Thursday, January 28, 2010

U.S. v. OHLE, Cite as 105 AFTR 2d 2010-XXXX, 01/12/2010

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. John B. OHLE III and William E. Bradley, Defendants.
Case Information:

Code Sec(s):
Court Name: United States District Court, S.D. New York,
Docket No.: No. S2 08 Cr. 1109(LBS),
Date Decided: 01/12/2010.
Disposition:
HEADNOTE

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Reference(s):

OPINION

United States District Court, S.D. New York,

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

Judge: SAND, District Judge.

On August 11, 2009, the Government filed the Second Superseding Indictment (“Indictment”) against Defendant JohnB. Ohle III (“Ohle”) and Defendant William E. Bradley (“Bradley”). The Indictment, which includes eight counts, charges Ohle and Bradley with various tax and fraud offenses. The Indictment alleges that between 2001 and 2004, Ohle and various co-conspirators engaged in a massive scheme to cheat the Government out of over $100 million by causing dozens of United States taxpayers to engage in fraudulent tax shelter transactions and fraudulently report the results of those shelters on their tax returns. Ohle is alleged to have formed two conspiracies, charged in Count One and Count Five. Bradley is only alleged to have been a member of the Count Five conspiracy.

The Count One conspiracy (the “HOMER conspiracy”) charges Ohle and others with conspiring to defraud the United States and to commit various tax crimes and mail and wire fraud. Ohle and his coconspirators are charged with developing and implementing an allegedly fraudulent tax shelter known as “Hedge Option Monetization of Economic Remainder” (“HOMER”). Ohle, a certified public accountant and attorney, is charged with helping to design, market, and implement HOMER while he was working for a national bank (“Bank A”), which maintained its principal offices in Chicago, Illinois. The scheme was allegedly designed to eliminate or reduce the amount of U.S. income taxes paid by wealthy clients of Bank A and law firm Jenkens & Gilchrist, P.C. (“J & G”). The scheme generated extraordinary fee income for Bank A, J & G, Ohle, and his co-conspirators. The Indictment also alleges that Ohle and other members of the Innovative Strategies Group (“ING”) at Bank A received bonuses based in part on the amount of fees each generated through their sale of the HOMER tax shelters. Ohle is charged with substantive tax evasion as to various clients in Count Two (Client D.W.), Count Three (Client C.P.), and Count 4 (Client D.D.).

The Count Five conspiracy, referred to in the Indictment as “The Mail and Wire Fraud and Personal Income Tax Fraud Conspiracy”, charges Ohle, Bradley, and co-conspirators Douglas Steger and Individual C with conspiracy to commit fraud. The conspiracy alleged in Count Five consists of two schemes: the referral fees and Carpe Diem. The Indictment alleges that as part of an effort to market, sell, and implement HOMER tax shelters, Ohle, other members of Bank A's ISG, and attorneys from J & G agreed to pay referral fees to third parties who referred a client who ultimately entered into a HOMER tax shelter. Third-party referral sources sent invoices to J & G, who would then pay referral fees to those third parties based on the amounts stated in the invoices. The Indictment alleges that J & G would issue IRS Forms 1099-MISC, when appropriate, to the third parties to reflect the payment of the referral fees as non-employee compensation to the third parties. As part of the referral scheme, Ohle is alleged, along with Steger and Bradley, to have prepared fraudulent invoices to obtain referral fees from Bank A, which they were not entitled to receive under the fee arrangement. Ohle is alleged to have contacted Bradley to prepare invoices for referral fees in connection with Client Group 1's HOMER tax shelter, despite the fact that Bradley performed no services in connection with that deal. Bradley is also alleged to have prepared fraudulent invoices related to two of Bank A's HOMER clients.

Second, the Carpe Diem scheme alleges that Ohle approached Client E, with whom Ohle had an established business relationship, to invest in Carpe Diem, a Bermuda-based hedge fund for whom Steger was an independent salesman. Client E invested $7 million in Carpe Diem. The Indictment alleges that Ohle also met with Client F and Client G, both of whom were HOMER clients of Bank A. Client F and Client G invested $1 million each in Carpe Diem. Ohle is alleged to have received a 5% commission on each of the Carpe Diem transactions, even though he told Client E that he would not receive any commission on her investments. The Indictment also alleges, related to the Carpe Diem fees, that Ohle unlawfully diverted funds from Client E's trust account to be used for Ohle's personal benefit. When Client E informed Ohle that she and her lawyer wished to discuss the finances of the trust, Ohle, with the assistance of Bradley, replaced a portion of the funds that had been unlawfully diverted from the trust bank account.

In Counts Six and Seven, Ohle is charged with personal tax evasion for the tax years 2001 and 2002, respectively. Count Eight of the Indictment alleges that Ohle obstructed and impeded the due administration of the internal revenue laws. With this background, the Court now addresses Defendant Ohle's and Defendant Bradley's various pretrial motions. For the purposes of these motions, all of the allegations in the Indictment are accepted as true.

I. Discussion

a. Use of the Mail Fraud Statute (Count One)

Ohle argues that Count One of the indictment impermissibly uses the wire fraud statute to reach an alleged criminal tax conspiracy, citing United States v. Henderson, 386 F.Supp. 1048 [34 AFTR 2d 74-6245] (S.D.N.Y.1974). Henderson held that the mail fraud statute (the scope of which is identical to the wire fraud statute, United States v. Schwartz, 924 F.2d 410, 417 (2d Cir.1991)), was not intended to reach cases of alleged tax evasion and was superseded by the comprehensive system of penalties Congress later enacted in the Internal Revenue Code. Henderson, 386 F.Supp. 1048 [34 AFTR 2d 74-6245]. Though it has never explicitly disapproved Henderson, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has recently stated that “Henderson-which other circuits have rejected, ... provides weak authority for the proposition that schemes aimed at defrauding the government of taxes do not fall within the scope of the mail and wire fraud statutes.”Fountain v. United States , 357 F.3d 250, 258 [93 AFTR 2d 2004-615] (2d Cir.2004). 1. We agree with the many courts of appeals 2. and courts within this District 3. that have declined to follow Henderson. Ohle's motion to dismiss the wire fraud allegations is denied. 4.

b. Duplicity (Count Five)

Ohle and Bradley both move to dismiss Count Five as duplicitous. An indictment is duplicitous if it joins two or more distinct crimes in a single count. United States v. Aracri, 968 F.2d 1512, 1518 [70 AFTR 2d 92-6305] (2d Cir.1992). Duplicitous pleading is not presumptively invalid; rather, it is impermissible only if it prejudices the defendant.United States v. Olmeda , 461 F.3d 271, 281 (2d Cir.2006). Duplicity is only properly invoked when a challenged indictment affects one of the doctrine's underlying policy concerns: (1) avoiding the uncertainty of a general guilty verdict, which may conceal a finding of guilty as to one crime and not guilty as to other, (2) avoiding the risk that jurors may not have been unanimous as to any one of the crimes charged, (3) assuring the defendant has adequate notice of charged crimes, (4) providing the basis for appropriate sentencing, and (5) providing the adequate protection against double jeopardy in subsequent prosecution. Olmeda, 461 F.3d at 281 (citing United States v. Margiotta, 646 F.2d 729, 732–33 (2d Cir.1981)).

The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has recognized that application of the duplicity doctrine to conspiracy indictments presents “unique issues.” United States v. Murray, 618 F.2d 892, 896 (2d Cir.1980). In this Circuit, “it is well established that [t]he allegation in a single count of a conspiracy to commit several crimes is not duplicitous, for [t]he conspiracy is the crime and that is one, however diverse its objects.”Aracri , 968 F.2d at 1518 (internal citations and quotations omitted). “A single conspiracy may be found where there is mutual dependence among the participants, a common aim or purpose or a permissible inference from the nature and scope of the operation, that each actor was aware of his part in a larger organization where others performed similar roles equally important to the success of the venture.” United States v. Vanwort, 887 F.2d 375, 383 (2d Cir.1989). Each member of the conspiracy is not required to have conspired directly with every other member of the conspiracy; a member need only have “participated in the alleged enterprise with a consciousness of its general nature and extent.”United States v. Rooney , 866 F.2d 28, 32 [63 AFTR 2d 89-534] (2d Cir.1989). If the Indictment on its face sufficiently alleges a single conspiracy, the question of whether a single conspiracy or multiple conspiracies exists is a question of fact for the jury.Vanwort , 887 F.2d at 383; see also United States v. Szur, No. S5 97 CR 108(JGK), 1998 WL 132942, at 11 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 1998). Accordingly, courts in this Circuit have repeatedly denied motions to dismiss a count as duplicitous.See United States v. Nachamie , 101 F.Supp.2d 134, 153 (S.D.N.Y.2000) (collecting cases).

Bradley, pointing to United States v. Muñoz-Franco, 986 F.Supp. 70 (D.P.R.1997), argues that Count Five is duplicitous on its face. We find Judge Rakoff's decision in United States v. Gabriel, 920 F.Supp. 498 (S.D.N.Y.1996), to be more instructive in this case. 5. InGabriel , Judge Rakoff found that, although the count at issue contained boilerplate allegations of a single conspiracy, the subsequent paragraphs in the count were more consistent with two conspiracies than a single conspiracy.Gabriel , 920 F.Supp. at 503. As inMuñoz-Franco, the paragraphs describing the overt acts in the Gabriel Indictment were divided into two distinct sets. Id. at 503; Muñoz-Franco, 986 F.Supp. at 71. Finding that “on any but a superficial reading, [the Government] appears to actually allege two distinct conspiracies[,]” Judge Rakoff stated that if it were within his power he would dismiss the count at issue as duplicative. Gabriel, 920 F.Supp. at 504–05. “But the Court of Appeals has repeatedly cautioned that the determination of whether a conspiracy is single or multiple is an issue of fact “singularly” well suited to determination by a jury.” Id. Therefore, Judge Rakoff held that “[g]iven Count Six's boilerplate allegations of a single conspiracy, the Court cannot conclude on the basis of the pleadings alone that there is no set of facts falling within the scope of Count Six that could warrant a reasonable jury in finding a single conspiracy.”Id.

Similarly, in the case at bar, Count Five contains “boilerplate allegations” of a single conspiracy. The Indictment alleges, “From in or about 2001 until at least in or about February 15, 2004, in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere, JOHNB. OHLE III, and WILLIAM BRADLEY, the defendants, together with Douglas Steger and Individual C, co-conspirators not named as defendants herein, and others known and unknown, unlawfully, willfully, and knowingly did combine, conspire, confederate, and agree together and with others to defraud the United States and an agency thereof, to wit, the IRS of the United States Department of Treasury, and to commit offenses against the United States, to wit, violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1341 and 1343, and Title 26, United States Code, Section 7201.” Indictment ¶ 80. Count Five then describes the two schemes involved: the referral fee fraud and Carpe Diem.

The Indictment's subsequent description of the overt acts indicates that Count Five may consist of multiple conspiracies. But, as in Gabriel, Count Five survives the facial test. The Government alleges that Bradley and Ohle, along with co-conspirators, are accused of participating in a conspiracy to “steal money by fraud, [and] pay no taxes.” (Gov't Opp. 47.) The Indictment alleges that both schemes sought to obtain money through fraud, and, thereafter, defrauded the IRS by concealing those ill-gotten gains. Both schemes occurred at the same time-between mid-November 2001 and February 2002. 6. (Gov't Opp. 44.) Ohle is alleged to have participated in all the Count Five schemes. But, contrary to Defendants' argument, Ohle was not the only member of the conspiracy alleged to have participated in multiple frauds. Steger and Bradley are both alleged to have submitted false invoices to J & G as part of the referral fee fraud. Indictment ¶¶ 84, 85. Bradley is alleged to have shared his proceeds with Individual C, who was owed legitimate referral fees. Ohle urged Individual C “to take care of” Bradley; Individual C then gave Bradley a check for $4,000. Indictment ¶ 92. Ohle and Steger are also alleged to have obtained funds from three different clients through investments in the Carpe Diem hedge fund. Indictment ¶¶ 95–102. One of these clients was Client E. Ohle is alleged to have misappropriated almost $350,000 of Client E's funds, which had been run through Carpe Diem. After Client E began to make inquiries regarding his investment, Ohle enlisted Bradley to replace a portion of the funds that had been misappropriated. Indictment ¶ 104.

Bradley's role in aiding Ohle to replace a portion of Client E's funds, which had been unlawfully diverted, alleges a “mutual dependence and assistance” across the schemes.See Vanwort , 887 F.2d at 383. Individual C's payment to Bradley shows that each individual submitting invoices was not acting in a vacuum. Given that the two frauds occurred at the same time and had common participants, and that compensation was paid amongst the co-conspirators (not just between co-conspirators and Ohle) and across the two frauds, we find that the Indictment alleges a single conspiracy on its face. Furthermore, proceeding on the current Count Five would not undermine any of the policies underlying the duplicity doctrine. 7. See Margiotta, 646 F.2d at 732–33. Defendants' motion to dismiss Count Five as duplicative is denied.

c. Severance

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(a) permits joinder of offenses if the offenses charged are “of the same or similar character, or are based on the same act or transaction, or are connected with or constitute parts of a common scheme or plan.” Fed.R.Crim.P. 8(a). Rule 8(b) permits joinder of defendants “if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction, or in the same series of acts or transactions, constituting an offense or offenses. The defendant may be charged in one or more counts together or separately. All defendants need not be charged in each count.” Fed.R.Crim.P. 8(b). Even if joinder is proper under Rule 8, a court may still sever pursuant to Rule 14(a) if it appears joinder would prejudice a defendant or the government. Fed.R.Crim.P. 14(a). “For reasons of economy, convenience and avoidance of delay, there is a preference in the federal system for providing defendants who are indicted together with joint trials.”United States v. Feyrer , 333 F.3d 110, 114 (2d Cir.2003).

i. Count Five

Bradley and Ohle both move to sever Count Five of the Indictment. “Though Rule 8(a) addresses joinder of offenses and Rule 8(b) concerns joinder of defendants, when a defendant in a multi-defendant action challenges joinder, whether of offenses or defendants, the motion is construed as arising under Rule 8(b).” 8. United States v. Stein, 428 F.Supp.2d. 138, 141 (S.D.N.Y.2006); see United States v. Turoff, 853 F.2d 1037, 1043 [62 AFTR 2d 88-5236] (2d Cir.1988). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has explained that a ““series” exists if there is a logical nexus between the transactions.” United States v. Joyner, 201 F.3d 61, 75 (2d Cir.2001). Unlike Rule 8(a), “Rule 8(b) does not permit joinder of defendants solely on the ground that the offenses charged are of “the same or similar character.”” Turoff, 853 F.2d at 1042. Joinder is proper only when the charged offenses are either (1) “unified by some substantial identity of facts or participants,” or (2) “arise out of a common plan or scheme.” United States v. Attanasio, 870 F.2d 809, 815 (2d Cir.1989); see also Feyrer, 333 F.3d at 114; Lech, 161 F.R.D. at 256. We take “a common sense approach when considering the propriety of joinder under Rule 8(b),” Feyrer, 333 F.3d at 114, and ask whether “a reasonable person would easily recognize the common factual elements that permit joinder.”Turoff , 853 F.2d at 1044. Determining whether joinder of two conspiracies is permitted often requires a fact specific analysis. See United States v. Reinhold, 994 F.Supp. 194, 199 (S.D.N.Y.1998) (collecting cases).

The Government's most persuasive argument that the two conspiracies have a common purpose is found in its Surreply: “A significant aspect of implementation [of the HOMER conspiracy] involved Ohle's recruitment and funding of a nominee, or puppet, in the form of Individual A, whose third-party role Ohle needed to fund in order to make the HOMER tax shelter work. Ohle generated that funding through his scheme to obtain HOMER client referral fees, and other client fees, by fraud-the core aspects of Count Five.” (Gov't Surreply 7.) The problem, though, is that these facts are not alleged in the Indictment. The Indictment alleges that “OHLE embezzled funds from a client, “Client E,” and used some of the money to fund Individual A's participation in the HOMER tax shelter. In addition, OHLE obtained by fraud from Bank A referral fees related to the HOMER tax shelter, the majority of which OHLE kept.” Indictment ¶ 74. Based on the Indictment, Count Five is only alleged to have had a minor role in financing the HOMER conspiracy. Additionally, the money allegedly transferred to Individual A was related to Carpe Diem not to the referral fee scheme. Therefore, based on the language of the Indictment, we read Count Five to allege a conspiracy to commit fraud in order to obtain money-some of which was diverted to Individual A in order to fund his role in the HOMER conspiracy.

Courts have upheld joinder in situations where the criminal acts of one offense helped to finance the criminal acts of another offense. See Turoff, 853 F.2d at 1037 [62 AFTR 2d 88-5236];United States v. Catapono , 05 Cr. 229, 2008 WL 3992303 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2008). In Turoff, the Court found that a “quid pro quo was exchanged between [the] participants,” and that “these financial benefits were part and parcel of the tax fraud.”Turoff , 853 F.2d at 1044. The court emphasized that “there is a key link between the two offenses-one scheme stemmed from the other-and that link provides a sound basis for joinder under Rule 8(b).” Turoff, 853 F.2d at 1044. Ohle is alleged to have used only a portion of the funds embezzled from Client E to finance Individual A's role in the HOMER conspiracy. The transfer of funds to Individual A's account does not provide a “key link” between the two conspiracies; rather, it appears to be an ancillary aspect of the Count Five conspiracy.

In United States v. Lech, then Judge Sotomayor found that “Turoff stands for the proposition that [defendants] may be tried together because they had specific knowledge of each other's activities, jointly participated in many of the acts alleged in the Indictment, and used that knowledge and participation as a springboard for the [other alleged offenses].” Lech, 161 F.R.D. at 257. The Indictment does not allege that Bradley had any knowledge of the HOMER conspiracy or the transfer of funds to Individual A. 9. Knowledge of the other conspiracy is not required, but it is an indicator of whether or not there is a common scheme or purpose. See United States v. Menashe, 741 F.Supp. 1135, 1139 (S.D.N.Y.1990) (“O'Toole's plan cannot be called “common”, since he is the only one alleged to be aware of it.....”)

Furthermore, the referral fees scheme's object-to fraudulently obtain fees from Bank A, a co-conspirator in the HOMER conspiracy-demonstrates that it did not have a common purpose with the HOMER conspiracy. In United States v. Rojas, S4 01 Cr. 251(AGS), 2001 WL 1568786 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2001), the court found that a common scheme could not exist where the goals of the conspiracy were antagonistic. InRojas , the Count One conspiracy, known as the LRO, sought to sell narcotics for financial gain, and the Count Two conspiracy sought to rob the Count One conspiracy of its narcotics and sell the stolen drugs for their own financial gain. The two conspiracies had at least one defendant in common. The court concluded that the conspiracies did not have a common goal and the similarity of facts did not support joinder.Rojas , 2001 WL 1568786, at 5 (“[T]heir goals were antagonistic: for the Count Two Conspiracy to succeed, it would have to harm the LRO by stealing the LRO's drugs.”).

Although the instant case only involves defrauding a single co-conspirator, as opposed to the conspiracy as a whole, the referral fee scheme undermined the HOMER conspiracy by defrauding one of its co-conspirators. In United States v. Kouzmine, 921 F.Supp. 1131 (S.D.N.Y.1996), Judge Kaplan noted that because the two defendants had a falling out prior to the second conspiracy, “there is no colorable argument” that the two conspiracies were part of one single overarching scheme.Id. at 1133. In the instant case, the referral scheme's object of defrauding a HOMER co-conspirator of its financial gain from that conspiracy, demonstrates an animosity between the two schemes, analogous to the falling out inKouzmine.

Nor do we find that the conspiracies are unified by a “substantial identity of facts or participants.”Attanasio , 870 F.2d at 815. “It is well settled ... that two separate transactions do not constitute a series within the meaning of Rule 8(b) merely because they are of a similar character or involve one or more common participants.”Lech , 161 F.R.D. at 256; see also United States v. Van Berry, No. 04 Cr. 269(JBS), 2005 WL 1168398, at 5 (D.N.J. May 18, 2005) (“That the same participants were involved in crimes of a separate nature, however, (or at the very least that the defendants believed the same participants were involved in separate crimes) is not sufficient to connect otherwise distinct crimes.”); United States v. Giraldo, 859 F.Supp. 52, 55 (E.D.N.Y.1994) (“[D]efendants charged with two separate-albeit similar-conspiracies having one common participant are not, without more, properly joined.”).

The Government argues that the two conspiracies share a substantial identity of similar facts because both conspiracies involve the HOMER tax shelter. The Government further argues that if Count Five is severed, it will be forced to prove the HOMER tax shelter twice. We do not agree. Severance of Count Five will not force the Government to prove “essentially the same facts” more than once. See Shellef, 507 F.2d at 99–100. The HOMER tax shelter plays an important role in both conspiracies but in different capacities. The Government will need to provide evidence of HOMER to contextualize Count Five but it will not have to prove HOMER's illegality. In trying the HOMER conspiracy, the Government will likely devote a substantial amount of time to the issue of the legality of the tax shelter, dissecting how HOMER worked and the role Ohle played in developing and operating it. In contrast, the Government could prove its entire burden in Count Five-the fraud perpetrated through the referral fee scheme, the Carpe Diem scheme, and the embezzlement of Client E's funds-without ever proving or alleging the illegality of the HOMER tax shelter.

In the instant case, the similarity between the two conspiracies is marginal. The courts in this Circuit have consistently required a far more substantial connection.See United States v. Butler , No. S1 04 Cr. 340(GEL), 2004 WL 2274751, at 4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2004) (finding the facts involved in the two counts to be “so closely connected that proof of the very same facts is necessary to establish each of the joined offenses”); United States v. Ferrarini, 9 F.Supp.2d 284, 292 (S.D.N.Y.1998) (finding a substantial connection because “evidence of those activities-and their unlawful nature-would be necessary at a separate trial on the false statement charges to prove the falsity of the defendants' statements that they were not engaged in fraudulent activity”). The most significant common factor is the HOMER tax shelter, but the fact that the Count Five conspiracy sought to steal proceeds from the HOMER conspiracy significantly decreases the relevance of this factor.See Rojas , 2001 WL 1568786, at 5 (finding that the antagonistic nature of the two conspiracies negated the significance of the fact that they involved the same narcotics). We find that the two conspiracies do not have a common scheme or plan, nor do they share a substantial identity of facts and participants; Defendants' motion to sever Count Five 10. is granted. 11.

ii. Severance of Counts Six through Eight

Ohle also seeks to sever Counts Six through Eight. Counts Six and Seven charge Ohle with personal tax evasion in 2001 and 2002, respectively. Count Eight charges Ohle with obstructing and impeding the due administration of the Internal Revenue laws pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a). As we have already severed Count Five, Ohle is the only defendant remaining in the Indictment. Therefore, Rule 8(a) governs the question of whether Counts Six through Eight are properly joined with Counts One through Four. Rule 8(a), unlike Rule 8(b), permits joinder solely on the ground that the offenses charged are “of the same or similar character.” Fed.R.Crim.P. 8(a); see Turoff, 853 F.2d at 1042.

Ohle's challenge to the joinder of Count Eight is without merit. Ohle is charged with obstructing and impeding the administration of the Internal Revenue laws through the design and implementation of the HOMER tax shelter. Without question Count Eight is “based on the same act or transaction” as Counts One through Four. Fed.R.Crim.P. 8(a). Therefore, Count Eight is properly joined.

With regard to severing Counts Six and Seven, we find this to be a close question. “[T]ax counts can properly be joined with non-tax counts where it is shown that the tax offenses arose directly from the other offenses charged.”Turoff , 853 F.2d at 1043; see also Shellef, 507 F.3d at 87–88. “The most direct link possible between non-tax crimes and tax fraud is that funds derived from non-tax violations either are or produce the unreported income.” Turoff, 853 F.2d at 1043. “However, if the character of the funds derived do not convince us of the benefit of joining these two schemes in one indictment, other overlapping facts or issues may.”Id. at 1043–44.

The Government has alleged a relationship between the unreported income in Counts Six and Seven and the HOMER conspiracy proceeds. However, the Government relies on allegations outside of the Indictment. Although the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has not directly confronted the question of whether joinder must be decided on the face of the Indictment, the Court recently “caution[ed] that the plain language of Rule 8(b) does not appear to allow for consideration of pre-trial representations not contained in the indictment, just as the language of the Rule does not allow for the consideration of evidence at trial.” United States v. Rittweger, 524 F.3d 171, 178 n. 3 (2d Cir.1998). Accordingly, we find that the Government's allegations regarding the relationship between the unreported income and the HOMER conspiracy proceeds cannot justify joinder.

Counts Six and Seven are alleged to be objects of the Count Five conspiracy. The unreported income includes money Ohle received from the referral fee fraud and Carpe Diem. (Gov't Mem. 72.) Thus, there is a “direct link” between the unreported income in Counts Six and Seven and the proceeds of the Count Five conspiracy. See Turoff, 853 F.2d at 1043. Given the close nexus between Counts Five, Six, and Seven, we conclude that Counts Six and Seven should also be severed.

Defendants' motion to sever is granted as to Counts Five, Six, and Seven and denied as to Count Eight.

d. Statute of Limitations

i. Count One

The applicable limitations period for a wire fraud conspiracy charge is generally five years. 18 U.S.C. § 3282;see United States v. Scop , 846 F.2d 135, 138 (2d Cir.1988). However, “if the offense affects a financial institution,” then a ten-year statute of limitations applies. 18 U.S.C. § 3293(2); see United States v. Bouyea, 152 F.3d 192, 195 (2d Cir.1998). Ohle does not contest that Bank A is a financial institution within the meaning of the statute. Rather, Ohle argues that § 3293(2) does not apply because Bank A was an active participant in the fraud, not the object of the fraud, and not directly affected by the fraud.

In United States v. Serpico, 320 F.3d 691, (7th Cir.2003), the Seventh Circuit specifically rejected the defendant's argument that a financial institution is not “affected” if it is an active participant in the offense.Serpico , 320 F.3d at 695. The Court concluded that the financial institution's active participation in the scheme did not negate the effect on the institution. Id. (“[W]e find it hard to understand how a bank that was put out of business as a direct result of the scheme was not “affected,” even if it played an active part in the scheme.”). Ohle attempts to distinguish Serpico, by limiting the holding to apply only when the financial institution is both the object of the scheme to defraud and a participant in the scheme. (Ohle Reply Memo. 6–7, n. 1.)

