005 (70,000)

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
2006 3,000

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
2007 (63,000)

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


The first 5 year presumption period begins with the first profit year of 2001, but the benefit of the presumption does not begin until the third profit year of 2004. The presumption is not available for 2001 through 2003 because it does not apply until the third profit year. The presumption is available during the first presumption period only in 2004 and 2005. The second five year presumption period begins with the 2003 profit year and runs through 2007. The presumption applies to the third profit year of 2006 and will be of benefit to the taxpayer for 2006 and 2007.

If the taxpayer meets the presumption rule, the Service can still argue that the activity is not engaged in for profit; however, the burden of proving that the activity is not engaged in for profit shifts to the Service. In addition, examiners cannot use IRC § 183(d) as the sole basis for disallowing losses under IRC § 183 even if it is shown that the taxpayer has not met the presumption rule.

Examiners should be alert for situations where the taxpayer may have manipulated income and or expenses to meet the presumption rule determination.



Election to Postpone Determination

Under IRC § 183(e), a taxpayer may elect to postpone a determination of whether the presumption applies until the close of the fourth taxable year (or the sixth year for qualifying horse activities) following the first taxable year in which the taxpayer engages in the activity. An electing taxpayer may file returns in the interim on the assumption that the activity is conducted for profit.

If an activity that is generating losses has not yet been carried on for the full profit presumption period, the taxpayer may elect to postpone a determination of whether or not an activity is engaged in for profit.

The examiner should first determine whether or not the activity is engaged in for profit from all available facts without regard to the presumption test or the possible election to postpone determination under IRC § 183(e). This determination should take into account the "nine relevant factors" listed in Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b) as well as the pertinent facts.

Upon the filing of all or a sufficient number of the returns of the presumption period, the case file will be returned to the examiner for a determination if the activity is presumed to be an activity engaged in for profit.



Making the Election

Form 5213, Election to Postpone Determination as To Whether the Presumption Applies That an Activity Is Engaged in for Profit, is used when taxpayers wish to postpone an IRS determination as to whether the presumption applies that they are engaged in an activity for profit. An election made by a partnership or an S corporation is binding on all persons who were partners or shareholders at any time during the presumption period.

The election to postpone determination generally can be filed anytime within three years after the due date of the return (determined without regard to extensions) for the first year of the activity but not later than 60 days after the taxpayer receives written notice from the IRS proposing to disallow deductions attributable to the activity.

Note: Form 5213 is rarely used by the taxpayer until an examiner proposes to disallow the activity as not engaged in for profit.

The examiner should determine if the taxpayer wants, and is eligible to elect to postpone the determination under IRC § 183(e). If the taxpayer makes the decision to make the election, all legal and procedural implications should be explained. If the taxpayer is eligible to make the election but does not wish to, the examiner should obtain a written statement from the taxpayer or his representative stating that the taxpayer does not wish to elect the provisions of IRC § 183(e).



Placing in Suspense

If there is an election to postpone the determination, the examiner will generally close the case to suspense until the end of the presumption period. Upon the filing of all or a sufficient number of the returns of the presumption period, the case file will be returned to the examiner for a final determination if the activity is engaged in for profit.

If the taxpayer wishes to make an §183(e) election to postpone determination, the examiner should:
1. secure fully completed and properly signed Form 5213,

2. requisition all returns beginning with the initial year,

3. obtain AMDISA, IMFOLT, IMFOLR for all tax returns,

4. perform audit functions as warranted, paying particular attention to the full development of the activity not engaged in for profit issue,

5. examine and complete any open years prior to placing in suspense,

6. prepare a report on each of the open years of the IRC § 183 adjustments,

7. attach a completed Form 3198, Special Handling Notice for Examination Case Processing, checking the blocks "Suspense Cases" and "Sec. 183 (Form 5213),"

8. make appropriate comments in the workpapers to document the election,

9. advise the taxpayer of the suspense process and to retain all pertinent books and records for each of the presumptive years,

10. attach the Form 5213 to the back of the first year's return with the form number showing above the tax return, and, if applicable,

11. resolve all other issues through partial assessments or unagreed procedures prior to sending the case to Technical Services for suspense.

A partially agreed report should be prepared if there are other issues which are agreed and generate a deficiency. One report will contain the agreed issues and the other report only the IRC § 183(a) issue as unagreed. IRM 4.10.8.5 contains the report writing instructions for partially agreed cases.

The Form 4549-A, Income Tax Discrepancy Adjustments, in the "Other Information' section should include the following statement:
"You have elected to postpone the determination with respect to the presumption that this activity is engaged in for profit by filing Form 5213 on (insert date) and thus, this issue will be suspended.

On the unagreed report, the IRC § 183(a) issue should be written up as if the case will go directly to Appeals. The Form 3198 should indicate in the Other Section "Partial Agreement Secured and Processed."

If there are other unagreed issues besides the § 183 (a) issue, the unagreed report will contain both the unagreed issue(s) and the IRC § 183(a) issue(s) before the case is forwarded to Appeals. The Form 3198 should be notated "Case to be forwarded to Technical Services for suspense after resolution of unrelated issues."

It is the IRS's position that the interest suspension period specified in IRC § 6404(g) is tolled (ceases to run) during the time the IRC § 183 election is in effect and for the particular activity to which the election relates.



Statute of Limitations

The filing of Form 5213 automatically extends the period of limitations for assessing any income tax deficiency specifically attributable to the activity during any year in the presumption period.

Under IRC § 183(e)(4), if a taxpayer elects a postponement, the statutory period for the assessment of any deficiency attributable to the issue is extended to 2 years after the due date (without extensions) for filing the return for the last taxable year in the 5 or 7 year presumption period to which the election relates.

For example, for an activity subject to a 5 year presumption period that began in 2004 and ends in 2008, the period of limitations automatically extends to April 15, 2012, for all tax years in the presumption period that would otherwise expire before that date with regards to the § 183 issue.

Note: The automatic extension applies only to those deductions attributable to the activity and to any deductions (such as medical expenses or charitable contribution deductions) that are affected by changes to AGI. It does not extend the statute of limitations for issues not related to the IRC § 183 issue.



Chapter 2: Examination Techniques



Examination Techniques Overview

Once an examiner believes there is a possible activity not engaged in for profit issue, the case must be adequately developed. In order to adequately develop an IRC § 183 issue, the examiner must address each of the nine relevant factors contained in Treas. Reg. 1.183-2(b). The nine factors found in the regulations along with a discussion of each factor are contained in Appendix A .

An IRC § 183 issue will not be sustained in Appeals or in the courts if it has not been properly developed and documented.

Included below are examination techniques specific to the IRC § 183 issue. Some of these techniques are the same or similar to techniques performed on a typical case.



Pre-audit Analysis

It is not always easy to determine from looking at the return if an activity is not engaged in for profit. Examiners should be alert to see if there is a "reasonable" indication that there is a "likelihood" of an activity not engaged in for profit in the pre-audit stage of the examination. The amount of pre-plan time spent will vary with the complexity of the case.

Examiners should consider the following in their pre-audit analysis:
 Are there activities with large expenses and little or no income?

 Are losses offsetting other income on the return?

 Does the activity result in a large tax benefit to the taxpayer?

 Does the history of the activity show that it is generating any profit in any years?

Examples of possible IRC § 183 activities include but are not limited to:
Possible IRC § 183 activities



Fishing Horse Racing Horse Breeding

Farming Motorcross Racing Auto Racing

Craft Sales Bowling Stamp Collecting

Dog Breeding Yacht Charter Artists

Gambling Fishing Bowling

Direct Sales Photography Writing

Entertainers Airplane Charter Rentals



An in-depth pre-audit analysis is essential to conducting a quality examination Examiners should prepare a comparative analysis of the taxpayer's returns for multiple years to assist in the identification of:
 large, unusual and questionable items,

 missing schedules,

 inconsistencies between different years, and

 audit potential.

A successful taxpayer interview depends upon what is done before the interview. The examiner should obtain as much information about the taxpayer, be organized, and prepare an interview outline that is tailored to the taxpayer under examination.

Information may be obtained by the use of internal sources such as IDRS, CFOL, MACS/CDE, IRP transcripts and YK-1 to learn everything possible about the taxpayer. External electronic sources of information such as Accurint, Google, Yahoo, and Altavista should also be searched. This information should be compared with the taxpayer's return.

Examiners should perform any preliminary research including reviewing applicable code sections, regulations, court cases, revenue rulings and procedures, and ATGs.

As preliminary information is gathered, it should be carefully reviewed and documented.



Information Document Request

The initial Information Document Request (IDR) for a possible IRC § 183 case should be tailored to the specific taxpayer under examination but will more than likely be the same as for a typical case.

The examiner should not issue an IDR asking the taxpayer to respond to each of the nine factors. This should be done in person with the taxpayer present and the examiner documenting responses. Also, examiners should not request the Business Plan with the first IDR as this should be addressed at the initial interview.

Subsequent IDR's should address other needed information to complete the examination.

An example of an IDR with possible items an examiner might request to assist in determining if a yacht charter activity is an activity engaged in for profit is in Appendix E .



Initial Interview

An examiner may not become aware that there is a possible IRC § 183 activity until the initial interview with the taxpayer and/or representative. A subsequent interview may be necessary to gather the factual information to evaluate each of the nine factors contained in Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b). The nine factors found in the regulations along with a discussion of each factor are in Appendix A . An effective and well documented interview is vital to the success in developing an IRC § 183 issue.

The business history should be developed and documented in the examiner's workpapers. Interviews provide information about the taxpayer's financial history, business/activity operations, and accounting records. Interviews should be used to obtain information needed to reach informed judgments about the scope of an examination and the resolution of issues. Interviews can be used to obtain leads, develop information and establish evidence.

A list of possible interview questions to consider for each of the nine factors used in determining whether an IRC § 183 issue present is in Appendix B . Not all of these questions are warranted in every case and questions should be tailored to address items specific to the taxpayer under examination. This interview plan is a guide, which should be modified based upon the responses of the taxpayer and should not be used as an inflexible outline.

Examiners should use short questions that can be easily understood and in a logical order. Sufficient questions should be asked to give a clear understanding of the taxpayer's operations. Follow-up questions should be used to clarify questionable areas. If both the taxpayer and preparer/authorized representative are present for the interview, direct the questions to the taxpayer. Listen to the answers and follow up on any answers that are incomplete or unclear.

The examiner should consider preparing Memorandum of Interview summarizing information obtained and statements made. This will become part of the case file to aid in the case development.



Authority to conduct interviews

The authority to conduct interviews and request information is granted by IRC § 7602.

Every attempt should be made to schedule the initial appointment with the taxpayer. IRC § 7521(c) permits a representative authorized by the taxpayer to represent that taxpayer at any interview. Although a request for the taxpayer's voluntary presence should be made through his/her representative, the taxpayer's presence will not be mandated as long as the person being interviewed has first hand knowledge of the taxpayer's business, business practices, bookkeeping methods, accounting practices and the daily operation of the business. That person must commit to having first hand knowledge of the information requested and affirm that the examiner can rely upon the information provided.

A representative may claim to have first hand knowledge, but when questions are asked it is clear he/she is unable to give adequate answers. If an examiner determines that the representative does not have sufficient knowledge of the taxpayer and his/her business to provide factual information, the examiner should request a subsequent interview with the individual who possesses that information. The examiner should not conduct the audit with someone who will serve as a courier, shuffling back and forth between the examiner and the taxpayer with IRS questions and client answers.

If the taxpayer's representative does not comply with the request to interview someone more knowledgeable, including the taxpayer, the examiner should consider management involvement, issuing an administrative summons to the taxpayer (IRC § 7521(c) and/or by-passing the representative. More information can be found in IRM 4.10.2.and 4.11.55.2.

The examiner may need to use third party contacts order to obtain corroborating information from third parties.



Place of Examination

IRC § 7605(a) states, in part, that "the time and place of examination shall be such time and place as may be fixed by the Secretary and as are reasonable under the circumstances."

For office examination cases the examination will be conducted in the office of the IRS closest to the taxpayer's residence in the assigned area.

For field examinations an examination will be conducted at the location where the original books, records and source documents are maintained. This is usually the taxpayer's principal place of the business/activity being examined.

On a case-by-case basis, examiners should consider requests by the taxpayer or representative to change the place of the examination (Treas. Reg. § 301.7605-1(e).) In considering these requests, the following factors should be considered:
 The location of the taxpayer's current residence and location of the business/activity.

 The location where the books and records and source documents are maintained.

 The physical restrictions at the activity which could cause disruption of taxpayer's daily operations.



Business/Activity Tour

Viewing the facilities and observing the activities is an opportunity to acquire an overview of the operation, establish that books and records accurately reflect operations, observe and test internal controls, clarify information obtained through interviews, and identify potential audit issues.

Treas. Reg. § 301.7605-1 states "regardless of where an examination takes place, the Service may visit the taxpayer's place of business or residence to establish facts that can only be established by direct visit, such as inventory or asset verification." The visit can show evidence of financial status, equipment usage, undisclosed aspects of the operation, etc.

Tours should be conducted after the initial interview and early in the examination process. Examiners should be alert to the physical surroundings and confirm that assets identified on the tax return are physically present and identify assets that are physically present but are not represented on the return. Examiners should ask questions to confirm an understanding of what is observed.

When determining the validity of office in the home deductions, the office or activity should be toured.

Examiners should document that a tour was completed and describe the results, including observations and resolution of any questions. If a tour of the business/activity is not conducted, the reason(s) for not conducting the tour should be documented in the workpapers.

A Tax Compliance Officer (TCO) does not always have the opportunity to perform a physical tour of the taxpayer's activity. However, the TCO can inspect any photographs that the taxpayer may have of the activity.



Factual Development

Examiners must determine whether the taxpayer engaged in the activity with an objective of earning a profit. Although a "reasonable" expectation of profit is not required, the profit objective must be bona fide, as determined from a consideration of the facts and circumstances.

Treas. Reg. §1.183-2(b) ( Appendix A ) contains nine relevant factors to be used in determining whether a taxpayer is conducting an activity with the intent to make a profit. An IRC §183 case is not adequately developed until all nine relevant factors are considered and documented. No one factor is more important or heavily weighted; a numerical majority does not decide the issue.

The examiner should obtain copies of prior year returns from the inception of the activity and should prepare a comparative analysis schedule of income and losses (expenses) since the inception of the business through the present as shown in Appendix D . All trends in profits or losses should be addressed and explained. Any unusual income items or expense items that occur and then "drop off" may mean the taxpayer's profit is contrived. The examiner should consider whether the profits shown were manipulated in order to meet the presumption test.

Examiners should be alert to the nature of the gross receipts that have been reported and determine if the income source truly exists or relates to the activity. Income may have been "created" in order to make it appear as though the activity earned income.

The case file should reflect an adequately documented interview. Each of the nine factors must be addressed and documented. Sample questions for each factor are contained in Appendix B .

A taxpayer who claims a business expense deduction has the burden of proof. Deductions are strictly a matter of legislative grace, and taxpayers bear the burden of proving that they are entitled to the deductions claimed. Hawthorne v. Comr , T.C. Memo 1999-31 (citing Indopco, Inc. v. Comr , 503 U.S. 79, 84, (1992)).

A taxpayer seeking a deduction must be able to point to an applicable statute and show that he comes within its terms. New Colonial Ice v. Helvering , 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934). Also see Indopco, Inc. v. Comr , 503 U.S. 79, 84, (1993); Rockwell v. Comr , 512 F.2d 882, 886 (1975), aff'g TC Memo 1972-133.

To take any deduction, the taxpayer must be able to cite an authority: Code, regulations, revenue rulings, notices. This includes the burden of substantiating the amount and purpose of the deduction claimed. IRC § 6001 imposes a broad recordkeeping responsibility on all taxpayers, requiring them to maintain adequate records to substantiate the liability. IRC § 6001 gives the IRS authority to require whatever records it deems necessary. If the taxpayer proves that a portion of the expenditure was made for a deductible purpose, the taxpayer may allocate that portion to the deductible purpose when the record contains sufficient evidence for a reasonable allocation. See Dillon v. Commissioner , 902 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1990).

IRC § 6201 provides examiners with the authority to resolve issues and to make determinations of tax liability. It also provides broad authority to exercise professional judgment to weigh conflicting factual information, data, and opinions on issues of law to determine the correct tax liability.



Factual Development of IRC § 162 Ordinary and Necessary Business Expenses

Like any other examination, the examiner should evaluate each large, unusual or questionable item to determine its deductibility as a business expense. IRC § 162 allows the deduction of ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred to carry on any trade or business. Examiners should be alert for personal expenses which may be disguised as business deductions.



Factual Development of Other Non § 183 Issues

Whether or not it is determined that an activity is engaged in for profit, the examiner should consider whether other Internal Revenue Code sections apply and treat as alternative positions. Substantiation of all large, unusual or questionable items should be performed on each examination.

Some of the other Internal Revenue Code sections include, but are not limited to:
 IRC § 704 partnership loss limitations

 IRC § 1366 S corporation stock or debt basis limitations

 IRC § 465 at-risk limitations

 IRC § 469 passive activity loss limitations

 IRC § 162 ordinary and necessary

 IRC § 274(d) record keeping requirements

 IRC § 179 election to expense certain depreciable assets

 IRC § 167 and 168 depreciation

 IRC § 212 expenses for production of income

 IRC § 280A disallowance of certain expenses in connection with business use of the home, rental of vacation homes, motor homes, houseboats, yachts, etc.

 IRC § 195 start up expenses

Taxpayers may use the activity to claim personal expenses. Examiners should be on the alert for any one or a combination of the following:
 Deducting all or most of the cost of maintaining a personal residence. See IRC § 280A. Taxpayers sometimes erroneously claim that the "exclusive use" restriction of IRC § 280A can be avoided by placing business-related items in any given room of the house. The taxpayers sometimes cite the IRC § 280A(c)(2) exception for storage use (storage on a regular basis of inventory or product samples). For example, the taxpayer may erroneously claim that if a poster, calendar, desk, file cabinet, telephone or other business item is placed in a room that secures the room's business status without regard to the fact that the room is used for personal purposes as a kitchen, bathroom, child's bedroom, etc.

 Paying children and/or family members for household duties that are not ordinary and necessary to the operation of any business (e.g. disposing of trash, mowing the law, answering the telephone, washing cars). Also, the payment may be excessive for the services performed.

 Deducting family education expenses by claiming an Education Assistance Program for family members claimed as employees. See IRC §127.

 Deducting excessive car and truck expenses when the vehicle was used for both personal and business use. Taxpayers sometimes claim a business purpose for every trip, whether it is to commute to a regular job or a trip to the grocery store, golf course, church, etc. Taxpayers sometimes erroneously argue that the trips are deductible given that there is always a potential of recruiting new clients.

 Deducting personal furniture, home entertainment equipment, children's toys, etc.

 Deducting personal travel, meals, and entertainment under the guise that since everyone is a potential client, these are deductible, not personal expenses.

 Deducting 100% of personal medical expenses merely by "employing" a family member who is not a bona fide employee and creating a medical reimbursement plan.



Income Tax Savings Benefit Analysis

The examiner needs to obtain information regarding the history of the activity under consideration. This information should be reviewed to see if any profits are being generated in any years and to determine the overall history of losses exceeding the profits. Completing an analysis of tax savings is important in developing a § 183 case. The analysis should begin, if possible, with the first year of the activity.

This analysis should be discussed with the taxpayer and included in the examination report.

A template that can be used in performing an income tax savings benefit analysis is in Appendix C .



Chapter 3: Supporting Law



Internal Revenue Code

Various code sections may come into play whenever there is an adjustment that may involve IRC §183, including but not limited to the following:

§ 67(a) - In the case of an individual, the miscellaneous itemized deductions are allowed only to the extent that the aggregate of such deductions exceeds 2% of AGI.

§ 67(c) - In the case of pass-thru entities (1120S and 1065), a partner or S corporation shareholder must take into account separately his/her distributive or pro rata share of the partnership's or S corporation's miscellaneous itemized deductions which are subject to the 2% limitation in IRC § 67(a);

§ 68(a) - Overall limitation on itemized deductions.

§ 162 - A deduction is allowed for all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred in carrying on any trade or business.

§ 183 - Provides, generally, that if an activity is not engaged in for profit, deductions are allowable in the following order and only to the following extent:
1. amounts allowable as deductions during the taxable year without regard to whether the activity was engaged in for profit are allowable in full (e.g. home mortgage interest, real estate taxes, etc.);

2. amounts that would otherwise be allowable if the activity were engaged in for profit and that would not result in an adjustment to the basis of the property if allowed are allowed only to the extent the gross income derived from the activity exceeds the deductions allowed or allowable in (1);

3. amounts that would otherwise be allowable if the activity were engaged in for profit that would result in an adjustment to the basis of the property if allowed are allowed only to the extent that gross income derived from the activity exceeds the deductions allowed or allowable in (1) and (2).

§ 212 - An itemized deduction is allowed for individuals for all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred for the production or collection of income, for the management, conservation, or maintenance held for the production of income; or in connection with the determination, collection, or refund of any tax.

§ 262 - Except as otherwise expressly provided, no deduction shall be allowed for personal, living, or family expense.

§ 280A - A trade or business expense deduction under IRC § 162 is not permitted with respect to a taxpayer's residence unless specifically permitted in limited circumstances by IRC § 280A(a). In order for allocable expenses to be deductible, the portion of the taxpayer's residence must be used exclusively by the taxpayer on a regular basis as a principal place of business for the taxpayer's trade or business, or to meet or deal with patients, clients or customers in the normal course of the taxpayer's trade or business. If the taxpayer is an employee, the exclusive and regular use of a portion of the taxpayer's residence must be for the convenience of the taxpayer's employer before any expenses relating to the part of the taxpayer's residence may be deducted.

§ 465 - This code section limits a taxpayer's deduction for losses from an activity to the amount at risk. IRC § 465 applies to activities in which the taxpayer is engaged in carrying on a trade or business or for the production of income. Therefore, for the rules of IRC § 465 to apply, the taxpayer must be engaged in the activity for profit. Accordingly, an activity subject to IRC § 183 cannot be subject to IRC § 465 in the same year. If IRC § 465 applies, any loss in excess of the taxpayer's amount at-risk cannot be deducted in the current year. If the taxpayer has no personal liability, but has pledged property as security for repayment of the debt, the amount at-risk is the fair market value of the pledged property, less any superior liens. If the taxpayer pledges property that is used in the activity as security, that property does not increase the amount at-risk. There is a special rule for real estate activities - a nonrecourse loan qualifies as an amount at-risk if it is "qualified non-recourse financing."

§ 469 - Passive losses in excess of passive income are nondeductible. A passive activity is any rental activity or any business activity in which the taxpayer does not materially participate. If the average customer use is 7 days or less, the rental activity falls outside the rental definition and is treated like a business subject to material participation. If the average customer use is 30 days or less, and there are significant personal services, the activity falls outside the rental definition and is treated like a business subject to material participation.

§ 704 - A partner's distributive share of partnership loss shall be allowed only to the extent of the adjusted basis of such partner's interest in the partnership.

§ 1366 - A S corporation's shareholder's pro rata share of loss is not deductible if the loss exceeds the shareholder's basis in his or her stock, plus certain debt basis.



Treasury Regulations

Below are applicable Treasury regulations:

1.183-1 - General information for IRC § 183.

Caution: Treasury Regulation § 1.183-1(c) has not been updated to reflect the 1986 amendment increasing the number of profit years required from two to three out of five years for activities other than horse racing, breeding or showing).

1.183-2 - Nine relevant factors to be used in determining if an activity is engaged in for profit. These factors are included in their entirety in Appendix A .



Revenue Rulings

Rev. Rul. 55-258 - holds that income received in an activity not engaged in for profit must be included in taxable income but is not subject to self-employment tax.

Rev. Rul. 75-14 - holds that the rental of a house to a relative at less than the full fair market value and less than the total expenses attributable to the house is an activity not engaged in for profit within the meaning of IRC § 183. Therefore, the taxpayer may only deduct the expenses to the extent allowable under Treas. Reg. 1.183-1(b)(1) provided he itemizes deductions.

Rev. Rul. 77-320 - holds that IRC § 183 of the Code applies to the activities of a partnership, and the provisions of IRC § 183 are applied at the partnership level and reflected in the partners' distributive shares.

Rev. Rul. 2004-32 - holds that taxpayers cannot use schemes designed to create the appearance of having a home-based business, where none actually exists, for the purpose of converting otherwise nondeductible personal, living or family expenses into purportedly legitimate deductions.



Case Law

There are numerous court cases which discuss IRC § 183. Some opinions are taxpayer-favorable while other opinions support the Government's position.

Where the specific facts warrant, the examiner should cite cases both favorable and unfavorable to the Government. The taxpayer or authorized representative should be requested to provide any cases which defend the taxpayer's position.



Chapter 4: Report Writing



Calculating the Examination Adjustments under IRC § 183

When the examiner has determined that the taxpayer falls under the provisions of IRC § 183, it is important to calculate the proper adjustments.

A common error is for the examiner to simply disallow the net loss from the activity. Income must be reported on the 1040, line 21, as unearned income and expenses that fall in category 2 and/or 3 are deductible only as miscellaneous itemized deductions. These category 2 and/or 3 deductions are subject to the 2% of AGI limitations (IRC §67) and the overall limitation on itemized deductions (IRC § 68). Also, an individual may be subject to alternative minimum tax since miscellaneous deductions are not deductible for alternative minimum tax purposes.



Gross Income

Treas. Reg. 1.183-1(e) provides that for purposes of IRC § 183, gross income derived from an activity not engaged in for profit includes the total of all gains derived from the sale, exchange, or other disposition of property, and all other gross receipts derived from such activity. Gross income may be determined from any activity by subtracting the cost of goods sold from the gross receipts as long as the taxpayer consistently does so and follows generally accepted methods of accounting in determining such income.



Deductions

If an activity is not engaged in for profit, deductions are allowable under IRC § 183(b) in the following order on the Schedule A and only to the following extent:
 Category 1 - First, deduct expenses that are allowable without regard to the taxpayer's profit motive from the gross income produced by the activity. For example, taxes, mortgage interest, casualty and theft losses, and contributions. These expenses are not limited by gross income from the activity since they are allowable under other sections of the Internal Revenue Code regardless of whether or not such activity is engaged in for profit. These expenses should appear in the proper places on the Schedule A and be allowed in full after taking into account any limitations such as the limitation on excess investment interest.

 Category 2 - Second, deduct expenses that would be allowable if the activity were to be engaged in for profit. For example, rent, labor, wages, travel, transportation, etc. These expenses are limited to the amount of gross income less the expenses in Category 1.

 Category 3 - Third, allow deductions which lead to basis adjustments (e.g. depreciation, amortization and the portion of casualty losses that is not deductible in Category 1). These expenses are limited to the amount of gross income from the activity less the expenses in Categories 1 and 2. If there is any gross income remaining after Category 1 and 2 items, the depreciation must be allocated to each depreciable asset.

The allowed expenses are reported as itemized deductions possibly subject to the overall limitation on itemized deductions and subject to the 2% AGI floor for miscellaneous itemized deductions. Also, for alternative minimum tax purposes, no deduction is allowed for miscellaneous items, as defined in IRC § 67(b).



Incorrect Computation Example

The following is an incorrect computation and examiners should not use this method.

Schedule C has gross receipts of $13,000 from a direct sales activity not engaged in for profit. After expenses of $50,000, the per return ordinary loss is $37,000.
An example for incorrect computation



____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Gross Receipts $13,000

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Less Expenses (Mortgage Interest) $-2,000

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Less Expenses (Supplies, Repairs, Etc.) $-11,000

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Balance of Gross Receipts $0

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Remaining Expenses ($50,000 - 13,000) = Incorrect Adjustment $37,000

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


In the above example, AGI would only have been increased by $37,000 and no adjustments would have been made on the Schedule A.

The correct method would have been to increase AGI by $50,000 by:
1. removing the $13,000 of gross receipts from the Schedule C;

2. reclassifying the $13,000 of gross receipts from Schedule C to other income (line 21 of the Form 1040);

3. removing all $50,000 in expenses from the Schedule C;

4. allowing $2,000 as a Schedule A mortgage expense deduction (Category 1 item); and

5. allowing $11,000 (Category 2 items) as Schedule A miscellaneous itemized deductions subject to the 2% AGI limitation.

By utilizing this method there will be an additional adjustment due to the miscellaneous itemized deductions limitation and possible other adjustments due to the possible overall limitation on itemized deductions, and other items (e.g., exemption deduction, AMT and change in AGI which could affect other items on the return.)

Activities not engaged in for profit expenses are deductible only as Schedule A items, therefore individual's who do not itemize cannot claim any deductions attributable to an IRC § 183 activity.

IRC § 183 adjustments are permanent adjustments unlike passive activity losses which are timing adjustments. Any adjustments made due to IRC §183 are not permitted to be carried forward.



IRC § 183(b) Computation Example

The following computation shows how to correctly compute the deductions allowable under IRC § 183(b).

An examiner is auditing a horse breeding activity and made the determination that it is not engaged in for profit. The AGI per return is $125,000 which includes the Schedule F loss of $64,000. All expenses on the Schedule F have been verified. The Schedule F loss is computed as follows:
The Schedule F loss computation



Schedule F Gross Income $23,200

Expenses $87,200

Schedule F Loss Per Return ($64,000)



Step 1 - Remove gross income of $23,200 from the Schedule F.

Step 2 - Reclassify income of $23,200 as other income - unearned, to line 21 of the Form 1040.

Step 3 - Remove all $87,200 expenses from the Schedule F.

Step 4 - Compute corrected AGI
The corrected AGI computation



AGI Per Return $125,000

Less Schedule F Gross Income ($23,200)

Plus Other Income-Unearned $23,200

Plus Disallowed Expenses $87,200

Corrected AGI $212,200



Step 5 - Sort expenses into Categories 1, 2 and 3
Expenses sorted into different categories



____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Expense Amount Category 1 Category 2 Category 3

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Real estate taxes 6,000 6,000

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Mortgage interest 12,000 12,000

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Insurance 1,600 1,600

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Utilities 4,200 4,200

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Cell Phone 400 400

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Veterinary Visits 2,000 2,000

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Auto 6,000 6,000

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Repairs 16,000 16,000

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Feed 8,000 8,000

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Depreciation 31,000 31,000

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Total 87,200 18,000 38,200 31,000

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


Step 6 - Determine amount of Category 1, 2 and 3 expenses allowable.
Determine amount of Category 1, 2 and 3 expenses allowable



Gross Income $23,200

Less Category 1 Expenses (18,000)

Maximum Category 1 and 2 Deductions $5,200

Less Category 2 Expenses * * (5,200)

Remaining Gross Income to offset Against Category 3 Expenses 0

* * Category 2 items which are deductible to the extent of gross income remaining after Category 1
items (and subject to IRC §§ 67 and 68).



The Category 2 expenses of $5,200 must further be reduced under IRC §67 by $4,244 (2% of the corrected AGI - 2% X 212,200). The itemized deduction limitation under IRC § 68 applies but not enough facts have been presented to determine this limitation.

There is no amount of gross income remaining for Category 3 expenses.

In this example, if the loss had simply been disallowed it would have resulted in a $64,000 adjustment. By moving the expenses to the Schedule A it resulted in an additional adjustment of $4,244 due to the miscellaneous itemized deduction limitation under IRC § 67 and possibly other adjustments due to the change in AGI.



RGS Input



Leadsheets

A leadsheet is available on IRC § 183 Activities Not Engaged in for Profit and should be used when the examiner determines that there is a possibility that an activity is not for profit. This issue should be categorized as de minimis with Per Return and Per Exam fields being zero. The compliance information will be completed with Reason Code 52, Form/Schedule X and Line number 99. For the NAICS code, enter "D."

All workpapers and supporting documentation pertaining to the development of the IRC § 183 issue should be contained in the Activities Not Engaged in for Profit leadsheet and should be included with the report issued to the taxpayer. The supporting documentation should include a schedule which shows how each category 1, 2 and 3 expenses were arrived at along with the factual development of the case addressing each of the nine relevant factors found in Treas. Reg.§1.183-2(b) used in determining whether a taxpayer is conducting an activity with the intent to make a profit.

The actual adjustments should be made in each income and expense leadsheet and reference made to the documentation contained in the IRC § 183 leadsheet. If an expense item is adjusted because of lack of verification or reasons other than IRC § 183, the supporting documentation and conclusions should be contained in each individual issue leadsheet and be treated as an alternative position in the event that, on appeal, the primary activity not engaged in for profit position is overturned.



Entering Adjustments in Report Generation Software (RGS)

After determining the expense categories and limitations, the adjustments need to be entered in RGS.

Each income and expense item on the schedule used to report the activity should be disallowed. Items should not be combined into one adjustment. The issues for these items may already be classified and created. Reason Code 10 or 14 should be used only if the item is allowed in full elsewhere on the return. All adjustments using Reason Code 10 or 14 must net to zero. Appropriate reason codes should be used for other adjustments.

Reason Code 10 description is "Income/Expenses entered on wrong item to reduce tax or increase credits." This reason code should be made to issues when penalties are applied

Reason Code 14 description is "Taxpayer entered item on the wrong form, schedule or line" for any expense disallowed which has been allowed in full on the Schedule A. In this example, Reason Code 14 would be used for all of the Category 1 expenses. This reason code should be made when no penalties have been asserted and the item has been allowed in full on the Schedule A.

An issue must be created moving the "earned income" to "unearned income (line 21 of Form 1040)" for the activity. This income should be categorized as "other income - unearned." Issues must be created separately for any Category 1 expenses fully allowable on Schedule A, e.g. mortgage interest, real estate taxes. An additional issue must be added for any other Category 2 and 3 allowable miscellaneous itemized deductions (these items may be grouped into one adjustment.) These Category 2 and 3 expenses are limited by the gross income from the activity after subtracting Category 1 expenses.



Partnerships and S Corporations

Where a flow through entity is engaged in several activities, if the activities are separate, the expenses and income from both may not be aggregated in order to apply the limits of IRC § 183.

Flow through entities are required to 'separately state" certain items of income and deductions. Items must be 'separately stated" if the item would result in a tax liability for any partner/shareholder different from the person's tax liability, if the items weren't 'separately stated.' E.g. charitable contributions, portfolio income, IRC § 179 deduction, investment interest expense.

Each income and expense item on the schedule used to report the activity should be disallowed. Income from an activity not engaged in for profit should be categorized separately in RGS as "Other Income' for both the Schedule K and K-1. Similarly, expenses should be grouped by category (1, 2 or 3) and categorized as 'other deductions' and deducted only up to the extent of hobby income. Any remaining deductions should be categorized as non-deductible expenses. The non-deductible expenses will result in a reduction in the investor basis. An issue should be created in RGS to reflect the non-deductible expenses.



1040 Schedule C Example

An examiner is auditing a Schedule C bass fishing activity not engaged in for profit with $3,000 of gross income. The taxpayer had $120,000 of AGI. The following Schedule C expenses were reported and verified by the taxpayer:
1040 Schedule C Example



____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Expense Amount Category 1 Category 2 Category 3

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Property taxes 700 700

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Mortgage interest 900 900

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Insurance 400 400

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Utilities 700 700

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Auto/Travel 23,000 23,000

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Bait/Tackle 2,000 2,000

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Entrance Fees 8,000 8,000

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Depreciation 28,000 28,000

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Total 63,700 1,600 34,100 28,000

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


Total expenses reported on the Schedule C were $63,700 resulting in a net loss of $60,700. The Schedule C was classified as a potential activity not for profit and all income and expense items were classified.
 Category 1 expenses total $1,600

 Category 2 expenses total $34,100

 Category 3 expenses total $28,000

Category 1 expenses of $1,600 are allowed in full leaving $1,400 remaining of gross income for Category 2 and 3 expenses. Since Category 2 expenses totaling $$34,100 exceed the remaining gross income of $1,400, the taxpayer is allowed only $1,400 of the Category 2 expenses. None of the Category 3 expenses may be allowed since there is no remaining gross income remaining.

Step 1 - Remove Income from Schedule C

The first step in RGS is to remove the Schedule C income. Enter $3,000 in the Per Return field Enter zero in the Per Exam field. For the NAICS code enter "D" in the Per Exam field (the Schedule C is disallowed in full).

Step 2 - Add an issue for Other Income - Unearned

Add an issue as a New Issue Resulting from a Classified Issue. Categorize the adjustment as Other Income - unearned (this income is not subject to self employment tax). Enter zero in the Per Return field. Enter $3,000 in the Per Exam Field.

Step 3 - Remove All Schedule C Expenses

In the example, all Schedule C expenses have been classified. Disallow the Category 1 expenses in full by entering zero in the Per Exam field. Use Reason code 10 or 14 only if the item is allowed in full elsewhere on the return. Enter "D" in the NAICS code Per Exam field. Note that if these issues had not been classified the examiner would need to add each individual expense item as a separate adjustment into RGS.

Step 4 -Allow Category 1 Expenses on Schedule A

Category 1 expenses are allowable in full on Schedule A without regard to gross income limitations. Add each issue as a New Issue Resulting from a Classified Issue. In this example there are two separate adjustments - one to mortgage interest and one to real estate taxes. Use Reason Code 10 or 14.

Step 5 - Allow Category 2 and 3 Expenses on Schedule A

The remaining allowable expenses ($3,000 income less $1,600 category 1 expenses) are limited to the remaining income from the activity and entered as Schedule A Miscellaneous Itemized Deductions subject to 2% of AGI. One adjustment can be made for the combined expenses. In this example, the taxpayer will have $1,400 of Category 2 expenses. There is no remaining income with which to offset Category 3 expenses.


____________________________________________________________________________________________________
AGI Per Return 120,000

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Sch C Expenses Disallowed 63,700

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Removal of Sch C Income -3,000

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Increase of Other Income-Unearned 3,000

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Corrected AGI 183,700

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


In the above example the taxpayer's per return AGI was $120,000. After the adjustments it is now $183,700. Miscellaneous itemized deductions are limited to the amount that they exceed $2% of AGI (2% X $183,700 = $3,674). In this example, the taxpayer would get no tax deduction for the $1,400 in Category 2 expenses since they did not exceed the 2% of AGI.

If the examiner had chosen (incorrectly) to simply disallow the loss from the Schedule C activity it would have resulted in a total adjustment of $ 60,700 to AGI.

By correctly removing the income and expenses from the Schedule C and treating the income as unearned, the adjustments result in an increase in AGI of $63,700 and an increase in total itemized deductions of $1,600 for a total adjustment of $62,100 ($63,700 - $1,600). In this example none of the miscellaneous itemized deductions exceeded the corrected AGI 2% limitation ($3,674). By correctly reclassifying the income and expenses, it results in a $62,100 increase of taxable income rather than the $60,700 had an adjustment been made to simply disallow the loss. Also, the taxpayer may have other items on their tax return that could be affected by the increase in AGI.



Partnerships, S Corporations, Trusts and Estates

The IRC § 183 activities not engaged in for profit rules are applied at the entity level for partnership, S corporations, trusts and estates. These rules apply on an activity by activity basis and the income and deductions arising in one activity cannot be combined with the income and deductions from another activity in an entity. The identification of whether there is one or two activities is necessary to apply the rules of IRC § 183. This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 1 of this guide.

In Magassy vs. Commr , TC Memo 2004-4, the taxpayer (an S corporation) had the burden of proving that it was engaged in the activity of restoring, chartering, and selling a yacht with the actual and honest objective of realizing profit. The court determined that the S corporation was involved in an activity that was not engaged in for a profit.

Income from an IRC § 183 issue for these type of entities determined not to be engaged in for profit should be removed from ordinary income and reclassified as separately stated income (generally as other income). All expenses should be grouped by category and separately stated and limited to gross income from the activity. There would seldom be any Category 1 expenses other than possibly investment interest or contributions. The limitation is determined at the entity level.

Even if the expenses of the activity may not be of beneficial use to the shareholder/partner due to the gross income limitation, they will still result in a reduction in the basis of the shareholder/partner.



S Corporation Example

An S corporation has gross receipts of $4,000 from a car racing activity not engaged in for profit. After expenses of $55,000 the ordinary loss is $51,000. The interest expense is in connection with the purchase of the race car.


____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Expense Amount Category 1 Category 2 Category 3

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Entrance Fees 10,000 10,000

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Interest 12,000 12,000

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Insurance 400 400

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Utilities 1,600 1,600

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Auto and Travel 13,000 13,000

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Repairs 2,000 2,000

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Depreciation 16,000 16,000

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Total 55,000 0 39,000 16,000

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


All of the income and expenses should be removed from the ordinary business operations of the S corporation return. The income should then be separately stated and reported on line 10 of the 1120S Schedule K . This income would then be reported on the shareholder's individual income tax return on line 21 as other income - unearned.

The interest expense in this example is not included as a Category 1 expense since it would not be deductible on the 1040 Schedule A because the interest is not home mortgage interest or investment interest.

Category 2 expenses would be allowed up to the $4,000 of gross income from the car racing activity and would be separately stated on line 12d of the 1120S Schedule K. The remaining non-deductible expenses of $51,000 would be reported as non-deductible expenses on line 16c of the 1120S Schedule K and K-1. The shareholder would then have $4,000 as a miscellaneous itemized deduction.

The $51,000 in non-deductible expenses will result in a reduction in the shareholder's stock basis and the Accumulated Adjustments Account (AAA) of the S corporation.



Taxpayer Penalties

When proposing audit adjustments, penalties should always be considered. All penalties including the accuracy-related and fraud penalties are important deterrents to non-compliance.

The IRS asserts the accuracy related penalty under IRC § 6662 for negligence or disregard of rules or regulations and/or a substantial understatement of income tax in appropriate cases.

Whether the accuracy related penalty applies to the activity must be determined on a case-by-case basis and will depend on the specific facts and circumstances of each case. It is the examiner's responsibility to develop the facts and circumstances.

IRC § 6662 imposes an accuracy related penalty in the amount equal to 20% of the portion of an underpayment attributable to, among other things:
 IRC § 6662(b)(1) - negligence or disregard of rules or regulations,

 IRC § 6662(b)(2) - any substantial understatement of income tax.

See also IRC § 6662(b)(3) for substantial or gross valuation misstatement and IRC § 6662A for accuracy-related penalty on understatements with respect to reportable transactions.

The penalty applies only when a tax return is filed. There is no stacking of the accuracy-related penalty components. The maximum accuracy-related penalty imposed on any portion of an underpayment is 20% (40% in the case of a gross valuation misstatement), even if that portion of the underpayment is attributable to more than one type of misconduct (e.g. negligence and substantial valuation misstatement). Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-2(c).

No accuracy-related penalty under IRC § 6662 is imposed if it is shown that the taxpayer had reasonable cause for the position taken and that the taxpayer acted in good faith. IRC § 6664(c).

Circumstances that may indicate reasonable cause and good faith include an honest misunderstanding of fact or law that is reasonable in light of all of the facts and circumstances, including the experience, knowledge and education of the taxpayer. Reliance on an information return, professional advise, or other facts may constitute reasonable cause and good faith if, under all the circumstances, such reliance was reasonable and the taxpayer acted in good faith. For a taxpayer to have reasonable cause, the taxpayer must have exercised ordinary business care and prudence regarding their tax affairs.

For purposes of IRC § 6662, the term "underpayment" is defined as "the amount by which any tax imposed exceeds the excess of the sum of the amount shown as the tax by the taxpayer on his return, plus amounts not so shown previously assessed (or collected without assessment), over the amount of rebates made."

Taxpayer penalty procedures and case development instructions can be found in IRM 20.1.5, Return Related Penalties. This IRM covers the accuracy related penalties under IRC § 6662 and the fraud penalty under IRC § 6663.



Negligence or Disregard of Rules or Regulations

Negligence is any failure to make a reasonable attempt to comply with the provisions of the Code and includes any failure by the taxpayer to keep adequate books and records or to substantiate items properly. Negligence includes the failure to exercise due care or the failure to do what a reasonable and prudent person would do under the circumstances. Negligence is strongly indicated when a taxpayer fails to make a reasonable attempt to ascertain the correctness of a deduction, credit or exclusion on a return which would seem to a reasonable and prudent person to be "too good to be true" under the circumstances. A return position is not attributable to negligence if there is a reasonable basis for that position. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(h)(1).

Disregard includes any careless, reckless, or intentional disregard of rules or regulations. Treas. Reg. § 1.666-3(b)(2) defines "rules or regulations," "careless," "reckless," and "intentional" as follows:
 "Rules or regulations" include the provisions of the Code, temporary or final Treasury regulations issued under the Code and revenue rulings or notices (other than notices of proposed rulemaking) issued by the IRS and published in the Internal Revenue Bulletins.

 "A disregard of rules or regulations is 'careless' if the taxpayer does not exercise reasonable diligence to determine the correctness of a return position that is contrary to the rule or regulation."

 "A disregard is 'reckless' if the taxpayer makes little or no effort to determine whether a rule or regulation exists, under circumstances which demonstrate a substantial deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe."

 "A disregard is 'intentional' if the taxpayer knows of the rule or regulation that is disregarded."



Substantial Understatement

For individual taxpayers a substantial understatement of income tax exists for a taxable year if the amount of understatement exceeds the greater of 10% of the tax required to be shown on the return or $5,000. An "understatement" is defined as the excess of any tax required to be shown on the return over the tax actually shown on the return, less any rebate. IRC § 6662(d). This excess is determined without regard to items to which IRC § 6662A applies. The amount of any reportable transaction understatement is, as determined under § 6662A(b), is added to this excess to determine whether the understatement is "substantial" (i.e. whether it is more than the greater of 10% of the tax required to be shown on the return or $5,000). See IRC § 6662A(e)(1).

For purposes of determining the amount of the understatement, for items not attributable to a "tax shelter," the understatement is reduced by the understatement attributable to any item (1) for which there is or was substantial authority for the tax treatment; or (2) for which the taxpayer has adequately disclosed the relevant facts affecting the tax treatment and for which there is a reasonable basis for the taxpayer's tax treatment. IRC § 6662(d). The taxpayer also is required to substantiate the position and keep adequate books and records. IRC § 6662(d)(2)(B); Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(e)(2)(iii); see Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(3).

"Substantial authority" is an objective standard and involves an analysis of the law and the application of that law to the relevant facts. It is a more stringent standard than "reasonable basis" but less stringent than a 50% likelihood of the possibility of being upheld. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(2). Whether authority is substantial depends on the weight of supporting authority relative to contrary authority, the relevance and persuasiveness of the authority, and the type of document providing the authority. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3).

Reasonable basis is a relatively high reporting standard and is not satisfied by a return position that is merely arguable or merely colorable. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(3). A position will generally satisfy the reasonable basis standard if the position is reasonably based on applicable statutory provisions, regulations, revenue rulings, revenue procedures, court cases, and other documents listed in Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii). Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(3).



Reasonable Cause Exception

No accuracy-related penalty under IRC § 6662 is imposed with respect to any portion of the underpayment if the taxpayer acted with reasonable cause and good faith. IRC § 6664(c). See also, IRC § 6664(d) for reasonable cause regarding reportable transactions. The determination of whether a taxpayer acted with reasonable cause and in good faith is made on a case-by-case basis, and all relevant facts and circumstances are taken into account. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b). Generally the most important factor is the extent of the taxpayer's effort to assess the taxpayer's proper tax liability. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b)(1).

Circumstances that may indicate reasonable cause and good faith include an honest misunderstanding of fact or law that is reasonable in light of all of the facts and circumstances, including the experience, knowledge, and education of the taxpayer. Reliance on an information return, professional advice, or other facts may constitute reasonable cause and good faith if, under all the circumstances, such reliance was reasonable and the taxpayer acted in good faith. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b)(1).

A taxpayer cannot rely on professional advice if the taxpayer fails to disclose a relevant fact that the taxpayer reasonably should have known was relevant if the advice is based on unreasonable assumptions, or if the advice relies upon the undisclosed position that a regulation is invalid. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(c)(1).



Return Preparer Penalties

The primary purpose of return preparer penalties is to bring non-compliant tax return preparers into compliance. In preparer penalty cases, the IRS focuses on the conduct of the preparer rather than the taxpayer. All examiners should consider if any of the following preparer penalties are applicable.
 IRC § 6694(a) Understatements Due to Unreasonable Positions

 IRC § 6694(b) Understatement Due to Willful or Reckless Conduct

 IRC § 6701 Aiding and Abetting Understatement of Tax Liability

The IRS recognizes that the vast majority of return preparers and practitioners are ethical, honest and serve their clients' best interests by preparing complete and accurate tax returns.

Taxpayers are sometimes advised by preparers to claim activities which are not engaged in for profit or are sham. Examiners should consider preparer penalties if deductions claimed are not ordinary and necessary expenses incurred during the taxable year in carrying on a trade or business or for profit activity.

Examiners should also consider whether an attempt has been made to characterize personal expenses as business expenses.

Preparer penalty procedures and case development instructions can be found in IRM 20.1.6, Preparer, Promoter Penalties

IRC § 6694 provides for penalties on tax return preparers who unreasonably or willfully understate a taxpayer's tax liability. IRC § 6694 was amended by the Small Business and Work Opportunity Tax Act of 2007 (SBWOTA) which was enacted into law on May 25, 2007, for tax returns prepared after May 25, 2007. SBWOTA extended the application of the income tax return preparer penalties to all tax return preparers, altered the standards of conduct, and increased applicable penalties. IRC § 6694 was again amended by the Tax Extenders and Alternative Minimum Tax Relief Act of 2008 (TEAMTRA). TEAMTRA reorganized IRC § 6694 and added a section regarding tax shelters and reportable transactions. The tax shelter reportable transaction addition to IRC § 6694 was effective as of October 3, 2008. The rest of TEAMTRA, as it pertained to IRC § 6694, was retroactively effective as of May 25, 2007. This effective date eliminated the applicability of the SBWOTA amendments as they pertain to IRC § 6694.

Prior to May 25, 2007, IRC § 7701(a)(36) defined income tax return preparer as any person who prepared for compensation, or employs one or more persons to prepare for compensation, an income tax return or claim for refund, or a substantial portion of an income tax return or claim for refunded. After May 24, 2007, IRC§ 7701(a)(36) defined tax return preparer as any person that prepared for compensation, or employs one or more persons to prepare for compensation, a tax return or claim for refund, or a substantial portion of a tax return or claim for refund, and is no longer limited to persons who prepare income tax returns.



IRC § 6694(a) Understatement Due to Unreasonable Positions

Prior to May 25, 2007, the amount of the IRC § 6694(a) penalty was $250 and the penalty only applied to income tax returns and claims for refund. After May 24, 2007, the penalty applied to all tax returns and claims for refund, including estate and gift tax returns, generation-skipping transfer tax returns, employment tax returns, and excise tax returns. The amount of the penalty was increased to $1,000 or 50% of the income derived (or to be derived) by the tax return preparer with respect to all tax returns.

The amendment also changed the standard for the penalty. The below table provides a comparison of IRC § 6694(a) standards.
IRC § 6694(a) is applied if:



____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Prior to May 25, 2007 After May 24, 2007 After Oct. 2, 2008

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
 There was an  There was an  There was an understatement,
understatement, understatement,  there was no substantial authority
 there was not a  there was no for the position,
realistic possibility substantial  the tax return preparer knew (or
(i.e. one in three authority for the reasonably should have known) of such
chance) that the position, position, AND
position would be  the tax return  such position was not disclosed or
sustained on its merits, preparer knew (or there was no reasonable basis for it,
reasonably should OR if the position is with respect to a
 the income tax return have known) of such tax shelter or reportable transaction,
preparer knew (or position, AND there was no reasonable belief that the
reasonably should have  such position was position would more likely than not be
known) of such position, not disclosed or sustained on the merits .
AND there was no
reasonable basis
 such position was not for it.
disclosed or was
frivolous .

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Penalty $250 Penalty greater of Penalty greater of $1,000 or 50% of the
$1,000 or 50% of the income derived by the preparer.
income derived by the
preparer.

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


IRC § 6694(a) does not apply if the position taken is adequately disclosed and there was a reasonable basis for such position, or, if the position is with respect to a tax shelter or reportable transaction, there was no reasonable belief that the position would more likely than not be sustained on the merits. IRC § 6694(a)(3).

