Friday, October 30, 2009

White House Press Release—Remarks by the President on International Tax Policy Reform, (May. 5, 2009)
2009ARD 087-4
Obama administration: Tax havens: International tax reform
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
May 4, 2009
REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT ON INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY REFORM
Grand Foyer
11:39 A.M. EDT
THE PRESIDENT: All right. Good morning, everybody. Hope you all had a good weekend.
Let's begin with a simple premise: Nobody likes paying taxes, particularly in times of economic stress. But most Americans meet their responsibilities because they understand that it's an obligation of citizenship, necessary to pay the costs of our common defense and our mutual well-being.
And yet, even as most American citizens and businesses meet these responsibilities, there are others who are shirking theirs. And many are aided and abetted by a broken tax system, written by well-connected lobbyists on behalf of well-heeled interests and individuals. It's a tax code full of corporate loopholes that makes it perfectly legal for companies to avoid paying their fair share. It's a tax code that makes it all too easy for a number—a small number of individuals and companies to abuse overseas tax havens to avoid paying any taxes at all. And it's a tax code that says you should pay lower taxes if you create a job in Bangalore, India, than if you create one in Buffalo, New York.
Now, understand, one of the strengths of our economy is the global reach of our businesses. And I want to see our companies remain the most competitive in the world. But the way to make sure that happens is not to reward our companies for moving jobs off our shores or transferring profits to overseas tax havens. This is something that I talked about again and again during the course of the campaign. The way we make our businesses competitive is not to reward American companies operating overseas with a roughly 2 percent tax rate on foreign profits; a rate that costs—that costs taxpayers tens of billions of dollars a year. The way to make American businesses competitive is not to let some citizens and businesses dodge their responsibilities while ordinary Americans pick up the slack.
Unfortunately, that's exactly what we're doing. These problems have been highlighted by Chairmen Charlie Rangel and Max Baucus, by leaders like Senator Carl Levin and Congressman Lloyd Doggett. And now is the time to finally do something about them. And that's why today, I'm announcing a set of proposals to crack down on illegal overseas tax evasion, close loopholes, and make it more profitable for companies to create jobs here in the United States.
For years, we've talked about ending tax breaks for companies that ship jobs overseas and giving tax breaks to companies that create jobs here in America. That's what our budget will finally do. We will stop letting American companies that create jobs overseas take deductions on their expenses when they do not pay any American taxes on their profits. And we will use the savings to give tax cuts to companies that are investing in research and development here at home so that we can jumpstart job creation, foster innovation, and enhance America's competitiveness.
For years, we've talked about shutting down overseas tax havens that let companies set up operations to avoid paying taxes in America. That's what our budget will finally do. On the campaign, I used to talk about the outrage of a building in the Cayman Islands that had over 12,000 business—businesses claim this building as their headquarters. And I've said before, either this is the largest building in the world or the largest tax scam in the world.
And I think the American people know which it is. It's the kind of tax scam that we need to end. That's why we are closing one of our biggest tax loopholes. It's a loophole that lets subsidiaries of some of our largest companies tell the IRS that they're paying taxes abroad, tell foreign governments that they're paying taxes elsewhere—and avoid paying taxes anywhere. And closing this single loophole will save taxpayers tens of billions of dollars—money that can be spent on reinvesting in America—and it will restore fairness to our tax code by helping ensure that all our citizens and all our companies are paying what they should.
Now, for years, we've talked about stopping Americans from illegally hiding their money overseas, and getting tough with the financial institutions that let them get away with it. The Treasury Department and the IRS, under Secretary Geithner's leadership and Commissioner Shulman's, are already taking far-reaching steps to catch overseas tax cheats—but they need more support.
And that's why I'm asking Congress to pass some commonsense measures. One of these measures would let the IRS know how much income Americans are generating in overseas accounts by requiring overseas banks to provide 1099s for their American clients, just like Americans have to do for their bank accounts here in this country. If financial institutions won't cooperate with us, we will assume that they are sheltering money in tax havens, and act accordingly. And to ensure that the IRS has the tools it needs to enforce our laws, we're seeking to hire nearly 800 more IRS agents to detect and pursue American tax evaders abroad.
So all in all, these and other reforms will save American taxpayers $210 billion over the next 10 years—savings we can use to reduce the deficit, cut taxes for American businesses that are playing by the rules, and provide meaningful relief for hardworking families. That's what we're doing. We're putting a middle class tax cut in the pockets of 95 percent of working families, and we're providing a $2,500 annual tax credit to put the dream of a college degree or advanced training within the reach for more students. We're providing a tax credit worth up to $8,000 for first-time home buyers to help more Americans own a piece of the American Dream and to strengthen the housing market.
So the steps I am announcing today will help us deal with some of the most egregious examples of what's wrong with our tax code and will help us strengthen some of these other efforts. It's a down payment on the larger tax reform we need to make our tax system simpler and fairer and more efficient for individuals and corporations.
Now, it will take time to undo the damage of distorted provisions that were slipped into our tax code by lobbyists and special interests, but with the steps I'm announcing today we are beginning to crack down on Americans who are bending or breaking the rules, and we're helping to ensure that all Americans are contributing their fair share.
In other words, we're beginning to restore fairness and balance to our tax code. That's what I promised I would do during the campaign, that's what I'm committed to doing as President, and that is what I will work with members of my administration and members of Congress to accomplish in the months and years to come.
Thanks very much, guys.


White House Press Release—Leveling The Playing Field: Curbing Tax Havens and Removing Tax Incentives for Shifting Jobs Overseas, (May. 5, 2009)
2009ARD 087-1
Obama administration: Tax havens: International tax reform
Leveling the Playing Field: Curbing Tax Havens and Removing Tax Incentives For Shifting Jobs Overseas
There is no higher economic priority for President Obama than creating new, well-paying jobs in the United States. Yet today, our tax code actually provides a competitive advantage to companies that invest and create jobs overseas compared to those that invest and create those same jobs in the U.S. In addition, our tax system is rife with opportunities to evade and avoid taxes through offshore tax havens:
• ○ In 2004, the most recent year for which data is available, U.S. multinational corporations paid about $16 billion of U.S. tax on approximately $700 billion of foreign active earnings - an effective U.S. tax rate of about 2.3%.
• ○ A January 2009 GAO report found that of the 100 largest U.S. corporations, 83 have subsidiaries in tax havens.
• ○ In the Cayman Islands, one address alone houses 18,857 corporations, very few of which have a physical presence in the islands.
• ○ Nearly one-third of all foreign profits reported by U.S. corporations in 2003 came from just three small, low-tax countries: Bermuda, the Netherlands, and Ireland.
Today, President Obama and Secretary Geithner are unveiling two components of the Administration's plan to reform our international tax laws and improve their enforcement. First, they are calling for reforms to ensure that our tax code does not stack the deck against job creation here on our shores. Second, they seek to reduce the amount of taxes lost to tax havens - either through unintended loopholes that allow companies to legally avoid paying billions in taxes, or through the illegal use of hidden accounts by well-off individuals. Combined with further international tax reforms that will be unveiled in the Administration's full budget later in May, these initiatives would raise $210 billion over the next 10 years. The Obama Administration hopes to build on proposals by Senate Finance Committee Chairman Max Baucus and House Ways and Means Chairman Charles Rangel - as well as other leaders on this issue like Senator Carl Levin and Congressman Lloyd Doggett - to pass bipartisan legislation over the coming months.
1. Replacing Tax Advantages for Creating Jobs Overseas With Incentives to Create Them at Home: The Administration would raise $103.1 billion by removing tax advantages for investing overseas, and would use a portion of those resources to make permanent a tax credit for investment in research and innovation within the United States.
• Reforming Deferral Rules to Curb A Tax Advantage for Investing and Reinvesting Overseas: Currently, businesses that invest overseas can take immediate deductions on their U.S. tax returns for expenses supporting their overseas investments but nevertheless “defer” paying U.S. taxes on the profits they make from those investments. As a result, U.S. taxpayer dollars are used to provide a significant tax advantage to companies who invest overseas relative to those who invest and create jobs at home. The Obama Administration would reform the rules surrounding deferral so that - with the exception of research and experimentation expenses - companies cannot receive deductions on their U.S. tax returns supporting their offshore investments until they pay taxes on their offshore profits. This provision would take effect in 2011, raising $60.1 billion from 2011 to 2019.
• Closing Foreign Tax Credit Loopholes : Current law allows U.S. businesses that pay foreign taxes on overseas profits to claim a credit against their U.S. taxes for the foreign taxes paid. Some U.S. businesses use loopholes to artificially inflate or accelerate these credits. The Administration would close these loopholes, raising $43.0 billion from 2011 to 2019.
• Using Savings from Ending Unfair Overseas Tax Breaks to Permanently Extend the Research and Experimentation Tax Credit for Investment in the United States: The Research and Experimentation Tax Credit - which provides an incentive for businesses to invest in innovation in the United States - is currently set to expire at the end of 2009. To provide businesses with the certainty they need to make long-term investments in research and innovation, the Administration proposes making the R&E tax credit permanent, providing a tax cut of $74.5 billion over 10 years to businesses that invest in the United States.
2. Getting Tough on Overseas Tax Havens: The Administration's proposal would raise a total of $95.2 billion over the next 10 years through efforts to get tough on overseas tax havens by:
• Eliminating Loopholes for “Disappearing” Offshore Subsidiaries : Traditionally, U.S. companies have been required to report certain income shifted from one foreign subsidiary to another as passive income subject to U.S. tax. But over the past decade, so-called “check-the-box” rules have allowed companies to make their foreign subsidiaries “disappear” for tax purposes - permitting them to legally shift income to tax havens and make the taxes they owe the United States disappear as well. The Obama administration proposes to reform these rules to require certain foreign subsidiaries to be considered as separate corporations for U.S. tax purposes. This provision would take effect in 2011, raising $86.5 billion from 2011 to 2019.
• Cracking Down on the Abuse of Tax Havens by Individuals: Currently, wealthy Americans can evade paying taxes by hiding their money in offshore accounts with little fear that either the financial institution or the country that houses their money will report them to the IRS. In addition to initiatives taken within the G-20 to impose sanctions on countries judged by their peers not to be adequately implementing information exchange standards, the Obama Administration proposes a comprehensive package of disclosure and enforcement measures to make it more difficult for financial institutions and wealthy individuals to evade taxes. The Administration conservatively estimates this package would raise $8.7 billion over 10 years by:
o ○ Withholding Taxes From Accounts At Institutions That Don't Share Information With The United States: This proposal requires foreign financial institutions that have dealings with the United States to sign an agreement with the IRS to become a “Qualified Intermediary” and share as much information about their U.S. customers as U.S. financial institutions do, or else face the presumption that they may be facilitating tax evasion and have taxes withheld on payments to their customers. In addition, it would shut down loopholes that allow QIs to claim they are complying with the law even as they help wealthy U.S. citizens avoid paying their fair share of taxes.
o ○ Shifting the Burden of Proof and Increasing Penalties for Well-Off Individuals Who Seek to Abuse Tax Havens: In addition, the Obama Administration proposes tightening the reporting standards for overseas investments, increasing penalties and imposing negative presumptions on individuals who fail to report foreign accounts, and extending the statute of limitations for enforcement.
• Devoting New Resources for IRS Enforcement to Help Close the International Tax Gap: As part of the Obama Administration's budget, the IRS will hire nearly 800 new employees devoted to international enforcement, increasing its ability to crack down on offshore tax avoidance.
Leveling the Playing Field: Removing Tax Incentives For Moving Jobs Overseas and Curbing Tax Havens
Backgrounder
I. Replacing Tax Advantages to Create Jobs Overseas with Incentives to Create Jobs at Home
As the first plank of its international tax reform package, the Obama Administration intends to repeal the ability of American companies to take deductions against their U.S. taxable income for expenses supporting profits in low-tax jurisdictions on which they defer paying taxes on for years and perhaps indefinitely. Combined with closing loopholes in the foreign tax credit program, the revenues saved will be used to make permanent the tax credit for research and experimentation in the United States. This will be accomplished through:
1. Reforming Deferral Rules to Curb A Tax Advantage for Investing and Reinvesting Overseas
Current Law
• Companies Can Defer Paying Taxes on Overseas Profits Until Later, While Taking Tax Deductions on Their Foreign Expenses Now : Currently, a company that invests in America has to pay immediate U.S. taxes on its profits from that investment. But if the company instead invests and creates jobs overseas through a foreign subsidiary, it does not have to pay U.S. taxes on its overseas profits until those profits are brought back to the United States, if they ever are. Yet even though companies do not have to pay U.S. taxes on their overseas profits today, they still get to take deductions today on their U.S. tax returns for all of the expenses that support their overseas investment.
• Deferral Rules Use U.S. Taxpayer Dollars to Create A Tax Advantage for Companies That Invest Abroad: As a result, this preferential treatment uses U.S. taxpayer dollars to provide companies with an incentive to invest overseas, giving them a tax advantage over competitors who make the same investments to create jobs in the United States.
Example Under Current Law:
• Suppose that two U.S. companies decided to borrow to invest in a new factory. Company A invests that money to build its plant in the U.S., while Company B invests overseas in a jurisdiction with a tax rate of only 10 percent.
• Company A will be able to deduct its interest expense, reducing its overall U.S. tax liability by 35 cents for every dollar it pays in interest. But it will also pay a 35 percent tax rate on its corporate profits.
• Company B will also be able to deduct its interest expense from its U.S. tax liabilities at a 35 percent rate. But it will only face a tax of 10 percent on its profits.
• Thus, our current tax code uses U.S. taxpayer dollars to put companies that invest in the United States at a competitive advantage with companies who invest overseas.
The Administration's Proposal
• Level the Playing Field: The Administration's commonsense proposal, similar to an earlier measure proposed by House Ways and Means Chairman Charles Rangel, would level the playing field by requiring a company to defer any deductions - such as for interest expenses associated with untaxed overseas investment - until the company repatriates its earnings back home. In other words, companies would only be able to take a deduction on their U.S. taxes for foreign expenses when they also pay taxes on their foreign profits in the United States. This proposal makes an exception for deductions for research and experimentation because of the positive spillover impacts of those investments on the U.S. economy.
• Raise $60.1 Billion From 2011 to 2019: This proposal goes into effect in 2011, and would raise $60.1 billion between 2011 and 2019.
2. Closing Foreign Tax Credit Loopholes
Current Law
• Companies Can Take Advantage Of Foreign Tax Credit Loopholes: When a U.S. taxpayer has overseas income, taxes paid to the foreign jurisdiction can generally be credited against U.S. tax liabilities. In general, this “foreign tax credit” is available only for taxes paid on income that is taxable in the U.S. The intended result is that U.S. taxpayers with overseas income should pay no more tax on their U.S. taxable income than they would if it was all from U.S. sources. However, current rules and tax planning strategies make it possible to claim foreign tax credits for taxes paid on foreign income that is not subject to current U.S. tax. As a result, companies are able to use such credits to pay less tax on their U.S. taxable income than they would if it was all from U.S. sources - providing them with a competitive advantage over companies that invest in the United States.
The Administration's Proposal
• Reform the Foreign Tax Credit to Remove Unfair Tax Advantages for Overseas Investment: The Administration's proposal would take two steps to rein in foreign tax credit schemes. First, a taxpayer's foreign tax credit would be determined based on the amount of total foreign tax the taxpayer actually pays on its total foreign earnings. Second, a foreign tax credit would no longer be allowed for foreign taxes paid on income not subject to U.S. tax. These reforms would go into effect in 2011, raising $43.0 billion from 2011 to 2019.
3. Making R&E Tax Credit Permanent to Encourage Investment in Innovation in the United States: The resources saved by curbing tax incentives for jobs overseas and limiting losses to tax havens would be used to strengthen incentives to invest in jobs in the United States by making permanent the R&E tax credit.
Current Law
• R&E Credit Is Set to Expire At End of 2009 : Under current law, companies are eligible for a tax credit equal to 20 percent of qualified research expenses above a base amount. But the research and experimentation tax credit has never been made permanent - instead, it has been extended on a temporary basis 13 times since it was first created in 1981 - and is set to expire on December 31, 2009.
How It Works
• Through the research and experimentation tax credit, companies receive a credit valued at 20 percent of qualified research expenses in the United States above a base amount. Taxpayers can also elect to take an alternative simplified research credit that provides an incentive for increasing research expenses above the level of the previous three years. Taxpayers may also take a credit based on spending on basic research and certain energy research.
• Any uncertainty about whether the R&E credit will be extended reduces its effectiveness in stimulating investments in new innovation, as it becomes more difficult for taxpayers to factor the credit into decisions to invest in research projects that will not be initiated or completed prior to the credit's expiration.
The Administration's Proposal
• Create Certainty to Encourage New Investment and Innovation at Home By Making the Research and Experimentation Tax Credit Permanent: To give companies the certainty they need to make long-term research and experimentation investment in the U.S., the Administration's budget includes the full cost of making the R&E credit permanent in future years. By making this tax credit permanent, businesses would be provided with the greater confidence they need to initiate new research projects that will improve productivity, raise standards of living, and increase our competitiveness. And with over 75 percent of credit dollars attributed to wages, the credit would provide an important incentive for businesses to create new jobs.
• Paid For With Provisions That Make the Tax Code More Efficient and Fair: This change would cost $74.5 billion over 10 years, which will be paid for by reforming the treatment of deferred income and the use of the foreign tax credit.
II. Getting Tough on Overseas Tax Havens
Some countries make it easy for U.S. taxpayers to evade or avoid U.S. taxes by withholding information about U.S.-held accounts or giving favorable tax treatment to shell corporations created just to avoid taxes. In certain cases, companies are taking advantage of currently legal loopholes to avoid paying taxes by shifting their profits to tax havens. In other cases, Americans break the law by hiding their income in hidden overseas accounts, and these tax havens refuse to provide the information the IRS needs to enforce U.S. law. Either way, these tax havens make our tax system less fair and harm the U.S. economy. President Obama proposes to address tax havens by:
1. Eliminating Loopholes that Allow “Disappearing” Offshore Subsidiaries: Current law allows U.S. businesses to establish foreign subsidiary corporations, but then to “check a box” to pretend that the subsidiaries do not exist for U.S. tax purposes. This practice allows taxes that would otherwise be paid in the U.S. on passive income to be avoided, at great cost to U.S. taxpayers.
Current Law
• Disappearing Subsidiaries Allow Corporations to Shift Income Tax-Free: Traditionally, if a U.S. company sets up a foreign subsidiary in a tax haven and one in another country, income shifted between the two subsidiaries (for example, through interest on loans) would be considered “passive income” for the U.S. company and subject to U.S. tax. Over the last decade, so-called “check-the box” rules have allowed U.S. firms to make these subsidiaries disappear for U.S. tax purposes. With the separate subsidiaries disregarded, the firm can shift income among them without reporting any passive income or paying any U.S. tax. As a result, U.S. firms that invest overseas are able to shift their income to tax havens. It is clear that this loophole, while legal, has become a reason to shift billions of dollars in investments from the U.S. to other counties.
Example under Current Law
• Suppose that a U.S. company invests $10 million to build a new factory in Germany. At the same time, it sets up three new corporations. The first is a wholly owned Cayman Islands holding company. The second is a corporation in Germany, which is owned by the holding company and owns the factory. The third is a Cayman Islands subsidiary, also owned by the Cayman Islands holding company.
• The Cayman subsidiary makes a loan to the German subsidiary. The interest on the loan is income to the Cayman subsidiary and a deductible expense for the German subsidiary. In this way, income is shifted from higher-tax Germany to the no-tax Cayman Islands.
• Under traditional U.S. tax law, this income shift would count as passive income for the U.S. parent - which would have to pay taxes on it. But “check the box” rules allow the firm to make the two subsidiaries disappear — and the income shift with them. As a result, the firm is able to avoid both U.S. taxes and German taxes on its profits.
The Administration's Proposal
• Require U.S. Businesses That Establish Certain Foreign Corporations To Treat Them As Corporations For U.S. Tax Purposes: The Administration's proposal seeks to abolish a range of tax-avoidance techniques by requiring U.S. businesses that establish certain corporations overseas to report them as corporations on their U.S. tax returns. As a result, U.S. firms that invest overseas would no longer be able to make their subsidiaries — or their income shifts to tax havens — disappear for tax purposes. This would level the playing field between firms that invest overseas and those that invest at home.
• Raise $86.5 Billion from 2011 to 2019: This loophole would be closed beginning in 2011, raising $86.5 billion from 2011 to 2019.
2. Cracking Down on the Abuse of Tax Havens by Individuals: The IRS is already engaged in significant efforts to track down and collect taxes from individuals illegally hiding income overseas. But to fully follow through on this effort, it will need new legal authorities. Current law makes it difficult for the IRS to collect the information it needs to determine that the holder of a foreign bank account is a U.S. citizen evading taxation. The Obama administration proposes changes that will enhance information reporting, increase tax withholding, strengthen penalties, and shift the burden of proof to make it harder for foreign account-holders to evade U.S. taxes, while also providing the enforcement tools necessary to crack down on tax haven abuse.
Current Law
• A Free Ride for Financial Institutions that Flout Reporting Rules: A centerpiece of the current U.S. regime to combat international tax evasion is the Qualified Intermediary (QI) program, under which financial institutions sign an agreement to share information about their U.S. customers with the IRS. Unfortunately, this regime, while effective, has become subject to abuse:
o ○ At Non-Qualifying Institutions, Withholding Requirements Are Easy to Escape: Currently, an investor can escape withholding requirements by simply attesting to being a non-U.S. person. That leaves it to the IRS to show that the investor is actually a U.S. citizen evading the law.
o ○ Loopholes Allow Qualifying Institutions to Still Serve as Conduits for Evasion: Moreover, financial institutions can qualify as QIs even if they are affiliated with non-QIs. As a result, a financial institution need not give up its business as a conduit for tax evasion in order to enjoy the benefits of being a QI. In addition, QIs are not currently required to report the foreign income of their U.S. customers, so U.S. customers may hide behind foreign entities to evade taxes through QIs.
o ○ Legal Presumptions Favor Tax Evaders Who Conceal Transactions: U.S. investors overseas are required to file the Foreign Bank and Financial Account Report, or FBAR, disclosing ownership of financial accounts in a foreign country containing over $10,000. The FBAR is particularly important in the case of investors who employ non-QIs, because their transactions are less likely to be disclosed otherwise. Unfortunately, current rules make it difficult to catch those who are supposed to file the FBAR but do not. And even when the IRS has evidence that a U.S. taxpayer has a foreign account, legal presumptions currently favor the tax evader — without specific evidence that the U.S person has an account that requires an FBAR, the IRS cannot compel an investor to provide the report or impose penalties for the failure to do so. This specific evidence may be almost impossible for the IRS to get.
• The IRS Lacks the Tools It Needs to Enforce International Tax Laws: In addition to the shortcomings of the QI program, current law features inadequate tools to crack down on wealthy taxpayers who evade taxation. Investors who withhold information about overseas investments face penalties limited to 20 percent of the amount of the understatement. The statute of limitations for enforcement is typically only three years - which is often too short a time period for the IRS to get the information it needs to determine whether a taxpayer with an offshore account paid the right amount of tax. And there are no requirements that U.S. individuals or third parties report transfers to and from foreign accounts, limiting the ability of the IRS to determine whether taxpayers are paying what they owe.
Example Under Current Law
• Through a U.S. broker, a U.S. account-holder at a non-qualified intermediary sells $50 million worth of securities.
• If the seller self-certifies that he is not a U.S. citizen and the non-qualified intermediary simply passes that information along to the U.S. broker, the broker may rely on that statement and does not need to withhold money from the transaction.
• As a result, a U.S. taxpayer who provides a false self-certification can easily avoid paying taxes, since the non-QI has not signed an agreement with the IRS, and the IRS may have limited tools to detect any wrongdoing.
Proposal
In addition to initiatives taken within the G-20 to impose sanctions on countries judged by their peers not to be adequately implementing information exchange standards, the Obama administration proposes to make it more difficult to shelter foreign investments from taxation by cracking down on financial institutions that enable and profit from international tax evasion. These measures - expected to raise $8.7 billion over 10 years - would:
• Strengthen the “Qualified Intermediary” System to Crack Down on Tax Evaders: The core of the Obama Administration's proposals is a tough new stance on investors who use financial institutions that do not agree to be Qualifying Intermediaries. Under this proposal, the assumption will be that these institutions are facilitating tax evasion, and the burden of proof will be shifted to the institutions and their account-holders to prove they are not sheltering income from U.S. taxation. As a result, the Administration proposes to:
o Impose Significant Tax Withholding On Transactions Involving Non-Qualifying Intermediaries: The Administration's plan would require U.S. financial institutions to withhold 20 percent to 30 percent of U.S. payments to individuals who use non-QIs. To get a refund for the amount withheld, investors must disclose their identities and demonstrate that they're obeying the law.
o Create A Legal Presumption Against Users Of Non-Qualifying Intermediaries: The Administration's plan would create rebuttable evidentiary presumptions that any foreign bank, brokerage, or other financial account held by a U.S. citizen at a non-QI contains enough funds to require that an FBAR be filed, and that any failure to file an FBAR is willful if an account at a non-QI has a balance of greater than $200,000 at any point during the calendar year. These presumptions will make it easier for the IRS to demand information and pursue cases against international tax evaders. This shifting of legal presumptions is a key component of the anti-tax haven legislation long championed by Senator Carl Levin.
o Limit QI Affiliations With Non-QIs: The Administration's plan would give the Treasury Department authority to issue regulations requiring that a financial institution may be a QI only if all commonly-controlled financial institutions are also QIs. As a result, financial firms couldn't benefit from siphoning business from their legitimate QI operations to illegitimate non-QI affiliates.
• Provide the IRS With The Legal Tools Necessary to Prosecute International Tax Evasion : The Obama administration proposes to improve the ability of the IRS to successfully prosecute international tax evasion through the following steps:
o Increase Penalties for Failing to Report Overseas Investments : The Administration's plan would double certain penalties when a taxpayer fails to make a required disclosure of foreign financial accounts.
o Extend the Statute of Limitations for International Tax Enforcement: The Administration's plan would set the statute of limitations on international tax enforcement at six years after the taxpayer submits required information.
o Tighten Lax Reporting Requirements : The Administration's plan would increase the reporting requirement on international investors and financial institutions, especially QIs. QIs would be required to report information on their U.S. customers to the same extent that U.S. financial intermediaries must. And U.S. customers at QIs would no longer be allowed to hide behind foreign entities. U.S. investors would be required to report transfers of money or property made to or from non-QI foreign financial institutions on their income tax returns. Financial institutions would face enhanced information reporting requirements for transactions that establish a foreign business entity or transfer assets to and from foreign financial accounts on behalf of U.S. individuals.
3. Hire Nearly 800 New IRS Staff to Increase International Enforcement: As part of the President's budget, the IRS would be provided with funds to support the hiring of nearly 800 new employees devoted specifically to international enforcement. The funding would allow the IRS to hire new agents, economists, lawyers and specialists, increasing the IRS' ability to crack down on offshore tax avoidance and evasion, including through transfer pricing and financial products and transactions such as purported securities loans. According to estimates by the IRS, every additional dollar invested in enforcement in recent years has yielded about four dollars in added tax revenues.
White House Press Release—Leveling The Playing Field: Curbing Tax Havens and Removing Tax Incentives for Shifting Jobs Overseas, (May. 5, 2009)
2009ARD 087-1
Obama administration: Tax havens: International tax reform
Leveling the Playing Field: Curbing Tax Havens and Removing Tax Incentives For Shifting Jobs Overseas
There is no higher economic priority for President Obama than creating new, well-paying jobs in the United States. Yet today, our tax code actually provides a competitive advantage to companies that invest and create jobs overseas compared to those that invest and create those same jobs in the U.S. In addition, our tax system is rife with opportunities to evade and avoid taxes through offshore tax havens:
• ○ In 2004, the most recent year for which data is available, U.S. multinational corporations paid about $16 billion of U.S. tax on approximately $700 billion of foreign active earnings - an effective U.S. tax rate of about 2.3%.
• ○ A January 2009 GAO report found that of the 100 largest U.S. corporations, 83 have subsidiaries in tax havens.
• ○ In the Cayman Islands, one address alone houses 18,857 corporations, very few of which have a physical presence in the islands.
• ○ Nearly one-third of all foreign profits reported by U.S. corporations in 2003 came from just three small, low-tax countries: Bermuda, the Netherlands, and Ireland.
Today, President Obama and Secretary Geithner are unveiling two components of the Administration's plan to reform our international tax laws and improve their enforcement. First, they are calling for reforms to ensure that our tax code does not stack the deck against job creation here on our shores. Second, they seek to reduce the amount of taxes lost to tax havens - either through unintended loopholes that allow companies to legally avoid paying billions in taxes, or through the illegal use of hidden accounts by well-off individuals. Combined with further international tax reforms that will be unveiled in the Administration's full budget later in May, these initiatives would raise $210 billion over the next 10 years. The Obama Administration hopes to build on proposals by Senate Finance Committee Chairman Max Baucus and House Ways and Means Chairman Charles Rangel - as well as other leaders on this issue like Senator Carl Levin and Congressman Lloyd Doggett - to pass bipartisan legislation over the coming months.
1. Replacing Tax Advantages for Creating Jobs Overseas With Incentives to Create Them at Home: The Administration would raise $103.1 billion by removing tax advantages for investing overseas, and would use a portion of those resources to make permanent a tax credit for investment in research and innovation within the United States.
• Reforming Deferral Rules to Curb A Tax Advantage for Investing and Reinvesting Overseas: Currently, businesses that invest overseas can take immediate deductions on their U.S. tax returns for expenses supporting their overseas investments but nevertheless “defer” paying U.S. taxes on the profits they make from those investments. As a result, U.S. taxpayer dollars are used to provide a significant tax advantage to companies who invest overseas relative to those who invest and create jobs at home. The Obama Administration would reform the rules surrounding deferral so that - with the exception of research and experimentation expenses - companies cannot receive deductions on their U.S. tax returns supporting their offshore investments until they pay taxes on their offshore profits. This provision would take effect in 2011, raising $60.1 billion from 2011 to 2019.
• Closing Foreign Tax Credit Loopholes : Current law allows U.S. businesses that pay foreign taxes on overseas profits to claim a credit against their U.S. taxes for the foreign taxes paid. Some U.S. businesses use loopholes to artificially inflate or accelerate these credits. The Administration would close these loopholes, raising $43.0 billion from 2011 to 2019.
• Using Savings from Ending Unfair Overseas Tax Breaks to Permanently Extend the Research and Experimentation Tax Credit for Investment in the United States: The Research and Experimentation Tax Credit - which provides an incentive for businesses to invest in innovation in the United States - is currently set to expire at the end of 2009. To provide businesses with the certainty they need to make long-term investments in research and innovation, the Administration proposes making the R&E tax credit permanent, providing a tax cut of $74.5 billion over 10 years to businesses that invest in the United States.
2. Getting Tough on Overseas Tax Havens: The Administration's proposal would raise a total of $95.2 billion over the next 10 years through efforts to get tough on overseas tax havens by:
• Eliminating Loopholes for “Disappearing” Offshore Subsidiaries : Traditionally, U.S. companies have been required to report certain income shifted from one foreign subsidiary to another as passive income subject to U.S. tax. But over the past decade, so-called “check-the-box” rules have allowed companies to make their foreign subsidiaries “disappear” for tax purposes - permitting them to legally shift income to tax havens and make the taxes they owe the United States disappear as well. The Obama administration proposes to reform these rules to require certain foreign subsidiaries to be considered as separate corporations for U.S. tax purposes. This provision would take effect in 2011, raising $86.5 billion from 2011 to 2019.
• Cracking Down on the Abuse of Tax Havens by Individuals: Currently, wealthy Americans can evade paying taxes by hiding their money in offshore accounts with little fear that either the financial institution or the country that houses their money will report them to the IRS. In addition to initiatives taken within the G-20 to impose sanctions on countries judged by their peers not to be adequately implementing information exchange standards, the Obama Administration proposes a comprehensive package of disclosure and enforcement measures to make it more difficult for financial institutions and wealthy individuals to evade taxes. The Administration conservatively estimates this package would raise $8.7 billion over 10 years by:
o ○ Withholding Taxes From Accounts At Institutions That Don't Share Information With The United States: This proposal requires foreign financial institutions that have dealings with the United States to sign an agreement with the IRS to become a “Qualified Intermediary” and share as much information about their U.S. customers as U.S. financial institutions do, or else face the presumption that they may be facilitating tax evasion and have taxes withheld on payments to their customers. In addition, it would shut down loopholes that allow QIs to claim they are complying with the law even as they help wealthy U.S. citizens avoid paying their fair share of taxes.
o ○ Shifting the Burden of Proof and Increasing Penalties for Well-Off Individuals Who Seek to Abuse Tax Havens: In addition, the Obama Administration proposes tightening the reporting standards for overseas investments, increasing penalties and imposing negative presumptions on individuals who fail to report foreign accounts, and extending the statute of limitations for enforcement.
• Devoting New Resources for IRS Enforcement to Help Close the International Tax Gap: As part of the Obama Administration's budget, the IRS will hire nearly 800 new employees devoted to international enforcement, increasing its ability to crack down on offshore tax avoidance.
Leveling the Playing Field: Removing Tax Incentives For Moving Jobs Overseas and Curbing Tax Havens
Backgrounder
I. Replacing Tax Advantages to Create Jobs Overseas with Incentives to Create Jobs at Home
As the first plank of its international tax reform package, the Obama Administration intends to repeal the ability of American companies to take deductions against their U.S. taxable income for expenses supporting profits in low-tax jurisdictions on which they defer paying taxes on for years and perhaps indefinitely. Combined with closing loopholes in the foreign tax credit program, the revenues saved will be used to make permanent the tax credit for research and experimentation in the United States. This will be accomplished through:
1. Reforming Deferral Rules to Curb A Tax Advantage for Investing and Reinvesting Overseas
Current Law
• Companies Can Defer Paying Taxes on Overseas Profits Until Later, While Taking Tax Deductions on Their Foreign Expenses Now : Currently, a company that invests in America has to pay immediate U.S. taxes on its profits from that investment. But if the company instead invests and creates jobs overseas through a foreign subsidiary, it does not have to pay U.S. taxes on its overseas profits until those profits are brought back to the United States, if they ever are. Yet even though companies do not have to pay U.S. taxes on their overseas profits today, they still get to take deductions today on their U.S. tax returns for all of the expenses that support their overseas investment.
• Deferral Rules Use U.S. Taxpayer Dollars to Create A Tax Advantage for Companies That Invest Abroad: As a result, this preferential treatment uses U.S. taxpayer dollars to provide companies with an incentive to invest overseas, giving them a tax advantage over competitors who make the same investments to create jobs in the United States.
Example Under Current Law:
• Suppose that two U.S. companies decided to borrow to invest in a new factory. Company A invests that money to build its plant in the U.S., while Company B invests overseas in a jurisdiction with a tax rate of only 10 percent.
• Company A will be able to deduct its interest expense, reducing its overall U.S. tax liability by 35 cents for every dollar it pays in interest. But it will also pay a 35 percent tax rate on its corporate profits.
• Company B will also be able to deduct its interest expense from its U.S. tax liabilities at a 35 percent rate. But it will only face a tax of 10 percent on its profits.
• Thus, our current tax code uses U.S. taxpayer dollars to put companies that invest in the United States at a competitive advantage with companies who invest overseas.
The Administration's Proposal
• Level the Playing Field: The Administration's commonsense proposal, similar to an earlier measure proposed by House Ways and Means Chairman Charles Rangel, would level the playing field by requiring a company to defer any deductions - such as for interest expenses associated with untaxed overseas investment - until the company repatriates its earnings back home. In other words, companies would only be able to take a deduction on their U.S. taxes for foreign expenses when they also pay taxes on their foreign profits in the United States. This proposal makes an exception for deductions for research and experimentation because of the positive spillover impacts of those investments on the U.S. economy.
• Raise $60.1 Billion From 2011 to 2019: This proposal goes into effect in 2011, and would raise $60.1 billion between 2011 and 2019.
2. Closing Foreign Tax Credit Loopholes
Current Law
• Companies Can Take Advantage Of Foreign Tax Credit Loopholes: When a U.S. taxpayer has overseas income, taxes paid to the foreign jurisdiction can generally be credited against U.S. tax liabilities. In general, this “foreign tax credit” is available only for taxes paid on income that is taxable in the U.S. The intended result is that U.S. taxpayers with overseas income should pay no more tax on their U.S. taxable income than they would if it was all from U.S. sources. However, current rules and tax planning strategies make it possible to claim foreign tax credits for taxes paid on foreign income that is not subject to current U.S. tax. As a result, companies are able to use such credits to pay less tax on their U.S. taxable income than they would if it was all from U.S. sources - providing them with a competitive advantage over companies that invest in the United States.
The Administration's Proposal
• Reform the Foreign Tax Credit to Remove Unfair Tax Advantages for Overseas Investment: The Administration's proposal would take two steps to rein in foreign tax credit schemes. First, a taxpayer's foreign tax credit would be determined based on the amount of total foreign tax the taxpayer actually pays on its total foreign earnings. Second, a foreign tax credit would no longer be allowed for foreign taxes paid on income not subject to U.S. tax. These reforms would go into effect in 2011, raising $43.0 billion from 2011 to 2019.
3. Making R&E Tax Credit Permanent to Encourage Investment in Innovation in the United States: The resources saved by curbing tax incentives for jobs overseas and limiting losses to tax havens would be used to strengthen incentives to invest in jobs in the United States by making permanent the R&E tax credit.
Current Law
• R&E Credit Is Set to Expire At End of 2009 : Under current law, companies are eligible for a tax credit equal to 20 percent of qualified research expenses above a base amount. But the research and experimentation tax credit has never been made permanent - instead, it has been extended on a temporary basis 13 times since it was first created in 1981 - and is set to expire on December 31, 2009.
How It Works
• Through the research and experimentation tax credit, companies receive a credit valued at 20 percent of qualified research expenses in the United States above a base amount. Taxpayers can also elect to take an alternative simplified research credit that provides an incentive for increasing research expenses above the level of the previous three years. Taxpayers may also take a credit based on spending on basic research and certain energy research.
• Any uncertainty about whether the R&E credit will be extended reduces its effectiveness in stimulating investments in new innovation, as it becomes more difficult for taxpayers to factor the credit into decisions to invest in research projects that will not be initiated or completed prior to the credit's expiration.
The Administration's Proposal
• Create Certainty to Encourage New Investment and Innovation at Home By Making the Research and Experimentation Tax Credit Permanent: To give companies the certainty they need to make long-term research and experimentation investment in the U.S., the Administration's budget includes the full cost of making the R&E credit permanent in future years. By making this tax credit permanent, businesses would be provided with the greater confidence they need to initiate new research projects that will improve productivity, raise standards of living, and increase our competitiveness. And with over 75 percent of credit dollars attributed to wages, the credit would provide an important incentive for businesses to create new jobs.
• Paid For With Provisions That Make the Tax Code More Efficient and Fair: This change would cost $74.5 billion over 10 years, which will be paid for by reforming the treatment of deferred income and the use of the foreign tax credit.
II. Getting Tough on Overseas Tax Havens
Some countries make it easy for U.S. taxpayers to evade or avoid U.S. taxes by withholding information about U.S.-held accounts or giving favorable tax treatment to shell corporations created just to avoid taxes. In certain cases, companies are taking advantage of currently legal loopholes to avoid paying taxes by shifting their profits to tax havens. In other cases, Americans break the law by hiding their income in hidden overseas accounts, and these tax havens refuse to provide the information the IRS needs to enforce U.S. law. Either way, these tax havens make our tax system less fair and harm the U.S. economy. President Obama proposes to address tax havens by:
1. Eliminating Loopholes that Allow “Disappearing” Offshore Subsidiaries: Current law allows U.S. businesses to establish foreign subsidiary corporations, but then to “check a box” to pretend that the subsidiaries do not exist for U.S. tax purposes. This practice allows taxes that would otherwise be paid in the U.S. on passive income to be avoided, at great cost to U.S. taxpayers.
Current Law
• Disappearing Subsidiaries Allow Corporations to Shift Income Tax-Free: Traditionally, if a U.S. company sets up a foreign subsidiary in a tax haven and one in another country, income shifted between the two subsidiaries (for example, through interest on loans) would be considered “passive income” for the U.S. company and subject to U.S. tax. Over the last decade, so-called “check-the box” rules have allowed U.S. firms to make these subsidiaries disappear for U.S. tax purposes. With the separate subsidiaries disregarded, the firm can shift income among them without reporting any passive income or paying any U.S. tax. As a result, U.S. firms that invest overseas are able to shift their income to tax havens. It is clear that this loophole, while legal, has become a reason to shift billions of dollars in investments from the U.S. to other counties.
Example under Current Law
• Suppose that a U.S. company invests $10 million to build a new factory in Germany. At the same time, it sets up three new corporations. The first is a wholly owned Cayman Islands holding company. The second is a corporation in Germany, which is owned by the holding company and owns the factory. The third is a Cayman Islands subsidiary, also owned by the Cayman Islands holding company.
• The Cayman subsidiary makes a loan to the German subsidiary. The interest on the loan is income to the Cayman subsidiary and a deductible expense for the German subsidiary. In this way, income is shifted from higher-tax Germany to the no-tax Cayman Islands.
• Under traditional U.S. tax law, this income shift would count as passive income for the U.S. parent - which would have to pay taxes on it. But “check the box” rules allow the firm to make the two subsidiaries disappear — and the income shift with them. As a result, the firm is able to avoid both U.S. taxes and German taxes on its profits.
The Administration's Proposal
• Require U.S. Businesses That Establish Certain Foreign Corporations To Treat Them As Corporations For U.S. Tax Purposes: The Administration's proposal seeks to abolish a range of tax-avoidance techniques by requiring U.S. businesses that establish certain corporations overseas to report them as corporations on their U.S. tax returns. As a result, U.S. firms that invest overseas would no longer be able to make their subsidiaries — or their income shifts to tax havens — disappear for tax purposes. This would level the playing field between firms that invest overseas and those that invest at home.
• Raise $86.5 Billion from 2011 to 2019: This loophole would be closed beginning in 2011, raising $86.5 billion from 2011 to 2019.
2. Cracking Down on the Abuse of Tax Havens by Individuals: The IRS is already engaged in significant efforts to track down and collect taxes from individuals illegally hiding income overseas. But to fully follow through on this effort, it will need new legal authorities. Current law makes it difficult for the IRS to collect the information it needs to determine that the holder of a foreign bank account is a U.S. citizen evading taxation. The Obama administration proposes changes that will enhance information reporting, increase tax withholding, strengthen penalties, and shift the burden of proof to make it harder for foreign account-holders to evade U.S. taxes, while also providing the enforcement tools necessary to crack down on tax haven abuse.
Current Law
• A Free Ride for Financial Institutions that Flout Reporting Rules: A centerpiece of the current U.S. regime to combat international tax evasion is the Qualified Intermediary (QI) program, under which financial institutions sign an agreement to share information about their U.S. customers with the IRS. Unfortunately, this regime, while effective, has become subject to abuse:
o ○ At Non-Qualifying Institutions, Withholding Requirements Are Easy to Escape: Currently, an investor can escape withholding requirements by simply attesting to being a non-U.S. person. That leaves it to the IRS to show that the investor is actually a U.S. citizen evading the law.
o ○ Loopholes Allow Qualifying Institutions to Still Serve as Conduits for Evasion: Moreover, financial institutions can qualify as QIs even if they are affiliated with non-QIs. As a result, a financial institution need not give up its business as a conduit for tax evasion in order to enjoy the benefits of being a QI. In addition, QIs are not currently required to report the foreign income of their U.S. customers, so U.S. customers may hide behind foreign entities to evade taxes through QIs.
o ○ Legal Presumptions Favor Tax Evaders Who Conceal Transactions: U.S. investors overseas are required to file the Foreign Bank and Financial Account Report, or FBAR, disclosing ownership of financial accounts in a foreign country containing over $10,000. The FBAR is particularly important in the case of investors who employ non-QIs, because their transactions are less likely to be disclosed otherwise. Unfortunately, current rules make it difficult to catch those who are supposed to file the FBAR but do not. And even when the IRS has evidence that a U.S. taxpayer has a foreign account, legal presumptions currently favor the tax evader — without specific evidence that the U.S person has an account that requires an FBAR, the IRS cannot compel an investor to provide the report or impose penalties for the failure to do so. This specific evidence may be almost impossible for the IRS to get.
• The IRS Lacks the Tools It Needs to Enforce International Tax Laws: In addition to the shortcomings of the QI program, current law features inadequate tools to crack down on wealthy taxpayers who evade taxation. Investors who withhold information about overseas investments face penalties limited to 20 percent of the amount of the understatement. The statute of limitations for enforcement is typically only three years - which is often too short a time period for the IRS to get the information it needs to determine whether a taxpayer with an offshore account paid the right amount of tax. And there are no requirements that U.S. individuals or third parties report transfers to and from foreign accounts, limiting the ability of the IRS to determine whether taxpayers are paying what they owe.
Example Under Current Law
• Through a U.S. broker, a U.S. account-holder at a non-qualified intermediary sells $50 million worth of securities.
• If the seller self-certifies that he is not a U.S. citizen and the non-qualified intermediary simply passes that information along to the U.S. broker, the broker may rely on that statement and does not need to withhold money from the transaction.
• As a result, a U.S. taxpayer who provides a false self-certification can easily avoid paying taxes, since the non-QI has not signed an agreement with the IRS, and the IRS may have limited tools to detect any wrongdoing.
Proposal
In addition to initiatives taken within the G-20 to impose sanctions on countries judged by their peers not to be adequately implementing information exchange standards, the Obama administration proposes to make it more difficult to shelter foreign investments from taxation by cracking down on financial institutions that enable and profit from international tax evasion. These measures - expected to raise $8.7 billion over 10 years - would:
• Strengthen the “Qualified Intermediary” System to Crack Down on Tax Evaders: The core of the Obama Administration's proposals is a tough new stance on investors who use financial institutions that do not agree to be Qualifying Intermediaries. Under this proposal, the assumption will be that these institutions are facilitating tax evasion, and the burden of proof will be shifted to the institutions and their account-holders to prove they are not sheltering income from U.S. taxation. As a result, the Administration proposes to:
o Impose Significant Tax Withholding On Transactions Involving Non-Qualifying Intermediaries: The Administration's plan would require U.S. financial institutions to withhold 20 percent to 30 percent of U.S. payments to individuals who use non-QIs. To get a refund for the amount withheld, investors must disclose their identities and demonstrate that they're obeying the law.
o Create A Legal Presumption Against Users Of Non-Qualifying Intermediaries: The Administration's plan would create rebuttable evidentiary presumptions that any foreign bank, brokerage, or other financial account held by a U.S. citizen at a non-QI contains enough funds to require that an FBAR be filed, and that any failure to file an FBAR is willful if an account at a non-QI has a balance of greater than $200,000 at any point during the calendar year. These presumptions will make it easier for the IRS to demand information and pursue cases against international tax evaders. This shifting of legal presumptions is a key component of the anti-tax haven legislation long championed by Senator Carl Levin.
o Limit QI Affiliations With Non-QIs: The Administration's plan would give the Treasury Department authority to issue regulations requiring that a financial institution may be a QI only if all commonly-controlled financial institutions are also QIs. As a result, financial firms couldn't benefit from siphoning business from their legitimate QI operations to illegitimate non-QI affiliates.
• Provide the IRS With The Legal Tools Necessary to Prosecute International Tax Evasion : The Obama administration proposes to improve the ability of the IRS to successfully prosecute international tax evasion through the following steps:
o Increase Penalties for Failing to Report Overseas Investments : The Administration's plan would double certain penalties when a taxpayer fails to make a required disclosure of foreign financial accounts.
o Extend the Statute of Limitations for International Tax Enforcement: The Administration's plan would set the statute of limitations on international tax enforcement at six years after the taxpayer submits required information.
o Tighten Lax Reporting Requirements : The Administration's plan would increase the reporting requirement on international investors and financial institutions, especially QIs. QIs would be required to report information on their U.S. customers to the same extent that U.S. financial intermediaries must. And U.S. customers at QIs would no longer be allowed to hide behind foreign entities. U.S. investors would be required to report transfers of money or property made to or from non-QI foreign financial institutions on their income tax returns. Financial institutions would face enhanced information reporting requirements for transactions that establish a foreign business entity or transfer assets to and from foreign financial accounts on behalf of U.S. individuals.
3. Hire Nearly 800 New IRS Staff to Increase International Enforcement: As part of the President's budget, the IRS would be provided with funds to support the hiring of nearly 800 new employees devoted specifically to international enforcement. The funding would allow the IRS to hire new agents, economists, lawyers and specialists, increasing the IRS' ability to crack down on offshore tax avoidance and evasion, including through transfer pricing and financial products and transactions such as purported securities loans. According to estimates by the IRS, every additional dollar invested in enforcement in recent years has yielded about four dollars in added tax revenues.