The statute applies a ten year period of limitations if the offense “affects” a financial institution. 18 U.S.C. § 3293(2). This Circuit has found that this language is to be read broadly. See Bouyea, 152 F.3d 192, 195 (2d Cir.1998) (“[T]he statute is clear: it broadly applies to any act of wire fraud “that affects a financial institution.””). In United States v. Bouyea, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that the statute was applicable to a wholly owned subsidiary where the parent company, but not the subsidiary, was a financial institution. Bouyea, 152 F.3d at 195. The Second Circuit rejected the defendant's argument that “the defrauding of a financial institution's subsidiary-leading to a reduction of the financial institution's assets-is insufficient as a matter of law to meet the “affect[ing] a financial institution” requirement of § 3293(2).”Id. In reaching this conclusion, the Court extensively quoted the Third Circuit's reasoning inUnited States v. Pellulo , 964 F.3d 193 (3d Cir.1992). Id. Notably, Bouyea quotes the Third Circuit's conclusion that “[the defendant's] argument would have more force if the statute provided for an extended limitations period where the financial institution is the object of fraud. Clearly, however, Congress chose to extend the statute of limitations to a broader class of crimes.” Id. (quoting Pellulo, 964 F.2d at 216).

Bouyea “easily reject[s]” the argument that the financial institution must be the object of fraud, requiring, instead, that the effect on the financial institution be “sufficiently direct.” Bouyea, 152 F.3d at 195. The effect on Bank A was direct. Ohle and his co-conspirators are alleged to have used Bank A to perpetrate the HOMER tax shelter “through the Bank's ostensible backing of the transaction, the use of its subsidiary as the “trustee” in each HOMER shelter, and the use of Bank funds.” (Gov't Opp. 16.) As Ohle argues himself, Bank A was an active participant in the fraud. As a result of this participation, Bank A was not only exposed to substantial risk but experienced actual losses.Id. Bank A paid over $24,000,000 in settlements to HOMER clients and over $4,200,000 in attorneys' fees defending the suits. Id. Ohle's argument that this effect is too remote is unpersuasive. In using Bank A as a central player in the HOMER conspiracy, Ohle and his co-conspirator's knew they were exposing it to risk if their fraud was uncovered. “[T]he whole purpose of § 3293(2) is to protect financial institutions, a goal it tries to accomplish in large part by deterring would-be criminals from including financial institutions in their schemes.” Serpico, 329 F.3d at 694–95. Through his alleged use of Bank A in the HOMER conspiracy, Ohle put Bank A at substantial risk. This risk resulted in millions of dollars of losses for the financial institution, and the losses were a direct and foreseeable result of the HOMER conspiracy. We find the ten year statute of limitations applies, 12. and Ohle's motion to dismiss Count One as time-barred is denied. 13.

ii. Counts Two, Four, and Six

Ohle contends that Counts Two, Four and Six are also time-barred. Pursuant to Section 6531(2), a six year statute of limitations period is applicable to tax evasion offenses. 26 U.S.C. § 6531(2). The period begins to run upon the filing of the tax returns that underlie those counts. See United States v. Habig, 390 U.S. 222, 223 [21 AFTR 2d 803] (1968). The initial indictment in this case was returned on November 13, 2008. The returns at issue were filed approximately six years and one month prior to the Indictment: October 17, 2002 (Count Two), October 21, 2002 (Count Four) and October 16, 2002 (Count Six).See Indictment ¶¶ 38, 70, 107. Section 6531 provides for a tolling of the limitations period for the time “during which the person committing any of the various offenses arising under the internal revenue laws is outside the United States or is a fugitive from justice.” 26 U.S.C. § 6531. The tolling provision is applicable even if the defendant is outside of the country for business or pleasure trips.United States v. Myerson , 368 F.2d 393, 395 [18 AFTR 2d 5997] (2d Cir.1966); see also United States v. Marchant, 774 F.2d 888, 892 [57 AFTR 2d 86-451] (8th Cir.1985). The Government states that it will prove at trial that Ohle spent at least two months outside of the country, which would result in the counts at issue being timely. Ohle's motion to dismiss Counts Two, Four and Six as time-barred is denied.

iii. Count Eight

Title 26, United States Code, Section 6531 sets forth the periods of limitation for criminal tax prosecutions.See 26 U.S.C. § 6531. The statute provides that, in general, criminal tax proceedings must be initiated within three years of the offense, but it carves out eight exceptions for which the statute of limitations is six years.Id. Section 6531(6) provides a six year statute of limitations “for the offense described in section 7212(a) (relating to intimidation of officers and employees).” 26 U.S.C. § 6531(6). Ohle urges a literal reading of the statute, which would apply the six year statute of limitations to violations of Section 7212(a) related to intimidation of officers and employees but not to omnibus clause violations of 7212(a).

Numerous circuits have applied the six year statute of limitations to the omnibus clause of Section 7212(a).See United States v. Kassouf , 144 F.3d 952, 959 [81 AFTR 2d 98-2066] (6th Cir.1998) (“There is nothing to indicate that Congress intended the parenthetical to be limiting rather than merely descriptive of § 7212(a). Similar parentheticals in other statutes have also been found to be descriptive rather than limiting.”); United States v. Wilson, 118 F.3d 228, 236 [80 AFTR 2d 97-5281] (4th Cir.1997) (applying, without discussion, the six year period of limitations to the alleged violation of the omnibus clause of § 7212(a)); United States v. Workinger, 90 F.3d 1409, 1414 [78 AFTR 2d 96-5710] (9th Cir.1996) (“In short, the structure of § 6531 makes it apparent that the parenthetical language in § 6531(6) is descriptive, not limiting.”). In United States v. Kelly, this Circuit found that the district court's application of the six year period of limitations to an omnibus clause violation of Section 7212(a) was not plain error. Kelly, 147 F.3d 172, 177 [82 AFTR 2d 98-5030] (2d Cir.1998). We find no reason to diverge from the persuasive reasoning of the courts that have previously addressed this issue. 14. Accordingly, we find that the six year period of limitations should be applied to the alleged violation of the omnibus clause of Section 7212(a). Ohle's motion to dismiss Count Eight as time-barred is denied.

e. Venue

Defendants Ohle and Bradley allege that venue is not proper in the Southern District of New York and move to dismiss Count Five. Ohle also moves to dismiss the substantive tax offenses-Counts Two, Three, Four, Six and Seven-for lack of venue. The United State Constitution provides that a defendant has the right to trial in “the district wherein the crime shall have been committed.” U.S. Const., Amend. VI.; see also United States v. Beech-Nut Nutrition Corp., 871 F.2d 1181, 1188 (2d Cir.1989). Where “the acts constituting the crime and the nature of the crime charged implicate more than one location, venue is properly laid in any of the districts where an essential conduct element of the crime took place.” United States v. Ramirez, 420 F.3d 134, 139 (2d Cir.2005). The Government bears the burden at trial of proving venue by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Potamitis, 739 F.2d 784, 791 (2d Cir.1989). When the defendant is charged with more than one count, venue must be proper to each count. Beech-Nut Nutrition Corp., 871 F.2d at 1188.

The Government need only allege that criminal conduct occurred within the venue, “even if phrased broadly and without a specific address or other information,” in order to satisfy its burden with regard to pleading venue. United States v. Bronson, No. 05 Cr. 714(NGG), 2007 WL 2455138, at 4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2007); see also United States v. Szur, 97 Cr. 108(JGK), 1998 WL 132942, at 9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 1998). In each count of the Indictment, the Government alleges that the offenses occurred “in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere.” See Indictment ¶¶ 40, 55, 72, 80, 107, 109. These allegations alone are sufficient to survive a pretrial motion to dismiss. 15. The question of whether there is sufficient evidence to support venue is appropriately left for trial. 16.Chalmers, 474 F.Supp.2d at 575. Defendants' motions to dismiss based on venue are denied without prejudice to renewing those motions at the close of the Government's case. 17.

f. Sufficiency of Pleading (Count Eight)

In Count Eight, Ohle is charged with obstructing and impeding the due administration of the Internal Revenue laws pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a). Ohle alleges that Count Eight is insufficiently pled and applying Section 7212(a) in the instant case would render the statute unconstitutionally vague. Count Eight, which tracks the language of the statute and incorporates specific allegations from previous paragraphs in the Indictment, is sufficiently pled and provides Ohle with fair notice of the charges against him. See United States v. Walsh, 914 F.3d 37, 44 (2d Cir.1999) (“[W]e have consistently upheld indictments that do little more than to track the language of the statute charged and state the time and place (in approximate terms) of the alleged crime.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted); United States v. Tramunti, 513 F.2d 1087, 1113 (2d Cir.1975) (“[A]n indictment need do little more than to track the language of the statute charged and state the time and place (in approximate terms) of the alleged crime.”).

Ohle argues that under United States v. Kassouf, 144 F.3d 952 [81 AFTR 2d 98-2066] (6th Cir.1998), Section 7212(a) requires proof of a pending IRS action that the defendant corruptly endeavored to obstruct; and, therefore, the Government has failed to allege a violation of Section 7212(a). (Ohle Mem. 25.) At the outset we note that Kassouf was immediately limited in its own circuit. 18. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, along with many other circuits, has repeatedly affirmed convictions for violations of § 7212(a), or otherwise failed to raise objections to § 7212(a) indictments, in which no IRS proceeding or investigation was pending. See United States v. Wilner, No. 07 Cr. 183(GEL), 2007 WL 2963711 [100 AFTR 2d 2007-6349], at 3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2007) (collecting cases). Furthermore,Kassouf is fundamentally at odds with this Circuit's broad interpretation of the omnibus clause. In United States v. Kelly, the Second Circuit held that the language of the omnibus clause is extremely broad and “renders criminal “any other” action which serves to obstruct or impede the due administration of the revenue laws.” Kelly, 147 F.3d at 175.

Count Eight, which incorporates prior paragraphs of the Indictment, alleges numerous specific acts of obstruction, including but not limited to undermining the ability of the IRS to ascertain HOMER clients' true tax liabilities and determine whether penalties should be obtained through the drafting of fraudulent opinion letters. Indictment ¶ 110 (incorporating ¶ 17). These allegations, which allege that Ohle participated in a scheme to conceal his own income and the income of others from the IRS, charge a violation of Section 7212(a) with sufficient specificity. See Wilner, 2007 WL 2963711 [100 AFTR 2d 2007-6349], at 6 (denying the motion to dismiss an indictment, which charged the defendant “with scheming to create a false paper trail of checks and divert income to a corporation in order to avoid taxes properly owing on income he himself earned as an individual (or similarly owed by other taxpayers)”).

Ohle also argues that the statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied. The Second Circuit rejected a similar argument inKelly. In Kelly, the court relied on the “well-reasoned opinion” of Judge Gertner inUnited States v. Brennick, 908 F.Supp. 1004 [79 AFTR 2d 97-1210] (D.Mass.1995), to conclude that the court's broad interpretation of the statute did not run afoul of the constitutional doctrines of overbreadth and vagueness. Id. We similarly find that application of Section 7212(a) in the instant case does not render the statute unconstitutionally vague. Ohle's motion to dismiss Count Eight is denied.

g. Lack of Pre-Indictment Administrative Conferences

Ohle argues that the failure of the IRS and the DOJ to offer Ohle a pre-indictment conference merits dismissal of the Indictment. However, IRS guidelines do not provide for a pre-indictment conference “if the taxpayer is the subject of a grand jury investigation,” as was the case here. IRM 9.5.12.3.1 (July 25, 2007). The United States Attorneys' Manual (“USAM”) provides that, “If time and circumstances permit, the Tax Division generally grants a taxpayer's written request for a conference with the Division in Washington, D.C.” USAM 6-4.214 (Sept.2007). However, the Second Circuit has held that the provisions of the USAM “reflect executive branch policy judgments” and “do not confer substantive rights on any party.” United States v. Piervinanzi, 23 F.3d 670, 682–83 (2d Cir.1994);see also United States v. Kelly, 147 F.3d 172, 176 [82 AFTR 2d 98-5030] (2d Cir.1998) (stating that “[internal department] guidelines provide no substantive rights to criminal defendants” in discussing DOJ Criminal Tax Manual). The Government claims it decided not to offer Ohle a pre-indictment conference in order to prevent Ohle from dissipating assets subject to forfeiture before he was indicted and arrested. This decision does not provide a basis for dismissal of the indictment. See United States v. Goldstein, 342 F.Supp. 661, 666 [30 AFTR 2d 72-5475] (E.D.N.Y.1972) (failure to offer preindictment conference in criminal tax case not grounds for dismissal of indictment because “such a conference is clearly not a matter of right”).

h. Request for Evidentiary Hearings

Ohle seeks a hearing on two issues: (1) whether grand jury subpoenas subsequent to the return of the initial Indictment were issued for the improper purpose of gathering evidence at trial; and (2) whether the Government improperly utilized two civil tax investigations to gather proof for the pending criminal trial.

Turning first to the issue of Grand Jury subpoenas, we find that there is no credible claim of improper use. The law is settled in this Circuit that “[i]t is improper to utilize a Grand Jury for the sole or dominating purpose of preparing an already pending indictment for trial.” In reGrand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated January 2, 1985 (Simels), 767 F.2d 26, 29 (2d Cir.1985); see also United States v. Dardi, 330 F.2d 316, 336 (2d Cir.1964). But “absent some indicative sequence of events demonstrating an irregularity, a court has to take at face value the Government's word that the dominant purpose of the Grand Jury proceedings is proper.” United States v. Raphael, 786 F.Supp. 355, 358 (S.D.N.Y.1992).

Ohle relies principally on In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated January 2, 1985 (Simels), 767 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.1985). In Simels, the Government first issued a trial subpoena for certain evidence. The trial subpoena was challenged, and the Government, instead of responding to that challenge, issued a Grand Jury subpoena for the exact same evidence. Id. at 29–30. In quashing the subpoena, the Second Circuit noted that the timing of the subpoena “casts significant light on its purposes.”Id. at 29. Ohle argues that the timing in the instant case is suspicious because Grand Jury subpoenas were issued after the initial Indictment. But what Ohle fails to acknowledge is that subsequent superseding indictments were filed. Since the filing of the Second Superseding Indictment on August 11, 2009, not a single Grand Jury subpoena has been issued. Ohle has simply failed to point to any aspect of the Government's actions that is questionable, and, thus, we find that there is no reason to hold an evidentiary hearing with regard to the Grand Jury subpoenas.

Next, Ohle argues an evidentiary hearing is necessary to determine whether the evidence obtained through tax audits of Ohle should be suppressed. The Government may use evidence acquired in a civil action in a subsequent criminal proceeding, unless the defendant demonstrates that the use of such evidence would violate his or her constitutional rights or depart from the proper administration of criminal justice. United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 11–13 (1970). InKordel, the Supreme Court set forth certain circumstances where a defendant's right to due process may be violated, including when the Government brings a civil action solely for the purpose of obtaining evidence in a criminal prosecution. Id. at 12; see also United States v. Teyibo, 877 F. Supp 846, 856 (S.D.N.Y.1995).

Although Ohle cites a number of legal propositions, he alleges no acts of bad faith on the part of the Government to support the contention that the Government conducted the civil tax proceedings in order to obtain evidence for the pending criminal trial. He argues only that the timing of the two civil audits conducted in the midst of the criminal tax investigation is “suspicious” without alleging relevant dates or information obtained. Notably, Ohle does not contest the Government's statement that he had counsel during both of the audits, and that one of the audits was commenced prior to the criminal investigation (Gov't Opp. 77 n. 45.) Ohle has not raised any issues or pointed to any potential infringement of his rights that would warrant an evidentiary hearing. Ohle's motion for an evidentiary hearing is denied.

II. Conclusion

Defendants' motions to sever Count Five, Count Six, and Count Seven are granted; Defendant Ohle's motion to sever Count Eight is denied. All remaining motions are also denied.

SO ORDERED.

1.
See also United States v. DeFiore, 720 F.2d 757 (2d Cir.1983) (distinguishingHenderson in prosecution for wire fraud where state tax laws were violated, and noting that the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had rejected Henderson),cert. denied, 466 U.S. 906 (1984); United States v. Mangan, 575 F.2d 32, 49 [41 AFTR 2d 78-1174] (2d Cir.) (distinguishingHenderson in prosecution for wire fraud and federal tax evasion), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 931 (1978).
2.
See, e.g., United States v. Dale, 991 F.2d 819, 849 [76 AFTR 2d 95-7649] (D.C.Cir.1993) (rejectingHenderson in prosecution for wire fraud and federal tax evasion); United States v. Computer Sciences Corp., 689 F.2d 1181, 1187 n. 13 (4th Cir.1982) (rejectingHenderson in prosecution for mail and wire fraud and making false claims to the government), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105 (1983), overruled in nonrelevant part by Busby v. Crown Supply, Inc., 896 F.2d 833, 841 (4th Cir.1990); United States v. Shermetaro, 625 F.2d 104, 110–11 [46 AFTR 2d 80-5303] (6th Cir.1980) (rejecting Henderson in prosecution for conspiracy to defraud the United States and federal tax evasion);United States v. Weatherspoon , 581 F.2d 595, 599–600 (7th Cir.1978) (distinguishingHenderson in prosecution for mail fraud and making false statements to the government); United States v. Miller, 545 F.2d 1204, 1216 [39 AFTR 2d 77-364] n. 17 (9th Cir.1975) (rejectingHenderson in prosecution for mail fraud and federal tax evasion), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 930 (1977),overruled on other ground by, Boulware v. United States , 552 U.S. 421 [101 AFTR 2d 2008-1065] (2008); see also United States v. LaBar, 506 F.Supp. 1267, 1274 (M.D.Pa.1981) (distinguishing Henderson in prosecution for mail fraud and making false statements to the government),aff'd mem. , 688 F.2d 826 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 945 (1982).
3.
See United States v. Regan, 713 F.Supp. 629 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (upholding inclusion of mail fraud allegations charging tax fraud as RICO predicates);United States v. Standard Drywall Corp. , 617 F.Supp. 1283, 1295–96 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (noting that “[a]lthough never rejected by the Second Circuit,Henderson has not carried the day in that court either”); United States v. Abrahams, 493 F.Supp. 296 (S.D.N.Y.1980) (noting Henderson's rejection by other courts and refusing to hold that the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act had implicitly repealed in part the mail and wire fraud statutes). But see United States v. Gallant, 570 F.Supp. 303, 309 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (followingHenderson in disallowing dual prosecution for mail and wire fraud and copyright violations), abrogated on other grounds by Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207 (1985).
4.
Ohle also argues that, even if the conspiracy to commit wire fraud allegations are upheld, the Government is not authorized to seek criminal forfeiture based on the proceeds of a conspiracy to commit wire fraud. However, this argument is based on a misreading of the complex statutory scheme at issue. 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c) allows the Government to seek criminal forfeiture when a defendant is charged with an offense for which any form of forfeiture is authorized. 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(c) authorizes civil forfeiture for “any offense constituting “specified unlawful activity” (as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1957(c)(7) of this title), or a conspiracy to commit such offense.” “Specified unlawful activity” is defined by § 1957(c)(7) to include offenses listed in the federal RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). Lastly, § 1961(1)(b) includes wire fraud within the definition of “racketeering activity.” Ohle's argument fails to consider the phrase “or a conspiracy to commit such offense” in § 981(a)(1)(c), which has the effect of allowing criminal forfeiture of the proceeds of a conspiracy to commit wire fraud.See United States. v. Evanson , No. 05 Cr. 00805(TC), 2008 WL 3107332, at 1 (D.Utah Aug. 8, 2008) (“[P]ursuant to Section 2461(c), the government may seek the criminal forfeiture of the proceeds of conspiracy to commit mail fraud and wire fraud if the indictment alleges those offenses.”). The Government, therefore, is authorized to seek criminal forfeiture of the proceeds of a conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and Ohle's motion to dismiss the forfeiture allegations is denied.
5.
The Second Circuit has repeatedly emphasized that the determination of whether a single conspiracy or multiple conspiracies exists is a question of fact for the jury. See United States v. Johansen, 56 F.3d 347, 350 (2d Cir.1995); United States v. Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d 934, 962 (2d Cir.1990);United States v. Vanwort , 887 F.2d 375, 383 (2d Cir.1989). Not only is Gabriel from this Circuit, but unlike the court inMuñoz-Franco , Judge Rakoff discusses the strong preference for juries to determine the question of whether multiple or single conspiracies exist and how this preference affects the pleading requirements. See Gabriel, 920 F.Supp. at 504–05.
6.
The only act alleged to have occurred prior to November 2001 is the embezzlement of Client E's trust, which the Indictment alleges began as early as 2000 and continued through 2003. Indictment ¶¶ 103–04. The fact that the embezzlement occurred over a significantly broader period of time than the referral fee fraud and the Carpe Diem fraud does not render it a distinct conspiracy. In Gabriel, the two conspiracies did not overlap in time at all, as the second set of criminal acts sought to cover up the first set.Gabriel , 920 F.Supp. at 503–04.
7.
Courts have noted that much of the risk of prejudice created by a potentially duplicative charge can be cured through proper instructions at trial. See Szur, 1998 WL 132942, at 11 (Defendants “may properly request a multiple conspiracies jury instruction depending upon the evidence presented at trial.”); Murray, 618 F.2d at 898 (“As we have stated in a related context, “(i)t is assumed that a general instruction on the requirement of unanimity suffices to instruct the jury that they must be unanimous on whatever specifications they find to be the predicate of the guilty verdict.””).
8.
This Circuit is currently divided on whether Rule 8(a) or Rule 8(b) governs when a defendant in a multi-defendant case seeks to sever a count in which only he or she is charged. See United States v. Shellef, 507 F.2d 82, 97 n. 12 (2d Cir.2007). But what is clear is that when a defendant, such as Bradley, seeks to sever a count in which he and another defendant are charged, we apply Rule 8(b).See United States v. Turoff , 853 F.2d 1037, 1043 [62 AFTR 2d 88-5236] (2d Cir.1988).
9.
In oral argument, the Government stated that “Mr. Bradley's own words in a deposition, which we will seek to have admitted at trial, show that he had knowledge of aspects of the Count One conspiracy, that he knew about the transaction, that he knew about the trust aspect of it, and that he knew that he was required to profess that he had done legal services in connection with that transaction in order to get referral fees.” (Tr. at 51.) Although the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has not directly addressed the question of whether joinder must be decided on the face of the Indictment, the Court recently “caution[ed] that the plain language of Rule 8(b) does not appear to allow for consideration of pre-trial representations not contained in the indictment.”United States v. Rittweger , 524 F.3d 171, 178 n. 3 (2d Cir.2008). Regardless, the proffered evidence would not alter our conclusion. At most, this evidence suggests that Bradley might have had some knowledge of the illegality of HOMER. InLech , the court found that the defendant had “very little, if any, knowledge of the other schemes, and did not participate in them.” Id. at 257. Similarly, even if Bradley's deposition testimony would show some knowledge of HOMER, his knowledge of its purpose appears to be marginal, if it existed at all, and there are no allegations that he had any role in that conspiracy.
10.
Ohle moves the Court to order a severance of Defendants pursuant to Rule 14. Ohle argues under Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), that he will be prejudiced by the admission of Bradley's proffer agreement. The Government has stated that it would redact the proffer agreement in order to ensure that it would not prejudice Ohle, including redacting any mentions of Ohle's name. Ohle protests that no such proposed redacted version of the agreement has been supplied. Prior to admission, the Court will inspect any proposed proffer agreement. If the proffer agreement cannot be adequately redacted in order to ensure that it does not unfairly prejudice Ohle, than the Court will exclude it. Ohle's motion to sever Defendants is denied.
11.
Ohle and Bradley both argue that the wire fraud allegations in Count Five should be dismissed because they fail to state a legally cognizable claim. These arguments rely heavily on the issue of repugnance, which is moot as the Court has severed Count Five. To the extent that issues remain as to whether Bank A had a property right in the referral fees, we need not reach that issue at this point. To find in Defendants' favor on this issue, the Court would have to determine that the HOMER tax shelter is illegal; and, therefore, any right Bank A had to the referral fees was based on an illegal agreement. This determination is not one the Court can or should make at this juncture. Defendants' motion to dismiss the mail and wire fraud allegations in Count Five is denied.
12.
We need not address the Government's additional arguments that Count One is timely, having concluded that the ten-year statute of limitations applies.
13.
Defendants also challenge Count Five as time-barred. The ten year statute of limitations also applies to Count Five. Bank A was the object of the referral fee scheme. (Gov't Opp. 48.) This scheme is alleged to have defrauded Bank A of over a million dollars. Id. Therefore, the Count Five conspiracy, which in part sought to defraud Bank A of money through the fraudulent referral fee scheme and did, in fact, defraud the bank of over a million dollars, affects a financial institution within the meaning of Section 3293(2). See Bouyea, 152 F.3d at 195;Serpico , 320 F.3d at 695.
14.
Ohle cites only one case where a court has declined to apply 6531(6) to omnibus violations of Section 7212(a). (Ohle Mem. 23–4); see United States v. Connell, No. CR-F 94-5052(REC) (E.D.Cal., Feb. 6, 1995). Ohle does not cite specifically to Connell, an unreported decision from the Eastern District of California, nor the court's reasoning, but rather to the discussion of Connell in United States v. Brennick, 908 F.Supp. 1004 [79 AFTR 2d 97-1210] (D.Mass.1995). Brennick declined to followConnell, saying that the court “appeared to assume” that 6531(6) applied only to intimidation offenses.Brennick , 908 F.Supp. at 1017. Connell predates the Ninth Circuit decision in Workinger, where the Court found that the six year period of limitations did, in fact, apply to omnibus violations of Section 7212(a).Workinger , 90 F.3d at 1414.
15.
See Bronson, 2007 WL 2455138, at 4 (“The Superseding Indictment alleges facts sufficient to support venue because it alleges that the criminal activity occurred “within the Eastern District of New York and elsewhere.””); United States v. Chalmers, 474 F.Supp.2d 555, 574–75 (S.D.N.Y.2007) (rejecting defendant's argument that the “allegation that the charged conduct took place “in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere” is insufficient to support venue because it fails to indicate which specific criminal acts were committed in this District”); Szur, 1998 WL 132942, at 9 (“[O]n its face, the Indictment alleges that the offense occurred “in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere,” which is sufficient to resist a motion to dismiss.”).
16.
Bradley contends that he will suffer substantial hardship and prejudice as a result of a trial in New York because his family, including his daughter who has a congenital brain formation, lives in Louisiana. (Bradley Mem. 17–18.) As Bradley is currently incarcerated in Georgia, these hardships are no longer relevant.
17.
Ohle also asserts that upholding venue would violate Ohle's Sixth Amendment right to be tried in “the district wherein the crime shall have been committed.” (Ohle Mem. 15.) We deny the motion on this basis as well.
18.
In United States v. Bowman, 173 F.3d 595 [83 AFTR 2d 99-2219] (6th Cir.1999), after limiting the applicability ofKassouf to its specific facts, Bowman held that Section 7212(a) was properly applied to the defendant, who provided false information to the IRS in an effort to stimulate an IRS investigation of other tax payers, despite the fact that there was no pending IRS action. Bowman, 173 F.3d at 600.
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Wednesday, January 27, 2010

IRS SB/SE Reissuance of Procedures for an Offer to Compromise an Accepted Offer, SBSE-05-0110-003, (Jan. 27, 2010)
2010ARD 018-4
Internal Revenue Service: SB/SE memorandum: Interim guidance: Offer to compromise an accepted offer
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20224
SMALL BUSINESS/SELF.EMPLOYED DIVISION
January 15, 2010
Control Number: SB/SE-05-0110-003
Expiration Date: January 15, 2011
Impacted: IRM 5.8.9
MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, CAMPUS COMPLIANCE OPERATIONS (BROOKHAVEN) and (MEMPHIS) DIRECTORS, COLLECTION AREA OPERATIONS
FROM: Frederick W. Schindler /s/ Frederick Schindler Director, Collection Policy
SUBJECT: Reissuance of Procedures for an Offer to Compromise an Accepted Offer
The purpose of this memorandum is to reissue interim guidance dated February 2, 2009 with control number SB/SE-05-0209-007 titled, Interim Guidance for an Offer to Compromise an Accepted Offer. This interim guidance memorandum provides procedures for working an offer to compromise an accepted offer. Please ensure this information is distributed to all affected employees.
When the monitoring campuses receive a proposal to change the payment terms of an accepted offer or receive a formal proposal to compromise an accepted offer, the monitoring campus is required to send an Other Investigation (OI) to the office of jurisdiction that initially accepted the offer for consideration (OIC Field function, Centralized OIC (COIC) or Appeals).
Although taxpayers are not required to use a specific offer form, i.e. Form 656, to submit a proposal they are required to submit the proposal in writing. The proposal will be forwarded with the OI to the office that will conduct the investigation. Taxpayers are not required to include a 20 percent payment or periodic payments with the proposal.
Employees will secure and review the taxpayer's updated financial information and supporting documentation and negotiate the terms of the proposal based on the taxpayer's financial situation. The terms available are the same as the terms offered on Form 656 (rev 02/2007 or later), i.e. lump sum cash or periodic payment, regardless of the original offer IRS received date. Employees must adhere to IRM 5.8.9.4.3 when considering a proposal for an offer on an offer and IRM 5.8.9.4.4 when closing the investigation. The investigating office will provide Monitoring Offer in Compromise Unit (MOIC) with the revised terms of the accepted offer. The offer will not be open on the Automated Offer in Compromise System (AOIC), and therefore no documentation will be necessary on AOIC. If the taxpayer's proposal is not acceptable, the investigating office will advise MOIC to proceed with the default of the original offer.
If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me, or a member of your staff may contact Diana Estey. Territory personnel should direct any questions, through their management staff to the appropriate Area contact.
cc: National Taxpayer Advocate
Chief Appeals
www.irs.gov

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Tuesday, January 26, 2010

MAGUIRE PARTNERS - MASTER INVESTMENTS, LLC, MAGUIRE PARTNERS, INC., TAX MATTERS PARTNERS, et al., Plaintiffs v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA. Case No. CV 06-07371-JFW(RZx) ✓. Related Case Nos.: CV 06-7374-JFW (RZx). CV 06-7376-JFW (RZx). CV 06-7377-JFW (RZx). CV 06-7380-JFW (RZx). Dated: December 11, 2009.

AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

WALTER, United States District Judge: This action came on for a court trial on August 12, 13, and 14, 2008. Steven R. Mather and Lydia Turanchik of Kajan Mather and Barish appeared for Plaintiffs Maguire Partners - Master Investments LLC, Maguire Partners Inc., Thomas Master Investments LP, Thomas Partners Inc., Tax Matters Partner, Huntington/Fox Investments LP, Edward D. Fox, Jr., Thomas Division Partnership LP, Thomas Investment Partners Ltd., (collectively “Plaintiffs”). Andrew Pribe, Rick Watson, and Jonathan Sloat of the Office of the United States Attorney appeared for Defendant United States of America (“Defendant”). On September 22, 2008, the parties filed their proposed Post-Trial Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. On October 6, 2008, the parties each filed their Post-Trial Briefs and their marked copies of the opposing parties' proposed Post-Trial Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. After considering the evidence, briefs and argument of counsel, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law: 1

Findings of Fact 2

I. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Principals and Their Entities

1. James Thomas

James Thomas, a real-estate investor and developer, is the trustee of the Lumbee Clan Trust, which is a partner in Thomas Investment Partners Ltd. (“TIP”), which, in turn, is a partner in Thomas Division Partnership LP (“TDP”). In 2001 through 2002, these various partnerships owned an interest in: the Library Tower in Los Angeles; the Gas Company Tower in Los Angeles; the Wells Fargo Center in Los Angeles; the MGM Plaza in Santa Monica; the Solana project in Dallas; and Commerce Square in Philadelphia. These investments were highly leveraged with debt in the range of eighty to ninety percent of the value of the property. Thomas's net worth in 2001 was approximately $200 million, with approximately twenty to thirty percent in cash or marketable securities/cash equivalents and the remainder in real estate holdings, including those identified above.

2. Edward Fox

Edward Fox, a real-estate investor and developer, is the trustee of The Edward D. Fox, Jr. Family Trust dated February 14, 1990 (the “Fox Trust”), which is a partner in Huntington/Fox Investments LP (“HFI”), which, in turn, is a partner in both Maguire Partners - Master Investments LLC (“MP-MI”) and Thomas Master Investments LP (“TMI”). In 2001 through 2002, these various partnerships owned an interest in: the Library Tower in Los Angeles; the Gas Company Tower in Los Angeles; the Wells Fargo Center in Los Angeles; the MGM Plaza in Santa Monica; the Solana project in Dallas; and Commerce Square in Philadelphia. These investments were highly leveraged with the debt in the range of eighty to ninety percent of the value of the property.

In 2001, Fox also was a major investor in the publicly-held Center Trust REIT where he served as chairman of the board and chief executive officer. The Media Center Shopping Mall in Burbank, California was one of the key assets owned by the Center Trust REIT. In 2001, Fox also was a founder and owner of Commonwealth Partners, which was assembling a portfolio of commercial real estate projects in partnership with various California state pension funds. Fox's net worth in 2001 was approximately $50 million.

B. The Transactions At Issue

1. The Lumbee Clan Trust Transaction

On December 20, 2001, the Lumbee Clan Trust and AIG entered into a transaction in which the Lumbee Clan Trust paid $1.5 million to AIG. The source of the funds used to pay AIG was a distribution from TIP. Thomas contends that the purpose of the transaction was to serve as a hedge against potential loss in the value of his real-estate interests arising from the risk of terrorism after September 11, 2001. Thomas also contends that the Lumbee Clan Trust paid $1.5 million for an opportunity to receive a net maximum of $38.4 million. The potential payout from the transaction was tied to the value of a portfolio of twenty REIT stocks (the “REIT basket”).

a. The Structure of the Transaction

In general, the transaction between the Lumbee Clan Trust and AIG consisted of a short option, a long option, and a promissory note. On December 20, 2001, the Lumbee Clan Trust and AIG in order to implement the transaction did the following: (1) the Lumbee Clan Trust sold a short option to AIG for $100 million; (2) the Lumbee Clan Trust purchased a long option from AIG for $61,683,169; (3) the Lumbee Clan Trust purchased a promissory note from AIG for $39,816,831; and (4) the Lumbee Clan Trust pledged the proceeds from the long option and the promissory note to secure the short option. The Lumbee Clan Trust's transaction costs amounted to $1.5 million. The long and short options were Asian-style European options. 3 The promissory note eliminated AIG's obligation to transfer funds to the Lumbee Clan Trust in the amount representing the difference between the price of the short option and the price of the long option. The strike price of the short option was fifty percent of the value of the REIT basket, or $100,021,176. The strike price of the long option was seventy percent of the value of the REIT basket, or $140,029,647.

b. The Terms of the Transaction

The terms of the transaction provided that any payoff depended on the average value of the REIT basket between December 20, 2001, and March 19, 2002, as compared to the value as of December 19, 2001. If the average value of the REIT basket between December 20, 2001, and March 19, 2002, did not fall by greater than thirty percent as compared to the value of the REIT basket on December 19, 2001, then the Lumbee Clan Trust would receive no payout. If the average value of the REIT basket between December 20, 2001, and March 19,2002, fell more than thirty percent as compared to the value of the REIT basket on December 19, 2001, then the Lumbee Clan Trust would receive a cash payment that would increase dollar-for-dollar with the reduction in the average value of the REIT basket below seventy percent of the value of the REIT basket on December 19, 2001, until a maximum payout of $40,008,471 was reached. This maximum payout would be reached if the average value of the REIT portfolio fell by fifty percent or more from its value of December 19, 2001. However, the Lumbee Clan Trust would never be obligated to pay out-of-pocket anything other than the $1.5 million transaction costs paid to AIG on December 20, 2001, for the transaction.

c. The Contributions to the Partnerships

On December 27, 2001, the Lumbee Clan Trust contributed the transaction to TIP. Specifically, the Lumbee Clan Trust contributed the long option and the promissory note, and TIP assumed the short option. On December 27, 2001, TIP contributed the transaction to TDP. Specifically, TIP contributed the long option and the promissory note, and TDP assumed the short option. These contributions of the assets and assumptions of the short option were with the approval of AIG. After the contributions to the partnerships, AIG's position in the short option remained secured by the pledge of the long option and the promissory note.

d. The Performance of the REIT Basket and the Transaction

The value of the REIT basket did not decline by an average of thirty percent for the period between December 20, 2001, and March 19, 2002, as compared to its value on December 19, 2001. Therefore, the transaction did not yield a net payment to TDP.

e. The Tax Reporting by the Partnerships and the IRS Adjustments Related to the Transaction

(i.) Thomas Investment Partners

TIP reported on its 2001 Form 1065 that $101,500,000 had been contributed in capital during the year and that this amount constituted an asset of TIP. TIP also reported on its 2001 Form 1065 that the Lumbee Clan Trust had increased its capital in TIP by $101,500,000. TIP also issued a K-1 (partner's share of income, credits, deductions, etc.) to the Lumbee Clan Trust for 2001 that reflected an increase in the Lumbee Clan Trust's capital account of $101,500,000 due to the contribution of the transaction. TIP reported on its 2002 Form 1065 that it had interest income of $191,640 and it claimed deductions of $1,691,640. TIP did not account for the short option on either the Form 1065 or the K-1s for 2001 and 2002. For 2001, the IRS issued a notice of Final Partnership Adjustment (“FPAA”) which adjusted downward the capital contributed to and assets of TIP by $101,500,000 and sought to adjust the outside basis of LCT by $101,500,000. For 2002, the FPAA adjusted downward income by $191,640 and disallowed the deduction of $1,691,640.

(ii.) Thomas Division Partnership

TDP reported on its 2001 Form 1065 that $101,500,000 had been contributed in capital during the year and that this amount constituted an asset of TDP. TDP also reported on its 2001 Form 1065 that TIP had increased its capital in TDP by $101,500,000. TDP also issued a K-1 to TIP for 2001 that reflected an increase in TIP's capital account of $101,500,000 due to the contribution of the transaction. TDP reported on its 2002 Form 1065 that it had interest income of $191,640, and it claimed deductions of $1,691,640. TDP did not account for the short option on either the Form 1065 or the K-1s for 2001 and 2002. For 2001, the IRS issued an FPAA that adjusted downward the capital contributed to and assets of TDP by $101,500,000, and sought to adjust the outside basis of TIP by $101,500,000. For 2002, the FPAA adjusted downward income by $191,640, and disallowed the deduction of $1,691,640.

2. The Fox Trust Transaction

On December 20, 2001, the Fox Trust and AIG entered into a transaction in which the Fox Trust paid $675,000 to AIG. Fox contends that the purpose of the transaction was to serve as a hedge against potential loss in the value of his real-estate interests arising from the risk of terrorism after September 11, 2001. Fox also contends that the Fox Trust paid $675,000 for an opportunity to receive up to a net maximum of $17,242,574. The potential payout from the transaction was tied to the value of a portfolio of twenty REIT stocks (the “REIT basket”). This was the identical basket that the Lumbee Clan Trust transaction used.

a. The Structure of the Transaction

In general, the transaction between the Fox Trust and AIG consisted of a short option, a long option, and a promissory note. On December 20, 2001, the Fox Trust and AIG in order to implement the transaction did the following: (1) the Fox Trust sold a short option to AIG for $45 million; (2) the Fox Trust purchased a long option from AIG for $27,757,426; (3) the Fox Trust purchased a promissory note from AIG for $17,917,574; and (4) the Fox Trust pledged the proceeds from the long option and the promissory note to secure the short option. The Fox Trust's transaction costs amounted to $675,000. The options were Asian-style European options. The promissory note eliminated AIG's obligation to transfer funds to the Fox trust in an amount representing the difference between the price of the short option and the price of the long option. The strike price of the short option was fifty percent of the value of the REIT basket, or $45,009,529. The strike price of the long option was seventy percent of the value of the REIT basket, or $63,013,341.

b. The Terms of the Transaction

The terms of the transaction provided that any payoff depended on the average value of the REIT basket between December 20, 2001, and March 19, 2002, as compared to the value as of December 19, 2001. If the average value of the REIT basket between December 20, 2001, and March 19, 2002, did not fall by greater than thirty percent as compared to the value of the REIT basket on December 19, 2001, then the Fox Trust would receive no payout. If the average value of the REIT basket between December 20, 2001, and March 19, 2002, fell by more than thirty percent as compared to the value of the REIT basket on December 19, 2001, then the Fox Trust would receive a cash payment that would increase dollar-for-dollar with the reduction in the average value of the REIT basket below seventy percent of the value of the REIT basket on December 19, 2001, until a maximum payout of $18,003,812 was reached. This maximum payout would be reached if the average value of the REIT portfolio fell by fifty percent or more from its value on December 19, 2001. However, the Fox Trust would never be obligated to pay out-of-pocket anything other than the $675,000 transaction costs paid to AIG on December 20, 2001.

c. The Contributions to the Partnerships

On December 27, 2001, the Fox Trust contributed the transaction to HFI. Specifically, the Fox Trust contributed the long option and the promissory note, and HFI assumed the short option. On December 27, 2001, HFI contributed $34,749,083 of the transaction to MP-MI. Specifically, HFI contributed seventy-six percent of the long option and the promissory note, and MP-MI assumed seventy-six percent of the short option. HFI had no prior investment in MP-MI. On December 27, 2001, HFI contributed $7,682,535 of the transaction to TMI. Specifically, HFI contributed seventeen percent of the long option and the promissory note, and TMI assumed seventeen percent of the short option. HFI had no prior investment in TMI. On December 27, 2001, HFI contributed the remaining seven percent of the transaction to Manhattan Properties, LP 4 , which assumed the remaining seven percent of the short option. These contributions of the assets and assumptions of the short option were with the approval of AIG. After the contributions to the partnerships, AIG's position in the short option remained secured by the pledge of the long option and the note.

d. The Performance of the REIT Basket and the Transaction

The value of the REIT basket did not decline by an average of thirty percent for the period between December 20, 2001, and March 19, 2002, as compared to its value on December 19, 2001. Therefore, the transaction did not yield a net payment to Fox.

e. The Tax Reporting by the Partnerships and the IRS Adjustments Related to the Transaction

(i.) Huntington/Fox Investments

HFI reported its investment in MP-MI on its 2001 Form 1065 in the amount of $513,515. HFI reported its investment in TMI on its 2001 Form 1065 in the amount of $113,519. HFI reported on its 2002 Form 1065 deductions of $707,183 and income of $80,114 pertaining to the transaction. HFI did not account for the short option on either the Form 1065 or the K-1s for 2001 and 2002. For 2001, the IRS issued an FPAA that adjusted downward the capital contributed to and assets of HFI by $42,431,618, and sought to adjust outside basis of the Fox Trust by $42,431,618. For 2002, the FPAA adjusted income downward by $80,114, and disallowed the deduction of $707,183.

(ii.) Maguire Partners-Master Investments

MP-MI reported on its 2001 Form 1065 that it had made a capital contribution of $34,749,083 during the year and that this amount constituted an asset of the partnership. MP-MI also reported on its 2001 Form 1065 that HFI had increased its capital in MP-MI by $34,749,083. MP-MI also issued a K-1 to HFI for 2001 that reflected an increase in the HFI's capital account of $34,749,083 due to the contribution of the transaction. MP-MI reported on its 2002 Form 1065 that it had interest income of $65,609 and it claimed deductions of $579,143 pertaining to the transaction. It also reported other investments of $34,235,549. MP-MI did not account for the short option on either the Form 1065 or the K-1s for 2001 and 2002. For 2001, the IRS issued an FPAA that adjusted downward the capital contributed to and assets of MP-MI by $34,749,083, and sought to adjust the outside basis of HFI by $34,749,083. For 2002, the FPAA adjusted downward income by $65,609, and disallowed the deduction of $579,143. The IRS also adjusted the other investments downward by $34,235,549.

(iii.) Thomas Master Investments

TMI reported on its 2001 Form 1065 that it had made a capital contribution of $7,682,535 during the year and that this amount constituted an asset of TMI. TMI also reported on its 2001 From 1065 that HFI had increased its capital in TMI by $7,682,535. TMI also issued a K-1 to HFI for 2001 that reflected an increase in HFI's capital account of $7,682,535 due to the contribution of the transaction. TMI reported on its 2002 Form 1065 that it had interest income of $14,505, and it claimed deductions of $128,040 pertaining to the transaction. It also reported other investments of $7,569,000. TMI did not account for the short option on either the Form 1065 or the K-1s for 2001 and 2002. For 2001, the IRS issued an FPAA that adjusted downward the capital contributed to and assets of TMI by $7,682,535, and sought to adjust the outside basis of HFI by $7,682,535. For 2002, the FPAA adjusted downward income by $14,505, and disallowed the deduction of $128,040. The IRS also adjusted the other investments downward by $7,569,000.

C. Background Regarding the Transactions at Issue

1. The Arthur Andersen Call-Option Spread

The transactions that were entered into by the Lumbee Clan Trust and AIG and the Fox Trust and AIG were designed by Arthur Andersen and referred to internally by various names, such as the “call-option spread”, the “synthetic put” and “asset-hedging.” The call-option spread consisted of two call options - one long and one short - and a promissory note. 5 By using the call-option spread, a taxpayer would be able to create a basis in an amount substantially greater than the amount of money actually paid for the call-option spread by taking the position that the transaction created a “contingent” liability for purposes of I.R.C. § 752 . In order to create basis and obtain the tax benefit, the taxpayer was required to contribute the call-option to a partnership.

The call-option spread was viewed by Arthur Andersen tax partners as one of many-tax-avoidance techniques marketed by Arthur Andersen. In fact, from 1999 to 2001, Arthur Andersen arranged approximately ten call-option spread transactions, and in all but one of these transactions AIG was the counterparty. The call-option spread was considered a “proven solution” by Arthur Andersen, which included techniques offered by Arthur Andersen to minimize taxes. It is estimated that the call-option spread transactions generated about $14.7 million in fees for Arthur Andersen in fiscal years 2000 and 2001.

2. Thomas and Fox Learn About the Call-Option Spread

In 2001, Martin Griffiths, a tax partner in the Los Angeles office of Arthur Andersen, was the engagement partner and the main point of contact for Thomas and Fox. In fact, Thomas, Fox, and another real estate investor, Robert Maguire, represented approximately one hundred percent of Griffiths's business. Because Griffiths was familiar with the investment portfolios and tax needs of Thomas and Fox, he considered it his duty to investigate and determine if any of the “interesting planning ideas” presented to him by Arthur Andersen had any applicability to Thomas or Fox. He testified that it was his job to bring Arthur Andersen's “industry expertise” to bear on Thomas and Fox's interests.

Sometime before September 11, 2001, Griffiths became aware of the call-option spread, and decided to investigate it for Thomas, Fox, and Maguire. Before September 11, 2001, Griffiths contacted his fellow tax partner Mandel to learn more about the call-option spread. After discussing the call-option spread with Mandel, Griffiths and Mandel met with Thomas and, separately, with Fox on September 27, 2001. During these meetings, Mandel explained to Thomas, a former trial attorney with the I.R.S., and Fox the increased basis that could result from the call-option spread, which Mandel described as a hedge, if the options and note were contributed to a partnership. In the weeks after the September 27, 2001 meetings, Griffiths continued to discuss the call-option spread with Thomas and Fox, including detailed discussions regarding the structure of the transaction.

In December 2001, Paul Rutter, outside transactional counsel to Thomas and Fox, met with Mandel to discuss the transaction. He also reviewed the transactional documents prepared by Sullivan & Cromwell, counsel to AIG. Rutter was not an expert on options or hedging, and did not provide business advice to Thomas or Fox regarding the transaction. Instead, Rutter's representation was limited to reviewing the documents prepared by AIG's counsel, which included the contribution agreements by which the transaction would be contributed to the partnerships. Rutter testified that it was his understanding “that they [AIG] were doing this transaction with other people and had a pre-existing set of documents they used[.]”

Rutter also testified that the decision to contribute the transactions to Thomas and Fox's respective partnerships had already been made by the time he became involved in the transaction. In fact, Thomas and Fox admitted that it was always their intention to contribute the transactions to their respective partnerships. The partnership contributions were always viewed by Thomas, Fox, Griffiths, and Rutter as integral to the entire transaction.

On December 20, 2001, Thomas and Fox entered into the call-option spread transactions, described above, with AIG.

II. Discussion

A. The Lumbee Clan Trust Transaction And The Fox Trust Transaction Lack Economic Substance.

A taxpayer is not permitted to reap tax benefits from a transaction that lacks economic substance. 6 Coltec Industries, Inc. v. United States , 454 F.3d 1340, 1352-55 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (discussing Supreme Court precedent invoking economic substance since 1935). As the Federal Circuit explained in Coltec , the economic substance doctrine requires “disregarding, for tax purposes, transactions that comply with the literal terms of the tax code but lack economic reality,” and, thus, “prevent[s] taxpayers from subverting the legislative purpose of the tax code by engaging in transactions that are fictitious or lack economic reality simply to reap a tax benefit.” Id. at 1352-54.

1. Legal Standard for Economic Substance Analysis

To determine whether a transaction is merely an economic sham, the court must determine whether the transaction had any practical economic effect other than the creation of tax benefits. Casebeer v. Commissioner , 909 F.2d 1360, 1363 (9th Cir. 1990); Sochin v. Commissioner , 843 F.2d 351, 354 (9th Cir. 1988). Therefore, the court must exam the objective economic substance of the transaction and the subjective business motivation of the taxpayer. Sochin , 843 F.2d at 354; Casebeer , 909 F.2d at 1363. However, the objective and subjective inquiries are not “discrete prongs of a rigid twostep analysis,” but “are simply more precise factors to consider in the application of [the Ninth Circuit's] traditional sham analysis; that is, whether the transaction had any practical economic effects other than the creation of income tax losses.” Id.

a. The Objective Economic Substance Inquiry

Under the objective economic substance inquiry, the Court must determine “whether the transaction ha[s] economic substance beyond the creation of tax benefits.” Casebeer , 909 F.2d at 1365 ( citing Bail Bonds by Marvin Nelson, Inc. v. Commissioner , 820 F.2d 1543, 1549 (9th Cir. 1987). To do so, the court must analyze whether the “substance of the transaction reflects its form” and whether, objectively, “the transaction was likely to produce economic benefits aside from a tax deduction.” Id.

A transaction lacks objective economic substance where it does not appreciably affect a taxpayer's beneficial interest except to reduce his taxes. Knetsch v. United States , 364 U.S. 361, 366 (1960); ACM Partnership v. Commissioner , 157 F.3d 231 248 (3d Cir. 1998). For example, de minimis economic effect - such as the accumulation of small amounts of cash value in an annuity contract or the assumption of marginal risks in a partnership arrangement - are insufficient to create economic substance. Knetsch , 364 U.S. 361, 365-66 (finding transaction involving leveraged annuities to be economic sham because possible $1,000 cash value of annuities at maturity was “relative pittance” compared to purported value of annuities); ASA Investerings Partnership v. Commissioner , 201 F.3d 505, 514 (D.C. Cir. 2000); ACM , 157 F.3d at 251-52.

b. The Subjective Business Purpose Inquiry

The Court analyzes a taxpayer's subjective business purpose by determining “whether the taxpayers have shown that they had a business purpose for engaging in the transaction other than tax avoidance.” Casebeer , 909 F.2d 1363-64. This analysis “often involves an examination of the subjective factors that motivated a taxpayer to make the transaction at issue,” such as the experience of the taxpayer, the extent of the taxpayer's investigation into a transaction, the extent of any advisor's investigation into the deal, and the taxpayer's trial testimony regarding their motivation for entering into the transaction.” Bail Bonds , 820 F.2d at 1549; see, also, Casebeer , 909 F.2d at 1364.

One factor that can be considered in analyzing a taxpayer's subjective business purpose is whether the taxpayer was acting like a prudent economic actor or contrary to rational business interests in the transaction. See, e.g., Gilman v. Comm'r , 933 F.2d 143, 146-47 (2d Cir.1991) (requiring taxpayer to demonstrate that prudent investor could have concluded that “realistic potential for economic profit” existed) (internal quotation marks omitted); Rice's Toyota World, Inc. v. Comm'r , 752 F.2d 89, 91 (4th Cir.1985) (equating lack of economic substance with finding that “no reasonable possibility of a profit exists”); Long Term Capital , 330 F.Supp.2d at 172 (finding that transaction lacked economic substance because, “at the time the transaction was entered into, a prudent investor would have concluded that there was no chance to earn a non-tax based profit return in excess of the costs of the transaction”); Estate of Strober v. Comm'r , 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 3158, 3160 (1992) (“We conclude that … a prudent investor, relying upon independently obtained appraisals and research, would not have concluded that [the] transaction offered a reasonable opportunity for economic gain exclusive of tax benefits.”). Thus, as the Federal Circuit found in Coltec, there must be an objective inquiry into economic reality that would ask “‘whether a reasonable possibility of profit from the transaction existed,’” Coltec , 454 F.3d at 1356 (quoting Black & Decker , 436 F.3d at 441), and “whether the transaction has ‘realistic financial benefit.’” Id . at 1356 n. 16 (quoting Rothschild , 407 F.2d at 411); see, also, Jade Trading, 80 Fed. Cl. At 47-48 (“The inquiry is not whether the [taxpayers] believed the Jade transaction was a real investment capable of making a profit, but whether the Jade transaction in fact objectively was a real investment capable of making a profit and altering their financial positions.”). In addition, where a taxpayer is sophisticated in economics and/or taxation, entering a bad deal may shed light on the taxpayer's true tax-avoidance motivation. Id. (“the absence of reasonableness sheds light on Long Term's subjective motivation, particularly given the high level of sophistication possessed by Long Term's principals in matters economic.”). Similarly, a conspicuous lack of concern over the particulars of the transaction by the taxpayer may be evidence that the transaction is a sham. See, Mahoney v. Commissioner , 808 F.2d 1219, 1220 (6th Cir. 1987).