The preparer generally may rely in good faith without verification upon information furnished by the taxpayer and upon information and advice furnished by another advisor, another tax return preparer, or another party (including another advisor or another tax return preparer at the tax return preparer's firm). The preparer is not required to audit, examine or review books and records, business operations, or documents or other evidence in order to verify independently information provided by the taxpayer, advisor, other tax return preparer or other party. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694(e).

However, the preparer:
 may not ignore the implications of information furnished to the preparer or actually known by the preparer,

 must make reasonable inquiries if the information as furnished appears to be incorrect or incomplete,

 must make appropriate inquiries to determine the existence of facts and circumstances required by a Code section or regulation as a condition to the claiming of a deduction.

Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-1(e).

The statute of limitations for IRC § 6694(a) expires three years from the later of the due date of the underlying related return or the date the return was filed. Remember, extending the statute on a taxpayer's return does not extend the statute for the return preparer penalty case. Use Form 872-D, Consent to Extend the Time on Assessment of Tax Return Penalty.



IRC § 6694(b) Willful or Reckless Conduct

SBWOTA increased the amount of the penalty under IRC § 6694(b) and made that penalty applicable with respect to all tax returns. The standard for application of the IRC § 6694(b) penalty, however, was not changed. Both prior to and after SBWOTA, the IRC § 6694(b) penalty applies if any part of an understatement of liability on a return, amended return, or claim for refunds is due:
 to a willful attempt in any manner to understate the liability for tax by a return preparer (income tax return preparers only prior to SBWOTA); or

 to any reckless or intentional disregard of rules or regulations by a tax return preparer (income tax return preparers only prior to SBWOTA.

The criteria to consider for the imposition of IRC § 6694(b) are:
 a tax return preparer,

 an understatement of income tax liability,

 an understatement due to a willful attempt to understate the income tax liability or due to any reckless or intentional disregard of the rules or regulations.

SBWOTA increased the IRC § 6694(b) penalty to the greater of $5,000 or 50% of the income derived (or to be derived) by the tax return preparer with respect to returns, amended returns, and claims for refund prepared on or after May 26, 2007. Former IRC § 6694(b) (returns prepared prior to May 26, 2007) applied only to preparers of income tax returns and the penalty was $ 1,000.

Under IRC § 7427, the IRS bears the burden of proof on the issue of whether the preparer willfully attempted to understate the tax liability.

The preparer bears the burden of proof on issues such as whether:
 the preparer recklessly or intentionally disregarded a rule or regulation.

 a position contrary to a regulation represents a good faith challenge to the validity of the regulation.

 disclosure was adequately made (Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-3(h)).

If both IRC § 6694(a) and IRC § 6694(b) penalties apply to a tax return preparer, the IRC § 6694(b) penalty amount must be reduced by the IRC § 6694(a) penalty amount per IRC § 6694(b)(3).

There is no statute of limitations for IRC § 6694(b).



IRC § 6701 Aiding and Abetting

IRC § 6701 imposes a $1,000 penalty ($10,000 if the prohibited conduct relates to a corporation's tax return) for aiding or assisting in the understatement of tax.

The penalty is imposed on a person who:
 aids or assists in, procures or advises with respect to, the preparation or presentation of any portion of a return, affidavit, claim or other document;, regardless of whether a fee is charged,

 knows (or has reason to know) that such portion will be used in connection with any material matter arising under the internal revenue laws; and

 knows that such portion (if used) would result in an understatement of another person's tax liability, even if no actual understatement exists.

A "document" for these purposes can be any portion of a return, affidavit, claim or other document. Therefore, a single letter distributed and used by many taxpayers can lead to multiple penalties.

It is not necessary for the taxpayer whose tax is understated to either have knowledge of or give his consent to the actions which result in the understatement. To aid in an understatement, it is not necessary to actually prepare the tax return or document that leads to the understatement. A person who controls the activities of subordinates and either orders the subordinate to act or does not prevent their participation is subject to the penalty.

The IRS bears the burden of proof with respect to this penalty.

If the IRC § 6701 penalty is asserted, no penalties under IRC § 6694(a) or IRC § 6694(b) can be assessed.

There is no statute of limitations for IRC § 6701.



Unagreed Reports

The examiner may find that the taxpayer will not agree to the proposed adjustments from an IRC § 183 activity not engaged in for profit issue. Therefore, the examiner should prepare the report showing the facts, law and argument, taxpayer's position and conclusion. Since the report is the government's position, all pertinent information must be included in the case write-up. Any relevant computations or documents should be attached to the report.

In cases where the IRS has been unsuccessful on IRC § 183 issues it is largely due to inadequate development and/or application of the tax law. Some of the reasons mentioned in Appeals feedback include:
 Alternative arguments were not addressed.

 Disallowed expenses were not first verified as to whether they would be deductible at all or were personal in nature.

 The nine factors in Treas. Reg. §1.183-2(b) were not addressed.

 No mention was made of whether there would ever be a realistic possibility of a profit.

 No mention was made documenting the history of the activity including losses incurred and taxes saved in the prior period.

 Lack of factual development.

It is important the case be fully developed in order to be sustained in Appeals or the courts. Any alternative positions should be addressed in the unagreed report.

If the examiner determines that there are other adjustments unrelated to the IRC § 183 issue, the examiner should attempt to secure a partial agreement of these adjustments.



Rebuttals

Rebuttals issued by examiners to the taxpayer's protest to the 30 day letter should be shared with the taxpayer and their authorized representative. The goal of this sharing is to resolve factual disputes before the case is submitted to Appeals.

Rebuttals should focus on the points raise in the protest. Sometimes the protest raises valid points that the unagreed write-up does not address.



Alternative positions

If it is determined that there is no profit motive and the taxpayer does not agree, the examiner should also consider an alternative position in the event that, on appeal, the primary activity not engaged in for profit position is overturned.

An alternative position for an issue in an unagreed case is a secondary position that the IRS may ultimately rely on if the primary position cannot be upheld. An alternative position is recommended as Appeals generally is not permitted to raise new issues.

Alternative positions should be developed when appropriate. If the IRC § 183 issue is not sustained, the examiner must have addressed whether the taxpayer meets the requirements under other code sections, i.e. 162, 179,195, 262, 274(d), 280A, 465, 469, etc. or due to lack of substantiation of the expense.

IRC § 183 adjustments are permanent adjustments and should generally be treated as the primary position (unless the alternative issues convert the loss into a profit). The passive activity loss rules of IRC § 469, the at risk limitations of IRC § 465, and the basis limitations of IRC §1366 and § IRC § 704 are timing adjustments and should be treated as alternative positions when the §183 issue is also present.

The examiner should discuss the alternative position with the taxpayer and/or authorized representative prior to issuing the examination report. The unagreed report should outline all alternative positions that may be applicable if the primary position is not sustained.

The facts, applicable law, taxpayer's position, and conclusions for the alternative position on an issue should be presented on a separate lead sheet from the primary position.

Further procedures regarding alternative positions can be found in IRM 4.10.8.11.



Inadequate Books and Records

IRC § 6001 contains the requirements for taxpayers to maintain and keep records.

Treas. Regs. § 1.6001-1(a) provides that taxpayers must keep permanent books of account or records, including inventories, as are sufficient to establish the amount of gross income, deductions, credits, or other matters required to be shown in the taxpayer's returns.

Treas. Regs. § 1.6001-1(e) provides that the books or records required by this section shall be kept at all times available for inspection by authorized internal revenue officers or employees, and shall be retained so long as the contents thereof may become material in the administration of any internal revenue law.

If the taxpayer has not kept adequate books and records this should be documented in the examiner's workpapers. It is relevant in the nine factor regulatory analysis. See Treas. Regs. § 1.183-2(b)(1).

Whenever the taxpayer's books and records are deemed inadequate for purposes of an examination of income, the examiner should consider the issuance of an inadequate records notice at the conclusion of the examination. The procedures for issuance of an inadequate records notice can be found in IRM 4.10.8.16.



Appendix

This appendix provides additional information that will assist in the development of IRC § 183 activity not for profit cases.

A -Treas. Regs. § 1.183-2(b) (9 Relevant Factors)

B - Suggested Questions for each of 9 Relevant Factors

C - Tax Savings Benefit Analysis

D - Year by Year Comparative Analysis of Income, Expenses and Losses

E - Sample IDR for Yacht Charter



Appendix A - Treas. Regs. § 1.183-2(b)

The nine relevant factors used to evaluate whether an activity is engaged in for profit with a brief explanation of each factor are included below.



Factor 1
(1) Manner in which the taxpayer carries on the activity. - The fact that the taxpayer carries on the activity in a businesslike manner and maintains complete and accurate books and records may indicate that the activity is engaged in for profit. Similarly, where an activity is carried on in a manner substantially similar to other activities of the same nature which are profitable, a profit motive may be indicated. A change of operating methods, adoption of new techniques or abandonment of unprofitable methods in a manner consistent with an intent to improve profitability may also indicate a profit motive.

The examiner needs to inquire about the books and records maintained for the activity during the Initial Interview. The examiner should document in the workpapers regarding the sophistication of the taxpayer's books and records. The examiner should determine if the taxpayer maintains checking accounts for the activity which are separate from the accounts used for the taxpayer's personal living expenses.

Depending upon the volume, the examiner should obtain photocopies of the taxpayer's entire set of books and records. If photocopying the entire set of books and records proves to be cost prohibitive, the examiner should only photocopy samples representative of the overall books and records.

The presence of sophisticated books and records does not automatically equate to profit motive. The taxpayer must be relying upon these records in order to operate the activity and make decisions or changes. The examiner needs to document how these records are utilized by the taxpayer.

The taxpayer should have a formal written Business Plan. This plan should demonstrate the taxpayer's financial and economic forecast for the activity. The plan should not be a "fantasy profit and loss statement." In other words, some taxpayers may wish to submit a business plan that is nothing more than a Schedule F or C, which unrealistically overstates the gross receipts and unrealistically understates the expenses for the activity.

The examiner should not request the business plan in the first IDR. Otherwise, the examiner will possibly receive a "canned" document. The examiner should inquire as to the business plan during the Initial Interview and follow-up with a subsequent appointment and/or IDR.

A business plan should show a short range and long range forecast for the activity. The forecast should allow for changes due to potential unforeseen and fortuitous circumstances.

The plan should be realistic. The examiner should perform quantitative analyses in order to determine the reasonableness of the projected gross receipts and various expense items. The examiner may consult with IRS economists in order to review the business plan.

The examiner should determine if the taxpayer followed the plan and if the original plan was not successful did the taxpayer made any amendments to the plan to increase profitability.

The examiner needs to document the taxpayer's method of operation. The examiner should document the daily operation as well as the history of the activity's operation in the workpapers. Denote changes in the method of operation over the years and indicate why these changes were initiated. Most of this information will be gathered during the Initial Interview.

The examiner needs to document the efficiency of the taxpayer's operation. Denote the taxpayer's use of any experts or specialists. Indicate if any changes were initiated and why. Obtain names, position titles, and addresses. Most of this information will be gathered during the Initial Interview.

The examiner will note whether the taxpayer is making changes to the operation that will result in improved operational efficiency.

The examiner needs to review the actual copy of any advertising in instances where the taxpayer has deducted such expenditures. Many taxpayers will buy advertising space for "vanity" ads. These spaces are sometimes purchased to place photographs of their children. These ads may wish the children "Best of luck" prior to upcoming competitions. The examiner should use professional judgment to determine whether the advertisements truly represent promotion of the taxpayer's activity.

The examiner needs to be alert for the children's activities being deducted on the parents' tax return. The examiner needs to review reports and determine who actually competes in certain activities. The parents may contend that the children are promoting the activity through the competitions. The examiner needs to consider the substance of the facts.

Depreciation and Inventory can be viable issues for the examiner to consider as an aside from IRC § 183. The examiner should develop a clear understanding of the taxpayer's activity and verify that the proper tax treatment is used for the activity.



Summary of Factor 1

The examiner must document the manner in which the taxpayer carries on the activity. Most of this information will be gathered during the Initial Interview and the tour of the operation. It is important for the examiner to document a clear understanding of the activity. Assumptions should not be made that each activity operates the same as another similar activity.



Factor 2
(2) The expertise of the taxpayer or his advisors. - Preparation for the activity by extensive study of its accepted business, economic, and scientific practices, or consultation with those who are expert therein, may indicate that the taxpayer has a profit motive where the taxpayer carries on the activity in accordance with such practices. Where a taxpayer has such preparation or procures such expert advice, but does not carry on the activity in accordance with such practices, a lack of intent to derive profit may be indicated unless it appears that the taxpayer is attempting to develop new or superior techniques which may result in profits from the activity.

Factor 2 addresses the expertise of the taxpayer or his or her advisors. The examiner should document the extent to which the taxpayer has relied upon his or her advisors. The examiner should also document the instances where the taxpayer received advice from his or her advisors, but failed to heed this advice.

The Initial Interview should include questions regarding the taxpayer's expertise, the use of any experts, and any changes or decisions regarding the operation of the activity.

The examiner should establish and document the taxpayer's background in the activity and determine how long the taxpayer has been engaged in the activity. Many times the taxpayer was involved in the activity in some capacity during youth and later became involved again as an adult. These adults have re-entered the activity after they have obtained the financial wherewithal to commence the activity. The examiner should establish a history of the taxpayer's growth of knowledge within the activity and how this knowledge was obtained.

The examiner should establish if the taxpayer has used any advisors or experts in the operation of the activity. Obtain names, position titles, and addresses of these advisors. Document how the advisors were chosen by the taxpayers. Establish the credentials of the advisors. Document if a personal relationship exists between the taxpayer and his advisors.

The examiner needs to document specific instances where the taxpayer was provided advice that was implemented in the activity. Describe how this information affected the operation and any resulting changes. Document whether the advised changes were successful or unsuccessful.

The examiner also needs to document specific instances whereby the taxpayer was advised by his or her experts to make changes and the taxpayer ignored the advice. The examiner should document why the taxpayer chose to ignore this advice. Many taxpayers will provide names of advisors in an effort to demonstrate profit motivation. However, if the taxpayer chooses not to implement the suggested changes and cannot provide just cause for doing so, then the taxpayer's use of advisors is questionable.



Summary of Factor 2

The examiner should document the expertise and knowledge of the taxpayer regarding the activity. The examiner should also document any advisors or experts that the taxpayer has used. Documentation should be prepared which shows specific instances where the taxpayer has followed the advice of the advisor.

Documentation should also show how the advice affected the operation of the activity. The examiner should especially note instances when the taxpayer has ignored the recommendations of the advisor and why that decision was made.



Factor 3
(3) The time and effort expended by the taxpayer in carrying on the activity. - The fact that the taxpayer devotes much of his personal time and effort to carrying on an activity, particularly if the activity does not have substantial personal or recreational aspects, may indicate an intention to derive a profit. A taxpayer's withdrawal from another occupation to devote most of his energies to the activity may also be evidence that the activity is engaged in for profit. The fact that the taxpayer devotes a limited amount of time to an activity does not necessarily indicate a lack of profit motive where the taxpayer employs competent and qualified persons to carry on such activity.

This factor addresses how much time and effort is expended by the taxpayer in carrying on the activity. In addition to the taxpayer's time, the examiner needs to consider the amount of time expended by any other individuals involved in the activity. The development of this factor may lead to the development of an alternative position under the provisions of IRC § 469 for Passive Activities.

The examiner needs to establish precisely how much time the taxpayer devotes to this activity as well as all other activities. The amount of time devoted to the activity may be an indicator of profit motive. If the taxpayer devotes a limited amount of time to the activity, then the taxpayer may be lacking a profit motive. However, if the taxpayer employs competent and qualified individuals to operate the activity, then the taxpayer's time and effort will be reduced. Time and effort expended reading magazines, journals, and other periodicals are consistent with engaging in a hobby.

After the examiner determines the amount of time that the taxpayer devotes to the activity, then the examiner should consider the possibility that the provisions under IRC § 469 may apply to the taxpayer. If the examiner determines that IRC § 469 may be applicable, then the examiner could use IRC § 469 as an alternative position to IRC §183.

The examiner should prepare an analysis that shows how much time is devoted to the activity as well as a breakdown of how that time is spent. For example, the examiner should designate how much is spent attending seminars, reading magazines and journals, or how much time is spent performing repairs and maintenance and so forth.

The examiner should note specifically the amount of time that the taxpayer devotes to other activities.



Summary of Factor 3

The examiner should consider the amount of time that the taxpayer devotes to the activity. The time analysis should precisely detail how much time the taxpayer devotes to each task related to the activity. The examiner should consider whether IRC § 469 Passive Activity provisions might be applicable. IRC § 469 could provide an alternative position for IRC §183.



Factor 4
(4) Expectation that assets used in activity may appreciate in value. - The term "profit" encompasses appreciation in the value of assets, such as land, used in the activity. Thus, the taxpayer may intend to derive a profit from the operation of the activity, and may also intend that, even if no profit from current operations is derived, an overall profit will result when appreciation in the value of land used in the activity is realized since income from the activity together with the appreciation of land will exceed expenses of operation. See, however, paragraph (d) of §1.183-1(d) for definition of an activity in this connection.

A taxpayer's "profit" expectations may include appreciation in the value of assets used in the activity. The courts have differed in their application of this factor. Some have included unrealized appreciation in boats, limousines, equipment and real property in determining if the taxpayer had a bona fide profit motive.

Factor 4 has been the most difficult of the nine relevant factors for examiners to correctly develop. The taxpayer has generally been successful with respect to this factor because of the potential for land appreciation. However, proper development of this factor can overcome the potential for land appreciation.

Factor 4 hinges on whether the operation of the taxpayer's activity and the holding of the land are considered to be a separate or single activity.

According to the Treasury Regulations, Factor 4 states that the term "profit" also includes the appreciation of assets, such as land, used in the activity. An overall profit may occur, in spite of losses from current operations, if the appreciation of the assets is realized.

The examiner needs to prepare an analysis that shows the history of the activity. Beginning with gross receipts, the examiner needs to separate current operating expenses from the costs of carrying the assets. These carrying costs would include depreciation and related interest expense.

The examiner needs to determine if gross receipts exceed current operating expenses with a resulting net profit. For the purpose of this calculation, depreciation expense and related interest expense should be excluded.

As previously mentioned, taxpayers can frequently show potential appreciation of asset value, usually with respect to the land. However, the appreciation of the assets may only be used as a consideration for overall profitably if the operation of the activity and the holding of the assets are considered to be a single activity.

If the operation of the activity and the holding of the assets are considered to be separate activities, then the appreciation of the assets will not be considered for overall profit. In other words, if the operation of the activity and the holding of the assets are considered to be separate activities, the history of operational losses cannot be offset by the potential gain from asset appreciation.

In order to show that the operation of the activity and the holding of the assets should be treated as separate activities, the examiner needs to refer to the previous analysis. If gross receipts do not exceed current operating expenses, then the operation of the activity and the holding of the assets will be considered as two separate activities. As two separate activities, the history of losses cannot be offset by the appreciation of the assets.

Factor 4 relies upon future asset gain potential to offset current losses. The examiner should inquire during the Initial Interview if the taxpayer intends to retire on the site. Frequently taxpayers have purchased these properties for the purpose of future retirement. If the taxpayer intends to retire on the property, then no future gain will be realized. Tax Court cases have gone both ways with respect to taxpayers who have expressed retirement purposes as an intention for land acquisition. Nonetheless, the examiner should document such intentions, if known. Since no one factor is determinative by itself, the examiner should address the taxpayer's intention for holding the land.

The examiner should consider the potential for appreciation of the activity assets, especially the land. This information can be gathered from comparables. Comparables would show land values for properties similar to the taxpayer's parcel. Comparables can be obtained from area realtors. Comparables are extremely important in determining land valuation. The potential for asset appreciation should be documented on a separate workpaper in the examiner's case file.



Summary of Factor 4

The examiner needs to determine if a potential for asset appreciation exists within the activity exists. The examiner also needs to determine whether the operation of the activity and the holding of the land are considered a single activity or separate activities. In the instances of single activities, the history of losses from current operations will be offset by the future potential gain. In the instances of separate activities, the taxpayer cannot offset current operating losses by future potential gains. A determination of separate activities will frequently result in the taxpayer not meeting Factor 4.



Factor 5
(5) The success of the taxpayer in carrying on other similar or dissimilar activities. - The fact that the taxpayer has engaged in similar activities in the past and converted them from unprofitable to profitable enterprises may indicate that he is engaged in the present activity for profit, even though the activity is presently unprofitable.

The examiner needs to document the taxpayer's financial success in other activities. This information will be gathered from prior year tax returns as well as the years under examination.

The examiner will prepare a worksheet that details the history of other activities.

This detail should show the profits and losses derived from the activities. In general, many taxpayers have achieved financial success in other business endeavors and yet failed in the operation of the activity in question.

The examiner should focus on activities in addition to the taxpayer's primary source of income. For example, if the taxpayer is a medical doctor, the examiner should not focus on his or her success with his or her medical practice. The examiner should focus on success or failure of other unrelated ventures that were conducted in addition to the medical practice, such as the operation of a restaurant or a kennel.

In addition to the aforementioned worksheet, the examiner needs to document any specific instances where the taxpayer has abandoned certain activities when those activities have proven to be unsuccessful.



Summary of Factor 5

The examiner needs to document the financial successes that the taxpayer has had with other activities. A statement should also address specific instances where the taxpayer has abandoned any activities.



Factor 6
(6) The taxpayer's history of income or losses with respect to the activity . - A series of losses during the initial or start-up stage of an activity may not necessarily be an indication that the activity is not engaged in for profit. However, where losses continue to be sustained beyond the period which customarily is necessary to bring the operation to profitable status such continued losses, if not explainable, as due to customary business risks or reverses, may be indicative that the activity is not being engaged in for profit. If losses are sustained because of unforeseen or fortuitous circumstances which are beyond the control of the taxpayer, such as drought, disease, fire, theft, weather damages, other involuntary conversions, or depressed market conditions, such losses would not be an indication that the activity is not engaged in for profit. A series of years in which net income was realized would of course be strong evidence that the activity is engaged in for profit.

The examiner needs to document the history of income or losses generated by the activity. This documentation should be prepared on a detailed worksheet with any narrative as necessary. While this factor may present the taxpayer in a negative light, examiners should not use this relevant factor by itself in reaching a conclusion regarding the profit motive of the activity.

Some of the nine relevant factors will overlap through the course of the examination process. Information developed for one factor may be used in the development of other factors. Factor 6 is one of the most important factors of the nine. This factor supports the framework of this Code section.

The examiner needs to prepare a worksheet that shows a history of the activity's profits and losses such as that shown in Appendix D . The examiner will need to gather prior year tax information using Integrated Data Retrieval System (IDRS). The examiner should order the original returns for any prior years that are no longer "online." These returns would be ordered for review purposes using local procedures. The examiner can copy the original returns and place them in the administrative file. The taxpayer can also be requested to provide copies of the applicable returns.

The examiner should prepare the worksheet with a separate column that shows the amount of depreciation that was deducted in each tax period. This separation is required for use in the development of other relevant factors. If the taxpayer has deducted other land carrying costs, such as real estate taxes or related interest expense, then these expenses should be shown in a separate column. Such real estate taxes and mortgage interest would be deductible on Schedule A subject to AGI phase-out limitations.



Summary of Factor 6

IRC § 183 focuses on the lack of profit potential for a specific activity. The question regarding profit motive is initially triggered by history of losses. For this reason, the development of this relevant factor provides the framework for this section. Examiners should not base any conclusions using this relevant factor alone.



Factor 7
(7) The amount of occasional profits, if any, which are earned. - The amount of profits in relation to the amount of losses incurred, and in relation to the amount of the taxpayer's investment and the value of the assets used in the activity, may provide useful criteria in determining the taxpayer's intent. An occasional small profit from an activity generating large losses, or from an activity in which the taxpayer has made a large investment, would not generally be determinative that the activity is engaged in for profit. However, substantial profit, though only occasional, would generally be indicative that an activity is engaged in for profit, where the investment or losses are comparatively small. Moreover, an opportunity to earn a substantial ultimate profit in a highly speculative venture is ordinarily sufficient to indicate that the activity is engaged in for profit even though losses or only occasional small profits are actually generated.

The examiner needs to address the amount of occasional profits that the taxpayer has derived from the activity. In most instances where the provisions of IRC § 183 are considered, the taxpayer will have few profits, if any.

The examiner needs to consider whether the taxpayer has generated any profits from the activity. A worksheet would be a useful tool in showing these profits or the lack thereof.

The examiner should pinpoint the exact source of the gross receipts reported for the activity on the tax return. There have been instances where taxpayers have reported gross receipts, which were derived from sources other than the activity, onto the Schedule for the activity. The misplacement of income may be an error, or it may be a deliberate attempt to show revenue where revenue did not exist.

If the examiner determines that certain gross receipts were mistakenly reported on the activity's Schedule, the examiner should not include these gross receipts in any of the worksheets prepared for the purpose of developing the IRC § 183 issue. If any worksheets are prepared with the omission of any such gross receipts, a footnote should be included on each worksheet disclosing such omission.



Example

A Schedule C for a dog breeding activity contained gross receipts for $3,200.

Upon further development, the examiner discovered that the entire amount of the gross receipts pertained to a separate activity, other than the dog breeding.

The examiner did not include the $3,200 of misplaced gross receipts in any worksheets during the development of the IRC § 183 issue. The examiner did incorporate footnotes that disclosed that $3,200 of gross receipts was erroneously reported on the Schedule C.

If as in the aforementioned example, a significant sum of gross receipts was misreported on the activity's Schedule and significant misrepresentation for the profitability results, the examiner should consider the implications of such misplacement. Civil fraud may be a consideration depending upon the overall impact.

If the examiner in the previous example had not excluded the misplaced gross receipts from the various IRC § 183 worksheets, then a true picture of the taxpayer's activity would not have been portrayed.

Some taxpayers have fabricated income for the activity in an effort to put forth an appearance of profit motive. The examiner needs to verify the income. Such fabrication raises consideration of potential fraud.



Summary of Factor 7

The examiner should consider the amount of occasional profits that the activity may generate. However, the examiner should determine the source of the gross receipts just in the event the gross receipts have been misreported on the tax return. Such misplacement could misstate the profitability of the activity and should be removed from the IRC § 183 issue development with footnotes or disclosures to that effect.



Factor 8
(8) The financial status of the taxpayer. - The fact that the taxpayer does not have substantial income or capital from sources other than the activity may indicate that an activity is engaged in for profit. Substantial income from sources other than the activity (particularly if the losses from the activity generate substantial tax benefits) may indicate that the activity is not engaged in for profit especially if there are personal or recreational elements involved.

This factor addresses the financial status of the taxpayer. In some instances, the taxpayer may have the financial wherewithal to sustain a history of financial losses for the activity. Certain taxpayers may receive a tax benefit from the losses incurred by the activity as these losses will offset other substantial sources of income.

In general, taxpayers with other substantial sources of income have the financial wherewithal to sustain significant losses from activities that appear to meet the criteria of the provisions set forth under IRC § 183.

Misinformation has been written that advises taxpayers to enter into certain activities for the purpose of deriving a tax benefit. Taxpayers with other substantial sources of income have the financial wherewithal to enter such activities irrespective of the motivation. The examiner needs to understand why the taxpayer has not abandoned an unsuccessful activity when other taxpayers who lack the same financial wherewithal would most likely abandon the unprofitable activity.

Many Tax Court cases have been pursued which involve taxpayers that have other substantial sources of income that have engaged in historically unprofitable activities without abandonment. In general, taxpayers who have other substantial sources of income have not faired as well in Tax Court litigation as taxpayers who do not have such financial wherewithal.

The examiner needs to document the financial status of the taxpayer in the workpapers. The examiner should also make a statement to the effect that the financial status has enabled the taxpayer to sustain a history of losses in the activity.

Earlier text directed the examiner to prepare a tax savings benefit analysis. This spreadsheet would show possible motivation for certain taxpayers to continue participation in an unsuccessful financial endeavor.



Summary of Factor 8

In general, taxpayers who have other substantial sources of income have the financial wherewithal to sustain a history of losses with respect to not for profit activities. Some taxpayers actually derive a tax benefit from participation in these activities since the losses offset the other sources of substantial income.



Factor 9
(9) Elements of personal pleasure or recreation. - The presence of personal motives in carrying on of an activity may indicate that the activity is not engaged in for profit, especially where there are recreational or personal elements involved. On the other hand, a profit motivation may be indicated where an activity lacks any appeal other than profit. It is not, however, necessary that an activity be engaged in with the exclusive intention of deriving a profit or with the intention of maximizing profits. For example, the availability of other investments which would yield a higher return, or which would be more likely to be profitable, is not evidence that an activity is not engaged in for profit. An activity will not be treated as not engaged in for profit merely because the taxpayer has purposes or motivations other than solely to make a profit. Also, the fact that the taxpayer derives personal pleasure from engaging in the activity is not sufficient to cause the activity to be classified as not engaged in for profit if the activity is in fact engaged in for profit as evidenced by other factors whether or not listed in this paragraph.

Section 183 has been referred to as the "hobby loss" section because many taxpayers have engaged in unprofitable activities due to the pleasurable attributes of the activities. Factor 9 addresses the elements of personal pleasure or recreation of the activity.

The examiner must develop an understanding of the taxpayer's activity. This understanding must be documented in the workpapers. The examiner must document all tasks that the taxpayer performs within the activity.

Some taxpayers will attempt to downplay any pleasurable aspects of the activity. Many taxpayers will express a passion for their activity. A skilled examiner will be able to draw this passion from the taxpayer through conversation. The courts do not mandate that taxpayers cannot enjoy the method by which they derive their income. Many taxpayers resist the phraseology of "hobby loss" in reference to IRC § 183. Examiners may wish to refrain from that terminology and refer to the actual title "Activity Not Engaged in for Profit."



Summary of Factor 9

The examiner needs to address the pleasurable and recreational aspects of the activity. By this point in the examination, the taxpayer is aware of the direction that the exam is going. The taxpayer knows about the nine relevant factors. A taxpayer with a savvy representative has been advised to downplay the pleasurable aspects and emphasize the hard work of the activity. Skilled listening will help the examiner to document and sort the details regarding this relevant factor.



Appendix B - Suggested Interview Questions for Each of 9 Relevant Factors

The following are suggested possible interview questions for each of the nine factors contained in Treas. Regs. §1.183-2(b)(1) through (9) which may be used by examiners to establish if an activity is or is not for profit. Other factors not listed may also need to be considered.

These questions should not be considered all-inclusive. The interview should be tailored to each specific taxpayer. The questions should be asked of the taxpayer in an interview and not be given to the taxpayer and/or authorized representative to complete.



1.183-2(b)(1) Manner in which the taxpayer carries on the activity
 Background and general description of the business.

o When did the taxpayer first include (first Schedule C, F. 1120S, 1065, etc.) this business for tax purposes?

o General industry, what specialized niche?

o Where is business conducted?

o What geographical area?

o Specific demographic target population?

o Is the business seasonal?

o Did the taxpayer have a business plan?

o Was the plan followed?

o How did the taxpayer propose to compete with similar businesses?

o When/how did the idea for the business activity originate?

o Was a business plan written-up?

o What were the financial requirements to start the business?

o How were the funds obtained?

o Bank loans, investors, personal savings, family, etc.?

o What documentation is available?

o How is the business currently being financed?

o What financial risks are involved in this type of business?

o Is any type of business insurance carried?

o Are policies in the business name?

o Did the taxpayer carry on any of these same policies prior to starting the business?

o Did the taxpayer stand to lose or have expenses beyond what he normally incurs?

o Does the activity involve multiple undertakings; and if so, what is the organizational and economic interrelationship between them?

o Does taxpayer have a license to operate?

o Is the activity in an area zoned for business?

o Is the taxpayer's telephone number listed in the white/yellow pages?

o Does the taxpayer have an internet site?

o How do customers find out about the business?

o Are signs posted?

o Is the activity still being conducted?

o Are any relatives employed in the business?

o If relatives are employed, how is wage determined?

 How are the business records maintained?

o Describe the system for recording income and expenses.

o Are budgets prepared?

o When and by whom are expenses recorded?

o What types of journals are maintained?

o Are books on cash or accrual?

o Are books and records accurate and complete? If not, why not?

o Are books comparable to types of books kept by others in same activity?

o Is a computer used? What software program is used?

o Are financial statements prepared?

o How often and by whom?

o Is an accountant or bookkeeper involved?

o What do they do and how often?

o Have they given any advice on the business?

o Are separate bank account(s) used for the business?

o If no, why not?

o Are ATM (cash or credit/debit) cards used on the account(s)?

o Are there transfers between business and personal accounts?

o If yes, how are they kept track of in the business books?

o Are the bank statements used to determine business and expenses for the year?

 What efforts are made in terms of attracting customers and securing suppliers or products necessary for the business?

o What advertising and promotion activity did the taxpayer perform to gain clients/buyers?

o What other relationship did the taxpayer have with his clients/buyers?

o What other relationship did the taxpayer have with his suppliers?

o What other relationship did the taxpayer have with his employees?

o What forms of advertising have been used? How often? How much?

o How effective was the advertising? Have ineffective methods been discontinued?

o Have steps been taken to improve profitability?

o Any changes in operating methods? What changes?

 When is a profit expected?

o What type of profit expectations are there?

o What is maximum profit expected?

o When will profit occur?

o Is it reasonable to expect any profit will result?

o How many "widgets" must be sold in order to obtain a profit?



1.183-2(b)(2) The expertise of the taxpayer or his advisors

Preparation for the activity by extensive study of its accepted business, economic, and scientific practices, or consultation with those are experts therein, may indicate that the taxpayer has a profit motive where the taxpayer carries on the activity in accordance with such practices.
 What background information was gathered about this type of activity prior to beginning the business?

o Has the taxpayer ever been employed in this area before?

o When, where, for whom, how long, what experience specifically pertains to this activity?

 Does the taxpayer have any education which is relevant?

o Educational institution?

o Degree, classes, how does it apply to this business or how did it prepare the taxpayer in any way to enter this field of business?

o Does the education relate to any other business or employment activities?

 Did the taxpayer rely on the advice of others in starting or developing the business?

o Did the taxpayer consult with experts?

o What are the credentials of others in starting or developing the business?

o What experience, education, degrees, business success do they possess which qualify them to advice the taxpayer?

o How did the taxpayer decide to rely on the person(s) advice?

o Was there any kind of previous personal, family or business relationship with the advisor?

 Did the taxpayer prepare for the activity by conducting research or an extensive study of its accepted business, economic, and scientific practices?

o What types of journals, publications, or other reference material did the taxpayer study in preparation to enter this business?

o What did the taxpayer learn which entered into the decision to engage in this business activity?

o What professional publications does the taxpayer now subscribe to and what specific benefit does the taxpayer derive?

 What other life experiences does the taxpayer have which would have prepared the taxpayer to engage in this type of activity?

 What related organizations does the taxpayer belong to? How long?



1.183-2(b)(3) The time and effort expended by the taxpayer in carrying on the activity

The fact that the taxpayer devotes much of his personal time and effort to carrying on an activity, particularly if the activity does not have substantial personal or recreation aspects, may indicate an intention to derive profit.

Note - This factor may be given greater weight (in taxpayer's favor) if there are no substantial personal or recreational aspects present.
 For the taxpayer personally, is this a full-time or part- time activity?

o How many hours per week? per month? per year? per season? are spent on this activity?

o What tasks does taxpayer perform?

o Is this more or less time than others in the same line of work devote?

o Did the taxpayer have to give up or reduce the time devoted to a different job or occupation?

o If personal time was given up, what did the taxpayer previously do with that time?

o If time is not devoted to the activity, did the taxpayer employ competent and qualified persons to carry on the activity?

 Who is involved with the day to day business operations?

o Does the activity have employees?

o How many?

o What are their duties and who does what?

o What are their hours? Full-time or part-time? Salaries?

o Are employment tax returns filed?

o Are any relatives involved with the business in any respect?

o Are information returns prepared?

o What are the taxpayer's own duties and responsibilities with respect to the business?

o If someone other than the taxpayer is running the business for them, what qualifications and relevant business background do they have?

o What decisions do they make?



1.183-2(b)(4) Expectation that assets used in activity may appreciate in value

The term "profit" encompasses appreciation in the value of assets used in the activity. Thus, the taxpayer may intend to derive a profit from the operation of the activity, and may also intend that even if no profit when appreciation in the value of the land used in the activity realized since income from the activity together with appreciation of land will exceed expenses of operation.
 List assets used in the activity.

o Were the assets held prior to starting the business?

o Was depreciation previously taken as a deduction?

o What was the prior use?

o How and when were the assets acquired (verify taxpayer's basis)?

o Are any assets used personally?

o How much is each asset worth today?

o Has anyone ever offered to buy any of the assets?

o Is it likely the assets will appreciate in value?

o Why does the taxpayer expect the appreciation to occur?

o At what rate are assets expected to appreciate?

o Over what period of time (how many years)?

o What are the taxpayer's plans for the appreciated asset(s)?

o At what point does the taxpayer intend to realize the inherent gain for tax purposes?

o Will the gain on appreciated assets offset operating losses - to the extent that the overall net result on the business is a profit?



1.183-2(b)(5) The success of the taxpayer in other similar or dissimilar activities

The fact that the taxpayer has engaged in similar activities in the past and converted these from unprofitable to profitable enterprises may indicate that he is engaged in the present activity for profit, even though the activity is presently unprofitable.
 What other activities has the taxpayer had previous success?

o Which, if any, were converted from unprofitable into profitable ventures (describe how the taxpayer was involved in this process - what did the taxpayer do to convert it)?

o What happened to that prior business?

o Ultimately, were the business(s) profitable on an overall net basis?



1.183-2(b)(6) The taxpayer's history of income or losses with respect to the activity

A series of losses during the initial or start-up stage of an activity may not necessarily be an indication that the activity is not engaged in for profit. However, where losses continue to be sustained beyond the period which customarily is necessary to bring the operation to profitable status, such continued losses, if not explainable, as due to customary business risks or reverses, may be indicative that the activity is not engaged in for profit. If losses are sustained because of unforeseen or fortuitous circumstances, which are beyond the control of the taxpayer, such as drought, disease, fire, theft, weather damages, other involuntary or depressed market conditions, such losses would not be an indication that the activity is not engaged in for profit. A series of years in which net income was realized would of course by strong evidence that the activity is engaged in for profit.

The examiner should prepare a comparative schedule of income and losses (expenses) since inception of the business through the present. Appendix D contains a sample year by year analysis of income and expenses.


____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Year XXXX12 XXXX12 XXXX12 XXXX12 XXXX12

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Gross Income

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Expenses (Other than
Depreciation)

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Depreciation

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
(Losses) or Gains

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

 Is there a trend toward profitability?

 Are there any profitable years?

 Are there consistent losses?

 Do the losses increase from year to year?

 Have losses continued beyond what would ordinarily be considered customary?

 What is the taxpayer's explanation for continuing with an unprofitable activity?

 Did the taxpayer change operating methods, adopt new techniques, or abandon nonprofitable methods in a manner consistent with intent to improve profitability.

 Why did the taxpayer continue the operation if it continued to lose money?

 Were there unforeseen circumstances?

 Were they beyond the control of the taxpayer?

 What happened and when?

 How did this change the taxpayer's business plans and what action was taken to deal with the unforeseen circumstances?



1.183-2(b)(7) The amount of occasional profits, if any, which are earned

The amount of profits in relation to the amount of losses incurred, and in relation to the amount of the taxpayer's investment and the value of the assets used in the activity, may provide useful criteria in determining the taxpayer's intent. An occasional small profit from an activity generating large losses, or from an activity in which the taxpayer has made a large investment, would not generally be determinative that the activity is engaged in for profit. However, substantial profit, though only occasional, would generally be indicative that an activity is engaged in for profit, where the investment or losses are comparatively small. Moreover, an opportunity to earn a substantial ultimate profit in a highly speculative venture is ordinary sufficient to indicate the activity is engaged in for profit even though losses or only occasional small profits are actually generated.
 What profits have been earned in any year?

o Is this a highly speculative business?

o Is there any change that the activity could generate a substantial profit in the future which would recover prior losses and the taxpayer's investment?

 What amount of an investment has the taxpayer made in the business?

o Is this amount significant in relation to the taxpayer's net worth?

o What percent of the taxpayer's net worth has been invested in this venture (obtain financial statements or other evidence of taxpayer's net worth)?



1.183-2(b)(8) The financial status of the taxpayer

The fact that the taxpayer does not have substantial income or capital from sources other than the activity may indicate that the activity is engaged in for profit. Substantial income from sources other than the activity (particularly if the losses from the activity generate substantial tax benefits) may indicate that the activity is not engaged in for profit especially if there are personal or recreational elements involved.

Note - When substantial tax benefits are being derived, greater weight may be given to the possibility the activity is not for profit, especially if personal or recreational elements are present.
 Does the taxpayer have substantial income or capital (investments, etc.) from other sources (list types, sources and amounts)?

o What tax benefit does the taxpayer receive from the losses on the activity?

o Are there other economic reasons for the taxpayer to be engaged in the activity? E.g. reduced property taxes for farmland, low interest loans, or federal grants?

o Can the taxpayer otherwise afford (based on taxpayer's net worth) to continue with the activity regardless of continued losses?



1.183-2(b)(9) Elements of personal pleasure or recreation

The presence of personal motives in carrying on of an activity may indicate that the activity is not engaged in for profit, especially where there are recreational or personal elements involved. On the other hand, a profit motivation may be indicated where an activity lacks any appeal other than profit. It is not, however, necessary that an activity be engaged in with the exclusive intention of deriving a profit or with the intention of maximizing profits. For example, the availability of other investments which would yield a higher return, or which would be more likely to be profitable, is not evidence that an activity is not engaged in for profit. An activity will not be treated as not engaged in for profit merely because the taxpayer has purposes or motivations other than solely to make a profit.

Also, the fact that the taxpayer derives personal pleasure from engaging in the activity is not sufficient to cause the activity to be classified as not engaged in for profit if the activity is in fact engaged in for profit as evidenced by other factors whether or not listed in this paragraph.
 Was the taxpayer involved or interested in this, or a related activity, prior to establishing it as a business for tax purposes?

o Are elements of fun or recreation generally associated with it by either the taxpayer, members of the taxpayer's family or by the taxpayer's friends?

o If there are any personal benefits (other than that of succeeding in the business) to being in this business, are they substantial?

o If the taxpayer previously engaged in the activity for other than business purposes, what currently distinguishes the activity as a business over what was done before?

o Would the taxpayer continue the activity even if he or she never made a profit?



Appendix C - Tax Savings Benefit Analysis

Completing an analysis of tax savings is important in developing a § 183 case. The analysis should begin, if possible, with the first year of the activity.

This analysis may also be applicable with respect to property tax savings when a taxpayer has derived such a tax benefit due to agricultural status (also known as an agriculture exemption.

The examiner should discuss this analysis with the taxpayer and also include this analysis in any report issued to the taxpayer.


____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Tax Period Tax With Loss Tax Without Loss Tax Savings

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
1995

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
1996

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
1997

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
1998

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
1999

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
2000

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
2001

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
2002

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
2003

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
2004

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
2005

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
2006

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
2007

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
2008

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Totals

____________________________________________________________________________________________________




Appendix D - Comparative Analysis Income, Expense and Losses

Completing an analysis of the year by year income, expense and loss of an activity is important in developing a § 183 case. Losses that continue beyond the start up stage are an indication that no profit motive is present. However, it is important to remember that losses sustained because of unforeseen circumstances beyond the taxpayer's control (fire, drought, theft, etc.), do not preclude a profit motive.

All trends in profits or losses should be addressed and explained. Any unusual income items or expense items that occur and then "drop off" may mean the taxpayer's profit is contrived. The examiner should consider whether the profits shown were manipulated in order to meet the presumption test. An occasional small profit from an activity generating large losses does not mean that the activity is engaged in for profit.

The examiner should discuss this analysis with the taxpayer and also include this analysis in any report issued to the taxpayer. Below is a sample of a 1040 Schedule C year by year income, expense and loss analysis:
Income, Expense and Loss Analysis



____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Income

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Gross Receipts

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Cost of Goods Sold

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Gross Profit

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Other Income

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Gross Income

____________________________________________________________________________________________________



____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Expenses

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Advertising

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Car and Truck

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Commissions and Fees

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Contract Labor

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Depletion

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Deprecation

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Employee Benefit Programs

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Insurance (Other than Health)

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Interest

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Legal and Professional

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Office Expense

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Pension and Profit Sharing Plans

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Rent or Lease

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Repairs and Maintenance

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Supplies

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Taxes and Licenses

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Travel, Meals, and Entertainment

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Utilities

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Wages

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Other Expenses

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Office in Home Expenses

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Total Expenses

____________________________________________________________________________________________________



____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Gross Income Less Expenses

____________________________________________________________________________________________________




Appendix E - Example of an IDR for a Yacht Charter Activity

Below is a listing of possible items an examiner might request to assist in determining if a yacht charter activity is an activity engaged in for profit. Some of the items would best be answered in a face to face interview. Examiners should tailor IDR's to the specific taxpayer under examination.
1. Statement of taxpayer's sailing experience.

2. Copies of experience profiles submitted by potential charterers.


Note to examiner: Is this a crewed charter where the yacht comes with a permanent captain and cook? Or, is this a bareboat charter where the charterer captains the yacht himself?

3. Purchase agreement, Bill of Sale and Invoice, and all canceled checks showing verification of yacht purchase.

4. Statement of actions taken to investigate boat chartering business before entering into this business.

5. Name and address of all charterers and their lease agreement.

6. Schedule of fees or charges billed to charters.

7. Copies of original loan agreements/promissory notes on financed portion of property.

8. Insurance policy(s) on yacht and its contents (collision and liability).


Note to examiner: Does policy cover rental of boat? Is it a commercial or personal asset?

9. Copy of First Preferred Ship Mortgage.


Note to examiner: The Preferred Ship Mortgage provides the financer of a vessel competitive status among competing claims that might arise against a vessel. The lender of an ocean vessel, if eligible, secures a loan with a Preferred Ship Mortgage. Otherwise, in a foreclosure situation the lender will be ranked first among the various maritime creditors that may be competing to collect on a vessel's proceeds.

10. Promotional materials and charter sailing brochures for yacht.

11. Invoices and ad copies for advertisements on availability of yacht for rental.

12. Copies of any management agreements or management contracts for boat supervision, maintenance, or operation.

13. Ships log(s) for engine and/or boat use.

14. Maintenance records and service check performance records.

15. Certificate of Origin.

16. Certification of Documentation from U.S. Coast Guard.

17. Copy of commercial captain's license.


Note to examiner: Is potential charterer required to provide taxpayer a copy of their captain's license?

18. Shipping document or other record which verifies delivery date of property.

19. Copy of any prospectus, private placement memorandum or other promotional material received when yacht was purchased.

20. Yacht operating budgets.

21. Break-even point calculations for chartering activity.

22. All books and records pertaining to the boat business.

23. Copies of your federal tax return for XXXX though XXXX (including any amendments thereto).

24. Please, complete the attached "Statement of Supplementary Examination."

25. Please complete a Schedule of Boat Use and Schedule of Taxpayer/Shareholder/Partner Time Spent to Operate the Activity of Boat Chartering."

Labels:

Monday, June 22, 2009

Notice of deficiency rules for imposition of IRS tax lein

United States of America, Plaintiff v. Theodore T. Navolio, Seiko Kaneyama, Gail P. Kendall, Ivan D. Saxe, Dorothy E. Saxe, Option One Mortgage Corporation, Defendants.

U.S. District Court, Mid. Dist. Fla., Orlando Div.; 6:06-cv-1461-Orl-19GJK, August 6, 2008.

[ Code Secs. 6212 and 7403]
-
The government was entitled to reduce to judgment the unpaid tax liabilities of the individual and to foreclose federal tax liens on his property. The IRS properly sent a statutory notice of deficiency by certified mail to the individual's the last known address and other possible addresses after searching the IRS database and requesting "postal tracers" from the United States Postal Service. Contrary to the individual's argument, the IRS exercised reasonable diligence in determining his address. Although the individual was in contact with the IRS's criminal division while he was incarcerated, the IRS's civil division and criminal division generally do not share information and, therefore, the IRS's civil division was not aware of the individual's changes in address while he was incarcerated.




[ Code Sec. 7121]


A settlement agreement between the IRS and an individual concerning his unpaid federal tax liabilities was not enforceable because the state's (Florida) unilateral mistake doctrine applied. The individual's mistaken belief that he was bargaining to resolve all issues relating to the tax liabilities for the years at issue, including the levy on his social security benefits, went to the substance of the agreement. This mistaken belief arose from ambiguous language used in the letter from the IRS and was not a result of an inexcusable lack of due care. Moreover, the government did not demonstrate that it relied on the settlement agreement or change its position to its detriment. Back reference: ¶41,090.279.







ORDER


FAWSETT, Chief District Judge: This case comes before the Court sitting as trier of fact after a one-day trial held on July 9, 2008. (Doc. No. 101.) Also pending before the Court is the Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement by Plaintiff United States of America. (Doc. No. 99, filed July 8, 2008.)

This action was brought by the United States (1) to reduce to judgment the unpaid federal income tax liabilities of Defendant Theodore T. Navolio for 1992 and 1993, and (2) to foreclose federal tax liens against two pieces of property in which Navolio possesses an interest. (Doc. No. 1 at 1-2, ¶1, filed Sept. 22, 2006.) The United States named as Defendants several other individuals possessing interests in these properties: Navolio's wife Seiko Kaneyama, Gail P. Kendall, Ivan D. Saxe, Dorothy E. Saxe, and Option One Mortgage Corporation. ( Id. at 2-3, ¶ ¶5-10.) However, Navolio and Kaneyama are the only Defendants actively opposing this action. 1



I. Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement

On July 3, 2008, the United States filed a Notice of Settlement in the record of this case. (Doc. No. 97.) The following day, Defendants Theodore T. Navolio and Seiko Kaneyama informed counsel for the United States, Bruce T. Russell, that there might be a misunderstanding about the terms of the agreement and therefore no settlement. Mr. Russell then filed a Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement on July 8, 2008 (Doc. No. 99), and Defendants filed a Notice of Retraction and Renouncement of Compromise (Doc. No. 100) with the Court. Both parties appeared before this Court on July 9, 2008 for an evidentiary hearing on the Motion of the United States and, in the event such Motion was denied, trial. (Doc. No. 101.) The Court reserved ruling on the Motion and proceeded with a joint evidentiary hearing and trial. ( Id.)




Findings of Fact


During his testimony, Navolio explained that he and Mr. Russell exchanged a number of phone calls at the end of June and the beginning of July concerning a possible settlement of this matter. In a letter to Mr. Russell dated June 11, 2008 and introduced by the United States at trial, 2 Navolio and Kaneyama listed the following proposed settlement terms:


1. We would not contest the foreclosure of the Condo.



2. I, Theodore T. Navolio would sign a judgment in favor of the government for the balance of the amount alleged to be owed to date.



3. The properties and monies that the government has taken to this point in time will not be further contested.



4. The foreclosure action of the final property still in litigation i.e. 24 hibiscus Dr. Ormond Beach Florida [sic] will not be further pursued by the government.


(Ex. 26 at 1.)

Nathan J. Hochman from the United States Department of Justice ("DOJ"), Tax Division, responded to Navolio and Kaneyama's offer to compromise in a letter dated June 26, 2008. (Ex. 27.) In this letter, Mr. Hochman recited the terms of the offer as follows:


1. You will sign a consent judgment in favor of the United States for the balance of the amount alleged to be owed for taxable years 1992 and 1993, and you will not [] contest the properties and monies that the United States has levied on to date.



2. You agree not to contest the foreclosure of the United States' liens on the condominium unit located at 219 S. Atlantic Avenue, # 335, Daytona Beach, in Volusia County, Florida.



3. The United States will discharge the property still at issue in the litigation, located at 24 Hibiscus Drive, Ormond Beach, Florida, from the tax liens that attach to it.



With the exception of the discharge of lien from this latter property, we understand your offer will not impair the ability of the United States to collect a consent judgment entered in this case.