Tax Day,T.1International Tax Reform Needed to Discourage Offshore Economic Activity, Treasury Official Says, (Oct. 29, 2009)
Stephen Shay, Treasury deputy assistant secretary (International Tax Affairs), said on October 28 that international tax reforms are needed because the current rules provide too much incentive for businesses to engage in economic activity offshore. Shay spoke at the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) Fall Tax Division meeting in Washington, D.C.
The Obama administration’s international reform proposals (TAXDAY, 2009/05/05, W.1) take a balanced approach to address these concerns, Shay said. They include two prongs: an anti-tax evasion component; and structural changes that would affect deferral, the check-the-box rules and the foreign tax credit.
The just-introduced Foreign Account Tax Compliance Bill of 2009 (Sen 1934; TAXDAY, 2009/10/28, C.1) focuses on tax evasion. Although the bill is a product of Capitol Hill, the Treasury provided assistance, and the bill is consistent with a substantial portion of the administration’s budget proposals, according to Shay. The bill, which requires foreign financial institutions to report accounts maintained on behalf of U.S. residents, would be a substantial advance over current law, Shay declared. The proposed law focuses on financial institutions, not on countries.
As an incentive for information reporting, a failure to report would trigger 30-percent withholding. There is high compliance where there is information reporting, Shay noted. He believes it is likely that the bill will pass, although he does not foresee any action on tax reform before 2010.
The bill would also repeal the laws allowing bearer bonds and would require withholding on substitute dividends paid on credit swaps, Shay said. The bill does not contain the administration’s structural proposals, such as those affecting corporate classification.
An audience member suggested that the bill’s requirement for practitioners to report information about their clients raised attorney-client privilege concerns. Shay said that the Treasury was interested in getting comments about this and other proposals. He said there is a high threshold for requiring reporting but that it will affect some organizations.
Shay noted that the offshore bank account disclosure initiative was "very successful." It called attention to a problem and got more cases into the system. He also suggested it could lead to "appropriate prosecutions," although the initiative itself promised protection from criminal prosecution. He noted that disclosures under the initiative involved a wide range of situations, some honorable, others less honorable. The initiative was very healthy for the U.S. tax system and promoted fairness by requiring others to pay their fair share of taxes.

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Thursday, October 29, 2009

Cannot rely on a taxpayer’s statement that there was an abandonment of property. A return preparer will have the duty to make sure that there is substantiation for the abandonment in order to avoid the 6694 penalty. 6694 was not an issue in this case but it could have been if there was a return preparer for the taxpayers in this case.
A married couple was liable for the accuracy-related penalty because the wife, as president and sole shareholder of an S corporation, failed to substantiate that she was entitled to an abandonment loss under section 165(a) that the corporation allocated to her, resulting in the taxpayers' understatement of tax. The S corporation did not maintain any books or records to substantiate the abandonment loss. It was "incredible" that the wife, who was a real estate agent, would not request written documentation with respect to the purchase of the partnership. Accordingly, she acted unreasonably and not with reasonable cause and good faith
C. and Renee M. Milton v. Commissioner., U.S. Tax Court, T.C. Memo. 2009-246, (Oct. 28, 2009), U.S. Tax Court, Dkt. No. 15875-08, TC Memo. 2009-246, October 28, 2009.

MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
OPINION
We are asked to decide whether petitioners underreported the distributive share from RMI because RMI was not entitled to deduct an abandonment loss. Respondent argues that petitioner did not establish that an abandonment occurred entitling RMI to a deduction. Respondent also argues that the accuracy-related penalty should be imposed.
I. Abandonment Loss Deduction
We begin with the general rules for deducting abandonment losses. A taxpayer is entitled to deduct uncompensated losses during a given tax year. Sec. 165(a). Deductions are a matter of legislative grace, however, and the taxpayer must show that he or she is entitled to any deduction claimed. 4 Rule 142(a); Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 493 (1940). This includes the burden of substantiation. Hradesky v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 87, 89-90 (1975), affd. per curiam 540 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1976). The Court need not accept the taxpayer's self-serving testimony when the taxpayer fails to present corroborative evidence. Beam v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1990-304 (citing Tokarski v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 74, 77 (1986)), affd. without published opinion 956 F.2d 1166 (9th Cir. 1992).
A taxpayer must prove he or she owned the property abandoned to claim an abandonment loss deduction. JHK Enters., Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-79. Petitioner has not proven that RMI owned the partnership interest it purported to abandon in 2005. There is no evidence that the conversations among petitioner, Mr. Purscelley, and his father resulted in RMI's owning a partnership interest in KM Welding. Petitioner has not provided an asset purchase agreement or any other document to substantiate the transaction. Petitioner even failed to substantiate that the funds were RMI's rather than hers individually. Moreover, the purported partnership interest in KM Welding was not listed as an asset on RMI's beginning-of-the-year balance sheet for 2005. We find that RMI did not own a partnership interest in KM Welding in 2005.
In addition, the taxpayer must also establish to claim an abandonment loss that he or she (1) intended to abandon the property and (2) took affirmative action to abandon the property. Citron v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 200, 208-209 (1991). The intent to abandon and the affirmative action are to be ascertained from the facts and circumstances surrounding the abandonment. United Cal. Bank v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 437 (1964), affd. per curiam 340 F.2d 320 (9th Cir. 1965). An abandonment occurs where the taxpayer has relinquished the asset as well as any future claims to the asset. Tsakopoulos v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-8, affd. without published opinion 63 Fed. Appx. 400 (9th Cir. 2003). Some express manifestation of abandonment is required when the asset is an intangible property interest, such as a partnership interest. Citron v. Commissioner, supra at 209-210.
Petitioner testified that she intended to abandon her purported partnership interest in KM Welding to avoid damage to her reputation and to her business, RMI. The record does not contain any independent evidence, however, to support her alleged intent. There is no evidence, other than petitioner's self-serving testimony, that petitioner would be held liable for any debts of KM Welding. Moreover, petitioner did not provide any independent evidence of the financial health of KM Welding in 2005, the year RMI “abandoned” the partnership interest. Petitioner also did not provide evidence that KM Welding was not completing projects or timely paying its bills. In fact, KM Welding continued operations after 2005.
Furthermore, petitioner testified she decided, upon her CPA's advice, to abandon the purported partnership interest. Yet petitioner did not provide evidence of the conversations she had with her CPA. Additionally, she admitted at trial that if she received any profits from KM Welding in the future, she would report the income. Petitioner's remarks suggest that she believed there was still a possibility she would receive a return on her investment. Accordingly, we find that petitioner did not truly intend to abandon any interest in KM Welding.
Petitioner did not take any affirmative action in 2005 to abandon the purported partnership interest in KM Welding. Petitioner was unable to provide the date on which she abandoned the interest. Petitioner testified that she did not file any public document indicating that she was no longer associated with KM Welding. Additionally, there is no evidence that petitioner informed her purported partners that she was abandoning the partnership interest. We find that petitioner did not take sufficiently identifiable steps to abandon the interest in KM Welding to thereby be entitled to an abandonment loss deduction.
II. Accuracy-Related Penalty
We turn now to respondent's determination in the deficiency notice that petitioners are liable for the accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a) and (b)(1). Respondent has the burden of production under section 7491(c) and must come forward with sufficient evidence that it is appropriate to impose the penalty. See Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 446-447 (2001).
A taxpayer is liable for an accuracy-related penalty for any portion of an underpayment of income tax attributable to negligence or disregard of rules and regulations, unless he or she establishes that there was reasonable cause for the underpayment and that he or she acted in good faith. Secs. 6662(a) and (b)(1), 6664(c)(1). Negligence is defined as any failure to make a reasonable attempt to comply with the provisions of the Code and includes any failure by the taxpayer to keep adequate books and records or to substantiate items properly. Sec. 6662(c); sec. 1.6662-3(b)(1), Income Tax Regs.
RMI did not maintain any books or records to substantiate the abandonment loss claimed on RMI's return for 2005. We find it incredible that petitioner, who is in the business of entering into contracts, would not request written documentation of the KM Welding transaction. Furthermore, uncorroborated self-serving testimony was the only evidence petitioner presented regarding the abandonment of the purported partnership interest in KM Welding. We find that petitioners acted negligently in failing to substantiate the abandonment loss, and respondent has met his burden of production.
Notwithstanding that petitioners were negligent, they may avoid the imposition of a penalty if they are able to show that there was a reasonable cause for, and that they acted in good faith with respect to, the underpayment. See sec. 6664(c). The determination of whether the taxpayer acted with reasonable cause and in good faith is made by taking into account all the pertinent facts and circumstances. See sec. 1.6664-4(b)(1), Income Tax Regs.
Petitioner testified that she abandoned the KM Welding partnership interest and claimed a loss deduction for 2005 on the advice of her CPA. We do not even have the name of her CPA, nor do we know what information petitioner provided to the CPA. Petitioner failed to give us adequate evidence that she acted in good-faith reliance. Accordingly, we hold that petitioners are liable for the accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a) and (b)(1) for 2005.
In reaching our holding, we have considered all arguments made, and, to the extent not mentioned, we conclude that they are moot, irrelevant, or without merit.
To reflect the foregoing and the concessions of the parties,
Decision will be entered under Rule 155.

Footnotes


1
All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the year at issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure, unless otherwise indicated.
2
Petitioner conceded Renee Milton, Inc. had $4,488.50 of unreported gross receipts or sales and it is not entitled to a deduction for outside services of $100,000. Respondent conceded that petitioners are entitled to $40,152 of other deductions.
3
Petitioners concede in their brief that the amount claimed should have been $90,000 rather than $100,000.
4
Sec. 7491(a) shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner in certain circumstances provided the taxpayer complies with substantiation requirements, maintains all required records, and cooperates with the Commissioner's reasonable requests. Petitioners did not seek to shift the burden. In addition, petitioners have failed to substantiate the abandonment loss deduction and maintain the required records, and therefore we decline to shift the burden. See sec. 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B).




Other annotations:

There was no recognizable loss to any partner upon the informal dissolution of a partnership because business operations were not completely terminated. The two withdrawing partners formed a new partnership and retained the clients they had been serving, so that no forfeiture of partnership interests occurred.
E.F. Neubecker, 65 TC 577, Dec. 33,549.
An investor in an oil and gas limited partnership was not entitled to a deduction for theft absent proof that he sustained a loss during the year in question. He was denied an abandonment loss deduction because he did not forfeit his partnership interest.
R. Lapin, 60 TCM 59, Dec. 46,704(M), TC Memo. 1990-343. Aff'd, CA-9 (unpublished opinion 3/12/92).

Labels:

Wednesday, October 28, 2009

IRS Small Business/Self-Employed Policies and Procedures for NFTLs first filed after CSEDs, Including Release and Refiling Considerations, SBSE-05-1009-018, (Oct. 20, 2009)
2009ARD 202-3




DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE WASHINGTON. D.C. 20224

SMALL BUSINESS/SELF-EMPLOYED DIVISION

October 14, 2009
Control Number: SB/SE-05-1009-018

Expires: October 9, 2010

Impacted: IRM 5.12.2.20

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTORS, COLLECTION AREA OPERATIONS

FROM: Frederick W. Schindler /s/ Laura Hostelley (for) Director, Collection Policy

SUBJECT: Policies and Procedures for NFTLs first filed after CSEDs, Including Release and Refiling Considerations

The purpose of this memorandum is to raise awareness and provide procedures for handling rare instances of Notices of Federal Tax Lien (NFTL) filed, for the first time, on a date later than the original Collection Statute Expiration Date (CSED). These filings occur because the CSED was extended or suspended and a NFTL was not filed prior to that original CSED. The Service used the term “Portland Liens” because the issue was identified in Portland, Oregon. Beginning with this memorandum, these liens are called NFTL After Original CSED (NAOC).

Attachment I: Example A - NAOC with Correct Refile Period Calculated

Example D - NAOC/NFTL in Timeline Format

I. Release of NAOC or NFTL
Expired CSEDs render the liability and underlying statutory lien legally unenforceable. On May 2, 2008 the Automated Lien System (ALS) released liens with expired CSEDs. ALS will continue to release liens when the final CSED expires on a module. Example D, referenced above, shows a release timeline after ALS receives module satisfaction from master file (MF) or determines that a CSED extension, previously received from MF, has expired even though the NAOC (or NFTL) refile period has not expired.

II. Effectiveness of Statutory and Notice of Lien (NAOC or NFTL)
The effectiveness of the notice provided by a NAOC (or NFTL) against third party creditors is distinguishable from the viability of the underlying statutory lien. The viability of the underlying statutory lien is tied to the assessment but circumstances may make its viability distinguishable from the assessment. Placing a date in column “e” of the NFTL causes the lien to self-release saving the Service resources devoted to releasing liens when CSEDs expire. If a CSED has been extended past the date in column “e” but no refile has occurred, the liability remains viable but the statutory lien and NAOC (or NFTL) have been extinguished. When the statutory lien has been extinguished a revocation of release is needed to reestablish it before a new NAOC (or NFTL) can be filed. If the statutory lien remains viable only a new NAOC (or NFTL) need be filed.

The underlying statutory lien is extinguished if :
a. The liability has been fully satisfied by payment

b. The liability becomes legally unenforceable due to no time remaining on the original statute collection period (or longer period if a suspension or extension)

c. A release occurs due to the self-releasing language on Form 668(Y)(c) even though the CSED has been extended or suspended


The NAOC or NFTL is valid if both :
a. The statutory lien is valid, and

b. The NAOC or NFTL refile period has not expired (whichever refile period applies section 6232(g)(3)(A) or section 6323(g)(3)(B) )


The NAOC or NFTL is not valid if either:
a. The statutory lien is not valid, or

b. The refile period has expired whether or not there is a date in column “e”


When a NAOC or NFTL is not valid, the Service must release that NAOC or NFTL within 30 days of the underlying liability becoming unenforceable or satisfied.

Attachment I: Example B - NAOC with Incorrect “Refile By” Date in Column “e”

Example D - NAOC/NFTL in Timeline Format

III. Repair Procedures for NAOC or NFTL with Expired Refile Period
No date in column “e”
If the CSED has not expired

File a new NAOC or NFTL

Attachment I: Example C - NAOC with NA for “Refile By” Date in Column “e”

Date in column “e”

If the CSED has not expired

File a revocation of release

File a new NAOC or NFTL

Attachment I: Example B - NAOC with Incorrect “Refile By” Date in Column “e”

For questions on the validity of NAOC or NFTL contact Advisory or Counsel.

IV. Table 1: Computing “Refile By” Dates for NFTL and NAOC

Refile Period
“Refile By” Date

IRC § 6323(g)(3)
Last Day for Refiling


From
Until
(a/k/a column “e”)


First 10 year period after assessment * **
The first day of a one year period ending with the date calculated to the right
10 years and 30 days after assessment
10 years and 30 days after assessment


Second period for refile
10 years after the date calculated above
10 years after the date calculated above
10 years after date calculated above


Third period for refile
20 years after date calculated in first row
20 years after date calculated in first row
20 years after date calculated in first row


REMINDER: Use the “refile by” date calculated using the table above even if the CSED precedes the “refile by” date.

* NOTE: If the first refile period begins in January, February, or March of a leap year, use IRM Exhibit 5.12.2-2 to obtain the refile period ending date. For questions on these calculations contact Area Counsel to ensure correct refile period calculation.

** NOTE: When encountering old cases, NFTL, NAOC, or judgments involving a tax liability assessed prior to the Revenue Reconciliation Act , effective November 5, 1990, contact Advisory and Counsel for assistance in determining the correct refile period.


If you have any questions, please call me or a member of your staff may contact Christine Kalcevic.

Attachment

cc: Director, Advisory, Insolvency, and Quality www.irs.gov

ATTACHMENT I
Example A NAOC with Correct Refile Period Calculated

1. Assessment date: 07-10-1998

2. Normal CSED: 07-10-2008

3. Prior to 07-10-2008 the Taxpayer submits an offer-in-compromise. The Service accepts the offer for processing by signing the completed Form 656 on 05-10-2008. Beginning on this date, the offer in compromise is pending. The Service accepts the offer in compromise on 11-10-2009.

4. During the time the offer-in-compromise was pending, the running of collection limitation period was suspended. In this case the collection limitation period was suspended for 18 months.

5. New CSED: 01-10-2010

6. NFTL (now known as “NAOC”) filed (for first time): 05-10-2009

7. Refiling Period: 08/10/2017 through 08/09/2018




Assessment
CSED
Original
Refile By
New
CSED
NAOC
Filed
ALS
Release
NAOC
Refile By



A
07-10-1998
07-10-2008
08-09-2008
01-10-2010
05-10-2009
01-10-2010
08-09-2018



Example B NAOC with Incorrect “Refile By” Date in Column “e”
Items 1- 6 are the same as Example A:

Assessment date: 07-10-1998

Normal CSED: 07-10-2008

Prior to 07-10-2008 the Taxpayer submits an offer-in-compromise. The Service accepts the offer for processing by signing the completed Form 656 on 05-10-2008. Beginning on this date, the offer in compromise is pending. The Service accepts the offer in compromise on 11-10-2009.

During the time the offer-in-compromise was pending, the running of collection limitation period was suspended. In this case the collection limitation period was suspended for 18 months.

New CSED: 01-10-2010

NFTL (now known as “NAOC”) filed for first time: 05-10-2009

“Refile by” date entered in column “e” is 08-09-2009 (incorrectly calculated by adding twelve months and thirty days to the original 10-year collection limitation period, thinking that was the end of the refile period)

Statutory lien is extinguished as a consequence of the self-release language contained on the NAOC. The lien is released as of 08-09-2009 even though the collection limitation period remains open until 01-10-2010.

Revocation of release filed (and mailed to taxpayer) 10-01-2009 to reinstate the statutory lien

New NAOC filed 10-02-2009 to reestablish the “notice” of lien against the four classes of creditors enumerated in section 6323(a) . See General Background. Thus, the new NAOC is effective as of 10-02-2009 in competing against these four interests. The effectiveness of the notice does not revert back to 05-10-2009, the date the NAOC was filed.

Correct Refiling Period is 08/10/2017 through 08/09/2018




Assessment
CSED
Original
Refile By
New
CSED
NAOC
Filed
ALS
Release
NAOC Refile By








05-10-2009
* 08-09-2009

B
07-10-1998
07-10-2008
08-09-2008
01-10-2010






* 10-02-2009
01-10-2010
08-09-2018


* Revocation required and filed 10-01-2009


Example C NAOC with NA for “Refile By” Date in Column “e”
1. Original Assessment: 04-23-1992

2. Normal CSED: 04-23-2002

3. 2 bankruptcies and the taxpayer's innocent spouse claim and appeal resulted in an 11-year CSED suspension to: 04-23-2013

4. Lien (NAOC) filed (for first time): 02-15-2004

5. Refile period: 05-24-2011 through 05-23-2012 (using the second ten year period after assessment)

6. NAOC shows “NA” in column “e” and the notice contains the standard self-release language used in NFTLs since 1982

7. NAOC not refiled during refiling period. The lien did not self-release because “NA” or nothing in column “e” makes the self-release language inoperable.

8. On 06-01-2012 a new NAOC filed and this includes 05-23-2022 as the refile by date in column “e”. The new NAOC protects the Service's priority position in relation to other creditors enumerated in section 6323(a) as of 06-01-2012, not 02-15-2004 (NOTE: Revocation of release was not filed because the underlying statutory lien remained viable)




Assessment
CSED
Original
Refile By
New
CSED
NAOC
Filed
ALS
Release
NAOC
Refile By








02-15-2004
*
*

C
04-23-1992
04-23-2002
05-23-2002
04-23-2013






○ 06-01-2012
04-23-2013
05-23-2022


○Second refile period ended 05-23-2012


PDF Version of Example DPDF Version of Example D

Labels:

Monday, October 26, 2009

USTC Cases, George M. Vanicsko v. United States of America., U.S. District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania, 2009-2 U.S.T.C. ¶50,699, (Sept. 30, 2009
The vice-president of a painting company was a responsible person under section 6672 liable for the trust fund recovery penalty. The individual co-founded the company and was associated with it throughout its existence. He exclusively supervised employees, managed projects, made hiring and firing decisions, had the authority to contractually bind the company, borrow money on its behalf, and had unrestricted access to its bank account. The president’s exercise of greater control over the company’s finances did not absolve the individual of his liability as a responsible person. Further, the individual acted willfully because he had actual knowledge that the company’s withholding taxes were not being paid and failed to exercise his authority to ensure their payment.

U.S. District Court, East. Dist. Pa.; CIV. 07-1087, September 30, 2009.