2. The Transactions At Issue Lack Economic Substance

The presence or lack of economic substance for federal tax purposes is determined by a fact-specific inquiry on a case-by-case basis. Frank Lyon , 435 U.S. at 584. In this case, the Court finds that the evidence demonstrates that the transactions at issue do not have economic substance because Thomas and Fox received no economic benefit, other than the increase in basis, from the transactions. In addition, the Court finds that the evidence demonstrates that Thomas and Fox were motivated by this increased basis and not by any purported “hedging” benefit.

Plaintiffs argue that factual differences between this case and the recent economic substance cases of Stobie Creek and Jade Trading mean that the transactions at issue in this case do, in fact, have economic substance. However, an examination of how the economic substance analysis was applied in Stobie Creek and Jade Trading demonstrate that the transaction at issue in this case, like the transactions in those cases, do not have economic substance.

a. Under the Economic Substance Analysis as Applied in Stobie Creek , The Transactions At Issue in This Case Lack Economic Substance

Stobie Creek involved the contribution of offsetting long and short foreign-currency options to single-member LLCs. The plaintiffs in Stobie Creek alleged that the principal involved was a “reasonable investor” who “made a reasonable assessment regarding profitability.” Id . at 693. In evaluating this claim, the court stated that it could not “ignore the functional and historical reality that the [offsetting option pairs] were part of the prepackaged J&G strategy marketed to shelter taxable gains.” Id. In addition, the Court in Stobie Creek relied heavily on the expert testimony offered by the Government in concluding that “plaintiffs' attempts to establish a legitimate profit motive wither against the devastating, much more credible expert testimony that established the objective economic reality that the [offsetting option pairs] were severely over-priced, had a negative expected-rate-of-return, and consequently had a scant profit potential.” Stobie Creek , 823 Fed. Cl. At 696. The Government's expert concluded that the transaction “was priced at levels that far exceeded [the components'] theoretical value[,]” where those values were computed using an adaptation of the Black-Scholes model. Id. At 685.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs' expert's criticism of the Government's expert's reliance on the Black-Scholes model. While the court recognized the validity of the criticism that “the model involves assumptions of perfect and static markets[,]” it found that the plaintiffs' expert “could not offer a more appropriate substitute.” Id. at 689-90. The court concluded that the expert testimony “suggests that no reasonable and prudent investor would have expected a possibility of a profit on these transactions.” Id. at 693.

In evaluating the subjective business purpose prong of the economic substance analysis, the court rejected the testimony of the principal that he “believed a 30% chance of doubling his investment existed” because the court found that “the [offsetting option pairs] had no objectively reasonable possibility of returning a profit and therefore lacked an objective business purpose.” Id. at 698. The court found that the transactions were “integral to a ‘preconceived’ tax shelter scheme that was not structured to create a viable profit-producing investment, but, rather, to inflate the basis in an unrelated asset that would yield large capital gains upon sale.” Id. Moreover, the court found that while there was “limited evidence” of an investment motive, the evidence was “not sufficient to overcome the evidence that the [offsetting option pairs] were economic nullities beyond producing the claimed tax benefits.” Id.

Similarly, in this case, Defendant's expert, Professor Grendier, used recognized option-pricing-modeling techniques to conclude that the value of the Thomas transaction was $574, and the value of the Fox transaction was $259. 7 Therefore, based on a thirty-five percent volatility, Thomas and Fox paid approximately 2,700 and 2,600 times the value of the transactions they purchased.

Although Plaintiffs' experts, Professors Manaster and Edelstein, criticized Professor Grendier's Black-Scholes method, Professor Manaster testified that, in the absence of comparative prices, he would have performed the same analysis while Professor Edelstein offered no acceptable alternative to Professor Grenadier's analysis.

Moreover, like the transaction in Stobie Creek , the call option spread was a prepackaged deal offered by Arthur Andersen that focused on the creation of basis. Arthur Andersen did not offer any advice on whether the transaction was a hedge, and Mandel, who offered the call option spread to Thomas and Fox, had no expertise on hedging or options.

Finally, there is no credible evidence that the transactions performed as hedges. First, there is no credible evidence that a close correlation exists between the value of the broad-based REIT basket and the value of any of Thomas's and Fox's real estate investments. Second, even if the transactions served as hedges, the price paid by Thomas and Fox vastly exceeded any benefit they could have received. In addition, despite claiming to follow the REIT market closely, Fox did not know the difference between the average drop required to produce a return of one dollar on his transaction, and the historical drop that occurred in 1974. Therefore, as in Stobie Creek , the Court does not find that the self-serving testimony of the principals, Thomas and Fox, sufficient to overcome the substantial and objective evidence that the transactions at issue are economic nullities entered into for the purpose of fabricating tax basis in amounts that are vastly disproportionate to the actual cost.

b. Under the Economic Substance Analysis as Applied in Jade Trading , The Transactions At Issue in This Case Lack Economic Substance

Jade Trading , another recent case involving economic substance analysis, involved the contribution of a long option and a short option to a partnership. Jade Trading , 80 Fed. Cl. at 11-13. The three taxpayers each paid $150,002, and each obtained an increased basis of $15 million. Id. The court disallowed the claimed tax benefits and determined that the transaction was an economic sham. Id. at 14. The court reached its conclusion based on five reasons. First, the claimed losses “were purely fictional” because the taxpayers “did not invest $15 million in the spread and did not lose $15 million when exiting Jade without exercising either option.” Second, the plaintiffs contentions that the transaction had a profit potential was contradicted by the large limitation on the maximum net profit that could be earned and the “large and unusual” fees that the plaintiffs paid. Third, the transaction was “devised and marketed by a tax accounting group …as a tax product, not by an investment advisor as a vehicle to earn a profit,” and, thus, the court found it “was developed as a tax avoidance mechanism and not an investment strategy.” Fourth, the initiation of the transaction outside the partnership followed by the contribution to the partnership “had no effect whatsoever on the investment's value, quality, or profitability, except to add cost and burden,” but “packaging the investment in the partnership vehicle was an absolute necessity for securing the tax benefits.” Fifth, there was a “highly disproportionate tax advantage to the underlying monetary outlay - the tax loss per [taxpayer], $14.9 million, was roughly 65 times greater than each LLC's $225,002 financial commitment to Jade, almost 100 times each LLC's $150,002 investment in the spread transaction which generated the loss, and approximately 100 times the $140,000 potential net profit each LLC could have earned.”

Similarly, the Court finds that consideration of these same five reasons in this case leads to the same result - that the transactions at issue in this case lack economic substance. First, the claimed basis is fictional, because Thomas and Fox paid only $1.5 million and $675,000, respectively for the integrated transactions they purchased, but gained an increased basis of $101,500,000 and $45,675,000, respectively. The increase in basis is approximately sixty-seven times what they paid for the transactions. Second, as Professor Grenadier explained, there is virtually no likelihood of a thirty percent average drop over ninety days - the drop required to yield a one dollar return - much less the average fifty percent drop required to yield the maximum payout possible. 8 Third, the design of the call option spread demonstrates that it was designed for the creation of tax benefits. Mandel, who was intimately familiar with the call option spread transaction format and was integral in selling these transactions to Thomas and Fox, was a tax expert specializing in “leading edge tax solutions,” not an options or risk-management expert. Moreover, there is no evidence that the call option spread was designed as a hedge generally, or that it operated as a hedge with respect to the transactions at issue in this case. Fourth, there is no evidence that the contribution to the partnerships, which was part of the design of the prepackaged transactions, had any effect “on the investment's value, quality, or profitability.” However, the contribution was required for the creation of an increased basis. In addition, in the weeks after Mandel first discussed the call option spread with Thomas and Fox, Griffiths provided tax advice to them about the increased basis they would achieve if they purchased the transactions. Fifth, the tax benefit is highly disproportional - sixty-seven times - to the actual economic outlay. As a result the Court finds that the transactions at issue lack economic substance.

c. The Transactions At Issue In This Case Are Economic Shams.

In this case, it is clear that Plaintiffs are not taxpayers “who structured their transactions and ordered their affairs in a way so as to reduce their liability for taxes or to achieve the greatest tax benefits; rather, the tax benefits shaped the structure of the investment in order to achieve the goal of tax avoidance.” Stobie Creek , 82 Fed. Cl. at 698; see, also, Coltec , 454 F.3d at 1357 (“there is a material difference between structuring a real transaction in a particular way to provide a tax benefit (which is legitimate), and creating a transaction, without a business purpose, in order to create a tax benefit (which is illegitimate).”). Because of the mismatch between the purported purpose of “hedging” and the inability of the Asian-style options to satisfy that purpose, the dramatic overpayment by Thomas and Fox for the de minimis value they received in return, and the virtual impossibility of receiving even one dollar in return versus the certain increase in basis by $101,500,000 Thomas and 445,675,000 by Fox, the Court finds that the only appreciable benefit gained by the transactions at issue was an increased basis. This conclusion is supported by the fact that Thomas and Fox were sophisticated economic actors. In fact, Thomas was a former trial attorney with the IRS. Thomas and Fox, along with Griffiths, their tax advisor, obviously recognized the value that would result from the increased basis, such as shielding distributions of cash and property from their partnerships by characterizing that property as a return on capital, or reducing the obligation to restore a negative capital account on termination of their partnerships.

The Court finds that the weight of evidence, including the persuasive expert testimony by Professor Grenadier, established that the transactions at issue did not appreciably improve the economic position of Thomas and Fox beyond the creation of an increased basis. Any subjective belief by Thomas and Fox that the transaction constituted a hedge was not objectively supported by the evidence, and any subjective belief that there was an economic benefit is not objectively reasonable. No prudent business person, such as Thomas or Fox, would pay between 2,600 and 2,700 times the value of the transactions in this case for this type of a hedge. Because the transactions do not provide any appreciable economic benefit to Thomas or Fox, the Court finds that the transactions at issue are economic shams, and any evidence of a non-tax avoidance subjective motivation is not sufficient to give the transactions economic substance. Therefore, the transactions must be disregarded under the prevailing economic substance doctrine, and are without effect for purposes of federal taxation.

B. Application of the Step Transaction Doctrine Yields a Cost-Basis of $1.5 Million for Thomas and $675,000 for Fox.

As an alternative to the economic substance doctrine, Defendant also seeks to invalidate the tax effects claimed by Plaintiffs under the step transaction doctrine. “The Supreme Court has expressly sanctioned the step transaction doctrine, noting that ‘interrelated yet formally distinct steps in an integrated transaction may not be considered independently of the overall transaction.’” The Falconwood Corp. v. United States , 422 F.3d 1339, 1349 (2005) (quoting Comm'r v. Clark , 489 U.S. 726, 738 (1989)). “[T]he objective of the doctrine is to ‘give tax effect to the substance, as opposed to the form of a transaction, by ignoring for tax purposes, steps of an integrated transaction that separately are without substance.’” Id . (quoting Dietzsch v. United States , 204 Ct.Cl. 535, 498 F.2d 1344, 1346 (1974)).

Courts principally rely on two tests to determine whether to apply the step-transaction doctrine: the interdependence test and the end result test. See, Kornfield v. Commissioner , 137 F.3d 1231, 1235 (10th Cir. 1998); Brown v. United States , 782 F.2d 559, 563-64 (6th Cir. 1986); Security Indus. Ins. Co. v. United States , 702 F.2d 1234, 1244 (5th Cir. 1983); McDonald's Rests. v. Commissioner , 688 F.2d 520, 524-25 (7th Cir. 1982). While the two tests have different formulations, both tests have as their central purpose the implementation of “the central purpose of the step transaction doctrine; that is, to assure that tax consequences turn on the substance of a transaction rather than on its form.” King , 418 F.2d at 517.

1. The End-Result Test

The end-result test applies when “a series of separate transactions were prearranged parts of what was a single transaction, cast from the outset to achieve the ultimate result.” Greene v. United States , 13 F.3d 577, 583 (2d Cir. 1994)( citing Penrod v. Commissioner , 88 T.C. 1415, 1429 (T.C. 1987). “[p]urportedly separate transactions will be amalgamated into a single transaction when it appears that they were really component parts of a single transaction intended from the outset to be taken for the purpose of reaching the ultimate result.” Brown , 782 F.2d at 564 ( quoting King , 418 F.2d at 516). While the taxpayer's intent is relevant under the end-result test, it is not the intent to avoid taxes; instead, it is whether the taxpayer intended to achieve a particular end-result, legitimate or not, through a series of interrelated steps. True , 190 F.3d at 1175. Thus, if a taxpayer structures a single transaction in a certain way that involves multiple steps, “he cannot request independent tax recognition of the individual steps unless he shows that at the time he engaged in the individual step, its result was the intended end result in and of itself.” Id. at 1175 fn. 9.

In this case, both Thomas and Fox contend that the reason they engaged in the transactions at issue was to “hedge” against a catastrophic collapse in the real-estate market. Thus, as they described it, Thomas and Fox essentially placed a “bet” that they now contend amounted to a hedge. Therefore, the long option, the short option, and the promissory note are simply the “interrelated steps” through which Thomas and Fox accomplish this “bet” or “hedge.” Under the end results test, these interrelated steps of the transaction should be collapsed into a unified whole and the tax consequences determined accordingly.

In addition, any attempt by Plaintiffs to argue that they had a valid business purposes, such as the plaintiff in the Falconwood case, in engaging in the transactions at issue does not “immunize” these transactions from the step transaction doctrine. See, Stobie Creek , 82 Fed. Cl. at 701. While the court in Falconwood held that the step transaction doctrine did not apply to the series of transactions at issue, it did so because the taxpayer had an independent business purpose for the initial step, and then was bound by regulation to follow the remaining steps that the Government had sought to collapse. Falconwood , 422 F.2d at 1351-52 (“Upon completing a downstream merger for independent business reasons, Falconwood therefore had little choice in the face of quasi-legislative mandates but to file a final consolidated tax return for the group that covered Falconwood's operations for its entire taxable year.”). However, as in Stobie Creek, Plaintiffs “cannot align themselves with the factual circumstances presented in Falconwood ” because they “were not bound by any legislative or regulatory mandate to proceed along the tortuous steps that resulted in the claimed basis enhancement.” Stobie Creek , 82 Fed. Cl. at 702.

2. The Interdependence Test

“The interdependence formulation of the step transaction doctrine requires an inquiry into whether the individual transactions in the series would be “fruitless” without completion of the series.” Id. at 699 ( quoting Falconwood , 422 F.3d at 1349). Under this test, courts analyze whether or not one part of the overall transaction would have occurred without another part. Kornfield , 137 F.3d at 1235; Security Indus. Ins. , 702 F.2d at 1247. If not, the transaction is then integrated and the step transaction applies. Id. Thus, under this test, courts “disregard the tax effects of individual transactional steps if “it is unlikely that any one step would have been undertaken except in contemplation of the other integrating acts.” True , 190 F.3d at 1175 ( citing Kuper v. Commissioner , 533 F.2d 152, 156 (5th Cir. 1976)).

In this case, the components of the transactions at issue were interdependent because each component was required to accomplish the desired economic result, which was, as Plaintiffs describe it a “bet” or “hedge” against a collapse in the real estate market. This is best demonstrated by the fact that the documents executed as part of the transactions created interlocking contractual obligations. For example, the Certificate re: Consent and Authorization discusses a “Master Transaction.” The Master Transaction “would be effectuated through the execution and delivery by the Trust of the following agreements: (a) Master Agreement to be entered into by … the Trust and [AIG] …; (b) Note …, to be entered into by and between the Trust and [AIG]…; (c) Pledge Agreement by and between Trust and [AIG]; (d) Option and Equity Derivative Account Agreement by and between Trust and [AIG], and (e) Confirmation Letter Agreements re: share option transaction I and re: share option transaction II to Trust from [AIG].” Moreover, the Master Agreement specifies that all transactions and confirmations constitute a single agreement.

The creation of these interlocking obligations with respect to the long option, the short option, and the note accomplished the goal of creating the “bet” sought by Thomas and Fox. Neither the long or short option independently could have created the required “bet.” For example, Thomas and Fox would have only benefitted from an independent purchase of the long option if prices of the stocks in the REIT basket increased, which is the opposite of what they were trying to accomplish in “hedging” against a drastic downturn in the real estate market. In addition, an independent purchase of the short option would have exposed Thomas and Fox to unlimited losses if the price of the stocks in the REIT basket increased. Thus, the purchase of the long option, the short option, and the AIG note were required to accomplish the desired “hedge.” Therefore, the transactions making up the steps of the “hedge” strategy pursued by the Plaintiffs “are interdependent and have no independent functional justification outside of the series.” Stobie Creek, 82 Fed. Cl. at 700. “Under the interdependence test, the individual steps must be disregarded and collapsed into a single transaction.” Id.

The Court finds that, under either the interdependence test or the end result test, the step transaction doctrine applies to Plaintiffs' transactions. Id. Accordingly, the tax consequences should be determined on the substance of the transactions at issue, and not on the form used by Plaintiffs. Id.

C. Application of the Substance Over Form Doctrine Yields a Cost-Basis of $1.5 Million for Thomas and $675,000 for Fox.

In 1945, the Supreme Court stated: “The incident of taxation depends on substance rather than form of the transaction.” Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945); see, also, True v. United States , 190 F.3d at 1174 (10th Cir. 1999); Allen v. Commissioner , 925 F.2d 348, 352 (9th Cir. 1991). In applying this principle, a court “must look beyond the taxpayers' characterization of isolated, individual transaction steps, and also review the substance of each series of transactions in its entirety.” True , 190 F.3d at 1174. Thus, taxpayers may not characterize a transaction solely based on the labels they have used, because such an approach “would completely thwart the Congressional policy to tax transactional realities rather than verbal labels.” Crenshaw v. United States , 450 F.2d 472, 477-78 (5 th Cir. 1971). Therefore, it is the “true nature” of the transaction, not its “mere formalisms” that control. Court Holding , 324 U.S. at 334; see, also, Allen , 925 F.3d at 352; True , 190 F.3d at 1174.

The countervailing consideration to application of the substance over form doctrine is the principle that taxpayers may generally structure their transactions as they wish. Brown v. United States , 329 F.3d 664, 671 (9 th Cir. 2003). Thus, courts do not invalidate claimed tax benefits if the form of the transaction yields tax benefits which are consistent with Congressional intent as to the particular Internal Revenue Code provisions at issue. Id. at 672. Therefore, courts must make a fact-specific inquiry to determine if the facts fall within the intended scope of the applicable statute. Stewart v. Commissioner , 714 F.2d 977, 988 (9 th Cir. 1983).

In this case, Thomas and Fox entered into the transactions at issue, which they described as “bets” or “hedges” against a collapse in the real estate market. Thomas contends that he “paid approximately $1,500,000 to take a chance that he could receive up to $38,400,000.” According to Thomas, “[t]he $1.5 million is, in effect, the TDP transaction cost, the cost of inducing Banque AIG to make a bet on real estate values. Similarly, Fox contends he “paid approximately $675,000 to take a chance that he could receive up to $17,242,574.” According to Fox, “[t]he $675,000 is, in effect, the Fox transaction cost, the cost of inducing Banque AIG to make a bet on real estate values.”

Once these initial payments of $1.5 million and $675,000 were made, Thomas and Fox had no downside exposure from their “bets,” and only an extremely remote possibility of receiving a return. These contractually interlocking transactions were carefully structured so that the amount payable under the short option would never exceed the amounts to be received from the long option and the AIG note. The assets - the long option and the note - were pledged to AIG to secure the liability created by the short option.

For purposes of the application of the form over substance doctrine, the substance of the transaction is clearly a net payment of $1.5 million by Thomas and $675,000 by Fox for a possible payout with no downside exposure. Therefore, Thomas's true economic cost is $1.5 million, not $101.5 million. Similarly, Fox's true economic cost is $675,000, not $45,675,000.

Because the basis of property is its cost per I.R.C. § 1012 , and because Thomas's economic cost for the entire transaction was $1.5 million, his basis was $1.5 million. Thomas's partnerships succeeded to that basis. Similarly, because Fox's economic cost for the entire transaction was $675,000, his basis was $675,000. HFI succeeded to that basis, while MP-MI and TMI succeeded to their proportional share of that basis. The partnerships' characterization of the contribution at more than sixty times what Thomas and Fox actually paid for their unified position is plainly inconsistent with the fundamental principle that basis equals cost as expressed by Congress in I.R.C. § 1012 . Accordingly, under the substance over form doctrine, the tax consequences should be determined on the substance of the transactions at issue, and not on the form used by Plaintiffs.

D. Even if the Transactions At Issue Have Economic Substance and the Step-Transaction and Form Over Substance Doctrines Do Not Apply, the Obligation Created by the Short Option is a Liability for Purposes of I.R.C. § 752.

When a partner contributes property to a partnership, the partnership succeeds to the contributing partner's basis in the property under I.R.C. § 723 . In addition, the contributing partner increases his basis in the partnership by his cost basis in the property under I.R.C. § 722 .

On the other hand, when a partnership assumes a liability of a partner, the partner's basis in his partnership interest is: (1) decreased by the amount of the liability; and (2) increased by the partner's share of the partnership liability resulting from the assumption of the liability. I.R.C. §§ 722 , 733(1), and 752(a) and (b). Once the liability is satisfied, the partner's basis in his partnership interest is decreased by the amount of the liability. I.R.C. §§ 733(1) and 752(b).

In this case, Plaintiffs argue that the short option was not a liability for purposes of Section 752 . Therefore, for example, Thomas argues that the $101.5 million increase in basis that he received when he contributed the long option and the AIG note should not be reduced to account for the offsetting $100 million short option. However, as explained above, when the liability is satisfied, Thomas's basis should be reduced by $100 million pursuant to Section 752 . Therefore, the increase in Thomas's basis would be merely $1.5 million, or the equivalent of Thomas's net payment for the transaction. Thus, the characterization of the partnership's short option as a liability for purposes of Section 752 is consistent with the cost basis - and the economic reality - of Thomas's contribution. See , I.R.C. § 1012 .

The above interpretation of Section 752 is consistent with Revenue Ruling 88-77 , where the I.R.S. determined that when an obligation creates or increases the basis of the obligor's assets, the obligation is a “liability” for the purposes of Section 752 . In Revenue Ruling 88-77 , the I.R.S. defined liability for purposes of Section 752 to “include an obligation only if and to the extent that incurring the liability creates or increases the basis to the partnership of any of the partnership's assets (including cash attributable to borrowings).”

In this case, the short option, the long option, and the AIG note were contractually interlocked, and the acquisition of the obligation (the short option) clearly created basis (via the long option and the note) and should be recognized as a liability for purposes of Section 752 . In fact, the long option and the AIG note were purchased with the proceeds of the sale of the short option.

The above interpretation of Revenue Ruling 88-77 is consistent with the Fifth Circuit's interpretation in Korman & Associates, Inc., v. United States , 527 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 2008), and the Court of Federal Claim's recent interpretation in Marriott International Resorts, L.P., v. United States , 83 Fed. Cl. 291 (2008). 9 At the time of the transactions at issue in this case and prior to the Fifth Circuit's decision in Korman , the Helmer line of cases found that certain liabilities assumed by partnerships should not be recognized for basis purposes because they were too indefinable or “contingent.” See, Helmer v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo. 1975-160 (1975); see, also, Long v. Commissioner , 71 T.C. 1 (1978), and La Rue v. Commissioner , 90 T.C. 465 (1988).

For example, in Helmer , a corporation held a purchase option on real estate owned by a partnership, and made periodic payments to maintain the option. T.C. Memo. 1975-160 (1975). Because the partnership was obligated to apply the option payments to the purchase price if the corporation exercised its option, the partners argued that its receipt of these payments created a partnership liability that increased their basis in the partnership. Id. However, the Tax Court found that the payments “created no liability on the part of the partnership to repay the funds paid nor to perform any services in the future.” 10 Id.

However, in Korman , the Fifth Circuit addressed the question whether the assumption of a liability from a short sale of Treasury notes is a liability under Section 752 , and determined that it was a Section 752 liability because the assumption was accompanied by the contribution of the proceeds from the short sale. In Korman, the taxpayer borrowed $100 million in Treasury bills and sold them for $102.5 million. The taxpayer then contributed the $102.5 million to a partnership, and the partnership assumed the liability for covering the short sale. The taxpayer then conveyed the partnership interest to another partnership, which sold the interest for $1.8 million. The taxpayer claimed a loss of $100 million, and ignored the liability created by the obligation to cover the short sale because it was “contingent.” 11

The Fifth Circuit noted that the taxpayer acknowledged “only suffer[ing] a $200,000 economic loss” but “claim[ing] a $102.6 [m]illion tax loss on its return.” Id. at 456. The Fifth Circuit found the taxpayer was making a “premeditated attempt to transform this wash transaction (for economic purposes) into a windfall (for tax purposes)” that was “reminiscent of an alchemist's attempt to transmute lead into gold.” Id.

In this case, as in Kornman , Plaintiffs are seeking to “treat[] [their] contingent assets and … contingent liabilities asymmetrically.” Id. at 460 (internal citation omitted). Moreover, the proceeds from the initial short sale and the subsequent covering transaction in this case are “inextricably intertwined.” Id . at 460-61. Therefore, to apply the Helmer line of cases to this case would, as the Korman court found, “fl[y] in the face of reality” and result in an “unwarranted aberration.” Id. at 461.

E. Even if the Short Option is Not an I.R.C. § 752 Liability, the Obligation Created by the Short Option Must Still be Taken into Account under Treasury Regulation § 1.752-6.

Section 1.752-6 of the Treasury Regulations applies to a partnership's assumption of liability occurring after October 18, 1999, and before June 24, 2003, if I.R.C. § 752(a) and (b) do not apply to that liability. 12 26 C.F.R. 1.752-6. On June 24, 2003, the Treasury Department proposed regulations, including temporary Treasury Regulation § 1.752-6 , that would define “liability” in the partnership context under I.R.C. § 752 , and which relied on the interpretation of “liability” found in I.R.C. § 358(h)(3) 13 and Revenue Ruling 88-77 . See, Assumption of Partner Liabilities , 68 Fed.Reg. 37,434 (June 24, 2003) (Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.752-0 to -7). These temporary regulations became final on May 26, 2005, and the Treasury Department specified that Treasury Regulation § 1.752-6 would apply retroactively. See, 70 Fed.Reg. 30,334, 30,335 (May 26, 2005). Treasury Regulation § 1.752-6 was adopted by Congressional directive pursuant to Section 309 of the Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000 (“2000 Act”), which added Section 358(h) to the I.R.C., and which defines “liability” as including contingent obligations for purposes of certain corporate stock exchanges. Section 309(c)(1) of the 2000 Act required the Secretary of the Treasury to adopt comparable rules for transactions involving partnerships, and expressly authorized retroactivity of those rules by stating that the Treasury Regulations adopted under Section 309(c) “shall apply to assumption of liabilities after October 18, 1999, or such later date as may be prescribed in such rules.”