In addition, we understand that a compromise will resolve all issues still pending between the parties in this litigation, and each party will bear its own costs of litigation, including any possible attorney's fees.





* * *



Upon receipt of your signed acknowledgment, your offer will be processed in accordance with our usual procedures. Final action will then be taken by the Attorney General or an official designated by him for that purpose. We are sure you understand that, unless you receive a formal notice of acceptance from this office, the Department of Justice is in no way committed to resolving this matter in the manner set forth above.


( Id. at 1-2.) On June 27, 2008, Navolio and Kaneyama signed a confirmation indicating that these terms accurately reflected their offer to compromise. (Ex. 28 at 2.)

Later, on July 3, 2008, Mr. Hochman sent Navolio and Kaneyama a letter which stated in part:


This offer has been accepted on behalf of the Attorney General on the condition that Mr. Navolio agree not to pursue any claim against the United States under 26 U.S.C. §7433 with respect to the taxes at issue in this case, or otherwise contest the continuing levy on his Social Security income, and to file federal income tax returns for future taxable years as required by law. Please acknowledge these conditions by signing the acknowledgment below and returning it to this office as quickly as possible.



We will prepare a Consent Judgment for your signature for the balance of the liabilities for 1992 and 1993 remaining at issue in the lawsuit and a proposed Decree of Foreclosure and Order of Sale with respect to the condominium unit described in the complaint. When we receive the executed Consent Judgment, we will ask the IRS to prepare and file a Certificate of Discharge of Lien from the Ormond Beach, Florida [property] described in the complaint.


(Ex. 29 at 1.) That same day, Navolio spoke with Mr. Russell on the phone and expressed his concern about the phrase "or otherwise contest the continuing levy on his Social Security income."

According to the undisputed testimony at trial, 3 Navolio, throughout his settlement conversations with Mr. Russell, maintained that the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") was permitted by statute to levy only fifteen percent of his Social Security benefits. His understanding was that the agreed upon sale of the condominium unit would pay off the majority of his tax liabilities for 1992 and 1993 and that he would be responsible for the balance. Navolio believed that the IRS would collect this balance through a fifteen percent levy on his Social Security benefits.

However, the conditional acceptance that Mr. Hochman sent on July 3, 2008 gave Navolio pause. Navolio felt that if he signed the agreement as written, he would be forever consenting to a one hundred percent levy on his Social Security benefits. Therefore, he wanted the language "or otherwise contest the continuing levy on his Social Security income" struck from the agreement. Mr. Russell permitted this alteration, agreeing that the language was perhaps overly broad. Navolio and Kaneyama then signed an acknowledgment which stated: "The foregoing accurately reflects the amended terms of our offer to compromise the claims of the United States of America in the abovereferenced case, as amended through our telephone discussions with Bruce T. Russell of the Tax Division, U.S. Department of Justice." (Ex. 30 at 3.) They faxed this confirmation to Mr. Russell.

Despite the confirmation, Navolio was again concerned that his understanding of the terms of the settlement differed from the understanding of the DOJ. Therefore, on July 4, 2008, Navolio sent an email to Mr. Russell to clarify their agreement. (Ex. 31 at 1.) The email stated:


Please see the attached letter. I just want to be sure that I have the correct understanding. It was towards the end of our conversations where you made so[me] statements about my social security that got me thinking maybe I was reading something into the compromise letter of June 26, 2008 that was not there. I need clarification.


( Id.) Navolio further explained in the attached letter that he believed that the phrase "will resolve all issues still pending" in the July 3, 2008 letter meant "that the IRS would cease from the further taking of my social security, based on the pending litigation." ( Id. at 2.) Navolio stated that if this was not the agreement, then he and Kaneyama would "retract and renounce the compromise of June 26, 2008 and the modification of July 03, 2008." ( Id.) Upon receiving this email from Navolio, Mr. Russell filed the instant Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement. (Doc. No. 99.)




Conclusions of Law


As explained by the Eleventh Circuit, "A settlement agreement is a contract and, as such, its construction and enforcement are governed by principles of Florida's general contract law." Schwartz v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 807 F.2d 901, 905 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing Wong v. Bailey, 752 F.2d 619, 621 (11th Cir. 1985)). "The Court's role is to determine the intention of the parties from the language of the agreement, the apparent objects to be accomplished, other provisions in the agreement that cast light on the question, and the circumstances prevailing at the time of the agreement." Id. (citing K & S Coin Operated Machs., Inc. v. Gottlieb, 362 So. 2d 38, 39 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)).

To compel enforcement of a settlement agreement, its terms must be sufficiently specific and mutually agreed upon as to every essential element. BP Prods. of N. Am. v. Oakridge at Winegard, Inc., 469 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1133 (M.D. Fla. 2007) (citing Don L. Tullis & Assocs., Inc. v. Benge, 473 So. 2d 1384 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)). The party seeking to enforce a settlement agreement bears the burden of showing the opposing party assented to the terms of the agreement. Id. (citing Carroll v. Carroll, 532 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988), rev. denied, 542 So. 2d 1332 (Fla. 1989)). A trial court's finding that a meeting of the minds occurred between the parties must be supported by competent substantial evidence. Id. (citing Long Term Mgmt., Inc. v. Univ. Nursing Ctr., Inc., 704 So. 2d 669, 673 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)).

When one of the parties to a contract has made a unilateral mistake, Florida case law follows the minority rule and permits rescission of the contract. Roberts & Schaefer Co. v. Hardaway Co., 152 F.3d 1283, 1295 (11th Cir. 1998); Md. Cas. Co. v. Krasnek, 174 So. 2d 541, 542-44 (Fla. 1965). For Florida's unilateral mistake doctrine to apply, three conditions must be met: "(1) the mistake goes to the substance of the agreement, (2) the error does not result from an inexcusable lack of due care, and (3) the other party has not relied upon the mistake to his detriment." Roberts & Schaefer Co., 152 F.3d at 1291 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Krasnek, 174 So. 2d at 542-43.

The first condition is "compelled by the rule that a meeting of the minds must occur in order to create a contract." Roberts & Schaefer Co., 152 F.3d at 1291. "Where one party misunderstands, or otherwise makes a mistake that goes to the substance of the agreement into which it enters, no meeting of the minds occurs, and thus, no contract exists." Id. In the instant case, Navolio mistakenly believed he was bargaining to resolve all issues relating to his 1992 and 1993 tax liabilities in the settlement negotiations, including the levy on his Social Security benefits in excess of fifteen percent. This mistake was caused in part by the statement "we understand that a compromise will resolve all issues still pending between the parties in this litigation " 4 in the response to Navolio's offer to compromise from Mr. Hochman. (Ex. 27 at 1 (emphasis added).) The issue of the levy on Navolio's Social Security benefits in excess of fifteen percent was not, however, an issue still pending in the litigation. This misunderstanding went to the very nature of the benefit for which Navolio was bargaining and concerns a material term of the contract. See Roberts & Schaefer Co., 152 F.3d at 1291-92 (explaining that Florida courts have found that the first element of the unilateral mistake doctrine is met when one party thinks "that the contract pertains to something other than it does"). Thus, Navolio's mistake goes to the substance of the agreement, and the first condition is met.

Under the second condition, a party claiming mistake must "demonstrate that the error did not result from an inexcusable lack of due care." Id. at 1293. "Florida courts have interpreted this standard generously to the benefit of the erring party." Id. As demonstrated by Navolio's undisputed trial testimony, Navolio's confusion was a result of the ambiguous language used in the letter from Mr. Hochman and the conversations with Mr. Russell which led Navolio to believe that the Social Security benefits issue would be resolved in the settlement agreement. Navolio promptly sought to clarify his confusion, as demonstrated by his email to Mr. Russell the day after faxing the confirmation letter to the DOJ. These circumstances do not suggest a lack of due care.

Furthermore, Navolio had good reason to believe that the agreement had yet to be finalized. The confirmation letter that Navolio signed stated: "We will prepare a Consent Judgment for your signature for the balance of the liabilities for 1992 and 1993 remaining at issue in the lawsuit[.]" (Ex. 30 at 2.) This indicates that the agreement between the United States and Navolio had not been reduced to a final, written, fully integrated contract. Navolio's mistake was not the result of an inexcusable lack of due care; therefore, the second condition is met.

Finally, for the third condition to be satisfied, the opposing party must not have relied to its detriment on the unilateral mistake. Roberts & Schaefer Co., 152 F.3d at 1294. To deny rescission on this ground, the opposing party must have "so changed his position in reliance upon [the mistaken party's] undertaking that it would be unconscionable to rescind the contract or that it would be impossible to restore him to the status quo." Krasnek, 174 So. 2d at 543, quoted in Roberts & Schaefer Co., 152 F.3d at 1294. The United States has not demonstrated how it has in any way changed its position in reliance on the settlement agreement, much less how it relied on the agreement to its detriment. On the contrary, Mr. Russell appeared on behalf of the United States before this Court on July 9, 2008, prepared to try the case. Accordingly, the United States did not rely on the agreement to its detriment, and the third condition is met.

Since all three conditions have been satisfied, Florida's unilateral mistake doctrine applies. A rescission is warranted in this case; therefore, the Court declines to enforce the settlement agreement. Since the Motion of the United States to enforce the settlement agreement is denied (Doc. No. 99), the Court proceeds to a decision on the merits of the case.



II. Bench Trial

In its Order denying the Motion for Summary Judgment by the United States, the Court found that there were two factual issues remaining for determination at trial: (1) whether the IRS sent a statutory notice of deficiency to Navolio, and (2) whether the IRS used reasonable diligence in ascertaining Navolio's last known address. (Doc. No. 87 at 7-13, filed June 11, 2008.) Subject to these factual determinations, the Court found no triable issues involving either the amount of assessment or the propriety of foreclosure on the relevant properties. ( Id. at 13-16.)

After consideration of the evidence presented at trial and the submissions by the parties, and after making determinations on the credibility of the witnesses, the Court enters its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52, as follows.




Findings of Fact


Defendant Theodore T. Navolio had taxable income in 1992 and 1993 but failed to pay federal income taxes or file any tax returns for those years. (Ex. 5 at 1.) Therefore, pursuant to its standard operating procedures, the IRS filed Substitutes for Returns for the 1992 and 1993 tax years on Navolio's behalf. (Ex. 8 at 3; Ex. 9 at 3.)

On April 15, 1994, Navolio was arrested for an unrelated matter and was initially incarcerated in Tampa, Florida. He was then moved back and forth between Tampa and a Brooksville, Florida facility. In 1995, Navolio was relocated to a prison in South Carolina. Finally, on February 26, 1996, Navolio was released to Las Vegas, Nevada. During this time, Navolio failed to send any notice to the IRS of his change in address or relocation from Florida to Nevada.

On October 11, 1995, the IRS sent by certified mail a statutory notice of deficiency for tax years 1988 through 1993 to Navolio at three different addresses: (1) 662 George Miller Circle, Port Orange, FL 32127; (2) 604 Mockingbird Lane, Alatamonte (sic) Springs, FL 32714; and (3) 850 Muary Road Box 97, Orlando, FL 32804. (Ex. 24 at 1.) Pursuant to established procedures, the IRS sent the notice to Navolio's last known residential address in Port Orange, Florida. The IRS also researched other possible addresses for Navolio by searching the IRS database, called "Masterfile," reviewing Navolio's case file for recent correspondence or third party payor information, and requesting "postal tracers" from the United States Postal Service. The two additional addresses to which the notices were sent were the product of this additional investigation.

After receiving no response from Navolio, on March 11, 1996, the IRS assessed Navolio's 1992 and 1993 income tax liabilities. (Ex. 8 at 2-3; Ex. 9 at 2-3.) As of March 3, 2008, Navolio's total federal income tax liability for 1992 and 1993, including interest and penalties, is $154,381.44. (Ex. 8 at 2; Ex. 9 at 2.) Approximately six months after assessment, on September 26, 1996, the United States filed a Notice of Federal Tax Lien against Navolio with the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Volusia County, Florida for tax years including 1992 and 1993. (Ex. 11.) The United States refiled this Notice on March 7, 2006. (Ex. 12.) The lien attached to the two properties still at issue in this case. The first is referred to as the "First Parcel" and is a piece of real property purchased by Navolio on July 13, 2001. 5 The second is referred to as the "Condominium Unit" and was purchased by Navolio on April 15, 2003. 6 The United States seeks to foreclose these tax liens pertaining to taxable years 1992 and 1993.




Conclusions of Law


According to the statutory scheme set forth in detail in this Court's Order denying Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 87 at 4-6), the mailing of a notice of deficiency is a statutory prerequisite to a valid tax assessment. 26 U.S.C. §6213(a). The notice must be sent by registered or certified mail to the deficient taxpayer's last known address. Id. §6212(b)(1); Wiley v. United States [ 94-1 USTC ¶50,089], 20 F.3d 222, 224 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing Guthrie v. Sawyer [ 92-2 USTC ¶50,391], 970 F.2d 733, 737 (10th Cir. 1992); Williams v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue [ 91-2 USTC ¶50,317], 935 F.2d 1066, 1067 (9th Cir. 1991)); United States v. Labato [ 2002-2 USTC ¶50,541], No. 6:97-cv-900-Orl-28JGG, 2002 WL 1770804, at *5 (M.D. Fla. June 18, 2002).

A taxpayer's "last known address" is "the address to which the IRS, in light of all the reasonable facts and circumstances, reasonably believed the taxpayer wished the notice to be sent." United States v. Bell [ 95-2 USTC ¶50,389], 183 B.R. 650, 652 (S.D. Fla. 1995). In determining the taxpayer's "last known address," the IRS must exercise "reasonable diligence." Id. The focus is on "the information available to the IRS at the time it issued the notice of deficiency." Id. Generally, the IRS is deemed to have used reasonable diligence if "it mailed the deficiency notice to the address contained on the taxpayer's most recently filed tax return." Ward v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue [ 90-2 USTC ¶50,430], 907 F.2d 517, 521 (5th Cir. 1990). The taxpayer has the burden of providing "clear and concise" notice to the IRS of an address change. Pugsley v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue [ 85-1 USTC ¶9121], 749 F.2d 691, 693 n.1 (11th Cir. 1985).

The burden of the IRS to determine the last known address and the burden of the taxpayer to notify the IRS of a change in address are separate and independent of each other. E.g., Sicari v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue [ 98-1 USTC ¶50,237], 136 F.3d 925, 928 (2d Cir. 1998). As the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has explained, "This is not to say...that the IRS has no obligation to attempt to ascertain the taxpayer's new address; where it is shown that the IRS has failed to exercise reasonable care in determining an address, a notice sent to the wrong address will not satisfy the statutory requirement, and the 90-day period will not begin to run." Id. Similarly, a decision from the trial court the Southern District of Florida has stated:


The IRS must also exercise reasonable diligence in determining [the last known] address, separate and distinct from the taxpayer's burden to provide clear and concise notification. What constitutes reasonable diligence will vary according to the information available to the IRS, including any notice from the taxpayer. However, the test focuses not on the information that the taxpayer provides but the information which the IRS possesses. More importantly, the test is fact specific and must be addressed on a case by case basis.


Bell [ 95-2 USTC ¶50,389], 183 B.R. at 653. The court continued, "While the taxpayer should bear the burden of notification of the new address, the IRS cannot simply ignore that which it obviously knows." Id. In the case of an incarcerated taxpayer, if the IRS has specific information concerning the taxpayer's whereabouts, this information may constitute sufficient notice of the incarcerated taxpayer's prison address. E.g., Broomfield v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue [ CCH Dec. 56,066(M)], 89 T.C.M. (CCH) 1466, 2005 WL 1444131, at **4-5 (T.C. 2005) (citing cases).

The Court concludes that the IRS mailed a statutory notice of deficiency to Navolio's last known address. Navolio's arguments that the IRS did not exercise reasonable diligence in determining his address are unavailing. While incarcerated, Navolio moved numerous times to multiple detention facilities. Upon his release, Navolio relocated to Nevada. At no point did Navolio submit a change of address form or provide notice of his relocation to the civil division of the IRS. While Navolio was in contact with agents in the IRS criminal division during this time, IRS agents Cathleen Curry and Roger D. Maurice testified at trial that the civil division and the criminal division of the IRS do not share information as a general rule. This testimony was not refuted by Navolio, and Navolio did not provide any evidence that the civil division knew of his whereabouts during his incarceration. Therefore, the Court concludes that the IRS exercised reasonable diligence by following its standard procedures to obtain Navolio's last known address.

Since the Court resolves the two remaining factual issues in favor of the United States, 7 the United States is entitled to foreclose its tax liens against the First Parcel and Condominium Unit in the amounts assessed by the IRS.




CONCLUSION


Based on the foregoing, it is ORDERED and ADJUDGED as follows:


1. The Motion by Plaintiff United States of America to Enforce the Settlement Agreement (Doc. No. 99, filed July 8, 2008) is DENIED .



2. The assessments made by the Internal Revenue Service against Defendant Theodore T. Navolio dated March 11, 1996 for tax years 1992 and 1993 are declared valid.



3. Defendant Theodore T. Navolio is indebted to the United States for unpaid federal income tax liabilities for the years 1992 and 1993 in the total amount of $154,381.44 as of March 3, 2008, plus further interest and statutory additions as allowed by law, to the date of payment.



3. The federal tax liens, notice of which has been filed in the public records of Volusia County, Florida, are declared valid and attach to all property and to rights to property of Defendant Theodore T. Navolio, including:



a. The real property referred to as the "First Parcel," more particularly described as Lot 124, Ormond-By-The-Sea Plat 6, according to the plat thereof, recorded in Map Book 11, Page[s] 282 and 283 of the Public Records of Volusia County, Florida; 8 and



b. The "Condominium Unit" described as Unit 335, Daytona Inn Beach Resort, a condominium, according to Declaration of Condominium recorded in Official Records Book 4360, page[] 4884, and amended in Official Records Book 4368, page 2695, and amended in Official Records Book 4367, page 3313 and amended in Official Records Book 4493, page 737, of the Public Records of Volusia County, Florida.



4. Within eleven days from the date of this Order, Plaintiff United States shall file in the record a Proposed Final Judgment setting forth the remaining balance of Defendant Theodore T. Navolio's tax liabilities for 1992 and 1993 to be recovered by the United States of America as well as a Proposed Decree of Foreclosure and Order of Sale for the properties detailed in paragraphs 3(a) and 3(b) above. 9 Defendants have ten (10) days thereafter in which to object.


DONE and ORDERED.

1 Defendants Ivan and Dorothy Saxe have disclaimed any interest in the property that is the subject of this litigation. (Doc. No. 66, filed Jan. 22, 2008.) Defendant Option One Mortgage and the United States have reached an agreement to subordinate the tax lien to Option One's security interest in one of the properties at issue. (Doc. No. 64, filed Jan. 18, 2008.) Defendant Gail P. Kendall has failed to respond or file an appearance in this case, and the Clerk has issued a default against her. (Doc. No. 58, filed June 19, 2007.)

2 Trial exhibits shall be cited as "Ex. ___."

3 While Mr. Russell suggested in argument that these facts might be disputed, he did not take the stand or otherwise present evidence to dispute Navolio's testimony.

4 Though not raised by either party, the phrase "in this litigation" is ambiguous, as it could modify either "issues" or "parties."

5 Lot 124, Ormond-By-The-Sea Plat 6, according to the plat thereof, recorded in Map Book 11, Page[s] 282 and 283 of the Public Records of Volusia County, Florida. (Exs. 13-20.)

6 Unit 335, Daytona Inn Beach Resort, a condominium, according to Declaration of Condominium recorded in Official Records Book 4360, page[] 4884, and amended in Official Records Book 4368, page 2695, and amended in Official Records Book 4367, page 3313 and amended in Official Records Book 4493, page 737, of the Public Records of Volusia County, Florida. (Exs. 21-23.)

7 Navolio filed a Notice of Additional Authority with the Court on August 1, 2008. (Doc. No. 103.) He attached a case from a Bankruptcy Court in Montana, Anderson v. Internal Revenue Serv. (In re Anderson), 250 B.R. 707 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2000), involving the maximum permitted continuous levy of Social Security benefits under 26 U.S.C. §6331(h)(1). The Social Security Benefits levy issue, however, was not preserved for trial and is not currently before the Court. ( See Doc. Nos. 35, 79.) The case therefore has no bearing on the instant decision.

8 Pursuant to the agreement between the United States and Defendant Option One Mortgage (Doc. No. 64), the lien on this property is subordinate to the security interest of Option One (Ex. 19).

9 Contemporaneously with filing these documents, the United States shall email copies of these filings in WordPerfect format to the Chambers email address of the undersigned Judge at chambers_flmd_fawsett@flmd.uscourts.gov.

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Thursday, June 18, 2009

An individual's refund claims were untimely because he sought to recover taxes that were deemed to have been paid more than three years before he filed his refund claims; therefore any recovery was barred by Code Sec. 6511(b)(2)(A). Under Code Sec. 6513(b), amounts that were deducted and withheld during the calendar year were deemed paid on the 15th day of the fourth month following the close of each tax year in issue. His argument that the IRS's filing of substitute returns extended his time to file for a refund was rejected because the doctrine of equitable tolling did not apply to refund claims that were barred by the statute of limitations under Code Sec. 6511.


Michael E. McKinzy, Sr., Appellant v. Internal Revenue Service, United States of America, United States Department of Justice, Appellees.

U.S. Court of Appeals, 8th Circuit; 08-1004, June 9, 2009.

-



Before: Bye, Colloton and Gruender, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.: In 2007, Michael McKinzy filed tax returns for tax years 1999, 2001, and 2002, claiming a refund for each year plus additional child tax credit for tax year 1999. Thereafter, he filed this suit alleging that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) wrongfully disallowed his tax refund claims for those years. The district court 1 granted summary judgment for the United States, 2 concluding that the refund claims were untimely. McKinzy appeals, and following de novo review, see Johnson v. Blaukat, 453 F.3d 1108, 1112 (8th Cir. 2006), we affirm.

As a jurisdictional prerequisite to bringing a tax refund suit, a taxpayer is required to file a refund claim, see 26 U.S.C. § 7422(a), and must do so within three years of when the tax return was filed, or within two years from when the tax was paid, whichever is later. See 26 U.S.C. § 6511(a). McKinzy filed his refund claims simultaneously with his tax return. See 26 C.F.R. § 301.6402-3(a)(5) (properly executed tax return constitutes claim for refund within meaning of § 6511 for amount of overpayment disclosed by such return, and is considered filed on date when return is considered filed); Weisbart v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, 222 F.3d 93, 94-96 (2d Cir. 2000) (taxpayer's refund claim was filed within three years from time return was filed where he submitted 1991 tax return in 1995, because he submitted refund claim simultaneously with return).

McKinzy cannot recover a refund, however, for any tax that was paid more than three years before he filed his refund claim. See 26 U.S.C. § 6511(b)(2)(A) (when claim is filed during three-year period prescribed in § 6511(a), "the amount of the credit or refund shall not exceed the portion of the tax paid within the period, immediately preceding the filing of the claim, equal to 3 years plus the period of any extension of time for filing the return"). McKinzy's taxes for 1999, 2001, and 2002 were deemed "paid" on April 15, 2000, April 15, 2002, and April 15, 2003, respectively, and his claim for additional child tax credit for the 1999 tax year was deemed paid on April 15, 2000. See 26 U.S.C. § 6513(b)(1) (for purposes of § 6511, any tax that is deducted and withheld during calendar year is deemed "paid" on fifteenth day of fourth month following close of tax year with respect to which tax is allowable as credit). Accordingly, his refund claims, filed in 2007, were untimely as to the taxes paid for each of the years at issue. See Oropallo v. United States, 994 F.2d 25, 27 (1st Cir. 1993) (per curiam) ( § 6511(b) barred recovery of taxes for tax year 1983 because those taxes were deemed paid on April 15, 1984, and taxpayer did not file claim for refund until March 1990). Further, equitable tolling does not apply in this context. See United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 350-54 (1997) (declining to read implicit equitable-tolling provision into § 6511). Accordingly, we reject McKinzy's argument that the IRS's filing of substitute returns in 2005 served to extend his time to file for a refund, and we affirm the district court's judgment.

1 The Honorable Nanette K. Laughrey, United States District Judge for the Western District of Missouri.

2 The district court agreed with the United States that it was the proper defendant. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1).

An individual who paid a trust fund recovery penalty in full over ten years and who was seeking a refund for the total amount could potentially recover only amounts paid during the two years preceding the date on which he filed his claim. While a refund claim cannot be made until after the amount assessed has been paid in full, under Code Sec. 6511(a), a refund claim must still be filed within three years of when the return was filed or within two years of when the tax was paid, whichever is later. Because the taxpayer did not file his refund claim within three years of filing the return, the applicable statute of limitations was two years from the time the tax was paid. Therefore, the taxpayer's refund could not exceed the portion of the tax paid during the two years immediately preceding the filing of the claim.

B. Dziewecynski, DC Minn., 2005-2 USTC ¶50,576.

An individual's suit seeking a refund of withheld taxes was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Because the taxpayer had not filed a tax return for the year at issue, he was required to file a refund claim within two years of paying the tax. However, the taxpayer did not file an administrative claim for more than eight years after the withholding credit was applied to his account.

E.W. Sidney, DC N.Y., 2006-1 USTC ¶50,200.

An individual was not entitled to refund of an overpayment of her individual federal income taxes that the IRS had applied as credit against an outstanding joint income tax liability arising in an earlier year. She failed to file the refund claim within the two-year statutory period from the date of the last payment made to the IRS.

K.C. Barker, FedCl, 2006-2 USTC ¶50,491.

The statute of limitations barred an individual's refund claims for three of the six tax years at issue because he sought refunds of taxes that were paid more than two years before his late returns were filed. Therefore, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review his refund claims.

M.E. McKinzy, Sr., DC Mo., 2008-1 USTC ¶50,115.

The Court of Federal Claims lacked subject matter jurisdiction over an individual's tax refund claims because his claims were filed after the two-year statute of limitations under Code Sec. 6511(a) had lapsed. The individual claimed refunds of amounts the IRS had levied and applied to trust fund recovery penalties assessed against him as a responsible person for two corporations. However, he filed his claims more than two years after the last levy and, therefore, his refund claims were barred by the limitations period in Code Sec. 6511.

B.J. McAdams, FedCl (unpublished opinion), 2008-1 USTC ¶50,181.

An individual's refund claim requesting that amounts improperly collected by the IRS an applied to an invalid trust fund recovery penalty (TFRP) assessment be credited to a valid (TFRP) assessment was time-barred pursuant to the two-year statute of limitations. The IRS had already credited all of the payments the individual made in the two-years prior to his administrative claim for refund.

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Wednesday, June 17, 2009

Shulman Urges Congress to Reform Rules for Employer-Provided Cell Phones
IRS Commissioner Douglas H. Shulman said on June 16 that the Service supports easing the listed property rules under Code Sec. 280F for employer-provided cell phones. Shulman's announcement came just one week after the IRS proposed simplifying the substantiation rules). Shulman also stressed that the IRS is not "cracking down" on employer-provided cell phones, contrary to some media reports.

Listed Property
Under current rules, employer-provided cell phones used for business purposes are excluded from the employee's gross income and the cell phone expense is a deductible business expense for the employer if substantiation requirements are met. Personal use, however, is included in the employee's gross income. In Notice 2009-46, the IRS announced several proposals to simplify the substantiation rules. These included a minimal personal use method, a safe harbor method and a statistical sampling method.

The IRS's announcement was welcomed by businesses and practitioners. "Businesses need flexibility," Karen Facer-Mee, CPA, president of the Greater Philadelphia Chapter of the Pennsylvania Institute of CPAs (PICPA), told CCH. "Employers have different cell phone usage among different departments. Cell phone use by the individuals in the sales department is going to be different from cell phone use by administrative personnel."

At the same time, confusion arose whether the IRS was intending tougher enforcement of the current rules. "Some have incorrectly implied that the IRS is cracking down on employee use of employer-provided cell phones," Shulman said in a statement. "To the contrary, the IRS is attempting to simplify the rules and eliminate uncertainty for businesses and individuals."

Pending Legislation
Shulman called on Congress to reform the listed property rules as they apply to cell phones. "Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner and I ask that Congress act to make clear that there will be no tax consequence to employers or employees for personal use of work-related devices such as cell phones provided by employers." Shulman added that technological changes since 1989 have made the current rules obsolete.

In the House, Rep. Sam Johnson, R-Tex., has introduced legislation (HR 690) to remove cell phones from the category of listed property under Code Sec. 280F. The bill has has 33 co-sponsors and has been referred to the House Ways and Means Committee. Sen. John Kerry, D-Mass., has introduced similar legislation (Sen 144) in the Senate; his bill has 45 co-sponsors and has been referred to the Senate Finance Committee.

Statement of IRS Commissioner Shulman Regarding Employer-Provided Cell Phones

June 17, 2009

Statement of IRS Commissioner Shulman : Employer-provided cell phones .



Statement of IRS Commissioner Doug Shulman

This month, the Internal Revenue Service asked for comments on ways to simplify compliance with rules related to employer-provided cellular telephones. The current law, which has been on the books for many years, is burdensome, poorly understood by taxpayers, and difficult for the IRS to administer consistently. Some have incorrectly implied that the IRS is 'cracking down' on employee use of employer-provided cell phones. To the contrary, the IRS is attempting to simplify the rules and eliminate uncertainty for businesses and individuals.

Although some of the proposed changes would add clarity, the current law will inevitably leave widespread confusion among employees and businesses. Therefore, Secretary Geithner and I ask that Congress act to make clear that there will be no tax consequence to employers or employees for personal use of work-related devices such as cell phones provided by employers. The passage of time, advances in technology, and the nature of communication in the modern workplace have rendered this law obsolete.

Modernize Our Bookkeeping In the Law for Employee's Cell Phone Act of 2009

January 30, 2009

111th Congress

111th CONGRESS

1st Session H. R. 690

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to remove cell phones from listed property under section 280F.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

January 26, 2009

Mr. Sam Johnson of Texas (for himself, Mr. Pomeroy, Mr. Herger, Mr. Cantor, Ms. Schwartz, Mrs. Bono Mack, and Ms. Zoe Lofgren of California) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means

A BILL

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to remove cell phones from listed property under section 280F.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,



SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Modernize Our Bookkeeping In the Law for Employee's Cell Phone Act of 2009".



SEC. 2. REMOVAL OF CELLULAR TELEPHONES (OR SIMILAR TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT) FROM LISTED PROPERTY.

(a) In General. --Subparagraph (A) of section 280F(d)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code (defining listed property) is amended by inserting "and" at the end of clause (iv), by striking clause (v), and by redesignating clause (vi) as clause (v).

(b) Effective Date. --The amendment made by subsection (a) shall apply to taxable years beginning after January 1, 2009.


Notice 2009-46 , I.R.B. 2009-23, 1068, June 8, 2009.


PURPOSE

This notice requests comments from the public regarding several proposals to simplify the procedures under which employers substantiate an employee's business use of employer-provided cellular telephones or other similar telecommunications equipment (hereinafter collectively referred to as "cell phones"). This notice describes the proposals under consideration. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and Treasury Department are interested in considering other possible approaches. Therefore, this notice also requests suggestions for alternative approaches to simplify the procedures under which employers substantiate an employee's business use of employer-provided cell phones.

Any changes to the substantiation procedures applicable to employer-provided cell phones will not become effective until the IRS and Treasury Department consider public comments and suggestions received in response to this notice and publish guidance announcing any simplified substantiation procedures.



BACKGROUND



Employers

Section 162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code provides that a deduction is allowed for all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business. However, § 262(a) provides that, except as otherwise expressly provided, no deduction shall be allowed for personal, living, or family expenses.

Section 274(d)(4) provides that no deduction shall be allowed with respect to any listed property (as defined in § 280F(d)(4)), unless the taxpayer substantiates by adequate records or by sufficient evidence corroborating the taxpayer's own statement (A) the amount of such expense or other item, (B) the use of the property, (C) the business purpose of the expense or other item, and (D) the business relationship to the taxpayer of persons using the property. The Secretary may by regulations provide that some or all of the requirements of the preceding sentence shall not apply in the case of an expense that does not exceed an amount prescribed pursuant to such regulations.

Section 280F(d)(4)(A)(v) provides that "listed property" includes any cellular telephone (or other similar telecommunications equipment).

Section 1.274-5T(a) of the temporary Income Tax Regulations provides that no deduction or credit shall be allowed with respect to any listed property unless the taxpayer substantiates each element of the expenditure or use. Section 1.274-5T(b)(6) provides that the elements to be proved with respect to any listed property are:

(i) Amount --(A) The amount of each separate expenditure with respect to an item of listed property, such as the cost of acquisition, and (B) the amount of each business use based on the appropriate measure (that is, time) and the amount of total use of the listed property for the taxable period ( see § 1.274-5T(e)(2));

(ii) Time --The date of the expenditure or use with respect to the listed property; and

(iii) Business purpose --The business purpose for an expenditure or use with respect to any listed property.



Employees

Section 61(a)(1) provides that, except as otherwise provided, gross income includes compensation for services, including fees, commissions, fringe benefits, and similar items. Section 1.61-21(b)(1) of the Income Tax Regulations requires that an employee generally must include in gross income the amount by which the fair market value of a fringe benefit exceeds the sum of (i) the amount, if any, paid for the benefit by or on behalf of the employee, and (ii) the amount, if any, specifically excluded from gross income by some other section of the Code. The fair market value of a fringe benefit is the amount that an individual would have to pay for the particular fringe benefit in an arm's length transaction. Section 1.61-21(b)(2). The cost incurred by an employer is not determinative of the fair market value of a fringe benefit. Id.

Section 132(a)(3) provides that gross income does not include any fringe benefit that qualifies as a working condition fringe. Section 132(d) provides that "working condition fringe" means any property or services provided to an employee of the employer to the extent that, if the employee paid for such property or services, such payment would be allowable as a deduction under § 162 or § 167.

Section 1.132-5(a)(1)(ii) provides that if, under § 274 or any other section of the Code, certain substantiation requirements must be met in order for a deduction under § 162 or § 167 to be allowable, then those substantiation requirements apply in determining whether a property or service is excludable as a working condition fringe. See also § 1.132-5(c)(1). The substantiation requirements of § 274(d) are satisfied by adequate records or sufficient evidence corroborating the employee's own statement. Section 1.132-5(c)(2). Therefore, such records or evidence provided by the employee, and relied upon by the employer to the extent permitted by the regulations promulgated under § 274(d), will be sufficient to substantiate a working condition fringe exclusion. Id.



DISCUSSION

If an employer provides a cell phone to an employee, and the employer acquires and pays the costs of using the cell phone, the employee receives a fringe benefit. To the extent that the employee uses the employer's cell phone for business purposes, the fair market value of such usage qualifies as a working condition fringe benefit excludable from the employee's gross income and the cell phone expense is a deductible business expense for the employer, provided that the substantiation requirements of § 274(d) are met. However, to the extent the employee uses the employer's cell phone for personal purposes, the fair market value of such usage is includable in the employee's gross income. The employer's cost to provide the cell phone is not determinative of the fair market value of the benefit received by the employee.



PROPOSALS

The IRS and Treasury Department are considering the following proposals to simplify the § 274(d) substantiation requirements applicable to employee usage of employer-provided cell phones.



A. Simplified Substantiation Methods



General Requirements

As discussed in greater detail below, the IRS and Treasury Department are considering three alternative methods to simplify the substantiation requirements applicable to employee usage of employer-provided cell phones: a minimal personal use method, a safe harbor substantiation method, and a statistical sampling method (or a combination of the foregoing). Any simplified cell phone substantiation method will be optional; taxpayers may continue to comply with current § 274(d) substantiation requirements.

The IRS and Treasury Department contemplate that any taxpayer who wishes to use a simplified cell phone substantiation method will be required to implement a written policy that requires employees to carry and use the employer-provided cell phones in connection with the employer's trade or business and that prohibits personal use of employer-provided cell phones, except for minimal personal use, similar to the requirements currently applicable to employer-provided automobiles in § 1.274-6T. In addition, the IRS and Treasury Department anticipate requiring that the employer must reasonably believe that the cell phone is not used for personal purposes except for minimal personal use.



1. Minimal Personal Use Method

The IRS and Treasury Department are considering two proposals that would allow an employer to deem all of an employee's usage of an employer-provided cell phone as business usage. Under the first proposal, the entire amount of an employee's use of an employer-provided cell phone would be deemed to be for business purposes if the employee can account to his or her employer with sufficient records to establish that the employee maintains and uses a personal (non-employer-provided) cell phone for personal purposes during the employee's work hours.

Alternatively, the second proposal would define a specified amount or type of "minimal" personal use that would be disregarded in determining the amount of personal use of an employer-provided cell phone. For example, "minimal" could be defined by reference to a particular number of minutes of use or for certain personal purposes.



2. Safe Harbor Substantiation Method

The IRS and Treasury Department are considering a safe harbor method under which an employer would treat a certain percentage of each employee's use of an employer-provided cell phone as business usage. The remaining percentage of use would be deemed to be for personal purposes. For this proposal, the IRS and Treasury Department propose a business use percentage of 75 percent.



3. Statistical Sampling Method

The IRS and Treasury Department are considering a proposal that would allow employers to use statistical sampling techniques to measure an employee's personal use of an employer-provided cell phone. In general, an employer could use an approved statistical sampling methodology similar to that provided in Rev. Proc. 2004-29, 2004-1 C.B. 918, to determine the percentage of personal use of employer-provided cell phones. The employer would multiply that percentage times the value of each employee's total usage to determine the value of personal usage. The remaining portion of the employee's usage would be deemed to be for business purposes.



B. Simplified Fair Market Value Determination

To the extent that an employee's use of an employer-provided cell phone does not qualify as a working condition fringe benefit (because the employer does not satisfy § 274(d) or the cell phone is used partially for personal purposes), the fair market value of an employee's use of the employer-provided cell phone is a taxable fringe benefit that is includable in the employee's gross income. An employer's cost to provide the cell phone is not determinative of the fair market value of an employee's fringe benefit. The IRS and Treasury Department are interested in understanding the methods employers currently use to arrive at the fair market value to an employee of an employer-provided cell phone. The IRS and Treasury Department are considering whether a simplified valuation method would be helpful and appropriate to determine such fair market value.



REQUEST FOR COMMENTS

The IRS and Treasury Department request public comments on the proposals contained in this notice and suggestions for other approaches for modifying and simplifying the substantiation requirements applicable to employee usage of employer-provided cell phones. The IRS and Treasury Department are particularly interested in any comments regarding:
 The specific provisions that should be required to be included in an employer's written policy prohibiting personal use of employer-provided cell phones;

 The types of employee records sufficient to establish that the employee maintains and uses a personal (nonemployer-provided) cell phone for purposes of the first proposed minimum personal use method contained in this notice;

 How to define a specified amount or type of "minimal" personal use ( e.g., a maximum number of minutes of use or a list of acceptable personal uses) that should be disregarded in determining the amount of personal use of an employer-provided cell phone for purposes of the second proposed minimum personal use method contained in this notice.

 The business use percentage that should be applied in the proposed safe harbor substantiation method contained in this notice and the data and rationale upon which it is based;

 The methods currently used by employers to determine the fair market value of an employee's use of an employer-provided cell phone; and

 Whether a simplified method of determining the fair market value of an employee's use of an employer-provided cell phone would be appropriate, and, if so, suggested simplified methodologies for determining such fair market value.

Comments must be submitted in writing on or before September 4, 2009, and should include a reference to Notice 2009-46. Submissions should be sent to:

Internal Revenue Service
Attn: CC:PA:LPD:PR
( Notice 2009-46), Room 5203P.O. Box 7604
Ben Franklin Station
Washington, DC 20044
Submissions also may be hand delivered Monday through Friday between the hours of 8 a.m. and 4 p.m. to: CC:PA:LPD:PR ( Notice 2009-46), Courier's Desk, Internal Revenue Service, 1111 Constitution Avenue, N.W., Washington, DC. Alternatively, comments may be submitted electronically directly to the IRS via the following e-mail address: Notice.comments@irscounsel.treas.gov. Please include "Notice 2009-46" in the subject line of any electronic communication. All comments will be available for public inspection and copying.



DRAFTING INFORMATION

The principal author of this notice is Jeffrey T. Rodrick of the Office of Associate Chief Counsel (Income Tax & Accounting). For further information regarding this notice, contact Mr. Rodrick at (202) 622-4930 (not a toll-free call).

Labels:

Tuesday, June 16, 2009

The Tax Court properly found that the IRS did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the offers-in-compromise of individual partners who had underreported their income in Hoyt partnership tax-shelter investments. The IRS considered all of the evidence submitted, and adequately evaluated each offer-in-compromise. The offers-in-compromise were not accepted based on doubt as to collectibility or economic hardship because the taxpayers were capable of paying more than the amount they offered. The IRS was not required to consider the taxpayers' future medical needs, since the evidence regarding such needs was highly speculative. Furthermore, accepting the offers on the ground that the taxpayers were victims of fraud or third-party misdeeds would undermine compliance with the tax laws. The IRS was permitted to proceed with its proposed collection actions to recover full payment of the outstanding tax liabilities because the delay in determining the individual tax liabilities was due to complexity of the tax-shelter partnerships and did not require the IRS to abate penalties and interest. Finally, the IRS had no legal obligation to consider each of the factors identified in C.G. Fargo, CA-9, 2006-1 USTC ¶50,326, 447 F3d 706, before rejecting the offers-in-compromise.





US-CT-APP-9, [2009-1 USTC ¶50,428], U.S. Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit, Michael W. Keller, Petitioner-Appellant v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent-Appellee. Gary W. McDonough, Petitioner-Appellant v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent-Appellee. William H. Lindley; Jo Anne Lindley, Petitioners-Appellants v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent-Appellee. Donald Ertz, Petitioner-Appellant v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent-Appellee. Franklin Hubbart; Janetta Hubbart, Petitioners-Appellants v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent-Appellee. Roger Carter; Lora Carter, Petitioners-Appellants v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent-Appellee. Daniel O. Abelein, Petitioner-Appellant v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent-Appellee. Bobbie E. Johnson, Petitioner-Appellant v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent-Appellee. Gordon Freeman; Ilene Freeman, Petitioners-Appellants v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent-Appellee. Estate of Carol Andrews, Deceased; Robert Andrews, Petitioners-Appellants v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent-Appellee. Roy Barnes; Antonette Barnes, Petitioners-Appellants v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent-Appellee. Roger D. Catlow; Mary M. Catlow, Petitioners-Appellants v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent-Appellee. Barry Blondheim; Sherry Blondheim, Petitioners-Appellants v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent-Appellee. Donald Clayton; Yvonne Clayton, Petitioners-Appellants v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent-Appellee. Gary Hansen; Johnean F. Hansen, Petitioners-Appellants v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent-Appellee. Martin Smith; Sharon Smith, Petitioners-Appellants v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent-Appellee. ., Tax Court: Offers-in-compromise. --, (June 3, 2009)
Michael W. Keller, Petitioner-Appellant v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent-Appellee. Gary W. McDonough, Petitioner-Appellant v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent-Appellee. William H. Lindley; Jo Anne Lindley, Petitioners-Appellants v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent-Appellee. Donald Ertz, Petitioner-Appellant v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent-Appellee. Franklin Hubbart; Janetta Hubbart, Petitioners-Appellants v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent-Appellee. Roger Carter; Lora Carter, Petitioners-Appellants v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent-Appellee. Daniel O. Abelein, Petitioner-Appellant v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent-Appellee. Bobbie E. Johnson, Petitioner-Appellant v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent-Appellee. Gordon Freeman; Ilene Freeman, Petitioners-Appellants v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent-Appellee. Estate of Carol Andrews, Deceased; Robert Andrews, Petitioners-Appellants v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent-Appellee. Roy Barnes; Antonette Barnes, Petitioners-Appellants v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent-Appellee. Roger D. Catlow; Mary M. Catlow, Petitioners-Appellants v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent-Appellee. Barry Blondheim; Sherry Blondheim, Petitioners-Appellants v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent-Appellee. Donald Clayton; Yvonne Clayton, Petitioners-Appellants v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent-Appellee. Gary Hansen; Johnean F. Hansen, Petitioners-Appellants v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent-Appellee. Martin Smith; Sharon Smith, Petitioners-Appellants v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent-Appellee. .

U.S. Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit; 06-75466, 07-70644, 07-71715, 07-71719, 07-72001, 07-72003, 07-72004, 07-72010, 07-72073, 07-72093, 07-72114, 07-72139, 07-72654, 07-72655, 07-72737, 07-73038, June 3, 2009.

Affirming in part and vacating in part, the Tax Court, 92 TCM 114, Dec. 56,587(M), TC Memo. 2006-166.





Terri A. Merriam, Merriam & Associates, P.C., for the petitioners-appellants; Anthony T. Sheehan, Department of Justice, for the respondent-appellee.


Before: Fletcher, Rymer and Fisher, Circuit Judges.




OPINION


RYMER, Circuit Judge: These consolidated appeals concern the outstanding tax liabilities for sixteen Taxpayers (as we shall refer to the individual partners) who invested in cattle partnerships operated by Walter J. Hoyt III. Their appeals are taken from the decision of the Tax Court holding that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue did not abuse his discretion in rejecting Taxpayers' offers-in-compromise. In collection due process hearings Taxpayers also challenged the imposition of interest under former 26 U.S.C. § 6621(c). 1 The Tax Court held that it lacked jurisdiction in partner-level proceedings to determine whether the partnerships' transactions were tax motivated for purposes of § 6621(c). 2 The effect was to leave standing the Commissioner's inclusion of § 6621(c) interest in his determination of outstanding liabilities. Taxpayers appeal this decision as well.

We agree with the Tax Court's disposition on the offers-in-compromise, and with its view that, under River City Ranches #1 Ltd. v. Commissioner, 401 F.3d 1136, 1144 (9th Cir. 2005), whether transactions were tax motivated is a partnership item to be determined at partnership-level proceedings. The problem in these cases is that the partnership-level proceedings were completed and the judgment had become final before River City Ranches #1 announced this rule. As the Tax Court has jurisdiction in partner-level proceedings to determine issues relating to liability that the taxpayer has had no opportunity to contest, § 6330(c)(2)(B), we believe the court could decide whether the partnership transactions were tax motivated based on the record in the partnership-level proceedings. We are as well situated as the Tax Court to undertake this review and, having done so, we conclude that the record of the partnership-level proceedings shows that the partnerships' transactions were in fact tax motivated.

Accordingly, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and permit the Commissioner to proceed with collection actions as determined by the Notices of Determination.




I


This is another in a growing line of cases arising out of the tangled tax liabilities of Hoyt partnerships. See, e.g., Keller v. Comm'r, 556 F.3d 1056 (9th Cir. 2009); Hansen v. Comm'r, 471 F.3d 1021 (9th Cir. 2006); River City Ranches #1, 401 F.3d 1136; Adams v. Johnson, 355 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2004); Abelein v. United States, 323 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 2003); Phillips v. Comm'r, 272 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2001). To make a long story short, Hoyt organized, promoted, and operated more than 100 cattle- and sheep-breeding partnerships from the 1970s through the 1990s. The cattle partnerships relevant to these appeals were touted as "The 1,000 lb Tax Shelter." Taxpayers invested in one or more of them.

The Commissioner sought to disallow tax benefits claimed by early partnerships, but lost in the Tax Court in 1989. See Bales v. Comm'r, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 431 (1989). After Bales, the Commissioner began to conduct a professional headcount of the Hoyt livestock.

Upon receipt of Notices of Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment (FPAA), Hoyt, who was the tax matters partner (TMP) for each of the partnerships, filed petitions with the Tax Court. Hoyt and the Commissioner settled a number of issues in a May 20, 1993 global settlement agreement that established a $4,000 value for each cow and a formula for determining the actual number of cattle owned by each partnership. 3 The Tax Court determined partnership-level adjustments in accordance with the 1993 Agreement, and issued opinions in 1996 resolving disagreements between Hoyt and the IRS over allocation of the 1980 through 1986 settlement items to the individual partners. See Shorthorn Genetic Eng'g 1982-2, Ltd. v. Comm'r, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) 1306 (1996) ( SGE 82-2).

Meanwhile, the Commissioner offered a variety of settlements to individual partners that waived accuracy-related penalties, including tax-motivated interest in some instances. When the IRS sent notices of intent to levy, Taxpayers requested a collection due process hearing before the Office of Appeals and submitted their own offers-in-compromise pursuant to § 6330(c)(2)(A)(iii). The standard offer was for Taxpayers to pay all Hoyt tax deficiencies for all years and regular interest accrued through April 15, 1993. The offers were based on grounds of public policy and equity, and eleven Taxpayers also claimed doubt as to collectibility with special circumstances or economic hardship.

The Commissioner's settlement officers issued a Notice of Determination in each case rejecting the compromise offer and upholding collection. In response to the Notices of Determination, Taxpayers petitioned the Tax Court to review whether the Commissioner abused his discretion in sustaining the proposed collection action, and whether Taxpayers are liable for the increased rate of interest on tax-motivated transactions under § 6621(c). The Tax Court held that the settlement officers had not abused their discretion in rejecting Taxpayers' offers-in-compromise or in upholding the proposed levies.

Those Taxpayers who were subject to § 6621(c) penalties agreed to be treated as if they were in the same partnership as Donald C. Ertz, that is the Durham Engineering 1985-5 (DGE 85-5) partnership. 4 For the relevant DGE 85-5 tax years, 1985 and 1986, the Commissioner sent FPAAs in 1989 and 1990, respectively, that noted the applicability of § 6621(c). In the DGE 85-5 partnership-level proceedings, the Tax Court applied the 1993 Agreement to adjust DGE 85-5's reported depreciation expenses for 1985 from $669,910 to $68,400 and its qualified investment property from $4,701,120 to $480,000; DGE 85-5's depreciation expenses for 1986 were reduced from $982,534 to $161,040. It also concluded that interest for tax-motivated transactions pursuant to § 6221(c) was an affected item that requires factual determinations to be made at the partner level and that it therefore lacked jurisdiction over the penalties. See DGE 85-5 v. Comm'r, No. 22070-89, at 14-15 (T.C. Nov. 27, 1996); DGE 85-5 v. Comm'r, No. 28577-90, at 14-16 (T.C. Nov. 27, 1996). 5 In these partner-level proceedings, the Tax Court declined jurisdiction over the Ertz Taxpayers' challenge to tax-motivated interest given that River City Ranches #1 had held that the character of a partnership's transactions is a partnership item to be determined at the partnership level, and no findings had been made on the § 6621(c) issue at the partnership-level proceeding in DGE 85-5.

Taxpayers timely appealed.




II


We review Tax Court decisions "in the same manner and to the same extent as decisions of the district courts in civil actions tried without a jury." § 7482(a)(1); Fargo v. Comm'r, 447 F.3d 706, 709 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, review of factual findings is under the clearly erroneous standard and review of questions of law is de novo. Fargo, 447 F.3d at 709; Millenbach v. Comm'r, 318 F.3d 924, 930 (9th Cir. 2003). Like the Tax Court, our review of the decision by the Commissioner whether to accept an offer-in-compromise is for an abuse of discretion. Fargo, 447 F.3d at 709. "Abuse of discretion occurs when a decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or a clearly erroneous assessment of the facts." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We review factual findings underlying the imposition of a penalty under § 6621(c) for clear error, and the legal conclusions de novo. See Keller, 556 F.3d at 1058-59; Wolf v. Comm'r, 4 F.3d 709, 715 (9th Cir. 1993); Gainer v. Comm'r, 893 F.2d 225, 226 (9th Cir. 1990).




III


[1] Congress authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to "compromise any civil or criminal case arising under the internal revenue laws." § 7122(a). The statute directs the Secretary to ensure that taxpayers entering into a compromise "have an adequate means to provide for basic living expenses." § 7122(d)(2). Congress delegated authority to promulgate more detailed guidelines to the Secretary. § 7122(d)(1).