The Internal Revenue Code requires employers to withhold from the wages of their employees income and social security taxes and to hold such taxes in trust for the United States. 26 U.S.C. §§ 3102, 3402, 7501. Section 6672 permits the United States to assess a trust fund recovery penalty against certain persons who fail to collect or turn over such funds to the IRS. Specifically, the statute provides:
Any person required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over any tax imposed by this title who willfully fails to collect such tax, or truthfully account for and pay over such tax, or willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any such tax or the payment thereof, shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be liable to a penalty equal to the total amount of the tax evaded, or not collected, or not accounted for and paid over.
26 U.S.C. § 6672(a). Tax assessments by the United States are presumptively correct. Brounstein v. United States, 979 F.2d 952, 954 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing Psaty v. United States, 442 F.2d 1154, 1160 (3d Cir. 1971)). Once the United States introduces certified copies of the assessment to the district court, the burden shifts to the taxpayer to disprove liability. Id. To disprove liability under § 6672, a taxpayer must establish either “(1) that he was not a responsible person within the meaning of the statute, or (2) that he did not willfully fail to pay the amount due to the IRS.” Id.
Here, there is no dispute that the United States assessed the trust fund recovery penalties against the plaintiff and that VW Painting owed taxes in the amount of $368,608. The only material dispute relates to whether (1) the plaintiff was a “responsible person” within the meaning of § 6672, and (2) whether the plaintiff “willfully” failed to turn over the trust fund taxes due.
A. “Responsible Person” Under § 6672
The plaintiff has failed to provide evidence from which a rational fact-finder could conclude that he was not a “responsible person” of VW Painting during the relevant periods. A “responsible person” is one “required to collect, truthfully account for or pay over any tax due to the United States.” Greenberg v. United States, 46 F.3d 239, 242-43 (3d Cir. 1994). “Responsibility is a matter of status, duty, or authority, not knowledge,” and requires that a person have significant, though not necessarily exclusive, control over the company's finances before liability can be imposed. Id. (quoting Brounstein, 979 F.2d at 954) (internal quotations omitted). The question of significant control over the company's finances is answered in light of the totality of the circumstances; no single factor, or the absence thereof, is determinative. Barnett v. IRS, 988 F.2d 1449, 1455 (5th Cir. 1993). In determining whether an individual is a responsible person, courts consider:
“(1) contents of the corporate bylaws, (2) ability to sign checks on the company's bank account, (3) signature on the employer's federal quarterly and other tax returns, (4) payment of other creditors in lieu of the United States, (5) identity of officers, directors, and principal stockholders in the firm, (6) identity of individuals in charge of hiring and discharging employees, and (7) identity of individuals in charge of the firm's financial affairs.”
Greenburg, 46 F.3d 239 at 243 (quoting Brounstein, 979 F.2d at 954-55).
Here, the United States has presented a certified copy of the notice of assessment, as well as substantial undisputed evidence with respect to the above factors. The undisputed evidence shows that the plaintiff had significant status, duties, and authority at VW Painting. The plaintiff was a co-founder of VW Painting and was associated with the company from its inception to closing. For about eight years, VW Painting operated out of the marital home of the plaintiff and Rosemary Vanicsko, and then they jointly made the decision to relocate the company to a jointlyowned property in 2000. The plaintiff identified himself as vice-president of VW Painting in signed correspondence, in signed financial statements, on state income tax returns, and other legal documents. He supervised the employees in the field and managed the projects - no other employee at VW Painting was tasked with that responsibility. He also made hiring and firing decisions either alone or jointly with Rosemary Vanicsko.
Furthermore, the plaintiff had significant control over VW Painting's finances. The plaintiff's claim that he was not responsible for the financial affairs of the company and had little control over the company's purse strings is belied by the overwhelming, undisputed evidence to the contrary. The plaintiff had the authority to negotiate contracts, modify contracts, and sign proposals for VW Painting's projects. The plaintiff regularly calculated the amount of payments owed by contractors, signed applications for payments, and prepared the invoices. He approved invoices for payment relating to materials and equipment. The plaintiff had the authority to sign liens against contractors, bind VW Painting to various contracts, and sign settlement agreements on behalf of the company. He had the unrestricted ability to make payments from the bank account of VW Painting through the use of a debit card. The plaintiff also had authority to borrow money on VW Painting's behalf and made personal loans to the company.
The plaintiff argues that his wife, Rosemary Vanicsko had control over VW Painting's bookkeeping and accounting, that she collected and paid the employees' withholding taxes, and that she was the “responsible person” under § 6672. 3 However, it matters not that Rosemary Vanicsko may have had greater control over the company's finances, as long as the plaintiff had significant status and control as well. See Greenburg, 46 F.3d at 243 (“While a responsible person must have significant control over the corporation's finances, exclusive control is not necessary.” (internal quotations omitted)). Moreover, liability attaches to the plaintiff regardless of whether he actually exercised his authority, as long as the plaintiff had such authority. See Muck v. United States, 3 F.3d 1378, 1381 (10th Cir. 1993) (“The existence of such authority, irrespective of whether that authority is actually exercised, is determinative.”); Barnett, 988 F.2d at 1455 (“That another person in the company has been delegated the jobs of withholding and paying employees' taxes and generally paying creditors is beside the point. The crucial inquiry is whether [the] party … by virtue of his position in (or vis-a-vis) the company, could have had ‘substantial’ input into such decisions, had he wished to exert his authority.” (footnote omitted)). Indeed, the undisputed evidence described above shows that the plaintiff had significant status, duties, and authority within VW Painting and, even if he did not exercise day-to-day control of its finances, the plaintiff had the ability to exert significant control.
Therefore, I find that, as a matter of law, the plaintiff was a “responsible person” of VW Painting within the meaning of § 6672 during the relevant periods.
B. “Willfully” Failing to Turn Over Taxes Under § 6672
The plaintiff has also failed to provide evidence from which a rational fact-finder could conclude that he did not “willfully” fail to pay the trust fund taxes owed by VW Painting during the relevant periods. Under § 6672, willfulness is defined as:
“‘a voluntary, conscious and intentional decision to prefer other creditors over the Government.’ A responsible person acts willfully when he pays other creditors in preference to the IRS knowing that taxes are due, or with reckless disregard for whether taxes have been paid.” In order for the failure to turn over withholding taxes to be willful, a responsible person need only know that the taxes are due or act in reckless disregard of this fact when he fails to remit to IRS. “Reckless disregard includes failure to investigate or correct mismanagement after being notified that withholding taxes have not been paid.” The taxpayer need not act with an evil motive or bad purpose for his action or inaction to be willful.
Greenburg, 46 F.3d at 244 (quoting Brounstein, 979 F.2d at 955-56) (internal citations omitted).
Here, the undisputed evidence shows that the plaintiff had actual knowledge of VW Painting's tax liabilities and failed to investigate or correct the situation. The plaintiff was, as described above, a “responsible person” required to pay the taxes owed by VW Painting. 4 At the latest, he had actual knowledge of VW Painting's tax liabilities in 2001, when he attended a meeting at the IRS where VW Painting's tax liabilities were discussed. After learning that the tax liabilities were not paid, the plaintiff took no direct action to ensure they were being paid. The plaintiff continued to receive checks from VW Painting indicating that taxes were being withheld from his wages, and he did nothing. This conduct constitutes “willful” behavior within the meaning of § 6672, and I find that, as a matter of law, the plaintiff “willfully” failed to turn over the taxes owed by VW Painting during the relevant periods.




The treasurer of a bankrupt corporation was personally liable to the government for withheld taxes that were diverted to pay other creditors. The treasurer breached his duty to hold such collected taxes in trust until they are paid over to the government. Although the treasurer could not sign checks in excess of $1,000 without the signature of another officer, such a limitation on his authority did not protect him from liability as the person responsible for payment of taxes. Further, the government was not bound by a hold-harmless agreement executed in favor of the treasurer by the other corporate officers.
E.A. Cella, DC, 80-1 ustc ¶9369.
Taxpayer was not an officer, director or employee of a toy company financed by her father and therefore was not liable for unpaid employment taxes of the company.
S. Philipson, DC, 55-1 ustc ¶9466.
Although the claimant denied that he was a director, officer or shareholder of the corporation, the weight of the evidence showed that he (1) hired and controlled employees of the corporation, (2) controlled the financial and business aspects of the corporation, (3) signed IRS forms, (4) engaged in other activities tending to show his direction and control over corporate funds, and (5) had the corporation formed.
J. Labowitz, DC, 73-1 ustc ¶9155, 352 FSupp 202.
A district court reversed a bankruptcy court's finding that the chairman of the board of two corporations was not a responsible person with respect to the collection and paying over of withholding and social security taxes. Because the taxpayer had, at all times, the power to see that such taxes were paid, the bankruptcy court's decision was clearly erroneous. The bankruptcy court's finding that the taxpayer did not willfully fail or refuse to pay the taxes in question was also clearly erroneous. After she became aware that the taxes had not been paid, she paid other creditors in preference to the government.
T.L. Woodson, DC Mich, 83-1 ustc ¶9258, rev'g BC- DC, 81-2 ustc ¶9791, 15 BR 185.
The determination of the liability (a corporate officer) for the payment of withheld taxes is an issue to be decided on the facts of the case. Thus, the court was compelled to dismiss both the government's and the taxpayer's motions for summary judgment.
B.H. Hoeniger, DC, 76-1 ustc ¶9296.
A corporate officer who paid the corporate liability for FICA taxes under the mistaken assumption that he was personally liable for their payment was entitled to a refund of the taxes and penalties paid.
E.B. David, DC, 83-1 ustc ¶9259.
After he failed to appear at trial, a district court sustained a 100% penalty against a president and treasurer of a photographic equipment business for his failure to pay over or collect employment taxes. However, an individual who had acted as general manager was not jointly liable for the penalty, since there was not sufficient evidence to suggest that he either preferred other creditors over the government or that he had financial responsibility over corporate affairs beyond that of depositing funds in a corporate account. As a result, the court sustained the penalty assessed against the president, but it dismissed the government's claim against the general manager.
R. Sparkman, DC Calif., 84-2 ustc ¶9983.
In reversing the Claims Court, the court of appeals held that a corporation's chairman of the board was not liable for the 100-percent penalty for failure to collect and pay withholding taxes because (1) he was not a responsible person who had a duty to collect, account for, and pay over taxes, since there was no evidence that he had or exercised control over such functions and (2) he did not act willfully in failing to withhold taxes because there was no evidence that he had actual knowledge of the nonpayment of taxes due after the first two quarters of the year until the eve of the corporation's bankruptcy. Since the taxpayer was not a responsible person and did not fail willfully to execute a duty to collect and pay taxes, the part of the judgment relating to the IRS's allocation of certain tax payments was vacated as moot.
D.J. Godfrey, Jr., CA-FC, 84-2 ustc ¶9974, 748 F2d 1568, rev'g ClsCt, 83-2 ustc ¶9635.
For withholding tax purposes, an individual who acquired a company in bleak financial condition and assumed unpaid liabilities had control over such company and was a responsible person. The facts that (1) the list of liabilities assumed did not include reference to unpaid pre-acquisition withholding tax liabilities and (2) such individual subsequently entered into an agreement with a bank to handle receipts and payments were insufficient to relieve such individual of his status as a responsible party. However, a question of material fact existed regarding whether such individual intentionally failed to pay taxes due.
H. Bonnabel, DC N.J., 90-2 ustc ¶50,481.
Mere titular officers of a corporation were not responsible parties and, even if they were, there was no showing that they willfully failed to pay the taxes due.
R.E. Couture, DC, 74-2 ustc ¶9706.
The son of the president of a restaurant corporation was not liable for the unpaid employee withholding taxes of the corporation because he was not a responsible person obligated to withhold and pay over taxes. Even though he managed some of the company's restaurants and was authorized to sign checks, he could not disburse funds except in emergency situations, and he did not have authority to pay creditors. In addition, although he held the office of Secretary/Treasurer and technically owned 10 percent of the stock of the corporation, he did not control that interest, had no authority to sell the stock, and was completely accountable to his father. Finally, even if it had been determined that he was a responsible person, he lacked authority to pay the taxes and other debts of the corporation and, therefore, could not be found to have willfully failed to carry out that responsibility.
E.D. Goodick, DC La., 92-1 ustc ¶50,279.
Individual financial backers who loaned money and obtained lines of credit for a corporation were responsible persons and, therefore, were liable for penalties for failure to pay over withheld income taxes. The backers had the ability to decide where corporate funds were spent and, in fact, exerted this control at least once. They had check-writing authority and could pull their financial support at any time their wishes were not fulfilled. Moreover, the backers' failure to pay the taxes was willful because they knew of the corporation's obligation to pay the taxes. In addition, the corporate officer, who operated the company on a day-to-day basis, was also liable for the taxes as a responsible person. Even though the officer intended to pay the taxes in the long run, he preferred to use current cash flows to carry on the corporation's operations and not to pay over the withheld taxes.
C.D. Webster, DC Md., 94-1 ustc ¶50,008.
A corporation in bankruptcy that was in the business of providing security guards to its customers was the employer of these guards because it had control over the guards and the funds used to pay them. It was responsible for the payment of employment taxes regarding these employees, and this obligation could not be avoided by delegating that function to another. However, the government's tax claim for the penalty for the failure to pay over withheld taxes was disallowed with leave to file an amended claim, because it failed to identify a particular person as the responsible person liable for the corporation's FICA and FUTA obligations and did not specify whether the unpaid FICA amounts were attributable to the debtor's portion or the employees' share.
Professional Security Services, Inc., BC-DC Fla., 94-1 ustc ¶50,148.
Summary judgment was denied where material issues of fact existed as to whether a corporate officer should be classified as a responsible person. The corporate officer had authority to sign corporation checks and could be deemed a person responsible for paying withholding taxes. Further, there was evidence that the officer was aware that the corporation was delinquent in paying over withholding to the IRS.
J.P. Ladwig, DC Ill., 94-1 ustc ¶50,192.
Married individuals were not responsible persons during the time that a company's tax delinquency accrued and, therefore, were not required to pay over federal income taxes and social security taxes withheld from employees' wages. They lacked control over the decision-making process by which the corporation allocated funds to other creditors instead of paying its withholding tax obligations.
M.L. Michaud, FedCl, 97-2 ustc ¶50,972, 40 FedCl 1.
The president of a bankrupt company who willfully failed to pay over his company's payroll withholding taxes was a responsible person with respect to the trust fund recovery penalty. The president acknowledged that he was a responsible person under the statute. However, whether two other company officers were responsible persons was questionable. Although one of the officers served as chief financial officer and both had check-writing authority, the president exerted such command over the finances of the company that a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that neither officer had significant control over the company's finances.
R.S. Hudson, DC Pa., 99-2 ustc ¶50,914.
A bankrupt attorney who was the president and sole shareholder of his law corporation was liable for the trust fund recovery penalty in connection with the corporation's failure to collect and pay over employment taxes.
D.A. Smith, DC Hawaii, 99-2 ustc ¶50,998. Aff'g 99-1 ustc ¶50,278.
The president and vice president of a corporation who failed to remit withholding taxes to the IRS were determined to be "responsible persons" liable for the trust fund recovery penalty. In addition to being corporate directors and officers, the individuals owned stock in the corporation, were responsible for daily management operations, hired and fired employees, and had the authority to sign checks and pay the corporation's taxes.
D.C. Stull, DC Tex., 2000-1 ustc ¶50,168. Aff'd, per curium, CA-5 (unpublished opinion), 2001-1 ustc ¶50,333, 252 F3d 436.
A corporate director who lacked control over the company's tax deposits and payments did not qualify as a responsible person liable for the trust fund recovery penalty. Although he made deposits and tax payments at a bank under the direction of the corporate president and was aware of the company's payroll tax delinquencies, he had no decision-making authority regarding the payment of creditors.
M.D. McGlaughlin, DC Md., 2000-1 ustc ¶50,183.
Questions of fact precluded summary judgment on the government's claim for the trust fund recovery penalty against the sole owner of a real estate appraisal business who was on maternity leave during the quarters at issue. Because her level of involvement with company during her maternity leave was in dispute, it could not be determined on summary judgment that she was a responsible party.
P. Ranson, DC Wash., 2001-1 ustc ¶50,161.
A federal district court applied improper legal standards to reach its determination that an individual was not a responsible person. The district court erroneously focused its inquiry on whether the taxpayer had knowledge of the unpaid taxes, the taxpayer's functional responsibility, and the fact that another individual had greater control of corporate affairs. That the taxpayer had significant control over the company's affairs was sufficient for him to qualify as a responsible person.
D.M. Chapman, CA-9 (unpublished opinion), 2001-1 ustc ¶50,380, 7 FedAppx 804, rev'g and rem'g and unreported District Court decision.
The former owner of a plumbing business who transferred 80% of the ownership in the business to his children was deemed to be a responsible person for purposes of the trust fund recovery penalty. The individual was still a 20% owner in the business, had check-signing authority, was often asked to co-sign checks for the business and continued to work to determine the bids the company would make. Moreover, he loaned money to the company when it was in financial difficulty and had considerable influence over how his children ran the business.
M.E. Pitts, DC Ariz., 2001-1 ustc ¶50,419.
The president and CEO of two trucking corporations, who was assessed penalties for his failure to turn over withholding taxes, was a responsible person under Code Sec. 6672. The undisputed evidence established that he had the authority to instruct his manager to pay the taxing authorities, had significant control over the finances of the corporations, retained the authority to sign checks on behalf of the corporation, and possessed the authority to hire and discharge employees. The taxpayer's argument that he delegated these duties and did not have day-to-day financial responsibilities was unpersuasive.
R.C. Bolus, Sr., DC Pa., 2001-2 ustc ¶50,644.
An individual who was the sole shareholder of one credit bureau and the president and CEO of a second bureau, both of which failed to pay over withholding taxes, qualified as a responsible person who willfully failed to collect, account for, or remit the funds to the IRS. Thus, he was liable for the assessed trust fund recovery penalties. No triable issues of fact existed as to the individual's liability for the penalties.
W.K. Hankins, DC Ind., 2001-2 ustc ¶50,692.
A third-party defendant's motion for summary judgment in connection with the IRS's assessment of a trust fund recovery penalty against him due to a corporation's failure to pay over employment taxes was denied. He unsuccessfully contended that he was not a responsible person because he was not an employee, officer or shareholder of the corporation. However, he served as corporate counsel and as the entity's chief financial officer. He also directed the president to make payments to various creditors, including tax payments to the IRS, was involved in the preparation and filing of the company's payroll tax returns, prepared corporate tax returns and was responsible for ensuring that the payroll tax deposits were made.
D.K. Scheingold, DC N.J. (unpublished opinion), 2002-2 ustc ¶50,510.
The chairman of a corporation was liable for the trust fund recovery penalty in connection with the corporation's failure to pay over employment taxes. He qualified as a responsible person because he had the authority to sign checks, hire and fire employees, participate in management, determine corporate financial policy, and authorize the payment of bills. He also discussed corporate business with other company officers on a weekly basis and was the corporation's majority shareholder, a member of its board of directors, and a guarantor of corporate loans.
C.S. Perlman, DC Fla., 2002-1 ustc ¶50,346.
The founder and president of a corporation was a responsible person with liability to pay the IRS's assessment of unpaid employment and withholding taxes, plus interest and penalties, for one tax year. He held the position of president of the company and attended its board meetings, he was generally responsible for the operation of the company and possessed the authority to sign checks and approved the check signing of the only other company employee with checking signing authority. Furthermore his decision not to pay over or withhold the employment taxes was willful. He made the decision to pay other creditors in preference to the IRS knowing that taxes were due and he failed to take corrective actions.
G. Sutton,, DC Tex., 2002-2 ustc ¶50,552, 194 FSupp2d 559.
The president of a corporation was considered the responsible person with liability to pay the assessment of unpaid taxes, plus interest and penalties, for two tax years. He was the highest-ranking officer and had substantial authority to direct operations. Moreover, he signed the payroll tax returns and had signature authority on corporate accounts. He paid other creditors in preference to the IRS knowing that taxes were due and failed to take corrective actions. That he resigned from his position of president was meaningless as he exercised control in all relevant areas both before and after the purported resignation.
L.A. Mitchell, DC N.J. (unpublished opinion), 2002-2 ustc ¶50,537. Aff'd, CA-3 (unpublished opinion), 2004-1 ustc ¶50,113, 82 FedAppx 781.
The CFO of a bankrupt airline company was a "responsible person," who willfully failed to file quarterly excise tax returns and pay the accompanying tax to the government. The CFO held a corporate office, possessed control over the financial affairs of the airline company, possessed the authority to disburse corporate funds, and possessed the ability to pay the excise taxes without the approval of the company's Board. There was a material issue of genuine fact, however, as to whether the controller of the company had the requisite corporate decision making authority within the company to be considered a responsible person with regard to the delinquent excise taxes. Although the controller applied for credit on behalf of the company and signed promissory notes that bound the company, he was not in charge of the department that was responsible for tracking the excise taxes and he was not involved in overall day-to-day operations of the company.
D.R. Ferguson, DC Iowa, 2004-1 ustc ¶50,247, 317 FSupp2d 945.
The bankruptcy court erroneously held that the president and sole shareholder was not a responsible person for purposes of the trust fund recovery penalty. Although the taxpayer did not run the day-to-day operations of the corporation, she had sole authority to right checks for the company. The bankruptcy court's conclusion that the taxpayer was not a responsible person was strongly based on the lack of authority or power over daily management of the company. However, the taxpayer's status as president, sole shareholder and her authority to sign checks was sufficient to make her the responsible person.
E.L. Marino, DC Fla., 2004-1 ustc ¶50,262, 311 BR 111, rev'ing BC-DC Fla., 2004-1 ustc ¶50,261.
A president and fifty percent shareholder of an employee leasing company was liable for the trust fund recovery penalty in connection with his company's failure to pay employee withholding taxes. Evidence established that the taxpayer was a responsible person because he had check signing authority, even though he claimed that he did not often exercise such authority, and had the authority to manage and direct the employees of the company. The taxpayer also had the authority to hire and fire all levels of employees, which he displayed when he fired his business partner, who was also a fifty percent shareholder.
S. Farkas, FedCl, 2003-2 ustc ¶50,574.
A debtor who served as vice-president of a general contracting business was a responsible person as a matter of law. He had significant authority over the employees, as well as over the finances of the company during the tax periods in issue. Questions remained regarding whether he willfully failed to pay over the withholding taxes.
V.K. Pugh, BC-DC Nev., 2004-2 ustc ¶50,352, 315 BR 889.
A debtor's objection to the IRS's claim for the trust fund recovery penalty assessed against him was denied because he was determined to be a responsible person who willfully failed to pay over withheld taxes. The debtor stipulated that he was a responsible person and his failure to remit the withheld taxes was willful because he was aware of the company's employment tax deficiency yet chose to pay creditors other than the government. The fact that the debtor was told by the company's owner not to pay the taxes and that he might have been fired had he disobeyed orders did not excuse his liability for nonpayment.
L. Borman, BC-DC Fla., 2005-1 ustc ¶50,109.
An individual was liable for the trust fund recovery penalty, during the time he was no longer president of the corporation. The taxpayer admitted to being the chairman of the board, the sole director, vice president, secretary, and treasurer. Between himself, his spouse and his children, he controlled about 50 percent of all outstanding stock and he has controlling interest in the corporation. At all times, the interim president served at his will. Undoubtedly, the taxpayer was a "responsible person" liable to pay the trust fund taxes.
D.J. Frank, BC-DC N.C., 2005-1 ustc ¶50,222.
The manager of a casino was not a responsible person for purposes of the trust fund recovery penalty since he had no authority over payroll or tax matters. Although he supervised department managers and was otherwise responsible for the day-to-day operations of the casino, the manager did not have significant decision-making authority over the financial affairs of the company to be responsible for payroll taxes. Authority to decide which checks were to be written, and to whom, rested in the sole shareholder, director and corporate officer of the casino.
B.E. Dewing, DC Nev., 2005-1 ustc ¶50,275.
The chief financial officer of a bankrupt company was not a responsible person for purposes of imposition of the trust fund recovery penalty, despite have check-signing authority, because the company president had absolute control over all of the company funds. The company president reviewed the cash flow balance daily, authorized the creditors to be paid and even wired funds to another creditor to prevent the IRS from obtaining the funds after the CFO sent the IRS a check without the president's knowledge.
J.D. Salzillo, FedCl, 2005-1 ustc ¶50,324, 66 FedCl 23.
The sole owner and president of a corporation was a responsible person who willfully failed to pay the corporation's employment tax liabilities for purposes of imposing the trust fund recovery penalty. He signed Form 941 employment tax returns on behalf of the corporation, could independently sign checks on behalf of the corporation and signed a sworn statement that he was solely responsible for all tax debts incurred by the corporation. The taxpayer's failure to pay the taxes was willful because he knew of the tax liabilities, but chose to pay other expenses.
G. Kraljevich, DC Mich., 2005-1 ustc ¶50,372, 364 FSupp2d 655.
An individual was determined to be a responsible person with respect to unpaid employment taxes. The taxpayer, who was involved in the operation of two companies until the time a surety company assumed control, did not present any evidence contradicting that he was a responsible party for tax liability under Code Sec. 6672. Instead, the evidence reflected that the majority of the unpaid employment taxes accrued prior to the time the surety company assumed control. Furthermore, whether the surety was responsible for the unpaid employment taxes had no bearing on whether the taxpayer was a responsible person for purposes of tax liability.
J. Dowdy, DC Tex., 2005-2 ustc ¶50,517.
The IRS was granted summary judgment against the former president of a non-profit corporation for trust fund recovery penalties under Code Sec. 6672. The taxpayer had significant control of the corporation's finances, had check writing authority, and was responsible for ensuring that the company paid its trust fund taxes. Further, once the taxpayer became aware of the deficiency, he failed to ensure its payment before any other creditors were paid. Such a failure is willful and subjects the responsible person to trust fund recovery penalties under Code Sec. 6672.
Reverend R. W. Schlicht, DC Ariz., 2005-2 ustc ¶50,527.
An electrical contractor was liable for penalties under Code Sec. 6672 for failing to pay over federal employment taxes owed by two corporations that he formed. Despite having relinquished his management role to family members, he was a "responsible person" for purposes of Code Sec. 6672 liability because he kept the title of president and retained authority to control the company, even if he did not exercise that authority. Specifically, the taxpayer had full check writing authority, full access to company books and records, and the opportunity to exercise substantial financial control over company affairs.
J.F. Grillo, BC-DC N.J, 2005-2 ustc ¶50,625.
The founder, president and principal stockholder of a company was determined to be a responsible person with respect to unpaid employment taxes. The failure of the taxpayer's accountant and tax specialist to properly designate amounts paid to offset these liabilities did not mean that the IRS should be equitably estopped from collecting under Code Sec. 6672, as the taxpayer mistakenly argued. The trust fund recovery penalty is separate and distinct from the legal obligation imposed on the employer to collect and remit the trust fund taxes. Since the taxpayer did not present any evidence to the contrary, he was found to be a responsible person who willfully failed to pay the owed employment taxes.
J.A. Lencyk, DC Tex., 2005-2 ustc ¶50,630, 384 FSupp2d 1028.
A 100-percent trust fund penalty was reduced to judgment since the taxpayer was the responsible person even though he did not have day-to-day control of the company. Rather his status as CEO, president and sole shareholder gave him sufficient control to be the responsible person for trust fund purposes.
R. Sage, DC N.Y., 2006-1 ustc ¶50,175, 412 FSupp2d 406.
The president of a tax-exempt organization was not entitled to a refund of the federal employment and withholding taxes he paid from his personal funds. As president of the board of directors for almost 20 years, he had check-signing authority and control over the organization’s financial affairs. Further, he exhibited a reckless disregard of a known risk that the organization was not making required trust fund payments to the IRS and he made no effort to ascertain the status of the organization's tax payments.
C.E. Jefferson, DC Ill., 2007-1 ustc ¶50,304, 459 FSupp2d 685.
A company’s vice president of operations was denied a refund of a trust fund recovery penalty assessed against her for her employer’s failure to pay backup withholding taxes. She was a responsible person because her own testimony about her duties and responsibilities and her undisputed check-writing authority established that she could have prevented the company from paying other creditors instead of paying the taxes. She enjoyed exclusive check-writing authority and was responsible for collecting, accounting for, and paying over the withheld taxes. She was in a position to use her ability to prioritize creditors and her check-signing authority to impede the flow of business to the extent necessary to ensure the payment of taxes and nothing in the company’s business model prevented her from paying the taxes. In addition, the undisputed evidence clearly established that the willfulness requirement was met.
N.A. Cook, DC Ind., 2007-1 ustc ¶50,333.
A trust fund recovery penalty was correctly assessed against the chief financial officer of a bankrupt airline company because he was a responsible person who willfully failed to pay the company’s excise taxes. The individual was authorized to sign checks and disburse corporate funds on behalf of the company and had the authority to pay the company’s excise taxes without board or management approval. The board never explicitly instructed him to not pay the excise taxes but he chose not to do so in order to pay other company expenses.
R. Musal, DC Iowa, 2006-1 ustc ¶50,207, 421 FSupp2d 1153. Aff'd sub nom. D.R. Ferguson, CA-8, 2007-1 ustc ¶50,481, 484 F3d 1068.
The CEO and board chairman of a motorcycle company was not entitled to a refund of a portion of the trust fund recovery penalty he paid to the IRS in satisfaction of the company’s unpaid payroll withholding taxes. Testimony of the CEO and the company’s chief operating officer and financial director established that the CEO was a responsible person who willfully failed to pay the company’s taxes. He had overall authority, including raising capital and hiring, was involved in the day-to-day management of the company, had the authority to issue checks, and determined which creditors to pay and when to pay them. Further, he instructed the company’s financial director that bills pertaining to utilities were to be paid first; thus, checks were issued to other creditors but not to the government.
R.K. Hagen, DC Md., 2007-1 ustc ¶50,510, 485 FSupp2d 622.
An individual who held no ownership or entrepreneurial stake in debtor corporations was not a responsible person with regard to those corporations' failure to pay over withheld federal taxes. She could not sign checks without the prior authorization of the president and sole shareholder of the corporations and had no power or authority to hire or fire employees. Although she was the secretary of the debtor corporations, the duties that she performed were ministerial and administrative in nature. All of the authority and control over the corporations' administration and finances resided with the president, and the tasks she performed were executed solely upon his instructions.
L.M. Benitez, DC PR, 2006-2 ustc ¶50,598.
The sole corporate officer of a construction company was a responsible person who willfully failed to pay over federal withholding taxes. The officer continued to write checks, sign returns and act on behalf of the corporation after the date he claimed an insurance company took over control under an indemnity agreement. However, the officer’s wife was not liable for the unpaid taxes because there was no evidence that she was an officer or director of the construction company. Her involvement was limited to occasional business purchases and as a signatory with her husband on the indemnity agreement.
G. Hartman, BC-DC Pa., 2007-2 ustc ¶50,747, 375 BR 740.
The chairman of a corporation was a responsible person who willfully failed to collect, account for and pay over the withheld income and employment taxes of the corporation. The IRS’s evidence showed that he had the ability to sign checks, hire and fire employees, and sign the corporation’s tax returns. He owned stock in the corporation, was ultimately responsible for making financial decisions and directed payment to the corporation’s creditors despite knowledge of the corporation’s unpaid employment taxes. However, a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether another corporate officer, the CEO, had sufficient authority over the corporation's financial affairs to be considered a responsible person for purposes of the trust fund recovery penalties.
R.C. Savona, DC Calif., 2007-2 ustc ¶50,788.
The CEO and the Chief Financial Officer of a trucking company were both responsible persons who were jointly and severally liable for the trust fund recovery penalties in connection with the company’s failure to pay its federal employment tax obligations. Both officers acted willfully when they made numerous voluntary and intentional payments to creditors despite having knowledge that the employment taxes were unpaid. Both exercised significant control over the disbursement of company’s funds, had active day-to-day involvement in the business and had full authority to sign checks and Form 941 tax returns.
J.M. Horovitz, DC Pa., 2008-1 ustc ¶50,186, 543 FSupp2d 441.
The founder, shareholder and officer of a corporation was liable for the trust fund recovery penalty because he exercised significant control over the corporation’s day-to-day activities and participated in the decision to hire or fire management employees and accountants in charge of the corporation’s payroll operations. He also reviewed weekly and monthly financial statements, personally guaranteed payments to vendors and directed checks to be written and expenses to be paid.
C.B. Erwin, DC N.C., 2008-1 ustc ¶50,258.
The owner and the bookkeeper of a limited liability company (LLC) were liable for trust fund recovery penalties in connection with the operation of a restaurant. The owner was a responsible person because she organized the LLC, entered into a lease agreement for the restaurant, obtained a liquor license and failed to make a timely election for the LLC to be taxed as a corporation. Further, the bookkeeper was also a responsible person because he had the authority to sign checks for the restaurant, to make and authorize bank deposits, to identify and calculate the amount to be withheld for federal payroll taxes, to authorize payment of federal tax deposits and to authorize payroll checks. Moreover, he acted willfully because he knew about the delinquent taxes and voluntarily paid other creditors before paying the government.
D.M. Seymour, DC Ky., 2008-2 ustc ¶50,406.
An individual who was the president, director, Chief Executive Officer and majority shareholder of a corporation was liable for the trust fund recovery penalty assessed against him in connection with the corporation’s unpaid withholding taxes. The individual was a "responsible person" with respect to the corporation because he had complete authority over every aspect of the corporation’s finances, including the sole authority to hire and fire employees, take out loans, sign contracts and checks, withhold income and FICA taxes from wages and pay those taxes to the government.
J.C. Tornes, DC Ohio, 2008-2 ustc ¶50,431.
The majority stockholder of two retail optometry companies was not entitled to a refund of the trust fund recovery penalty he paid to the IRS in satisfaction of the companies' unpaid withholding taxes. The individual was a responsible person because he exercised significant control over the companies’ finances, had check-signing authority and the authority to sign the companies’ employment tax returns. Furthermore, more than one person can be a responsible person with respect to liability for unpaid taxes.
L.H. Joel, DC Ky., 2008-2 ustc ¶50,451.
The director, shareholder and secretary-treasurer of a closely held corporation was liable for the trust fund recovery penalty assessed against her in connection with the corporation’s unpaid withholding taxes. The individual was a responsible person because she was involved in the corporation’s business operations, had check signing authority, attended meetings to discuss the corporation’s cash-flow problems, had access to the corporation’s financial records and books and knew of the corporation’s tax problems. Although her responsibilities did not typically include the payment of withholding taxes and she did not believe that it was within her control, she had the power to pay the corporation’s withholding taxes.
N. Noronha, DC Ky., 2008-2 ustc ¶50,554.
The president of a company was liable for the trust fund recovery penalties assessed against him. The individual was the responsible person with respect to the company since he had the sole authority to write and sign checks on corporate accounts and to hire and fire personnel.
C.C. Anuforo, DC Minn., 2008-2 ustc ¶50,584.
The owner of a company was liable for the trust fund recovery penalty (TFRP). The individual maintained the company’s books, prepared its financial statements, authorized payment of its bills and payroll, reviewed federal income tax returns and prepared and signed federal payroll tax returns. He acted willfully because he had reason to know that the taxes were not being paid and failed to exercise his authority to ensure their payment. Despite knowledge of the tax deficiencies, he regularly directed that payments be made to creditors other than the IRS.
S.O. Johnson, DC Ill., 2008-2 ustc ¶50,585.
The president of the board of directors of a tax-exempt organization was not entitled to a refund of federal employment and withholding taxes he paid from his personal funds. Although his position was voluntary and uncompensated, and although he was not involved in the day-to-day operations of the day care center, the individual had enough involvement in and control over the organization’s financial affairs to qualify him as a "responsible person" within the meaning of Code Sec. 6672.
C.E. Jefferson, CA-7, 2008-2 ustc ¶50,587.
The owners of three companies and their employee, a certified public accountant (CPA), serving as the vice president of finance for those companies, were all responsible persons for purposes of the trust fund recovery penalty. The owners were the founders, officers, board members, and equal shareholders of each of the three companies. They had check-signing authority, could hire and fire employees, could exercise control over the companies’ finances, including the payment of payroll taxes, and were intimately involved in running the companies. Although the CPA/employee had no check-signing authority, he supervised the accounting department, oversaw the preparation of checks, including payroll and federal tax deposit checks and had the authority to direct the accounting department to draft checks to the IRS instead of to other creditors. Further, the individuals acted willfully when they made payments to other creditors despite knowing that the trust fund taxes remained unpaid.
S.P. Davis, Sr., DC La., 2008-2 ustc ¶50,613, Motion to reconsider den'd, 2009-1 ustc ¶50,375.
The secretary and treasurer of a corporation was liable for the trust fund recovery penalty assessed against him in connection with the corporation's unpaid withholding taxes. The individual was a "responsible person" because he exercised significant control over the day-to-day management of the corporation and over the company’s payroll, had the power to write checks on behalf of the corporation, had the authority to hire and fire employees, sign corporate income tax and payroll tax returns and to determine which creditors to pay and when.
W.M. Cheatle, DC Va., 2009-1 ustc ¶50,139, 589 FSupp2d 694.
Unpaid employment tax assessments against the president and vice-president of two health care companies were reduced to judgment. The individuals were responsible persons because they had the authority to sign checks, hire and fire employees, determine corporate financial policy, and authorize the payment of bills.
J.A. Rineer, DC Tex., 2009-1 ustc ¶50,149, 594 FSupp2d 732.
An individual who assumed the role of chief executive officer (CEO) of a holding company was a responsible person liable for the unpaid employment tax obligations of a wholly-owned subsidiary for two assessment periods at issue. On becoming a CEO, he also became a "responsible person" within the meaning of the trust fund provisions because he had the authority to control the financial affairs of the subsidiary. He was not relieved of that responsibility even though he took control after the holding company decided to cease paying the subsidiary’s trust fund taxes. However, the individual was not responsible with respect to unpaid tax obligations for a period when he was merely a member of the board of directors and had no official role in the subsidiary’s operations or any direct control over payment of the subsidiary’s taxes.
B.A. Haslett, DC Alas., 2009-1 ustc ¶50,225.
The general manager of a printing company was a responsible person liable for the company’s unpaid employment taxes for the two tax years at issue. The individual’s power to ensure that the taxes were paid was evidenced by his control over the company’s day-to-day operations, accounting and finance functions, independent check-signing authority and his unrestrained authority to electronically pay the payroll taxes. Moreover, the district court correctly refused to instruct the jury that a capital infusion into the business was a necessary indicia of responsibility or that only the owner of a closely held corporation was a responsible person or that the reasonable cause exception to the willfulness requirement applied. The reasonable cause defense was not available because the individual failed to pay the taxes even after he was directly instructed to keep the taxes current and despite his knowledge of the tax deficiencies and that other creditors were being paid. Further, the jury instructions also properly stated that a superior’s order to pay other creditors did not negate the individual’s status as a responsible person.
R.A. Smith, CA-10, 2009-1 ustc ¶50,263, 555 F3d 1158.
The principal officer and majority shareholder of four companies was a responsible person for purposes of the trust fund recovery penalties assessed against him in connection with the companies’ unpaid withholding taxes. The individual had the authority to sign checks and federal tax returns, hire and fire employees and exercised significant control over the disbursement of the companies’ funds. Furthermore, the relevant tax period wherein the IRS assessed the trust fund recovery penalties ended prior to the conversion of the companies’ bankruptcy proceedings, and before the alleged termination of his role as an officer and shareholder.
J.C. Kavanaugh, DC Pa., 2009-1 ustc ¶50,368.
The majority shareholder of a home health care corporation was liable for trust fund recovery penalties. For purposes of imposing the penalties, the notice requirement was satisfied by a proper mailing of IRS Letter 1153 to the taxpayer's last known address. Actual receipt of the notice was not required. As the majority shareholder, officer and employee of the corporation who had the authority to hire and fire employees, write checks and manage the corporation, the taxpayer possessed six indicia of a responsible person. While initially unaware of the bookkeeper's failure to remit employment taxes, once she became aware of the failure, she continued to authorize payments to other creditors. Accordingly, her failure to pay over employment taxes was willful and the defense of reasonable cause was not available to her.
M.M. Mason, 132 TC —, No. 14, Dec. 57,807.
The controller and Chief Financial Officer (CFO) of a company was liable for trust fund recovery penalties assessed against him in connection with the company’s unpaid employment taxes. The individual was a responsible person because he exercised significant control over the day-to-day management of the company and over the company’s payroll, had the power to write checks on behalf of the company, had the authority to hire and fire employees, had access to the company’s books and records, prepared the company’s quarterly tax returns and had input on which creditors to pay and when. Further, he acted willfully because he was aware throughout the period of his employment that the company’s withholding taxes were not being paid and failed to exercise his authority to ensure their payment.
D.C. Milchling, DC Md., 2009-2 ustc ¶50,499.