If Treasury Regulation § 1.752-6 is applied retroactively in this case, the short options at issue would constitute liabilities for purposes of I.R.C. § 752 , and, thus, would require a reduction in the partnership basis claimed by Plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs argue that, as the court in Stobie Creek recently found, the requirement under Section 1.752-6 that a partner's basis in a partnership interest must be reduced by the value of the contingent liabilities assumed by the partnership is “contrary to the then existing policy to exclude contingent liabilities from the computation of partnership basis.” Stobie Creek Investments, LLC v. United States , 82 Fed. Cl. 636, 668 (2008) (citing Helmer , 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 727 (1975)). Both Plaintiffs and the court in Stobie Creek base the conclusion that Section 1.752-6 represented a change from previous policy on the Treasury Department's statement that “[t]he definition of a liability contained in these proposed regulations [including Section 1.752-6 ] does not follow Helmer. ” Stobie Creek, 82 Fed. Cl. At 668 (citing 68 Fed.Reg. at 37,436).

However, other courts have found that Treasury Regulation § 1.752-6 does apply retroactively. For example, in Cemco the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit observed that Treasury Regulation § 1.752-6 was “explicit” in stating that it applied retroactively to assumptions of liabilities occurring before its enactment. Cemco Investors, LLC v. U.S. , 515 F.3d 749, 752 (7th Cir. 2008). The Cemco court relied on I.R.C. § 7805(b)(6) which specifically allows retroactivity. 14 Cemco , 515 F.3d at 752. The Cemco court found that the effect of Treasury Regulation § 1.752-6 was to “instantiate the pre-existing norm that transactions with no economic substance don't reduce people's taxes.” Cemco , 515 F.3d at 752.

This Court agrees with the Cemco court that Treasury Regulation § 1.752-6 should be applied retroactively. The Court finds that the rationale of the First Circuit in Stobie Creek and Plaintiffs with respect to Treasury Regulation § 1.752-6 “misrepresents the state of prior law” by interpreting the statement that “[t]he definition of a liability contained in these proposed regulations does not follow Helmer v. Commissioner ” as an indication that Helmer represented the prevailing prior law. Burke, Karen C. and McCough, Gayson, M.P., Cobra Strikes Back: Anatomy of a Tax Shelter (June 19, 2008), at 33 and 39 n. 121. In addition, the Treasury Department also stated that “following the principles set forth in § 1.752-1T(g) and Rev. Rul. 88-77 , the proposed regulations provide that an obligation is a liability if and to the extent that incurring the obligation: (A) Creates or increases the basis of any of the obligor's assets (including cash).” 68 Fed. Reg. 37434, 37437 (2003).

Recognizing that “[t]here is no statutory or regulatory definition of liabilities for purposes of section 752 ” (68 Fed. Reg. 37434, 37435 (2003)), the Treasury Department relied upon Revenue Ruling 88-77 and Salina Partnership v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo 2000-352 (T.C. 2000), and concluded that “[c]ase law and revenue rulings, however have established that, as under section 357(c)(3) , the terms liabilities for this purpose does not include liabilities the payment of which would give rise to a deduction, unless the incurrence of the liability resulted in the creation of, or increase in, the basis of property.” 68 Fed. Reg. 37334, 37435 (2003). Thus, the Treasury Department found that “[t]he question of what constitutes a liability for purposes of section 752 was addressed in Revenue Ruling 88-77 ,” and that the definition of liability in Revenue Ruling 88-77 was consistent with the Internal Revenue's position in Revenue Ruling 95-26 . Id. at 37436. Therefore, the Treasury Department simply applied the pre-existing rule contained in Revenue Ruling 88-77 to address the possibility of abuse caused by contingent liabilities not being recognized under I.R.C. § 752 . 15

Moreover, Notice 2000-44 placed Plaintiffs on notice that the transactions it described would be scrutinized and penalized. Because Notice 2000-44 was issued in August 2000, and notified taxpayers that the contribution of paired long and short options to partnerships in order to artificially increase outside basis were abusive, and would not be allowed, the Secretary's exclusion of these transactions from the exceptions in Treas. Reg. § 1.752-6(b) should not have been a surprise to sophisticated taxpayers such as Thomas and Fox, and their advisor, Arthur Andersen tax partner Griffiths. Moreover, while Plaintiffs argue that Notice 2000-44 did not give them notice because the transactions at issue are not identical to those described in Notice 2000-44 , Plaintiffs conveniently ignore the “substantially similar” language contained in the Notice. Accordingly, the Court finds that even if the short options at issue in this case are not liabilities under I.R.C. § 752 , the obligations created by the short options still must be taken into account under Treasury Regulation § 1.752-6 .

F. The Accuracy-Related Penalties on the Ground of Negligence or Disregarding the Rules or Regulations is Appropriate Under I.R.C. § 6662.

Section 6662 of the Internal Revenue Code governs accuracy-related penalties. The purpose of penalties is “to deter taxpayers from playing the ‘audit lottery,’ that is, taking undisclosed questionable reporting positions and gambling that they [will] not be audited. Caulfield v. Commissioner , 33 F.3d 991, 994 (8th Cir. 1994). As Plaintiffs have argued, Thomas and Fox have not yet used any of the tax benefits associated with the transactions at issue in this case. Because this case is a partnership-level proceeding, the Court must determine “the applicability of any penalty … which relates to an adjustment to a partnership item.” I.R.C. § 6221 . However, the actual computation of the penalty in not done at the partnership level.

One of the accuracy-related penalties provided for in Section 6662 of the Internal Revenue Code is for negligence or disregard of rules or regulations. I.R.C. § 6662(a) and (b)(1). The Code defines negligence as “any failure to make a reasonable attempt to comply with the provisions” of the Code. I.R.C. § 6662(c) . This is an objective standard requiring that the taxpayer exercise “due care.” Hansen v. Commissioner , 471 F.3d 1021, 1028 (9th Cir. 2006) ( citing Collins v. Commissioner , 857 F.2d 1383, 1386 (9th Cir. 1988)). Due care exists where the taxpayer “acted as a reasonable and prudent person would act under similar circumstances.” Id. Under the Treasury Regulations, negligence is “strongly indicated” where “a taxpayer fails to make a reasonable attempt to ascertain the correctness of a deduction, credit, or exclusion on a return which would seem to a reasonable and prudent person to be ‘too good to be true’ under the circumstances.” Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(1)(ii) (2002); see also Hansen , 471 F.3d at 1029. In the Ninth Circuit, negligence is determined by an analysis of “both the underlying investment and the taxpayer's position taken on the tax return.” Hansen , 471 F.3d at 1029; see also Neonatology Associates, P.A. v. Commissioner , 299 F.3d 221, 234 (3d Cir. 2002) (finding that a taxpayer “proceeds at his own peril” when “presented with what would appear to be a fabulous opportunity to avoid tax obligations.”); Pasternak v. Commissioner , 990 F.2d 893, 902 (6th Cir. 1993) (upholding negligence penalty where the “Tax Court found that petitioners were aware that they were buying a program primarily of ‘window dressings’ for tax benefits and either negligently or intentionally disregarded the law.”).

In this case, the Court finds that the facts support the imposition of an accuracy-based penalty on the grounds of negligence or disregard of the rules and regulations. Specifically, the transactions were entered into over one year after the IRS issued IRS Notice 2000-44 entitled “Tax avoidance using artificially high basis,” which alerted taxpayers and their representatives that purported losses arising from certain transactions designed to create artificially high bases in partnership interests would be disallowed. In addition, the partnerships failed to demonstrate any attempt to determine whether the transactions would potentially be covered by Revenue Ruling 88-77 . Moreover, the partnerships failed to demonstrate that they attempted to determine whether the transactions had any economic substance. Furthermore, the partnerships failed to demonstrate that they sought and received disinterested and objective tax advice because the tax advice that they did receive came from Arthur Anderson, which also arranged the transactions. Based on these facts, the Court concludes that any objective view of the transactions results in the conclusion that they had no non-tax economic benefit.

In addition, the partnership returns reported the valuation of the transaction at sixty-seven times their proper value under either I.R.C. § 752 or the substance over form or step-transaction analysis. In that regard, the Thomas partnerships reported an increase in its capital account of $101,500,000, which is sixty-seven times the actual economic outlay of $1.5 million that Thomas paid for the transaction. Any reasonable and prudent taxpayer would consider the transaction “too good to be true.” Treas. Reg. 1.6662-3(b)(1)(ii) (2002). Therefore, the Court finds that the partnerships were negligent and disregarded the rules and regulations for purposes of I.R.C. § 6662 . Id.

The reasonable cause and good faith defense is a fact and circumstance test that focuses on the taxpayer's affirmative actions to determine its correct tax liability: “[g]enerally, the most important factor is the extent of the taxpayer's effort to assess the taxpayer's proper tax liability.” Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(b) . The taxpayer's “experience, knowledge, and education” may be taken into account. Id. Reliance on a tax advisor “does not necessarily demonstrate reasonable cause and good faith.” Id.

In this case, the partnerships did not have reasonable cause to disregard the liabilities created by the short options in valuing the Arthur Andersen call option spreads contributed to the partnerships. The transactions were entered into over one year after the IRS issued IRS Notice 2000-44 entitled “Tax avoidance using artificially high basis.” This notice alerted taxpayers and their representatives that purported losses arising from certain transactions designed to create artificially high basis in partnership interests would be disallowed. In addition, the partnerships have failed to provide evidence that they diligently attempted to properly assess their proper tax reporting. The partnerships also have failed to demonstrate any attempt to determine whether the transactions would potentially be covered by Revenue Ruling 88-77 . Furthermore, the partnerships have failed to demonstrate that they attempted to determine whether the transactions had any economic substance. Finally, the partnerships have failed to demonstrate that they sought and received disinterested and objective tax advice because the tax advice that they did receive came from Arthur Andersen, which also arranged the transactions resulting in the increased basis that is at issue in this case. Therefore, the partnerships have failed to demonstrate that they acted in good faith as required by the reasonable cause exception of I.R.C. § 6664(c)(1) .

Conclusions of Law

1. The Court has original jurisdiction over the federal claims asserted in this action pursuant to Section 6226 of the Internal Revenue Code. The Court's jurisdiction extends to all items of the partnership for the period at issue. I.R.C. § 6226(f) . Contributions to partnerships and distributions from partnerships are partnership items. Treas. Reg. § 301.6231(a)(3)-1(a)(4)(I) and (ii). The characterization of offsetting options when contributed to partnerships is a partnership item. See, Jade Trading, LLC v. United States , 80 Fed. Cl. 11, 41-43 (Fed. Cl. 2007); Nussdorf v. Comm'r , 129 T.C. 30, 43-44 and n. 16 (2007). 16

2. Venue is proper in the United States District Court for the Central District of California under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because the alleged acts complained of occurred and are occurring in this district.

3. In applying the economic substance analysis to the transactions at issue in this case, the Court concludes that the transactions at issue are economic shams for tax purposes.

4. Application of the step-transaction doctrine, through either the end result test or interdependence test, yields a cost basis of $1.5 million for Thomas and $675,000 for Fox.

5. Application of the substance over form doctrine yields a cost basis of $1.5 million for Thomas and $675,000 for Fox.

6. The obligations created by the short options in the transactions at issue are liabilities for purposes of I.R.C. § 752 .

7. The obligations created by the short options in the transactions at issue are liabilities for purposes of Treasury Regulation § 1.752-6 .

8. I.R.C. § 6221 requires that “the tax treatment of any partnership item (and the applicability of any penalty, addition to tax, or additional amount which relates to an adjustment to a partnership item) shall be determined at the partnership level.” I.R.C. § 6226(e) authorizes this Court to conduct partnership-level proceedings and determine “the applicability of any penalty, addition to tax, or additional amount which relates to an adjustment to a partnership item,” I.R.C. § 6226(f) . In this case, the Court concludes that the partnerships were negligent for purposes of IRC § 6662 , and, therefore, accuracy-related penalties are applicable in this case.


Footnotes

1
The Court deferred ruling on the admissibility of deposition testimony of Messrs. Mandel, Varellas and Nelson offered by the government as well as certain trial exhibits objected to by the parties in the Final Pre-Trial Exhibit Stipulation filed August 5, 2008, pending further post-trial submissions by the parties. On October 6, 2008, the parties filed Notices of Designated Deposition Testimony of Kenneth Mandel, Lawrence Varellas, and Kurt Nelson, Plaintiffs' Objections and Defendant's Response to Objections.

The Court has reviewed the objections to the proffered deposition testimony and the objections to certain trial exhibits in the Final Pre-Trial Stipulation filed August 5, 2008, and rules as follows: The Court overrules the objections to Exhibits 45, 52, 53, 54, 74, 81, 82, 85, 86, 88, 89, 90, 94, 95, 97, 100, 101, 102, 103, 105, 130, 131, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 151, 260 (a) - (v) and those exhibits will be received into evidence as of the last day of trial, which was August 14, 2008. As to the objections to the deposition testimony of Mr. Mandel, all of the Plaintiffs' objections are overruled except for the following objections which are sustained: (1) p. 35, lines 2 - 4. As to the objections to the deposition testimony of Mr. Varellas, all of Plaintiffs' objections are overruled except the following which are sustained: (1) p. 47, lines 1- 10 and 15 - 25; (2) p. 48, lines 1 - 25; (3) p. 54, lines 1 - 25; (4) p. 55, lines 1 - 8; and (5) p. 87, lines 15 - 25. As to the objections to the deposition testimony of Mr. Nelson, all of Plaintiffs' objections are overruled. Plaintiffs' objections to Defendant's attempt to introduce documents through deposition excerpts which were not marked by Defendant as trial exhibits are sustained. Those documents are inadmissible and will not be received into evidence and have not been considered by the Court.

2
The Court has elected to issue its findings in narrative form. Any finding of fact that constitutes a conclusion of law is also hereby adopted as a conclusion of law, and any conclusion of law that constitutes a finding of fact is also hereby adopted as a finding of fact.

3
An Asian-style option is an option whose payoff depends on the average value of the underlying security or commodity over a specified period of time. In this case, the Asian-style feature meant that the payout was dependent on the average value of the REIT basket from December 20, 2001, to March 19, 2002, as compared to the value of the REIT basket on December 19, 2001. A European option is one that can only be exercised on a particular date. In this case, the date was March 19, 2002.

4
The Manhattan Properties, L.P., transaction is not a part of this litigation.

5
Ken Mandel was a tax partner at Arthur Andersen who worked on "leading edge tax solutions for both high-net-worth clients and large public corporations." Defendant contends that Mandel developed the call-option spread, which is an allegation that Plaintiffs deny. In any case, it is clear from the evidence in this case that Mandel is familiar with the Arthur Andersen technique referred to as the call-option spread. In fact, Mandel described the call-option spread as suitable "for a handful of very large dollar, trust-client transactions, where we excluded the participation from outside attorneys and other non Firm professionals."

6
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs are not entitled to the increased basis created by the transactions at issue under the economic substance doctrine, the substance-overform doctrine, or the step-transaction doctrine. As the Stobie Creek court noted, "[t]hese doctrines vary in origin and somewhat in application, yet apply to the same analysis." (citing King Enters., Inc. v. United States , 418 F.2d 511, 516 n. 6 (1969) ( "[C]ourts have enunciated a variety of doctrines, such as step transaction, business purpose, and substance over form. Although the various doctrines overlap and it is not always clear in a particular case which one is most appropriate, their common premise is that the substantive realities of a transaction determine its tax consequences." ); and H.J. Heinz Co. & Subsidiaries v. United States , 76 Fed.Cl. 570, 583-85 (2007) (discussing multiple formulations employed by courts to consider whether transaction has economic substance or whether it is a "sham" )).

7
Professor Grenadier used a thirty-five percent implied volatility, which is validated by the implied volatility of the Bank of America and JP Morgan quotes Plaintiffs received for similar transactions.

8
In post-trial filings in January 2009, Plaintiffs ask the Court to take judicial notice of the fact that had options with identical terms been purchased on October 1, 2008, there would have been a payoff. In fact, Plaintiffs allege that the actual drop in the REIT basket for the ninety-day period from October 1, 2008 to December 29, 2008, using Asian-style options was 43.47 percent. Defendant does not dispute that this information is accurate, but asserts that it is irrelevant because Defendant did not argue that a payoff from the transactions as issue was "impossible" , but merely "extremely low" and, thus, any economic substance from the transactions at issue was de minimis . The Court agrees with Defendant that the fact that Plaintiffs are able to demonstrate one instance of an Asian-style European option drop in the nearly fifty-year history of REITs occurring seven years after the transactions in question does not change the Court's conclusion that a payoff from the transactions at issue was, at best, highly unlikely. In addition, the Court's conclusion that the transaction at issue lack economic substance is based on, as explained above, a variety of other factors.

9
The recent Court of Federal Claims case of Marriott International Resorts , relied on Revenue Ruling 88-77 to determine that the obligation created by a short sale was a liability for purposes of I.R.C. § 752 . Marriott International Resorts, L.P. v. United States , 83 Fed. Cl. 291 (2008) (finding that, in light of the promulgation of Revenue Ruling 88-77 , symmetrical treatment that "would call for recognition of the corresponding obligation to replace the borrowed securities" was required under Section 752 ).

10
That the option holder in Helmer was able to exercise his option or not is a key distinction between Helmer , and its progeny, and this case where the funds received from the sale of the short option are used to purchase the long option and the AIG note, and the proceeds of which are pledged to secure the liability created by the short option. Helmer and its progeny also are distinguishable from this case because they did not involve the assumption of a payment obligation by a partnership from a partner.

11
However, as the Fifth Circuit found, "[t]he Internal Revenue Code deals with dollars, and the basis adjustment provisions of section 752 presume that the value of the liability is ascertainable." Korman, 527 F.3d at 452.

12
Section 1.752-7 applies to assumptions of liability occurring after June 24, 2003, and taxpayers could elect to apply it to assumptions of liability occurring between October 18, 1999, and June 24, 2003. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-7(k) .

13
Section 358(h)(3) , which defines "liability" in the context of determining basis on corporate transactions as including "any fixed or contingent obligation to make payment."

14
Retroactivity is also permitted to prevent abuse pursuant to I.R.C. § 7805(b)(3) .

15
Treasury Regulation § 1.752-6 also incorporates the definition of liability contained in I.R.C. § 358(h)(3) , which defines "liability" to include contingent liabilities.

16
The parties do not dispute the facts requisite to federal jurisdiction.

Labels:

Friday, January 22, 2010

Return preparer filed false claims

U.S. v. GOVEREH, Cite as 105 AFTR 2d 2010-XXXX, 01/05/2010
________________________________________
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Onessimus M. GOVEREH, Defendant.
Case Information:
Code Sec(s):
Court Name: United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division,
Docket No.: No. 1:07-CR-131-JEC,
Date Decided: 01/05/2010.
Disposition:
HEADNOTE
.
Reference(s):
OPINION
United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division,
ORDER and OPINION
Judge: JULIE E. CARNES, Chief Judge.
This case is presently before the Court on defendant's Motion for James Hearing [14], defendant's Motion in Limine [50], defendant's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal [98], and defendant's Motion for New Trial [99]. The Court has reviewed the record and the arguments of the parties and, for the reasons set out below, concludes that defendant's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal [98] and Motion for New Trial [99] are DENIED.
BACKGROUND
Onessimus M. Govereh (“Govereh” or “defendant”) ran the Norcross, Georgia office of Icon Tax Service from January 2, 2007 until February 15, 2007, when he was arrested. (Tr. [115] at 1024–25, 1086–90, 1118.) During that time, 107 personal income tax returns were filed electronically using Govereh's Electronic Filing Identification Number (“EFIN”), which he had obtained from the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”). (Tr. [108] at 152–56; Tr. [113] at 586–89; Tr. [114] at 901, 970–71.) Each return bore Govereh's name as the tax preparer, and a copy of each return was saved on a password-protected computer he used. (Tr. [108] at 152–56; Tr. [113] at 586–89; Tr. [114] at 901.)
Govereh was charged with twenty counts of filing false claims based on twenty returns that were filed in January 2007 in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 287, the False Claims Act (FCA). 1. (Indictment [1].) Fourteen taxpayers testified that Govereh had prepared their taxes, and most of them told essentially the same story. (See generally Trs. [108], [112], [113], [114], [115].) Govereh sat at a computer and entered information while the taxpayers talked to him. (See, e.g., Tr. [113] at 299.) He entered false information on their returns, including false information about dependants, 2. earnings, and educational expenses. (Id.) Govereh also did not show his customers the returns he filed for them, so many were surprised to see the false information when they finally saw their returns. (Tr. [108] at 268–70; Tr. [112] at 301, 305, 327, 349; Tr. [113] at 507.) In all the returns, Govereh claimed that the taxpayer was entitled to substantial Telephone Excise Tax Refund (“TETR”) credits, even though he never discussed telephone use with any of them, nor did any of them provide any documentation about telephone use. Moreover, it is inconceivable that any individual would ever incur excise taxes in the amount claimed on their returns. 3.
Govereh's scheme utilized a process called Refund Anticipated Loans (“RAL”). A taxpayer whose return indicates that a refund is due can file for such a loan through an approved intermediary, such as Govereh, in advance of actually receiving the refund from the IRS. The bank that issues such a loan receives a certain commission from that loan and ultimately receives a check from the IRS in the total amount of the refund. A bank will not issue a loan in the full-agreed upon amount until the return is actually filed with the IRS, and, for the tax year 2006, no return could be filed electronically before January 12, 2007. Nonetheless, the participating banks-HSBC Bank and Santa Barbara Bank and Trust (“SBBT”)-permitted Govereh to print a check up to the amount of $1600 prior to filing the return, and once the return was actually filed electronically after January 12, the bank sent a check for the balance of any refund due. See generally Tr. [112] at 430, 435–36.
Govereh had his customers cash both the advance check and the second loan check at the check-cashing business next door and return with his fees, which were often several thousand dollars. (Tr. [108] at 270–73; Tr. [112] at 329–332, 352, 444–46; Tr. [113] at 489–93.) When the IRS ultimately refused to fund the claimed refunds and the banks contacted the customers about repaying their loans, many were surprised to learn that they had even been parties to a loan. (Tr. [112] at 329, 355; Tr. [113] at 493–94.) Both banks ultimately discontinued working with Govereh because of the high fees that he was charging his clients and because of a high loan-loss ratio. (Tr. [112] at 422; Tr. [113] at 683.)
Govereh was convicted by a jury on January 16, 2008, following a trial before this Court, on fourteen counts of presenting or causing false tax returns to be presented to the IRS. (Jury Verdict [93].) Defendant now moves for judgment of acquittal or for a new trial. (Mot. for J. of Acquittal [98]; Mot. for New Trial [99]).
DISCUSSION
I. Motion for Judgment of Acquittal
Defendant moves for judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c). (See Mot. for J. of Acquittal [98].)
A. The False Claims Act Applies to Defendant's Claims.
1. The False Claims Act is Construed Broadly.
Defendant argues that the False Claims Act (FCA), under which he was convicted, does not apply to the claims he made to the IRS. The FCA provides in relevant part: “Whoever makes or presents ... to any department or agency [of the United States], any claim upon or against the United States, or any department or agency thereof, knowing such claim to be false, fictitious, or fraudulent, shall be imprisoned.” 18 U.S.C. § 287.
In United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228, 233 (1968), the Supreme Court interpreted the FCA to include “all fraudulent attempts to cause the Government to pay out sums of money.” Id. The Supreme Court has further determined that the FCA and the term “any claim” must be construed liberally to effect the FCA's broad purpose of protecting the government treasury from fraudulent claims.Hubbard v. United States , 514 U.S. 695, 703 n. 5 (1995). Furthermore, the FCA punishes the mere submission of fraudulent claims for payment, regardless of whether the Government pays them. United States v. Coachman, 727 F.2d 1293, 1302 (D.C.Cir.1984) (“there is no requirement that the claim has actually been honored”) (citations omitted).
This statute has been applied to protect the Government from a wide range of fraudulent claims, including tax returns that claim refunds to which filers are not entitled. See United States v. Lyle, No. 06-16574, 2007 WL 2344873 [100 AFTR 2d 2007-5599], at 4 (11th Cir. Aug. 17, 2007) (defendant who filed tax returns using false information); United States v. Morton, No. 07-14803, 2008 WL 5077733 [102 AFTR 2d 2008-7193], at 2 (11th Cir. Dec. 3, 2008) (defendant tax return preparer who created false tax returns as part of RAL program); United States v. Barnes, 324 F.3d 135, 137 [91 AFTR 2d 2003-1391] (3d Cir.2003) (defendant who filed false claims for refunds from IRS); United States v. Nash, 175 F.3d 440, 444 [83 AFTR 2d 99-2126] (6th Cir.1999) (defendant who presented false, fictitious, or fraudulent claims for tax refunds).
2. Defendant's Electronic Returns Qualify as “Any Claim.”
Defendant advances a technical challenge against the applicability of the FCA to his conduct, claiming that because he was sloppy in his submission of paperwork to make these claims for refund to the IRS, the requests for refunds did not really constitute a claim for monies to be refunded. He makes this claim notwithstanding the fact that he was seeking to have the IRS pay these monies to the banks lending the money and the fact that his claim to the IRS was sufficient to cause banks to issue refund checks in reliance on the refund checks that they expected to be forthcoming from the IRS. (Supplemental Br. [125] at 32–39.) Specifically, defendant argues: (1) that the claims were not properly executed pursuant to IRS regulations, as the electronic portions of Form 1040 do not qualify as returns because they did not include a signed form 8453 and (2) that his customers did not sign their returns, so the IRS could not have regarded those forms as having been properly filed. (Id.)
The Court finds these arguments to be without merit. The 107 returns that Govereh filed with the IRS, which were received by the IRS, were indeed “fraudulent attempts to cause the government to pay out sums of money,” regardless of whether the paperwork was submitted properly. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. at 233. Given the breadth with which the FCA is to be construed, defendant cannot escape criminal responsibility based on this professed technicality. Accordingly, defendant's returns constitute claims under the FCA.
Indeed, given the laxness with which the IRS and other federal agencies often issue benefit checks to those who apply for them-even though a bit of due diligence from those agencies could often thwart readily discernable fraud on the American taxpayer-there are sound practical reasons behind the notion that the FCA should be applied broadly and should focus on the conduct and intent of the claimant, and not on any assumption that the agency will be able to ferret out any improper claim through its own internal procedures.
Similarly, the existence of internal Treasury Department regulations indicating that a return is not considered to have been filed unless certain prerequisites have been met by the filer does not exempt the defendant from culpability under the FCA, as the Government did not charge the defendant with the narrower offense of filing a false income tax return. 4.
B. There Was Sufficient Evidence at the Trial for a Reasonable Jury to Find the Defendant Guilty Beyond a Reasonable Doubt.
1. Standard for Rule 29
When determining whether to grant a post-trial motion for judgment of acquittal, the Court must determine “whether the evidence, examined in a light most favorable to the Government, was sufficient to support the jury's conclusion that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”United States v. Williams , 390 F.3d 1319, 1323–24 (11th Cir.2004) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, when determining sufficiency of the evidence, “[i]t is not necessary that the evidence exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence or be wholly inconsistent with every conclusion except that of guilt, provided a reasonable trier of fact could find that the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Young, 906 F.2d 615, 618 (11th Cir.1990) (citation omitted).
2. Sufficient Evidence Existed for Jury to Convict.
Both documentary evidence and testimony permitted a reasonable jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. First, the Government presented an extensive amount of documentary evidence, including 107 returns that listed defendant as the tax preparer, all of which were stored in a password-protected computer in his office. (Tr. [108] at 152–56, 206–13; Tr. [113] at 586–589; Tr. [114] at 874–67, 901.) Although defendant argues that no taxpayer actually saw him prepare the form (Supplemental Br. [125] at 40), the evidence supports an inference that he did so.
Second, numerous witnesses provided testimony that would permit a reasonable jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Eight witnesses testified that they gave defendant pertinent tax and personal information, defendant appeared to enter the information into the computer, and defendant told them he would call them when their checks arrived. (Tr. [108] at 263–64; Tr. [112] at 296–300, 305, 325–27, 345–47, 439–42; Tr. [113] at 485–87, 539–40, 550–54.) Defendant openly spoke with some of them about claiming false dependents on their returns so they could gain more money. (Tr. [108] at 266–68; Tr. [114] at 818–19, 832.) He never showed them their returns, but when their checks arrived, he told them to cash them immediately at the check-cashing business next door, and then return with his fees. (Tr. [108] at 270–73; Tr. [112] at 329–32, 352, 444–446; Tr. [113] at 489–93.) Kenndric Roberts (“Roberts”), who worked for the defendant at the latter's tax preparer office, testified that defendant took credit for preparing Roberts' taxes in January 2007 and that defendant prepared and filed all his customers' returns from his desktop computer. (Tr. [114] at 804–06.) Roberts testified that Govereh told him that he made most of his money selling phony dependents. (Id. at 806, 818–19.)
Roberts' testimony alone would have been sufficient for the jury to convict him. See United States v. Le-Quire, 943 F.2d 1554, 1562 (11th Cir.1991) (uncorroborated testimony of accomplice is sufficient to support a conviction). The jury also could have convicted based on the testimony of Raymond White, Jr., who testified that defendant showed White the computer monitor screen on which defendant entered White's information on tax software. (Tr. [113] at 551–54, 578.)See United States v. Hernandez , 433 F.3d 1328, 1334 (11th Cir.2005) (a jury is free to believe a thoroughly cross-examined witness).
Therefore, sufficient evidence was presented to allow the jury to convict.
3. Defendant's Testimony.
Defendant's brief appears to rely greatly on Govereh's testimony that he did not file the tax returns. However, a jury is free to reject a defendant's testimony and instead believe the prosecution's witnesses. United States v. Siegelman, 561 F.3d 1215, 1235 (11th Cir.2009) (finding that reviewing courts must respect a jury's credibility determinations);Hernandez , 433 F.3d at 1334 (a jury can disbelieve a defendant's defense and instead believe thoroughly cross-examined witnesses). The Court cannot substitute its own credibility determinations for the jury's. See Siegelman, 561 F.3d at 1219 (because a jury verdict commands respect, a reviewing court cannot substitute its credibility determinations for the jury's).
Therefore, defendant cannot use his testimony as a basis for acquittal when a jury can properly arrive at its verdict based on the prosecution witnesses or the jury's disbelief of the defendant's own testimony. Accordingly, defendant's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal [98] is DENIED.
II. Motion for New Trial
Defendant moves for a new trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 because of: (1) insufficiency of the evidence; (2) undue prejudice from 404(b) evidence; (3) undue prejudice from non-TETR tax violations; (4) constructive amendment and variance; (5) the potential viewing of defendant in handcuffs by some jurors; (6) jury misconduct; (7) new evidence; (8) denial of certain jury instructions; and (9) improper closing argument. (Supplemental Br. [125] at 49.)
A. The Evidence is Sufficient to Support the Verdict.
Defendant again attacks the sufficiency of the evidence pursuant to Rule 33. Motions for a new trial based on insufficient evidence are “not favored” and should be granted only in “exceptional cases” where the evidence so weighs against the verdict “that it would be a miscarriage of justice to let the verdict stand.” Hernandez, 433 F.3d at 1336–37 (internal citations omitted).
Defendant restates his attacks on the evidence, and they fail here for the same reason they failed in his Motion for Judgment of Acquittal [98]. See, e.g., Hernandez, 433 F.3d at 1336–37 (court properly denied Rule 33 motion when jury chose to believe prosecution's witnesses, and not the defense).
B. Undue Prejudice from 404(b) Evidence
Defendant claims that the Court should not have admitted his Florida fraud conviction in the prosecution's case-in-chief as Rule 404(b) evidence. At the outset, the Court notes that the brevity of defendant's argument on this matter-the supplemental memorandum devotes less than three pages to this issue-does not convey the amount of attention “and time that this Court devoted to the question whether the ample Rule 404(b) evidence against defendant should be admitted. The matter occupied a substantial part of the discussion during the pretrial conference, which has not been transcribed. In addition, this matter created frequent interruptions during the trial at which times the Court continued to hear arguments from defendant in opposition to the admission of this evidence. See, e.g., Tr. [112] at 453–470; Tr. [[113] at 580–596; Tr. [114] at 849–869, 886). At each juncture, the Court deferred admission of any of this evidence until it could be certain that the evidence was necessary for the matters on which the Government sought its admission. Indeed, while the Court admitted the Florida conviction as Rule 404(b) evidence, it disallowed admission of the Michigan convictions during the Government's case-in-chief on Rule 403 grounds. 5.
1. Florida Conviction
On May 4, 2006, defendant pleaded guilty in Florida to executing a scheme to defraud customers of a gas station where he worked by stealing and using their credit card and drivers' license numbers. (Tr. [114] at 889–98.) Hismodus operandi was to tell customers that they could not use their credit cards at the pumping station, but that instead they had to go inside and show the defendant their cards and their driver's licenses. Armed with that information, the defendant was then able to use these credit cards to purchase airline tickets and other merchandise.
The Court determined that this conviction was more probative than prejudicial and permitted the Government to prove the conviction pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). (Tr. [112] at 458–60; Tr. [113] at 581–82; Tr. [114] at 850–57, 868–69, 886–900; Tr. [115] at 1094–96; 1132–34.)
The abuse of discretion standard applies to a review of a district court's admission of Rule 404(b) evidence.United States v. Calderon , 127 F.3d 1314, 1331 (11th Cir.1997). Defendant has not met its burden of proving that the Court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence. (Supplemental Br. [125] at 51–54.)
Rule 404(b) allows the introduction of evidence of other acts of the accused that are: (1) relevant to an issue other than the defendant's character and (2) established by sufficient proof to permit a jury finding that the defendant committed the extrinsic act; and (3) the probative value must not be outweighed by prejudice. FED.R.EVID. 404(b) 6.;United States v. Dickerson , 248 F.3d 1036, 1046–47 (11th Cir.2001) (finding evidence of defendant's drug activity two years prior admissible because of similarity and relevance of acts).
There was no question that the defendant committed the act: he had pled guilty to the crime in Florida. Second, willfulness was an element in the case and it appeared apparent that defendant would, as he ultimately did, contend that whatever acts he took, he did so with no intent to defraud anyone and that any acts that violated the law were done as a result of an honest mistake. That is, it was defendant's position that whatever acts he did were at the behest of someone else, more knowledgeable than he concerning tax law.
Moreover, while the facts underlying an extrinsic act do not have to be identical to the facts of the underlying crime, as long as both reveal a similar intent by the defendant, in this case there were substantial similarities to the conduct in question and to the state of mind of the defendant revealed by that conduct. That is, in Florida, the defendant obtained personal information from customers and then used that information to obtain money for the defendant from a third-party. Here, the defendant obtained the client's relevant tax information, then, unbeknownst to them, added false information about telephone tax expenses, without their permission, to the tax returns that he was preparing: again, with the motivation to have ill-gotten monies paid to the defendant. In both cases, the customers were on the hook for monies paid, in part, to the defendant. In the gas station incident, the customers were billed for merchandise that they never bought. In the false claims case here, clients were left holding the bag for the entire loan that the defendant had obtained for them using false information, even though the clients had not received the entire proceeds of that loan. In short, in both cases, the defendant filed false claims for payment, purportedly on behalf of an unwitting third party.
Finally, as noted above, defendant's defense was to portray himself as a dupe, used by others in his office who were actually the perpetrators and masterminds of this scheme. Any unfair prejudice deriving from this evidence-and the Court concludes that there was no unfair prejudice-clearly did not outweigh its probative value. 7.Accordingly, the admission of this Florida conviction does not entitle the defendant to a new trial.
2. Michigan Conviction
Defendant was also convicted of the felony offenses of passing bad checks drawn on non-existent companies in Michigan in June 2003 and May 2004. (Tr. [115] at 1096–99.) As noted, the Court had concluded that this was appropriate Rule 404(b) evidence, but did not admit it during the Government's case because of Rule 403 concerns. Once the defendant took the stand in the trial, however, the Government was entitled to impeach him with this conviction, and the Court so permitted.See United States v. Vigliatura , 878 F.2d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir.1989) (when a defendant testifies, “he places his credibility in issue” and allows the prosecution to impeach him) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The Court permitted the Government to impeach defendant during his testimony with these fraudulent check convictions, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(1), which provides that “evidence that an accused has been convicted of a [felony] shall be admitted ... if the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused.” FED.R.EVID. 609(a)(1).
Again, the Court determined that the probative value of the bad check convictions outweighed their prejudicial effect. First, courts allow evidence as probative when a defendant attacks the credibility of the prosecution's witnesses. United States v. Pritchard, 973 F.2d 905, 909 (11th Cir.1992) (defendant's criminal history has “special significance” when he attacks the credibility of the prosecution's witness with prior convictions); United States v. Harris, 720 F.2d 1259, 1263 (11th Cir.1983) (defendant's prior conviction was admissible for impeachment when he attacked the credibility of the prosecution's witness). Through his testimony and the cross-examination by his counsel of witnesses, defendant was challenging the credibility of the prosecution's witnesses, suggesting that Roberts and the customers were conspiring to put him in prison. He also attacked several of them with evidence of prior convictions. (Tr. [108] at 280–84; Tr. [112] at 339–40; Tr. [113] at 610; Tr. [114] at 830–37, 841–43; Tr. [115] at 1094.) Not to allow those convictions would allow defendant “to appear pristine while at the same time he vigorously” was attacking the credibility of the witnesses against him.Harris, 720 F.2d at 1263. Further, as noted, it was a close call, anyway, not to allow the Government to admit this evidence during its case-in-chief.
These Michigan convictions were felonies, but would also have been admissible even if they were misdemeanors because “forgery goes to truthfulness.” (Tr. [114] at 1004). Therefore, these convictions were admissible as a matter of law under Rule 609(a)(2) because all crimes of dishonesty or false statements can be admitted without any balancing tests.See Kane , 944 F.2d at 1413 (misdemeanor bad check conviction found to be admissible under Rule 609(a)(2));Rogers , 853 F.2d at 252 (under Rule 609(a)(2), district court has no discretion to prevent the impeachment of a witness with a prior conviction for a false statement).
C. Undue Prejudice from Non-TETR Tax Violations
Defendant also protests the court's admitting testimony concerning other false information, besides the charged false telephone tax claims, that the defendant included on some of the tax returns that he prepared and caused to be filed. Specifically, the Government offered evidence that the defendant also included false information about the amount of wages, the number of dependents, and the existence of education expenses on his customers' returns. Defendant further complains that the Government introduced evidence that the defendant charged fees higher than his banks suggested and that he required additional cash payments from his customers for certain acts, such as “selling” false dependants. (Supplemental Br. [125] at 54.)
The Federal Rules of Evidence mandate that “[e]vidence of criminal activity other than the offense charged is not extrinsic under Rule 404(b) if it is: (1) an uncharged offense which arose out of the same transaction or series of transactions as the charged offense, (2) necessary to complete the story of the crime, or (3) inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged offense.”United States v. Veltmann , 6 F.3d 1483, 1498 (11th Cir.1993) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Richardson, 532 F.3d 1279, 1386–87 (11th Cir.2008) (court found evidence of defendant's background admissible to show how he became involved with drug dealing).
In this case, the challenged evidence met all three of the above factors. The evidence unquestionably arose out of the same series of transactions: tax preparation. It was necessary to complete the story of the crime and was inextricably intertwined with the charged offense, as it showed how Govereh operated and how he gained money for his scheme. See United States v. Smith, 122 F.3d 1355, 1359–60 (11th Cir.1997) (court admitted evidence that defendant's companion robbed a bank three hours after the charged robbery because it was inextricably intertwined with the charged robbery); United States v. Tampas, 493 F.3d 1291, 1301–02 (11th Cir.2007) (when the defendant embezzled money from a YMCA, Court found evidence that YMCA had not paid taxes was admissible because it showed source of cash for defendant's scheme and was evidence of defendant's knowledge of and access to the funds).
Additionally, the Court twice gave cautionary instructions regarding the proper use of evidence concerning Govereh's excessive fees. (Tr. [112] at 427–28; Tr. [115] at 1214–15.) For all the above reasons, admission of the above inextricably intertwined evidence does not entitle the defendant to a new trial.
D. Constructive Amendment and Variance
Defendant claims that his rights were violated by a constructive amendment of the indictment and a variance in the evidence.
1. Constructive Amendment
A constructive amendment to an indictment occurs when the essential elements of the charged offense are altered to broaden the possible bases for conviction. Tampas, 493 F.3d at 1301. See United States v. Keller, 916 F.2d 628, 637 (11th Cir.1990) (finding constructive amendment when court instructed jury it could find defendant guilty of conspiracy if he made an illegal agreement with anyone, not just the person in the indictment).
The indictment stated that defendant knew that the returns he filed were false because “claims for income tax refunds in the monetary amounts listed below [ ] were made with the knowledge that such claims were false, fictitious and fraudulent in that taxpayers were not entitled to the [TETR] credits set forth.” (Indictment [1] at 1–2.) However, the indictment does not allege that the TETR claims were the only fraudulent claims in the returns. (Indictment [1] at 1–2.) The information in the indictment did not state the only essential elements of the offense, but merely elaborated on some of the essential elements. See Tampas, 493 F.3d at 1301 (no constructive amendment when language in indictment merely elaborates on essential elements);United States v. Ward , 486 F.3d 1212, 1226–27 (11th Cir.2007) (surplusage does not constructively amend an indictment). Moreover, the additional evidence was properly admitted as being inextricably intertwined with the facts underlying the offense conduct.
Therefore, there was no constructive amendment of the indictment.
2. Variance
Defendant also claims that he suffered a material variance because evidence was presented about other violations than the TETR credit. A material variance occurs when the facts proved at trial deviate from the facts charged in the indictment.Ward , 486 F.3d at 1226. A variance requires reversal only if a defendant shows that it was material and substantially prejudiced his rights. Id.
Defendant has not shown a variance because the indictment did not limit defendant's fraud to the TETR claims,see supra. Furthermore, he did not show that the evidence prevented him from presenting a defense because of unfair surprise or that the jury was confused. See Richardson, 532 F.3d at 1287 (no material variance when defendant failed to show unfair surprise or inability to present a defense); United States v. Flynt, 15 F.3d 1002, 1006 (11th Cir.1994) (no material variance when indictment charged defendant with receiving payments from other party, and evidence showed he received payments from other party's company). Finally, the above evidence was either proper Rule 404(b) evidence or inextricably intertwined with the evidence concerning defendant's offense.
E. The Viewing of Defendant in Handcuffs
Defendant argues that a new trial is necessary because several jurors may have momentarily seen the defendant brought into the courtroom in handcuffs. (Supplemental Br. [125] at 60.) Unfortunately, although this matter was discussed at a couple of different points during the trial, defendant has not assisted the Court by providing citations to the transcript. Accordingly, it has been necessary for the Court to conduct its own time-consuming search throughout the various volumes of the transcript to try to find any references to the matter. 8.
The transcript reveals that, because the Court's own prisoner elevator was broken, a deputy marshal brought the defendant up through another judge's elevator and had the defendant cross in front of the courtroom before coming inside. This occurred during a lunch break during voir dire. While the marshal believed that the jurors were not in a position to see the defendant, because they had been placed behind a wall partition that did not permit them to view the entry to this Court's courtroom, unfortunately, as many as 10 of the 40 prospective jurors were in a position where they might have been able to see the defendant. Thus, at most, these 10 jurors, who may not have even been selected to serve on the jury, may have momentarily glimpsed the defendant handcuffed. (Vol. 1 at 17–31.)
The Court denied the defendant's motion for a mistrial, concluding that such a momentary glimpse of the defendant did not warrant a mistrial. (Vol. 2 at 35–44.) As the Court noted at the time, a defendant is potentially prejudiced when he is seen by a jury in handcuffs or shackles because the jury may infer that the defendant is dangerous, given the conditions of his detention. Further, the repeated observation of a defendant in shackles or handcuffs could serve to dehumanize the defendant before the jury. As to the first concern, however, the Court explained that most jurors assume that a defendant is in custody because he has been accused of a crime, and not because he is necessarily dangerous. Indeed, in this case, the jury properly learned, through a stipulation agreed to by the defendant, that the defendant had remained in custody since the date of his arrest. As to any “dehumanization,” the Court noted that the defendant was sharply dressed in a nice suit and made an attractive and sophisticated appearance. A juror's momentary glimpse of him in handcuffs could not have been unduly prejudicial.
Defendant claims, however, that his presumption of innocence was nullified by the possible momentary, chance sighting of him in handcuffs. Numerous cases state that a defendant “is not necessarily prejudiced by a brief or incidental viewing by the jury of the defendant in handcuffs.” Gates v. Zant, 863 F.2d 1492, 1501 (11th Cir.1989) (listing cases);see also United States v. Maclean , No. 06-14298, 2007 WL 1593246 [99 AFTR 2d 2007-3088], at 6 (11th Cir. June 4, 2007) (denying motion for mistrial when jurors saw defendant in handcuffs because any suggestion of prejudice was “completely speculative”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Allen v. Montgomery, 728 F.2d 1409, 1414 (11th Cir.1984) (“the necessity of courtroom security sometimes outweighs a defendant's right to stand before the jury untainted by physical reminders of his status as accused”). Defendant would have to “make some showing of actual prejudice” to argue for a new trial, and he cannot. Gates, 863 F.2d at 1501.
Finally, and most importantly, defendant's claim that he was prejudiced during voir dire because some jurors may have momentarily seen him in handcuffs was later mooted by defendant's own trial stipulation that he had been in custody since the time of his arrest in February 2007. Defendant sought this stipulation because the Government indicated that, otherwise, it would seek admission of evidence to show that the defendant was in fugitive status as to his immigration release at the time of his fraud and of his arrest. (Tr. [112] at 461–67.) Clearly, with this stipulation, the jury was properly aware that the defendant was in custody, and any prior momentary glimpse of the defendant in handcuffs would be consistent with that awareness. Therefore, the Court concludes that defendant's request for a new trial on this ground also fails.
F. Possible Jury Misconduct