[2] The Secretary's regulations allow compromises for doubt as to liability (which is not at issue here); for doubt as to collectibility; and to promote effective tax administration for economic hardship when collection of the normal amount would leave a taxpayer unable to afford basic living expenses, or where compelling public policy or equity reasons are shown and, due to exceptional circumstances, collection of the full amount of tax liability would undermine public confidence in the fairness of tax administration whether or not a similarly situated taxpayer may have paid his liability in full. 26 C.F.R. § 301.7122-1(b). The regulations constrain compromises to promote effective tax administration (that is, compromises based on economic hardship and on grounds of public policy or equity) to those that would not undermine compliance with the tax laws. Id., § 301.7122-1(b)(3)(iii). 6 "The determination whether to accept or reject an offer to compromise will be based upon consideration of all the facts and circumstances .... " Id. § 301.7122-1(c)(1). Once a taxpayer establishes a ground for compromise, the determination whether to accept the offer is within the Secretary's discretion. Id.




A


Eleven Taxpayers 7 in these consolidated cases appeal the Tax Court's ruling affirming denial of their offers-in-compromise based on doubt as to collectibility with special circumstances or economic hardship.

[3] A doubt as to collectibility exists where the taxpayer's assets and income are less than the full amount of the outstanding tax liability. 26 C.F.R. § 301.7122-1(b)(2), (c)(2). A compromise based on economic hardship may be entered into when, even though the full liability could be collected, it would cause the taxpayer to be unable to pay his reasonable living expenses. See id. §§ 301.6343-1, 301.7122-1(b)(3)(i); Fargo, 447 F.3d at 709-710 (noting the statute's focus on basic expenses with an offer-in-compromise alleging economic hardship). 8 Both types of offer trigger the same inquiry into how much of the tax liability can be paid while allowing the taxpayer to retain enough to pay for reasonable living expenses. 26 C.F.R. §§ 301.6343-1(b)(4) (economic hardship means "unable to pay his or her reasonable basic living expenses"); 301.7122-1(b)(2), (3); 301.7122-1(c)(2)(i) ("[a] determination of doubt as to collectibility will include a determination of ability to pay ... [while] permit[ting] taxpayers to retain sufficient funds to pay basic living expenses").

[4] Under IRS guidelines, the Commissioner may accept a doubt as to collectibility offer that is less than the taxpayer's "reasonable collection potential" (net equity plus future income plus other components of collectibility) (RCP) if "special circumstances" are present. Rev. Proc. 2003-71, § 4.02(2); Internal Revenue Manual § 5.8.1.1.3 (2005) (I.R.M.). The factors the IRS considers for a doubt as to collectibility with special circumstances offer are the same as for an economic hardship offer. I.R.M. § 5.8.4.3.

For each of the Taxpayers, the Commissioner rejected the offer because it was substantially lower than what the RCP calculation showed the Taxpayer could afford to pay. Taxpayers attack the Commissioner's denial of their offers on multiple grounds, but we see no basis to conclude the Commissioner abused his discretion in any of these cases.

[5] A number of Taxpayers argue the Commissioner should have factored into the RCP calculation higher future medical expenses (Andrews, Barnes, Carters, Catlows, Hubbarts, Ertz, Johnson, Lindleys, 9 McDonough, and Smiths). We cannot say the Commissioner clearly erred in considering medical needs by relying on present medical expenses instead of estimating future increases. See Fargo, 447 F.3d at 710 (noting that taxpayers' evidence of future medical needs was thin, ambiguous, and speculative); 26 C.F.R. § 301.7122-1(c)(3) (including as a factor in support of hardship that the taxpayer is incapable of earning a living because of a medical condition and it is "reasonably foreseeable" that financial resources will be exhausted providing for care and support).

[6] Some Taxpayers fault the Commissioner for computational mistakes, such as omitting transaction costs or not including a corresponding adjustment to housing expenses when treating the Taxpayer's equity in his home as fully collectible (Barnes, Carters, Catlows, Claytons, Ertz, Hubbarts, Johnson, Lindleys, and McDonough). The Commissioner, however, caught and corrected those mistakes to a significant extent in the Tax Court. Moreover, those relying on miscalculations fail to demonstrate that, allowing for the errors, their offers do not remain below their ability to pay. Cf. City of Sausalito v. O'Neill, 386 F.3d 1186, 1220 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting the requirement in the Administrative Procedure Act that "'due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error' " by courts reviewing agency action) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706). For the same reason, to the extent Ertz is correct that the Commissioner's treatment of his home equity and retirement account as fully collectible is inconsistent with 26 C.F.R. § 301.7122-1(c)(3)(i)(example 2), he has not shown this error affected the Commissioner's determination that he could afford to pay more than his offer.

A few Taxpayers attempt to undermine the Commissioner's determination based on evidence that was not part of the record before him (Andrews, Carters, Hubbarts, and Johnson). However, our review is confined to the record at the time the Commissioner's decision was rendered. See Robinette v. Comm'r, 439 F.3d 455, 459 (8th Cir. 2006) (observing that appellate review is based on "the administrative record already in existence, not some new record made initially in the reviewing court") (quoting Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973)); Northcoast Envtl. Ctr. v. Glickman, 136 F.3d 660, 665 (9th Cir. 1998).

[7] Beyond this, Taxpayers question whether the Commissioner fully considered their special circumstances, allowed sufficient time to submit information in support of their offers, and provided an opportunity to respond before making a final determination. The Commissioner is not required to perform an investigation, engage in formal fact-finding proceedings, or respond to an offer with a counter-offer. We believe the Commissioner adequately considered each Taxpayer's offer given the record before him and within the framework established by the statute, regulations, and Manual. 10




B


Those Taxpayers who sought compromise based on special circumstances or economic hardship but failed on those grounds, join the rest who claim that exceptional circumstances exist based on considerations of public policy and equity for accepting their offers-in-compromise. They point to two in particular: that they were victims of Hoyt's fraud, and that the Commissioner caused undue delays in resolving their individual tax liabilities.

[8] A compromise to promote effective tax administration based on public policy or equity considerations "will be justified only where, due to exceptional circumstances, collection of the full liability would undermine public confidence that the tax laws are being administered in a fair and equitable manner." Id. § 301.7122-1(b)(3)(ii). "No compromise to promote effective tax administration may be entered into if compromise of the liability would undermine compliance by taxpayers with the tax laws." Id. § 301.7122-1(b)(3)(iii).

[9] Taxpayers argue that they were victimized by the Hoyt operation, but no authority requires the Commissioner to accept an offer-in-compromise simply because the taxpayer was a victim of fraud or third-party misdeeds. The Commissioner could certainly consider third-party actions along with Taxpayers' own conduct and motivation for investing in the Hoyt partnerships. However, we have never held that being victimized by a tax shelter scheme is alone sufficient to require compromise. Indeed, we have upheld negligence penalties applied by the Commissioner to Hoyt partners, see Hansen, 471 F.3d at 1029, and it would be anomalous to require a reduction in liability based on public policy or equity grounds in these cases. Given all the facts and circumstances of Taxpayers' involvement in the Hoyt partnerships, we cannot say that the Commissioner abused his discretion in rejecting their offers. It was reasonable for him to decide that collection of less than the full liability would undermine public confidence in administration of the tax laws, whereas accepting the offers could "undermine compliance by taxpayers." See 26 C.F.R. §§ 301.7122-1(b)(3)(ii), (iii).

[10] While it did take nearly twenty years to shut down Hoyt's operations and determine individual tax liabilities, the delay is not all that surprising given the complexity of these tax-shelter partnerships. The lengthy time required for the Commissioner --and the courts --to unravel how the Hoyt partnerships really worked is part of the risk assumed by those who chose to invest in them. Taxpayers fault the IRS, rather than the nature of the TEFRA proceedings, for the delay, maintaining that the IRS failed to seek injunctive relief against Hoyt when it knew enough to do so (no later than 1988); waited until 1997 before seeking to revoke Hoyt's status as an Enrolled Agent when it could have done so earlier; and dealt with Hoyt (as TMP) instead of a settlement committee prior to the 1993 Agreement that, among other things, waived the statute of limitations. But focusing on a few steps that the IRS in hindsight might have taken sooner oversimplifies the saga that got side-tracked with the Commissioner's early loss in Bales.

[11] Taxpayers also submit that resolution of their tax liability took longer than the "average" amount of time it takes to conclude a tax shelter case. They suggest that delay should somehow be measured by the "average" time, which, they say, is in the range of ten years. However, there is no footing in the statutes or regulations for an arbitrary cut-off, or for requiring the Commissioner to abate penalties and interest once an "average" amount of time for "average" shelters has passed. Indeed, Taxpayers' cases are not that different from Fargo, where the individual partners invested in partnerships more than twenty years prior to resolution of their tax liability in our court. 11 We rejected taxpayers' similar argument there, that delays outside their control should not be held against them. Fargo, 447 F.3d at 713-14. Although the IRS may resolve longstanding cases by foregoing penalties and interest that have accumulated as a result of delay in determining the taxpayer's liability, 12 no authority says that it must. Congress advisedly left settlement decisions to the Commissioner's discretion. We conclude that the Commissioner had discretion to find that full payment of the outstanding tax liabilities in these cases would encourage future investors to take care before investing in similar tax shelters, whereas less than full payment would discourage potential investors from researching and monitoring similar investments.

Taxpayers further take issue with the Commissioner's reliance on the Internal Revenue Manual, § 5.8.11 (2005), which gives an example of when an offer-in-compromise may be rejected that is quite close factually to their case but which, they contend, was legal error because the Manual lacks the force of law under Fargo. 13 In Fargo, taxpayers relied on the Manual in support of their position, and we held that the Internal Revenue Manual "does not have the force of law and does not confer rights on taxpayers." 447 F.3d at 713. By this we did not mean to suggest that it is legal error for the Commissioner to be guided by his own guidelines. Nor are we persuaded by Taxpayers' argument that referencing the Manual's most analogous example deprived them of full consideration of the facts and circumstances surrounding their investment. As settlement officers are required by the regulations to do, 26 C.F.R. § 301.7122-1(c)(1), the officers here did look at the facts and circumstances of each case but nevertheless found their decision in Taxpayers' cases was guided by the Manual's example. They did not err in doing so.

Finally, Taxpayers contend that the Commissioner erred by failing to follow the factors that informed the court's decision in Fargo affirming the Commissioner's denial of an offer-in-compromise. The factors we identified there as "cutting against" taxpayers were:


1) Taxpayers invested in tax shelters, and purely tax-motivated transactions are frowned upon by the Code; 2) no evidence was presented to suggest that Taxpayers were the subject of fraud or deception; 3) the delay that took place was due to well-established TEFRA procedures and the inability of [the TMPs] to negotiate quickly; and 4) the primary incentives created by requiring full payment are to encourage taxpayers to research future investments more carefully and to keep in better contact with financial agents (such as TMPs).


Fargo, 447 F.3d at 714 (footnotes omitted). These factors were neither intended as a mantra to be applied to each offer-in-compromise based on grounds of public policy or equity, nor as a minimum requirement for the proper exercise of the Commissioner's discretion. Rather, we mentioned these facts as indicating why, "at the very least," the Commissioner did not abuse his discretion in not accepting the offer-in-compromise in that case. Id. Accordingly, the Commissioner had no legal obligation explicitly to consider each of these factors before rejecting Taxpayers' offers-in-compromise. Even so, as in Fargo, there are a number of factors here that also cut against, not in favor of, Taxpayers. Taxpayers invested in a "1,000 lb Tax Shelter" which is "frowned upon." While individual partners may have thought or hoped they were investing in a business that would make money, the program was marketed for its tax benefits. Even considering Hoyt's fraud, investors in Hoyt's partnerships have been unable to avoid negligence penalties. 14 The time it took to resolve these cases was, as in Fargo, explicable. Also, "the primary incentives created by requiring full payment are to encourage taxpayers to research future investments more carefully and to keep in better contact with financial agents (such as TMPs)." Fargo, 447 F.3d at 714 . Finally, reducing the risks of participating in tax shelters would encourage more taxpayers to run those risks.

[12] In sum, we conclude that the Commissioner was not obliged by compelling considerations of public policy or equity to accept Taxpayers' offers-in-compromise.




IV


We now turn to whether the Commissioner may apply the interest penalty of § 6621(c) to the tax liability of the twelve Ertz Taxpayers.

[13] TEFRA established a statutory scheme for separately determining the partnership's tax liability and then the resulting liability of individual partners. Under TEFRA, a partnership files an informational return describing the share of income and expenses attributable to its partners; the individual partners then report their pro rata share of the partnership's tax liability on their individual tax returns. §§ 701, 702, 6221, 6222; see Kaplan v. United States, 133 F.3d 469, 471 (7th Cir. 1998). To assure uniformity, TEFRA "intends that adjustments to a partnership tax return be completed in one consistent proceeding before individual partners are assessed for partnership items." AD Global Fund, LLC ex rel. North Hills Holding, Inc. v. United States, 481 F.3d 1351, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Thus, "[a] partnership's tax items, which determine the partners' taxes, are litigated in partnership proceedings --not in the individual partners' cases." River City Ranches #1, 401 F.3d at 1144. TEFRA gives a court with jurisdiction over the partnership-level proceedings jurisdiction "to determine all partnership items of the partnership." § 6226(f).

[14] Section 6621(c) interest is an "affected item," that is, a partner-level item that is affected by partnership items. § 6231(a)(5). "The nature of [a] partnership['s] transactions" for purposes of § 6621(c) is a "partnership item." River City Ranches #1, 401 F.3d at 1144; see § 6231(a)(3). Once the 1993 Agreement was reached, the Tax Court determined allocation issues at the partnership level. The difficulty here is that (consistent with its own then-governing precedent) the court held that § 6221(c) interest was an affected item requiring factual determinations at the partner level, therefore it was not within the court's jurisdiction in the partnership-level proceedings. This decision was not appealed, but Ertz Taxpayers did challenge § 6621(c) interest in the collection due process, or partner-level, proceedings. Meanwhile, the Tax Court's similar ruling at the partnership-level proceedings in River City Ranches #1 was appealed. We reversed and remanded, holding that the Tax Court --at the level of partnership proceedings --had jurisdiction to rule on the character of the partnerships' transactions for purposes of § 6621(c) interest. River City Ranches #1, 401 F.3d at 1143-44. In the wake of River City Ranches #1, the parties asked the Tax Court in these cases to use the findings, or lack thereof, in the DGE 85-5 partnership-level proceedings to determine whether their partnership transactions were tax motivated. The court declined to do so, believing that its prior decisions could not fairly be interpreted as making those findings or determinations. Given this, and deferring to our decision in River City Ranches #1 that the character of a partnership's transactions is a partnership item to be determined at the partnership level, the Tax Court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to determine DGE 85-5's partnership items, including whether its transactions were tax motivated. Accordingly, it did not decide whether Ertz Taxpayers had substantial underpayments of tax resulting from tax-motivated transactions. The net result is that Ertz Taxpayers owe § 6621(c) interest without a court having specifically ruled on any aspect of that interest.

[15] We must decide whether, in these circumstances, the Tax Court had jurisdiction in the partner-level proceedings to determine from findings that were made and from the record adduced in the partnership-level proceedings, whether the partnership transactions were tax motivated or not. We conclude that the Tax Court in these partner-level proceedings had jurisdiction to review the decision and evidence in the partnership-level proceedings for this limited purpose.

[16] The Tax Court clearly has jurisdiction in a collection due process proceeding to consider issues relating to a taxpayer's liability which the taxpayer has had no opportunity to dispute. See § 6330(c)(2)(B). This is true here of issues relating to Ertz Taxpayers' liability for § 6621(c) interest. Unless the Tax Court has jurisdiction to review the partnership-level record, Taxpayers will have no forum for disputing the imposition of § 6621 penalties. While River City Ranches #1 recognized that jurisdiction lies in the partnership-level proceeding to decide whether partnership transactions are tax motivated, we did not purport to revoke the Tax Court's residual jurisdiction in a partner-level proceeding to entertain issues over which the taxpayer otherwise would have no review. As the Commissioner included § 6621(c) interest in his Notices of Determination, we hold that the Tax Court had jurisdiction to consider Ertz Taxpayers' challenge to the amount of their liability, including liability for additional interest penalties, that the Commissioner determined. In exercising this jurisdiction the Tax Court should not be making an independent judgment at the partner level about whether partnership transactions were tax motivated, but rather should be reviewing the partnership-level proceedings to determine whether the findings and the record there show the character of the partnerships' transactions.

We agree with the Tax Court that no explicit findings were made on partnership-level issues relevant to § 6621(c) interest in DGE 85-5. However, we disagree that the court needed to stop at this point. Rather, it could consider what was implicitly found as well. Cf. Botany Worsted Mills v. United States, 278 U.S. 282, 290 (1929) (noting "[subsidiary] findings will not support a judgment unless ... the ultimate fact follows from them as a necessary inference and may be held to result as a conclusion of law"). A necessary implication of what was found in DGE 85-5 is that the outstanding tax liabilities for 1985 and 1986 were attributable to either an overvaluation or a sham transaction. Either way, the transactions were tax motivated.

The applicable (former) version of § 6621(c) stated:


(1) In general. In the case of interest payable under section 6601 with respect to any substantial underpayment attributable to tax motivated transactions, the rate of interest established under this section shall be 120 percent of the underpayment rate established under this section.



(2) Substantial underpayment attributable to tax motivated transactions. For purposes of this subsection, the term "substantial underpayment attributable to tax motivated transactions" means any underpayment of taxes imposed by subtitle A for any taxable year which is attributable to 1 or more tax motivated transactions if the amount of the underpayment for such year so attributable exceeds $1,000.



(3) Tax motivated transactions.




(A) In general. For purposes of this subsection, the term "tax motivated transaction" means --



(i) any valuation overstatement (within the meaning of section 6659(c)),



...



(v) any sham or fraudulent transaction.


A "valuation overstatement" is defined as "150 percent or more of the amount determined to be the correct amount of such valuation or adjusted basis." §§ 6621(c), 6659(c). A "sham or fraudulent transaction" is one that has no "practical economic effects other than the creation of income tax losses." Sochin v. Comm'r, 843 F.2d 351, 354 (9th Cir. 1988), abrogated on other grounds as recognized by Keane v. Comm'r, 865 F.2d 1088, 1092 n. 8 (9th Cir. 1989). The test for a "sham or fraudulent transaction" is whether "the taxpayer has shown 1) a non-tax business purpose (a subjective analysis), and 2) that the transaction had 'economic substance' beyond the generation of tax benefits (an objective analysis)." Id.; see also Sacks v. Comm'r, 69 F.3d 982, 988 (9th Cir. 1995).

In the partnership-level proceedings, the Tax Court adjusted the qualified investment property of DGE 85-5 from $4,701,120 to $480,000. Ertz Taxpayers argue that this adjustment cannot fit within the definition of overvaluation (150 percent or more of the actual value) without knowing how many cattle were included in each valuation. 15 The 1993 Agreement established a $4,000 per head value for the cattle; thus the adjustment to $480,000 reflects $4,000 multiplied by 120 cows. Ertz Taxpayers suggest that DGE 85-5's initial valuation of $4,701,120 could represent 784 cattle, which would equal $5,996 per head, and then the overvaluation would be less than 150 percent compared to the $4,000 per head valuation agreed upon in the 1993 Agreement. Essentially, the argument is that the partnership-level record does not conclusively reveal whether DGE 85-5 overvalued the actual number of cattle, included nonexistent cattle, or both.

However, no matter how one cuts it, the difference between the claimed value and the adjusted value is attributable to either an overvaluation or sham transaction. Based on the actual number of cows, 120, DGE 85-5's claimed valuation of $4,701,120 represents a per head valuation of $39,176, roughly ten times the actual value of $4,000. On the other hand, to the extent that Ertz Taxpayers did not overvalue their cattle in excess of 150 percent on the assumption that DGE 85-5's tax returns included at least 664 nonexistent cattle, then the disallowed portion of DGE 85-5's claimed tax benefits was based on cattle it never acquired. It follows that those benefits are the result of transactions that fit within the definition of a factual sham. Viewed either as an overvaluation or as a sham transaction, the effect is the same: underpayment by DGE 85-5 is necessarily "attributable to" a tax-motivated transaction as defined by § 6621(c).

[17] Ertz Taxpayers offer no explanation for the underpayment that escapes imposition of § 6621(c) interest. None appears in the record of the partnership-level proceedings. Accordingly, as a Commissioner's ruling "has the support of a presumption of correctness, and the petitioner has the burden of proving it to be wrong," Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933), we uphold his imposition of § 6621(c) interest.

Ertz Taxpayers maintain that an overvaluation penalty should nonetheless not apply when a deduction is disallowed in its entirety. See Keller, 556 F.3d at 1059-62; Gainer, 893 F.2d at 226. While we have held that where a deduction is disallowed in its entirety, any underpayment is not "attributable to" an overvaluation after taking into consideration the effect of disallowing the deduction, see Keller, 556 F.3d at 1060; Gainer, 893 F.2d at 226-29, the deduction claimed by DGE 85-5 was not disallowed in its entirety. Therefore, Gainer and Keller do not apply.

[18] Finally, Ertz Taxpayers submit that a partner-level determination is needed with respect to whether each partner made the valuation overstatement in good faith. Then-existing § 6659 authorized the Secretary to waive "all or any part of the addition to the tax provided by this section on a showing by the taxpayer that there was a reasonable basis for the valuation or adjusted basis claimed on the return and that such claim was made in good faith." § 6659(e) (1988). By its terms, § 6659(e) only applies to a valuation overstatement penalty imposed pursuant to § 6659. Section 6621 incorporates the definition of § 6659(c) that a valuation overstatement exists "if the value of any property ... claimed on any return is 150 percent or more of the amount determined to be the correct amount." Section 6621, however, does not incorporate the discretionary waiver for good faith underpayments in § 6659(e). Ertz Taxpayers point to no authority for interpreting the applicable version of § 6621 to include a good faith exception. To read the statute this way would require us to hold that a statutory provision that explicitly cross-references one part of another provision also implicitly incorporates another part of that other provision. We decline to do this. See, e.g., Botosan v. Paul McNally Realty, 216 F.3d 827, 832 (9th Cir. 2000) ("The incorporation of one statutory provision to the exclusion of another must be presumed intentional under the statutory canon of expressio unius."). It is "unlikely that Congress would absentmindedly forget to adopt a provision that appears a mere two paragraphs below the subsection it adopted." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).




V


Taxpayers raise a number of issues regarding evidentiary decisions by the Tax Court, including to grant the Commissioner's motion in limine excluding extra-record evidence, to limit trial time and restrict testimony, and to decline to enforce a subpoena for documents from the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration. We have considered the record on each of these points, and see no abuse of discretion in the Tax Court's rulings.




VI


[19] We conclude that the Commissioner did not abuse his discretion in rejecting offers-in-compromise that did not measure up under IRS guidelines and Treasury Regulations. Contrary to the Tax Court's view, it did have jurisdiction in the partner-level proceedings in these cases to review the record of partnership-level proceedings to determine whether the partnerships' transactions were tax motivated. Having conducted this review ourselves, we are satisfied that the partnership-level record admits of only one reasonable conclusion --that the partnerships' transactions were either overvalued or sham, thus tax motivated. We therefore vacate the portion of the Tax Court's order and decision in the Ertz Taxpayers' cases that dismisses the claim regarding § 6621(c) for lack of jurisdiction. We affirm the order in each of these sixteen cases to the extent it permits the Commissioner to proceed with the collection action as determined in the Notice of Determination Concerning Collection Action(s).

AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART.

1 All of the partnerships involved in these consolidated actions were subject to the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324. The version of § 6621(c) that was in effect for the relevant tax years, 1985 and 1986, increased the statutory interest rate by 120 percent for a "substantial underpayment attributable to tax motivated transactions." § 6621(c) (1988). This version of § 6621(c) was repealed in 1990. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7721(b), 103 Stat. 2106, 2399 (1989).

2 All statutory references are to the Internal Revenue Code as codified in Title 26 of the United States Code, unless otherwise noted.

3 Proceedings to revoke Hoyt's status as an Enrolled Agent were initiated in 1997. He was then indicted, and convicted on thirty-one counts of mail fraud (among other things) on February 12, 2001. United States v. Hoyt, No. CR-98-529 (D. Or. 2001), aff'd, 47 Fed. Appx. 834 (9th Cir. 2002). Taxpayers were identified as victims.

4 These taxpayers are Daniel O. Abelein, Estate of Carol Andrews and Robert Andrews, Roy and Antonette Barnes, Barry and Sherry Blondheim, Roger and Lora Carter, Roger D. and Mary M. Catlow, Donald and Yvonne Clayton, Gordon and Ilene Freeman, Franklin and Janetta Hubbart, Bobbie E. Johnson, and Martin and Sharon Smith. When appropriate, we will refer to them collectively as "Ertz Taxpayers," and to their partnerships collectively as "DGE 85-5."

5 The Tax Court had adhered to the same view in River City Ranches #1, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1365 (2003), which, unlike DGE 85-5, was appealed. In River City Ranches #1, we rejected the Tax Court's view that jurisdiction over § 6621(c) penalties lies only in partner-level proceedings, holding instead that the court has jurisdiction at the partnership level to make findings concerning the imposition of penalty interest under § 6621(c). 401 F.3d at 1138, 1143-44.

6 Section 301.7122-1(b)(3), which governs the ground for compromise based on effective tax administration, provides:

(i) A compromise may be entered into to promote effective tax administration when the Secretary determines that, although collection in full could be achieved, collection of the full liability would cause the taxpayer economic hardship within the meaning of Sec. 301.6343-1.

(ii) If there are no grounds for compromise under paragraphs (b)(1), (2), or (3)(i) of this section, the IRS may compromise to promote effective tax administration where compelling public policy or equity considerations identified by the taxpayer provide a sufficient basis for compromising the liability. Compromise will be justified only where, due to exceptional circumstances, collection of the full liability would undermine public confidence that the tax laws are being administered in a fair and equitable manner. A taxpayer proposing compromise under this paragraph (b)(3)(ii) will be expected to demonstrate circumstances that justify compromise even though a similarly situated taxpayer may have paid his liability in full.

(iii) No compromise to promote effective tax administration may be entered into if compromise of the liability would undermine compliance by taxpayers with the tax laws.

The regulations as such are not challenged in these cases.

7 Estate of Carol Andrews and Robert Andrews, Roy and Antonette Barnes, Roger and Lora Carter, Roger D. and Mary M. Catlow, Donald and Yvonne Clayton, Donald Ertz, Franklin and Janetta Hubbart, Bobbie E. Johnson, William H. and Jo Anne Lindley, Gary W. McDonough, and Martin and Sharon Smith.

8 Factors that support, but are not conclusive of, a determination to accept an economic hardship offer include: "(A) Taxpayer is incapable of earning a living because of a long term illness, medical condition, or disability, and it is reasonably foreseeable that taxpayer's financial resources will be exhausted providing for care and support during the course of the condition; (B) Although taxpayer has certain monthly income, that income is exhausted each month in providing for the care of dependents with no other means of support; and (C) Although taxpayer has certain assets, the taxpayer is unable to borrow against the equity in those assets and liquidation of those assets to pay outstanding tax liabilities would render the taxpayer unable to meet basic living expenses." 26 C.F.R. § 301.7122-1(c)(3)(i).

9 We agree with the Tax Court's determination that the Lindleys abandoned their offer based on doubt as to collectibility with special circumstances or economic hardship; on appeal the Lindleys contend the Commissioner erred even if their offer is treated under the standard for a normal doubt as to collectibility offer.

10 We note that this is not necessarily the end of the road. Whether equity is obtainable from an asset is investigated prior to an actual levy, and court approval is required before a principal residence can be seized. 26 U.S.C. § 6334(a)(13)(B), (e); 26 C.F.R. § 301.6334-1(d). Also, a taxpayer may make a new offer. Taxpayers may be entitled to another collection due process hearing if the IRS seeks to collect by levy. 26 U.S.C. §§ 6320(b)(2), 6330(b)(2). Finally, the Office of Appeals retains jurisdiction to consider changes in circumstances. 26 U.S.C. § 6330(d)(2); 26 C.F.R. § 301.6330-1(h).

11 Bales was tried in 1986 and the opinion, adverse to the Commissioner, was issued in October 1989. The headcount begun by the Commissioner in response to Bales had progressed sufficiently by May 1993 for the IRS and Hoyt to enter into a global settlement for tax years 1980 through 1986, and for the IRS to issue FPAAs for later tax years. Partnership-level cases were filed in 1994. The Tax Court issued opinions in 1996 resolving disagreements between Hoyt and the IRS over allocation of the 1980 through 1986 settlement items to the individual partners. See, e.g., SGE 82-2. In 1996 and 1997 the court held trials in two test cases for tax years 1987 and later, for which it issued opinions in 1999 and 2000. See Durham Farms, #1 v. Comm'r, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 2009 (2000), aff'd, 59 Fed. Appx. 952 (9th Cir. 2003); River City Ranches #4 v. Comm'r, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 2245 (1999), aff'd, 23 Fed. Appx. 744 (9th Cir. 2001). The ruling in River City Ranches #4 was the first on the merits since Bales in 1989.

12 See H.R. Rep. No. 105-599, at 289 (1998) (Conf. Rep.) (noting that the IRS may utilize the new authority to make compromises "to resolve longstanding cases by forgoing penalties and interest which have accumulated as a result of delay in determining the taxpayer's liability").

13 In the example, a taxpayer invests in a nationally-marketed partnership, claims investment tax credits from the partnership, the partnership is then audited, the taxpayer rejects the Commissioner's initial settlement offer, litigation by the partnership upholds the Commissioner's determination, and the taxpayer submits an offer-in-compromise supported by the argument that the tax managing partner is at fault and the statutory rules are unfair. The example suggests that compromise on the grounds of equity "would undermine the purpose of both the penalty and interest provisions at issue and the consistent settlement principles of TEFRA."

14 See Hansen, 471 F.3d at 1029-33; Mortensen v. Comm'r, 440 F.3d 375, 387-93 (6th Cir. 2006); Van Scoten v. Comm'r, 439 F.3d 1243, 1252-60 (10th Cir. 2006)."

15 The Commissioner relies on a schedule that was not referenced or incorporated in any stipulation in the partnership-level proceedings. We cannot say that the Tax Court necessarily relied on the numbers contained in the Commissioner's schedule, therefore we do not consider it.

Labels:

Thursday, June 11, 2009

Because petitioners do not meet the statutory presumption of profit, 2 we consider whether they engaged in the charter fishing activity for profit. We consider all the facts and circumstances in determining whether a taxpayer entered into the activity for profit, placing greater weight upon objective facts than the taxpayer's statements of intent. Dreicer v. Commissioner, supra at 645. The following nine nonexclusive factors are relevant in determining whether the taxpayer engaged in the activity for profit: (1) The manner in which the taxpayer carries on the activity; (2) the expertise of the taxpayer or his advisers; (3) the time and effort expended by the taxpayer in carrying on the activity; (4) the expectation that assets used in the activity may appreciate in value; (5) the success of the taxpayer in carrying on other similar or dissimilar activities; (6) the taxpayer's history of income or losses with respect to the activity; (7) the amount of occasional profits, if any, which are earned; (8) the financial status of the taxpayer; and (9) the elements of personal pleasure or recreation. Sec. 1.183-2(b), Income Tax Regs.



[T.C. Summary Opinion 2009-93]
Charles L. and Deborah J. Beasley v. Commissioner.

Docket No. 15470-07S . Filed June 10, 2009.


PANUTHOS, Chief Special Trial Judge: This case was heard pursuant to the provisions of section 7463 of the Internal Revenue Code in effect when the petition was filed. 1 Pursuant to section 7463(b), the decision to be entered is not reviewable by any other court, and this opinion shall not be treated as precedent for any other case.

Respondent determined Federal income tax deficiencies and accuracy-related penalties as follows:



Penalties

Year Deficiency Sec. 6662(a)

2003 $17,589 $3,517.80

2004 9,608 1,921.60

2005 5,570 1,114.00


The issues for decision are: (1) Whether petitioners' charter fishing activity was not engaged in for profit; and (2) whether petitioners are liable for the accuracy-related penalties.


Background

Some of the facts have been stipulated, and we incorporate the stipulation and accompanying exhibits by this reference. Petitioners were married and living in Maryland during the years at issue and at the time they filed the petition.

During the years at issue Charles Beasley (petitioner) was employed full time as an estimator and project manager for a heating, ventilating, and air conditioning installer. Mrs. Beasley was employed full time as a Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority police officer. Petitioner completed high school, as well as 5 years of trade school. Mrs. Beasley also completed high school.

Petitioner is a self-described "waterman", having spent much of his life on the water fishing and boating. Petitioner first obtained his U.S. Coast Guard master license in 1995 and had it renewed periodically. Petitioner obtained his Maryland commercial fishing license in 1996. Sometime before 2003 petitioners contemplated starting a charter fishing business to supplement their income. Before 2003 petitioners did not have any experience owning or operating a small business or a charter fishing business. During the years at issue petitioner maintained several related licenses, including his Coast Guard master license, a Maryland charter boat license, a Chesapeake Bay fishing license, and a Maryland guide license.

Between 2001 and early 2003 petitioners searched extensively for a used boat suitable for charter fishing operations in and around Chesapeake Bay. During this time petitioner informally surveyed charter boat captains regarding boat selection.

On January 30, 2003, petitioner wrote a business plan which indicated that he did not expect to make a profit initially but hoped to reach profitability within 3 years. He predicted the fuel cost of each trip to be $50. Petitioner inquired about the fees set by other charter captains and set his charter fees slightly below the prices reported to him. Petitioner did not seek any other advice while preparing his business plan.

Petitioners ordered a custom boat on February 3, 2003, at a contract price of $127,055. This price was later reduced to $122,435 to offset the cost of radar and depth-finding equipment petitioners purchased and installed themselves. The contract anticipated delivery on September 1, 2003, but petitioners did not receive the boat until November 3, 2003. After a modification to the propeller, petitioners deemed the boat suitable for charter fishing operations on November 15, 2003. The fishing season ended on November 30, 2003. As a result of the late delivery, petitioners canceled the charters they had booked for October and November. Petitioners did not receive any income from the charter fishing activity in 2003.

In 2004 petitioners made 21 paid fishing trips and at least 6 unpaid trips. Petitioners' gross receipts from their charter fishing activity in 2004 was $8,630. Petitioners did not pay for any advertising for their charter fishing activity in 2004.

In 2005 petitioners made 20 paid fishing trips and 1 or more unpaid trips. In an attempt to increase profitability, petitioners took their boat to Virginia Beach, Virginia, in late 2005 to operate winter charters.

Petitioners opened a bank account with SunTrust bank in 2003. The name on the account was "Charles L. Beasley, AKA Deborah J Charters." Petitioners deposited some of the receipts from their charter fishing activity into their personal account and deposited some of their wages, as well as other moneys, into the SunTrust account.

Petitioners booked fewer charters each year than their business plan required for profitability. The number of charter fishing boats operating in petitioners' area increased from about 50 in 2003 to about 150 in 2008.

Petitioners did not keep any financial accounting records for their charter fishing activity, and they did not consult an accountant for advice on the financial operation of that activity. Petitioners' evidence of income from charter fishing is limited to a handwritten list of dates, amounts, and names. Although they retained fuel and supply invoices as well as credit card receipts for income tax preparation purposes, they did not use their records to evaluate profitability.

Petitioner believed that the charter boat might appreciate in value; however, he had no expectation that the value of the boat would increase enough to offset the losses incurred during the initial years of the charter fishing activity. Petitioners believe that the charter fishing activity did not reduce their capacity to perform the duties of their regular employment. A full-day fishing trip required each petitioner to work a 13-hour day.

Petitioners had their returns for each of the years at issue prepared by Tax Consultants of North America. Petitioners' Forms 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, reported the following:



2003 2004 2005

Combined wages $128,290 $113,272 $93,162

Itemized
deductions 27,318 27,953 27,767

Exemption amount 9,150 9,300 9,600

Schedule C Charter
Activity

Receipts -0- 8,630 9,490

Expenses

Depreciation 73,800 19,680 11,808

Supplies 12,308 13,879 11,514

Other expenses 12,031 12,567 10,138

Interest on
loan 2,946 9,800 9,799

Profit (loss) (101,085) (47,296) (33,769)

Taxable Income
and Overpayment

Taxable income -0- 33,179 28,475

Tax -0- 4,261 3,541

Withholding 14,706 11,518 8,957

Overpayment
(refund) (14,706) (7,257) (5,416)


Respondent issued a notice of deficiency on April 18, 2007. Respondent disallowed petitioners' expense deductions claimed on, Schedule C, Profit or Loss From Business, in excess of their Schedule C income, and determined deficiencies for 2003, 2004, and 2005. Additionally, respondent determined a section 6662 accuracy-related penalty for each year.


Discussion

In general, the Commissioner's determinations set forth in a notice of deficiency are presumed correct, and the taxpayer bears the burden of proving that these determinations are in error. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances. Petitioners have alleged that section 7491(a) applies but have not established compliance with its requirements. Petitioners therefore bear the burden of proof.



I. Whether Petitioners' Charter Fishing Activity Was Not Engaged in for Profit
Respondent contends that petitioners' deductions from their charter fishing activity are subject to the limitations of section 183 because the activity was not a trade or business. If a taxpayer is not engaged in a trade or business under section 162, he generally may deduct the expenses related to an activity "not engaged in for profit" only to the extent of the gross income derived from the activity for the taxable year. Sec. 183(a) and (b)(2).

Section 162(a) provides that a taxpayer who is carrying on a "trade or business" may deduct ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in connection with the operation of the business. To be engaged in a trade or business within the meaning of section 162, "the taxpayer's primary purpose for engaging in the activity must be for income or profit." Commissioner v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 35 (1987). Profit means economic profit, independent of tax savings. Surloff v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 210, 233 (1983).

A taxpayer seeking to deduct trade or business expenses under section 162 must establish that the underlying activity was engaged in with an actual and honest profit objective. Dreicer v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 642, 645 (1982), affd. without published opinion 702 F.2d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The taxpayer must have entered into the activity, or continued the activity, with the actual, honest, and bona fide objective of making a profit. Filios v. Commissioner, 224 F.3d 16, 23 (1st Cir. 2000), affg. T.C. Memo. 1999-92; Dreicer v. Commissioner, supra at 644-645; sec. 1.183-2(a), Income Tax Regs. Objective indicia may be considered to establish the taxpayer's true intent. Dreicer v. Commissioner, supra at 644-645.

Because petitioners do not meet the statutory presumption of profit, 2 we consider whether they engaged in the charter fishing activity for profit. We consider all the facts and circumstances in determining whether a taxpayer entered into the activity for profit, placing greater weight upon objective facts than the taxpayer's statements of intent. Dreicer v. Commissioner, supra at 645. The following nine nonexclusive factors are relevant in determining whether the taxpayer engaged in the activity for profit: (1) The manner in which the taxpayer carries on the activity; (2) the expertise of the taxpayer or his advisers; (3) the time and effort expended by the taxpayer in carrying on the activity; (4) the expectation that assets used in the activity may appreciate in value; (5) the success of the taxpayer in carrying on other similar or dissimilar activities; (6) the taxpayer's history of income or losses with respect to the activity; (7) the amount of occasional profits, if any, which are earned; (8) the financial status of the taxpayer; and (9) the elements of personal pleasure or recreation. Sec. 1.183-2(b), Income Tax Regs.

1. Manner in Which the Taxpayer Carries On the Activity

The fact that the taxpayer carries on the activity in a businesslike manner may indicate that the activity is engaged in for profit. Elliott v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 960, 972 (1988), affd. without published opinion 899 F.2d 18 (9th Cir. 1990); Engdahl v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 659, 666 (1979); sec. 1.183-2(b)(1), Income Tax Regs. Relevant indicators include maintaining complete and accurate books and records, obtaining a business license, maintaining a separate business bank account, developing a written business plan, having a plausible strategy for earning a profit, and attempting changes in order to improve profitability. See Morley v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-312; Holowinski v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-168; Ellis v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1984-50; sec. 1.183-2(b)(1), Income Tax Regs.

Petitioners did not keep a journal or a book of accounts for their charter fishing activity. Petitioners instead retained numerous credit card receipts and fuel and supply invoices that reflect some of the expenses incurred with respect to that activity. Petitioners also produced a list of amounts and dates that generally reflect their charter fishing income. We are not convinced that petitioners' recordkeeping represented anything other than an effort to substantiate expenses claimed on their returns. 3

For a taxpayer's books and records to reflect a businesslike activity, the taxpayer's books and records must provide a method for measuring profits, controlling expenses, and evaluating the overall performance of the operation. Golanty v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 411, 430 (1979), affd. without published opinion 647 F.2d 170 (9th Cir. 1981). Petitioners did not present any evidence that they prepared and maintained records to evaluate the profitability of their operations. 4 Petitioners' failure to keep contemporaneous accounting records undermines their asserted profit objective.

Petitioner did obtain the licenses required to run a sole proprietorship charter fishing business for profit in Maryland. These licenses, however, appear to be necessary for any charter fishing activity to take place, and are not necessarily indicative of an actual profit motive. We also note that petitioner obtained his Coast Guard master license and commercial fishing license several years before petitioners began any charter fishing activity. Petitioner's licenses do not support, nor undercut, the asserted profit objective.

While petitioners maintained a separate bank account designated for the charter fishing activity, they commingled charter fishing and personal funds. 5 Such commingling does not support a finding that petitioners conducted the activity in a businesslike manner that would demonstrate a profit objective. See Ballich v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1978-497.

Petitioners introduced a signed and dated business plan. While the existence of a plan supports the asserted profit objective, it cannot alone prove such an objective.

Petitioners made changes to their charter fishing activity at the end of 2005 and added winter charters from Virginia Beach, Virginia. Petitioners' decision to expand their charter fishing season supports their asserted profit objective. 6

On balance, this factor supports respondent's determination.

2. Expertise of the Taxpayers or Their Advisers

Preparation for the activity by extensive study of its accepted business and economic practices or consultation with experts may indicate that the taxpayer has a profit objective where the taxpayer carries on the activity in accordance with those practices. Sec. 1.183-2(b)(2), Income Tax Regs.

Before petitioners began their charter fishing activity, petitioner called other charter operators in the area to determine their pricing structure in order to establish competitive rates. Petitioner's calls extracted little information regarding business practices or the likelihood of success in the charter fishing business. 7 Petitioners failed to establish that they acquired any expertise or took reasonable steps to acquire such expertise in the accepted business or accounting practices required to run a profitable business.

Petitioners relied on their knowledge of recreational fishing to make their charter fishing activity profitable, apparently not recognizing that they would also have to control expenses relative to income. The lack of consultation with small business experts undercuts petitioners' claim that they engaged in the charter fishing activity with a profit objective.

This factor supports respondent's determination.

3. Time and Effort Expended

The fact that a taxpayer devotes much of his personal time and effort to carrying on the activity may indicate an intent to profit, particularly if the activity does not have substantial personal or recreational elements. Sec. 1.183-2(b)(3), Income Tax Regs.

During the years at issue petitioners each maintained fulltime employment that was not related to their charter fishing activity. Petitioners testified that a standard 8-hour charter fishing trip often required 13 hours of work from each petitioner. Nevertheless, as we discuss in greater detail below, charter fishing has substantial personal or recreational aspects for petitioners. Id. The time petitioners spent working on the charter fishing activity is also consistent with their use of the boat for recreation. See Warden v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-176 (finding that the time taxpayers spent cleaning and maintaining their yacht was consistent with the use of the yacht for recreation), affd. without published opinion 111 F.3d 139 (9th Cir. 1997).

This factor is neutral.

4. Expectation That Assets Used in the Activity May Appreciate in Value

A taxpayer's expectation that assets such as land and other tangible property used in an activity may appreciate in value and generate an overall profit may indicate that the taxpayer has a profit objective as to that activity. Sec. 1.183-2(b)(4), Income Tax Regs. An overall profit is present if net earnings and appreciation are sufficient to recoup losses sustained in prior years. Bessenyey v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 261, 274 (1965), affd. 379 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1967).

Petitioners acknowledge that they had no expectation that the value of the boat would increase so much that it would offset the losses incurred during the first 3 years of their charter fishing activity.

This factor does not support petitioners' asserted profit objective.

5. Success of Taxpayer in Carrying On Other Similar or Dissimilar Activities

The fact that the taxpayer has engaged in similar activities in the past and converted them from unprofitable to profitable enterprises may indicate that he is engaged in the present activity for profit, even though the activity is presently unprofitable. Sec. 1.183-2(b)(5), Income Tax Regs.

Though petitioners attempt to connect their prior work experience and their charter fishing activity, we do not find any evidence that petitioners' estimating and law enforcement experience would indicate that they could transform an unprofitable charter fishing enterprise into a profitable one.

This factor does not support petitioners' asserted profit objective.

6. History of Income or Losses

A series of losses during the initial stage of an activity is not necessarily an indication that the activity is not engaged in for profit. Sec. 1.183-2(b)(6), Income Tax Regs. However, continued losses which cannot be explained may indicate that the activity is not engaged in for profit. Id.

Petitioners did not earn charter fishing receipts in excess of their expenses during any of the tax years at issue. Petitioners claimed losses of $101,085 for 2003, $47,296 for 2004, and $33,769 for 2005. Petitioners had no clients and no trips in 2003, 14 clients and 21 trips in 2004, and 15 clients and 20 trips in 2005.

Although petitioners have offered explanations for continued losses, such as a slow economy and rising fuel costs, their reasons do not rise to the level necessary to offset the size of their losses for every year of their charter fishing activity. Further, petitioner's testimony regarding the tripling of the number of charter fishing operations in his area does not support his contention of a weak charter fishing market. We conclude that this factor does not support petitioners' asserted profit objective.

7. Amount of Occasional Profits

An opportunity to earn a substantial profit in a highly speculative venture is ordinarily sufficient to indicate that the activity is engaged in for profit even though losses or only occasional small profits are actually generated. Sec. 1.183-2(b)(7), Income Tax Regs.

Petitioners' charter fishing activity is not a highly speculative venture, such as oil prospecting. See sec. 1.183-2(a), Income Tax Regs. Further, there is no indication that a windfall profit may ever be generated by this particular activity. Therefore, this factor does not support petitioners' asserted profit objective.

8. Taxpayer's Financial Status

The fact that the taxpayer does not have substantial income from sources other than the activity may indicate that the activity is engaged in for profit. Sec. 1.183-2(b)(8), Income Tax Regs. Substantial income from other sources may indicate the lack of a profit objective, however, particularly if there are personal or recreational elements in the activity. Id.

Petitioners' wage income for each of the 3 years at issue is substantial; petitioners reported combined wages of $128,290 in 2003, $113,272 in 2004, and $93,162 in 2005. Because of their Schedule C losses, petitioners realized significant tax savings for each year at issue. Considering the personal and recreational elements involved in petitioners' charter fishing activity, as we discuss below, this factor undercuts petitioners' claim that they engaged in the activity with an intent to profit without regard for tax savings. See Surloff v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. at 233; sec. 1.183-2(b)(8), Income Tax Regs.

This factor supports respondent's determination.

9. Elements of Personal Pleasure

The presence of personal motives in carrying on an activity may indicate that the activity is not engaged in for profit, particularly where there are recreational or personal elements involved. Sec. 1.183-2(b)(9), Income Tax Regs. However, the fact that the taxpayer derives personal pleasure from engaging in the activity, alone, is insufficient to foreclose for-profit treatment. Id.

Mr. Beasley has been an avid waterman all his life. Fishing can be a decidedly recreational activity, and there is no evidence that petitioners do not derive personal pleasure from the activity. The personal pleasure or recreation that petitioners derive from the charter fishing activity, while not preclusive of a profit motive, also does not support petitioners' assertion that they engaged in the activity primarily for profit. See id.



II. Summary of Factors
Having considered the above factors and recognizing that no one factor is controlling, we conclude that even though petitioners may have entered into the charter fishing activity hoping for eventual profitability, the facts presented do not support a finding that, during the years at issue, petitioners engaged in their charter fishing activity with a profit objective as defined by section 1.183-2(b), Income Tax Regs. Accordingly, we hold that respondent correctly applied section 183 by allowing expense deductions only to the extent of petitioners' income from charter fishing.



III. Penalties
By virtue of section 7491(c), the Commissioner has the burden of production with respect to the accuracy-related penalty. To meet this burden, he must produce sufficient evidence indicating that it is appropriate to impose the penalty. See Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 446 (2001). Once the Commissioner meets this burden of production, a taxpayer must come forward with persuasive evidence that the Commissioner's determination is incorrect. Rule 142(a); see Higbee v. Commissioner, supra.

Respondent determined accuracy-related penalties under section 6662, which provides for a penalty equal to 20 percent of an underpayment if the underpayment is due to a substantial understatement of income tax. Sec. 6662(a) and (b)(2). Section 6662(d)(1)(A) defines a substantial understatement of income tax as an understatement that exceeds the greater of: (i) 10-percent of the tax required to be shown on the return for the taxable year; or (ii) $5,000. For each year at issue petitioners' return contained an understatement of income tax that meets the section 6662(d)(1)(A) definition, as follows:



Tax
Required
to be Tax
Year Shown Shown Understatement

2003 $17,589 -0- $17,589

2004 13,869 $4,261 9,608

2005 9,111 3,541 5,570


A taxpayer may avoid the application of an accuracy-related penalty by proving that he acted with reasonable cause and in good faith. See sec. 6664(c)(1); see also Higbee v. Commissioner, supra at 446-447; sec. 1.6664-4(a), Income Tax Regs. We analyze whether a taxpayer acted with reasonable cause and good faith by examining the relevant facts and circumstances and, most importantly, the extent to which the taxpayer attempted to assess his proper tax liability. See Neely v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 934, 947 (1985); Stubblefield v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-537; sec 1.6664-4(b)(1), Income Tax Regs. In order for the reasonable cause exception to apply, the taxpayer must prove that he exercised ordinary business care and prudence as to the disputed item. See Neonatology Associates, P.A. v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 43, 98 (2000), affd. 299 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2002).

Reliance upon the advice of a tax professional may establish reasonable cause and good faith for the purpose of avoiding liability for the section 6662(a) penalty. See United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 250 (1985). Reliance on a tax professional is not an "absolute defense" but merely "a factor to be considered." Freytag v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 849, 888 (1987), affd. 904 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1990), affd. 501 U.S. 868 (1991). As a general rule, a taxpayer cannot shift the responsibility of filing an accurate return to a return preparer. Metra Chem Corp. v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 654, 662 (1987). However, we have held that under certain circumstances the taxpayer may avoid the imposition of a penalty if there was good faith reliance by the taxpayer on the advice of a competent adviser. Jackson v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 492, 539-540 (1986), affd. 864 F.2d 1521 (10th Cir. 1989). Whether reasonable cause exists when a taxpayer has relied on a tax professional to prepare a return must be determined on the basis of all of the facts and circumstances. See Neonatology Associates, P.A. v. Commissioner, supra at 98. The taxpayer claiming good faith reliance on a competent adviser must demonstrate that: "(1) The adviser was a competent professional who had sufficient expertise to justify reliance, (2) the taxpayer provided necessary and accurate information to the adviser, and (3) the taxpayer actually relied in good faith on the adviser's judgment." Id. at 99. Reliance on a return preparer is not reasonable where even a cursory review of the return would reveal inaccurate entries. See Pratt v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-279.

For the years at issue petitioners had their Federal tax returns prepared by a professional preparer. There is no evidence that petitioners' preparer was not competent or that petitioners were not justified in relying on the preparer's expertise in preparing tax returns for individuals and sole proprietors. It does not appear from the record that petitioners were anything other than forthright with their preparer. Petitioners were not educated in accounting or tax return preparation. Petitioners apparently relied on the preparer's judgment to complete and enter amounts on proper schedules on the returns. It appears that petitioners provided accurate information to their preparer for completion of their returns.

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An IRS settlement officer abused his discretion in sustaining a proposed levy when he failed to grant an extension to the taxpayer to file a revised Form 433-A with corrected taxpayer financial information. The taxpayer's past cooperation with IRS Appeals should have indicated that he would have submitted the revised financial information in a timely fashion if given a brief extension. The short delay in submitting the form did not justify the settlement officer sustaining the levy without granting the extension for the taxpayer to revise the Form 433-A, given the fact that the IRS had neglected to inform the taxpayer that it had lost his first Form 433-A which had been submitted several months previously. In addition, the record indicated that the settlement officer did not make a determination based on the financial information provided by the taxpayer, as required by Code Sec. 6330.