The president of the company was a responsible person, but his lack of knowledge that withheld taxes were not being paid over might have diminished the willfulness of his action. Therefore, the case was remanded.
R.J. Kalb, CA-2, 74-2 ustc ¶9760, 505 F2d 506.
In ruling that the major shareholder in two corporations could not be held liable for the corporations' unpaid withholding taxes, the court held that the IRS could not prove that the shareholder acted willfully in failing to pay the taxes since he did not actually know of the tax delinquencies.
M.J. Premo, BC-DC Mich., 90-2 ustc ¶50,396.
In a charge to a jury, the court instructed that a responsible person has not willfully failed to collect and pay over taxes if he prefers other creditors at a time when he does not know that the taxes have not been paid over. The court further instructed the jury that such a person willfully fails to pay taxes when he learns that the taxes have not been paid and he continues to pay other creditors.
R.S. Chappell, DC, 75-1 ustc ¶9296. Aff'd CA-7 (unpublished opinion 11-18-75).
A company's newly hired Chief Financial Officer was liable for the company's unpaid employment taxes even though he was unaware of the unpaid amounts. Having been aware of the company's inability to pay debts owed to creditors other than the IRS, he should have investigated the company's ability to pay the IRS. Later, he should not have capitulated to directives from the company's president and a leading creditor of the company to refrain from making the payments.
M. Sederoff, BC-DC Calif., 90-2 ustc ¶50,558.
A president of a corporation was a responsible person liable for unpaid federal employment taxes to the extent of unencumbered funds received by the corporation after he learned of the nonpayment (i.e., after the corporation's failure to pay became willful with respect to the president). The fact that the president paid other creditors before the IRS with unencumbered funds received after he acquired knowledge of the nonpayment constituted willfulness as a matter of law. The bankruptcy court's conclusion that a responsible person is liable for the penalty only to the extent of unencumbered funds on the date that the failure to pay became willful was reversed. The court distinguished Slodov ( ¶39,780.69, above), in which a responsible person was held not liable for the trust fund tax incurred before he became a responsible person (rather than before the failure to pay became willful). The president's liability extended to delinquent taxes incurred before he had actual knowledge of the delinquency because he was involved with the corporation at all relevant times and the situation involved different policy interests than Slodov.
W.A. King, DC Ala., 95-1 ustc ¶50,241.
A construction firm's director-treasurer was liable where he was aware that the taxes were not being paid.
Messina, DC, 65-1 ustc ¶9370.
An officer-stockholder of two corporations was not liable for unpaid withholding and Social Security taxes owed by one corporation where he relied on an employee of the corporation to pay the taxes, but he was liable for the taxes owed by the successor corporation since he was then aware of the fact that the employee had failed to properly pay the taxes due from the predecessor corporation.
R.D. Leuschner, Sr., CA-9, 64-2 ustc ¶9742, 336 F2d 246.
Although an officer of a bankrupt corporation qualified as a responsible person, his knowing failure to pay over the taxes, without more, was insufficient to establish that he willfully attempted to evade or defeat the tax.
F.P. Macagnone, BC-DC Fla., 98-2 ustc ¶50,624, 224 BR 212.
On reconsideration, the bankruptcy court found that it did not err in placing the burden of proof on the IRS to show that the taxpayer was a responsible person.
F.P. Macagnone, BC-DC Fla. 99-1 ustc ¶50,276, 228 BR 784.
The Bankruptcy Court erred in determining that the government's failure to prove that a bankrupt responsible person willfully failed to collect and pay over employment taxes relieved him of liability for the trust fund recovery penalty. According to well-established precedent in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit, an individual who has been determined to be a responsible person bears the burden to disprove willfulness.
F.P Macagnone, DC Fla., 99-2 ustc ¶50,681. Rev'g and rem'g BC-DC Fla. 99-1 ustc ¶50,276, 228 BR 784.
On remand, the bankruptcy court held that the responsible person/debtor was not liable for the trust fund recovery penalty for failure to collect and pay over employment taxes. This was affirmed on appeal. The officer did not show reckless disregard for a known or obvious risk by failing to determine whether funds withheld from employees' wages were remitted to the government. Despite the taxpayer's failure to inquire about the status of the employment taxes after his business encountered financial difficulties, absent a history of delinquency, his failure to do so was not reckless.
F.P. Macagnone, DC Fla., 2000-2 ustc ¶50,551. Aff'g BC-DC Fla., 2000-1 ustc ¶50,207.
The son of the president of a corporation was a responsible person where he had check writing authority, controlled the daily operations of the company, and was considered a substantial stockholder and at least a de facto vice-president. The failure to pay was willful because he caused payments to be made to other creditors when he knew that such funds were owed to the government. The duty of a responsible person to pay over withheld tax to the government may not be contravened by a superior's contrary instructions.
J. Bernard, BC-DC La., 91-2 ustc ¶50,516.
A president and major shareholder of a corporation was the responsible officer liable for willfully failing to pay withholding and social security taxes of the corporation's employees. The taxpayer contended that because he lacked knowledge of the corporation's failure to pay taxes until after they were due, his subsequent use of corporate revenues to compensate creditors rather than to pay the delinquent taxes did not evince willfulness. Since this argument was inconsistent with the definition of willfulness promulgated by the Supreme Court and other courts of appeals, it was rejected.
D.O. Davis, CA-9, 92-1 ustc ¶50,292, 961 F2d 867. Cert. denied, 113 SCt 969.
An officer of a corporation who had the authority to decide whether corporate funds should be expended was a responsible person. The taxpayer did not carry his burden of proving that he did not act willfully in failing to timely pay the taxes. The taxpayer, who forced his role of authority on the other shareholders, had a duty to insure prompt payment of the corporate tax liability. Because the taxpayer was aware of a previous tax delinquency, as well as of the inadequate performance of the acting financial manager, he could not escape culpability by delegating the payment of taxes to the manager or by disregarding his own obligations.
R.M. Guito, Jr., DC Fla., 92-1 ustc ¶50,231.
A supervisor of a trucking company was a responsible person liable for willfully failing to pay over withholding taxes. The evidence indicated that the taxpayer willfully failed to pay over the taxes. His signing of the paychecks and the withholding tax form indicated that he should have known of his responsibility.
W.E. Whiteside, ClsCt, 92-2 ustc ¶50,436.
A president of a corporation did not willfully fail to withhold and pay employment taxes for the two calendar quarters prior to his resignation, even though, as president, he had final authority regarding the payment of creditors and directly supervised the person actually responsible for paying the taxes. The taxpayer had no knowledge of any nonpayment nor did he recklessly disregard whether the taxes were paid. Moreover, upon discovery of the nonpayment, a payroll tax deposit was made. Since the IRS offered no evidence to rebut the evidence of payment, there was no genuine issue of material fact, and the taxpayer's motion for summary judgment was granted.
J.M. Cohen, DC Calif., 93-1 ustc ¶50,350. Aff'd, CA-9 (unpublished opinion 3/24/94).
The chief executive officer (CEO) of an airline carrier in bankruptcy did not "willfully" fail to collect, account for, or pay over taxes. The CEO was not liable for a penalty assessment for taxes accrued before his appointment, and his knowledge of prior tax deficiencies did not establish willfulness with respect to future deficiencies. His attendance at a hearing before the bankruptcy court during his brief tenure as CEO did not provide him with an awareness of current unpaid payroll taxes. There was no evidence that he was anything more than an observer at the hearing or that current delinquencies were discussed there in any detail. In addition, there was nothing in the airline's records that would have alerted him to any substantial deficiency in the payment of currently accruing taxes.
B.A. Cooke, DC Calif., 93-1 ustc ¶50,294.
A corporate president and director was liable for the penalty for unpaid withholding taxes. Although he claimed to have no knowledge of the corporate vice president's failure to pay over the withholding taxes at issue, he did know of a prior, relatively small tax delinquency levied against his company, took no steps to confirm or ensure that this tax delinquency and future taxes were being paid and signed smaller checks to other creditors during the same time period.
P.J. Strunk, DC Iowa, 94-1 ustc ¶50,110.
A corporate officer was not liable for the 100% penalty because he did not willfully fail to pay over withholding taxes. At the time of his resignation from the parent of his employer, the parent corporation was current in paying its taxes, and, after his resignation, he lacked actual knowledge of the nonpayment of taxes and was not responsible for preparing the corporation's tax returns.
M.P. Running, CA-7, 93-2 ustc ¶50,568.
An officer-stockholder of a condominium management company was liable for the trust fund recovery penalty with respect to withholding taxes owed by the predecessor corporation because he willfully failed to pay over the taxes. Even though he did not have actual knowledge of a failure to pay the tax, the officer was put on notice of the obvious risk that the taxes were not paid and acted with reckless disregard to that risk. The officer restructured the company to circumvent any responsibility for the unknown liabilities. His reliance on the bookkeeper's and owner's assessment of the predecessor corporation's state of affairs did not absolve him from making inquiries as to the actual tax liability.
S.A. Malloy, CA-11, 94-1 ustc ¶50,145.
A corporation's president and majority shareholder was liable for the trust fund recovery penalty because his failure to pay over withheld taxes was willful. He could not avoid liability for the penalty on the ground that, since the jury did not specifically find that he had actual knowledge of the delinquency before resigning and surrendering his stock, he did not act willfully. Willfulness includes the reckless disregard for an obvious or known risk of nonpayment. Also, the evidence did not support the president's contention that his ownership of the corporation had ceased before he discovered the unpaid taxes; thus, a jury instruction regarding his failure to make payment with available corporate assets after discovering the delinquency was valid. Moreover, the jury was properly instructed that a person who is responsible for withholding taxes cannot escape that obligation by delegating it to others.
J.N. Hauf, DC N.Y., 97-2 ustc ¶50,645.
An employer was liable as a responsible person for his failure to collect and pay over employment taxes owed by his wholly owned corporation. The willfulness requirement was satisfied because, after the IRS had sent several notices of delinquency, the company received unencumbered funds and used those funds to pay employee claims rather than the delinquent employment taxes.
C.G. Vaglica, CA-5, 94-1 ustc ¶50,114.
An owner and officer of a corporation was liable for the trust fund recovery penalty. He willfully failed to pay the taxes since he knew about the tax liability but continued to pay creditors and employees ahead of the government. The officer's claim that he was not liable for taxes attributable to periods prior to the date he acquired knowledge of the tax liability was rejected because he had a legal duty to make up any prior deficiency once he obtained knowledge of it. Moreover, a lender's alleged refusal to allow the corporation to pay the taxes did not insulate the officer from liability because the corporation voluntarily entered into the lending arrangement and continued to operate and pay employees, thereby incurring new tax liabilities. The individual also could not rely on assurances of others that the taxes would be paid.
J.D. Durham, DC Okla., 94-2 ustc ¶50,331.
The volunteer chairman of the board of directors of a not-for-profit organization who volunteered his time to the organization was liable as a responsible person for the trust fund recovery penalty. He willfully failed to pay withholding taxes because he signed checks to pay creditors other than the government, and the organization had unencumbered funds in an amount sufficient to pay the taxes. The taxpayer was on notice of substantial cash shortfalls and improprieties in the financial management of the organization, and his failure to investigate and correct such mismanagement was reckless and constituted willful conduct.
H. Wright, DC N.Y., 96-1 ustc ¶50,114.
A corporate vice president's reckless disregard of the obvious risk that the taxes would not be paid to the government constituted willfulness as a matter of law. Once he became aware of the payroll tax delinquencies, he had a duty to investigate or correct the problem. Another officer's assurances of payment did not relieve him of that duty.
W.C. Kelver, DC Colo., 98-2 ustc ¶50,766.
Although he may have been negligent, a responsible person was not liable for the trust fund recovery penalty because the failure to pay withholding taxes was not reckless, and, therefore, was not willful. First, he had little responsibility for finances and taxes. He was not involved in preparing company tax returns, nor did he exercise primary authority over check writing and bill paying (except for those arising at construction sites). Second, he had no knowledge of past or present tax deficiencies or other indications that the taxes were unpaid. Since the taxpayer resigned after learning of the unpaid taxes, his failure to pay the taxes at that point did not constitute willfulness.
P.E. Abel, DC Pa., 96-2 ustc ¶50,498.
A corporate president and chairman of the board of directors was a responsible person subject to the trust fund recovery penalty. For some of the quarters at issue, willfulness was established by the president's admissions that he was aware of the delinquency, reviewed the corporation's payroll tax returns, and signed the company's Forms 941, Employer's Quarterly Federal Tax Return, all of which reflected a balance due. For other quarters, the admissions were vaguely phrased and did not clearly state that the president was aware of the deficiencies for those quarters. Nonetheless, those admissions established the president's knowledge of the deficiencies for those quarters. The admissions regarded conversations with the company's outside accountant, review of the payroll tax returns, and the president's authority over financial decisions. Additionally, the president admitted that he authorized payment of company expenses other than the taxes.
A. Hutchinson, DC Tex., 97-2 ustc ¶50,795.
A president failed to meet his burden of disproving willfulness. There was evidence that he was aware of the corporation's cash flow problems and recklessly disregarded the risk of nonpayment of taxes, and he made no effort to prove that funds deposited into and withdrawn from corporate accounts during one of the quarters at issue were encumbered and, thus, unavailable for taxes.
E. Rojo, BC-DC Fla., 97-2 ustc ¶50,789.
Sufficient evidence existed to support a jury verdict that a president and CEO of a corporation was a "responsible person" who willfully failed to pay the corporation's withholding taxes. Accordingly, he was liable for the trust fund recovery penalty. His contention that he lacked control of the corporation's finances and was unable to make the appropriate tax payments was rejected. The taxpayer was aware of the delinquent taxes and that the corporation had sufficient funds to pay the delinquent taxes in full. However, he used the corporation's funds to pay other creditors.
M.P. Logal, CA-5, 99-2 ustc ¶50,988. Aff'g DC Tex., 98-2 ustc ¶50,716.
A corporation's majority shareholder was found to have willfully failed to see that the withheld federal taxes were paid when he had notice and acted in reckless disregard of a known risk that the funds may not be remitted to the government. Since the taxpayer had personally borrowed the funds to pay an earlier tax deficiency, he was on notice that the corporation's president had mismanaged the company and could not be trusted to pay the taxes. His failure to take a more active role in securing payment constituted willful failure to pay over withheld taxes.
P.M. Larson, DC Wash., 99-2 ustc ¶50,787.
The president and vice president of a corporation who failed to remit withholding taxes to the IRS acted willfully by paying other creditors and employees ahead of the IRS after becoming aware of the corporation's unpaid tax liabilities.
D.C. Stull, DC Tex., 2000-1 ustc ¶50,168. Aff'd, per curiam, CA-5 (unpublished opinion), 2001-1 ustc ¶50,333.
The president of a corporation that failed to remit payroll taxes to the IRS qualified as a responsible person for purposes of determining liability for the trust fund recovery penalty. The officer, who had been hired to revive the financially strapped corporation, acted willfully in failing to pay over the taxes because he had knowledge of the tax delinquency and deliberately paid other creditors ahead of the IRS.
W.W. Borland II, DC Mich., 2000-1 ustc ¶50,458.
The president and majority shareholder of a corporation who was found to be a responsible person willfully failed to pay his corporation's employment taxes. The taxpayer paid off a tax lien that his bank had placed on his corporation's line of credit despite having actual knowledge of the tax deficiencies.
E.D. Battles, BC-DC Ala., 2000-1 ustc ¶50,536.
Related officers and a consultant of a bankrupt corporation who were deemed to be responsible persons within the meaning of Code Sec. 6672 acted willfully in their failure to remit withheld employment taxes and, thus, were liable for the trust fund recovery penalty. Each individual had knowledge of or were involved in settlement discussions with the IRS concerning the corporation's employment tax liability.
W. Mahler, DC Conn., 2000-2 ustc ¶50,808, 121 FSupp2d 179. Aff'd, on another issue, CA-2 (unpublished opinion), 2002-1 ustc ¶50,292.
The conduct of a bankrupt corporation's president, who qualified as a responsible person for purposes of determining his liability for the trust fund recovery penalty, was deemed to be willful because he failed to pay the IRS ahead of other creditors despite knowing the company was delinquent.
A. Bruno, DC Ill., 2000-2 ustc ¶50,831.
The president and sole officer of a closely held corporation willfully failed to pay over withheld employment taxes to the IRS. She admitted that she was aware of the corporation's failure to pay over the taxes and that she paid other creditors ahead of the IRS. Thus, she had no reasonable cause for failing to remit the taxes.
J.C. Luce, DC Ohio, 2000-2 ustc ¶50,847, 119 FSupp2d 779.
A vice-president of a defunct corporation qualified as a responsible person and was not entitled to a refund of payments issued in partial satisfaction of a trust fund recovery penalty assessed against him individually in connection with the corporation's failure to pay over withheld employment taxes. The taxpayer had extensive control over the financial affairs of the business including the ability to sign checks and pay bills. Moreover, his conduct was willful in that he knew that the withholding taxes were not being paid and that available funds were being used to pay other creditors in preference to the IRS.
H.W. Fisher, DC Okla., 2001-1 ustc ¶50,159.
A bankrupt corporate officer's objection to the IRS's claim for the trust fund recovery penalty assessed against him was denied because he was properly deemed a responsible person within the meaning of Code Sec. 6672. The debtor had extensive control over the corporation's financial affairs, including check signing authority and the ability to pay bills. Further, his conduct was willful in that he knew the withholding taxes were not being paid and that available funds were being used to pay other creditors, including himself, in preference to the IRS.
W. Karnofsky, BC-DC Fla., 2001-1 ustc ¶50,170.
The president, director and sole shareholder of a bankrupt contracting business who qualified as a responsible person and who willfully failed to remit employee withholding taxes to the government was liable for the trust fund recovery penalty. Although he withheld the taxes from his employees' wages during the 10 quarters at issue and knew that the taxes were due and owing, he failed to remit payment to the IRS. Instead, he used corporate funds to pay wages to such employees as himself, his wife and his son, and he paid a broad array of other creditors ahead of the IRS.
L.B. Breaux, DC La., 2001-1 ustc ¶50,255.
A corporate accountant who was deemed to a responsible person was liable for the trust fund recovery penalty because she had knowledge of the unpaid employment taxes, yet paid off debts to other creditors before the government. That she was directed by the corporation's CEO not to pay the outstanding employment taxes was irrelevant to her knowledge of them.
B. Frey, DC Tex., 2001-1 ustc ¶50,417. Aff'd, per curiam, CA-5 (unpublished opinion), 2002-2 ustc ¶50,690, 34 FedAppx 151.
Although the partial owner of a closely held business qualified as a responsible person, he was not liable for the trust fund recovery penalty because he did not willfully attempted to evade or defeat payment of employment taxes. The individual's daughter was the business's bookkeeper and managed its finances, including the payment of employment taxes. The individual did not know of the unpaid amounts, and would not be expected to have checked on those payments.
M.E. Pitts, DC Ariz., 2001-1 ustc ¶50,419.
The conduct of an individual who was conceded to being a responsible person with respect to one of three related businesses, was deemed to be willful; thus he was liable for the trust fund recovery penalty. The IRS's levying of the business's assets did not relieve him of his liability as a responsible person, which was separate and distinct from the business's liability, or negate his knowledge that employment taxes were not being paid.
S. Rocha, DC Ore., 2001-1 ustc ¶50,425, 142 FSupp2d 1277.
The owner and former president of a bankrupt corporation was not liable for the trust fund recovery penalty because he did not willfully fail to pay his company's employment tax delinquency. While the individual conceded he was a responsible person within the meaning of Code Sec. 6672, he had no reason to know that his company was in arrears since he turned over control of his company when it was in good standing. Moreover, he took immediate action when he became aware of its failure to remit payroll taxes to the IRS, retaking control of the company, ensuring that it remained current with its tax obligations and making arrangements for paying past-due taxes. Moreover, he did not favor other creditors above the IRS.
R.D. Nutt, DC Fla., 2003-1 ustc ¶50,395, aff'g BC-DC Fla., 2002-2 ustc ¶50,753.
A trust fund recovery penalty was imposed against an individual for failure to pay over employment withholding taxes for one tax year. The taxpayer had significant day-to-day control and decision-making authority over the operations and financial affairs of the company, which was supported by his ability to decide which creditors to pay, unrestrained check-writing authority, and access to corporate books and records. Consequently, he was a responsible person under Code Sec. 6672. Moreover, the taxpayer knew that the company was not paying employment taxes and took no steps to ensure that the taxes would be paid. As a result, the taxpayer's failure to collect, account for, or pay over the company's withholding taxes was deemed willful.
H.N. Werkheiser, DC Pa., 2002-1 ustc ¶50,212.
A corporate president was deemed to be a responsible person in connection with the corporations failure to pay over employment taxes. In addition to being the corporation's president, he was the chairman of the board, majority shareholder and actively involved in the day-to-day activities of the corporation. That he employed an individual to lead the corporation's financial department was insufficient to relieve him from liability because he had supervisory control of that individual.
F.T. Johnson, Jr., DC Md., 2002-1 ustc ¶50,267, 203 FSupp2d 416. Aff'd, per curiam, CA-4 (unpublished opinion), 2003-1 ustc ¶50,345, 50 FedAppx 113. Cert. denied, 10/6/2003.
The wife of the owner of a sole proprietorship willfully failed to pay the outstanding employment tax liability of the business. The taxpayer, who was a responsible person, stipulated that she knew the business was delinquent on its withholding obligations during the tax quarters in issue, yet she continued to draft and sign checks to pay other creditors, payroll and personal expenses.
D.M. Keohan, DC Mass., 2002-1 ustc ¶50,279.
The failure of a corporate vice president, who was a responsible person, to withhold or pay over employment taxes was willful. Following his receipt of the notice of deficiency regarding the corporation's unpaid tax liability, he was aware that the corporation was paying creditors other than the government. In addition, he continued to sign payroll checks and he favored payment of the corporation's debts that were owed to him over the payment of the deficient withholding taxes.
B. Crutcher, DC Ala., 2002-1 ustc ¶50,289.
A corporate president was liable for the trust fund recovery penalty in connection with the corporation's failure to pay over its employment tax liability. The taxpayer's failure to pay over the taxes at issue was willful. He knew of the corporation's liability for employment taxes but paid net wages to employees knowing that payroll taxes would not be paid over to the government. The taxpayer unsuccessfully contended that his actions were not willful because he acted on orders of the bankruptcy court to use the company's available funds for environmental cleanup and operating expenses. The bankruptcy court, however, did not compel him to avoid paying the corporation's employment tax obligations.
D.F. Cook, FedCl, 2002-1 ustc ¶50,328.
The chairman of a corporation was liable for the trust fund recovery penalty because he was a responsible person who willfully failed to remit his company's employment taxes. He failed to fulfill his obligation to apply unencumbered corporate funds to pay its tax liabilities despite his knowledge that the taxes were unpaid. His self-serving statements that he lacked such knowledge were insufficient to satisfy his burden of proving that he had not acted willfully. In addition, he devoted corporate funds to purposes other than payment of the withholding taxes.
C.S. Perlman, DC Fla., 2002-1 ustc ¶50,346.
A corporate vice president's failure to pay withholding taxes was willful. The record indicated that he continued to make payments to other creditors after learning of the corporation's failure to pay employment taxes.
D.W. Parr, DC Tex., 2002-1 ustc ¶50,376.
A responsible person who willfully paid other creditors of his delinquent corporation ahead of the IRS was liable for the trust fund recovery penalty. The individual, who was a corporate officer who owned stock in the company, acted willfully in failing to remit the company's withholding taxes because he was aware that other parties were being paid ahead of the IRS. His failure to make the payments on orders of the second responsible person and his approval of payments to other creditors in order to keep the company going and to preserve its ability to repay the delinquent taxes did not relieve him of liability for the penalty.
P. Thosteson, CA-11, 2002-2 ustc ¶50,649, 304 F3d 1312.
The First Circuit affirmed special jury verdicts that an individual could be held liable for a company's debt. The taxpayer was a responsible person with respect to the company's unpaid employment taxes and the trust fund recovery penalty, and his failure to pay over the taxes was willful. The "effective power" and "significant control" tests for the responsible person prong of liability constituted a proper standard of proof, despite the taxpayer's argument that he had a tenuous and indirect formal connection to the business. There was evidence that the taxpayer retained managerial control of the company and had knowledge of nonpayment of the employment taxes. Moreover, he failed to show that he investigated or corrected mismanagement of funds that allowed other creditors to be paid ahead of the IRS. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a new trial.
J.V. Stuart, CA-1, 2003-2 ustc ¶50,585, 337 F3d 31.
The president and sole owner of a roofing construction company was the responsible officer liable for the corporation’s unpaid payroll taxes. The taxpayer contended that he lacked knowledge of the corporation's failure to pay taxes until after they were due. Moreover, his subsequent use of corporate revenues to compensate creditors rather than to pay the delinquent taxes was done in an attempt to increase the ultimate payout to the IRS. Basing its decision on the credibility of presented testimony, the Bankruptcy Court concluded it was not plausible that the individual did not know that the payroll taxes were not being paid. At the very least, the court concluded that he recklessly disregarded whether the taxes were being paid.
C.R. Howard, BC-DC N.C., 2003-2 ustc ¶50,683, 301 BR 456.
An officer of a bankrupt corporation that failed to pay over withholding taxes was a responsible person liable for the trust fund recovery penalty. As the entity's majority shareholder and chief operating officer, he ran the company and controlled its financial affairs. Also, he knew about the tax delinquencies and voluntarily paid other creditors ahead of the government. His contention that the company's relationship with its lending institution deprived him of control over the funds was rejected. Disbursement of the corporate funds was not "encumbered" by the contractual obligations with the lender. Thus, the officer acted willfully in failing to remit the taxes.
R. Bell, CA-6, 2004-1 ustc ¶50,118,355 F3d 387.
The CFO and controller of a bankrupt airline company willfully failed to pay airline ticket excise taxes to the government since both had knowledge that the taxes were not being paid over to the government.
D.R. Ferguson, DC Iowa, 2004-1 ustc ¶50,247.
A debtor's objection to the IRS's claim for the trust fund recovery penalty assessed against him was denied because he was determined to be a responsible person who willfully failed to pay over withheld taxes. The debtor stipulated that he was a responsible person and his failure to remit the withheld taxes was willful because he was aware of the company's employment tax deficiency yet chose to pay creditors other than the government. The fact that the debtor was told by the company's owner not to pay the taxes and that he might have been fired had he disobeyed orders did not excuse his liability for nonpayment.
L. Borman, BC-DC Fla., 2005-1 ustc ¶50,109.
A 100-percent trust fund penalty was reduced to judgment since the taxpayer was determined to be the responsible person who willfully failed to pay over trust fund taxes. The sole exception did not apply because he knew of the debt to the IRS and continued to use funds to pay other creditors.
R. Sage, DC N.Y., 2006-1 ustc ¶50,175, 412 FSupp2d 406.
Despite recurring health problems and absences from work, a CEO was a "responsible person" who willfully avoided tax obligations under Code Sec. 6672. The taxpayer's behavior was willful because he consciously and intentionally preferred another creditor over the United States; factual issues as to prior ignorance of non-payment then became irrelevant. Furthermore, allowing a responsible person to discount his liability based on the amount he actually wrongfully diverted to other creditors is inconsistent with the language of the statute.
D. S. Savage, DC-Calif., 2006-1 ustc ¶50,202.
The chairperson of a corporation's board of directors and the corporation's largest shareholder was a "responsible person" for purposes of the corporation's unpaid employment taxes and was liable for the trust fund recovery penalty. He satisfied the willfulness requirement because he knew of the corporation's unpaid taxes and made no effort to urge other members of the board to pay the IRS, rather than the other creditors.
T.C. Turner, DC Wash., 2006-1 ustc ¶50,238.
For the periods after an individual signed a check for partial payment of unpaid withholding taxes that accompanied the federal withholding tax form, his claim of ignorance of the company's withholding tax problems was not credible. Since he was either aware that other liabilities were being satisfied in preference to withholding taxes or recklessly disregarded that information, he willfully failed to pay the federal withholding taxes of the company.
D.J. Thatcher, DC Pa., 2006-1 ustc ¶50,334.
The manager of a grocery store was determined to be a responsible person with regard to the store’s failure to pay over withholding taxes. Despite being the person responsible for the submission of withheld payments, and personally making such payments in the past, the individual did nothing to ensure that the taxes were in fact fully paid for the period at issue, although more than enough liquidation proceeds were generated from the closure of the store to pay the taxes.
J.H. Harold, CA-6 (unpublished opinion), 2006-2 ustc ¶50,525, aff'g an unreported DC Ohio decision.
A bankrupt airline company’s chief financial officer willfully failed to pay the company’s excise taxes. The individual was fully aware of the company’s financial condition and of the nonpayment of excise taxes but he continued to direct payments to other creditors.
R. Musal, DC Iowa, 2006-1 ustc ¶50,207, 421 FSupp2d 1153. Aff'd sub nom. D.R. Ferguson, CA-8, 2007-1 ustc ¶50,481, 484 F3d 1068.
A trust fund recovery penalty (TFRP) assessed against a responsible person after he was discharged from bankruptcy was reduced to judgment. The individual was a responsible person because he controlled the business’s finances and he recklessly failed to ensure that the withheld taxes were paid over to the government by the employee to whom he had delegated that responsibility.
D.H. Klohn, DC Fla., 2008-1 ustc ¶50,228.
The Board Chairman of a tax-exempt hospital was not entitled to a refund of the trust fund recovery penalty. The individual was a responsible person because he actively participated in the day-to-day management of the hospital, Also, the individual acted willfully because he had reason to know that the taxes were not being paid and failed to exercise his authority to ensure their payment. The fact that the primary responsibility for paying the taxes rested with another did not excuse him since the trust fund recovery penalty is a joint and several liability. Finally, the individual did not qualify for exemption from the penalty under Code Sec. 6672(e) because he did not serve solely in an honorary capacity as Chairman of the Board.
S.K. Verret, DC Texas, 2008-1 ustc ¶50,248, 542 FSupp2d 526, Aff'd per curiam, CA-5 (unpublished opinion), 2009-1 ustc ¶50,248, 312 FedAppx 615.
The founder, shareholder and officer of a corporation was liable for the trust fund recovery penalty assessed against him in connection with the corporation’s unpaid withholding taxes. The individual was a “responsible person” with respect to the corporation, and had acted willfully because he had reason to know that the taxes were not being paid and failed to exercise his authority to ensure their payment. Despite knowledge of the tax deficiencies, he regularly directed that payments be made to creditors other than the IRS.
C.B. Erwin, DC N.C., 2008-1 ustc ¶50,258.
An individual who was the president, director, Chief Executive Officer and majority shareholder of a corporation was liable for the trust fund recovery penalty assessed against him in connection with the corporation’s unpaid withholding taxes. The individual was a "responsible person" with respect to the corporation and acted willfully because he was aware of the tax debt, yet authorized and made payments to other creditors.
J.C. Tornes, DC Ohio, 2008-2 ustc ¶50,431.
The majority stockholder of two retail optometry companies was not entitled to a refund of the trust fund recovery penalty he paid to the IRS in satisfaction of the companies' unpaid withholding taxes. The individual continued to sign payroll checks, paying employees, rather than ensuring payment of the taxes, even after he became aware of the companies’ delinquent tax obligations.
L.H. Joel, DC Ky., 2008-2 ustc ¶50,451.
The director, shareholder and secretary-treasurer of a closely held corporation was liable for the trust fund recovery penalty assessed against her in connection with the corporation’s unpaid withholding taxes. The individual was a responsible person who acted willfully when she repeatedly failed to examine the corporation’s documents and request more information from the IRS despite having knowledge of the corporation’s unpaid withholding taxes. She had the power to pay the corporation’s withholding taxes and could not rely on her Indian culture to explain her failure to question her husband’s business practices and pay the corporation’s taxes once she became aware of them.
N. Noronha, DC Ky., 2008-2 ustc ¶50,554 (aff'g an unreported Bankruptcy Court decision).
The owner of a company was liable for the trust fund recovery penalty (TFRP). The individual maintained the company’s books, prepared its financial statements, authorized payment of its bills and payroll, reviewed federal income tax returns and prepared and signed federal payroll tax returns. He acted willfully because he had reason to know that the taxes were not being paid and failed to exercise his authority to ensure their payment. Despite knowledge of the tax deficiencies, he regularly directed that payments be made to creditors other than the IRS.
S.O. Johnson, DC Ill., 2008-2 ustc ¶50,585.
The president of the board of directors of a tax-exempt organization was not entitled to a refund of the federal employment and withholding taxes he paid from his personal funds. The individual’s actions were willful because he ignored signs that the center’s taxes were not being paid. While he asserted that he was not aware of the organization’s ongoing failure to remit payroll taxes, he had access to the reports made available at the organization’s office, and he was aware that at one time taxes had not been paid and penalties had been assessed. Additionally, although he had instructed a director to timely remit withheld taxes to the IRS, he did not ensure that the payments were actually made.
C.E. Jefferson, CA-7, 2008-2 ustc ¶50,587 aff'g DC Ill. 2007-1 ustc ¶50,304, 459 FSupp2d 685.
The owners of three companies and their employee, a certified public accountant (CPA), serving as the vice president of finance for those companies, were all responsible persons for purposes of the trust fund recovery penalty. The individuals acted willfully when they made payments to other creditors despite knowing that the trust fund taxes remained unpaid. Further, the involuntary bankruptcy proceeding instituted for one of the companies did not strip the owners’ of control and authority to pay that company’s withholding tax obligations.
S.P. Davis, Sr., DC La., 2008-2 ustc ¶50,613, Motion to reconsider den'd, 2009-1 ustc ¶50,375.
The secretary and treasurer of a corporation was liable for the trust fund recovery penalty assessed against him in connection with the corporation's unpaid withholding taxes. The individual, a "responsible person," had acted willfully because he authorized payments to nongovernmental creditors even after he became aware of the delinquent tax obligations.
W.M. Cheatle, DC Va., 2009-1 ustc ¶50,139, 589 FSupp2d 694.
Unpaid employment tax assessments against the president and vice-president of two health care companies were reduced to judgment. The individuals were responsible persons because they had the authority to sign checks, hire and fire employees, determine corporate financial policy, and authorize the payment of bills. Further, their decision not to pay the payroll taxes was willful because they knew about the companies’ unpaid payroll taxes, but they paid employees, including themselves, and other creditors in preference to the IRS.
J.A. Rineer, DC Tex., 2009-1 ustc ¶50,149, 594 FSupp2d 732.
The controller and Chief Financial Officer (CFO) of a company was a responsible person and liable for trust fund recovery penalties assessed against him in connection with the company’s unpaid employment taxes. He acted willfully because he was aware throughout the period of his employment that the company’s withholding taxes were not being paid and failed to exercise his authority to ensure their payment. Despite full knowledge of the unpaid tax obligations, the individual continued to prepare checks to pay employee salaries and nongovernmental creditors.
D.C. Milchling, DC Md., 2009-2 ustc ¶50,499.
The president/CEO of a hospital was liable for the trust fund recovery penalties assessed against him in connection with the hospital’s unpaid employment taxes. The individual was a responsible person with respect to the hospital and acted willfully in failing to remit the hospital’s withholding taxes. Despite having knowledge that the payroll taxes collected from hospital employees had not been remitted to the government in their entirety and possessing the authority to make payments on behalf of the hospital, the individual signed checks to pay suppliers and nongovernmental creditors; thereby willfully enabling hospital funds to be used for purposes other than paying taxes.
J. Doulgeris, DC Fla., 2009-2 ustc ¶50,544.