Following the rendering of the jury's verdict on the morning of January 16, 2008, juror Tameka Braswell wrote an e-mail to defendant's attorney shortly before midnight that evening, stating that she had some doubts about her verdict. (Letter [98-2].) She stated that she was not sure about the charge because she did not think the instructions properly stated what the jury was charged with determining. (See id. at 1.) She criticized what she believed to be the faulty analysis of her fellow pan el members. She noted her opinion that the trial was swayed by “racially (sic) bias” although it was not racist. Id. She inquired why certain witnesses were not called to testify. Ultimately, notwithstanding her concerns about whether the prosecution had properly shouldered its burden of proof, however, she indicated her belief that the defendant was guilty, albeit a scapegoat. (“I don't think that the defendant is innocent; I do believe that he was the scapegoat.” (Id. at 2.)
The Court reads Ms. Braswell's email as expressing some regret that she had voted to convict the defendant and some pity for the defendant's fate. Such an emotion is not uncommon with some jurors after they have rendered their verdict. Voting to convict another person can create a heavy burden for some jurors; a second-guessing of one's decision is not an uncommon reaction in these situations. Defendant attempts to extrapolate from Ms. Braswell's email, however, the possibility of racial bias by the jury or of their use of extrinsic information. The Court concludes that defendant's assertions constitute nothing more than speculation, unsupported by Ms. Braswell's email.
In assessing a claim of jury misconduct, it is important to note the firmly established common law rule prohibiting the use of juror testimony to impeach a verdict. Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 117 (1987). Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) states that when inquiring into the validity of a verdict, a juror cannot “testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict ... or concerning the juror's mental processes.” FED.R.EVID. 606(b). This rule “protect[s] jurors from postverdict investigation” and “endless attack.”Siegelman , 561 F.3d at 1241 (harmless error for jurors to be exposed to media reports).
The only exception is if: (1) “extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention,” (2) “any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror,” or (3) “there was a mistake in entering the verdict onto the verdict form.” United States v. Benally, 560 F.3d 1151, 1153 (10th Cir.2009). Braswell's email provides no evidence to support the applicability of any of these exceptions.
Defendant argues first that racial bias may have infected the jury's deliberation, based on Ms. Braswell's vague speculation that the jury might have been “definitely swayed, racially bias (sic) (although not racist). It is difficult to discern the distinction that Ms. Braswell is attempting to make between being swayed by racial bias, but not being racist. At any rate, Ms. Braswell never offers any specific statements that a juror may have made to suggest racial bias. She only “thinks” that this may have been the case. Such speculation by Ms. Braswell does not constitute evidence of actual racial bias. Moreover, the Court's notes regarding jury selection indicate that one-third of the “jury (four jurors) were black. The verdict was necessarily unanimous. For all of the above reasons, defendant has failed to show that racial bias played a role in the jury's verdict.
Defendant also contends that jurors “may have consulted [ ] extrinsic sources prior to the jury's return of its verdict.” (Supplemental Br. [125] at 68.) Because jurors are presumed to be impartial, Siegelman, 561 F.3d at 1237, defendant must overcome this presumption with evidence. Ms. Braswell's email does not indicate that jurors received extrinsic information during the trial.
Defendant bases its speculation that jurors may have looked at extrinsic evidence on Ms. Braswell's reference, presumably derived from an internet search, to a news item that showed a photograph of one of defendant's putative co-conspirators sitting behind a computer. Ms. Braswell made mention of this picture in the section of her letter that was “not meant to question (defense counsel's) expertise,” but nevertheless subtly offered, in bullet point, some suggestions as to how defense counsel could have strengthened his case. Thus, in addition to inquiring why “Tauya, Kendra, Rasheeda, Kalia, etc.” were not brought in as witnesses, Ms. Braswell also asked: “Could the picture of Tauya in the CBS interview, behind the computer be used in this case? Or the article that state that Tauya fired him and claimed to be the president of the company.” Presumably, Ms. Braswell felt that the photograph and admission by Tauya could have benefitted the defendant, had it been elicited at trial.
Ms. Braswell goes on, in her bullet points, to opine that defendant's intent was established solely on the fact that the defendant had previously engaged in fraudulent activities and wonders what the other jurors would have done had they known about defendant's other criminal charges “if they hadn't already.”
From the above random opinions and criticism of the verdict (on which she had agreed) by Ms. Braswell, defendant wonders whether other jurors may have inserted Mr. Govereh's name into an internet search during the trial and discovered the above article. Yet, Ms. Braswell said nothing of the kind. Had her fellow jurors discussed an internet search or discussed facts that had not been admitted into evidence, one can safely assume that Ms. Braswell would have disclosed that in her email, as she was attempting to mount criticisms of the deliberative process of her fellow jurors.
Second, defendant speculates whether Ms. Braswell, herself, might have performed the internet research that yielded the above-described information during the trial, as opposed to the twelve-hour period of time following the announcement of the verdict and Ms. Braswell's email to counsel. Again, Ms. Braswell does not indicate that she conducted any internet research during the course of the trial. Indeed, this Court always very forcefully instructs the jurors at the beginning of a trial, and repeats the instruction each evening before recessing, that jurors are absolutely forbidden from conducting internet research or any other independent inquiry into the subject matter of the case while the trial is ongoing. The Court followed that practice in this case. See Tr. [107] at 15–16; Tr. [108] at 286–87; Tr. [112] at 452; Tr. [113] at 744; Tr. [114] at 995–96; Tr. [115] at 1229. A more reasonable inference is that, still mulling over the verdict and evidence, Ms. Braswell did internet research following the conclusion of the case. Accordingly, absent some statement by Ms. Braswell indicating that she received extraneous information during the trial, the presumption against such an inference remains.
Moreover, there is no indication that Ms. Braswell construed the information in this article as being prejudicial to the defendant. Indeed, she references exculpatory material in the article that she wishes defense counsel had focused on: that is, the photograph of a co-conspirator sitting behind the computer in the office and the fact that Tauya had fired the defendant and that Tauya claimed to be the president of the company. (Defendant had testified and his counsel had argued that others, including Tauya Muteke, who was the supposed ringleader, were responsible for the fraudulent tax filings). Ms. Braswell clearly viewed such information as being helpful to the defendant because she questioned why defense counsel had not used it.
She does question whether the Government had proved defendant's fraudulent intent, noting that it had been “established solely on his (Tony) ability to execute credit card fraud and write bad checks (I couldn't image (sic) what they would have done had they known the other charges, if they hadn't already).” Presumably, the article indicated the existence of criminal charges against the defendant, in addition to those already disclosed to the jury. Ms. Braswell does not set out what those other charges were. At any rate, she poohpoohs the significance of other criminal charges and makes clear her belief that any prior criminal conduct by the defendant did not establish his intent in this case. In short, Ms. Braswell does not indicate that she received extraneous information during the trial and, further, she makes clear that she does not believe that the information to which she referred in her email caused her to believe that the Government had proven its case. Indeed, as noted, Ms. Braswell expressed her belief that parts of the news item were exculpatory.
In short, the Court concludes that juror Braswell's email does not provide sufficient reason to question the fairness of the deliberation process or to grant a new trial.
G. New Evidence
Defendant states that he is entitled to a new trial based on newly-discovered evidence: specifically, a photograph that Braswell sent him that shows someone else sitting at the computer that was used to file the fraudulent returns. (Supplemental Br. [125] at 68.) Apparently, this was the same photograph to which Ms. Braswell referred in her email to defense counsel.
To obtain a new trial based on new evidence, a defendant must show that the new evidence is (1) “discovered after trial”; (2) “not merely cumulative or impeaching,” (3) “material,” and (4) “of such a nature that a new trial would probably produce a different result”; and (5) “the defendant exercised due care to discover the evidence.”United States v. Thompson , 422 F.3d 1285, 1294 (11th Cir.2005). The failure of any of these elements is fatal to the motion. Id.
While the Court will assume that this new “evidence” was discovered after trial, defendant has failed to show that the evidence was material, that it would likely have produced a different verdict had it been admitted, or that the defendant exercised due care to discover the evidence. First, the Court cannot conclude that this photograph is material or that it would have changed the jury's verdict. Evidence already established that defendant did not have exclusive control over the computer in the office. Roberts had testified that he also used the computer. (Tr. [114] at 807–09, 838.)
Further, it appears clear, from a reading of the internet article referenced by defendant and containing the photograph in question, that the photograph was taken during the interview by the reporter of Tauya Muteke. This is obvious because the reporter is in the photograph with Mr. Muteke. As this photograph was taken after the defendant's arrest, when the proverbial jig was up, it is not clear how Muteke's presence near the computer would shed any light on the defendant's earlier use of that computer to effect his fraud. In short, the Court concludes that admission of this evidence would not have affected the outcome of trial. Cf., United States v. Bornscheuer, 563 F.3d 1228, 1236 (11th Cir.2009) (affirming district court's denial of new trial because newly discovered evidence was merely cumulative and would not have affected the outcome); United States v. Chung, No. 08-10500, 008-14118, 08-14447, 2009 WL 1279128, at 4 (11th Cir. May 11, 2009) (denying motion for new trial because newly discovered evidence was immaterial).
Finally, and decisively, defendant has failed to show that he exercised due care to discover this evidence. Defendant, through his counsel, could have readily inserted the words “Govereh” and “tax” into an internet search engine, and readily discovered the photograph.
For all the above reasons, the Court concludes that defendant has failed to show that a new trial is warranted based on the discovery of new evidence.
H. Jury Instructions
Defendant argues that the Court erred in failing to give his proposed jury instructions concerning: (1) reliance on a misrepresentation by a government official, (2) good faith misunderstanding of the law, and (3) reliance on a tax preparer. (Supplemental Br. [125] at 71–73.)
Defendant's two-page argument on this point does not convey the extent of the discussion between the Court and counsel concerning defendant's late requests on these issues.See discussion at Tr. [115] at 1123–24, 1126–42, 1144–53.) Nor does defendant accurately note that the Court gave the gist of some of what the defendant sought, albeit not in the precise words requested. Moreover, in choosing to give the instructions that it ultimately gave, the Court accorded the defendant great leeway, as the defendant had failed to establish a factual predicate for any of these instructions.
Finally, defendant's requests on these charges was untimely. As it always does, the Court set a deadline prior to trial for the submission of proposed requests to charge. Although defense counsel was aware that the Court would be preparing jury instructions over the weekend following recess of the proceedings on Friday evening, on Monday morning, after the close of his case and shortly before the jury was to return to hear closing argument, defense counsel submitted the new instructions that are now at issue. (Tr. [115] at 1123–24.)
1. Reliance on Misrepresentation by Government Official
Defendant argues that the Court should have instructed the jury that defendant's actual and reasonable reliance upon a misrepresentation on a point of law by a Government official is a defense to the charged offense. (Tr. [115] at 1126.) Defendant contended that he believed that another employee at this tax preparation office, Kendra Robertson, worked for the IRS and it is she who defendant offers as the Government official on whom he relied.
In requesting this instruction, defendant was apparently relying on an “entrapment-by-estoppel” defense. This defense arises when “a government official incorrectly informs a defendant that certain conduct is legal, the defendant believes the government official and is then prosecuted for acting in conformity with the official's advice. United States v. Johnson, 139 F.3d 1359, 1365 (11th Cir.1998). To assert this defense to a federal crime, the official in question must have been a federal official. United States v. Funches, 135 F.3d 1405, 1407 (11th Cir.1998). Further, “[t]his defense is a narrow exception to the general rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse and is based on fundamental fairness concerns of the Due Process Clause.The focus of the inquiry is on the conduct of the Government not the intent of the accused. ” United States v. Spires, 79 F.3d 464, 466 (emphasis added). Finally, the defendant must actually rely on a point of law misrepresented by the federal official, and this reliance must be objectively reasonable. United States v. Eaton, 179 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir.1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Defendant did not present evidence entitling him to an instruction embodying an entrapment-by-estoppel defense. The first requirement for the defense is that the advice in question be given by a federal official. There is no evidence that Kendra Robertson was an IRS employee. Defendant's only basis for this assertion is that someone in the office told him that she was an employee and that she had confirmed that information. Even assuming that someone had so informed the defendant, that information does not prove that Robertson was, in fact, employed by the federal government. Thus, on this record, there is no evidence that Robertson was a Government official. 9.
Moreover, as noted, it does not matter that defendant may have claimed that he believed Robertson was a Government agent. As noted supra, the focus of the inquiry is on the conduct of the Government, not the intent of the defendant.
Second, it was never the defendant's contention that he had innocently filed returns that exaggerated the telephone excise taxes of clients based on the erroneous advice of Robertson. Indeed, to the contrary, it was defendant's testimony that he never filed returns claiming false excise tax credits. It was defendant's consistent story that others in the office-usually Kendra, but never the defendant-prepared and filed these returns.See, e.g., Tr. [114] at 984, Tr. [115] at 1013–1014, 1026, 1031, 1058–59, 1068–75, 1107. As it was defendant's testimony that he was not involved in the claiming of any telephone excise credits for clients, it is therefore impossible that he would have been relying on the opinion of anyone for actions he never took. 10.
Third, had defendant actually prepared tax returns containing false TETR credits and had he received specific advice from someone else in the office that it was okay to falsify this information, his reliance on any such advice would not have been objectively reasonable. This case charged the knowing submission of a false claim to the Government. It is difficult to understand how one could reasonably rely on the representation of a co-worker that it is proper to lie on a return.
Finally, as discussed infra, although the defendant was not entitled to a good faith charge, the Court nevertheless did instruct the jury that “a good-faith misunderstanding of the law or a goodfaith belief that one is not violating the law therefore negates willfulness.” (Tr. [115] at 1220.) That instruction gave the defendant room to argue that he relied on the advice of others and gave the jury authority to acquit the defendant if it concluded that he had done so.
In short, defendant failed to establish a factual predicate for an entrapment-by-estoppel defense, and the Court properly declined to give defendant's requested instruction
2. Good Faith Instruction
Defendant states that the Court did not instruct the jury about good faith. On the contrary, as noted, the Court did instruct the jury that “[a] good faith misunderstanding of the law or a good faith belief that one is not violating the law therefore negates willfulness.” (Tr. [115] at 1146–55, 1220.) Further, the Court gave this good faith instruction, although the defendant had failed to lay a factual predicate for it. See discussion at Tr. [115] at 1123–24, 1126–30, 1146–53. Although the Court did not use defendant's exact proposed language, its instruction covered the substance of the request.
3. Reliance on Tax Preparer
Though defendant testified that he did not prepare returns, he wanted an instruction for an alternate defense, unsupported by any evidence, that if the jury found he had prepared forms, it should consider, as a defense, his reliance on a tax preparer. (Supplemental Br. [125] at 72.) This instruction was presented at the eleventh hour, right before closing, by the defendant pro se. The Court deemed it to be untimely. (Tr. [115] at 1140). 11.
Moreover, on the merits, the requested instruction was not remotely apt. The proposed instruction addresses the defense of a tax filer who has provided accurate information to a tax preparer and who relies, in good faith, on the work of that preparer. This defense is intended for an individual filer who has been charged with filing a false return. Defendant has offered no authority that a tax preparer can invoke the defense of reliance on another tax preparer. (Reply [136] at 34.)
Furthermore, defendant was not entitled to this defense because he offered no specific testimony as to what information he had provided the preparer for a particular return and whether that information represented a complete disclosure of the relevant information. See United States v. Williams, 573 F.2d 284, 292 n.7 (5th Cir.1978) (defense requires showing of good faith reliance on a professional tax preparer, disclosure of all relevant facts, and no reason to believe the return was false) 12.; McGraw v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 384 F.3d 965, 972–73 [94 AFTR 2d 2004-6095] (8th Cir.2004) (same).
Taking defendant's testimony in the best light, he merely provided assistance to others who actually prepared the returns. Again, his defense was that he did not prepare or file the tax returns in question. To the extent that his “alternative” defense was that, even if he did file, or assist in the filing of these returns, 13. he did so, thinking that the actual tax preparers had done their work correctly, the Court's other instructions informed the jury that the defendant must have acted knowingly and willfully and further that if the defendant had a good faith belief that he was acting lawfully, then this would constitute a defense to the charge. The instructions given conveyed the gist of what defendant sought in his inapt and confusing tax preparer instruction.
I. Prosecutor's Comments on Flight and the Evidence
Defendant claims that the prosecutor should not have commented on defendant's flight from arrest and that the cumulative effect of the prosecutor's comments tainted the trial.
1. Flight
Defendant argues that the prosecutor violated the Constitution by commenting, in his closing argument, on defendant's silence at the time of his arrest. (Supplemental Br. [125] at 73–75.) The Government contends that the comment was directed toward defendant's attempted flight when officers attempted to arrest him.
Defendant was arrested on February 15, 2007, after he saw agents searching his business and then sped away in his car, despite their orders not to. (Tr. [108] at 164–71.) Defendant's position, throughout his testimony, had been that during most of the time that he was working at the Icon office, he was unaware that false returns were being prepared, but that by the time of the arrest, he was beginning to have some concerns. (Tr. [115] at 1107–11.) The prosecutor's remark in closing focused on the inconsistency between defendant's exculpatory testimony and this flight. (Id. at 1170–71.)
The prosecutor first anticipated that defense counsel would repeat remarks that the latter had made in his opening statement to the effect that it is inconceivable that the defendant would commit such a substantial tax fraud and leave a paper trail with his name connected. The prosecutor argued that the defendant never expected that he would be caught by federal authorities before he had a chance to disappear. 14. (Id.)
The prosecutor then noted:
And you know that he knew exactly what he was doing, because when Special Agent Horton's colleagues showed up at the Norcross location wearing their blue and gold windbreakers, having badges appear, having jackets that said federal police, the defendant didn't come forward and say, oh, I've been dying to tell you some things about this business. I'd really like to cooperate with you about what's going on here associated with Kendra, associated with Tauya Muteke, associated with everybody else that is committing this fraud.
What the did the defendant do? He didn't stop. He didn't get out of the car. He didn't raise up his hands and say I really need to talk to you. He tried to take off....
(Id. at 1171.)
At the outset, the Court notes that defendant's claim will be reviewed on appeal only for plain error, as defendant did not object to the prosecutor's remarks, nor did he ask for curative instructions. FED.R.EVID. 103(d) (court can “tak[e] notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to the attention of the court”). The plain error exception should be “used sparingly, solely in those circumstances in which a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result.” United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). The remarks must be viewed in the context of the entire trial, id. at 12, 16, and “improper comments during closing argument rarely rise to the level of reversible error.” United States v. Wilson, 985 F.2d 348, 353 [71 AFTR 2d 93-1016] (7th Cir.1993).
Had defense counsel considered this remark to be unfairly prejudicial, he should have asked for a curative instruction. Likely, however, defense counsel purposely and prudently decided not to object, because an objection would probably have precipitated an unhelpful instruction to the jury. Specifically, the Court would have told jurors that while a defendant has no obligation to answer an agent's questions, the jury could nonetheless consider defendant's attempted flight as a possible acknowledgment of some guilt.
Moreover, this case does not present the “miscarriage of justice” addressed in Young, 470 U.S. at 15. Indeed, in considering the defendant's current claim, one must consider the legal framework in which such a claim may properly be made. Defendant is apparently relying on Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), and the line of cases that follow it. In Doyle, the Supreme Court held that, where a defendant in custody has been given his Mirandawarnings, he has been implicitly assured that his silence will carry no penalty. Therefore, a prosecutor's comment at trial on that silence, as being inconsistent with a later-told exculpatory account, constitutes something akin to bait-and-switch, and is not permitted.
In this case, there was no testimony concerning whether or not the defendant had been silent following the giving ofMiranda warnings, nor did the prosecutor make any such comment. Rather, the prosecutor was pointing out the defendant's attempted flight prior to his arrest, and noting that this flight was inconsistent with defendant's exculpatory accounts of his conduct during his testimony.
It is undisputed that flight from arrest may be considered as evidence of guilt. United States v. Williams, 541 F.3d 1087, 1089 (11th Cir.2008); United States v. Wright, 392 F.3d 1269, 1277–78 (11th Cir.2004). To be sure, flight typically involves silence on the part of a suspect, as a fleeing defendant usually has little inclination or time to engage in conversation with the police. Here, the prosecutor mentioned briefly this flight and noted its inconsistency with the exculpatory version of events recounted by the defendant at trial. The Court does not view the prosecutor's isolated comment as being violative of the Doyle line of cases.
Therefore, the Court concludes that this comment by the prosecutor does not entitle the defendant to a new trial.
2. Cumulative Effect
Defendant also claims that other comments made by the prosecutor during summation and rebuttal were improper and denied the defendant a fair trial. Again, because defendant did not object at the time of the comments, this claim is reviewed only for plain error.
The Court concludes that none of these remarks rendered defendant's trial unfair nor necessitate a new trial.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, defendant's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal [99] and Motion for New Trial [99] are DENIED.
So ORDERED.
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1.
Although the prosecution could have potentially charged Govereh with 107 counts, apparently out of considerations of efficiency and a desire not to extend trial time unnecessarily, it chose to prosecute him on only 20 counts.
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2.
Govereh also sometimes offered to “sell” his clients dependents. (Tr. [108] at 266–68; Tr. [114] at 818–19, 832.) That is, defendant would use the names and social security numbers of dependents of other individuals and affix these to the returns of clients in order to increase those client's refunds. The clients would be charged an additional fee for this service.
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3.
Taxpayers were able to claim credit for telephone excise taxes paid between February 2003 and August 2006. (Tr. [108] at 103–05.) The standard tax credit for TETR ranged from $30 to $60, which would have yielded, at most, total credits in the amount of $6420. Govereh's 107 forms, however, listed TETR credit amounts totaling approximately $469,000. (Id. at 102–03; Tr. [114] at 910.)
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4.
The defendant has filed a pro se Reply Brief [138]. As defendant has counsel, the Court has not considered his Reply Brief. Indeed, defendant has previously caused himself some problems by his habit of filing pleadings and sending letters to the Court. For example, at trial, the Government wanted to introduce a letter that the defendant had sent to the Court making clear the defendant's extensive knowledge of tax law and the process for filing refunds. Such evidence was probative, as it impeached the defendant's protestation to the jury that he was unschooled in tax law.
Albeit these letters constituted persuasive admissions of knowledge of tax law by the defendant, the Court did not consider it appropriate, on Rule 403 grounds, to allow the Government to introduce letters from the defendant to this Court. Nonetheless, the Court cautioned the defendant to stop sending such communications to the Court. (Tr. [114] at 865–68).
Further, even were this Court willing to consider defendant's pro se brief, he has introduced a new argument in that brief concerning the inapplicability of the FCA where a false income tax return has been filed. As a preliminary matter, when a party introduces a new argument in a reply brief, the Court may either strike it or permit the non-moving party additional time to respond to the new argument.Int'l Telecomms. Exch. Corp. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp. , 892 F.Supp. 1520, 1531 (N.D.Ga.1995). The Court in this case strikes this argument. See, e.g., United States v. Ga. Dep't of Natural Res., 897 F.Supp. 1464, 1471 (N.D.Ga.1995) (striking arguments raised for first time in reply brief).
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5.
When the defendant testified, however, the Court did permit the Government to impeach him with these felony convictions. Further, as the Michigan convictions were also properly admitted under Rule 404(b), once they had been revealed during cross-examination, the Court permitted the jury to consider them both for the purposes addressed by that Rule, as well as for impeachment purposes.
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6.
Rule 404(b) provides that “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” FED.R.EVID. 404(b).
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7.
This conviction would also have been admissible as impeaching evidence once the defendant testified, under Rule 609(a)(2), as a crime of dishonesty or a false statement that can be admitted without any balancing tests.See United States v. Kane, 944 F.2d 1406, 1413 (7th Cir.1991) (misdemeanor bad check conviction found to be admissible under Rule 609(a)(2)); United States v. Rogers, 853 F.2d 249, 252 [62 AFTR 2d 88-5340] (4th Cir.1988) (same);United States v. Toney , 615 F.2d 277, 279–80 (5th Cir.1980) (under Rule 609(a)(2), district court has no discretion to prevent the impeachment of a witness with a prior conviction for a false statement).
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8.
The defendant did not order that part of the transcript that would have reflected a conference in chambers when defense counsel first became aware of the matter. The Court has therefore been able to rely on those parts of the transcript provided, but believes that these parts of the record cited herein provide most, if not all, of the pertinent information.
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9.
As the Court noted at the time, defendant had ample time to seek discovery “as to whether Ms. Roberts worked for the IRS. (Tr. [115] at 1126–27.) That he did not do so undermines his present claim that he believed Ms. Roberts to have worked for the IRS.
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10.
It is true that defendant testified that he did obtain specific advice from Tauya and Robertson that it was okay to sell dependents to a client. That is, defendant claimed that these individuals told him that a tax preparer could take a legitimate dependent from someone else and, for a fee, let a client use that dependent's social security number and name on the client's own return to get a dependent credit.See, e.g., Tr. [115] at 1040–1048. Although the defendant never put such dependents on anyone's tax return-again, given his position that he did not prepare tax returns-he did collect money from the clients for this sale. (Id. at 1047–48.) In addition, while the false dependent claims were introduced as inextricably intertwined evidence, defendant was not charged with filing false claims regarding dependents. He was charged with filing false claims regarding the telephone excise tax credits.
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11.
Defense counsel marked this request and asked that it be made part of the record. The docket entry [91] inaccurately reflects this request as a proposed instruction by the Government: understandably so, as the instruction's caption is: “Government Proposed Jury Inst. No. 371.” Yet, this was apparently an instruction that the defendant had obtained from another source and this document was the defendant's own request for an instruction as to reliance on a tax preparer.
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12.
This case is binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit; see Bonner, 661 F.2d at 1207.
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13.
The defendant's alternative defenses are somewhat reminiscent of the much-parodied defense of an accusation that a defendant's dog had bitten the plaintiff. That defense was: “I don't own a dog. If I did own a dog, he didn't bite you. And if he bit you, you provoked him.” Here, defendant's position is that he never prepared or filed any returns. If he had done so, however, he would not have known that any information contained therein was false. But, if he had known that the information was a lie, that would also be okay, because other people in the office told him that it was alright to put false information on tax returns.
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14.
Although the jury was not informed, the defendant was on fugitive status from ICE authorities, as he had failed to report in Michigan, as required by the terms of his release on asylum status. As noted, after absconding from Michigan, the defendant had gone to Florida, where he was convicted of a fraud crime, and was in Georgia, involved in the fraudulent tax scheme on trial, at the time of his arrest.