Robert Judge v. Commissioner.

Dkt. No. 28615-07L , TC Memo. 2009-135, June 10, 2009.





MEMORANDUM OPINION

GOEKE, Judge: Petitioner seeks review of respondent's determination to proceed with a proposed levy to collect income tax liabilities for tax years 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004. The issue for decision is whether respondent abused his discretion in sustaining the levy. For the reasons stated herein, we hold that respondent abused his discretion.


Background

The parties submitted this case fully stipulated under Rule 122. 1 The stipulation of facts and the attached exhibits are incorporated herein by this reference. Petitioner resided in New York at the time of filing his petition.

Petitioner filed individual income tax returns that reported tax due for the years at issue. The unpaid tax resulted from insufficient estimated income tax payments. Petitioner did not submit any payments with his returns. In 2004 petitioner entered into and subsequently defaulted on an installment agreement with respect to 2001. In 2005 petitioner submitted an offer-in-compromise with respect to the years at issue. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) rejected the offer-in-compromise on the basis that petitioner's reasonable collection potential exceeded the offer.

In April 2007 respondent issued a notice of intent to levy for the years at issue. At that time petitioner had unpaid assessments in excess of $200,000 plus accrued interest for the years at issue. Petitioner timely requested a collection due process hearing (CDP hearing) and indicated that he would pursue an installment agreement or an offer-in-compromise. The Appeals Office requested that petitioner provide a completed Form 433-A, Collection Information Statement for Wage Earners and Self-Employed Individuals. Petitioner submitted a Form 433-A to the Appeals Office on July 2, 2007. Upon receipt of the Form 433-A the Appeals Office assigned the case to a settlement officer. In October 2007 the Appeals Office discovered that the settlement officer had not received the case file because the file was apparently delivered to an incorrect address. Once he received the case file, the settlement officer could not find the Form 433-A. In an October 11, 2007, letter, the settlement officer requested that petitioner submit a Form 433-A, a signed 2006 return, and proof of 2007 estimated tax payments within 14 days, i.e., by October 25, 2007. The settlement officer did not inform petitioner that he could not find the Form 433-A petitioner had previously submitted. Petitioner had filed his 2006 return electronically before the date of this letter.

On November 8, 2007, the settlement officer held a telephone conference with petitioner's representative. During the hearing petitioner's representative stated that petitioner sent the requested documents 2 days before, but the settlement officer had not received the documents. Petitioner's representative stated that he believed petitioner's income was overstated on the Form 433-A and requested a brief extension of time to prepare a revised Form 433-A. Petitioner's representative also stated that petitioner qualified for an offer-in-compromise. The settlement officer denied the request for an extension. Shortly after the hearing, the settlement officer received the Form 433-A and the 2006 return. During the CDP hearing petitioner did not challenge the underlying tax liabilities for 2000 through 2004. On November 19, 2007, respondent issued a notice of determination sustaining the levy for the years at issue.


Discussion

Petitioner argues that the settlement officer abused his discretion because he refused to grant a brief extension of time for petitioner to submit a revised Form 433-A to correct his income information. Because petitioner does not dispute the underlying tax liabilities, we review respondent's determination sustaining the collection action for abuse of discretion. See Sego v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 604, 610 (2000); Goza v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 176, 182 (2000). An abuse of discretion occurs when the Appeals officer's determination was arbitrary, capricious, or without sound basis in fact or law. Murphy v. Commissioner, 125 T.C. 301, 308 (2005), affd. 469 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2006).

At a CDP hearing a taxpayer may raise any relevant issue relating to the collection action including challenges to the appropriateness of the collection actions and possible collection alternatives. Sec. 6330(c)(2)(A). Following the hearing, the Appeals officer must determine whether the collection action should proceed. The Appeals officer must consider: (1) Whether the requirements of applicable law and administrative procedure have been met, (2) any issues the taxpayer raised, and (3) whether the collection action balances the need for efficient collection of taxes with the taxpayer's legitimate concern that any collection action be no more intrusive than necessary. Sec. 6330(c)(3).

It is not an abuse of discretion for an Appeals officer to sustain a collection action on the basis of a taxpayer's failure to submit requested financial information. See Cavazos v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-257; Chandler v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-99. Respondent argues that the settlement officer did not abuse his discretion because petitioner failed to provide the financial information necessary to consider collection alternatives. The record clearly establishes otherwise. The settlement officer denied petitioner's request for a brief extension at the hearing on the ground that petitioner failed to provide a Form 433-A before the October 25 deadline, which is clearly incorrect because petitioner provided a Form 433-A to the Appeals Office in July 2007, 4 months before the hearing. 2 The Appeals Office misplaced petitioner's Form 433-A, but the settlement officer never informed petitioner of this fact. The settlement officer's basis for denying petitioner's request for a brief extension, i.e., petitioner's failure to provide a Form 433-A before the hearing, is contrary to the facts in the record. Accordingly, we hold that he abused his discretion in denying a brief extension and sustaining the levy.

In denying a brief extension, the settlement officer also failed to consider that petitioner resubmitted the Form 433-A at the settlement officer's request on November 6, 2007. The settlement officer had not received petitioner's second submission of the Form 433-A before the CDP hearing on November 8, 2007. The settlement officer knew petitioner had sent it, and he received the Form 433-A shortly after the hearing. The record does not establish the date the settlement officer received the Form 433-A or whether he received the form before the issuance of the notice of determination on November 19, 2007. However, the settlement officer denied petitioner's request for a brief extension on the basis that he did not receive the Form 433-A by the October 25 deadline. This short delay in petitioner's submission of the second Form 433-A does not justify respondent's sustaining the levy without granting a brief extension for petitioner to revise his income information, especially in view of the fact that the settlement officer failed to acknowledge that the Appeals Office lost petitioner's first Form 433-A submitted 4 months before the CDP hearing.

Respondent contends that the settlement officer could not have considered the Form 433-A because it was incorrect. The record supports petitioner's claim that his income information was overstated on the second Form 433-A that petitioner submitted. The second Form 433-A listed petitioner's monthly net business income as nearly double his net profit from his business reported on his 2006 Schedule C, Profit or Loss From Business. In view of this clear inconsistency and the fact that the Appeals Office lost petitioner's first Form 433-A, we believe that it was unreasonable for the settlement officer to refuse to grant petitioner a brief extension.

Irrespective of whether or not the Form 433-A was correct, the record establishes that the settlement officer did not make any determination based on the financial information petitioner provided as section 6330 requires. Section 6330 requires the settlement officer to consider information the taxpayer presented. The settlement officer did not make any determination based upon the information petitioner provided regarding petitioner's ability to pay the tax liabilities or whether he would qualify for collection alternatives such as an offer-in-compromise. See Crisan v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-318; Schulman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-129. The settlement officer could not have done so when he decided at the CDP hearing to deny the extension because the Appeals Office misplaced the Form 433-A petitioner sent in July 2007 and the settlement officer had not yet received the second Form 433-A petitioner sent 2 days before the hearing.

Respondent also argues that petitioner failed to provide an offer-in-compromise before the CDP hearing. The settlement officer did not request that petitioner submit an offer-in-compromise before the CDP hearing date. Nor did the settlement officer base his decision to deny a brief extension on the fact that petitioner did not provide an offer-in-compromise before the CDP hearing. Respondent argues that the settlement officer reasonably determined that collection alternatives would be ineffective on the basis of the defaulted installment agreement and previously rejected offer-in-compromise. However, the record does not indicate that the settlement officer considered these past collection alternatives when making his determination.

We hold that the settlement officer's refusal to grant a brief extension for petitioner to correct the income information on his Form 433-A was an abuse of discretion and denied petitioner his right to a fair hearing. Petitioner's past cooperation with the Appeals Office persuades us that he would have timely submitted the revised financial information if granted an extension. Petitioner had not previously requested an extension and had cooperated with the Appeals Office. Cf. Roman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-20 (taxpayer received repeated extensions and still failed to provide the requested information); Rodriguez v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-153 (same). Accordingly, we shall remand this matter for the Appeals Office to consider an offer-in-compromise or other collection alternative.

To reflect the foregoing,

An appropriate order will be issued.

1 All Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure, and unless otherwise indicated all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code.

2 In the attachment to the notice of determination, the settlement officer justified his denial of a brief extension as follows: "The information was to be submitted by October 25th and still not received, further extension was denied."

Labels:

Wednesday, June 10, 2009

Failure to make deposit requirement - section 6656

Heartland Automotive Enterprises, Inc., Plaintiff, v. United States of America by and through the Commissioner of Internal Revenue Service, Defendant.

U.S. District Court, Mid. Dist. Ga., Macon Div.; Civil Action No. 5:07-CV-037-HL, May 27, 2009.

[ Code Secs. 6302 and 6656]


A corporation was not entitled to abatement of penalties imposed by the IRS for its failure to deposit employment taxes electronically through the Electronic Federal Tax Payment System (EFTPS). Although the corporation paid the taxes in a timely manner, it was liable for the penalties under Code Sec. 6656 because it deposited the taxes with a federal depository bank, rather than through the EFTPS. The corporation failed to prove that such noncompliance was due to reasonable cause and not willful neglect. The documents the corporation claimed to have relied on did not support reasonable cause. Rather, the corporation's comptroller admitted that he did not refer to the regulations and other published guidance regarding electronic deposits.




ORDER


LAWSON, Judge: This a tax refund case in which the Plaintiff seeks a refund of $24,731.97 in penalties paid to the Internal Revenue Service for failure to electronically deposit certain taxes. Pending before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 20). 1 For the foregoing reasons, the Defendant's Motion is granted.



I. BACKGROUND

The material facts of this case are not in dispute: Heartland Automotive Enterprises ("Heartland") operated a car dealership in Warner Robins, Georgia from 1997 to 2003. From the period of June 30, 2000 through March 21, 2001, Heartland made a timely and full deposit of its federal employment, unemployment, and excise taxes, but failed to do so electronically through the Electronic Federal Tax Payment System ("EFTPS"), as required by 26 U.S.C. § 6302(h). 2 The IRS imposed failureto-deposit penalties under 26 U.S.C. § 6656. 3

There is no dispute that Heartland was required to utilize the EFTPS for the periods in questions. Heartland contends, however, that under § 6656 the imposition of penalties should have been waived because non-compliance with the EFTPS was due to reasonable cause and not willful neglect. Heartland subsequently filed a claim for refund and request for abatement of the assessed penalties with the IRS. Following receipt of notice from the IRS disallowing the claim, Heartland filed suit in this Court on January 30, 2007. The IRS filed a counterclaim in the amount of $74,566.06, representing the uncollected penalties, plus interest, assessed pursuant to § 6656 (Doc. 10). 4



II. DISCUSSION



A. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment must be granted if "the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). A genuine issue of material fact arises only when "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510, (1986). When considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court must evaluate all of the evidence, together with any logical inferences, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at 254-55. The Court may not, however, make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. Id. at 255; see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S. Ct. 2097, 2110 (2000).

The moving party "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553 (1986) (internal quotations omitted). If the moving party meets this burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and present specific evidence showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact, or that the nonmoving party is not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 324-26. This evidence must consist of more than mere conclusory allegations. See Avirgan v. Hull, 932 F.2d 1572, 1577 (11th Cir. 1991). Under this scheme summary judgment must be entered "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.



B. 26 U.S.C. § 6656

The disposition of this case turns on whether Plaintiff's failure to comply with 26 U.S.C. § 6656(a) is due to reasonable cause and not willful neglect. 26 U.S.C. § 6656(a) provides:
Underpayment of Deposits.-In the case of any failure by any person to deposit (as required by this title or by regulations of the Secretary under this title) on the date prescribed therefor any amount of tax imposed by this title in such government depository as authorized under section 6302(c) to receive such deposit, unless it is shown that such failure is due to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect, there shall be imposed upon such person a penalty equal to the applicable percentage of the amount of the underpayment.

Section 6656 does not specifically state failure-to-deposit penalties shall be imposed on a taxpayer for failing to deposit tax payments electronically where the taxpayer otherwise pays the taxes on time and in the correct amount. However, Treas. Reg. § 31.6302-1(h) requires that certain tax deposits be made electronically, as opposed to depositing them through a federally authorized depository bank. Applying cannon's of statutory interpretation, two district courts have read the parenthetical portion of § 6656 in conjunction with Treas. Reg. § 31.6302-1(h) to mandate a failure-to-deposit penalty whenever a taxpayer fails to deposit tax payments electronically, irrespective of whether the taxpayer complied with all other deposit requirements. Fallu v. United States, No. 06 Civ. 13248 2008 WL 397912, *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2008); F.E. Schumacher Co., Inc. v. U.S., 308 F. Supp. 2d 819, 826-30 (N.D. Ohio 2004); see also 13 Mertens Law of Fed. Income Tax'n § 47A:43.40 ("Absent reasonable cause, a taxpayer that is required to deposit federal taxes by [the EFTPS] is subject to the failure-to-deposit penalty imposed by Section 6656 if the taxpayer deposits the taxes by means other than [the EFTPS], or by [the EFTPS] after the date on which the taxes are due."). This Court need not decide whether it concurs with the above interpretation of § 6656, however. In its brief, Heartland's arguments were all constructed on the assumption § 6656 that penalties are generally applicable to a taxpayer who, when required, does not utilize the EFTPS. Therefore, because Heartland has not challenged the applicability of § 6656, the crux of the issue is whether its failure to abide by the Treasury Regulations was due to reasonable cause and not willful neglect.

Section 6656(a) expressly waives imposition of the penalties described therein where it is shown that non-compliance is due to reasonable cause and not willful neglect. In discussing the same standard in the context of a penalty for failing to timely file a tax return under 26 U.S.C. § 6651, the Supreme Court, in United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 245, 105 S. Ct. 687, 689 (1985), held that "[t]o escape the penalty, the taxpayer bears the heavy burden of proving both (1) that the failure did not result from 'wilful neglect,' and (2) that the failure was 'due to reasonable cause." 5 Wilful neglect is defined as a conscious, intentional failure or reckless indifference. Id. Reasonable cause requires the exercise of ordinary business care and prudence with regards to its decisions and/or methods. Id.

In support of reasonable cause, Heartland essentially advances three justifications for its failure to deposit tax payments electronically. First, Heartland argues reasonable cause is established because its comptroller had made previous tax deposits via coupon at a federally authorized bank depository with no objection from the IRS. Second, Heartland points to its reliance upon particular documents that were allegedly misleading as to the requirement to use the electronic payment system. Finally, Heartland opines that the electronic deposit regulations are themselves complex and difficult to understand. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Heartland, as required under summary judgment, this Court finds such justifications do not amount to reasonable cause.

Heartland relies upon Dana Corp. v. United States, 764 F. Supp. 482 (N. D. Ohio 1991), for the argument that a failure to use the EFTPS was due to reasonable cause because of reliance on it comptroller, whom had previously made tax deposits via coupon at a federally authorized bank depository the during the tax periods in 2000 with no penalties assessed by the IRS. In Dana Corp., a company was penalized pursuant to § 6656 for failing to timely deposit the proper amount of payroll taxes 11 times over a two year period from 1982-1983. Id. at 484. The reason for the companies failure to make timely deposits was due to its misinterpretation of the "safe harbor" provision for payroll tax deposits found in Treas. Reg. 31.6302(c)-1(a)(1)(i)(b)(1). Id. Prior to when the penalties were first assessed the corporation had interpreted the provision to mean that "if [it] deposited 100% of its aggregate payroll taxes for one eighth-monthly period and 90% of its aggregate payroll taxes for the subsequent eighth-monthly period, [it] would not be liable for any penalties under § 6656 because it had deposited 95% of its payroll taxes over both periods." Id. The IRS, on the other hand, interpreted the provision to mean that "a company is liable for penalties under § 6656(a) each time an eighth-monthly period deposit is less than 95% of the aggregate payroll taxes due for that period." Id. The court held that although the IRS was correct in its interpretation of the provision, the company was not liable for penalties under § 6656 because its failure to deposit the payroll taxes in the required amounts was due to reasonable cause and not willful neglect. Id. at 487-88. In finding reasonable cause for the misinterpretation, the court noted that the company had a longstanding practice of staggering the percentages of payroll taxes due and that the IRS had never previously penalized them following audits despite occasionally not meeting the requirements of the safe harbor provision as the IRS interpreted them. Id. at 488.

There exists a salient difference between the facts presented in Dana Corp and the case at bar-namely, the absence of any misinterpretation of the taxpayer's duties. Here, Heartland does not contend that it understood Treas. Reg. § 31.6302-1(h) to mean it was not required to use the EFTPS. Rather, Heartland only contends that its ignorance of the requirements was reasonable in light of an absence of IRS objection the previous tax periods. Such argument is without merit. When assessing whether the elements of reasonable cause are established the law imparts a legally significant distinction between a taxpayer's misinterpretation of its duties, on one hand, and a taxpayers ignorance as to its duties, on the other. 6 See Univ. of Chicago v. U.S., 547 F.3d 773, 785 (7th Cir. 2008); Lieb v. U.S., 438 F. Supp. 1015, 1021 (D.C. Okl. 1977); Gilmore v. U.S., 443 F. Supp. 91, 98-99 (D.C. Md. 1977) (finding failure to file certain tax returns was due to reasonable cause where misunderstanding of the law under the circumstances, but adding "[m]erely forgetting to file a return is not reasonable cause, nor is ignorance of the law.") (internal quotations and citations omitted).

The court also finds that Heartland cannot establish reasonable cause by claiming reliance upon particular documents that were allegedly misleading on the requirement to use the electronic payment system. Specifically, Heartland points to an IRS Deposit Brochure (which allegedly contains permissive language regarding the use of the EFTPS) 7 , the "Changes to Note" section of the 1999-2001 IRS Employment Tax Instructions for Form 941 (which does not mention the electronic filing requirement), and the actual instructions to Form 941 (which identifies electronic filing and depositing via coupon at an authorized bank as methods for depositing taxes). 8 Notably, Heartland failed to identify any case where reasonable cause was found based upon a taxpayers reliance on these types of documents. Indeed, a cursory review of cases where the taxpayer established reasonable cause based upon reliance of the IRS reveal one common denominator-an act or omission by an actual IRS agent. See Gilmore, 443 F. Supp. 91, 99-100; Koehnemann v. U.S., 322 F. Supp. 1200,1204 (N.D. Ill. 1970); see also Chilingirian v. C.I.R., 918 F.2d 1251, 1254-55 (6th Cir. 1990); U.S. v. Red Stripe, Inc., 792 F. Supp. 1338, 1345 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).

Moreover, assuming for the sake of argument that unsolicited documents from the IRS are not per se unreasonable to rely upon, this Court finds none of the proffered documents provides reasonable cause in the case. Nothing in the text of the documents states that taxpayers are not required to make deposits electronically if they meet the statutory prerequisites for doing so. In fact, a reading of the instructions for Form 941 evinces the opposite conclusion. In pertinent part, the instructions state "[s]ee section 11 of the Circular E for information and rules concerning Federal Tax Deposits." (Wyatt Aff. Ex. B, C, D, and E). Both Circular E, which is an employers tax guide, and Treas. Reg. § 31.6302-1(h) clearly delineate when taxpayers are required to make deposits electronically. Simply put, no reasonable taxpayer exercising ordinary business care and prudence would abstain from familiarizing themselves with the regulations and other published guidance in reliance upon the contents of the documents put forth in this case.

Finally, Heartland contends that the electronic deposit regulations are themselves complex and difficult to understand. Whatever the merits of such an argument, it is merely a red herring under the circumstances. It is undisputed that Heartland's comptroller did not read the relevant regulations or published guidance. Furthermore, in his deposition, Heartland's comptroller states he would have understood the regulations had he read them. Therefore, Heartland's failure to utilize the EFTPS stemmed not from confusion or misinterpretation of the applicable regulations, but rather from a lack of knowledge of them in the first instance.

The Court is not indifferent to Heartland's position; it failed to deposit certain payments electronically but nevertheless made the payments timely and in full. However, as articulated in Fallu, "[t]he increased efficiency of the EFTPS provides reasonable justification for requiring that certain deposits be made using the system, in service of the legitimate IRS objective of collecting taxes." 2008 WL 397912, *3. Moreover, "'[t]he Government has millions of taxpayers to monitor, and our system of self-assessment in the initial calculation of a tax simply cannot work on any basis other than one of strict filing standards." Boyle, 469 U.S. at 249, 105 S. Ct. at 691. The standards set forth in § 6656 do contain a narrow statutory exemption, however. The penalties must be abated when the taxpayer overcomes the heavy burden of proving the failure to use the electronic deposit method was due to reasonable cause and not willful neglect. This Court finds that Heartland has failed to carry that burden. 9



III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.

SO ORDERED, this the 27 th day of May, 2009.

1 On June 4, 2008, Plaintiff filed a response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, styled as a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and In Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 29, 30). Under this Court's Rules 16 and 26 Order, all dispositive motions were to be filed within 45 days of the close of discovery. The last day of discovery was March 7, 2008 and, therefore, the filing deadline for dispositive motions was May 1, 2008. Therefore, because Plaintiff's "Cross-Motion" for summary judgment is untimely, the Court strikes Plaintiff's Reply to Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 37).

2 Pursuant to the Current Tax Payment Act of 1943 employers were required to deposit certain federal taxes through federally authorized bank depositories, accompanied by a federal tax deposit coupon. In 1993, however, Congress directed the Secretary of the Treasury to prescribe regulations for the development and implementation of an electronic deposit system, known as EFTPS, to be used for the collection of depository taxes. 26 U.S.C. § 6302(h)(1). Consistent with this directive, the Secretary of Treasury promulgated regulations establishing

SEC. 6656. FAILURE TO MAKE DEPOSIT OF TAXES.

6656(a) UNDERPAYMENT OF DEPOSITS. --In the case of any failure by any person to deposit (as required by this title or by regulations of the Secretary under this title) on the date prescribed therefor any amount of tax imposed by this title in such government depository as is authorized under section 6302(c) to receive such deposit, unless it is shown that such failure is due to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect, there shall be imposed upon such person a penalty equal to the applicable percentage of the amount of the underpayment.

6656(b) DEFINITIONS. --For purposes of subsection (a) --

6656(b)(1) APPLICABLE PERCENTAGE. --

6656(b)(1)(A) IN GENERAL. --Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the term "applicable percentage" means --

6656(b)(1)(A)(i) 2 percent if the failure is for not more than 5 days,

6656(b)(1)(A)(ii) 5 percent if the failure is for more than 5 days but not more than 15 days, and

6656(b)(1)(A)(iii) 10 percent if the failure is for more than 15 days.

6656(b)(1)(B) SPECIAL RULE. --In any case where the tax is not deposited on or before the earlier of --

6656(b)(1)(B)(i) the day 10 days after the date of the first delinquency notice to the taxpayer under section 6303, or

6656(b)(1)(B)(ii) the day on which notice and demand for immediate payment is given under section 6861 or 6862 or the last sentence of section 6331(a),

the applicable percentage shall be 15 percent.

6656(b)(2) UNDERPAYMENT. --The term "underpayment" means the excess of the amount of the tax required to be deposited over the amount, if any, thereof deposited on or before the date prescribed therefor.

6656(c) EXCEPTION FOR FIRST-TIME DEPOSITORS OF EMPLOYMENT TAXES. --The Secretary may waive the penalty imposed by subsection (a) on a person's inadvertent failure to deposit any employment tax if --

6656(c)(1) such person meets the requirements referred to in section 7430(c)(4)(A)(ii),

6656(c)(2) such failure --

6656(c)(2)(A) occurs during the first quarter that such person was required to deposit any employment tax; or

6656(c)(2)(B) if such person is required to change the frequency of deposits of any employment tax, relates to the first deposit to which such change applies, and

6656(c)(3) the return of such tax was filed on or before the due date.

For purposes of this subsection, the term "employment taxes" means the taxes imposed by subtitle C.

6656(d) AUTHORITY TO ABATE PENALTY WHERE DEPOSIT SENT TO SECRETARY. --The Secretary may abate the penalty imposed by subsection (a) with respect to the first time a depositor is required to make a deposit if the amount required to be deposited is inadvertently sent to the Secretary instead of to the appropriate government depository.

6656(e) DESIGNATION OF PERIODS TO WHICH DEPOSITS APPLY. --

6656(e)(1) IN GENERAL. --A deposit made under this section shall be applied to the most recent period or periods within the specified tax period to which the deposit relates, unless the person making such deposit designates a different period or periods to which such deposit is to be applied.

6656(e)(2) TIME FOR MAKING DESIGNATION. --A person may make a designation under paragraph (1) only during the 90-day period beginning on the date of a notice that a penalty under subsection (a) has been imposed for the specified tax period to which the deposit relates.

Failure to Make Deposit of Taxes: Electronic funds transfer

To establish reasonable cause for an abatement of the penalty under Code Sec. 6656 for failure to make a timely deposit, a taxpayer making an electronic fund transfer (EFT) via a debit or credit transaction may use the records of the financial institution that initiated the EFT and/or its own books and records. The books and records can be used to show that it timely informed the financial institution as to payment instructions, the correct amount and type of tax to be deposited, the correct period for which the tax deposit was to be made, the correct date the funds were to be transferred to the IRS and the taxpayer's account number.

Rev. Rul. 94-46, 1994-2 CB 278.

The IRS has ruled that, absent reasonable cause, taxpayers who participate in TAXLINK, the electronic remittance processing system, and who are required to deposit federal taxes by electronic funds transfer are subject to the failure-to-deposit penalty under Code Sec. 6656 if the taxes are deposited by means other than EFT or by EFT after the due date. However, taxpayers not required to deposit taxes by EFT, but who have done so on a voluntary basis, are not subject to the failure-to-deposit penalty imposed by Code Sec. 6656 if the taxpayer instead timely deposits the taxes at an authorized depository using Form 8109.

Rev. Rul. 95-68, 1995-2 CB 272.

The IRS has issued guidance relating to the temporary waiver of penalties for taxpayers first required to make federal tax deposits by electronic funds transfer on or after July 1, 1997. The waiver applies only to deposit obligations incurred on or before December 31, 1997, and includes deposits made after December 31, 1997, provided the deposit obligation was incurred on or before December 31, 1997.

Notice 97-43, 1997-2 CB 294.

The IRS has provided guidance relating to the waiver of the Code Sec. 6656 failure to deposit penalty for the more than one million businesses that were required to make their federal tax deposits electronically beginning on or after July 1, 1997. Pursuant to IR-98-28, those employers were given an extension of time in which to begin making their federal tax deposits by electronic funds transfer (EFT). However, they will remain liable for the penalty if they fail to make the requisite deposits, either by EFT or using paper coupons, in a timely manner. The penalty waiver applies only to deposit obligations incurred before 1999, and includes post-1998 deposits provided that the deposit obligation arises prior to 1999. The waiver does not apply to taxpayers that had to begin using EFT in 1995 or 1996.

Notice 98-30, 1998-1 CB 1164.

The IRS will not impose the 10% penalty solely for the failure to make deposits by electronic funds transfer; however, the penalty will be imposed if the taxpayer fails to make the deposit in a timely manner. The waiver applies to deposit obligations that were incurred on or before June 30, 1999. It includes deposits made after June 30, 1999, if the deposit obligation was incurred on or before that date.

Notice 99-12, 1999-1 CB 641.

Taxpayers who did not deposit more than $200,000 in aggregate federal depository taxes during 1998 will not be assessed the 10% penalty solely because they did not make their deposits by EFT. However, absent a showing of reasonable cause, the penalty will be imposed against taxpayers that fail to make their required deposits in a timely manner. This waiver applies to deposit obligations incurred after June 30, 1999, and on or before December 31, 1999. The penalty waiver includes deposits made after 1999, provided that the deposit obligation was incurred on or before December 31, 1999. The waiver extends to taxpayers that were first required to deposit by EFT in 1995 or 1996.

Notice 99-20, 1999-1 CB 958.

See ¶38,070.021.

A corporation that failed to deposit its employment taxes electronically pursuant to the Electronic Federal Tax Payment System (EFTPS) was liable for failure to deposit penalties under Code Sec. 6656, even though it actually paid those taxes in a timely manner. By depositing the employment taxes using means other than EFTPS, the taxpayer failed to comply with the substantive purpose of Code Sec. 6302(h), which is to establish an electronic system for making electronic funds transfer deposits. Absent substantial compliance with the statutory, regulatory, and procedural requirements, the taxpayer was not entitled to abatement of the penalties. Further, it was unable to show that its noncompliance was due to reasonable cause and not willful neglect; the taxpayer provided no facts on which it relied for its position that EFTPS did not provide adequate internal control and security features.

F.E. Schumacher Co., Inc., DC Ohio, 2004-1 USTC ¶50,166.

A film production company that did not deposit its employment taxes electronically as prescribed under the Electronic Federal Tax Payment System (EFTPS) was liable for failure to deposit penalties under Code Sec. 6656, even though it paid its taxes in a timely manner. The taxpayer's argument that the statute authorizes penalties only for a deficiency in the amount of taxes paid, not for a deficiency in the method by which payment was made, was rejected. The plain language of the statute emphasizes that the deposit itself must satisfy the requirements of the IRC and the applicable regulations.

Fallu Productions, Inc., DC N.Y., 2008-1 USTC ¶50,199.


Electronic deposits. --Mode or Time of Collection: Electronic deposits

A film production company that failed to deposit its employment taxes electronically as prescribed under the Electronic Federal Tax Payment System (EFTPS) was liable for failure to deposit penalties, even though it paid its taxes in a timely manner. The company admitted that its employment tax deposits fell within the requirements of Reg. §31.6302-1(h), which requires certain payments to be made electronically.

Fallu Productions, Inc., DC N.Y., 2008-1 USTC ¶50,199.

A corporation that failed to deposit its employment taxes electronically pursuant to the Electronic Federal Tax Payment System (EFTPS) was liable for failure to deposit penalties under Code Sec. 6656, even though it actually paid those taxes in a timely manner. By depositing the employment taxes using means other than EFTPS, the taxpayer failed to comply with the substantive purpose of Code Sec. 6302(h), which is to establish an electronic system for making electronic funds transfer deposits. Absent substantial compliance with the statutory, regulatory, and procedural requirements, the taxpayer was not entitled to abatement of the penalties. Further, it was unable to show that its noncompliance was due to reasonable cause and not willful neglect; the taxpayer provided no facts on which it relied for its position that EFTPS did not provide adequate internal control and security features.

F.E. Schumacher Co., Inc., DC Ohio, 2004-1 USTC ¶50,166, 308 FSupp2d 819.

A taxpayer making an EFT through either a debit transaction or a credit transaction may establish reasonable cause for abating the failure to deposit penalty under Code Sec. 6656 by using the records of the bank instructed to initiate the EFT (whether a Financial Agent or the taxpayer's financial institution), and/or the taxpayer's books and records (including, among other things, a recording of telephone instructions or a saved electronic file of instructions), to establish that the taxpayer timely provided to the bank the following information: (1) payment instructions, (2) the correct amount of tax to be deposited, (3) the correct type of tax to be deposited, (4) the correct tax period for which the deposit was made, (5) the correct date the funds were to be transferred from the taxpayer's bank account to Treasury's general account, and (6) the number of the taxpayer's bank account with sufficient funds to cover the EFT.

Rev. Rul. 94-46, 1994-2 CB 278.

Absent reasonable cause, a taxpayer that is required to deposit federal taxes by EFT is subject to the failure-to-deposit penalty imposed by Code Sec. 6656 if the taxpayer deposits the taxes by means other than EFT, or by EFT after the date on which the taxes are due. A taxpayer that is not required to deposit taxes by EFT, but has done so on a voluntary basis, is not subject to the failure-to-deposit penalty if the taxpayer instead timely deposits the taxes at an authorized depository using Form 8109.

Rev. Rul. 95-68, 1995-2 CB 272.

The IRS has released a revenue procedure providing information about the Electronic Federal Tax Payment System (EFTPS). Code Sec. 6302(h) requires taxpayers with federal depository taxes in excess of certain specified thresholds to transfer their federal tax deposits and federal tax payments electronically. The revenue procedure includes a list of definitions used in the EFTPS and describes the EFTPS enrollment process. It also notes that no refunds of tax deposits will be made through EFTPS. Instead, refund requests should be made under the existing refund procedures. The revenue procedure is effective on July 11, 1997. Rev. Proc. 94-48 is obsoleted for federal tax deposits and federal tax payments made after July 15, 1997.

Rev. Proc. 97-33, 1997-2 CB 371, modified by Rev. Proc. 98-32, 1998-1 CB 935.

The IRS has provided mandatory procedures for banks and financial institutions that, as batch and bulk filers, submit enrollments and make federal tax deposits (FTDs) and federal tax payments (FTPs) on behalf of multiple taxpayers via the Electronic Federal Tax Payment System (EFTPS). These guidelines are generally effective April 27, 1998. Rev. Proc. 97-33 is modified.

Rev. Proc. 98-32, 1998-1 CB 935, modifying Rev. Proc. 97-33, 1997-2 CB 371.

The IRS is terminating the magnetic tape program for the reporting of federal tax deposits and certain estimated income tax payments for deposits or payments made after January 31, 2000. After the effective date, current magnetic tape filers may use paper coupons, estimated tax vouchers or the Electronic Federal Tax Payment System (EFTPS).

Notice 99-42, 1999-2 CB 325.

The IRS has announced that a major upgrade of the Internet version of the Electronic Federal Tax Payment System (EFTPS) --the EFTPS-OnLine website --includes several new improvements to help taxpayers. Taxpayers using the system will be able to (1) schedule all four estimated tax payments (Form 1040ES) in one session without logging out; (2) access payment history for a 16-month period; and (3) search, print, or download payment history by date, tax type, amount, tax form, and other factors. With the user-friendly system, taxpayers can change bank accounts by phone without completing new enrollments; select PINs online; access links to states with electronic tax payment systems; use an enhanced and updated glossary and information; and take advantage of improved accessibility if visually impaired. Payments can be made 24 hours a day, seven days a week from home or office, and taxpayers receive an EFT Acknowledgement Number for every EFTPS transaction.

Internal Revenue News Release IR-2003-90, July 21, 2003.

The IRS has launched an initiative, which will be available using the Electronic Federal Tax Payment System (EFTPS), to provide businesses with a faster system for the electronic payment of taxes. EFTPS Express Enrollment for New Businesses will affect all businesses receiving a new employer identification number. Business taxpayers with a federal tax obligation will be automatically pre-enrolled in EFTPS to make all federal tax deposits.

Internal Revenue News Release IR-2004-10, January 15, 2004.

The IRS announced an incentive program offering a refund of the federal tax deposit (FTD) penalty to qualified business taxpayers in exchange for enrollment in and use of the Electronic Federal Tax Payment System (EFTPS). This one-time refund is available to approximately 1 million employers. To qualify for the refund, the employer must use EFTPS for four consecutive quarters, make all Form 941 payments on time, and have previously paid the FTD penalty in full. The offer is available to employers who are not mandated to use EFTPS, and is only available for penalties paid within a year (four quarters) prior to the four-quarter compliance period.

Internal Revenue News Release IR-2004-70, May 24, 2004.

Taxpayers may pay their taxes electronically by authorizing an electronic funds withdrawal from a checking or savings account or by using a credit card. The e-payment method can be used to pay taxes reported on a 2005 income tax return, pay past due taxes owed for years 1996 and after, pay projected tax due when requesting an automatic filing extension, or pay estimated taxes for tax year 2006. Electronic funds withdrawal is free and the taxpayer decides when the tax payment is to be withdrawn from his or her account; however, this payment method is available only to e-filers. Credit card payments will be accepted whether a return is filed electronically or by mail. Credit card payments can also be made over the telephone. While the IRS does not impose a fee for credit card payments, the private-sector companies authorized to process the payments do impose convenience fees. Finally, the Electronic Federal Tax Payment System (EFTPS) offers another method by which taxpayers may pay their taxes; EFTPS is a free service and is available year-round to individual and business taxpayers.

IRS Fact Sheet FS-2006-5, January 3, 2006.


when the electronic deposit system was required. 26 C.F.R. § 31.6302-1(h). For calendar quarters beginning in 2000, the regulation provided that, if the aggregate deposits in a calender year exceeded $200,000, the employer was required to use the electronic deposit system for all tax periods after the calender year following the year in which the threshold was reached. 26 C.F.R. § 31.6302-1(h)(2)(ii). According to those standards, Heartland was required to use the EFTPS in 2000 and 2001.

3 Of the penalties assessed, Heartland only made a payment for the tax period ending on March 31, 2001, which after interest totaled $24,731.97.

4 This amount also includes a failure-to-pay tax penalty, imposed on March 18, 2002, pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6651(a)(2), in the amount of $107.47, and interest in the amount of $81.57.

5 The terms "reasonable cause" and "willful neglect" found in §§ 6651(a) and 6656(a) are construed consistently, and therefore, precedent discussing the former is applicable when analyzing the latter. See Staff IT, Inc. v. U.S., 482 F.3d 792, 798 n.17 (5th Cir. 2007) ( "The analysis in Boyle only concerned failure-to-file penalties under § 6651(a)(1) and not failure-to-pay or failure-to-deposit penalties under §§ 6651(a)(2) and 6656, respectively. The language concerning the relevant standard is identical in all three provisions. Thus, we find no reason to treat the language in § 6656(a)(1) differently from that in §§ 6651(a)(2) and 6656.") (internal citations omitted); see also Del Commercial Properties, Inc. v. C.I.R., 251 F.3d 210, 218 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ( "Although the Boyle Court did not address the meaning of the terms 'reasonable cause' and 'willful neglect' as used in § 6656(a), the same terms used in the same statute for the same purpose presumably have the same meaning.") (internal citations omitted); Valen Mfg. Co. v. U.S., 90 F.3d 1190, 1193 n.1 (6th Cir. 1996) ( "Although Boyle involved only a § 6651(a)(1) violation, the language of the 'reasonable cause' exceptions in §§ 6651(a)(2) and 6656 is identical and should be given the same construction.").

6 This is not to suggest that general allegations of a misinterpretation of a taxpayer's duties is sufficient in establishing reasonable cause. The sufficiency of such claims must be reasonable and supported by the evidence. Univ. of Chicago, 547 F.3d at 785.

7 Heartland points to the following language in the IRS Deposit Brochure:

Now there's an easier way to pay your Federal business taxes .... Now you can enroll in the most convenient tax payment service .... EFTPS is the most convenient way to pay .... Make a Call When You're Ready.... Want to Give it a Try? ... Enroll Today! Enjoy the convenience of making your tax payments....

(Wyatt Aff. Ex. A).

8 The instructions read, in pertinent part:

If your net taxes [exceed a certain amount] for the quarter, you must deposit your tax liabilities at an authorized financial institution with Form 8109, Federal Tax Deposit Coupon, or by using the Electronic Federal Tax Payment System (EFTPS). See section 11 of the Circular E for information and rules concerning Federal Tax deposits.

(Wyatt Aff. Ex. B, C, D, and E).

9 Because the Court finds that Heartland cannot establish that noncompliance with § 6656 was due to reasonable cause, an analysis of willful neglect is unnecessary.

Labels:

Tuesday, June 9, 2009

Evidence of tax fraud

U.S. Court of Appeals, 2nd Circuit; 07-3958-cr, April 9, 2009.

An investment advisor was properly convicted and sentenced for willful tax evasion, subscribing false tax returns, willfully failing to file timely personal income tax returns and pay taxes, and obstructing and impeding the IRS's investigation into his assets. Tax assessment certificates showed that the individual had a substantial tax debt, and his accountant's testimony revealed that his returns falsely claimed net operating losses that the individual knew were disallowed. The individual also engaged in affirmative acts of evasion to hide his assets by using two corporate entities and stock accounts in his childrens' names. The individual could not claim that his Fifth Amendment rights in a related matter excused his failure to file returns and pay taxes. His privilege against self-incrimination was sufficiently protected by his right to refuse to answer specific questions implicating that privilege. Additionally, the individual was not entitled to a new trial on grounds of prosecutorial misconduct. The trial court adequately instructed the jury as to the willfulness components of Code Secs. 7201 and 7206, the jury instructions did not indicate that the tax assessments were conclusive, and the trial court properly refused to instruct the jury that restricted stock issued in the individual's childrens' names had no value. Finally, the trial court properly calculated the individual's base offense level according to the sentencing guidelines. Since the individual's tax offenses were committed as part of a common scheme or plan, the court calculated the tax loss by using the amount of taxes, interest and penalties that were assessed and unpaid, instead of limiting itself to the value of the concealed assets.



KEARSE, Circuit Judge: Defendant Richard Josephberg appeals from a judgment entered in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York following a jury trial before Charles L. Brieant, Judge, convicting him on all counts of a seventeen-count indictment, to wit: evasion of payment of personal income taxes for the years 1977-1980 and 1983-1985, in violation of 26 U.S.C. §7201 (Count 1); conspiracy to defraud the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") and, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1347, to defraud Josephberg's health care insurer, all in violation of 18 U.S.C. §371 (Count 2); evasion of personal income taxes for the years 1997 and 1998, in violation of 26 U.S.C. §7201 (Counts 3 and 4); subscribing false income tax returns for the years 1997 and 1998, in violation of 26 U.S.C. §7206(1) (Counts 5 and 6); willful failure to file timely personal income tax returns for the years 1999-2002, in violation of 26 U.S.C. §7203 (Counts 7-10); willful failure to pay income tax due for the years 1999-2003, in violation of 26 U.S.C. §7203 (Counts 11-15); obstructing and impeding the due administration of the Internal Revenue Laws, in violation of 26 U.S.C. §7212(a) (Count 16); and health care fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§1347 and 2 (Count 17). Josephberg was sentenced principally to 50 months' imprisonment to be followed by a three-year period of supervised release.

On appeal, Josephberg contends (a) that his convictions on Counts 1-6, 16, and 17 should be reversed, and those counts dismissed, on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence; (b) that his convictions on the remaining counts, 7-15, should be reversed and those counts dismissed on the ground that they violate his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination; (c) that as to any counts not dismissed, he is entitled to a new trial on grounds of prosecutorial misconduct and/or errors in the district court's instructions to the jury; and (d) that there were errors in the calculation of his sentence. For the reasons that follow, we reject Josephberg's contentions.


I. BACKGROUND


The present prosecution focused on the financial activities of Josephberg, an investment banker and investment advisor, during the period 1977-2004. At issue principally were transactions generating losses that were not permissible tax deductions because the transactions were entered into with no profit motive and involved no market risk, and Josephberg's conduct with respect to his personal tax liabilities resulting from those transactions. At trial, the government presented, inter alia, (a) documentary evidence such as IRS computer printouts of Josephberg's tax activity showing, e.g., the dates on which returns were filed or assessments were made or notices were sent, IRS certificates of assessments stating Josephberg's tax liability, IRS notices of deficiency, and financial records of Josephberg and his children; and (b) testimony from numerous witnesses, including Josephberg's former business partner Jeffrey Feldman, Josephberg's former accountant Hyman Fox, former clients of Josephberg who were instructed by Josephberg to send his compensation to accounts in the names of his children rather than to Josephberg himself, and revenue agents and officers of the IRS. The evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the government, summarized here and discussed in greater detail as necessary in Part II below, showed the following.



A. The Straddle, and Simulated Straddle, Transactions

In the late 1970s, a company owned by Josephberg and Feldman, Cralin Associates, Inc. ("Cralin"), entered into an agreement with a company owned by one Bernard Manko, pursuant to which Josephberg and his Cralin business associates would "syndicate" --i.e., sell interests in (Trial Transcript ("Tr.") 130-31) --limited partnerships that were created to invest in tax shelter "straddle" transactions involving United States Treasury bills ("T-Bills") (collectively the "Manko tax shelters" or "tax shelter partnerships"). A straddle is the simultaneous ownership of a contract to buy a commodity for delivery in a future month and a contract to sell the same amount of the same commodity in a different future month, see generally United States v. Atkins [ 89-1 USTC ¶9195], 869 F.2d 135, 137-38 (2d Cir.) ("Atkins"), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 818 (1989). As each Manko tax shelter partnership owned both contracts to buy and contracts to sell, either the purchase contracts or the sale contracts could be sold at a loss. Each year the partnerships sold the category of contracts that had decreased in value, thereby realizing losses. As the losses (or gains) realized by a partnership flow through to the individual partners in proportion to their respective ownership interests, see generally United States v. Helmsley [ 91-2 USTC ¶50,455], 941 F.2d 71, 84 n.5 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1091 (1992); 26 U.S.C. §§701-04, the individual investors in a given Manko tax shelter partnership claimed their shares of those losses as deductions on their income tax returns for that year. The partnership's sale of the offsetting profitable contracts was deferred until the following year; but tax shelter straddle transactions were repeated through 1980, with the amounts escalating each year ( see Tr. 142) in order to generate losses that would offset the gains that had been rolled forward from the year before ( see id. at 133-34). While an "ordinary straddle is not risk free because there is no assurance that the gain on the second leg will be equal in amount to the loss on the first leg," Atkins [ 89-1 USTC ¶9195], 869 F.2d at 137, Josephberg and his Cralin associates sought to structure their straddles or simulated straddles in ways that would ensure that "everything washe[d] out," i.e., that "if there was a profit" it was "the same amount as [the] loss" (Tr. 154).

In 1981, the accumulated deferred gains for Josephberg, Feldman, and their tax shelter partners totaled some $140 million; absent an offsetting loss, taxes on those gains would have been owing in 1982. These gains could not be offset by further Manko tax shelters, however, because of a provision in the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 requiring generally that a straddle owner claiming a straddle loss must recognize the gain in the offsetting commodity contract in the same year as the claimed loss, even if the gain was as yet unrealized. See 26 U.S.C. §1092. In order to obtain losses to offset the $140 million in gains rolled into 1981, Josephberg and his associates entered into an agreement with a government bond dealer, New York Hanseatic ("Hanseatic"), whose principal was Charles Atkins, to generate tax losses in T-bill transactions by using repurchase agreements (or "repos"), which are "devices for financing the purchase or sale of securities," Atkins [ 89-1 USTC ¶9195], 869 F.2d at 138. T-bills are purchased at a discount and appreciate through the dates of their maturity. Repo transactions were used by Josephberg and his associates to "simulate a straddle" (Tr. 145) by deducting the financing expense in one year and realizing the gain from the T-bills' appreciation in the following year. In 1981 Cralin paid Hanseatic approximately $1 million to purchase $140 million in T-bill repo losses ("without any physical securities being involved" ( id. at 151)), and the individual investors claimed their shares of those losses as deductions on their income tax returns to offset the tax-shelter-deferred gains ( see id. at 150).

The Manko tax shelter straddles had been designed to create deductions amounting to four times the investor's capital contribution. ( See id. at 131-32.) Both the Manko and the Hanseatic-related shelter transactions were "pre-arranged," "manipulated," "rigged," and "riskless" ( e.g., id. at 150-51, 159, 168-69); and Josephberg and his partners engaged in these transactions not for the purpose of producing profits but solely for the purpose of generating losses that investors could deduct from income on their tax returns ( see id. at 142-43, 147-55). Indeed, in 1981, when Cralin entered into its first transaction with Hanseatic, Cralin could have made a profit of more than $20 million at the second planned stage of the financing process, due to an anomalous and precipitous decline in interest rates; but instead of financing the repo expense at the lower rate, Cralin chose to pay the originally planned, non-prevailing, higher interest rate in order to achieve the desired $140 million loss. ( See id. at 146-50.)

Cralin continued these simulated straddle transactions until the IRS began an investigation of the transactions with Hanseatic. ( See Tr. 155-56.) The last Hanseatic repo deal occurred in 1984, with losses taken in that year and the gains deferred into 1985. ( See id. at 155.) Feldman, who described the Manko and Hanseatic transactions at trial, and had pleaded guilty to conspiring to commit tax fraud with respect to the purchase of $140 million in tax losses from Hanseatic in 1981 ( see id. at 158, 161), testified "[w]e didn't care about profits" (id. at 196).

Among those claiming shares of the losses generated by these tax shelter transactions on their individual tax returns were Josephberg and other Cralin principals, who received syndication fees for creating and marketing the Manko partnerships. ( See id. at 931-33.) Because of their roles as syndicators, the Cralin principals were not even required to make cash investments in the Manko tax shelter partnerships in order to claim losses; Josephberg and his partners simply received "an allocation of the losses in the structure of the transaction." ( Id. at 133.)

Because of the losses claimed, the tax returns of the Cralin principals for the years in question generally showed no tax liability. ( See id. at 933.) In 1978, for example, Josephberg reported more than $250,000 in wages and other income on his personal income tax return; but, claiming more than $260,000 in losses attributable to the Manko-related transactions, he paid nothing in taxes. For the period 1977-1985, Josephberg earned more than $3,672,000, a significant portion of which came from his sales, through Cralin, of the Manko and Hanseatic-related tax shelters; because of the tax shelter losses he claimed, he paid a total of only $41,000 in taxes for those nine years. ( See GX JD-12.)



B. The IRS Investigation and Josephberg's Re-routing of Assets

In 1986, the IRS sent Josephberg a letter indicating that it calculated he owed some $372,000 in taxes for the years 1977-1980, based on its rejection of losses generated by the Cralin tax shelter partnerships in which Josephberg participated. ( See GX PW-1.) The letter informed Josephberg of his right to challenge this calculation through the IRS appeals process. Josephberg appealed these adjustments unsuccessfully, and the IRS in 1993 issued a notice of deficiency to Josephberg with respect to this debt ( see GX 152). Josephberg had also received a notice of deficiency in December 1992 stating that he had an additional tax liability of $548, 592 for 1985. ( See GX PW-6.) Josephberg commenced tax court actions, petitioning for redeterminations of these deficiencies. In the action challenging the calculations for 1977-1980, Josephberg failed to answer, object to, or otherwise respond to IRS requests for factual admissions; the facts set forth in those requests were deemed admitted; and the IRS motion for summary judgment against him was granted. See Josephberg v. CIR, No. 496-94 (Tax Ct. Jan. 31, 1996) ("Tax Court Judgment I"). Josephberg's action challenging the calculation of his tax deficiency for 1985 was dismissed for lack of prosecution after neither he nor anyone representing him showed up for trial. See Josephberg v. CIR, No. 4824-93 (Tax Ct. Apr. 16, 1996) ("Tax Court Judgment II").

After the entry of these tax court judgments, the IRS commenced efforts to collect Josephberg's tax debts for 1977-1980 and 1985, including accrued interest and penalties. In addition, in 1997 it issued to Josephberg notices of deficiency for the tax years 1983 and 1984, which Josephberg did not challenge. The IRS's efforts to collect Josephberg's tax debts were impeded because Josephberg repeatedly maintained, in the ensuing IRS interviews and in his representations on IRS asset disclosure forms, that he had no assets that had not already been seized by the IRS.

In fact, however, Josephberg was merely hiding his income. On his IRS asset disclosure form dated June 4, 1997, Josephberg represented that he owned only a 50 percent interest in his investment banking firm, Josephberg Grosz & Co. Inc. ("Josephberg-Grosz") ( see GX 181-B), despite the fact that since 1993 he had owned 100 percent of that firm ( see Tr. 967-69). In the fall of 1997, Josephberg created two new entities, JG Capital, Inc. ("JG Capital"), and JG Partners. ( See GX 201-C.) JG Capital was wholly owned by JG Partners, which in turn was 99-percent-owned by Josephberg's three children, unbeknownst to them; Josephberg owned the remaining 1 percent. ( See Tr. 418-19.) On his subsequent IRS asset disclosure form, Josephberg did not disclose the existence of JG Capital or JG Partners. ( See, e.g., GX 181-D.) He told Fox, his accountant, that he created the two entities for the purpose of placing his investment banking income beyond the reach of the IRS, because any account in his name would undoubtedly have been levied upon. ( See Tr. 976-77.)