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Wednesday, October 14, 2009

The IRS was not barred from seizing an individual’s overpayment while an offer-in-compromise (OIC) was pending. Code Sec. 6331(i)(3)(B)(i), incorporated into Code Sec. 6331(k), permits an offset during the pendency of an OIC. Moreover, under Reg. §301.7122-1(g)(5), the submission of an OIC does not automatically operate to stay collection of a tax liability.
USTC Cases, Standford C. Stoddard, Plaintiff v. United States of America, Defendant., U.S. District Court, E.D. Michigan, 2009-2 U.S.T.C. ¶50,672, (Sept. 30, 2009) U.S. District Court, East. Dist. Mich., So. Div.; 07-11173, September 30, 2009.

An individual, who was a partner in various entities, established that material issues of fact existed regarding whether an assessment resulted from a judgment in a partnership-level proceeding. If the assessment resulted from a judgment in the partnership-level proceeding, the individual would be barred from raising a statute of limitations defense under Code Sec. 6501(a). Certificates of Assessments and Payments showed no reversal of an investment tax credit or a carryback and did not reflect the taxpayer’s filing of an amended return. Further, the assessment was not barred by a settlement agreement because the second page of the agreement contained specific language that excluded partnership items from the scope of the agreement.
[ Code Sec. 6331]
Offset: Offer-in-compromise.–
[
The complex nature of an individual’s financial affairs that allegedly made it difficult for him to obtain information necessary to accurately estimate his tax liability was not an unusual circumstance warranting abatement of additions to tax for underpayment of estimated taxes under Code Sec. 6654(e)(3)(A).





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IV. ARGUMENTS AND ANALYSIS
A. Burden of Proof
In general, a presumption of correctness attaches to a tax assessment if the assessment is supported by a minimal evidentiary or factual foundation. United States v. Stonehill [ 83-1 ustc ¶9285], 702 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1983). However, an assessment is “naked” and “beyond saving” when “the records supporting an assessment are excluded from evidence, … or are nonexistent, … , so that the basis upon which an assessment is calculated is beyond the knowledge of the court.” United States v. Schroeder [ 90-1 ustc ¶50,250], 900 F.2d 1144, 1149 (7th Cir. 1990).
Although courts recognize that the loss of the administrative file may mean that an assessment lacks a factual foundation, loss of the file does not necessarily create a “naked assessment.” Cook v. United States [ 2000-1 ustc ¶50,267], 46 Fed.Cl. 110, 114 (Ct. Fed.Cl. 2000). When the government produces evidence to support the assessment in lieu of the lost file, demonstrating that the assessment has a “foundation in fact,” then the presumption of correctness applies. Id. at 115. The burden of proof then shifts to the taxpayer to show that the assessment is arbitrary, erroneous or excessive. Helvering v. Taylor [ 35-1 ustc ¶9044], 293 U.S. 507, 79 L.Ed. 623, 55 S.Ct. 287 (1935). If the taxpayer rebuts the presumption, it disappears. Stonehill at 1294. The burden of proving the deficiency then reverts to the government. Id.
B. Objection 1: 1980 Assessment
The Magistrate said the Court lacked jurisdiction under the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, P.L. 97-248 (“TEFRA”) to consider Plaintiff's arguments, because Plaintiff presented no evidence on which a reasonable fact finder could conclude that the 1980 assessment was for anything other than a partnership item.
Plaintiff argues the Magistrate erred in presuming the 1980 assessment was a partnership assessment controlled by TEFRA and not barred by the statute of limitations in 26 U.S.C. §6501(a). He contends there is a question of fact whether: (1) the IRS adjusted his income for 1983 based on the judgment in the Barrister partnership level proceeding; (2) any such adjustment reduced a carryback claimed on his 1980 amended income tax return; (3) the IRS made an additional assessment of tax for 1980, because of a disallowed carryback; and (4) the statute of limitations barred the additional assessment for 1980.
The Government's position is that: (1) Plaintiff was a partner in Butler Properties, which in turn was a partner in Barrister Equipment Series 140; (2) the tax matters partner of Barrister Equipment Series 140 initiated a Tax Court proceeding in 1989 which addressed proposed TEFRA adjustments to Barrister's income for the 1983 and 1984 tax years; (3) the Tax Court proceeding was resolved in 1995 through the entry of a stipulated judgment; (4) pursuant to that judgment, the IRS made adjustments to Plaintiff's income for the 1983 tax year; (5) the adjustments to Plaintiff's income for 1983, once made, reduced a carryback credit which he previously claimed on his 1980 amended tax return; (6) in 1996, because of the disallowed carryback for 1980, the IRS made an additional assessment of tax for the 1980 tax year; and (7) the assessment (related to a 1983 TEFRA adjustment) was not barred by the statute of limitations.
Under TEFRA, a statute of limitations defense relates to a partnership item that must be raised at the partnership level. Kaplan v. United States [ 98-1 ustc ¶50,129], 133 F.3d 469, 473 (7th Cir. 1998). A “partnership item” is “any item required to be taken into account for the partnership's taxable year … [that] is more appropriately determined at the partnership level than at the partner level.” 26 U.S.C. §6231(a)(3). Changes in the tax liabilities of individual partners which result from the correct treatment of partnership items determined at the partnership level proceeding are defined under TEFRA as “computational adjustments.” IRC §6231(a)(6).
TEFRA contemplates the Commissioner's determination at the individual partner level of “affected items,” which are defined as “any item to the extent such item is affected by a partnership item.” 26 U.S.C. §6231(a)(5). Penalties assessed against a partner based on the partner's tax treatment of partnership items on his individual return are examples of affected items. See Olson v. United States [ 99-1 ustc ¶50,241], 172 F.3d 1311, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 1751, at *19-20 (Fed. Cir. 1999); N.C.F. Energy Partners v. Commissioner [ CCH Dec. 44,257], 89 T.C. 741, 744-46 (1987).
The Government admits that its administrative files for the 1980 tax year no longer exist or cannot be located. To meet its burden of production, the Government offered the following evidence: (1) a Certificate of Assessments and Payments for the 1980 tax year [ See Defendant's Ex. 3], which lists all of the assessments, penalties, interests, abatements, credits and refunds against Plaintiff and his deceased wife from June 17, 1981 through November 27, 2006; (2) Plaintiff's original 1980 income tax return [ See Plaintiff's Ex. I, p. 25], which indicates that he had a partnership interest in an entity called “Butler Properties; (3) a Prompt Assessment Billing Assembly on Form 3552 [ See Cole Dec. Ex. 11, p. 2048]; (4) a Request for Quick or Prompt Assessment on Form 2859 [ See Cole Dec. Ex. 11, p. ], which indicates that additional tax was assessed related to “Butler Properties” and “Barrister Flow-through"; (5) an Income Tax Examination Changes Form 4549A-CG [ See Cole Dec. Ex. 11, p. ], which indicates that the tax changes related to “Barrister Equipment Series 140” and an investment tax credit and an investment tax credit carryback; and (6) a microfiche page showing that Plaintiff is one of two partners in the entity with the taxpayer identification number identified for Butler Properties [ See Cole Dec. Ex. 16].
This evidence is sufficient to establish the Government's prima facie case. Accordingly, the presumption of correctness attaches to the assessment. See Coleman v. United States [ 83-1 ustc ¶9288], 704 F.2d 326, 329 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding that assessment was naked, but noting that “secondhand” records or “any demonstrably reasonable methodology of estimation” may be used to establish presumption of correctness).
In rebuttal, Plaintiff offered the following to meet his burden to show the assessment is erroneous: (1) the 1990 settlement agreement (Form 870-AD) with the IRS [ See Plaintiff's Ex. J]; (2) the OIC that was pending at the time of the seizure of the overpayment [ See Plaintiff's Ex. K]; (3) IRS Document Identification Forms regarding destroyed documents [ See Plaintiff's Ex. GG]; (4) the first page of the amended 1980 tax return, dated December 30, 1987, and prepared by Daniel Maher, along with check payable to the Internal Revenue Service in the amount of $37,380.00 [ See Plaintiff's Ex. G]; (5) the first page of the amended 1980 tax return, dated March 4, 1988 [ See Plaintiff's Ex. PP]; (6) a Notice of Deficiency dated May 1, 1996 regarding tax year 1980, along with a handwritten explanation on Form 5260 and an Income Tax Examination Changes form, showing a deficiency of $22,756.00 related to the Barrister 140 partnership [ See Plaintiff's Ex. OO]; and (7) the affidavit of Daniel Maher, Plaintiff's former accountant [ See Doc. 40]. Close review of the evidence supports Plaintiff's claim that material issues of fact exist which preclude summary judgment.
The IRS Document Identification Forms indicates that the IRS' 1980 and 1983 tax files were destroyed. The Government relies on the 1980 Certificate of Assessments and Payments to support the assessment. See Exh. 3. It shows assessments of tax and interest of $22,576.00 and $103,556.73, respectively, on April 4, 1996. However, it shows no reversal of an investment tax credit or a carryback for either 1980 or 1983. The Government concedes the document omits the amended return filed by Plaintiff in late 1987 or early 1988, though Plaintiff provides a copy of the first page of the return. This further calls into question the accuracy of the certificate. Similarly, the 1983 Certificate of Assessments and Payments does not reflect reversal of an investment tax credit (which would affect the 1980 tax year). See Exh. BB. The Government has not offered a notice of deficiency or a Barrister partnership audit assessment for the 1983 tax year (from which the 1980 carryback credit arose).
Notably, the “Notice of Deficiency” for the 1980 tax year shows a deficiency of $0, and penalties of $1,138.00 and $5,689.00, totaling $6,827.00. See Exh OO. Plaintiff contends that only $5,589.00 was assessed, and that he never received a notice of deficiency or assessment for any remaining amounts the IRS claims to be due. The “Income Tax Examination Changes” form reflects a $22,756.00 deficiency which the IRS says Plaintiff owes for 1980. See Exh. 11. But, it shows no adjustment to taxable income or investment tax credit recapture for 1980, thus the source of the deficiency is not clear. Another inconsistency exists in the Request for Quick or Prompt Assessment, which reflects taxes and interest of $124,622.66 owed for 1980 and a statute of limitations date of May 16, 1996. Id.
The affidavit of Plaintiff's former accountant, Daniel Maher, indicates that Plaintiff's 1986 amended income tax return contained a large loss on line 4, which arose from the payment of professional fees incurred by Plaintiff in the course of a government investigation of Michigan National Bank, a bank in which Plaintiff and other family members had a controlling interest. Mr. Maher says the large deduction for 1986 was carried back three years to 1983, resulting in excess tax credits for 1983, which were in turn carried back three more years to 1980, and that none of the changes in the amended income tax returns involved any investment in, or audit of, the Barrister Equipment Associates tax shelters.
The Government argues that Mr. Maher is not competent to rebut its evidence because he has no knowledge regarding the Barrister partnership proceeding. This Court disagrees. Mr. Maher's statements rebut the Government's claim that the carryback recapture from 1983 to 1980 was a Barrister partnership item. They create a question of fact regarding the source of the deficiency. Coupled with the above evidence, there is sufficient disagreement for presentation to a jury.
If, in fact, the 1980 assessment resulted from the judgment in the Barrister partnership level proceeding, it is a partnership assessment controlled by TEFRA and Plaintiff is barred from raising the statute of limitations defense in this partner-level, affected items proceeding. This question of fact must be resolved before the Court can determine which statute of limitations, if any, applies.
B. Objection 2: 1990 Settlement Agreement
Plaintiff argues the Magistrate erred in finding that the 1990 settlement agreement between Plaintiff and the IRS did not include Barrister Equipment Series 140 and all of its issues. He contends there is a question of fact regarding whether the second page of the IRS Form 870-AD, which includes printed language excluding partnership items, was properly incorporated in the agreement.
The Magistrate decided that the 1980 assessment was not barred by the 1990 settlement agreement because the second page of the IRS Form 870-AD contained specific language that excluded partnership items from the scope of the agreement. The Magistrate rejected Plaintiff's claims about the second page, finding that it was clearly part of the Form 870-AD agreement, not a separate, unrelated document. The Magistrate said that even though the agreement covered 1983 (the year related to the 1980 carryback), the carryback itself was a partnership item regarding Butler Properties/Barrister Equipment Series 140, and was excluded from the agreement.
The Form 870-AD covers the tax years 1982 to 1986 and has a handwritten notation which states “5 years closed at the appellate level plus 3 year carryback for investment tax credit (covers 1980).” See Exhibit J. It is unclear by whom and when this notation was written, and whether this was part of the agreement. Exhibit J also includes “Letter 913” from the IRS accepting Plaintiff's “Form 870-AD” and an attachment which includes a list of terms and conditions relative to “Form 870-AD.”
Plaintiff's affidavit states that he never saw the second page of the IRS Form 870-AD. See Doc. 39. Yet, Plaintiff submitted it as an exhibit and argues that those terms and conditions, found on the back of “Form 870-AD,” confirm that the 1990 settlement is final and binding. See Doc. 24, p. 10. Plaintiff seeks to have it both ways. He essentially asks the Court to find that the terms and conditions were not part of the original agreement, but to consider them to find that the 1990 settlement included the 1980 tax year. The Court finds that the Magistrate did not err in rejecting this argument.
C. Objection 3: Seizure of 2001 Overpayment
Plaintiff argues that the seizure of his 2001 overpayment, while he had a pending OIC, was a violation of the tax code and regulations. He contends that 26 C.F.R. §301.7122-1T(j), the temporary regulation in place at the time he submitted his OIC, is in conflict with 26 U.S.C. §6331(k)(1)(A) and is beyond the legitimate rulemaking power of the IRS. Plaintiff says the Magistrate overlooked the plain language of the OIC in finding that the IRS did not waive any statutory right to seize the 2001 overpayment. He says the Court has jurisdiction to apply equity and impose a remedy similar to recoupment, and award him a credit for future income taxes that become due and owing.
The Magistrate held that the regulation was a statutorily permissible exercise of the IRS's rule-making power because it derived from the IRS's power to collect taxes through offsets, as set forth in 26 U.S.C. §6402. The Magistrate says 26 U.S.C. §6331(i)(3)(B)(i), incorporated into 26 U.S.C. §6331(k), permits an offset during the pendency of an OIC. The Government agrees with this reasoning.
26 U.S.C. §6331(k) contains a statutory bar on levies during the pendency of an offer in compromise:
(1) Offer in compromise pending
No levy may be made under subsection (a) on the property or rights to property of any person with respect to any unpaid tax—
(A) during the period that an offer-in-compromise by such person under section 7122 of such unpaid tax is pending with the Secretary;
26 U.S.C. §6331(k)(1)(A). However, 26 U.S.C. §6331(k)(3) says that rules similar to 26 U.S.C. §6331(i)(3) and (4) shall apply to sub section 6331(k).
26 U.S.C. §6331(i) generally prohibits levies during the pendency of an action in federal trial court for recovery of a refund. However, §6331(i)(3) contains two exceptions; one applies here:
(B) Certain levies
This subsection shall not apply to—
(i) any levy to carry out an offset under section 6402;
26 U.S.C. §6331(i)(3)(B)(i).
26 U.S.C. §6402 grants broad authority to the IRS to credit overpayments to any tax liability, which may reasonably include interest and penalties. Smith v. United States [ 2001-1 ustc ¶50,177], 4 Fed.Appx. 759 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Thus, notwithstanding the perceived unfairness, the statute permits such a seizure while an offer in compromise is pending.
Additionally, under the current regulation 26 C.F.R. §301.7122-1(g)(5), which contains language identical to the temporary regulation, the submission of an OIC does not automatically operate to stay collection of a tax liability. This supports the view that the IRS may, but is not required to, stay the collection of tax while an OIC is pending.
Plaintiff admits that this language is discretionary, but contends the IRS either contracted away or waived its right to seize his refund by the terms of the OIC. He relies on Item 8(g) of the OIC:
As additional consideration beyond the amount of my/our offer, the IRS will keep any refund, including interest, due to me/us because of overpayment of any tax or other liability, for tax periods extending through the calendar year that the IRS accepts the offer. I/We may not designate an overpayment ordinarily subject to refund, to which the IRS is entitled, to be applied to estimated tax payments for the following year. This condition does not apply if the offer is based on Doubt as to Liability.
See Exhibit K, p. 3. He also relies on a form, contained in the same exhibit, which includes a section regarding “Withholding Collection Activities”:
We will withhold collection activities while we consider your offer. We will not act to collect the tax liability:
• While we investigate and evaluate your offer
• For 30 days after we reject an offer
• While you appeal an offer rejection
See Exhibit K, p. 5. It is unclear whether this form was part of the OIC, and based on the parties' submissions, the Court cannot conclude that it was. Additionally, page 1 of the OIC says that “signature(s) of taxpayer is required on last page of Form 656.” Neither Plaintiff, nor the Government included a signature page with their exhibits. In its absence, the Court cannot conclude that the parties agreed to be bound by any specific terms and conditions, and that there was a waiver of the right to pursue collection. This objection lacks merit.
D. Objection 4: Assessment of Addition to Tax
Plaintiff argues that the Magistrate erred in finding that he was liable for 26 U.S.C. §6654 additions to tax for underpayment of estimated taxes. He contends that the nature of his income is extremely complex and it is difficult for him to obtain information necessary to accurately estimate his tax liability. Thus, he says there is a question of fact as to whether the additions to tax should be waived based on “unusual circumstances,” pursuant to §6654(e)(3)(A).
The Magistrate said that Plaintiff's claim of “unusual circumstances” is a claim of “reasonable cause” in disguise, and §6654(e)(3)(A) does not permit abatement for reasonable cause. The Magistrate opined that Plaintiff's difficulty in obtaining information is no more unusual than what might be experienced by any other taxpayer with investment income from multiple sources.
26 U.S.C. §6654 requires assessment of an addition to tax for an individual's underpayment of estimated tax payments. Section 6654(e)(3)(A) contains an exception:
No addition to tax shall be imposed under subsection (a) with respect to any underpayment to the extent the Secretary determines that by reason of casualty, disaster, or other unusual circumstances the imposition of such addition to tax would be against equity and good conscience.
26 U.S.C. §6654(e)(3)(A).
Plaintiff offers the affidavit of his accountant, Roger Steensma, to support his claim of unusual circumstances. Steensma says that he has prepared Plaintiff's personal income tax returns since 1995 and that they present “one of a kind” issues that are unique in complexity and scope; he spends an unparelled number of hours preparing Plaintiff's income tax return. Steensma also says that for the years in which the §6654 penalty was imposed, Plaintiff's failure to pay adequate estimated payments was largely due to untimely receipt of IRS Form 1099, IRS Schedule K-1 or other reports from the reporting sources.
Plaintiff says the R&R suggests he met the threshold required by the court in Carlson v. United States [ 97-2 ustc ¶50,702], 126 F.3d 915 (7th Cir. 1997), that a showing of “reasonable cause” - as that phrase relates to penalties for which there is a reasonable cause exception - has to be made before a taxpayer could meet the “unusual circumstances” exception under §6654(e)(3)(A). There, because the taxpayer could not even meet the reasonable cause standard for waiver of other tax penalties, he could not demonstrate unusual circumstances sufficient to avoid the §6654 addition to tax.
Plaintiff says he meets the reasonable cause standard and goes beyond by showing it was beyond his control to obtain the necessary information. The Government counters that to the extent Carlson allows for a reasonable cause exception to the §6654 addition to tax, the Seventh Circuit improperly grafted a reasonable cause exception not provided by Congress. The Court agrees; the plain language of the statute does not contain a reasonable cause exception.
Plaintiff also cites In re Sims [ 91-2 ustc ¶50,510], 1991 WL 322994 (Bkrtcy. E.D. La, 1991) in support of his contention that his situation falls within the unusual circumstances language. Similar to this Plaintiff, the debtor in Sims was an investor in a number of business ventures and partnerships. The tax reporting for those entities was handled by individuals other than the debtor and his accountant, and many times they could not obtain information to timely file a tax return. The IRS argued that the debtor was liable for additions to tax pursuant to §6654. The bankruptcy court held that such inability to obtain needed information constituted an unusual circumstance, such that the imposition of an additional tax would be against equity and good conscience.
Plaintiff notes that the Sims decision has been cited by the United States Tax Court without disparagement of its holding. See Merriam v. Commissioner [ CCH Dec. 50,880(M)], T.C. Memo 1995-432 (distinguishing Sims where the records needed to complete taxpayer's return were available to taxpayer, under taxpayer's control, and capable of being generated by taxpayer).
The Government, however, says that §6654(e)(3)(A) applies only if the Secretary has made a determination that “by reason of casualty, disaster, or other unusual circumstances” it “would be against equity and good conscience” to impose the addition. Since no determination was made here, the Government suggests the absence of such a determination cannot be viewed by the Court, or to the extent that it can, must be reviewed on an abuse of discretion standard. It relies on United States v. Williams [ 95-1 ustc ¶50,218], 514 U.S. 527, 537 (1995) and Mekulsia v. Commissioner [ 2005-1 ustc ¶50,108], 389 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 2004) for this proposition.
In Williams, the Court, in discussing why the plaintiff could not avail herself of §6325(b)(3), noted that the remedy afforded by the statute and its implementing regulation was available only at the Government's discretion. Id. at 537.
In Mekulsia, the taxpayer challenged the Commissioner's denial of an interest abatement for payment deficiencies under §6404. The court held the taxpayer must both identify a ministerial act that was required, and was not performed or was performed in an erroneous manner, and prove abuse of discretion. Id. at 604. The court did not reach the abuse of discretion question because it found all relevant acts were discretionary and not ministerial.
Here, the Government cites to no similar discretionary language in §6654(e)(3)(A). This Court rejects the contention that the decision is not subject to judicial review.
The Government additionally says that Plaintiff's argument regarding his inability to make estimated payments is not credible, because §6654(d)(1)(B)(ii) provides a safe harbor provision where taxpayers make estimated payments based on the prior year's tax figure. That credibility determination is a question of fact for the jury.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court ADOPTS the Magistrate's Report and Recommendation with the following modification:
A. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment regarding the 1980, 1995, and 1998 through 2000 tax years is DENIED for the reasons stated.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Whalen, Magistrate Judge: On March 19, 2007, Plaintiff Stanford C. Stoddard filed a taxpayer's complaint for a refund, pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §6532(a) (referencing 26 U.S.C. §7422(a)). Before the Court are Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment [Docket #24] and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket #27], which have been referred for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(B). For the reasons set forth below, I recommend as follows:
(1) That Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment [Docket #24] be DENIED.
(2) That Defendant's motion for summary judgment [Docket #27] be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Specifically, regarding the assessments for tax years 1980, 1995, 1998, 1999 and 2000, the motion should be GRANTED, and those claims DISMISSED. Regarding the assessments for the 1984 tax year, the Defendant's motion should be DENIED.
I. FACTS
When Plaintiff filed his 2001 federal income tax return, he declared an overpayment of $411,480.00. Plaintiff's Motion, Exhibit D. However, by correspondence dated December 2, 2002, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) applied $177,384.23 of that overpayment to taxes it claimed were owed for other tax periods. Id., Exhibit E. Specifically, the IRS applied these funds as follows:
Tax Period Amount Applied
1980 $72,989.14
1984 $50,451.24
1995 $19,317.62
1998 $ 326.78
1999 $18,215.33
2000 $16,084.12