In addition, in or around 1993 ( see id. at 1060), the year in which he received the IRS notice of deficiency for 1977-1980, Josephberg had created securities accounts in the names of his children, likewise unbeknownst to them, which he alone managed ( see, e.g., id. at 754-55, 772, 782-83, 788). Josephberg then, as compensation for his investment banking and other professional services, had his clients issue stock in the names of JG Capital, JG Partners, his wife, or his children. ( See, e.g., id. at 328, 357-58, 698-700.) Josephberg did not disclose the existence or contents of these accounts, or his unfettered control over them, to the IRS. ( See GX JD-7, 181-B, 181-D.) For example, although Josephberg stated in a May 1997 IRS interview that he lacked the wherewithal to pay his bills and that he had not closed a deal as an investment banker in two years ( see Tr. 535-37), in fact within that period Josephberg had raised capital for GK Intelligent Systems ("GK") and had caused hundreds of thousands of dollars of his fee to be paid in the form of stock and placed in the accounts of his children. Although the stock was "restricted stock," in that it could not be sold for a period of time, when the restrictions lapsed Josephberg used those assets at will.

In 1998 and 1999, for example, without the knowledge of his daughter Kara, Josephberg sold shares of GK stock that had been issued in her name as compensation for his services, and he caused the gains resulting from those sales --some $59,000 for 1998 and $30,000 for 1999 --to be reported on Kara's tax returns. ( See Tr. 779-81; GX 130, GX 131.) At trial, Kara testified that she had never filed her own tax returns before 2001, that she had not signed the returns showing the sales of the GK stock, and that she had not even been aware that she owned GK stock. ( See Tr. 774, 782.) In 2001, Kara filed an individual tax return for the year 2000, reporting income she had received for her work as a summer associate at a law firm, and she expected a significant tax refund. Instead of receiving a refund, she learned that she had a personal tax liability of more than $10,000 resulting from Josephberg's sales of the GK stock he had had put in her name. ( See id. at 779-81.)

Josephberg also had some of his income placed in accounts in the name of his younger daughter, Jessica; and in 1998, 1999, and 2000, he sold shares of stock in her name for a total of more than $148,000. ( See GX 133, GX 134, GX 135.) The parties stipulated that if Jessica were called as a witness at trial, she would testify that she had no recollection of signing or filing, and no role in preparing, tax returns; that she had never been required to file a return and had not known that in fact returns in her name were filed for the tax years 1998, 1999, and 2000 --when she was 11-13 years of age. As a result of those returns, Jessica's tax liability by the time of trial, including penalties and interest resulting from nonpayment of taxes, was some $52,600. ( See Tr. 755-56.)

Josephberg told Fox that he caused stock to be issued in his children's names because "[t]he IRS had levied all of his bank accounts, [and] he had no place else to put it." (Tr. 976.) As a result, while his tax debts remained outstanding, Josephberg used the accounts of his children and the corporate accounts of JG Capital and JG Partners to pay various personal expenses, such as rent (totaling some $250,000), country club dues (totaling nearly $300,000), and parties costing tens of thousands of dollars. ( See, e.g., GX JD-6; GX JD-13.)



C. The Fraudulent 1997 and 1998 Returns, the Subsequent Failures To File Timely and To Pay, and the Health Care Fraud

For the 20 years spanning 1979-1998, Josephberg claimed and carried forward on his individual tax returns a substantial net operating loss (or "NOL") stemming from Cralin's tax shelter activities. The IRS's 1993 notice of deficiency informed Josephberg that his claimed losses from the Cralin tax shelter transactions were disallowed because they were "not bona fide economic transactions, but rather were pre-arranged, manipulated, fixed, rigged & risk-free transactions that generated artificial tax losses" and because it had "not been shown that the partners or the partnership entered into the transactions primarily for profit." (GX 152.) Josephberg nonetheless continued to carry the NOL forward and claimed it on his returns for tax years 1993 through 1998, signing and filing those returns under penalty of perjury. ( See Tr. 970-72, 988-89, 999-1000; GX 116, GX 117, GX 118, GX 119, GX 120, GX 121.) The NOL carried over was substantial. On Josephberg's 1997 return, for example, it was more than $1.5 million ( see GX 120); on his 1998 return, it was more than $1.2 million ( see GX 121); and on each such return, except for his Social Security self-employment tax, the NOL deduction resulted in a claimed tax liability of zero.

In addition, on his returns for 1997 and 1998, Josephberg failed to pay withholding, Social Security, and Medicare taxes (collectively "employment taxes") for Norma Grant, who resided with the Josephbergs, was nanny for their daughter Jessica, and did housekeeping chores. For the tax years 1999-2002, Josephberg failed to file timely tax returns; and he made no payment of taxes for the years 1999-2003.

As to the charge of health care fraud, the record showed that in the fall of 1998, Josephberg submitted to Oxford Health Plans ("Oxford"), his health care provider, two false documents designed to induce Oxford to provide coverage for Mrs. Josephberg and to charge a group insurance rate to Josephberg's company. ( See Part II.B.4. below.) The documents were false tax forms prepared by Fox, who testified that he prepared the first after Josephberg "asked me to prepare a phony Schedule C" showing Mrs. Josephberg as an employee of Josephberg-Grosz (Tr. 985). Josephberg had Fox prepare a second false tax form in response to a request from Oxford for further documentation. ( See id. at 986-88.)

Prior to trial, Fox had pleaded guilty to tax fraud with respect to Josephberg's returns, to health care fraud with respect to the documents submitted to Oxford, and to conspiring with Josephberg to commit those frauds. ( See id. at 922-23.)



D. The Verdicts and Sentence

The jury found Josephberg guilty on all seventeen counts of the indictment, to wit, income tax evasion for the years 1977-1980 and 1983-1985, in violation of 26 U.S.C. §7201 (Count 1); evasion of tax assessments for the years 1997-1998, in violation of id. §7201 (Counts 3 and 4); subscribing fraudulent tax returns for the years 1997-1998, in violation of id. §7206(1) (Counts 5 and 6); willful failure to file timely tax returns and to pay taxes due for the years 1999-2002, in violation of id. §7203 (Counts 7-14); willful failure to pay taxes for the year 2003, in violation of id. §7203 (Count 15); attempting to obstruct the IRS's investigation into his assets, in violation of id. §7212(a) (Count 16); and health care fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§1347 and 2 (Count 17). It found Josephberg guilty as well of conspiring with Fox to defraud the IRS, to violate §1347 by defrauding Oxford, to evade assessment of his tax obligations for the years 1994-1998, and to subscribe fraudulent tax returns for those years, all in violation of 18 U.S.C. §371 (Count 2).

By the time of his trial in 2007, Josephberg's total tax debt dating back to his tax year 1977, including interest and penalties, was approximately $17,000,000. The district court calculated Josephberg's sentence under the 2006 version of the advisory Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines") but imposed a non-Guidelines sentence of, principally, 50 months' imprisonment. ( See Part II.F. below.) This appeal followed.


II. DISCUSSION


On appeal, Josephberg contends principally (a) that the government's evidence was legally insufficient to convict him on Counts 1-6, 16, and 17, the tax evasion, tax fraud, obstruction, and health care fraud counts, and that those counts should thus be dismissed; (b) that Counts 7-15, the failure-to-file and failure-to-pay counts, should be dismissed because they violate his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination; and (c) in the alternative, that he is entitled to a new trial on grounds of prosecutorial misconduct and/or errors in the court's jury charge. He also challenges his sentence on the grounds that the application of the 2006 Guidelines violated the Ex Post Facto Clause and that the district court miscalculated the tax loss attributable to his offenses. Finding no merit in these contentions, we affirm.



A. Standards of Review

In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction, a defendant bears a heavy burden. See, e.g., United States v. Leonard, 529 F.3d 83, 87 (2d Cir. 2008) ("Leonard"); United States v. Morgan, 385 F.3d 196, 204 (2d Cir. 2004); United States v. Hamilton, 334 F.3d 170, 179 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 985 (2003). In reviewing such a challenge, we are required to view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, see, e.g., United States v. Eppolito, 543 F.3d 25, 45 (2d Cir. 2008) ("Eppolito"), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 1027 (2009); Leonard, 529 F.3d at 87, crediting every inference that could have been drawn in the government's favor, see, e.g., Eppolito, 543 F.3d at 45; Leonard, 529 F.3d at 87, and we must affirm the conviction so long as, from the inferences reasonably drawn, the jury might fairly have concluded guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, see, e.g., Eppolito, 543 F.3d at 45-46; United States v. Jackson, 335 F.3d 170, 180 (2d Cir. 2003).

The assessment of witness credibility lies solely within the province of the jury, and the jury is free to believe part and disbelieve part of any witness's testimony, see, e.g., United States v. Gleason, 616 F.2d 2, 15 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1082 (1980). "[W]here there are conflicts in the testimony, we must defer to the jury's resolution of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses." United States v. Miller, 116 F.3d 641, 676 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 905 (1998); see, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 153 F.3d 34, 49 (2d Cir. 1998). "The weight of the evidence is a matter for argument to the jury, not a ground for reversal on appeal." United States v. Hamilton, 334 F.3d at 179; see, e.g., United States v. Roman, 870 F.2d 65, 71 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1109 (1989). These principles apply whether the evidence being reviewed is direct or circumstantial. See, e.g., Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942). The conviction must be upheld if "any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in original).

In contrast, we review de novo claims of legal error such as constitutional challenges to the indictment, see, e.g., United States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 125 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1274 (2007), and alleged errors in the trial judge's instructions, United States v. Masotto, 73 F.3d 1233, 1238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 810 (1996); United States v. Dove, 916 F.2d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 1990). We review for abuse of discretion the district court's denial of a motion for a new trial. See, e.g., United States v. Ferguson, 246 F.3d 129, 133 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. Autuori, 212 F.3d 105, 120 (2d Cir. 2000); United States v. Sanchez, 969 F.2d 1409, 1414 (2d Cir. 1992). In deciding such a motion, the district court must take care not to usurp the role of the jury, and the ultimate consideration is whether letting a guilty verdict stand would be a manifest injustice. See, e.g., United States v. Ferguson, 246 F.3d at 134.



B. The Sufficiency Challenges

In order to prevail on a charge of income tax evasion in violation of 26 U.S.C. §7201, the government must prove (1) the existence of a substantial tax debt, (2) willfulness of the nonpayment, and (3) an affirmative act by the defendant, performed with intent to evade or defeat the calculation or payment of the tax. See, e.g., United States v. Ellett [ 2008-1 USTC ¶50,362], 527 F.3d 38, 40 (2d Cir. 2008); United States v. Helmsley [ 91-2 USTC ¶50,455], 941 F.2d at 83-84; United States v. Romano [ 91-2 USTC ¶50,471], 938 F.2d 1569, 1571 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Koskerides [ 89-1 USTC ¶9381], 877 F.2d 1129, 1137 (2d Cir. 1989). Josephberg contends principally that the government's evidence at trial was insufficient to show (1) that he had any tax debt, (2) that he made any material false statement in his returns for 1997 and 1998, and (3) that he engaged in any affirmative conduct to evade payment or obstruct collection of his tax debt. For the reasons that follow, we disagree.



1. The Existence of a Substantial Tax Debt

With respect to Counts 1, 3, and 4, Josephberg contends, inter alia, that the government's evidence was legally insufficient to support a finding of substantial tax due. Josephberg conceded in the district court ( see Defendant's Requests for Jury Instructions at 16), that the IRS tax assessment certificates for 1977-1985 introduced by the government, reflecting relevant information pertaining to his personal returns and the balance-due notices sent to him, constituted prima facie evidence that Josephberg had a substantial tax debt. See generally United States v. Silkman [ 98-2 USTC ¶50,724], 156 F.3d 833, 835-36 (8th Cir. 1998); id. at 836 ("The formal assessments were prima facie evidence of tax deficiencies."); United States v. Voorhies [ 81-2 USTC ¶9710], 658 F.2d 710, 715 (9th Cir. 1981) ("A valid assessment is one method of establishing tax liability ... ."); United States v. England [ 65-1 USTC ¶9350], 347 F.2d 425, 430 n.10 (7th Cir. 1965) (approving jury charge that included the instruction that "an assessment is prima facie correct"). On appeal, Josephberg argues that the evidence was insufficient because he "mounted a strong challenge" to the certificates on the ground that the assessments against him were based on the disallowance of his deductions of his shares of the losses of the 139 tax shelter partnerships at issue and that the government did not introduce evidence of audits and adjustments made to any of the partnerships themselves. (Josephberg brief on appeal at 61.)

This contention is meritless, amounting essentially to an argument as to the weight of the evidence, which, as discussed in Part II.A. above, is not a ground for reversal on appeal. As Josephberg's brief concedes, if IRS certificates of assessments "are challenged, then the issue is one for the jury." ( Id.) Here, the evidence was ample to permit a rational juror to conclude that Josephberg had a substantial tax debt. First, the certificates of assessments themselves showed that before the end of 1996, the year in which the IRS collection efforts began, Josephberg had tax debts, including interest and penalties, of, for example, more than $1.3 million for the year 1979 and more than $1 million for the year 1980. By the end of 1997, Josephberg's tax debt, including interest and penalties, for 1985-the year into which all of the Cralin tax-shelter-deferred gains were ultimately rolled --was more than $8 million. ( See GX 164-C, GX 164-D, GX 164-I.)

Second, although Josephberg argues that the government could not prove his tax deficiency on the basis of the certificates "alone" (Josephberg brief on appeal at 60), we need not address his legal premise because the government did not in fact rest its case on the certificates alone. The government also introduced the notices of deficiency sent to Josephberg informing him of the amounts due ( see, e.g., GX 152, GX 153, GX 155, GX 156, GX 159); these notices included statements with respect to specified tax shelter partnerships that "the partnership is not entitled to the claimed losses because it has not been shown that the partners or the partnership entered into the transactions primarily for profit" ( e.g., GX 152 (emphasis added)).

In addition, the government introduced the tax court judgments rejecting Josephberg's challenges to the assessments for the years 1977-1980 and 1985. ( See GX 400-B, GX 400-D.) Although Josephberg argues that "the Tax Court judgments against [him] were not on the merits" (Josephberg brief on appeal at 46), we disagree. The tax court actions were brought by Josephberg for redetermination of the deficiencies calculated by the IRS; he had the initial burden of showing that the IRS calculations were erroneous, see Tax Court Rule 142(a); see also 26 U.S.C. §7491(a)(1); and he plainly failed to carry that burden. As described in Part I.B. above, in his action challenging the 1977-1980 calculations, Josephberg failed to respond --or object --to the IRS's requests for factual admissions, and the facts set forth in the IRS requests were "deemed admission[s] of the facts set forth in the request[s] for admissions," Tax Court Judgment I, at 1; see id. at 1-2. On the basis of those admissions, the tax court granted summary judgment against Josephberg --plainly a merits decision. In his action challenging the 1985 calculations, Josephberg and his attorneys failed to appear when the case was called for trial, and the action was "dismissed for lack of prosecution." Tax Court Judgment II. The Internal Revenue Code (or "Code") provides that "[i]f a petition for a redetermination of a deficiency has been filed by the taxpayer, a decision of the Tax Court dismissing the proceeding shall be considered as its decision that the deficiency is the amount determined by the Secretary." 26 U.S.C. §7459(d) (emphasis added). Thus, the tax court decision in Josephberg's action challenging the 1985 calculations was likewise a ruling on the merits.

In sum, despite the absence of direct proof as to the audits of the tax shelter partnerships themselves, the evidence viewed as a whole was ample to permit a rational juror to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Josephberg had a substantial tax debt.



2. False Statements in the Returns for 1997 and 1998

As to Counts 5 and 6, which charged Josephberg with subscribing false income tax returns for the years 1997 and 1998, Josephberg also contends that the certificates "alone" (Josephberg brief on appeal at 60) were not sufficient to establish that he made material misstatements in those returns; but he makes no arguments in support of that contention other than those he makes to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to show that he had a substantial tax debt. We reject his contention in part for the reasons discussed in the preceding section.

In addition, we note that, as described in Part I.C. above, the record included the testimony of Fox that Josephberg's returns for 1997-1998 falsely claimed entitlement to deduct his net operating loss, based on the tax shelter partnerships, in spite of the fact that Josephberg had been expressly informed in 1993 that that loss was not allowed. The amounts claimed were plainly material: $1,534,457 for 1997, and $1,280,222 for 1998.



3. Affirmative Acts of Evasion

Josephberg contends that, with respect to Count 1, the government's evidence was also insufficient to prove that he engaged in any affirmative act of evasion, arguing, in part, that the witnesses on whose testimony the government relied to prove this element "withdrew the essential points of their direct testimony upon cross-examination" (Josephberg brief on appeal at 63). This argument is doubly flawed. First, the witnesses referred to by Josephberg in making this argument are IRS Revenue Agent John Dennehy and IRS Revenue Officer Joseph Lewandoski, and for the reasons discussed in Part II.D. below, we do not agree with Josephberg's characterizations of the record. Second, as discussed in Parts II.A. above and II.D. below, it is the province of the jury as the appropriate arbiter of the truth to determine what part, if any, of a witness's testimony to credit or discredit.

Josephberg also asserts that "there was utterly no evidence to prove that Josephberg concealed assets or income" ( id. at 63-64), and that the stock he caused to be issued in the names of his children lacked economic value ( see id. at 64). These contentions border on the frivolous.

"An affirmative act" of evasion "includes 'any conduct, the likely effect of which would be to mislead or to conceal.'" United States v. Klausner [ 96-1 USTC ¶50,173], 80 F.3d 55, 62 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Spies v. United States [ 43-1 USTC ¶9243], 317 U.S. 492, 499 (1943)). "Such conduct includes 'false statements made to Treasury representatives for the purpose of concealing unreported income.'" United States v. Klausner [ 96-1 USTC ¶50,173], 80 F.3d at 62 (quoting United States v. Beacon Brass Co. [ 52-2 USTC ¶9528], 344 U.S. 43, 45-46 (1952)); see also United States v. Winfield [ 92-2 USTC ¶50,319], 960 F.2d 970, 973 (11th Cir. 1992) ("an affirmative act constituting an evasion or attempted evasion of the tax occurs when false statements are made to the IRS after the tax was due"). Accordingly, "concealment of assets or covering up of sources of income, [and] handling of one's affairs to avoid making the records usual in transactions of the kind" are examples of conduct sufficient to create an inference of evasion. Spies [ 43-1 USTC ¶9243], 317 U.S. at 499.

As described in Part I.B. above, after the IRS began trying to collect Josephberg's tax debt following the entry of the tax court judgments, Josephberg in mid-1997 concealed the fact that he was the sole owner of Josephberg-Grosz, stating that he owned only 50 percent. In the fall of 1997, he set up JG Capital and JG Partners in order to --as he confided to his accountant Fox-place his investment banking income in accounts not bearing his name so as to avoid having the IRS seize that income. In the asset disclosure form he subsequently submitted to the IRS, Josephberg did not disclose the existence of these two entities.

Further, in 1993, the year in which Josephberg received the IRS notice of deficiency with respect to the earliest years, 1977-1980, he established the stock accounts for his children into which he thereafter had his investment banking income redirected. Josephberg told Fox that he had caused the stock to be placed in his children's names because "[t]he IRS had levied all of his bank accounts, [and] he had no place else to put it." (Tr. 976.) Fox testified on cross-examination that Josephberg had not been putting such stock into his children's names prior to having serious problems with the IRS. ( See id. at 1060.)

Josephberg's contention that because the stock thus issued in the names of his children was "restricted" stock it had no value, is contrary to both the law ( see Part II.E.1. below) and the evidence. The jury was entitled to infer that the stock was not worthless in light of the evidence as to its market value, as well as the evidence that Josephberg was willing to accept it as payment of his investment banking fees totaling hundreds of thousands of dollars and that Josephberg later sold the stock for hundreds of thousands of dollars.



4. Evidence of Health Care Fraud

Josephberg also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to show that he defrauded his health care insurer (Count 17). He argues that "Mrs. Josephberg testified that she worked 20 hours a week for Mr. Josephberg's business, and there was no evidence in the trial to prove otherwise." (Josephberg brief on appeal at 64-65.) The record is to the contrary.

The evidence was that in the fall of 1998, Josephberg, seeking a group rate for health insurance and inexpensive coverage for his wife, told Fox that he needed to supply his health care insurer with "tax documents that showed his wife was an employee" (Tr. 984; see id. at 1065-66), and he "asked [Fox] to prepare a phony Schedule C" (id. at 985; see also id. at 1065-66), a schedule designed to be attached to a taxpayer's federal income tax form, Form 1040, to show his income from a business. Fox, though "know[ing] it was wrong to do that," immediately complied; he "took the Schedule C and ... added ... a $12,000 salary to [Josephberg's] wife." ( Id. at 985.) This document was submitted to Oxford by Josephberg, bearing Fox's handwritten statement that "[t]his form was included in Richard Josephbergs [ sic] 1997 Form 1040" (GX 201-A; see Tr. 984-86). Fox testified that that handwritten statement "was a lie" ( id. at 986): In fact Josephberg had not yet filed his 1997 tax return; and when he did eventually file a 1997 return (in 1999), the accompanying Schedule C bore no indication that Mrs. Josephberg was employed by Josephberg's company ( see GX 120).

Further, when Oxford asked Josephberg for verification in the form of a New York State tax return for Mrs. Josephberg to show that she reported salary from Josephberg-Grosz, Fox prepared a New York State tax form representing that Mrs. Josephberg was employed by Josephberg-Grosz in 1997, which Josephberg then sent to Oxford. ( See Tr. 986-88; GX 201-B.) This form too was false. ( See Tr. 987.)

Mrs. Josephberg herself testified at trial that she had not received any salary from Josephberg's company. ( See Tr. 1882.) Indeed, the government introduced evidence that in 1997 Mrs. Josephberg commenced a personal bankruptcy proceeding in which she, inter alia, said she was employed solely as a teacher by Westchester County, and that she stated under oath that she "'ha[d] no knowledge of Richard Josephberg's business operations'" (Tr. 1881 (quoting Mrs. Josephberg's response to Interrogatory 5 in her bankruptcy proceeding)). Asked at trial if she had given that answer, Mrs. Josephberg responded "that's true, I really didn't know about his business operations." ( Id. at 1882.)

The evidence that Josephberg had Fox prepare false documents to indicate that his wife worked at his firm was itself sufficient to permit an inference that she did not in fact work there. And that inference was amply supported by Mrs. Josephberg's sworn statements that she lacked any knowledge of Josephberg's business operations.



5. Other Sufficiency Challenges

Although Josephberg's brief also lists Count 2 (conspiracy) and Count 16 (obstruction) in the heading of the section challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the ensuing discussion contains no argument with respect to those counts. To the extent that Josephberg means to imply that his convictions on those counts are flawed because of the insufficiencies he asserts with respect to other counts, any such contention founders on our rejection of his sufficiency challenges to those other counts. Any other sufficiency challenges to Counts 2 and 16 are waived.



C. The Fifth Amendment Challenge to Counts 7-15

Josephberg contends here, as he did in the district court, that Counts 7-15 of the indictment, charging him with willful failure to file timely income tax returns for the years 1999-2002 and willful failure to pay tax for the years 1999-2003, must be dismissed as violative of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. He argues principally that because in those years there was an ongoing investigation into the propriety of his continued claims of net operating loss, the very filing of returns for those years would tend to incriminate him, for if he continued to claim the loss he would subject himself to prosecution for those years as well, whereas if he did not claim the loss it would be tantamount to an admission that his prior NOL claims were impermissible. The district court properly rejected this argument, based on long-standing Supreme Court precedent.

It is well settled that the Fifth Amendment does not provide a blanket defense for a failure to file tax returns. See California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 434 (1971); United States v. Sullivan [ 1 USTC ¶236], 274 U.S. 259, 263-64 (1927). Although a taxpayer may, on his return, invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege selectively as to any particular item of information solicited, see, e.g., id. at 264; United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 148 (2d Cir. 1979) cert. denied, 446 U.S. 907 (1980), "[t]here is no constitutional right to refuse to file an income tax return," Byers, 402 U.S. at 434. This principle has been applied even where there is an ongoing investigation into the taxpayer's affairs. See, e.g., United States v. Poschwatta [ 87-2 USTC ¶9565], 829 F.2d 1477, 1482 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1987) ("[e]ven assuming" that the IRS was known to be conducting an ongoing criminal investigation, "defendant was required to file his returns" (citing Sullivan)), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1064 (1988), effectively overruled on other grounds by Cheek v. United States [ 91-1 USTC ¶50,012], 498 U.S. 192 (1991), as noted in United States v. Powell [ 91-2 USTC ¶50,320], 936 F.2d 1056, 1064 n.3 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Malquist [ 86-2 USTC ¶9484], 791 F.2d 1399, 1401-02 (9th Cir.) (failure to file a "tax return" within the meaning of §7203 is not excused by Fifth Amendment concerns over a pending investigation (citing Sullivan)), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 954 (1986).

Although Josephberg contends that this Court in United States v. Romano [ 91-2 USTC ¶50,471], 938 F.2d 1569 ("Romano"), ruled that the Fifth Amendment provides protection against a willful-failure-to-file charge where there is an ongoing investigation into the taxpayer's affairs, that contention is squarely contradicted by Romano itself. The case involved a defendant who in November 1983 attempted to transport $359,500 in cash from the United States into Canada. The cash was seized and held by United States customs officials, and the IRS immediately served Romano with a "termination assessment" of $169,973 as income tax due, an assessment that causes the resulting tax to be due immediately. Romano [ 91-2 USTC ¶50,471], 938 F.2d at 1570. On the following day, the IRS filed a lien to secure payment of the assessed tax. Thereafter the government sought forfeiture of the entire $359,500. While the forfeiture proceeding was pending, the government commenced a criminal prosecution against Romano alleging various tax violations; ultimately, all but a charge of tax evasion were dismissed on consent; and after a bench trial on stipulated facts, Romano was convicted of that offense.

On appeal, we held that the evidence was insufficient to prove the affirmative-act element of tax evasion, despite several theories advanced by the government. One of the theories we rejected was that Romano's failure to file a tax return in April 1984 --some five months after the border incident, the seizure of the cash, and the IRS's filing of its lien --constituted an attempt to evade taxes. Although Josephberg states that "[t]his Court reversed Romano's conviction, holding that by filing a tax return Romano might have revealed the source of the currency and incriminated himself, in violation of his Fifth Amendment privilege" (Josephberg brief on appeal at 77), the Romano opinion itself, far from supporting this imputation of a Fifth Amendment rationale for the reversal, expressly noted that Romano was not excused from filing the return. The offense of which Romano was convicted was tax evasion, not failure to file. This Court rejected the government's failure-to-file theory of evasion simply because (1) a mere willful omission is not an affirmative act, see Romano [ 91-2 USTC ¶50,471], 938 F.2d at 1573, and (2) Romano's failure to file could not logically be viewed as an act of evasion or attempted evasion because, as Romano was well aware, before the tax return was due the government already knew of the money and, indeed, had custody of it, see id. at 1573-74. Notwithstanding the fact that the tax return could have called for incriminating information as to the source of the money, we stated that "Romano was, of course, required to file a tax return," id. at 1574; see also id. at 1570-71 ("The filing of a termination assessment does not relieve the taxpayer of her obligation to prepare, sign, and file a true and correct income tax return for that year."). Citing Sullivan [ 1 USTC ¶236], 274 U.S. 259, we reasoned that the mere requirement that the tax return be filed did not infringe Romano's Fifth Amendment privilege because "Romano need only have filed a return reporting this money as 'Sullivan case income --$395, 500'." Id. at 1573.
[W]hatever Romano's specific reasons may have been for not filing the 1983 return, an attempt to evade taxes was not one of them, for there was nothing for Romano to gain, nothing to conceal from the IRS, except possibly some incriminating information as to the source of the income --information that is protected by the fifth amendment.

Romano was, of course, required to file a tax return, and his failure to do so might have been a basis for the lesser criminal charge of failure to file, see 26 U.S.C. §7203, one of the charges that was dropped. However, given that Romano was required to provide only the bare minimum of information under Sullivan, to protect his fifth amendment rights, information which the government already had and which Romano knew the government had, we cannot accept the government's claim that Romano's failure to file under these circumstances has probative weight in establishing the more serious crime of tax evasion.

Romano [ 91-2 USTC ¶50,471], 938 F.2d at 1574 (first emphasis in original; subsequent emphases ours).

We agree with the reasoning adopted in Romano. The pendency of a government investigation does not give a taxpayer a Fifth Amendment option to fail to file his tax return. His privilege against self-incrimination is protected by his right to refuse, with a Sullivan citation, to answer the questions that implicate that privilege. The district court correctly denied Josephberg's motion to dismiss Counts 7-15.



D. Allegations of Prosecutorial Misconduct

Josephberg contends that as to any counts against him that are not dismissed, he is entitled to a new trial on the grounds that the government made "knowing use of false testimony" (Josephberg brief on appeal at 68), made "efforts to elicit false and misleading testimony" from certain witnesses ( id. at 72), and made "improper prejudicial remarks in summation" ( id. at 68). We are unpersuaded.

In order to be granted a new trial on the ground that a witness committed perjury, the defendant must show that "(i) the witness actually committed perjury ...; (ii) the alleged perjury was material ...; (iii) the government knew or should have known of the perjury at [the] time of trial ...; and (iv) the perjured testimony remained undisclosed during trial ...." United States v. Zichettello, 208 F.3d 72, 102 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1143 (2001). Differences in recollection do not constitute perjury, see, e.g., United States v. Sanchez, 969 F.2d 1409, 1415 (2d Cir. 1992), and when testimonial inconsistencies are revealed on cross-examination, the "jury [i]s entitled to weigh the evidence and decide the credibility issues for itself," United States v. McCarthy, 271 F.3d 387, 399 (2d Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12 (2005); see also United States v. Joyner, 201 F.3d 61, 82 (2d Cir. 2000) ("[C]ross-examination and jury instructions regarding witness credibility will normally purge the taint of false testimony."). It is the task of the jury as the "appropriate arbiter of the truth" to "sift[] falsehoods from facts" and determine whether an inconsistency in a witness's testimony represents intentionally false testimony or instead has innocent provenance such as confusion, mistake, or faulty memory. United States v. Zichettello, 208 F.3d at 102 (internal quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., United States v. Blair, 958 F.2d 26, 29 (2d Cir. 1992).

Josephberg's arguments fall far short of meeting the criteria for showing perjury. His principal allegations of perjury focus on the testimony of IRS Revenue Agent Dennehy. In the background section of his brief, Josephberg asserts that
Dennehy attempted to bolster his reliance on the [assessment certificates] by testifying (for a time) that he "verified" ([Tr. 1528]) and he "reviewed" ([Tr. 1614]) the audit reports (RARs) showing the audit adjustments for the 139 partnerships and that he had spoken with the revenue agents who had performed the partnership audits and written the RARs in the 1980s. ([Tr. 1637].)

Dennehy's testimony that he reviewed and verified the partnership RARs and spoke[] to the agents was false ....

...

... Dennehy's claims that he had verified and reviewed the RARs for the 139 partnerships on Josephberg's tax returns were proven false.

(Josephberg brief on appeal at 15, 19 (emphases added).)

The trial transcript, however, demonstrates that these are mischaracterizations of Dennehy's testimony. First, there were two groups of RARs, i.e., revenue agent reports: one for Josephberg's individual tax returns, and the other for the tax shelter partnership returns. At the transcript page cited by Josephberg for the proposition that Dennehy testified "I verified the RARs" (Tr. 1528), Dennehy was being cross-examined about the top line of a chart he had prepared, which was in evidence as GX JD-2, of Josephberg's taxable income for the years 1983-1989 as corrected for the disallowance of Josephberg's net operating loss carryovers; the RARs that Dennehy testified he had used to prepare this chart were the RARs for Josephberg's individual returns, not for the returns of the partnerships. ( See id. at 1523-28; see also id. at 1593-94 (in discussing "the RARs [that] were the basis for adjusting the top line," defense counsel asked, "[t]hese RARs that you're referring to, these are the revenue agent reports prepared by the revenue agents who [audited] Richard Josephberg's tax returns?" Dennehy responded "Yes."); id. at 1613 (again discussing GX JD-2: "Q. Now these revenue agent reports that you relied on, they're all in regard to audits of Richard Josephberg's 1040s? A. Well, yes, and there were additional revenue agent reports with regard to the partnerships. Q. But you relied on the ones regarding the 1040s, correct? A. Correct.").)

Second, at the transcript page cited by Josephberg for the proposition that Dennehy testified "that he had verified and reviewed the RARs for the 139 partnerships" (Josephberg brief on appeal at 19 (emphasis added); see also id. at 15), Dennehy testified as follows:
"Q. Did you review the RARs concerning the partnerships?

A. Yes, I think I indicated that. I looked at some of those RARs.

(Tr. 1614 (emphasis added).) Defense counsel plainly understood Dennehy to mean he had looked at only some, not all 139. He asked: "So which of the partnership RARs that are listed on Richard Josephberg's Schedules E for those nine years did you read?" ( Id. at 1636 (emphases added).)

Nor did Dennehy testify that he had spoken with all of the revenue agents who had prepared those partnership RARs. Rather, he testified that he "did locate one who was working on one of the Cralin partnerships" ( id. at 1611; see also id. at 1742 ("when I became aware of the partnership aspect of the case, I made contact with whoever and wherever I could"; "I found one particular agent who I thought may be of some help")).

In the perjury section of his brief, Josephberg's only argument with respect to Dennehy is that
Dennehy was an integral part of the prosecution since 2002. He claimed that he did not review the 139 RARs until October 2006, after the court ordered that all partnership audit records be provided to the defense. Thus, Mr. Okula [an assistant United States Attorney] knew that the government did not even possess the RARs Dennehy claimed he reviewed.

(Josephberg brief on appeal at 70-71.) On its face, the logic of this assertion, even if it were accurate in its details, is hardly clear; and as an allegation of perjury, it is incomprehensible.

Josephberg also points to varying statements in the testimony of IRS Revenue Officer Lewandoski:
Lewandoski testified on direct examination that Josephberg told him on May 28, 1997, that he has "no deals going," and "no income coming in at the time." ([Tr. 534, 539, 542-43, 553, 562, 566-67].)

However, on cross-examination, Lewandoski admitted that Josephberg actually had told him on May 28, 1997 that he had six deals pending at the time. ([Tr. 583-84].) Lewandoski then amended his testimony and said that Josephberg had told him in December 1996 that he had no deals pending. ([Tr. 584-85].) But then Lewandoski amended that testimony and admitted that Josephberg had not told him in December 1996 that he had no deals pending. ([Tr. 585].) In the end, it was clear to Lewandoski that Josephberg informed him on May 28, 1997 that he had six deals pending. ([Tr. 585-87].)

(Josephberg brief on appeal at 12.) But Lewandoski's testimony that Josephberg said he had no pending deals and no income, which appears on only two of the eight pages cited by Josephberg ( i.e., Tr. 534 and 567), and which obviously was thoroughly explored on cross-examination, was not shown to be false. Testifying a decade after his dealings with Josephberg, Lewandoski refreshed his recollection by reviewing his notes of his various conversations with Josephberg; he testified that an entry in his May 28th notes "show[ed] that [Josephberg] said that he has no deals imminent," and that another entry showed that Josephberg "did say later in the interview" that he was working on "six deals" ( id. at 586). Thus, while Lewandoski acknowledged that on May 28, 1997, Josephberg had said he had six deals pending, his testimony that Josephberg had also said he had "no deals imminent" ( id. at 534, 586) was not shown to be untrue.

In essence, Josephberg's attacks on the testimony of Dennehy, Lewandoski, and other witnesses amount only to arguments that the testimony unfavorable to Josephberg should not have been credited. As discussed in Parts II.A. and II.B. above, however, witness credibility and the weight of the evidence were matters for argument to the jury; they are not bases for reversal on appeal; and the evidence was legally sufficient to support the jury's verdicts.

Josephberg's further suggestions that the government may have denied him a fair trial by coercing favorable testimony from witnesses, such as Grant by threatening deportation, or Fox by threatening a perjury prosecution if his trial testimony were inconsistent with his prior plea allocution, were rejected by the district court:
There is no evidence in the trial record which could support a finding that Norma Grant was coerced in any way by the Government or that her testimony was altered. If efforts were made to do so, such efforts were ineffectual. The same is true with respect to Jeffrey Feldman.

District Court Memorandum and Order dated May 30, 2007, at 4. Our review of the record persuades us that there was no error in that decision.

Finally, Josephberg's contention that the government made prejudicially improper remarks in summation was likewise rejected by the district court, stating in part as follows:
[I]t is noteworthy that the defense did not object contemporaneously with respect to the rebuttal summation and made no ... request [for surrebuttal]. The rebuttal was in fact somewhat lengthy and tedious. However, the propriety of the Government's conduct has to be measured in relation to the closing arguments asserted by the defense. The defense tendered a free-ranging diatribe taking two and three-quarters hours, not counting interruptions for recesses. Much of the closing argument was not directed to the charges themselves nor was there much concession to common sense. Defendant argued, among other things, that the Internal Revenue Service was "arrogant," which it probably is, and that because of this, Defendant should be acquitted. This Court with great self-restraint refrained from interrupting and telling the jury that "if you think the Government is arrogant, write your Congressman, and if you think the Defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, enter a judgment of conviction." See United States v. Cheung, 555 F.2d 1069, 1073-74 (2d Cir. 1977).

....

This Court is convinced that the trial viewed as a whole was a fair trial directed towards the merits, and that at least with respect to most of the counts of conviction, the proof of guilt was overwhelming. To the extent some of the prosecutor's comments may in hindsight be regarded as somewhat in excess, they did not distort the trial, and constituted at most harmless error, which may not be a basis for relief, particularly in the absence of a contemporaneous objection. See United States v. Elias, 285 F.3d 183, 190 (2d Cir. 2002). The comment presently being criticized concerning the effect of Feldman's plea and his later motion to withdraw the plea, was a fair response to a defense argument. The jury was clearly told by this Court that guilt is personal and a plea of guilty by a Josephberg accomplice is not evidence of Josephberg's guilt.

The argument that the defense had a chance to investigate prior wrongdoing by Hyman Fox was a fair response to defense's claims that Fox's testimony was incredible in that he claimed Josephberg was the only person he knowingly aided in preparing false tax returns. The argument that Josephberg took no legal action against [the attorney who had represented him in the tax court actions] is inaccurate but in this Court's opinion was, at most, harmless error. It was reasonable for the Government to argue that there were many other lawyers available in New York City to litigate the civil side of the issues which Josephberg had with the Tax Court and the Treasury. The Court finds no error in the Government's rebuttal argument which would justify granting a new trial or any other relief to Defendant.

District Court Memorandum and Order dated May 30, 2007, at 2-3. We see no error in these rulings.



E. Challenges to the Jury Instructions

Josephberg also contends that he should be given a new trial because of the district court's refusal to give jury instructions he requested as to the proper valuation of restricted stock, the employment status of Grant, and the permissible inferences from IRS certificates of assessments. We find no basis for reversal, and only the last of these causes us any concern.



1. Valuation of Restricted Stock

Josephberg asked the district court to instruct the jury that market value is an inappropriate indication of the value of restricted stock, and that the jury could find that because the stock he caused his clients to place in the accounts of his children was restricted stock, it had no value. His theory was that if that stock had no value or only nominal value, it could not be considered concealed "assets." (Josephberg brief on appeal at 51-52.)

The court properly refused to give the requested instruction. The Internal Revenue Code provides that "[i]f, in connection with the performance of services, property is transferred to any person other than the person for whom such services are performed, ... the fair market value" of the property transferred is to be "determined without regard to any restriction other than a restriction which by its terms will never lapse ... ." 26 U.S.C. §83(a). Thus, although "[t]he actual value of the stock arguably may be less than the value of stock readily transferable on the open market because of restrictions imposed ... these restrictions, other than permanent, nonlapsing restrictions, may not be considered in determining fair market value." Sakol v. CIR [ 78-1 USTC ¶9372], 574 F.2d 694, 696 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 859 (1978) (emphases added).

The restrictions on the stock that Josephberg caused to be issued to his children were not permanent. And when they lapsed, Josephberg sold the stock. The instruction he requested would have been contrary to law.



2. "Statutory Nonemployees"

Contending that he believed that Grant was not his employee, but rather was an independent contractor for whom an employer is not required to pay employment taxes, Josephberg asked the district court to read to the jury an excerpt from an IRS publication stating, inter alia, that "individuals who furnish personal attendance, companionship, or household care services to children" and who are not employees of a placement service "are generally treated as self-employed for all federal tax purposes," I.R.S. Publication 15-A, Employer's Supplemental Tax Guide ("Pub. 15-A" or "IRS Pub. 15-A"), at 5. Josephberg argued that even if this excerpt did not represent the law governing the relationship between the individual who furnishes services and the family using her services, it should be included in the instructions because Josephberg's reliance on the publication's language would show that his nonpayment of employment taxes for Grant was not willful. ( See Tr. 2376.) The district court properly refused to give the requested instruction.

IRS publications, though "aimed at explaining existing tax law to taxpayers," do not have the force of law. Taylor v. United States [ 2003-2 USTC ¶50,601], 57 Fed.Cl. 264, 266 (2003). "The authoritative sources of Federal tax law are the statutes, regulations, and judicial decisions; they do not include informal IRS publications." Miller v. CIR [ CCH Dec. 53,811], 114 T.C. 184, 195 (U.S. Tax Ct. 2000).

The Code itself defines "employee" to include "any individual who, under the usual common law rules applicable in determining the employer-employee relationship, has the status of an employee." 26 U.S.C. §3121(d). IRS regulations provide detailed guidance for determining whether a person providing services to an individual is an employee of that individual rather than an independent contractor, see 26 C.F.R. §31.3121(d)-1 ("Who are employees"); id. §31.3121(d)-2 ("Who are employers"), and official IRS interpretations set out 20 factors to be considered in making that determination, see IRS Rev. Rul. 87-41; 26 C.F.R. §§31.3306(i)-1, 31.3401(c)-1.

The paragraph of Pub. 15-A invoked by Josephberg, which is titled "Companion sitters," appears in a section of that publication entitled "Statutory Nonemployees" and is drawn from 26 U.S.C. §3506(a), a section that simply describes the circumstances under which an employment agency, conducting the business of putting sitters in touch with individuals who wish to employ them, is not to be considered the sitter's employer. The regulations interpreting §3506 of the Code, after paraphrasing the terms of §3506(a), see 26 C.F.R. §31.3506-1(b), and defining "sitters" and "companion sitting placement service," see 26 C.F.R. §§31.3506-1(a)(2) and (a)(1), state that
[a]ny individual who, by reason of this section, is deemed not to be the employee of a companion sitting placement service shall be deemed to be self-employed for purposes of the tax on self-employment income,

26 C.F.R. §31.3506-1(c) (emphasis added), and that
[t]he rules of this section operate only to remove sitters and companion sitting placement services from the employee-employer relationship when, under §§31.3121(d)-1 and 31.3121(d)-2, that relationship would otherwise exist... . [I]f, under §§31.3121(d)-1 and 31.3121(d)-2, a sitter is considered to be the employee of the individual for whom the sitting is performed rather than the employee of the companion sitting placement service, this section has no effect upon that employee-employer relationship.

26 C.F.R. §31.3506-1(d) (emphases added). Thus, the statement in IRS Pub. 15-A that a sitter who is not an employee of the agency is "generally treated as self-employed for all federal tax purposes," IRS Pub. 15-A, at 5 (emphases added), could not reasonably be taken at face value.

The district court here properly instructed the jury that as to "the willfulness element of the offense of tax evasion under Section 7201 and subscribing a materially false return, Section 7206(1),"
[b]efore you may conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Josephberg owed employment taxes for Ms. Grant ... you must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Josephberg was aware that Norma Grant was his employee, as the law defines that term, as opposed to being an independent contractor for whom such tax payments are not required.

(Tr. 2330.) The court added:
You may not conclude that he knowingly and willfully failed to pay employment taxes unless the government proves to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly and willfully acted in violation of the law as opposed to relying on a good-faith belief that Miss Grant was an independent contractor.

( Id. at 2331.) The district court then described for the jury each of the 20 factors set out in the pertinent IRS Revenue Ruling, Rev. Rul. 87-41 ( see Tr. 2331-37). The court properly refused to add the overly broad Pub. 15-A language, which would have been confusing and erroneous.



3. Permissible Inferences from the Assessments

Finally, Josephberg asked the district court to instruct the jury that an IRS certificate of assessments "is only prima facie proof of a deficiency and is not conclusive proof, or proof beyond a reasonable doubt, in a criminal trial that taxes were in fact owing." (Defendant's Requests for Jury Instructions at 16.) After the court gave instructions that included the statement "that assessments by the IRS constitute prima facie --that's a Latin word which means [']on its face['] --constitute sufficient evidence of the asserted tax deficiencies" (Tr. 2318), Josephberg asked the court to amend its instruction and tell the jury "that the assessments may be prima facie evidence, may constitute" ( id. at 2379 (emphases added)). The district court declined, and Josephberg contends on appeal that this was error. Quoting only the phrase "constitute sufficient evidence" from the instruction, he argues that the charge as given "amount [ed] to an improper conclusive presumption that took away from the jury the ability to determine on its own whether the government proved the requisite element of a substantial additional tax." (Josephberg brief on appeal at 65.) We disagree.

In determining whether the district court properly instructed the jury, we must not judge any instruction in isolation but must instead view the charge as a whole. See, e.g., Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146-47 (1973); United States v. Carr, 880 F.2d 1550, 1555 (2d Cir. 1989). Thus, we will not make our determination "on the basis of excerpts taken out of context." United States v. Zvi, 168 F.3d 49, 58 (2d Cir.) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 872 (1999). Here, although we question the wisdom of instructing a jury in terms of procedure-driving concepts such as the prima facie case, we see no error in the court's instructions as a whole or in its rejection of Josephberg's requested modifying language.

Our concern for the inclusion of reference to "prima facie evidence" in a jury charge is that it may tend to confuse rather than enlighten the jury. See, e.g., L. Sand et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions --Criminal ¶ 32.01, Comment (rev. Nov. 2008) (even where the relevant statute specifies what constitutes "prima facie evidence," instructions to the jury using the term "prima facie" may be "'needlessly confusing'" (quoting United States v. Martorano, 557 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1977))). That a prima facie case was established, in this context, means, in theory, simply that the government presented enough evidence to have the case submitted to the jury. In practice, of course, the judge may, in the interests of justice, submit the case to the jury even if he believes that a prima facie case was not established, planning to enter a judgment of acquittal if the jury returns a verdict of guilty and preserving the sufficiency issue for appeal. See generally United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977) (Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution protects a defendant against an appeal by the government from a judgment of acquittal entered prior to a jury verdict). But in instructing the jury on the law, in preparation for submitting the case to it, the trial court has no need to tell the jury that there is sufficient evidence for the case to be submitted to the jury. The risk is that the jury may be confused by the announcement of such a self-evident proposition and believe that it has some other meaning.

Further, we reject Josephberg's contention that the court should have instructed only that the IRS tax assessments "may" be "prima facie" evidence of Josephberg's tax debts. As a matter of law, given a defendant's right to a jury trial, the assessments could not be conclusive, see, e.g., United States v. Silkman [ 98-2 USTC ¶50,724], 156 F.3d at 835-36; see generally Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. at 572-73 ("a trial judge is prohibited from entering a judgment of conviction or directing a jury to come forward with such a verdict, ... regardless of how overwhelmingly the evidence may point in that direction"); but the assessments were, as a matter of law, see Part II.B.1. above, prima facie evidence of those debts. The equivocal language suggested by Josephberg could only have served to confuse.

Finally, we reject Josephberg's contention that the phrase "constituted sufficient evidence" created a "conclusive presumption" (Josephberg brief on appeal at 65) that the government had proven that Josephberg had a substantial tax debt. The challenged snippet was part of the following instruction:
You are instructed that assessments by the IRS constitute prima facie --that's a Latin word which means on its face --constitute sufficient evidence of the asserted tax deficiencies. You may, however, consider whether there is evidence from which it can be concluded that the IRS improperly or incorrectly assessed the taxes in determining whether Mr. Richard Josephberg owed additional taxes for any of those years. And you must consider all the evidence in the case and consider and decide whether the government has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Josephberg owed substantial additional income tax for the tax year or years that you're then considering.

As I mentioned earlier, the government does not have to prove the precise amount owed so long as it proves beyond a reasonable doubt that it is substantial for the count of the indictment you are then considering.

It is for you to decide whether a substantial tax deficiency exists for the years in issue, and in making that decision, you should consider all the evidence in the case.

(Tr. 2318-19 (emphases added); see also id. at 2320 ("You should decide, based on all relevant factors, whether the tax owed, if any, was substantial or merely trivial.").) Plainly, the court did not indicate that the assessments were conclusive.



F. Challenges to the Sentence

In sentencing Josephberg, the district court began by calculating the range of imprisonment recommended by the 2006 version of the advisory Guidelines --the version then in effect --focusing particularly on Josephberg's tax offenses, the loss from which dwarfed that caused by his health care fraud. Section 2T1.1(c)(1) of that version provided, in pertinent part, that
[i]f the offense involved tax evasion or a fraudulent or false return, statement, or other document, the tax loss is the total amount of loss that was the object of the offense ( i.e., the loss that would have resulted had the offense been successfully completed).

Guidelines §2T1.1(c)(1). The commentary to this section provided that
tax loss does not include interest or penalties, except in willful evasion of payment cases under 26 U.S.C. §7201 and willful failure to pay cases under 26 U.S.C. §7203.

Id. Application Note 1 (emphasis added). Applying this guideline, which had been amended in 2001 by the addition of the "except" clause to Application Note 1, the district court found that the aggregate tax loss resulting from Josephberg's offenses, including interest and penalties, exceeded $7 million but not $20 million, making his base offense level 26, see Guidelines §2T4.1(K). Finding, ultimately, that Josephberg's total offense level was 26 and his criminal history category was I, the court concluded that the advisory-Guidelines recommended range of imprisonment was 63-78 months. After considering the sentencing factors set out in 18 U.S.C. §3553(a), the court elected to impose a non-Guidelines sentence of, principally, 50 months' imprisonment. ( See Sentencing Transcript, September 5, 2007 ("S.Tr."), at 46-48.) We review Josephberg's sentence for abuse of discretion, see, e.g., Gall v. United States, 128 S.Ct. 586, 600-02 (2007), i.e., for an error of law, or clearly erroneous findings of fact, or a decision that cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions, see, e.g., United States v. Williams, 475 F.3d 468, 474 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S.Ct. 881 (2008); United States v. Brady, 417 F.3d 326, 332-33 (2d Cir. 2005).

Josephberg makes two challenges to the court's Guidelines calculations. First, arguing that his tax evasion offenses were completed by mid-December 1998 (when he made disclosures in his wife's bankruptcy proceeding), Josephberg contends that calculations under the 2006 version of the Guidelines violated the Ex Post Facto Clause because they included §2T1.1(c)(1) as amended in 2001. Prior to that amendment, the Guidelines provided, without exceptions, that "[t]he tax loss does not include interest or penalties," Sentencing Guidelines §2T1.1, Application Note 1 (2000). Second, Josephberg contends that in determining the loss resulting from his tax offenses, the district court erred in using the amount of taxes, interest, and penalties that were assessed and unpaid, instead of the value of the assets he concealed. These contentions need not detain us long.

"Generally, a sentencing court must use the version of the [G]uidelines in effect at the time of defendant's sentencing, not that extant at the time of the offense" unless use of the later version would create an ex post facto problem. United States v. Keller, 58 F.3d 884, 889 (2d Cir. 1995). The ex post facto prohibition is concerned in part with "lack of fair notice and governmental restraint when the legislature increases punishment beyond what was prescribed when the crime was consummated." Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 430 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted). A crime is consummated when it is completed, and as to a continuing offense that was begun prior to the effective date of a Guidelines amendment and completed after that date, application of the amendment does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. See, e.g., United States v. McCall, 915 F.2d 811, 816 (2d Cir. 1990).