TOTAL $177,384.23
Through both his accountant and his attorney, Plaintiff filed a claim for a refund with the IRS. Following discussion and correspondence between the parties, the IRS disallowed the Plaintiff's claim by correspondence dated November 8, 2006. Id., Exhibit B. On March 13, 2007, following further review “on an informal basis,” the IRS reaffirmed its denial of the claim. Plaintiff timely filed the present action on March 19, 2007.
Both parties have filed motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff clarified at oral argument that he seeks summary judgment only as to the portion of his 2001 overpayment that was applied to the 1980 tax period. Additional facts peculiar to each year in question will be discussed in the Analysis section.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate where “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must show sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact. Klepper v. First American Bank, 916 F.2d 337, 341-42 (6 th Cir. 1990). Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, the Court must determine “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Entry of summary judgment is appropriate “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celetox Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). When the “record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party,” there is no genuine issue of material fact, and summary judgment is appropriate. Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945, 951 (6 th Cir. 2000).
Once the moving party in a summary judgment motion identifies portions of the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute over material facts, the opposing party may not then “rely on the hope that the trier of fact will disbelieve the movant's denial of a disputed fact,” but must make an affirmative evidentiary showing to defeat the motion. Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479 (6 th Cir. 1989). The non-moving party must identify specific facts in affidavits, depositions or other factual material showing “evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252 (emphasis added). If, after sufficient opportunity for discovery, the non-moving party cannot meet that burden, summary judgment is clearly proper. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23.
III. ANALYSIS
A. 1980 Tax Year
The IRS applied $72,989.14 out of Plaintiff's 2001 overpayment to satisfy an assessment regarding the 1980 tax year. The assessment, made in 1996, is documented in Defendant's Exhibit 11, filed with Defendant's Response and Cross-Motion [Docket #27]. IRS Form 2859, part of that exhibit, contains a “Remarks” section that describes the basis of the assessment as “Re: Butler Properties 38-612, Barrister Flow-through.” This is further set forth in form 4549-CG, part of the same exhibit (pg. IRS 2055), describing an adjustment to income based on a flow-through from the 1983 tax year:
“Butler Properties / 38-6124762 Flow thru Barrister Equipment Associates Series 140/11-2646864 / Investment tax credit / investment tax credit carryback.” (Emphasis added).
With regard to the present case, the critical item is Barrister Equipment Series 140. Barrister is a partnership item, subject to the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (“TEFRA”), 26 U.S.C. §§6221-6234. 1 Barrister Equipment Series 140 was a party to a United States Tax Court partnership-level proceeding in 1989. See Defendant's Exhibit #15. The Defendant states that Plaintiff Stoddard had an interest in the Barrister partnership through Butler Properties, another partnership:
“The Plaintiff's original income tax return for 1980 indicates that he had a partnership interest in an entity called ‘Butler Properties. (Plaintiff's Ex. I, Plaintiff's ECF page 25 of 45.) An IRS document related to the 1996 assessments for the 1980 tax year indicates that the additional tax related to ‘Butler Properties’ and ‘Flow Thru Barrister Equipment Series 140’ and an investment tax credit or investment tax credit carry-back related to those two entities. ( See Cole Decl. Exh. 11, (IRS pages 2055 and 2049.) The United States has also located an IRS microfiche page showing that Stanford Stoddard is one of two partners in the entity with the taxpayer identification number identified for Butler Properties on the abovedescribed exhibit. ( See Cole Decl. Ex. 16.) Thus, the evidence demonstrates that Mr. Stoddard had links, through one of his own partnerships, to Barrister Equipment Series 140.” Defendant's Brief in Opposition [Docket #27], p.9.
Plaintiff's Exhibit OO, attached to his supplemental brief [Docket #38], is a deficiency letter from the IRS to the Plaintiff, dated May 1, 1996, along with documentation explaining the reasons for the determination of a tax deficiency for 1980. This exhibit further supports the finding that the claimed deficiency was related to the Butler Properties/Barrister Equipment Series 140 partnership item. It contains the same portion of Form 2859 noted above, as well as an explanation on page 4 Schedule A of a Butler Properties adjustment indicating a carry-back from 1983:
“An examination of this partnership [Butler Properties] indicates that your distributive share of ordinary income (loss) should be corrected as shown above. A detailed report which sets forth the adjustments to the partnership income has been furnished to the tax matters partner. Please contact such individual or organization for additional information.”
Page 3 of Schedule A (Plaintiff's Exhibit OO, attached to Plaintiff' Supplemental Brief, Docket #38) also reflects “1983 adjustments attributable to tax motivated transactions” that include a 1983 carry-back investment credit related to Butler Properties.
Thus, Plaintiff's argument that the source of the 1980 carry-back claim is unclear, or that 1983 was not a “Barrister Properties year,” lacks plausibility.
Plaintiff argues that the 1980 assessment is barred by the statute of limitations set forth in either 26 U.S.C. §6501(a) or §6502(1)(a). However, a statute of limitations challenge by an individual partner is barred by TEFRA, 26 U.S.C. §6221. In Kaplan v. United States [ 98-1 ustc ¶50,129], 133 F.3d 469 (7 th Cir. 1998), the plaintiffs in a tax refund action brought a statute of limitations challenge regarding an alleged partnership item. The Seventh Circuit held:
“This argument cannot succeed because the underlying substantive claim concerns the propriety of the adjustments to the partnership's 1983 tax return. If the Kaplans were to succeed in their claim, it would affect the tax liability of all of MCDA II's partners. This is precisely the type of challenge prohibited by TEFRA in light of Congress's decision that such suits are better addressed in one fell swoop at the ‘partnership level’ than in countless suits by individual partners. Other courts share our view that this kind of statute of limitation challenge concerns a partnership item. See Thomas v. United States [ 97-1 ustc ¶50,368], 967 F.Supp. 505, 506 (N.D. Ga.1997); Crowell v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue [ CCH Dec. 49,881], 102 T.C. 683, 693, 1994 WL 151303 (1994); Slovacek v. United States [ 98-1 ustc ¶50,397], 36 Fed.Cl. 250, 254-56 (1996); Anderson v. United States [ 93-1 ustc ¶50,360], No. C-91-3523 MHP, 1993 WL 204605 (N.D. Cal. June 3, 1993), aff'd. without opinion, [ 95-1 ustc ¶50,052], 50 F.3d 13 (9th Cir.1995).”
“It is well established that statute of limitations challenges are considered challenges to a partnership item.” Williams v. United States [ 98-2 ustc ¶50,679], 165 F.3d 30, *3 (Table) (6 th Cir. 1998); see also Klein v. United States [ 2001-2 ustc ¶50,484], 86 F.Supp.2d 690 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (Roberts, J.) (“Applying Kaplan to the instant case, it is clear that this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain Plaintiffs' claim for refund with respect to partnership items”).
Likewise, this Court lacks jurisdiction, under TEFRA, to consider Plaintiff's arguments, including statute of limitations issues, regarding what the Defendant has clearly shown are partnership items relative to the 1980 assessment.
Furthermore, the 1980 assessment is not barred by a 1990 settlement agreement entered into by the Plaintiff and the IRS. That agreement, set forth an an IRS Form 870-AD, is appended to Plaintiff's motion as Exhibit J [Docket #24], and settles claims relating to tax years 1982 to 1986. It is a two-page form, with the second page containing language that specifically and unambiguously excludes partnership items from the scope of the agreement: 2
“If this offer is accepted, the case will not be opened by the Commissioner unless there was…a deficiency or overassessment resulting from adjustments made under Subchapters C and D of Chapter 63 concerning the tax treatment of partnership and subchapter S items determined at the partnership and corporate level.” (Emphasis added).
Also, the Defendant has submitted as Exhibit 1 to the Supplemental Declaration of Thomas P. Cole [Docket #37] a portion of the closing memorandum from Plaintiff's 1990 settlement, which confirms that the Barrister Series 140 matter was not included in the agreement:
“All adjustments necessary for the Barrister 136 settlement were assessed by the TEFRA Support Unit on April 9, 1990.
“ The Barrister 140 and the Dayton Securities tax shelters have not yet been settled. Therefore, the case will be forwarded to the TEFRA Support Unit which is controlling the Butler tax shelter after processing of the other issues reflected in this Appeals Report.” (Emphasis added).
Thus, even though the agreement covers 1983 (the year related to the 1980 carryback), the carry-back itself was a partnership item regarding Butler Properties/Barrister Equipment Series 140. As a partnership item, it is excepted from the 1990 agreement.
Finally, Plaintiff entered into another agreement with the IRS in 1989, an agreement that did address and settle partnership items related to tax years 1983 and 1984. See Exhibit NN, appended to Plaintiff's Supplemental Brief [Docket #38] and Exhibit 1 to Supplemental Declaration of Thomas Cole [Docket #37]. However, that agreement very specifically relates to Barrister Equipment Series 136, not Barrister Equipment Series 140, the partnership at issue in this case. Therefore, Plaintiff can find no refuge in the 1989 agreement.
Plaintiff has presented no evidence on which a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that the assessment for 1980 was related to anything other than a partnership item. Accordingly, this Court is without jurisdiction to consider Plaintiff's refund action with respect to that year, Kaplan v. United States, supra. Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to 1980 should be granted, and Plaintiff's motion denied.
B. 1984 Tax Year
The 1996 assessments regarding Plaintiff's 1984 tax year is more problematic. Defendant's Exhibit 12 [appended to Docket #27] is the Examination Closing Record for the tax year ending December 31, 1984. This is the only documentation that relates to 1984. Unlike Exhibit 11, relating to the 1980 tax year, Exhibit 12 contains no reference to Barrister Equipment or flow-throughs from Butler Properties. Indeed, comparing the 1980 assessment documents, Defendant concedes that “[w]e have been unable to locate a comparable document for the 1984 year.” Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 17 [Docket #27]. Rather, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's situation in 1984 was “likely” the same as the plaintiffs in Chimblo v. United States, supra, a case that involved the Barrister Equipment partnership:
“ Chimblo indicates that the Barrister Equipment Series Tax Court proceedings related to the 1983 and 1984 tax years. Chimblo [ 99-1 ustc ¶50,540], 177 F.3d at 121-22. At the conclusion of that case, the IRS proposed deficiencies against the Chimblos, who were partners in another Barrister Equipment Series partnership, for 1984 and 1980, because the Chimblos had carried back losses from the 1983 or 1984 years back to the 1980 year. Chimblo [ 99-1 ustc ¶50,540], 177 F.3d at 122. The same thing likely happened with Mr. Stoddard: following the conclusion of the Barrister Tax Court Equipment Series Tax Court proceeding, adjustments were made to the Stoddard liability, which included the making of a new assessment for the 1984 year and the disallowance of a carryback for the 1980 year. Indeed, Mr. Stoddard's argument that the 1990 settlement agreement covered the 1980 year (even though this year is not on the settlement agreement) may very well be premised on the carrying back of a loss for the 1983 year (which may have been allowed by the 1990 settlement) to the 1980 year.” (Emphasis added).
In a summary judgment motion, it is incumbent on the moving party to initially demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute over material facts. Celotex, supra, 477 U.S. at 422-23; Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970) (“As the moving party, respondent had the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact, and for these purposes the material it lodged must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opposing party”); Moldowan v. City of Warren, F.3d , 2009 WL 2176640, *12 (6 th Cir. 2009) (“At the summary judgment stage, the moving party bears the initial burden of identifying those parts of the record that demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact”). 3
Exhibit 12, which contains absolutely no reference to partnership items, does not satisfy the Defendant's burden under Rule 56. Nor does Defendant's speculation that Plaintiff's situation in 1984 is “likely” similar to the plaintiffs in Chimbo, or that the settlement agreement “may very well be” premised on the carry-back of a 1984 partnership item. Moreover, Plaintiff has submitted as Exhibit AA, appended to his motion for summary judgment [Docket #24], a transcript of his IRS records pertaining to tax year 1984, including certificates of assessments and payments. These records indicate that additional tax, along with interest and penalties, was assessed in 1996, but (consistent with Defendant's admission that there are no documents substantiating its claim that the assessments related to partnership items), there is no reference to Butler Properties or Barrister Equipment Series 140.
As discussed above, there is ample support for the Defendant's claim that the adjustments for 1980 involved partnership items, and therefore this Court is without jurisdiction under TEFRA. By contrast, there is little support, other than inferences derived from the Chimbo case, that the assessments for 1984 were related to Barrister, Butler, or any other partnership. If they were not, there is no TEFRA bar to this suit, and summary judgment for the Defendant is inappropriate.
C. 1995 and 1998 to 2000 Tax Years
The assessments of penalties for tax years 1995, 1998, 1999 and 2000 4 were based on Plaintiff's failure to make sufficient estimated tax installment payments. See 26 U.S.C. §6654, which provides for the assessment of penalties where there is an underpayment of estimated taxes. Plaintiff seeks abatement of the penalties owing to the complex nature of his income and his inability to obtain timely and accurate reporting from his income sources, which number 155 items.
In April, 2002, Plaintiff filed an Offer in Compromise (“OIC”) regarding liability for tax years 1995, 1998, 1999 and 2000. 5 On December 2, 2002, while the OIC was pending, the IRS applied a portion of Plaintiff's overpayment for the 2001 tax year to the assessments for 1995 and 1998 to 2000. On April 14, 2003, the IRS denied the OIC, stating:
“We are sorry but your offer is rejected because the taxes, penalties and interest are held to be legally due and an amount larger than the offer has been collected. We do not have authority to accept an offer in these circumstances.”
Plaintiff's Motion, Exhibit M [Docket #24].
Plaintiff argues that the Defendant's seizure and crediting of his 2001 overpayment to the assessments in question while an OIC was pending was improper. The Defendant relies on then-temporary regulation 26 C.F.R. §301.7122-1T(j), which provides, “Notwithstanding the evaluation and processing of an offer to compromise, the IRS may, in accordance with section 6402, credit any overpayments made by the taxpayer against a liability that is the subject of an offer to compromise and may offset such overpayments against other liabilities owed by the taxpayer to the extent authorized by section 6402.” 6 Plaintiff counters that the regulation is in conflict with 26 U.S.C. §6331(k)(1)(A), which provides:
(1) Offer-in-compromise pending.—No levy may be made under subsection (a) on the property or rights to property of any person with respect to any unpaid tax—
(A) during the period that an offer-in-compromise by such person under section 7122 of such unpaid tax is pending with the Secretary.
Given this statutory bar on levies made during the pendency of an offer in compromise, Plaintiff argues that “the regulation is clearly beyond the legitimate rule making power of the IRS.” Plaintiff's Supplemental Brief, pp. 3-4 [Docket #38]. Plaintiff's argument is based on an incomplete reading of the underlying statute, 26 U.S.C. §6331(k).
In determining whether an agency exceeds its rule-making power, the first question is “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842, 104 S.Ct. 2778 (1984). In analyzing whether Congress has directly spoken, the court “employ[s] ‘the traditional tools of statutory construction.’” Timex V.I. Inc. v. United States, 157 F.3d 879, 882 (Fed.Cir. 1998) ( citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, n.9). These tools include the statute's plain text, structure, and legislative history. Because the regulation derives from the IRS's power to collect taxes through offsets, as set forth in 26 U.S.C. §6402, it is important to understand what §6331(k) says about offsets. In this regard, §6331(k)(3) states:
(3) Certain rules to apply.—Rules similar to the rules of—
(A) paragraphs (3) and (4) of subsection (i), and
(B) except in the case of paragraph (2)(C), paragraph (5) of subsection (i), shall apply for purposes of this subsection. (Emphasis added).
The referenced Subsection (i) generally precludes levies during the pendency of a federal court action to recover a refund. However, § (i)(3)(B)(i) sets forth an exception to this rule:
(B) Certain levies.—This subsection shall not apply to—
(i) any levy to carry out an offset under section 6402.
Again, the plain language of a statute is a controlling factor. Because Paragraph (3)(B)(i) is explicitly incorporated into §6331(k), it is clear that subparagraph (k) permits an offset even though an OIC is pending, and that the corresponding regulation is a statutorily permissible exercise of the IRS's rule-making power. 7
On a visceral level, the idea that the IRS can swoop in and seize an overpayment while an OIC is pending, and then deny the OIC because the assessment has been paid in full, seems offensive. Whether or not it is equivalent to “grand larceny,” as the Plaintiff suggests, the average fourth-grader would no doubt perceive it as unfair, at least in the colloquial sense. Nevertheless, Congress has spoken, and under the existing statutory and regulatory scheme, the IRS lawfully applied the Plaintiff's 2001 overpayment to the assessments in question. Plaintiff's remedy lies in this action for a refund. 8 The underlying question in this case is whether the Plaintiff does or does not owe the money, not whether the IRS played dirty pool in the way it collected the penalty.
In a court challenge to an addition to tax for underpayment of estimated tax, the IRS has the initial burden of production. 26 U.S.C. §7491(c); Rinn v. C.I.R. [ CCH Dec. 55,789(M)], 2004 WL 2397144, *3 (U.S. Tax Ct., 2004). In this case, the Plaintiff does not dispute that the estimated tax was underpayed, and indeed, the Defendant has provided sufficient documentation to show an underpayment. Defendant has therefore satisfied its burden of production. The burden therefore shifts to the Plaintiff to show that the additions to tax were invalid. Simpson v. C.I.R., 23 Fed.Appx. 425, *4 (6 th Cir. 2001), citing Ledbetter v. Commissioner [ 88-1 ustc ¶9138], 837, F.2d 708, 711 (5 th Cir. 1988).
Plaintiff argues that the penalty/additions to tax should be abated under 26 U.S.C. §6654(e)(3)(A), providing for no addition for underpayment of estimated tax where the failure is due to “unusual circumstances” and addition would be “against equity and good conscience.” He contends that the nature of his income is extremely complex and that it is difficult for him to obtain information necessary to accurately estimate his tax liability. Plaintiff's accountant, Roger D. Steensma, has prepared an affidavit, appended to Plaintiff's Supplemental Brief [Docket #38] as Exhibit QQ, stating, at ¶ 31:
“Mr. Stoddard's income tax returns for each year in question presents, in my experience, the type of ‘unusual circumstances’ warranting abatement of the §6654 penalty due to (a) the amount of income he receives, (b) the numerous sources of income and businesses in which he is a third party investor, and (c) that he is without input or control in providing timely financial reporting for nearly all of these sources of income and businesses.”
It is important to note that while §6654(e)(3)(A) provides for abatement in the case of “unusual circumstances,” it does not permit abatement for “reasonable cause.” Plaintiff concedes that a “reasonable cause” defense is unavailable to him. See Plaintiff's Consolidated Reply, p. 17 [Docket #30]. In this regard, Plaintiff cites Carlson v. United States [ 97-2 ustc ¶50,702], 126 F.3d 915, 921 (7 th Cir. 1997), which in turn quotes a Treasury Regulation, 26 C.F.R. §301.6651-1(c)(1), defining “reasonable cause” as follows:
“Failure to pay will be considered to be due to reasonable cause to the extent that the taxpayer has made a satisfactory showing that he exercised ordinary business care and prudence in providing for payment of his tax liability and was nevertheless either unable to pay the tax or would suffer an undue hardship..if he paid on the due date.”
While the Plaintiff does not claim (and the evidence does not show) that he was either unable to pay the estimated tax or that to do so would cause him undue hardship, his claim of “unusual circumstances,” based on the complexity and numerosity of his sources of income and the difficulty in obtaining timely information from those sources, sounds very much like a claim that he “exercised ordinary business care and prudence,” but was still unable to make the payments. In that sense, his claim of “unusual circumstances” is a claim of “reasonable cause” in disguise.
The only authority Plaintiff cites to support his claim of unusual circumstances is an unpublished bankruptcy court decision from Louisiana, In re Sims [ 91-2 ustc ¶50,510], 1991 WL 322994 (Bkrtcy. E.D. La., 1991). The court described Sims' situation as follows:
“During the years at issue, the Debtor was an investor in a number of business ventures and partnerships. The tax reporting for those business entities was handled by individuals besides the Debtor or his accountant. As reflected in the testimony at trial, on many occasions neither the Debtor nor his accountant could obtain tax reporting information to timely file a tax return. The Debtor filed extensions for some years, but much of the needed information was not available by the extended filing due dates.” Id. at *1.
Finding these to be “unusual circumstances” under §6654(e)(3)(A), the court held:
“The facts and evidence presented above in this case indicate that neither the Debtor nor his accountant had any control, power, or ability to secure the proper documents and financial information needed to prepare the Debtor's income tax returns for the year in question. This Court holds that such inability to obtain needed information constitutes an unusual circumstance and the imposition of an additional tax under 26 U.S.C. §6654 would be against equity and good conscience.” Id. at *2
Apart from the fact that Sims has no precedential value, I disagree with its conclusion regarding what constitutes “unusual circumstances.” First, as noted above, to allow the complexity of a taxpayer's income and the difficulty of obtaining information to constitute “unusual circumstances” would be to effectively import a “reasonable cause” standard into §6654(e)(3)(A). “[N]either reasonable cause nor good faith is a valid defense against the [ §6654] penalty.” Sawyer v. United States [ 77-1 ustc ¶9190], 426 F.Supp. 572, 574 (D.C. La. 1977). The Plaintiff's difficulty in obtaining information is no more unusual than what might be experienced by any other taxpayer who has investment income from multiple sources. While it could be said that the Plaintiff's underpayment of his estimated tax was due to extenuating circumstances, that is insufficient under §6654(e)(3)(A). See Estate of Ruben v. CIR [ CCH Dec. 24,109], 33 T.C. 1071, 1072 (U.S. Tax Court, 1960) (“This section has no provision relating to reasonable cause and lack of willful neglect. It is mandatory and extenuating circumstances are irrelevant”); Gurtman v. United States [ 73-2 ustc ¶9528], 1973 WL 574, *4 (D. N.J. 1973) (unpublished) (“[T]here can be no doubt that Congress explicitly defined all exceptions to the operation of the addition to tax provision of Section 6654(a), and that no exception based upon reasonable cause or other mitigating or extenuating circumstances may be fairly implied.”).
More generally, to accept the Sims view of what constitutes “unusual circumstances” would create a double standard, whereby taxpayers who derive an extremely large income from a complex network of investments and outside sources are given an advantage not enjoyed by those operating under more modest circumstances.
For these reasons, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment as to the assessments for 1995 and 1998 to 2000.
IV. CONCLUSION
I recommend as follows:
(1) That Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment [Docket #24] be DENIED.
(2) That Defendant's motion for summary judgment [Docket #27] be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Specifically, regarding the assessments for tax years 1980, 1995, 1998, 1999 and 2000, the motion should be GRANTED, and those claims DISMISSED. Regarding the assessments for the 1984 tax year, the Defendant's motion should be DENIED.
Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed within ten (10) days of service of a copy hereof as provided for in 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1) and E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(d)(2). Failure to file specific objections constitutes a waiver of any further right of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985); Howard v. Secretary of HHS, 932 F.2d 505 (6 th Cir. 1991); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6 th Cir. 1981). Filing of objections which raise some issues but fail to raise others with specificity will not preserve all the objections a party might have to this Report and Recommendation. Willis v. Secretary of HHS, 931 F.2d 390, 401 (6 th Cir. 1991); Smith v. Detroit Fed'n of Teachers Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6 th Cir. 1987). Pursuant to E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(d)(2), a copy of any objections is to be served upon this Magistrate Judge.
Within ten (10) days of service of any objecting party's timely filed objections, the opposing party may file a response. The response shall be not more than twenty (20) pages in length unless by motion and order such page limit is extended by the court. The response shall address specifically, and in the same order raised, each issue contained within the objections.

Footnotes


1
A "partnership item" is "any item required to be taken into account for the partnership's taxable year…[that] is more appropriately determined at the partnership level than at the partner level." 26 U.S.C. §6231(a)(3). See Chimblo v. CIR [ 99-1 ustc ¶50,540], 177 F.3d 119, 121 (2 nd Cir 1999).
2
Plaintiff's argument that the printed language excluding partnership items was not properly incorporated into the agreement is without merit. It is clearly the second page, and thus part of Form 870-AD, not a separate, unrelated document.
3
If a moving party fails to meet this initial burden, the non-moving party has no duty to present countervailing evidence. Indeed, a court abuses its discretion if it grants a summary judgment motion where the moving party has not met its burden. Hunter v. Caliber System, Inc., 220 F.3d 702, 726 (6 th Cir. 2000).
4
The penalty for under payment of estimated taxes is deemed an "addition to tax" under 26 U.S.C. §6654(a)).

5
The OIC also included tax years 1980 and 1984.
6
This temporary regulation was in effect at the time Plaintiff's OIC was submitted. It has since been replaced by a permanent regulation, 26 C.F.R. §301-7122-1(g)(5), which contains the same language.
7
In his Consolidated Reply to Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket #30], Plaintiff asks for damages pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §§7433(a) and (b), based on the application of the offset while an OIC was pending. Apart from the fact that this claim was not included in the complaint, it fails on its merits. Section 7433(a) provides a cause of action where "in connection with any collection of Federal tax with respect to a taxpayer, any officer or employee of the Internal Revenue Service recklessly or intentionally, or by reason of negligence disregards any provision of this title, or any regulation promulgated under this title…." In this case, there was compliance with, not disregard of the applicable statutes and regulations. Moreover, no individual "officer or employee" of the IRS has been named as a Defendant.
8
Plaintiff suggests that the overpayment should be returned to him and the OIC should be reinstated and reconsidered by the Commission. However, there would be two additional impediments to ordering the return of the seized overpayment prior to this Court's substantive finding that Plaintiff did not owe the additions to tax. First, the Plaintiff's request is in the nature of injunctive relief, which is proscribed by 26 U.S.C. §7421(a). Secondly, a plaintiff cannot maintain a refund suit unless the tax has been paid. See Flora v. United States [ 60-1 ustc ¶9347], 362 U.S. 145, 146-63, 80 S.Ct. 630, 4 L.Ed.2d 623 (1960); Martin v. Commissioner [ 85-1 ustc ¶9181], 753 F.2d 1358, 1360 (6th Cir.1985).

7122(a)Authorization.—
The Secretary may compromise any civil or criminal case arising under the internal revenue laws prior to reference to the Department of Justice for prosecution or defense; and the Attorney General or his delegate may compromise any such case after reference to the Department of Justice for prosecution or defense.
7122(b)Record.—
Whenever a compromise is made by the Secretary in any case, there shall be placed on file in the office of the Secretary the opinion of the General Counsel for the Department of the Treasury or his delegate, with his reasons therefor, with a statement of—
7122(b)(1)
The amount of tax assessed,
7122(b)(2)
The amount of interest, additional amount, addition to the tax, or assessable penalty, imposed by law on the person against whom the tax is assessed, and
7122(b)(3)
The amount actually paid in accordance with the terms of the compromise.
Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this subsection, no such opinion shall be required with respect to the compromise of any civil case in which the unpaid amount of tax assessed (including any interest, additional amount, addition to the tax, or assessable penalty) is less than $50,000. However, such compromise shall be subject to continuing quality review by the Secretary.
7122(c)Rules for Submission of Offers-in-Compromise.—
7122(c)(1)Partial payment required with submission.—
7122(c)(1)(A)Lump-sum offers.—
7122(c)(1)(A)(i)In general.—
The submission of any lump-sum offer-in-compromise shall be accompanied by the payment of 20 percent of the amount of such offer.
7122(c)(1)(A)(ii)Lump-sum offer-in-compromise.—
For purposes of this section, the term "lump-sum offer-in-compromise" means any offer of payments made in 5 or fewer installments.
7122(c)(1)(B)Periodic payment offers.—
7122(c)(1)(B)(i)In general.—
The submission of any periodic payment offer-in-compromise shall be accompanied by the payment of the amount of the first proposed installment.
7122(c)(1)(B)(ii)Failure to make installment during pendency of offer.—
Any failure to make an installment (other than the first installment) due under such offer-in-compromise during the period such offer is being evaluated by the Secretary may be treated by the Secretary as a withdrawal of such offer-in-compromise.
7122(c)(2)Rules of application.—
7122(c)(2)(A)Use of payment.—
The application of any payment made under this subsection to the assessed tax or other amounts imposed under this title with respect to such tax may be specified by the taxpayer.
7122(c)(2)(B)Application of user fee.—
In the case of any assessed tax or other amounts imposed under this title with respect to such tax which is the subject of an offer-in-compromise to which this subsection applies, such tax or other amounts shall be reduced by any user fee imposed under this title with respect to such offer-in-compromise.
7122(c)(2)(C)Waiver authority.—
The Secretary may issue regulations waiving any payment required under paragraph (1) in a manner consistent with the practices established in accordance with the requirements under subsection (d)(3).
7122(d)Standards for Evaluation of Offers.—
7122(d)(1)In general.—
The Secretary shall prescribe guidelines for officers and employees of the Internal Revenue Service to determine whether an offer-in-compromise is adequate and should be accepted to resolve a dispute.
7122(d)(2)Allowances for basic living expenses.—
7122(d)(2)(A)In general.—
In prescribing guidelines under paragraph (1), the Secretary shall develop and publish schedules of national and local allowances designed to provide that taxpayers entering into a compromise have an adequate means to provide for basic living expenses.
7122(d)(2)(B)Use of schedules.—
The guidelines shall provide that officers and employees of the Internal Revenue Service shall determine, on the basis of the facts and circumstances of each taxpayer, whether the use of the schedules published under subparagraph (A) is appropriate and shall not use the schedules to the extent such use would result in the taxpayer not having adequate means to provide for basic living expenses.
7122(d)(3)Special rules relating to treatment of offers.—
The guidelines under paragraph (1) shall provide that—
7122(d)(3)(A)
an officer or employee of the Internal Revenue Service shall not reject an offer-in-compromise from a low-income taxpayer solely on the basis of the amount of the offer,
7122(d)(3)(B)
in the case of an offer-in-compromise which relates only to issues of liability of the taxpayer—
7122(d)(3)(B)(i)
such offer shall not be rejected solely because the Secretary is unable to locate the taxpayer's return or return information for verification of such liability; and
7122(d)(3)(B)(ii)
the taxpayer shall not be required to provide a financial statement, and

7122(d)(3)(C)
any offer-in-compromise which does not meet the requirements of subparagraph (A)(i) or (B)(i), as the case may be, of subsection (c)(1) may be returned to the taxpayer as unprocessable.
7122(e)Administrative Review.—
The Secretary shall establish procedures—
7122(e)(1)
for an independent administrative review of any rejection of a proposed offer-in-compromise or installment agreement made by a taxpayer under this section or section 6159 before such rejection is communicated to the taxpayer; and
7122(e)(2)
which allow a taxpayer to appeal any rejection of such offer or agreement to the Internal Revenue Service Office of Appeals.
7122(f)Deemed Acceptance of Offer Not Rejected Within Certain Period.—
Any offer-in-compromise submitted under this section shall be deemed to be accepted by the Secretary if such offer is not rejected by the Secretary before the date which is 24 months after the date of the submission of such offer. For purposes of the preceding sentence, any period during which any tax liability which is the subject of such offer-in-compromise is in dispute in any judicial proceeding shall not be taken into account in determining the expiration of the 24-month period.
Code Sec. 7122(f)[(g)]), below, as added by P.L. 109-432, §407(d), applies to submissions made and issues raised after the date on which the Secretary first prescribes a list under Code Sec. 6702(c), as amended by P.L. 109-432, §407(a).
7122(f)[(g)]Frivolous Submissions, etc.—
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, if the Secretary determines that any portion of an application for an offer-in-compromise or installment agreement submitted under this section or section 6159 meets the requirement of clause (i) or (ii) of section 6702(b)(2)(A), then the Secretary may treat such portion as if it were never submitted and such portion shall not be subject to any further administrative or judicial review.

Labels:

Friday, October 9, 2009

The IRS was required to reconsider the offer-in-compromise (OIC) made by an individual taxpayer. The settlement officer did not calculate the taxpayer’s future income using the 48-month factor allowable by the Internal Revenue Manual but used a 109-month factor.




Kenneth Everett Blair v. Commissioner., U.S. Tax Court, CCH Dec. 57,961(M), T.C. Memo. 2009-232, (Oct. 8, 2009)
U.S. Tax Court, Dkt. No. 16510-07L, TC Memo. 2009-232, October 8, 2009.




Kenneth Everett Blair, pro se; Francis Mucciolo, for respondent.


MEMORANDUM OPINION
WELLS, Judge: Petitioner petitioned the Court pursuant to section 6330(d) 1 to review the determination of respondent's Office of Appeals (Appeals Office) sustaining a proposed levy to collect petitioner's Federal income tax liabilities for 2001 through 2003. Petitioner argues that the Appeals officer was required to accept his offer of $24,000 to compromise his $81,483.52 (inclusive of penalties and interest) in liabilities. We decide whether the Appeals officer abused his discretion in rejecting petitioner's offer.

Background
The parties filed with the Court stipulations of fact and accompanying exhibits. The stipulated facts are found accordingly. When the petition was filed, petitioner resided in Florida.

On October 20, 2006, respondent mailed to petitioner a Letter 1058, Final Notice of Intent to Levy and Notice of Your Right to a Hearing, regarding petitioner's 2001, 2002, and 2003 income tax years. On October 27, 2006, respondent mailed to petitioner a Letter 3172, Notice of Federal Tax Lien Filing and Your Right to a Hearing Under IRC 6320, regarding petitioner's 2001, 2002, and 2003 taxable years. In his request for a hearing petitioner stated that the proposed levy would cause him financial hardship.

Petitioner was granted a hearing by respondent's Appeals Office for both the notice of lien and the notice of levy. At the hearing, petitioner made an offer-in-compromise of $24,000 as a collection alternative. After reviewing petitioner's financial information, the settlement officer assigned to petitioner's case (settlement officer) determined that petitioner's reasonable collection potential was $58,998. Petitioner did not agree to that amount. The settlement officer offered petitioner an installment agreement, which petitioner declined. Because the settlement officer was presented with no other collection alternatives, he made a determination upholding the collection action.

The notice of determination states that: Petitioner failed to file tax returns for 2001 and 2002; respondent prepared substitutes for returns under section 6020(b) and assessed the tax due; respondent made an additional tax assessment on petitioner's self-filed return for 2003; respondent's records show that the assessments were properly made; notice and demand was sent to petitioner for each tax period as required by section 6303 and petitioner failed to pay the liabilities in full; there was a balance due at the time that the collection notices were sent as required by sections 6322 and 6331(a); Letter 3172 was sent to petitioner on October 27, 2006; Letter 1058 was sent to petitioner on October 20, 2006; and petitioner made a timely request for a hearing on Form 12153, Request for a Collection Due Process Hearing, that was received November 16, 2006.

During the hearing that was conducted via telephone on June 12, 2007, the settlement officer advised petitioner that, after review of all the information petitioner had provided, it was determined that petitioner's offer of $24,000 to compromise his tax liabilities could not be accepted. The settlement officer explained to petitioner that an amount larger than $24,000 could be collected and that an offer could not be accepted under these circumstances. The settlement officer determined that the reasonable collection potential (RCP) was $58,998. The RCP was calculated as follows:

Income/Expense Table
Claimed by Taxpayer

Allowed Per
Settlement Officer


Monthly gross income
$2,580

$2,580


Monthly necessary living expenses:



Food, clothing, misc.
300

556



Housing & utilities
200

200



Transportation
350

350



Health care
270

270



Taxes
438

563



Child care
400

1-0-



Life insurance
90

119



Unsecured loan
200

2-0-



Total
2,248

2,058


Net monthly income
332

522


Future income (× 109)

56,898


1The $400 in childcare expenses claimed by petitioner were college expenses, and the record does not establish that those expenses were a legal obligation of petitioner.

2The record does not establish that petitioner is legally obligated to repay the unsecured loan.

Asset/Equity Table Asset
Fair Market
Value

Quick Sale
Value

Encumbrance

Equity


'88 GMC
$500

$400

-0-

$400


'93 Ford
1,500

1,200

-0-

1,200


Savings acct.
500

500

-0-

500


Future income
56,898

56,898

-0-

58,998



Total (RCP)

58,998



At the hearing with the settlement officer, petitioner stated that he could not increase his offer to the amount of the RCP. Petitioner did not raise any other issues, such as a challenge to the tax liabilities.

Discussion
Petitioner contends that respondent's settlement officer did not consider his obligations to make payments out of his income. Petitioner also argues that his health care costs have increased and those costs were not included in the settlement officer's consideration. Petitioner further contends that his offer-in-compromise was the amount he could reasonably expect to repay “before I go on Social Security.”

Where the underlying tax liability is not in issue, we review the determination of the Appeals Office for abuse of discretion. See Sego v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 604, 610 (2000). We reject the determination of the Appeals Office only if the determination was arbitrary, capricious, or without sound basis in fact or law. See Murphy v. Commissioner, 125 T.C. 301, 308, 320 (2005), affd. 469 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2006).

Where we decide the propriety of the Appeals Office's rejection of an offer-in-compromise, we review the reasoning underlying that rejection to decide whether the rejection was arbitrary, capricious, or without sound basis in fact or law. We do not substitute our judgment for that of the Appeals Office, and we do not decide independently the amount that we believe would be an acceptable offer-in-compromise. See Murphy v. Commissioner, supra at 320.

Section 6330(c)(2)(A)(iii) allows a taxpayer to offer to compromise a Federal tax debt as a collection alternative to a proposed levy. Section 7122(d) authorizes the Commissioner to prescribe guidelines to determine when a taxpayer's offer-in-compromise should be accepted. Sec. 301.7122-1(b), Proced. & Admin. Regs., lists grounds on which the Commissioner may accept an offer-in-compromise of a Federal tax debt.

The settlement officer determined petitioner's RCP to be $58,998. Therefore, it is undisputed that petitioner cannot fully pay his $81,483.52 tax liability. The Commissioner evaluates economic hardship. See Internal Revenue Manual (IRM) pt. 5.8.11.2.1 (Sept. 1, 2005). In accordance with the Commissioner's guidelines, an offer-in-compromise should not be accepted even in a case of economic hardship if the taxpayer does not offer an acceptable amount. See IRM pt. 5.8.11.2.1(11) (Sept. 1, 2005).

As we noted in Barnes v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-150, n.8, affd. in part and vacated in part sub nom. Keller v. Commissioner, 568 F.3d 710 (9th Cir. 2009), IRM pt. 5.8.5.5 allows the calculation of future income using a 48-month factor where the taxpayer offers to pay the compromise amount in cash within 5 months. It appears that petitioner's offer met the criteria set forth in the IRM, and it is unclear why the settlement officer used a 109-month factor instead of a 48-month factor. The difference between petitioner's offer of $24,000 and the amount called for by applying a 48-month factor (approximately $27,156) is only a few thousand dollars. It is not clear to the Court from the record that the settlement officer took into account the 48-month factor allowed in the IRM as noted above. Consequently, we will remand this case to respondent's Appeals Office for reconsideration of petitioner's offer in the light of the 48-month factor.

To reflect the foregoing,

An appropriate order will be issued.

Labels:

Wednesday, October 7, 2009

Taxpayer operated a charter fishing business could deduct the losses generated from the business because the business did not constitute a passive activity under Code Sec. 469(c). The couple materially participated in the business because they participated in the business activity for more than 100 hours during the year at issue and their participation was not less than the participation of any other individual during that year.

Sean Kieran Hegarty and Kerry Ann Hegarty v. Commissioner., U.S. Tax Court, T.C. Summary Opinion 2009-153, (Oct. 6, 2009)

Docket No. 3730-07S. Filed October 6, 2009.


Discussion
Respondent relies upon section 469 to support the disallowance of the loss from Blue Marlin. That section generally disallows for the taxable year any passive activity loss. Sec. 469(a)(1). The term “passive activity loss” is defined as the excess of the aggregate losses from all passive activities for the taxable year over the aggregate income from all passive activities for that year. Sec. 469(d)(1). A passive activity is any activity which involves the conduct of any trade or business and in which the taxpayer does not materially participate. Sec. 469(c)(1). For this purpose, a “trade or business” is generally defined as any activity in connection with a trade or business or any activity for the production of income under section 212. Sec. 469(c)(6).
A taxpayer is treated as materially participating in an activity only if the taxpayer is involved in the operations of the activity on a basis which is regular, continuous, and substantial. Sec. 469(h)(1). The participation of the taxpayer's spouse is taken into account in the determination of the extent to which a taxpayer materially participates in an activity. Sec. 469(h)(5).
The applicable regulations provide that if: (1) The individual participates in the activity for more than 500 hours during such year; or (2) the individual's participation in the activity for the taxable year constitutes substantially all of the participation in such activity of all individuals (including individuals who are not owners of interests in the activity) for such year; or (3) the individual participates in the activity for more than 100 hours during the taxable year, and such individual's participation in the activity for the taxable year is not less than the participation in the activity of any other individual (including individuals who are not owners of interests in the activity) for such year; or (4) the activity is a significant participation activity for the taxable year, and the individual's aggregate participation in all significant participation activities during such year exceeds 500 hours; or (5) the individual materially participated in the activity for any 5 taxable years (whether or not consecutive) during the 10 taxable years that immediately precede the taxable year; or (6) the activity is a personal service activity, and the individual materially participated in the activity for any 3 taxable years (whether or not consecutive) preceding the taxable year; or (7) based on all of the facts and circumstances, the individual participates in the activity on a regular, continuous, and substantial basis during such year, then the individual will be treated as materially participating in an activity for purposes of section 469. Sec. 1.469-5T(a)(1) through (7), Temporary Income Tax Regs., 53 Fed. Reg. 5725 (Feb. 25, 1988).
According to respondent, because the business was conducted through a limited liability company, petitioners are treated as limited partners in considering whether they materially participated in the business. That being so, and relying upon section 469(h)(2) and section 1.469-5T(e)(1) and (2), Temporary Income Tax Regs., 53 Fed. Reg. 5726 (Feb. 25, 1988), 4 respondent argues that they did not materially participate in the business because they have not established that their participation in the business during 2003 exceeded 500 hours.
We would be reluctant to find that they did, but for reasons discussed in Garnett v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. ___, ___ (2009) (slip op. at 22), such a finding is not necessary. In Garnett we found the Commissioner's reliance upon section 469(h)(2) to be misplaced and held that the material participation of a taxpayer who participated in a business conducted through a limited liability company is determined with reference to any of the seven tests listed in section 1.469-5T(a)(1) through (7), Temporary Income Tax Regs., supra.
As noted, a taxpayer is treated as having materially participated in the activity if the taxpayer participates in the activity for more than 100 hours during the taxable year and the taxpayer's participation in the activity for the taxable year is not less than the participation of any other individual. Sec. 1.469-5T(a)(3), Temporary Income Tax Regs., supra. We are satisfied that petitioners participated in the business for more than 100 hours during 2003. We are further satisfied that their participation was not less than the participation of any other individual during that year. See sec. 1.469-5T(a)(2), Temporary Income Tax Regs., supra. It follows that petitioners materially participated in the business during 2003, and the deduction attributable to that business is not subject to limitation under section 469.
Respondent's disallowance of the deduction of the loss attributable to Blue Marlin is rejected.
To reflect the foregoing,
Decision will be entered under Rule 155.

Footnotes


1
Unless otherwise indicated, section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, in effect for the year in issue. Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
2
Respondent agrees that the charter fishing activity constituted a trade or business within the meaning of sec. 162(a) during the year in issue.

3
Petitioners retrofitted the vessel with the necessary equipment to convert it into a fishing boat fit for charter.
4
Sec. 469(h)(2) states, “Except as provided in regulations, no interest in a limited partnership as a limited partner shall be treated as an interest with respect to which a taxpayer materially participates.” As relevant here, sec. 1.469-5T(e)(1) and (2), Temporary Income Tax Regs., 53 Fed. Reg. 5726 (Feb. 25, 1988), provides that as limited partner a taxpayer shall be treated as having materially participated in an activity only if the taxpayer participated in the activity for more than 500 hours during the taxable year.

Labels:

Monday, October 5, 2009

An individual did not maintain adequate records under Code Sec. 6001 to shift the burden of proof regarding her gambling winnings to the IRS under Code Sec. 7491 nor did she keep a notebook tracking her gambling as recommended by the IRS. Thus, the IRS findings regarding her winnings and losses was upheld.
Because the IRS increased the taxpayer’s gross income from gambling, she was required, but failed, to include a greater percentage of her Social Security benefit in income. Nonetheless, the taxpayer avoided the accuracy-related penalty because she acted with good faith and reasonable cause in relying on a competent tax professional to prepare her returns.

Ann M. Laplante v. Commissioner., U.S. Tax Court, CCH Dec. 57,954(M), T.C. Memo. 2009-226, (Oct. 1, 2009), U.S. Tax Court, Dkt. No. 17591-07
.
MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
GOLDBERG, Special Trial Judge: Respondent determined a deficiency of $1,808 in petitioner's Federal income tax for 2004 and an accuracy-related penalty of $362 under section 6662(a) for negligence.
The deficiency arises from petitioner's reporting of her 2004 recreational gambling activities. Petitioner reported $4,000 in income from gambling winnings on her 2004 Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, and she deducted $4,000 in gambling losses on her 2004 Schedule A, Itemized Deductions, under “Other Miscellaneous Deductions”. After examination, respondent determined that petitioner should have reported $30,170 in gross income from gambling winnings, causing an automatic computational increase in the amount of petitioner's Social Security benefits includable in income, and petitioner should have deducted $30,170 in gambling losses for 2004.
As a result, the issues for decision are: (1) Whether petitioner's gambling winnings for 2004 were $30,170 as respondent determined; and (2) whether petitioner is liable for the section 6662(a) accuracy-related penalty for negligence for 2004.
Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code (Code), and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. All amounts are rounded to the nearest dollar.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found. The stipulation of facts and the attached exhibits are incorporated herein by this reference. Petitioner resided in Massachusetts at the time she filed her petition.
Petitioner is a widow and is retired. She worked for 48 years from 1950 to 1998 for John C. Tombarello & Sons, a scrap iron and metal facility in Lawrence, Massachusetts, retiring when the owners sold the business. Before the sale, the business employed 35 to 40 people. Petitioner's original duties included bookkeeping, but as the business grew she became the office manager and had a bookkeeper reporting to her.
When petitioner gambles, she enjoys playing the slot machines. She began slot machine gambling in earnest in 1988 on a trip to Las Vegas. While she was still employed, petitioner would vacation a couple of times a year in Las Vegas and would also travel to Atlantic City to gamble. After Foxwoods Resort Casino opened in Ledyard, Connecticut, in 1992 and after petitioner retired from her job, she eventually became a regular Foxwoods patron.
Petitioner participated in Foxwoods' loyalty program, which provided her with a Wampum Club card. Petitioner would insert the Wampum Club card into a slot machine, and the casino would track her play. She would receive Wampum points on the basis of the time she spent at the machines, not on the basis of the amount of money she spent or lost. Foxwoods has restaurants, hotel rooms, stores, and boutiques. Petitioner would use the Wampum points to purchase clothing and jewelry. Foxwoods would also provide petitioner at no charge complimentary (commonly called comp) meals, rooms, and occasional limousine rides from her home to and from the casino.
During 2004 petitioner traveled with a group of friends to Foxwoods on 25 to 30 separate occasions. Petitioner's normal practice was to spend at least 8 hours at the casino and then return home. Sometimes she would stay longer and return home after spending 2 or more full days at the casino. Typically, petitioner would start at 25 cents per wager, progress to 50 cents, then $1, and finally $5 per wager.
Whenever she won $1,200 or more from one pull (or push of a button), the casino would promptly provide her with a Form W-2G, Certain Gambling Winnings, reflecting her winnings from that one pull or push. During 2004 petitioner received 26 Forms W-2G, which reported winnings totaling $56,200. Petitioner received a Form W-2G on 22 separate days in 2004. On 4 days petitioner won two prizes of $1,200 or more, causing the casino to issue two Forms W-2G for those 4 days. A review of the dates from petitioner's summary of the Forms W-2G indicates that petitioner gambled at Foxwoods on many different days of the week, receiving at least one Form W-2G on 5 Sundays, 11 Mondays, 1 Tuesday, 2 Wednesdays, and 3 Saturdays.
Petitioner engaged an attorney to prepare her 2004 Federal income tax return, the same attorney she had used to prepare her prior years' returns. Attached to the return was a two-page document entitled “MEMORANDUM Re: W-2G” addressing petitioner's 2004 gambling activity. The first page detailed by date and amount the winnings on each of the 26 Forms W-2G totaling $56,200. The second page was a legal memorandum providing the attorney's rationale for petitioner's including only $4,000 of the gambling winnings in her 2004 income. Petitioner did not discuss or report in income any of her gambling winnings below $1,200; neither did she include in income the fair market value of meals, rooms, limousine rides, clothing, jewelry, and the other comps she received from Foxwoods.
Petitioner reported adjusted gross income totaling $36,111 for 2004. In addition to the $4,000 in gambling winnings, petitioner's other items of income for 2004 were: Interest of $2,262; dividends of $755; refunds of State and local income taxes of $158; capital gain distributions of $78; IRA distributions of $7,197; pension and annuities of $11,367; net income from rental real estate of $1,663; and Social Security benefits of $22,758, of which $8,631 was includable in income. Petitioner also claimed itemized deductions of $12,638 on Schedule A, of which pertinent here was a deduction of $4,000 for gambling losses.
Respondent examined petitioner's 2004 Federal income tax return, determining that the correct amount of her gambling winnings and losses for 2004 was $30,170. The $30,170 consists of the total of 11 of 26 Form W-2G amounts, but the record is silent as to why respondent chose to exclude some of the Forms W-2G and how respondent determined which ones to exclude.
Because of the adjusted gross income thresholds in section 86, Social Security and Tier 1 Railroad Retirement Benefits, the additional $26,170 in wagering income caused a computational increase to the portion of petitioner's $22,758 in Social Security benefits includable in income from $8,631 (38 percent) to $19,345 (85 percent). As a result, respondent issued a notice of deficiency determining a deficiency of $1,808 in Federal income tax for 2004 and an accuracy-related penalty of $362 for negligence. Petitioner timely petitioned the Court seeking a redetermination of the deficiency and the accuracy-related penalty.
At trial the Court received into evidence two documents purporting to support petitioner's claim of receiving only $4,000 in gambling winnings and $4,000 in gambling losses. One document was an undated and untitled two-page worksheet with 33 specific dates in 2004 reflecting a dollar amount in at least one of four columns showing: (1) Checks she cashed at the casino totaling $14,600; (2) markers totaling $42,000, which represent cash advances the casino provided to petitioner during her play in exchange for petitioner's authorization for the casino to withdraw reimbursement within 2 weeks from her checking account; (3) money market checks totaling $61,100, which petitioner cashed before her trips to the casino to have about $2,000 to $3,000 in cash on hand when she began each visit; and (4) deposits she returned to the checking account totaling $28,600.
With respect to the deposit column, the worksheet contains a notation immediately to the right of three of the seven deposits. Next to the August 31 deposit of $2,000 is the notation “winnings”, and next to the November 17 and December 11 deposits of $10,000 and $4,000, respectively, are notations indicating the deposits were transfers of funds from her money market account. The other four deposits totaling $14,600 have no notation next to them. An IRS date stamp on petitioner's 2004 Federal income tax return shows that respondent received petitioner's return on October 15, 2005. The record does not clarify whether petitioner prepared the worksheet around the end of 2004, near her tax return filing date of October 15, 2005, or in preparation for trial.
The second document is a letter dated February 22, 2005, from Foxwoods Resort Casino to petitioner printed on plain paper, not on Foxwoods' letterhead. The letter states that petitioner's win or loss total from table games was zero and that she lost a total of $35,480 at slot machines during 2004. The letter explained that “the total slot machine activity is the total coin deposited in the machines, less the total coin paid out, and less jackpots paid by hand with currency.” The letter advised that the “information is derived from the use of your Wampum Club Card as recorded in Foxwoods Resort Casino's player rating system, which is maintained for marketing purposes only.”
OPINION
I. Reporting of Gambling Winnings and Losses
Gambling winnings are includable in gross income. Sec. 61(a); Merkin v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-146. The Code treats gambling losses in one of two ways. Taxpayers engaged in the trade or business of gambling may deduct their gambling losses against their gambling winnings above the line as a trade or business expense in arriving at adjusted gross income. Sec. 62(a)(1); Merkin v. Commissioner, supra. In contrast, taxpayers who are not in the trade or business of gambling are typically called recreational or casual gamblers and may deduct their gambling losses less favorably below the line as an itemized deduction in arriving at taxable income. Sec. 63(a); Merkin v. Commissioner, supra. Irrespective whether the taxpayer is a professional or a casual gambler, “Losses from wagering transactions shall be allowed only to the extent of the gains from such transactions.” Sec. 165(d); Merkin v. Commissioner, supra; sec. 1.165-10, Income Tax Regs.
Petitioner was a recreational gambler in 2004. See generally Merkin v. Commissioner, supra. Petitioner argues for a different methodology for reporting her gambling winnings and losses. Petitioner contends the summation of her individual gambling wins does not accurately reflect true winnings because she promptly plowed the individual winnings back into the casino's slot machines. In petitioner's view, a gambling session is not complete until the gambler finishes gambling for the day or weekend or weeklong visit to the casino and leaves the casino at the conclusion of the visit with either a net win or loss.
Petitioner emphasizes that the tracking of individual wins and losses is unrealistic when placing many bets at slot machines during a long session of plays. As a result, according to petitioner a gambler should net the winnings and losses from each visit to the casino. On those visits where the gambler leaves with more money than the gambler brought to the casino (here and for the rest of this opinion the term “brought” encompasses a broad definition to include cash in the gambler's pocket when the gambler arrived at the casino plus cash the gambler added at the casino from markers, ATM draws, credit card advances, and cashing checks), the gambler should recognize the net winnings for the visit in a single amount. The gambler should then total the net winning visits in a year to determine an aggregate amount to include in income as gambling winnings for that year.
Similarly, in those instances where the gambler leaves the casino with less money than brought, the gambler should recognize a net loss for the visit. The gambler should then aggregate the net amounts from losing visits for the year and may deduct the total losses as an itemized deduction up to the total winnings from the successful gambling sessions for the year.
Applying her theory to her own situation, petitioner determined her $4,000 in gambling winnings and losses for 2004 in the following manner. Petitioner claims that on only one occasion in her 25 to 30 visits did she leave the casino with more money than she brought. On that one occasion, she won a single jackpot of $8,000 on Monday, August 30, 2004, of which Foxwoods held back 25 percent or $2,000 for petitioner's Federal income tax withholding. Petitioner claims she gambled and lost $4,000 of the winnings, and left the casino with the remaining $2,000. Consequently, according to petitioner her one net win of $2,000 plus the $2,000 in withholding represents her sole gambling winnings for the year totaling $4,000.
With respect to gambling losses for 2004, petitioner contends that she broke even or lost money on every one of her other 24 to 29 visits to the casino during the year. Petitioner claims her losses totaled much more than $4,000, but pursuant to the gambling loss limitation of section 165(d) she limited her gambling losses to the amount of her gambling winnings, $4,000, and deducted the $4,000 gambling loss as an itemized deduction for 2004.
In general, casual gamblers such as petitioner should report the gross amount of their gambling winnings as income and should deduct separately as an itemized deduction the gross amount of their gambling losses up to the amount of gambling winnings. See Merkin v. Commissioner, supra (taxpayers not in the trade or business of gambling may report gambling losses only as an itemized deduction); Hardwick v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-359 (same); Lutz v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-89 (“It is well settled that taxpayers [who are recreational gamblers] have a duty to report as gross income gambling winnings” and “gambling losses must be claimed as itemized deductions”).
Respondent nonetheless agrees with petitioner's theory of recognizing slot machine play on the basis of net wins or losses per visit to the casino. Specifically, respondent states the following:
[T]he better view is that a casual gambler playing a slot machine, such as the petitioner, recognizes a wagering gain or loss at the time she redeems her tokens. The fluctuating wins and losses left in play are not accessions to wealth until the taxpayer redeems her tokens and can definitively calculate the amount above or below basis (the wager) realized. See Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
Respondent's agreement, however, does not mean petitioner wins the day. Respondent argues instead that petitioner's contentions fail because petitioner did not maintain adequate records to substantiate her claims of net gambling winnings and losses.
We do not have to decide and we explicitly do not decide the propriety of petitioner's theory of income recognition from recreational slot machine play because, as discussed below, we agree with respondent that with respect to 2004, petitioners did not maintain adequate records to substantiate her claims of net gambling winnings and losses. Thus, in its essence this case is solely one of substantiation. See Gagliardi v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-10 (concluding that that gambling case was solely “a substantiation case”, with the sole issue being whether the taxpayer had substantiated the gambling losses which the Commissioner had disallowed).
II. Substantiation of Gambling Winnings
Petitioner's situation is different from the usual gambling case where the taxpayer tries to prove gambling losses greater than the amount the Commissioner allowed. See, e.g., Briseno v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-67; Gagliardi v. Commissioner, supra; Hardwick v. Commissioner, supra. Petitioner is already at the maximum of losses that section 165(d) allows (gambling losses may not exceed reported gambling winnings). Instead, to refute respondent's determination, petitioner must establish that she had less than the $30,170 in gambling winnings that respondent determined.
In general, the Court presumes the Commissioner's determination of a deficiency in a notice of deficiency is correct, and the burden is on the taxpayer to prove otherwise. Rule 142(a)(1); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). Under certain circumstances the taxpayer may shift the burden to the Commissioner regarding factual matters affecting tax if the taxpayer produces credible evidence and meets the other requirements of the section including maintaining records required by the Code. Sec. 7491(a). Petitioner does not argue that she satisfied the elements for a burden shift, but even if she did advance this argument, petitioner did not produce sufficient substantiation to support her claims as section 6001 requires. See Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 443 (2001). Accordingly, the burden of proof remains on petitioner to prove the $30,170 in gambling winnings that respondent determined for 2004 was in error. With respect to the accuracy-related penalty, the burden of production is on respondent. See sec. 7491(c).
Deductions are a matter of legislative grace, and the taxpayer bears the burden of proving entitlement to deductions claimed on a return. Rule 142(a)(1); INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934). Implicit in this burden is the requirement that taxpayers must prove the amount of gambling winnings as well as losses. Schooler v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 867, 869 (1977); Donovan v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1965-247, affd. per curiam 359 F.2d 64 (1st Cir. 1966).
Section 6001 and the regulations thereunder require taxpayers to keep permanent records sufficient to substantiate the amounts of income, deductions, and credits shown on their income tax returns. Sec. 1.6001-1(a), Income Tax Regs. The obligation to maintain sufficient supporting records for wagering transactions is no more onerous than the recordkeeping requirements for taxpayers engaged in daily activities such as business travel and entertainment. Schooler v. Commissioner, supra at 870-871; see also Rodriguez v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-36.
Petitioner's evidence consists of the following three items: (1) The undated four-column worksheet that petitioner prepared; (2) the February 22, 2005, letter from Foxwoods; and (3) petitioner's oral testimony that on only one occasion did she leave the casino with more money that she wagered. We review in turn each of these three pieces of evidence.
Petitioner relies on the four-column worksheet with the written notation “winnings” next to one deposit of $2,000 as the documentary evidence that only one of her visits to Foxwoods in 2004 resulted in a net win, and the amount of that win was $4,000 (including the $2,000 in Federal tax withholding). However, shortcomings exist with respect to this evidence. No valid reason exists for taxpayers engaged in wagering transactions not to maintain a contemporaneous gambling diary or gambling log. Schooler v. Commissioner, supra at 870-871. Petitioner acknowledged that she did not prepare the worksheet contemporaneously, stating that she tried to “keep up with it [her recordkeeping] daily, but if not, it would have to be yearly. It would be a lot easier to go through it yearly.” Petitioner was not specific as to whether she prepared the worksheet around the end of the 2004 calendar year, 10 months later when she filed her 2004 return, or 3 years later in preparation for trial.
Additionally, the worksheet was untitled, had no explanation of its purpose, and did not explain many items on the document. For instance, the worksheet showed $14,600 of deposits with no explanation, which may have been additional gambling winnings. Similarly, petitioner did not reconcile the worksheet to the winnings Foxwoods reported on the Forms W-2G.
Moreover, petitioner did not provide copies of bank statements, canceled checks, or other corroborating evidence to establish the accuracy of individual line items on the worksheet or to establish the completeness of the worksheet by reconciling the worksheet to figures supplied by the bank. Without support, the worksheet is unreliable to corroborate petitioner's claims.
The February 22, 2005, letter from Foxwoods also has shortcomings. The letter reports that petitioner lost a total of $35,480 at the slots during 2004. However, the letter provides no detail by which we could determine which of petitioner's 25 to 30 visits to the casino for the year were a net win or a net loss. Since the net win or loss per visit is the mainstay of petitioner's argument, and since Foxwoods' letter stated the casino was tracking petitioner's results, we find it curious that petitioner did not ask Foxwoods to provide, or that petitioner did not supply to the Court, a more detailed statement from Foxwoods showing the results for each visit. In summary, the letter is helpful in confirming the overall picture that petitioner lost money for 2004, a point not in dispute, but the letter does not shed light on the decisive matter regarding which of petitioner's visits were net wins or losses and in what amounts.
With respect to petitioner's testimony, petitioner claims that she walked away a winner from Foxwoods on only 1 of her 25 to 30 visits to the casino during 2004. Given the nature of gambling, where the house usually wins; Foxwoods' letter stating petitioner's overall losses for 2004; and petitioner's credible testimony, we find it likely that she lost money on most of her visits to the casino during 2004. However, a general tenor is not the same as accepting petitioner's unsupported assertion of precisely $4,000 in income from just one win. See Crepeau v. Commissioner, 438 F.2d 1228 (1st Cir. 1971) (uncontradicted oral testimony is not adequate to overcome insufficiently supported taxpayer statements), affg. T.C. Memo. 1969-236; Niedringhaus v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. 202, 212 (1992) (we need not accept a taxpayer's testimony in the absence of corroborating evidence).
We also note that petitioner did not call as a witness any friend with whom she traveled to Foxwoods to corroborate her testimony. The failure to call witnesses leads to an inference that if called they would testify adversely. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 226 (1939); Bresler v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 182, 188 (1975); Blum v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 436, 440-441 (1972); Wichita Terminal Elevator Co. v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 1158, 1165 (1946), affd. 162 F.2d 513 (10th Cir. 1947).
Moreover, respondent has already reduced the gambling winnings that Foxwoods reported for 2004 on the Forms W2-G, from $56,200 to $30,170. Petitioner has simply not provided sufficient corroborating evidence to make an estimate beyond the reduction respondent has already determined. See Hardwick v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-359 (the Court should not make an estimate in a gambling case where the taxpayer's substantiation has too many omissions and discrepancies, especially where the taxpayer could have simply provided evidence from use of a casino Players' Club card to document slot machine play during each gambling trip). Further, respondent made the reduction even though petitioner almost certainly had many winnings below the Form W2-G threshold amount of $1,200 and despite petitioner's receiving comps from Foxwoods for some meals, hotel stays, limousine rides, and shopping. See Libutti v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-108 (comps are “increases to * * * wealth” and therefore fall within the plain meaning of section 165(d) as gains from wagering transactions).
In summary, we find that petitioner has not met her burden of proving that respondent's determination is incorrect. Because petitioner has not provided a reasonable basis to estimate which of her visits to the casino resulted in a net win or a net loss, or the dollar amount of each outcome, to reduce income more than respondent has already done would be unguided largesse. Therefore, we sustain respondent's determination.
III. Accuracy-Related Penalty
Respondent also determined that petitioner is liable for a 20-percent accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a) and (b)(1) for 2004 for an underpayment of income tax that results either from negligence or disregard of rules and regulations. The term “negligence” includes any failure to make a reasonable attempt to comply with the provisions of the Code, and the term “disregard” includes any careless, reckless, or intentional disregard. Sec. 6662(c); sec. 1.6662-3(b)(1), Income Tax Regs. Negligence is also “‘a lack of due care or the failure to do what a reasonable and ordinarily prudent person would do under the circumstances.’” Freytag v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 849, 887 (1987) (quoting Marcello v. Commissioner, 380 F.2d 499, 506 (5th Cir. 1967), affg. in part and remanding in part 43 T.C. 168 (1964) and T.C. Memo. 1964-299), affd. 904 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1990), affd. 501 U.S. 868 (1991).
As noted, the Commissioner bears the burden of production with respect to penalties. Sec. 7491(c). To meet this burden, the Commissioner must produce evidence to show that it is appropriate to impose the relevant penalty. Swain v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 358, 363 (2002); Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. at 446. Respondent has met his burden by establishing that petitioner did not keep adequate records as required by section 6001 to substantiate the amount of gambling income she reported on her 2004 Federal income tax return.
Nonetheless, a taxpayer may overcome the accuracy-related penalty if the taxpayer can show that the underpayment of income tax was due to “reasonable cause * * * and that the taxpayer acted in good faith”. Sec. 6664(c)(1). The taxpayer bears the burden of proving reasonable cause. Higbee v. Commissioner, supra at 446-447. The Court decides reasonable cause and good-faith effort on a case-by-case basis, taking into account all pertinent facts and circumstances, including the extent of the taxpayer's efforts to assess his or her proper tax liability; the taxpayer's education, knowledge, and experience; and the taxpayers' reasonable reliance on a tax professional. Higbee v. Commissioner, supra at 448; Sec. 1.6664-4(b)(1), Income Tax Regs. The extent of the taxpayer's efforts to assess the proper tax liability is generally the most important factor. Sec. 1.6664-4(b)(1), Income Tax Regs.
Good faith reliance on professional advice concerning tax laws may provide a basis for a reasonable cause defense. United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 250-251 (1985); see also sec. 1.6664-4(b)(1), Income Tax Regs. Reliance on professional advice is not an absolute defense to the section 6662(a) penalty. Freytag v. Commissioner, supra at 888. Reasonable cause exists where a taxpayer relies in good faith on the advice of a qualified tax adviser where the following three elements are present: “(1) The adviser was a competent professional who had sufficient expertise to justify reliance, (2) the taxpayer provided necessary and accurate information to the adviser, and (3) the taxpayer actually relied in good faith on the adviser's judgment.” Neonatology Associates, P.A. v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 43, 99 (2000), affd. 299 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2002).
Petitioner made a good-faith effort to determine the proper tax by engaging an attorney to prepare her return, the same attorney who had prepared her prior returns which respondent never challenged. Petitioner's attorney was certainly competent: respondent agreed with the attorney's theory of the case that taxpayers should recognize results from slot machine play on the basis of net wins or losses per visit to the casino.
Petitioner's overall story is also credible, albeit unsupported. That she probably did lose money on most of her visits to the casino is reflected in the fact that respondent reduced the amount of petitioner's winnings for 2004 from $56,200 to $30,170, and reflected in a reduction from 26 to 11 in the number of Forms W-2G that respondent required petitioner to recognize for 2004.
Petitioner disclosed all of her $56,200 of Form W-2G winnings to her attorney. Petitioner relied in good faith on the attorney's judgment, disclosing to respondent on her 2004 Federal income tax return the Forms W-2G that led to the $56,200 total and attaching a memorandum describing the attorney's theory of netting wins and losses per visit to the casino. “To require the taxpayer to challenge the attorney, to seek a ‘second opinion,’ or to try to monitor counsel on the provisions of the Code himself would nullify the very purpose of seeking the advice of a presumed expert in the first place.” United States v. Boyle, supra at 251.
In summary, we conclude that petitioner has done what a reasonable person would do under the circumstances to determine the proper tax. Therefore, on the basis of the record before us, for all of the above reasons, we find that petitioner had reasonable cause and acted in good faith. We do not sustain respondent's determination of an accuracy-related penalty for 2004.
To reflect our disposition of the issues,
Decision will be entered for respondent as to the deficiency and for petitioner as to the accuracy-related penalty.

Labels:

Thursday, October 1, 2009

Rev. Proc. 2009-47,Internal Revenue Service, (Oct. 1, 2009)
2009FED ¶46,501



Part III

Administrative, Procedural, and Miscellaneous
26 CFR 601.105: Examination of returns and claims for refund, credit, or abatement; determination of correct tax liability.

(Also Part I, §§ 62 , 162, 267, 274; 1.62-2, 1.162-17, 1.267(a)-1, 1.274-5.)

Rev. Proc. 2009-47 1.274-5

SECTION 1. PURPOSE
This revenue procedure updates Rev. Proc. 2008-59 , 2008-41 I.R.B. 857, and provides rules under which the amount of ordinary and necessary business expenses of an employee for lodging, meal, and incidental expenses, or for meal and incidental expenses, incurred while traveling away from home are deemed substantiated under § 1.274-5 of the Income Tax Regulations when a payor (the employer, its agent, or a third party) provides a per diem allowance under a reimbursement or other expense allowance arrangement to pay for the expenses. In addition, this revenue procedure provides an optional method for employees and self-employed individuals who are not reimbursed to use in computing the amounts paid or incurred for business meal and incidental expenses, or for incidental expenses only if no meal expenses are paid or incurred, while traveling away from home. Use of a method described in this revenue procedure is not mandatory, and a taxpayer may use actual allowable expenses if the taxpayer maintains adequate records or other sufficient evidence for proper substantiation. This revenue procedure does not provide rules under which the amount of an employee's lodging expenses are deemed substantiated to a payor when a payor provides an allowance to pay for lodging expenses but not meal and incidental expenses.

SECTION 2. BACKGROUND AND CHANGES
.01 Section 162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code allows a deduction for all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business. Under that provision, an employee or self-employed individual may deduct expenses paid or incurred while traveling away from home in pursuit of a trade or business. However, under § 262 , no portion of travel expenses attributable to personal, living, or family expenses is deductible.

.02 Section 274(n) generally limits the amount allowable as a deduction under § 162 for any expense for food, beverages, or entertainment to 50 percent of the amount of the expense that otherwise would be allowable as a deduction. In the case of any expenses for food or beverages consumed while away from home (within the meaning of § 162(a)(2) ) by an individual during, or incident to, the period of duty subject to the hours of service limitations of the Department of Transportation, § 274(n)(3) provides that, for taxable years beginning in 2009 or thereafter, the deductible percentage for these expenses is 80 percent.

.03 Section 274(d) provides, in part, that no deduction is allowed under § 162 for any travel expense (including meals and lodging while away from home) unless a taxpayer complies with certain substantiation requirements. Section 274(d) further provides that regulations may prescribe that some or all of the substantiation requirements do not apply to an expense that does not exceed an amount prescribed by the regulations.

.04 Section 1.274-5(g) , in part, grants the Commissioner the authority to prescribe rules relating to reimbursement arrangements or per diem allowances for ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred while traveling away from home. Under this grant of authority, the Commissioner may prescribe rules under which these arrangements or allowances, if in accordance with reasonable business practice, are regarded (1) as equivalent to substantiation, by adequate records or other sufficient evidence, of the amount of travel expenses for purposes of § 1.274-5(c) , and (2) as satisfying the requirements of an adequate accounting to the employer of the amount of travel expenses for purposes of § 1.274-5(f) .

.05 For purposes of determining adjusted gross income, § 62(a)(2)(A) allows an employee a deduction for expenses allowed by Part VI ( § 161 and following), subchapter B, chapter 1 of the Code, the employee pays or incurs in performing services as an employee under a reimbursement or other expense allowance arrangement with a payor.

.06 Section 62(c) provides that an arrangement is not treated as a reimbursement or other expense allowance arrangement for purposes of § 62(a)(2)(A) if it—

(1) Does not require the employee to substantiate the expenses covered by the arrangement to the payor, or

(2) Provides the employee with the right to retain any amount in excess of the substantiated expenses covered under the arrangement. Section 62(c) further provides that these substantiation requirements do not apply to any expense to the extent that, under the grant of regulatory authority in § 274(d) , the Commissioner provides that substantiation is not required for the expense.

.07 Under § 1.62-2(c) , a reimbursement or other expense allowance arrangement satisfies the requirements of § 62(c) if it meets the requirements of business connection, substantiation, and returning amounts in excess of expenses as specified in the regulations. If an arrangement meets these requirements, all amounts paid under the arrangement are treated as paid under an accountable plan and are excluded from income and wages. If an arrangement does not meet these requirements, all amounts paid under the arrangement are treated as paid under a nonaccountable plan and are included in an employee's gross income, must be reported as wages or compensation on the employee's Form W-2, and are subject to the withholding and payment of employment taxes. Section 1.62-2(e)(2) specifically provides that substantiation of certain business expenses in accordance with rules prescribed under the authority of § 1.274-5(g) is treated as substantiation of the amount of the expenses for purposes of § 1.62-2 . Under § 1.62-2(f)(2) , the Commissioner may prescribe rules under which an arrangement providing per diem allowances is treated as satisfying the requirement of returning amounts in excess of expenses, even though the arrangement does not require the employee to return the portion of the allowance that relates to days of travel substantiated and that exceeds the amount of the employee's expenses deemed substantiated under rules prescribed under § 274(d) , provided the allowance is reasonably calculated not to exceed the amount of the employee's expenses or anticipated expenses and the employee is required to return within a reasonable period of time any portion of the allowance that relates to days of travel not substantiated.

.08 Section 1.62-2(h)(2)(i)(B) provides that, if a payor pays a per diem allowance that meets the requirements of § 1.62-2(c)(1) , the portion, if any, of the allowance that relates to days of travel substantiated in accordance with § 1.62-2(e) , that exceeds the amount of an employee's expenses deemed substantiated for the travel under rules prescribed under § 274(d) and § 1.274-5(g) , and that the employee is not required to return, is subject to withholding and payment of employment taxes. See §§ 31.3121(a)-3 , 31.3231(e)-1(a)(5), 31.3306(b)-2, and 31.3401(a)-4 of the Employment Tax Regulations. Because the employee is not required to return this excess portion, the reasonable period of time provisions of § 1.62-2(g) (relating to the return of excess amounts) do not apply to this portion.

.09 Under § 1.62-2(h)(2)(i)(B)(4) , the Commissioner has the discretion to prescribe special rules regarding the timing of withholding and payment of employment taxes on per diem allowances.

.10 Section 1.274-5(j)(1) grants the Commissioner the authority to establish a method under which a taxpayer may elect to treat a specific amount as paid or incurred for meals while traveling away from home in lieu of substantiating the actual cost of meals.