In the present case, Josephberg was convicted of, inter alia, tax evasion for the years 1977-1980, 1983-1985, and 1997-1998, in violation of §7201, and of willful failure to file timely tax returns for the years 1999-2002, in violation of §7203. The district court rejected Josephberg's contention that application of the 2006 version of the Guidelines would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause on his theory that "nothing was concealed after December 16th, 1998" (S.Tr. 38). The court responded: "I don't think that's a correct analysis of it. I think the issue is whether there is a continuing offense which straddled the dates of the guidelines. That's the argument, and I think you have an uphill road." ( Id.) The court ultimately concluded that although some of Josephberg's acts occurred before the effective date of the 2001 amendment to §2T1.1(c)(1), "all" of Josephberg's acts "are part of the general single offense behavior." (S.Tr. 40.)

We see no abuse of discretion in this decision. Josephberg's evasions for the years 1977-1980 and 1983-1985 gave rise to a substantial tax debt, the payment of which he attempted to avoid by claiming, on his returns through 1998, a net operating loss that he knew as early as 1993 was disallowed. The correctness of the district court's view of the relatedness of Josephberg's tax offense behavior is most clearly shown by the fact that after 1998 Josephberg elected not to file timely income tax returns for the years 1999-2002 because in part --according to his own arguments, see Part II.C. above --he was attempting to avoid taking a stance on returns for 1999-2002 that would assist in prosecuting him for having claimed net operating losses through 1998. We thus agree with the district court that Josephberg's later tax offenses were closely related to the earlier offenses and were properly viewed as part of the same scheme or plan.

Finally, here, as in the district court, Josephberg contends that the district court should have ruled that the losses attributable to his tax offenses were limited to the value of the assets he concealed. Such a view is contrary to the Guidelines, which, as to an offense involving tax evasion or the filing of a false or fraudulent return, state that "the tax loss is the total amount of loss that was the object of the offense," Guidelines §2T1.1(c)(1). The district court thus concluded, "what's being evaded is what's owed." (S.Tr. 41.) We see no abuse of discretion in this conclusion.


CONCLUSION


We have considered all of Josephberg's arguments in support of his appeal and have found them to be without merit. The judgment of the district court is affirmed.




Fact finding. --Willful Failure to File Return, Supply Information, or Pay Tax: Evidence: Fact finding

In a jury trial in which the Government sought to establish understatement of income by the net worth method plus the non-deductible expenditures method, the jury found the former Governor of the State of Illinois not guilty of willfully attempting to evade and defeat the payment of income taxes for the years 1957 through 1960.

W.G. Stratton, DC, 65-1 USTC ¶9289.

A jury found the taxpayer not guilty of the charge of filing false and fraudulent returns with intent to evade income tax.

Littlefield, DC, 56-2 USTC ¶10,083.

W.R. Long, DC, 61-1 USTC ¶9118.

The evidence was sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that the taxpayer misunderstood in good faith the tax laws and his duty to file an income tax return.

M.L. Harting, CA-10, 89-2 USTC ¶9435.

An individual's attempt to take money out of the country, his initial understatement to customs officials of the amount involved, and his subsequent failure to file a return were not affirmative acts sufficient to sustain a conviction for tax evasion.

B. Romano, CA-2, 91-2 USTC ¶50,471, 938 F2d 1569.

Despite an attorney's claim that he did not file tax returns for the years in question because his net self-employment income was below the filing threshold, sufficient evidence supported an attorney's conviction for willful failure to file. The amount of his gross income imposed a filing requirement for a single filer. Further, he acted willfully since his filing of returns in the past indicated knowledge of a legal duty to file. Also, it was not unreasonable to conclude that he did not rely in good faith on IRS notices indicating that he was not required to file.

G.V. Dubin, CA-9 (unpublished opinion), 96-2 USTC ¶50,541. Cert. denied, 10/7/96. Rehearing denied, 1/21/97.

A taxpayer knowingly filed a false income tax return with the intent to evade a capital gains tax upon the sale of Italian real estate. He grossly understated his taxable income for tax year, his statements about the amounts of the additional income and tax were inconsistent, and he failed to develop testimony that the Italian registration taxes and fees were paid by him when the real estate was purchased by the buyer. Furthermore, the taxpayer never declared the capital gain.

S. Cinquergrani, BC-DC Ill., 93-1 USTC ¶50,170.

A federal district court properly determined the amounts embezzled by an individual from his employers.

D.J. Peterson, CA-10, 2003-1 USTC ¶50,168, 312 F3d 1300 .

The government's evidence was sufficient to support a jury's decision to convict three partners for employment tax evasion. The government's evidence established that the partners, despite their knowledge of the requirement to file accurate tax returns on behalf of the partnership, willfully omitted payroll information for their employees who were members of a small religious sect that opposed payment of taxes. The government's evidence established that the fraudulent withholding was common knowledge amongst the partnership's employees, and that each of the partners knew that the returns were false, but took no steps to correct the situation or report the unreported wages. Their misrepresentation of the total wages subject to employment taxes was a willful act of concealment, and their failure to comply with the filing requirements was an overt act of willful tax evasion.

K. McKee, CA-3, 2007-2 USTC ¶50,778, 506 F3d 225.

An individual was properly convicted of tax evasion. The individual's false assertion in his offer-in-compromise (OIC) that he lacked the funds to satisfy his tax liabilities constituted an affirmative attempt to evade taxes. A conversation recorded by IRS investigators after the individual submitted his OIC established that he believed that funds he transferred to an offshore account were under his control and available to him when he submitted his offer.

S.P. Miller, CA-5, 2008-1 USTC ¶50,237, 520 F3d 504.

The government produced sufficient evidence to support an individual's conviction for willfully attempting to evade and defeat taxes by failing to file income tax returns. The evidence showed that the individual intentionally avoided her tax obligations by providing her employer with fraudulent tax forms, instructing him to stop withholding taxes, depositing her earnings in nominee bank accounts, conducting surreptitious cash transactions and failing to file tax returns or pay taxes. Because the government showed that the individual was aware of her duty to file returns and treat her wages as income, it was not required to prove her knowledge that a specific statute or regulation imposed those duties. The government was not required to prove that the IRS had assessed the tax owing or demanded payment because such acts were not required before filing of tax return or paying taxes.

N.M. Ware, CA-11 (unpublished opinion) 2008-2 USTC ¶50,550, aff'g, per curiam, an unreported DC Fla. decision.

A doctor and his son were properly convicted of attempted tax evasion. The government produced sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that a lease transaction between the doctor and his son was a sham that constituted an overt or affirmative act in furtherance of their tax evasion conspiracy and attempted tax evasion. The government also presented evidence that the doctor failed to timely file and pay taxes in the years before and after the tax years charged in the indictment, showing that the doctor acted willfully to avoid his tax obligations and did not have a good-faith belief that he was not obligated to file returns or pay taxes.

B.R. Shows, II, CA-5, 2009-1 USTC ¶50,180.

An investment advisor was properly convicted and sentenced for willful tax evasion, subscribing false tax returns, willfully failing to file timely personal income tax returns and pay taxes, and obstructing and impeding the IRS's investigation into his assets. The tax assessment certificates constituted prima facie evidence that the individual had a substantial tax debt, his returns falsely claimed entitlement to deduct net operating loss despite being informed of the disallowance of the loss and he engaged in affirmative acts of evasion by concealing the existence of two corporate entities that were set up to avoid lawful seizure of his assets and establishing stock accounts for his children, into which he redirected his income subsequent to receiving the deficiency notice.

R. Josephberg, CA-2, 2009-1 USTC ¶50,346.

Labels:

Monday, June 8, 2009

Notice 2009-46 , I.R.B. 2009-23, 1068, June 8, 2009.




Business expenses: Gross income: Fringe benefits: Substantiation: Cell phones. --





PURPOSE

This notice requests comments from the public regarding several proposals to simplify the procedures under which employers substantiate an employee's business use of employer-provided cellular telephones or other similar telecommunications equipment (hereinafter collectively referred to as "cell phones"). This notice describes the proposals under consideration. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and Treasury Department are interested in considering other possible approaches. Therefore, this notice also requests suggestions for alternative approaches to simplify the procedures under which employers substantiate an employee's business use of employer-provided cell phones.

Any changes to the substantiation procedures applicable to employer-provided cell phones will not become effective until the IRS and Treasury Department consider public comments and suggestions received in response to this notice and publish guidance announcing any simplified substantiation procedures.



BACKGROUND



Employers

Section 162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code provides that a deduction is allowed for all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business. However, § 262(a) provides that, except as otherwise expressly provided, no deduction shall be allowed for personal, living, or family expenses.

Section 274(d)(4) provides that no deduction shall be allowed with respect to any listed property (as defined in § 280F(d)(4)), unless the taxpayer substantiates by adequate records or by sufficient evidence corroborating the taxpayer's own statement (A) the amount of such expense or other item, (B) the use of the property, (C) the business purpose of the expense or other item, and (D) the business relationship to the taxpayer of persons using the property. The Secretary may by regulations provide that some or all of the requirements of the preceding sentence shall not apply in the case of an expense that does not exceed an amount prescribed pursuant to such regulations.

Section 280F(d)(4)(A)(v) provides that "listed property" includes any cellular telephone (or other similar telecommunications equipment).

Section 1.274-5T(a) of the temporary Income Tax Regulations provides that no deduction or credit shall be allowed with respect to any listed property unless the taxpayer substantiates each element of the expenditure or use. Section 1.274-5T(b)(6) provides that the elements to be proved with respect to any listed property are:

(i) Amount --(A) The amount of each separate expenditure with respect to an item of listed property, such as the cost of acquisition, and (B) the amount of each business use based on the appropriate measure (that is, time) and the amount of total use of the listed property for the taxable period ( see § 1.274-5T(e)(2));

(ii) Time --The date of the expenditure or use with respect to the listed property; and

(iii) Business purpose --The business purpose for an expenditure or use with respect to any listed property.



Employees

Section 61(a)(1) provides that, except as otherwise provided, gross income includes compensation for services, including fees, commissions, fringe benefits, and similar items. Section 1.61-21(b)(1) of the Income Tax Regulations requires that an employee generally must include in gross income the amount by which the fair market value of a fringe benefit exceeds the sum of (i) the amount, if any, paid for the benefit by or on behalf of the employee, and (ii) the amount, if any, specifically excluded from gross income by some other section of the Code. The fair market value of a fringe benefit is the amount that an individual would have to pay for the particular fringe benefit in an arm's length transaction. Section 1.61-21(b)(2). The cost incurred by an employer is not determinative of the fair market value of a fringe benefit. Id.

Section 132(a)(3) provides that gross income does not include any fringe benefit that qualifies as a working condition fringe. Section 132(d) provides that "working condition fringe" means any property or services provided to an employee of the employer to the extent that, if the employee paid for such property or services, such payment would be allowable as a deduction under § 162 or § 167.

Section 1.132-5(a)(1)(ii) provides that if, under § 274 or any other section of the Code, certain substantiation requirements must be met in order for a deduction under § 162 or § 167 to be allowable, then those substantiation requirements apply in determining whether a property or service is excludable as a working condition fringe. See also § 1.132-5(c)(1). The substantiation requirements of § 274(d) are satisfied by adequate records or sufficient evidence corroborating the employee's own statement. Section 1.132-5(c)(2). Therefore, such records or evidence provided by the employee, and relied upon by the employer to the extent permitted by the regulations promulgated under § 274(d), will be sufficient to substantiate a working condition fringe exclusion. Id.



DISCUSSION

If an employer provides a cell phone to an employee, and the employer acquires and pays the costs of using the cell phone, the employee receives a fringe benefit. To the extent that the employee uses the employer's cell phone for business purposes, the fair market value of such usage qualifies as a working condition fringe benefit excludable from the employee's gross income and the cell phone expense is a deductible business expense for the employer, provided that the substantiation requirements of § 274(d) are met. However, to the extent the employee uses the employer's cell phone for personal purposes, the fair market value of such usage is includable in the employee's gross income. The employer's cost to provide the cell phone is not determinative of the fair market value of the benefit received by the employee.



PROPOSALS

The IRS and Treasury Department are considering the following proposals to simplify the § 274(d) substantiation requirements applicable to employee usage of employer-provided cell phones.



A. Simplified Substantiation Methods



General Requirements

As discussed in greater detail below, the IRS and Treasury Department are considering three alternative methods to simplify the substantiation requirements applicable to employee usage of employer-provided cell phones: a minimal personal use method, a safe harbor substantiation method, and a statistical sampling method (or a combination of the foregoing). Any simplified cell phone substantiation method will be optional; taxpayers may continue to comply with current § 274(d) substantiation requirements.

The IRS and Treasury Department contemplate that any taxpayer who wishes to use a simplified cell phone substantiation method will be required to implement a written policy that requires employees to carry and use the employer-provided cell phones in connection with the employer's trade or business and that prohibits personal use of employer-provided cell phones, except for minimal personal use, similar to the requirements currently applicable to employer-provided automobiles in § 1.274-6T. In addition, the IRS and Treasury Department anticipate requiring that the employer must reasonably believe that the cell phone is not used for personal purposes except for minimal personal use.



1. Minimal Personal Use Method

The IRS and Treasury Department are considering two proposals that would allow an employer to deem all of an employee's usage of an employer-provided cell phone as business usage. Under the first proposal, the entire amount of an employee's use of an employer-provided cell phone would be deemed to be for business purposes if the employee can account to his or her employer with sufficient records to establish that the employee maintains and uses a personal (non-employer-provided) cell phone for personal purposes during the employee's work hours.

Alternatively, the second proposal would define a specified amount or type of "minimal" personal use that would be disregarded in determining the amount of personal use of an employer-provided cell phone. For example, "minimal" could be defined by reference to a particular number of minutes of use or for certain personal purposes.



2. Safe Harbor Substantiation Method

The IRS and Treasury Department are considering a safe harbor method under which an employer would treat a certain percentage of each employee's use of an employer-provided cell phone as business usage. The remaining percentage of use would be deemed to be for personal purposes. For this proposal, the IRS and Treasury Department propose a business use percentage of 75 percent.



3. Statistical Sampling Method

The IRS and Treasury Department are considering a proposal that would allow employers to use statistical sampling techniques to measure an employee's personal use of an employer-provided cell phone. In general, an employer could use an approved statistical sampling methodology similar to that provided in Rev. Proc. 2004-29, 2004-1 C.B. 918, to determine the percentage of personal use of employer-provided cell phones. The employer would multiply that percentage times the value of each employee's total usage to determine the value of personal usage. The remaining portion of the employee's usage would be deemed to be for business purposes.



B. Simplified Fair Market Value Determination

To the extent that an employee's use of an employer-provided cell phone does not qualify as a working condition fringe benefit (because the employer does not satisfy § 274(d) or the cell phone is used partially for personal purposes), the fair market value of an employee's use of the employer-provided cell phone is a taxable fringe benefit that is includable in the employee's gross income. An employer's cost to provide the cell phone is not determinative of the fair market value of an employee's fringe benefit. The IRS and Treasury Department are interested in understanding the methods employers currently use to arrive at the fair market value to an employee of an employer-provided cell phone. The IRS and Treasury Department are considering whether a simplified valuation method would be helpful and appropriate to determine such fair market value.



REQUEST FOR COMMENTS

The IRS and Treasury Department request public comments on the proposals contained in this notice and suggestions for other approaches for modifying and simplifying the substantiation requirements applicable to employee usage of employer-provided cell phones. The IRS and Treasury Department are particularly interested in any comments regarding:
 The specific provisions that should be required to be included in an employer's written policy prohibiting personal use of employer-provided cell phones;

 The types of employee records sufficient to establish that the employee maintains and uses a personal (nonemployer-provided) cell phone for purposes of the first proposed minimum personal use method contained in this notice;

 How to define a specified amount or type of "minimal" personal use ( e.g., a maximum number of minutes of use or a list of acceptable personal uses) that should be disregarded in determining the amount of personal use of an employer-provided cell phone for purposes of the second proposed minimum personal use method contained in this notice.

 The business use percentage that should be applied in the proposed safe harbor substantiation method contained in this notice and the data and rationale upon which it is based;

 The methods currently used by employers to determine the fair market value of an employee's use of an employer-provided cell phone; and

 Whether a simplified method of determining the fair market value of an employee's use of an employer-provided cell phone would be appropriate, and, if so, suggested simplified methodologies for determining such fair market value.

Comments must be submitted in writing on or before September 4, 2009, and should include a reference to Notice 2009-46. Submissions should be sent to:
Internal Revenue Service

Attn: CC:PA:LPD:PR

( Notice 2009-46), Room 5203

P.O. Box 7604

Ben Franklin Station

Washington, DC 20044

Submissions also may be hand delivered Monday through Friday between the hours of 8 a.m. and 4 p.m. to: CC:PA:LPD:PR ( Notice 2009-46), Courier's Desk, Internal Revenue Service, 1111 Constitution Avenue, N.W., Washington, DC. Alternatively, comments may be submitted electronically directly to the IRS via the following e-mail address: Notice.comments@irscounsel.treas.gov. Please include "Notice 2009-46" in the subject line of any electronic communication. All comments will be available for public inspection and copying.



DRAFTING INFORMATION

The principal author of this notice is Jeffrey T. Rodrick of the Office of Associate Chief Counsel (Income Tax & Accounting). For further information regarding this notice, contact Mr. Rodrick at (202) 622-4930 (not a toll-free call).

Substantiation Requirements and Per Diem Rates: Substantiation of Individual Expenses for Listed Property: Elements that must be substantiated for deduction of automobile and computer equipment expenses

In general, expenses related to listed property must be substantiated. Listed property includes passenger automobiles and other property used for transportation, property used for entertainment, any computer and peripheral equipment not used exclusively in a business, and cellular telephones ( Code Sec. 280F(d)(4)).

Expenses relating to listed property must be substantiated by providing an adequate record of the following elements of expenses:
(1) Amount --both the amount of each separate expenditure made with respect to the property and the amount of business investment use must be proved ( Temporary Reg. §1.274-5T(b)(6)).

(2) Time --dates of expenditures made with respect to the property must be proved ( Temporary Reg. §1.274-5T(b)(6)(ii)).

(3) Business or investment purposes --the business reason for the use of listed property and for expenditures made with respect to listed property must be substantiated ( Temporary Reg. §1.274-5T(b)(6)(iii)).

(4) Business/investment use --a taxpayer must provide sufficient information as to each element of every business or investment use of listed property. However, if the facts and circumstances indicate that the listed property has a repetitive business use, the details of each use need not be repeated. For example, if a truck that is used both for personal and business purposes travels on an established business route, the information regarding the route may be recorded once. Details regarding the date of each repetitive use, however, must be stated ( Temporary Reg. §1.274-5T(c)(2)(ii)(C)).

The amount of business use may be expressed in terms of mileage if the property is used for transportation ( Temporary Reg. §1.274-5T(b)(6)(i)). Regarding vehicles used in farm operations, the business use may be deemed to be 75% plus the percentage attributable to the amount included in any employee's gross income ( Temporary Reg. §1.274-6T(b)).

The adequate record requirements of Temporary Reg. §1.274-5T(c)(2) apply to listed property expenses. Thus, a taxpayer must prove each element by written documentary evidence and taxpayer-maintained records. Written documentary evidence, such as receipts or paid bills, is required for amounts of $75 or more (see ¶14,417.023). However, a record of the business use of certain listed property, such as computers and vehicles, for example, may be provided by logging devices rather than by written evidence. Under certain circumstances, a taxpayer may prove elements by corroborative evidence and his own statement, or by other methods such as reconstruction (see ¶14,417.023).

Substantiation by sampling. If a taxpayer maintains an adequate record for portions of the tax year, and the taxpayer proves by other evidence that the adequate record is representative of the entire year, the business use or investment use of listed property during all or a portion of the year will be substantiated. The sampling method is not available to substantiate the business or investment use of vehicles that are used by more than one employee during the year ( Temporary Reg. §1.274-5T(c)(3)(ii)).

Substantiation Requirements and Per Diem Rates: Substantiation of Individual Expenses for Listed Property: Elements that must be substantiated for deduction of automobile and computer equipment expenses

In general, expenses related to listed property must be substantiated. Listed property includes passenger automobiles and other property used for transportation, property used for entertainment, any computer and peripheral equipment not used exclusively in a business, and cellular telephones ( Code Sec. 280F(d)(4)).

Expenses relating to listed property must be substantiated by providing an adequate record of the following elements of expenses:
(1) Amount --both the amount of each separate expenditure made with respect to the property and the amount of business investment use must be proved ( Temporary Reg. §1.274-5T(b)(6)).

(2) Time --dates of expenditures made with respect to the property must be proved ( Temporary Reg. §1.274-5T(b)(6)(ii)).

(3) Business or investment purposes --the business reason for the use of listed property and for expenditures made with respect to listed property must be substantiated ( Temporary Reg. §1.274-5T(b)(6)(iii)).

(4) Business/investment use --a taxpayer must provide sufficient information as to each element of every business or investment use of listed property. However, if the facts and circumstances indicate that the listed property has a repetitive business use, the details of each use need not be repeated. For example, if a truck that is used both for personal and business purposes travels on an established business route, the information regarding the route may be recorded once. Details regarding the date of each repetitive use, however, must be stated ( Temporary Reg. §1.274-5T(c)(2)(ii)(C)).

The amount of business use may be expressed in terms of mileage if the property is used for transportation ( Temporary Reg. §1.274-5T(b)(6)(i)). Regarding vehicles used in farm operations, the business use may be deemed to be 75% plus the percentage attributable to the amount included in any employee's gross income ( Temporary Reg. §1.274-6T(b)).

The adequate record requirements of Temporary Reg. §1.274-5T(c)(2) apply to listed property expenses. Thus, a taxpayer must prove each element by written documentary evidence and taxpayer-maintained records. Written documentary evidence, such as receipts or paid bills, is required for amounts of $75 or more (see ¶14,417.023). However, a record of the business use of certain listed property, such as computers and vehicles, for example, may be provided by logging devices rather than by written evidence. Under certain circumstances, a taxpayer may prove elements by corroborative evidence and his own statement, or by other methods such as reconstruction (see ¶14,417.023).

Substantiation by sampling. If a taxpayer maintains an adequate record for portions of the tax year, and the taxpayer proves by other evidence that the adequate record is representative of the entire year, the business use or investment use of listed property during all or a portion of the year will be substantiated. The sampling method is not available to substantiate the business or investment use of vehicles that are used by more than one employee during the year ( Temporary Reg. §1.274-5T(c)(3)(ii)).

Adequate v. inadequate records. --Substantiation Requirements and Per Diem Rates: Evidence: Adequate v. inadequate records

A lawyer who entertains clients in his own residence must substantiate all the required elements the same as a person who entertains elsewhere. Nor was the Court persuaded by the taxpayer's contention that it would have been economically unfeasible for him to have kept detailed records due to the large number of people he entertained. His situation was similar to that of a large number of professionals and businessmen who find it advisable to entertain.

R. Steel, CA-2, 71-1 USTC ¶9164, 437 F2d 71.

Oral testimony and circumstantial evidence that corroborated written evidence and the taxpayer's own statement concerning the amount, time and place, business purpose and business relationship of expenditures for travel, meals and entertainment with current and prospective customers were sufficient to substantiate the expenditures.

C.F. Dowell, Jr., CA-5, 75-2 USTC ¶9819, 522 F2d 708. Cert. denied, 426 US 920, 96 SCt 2626.

Where neither a professional employer organization (PEO) nor its client properly limited the deduction for per diem payments in accordance with Code Sec. 274(n), the PEO (a subsidiary of the taxpayer, a truck driver leasing company) was responsible for the resulting tax deficiency. The court of appeals, reversing the Tax Court, held that the taxpayer proved that it was not subject to the Code Sec. 274(n) limitation of 50 percent of any expense for food or beverages. The taxpayer paid per diem expenses to the truck drivers and provided its trucking company clients with the expense substantiation information required by Code Sec. 274(d). The trial record included substantial documentary and testimonial evidence establishing that the taxpayer and its clients entered into a "reimbursement or other expense allowance arrangement" that satisfied the requirements of Reg. §1.62-2(c) --(f) and, therefore, Code Sec. 274(e)(3).

Transport Labor Contract/Leasing, Inc., CA-8, 2006-2 USTC ¶50,478. Rev'g Dec. 55,714, 123 TC 154 and Dec. 56,096(M), 90 TCM 42, TC Memo. 2005-173.

Amounts spent for telephone, lodging, transportation, etc., were deductible where they were substantiated in a diary by time, place, and amount and further substantiated by receipts or the oral testimony of the person incurring the expense.

W.T. Brown, DC, 68-1 USTC ¶9134, 280 FSupp 854.

Logbooks and monthly summaries omitting the purpose of expenditures, the business relationship of recipients, and sometimes the names of recipients and the places where they were entertained did not substantiate a chiropractor's claimed deductions for entertaining patients on his boat.

F.P. Rutz, 66 TC 879, Dec. 33,979.

Code Sec. 274(d) contemplates that no deduction is to be allowed for expenditures on the basis of approximations ( Cohan rule) or unsupported testimony. To meet the "adequate records" requirement of Code Sec. 274(d), a taxpayer should maintain an account book, diary, statement of expenses or similar record and documentary evidence, which, in combination, are sufficient to establish each element of an expenditure. It is not necessary to record information that duplicates information reflected on a receipt so long as such account book and receipt complement each other in an orderly manner.

Rev. Rul. 75-169, 1975-1 CB 59, modifying Rev. Rul. 54-497, 1954-2 CB 75.

A deduction for unreimbursed travel expenses was denied because Code Sec. 274(d) overrides the Cohan rule.

L. Witherspoon, 68 TCM 1333, Dec. 50,270(M), TC Memo. 1994-593.

Substantiation of claimed travel expenses by a corporation was made by use of receipts, an employee's diary and his testimony.

Champion Trophy Mfg. Corp., 31 TCM 1236, Dec. 31,643(M), TC Memo. 1972-250.

Air travel expenses substantiated by checks to a credit card company and by a diary were deductible.

M. Feinstein, 34 TCM 830, Dec. 33,271(M), TC Memo. 1975-193.

An outside liquor salesman adduced sufficient evidence to support his claim to a deduction for promotional drinks that he was required to purchase in order to secure liquor orders for which he was compensated on a commission basis.

C. Diller, 37 TCM 1332, Dec. 35,343(M), TC Memo. 1978-321.

Based upon a log book and receipts kept by the taxpayer, the court allowed a deduction for some of the food and lodging expenses incurred by the taxpayer when he was required to stay away from home overnight.

M.L. Johnson, 43 TCM 248, Dec. 38,703(M), TC Memo. 1982-2.

A physician's expenditures for business meals and gifts to referral physicians, employees and business associates were substantiated by the taxpayer's testimony and receipts containing notations describing the persons involved in each activity.

E.R. Beltran, 43 TCM 892, Dec. 38,884(M), TC Memo. 1982-153.

A taxpayer who testified at trial as to the business purpose for certain trips and who presented as evidence a summary sheet of the amount of the expenditures incurred on each trip, which included the business purpose of the trips, provided adequate substantiation of his business purpose for the expenses to be deductible.

S.J. Hernandez, 44 TCM 96, Dec. 39,095(M), TC Memo. 1982-327.

The taxpayer adequately substantiated and was entitled to a deduction for the costs of a rental car and meals incurred on a trip to care for his rental property.

D.A. Jenkins, 44 TCM 510, Dec. 39,195(M), TC Memo. 1982-407.

A self-employed taxpayer who supplied a log and credit card receipts as well as his oral testimony satisfied the substantiation requirement for part of his claimed travel and entertainment expenses. However, no deduction was allowed where taxpayer offered an estimation of entertainment expenses but no records for the claimed expenditures.

L.G. Anderson, 44 TCM 874, Dec. 39,279(M), TC Memo. 1982-475.

An insurance company's district manager was entitled to business expense deductions for periodic bonus payments made to his sales managers in addition to their overwrites, based on the recorded amounts appearing on ledger sheets as well as the canceled checks specifically bearing a notation that they were for bonuses.

V.C. McCue, 46 TCM 1450, Dec. 40,473(M), TC Memo. 1983-580.

An anesthesiologist was entitled to deduct certain expenses claimed with respect to a pleasure boat maintained for the purpose of entertaining other physicians to solicit referrals. With the exception of expenses for costs that were not self-explanatory in nature and required further substantiation, the court accepted the doctor's list of itemized expenses incurred in connection with the operation of the boat, since the boat was sufficiently connected to the doctor's business.

G. Detko, 53 TCM 186, Dec. 43,719(M), TC Memo. 1987-99.

A deduction was denied for the unsubstantiated expenses of entertaining on a taxpayer's boat.

R.G. Shannon, 35 TCM 1371, Dec. 34,037(M), TC Memo. 1976-304.

R.A. Roumiquire, 40 TCM 1137, Dec. 37,203(M), TC Memo. 1980-356.

A husband and wife who operated an audio-visual business exclusively out of their home were entitled to a deduction for candy, beverages, and light meals provided to clients during working meetings. Further, the taxpayers were entitled to a deduction for local entertainment of clients because their documentary evidence, coupled with the corroborative testimony of their clients, substantiated such deductions.

C.R. Hefti, 54 TCM 1555, Dec. 44,527(M), TC Memo. 1988-22.

A self-employed real estate broker was entitled to deduct auto, travel and entertainment expenses to the extent such expenses were substantiated. The taxpayer had disposed of the original receipts relating to the claimed expenses. However, a schedule of the expenses summarizing the information on the receipts, which the taxpayer made at the IRS's request, constituted an accurate record of his expenses for purposes of determining whether the claimed deductions were substantiated.

R. Fors, 70 TCM 420, Dec. 50,837(M), TC Memo. 1995-392.

Ordained ministers who presented credible testimony relating to the issue and adequately substantiated and reconstructed their travel expenses were allowed to exclude reimbursements of travel expenses related to their work even though they did not make an adequate accounting of their expenses. Their failure to produce more adequate records was the result of the IRS taking possession of the records and restricting the taxpayers' access to those records.

L. Whittington, 80 TCM 396, Dec. 54,051(M), TC Memo. 2000-296.

A couple who operated a nutrition supplement and personal care items business out of their home were entitled to deduct their substantiated ordinary and necessary business expenses. Based on the husband's credible testimony, and the available documentation, the couple was allowed deductions under Code Sec. 162 for meeting and convention expenses, cost of goods sold, meals and entertainment, car and truck expenses, travel expenses, royalty income expenses and equipment depreciation. The couple also satisfied the special substantiation requirements of Code Sec. 274 which applied to certain of such expenses.

S.G. Chaney, 97 TCM 1293, Dec. 57,758(M), TC Memo. 2009-55.

The taxpayer's diary and canceled checks were insufficient to substantiate his claimed deductions for hotel and food expenses in excess of the amounts determined by the Commissioner because the diaries did not include either the location of the taxpayer's travels or their business purpose and the canceled checks failed to reflect the business purpose of the expenditures.

J.C. Coursey, Jr., 33 TCM 205, Dec. 32,466(M), TC Memo. 1974-430.

Mere restaurant receipts, most of which were undated and about half of which failed to identify the restaurant or to indicate how many persons were served, failed to substantiate alleged entertainment expenses.

G.L. Gee, 36 TCM 327, Dec. 34,308(M), TC Memo. 1977-72.

A couple was denied a deduction for meals and lodging expenses incurred by the husband while away from home in pursuit of his trade as a carpenter because they failed to produce adequate records to substantiate the expenses.

B.W. Moretz, 36 TCM 1341, Dec. 34,662(M), TC Memo. 1977-334.

An attorney properly substantiated the business meal expenses incurred at a private club by providing invoices listing the names of clients and business partners entertained. However, the business relationship was not substantiated where the persons listed were not clients or business partners.

J.H. Lennon, 37 TCM 751, Dec. 35,146(M), TC Memo. 1978-176.

The taxpayer failed to adequately substantiate his business travel expenses where he simply drew cash with a check in the estimated amount of the travel expenses prior to a trip, and made a notation on the check as to the trip's destination.

G.T. Hicks, 37 TCM 1540, Dec. 35,418(M), TC Memo. 1978-373.

Lack of documentation in the form of receipts and diaries to verify deductions caused the Tax Court to use a low estimate for the travel expense and to disallow the entertainment expense claimed by taxpayer.

T.T. Rembusch, Jr., 38 TCM 310, Dec. 35,913(M), TC Memo. 1979-73.

The cost of meals consumed by an over-the-road truck driver on trips in pursuit of his employer's business was not deductible where unsubstantiated by expense records or other corroborating evidence.

C.W. Henson, 38 TCM 510, Dec. 35,959(M), TC Memo. 1979-110.

The taxpayer was unable to deduct certain expenses for meals and entertainment because he failed to properly substantiate each item of expense. In order to substantiate an entertainment expense, it is necessary to provide the amount, time, place, and business purpose of the expense and the business relationship of the party entertained to the taxpayer.

B. Schmoutey, 38 TCM 637, Dec. 36,004(M), TC Memo. 1979-142.

The amount of business mileage allowed as a deduction to a salesman was substantially reduced because of his failure to substantiate expenses by keeping a daily mileage record.

J.C. Perkins, 38 TCM 1087, Dec. 36,190(M), TC Memo. 1979-277.

A professional corporation was not entitled to deduct amounts paid to its president and chief medical officer for the rental of his trailer for entertainment of hospital personnel. The summary of a "log" was inadequate proof and contained only one entry for the period in issue.

S.I. Blake, M.C., P.C., 41 TCM 802, Dec. 37,656(M), TC Memo. 1981-41.

Although the evidence presented by the taxpayer indicated that claimed travel, entertainment, and meals and lodging expenses were related to a business purpose, the taxpayer failed to produce any records or receipts to substantiate the expenses. Therefore, the expenses were not deductible.

Aero Industrial Co., Inc., 40 TCM 147, Dec. 36,885(M), TC Memo. 1980-116.

Only limited employee business expense deductions were allowed to a truck driver who was away from home for 236 days in one tax year and 246 days in another. The taxpayer produced no contemporaneous documents or records reflecting additional amounts paid for meals or any amounts paid for lodging during the years in issue. While the costs of meals may be aggregated, expenditures for lodging must be substantiated by documentary evidence in the form of receipts, paid bills or similar evidence.

F.F. Wright, 40 TCM 258, Dec. 36,917(M), TC Memo. 1980-141.

Expenses incurred by a taxpayer and his family while traveling through the Pacific Northwest were not deductible as business expenses. The taxpayer's failure to provide any corroborating evidence of the expenditures or to attempt to apportion the costs attributable to his family and those attributable to his business-related purposes in taking the trip demonstrated the inadequacy as evidence of receipts that the taxpayer claimed represented expenses incurred on the trip.

J.P. Kennedy, 40 TCM 958, Dec. 37,150(M), TC Memo. 1980-310.

A long-haul truck driver was not entitled to a claimed meals expense deduction because he failed to substantiate the deduction with a record prepared contemporaneously with the expenditures.

D.G. Carpenter, 42 TCM 98, Dec. 37,983(M), TC Memo. 1981-298.

Receipts that did not explain the time, place and business purposes of travel expenditures were insufficient to sustain a deduction greater than that allowed by the Commissioner.

P.L. Cooper, 42 TCM 418, Dec. 38,064(M), TC Memo. 1981-369.

Similarly. --

W.D. Tyler, 43 TCM 927, Dec. 38,892(M), TC Memo. 1982-160.

R. Lewis, 44 TCM 887, Dec. 39,282(M), TC Memo. 1982-478.

H.J. Langer, 59 TCM 740, Dec. 46,616(M), TC Memo. 1990-268. Aff'd, per curiam, CA-8, 93-1 USTC ¶50,008, 980 F2d 1198.

G.G. Smith, 50 TCM 492, Dec. 42,244(M), TC Memo. 1985-336.

T.B. Javor, 61 TCM 2558, Dec. 47,330(M), TC Memo. 1991-201.

O.A. Steinberg, 69 TCM 2131, Dec. 50,530(M), TC Memo. 1995-116.

E. Clark, 83 TCM 1174, Dec. 54,637(M), TC Memo. 2002-32.

V. Perrah, 84 TCM 547, Dec. 54,935(M), TC Memo. 2002-283.

Worksheets prepared by a taxpayer's accountant were not sufficient without some documentation or testimony supporting them to sustain the taxpayer's burden of proof with respect to additional amounts claimed as deductions for telephone, automobile, and interest expenses.

P.M. Ramos, 42 TCM 924, Dec. 38,202(M), TC Memo. 1981-473.

A truck driver failed to comply with the strict requirement of substantiating by sufficient evidence corroborating his own statement the amount of his expenses, the time and places of travel, and the business purposes of his expenses. Instead, he kept records of his traveling expenses on "scratch sheets" to be transferred to his log books, but these scratch sheets were not offered into evidence. Further, the accuracy of the notations in the truck driver's log books was not credited because the I.R.S. agent who audited his returns testified that the log books offered in the course of the examination bore no notations of travel expenses.

C.R. Ferretti, 44 TCM 364, Dec. 39,158(M), TC Memo. 1982-375.

Various travel and lodging expenses claimed by the taxpayer were either disallowed or allowed on the basis of the evidence. She failed to introduce adequate records detailing the amounts and dates of her expenditures or identifying the purposes of the expenditures. Diaries submitted by her as a record of expenses were deficient, because having written the amounts scribbled on the pages four years after incurring the expenses, she failed to prepare the records "at or near" the time of her travels.

E.D. Gardner, 46 TCM 1283, Dec. 40,423(M), TC Memo. 1983-541.

A structural engineer adequately substantiated deductions for his lodging and automobile expenses, but not for his meals. The deduction for meals was disallowed because the amounts were based on estimates.

D.G. Massey, 47 TCM 1648, Dec. 41,160(M), TC Memo. 1984-210.

Alleged employee business expenses were nondeductible due to lack of substantiation. Although the taxpayer argued that he disposed of the relevant records after the IRS tax auditor conceded such expenses, the testimony of the auditor indicated that the records disposed of, canceled checks and receipts, were not adequate in any event.

R.C. Bacon, 56 TCM 1391, Dec. 45,517(M), TC Memo. 1989-90.

The director of four public companies failed to establish that travel and entertainment expenses related to meetings he attended on behalf of the companies. He failed to supply adequate records in the form of an account book, a diary, a statement of expense or a record book, and did not give specific testimony about the claimed expenditures.

C.H. Magruder, 57 TCM 117, Dec. 45,619(M), TC Memo. 1989-169.

The taxpayer, a design engineer, and his wife were taxable on the cost of a cruise that they took with the president of the company and that was paid for by the employer. At the end of the cruise, the taxpayer and the company president met with individuals who were believed to be a potential source of business for the company. Although the taxpayer claimed that half the cost of the cruise was business related, he failed to substantiate the claim.

C.C. Quantz, 58 TCM 1274, Dec. 46,342(M), TC Memo. 1990-39.

Deductions for entertainment expenses were denied where the business purposes of the entertaining were not substantiated. Claimed deductions for business gifts were disallowed where the only substantiation offered for the deductions was three altered receipts for cameras purchased during the year. However, two small substantiated gift deductions were allowed.

M.L. Swedelson, 61 TCM 1650, Dec. 47,111(M), TC Memo. 1991-10.

Automobile expense deductions claimed by an insurance salesman were disallowed. The taxpayer failed to substantiate the portion of expenses that were incurred in traveling to business meetings with clients. Entries in a diary that typically listed only a client's name and time of day did not meet the substantiation requirements. Travel and entertainment expenses claimed in connection with the taxpayer's travel to an insurance convention for each of the years at issue were limited to meal expenses for the number of days the convention was attended. Additional expenses were unsubstantiated. Similarly, deductions for business meals apart from the conventions were denied for lack of substantiation.

C.A. Cook, 61 TCM 2647, Dec. 47,354(M), TC Memo. 1991-222.

A construction worker who worked on numerous short-term projects could not deduct his daily commuting costs as trade or business expenses because they were not incurred away from home and were for personal reasons of his own choosing. He could deduct his mileage expenses for travel away from home because they were substantiated by corroborating evidence, but he failed to substantiate his estimates of food and lodging expenses.

J.M. Rotherham, 63 TCM 2971, Dec. 48,208(M), TC Memo. 1992-271.

Business deductions were disallowed because incomplete or no records were kept with respect to a number of the taxpayer's real properties and a business enterprise and because the taxpayer's law practice and investing activities were arbitrarily mixed. However, portions of the amounts claimed for salaries paid to relatives, business travel expenses, and other professional expenses were deductible as investment expenses.

J.C. DeMoss, 66 TCM 1834, Dec. 49,517(M), TC Memo. 1993-636.

A guest book maintained for a reception held by a real estate salesman and his wife was not a record sufficient to establish the business purpose of the reception. The guest book did not indicate the purpose of the reception or state the guests' business relationships with the salesman and his wife. Automobile expenses were also disallowed for lack of substantiation.

P.G. Cao, 67 TCM 2171, Dec. 49,669(M), TC Memo. 1994-60. Aff'd, CA-9 (unpublished opinion), 96-1 USTC ¶50,167.

A minister was allowed a depreciation deduction in connection with the business use of his personal automobile to the extent it was used to transport church members to various church-related functions. Written statements presented by a number of church members constituted direct evidence that was sufficient to corroborate the taxpayer's statements regarding the business use of the automobile. However, no deduction was allowed for unsubstantiated mileage traveled between the church and his other place of employment.

M.S. Clark, Jr., 67 TCM 2458, Dec. 49,735(M), TC Memo. 1994-120. Aff'd, per curiam, CA-5 (unpublished opinion), 95-2 USTC ¶50,507.

A taxpayer who sold tip sheets at greyhound racetracks was not allowed to deduct associated transportation expenses because, other than the taxpayer's testimony and that of her friend, there was nothing in the record to support her claimed deductions. Moreover, she maintained no records to appropriately document her trips.

W.S. Davis, 66 TCM 1598, Dec. 49,479(M), TC Memo. 1993-599.

An owner of a vocational rehabilitation business could not deduct as trade or business expenses amounts incurred for travel to Mexico. She produced receipts for only slightly more than half of the expenses claimed and thus failed to satisfy the substantiation requirements of Code Sec. 274. The taxpayer also failed to establish an underlying business purpose for the expenses that were substantiated. No contemporaneous written record regarding the business purpose of these expenditures was introduced. The only evidence offered by the taxpayer was her own testimony and that of her husband.

B.J. Shackelford, 67 TCM 3088, Dec. 49,904(M), TC Memo. 1994-271.

An attorney was denied deductions for travel and entertainment expenses because he failed to establish that the expenses were directly related to his law practice. Moreover, the canceled checks that he offered as evidence of the expenditures failed to satisfy the substantiation requirements. The attorney did not corroborate the expenses with contemporaneous account books, diaries, expense statements or similar documentary evidence, and his testimony regarding the travel and entertainment expenses lacked any specific detail as to amount, time, purpose or relationship to his business.

J.P. Rice, Jr., 67 TCM 2921, Dec. 49,833(M), TC Memo. 1994-204.

An individual who did not keep adequate records of travel, meals, and lodging expenses incurred during the course of his house painting and lightning rod installation business could not claim deductions for those expenses. The deductions could not be claimed based solely on the individual's uncorroborated testimony. However, depreciation deductions for vehicles used exclusively in the individual's business were permitted. The deductible portion of the remaining claimed business expenses was estimated by the court.

H.J. Carroll, 69 TCM 1711, Dec. 50,431(M), TC Memo. 1995-28.

Automobile expenses were disallowed since the taxpayer produced only a car lease, repair bills and various canceled checks in support of the deductions.

K. Keating, 69 TCM 2052, Dec. 50,513(M), TC Memo. 1995-101.

A salesperson for a cellular telephone company was denied a deduction for unreimbursed employee expenses for car transportation, parking, and meals and entertainment because she failed to substantiate the amount of the expenses. Although she produced various receipts and charts in support of her deductions, a record of a business purpose and relationship for the items was absent. Further, the salesperson's testimony was vague and unhelpful.

S.J. Bokhari O'Neil, 71 TCM 2317, Dec. 51,210(M), TC Memo. 1996-104.

A certified public accountant was denied Schedule A deductions for vehicle expense and other business expenses. The taxpayer's daily calendar that did not indicate mileage or business purpose for any of his appointments was not sufficient to substantiate his vehicle expense deductions. Moreover, the taxpayer was not permitted to introduce a sampling of mileage from a prior year as an estimation of his current business use.

B.R. Thomas, 72 TCM 570, Dec. 51,534(M), TC Memo. 1996-403.

Deductions for additional travel and entertainment expenses were denied because the travel receipts submitted by a corporation contained no indication that the expenses had a business purpose. The sole shareholder's uncorroborated testimony of the trips' business purposes failed to satisfy the substantiation requirements.

Group Administration Premium Services, Inc., 72 TCM 834, Dec. 51,588(M), TC Memo. 1996-451.

An individual employed as a teacher and a nurse was denied business expense deductions for the costs incurred in traveling to a health conference at which she presented a paper because she did not substantiate her claimed deductions. Although the expenses were ordinary and necessary, the meal, lodging, and travel expenses covered by the convention fee were not separately accounted for. Moreover, the portion of the fee that represented the cost of attending the conference was not distinguished. Other miscellaneous, unsubstantiated expenses were also nondeductible.

J.E.S. Fast, 76 TCM 171, Dec. 52,808(M), TC Memo. 1998-272.

A musician failed to provide records, other than receipts from restaurants and for bulk food purchases, to substantiate her claimed deduction for meal and entertainment expenses. Although she alleged that meals at restaurants with other musicians allowed her to make contacts who would help increase her earnings, casual conversation regarding business matters among business associates or fellow employees did not satisfy the business purpose requirement. However, she was allowed to deduct the cost of food purchased for a reception after one recital because she substantiated the expense with a recital announcement and food purchase receipts.

K.V. Popov, 76 TCM 695, Dec. 52,920(M), TC Memo. 1998-374. Rev'd and rem'd on another issue, CA-9, 2001-1 USTC ¶50,353, 246 F3d 1190.

Married taxpayers' entitlement to deductions for unreimbursed employee business expenses was determined by the court. The husband's testimony, together with his travel vouchers, substantiated his business-related automobile mileage. After accounting for differences between the standard mileage rates and the rates at which the husband was generally reimbursed, his deductible expenses for the use of his vehicle exceeded the amounts of his advances and reimbursements. However, the husband's testimony regarding his wife's claimed expenses and the written evidence in the record were inadequate to substantiate her claimed vehicle and travel costs.

V.C. Jackson, 78 TCM 48, Dec. 53,449(M), TC Memo. 1999-226.

An apprentice ironworker was denied a Schedule C automobile expense deduction for unsubstantiated miles driven while marketing Amway products. Although she produced a calendar and log book that purported to record the miles driven, the log failed to indicate the total mileage for all use of her vehicle during the taxable period. Furthermore, the credibility and reliability of the log, calendar and her testimony were questioned: the log book was in pristine condition; all of the entries were in the same color ink; the log book contradicted entries in her calendar; and the log showed her driving unrealistic distances.

D. Aldea, 79 TCM 1917, Dec. 53,853(M), TC Memo. 2000-136.

A car salesman who claimed that a flood destroyed his business records but who was able to produce a recently located, unorganized and confusingly notated business calendar, was entitled to deductions for meals and business expenses, including gifts and gasoline, purchased for his customers that were clearly reflected in the calendar. However, deductions were denied where the calendar entries were unclear, or the amounts or frequencies of the deductions seemed unlikely.

K.E. O'Brien, 79 TCM 2221, Dec. 53,933(M), TC Memo. 2000-199.

Married taxpayers could not deduct office expenses, travel and transportation expenses and meal and entertainment expenses associated with several businesses they operated in addition to maintaining their regular jobs, because they did not provide credible evidence to substantiate them. Further, the substantiation rules and the requirement that expenses be ordinary and necessary were applicable despite not being raised during audit, because the statutory notice of deficiency expressly raised these issues.

J.M. Nitschke, 79 TCM 116, Dec. 53,972(M), TC Memo. 2000-230.

An enrolled member of an Indian community was unable to deduct business expenses, travel costs and mileage incurred while performing activities on behalf of the community's tribal council. There was no evidence that he was performing such services with continuity and regularity, or that his primary purpose for performing the service was for income and profit. Moreover, even if the expenses were legitimately incurred in connection with a trade or business, the individual failed to adequately substantiate his claims. He maintained some records and offered those records into evidence at trial, but the documentation was inconsistent, incoherent, and insufficient to demonstrate which expenses, if any, were deductible.

J.B. Campbell, 81 TCM 1241, Dec. 54,261(M), TC Memo. 2001-51. Aff'd, per curiam, CA-8 (unpublished opinion), 2002-1 USTC ¶50,242.

A paramedical aesthetician who provided training to others in the use of micropigmentation services was entitled to deduct some of the meal expenses she incurred promoting her business because she provided detailed information as to the name, location and purpose of some of the claimed expenses. However, certain expenses were denied because receipts that she produced at trial merely identified the individuals entertained as "clients."

K.M. Hintze, 81 TCM 1386, Dec. 54,284(M), TC Memo. 2001-70.

A married couple was not entitled to deduct claimed transportation expenses because they failed to provide adequate documentation. Their mileage summary did not contain odometer readings entered at the time the vehicle was used, but rather, numbers based on figures in a computer atlas. They also failed to support their summary of truck repairs and maintenance or to indicate the percentage of business versus personal use of their truck.

M.R. Olsen, 83 TCM 1236, Dec. 54,649(M), TC Memo. 2002-42. Aff'd, per curiam, CA-9 (unpublished opinion), 2003-1 USTC ¶50,230.

A self-employed subcontractor was not entitled to deduct on his Schedule C unsubstantiated truck expenses and amounts paid as wages for casual labor in excess of those determined by the IRS. He failed to meet the adequate records requirement of Code Sec. 274 for the truck expenses and gave no oral or written evidence regarding his alleged employees. Consequently, the court lacked a basis on which to estimate such expenses. Additionally, the taxpayer was liable for self-employment tax.

H.J. Sullivan, 83 TCM 1746, Dec. 54,759(M), TC Memo. 2002-131.

An individual was liable for a tax deficiency as determined by the IRS because he failed to substantiate his claimed business expense deductions. The taxpayer did not present sufficient records to establish his claimed expenses. Testimony by the taxpayer was deemed unpersuasive.

H.C. Buck, 86 TCM 591, Dec. 55,346(M), TC Memo. 2003-314.

An individual who worked as a sales representative for a consulting firm was not entitled to all of his claimed unreimbursed employee business expense deductions because he failed to meet the substantiation requirements. The taxpayer's mileage spreadsheet which listed the trips he took, the number of miles driven and the clients he visited was not sufficient evidence of his automobile expenses because he failed to introduce written documentation to corroborate the entries. Furthermore, there were numerous inconsistencies between the spreadsheet and other evidence presented. A credit card summary offered as proof of claimed meals and entertainment expenses was not sufficient because it did not show the business purpose of the activity or the name of the person entertained. Also, the summary did not show a breakdown between business and personal charges.

J.M. Barton, 89 TCM 1126, Dec. 56,009(M), TC Memo. 2005-97.

Expenses a high school English teacher and his wife incurred for travel and his attendance at English literature classes in Oxford, England were disallowed. The teacher offered no substantiation of any amounts claimed. He offered only his own testimony that these were job-related expenses and failed to demonstrate a direct relationship between the course work and his employment as a high school English teacher.

P.M. Joseph, 90 TCM 26, Dec. 56,090(M), TC Memo. 2005-169.

Depreciation expenses claimed by an individual, including depreciation for an automobile used for business travel, were disallowed because the taxpayer did not produce any records or other evidence at trial to substantiate the amounts claimed. Supporting documents that the taxpayer attached to his pretrial memorandum did not count as evidence for purposes of the Tax Court trial.

R.O. Craft, 90 TCM 149, Dec. 56,120(M), TC Memo. 2005-197.

A welder' unsubstantiated automobile and meal expenses were not deductible as unreimbursed employee expenses. Although he incurred travel and meal expenses while working away from home, his automobile records were not contemporaneous with his travel or consistent with one another. His meal expenses were completely unsubstantiated, and were not consistent with the applicable federal meal and incidental expense (M&IE) rates that could be used in lieu of itemized expenses.

B.F. Nicely, 92 TCM 134, Dec. 56,593(M), TC Memo. 2006-172.

The taxpayer was not entitled to deduct any of the rental or business expenses reported on his Schedule C or Schedule E. Even though the taxpayer presented evidence of the expenses, there was insufficient information on the documents or in the taxpayer's testimony that showed any connection to his business or three rental properties for the expenses. The type and amount of the expenses were equally consistent with personal expenses. Moreover, the court could find no evidence upon which it could even base an estimate on the amount of the expenses that could be considered a business or rental expense.

W. Lenihan, 92 TCM 463, Dec. 56,691(M), TC Memo. 2006-259. Aff'd, CA-2 (unpublished opinion), 2008-2 USTC ¶50,598.

A taxpayer who kept no car expense records at all could not deduct the expenses on his Schedule C.

Y. Chong, 93 TCM 687, Dec. 56,813(M), TC Memo. 2007-12.

A salesperson could not deduct $1,600 worth of small gifts to his customers where he kept no records to substantiate (1) who received the gifts, (2) the nature of his (or his employer's) business relationship with the recipients, (3) the cost of the claimed gifts, (4) the dates of the gifts, (5) descriptions of the gifts, or (6) the business purpose of the gifts.

D.E. Benson, 93 TCM 1199, Dec. 56,925(M), TC Memo. 2007-113.

Various expenses claimed with respect to an individual's alleged stock trading and consulting activities were disallowed for lack of substantiation or recharacterized as employee expenses (i.e., itemized deductions) subject to the two-percent-of-adjusted-gross-income limitation. None of the supporting documentation provided by the taxpayer established a connection between the expenses incurred and any particular business activity other than his consulting business.

L.B. Arberg, 94 TCM 215, Dec. 57,066(M), TC Memo. 2007-244.

An individual's claimed deductions for several expenses including: tax preparation software, charitable contributions, and various business deductions were denied due to lack of substantiation. The individual failed to keep adequate records and he failed to prove that the business expenses were not reimbursed by his employer.

M.K. Boltinghouse, 94 TCM 416, Dec. 57,154(M), TC Memo. 2007-324.

While a taxpayer's mileage records were sufficient to support a deduction for vehicle expenses, certain other deductions claimed on separate returns filed by the taxpayer and his wife were disallowed. At trial the taxpayer provided as evidence detailed monthly mileage logs, which he credibly testified were created from contemporaneous daily and weekly logs. To the extent the mileage logs did not match the mileage disclosed on the returns, the court allowed the taxpayer to claim a deduction for the standard mileage rate multiplied by the lesser of the mileage shown on the return, the mileage used to calculate the deduction, or the mileage substantiated by the monthly logs. The taxpayer's deductions for actual leasing, insurance, and maintenance expenses incurred were denied because they were precluded by the use of the standard mileage deduction. The taxpayer also failed to provide evidence of the business use percentage of the vehicle, which is necessary to calculate such deductions. The deductions claimed by the taxpayer's wife on her return, for maintenance, repairs, management fees and interest, were not substantiated at trial and so were denied.

G.L. Larson, 96 TCM 73, Dec. 57,508(M), TC Memo. 2008-187.

The IRS provided guidance, in the form of questions and answers, on the substantiation requirements as amended in 1962. The information in the guidance has since largely been reflected in regulations.

Rev. Proc. 63-4, 1963-1 CB 474.

A corporate taxpayer could not recalculate previously taken deductions for more than 50,000 items posted to its meal and entertainment accounts during several tax years. Rather than identifying and documenting each claimed item, the taxpayer proposed to use a statistical sampling of the total population of its meal and entertainment items for each year to determine a percentage of the items improperly calculated. While the potential accuracy of the sampling method was not denied, the method was not permitted because the strict substantiation requirement of Code Sec. 274(d) requires an expenditure-by-expenditure determination rather than a close approximation.

Field Service Advice Memorandum 200209028, November 29, 2001.

Expenses incurred in renting office space and for accounting were substantiated by an individual because invoices bearing a "paid" stamp from another person, corroborated by the individual's testimony and a written contract, were credible evidence of the amounts paid. Likewise, wage expenses were substantiated because invoices bearing a "paid" stamp from another person, corroborated by the individual's testimony, were credible evidence of the amount of the wage expenses paid. Amounts paid for telephone expenses were estimated, pursuant to the Cohan rule. However, the individual failed to substantiate his claimed automobile expenses and a deduction for depreciation. A deduction for interest was not allowed because there was insufficient credible evidence to establish a rational basis for making an estimate of the deductible amount of interest paid.

K.E. Aref, Dec. 57,834(M), TC Memo. 2009-118.

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Friday, June 5, 2009

Congress will remove 20% deposits in Offer in Compromise cases

House Ways and Means Oversight Subcommittee Press Release: Chairman Lewis on IRS Operations and Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Proposals

June 5, 2009

111th Congress

House Committee on Ways and Means

For Immediate Release:

Thursday, June 4, 2009

Contact:

Matthew Beck (W&M) - (202) 225-8933

Brenda Jones (Lewis) 202-225-3801



Chairman Lewis on IRS Operations and Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Proposals

WASHINGTON, DC --Ways and Means Oversight Subcommittee Chairman John Lewis (D-GA), delivered the following statement today at a Subcommittee hearing reviewing IRS operations and budget proposals for Fiscal Year 2010 with IRS Commissioner Douglas Shulman.

"Again this year, the Subcommittee is holding an oversight review of the Internal Revenue Service. We intend to examine the operations of the agency, its budget, and its service to taxpayers.

"This is the first time the Commissioner has been before the Subcommittee this Congress. We welcome him. This is also the first time many of the Members of this Subcommittee will have the opportunity to review the agency. I look forward to their participation.

"Today's hearing is a chance for the IRS to assure this Subcommittee and the public that it is acting fairly --fair in how it treats taxpayers and fair in how it treats its employees. Overall, I think the agency has done a good job. However, there is always room for improvement.

"I do not think it is fair that five million taxpayers received busy signals when they called this year for help and almost 18 million taxpayers hung up before getting through. If the agency needs additional resources to meet its customer service mission, we need to know that.

"I am also concerned that low-income taxpayers are having their Social Security payments levied by the agency. And, it is a shame that victims of identity theft do not have their cases resolved with more urgency.

"Where this Subcommittee can help the agency improve, we will. Taxpayers wanting to settle their tax debts should not be required to make a down payment with their offer. Small businesses should not be run out of business by tax shelter penalties aimed at big corporations. These issues require tax law changes that the Ranking Member and I support.

"Finally, I want to be sure that the agency is being fair to its employees. Each year, the agency's employees collect about $2.7 trillion and process 250 million returns. As fewer paper returns are filed, the agency has started to consolidate. In these difficult times, I ask the agency to take every reasonable step to ensure that employees at these locations, such as Atlanta and Andover, are not without jobs.

"Thank you."

Commissioner Testifies on State of IRS Operations Before House Oversight Subcommittee
IRS Commissioner Douglas H. Shulman, in testifying before the House Ways and Means Oversight Subcommittee on June 4 in Washington, D.C., discussed the IRS's operations and budget proposals for fiscal year 2010. Shulman addressed a wide range of topics presented by subcommittee members, ranging from telephone responses and the Making Work Pay credit, to tax shelters and the IRS's international tax enforcement efforts.

Telephone Responses
Several lawmakers questioned Shulman on reports that numerous taxpayers have had difficulty getting through to IRS telephone representatives to discuss their positions. Subcommittee Chairman John Lewis, D-Ga., stated, "I do not think it is fair that 5 million taxpayers received busy signals when they called this year for help and almost 18 million taxpayers hung up before getting through."

Shulman responded that the IRS has received an enormous volume of telephone calls in recent tax years regarding the tax benefits provided in recent economic stimulus legislation; however, the Service was attempting to maintain its attention to both paper communications with taxpayers and its telephone services. Shulman also reported that the IRS is encouraging taxpayers to make greater use of the Service's website and that the IRS has changed the script of its telephone greeting to tell callers what their expected wait time will be before speaking with an IRS representative. Shulman promised to monitor the Service's progress on the issue and to continue improvement.

Making Work Pay Credit
A subcommittee member asked Shulman about potential discrepancies between the IRS's recently released withholding tables under the new Making Work Pay credit and the actual amount of the credit that taxpayers will receive. The member questioned whether some taxpayers would be left with an unwanted tax burden due to inaccurate withholding from their wages. Shulman replied that the tables were more of a guide to taxpayers rather than an exact indication of what they are actually required to withhold. By definition, he stated, the tables cannot possibly accommodate the specific situation of every taxpayer, so they are more of an average.

Shulman also pointed out that the IRS and Treasury did recently correct a problem with withholding tables for pensioners. These individuals may have been withholding too little from their monthly receipts, since they were not entitled to the credit.

IRS 2010 Budget Proposals
In discussing the IRS's budget proposals for the 2010 fiscal year, Shulman reported three main focuses:

(1) Cracking down on international tax evasion;

(2) Requiring return preparers who file a certain volume of returns to file electronically; and

(3) Eliminating the 20-percent down payment for taxpayers proposing offers-in-compromise (OICs).

With regard to the latest proposal, Shulman estimated that the down payment requirement was responsible for the sharp decline in taxpayer requests for offers in compromise (OICs) in recent tax years. Shulman further asserted that, given the tumultuous state of the U.S. economy, taxpayers who do not have the money to pay their income tax liabilities are likely not willing to attempt to propose an OIC when there is not even a guarantee that the IRS will accept their offer. He stated that he was disturbed by this trend and promised to perform an internal review to get to the root of the matter.

Tax Shelters
Some subcommittee members also questioned whether Shulman's recent initiatives to crack down on tax shelters have been disproportionately geared toward small businesses. Lewis stated, "Small businesses should not be run out of business by tax shelter penalties aimed at big corporations."

In response, Shulman pointed out that it was Congress that passed strict liability penalties for failing to report a listed transaction --those transactions with often the most questionable tax positions. The draconian nature of the law itself, Shulman reasoned, gave the IRS little discretion in enforcing the penalty, often resulting in taxpayers unwittingly getting caught up in enforcement of a law that was not intended to affect them.

International Tax Enforcement
Finally, ranking subcommittee member Charles Boustany, R-La., voiced concern that the IRS's latest efforts to crack down on offshore tax abuses may be incorrectly punishing taxpayers attempting to do business abroad and engage in legitimate tax planning. "Tax evasion is a federal crime, and individuals who break the law by hiding their income in offshore accounts should be aggressively pursued and punished to the fullest extent of the law. But these efforts should not be confused with policies such as the ability of U.S. businesses to defer tax on foreign profits --a long-standing principle of sound tax policy that puts our businesses on a more even playing field with foreign competitors."

As he has asserted on previous occasions, Shulman emphasized that the IRS's latest focus has primarily been directed toward individual taxpayers avoiding tax by hiding assets in offshore accounts and multi-national businesses that abuse the rules. Shulman pointed out that there was a difference between legitimate businesses that happen to disagree with the IRS about interpretation of the law and those who push the boundaries of the law.

Labels:

Wednesday, June 3, 2009

Innocent Spourse relief granted
C.A. Denton, June 3, 2009, T.C. Summary Opinion 2009-87



CANDANCE A. DENTON, Petitioner, AND TIMOTHY DENTON, Intervenor v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.

UNITED STATES TAX COURT. Docket No. 19779-06S. Filed June 2, 2009.

.

CARLUZZO, Special Trial Judge: This case was heard pursuant to the provisions of section 7463 . 1 Pursuant to section 7463(b) , the decision to be entered is not reviewable by any other court, and this opinion shall not be cited as precedent for any other case.

In a Final Notice of Determination dated August 10, 2006, respondent denied petitioner's claim for section 6015 relief with respect to the joint and several liability arising from the 2003 joint Federal income tax return filed by petitioner and intervenor (the 2003 joint return). According to that notice, relief was denied because petitioner did not respond to respondent's requests for additional information. In a timely petition filed September 27, 2006, petitioner challenges respondent's determination. Respondent and intervenor oppose allowing petitioner any section 6015 relief. Petitioner readily admits that she was aware of the item or items resulting in the understatement of income shown on the 2003 joint return. Her admission, in effect, requires us to consider only her entitlement to relief under section 6015(f) .


Background


Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found. At the time the petition was filed, petitioner and intervenor resided at separate addresses in South Carolina.

Petitioner and intervenor were married in 1995. They have two children. They separated in 2005 and were divorced in 2006. As best can be determined from the record, the documents relating to petitioner's divorce contain no references to the then-outstanding income tax liability from which petitioner now seeks relief.

During 2003 petitioner worked as a waitress at Bob Evans for what she describes as a "very, very short period of time". She also worked as a sales representative at Beauty Systems Group, Inc. (Systems). The record does not reveal the income, if any, that she earned as a waitress. She earned $985 as an employee of Systems, which, she admits, was not reported on the 2003 joint return.

During 2003 intervenor was employed by CDI Services, Inc. (CDI). He was also self-employed as a commercial truck driver during that year primarily, if not exclusively, providing services for Annette Holdings, Inc. (Holdings). The truck he drove was leased from Holdings, and the compensation that he received as a driver for that company was net of lease, insurance, and license fees. Holdings issued intervenor a Form 1099-MISC, Miscellaneous Income, for 2003 showing compensation totaling $41,798. That income is not reported on the 2003 joint return.

Throughout 2003 petitioner and intervenor lived with intervenor's mother in intervenor's mother's modular home. During 2003 intervenor's mother paid for the majority of expenses, including food, utilities, and general household expenses.

As relevant here, the 2003 return shows: (1) Intervenor's $5,951 wage income from CDI, (2) $1,946 of unemployment compensation not specifically attributed to either petitioner or intervenor, and (3) a $2,390 earned income credit. As noted, petitioner's earnings from Systems ($985) and intervenor's compensation from Holdings ($41,798) are not reported on the 2003 return (the omitted items).

At the time petitioner signed the 2003 joint return she was aware that the omitted income and her earnings from Systems were not reported on the return. She expected that intervenor would prepare and file an amended return on which the omitted items and related deductions would be shown.

Respondent's examination of the 2003 joint return resulted in a notice of deficiency that was issued to petitioner and intervenor on April 11, 2005. The $9,500 deficiency determined in that notice of deficiency takes into account the omitted items (without any offsetting deductions), the disallowance of the earned income credit, and the imposition of a section 1401 self-employment tax on the compensation that intervenor received from Holdings. Neither petitioner nor intervenor petitioned this Court in response to that notice of deficiency, and the deficiency and section 6662(a) penalty determined in the notice were assessed in due course. The deficiency is, almost entirely, attributable to the unreported income earned by intervenor. Petitioner did not challenge the deficiency because she assumed that after an amended return was filed that would take into account deductions relating to the omitted items, the 2003 income tax liability would be substantially reduced.


Discussion




I. Introduction

In general, married taxpayers may elect to file a joint Federal income tax return. Sec. 6013(a) . After making the election for a year, each spouse is jointly and severally liable for the entire Federal income tax liability assessed for that year, whether as reported on the joint return or subsequently determined to be due. Sec. 6013(d)(3) ; see sec. 1.6013-4(b) , Income Tax Regs. Subject to various conditions and in a variety of ways set forth in section 6015 , an individual who has made a joint return with his or her spouse for a year may seek relief from the joint and several liability arising from that joint return.

There are three types of relief available under section 6015 . In general, section 6015(b) provides full or apportioned relief from joint and several liability, section 6015(c) provides proportionate tax relief to divorced or separated taxpayers, and section 6015(f) provides equitable relief from joint and several liability in certain circumstances if relief is not available under section 6015(b) or (c).

As noted, petitioner is not entitled to relief under section 6015(b) or (c) because, as she readily admitted, at the time she signed the 2003 joint return she knew that intervenor's income from Holdings and her income from Systems were not reported on that return. See sec. 6015(b)(1)(C) , (c)(3)(C).

A taxpayer who does not qualify for relief under section 6015(b) or (c) can be relieved from joint and several liability pursuant to section 6015(f) if, taking into account all the facts and circumstances, it would be inequitable to hold the taxpayer liable for any unpaid tax or deficiency. Sec. 6015(f)(1) .

We review, de novo, petitioner's entitlement to relief under section 6015(f) . Porter v. Commissioner , 132 T.C. ___, (2009).



II. Section 6015(f) Relief

Petitioner's knowledge at the time she signed the 2003 joint return weighs heavily against her entitlement to section 6015(f) relief. But in considering her entitlement to relief under section 6015(f) , her knowledge is only one factor among many to be taken into account, and as we have repeatedly noted, no factor, in and of itself, is determinative. See Stolkin v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo. 2008-211; Beatty v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo. 2007-167; Banderas v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo. 2007-129. To be fair, petitioner's knowledge regarding the omitted items of income must be considered against her not unreasonable expectation that her 2003 tax liability would be substantially reduced upon the filing of an amended return that would show the omitted items along with allowable deductions related to that income.

Separate and apart from her knowledge at the time she signed the 2003 joint return, or her belief that the errors on that return would be corrected by an amended return, it remains that had petitioner not filed a joint return with intervenor for 2003, her income for that year would not have obligated her to file a Federal income tax return. Sec. 6012(a)(1)(A) . Furthermore, a large part of the liability from which petitioner seeks relief is attributable to the self-employment tax imposed upon the income intervenor earned as a truck driver for Holdings.

Considering the foregoing, and taking into account the factors the Commissioner considers in matters such as this, 2 see Rev. Proc. 2003-61 , 2003-2 C.B. 296, we find that it would be inequitable to hold petitioner liable for the unpaid portion of the income tax liability resulting from the 2003 joint return. Petitioner is entitled to relief from that liability under section 6015(f) .

To reflect the foregoing,

Decision will be entered under Rule 155 .

1 Section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, in effect for the relevant period. Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.

2 Respondent never actually considered those factors. Petitioner's request for sec. 6015 relief was summarily denied because she failed to respond to requests for additional information under circumstances that suggest she might not have been aware of the requests. See the bench opinion rendered on Sept. 20, 2007, Columbia, South Carolina. Furthermore, upon review by respondent's Appeals Office after the petition was filed, relief under sec. 6015(f) was not considered because the Appeals officer concluded that petitioner was entitled to relief under sec. 6015(c) .


6015(a) IN GENERAL. --
Notwithstanding section 6013(d)(3) --

6015(a)(1) an individual who has made a joint return may elect to seek relief under the procedures prescribed under subsection (b); and

6015(a)(2) if such individual is eligible to elect the application of subsection (c), such individual may, in addition to any election under paragraph (1), elect to limit such individual's liability for any deficiency with respect to such joint return in the manner prescribed under subsection (c).

Any determination under this section shall be made without regard to community property laws.

6015(b) PROCEDURES FOR RELIEF FROM LIABILITY APPLICABLE TO ALL JOINT FILERS. --


6015(b)(1) IN GENERAL. --
Under procedures prescribed by the Secretary, if --

6015(b)(1)(A) a joint return has been made for a taxable year;

6015(b)(1)(B) on such return there is an understatement of tax attributable to erroneous items of 1 individual filing the joint return;

6015(b)(1)(C) the other individual filing the joint return establishes that in signing the return he or she did not know, and had no reason to know, that there was such understatement;

6015(b)(1)(D) taking into account all the facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the other individual liable for the deficiency in tax for such taxable year attributable to such understatement; and

6015(b)(1)(E) the other individual elects (in such form as the Secretary may prescribe) the benefits of this subsection not later than the date which is 2 years after the date the Secretary has begun collection activities with respect to the individual making the election,

then the other individual shall be relieved of liability for tax (including interest, penalties, and other amounts) for such taxable year to the extent such liability is attributable to such understatement.

6015(b)(2) APPORTIONMENT OF RELIEF. --If an individual who, but for paragraph (1)(C), would be relieved of liability under paragraph (1), establishes that in signing the return such individual did not know, and had no reason to know, the extent of such understatement, then such individual shall be relieved of liability for tax (including interest, penalties, and other amounts) for such taxable year to the extent that such liability is attributable to the portion of such understatement of which such individual did not know and had no reason to know.

6015(b)(3) UNDERSTATEMENT. --For purposes of this subsection, the term "understatement" has the meaning given to such term by section 6662(d)(2)(A).



6015(c) PROCEDURES TO LIMIT LIABILITY FOR TAXPAYERS NO LONGER MARRIED OR TAXPAYERS LEGALLY SEPARATED OR NOT LIVING TOGETHER. --

6015(c)(1) IN GENERAL. --Except as provided in this subsection, if an individual who has made a joint return for any taxable year elects the application of this subsection, the individual's liability for any deficiency which is assessed with respect to the return shall not exceed the portion of such deficiency properly allocable to the individual under subsection (d).

6015(c)(2) BURDEN OF PROOF. --Except as provided in subparagraph (A)(ii) or (C) of paragraph (3), each individual who elects the application of this subsection shall have the burden of proof with respect to establishing the portion of any deficiency allocable to such individual.

6015(c)(3) ELECTION. --

6015(c)(3)(A) INDIVIDUALS ELIGIBLE TO MAKE ELECTION. --

6015(c)(3)(A)(i) IN GENERAL. --An individual shall only be eligible to elect the application of this subsection if --

6015(c)(3)(A)(i)(I) at the time such election is filed, such individual is no longer married to, or is legally separated from, the individual with whom such individual filed the joint return to which the election relates; or

6015(c)(3)(A)(i)(II) such individual was not a member of the same household as the individual with whom such joint return was filed at any time during the 12-month period ending on the date such election is filed.

6015(c)(3)(A)(ii) CERTAIN TAXPAYERS INELIGIBLE TO ELECT. --If the Secretary demonstrates that assets were transferred between individuals filing a joint return as part of a fraudulent scheme by such individuals, an election under this subsection by either individual shall be invalid (and section 6013(d)(3) shall apply to the joint return).

6015(c)(3)(B) TIME FOR ELECTION. --An election under this subsection for any taxable year may be made at any time after a deficiency for such year is asserted but not later than 2 years after the date on which the Secretary has begun collection activities with respect to the individual making the election.

6015(c)(3)(C) ELECTION NOT VALID WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN DEFICIENCIES. --If the Secretary demonstrates that an individual making an election under this subsection had actual knowledge, at the time such individual signed the return, of any item giving rise to a deficiency (or portion thereof) which is not allocable to such individual under subsection (d), such election shall not apply to such deficiency (or portion). This subparagraph shall not apply where the individual with actual knowledge establishes that such individual signed the return under duress.

6015(c)(4) LIABILITY INCREASED BY REASON OF TRANSFERS OF PROPERTY TO AVOID TAX. --

6015(c)(4)(A) IN GENERAL. --Notwithstanding any other provision of this subsection, the portion of the deficiency for which the individual electing the application of this subsection is liable (without regard to this paragraph) shall be increased by the value of any disqualified asset transferred to the individual.

6015(c)(4)(B) DISQUALIFIED ASSET. --For purposes of this paragraph --

6015(c)(4)(B)(i) IN GENERAL. --The term "disqualified asset" means any property or right to property transferred to an individual making the election under this subsection with respect to a joint return by the other individual filing such joint return if the principal purpose of the transfer was the avoidance of tax or payment of tax.

6015(c)(4)(B)(ii) PRESUMPTION. --

6015(c)(4)(B)(ii)(I) IN GENERAL. --For purposes of clause (i), except as provided in subclause (II), any transfer which is made after the date which is 1 year before the date on which the first letter of proposed deficiency which allows the taxpayer an opportunity for administrative review in the Internal Revenue Service Office of Appeals is sent shall be presumed to have as its principal purpose the avoidance of tax or payment of tax.

6015(c)(4)(B)(ii)(II) EXCEPTIONS. --Subclause (I) shall not apply to any transfer pursuant to a decree of divorce or separate maintenance or a written instrument incident to such a decree or to any transfer which an individual establishes did not have as its principal purpose the avoidance of tax or payment of tax.

Rev. Proc. 2003-61 , I.R.B. 2003-32, July 24, 2003.

[ Code Secs. 66 and 6015]


Innocent spouse: Liability for tax on joint return: Equitable relief: Threshold requirements: Relief ordinarily granted: Factors: Procedures. --
The IRS has provided guidance for individuals seeking equitable relief from tax liabilities under the innocent spouse provisions of Code Secs. 66(c) or 6015(f). The guidance enumerates the threshold conditions that must be satisfied for any request for equitable relief to be considered, sets forth the criteria under which relief will ordinarily be granted, and includes a nonexclusive list of factors that are to be considered in determining whether it would be inequitable to hold a requesting spouse jointly and severally liable for a deficiency or for an unpaid liability. Those factors also apply in determining whether to relieve a spouse of tax liability resulting from the operation of the community property laws. The procedures apply to any spouse who requests equitable relief from tax liabilities on or after November 1, 2003. The guidelines are also effective for relief requests pending on that date for which no preliminary determination letter has been issued as of that date. Rev. Proc. 2000-15, 2000-1 CB 447, is superseded. Back references: ¶6051.035, ¶6051.037, ¶6051.08, ¶6051.20, ¶35,192.023 and ¶35,192.25.





SECTION 1. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

01. Purpose. This revenue procedure provides guidance for a taxpayer seeking equitable relief from income tax liability under section 66(c) or section 6015(f) of the Internal Revenue Code (a "requesting spouse"). Section 4.01 of this revenue procedure provides the threshold requirements for any request for equitable relief. Section 4.02 of this revenue procedure sets forth the conditions under which the Internal Revenue Service ordinarily will grant equitable relief under section 6015(f) from an underpayment of income tax reported on a joint return. Section 4.03 of this revenue procedure provides a nonexclusive list of factors for consideration in determining whether relief should be granted under section 6015(f) because it would be inequitable to hold a requesting spouse jointly and severally liable for an underpayment of income tax on a joint return where the conditions of section 4.02 are not met, or for a deficiency. The factors in section 4.03 also will apply in determining whether to relieve a spouse from income tax liability resulting from the operation of community property law under the equitable relief provision of section 66(c).

.02 Scope. This revenue procedure applies to spouses who request either equitable relief from joint and several liability under section 6015(f), or equitable relief under section 66(c) from income tax liability resulting from the operation of community property law.



SECTION 2. BACKGROUND

.01 Section 6013(d)(3) provides that married taxpayers who file a joint return under section 6013 will be jointly and severally liable for the income tax arising from that joint return. For purposes of section 6013(d)(3) and this revenue procedure, the term "tax" includes penalties, additions to tax, and interest. See sections 6601(e)(1) and 6665(a)(2).

.02 Section 3201(a) of the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685, 734 (RRA), enacted section 6015, which provides relief in certain circumstances from the joint and several liability imposed by section 6013(d)(3). Section 6015(b) and (c) specifies two sets of circumstances under which relief from joint and several liability is available. If relief is not available under section 6015(b) or (c), section 6015(f) authorizes the Secretary to grant equitable relief if, taking into account all the facts and circumstances, the Secretary determines that it is inequitable to hold a requesting spouse liable for any unpaid tax or any deficiency (or any portion of either). Section 66(c) provides relief from income tax liability resulting from the operation of community property law to taxpayers domiciled in a community property state who do not file a joint return. Section 3201(b) of RRA amended section 66(c) to add an equitable relief provision similar to section 6015(f).

.03 Section 6015 provides relief only from joint and several liability arising from a joint return. If an individual signs a joint return under duress, the election to file jointly is not valid and there is no valid joint return. The individual is not jointly and severally liable for any income tax liabilities arising from that return. Therefore, section 6015 does not apply.

.04 Under section 6015(b) and (c), relief is available only from a proposed or assessed deficiency. Section 6015(b) and (c) does not authorize relief from an underpayment of income tax reported on a joint return. Section 66(c) and section 6015(f) permit equitable relief for an underpayment of income tax. The legislative history of section 6015 provides that Congress intended for the Secretary to exercise discretion in granting equitable relief if a requesting spouse "does not know, and had no reason to know, that funds intended for the payment of tax were instead taken by the other spouse for such other spouse's benefit." H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 105-599, at 254 (1998). Congress also intended for the Secretary to exercise the equitable relief authority under section 6015(f) in other situations if, "taking into account all the facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to hold an individual liable for all or part of any unpaid tax or deficiency arising from a joint return." Id.



SECTION 3. CHANGES

This revenue procedure supersedes Revenue Procedure 2000-15, changing the following:

.01 Section 4.01 of this revenue procedure adds a new threshold requirement under section 4.01(7).

.02 Section 4.03(2)(a)(iii) of this revenue procedure revises the weight given to the knowledge or reason to know factor.

.03 Section 4.04 of this revenue procedure broadens the availability of refunds if equitable relief is granted under section 66(c) or section 6015(f).



SECTION 4. GENERAL CONDITIONS FOR RELIEF

.01 Eligibility for equitable relief. A requesting spouse must satisfy all of the following threshold conditions to be eligible to submit a request for equitable relief under section 6015(f). With the exception of conditions (1) and (2), a requesting spouse must satisfy all of the following threshold conditions to be eligible to submit a request for equitable relief under section 66(c). The Service may relieve a requesting spouse who satisfies all the applicable threshold conditions set forth below of all or part of the income tax liability under section 66(c) or section 6015(f), if, taking into account all the facts and circumstances, the Service determines that it would be inequitable to hold the requesting spouse liable for the income tax liability. The threshold conditions are as follows:

(1) The requesting spouse filed a joint return for the taxable year for which he or she seeks relief.

(2) Relief is not available to the requesting spouse under section 6015(b) or (c).

(3) The requesting spouse applies for relief no later than two years after the date of the Service's first collection activity after July 22, 1998, with respect to the requesting spouse. See Treas. Reg. §1.6015-5(b)(2)(i) for the definition of collection activity.

(4) No assets were transferred between the spouses as part of a fraudulent scheme by the spouses.

(5) The nonrequesting spouse did not transfer disqualified assets to the requesting spouse. If the nonrequesting spouse transferred disqualified assets to the requesting spouse, relief will be available only to the extent that the income tax liability exceeds the value of the disqualified assets. For this purpose, the term "disqualified asset" has the meaning given the term by section 6015(c)(4)(B).

(6) The requesting spouse did not file or fail to file the return with fraudulent intent.

(7) The income tax liability from which the requesting spouse seeks relief is attributable to an item of the individual with whom the requesting spouse filed the joint return (the "nonrequesting spouse"), unless one of the following exceptions applies:

(a) Attribution solely due to the operation of community property law. If an item is attributable or partially attributable to the requesting spouse solely due to the operation of community property law, then for purposes of this revenue procedure, that item (or portion thereof) will be considered to be attributable to the nonrequesting spouse.

(b) Nominal ownership. If the item is titled in the name of the requesting spouse, the item is presumptively attributable to the requesting spouse. This presumption is rebuttable. For example, H opens an individual retirement account (IRA) in W's name and forges W's signature on the IRA in 1998. Thereafter, H makes contributions to the IRA and in 2002 takes a taxable distribution from the IRA. H and W file a joint return for the 2002 taxable year, but do not report the taxable distribution on their joint return. The Service later proposes a deficiency relating to the taxable IRA distribution and assesses the deficiency against H and W. W requests relief from joint and several liability under section 6015. W establishes that W did not contribute to the IRA, sign paperwork relating to the IRA, or otherwise act as if W were the owner of the IRA. W thereby rebutted the presumption that the IRA is attributable to W.

(c) Misappropriation of funds. If the requesting spouse did not know, and had no reason to know, that funds intended for the payment of tax were misappropriated by the nonrequesting spouse for the nonrequesting spouse's benefit, the Service will consider granting equitable relief although the underpayment may be attributable in part or in full to an item of the requesting spouse. The Service will consider relief in this case only to the extent that the funds intended for the payment of tax were taken by the nonrequesting spouse.

(d) Abuse not amounting to duress. If the requesting spouse establishes that he or she was the victim of abuse prior to the time the return was signed, and that, as a result of the prior abuse, the requesting spouse did not challenge the treatment of any items on the return for fear of the nonrequesting spouse's retaliation, the Service will consider granting equitable relief although the deficiency or underpayment may be attributable in part or in full to an item of the requesting spouse.

.02 Circumstances under which the Service ordinarily will grant equitable relief under section 6015(f) with respect to underpayments on joint returns.

(1) If an income tax liability reported on a joint return is unpaid, the Service ordinarily will grant equitable relief under section 6015(f) (subject to the limitations of paragraph (2) below) in cases in which all of the following elements are satisfied:

(a) On the date of the request for relief, the requesting spouse is no longer married to, or is legally separated from, the nonrequesting spouse, or has not been a member of the same household as the nonrequesting spouse at any time during the 12-month period ending on the date of the request for relief.

(b) On the date the requesting spouse signed the joint return, the requesting spouse had no knowledge or reason to know that the nonrequesting spouse would not pay the income tax liability. The requesting spouse must establish that it was reasonable for the requesting spouse to believe that the nonrequesting spouse would pay the reported income tax liability. If a requesting spouse would otherwise qualify for relief under this section, except for the fact that the requesting spouse's lack of knowledge or reason to know relates only to a portion of the unpaid income tax liability, then the requesting spouse may receive relief to the extent that the income tax liability is attributable to that portion.

(c) The requesting spouse will suffer economic hardship if the Service does not grant relief. For purposes of this revenue procedure, the Service will base its determination of whether the requesting spouse will suffer economic hardship on rules similar to those provided in Treas. Reg. §301.6343-1(b)(4). After the requesting spouse is deceased, there can be no economic hardship. See Jonson v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 106, 126 (2002), appeal docketed, No. 02-9009 (10th Cir. May 24, 2002) (taxpayer appeal filed on other grounds).

(2) Relief under this section 4.02 is subject to the following limitation: If the Service adjusts the joint return to reflect an understatement of income tax, relief will be available only to the extent of the income tax liability shown on the joint return prior to the Service's adjustment.

.03 Factors for determining whether to grant equitable relief.

(1) Applicability. This section 4.03 applies to requesting spouses who did not file a joint return in a community property state, who request relief under section 66(c), and satisfy the applicable threshold conditions of section 4.01. This section 4.03 also applies to requesting spouses who filed a joint return, request relief under section 6015, and satisfy the threshold conditions of section 4.01, but do not qualify for relief under section 4.02.

(2) Factors. The following is a nonexclusive list of factors that the Service will consider in determining whether, taking into account all the facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the requesting spouse liable for all or part of the unpaid income tax liability or deficiency, and full or partial equitable relief under section 66(c) or section 6015(f) should be granted. No single factor will be determinative of whether to grant equitable relief in any particular case. Rather, the Service will consider and weigh all relevant factors, regardless of whether the factor is listed in this section 4.03.

(a) Factors that may be relevant to whether the Service will grant equitable relief include, but are not limited to, the following:

(i) Marital status. Whether the requesting spouse is separated (whether legally separated or living apart) or divorced from the nonrequesting spouse. A temporary absence, such as an absence due to incarceration, illness, business, vacation, military service, or education, shall not be considered separation for purposes of this revenue procedure if it can be reasonably expected that the absent spouse will return to a household maintained in anticipation of his or her return. See Treas. Reg. §1.6015-3(b)(3)(i) for the definition of a temporary absence.

(ii) Economic hardship. Whether the requesting spouse would suffer economic hardship (within the meaning of section 4.02(1)(c) of this revenue procedure) if the Service does not grant relief from the income tax liability.

(iii) Knowledge or reason to know.

(A) Underpayment cases. In the case of an income tax liability that was properly reported but not paid, whether the requesting spouse did not know and had no reason to know that the nonrequesting spouse would not pay the income tax liability.

(B) Deficiency cases. In the case of an income tax liability that arose from a deficiency, whether the requesting spouse did not know and had no reason to know of the item giving rise to the deficiency. Reason to know of the item giving rise to the deficiency will not be weighed more heavily than other factors. Actual knowledge of the item giving rise to the deficiency, however, is a strong factor weighing against relief. This strong factor may be overcome if the factors in favor of equitable relief are particularly compelling. In those limited situations, it may be appropriate to grant relief under section 66(c) or section 6015(f) even though the requesting spouse had actual knowledge of the item giving rise to the deficiency.

(C) Reason to know. For purposes of (A) and (B) above, in determining whether the requesting spouse had reason to know, the Service will consider the requesting spouse's level of education, any deceit or evasiveness of the nonrequesting spouse, the requesting spouse's degree of involvement in the activity generating the income tax liability, the requesting spouse's involvement in business and household financial matters, the requesting spouse's business or financial expertise, and any lavish or unusual expenditures compared with past spending levels.

(iv) Nonrequesting spouse's legal obligation. Whether the nonrequesting spouse has a legal obligation to pay the outstanding income tax liability pursuant to a divorce decree or agreement. This factor will not weigh in favor of relief if the requesting spouse knew or had reason to know, when entering into the divorce decree or agreement, that the nonrequesting spouse would not pay the income tax liability.

(v) Significant benefit. Whether the requesting spouse received significant benefit (beyond normal support) from the unpaid income tax liability or item giving rise to the deficiency. See Treas. Reg. §1.6015-2(d).

(vi) Compliance with income tax laws. Whether the requesting spouse has made a good faith effort to comply with income tax laws in the taxable years following the taxable year or years to which the request for relief relates. (b) Factors that, if present in a case, will weigh in favor of equitable relief, but will not weigh against equitable relief if not present in a case, include, but are not limited to, the following:

(i) Abuse. Whether the nonrequesting spouse abused the requesting spouse. The presence of abuse is a factor favoring relief. A history of abuse by the nonrequesting spouse may mitigate a requesting spouse's knowledge or reason to know.

(ii) Mental or physical health. Whether the requesting spouse was in poor mental or physical health on the date the requesting spouse signed the return or at the time the requesting spouse requested relief. The Service will consider the nature, extent, and duration of illness when weighing this factor.

.04 Refunds.

(1) Deficiency cases. In a case involving a deficiency, a requesting spouse is eligible for a refund of certain payments made pursuant to an installment agreement that the requesting spouse entered into with the Service, if the requesting spouse has not defaulted on the installment agreement. Only installment payments made after the date the requesting spouse filed the request for relief are eligible for refund. Additionally, the requesting spouse must establish that he or she provided the funds for which he or she seeks a refund. For purposes of this revenue procedure, a requesting spouse is not in default if the Service did not issue a notice of default to the requesting spouse or take any action to terminate the installment agreement.

(2) Underpayment cases. In a case involving an underpayment of income tax, a requesting spouse is eligible for a refund of separate payments that he or she made after July 22, 1998, if the requesting spouse establishes that he or she provided the funds used to make the payment for which he or she seeks a refund. A requesting spouse is not eligible for refunds of payments made with the joint return, joint payments, or payments that the nonrequesting spouse made.

(3) Other limitations. The availability of refunds is subject to the refund limitations of section 6511.



SECTION 5. PROCEDURE

A requesting spouse seeking equitable relief under section 66(c) or section 6015(f) must file Form 8857, Request for Innocent Spouse Relief (and Separation of Liability, and Equitable Relief), or other similar statement signed under penalties of perjury, within two years of the first collection activity against the requesting spouse. See Treas. Reg. §1.6015-5(b)(2)(i) for the definition of collection activity.



SECTION 6. EFFECT ON OTHER DOCUMENTS

Revenue Procedure 2000-15, 2000-1 C.B. 447, is superseded.



SECTION 7. EFFECTIVE DATE

This revenue procedure is effective for requests for relief filed on or after November 1, 2003. In addition, this revenue procedure is effective for requests for relief pending on November 1, 2003, for which no preliminary determination letter has been issued as of November 1, 2003.



DRAFTING INFORMATION

The principal author of this revenue procedure is Robin M. Tuczak of the Office of Associate Chief Counsel, Procedure and Administration (Administrative Provisions and Judicial Practice Division). For further information regarding this revenue procedure, contact Ms. Tuczak at (202) 622-4940 (not a toll-free call).

Labels:

Tuesday, June 2, 2009

A family trust was disregared in this case using "substance over form" principles

C. Lizalek, et al. v. Commissioner.

Dkt. No. 3202-07L , 14297-07 , 14298-07 , 14299-07 , TC Memo. 2009-122, June 1, 2009.


OPINION




A. Reporting of Income
Section 61(a) defines gross income as "all income from whatever source derived". A fundamental principle of income taxation is that income is taxable to the person who earns it. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114-115 (1930). An anticipatory assignment of income from a true income earner to another entity by means of a contractual arrangement does not relieve the true income earner from tax and is not effective for Federal income tax purposes regardless of whether the contract is valid under State law. Id.; Vercio v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 1246, 1253 (1980). Although taxpayers are entitled to arrange and conduct their affairs and structure their transactions to minimize taxes, a trust is disregarded for Federal tax purposes if it lacks economic substance and was formed solely for tax avoidance purposes. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935); Zmuda v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 714, 719-720 (1982), affd. 731 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir. 1984).

Petitioner contends that the Social Security Administration (SSA) created the Lizalek Trust when it issued a Social Security card to petitioner, which constituted a transfer of property. Petitioner further contends that he serves as trustee and the United States is the sole beneficiary. Petitioner asserts that he submitted a written indenture for the Lizalek Trust to the SSA reflecting this relationship that the SSA accepted based on its failure to respond as required by the Privacy Act and the Administrative Procedure Act. Similarly, petitioner argues that the IRS accepted that the Lizalek Trust existed when it assigned an EIN to the Lizalek Trust upon submission of a Form SS-4, Application for Employer Identification Number. Finally, petitioner argues that the Lizalek Trust was the employee that earned the wages and other income at issue and that the trust properly reported the income on Form 1041. Respondent contends that the purported trust does not exist in fact or alternatively the Lizalek Trust is a sham or grantor trust.

Petitioner has not established that a valid trust exists. The issuance of a Social Security card is not a transfer of property that creates a trust as petitioner contends. Petitioner's submission of a purported trust document to the SSA and a Form SS-4 to the IRS does not create or in any way acknowledge the existence of a trust. Petitioner has not provided any legitimate trust documents forming the purported trust. The purported trust does not reflect economic reality and is not recognized for Federal tax purposes. Accordingly, we hold that petitioner earned the wages and other income at issue, and the income is includable in his gross income. See McManus v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-68; Nichols v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-24, affd. 79 Fed. Appx. 282 (9th Cir. 2003).

Labels:

Monday, June 1, 2009

The IRS does not agree with the Baber decision involving an offer in compromise. An IRS Appeals officer who conducted an individual's Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing was not an "impartial officer" under Code Sec. 6320(b)(3); thus, the taxpayer was entitled to a new CDP hearing before an impartial Appeals officer. The Appeals officer had prior involvement with the taxpayer's unpaid tax for the tax years at issue because she mailed the forms required for an offer-in-compromise to the taxpayer to settle the taxpayer's tax liabilities


James D. Baber v. Commissioner.

Dkt. No. 14606-06L , TC Memo. 2009-30, 97 TCM 1125, February 9, 2009.

[Appealable, barring stipulation to the contrary, to CA-10. --CCH.]

[ Code Sec. 6330]

for the same years.




MEMORANDUM OPINION



VASQUEZ, Judge: Respondent sent a Notice of Determination Concerning Collection Action(s) Under Section 6320 and/or 6330 (notice of determination) to petitioner with respect to a notice of Federal tax lien filed to collect petitioner's unpaid tax liabilities for 1994, 1995, 1996, and 1997. In response petitioner timely filed a petition pursuant to section 6330(d) 1 seeking review of respondent's determination. The issues for decision are: (1) Whether Settlement Officer Joella M. Apodaca was an "Impartial officer" as defined in section 6320(b)(3); and (2) if the settlement officer was an "impartial officer", then whether respondent may proceed with collection of the above-mentioned unpaid income tax liabilities.





Background



Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found. The stipulation of facts, the supplemental stipulation of facts, and the attached exhibits are incorporated herein by this reference. At the time he filed the petition, petitioner resided in New Mexico.



Petitioner filed Federal income tax returns for 1994, 1995, 1996, and 1997. During 2000 the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) examined those returns. On August 9, 2000, petitioner signed Forms 4549-CG, Income Tax Examination Changes, with respect to his income tax liabilities for 1994, 1995, 1996, and 1997.



On July 22 and 28, 2005, respondent sent to petitioner Notices of Federal Tax Lien Filing and Your Right to a Hearing Under IRC 6320, with respect to petitioner's income tax liabilities for 1994, 1995, 1996, and 1997. On August 9, 2005, the IRS filed a NFTL with respect to those liabilities with the County Clerk, Rio Arriba County, Tierra Amarilla, New Mexico.



Petitioner filed a timely Form 12153, Request for a Collection Due Process Hearing. Petitioner and Settlement Officer Joella M. Apodaca conducted a section 6330 hearing via correspondence and telephone. On June 28, 2006, respondent mailed to petitioner a notice of determination with respect to petitioner's income tax liabilities for the taxable years 1994, 1995, 1996, and 1997. Respondent determined that the filing of the NFTL was correct.





Discussion



Section 6320 provides that the Secretary shall furnish the person described in section 6321 with written notice (i.e., the hearing notice) of the filing of a notice of lien under section 6323. Section 6320 further provides that the taxpayer may request administrative review of the matter (in the form of a hearing) within a 30-day period. The hearing generally shall be conducted consistent with the procedures set forth in section 6330(c), (d), and (e). Sec. 6320(c).



Pursuant to section 6330(c)(2)(A), a taxpayer may raise at the section 6330 hearing any relevant issue with regard to the Commissioner's collection activities, including spousal defenses, challenges to the appropriateness of the Commissioner's intended collection action, and alternative means of collection. Sego v. Commissioner [ Dec. 53,938], 114 T.C. 604, 609 (2000); Goza v. Commissioner [ Dec. 53,803], 114 T.C. 176, 180 (2000). In addition to considering issues raised by the taxpayer under section 6330(c)(2), the Appeals officer must also verify that the requirements of any applicable law or administrative procedure have been met. Sec. 6330(c)(1), (3); Hoyle v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. ___, ___ (2008) (slip op. at 5).



Petitioner questioned whether Settlement Officer Apodaca was an impartial officer pursuant to section 6320(b)(3). The validity of the underlying tax liability is not at issue; therefore we review the respondent's determination for abuse of discretion. See Sego v. Commissioner, supra at 610.




Was Settlement Officer Apodaca an Impartial Officer?


This case is appealable to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Accordingly, with regard to section 6320(b)(3), we apply the standard for an impartial officer set forth in Cox v. Commissioner [ 2008-1 USTC ¶50,165], 514 F.3d 1119, 1124-1128 (10th Cir. 2008), revg. [ Dec. 56,506], 126 T.C. 237 (2006). See Golsen v. Commissioner [ Dec. 30,049], 54 T.C. 742 (1970), affd. [ 71-2 USTC ¶9497], 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971).



Section 6320(b)(3) provides: "Impartial officer. --The hearing under this subsection shall be conducted by an officer or employee who has had no prior involvement with respect to the unpaid tax specified in subsection (a)(3)(A) before the first hearing under this section". The Internal Revenue Code does not define the term "no prior involvement". See Cox v. Commissioner, supra at 1124. The Commissioner has promulgated regulations interpreting the meaning of "no prior involvement". See id.; secs. 301.6320-1(d)(2), 301.6330-1(d)(2), Proced. & Admin. Regs. The regulations define prior involvement as follows:



Q-D4. What is considered to be prior involvement by an employee or officer of Appeals with respect to the unpaid tax and tax period or periods involved in the hearing?



A-D4. Prior involvement by an employee or officer of Appeals includes participation or involvement in an Appeals hearing (other than a CDP hearing held under either section 6320 or section 6330) that the taxpayer may have had with respect to the unpaid tax and tax periods shown on the NFTL.



Sec. 301.6320-1(d)(2), Q&A-D4, Proced. & Admin. Regs. 2



The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit interpreted the statute 3 and the regulation as follows:



The best indicator of a statute's meaning should be the language itself and section 6330(b)(3) clearly and unambiguously provides that an appeals officer conducting a CDP hearing shall have had "no prior involvement" with respect to the unpaid tax specified on the CDP Notice.



The tax court and Commissioner interpret this term * * * essentially limiting section 6330's meaning to the language of Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(d)(2). However, "we assume that in drafting legislation, Congress says what it means."



An agency may not read ambiguity into a statute in order to reach a practical result. While interpreting section 6330(b)(3) narrowly makes it less likely that appeals officers will have to recuse themselves from hearing taxpayers' cases and easier for Appeals Officers to assign officers to CDP hearings, we find no legal support for doing so. By using the term "involvement," Congress deliberately implemented a broad restriction on IRS appeals officers to ensure their impartiality.



To be sure, Congress never stated any intent to narrow the meaning of "prior involvement" to prior involvement in a hearing, let alone one specifically regarding the tax liability listed on the CDP Notice.



A review of section 6330(b)(3)'s legislative history * * * [confirms] Congress' broad intent. In fact, Congress expressly contemplated only one scenario where an appeals officer with prior involvement in the taxpayer's case could conduct a subsequent CDP hearing, namely that the same appeals officer can conduct a pre-levy CDP hearing pursuant to I.R.C. § 6330 and a pre-lien CDP hearing pursuant to I.R.C. § 6320 regarding the same unpaid liability. Congress did not provide for other exceptions, nor did it express any intent that additional exceptions could be provided by the Commissioner.



Cox v. Commissioner, supra at 1125-1126 (citations and fn. refs. omitted). The Court of Appeals also held that its conclusion is further supported by the purpose of section 6330. Id. at 1126. "Central to that purpose is the taxpayer's fundamental right to an impartial appeals officer". Id. (emphasis added). Limiting the definition of "no prior involvement" to section 301.6330-1(d)(2), Proced. & Admin. Regs., impermissibly narrows that protection. Cox v. Commissioner, supra at 1126.



Furthermore, it is not relevant whether the officer or employee of Appeals was biased by his or her prior involvement with a taxpayer's liability or liabilities. Id. at 1127. All that is required for recusal is that the employee or officer in fact did have prior involvement with the taxpayer's liability or liabilities. Id. If the employee or officer had prior involvement, the taxpayer is entitled to a new section 6330 hearing before an impartial Appeals officer in accordance with the statute. Id.



During 2000 petitioner submitted an offer-in-compromise (OIC) to settle his tax liabilities for 1994, 1995, 1996, and 1997 that the IRS rejected. At the time Settlement Officer Apodaca worked for the IRS in Albuquerque, New Mexico, in the Compliance Unit as an OIC specialist. Settlement Officer Apodaca mailed petitioner the forms to complete for an OIC to settle his tax liabilities for 1994, 1995, 1996, and 1997. Settlement Officer Apodaca testified that her handwriting was on the envelope mailed to petitioner in 2000.



On September 19, 2000, as instructed by Settlement Officer Apodaca, petitioner wrote a letter to another IRS employee, Patty Trusty, regarding an OIC to settle his tax liabilities for 1994, 1995, 1996, and 1997. At the time Settlement Officer Apodaca was Patty Trusty's supervisor in the OIC function of the IRS.



At the time of the section 6330 hearing, Settlement Officer Apodaca did not recall her prior involvement with petitioner regarding his tax liabilities for 1994, 1995, 1996, and 1997. An attachment to the notice of determination states: "The Appeals Officer has no prior involvement with respect to the unpaid tax specified in IRC § 6330(a)(3)(A) before the first hearing under IRC § 6330 or IRC § 6320 as required by IRC 6330(b)(3) [sic]."



The attachment to the notice of determination and Settlement Officer Apodaca's memory at the time of the section 6330 hearing were incorrect. Settlement Officer Apodaca did have prior involvement with respect to the unpaid tax for the years in issue before the first hearing pursuant to section 6320. Accordingly, petitioner is entitled to a new section 6330 hearing before an impartial Appeals officer in accordance with the statute. See Cox v. Commissioner, 514 F.3d at 1127; Golsen v. Commissioner [ Dec. 30,049], 54 T.C. 742 (1970).



To reflect the foregoing,



An appropriate order will be issued.


1 Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code.

2 The version of the regulation in effect before amendment in 2006 applies to this case. See Cox v. Commissioner [2008-1 USTC ¶50,165], 514 F.3d 1119, 1125 n.7 (10th Cir. 2008), revg. [ Dec. 56,506], 126 T.C. 237 (2006).

3 Although Cox v. Commissioner, supra at 1124 n.6, dealt with sec. 6330, "Section 6320 is a related provision included in the RRA that entitles a taxpayer to similar protections after the IRS issues a notice of lien." Secs. 6320(b)(3) and 6330(b)(3) are identical except that the language "under this section or section 6330" in the former is the reverse of the phrase "under this section or section 6320" in the latter.

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