.11 Section 1.274-5(j)(3) grants the Commissioner the authority to establish a method under which a taxpayer may elect to treat a specific amount as paid or incurred for incidental expenses while traveling away from home in lieu of substantiating the actual cost of incidental expenses.

.12 This revenue procedure includes modifications to Rev. Proc. 2008-59 as follows:

(1) Sections 3 .02(1)(a), 4.04(6), and 5.06 provide transition rules for the last 3 months of calendar year 2009.

(2) Section 5.02 contains revisions to the per diem rates for high-cost localities and for other localities for purposes of section 5 .

(3) Section 5.03 contains the list of high-cost localities, and section 5.04 describes changes to the list of high-cost localities for purposes of section 5 .

(4) The reference in section 6.04 to section 4.04 is deleted. Section 6.04 references taxpayers that use section 4.02 or 4.03 to determine the amount of travel expenses deemed substantiated. Taxpayers described in section 4.04 use section 4.02 or 4.03. Therefore, the reference to section 4.04 in section 6.04 is unnecessary and potentially confusing.

SECTION 3. DEFINITIONS
.01 Per diem allowance . The term “per diem allowance” means a payment under a reimbursement or other expense allowance arrangement that is B

(1) Paid for ordinary and necessary business expenses incurred, or that the payor reasonably anticipates will be incurred, by an employee for lodging, meal, and incidental expenses, or for meal and incidental expenses, for travel away from home performing services as an employee of the employer,

(2) Reasonably calculated not to exceed the amount of the expenses or the anticipated expenses, and

(3) Paid at or below the applicable federal per diem rate, a flat rate or stated schedule, or in accordance with any other Service-specified rate or schedule.

.02 Federal per diem rate and federal M&IE rate .

(1) In general . The federal per diem rate is equal to the sum of the applicable federal lodging expense rate and the applicable federal meal and incidental expense (M&IE) rate for the day and locality of travel.

(a) CONUS rates . The rates for localities in the continental United States (“CONUS”) are set forth in Appendix A to 41 C.F.R. ch. 301. However, in applying section 4.01 , 4.02, or 4.03 of this revenue procedure, taxpayers may continue to use the CONUS rates in effect for the first 9 months of 2009 for expenses of all CONUS travel away from home that are paid or incurred during calendar year 2009 in lieu of the updated GSA rates. A taxpayer must consistently use either these rates or the updated rates for the period October 1, 2009, through December 31, 2009.

(b) OCONUS rates . The rates for localities outside the continental United States (“OCONUS”) are established by the Secretary of Defense (rates for non-foreign localities, including Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the possessions of the United States) and by the Secretary of State (rates for foreign localities), and are published in the Per Diem Supplement to the Standardized Regulations (Government Civilians, Foreign Areas) (updated on a monthly basis).

(c) Internet access to the rates . The CONUS and OCONUS rates may be found on the Internet at www.gsa.gov.

(2) Locality of travel . The term “locality of travel” means the locality where an employee traveling away from home performing services as an employee of an employer stops for sleep or rest.

(3) Incidental expenses . The term “incidental expenses” has the same meaning as in the Federal Travel Regulations, 41 C.F.R. 300-3.1 (2009). The Federal Travel Regulations currently include as incidental expenses fees and tips given to porters, baggage carriers, bellhops, hotel maids, stewards or stewardesses and others on ships, and hotel servants in foreign countries; transportation between places of lodging or business and places where meals are taken, if suitable meals can be obtained at the temporary duty site; and the mailing cost associated with filing travel vouchers and payment of employer-sponsored charge card billings.

.03 Flat rate or stated schedule .

(1) In general . Except as provided in section 3.03(2) of this revenue procedure, an allowance is paid at a flat rate or stated schedule if it is provided on a uniform and objective basis for the expenses described in section 3.01 of this revenue procedure. The allowance may be paid for the number of days away from home performing services as an employee or on any other basis that is consistently applied and in accordance with reasonable business practice. Thus, for example, an hourly payment to cover meal and incidental expenses paid to a pilot or flight attendant who is traveling away from home performing services as an employee is an allowance paid at a flat rate or stated schedule. Likewise, a payment based on the number of miles traveled (such as cents per mile) to cover meal and incidental expenses paid to an over-the-road truck driver who is traveling away from home performing services as an employee is an allowance paid at a flat rate or stated schedule.

(2) Limitation . An allowance that is computed on a basis similar to that used in computing an employee's wages or other compensation (such as the number of hours worked, miles traveled, or pieces produced) does not meet the business connection requirement of § 1.62-2(d) , is not a per diem allowance, and is not paid at a flat rate or stated schedule, unless, as of December 12, 1989, (a) the allowance was identified by the payor either by making a separate payment or by specifically identifying the amount of the allowance, or (b) an allowance computed on that basis was commonly used in the industry in which the employee performed services. See § 1.62-2(d)(3)(ii) .

SECTION 4. PER DIEM SUBSTANTIATION METHOD
.01 Per diem allowance . If a payor pays a per diem allowance in lieu of reimbursing actual lodging, meal, and incidental expenses incurred or to be incurred by an employee for travel away from home, the amount of the expenses that is deemed substantiated for each calendar day is equal to the lesser of the per diem allowance for that day or the amount computed at the federal per diem rate (see section 3.02 of this revenue procedure) for the locality of travel for that day (or partial day, see section 6.04 of this revenue procedure).

.02 Meal and incidental expenses only per diem allowance . If a payor pays a per diem allowance only for meal and incidental expenses in lieu of reimbursing actual meal and incidental expenses incurred or to be incurred by an employee for travel away from home, the amount of the expenses that is deemed substantiated for each calendar day is equal to the lesser of the per diem allowance for that day or the amount computed at the federal M&IE rate for the locality of travel for that day (or partial day). A per diem allowance is treated as paid only for meal and incidental expenses if (1) the payor pays the employee for actual expenses for lodging based on receipts submitted to the payor, (2) the payor provides the lodging in kind, (3) the payor pays the actual expenses for lodging directly to the provider of the lodging, (4) the payor does not have a reasonable belief that lodging expenses were or will be incurred by the employee, or (5) the allowance is computed on a basis similar to that used in computing an employee's wages or other compensation (such as the number of hours worked, miles traveled, or pieces produced).

.03 Optional method for meal and incidental expenses only deduction . In lieu of using actual expenses in computing the amount allowable as a deduction for ordinary and necessary meal and incidental expenses paid or incurred for travel away from home, employees and self-employed individuals who pay or incur meal expenses may use an amount computed at the federal M&IE rate for the locality of travel for each calendar day (or partial day) the employee or self-employed individual is away from home. This amount is deemed substantiated for purposes of paragraphs (b)(2) and (c) of § 1.274-5 , provided the employee or self-employed individual substantiates the elements of time, place, and business purpose of the travel for that day (or partial day) in accordance with those regulations. See section 6.05(1) of this revenue procedure for rules related to the application of the limitation under § 274(n) to amounts determined under this section 4.03 . See section 4.05 of this revenue procedure for a method for substantiating incidental expenses that may be used by employees or self-employed individuals who do not pay or incur meal expenses.

.04 Special rules for transportation industry .

(1) In general . This section 4.04 applies to (a) a payor that pays a per diem allowance only for meal and incidental expenses for travel away from home to an employee in the transportation industry and computes the amount under section 4.02 of this revenue procedure, or (b) an employee or self-employed individual in the transportation industry who computes the amount allowable as a deduction for meal and incidental expenses for travel away from home under section 4.03 of this revenue procedure.

(2) Transportation industry defined . For purposes of this section 4.04 , an employee or self-employed individual is in the transportation industry only if the employee's or self-employed individual's work (a) is of the type that directly involves moving people or goods by airplane, barge, bus, ship, train, or truck, and (b) regularly requires travel away from home which, during any single trip away from home, usually involves travel to localities with differing federal M&IE rates. For purposes of the preceding sentence, a payor must determine that an employee or a group of employees is in the transportation industry by using a method that is consistently applied and in accordance with reasonable business practice.

(3) Rates . A taxpayer described in section 4.04(1) of this revenue procedure may treat $59 as the federal M&IE rate for any CONUS locality of travel, and $65 as the federal M&IE rate for any OCONUS locality of travel. A payor that uses either (or both) of these special rates for an employee must use the special rate(s) for all amounts deemed substantiated under section 4.02 of this revenue procedure paid to that employee for travel away from home within CONUS and/or OCONUS, as the case may be, during the calendar year. Similarly, an employee or self-employed individual that uses either (or both) of these special rates must use the special rate(s) for all amounts deemed substantiated under section 4.03 of this revenue procedure for travel away from home within CONUS and/or OCONUS, as the case may be, during the calendar year. See section 4.04(6) of this revenue procedure for transition rules.

(4) Periodic rule . A payor described in section 4.04(1) of this revenue procedure may compute the amount of the employee's expenses that is deemed substantiated under section 4.02 of this revenue procedure periodically (not less frequently than monthly), rather than daily, by comparing the total per diem allowance paid for the period to the sum of the amounts computed either at the federal M&IE rate(s) for the localities of travel, or at the special rate described in section 4.04(3) , for the days (or partial days) the employee is away from home during the period.

(5) Examples .

(a) Example 1 . Taxpayer, an employee in the transportation industry, travels away from home on business within CONUS on 16 days (including partial days) during a calendar month. A payor pays Taxpayer a per diem allowance only for meal and incidental expenses that the payor computes using section 4.04(3) of this revenue procedure and the method of proration described in section 6.04(2) of this revenue procedure. The amount deemed substantiated under section 4.02 of this revenue procedure is equal to the lesser of the total per diem allowance paid for the month or $944 (16 days at $59 per day).

(b) Example 2 . Taxpayer, a truck driver employee in the transportation industry, is paid a “cents-per-mile” allowance that qualifies as an allowance paid under a flat rate or stated schedule as defined in section 3.03 of this revenue procedure. Taxpayer travels away from home on business for 10 days. Based on the number of miles driven by Taxpayer, Taxpayer's employer pays an allowance of $500 for the 10 days of business travel. Taxpayer actually drives for 8 days, and does not drive for the other 2 days Taxpayer is away from home. Taxpayer is paid under the periodic rule used for transportation industry employers and employees in accordance with section 4.04(4) of this revenue procedure. The amount deemed substantiated is the full $500 because that amount does not exceed $590 (ten days away from home at $59 per day).

(6) Transition rules . Under the calendar-year convention provided in section 4.04(3) , a taxpayer who used the federal M&IE rates during the first 9 months of calendar year 2009 to substantiate the amount of an individual's travel expenses under sections 4 .02 or 4.03 of Rev. Proc. 2008-59 may not use, for that individual, the special transportation industry rates provided in this section 4.04 until January 1, 2010. Similarly, a taxpayer who used the special transportation industry rates during the first 9 months of calendar year 2009 to substantiate the amount of an individual's travel expenses may not use, for that individual, the federal M&IE rates until January 1, 2010.

.05 Optional method for incidental expenses only deduction . In lieu of using actual expenses in computing the amount allowable as a deduction for ordinary and necessary incidental expenses paid or incurred for travel away from home, employees and self-employed individuals who pay or incur incidental expenses but do not pay or incur meal expenses for a calendar day (or partial day) of travel away from home may use, for each calendar day (or partial day) the employee or self-employed individual is away from home, an amount computed at the rate of $5 per day for any CONUS or OCONUS locality of travel. This amount is deemed substantiated for purposes of paragraphs (b)(2) and (c) of § 1.274-5 , provided the employee or self-employed individual substantiates the elements of time, place, and business purpose of the travel for that day (or partial day) in accordance with those regulations. See section 4.03 of this revenue procedure for a method that may be used by employees or self-employed individuals who pay or incur meal expenses. The method authorized by this section 4.05 may not be used by payors that use section 4.01 , 4.02, or 5.01 of this revenue procedure, or by employees or self-employed individuals who use the method described in section 4.03 of this revenue procedure. See section 6.05(5) of this revenue procedure for rules related to the application of the limitation under § 274(n) to amounts determined under this section 4.05 .

SECTION 5. HIGH-LOW SUBSTANTIATION METHOD
.01 In general . If a payor pays a per diem allowance in lieu of reimbursing actual lodging, meal, and incidental expenses incurred or to be incurred by an employee for travel away from home and the payor uses the high-low substantiation method described in this section 5 for travel within CONUS, the amount of the expenses that is deemed substantiated for each calendar day is equal to the lesser of the per diem allowance for that day or the amount computed at the rate provided in section 5.02 of this revenue procedure for the locality of travel for that day (or partial day, see section 6.04 of this revenue procedure). Except as provided in section 5.06 of this revenue procedure, this high-low substantiation method may be used in lieu of the per diem substantiation method provided in section 4.01 of this revenue procedure, but may not be used in lieu of the meal and incidental expenses only per diem substantiation method provided in section 4.02 of this revenue procedure.

.02 Specific high-low rates . Except as provided in section 5.06 of this revenue procedure, the per diem rate set forth in this section 5.02 is $258 for travel to any “high-cost locality” specified in section 5.03 of this revenue procedure, or $163 for travel to any other locality within CONUS. The high or low rate, as appropriate, applies as if it were the federal per diem rate for the locality of travel. For purposes of applying the high-low substantiation method and the § 274(n) limitation on meal expenses (see section 6.05(3) of this revenue procedure), the amount of the high and low rates that is treated as paid for meals is $65 for a high-cost locality and $52 for any other locality within CONUS.

.03 High-cost localities . The following localities have a federal per diem rate of $211 or more, and are high-cost localities for all of the calendar year or the portion of the calendar year specified in parentheses under the key city name:

Key city
County or other defined location

Arizona


Phoenix/Scottsdale
Maricopa



(January 1-May 31)


Sedona
City limits of Sedona



(March 1-April 30)




California


Monterey
Monterey


Napa
Napa



(October 1-November 30 and April 1-September 30)


San Diego
San Diego


San Francisco
San Francisco


Santa Barbara
Santa Barbara


Santa Monica
City limits of Santa Monica


South Lake Tahoe
El Dorado



(December 1-March 31)




Colorado


Aspen
Pitkin



(December 1-April 30)


Denver/Aurora
Denver, Adams, Arapahoe, and Jefferson


Steamboat Springs
Routt



(December 1-March 31)


Telluride
San Miguel



(December 1-March 31 and June 1-September 30)


Vail
Eagle



(December 1-March 31)




District of Columbia



Washington D.C. (also the cities of Alexandria, Falls Church, and Fairfax, and the counties of Arlington and Fairfax, in Virginia; and the counties of Montgomery and Prince George's in Maryland) (See also Maryland and Virginia)




Florida


Fort Lauderdale
Broward



(October 1-April 30)


Fort Walton Beach/De Funiak Springs
Okaloosa and Walton



(June 1-July 31)


Key West
Monroe


Miami
Miami-Dade



(January 1-March 31)


Naples
Collier



(January 1-April 30)




Illinois


Chicago
Cook and Lake




Maine


Bar Harbor
Hancock



(July 1-August 31)




Maryland


Baltimore City
Baltimore City



(October 1-November 30 and March 1-September 30)


Cambridge/St. Michaels
Dorchester and Talbot



(June 1-August 31)


Ocean City
Worcester



(June 1-August 31)


Washington, DC Metro Area
Montgomery and Prince George's




Massachusetts


Boston/Cambridge
Suffolk, City of Cambridge


Martha's Vineyard
Dukes



(June 1-August 31)


Nantucket
Nantucket



(June 1-September 30)




New Hampshire


Conway
Carroll



(July 1-August 31)




New York


Floral Park/Garden City/Great Neck
Nassau


Glens Falls
Warren



(July 1-August 31)


Lake Placid
Essex



(July 1-August 31)


Manhattan (includes the boroughs of Manhattan, Brooklyn, the Bronx, Queens and Staten Island)
Bronx, Kings, New York, Queens, Richmond


Saratoga Springs/Schenectady
Saratoga and Schenectady



(July 1-August 31)


Tarrytown/White Plains/New Rochelle
Westchester




Pennsylvania


Hershey
City of Hershey



(June 1-August 31)


Philadelphia
Philadelphia




Rhode Island


Jamestown/Middletown/Newport
Newport



(October 1-October 31 and May 1-September 30)




Utah


Park City
Summit



(January 1-March 31)




Virginia


Washington, DC Metro Area
Cities of Alexandria, Fairfax, and Falls Church; counties of Arlington and Fairfax




Washington


Seattle
King




Wyoming
Teton and Sublette


Jackson/Pinedale



(July 1-August 31)


.04 Changes in high-cost localities . The list of high-cost localities in section 5.03 of this revenue procedure differs from the list of high-cost localities in section 5.03 of Rev. Proc. 2008-59 (changes listed by key cities).

(1) The following localities have been added to the list of high-cost localities: Monterey, California; Denver/Aurora, Colorado; Bar Harbor, Maine; Conway, New Hampshire; Glens Falls, New York; Lake Placid, New York; and Hershey, Pennsylvania.

(2) The portion of the year for which the following are high-cost localities has been changed: Phoenix/Scottsdale, Arizona; Napa, California; San Diego, California; Telluride, Colorado; Vail, Colorado; Miami, Florida; Naples, Florida; Baltimore City, Maryland; Cambridge/St. Michaels, Maryland; Ocean City, Maryland; and Jamestown/Middletown/Newport, Rhode Island.

(3) The following localities have been removed from the list of high-cost localities: Crested Butte/Gunnison, Colorado; Silverthorne/Breckenridge, Colorado; and Palm Beach, Florida.

(4) The following localities have been redefined: Floral Park/Garden City/Great Neck, New York no longer includes Glen Gove and Roslyn; Tarrytown/White Plains/New Rochelle, New York no longer includes Yonkers .

.05 Specific limitation .

(1) Except as provided in section 5.05(2) of this revenue procedure, a payor that uses the high-low substantiation method for an employee must use that method for all amounts paid to that employee for travel away from home within CONUS during the calendar year. See section 5.06 of this revenue procedure for transition rules.

(2) For an employee described in section 5.05(1) of this revenue procedure, the payor may reimburse actual expenses or use the meal and incidental expenses only per diem substantiation method described in section 4.02 of this revenue procedure for any travel away from home, and may use the per diem substantiation method described in section 4.01 of this revenue procedure for any OCONUS travel away from home.

.06 Transition rules . A payor who used the substantiation method of section 4.01 of Rev. Proc. 2008-59 for an employee during the first 9 months of calendar year 2009 may not use the high-low substantiation method in section 5 of this revenue procedure for that employee until January 1, 2010. A payor who used the high-low substantiation method of section 5 of Rev. Proc. 2008-59 for an employee during the first 9 months of calendar year 2009 must continue to use the high-low substantiation method for the remainder of calendar year 2009 for that employee. A payor described in the previous sentence may use the rates and high-cost localities published in section 5 of Rev. Proc. 2008-59 , in lieu of the updated rates and high-cost localities provided in section 5 of this revenue procedure, for travel on or after October 1, 2009, and before January 1, 2010, if those rates and localities are used consistently during this period for all employees reimbursed under this method.

SECTION 6. LIMITATIONS AND SPECIAL RULES
.01 In general . The federal per diem rate and the federal M&IE rate described in section 3.02 of this revenue procedure for the locality of travel apply in the same manner as they apply under the Federal Travel Regulations, 41 C.F.R. Part 301-11 (2009), except as provided in sections 6 .02 through 6.04 of this revenue procedure.

.02 Federal per diem rate . A receipt for lodging expenses is not required in determining the amount of expenses deemed substantiated under section 4.01 or 5.01 of this revenue procedure. See section 7.01 of this revenue procedure for the requirement that the employee substantiate the time, place, and business purpose of the expense.

.03 Federal per diem or M&IE rate . A payor is not required to reduce the federal per diem rate or the federal M&IE rate for the locality of travel for meals provided in kind, provided the payor has a reasonable belief that the employee incurred or will incur meal and incidental expenses during each day of travel.

.04 Proration of the federal per diem or M&IE rate . Under the Federal Travel Regulations, in determining the federal per diem rate or the federal M&IE rate for the locality of travel, the full applicable federal M&IE rate is available for a full day of travel from 12:01 a.m. to 12:00 midnight. The method described in section 6.04(1) of this revenue procedure must be used for purposes of determining the amount deemed substantiated under section 4.03 or 4.05 of this revenue procedure for partial days of travel away from home. For purposes of determining the amount deemed substantiated under section 4.01 , 4.02, or 5 of this revenue procedure for partial days of travel away from home, either of the following methods may be used to prorate the federal M&IE rate to determine the federal per diem rate or the federal M&IE rate for the partial days of travel:

(1) The rate may be prorated using the method prescribed by the Federal Travel Regulations. Currently the Federal Travel Regulations allow three-fourths of the applicable federal M&IE rate for each partial day during which an employee or self-employed individual is traveling away from home performing services as an employee or self-employed individual. The same ratio may be applied to prorate the allowance for incidental expenses described in section 4.05 of this revenue procedure; or

(2) The rate may be prorated using any method that is consistently applied and in accordance with reasonable business practice. For example, if an employee travels away from home from 9 a.m. one day to 5 p.m. the next day, a method of proration that results in an amount equal to two times the federal M&IE rate is treated as being in accordance with reasonable business practice (even though the Federal Travel Regulations would allow only one and a half times the federal M&IE rate).

.05 Application of the appropriate § 274(n) limitation on meal expenses . Except as provided in section 6.05(5) , all or part of the amount of an expense deemed substantiated under this revenue procedure is subject to the appropriate limitation under § 274(n) (see section 2.02 of this revenue procedure) on the deductibility of food and beverage expenses.

(1) If an amount for meal and incidental expenses is computed under section 4.03 of this revenue procedure, a taxpayer must treat that amount as an expense for food and beverages.

(2) If a per diem allowance is paid only for meal and incidental expenses, a payor must treat an amount equal to the lesser of the allowance or the federal M&IE rate for the locality of travel for each day (or partial day, see section 6.04 of this revenue procedure) as an expense for food and beverages.

(3) If a per diem allowance is paid for lodging, meal, and incidental expenses for each calendar day (or partial day) an employee is away from home at a rate equal to or in excess of the federal per diem rate for the locality of travel, a payor must treat an amount equal to the federal M&IE rate for the locality of travel for each calendar day (or partial day) as an expense for food or beverages.

(4) If a per diem allowance is paid for lodging, meal, and incidental expenses for each calendar day (or partial day) an employee is away from home at a rate less than the federal per diem rate for the locality of travel, a payor must:

(a) Treat an amount equal to the federal M&IE rate for the locality of travel for each calendar day (or partial day) or, if less, the amount of the allowance, as an expense for food or beverages; or

(b) Treat an amount equal to 40 percent of the allowance as an expense for food or beverages.

(5) If an amount for incidental expenses is computed under section 4.05 of this revenue procedure, none of the amount is subject to limitation under § 274(n) .

.06 No double reimbursement or deduction . If a payor pays a per diem allowance in lieu of reimbursing actual lodging, meal, and incidental expenses, or meal and incidental expenses, in accordance with section 4 or 5 of this revenue procedure, and the amount is treated as paid under an accountable plan, any additional payment for those expenses is treated as paid under a nonaccountable plan, is included in an employee's gross income, is reported as wages or other compensation on the employee's Form W-2, and is subject to withholding and payment of employment taxes. Similarly, if an employee or self-employed individual computes the amount allowable as a deduction for meal and incidental expenses for travel away from home in accordance with section 4.03 or 4.04 of this revenue procedure, no other deduction is allowed to the employee or self-employed individual for those expenses. For example, assume an employee receives a per diem allowance from a payor for lodging, meal, and incidental expenses, or for meal and incidental expenses, incurred while traveling away from home and the amount is treated as paid under an accountable plan. During that trip, the employee pays for dinner for the employee and two business associates. The payor reimburses as a business entertainment meal expense the meal expense for the employee and the two business associates. Because the payor also pays a per diem allowance to cover the cost of the employee's meals, the amount paid for the employee's portion of the business entertainment meal expense is treated as paid under a nonaccountable plan, is reported as wages or other compensation on the employee's Form W-2, and is subject to withholding and payment of employment taxes.

.07 Related parties . Sections 4 .01 and 5 of this revenue procedure do not apply if a payor and an employee are related within the meaning of § 267(b) , but for this purpose the percentage of ownership interest referred to in § 267(b)(2) is 10 percent.

SECTION 7. APPLICATION
.01 An employee satisfies the adequate accounting and substantiation requirements of § 1.274-5(c) and (f)(4) and § 1.274-5T(c) if—

(1) The employee uses this revenue procedure to substantiate to a payor the amount of the employee's travel expenses, and

(2) Within a reasonable period of time, the employee also substantiates to the payor the elements of time, place, and business purpose of the travel in accordance with § 1.274-5T(b)(2) and (c) and § 1.274-5(c) (other than § 1.274-5(c)(2)(iii)(A)) .

.02 An arrangement providing per diem allowances is treated as satisfying the requirement of § 1.62-2(f)(2) of returning amounts in excess of expenses if an employee is required to return within a reasonable period of time (as defined in § 1.62-2(g)) any portion of the allowance that relates to days of travel not substantiated, even though the arrangement does not require the employee to return the portion of the allowance that relates to days of travel substantiated and that exceeds the amount of the employee's expenses deemed substantiated. For example, assume a payor provides an employee an advance per diem allowance for meal and incidental expenses of $250, based on an anticipated 5 days of business travel at $50 per day to a locality for which the federal M&IE rate is $46, and the employee substantiates 3 full days of business travel. The requirement to return excess amounts is treated as satisfied if the employee is required to return within a reasonable period of time (as defined in § 1.62-2(g)) the portion of the allowance that is attributable to the 2 unsubstantiated days of travel ($100), even though the employee is not required to return the portion of the allowance ($12) that exceeds the amount of the employee's expenses deemed substantiated under section 4.02 of this revenue procedure ($138) for the 3 substantiated days of travel. However, the $12 excess portion of the allowance is treated as paid under a nonaccountable plan as discussed in section 7.04 of this revenue procedure.

.03 An employee is not required to include in gross income the portion of a per diem allowance received from a payor that is less than or equal to the amount deemed substantiated under the rules provided in section 4 or 5 of this revenue procedure if the employee substantiates the business travel expenses covered by the per diem allowance in accordance with section 7.01 of this revenue procedure. See § 1.274-5T(f)(2)(i) . If the remaining requirements for an accountable plan provided in § 1.62-2 are satisfied, that portion of the allowance is treated as paid under an accountable plan, is not reported as wages or other compensation on the employee's Form W-2, and is exempt from the withholding and payment of employment taxes. See § 1.62-2(c)(2) and (c)(4).

.04 An employee is required to include in gross income only the portion of the per diem allowance received from a payor that exceeds the amount deemed substantiated under the rules provided in section 4 or 5 of this revenue procedure if the employee substantiates the business travel expenses covered by the per diem allowance in accordance with section 7.01 of this revenue procedure. See § 1.274-5T(f)(2)(ii) . In addition, the excess portion of the allowance is treated as paid under a nonaccountable plan, is reported as wages or other compensation on the employee's Form W-2, and is subject to withholding and payment of employment taxes. See § 1.62-2(c)(3)(ii) , (c)(5), and (h)(2)(i)(B).

.05 If the amount of the expenses that is deemed substantiated under the rules provided in section 4.01 , 4.02, or 5 of this revenue procedure is less than the amount of an employee's business expenses for travel away from home, an employee may claim an itemized deduction for the amount by which the business travel expenses exceed the amount that is deemed substantiated, provided the employee substantiates all the business travel expenses (not just the excess over the federal per diem rate), includes on Form 2106, “Employee Business Expenses,” the deemed substantiated portion of the per diem allowance received from the payor, and includes in gross income the portion (if any) of the per diem allowance received from the payor that exceeds the amount deemed substantiated. See § 1.274-5T(f)(2)(iii) . However, for purposes of claiming this itemized deduction for meal and incidental expenses, substantiation of the amount of the expenses is not required if the employee is claiming a deduction that is equal to or less than the amount computed under section 4.03 of this revenue procedure minus the amount deemed substantiated under sections 4 .02 and 7.01 of this revenue procedure. The itemized deduction is subject to the appropriate limitation (see section 2.02 of this revenue procedure) on meal and entertainment expenses in § 274(n) and the 2-percent floor on miscellaneous itemized deductions in § 67 .

.06 An employee who pays or incurs meal expenses and does not receive a per diem allowance for meal and incidental expenses may deduct an amount computed under section 4.03 of this revenue procedure only as an itemized deduction. This itemized deduction is subject to the appropriate limitation on meal and entertainment expenses in § 274(n) and the 2-percent floor on miscellaneous itemized deductions in § 67 . See section 7.07 of this revenue procedure for the treatment of an employee who does not pay or incur amounts for meal expenses and does not receive a per diem allowance for incidental expenses.

.07 An employee who does not pay or incur amounts for meal expenses and does not receive a per diem allowance for incidental expenses may deduct an amount computed under section 4.05 of this revenue procedure only as an itemized deduction. This itemized deduction is subject to the 2-percent floor on miscellaneous itemized deductions § 67 . See section 7.06 of this revenue procedure for the treatment of an employee who pays or incurs amounts for meal expenses and does not receive a per diem allowance for meal and incidental expenses.

.08 A self-employed individual who pays or incurs meal expenses for a calendar day (or partial day) of travel away from home may deduct an amount computed under section 4.03 of this revenue procedure in determining adjusted gross income under § 62(a)(1) . This deduction is subject to the appropriate limitation on meal and entertainment expenses in § 274(n) .

.09 A self-employed individual who does not pay or incur meal expenses for a calendar day (or partial day) of travel away from home may deduct an amount computed under section 4.05 of this revenue procedure in determining adjusted gross income under § 62(a)(1) .

SECTION 8. WITHHOLDING AND PAYMENT OF EMPLOYMENT TAXES
.01 The portion of a per diem allowance, if any, that relates to the days of business travel substantiated and that exceeds the amount deemed substantiated for those days under section 4.01 , 4.02, or 5 of this revenue procedure is treated as paid under a nonaccountable plan and is subject to withholding and payment of employment taxes. See § 1.62-2(h)(2)(i)(B) .

.02 In the case of a per diem allowance paid as a reimbursement, the excess described in section 8.01 of this revenue procedure is subject to withholding and payment of employment taxes in the payroll period in which a payor reimburses the expenses for the days of travel substantiated. See § 1.62-2(h)(2)(i)(B)(2) .

.03 In the case of a per diem allowance paid as an advance, the excess described in section 8.01 of this revenue procedure is subject to withholding and payment of employment taxes no later than the first payroll period following the payroll period in which the days of travel for which the advance was paid are substantiated. See § 1.62-2(h)(2)(i)(B)(3) . If an employee does not substantiate some or all of the days of travel for which the advance was paid within a reasonable period of time or does not return the portion of the allowance that relates to those days within a reasonable period of time, the portion of the allowance that relates to those days is subject to withholding and payment of employment taxes no later than the first payroll period following the end of the reasonable period. See § 1.62-2(h)(2)(i)(A) .

.04 In the case of a per diem allowance only for meal and incidental expenses for travel away from home paid to an employee in the transportation industry by a payor that uses the rule in section 4.04(4) of this revenue procedure, the excess of the per diem allowance paid for the period over the amount deemed substantiated for the period under section 4.02 of this revenue procedure (after applying section 4.04(4) of this revenue procedure), is subject to withholding and payment of employment taxes no later than the first payroll period following the payroll period in which the excess is computed. See § 1.62-2(h)(2)(i)(B)(4) .

.05 For example, assume that an employer pays an employee a per diem allowance under an arrangement that otherwise meets the requirements of an accountable plan to cover business expenses for meals and lodging for travel away from home at a rate of 120 percent of the federal per diem rate for the localities to which the employee travels. The employer does not require the employee to return the 20 percent by which the reimbursement for those expenses exceeds the federal per diem rate. The employee substantiates 6 days of travel away from home: 2 days in a locality in which the federal per diem rate is $160 and 4 days in a locality in which the federal per diem rate is $120. The employer reimburses the employee $960 for the 6 days of travel away from home (2 × (120% × $160) + 4 × (120% × $120)), and does not require the employee to return the excess payment of $160 (2 days × $32 ($192-$160) + 4 days × $24 ($144-$120)). For the payroll period in which the employer reimburses the expenses, the employer must withhold and pay employment taxes on $160. See section 8.02 of this revenue procedure.

.06 All payments to an employee under a per diem allowance arrangement are treated as paid under a nonaccountable plan if the reimbursement arrangement evidences a pattern of abuse. An arrangement evidences a pattern of abuse if, for example, it has no process to determine when an allowance exceeds the amount that may be deemed substantiated and the arrangement routinely pays allowances in excess of the amount that may be deemed substantiated without requiring actual substantiation or repayment of the excess amount or treating the excess allowances as wages for employment tax purposes. See § 62(c) , § 1.62-2(k) , and Rev. Rul. 2006-56 , 2006-2 C.B. 874. Thus, these payments are included in the employee's gross income, are reported as wages or other compensation on the employee's Form W-2, and are subject to withholding and payment of employment taxes. See §§ 1.62-2(c)(3) , (c)(5), and (h)(2).

SECTION 9. EFFECTIVE DATE
This revenue procedure is effective for per diem allowances for lodging, meal and incidental expenses, or for meal and incidental expenses only that are paid to an employee on or after October 1, 2009, for travel away from home on or after October 1, 2009. For purposes of computing the amount allowable as a deduction for travel away from home, this revenue procedure is effective for meal and incidental expenses or for incidental expenses only paid or incurred on or after October 1, 2009.

SECTION 10. EFFECT ON OTHER DOCUMENTS
Rev. Proc. 2008-59 is superseded.

DRAFTING INFORMATION
The principal author of this revenue procedure is Karla M. Meola of the Office of Associate Chief Counsel (Income Tax and Accounting). For further information regarding this revenue procedure, contact Ms. Meola at (202) 622-4930 (not a toll-free call).


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METADATA
title Rev. Proc. 2009-47
search-title Revenue Procedure: Rev. Proc. 2009-47, (Oct. 1, 2009)
primary-class ruling/revenue-procedure
wk-da number WKUS_TAL_1432
CCH Paragraph No. 46,501
language http://psi.oasis-open.org/iso/639/#eng
region United States [http://wk-us.com/meta/regions/#US]
publisher http://wk-us.com/meta/publishers/#CCH
publishing-status new
publishing-dates available-date:
modified-date:
revised-date:
sort-date: 2009-10-01

key-phrase Deductions
key-phrase Business expenses
key-phrase Per diem rates
document-transformation-history SOURCE-CRC: 3560115307
G2I-VERSION: Group2Interchange-RELEASE-03-14-0008
G2I-TRANSFORMATION-DATE: 2009-09-30
I2A-VERSION: I2A-03-15-0004
I2A-TRANSFORMATION-DATE: 2009-09-30

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