Labels:

Wednesday, January 20, 2010

WELLS FARGO & COMPANY AND SUBSIDIARIES v. U.S., Cite as 105 AFTR 2d 2010-XXXX, 01/08/2010
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WELLS FARGO & COMPANY AND SUBSIDIARIES, Plaintiff, v. THE UNITED STATES, Defendant.
Case Information:
Code Sec(s):
Court Name: In the United States Court of Federal Claims,
Docket No.: No. 06-628T,
Date Decided: 01/08/2010.
Disposition:
HEADNOTE
.
OPINION
In the United States Court of Federal Claims,
OPINION AND ORDER
Judge: WHEELER, Judge.
In this tax refund suit, Plaintiff Wells Fargo & Company (“Wells Fargo”) claims $115,174,203.00 in depreciation, interest and transaction cost deductions for the tax year 2002. The deductions stem from Wells Fargo's participation in 26 leveraged lease transactions, seventeen with domestic transit agencies, and nine involving qualified technological equipment (“QTE”). Although the tax treatment of all 26 transactions is at issue in this case, the parties limited their trial presentation to five agreed transactions, allowing the Court's ruling on these five to guide the resolution of the remainder. Of the five trial transactions, four involve public transit agencies, and one is a QTE lease involving cellular telecommunications equipment. The four transit lessees are: the New Jersey Transit Corporation (“NJT”), the State of California Department of Transportation (“Caltrans”), the Metropolitan Transit Authority of Harris County, Texas (“Houston Metro”), and the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (“WMATA”). The lessee in the QTE lease is a Belgian entity, Belgacom Mobile, S.A. (“Belgacom”).
The leveraged leases in this case sometimes are referred to as “SILO” (“sale in/lease out”) tax shelters, where a tax-exempt entity such as a public transit agency transfers tax benefits for a fee to a United States taxpayer such as Wells Fargo. The transactions involve depreciable assets such as rail cars, locomotives, or buses in the transit leases, or telecommunications equipment in the Belgacom lease. The documentation for each transaction is extensive, but the objective is for the taxpayer, Wells Fargo, to take advantage of significant tax deductions acquired from tax-exempt entities to offset taxable income and thereby reduce overall tax liability to the United States.
In assessing Wells Fargo's claimed deductions, the Court must examine the “substance over form” doctrine to determine whether Wells Fargo acquired a depreciable ownership interest in the property, and whether Wells Fargo bears the property's burdens and benefits. In simplest terms, the agreements comprising a SILO transaction are set up to suggest that a “sale” of property has taken place, that the property has been “leased back” to the original owner, and that a “loan” has been created to finance the transaction. Defendant contends that the “substance” of the transactions merely is a transfer of tax benefits to avoid federal taxes. The Court also must examine whether the circular flow of loan proceeds in these transactions creates any allowable interest deductions. Part of this inquiry is to determine whether any genuine indebtedness has occurred, and whether the loaned funds actually were available for use by Wells Fargo to finance the “sale.” A third inquiry is whether there is any economic substance to these transactions, other than the transfer of tax benefits, that would warrant depreciation and transaction cost deductions under the Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”) §§ 167 and 168, or interest deductions under IRC § 163. 1
The Court conducted a 20-day trial in Washington, D.C. during April 6 through May 1, 2009. The Court heard the testimony of 33 witnesses, thirteen of whom were experts. The fact witnesses included representatives from Wells Fargo and each of the four transit agencies, as well as appraisers and consultants who participated in, or assisted in arranging, the transactions. The expert witnesses testified in the areas of finance, economics, accounting, leveraged leases, and transit industry practices. The Court also heard fact and expert testimony on the Belgacom transaction. The evidentiary record consists of 5,150 pages of trial transcript, and 1,157 documentary exhibits. The parties submitted post-trial briefs on August 3, 2009, and reply briefs on September 17, 2009. The Court heard closing arguments on October 22, 2009. The Court allowed the parties to submit supplemental briefs on November 13, 2009 addressing new case law issued since the post-trial reply briefs.
Other courts have considered the tax treatment of SILO transactions, or the similar “LILO” (“lease in/lease out”) transactions and, with one exception, have concluded that the taxpayer who participated in the transaction is not entitled to any of the claimed tax benefits. AWG Leasing Trust v. United States, 592 F.Supp.2d 953 [101 AFTR 2d 2008-2397] (N.D. Ohio 2008); BB&T Corp. v. United States, 2007 WL 37798 [99 AFTR 2d 2007-376], at 1 (M.D.N.C., Jan. 4, 2007), aff'd, 523 F.3d 461 [101 AFTR 2d 2008-1933] (4th Cir. 2008). Two of the SILO and LILO cases have been tried to juries, and in both of those cases, the jury returned a verdict disallowing the tax deductions. Altria Group, Inc. v. United States, No. 1:06-cv-09430, 2009 WL 874207, at 1 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2009); Fifth Third Bancorp & Subs. v. United States, No. 1:05-cv-350 (S.D. Ohio, April 18, 2008). The one exception to date is Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. v. United States, No. 06-305T, 2009 WL 3418533 [104 AFTR 2d 2009-6966], at 1 (Fed. Cl. Oct. 21, 2009) (Horn, J.), where our Court concluded after lengthy analysis that a LILO transaction had legitimate business purposes, and allowed the claimed tax deductions. The Court rightly observed in Consolidated Edison that each transaction “must be evaluated on its own merits.” Id.
Another SILO tax shelter case, although not a tax refund suit, is Hoosier Energy Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. John Hancock Life Insurance Company, 588 F.Supp.2d 919 (S.D. Ind. 2008), aff'd 582 F.3d 721 (7th Cir. 2009). This case arose from the 2007–2008 economic downturn, where one of the insurance entities in the transaction, Ambac Assurance Corporation, had its credit rating reduced. The lessor, John Hancock, exercised its right to demand that Hoosier Energy find a replacement for Ambac, even though Ambac had not missed any payments. The case involves Hoosier Energy's request for injunctive relief to maintain the status quo while Hoosier Energy seeks a replacement for Ambac. In granting injunctive relief, the district court described the SILO transaction as a “blatantly abusive tax shelter” that is “rotten to the core.” 588 F.Supp.2d at 921, 928. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's grant of injunctive relief, but clarified that the agreements comprising the SILO transaction were legally enforceable under New York law, even if not an approved tax shelter under the Internal Revenue Code. The Court of Appeals gave Hoosier Energy until the end of 2009, approximately 3-1/2 months, to find a replacement for Ambac. 582 F.3d at 730.
The Court has reviewed carefully the applicable case law and all of the evidence of record. In brief summary, the Court finds that Wells Fargo is not entitled to the claimed tax deductions on the five trial transactions. The SILO transactions did not grant to Wells Fargo the burdens and benefits of property ownership. The transactions lack economic substance, and were intended only to reduce Wells Fargo's federal taxes by millions of dollars. Although well disguised in a sea of paper and complexity, the SILO transactions essentially amount to Wells Fargo's purchase of tax benefits for a fee from a tax-exempt entity that cannot use the deductions. The transactions are designed to minimize risk and assure a desired outcome to Wells Fargo, regardless of how the value of the property may fluctuate during the term of the transactions. Indeed, nothing of any substance changes in the tax-exempt entity's operation and ownership of the assets. The only money that changes hands is Wells Fargo's up-front fee to the tax-exempt entity, and Wells Fargo's payments to those who have participated in or created the intricate agreements. The equity and debt “loop” transactions simply are offsetting accounting entries not involving actual payments, or pools of money eventually returned to the original holder. If the Court were to approve of these SILO schemes, the big losers would be the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”), deprived of millions in taxes rightfully due from a financial giant, and the taxpaying public, forced to bear the burden of the taxes avoided by Wells Fargo.
On the issue of economic substance, the Court has considered whether there is any likelihood of profit from the five trial transactions, aside from the tax benefits. In each transaction, the parties employed equity and debt “defeasance accounts,” which are types of escrow accounts intended to minimize the risks of non-payment. During the lease-back period, a return is generated from the equity defeasance account investments. The value of the equity defeasance account is expected to grow so that the tax-exempt entity can exercise the buy-out option at the end of the lease-back period without using any of its own funds. However, the equity defeasance account return is more than offset by the other costs of the transaction, including Wells Fargo's cost of funds to engage in the transaction. The end result is that the trial transactions produce an overall loss without the tax benefits, and no rational person would engage in these transactions absent the tax benefits. This conclusion is borne out by Wells Fargo's cessation of SILO transactions after the IRS began disallowing SILO tax deductions. Moreover, the profitable portion of the transactions could be realized simply by investing in the same portfolio as the equity defeasance account. The only reason to create the elaborate array of agreements comprising a SILO transaction is for Wells Fargo to obtain the tax benefits at minimal risk, and with complete assurance of the desired long-term outcome.
The SILO transactions here are offensive to the Court on many levels. A cadre of company executives, in concert with teams of well known legal and accounting firms and other consultants, regularly constructed and participated in these tax schemes for Wells Fargo, apparently blind to professional standards of care. Representatives from the Federal Transit Administration (“FTA”) encouraged transit agencies to participate in SILO transactions as a way to raise additional funds, without seriously considering the probable adverse tax treatment of the transactions. Even when the IRS issued a 1999 Revenue Ruling disallowing tax deductions from LILO transactions, 2 the participants continued on with only slight adjustments to create the SILO transactions. The Court has little sympathy for those who have lost out as a result of this decision.
The Court will set a conference with counsel during the next 45 days to determine whether any further proceedings are necessary to address the remaining 21 transactions at issue in this case. With respect to the five trial transactions, and for the reasons explained in more detail below, the Court finds for Defendant. If the parties agree that additional proceedings are not needed for the other 21 transactions, the Court will direct the Clerk to enter final judgment for Defendant, and to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint with prejudice. Further action by the Court therefore must await guidance from the parties.
I. Findings of Fact 3
A. Overview of SILO Transactions
In a SILO transaction, a United States taxpayer such as Wells Fargo enters into various agreements with an entity that is not subject to federal income tax, and with financing institutions. The agreements are described as “leases,” “subleases,” and “loans,” among others, but they are all part of a single, integrated “sale in, lease out” transaction. One witness described the agreements as a “stack [that] was almost a foot high.” (Britton, Tr. 1228.) 4 In the package of agreements, each part is precisely interwoven with, and dependent upon, the others. The substance of the SILO transaction can be seen only from the entire package of agreements, not from examining the individual agreements separately. A “participation agreement” defines all of the participants and documents comprising the overall SILO transaction. (Johnson, Tr. 1650.) Each of the five trial transactions employed a participation agreement. (PX903, NJT; PX1076, Caltrans; PX1319, Houston Metro; PX1515, WMATA; PX678, Belgacom.)
When considered as a whole, the SILO transaction is designed to provide the taxpayer, Wells Fargo, with: (1) a purported basis to claim large depreciation deductions as the alleged owner of rail cars, locomotives, buses, or other capital assets; and (2) interest expense deductions based upon non-recourse “loop debt” arranged with a financing institution. “Rental” payments and “interest” payments are not actually made among the SILO participants, but are recorded as offsetting accounting entries at the affiliated entities managing the debt accounts.
The tax-exempt entity already has acquired and owns the capital assets used for a SILO transaction. Thus, financing the tax-exempt entity's acquisition of the capital assets is not one of the transaction's objectives. (Lys, Tr. 4567; DX701 at 20240.) The tax-exempt entity continues to hold legal title to the capital assets, and is responsible for the operation and maintenance of the assets. (DX701 at 20240.) Nevertheless, the taxpayer claims that ownership of the assets for tax purposes has shifted to it pursuant to one of the leases, and that it is incurring interest expense on a non-recourse loan. The tax benefits acquired by the taxpayer did not previously hold any value, because the tax-exempt entity does not pay federal income taxes, and cannot use the deductions. The right to claim the deductions has value only in the hands of a taxpaying entity. The tax-exempt entity receives an up-front payment from the taxpayer as consideration for the transfer of the tax benefits. (McCalley, Tr. 672–73; Pohl, Tr. 927–30.) The up-front payment, often expressed as a percentage of the transaction size, provides the incentive for the tax-exempt entity to participate in the transaction. (McCalley, Tr. 633, 672–74; Webb, Tr. 1002–03; Britton, Tr. 1206; DX329 at 623–26; PX808 at 7636.)
The tax-exempt entity has the right to terminate the SILO transaction at a future date through exercise of a “purchase option.” However, the tax-exempt entity does not actually contribute any of its own money to pay the purchase option price. Instead, “equity funds” from the taxpayer are set aside at the inception of the transaction, invested in securities in a collateral account, and then later used to fund the purchase option price. In this way, equity funds advanced by the taxpayer at the outset ultimately are returned to it. The tax-exempt entity pays nothing to exercise the purchase option.
The following hypothetical diagram shows the “Equity Loop” and “Debt Loop” segments of a SILO transaction. The Debt Loop side shows an $8.00 non-recourse loan that passes through the tax-exempt entity on the closing date, and is deposited in an account with an affiliate of the lender. On the Equity Loop side, the taxpayer makes a $2.00 payment to the tax-exempt entity on the closing date, of which the tax-exempt entity keeps $0.50 as its incentive fee for transferring the tax benefits to the taxpayer. The remaining $1.50 is deposited in an account with another affiliate of the lender, to be invested for later funding of the purchase option.
B. The Components and Mechanics of a SILO Transaction
In a typical SILO transaction, the taxpayer, Wells Fargo, purports to lease capital assets from a tax-exempt entity under an agreement called a “head lease.” The length of the head lease is set to be longer than the remaining economic useful life of the assets, so the taxpayer can assert that the head lease should be treated as a sale for federal tax purposes and claim depreciation deductions as the purported new owner. (D. Ellis, Tr. 2623, 2629; Pohl, Tr. 900.) The tax-exempt entity concurrently enters into another agreement, usually called a “sublease,” where it purports to lease the assets back from the taxpayer for a shorter period of time than the head lease. After executing these documents, the tax-exempt entity continues to use the assets, just as it did before the SILO transaction. The tax-exempt entity retains all maintenance, insurance, and other obligations associated with ownership of the property.
As payment of the “head lease rent,” the taxpayer makes a single payment to the tax-exempt entity at closing. The funds for the head lease rent come from two sources: (1) the proceeds of a purported non-recourse loan, called the “debt funds;” and (2) a cash payment from the taxpayer, called the “equity funds.” The tax-exempt entity, however, does not retain the head lease payment. All of the debt funds are paid immediately to an affiliate of the lender, called a “debt payment undertaker,” as part of a debt defeasance arrangement. “Defeasance” is a means of reducing risk on a debt by having a third party hold the necessary funds or securities and make payments when due during the course of a transaction. See Charles J. Woelfel, The Fitzroy Dearborn Encyclopedia of Banking & Finance, 285 (10th ed. 1994); (Rupprecht, Tr. 155–56; Grossman, Tr. 2013.) The debt payment undertaker then is obligated to make the tax-exempt entity's “rent payments” on the sublease to the taxpayer. The rent payments, however, are not actually made to the taxpayer, but are made instead to the lender (the debt payment undertaker's affiliate), to satisfy the taxpayer's debt service obligations on the non-recourse loan.
The debt service obligations on the non-recourse loan are set to match, in timing and amount, the tax-exempt entity's rent payments under the sublease. (DX701 at 20241.) Thus, the debt funds given to the debt payment undertaker are sufficient to satisfy both the tax-exempt entity's sublease rental obligations and the taxpayer's debt service obligations throughout the sublease, without any additional payments by either the taxpayer or the tax-exempt entity. Id. In this loop debt structure, the debt funds flow in a circle from the lender, to the taxpayer, to the tax-exempt entity, and then back to an affiliate of the lender, all in accordance with terms agreed to by the parties at the closing of the SILO transaction. (Whitman, Tr. 1380–82, 1385; Lys, Tr. 4575–76.) The taxpayer, however, claims interest deductions for tax purposes throughout the sublease term.
Like the debt funds, most of the equity funds contributed by the taxpayer, and nominally paid to the tax-exempt party as part of the head lease payment, are immediately paid as a fee to the “equity payment undertaker” at closing, as part of an equity defeasance arrangement. (Whitman, Tr. 1382–83.) The remaining portion of the equity funds is retained by the tax-exempt entity as its inducement fee for entering into the SILO transaction. (Lys, Tr. 4567–68.) The funds paid to the equity payment undertaker typically are invested in government bonds or other high-grade debt securities, and are referred to as the “equity collateral.” As with the debt defeasance arrangement, the tax-exempt entity does not have access to these funds during the term of the sublease. At the end of the sublease, when the tax-exempt entity can exercise the “purchase option,” the funds held by the equity payment undertaker provide exactly the amount due from the tax-exempt entity to terminate the transaction.
The tax-exempt entity thus does not need to use any of its own funds to exercise the purchase option. The equity payment undertaker simply repays the taxpayer's equity funds with a predetermined return, in a second circular flow of funds. From the date of closing, the taxpayer claims to be the owner of the capital assets, with the right to assert depreciation deductions on its taxes, even though the tax-exempt entity continues to use and maintain the assets, just as it had done before the SILO transaction. (McCalley, Tr. 653.)
C. The Two Types of SILOs
1. Lease to Service Contract SILO Transactions
At the end of the sublease period, the tax-exempt entity has the unilateral right to exercise a pre-funded purchase option, and terminate the SILO transaction. In a “lease-to-service contract” SILO transaction, if the tax-exempt entity does not exercise its purchase option, the taxpayer then can select between one of two options: (1) it can require the tax-exempt entity to transfer the assets to the taxpayer, described as “the return option” in the transaction documents; or (2) it can require the tax-exempt entity to arrange a so-called service contract for the operation of the assets, described as “the service contract option.” (Shuman, Tr. 2378–79; Shinderman, Tr. 3753–55.)
If the tax-exempt entity does not exercise the purchase option, and the taxpayer then elects the service contract option, the tax-exempt entity becomes obligated to arrange for the service contract, many of the terms for which are specified in the SILO closing documents. If the taxpayer chooses, the tax-exempt entity also becomes obligated to locate an “operator” for the assets, which must be an entity other than the “service recipient,” the entity for whom the assets are operated. The tax-exempt entity typically is required to arrange for refinancing of the original non-recourse loan. (Lys, Tr. 4524.) Like the original loan, the refinancing loan must be non-recourse.
For the service contract option, the SILO documents specify the amount and timing of the payments, even though the beginning of the hypothetical service contract would not begin until at least twenty years in the future. These terms are set in advance so that the service contract will provide the necessary funds to repay any non-recourse refinancing loan, if one could be obtained, without the taxpayer having to contribute any of its own funds. The intent is for the taxpayer to receive its original equity contribution, along with the same or similar return that it would receive if the tax-exempt entity had exercised the purchase option. From the inception of the SILO transaction, the taxpayer is guaranteed to receive back its equity contribution with the specified return. The taxpayer also is insulated from any meaningful risk exposure associated with “ownership” of the assets.
Alternatively, if the taxpayer elects the return option, the tax-exempt entity likely would be required to find replacement equipment within an eleven or twelve-month period. Such a short period for this purpose would pose a significant challenge for transit agencies. The typical procurement cycle for new vehicles in the bus and rail industry ranges from two to six years, depending on the number of railcars or buses to be procured and the transit agencies' total fleet and operating needs. (Wilson, Tr. 4266–68; Salci, Tr. 3442–46, 3450–51; Britton, Tr. 1196; Weinman, Tr. 4121–29.) While the actual construction of new railcars, for example, could take approximately two years, the procurement process also would include substantial planning, engineering, and testing before acceptance and revenue operation could occur. This process would require a minimum of five years before new railcars could be placed into service. (Weinman, Tr. 4124–25.) The transit agencies thus would need to consider a possible new procurement well in advance of deciding whether to exercise the fixed purchase option. (Wilson, Tr. 3450–51; Salci, Tr. 4267–68.) If they decline the fixed purchase option, the transit agencies would not know whether Wells Fargo would elect the return option or the service contract option until eleven or twelve months prior to the termination date. Thus, the structure of the end of sublease choices strongly encourages the tax-exempt entity to exercise the fixed purchase option.
2. QTE SILO Transactions
A QTE SILO differs from a lease-to-service contract SILO in some respects. First, the tax-exempt entity's purchase option typically is earlier than the end of the sublease period, and is often called an “early buyout option” or “EBO.” Second, the taxpayer usually does not have the option to force the tax-exempt entity to enter into a service contract at the end of the sublease if the tax-exempt entity does not exercise the EBO. In general, the participants executed QTE SILOs before the SILO “industry” developed the service contract feature. Third, the QTE SILOs typically impose strict conditions on the tax-exempt entity if it declines the EBO and must transfer the equipment to the taxpayer. The so-called “return conditions” typically require the tax-exempt entity to return the equipment in “as new” condition, with the most recent hardware and software releases from the equipment manufacturer included. Due to these onerous conditions, the tax-exempt entity is motivated to exercise the EBO and terminate the SILO.
D. Safe-Harbor Leases and LILO Transactions — Predecessors to SILOs
In 1981, Congress enacted laws that permitted leasing transactions with tax-exempt entities, often referred to as “safe-harbor leasing rules.” See Economic Recovery Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981); see also Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, 97th Cong., General Explanation of the Revenue Provisions of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, at 45–62 (Dec. 31, 1982) (“TEFRA Bluebook”). Under the safe-harbor leasing rules, a transaction could qualify as a sale and lease-back for tax purposes if it met the safe-harbor criteria, regardless of whether the lessor could only obtain a profit on the transaction by taking tax benefits into account, and regardless of whether the lessor obtained the substantive benefits and burdens of ownership of the property as a result of the transaction. TEFRA Bluebook at 50–51. Safe-harbor leasing criteria permitted a sale-leaseback transaction even if it was nothing more than a “tax benefit transfer.” Id. at 51–52. Safe-harbor leases in many respects were similar to SILO transactions. The enactment of the safe-harbor leasing rules led to a proliferation of leasing transactions whose sole purpose was tax avoidance. Id.
Just one year later, in 1982, Congress shut down safe-harbor leasing transactions. Congress enacted laws that limited the tax benefits available for safe-harbor leases entered into between July 1, 1982 and January 1, 1984, and repealed the safe-harbor leasing rules thereafter. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982); TEFRA Bluebook at 54. Congress took this action because of “the tax avoidance opportunities that safe-harbor leasing had created,” and “adverse public reaction to the sale of tax benefits.” TEFRA Bluebook at 53.
In 1984, Congress enacted what is known as the “Pickle Rule.” By this rule, Congress intended to limit the tax benefits associated with leasing transactions involving tax-exempt entities by requiring the taxpayer to depreciate the value of the leased assets over a longer time period than otherwise would be required. Deficit Reduction Act, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (1984). The Pickle Rule required any leased tax-exempt property to be depreciated on a straight-line basis over an assigned asset class, or 125 percent of the lease term, whichever was longer. Deficit Reduction Act, § 31; Shinderman, Tr. 2781; DX704A at 7–8. Congress added IRC § 7701(e), which requires arrangements denominated as “service contracts” to be treated as leases if they are “properly treated” as such, and the arrangement meets other relevant factors. (DX704A at 8.)
After the repeal of safe-harbor leasing and the enactment of the Pickle Rule, some taxpaying entities sought ways to structure transactions that would allow the purchase of tax benefits from tax-exempt entities, but would not run afoul of the Pickle Rule. One of these was the LILO transaction.
The typical LILO transaction is similar to the SILO transaction, described above. The taxpayer purports to lease assets from a tax-exempt entity, and then immediately lease them back to the tax-exempt entity for a shorter period. See Rev. Rul. 2002-69; Maxim Shvedov, CRS Report of Congress: Tax Implications of SILOs, QTEs and Other Leasing Transactions with Tax Exempt Entities, pp. 8–9 (Nov. 30, 2004) (“CRS Report”). As in a SILO, the tax-exempt entity continues to use the property just as it did before the LILO transaction, and remains responsible for the maintenance and operation of the asset during the lease-back period. A portion of the head lease is prepaid, and is funded largely with a purported non-recourse loan that is defeased in a loop debt structure. The timing and amount of the tax-exempt entity's sublease rental payments and the taxpayer's debt service payments on the non-recourse loan match exactly, so neither party makes any out-of-pocket payments during the lease-back period.
Also, as in a SILO, the taxpayer makes an “equity investment” with its own funds, most of which is paid as an “equity undertaking fee” to an equity undertaker. The remainder is paid to the tax-exempt entity as its inducement fee for transferring the tax benefits. The funds paid to the equity undertaker are used to purchase securities that pay a fixed rate of return, which matches the amount needed for the tax-exempt entity to exercise the purchase option at the end of the sublease term.
There are two principal differences between LILO and SILO transactions. In a LILO tax shelter, the head lease term is structured to span less than 80 percent of the remaining useful life of the assets, so the taxpayer can assert the head lease isnot equivalent to a sale for tax purposes. See CRS Report at 12. Instead, the taxpayer claims to have a leasehold interest in the assets for tax purposes, and claims deductions for its purported rental obligations, not depreciation deductions associated with an ownership interest, thereby avoiding the Pickle Rule. The LILO transaction is structured so that the rental deductions are claimed more quickly than taxable income is realized on the sublease, thereby creating a tax benefit for the taxpayer.
The second difference between LILO and SILO transactions is the description of the options available to the taxpayer at the end of the lease-back period if the tax-exempt entity does not exercise the purchase option. In a LILO transaction, the taxpayer can (1) require the tax-exempt entity to surrender the assets to the taxpayer for its own use; (2) lease the assets to a third party (“the replacement lease option”); or (3) compel the tax-exempt entity to lease the property under a renewal lease. See Rev. Rul. 2002-69. If the taxpayer elects either of the latter two options, it would be obligated to make a second “deferred rent” payment at the end of the sublease period. Id. However, because of offsetting rents under the renewal or replacement lease, the taxpayer never needs its own funds to satisfy the deferred rent payment. Similar to the service contract option in a SILO transaction, the renewal and replacement lease options in a LILO transaction are structured so that the taxpayer obtains a return of its equity and has an expected after-tax return as if the tax-exempt entity had exercised the purchase option. See BB&T, 523 F.3d at 464–65 (LILO structured “in a way that essentially eliminates any risk of economic loss”).
E. Regulatory and Legislative Responses to LILO and SILO Transactions
In 1999, the Treasury Department issued amendments to IRC § 467 that effectively eliminated the market for LILO transactions. Under these amendments, the taxpayer in a LILO transaction had to treat the prepayment of the head lease rent as a loan for tax purposes, and the rental income as interest on that loan, thereby eliminating the tax benefit generated by the prepayment of the head lease. See Treas. Reg. § 1.467-4 (1999). Also in 1999, the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 1999-14, holding that taxpayers could not take rental payment or interest deductions in LILO transactions because they lack economic substance. Later, in Revenue Ruling 2002-69, the IRS held that LILO transactions did not satisfy the substance-over-form doctrine. See Rev. Rul. 2002-69. In light of these IRS actions, taxpayers and tax-exempt entities, including public transit agencies, stopped engaging in LILOs. (McCalley, Tr. 629; Pohl, Tr. 898–99; Webb, Tr. 1054–55; Whitman, Tr. 1342; D. Ellis, Tr. 2742; Shinderman, Tr. 3782; DX722, Schroeder Dep., at 39.)
These new rulings and regulations, however, did not end the attempts of taxpayers to create tax benefits from leases involving tax-exempt entities. The lawyers, promoters, and arrangers involved with LILOs next developed the SILO structure. (McCalley, Tr. 626–27, 630; Whitman, Tr. 1339; Hackett, Tr. 3569; Shinderman, Tr. 3783–84; DX722, Schroeder Dep., at 39–40.) Since the target of the new IRS provisions was the rental and interest payments involved in LILO transactions, the provisions did not apply to depreciation deductions derived from the taxpayer's purported ownership of assets in SILO transactions. The issuance of the final regulations under IRC § 467 led to the creation of SILO transactions with lease-to-service contract options. Under the Pickle Rule, the lease term over which the taxpayer must depreciate property does not include service contracts that satisfy the requirements of IRC § 7701(e). In a lease-to-service contract SILO, the taxpayer asserts that the service contract period tacked on at the end of the sublease is not included in the lease term for purposes of the Pickle Rule. On this basis, the taxpayer claims the depreciation deduction over a shorter time period, thus increasing its value to the taxpayer because of the time-value of money.
The promoters and arrangers proposed the SILO transaction to taxpayers and tax-exempt entities as a replacement to the LILO structure. (Webb, Tr. 999–1003; DX200; DX722, Schroeder Dep., at 33–35.) Arrangers, such as Allco Financial Corporation (“Allco”), typically were paid a percentage of the transaction size on a contingent fee basis. If the parties did not complete the transaction, the arrangers did not receive any payment. (Whitman, Tr. 1299–301, 1333–34; Hackett, Tr. 3577–79.)
The market for SILO transactions continued until 2004, when Congress enacted the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418 (2004) (“AJCA”), amending the IRC to eliminate the purported tax benefits associated with LILO and SILO transactions. See also IRS Notice 2005-13, 2005-1 C.B. 630. Congress made these Code amendments to “curtail[] the ability of a tax-exempt entity to transfer ... tax benefits to a taxable entity.” Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, 108th Congress, General Explanation of Tax Legislation Enacted in the 108th Congress, at 420 (May 2005). Congress was concerned that taxpayers were “attempting to circumvent” the Pickle Rule “through the creative use of service contracts with ... tax-exempt entities,” and were thereby frustrating the purpose of the Pickle Rule to “prevent tax-exempt entities from using leasing arrangements to transfer the tax benefits of accelerated depreciation on property they used to a taxable entity.” Id. Although the AJCA provisions relating to LILO and SILO transactions applied prospectively, the AJCA's legislative history states that the amendments to the Code were “not intended to affect the scope of any other present-law tax rules or doctrines applicable to purported leasing transactions,” and that “[n]o inference is intended regarding the appropriate present-law tax treatment of transactions entered into prior to the effective date.” H.R. No. 108-755 at 660 (2004).
The AJCA created an exemption for SILO transactions involving public transit agency purchases of transportation equipment using federal subsidies administered by the FTA, where the transit agency had submitted an application to the FTA, permitting the use of the federally subsidized transportation equipment in the SILO transaction. AJCA, § 849(b). The AJCA exemption applies to “qualified transportation property,” defined as property where an application: (1) had been submitted to the FTA after June 30, 2003 and before March 14, 2004; (2) had been approved by the FTA before January 1, 2006; and (3) included a description of and value of the property. Id. None of the public transit agency transactions at issue in this case fall within these established time frames.
F. Wells Fargo's Leasing History
Wells Fargo began in business in 1852 as a provider of stagecoach service, mail delivery, banking services, freight delivery, and passenger transportation. Over the years, Wells Fargo evolved into a diversified financial services company. In 1998, Norwest Corporation acquired Wells Fargo and changed its name to Wells Fargo & Company. After this merger, Wells Fargo continued Norwest's historical leasing business, which had existed since the 1970s. (Rupprecht, Tr. 79–80, 88–89.) Norwest's equipment finance company became known as Wells Fargo Equipment Finance, Inc., or “WFEFI.” (Rupprecht, Tr. 78.) In 2000, Wells Fargo acquired First Security Bank Corporation, which also had a leasing business. (Johnson, Tr. 1488–89.)
Wells Fargo has engaged in many leasing transactions, including leveraged leases, involving rail cars, buses, and a variety of other assets. In this respect, Wells Fargo is similar to other large banks that maintain significant leasing portfolios. See AWG, 592 F.Supp.2d at 962. For a short time, however, Wells Fargo engaged in the transactions at issue, which differed from those it had done previously, and from those it has done since. Wells Fargo still engages in traditional leveraged lease transactions. (Johnson, Tr. 1791.)
Following the enactment of the AJCA in 2004, Wells Fargo and others stopped entering into new leveraged lease-to-service contract transactions because the market for them ceased to exist. (McCalley, Tr. 632; Webb, Tr. 1063–64; Britton, Tr. 1204–05; Johnson, Tr. 1790–91.) Many of the LILO and SILO arrangers went out of business, or stopped promoting SILOs, after enactment of the AJCA. (Whitman, Tr. 1348–50; Hackett, Tr. 3573.) Wells Fargo had closed lease-to-service contract transactions in 2003 that involved buses, and which were approved by the IRS because of the AJCA exemption regarding FTA approval. These bus transactions were with the Chicago Transit Authority, PACE (a suburban bus service in Chicago), and AC Transit (a San Francisco-Oakland area bus service). (Johnson, Tr. 1528–29.)
For all of its leveraged lease transactions, Wells Fargo typically engaged in an extensive due diligence and approval process. The due diligence included a careful credit review by the Credit Department, and an equipment review by the Equipment Department. (Johnson, Tr. 1555–57; Grossman, Tr. 1985.) Wells Fargo employed the guidelines from a “Front End Guidance” document developed by Phyllis Grossman in evaluating whether to go forward with a proposed transaction. (Grossman, Tr. 1978–79; PX34; PX73; DX529.) Ms. Grossman was a Vice President of Norwest Equipment Finance, Inc. from 1990 to 1998, and was responsible for overseeing the leveraged lease portfolio. (Grossman, Tr. 1974–76.) She originated the Belgacom transaction. (Grossman, Tr. 1984–85.) The “Front End Guidance” document described requirements relating to lessee credit quality, equipment, service contracts, yield/return requirements, and concentration limitations. (PX34; PX73; PX451.) Wells Fargo's analysis always involved a tax capacity review, designed to assure that sufficient taxable revenue existed against which to offset the expected tax deductions from the transaction. (Rupprecht, Tr. 161–62; Grossman, Tr. 2046–47.)
Investors in leveraged leases such as Wells Fargo are motivated in part by the pattern of earnings available under accepted accounting procedures. (J. Ellis, Tr. 3113–16.) The Financial Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”) is responsible for promulgating accounting rules, known as Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”), pursuant to authorization from the Securities and Exchange Commission. (J. Ellis, Tr. 3082–83.) One of the accounting rules is FAS 13, Accounting for Leveraged Leases. (J. Ellis, Tr. 3083–3085; PX2.) FAS 13 contains criteria for determining whether a transaction qualifies as a leveraged lease. (PX1663A at 14–15; PX2.) If FAS 13 applies, the lessor is required to allocate its expected income from the transaction to the periods when it has a positive investment. (J. Ellis, Tr. 3112–14.) The pattern of earnings often is referred to as “frontloaded earnings.” (Shinderman, Tr. 3947–48.)
Under FAS 13, a leveraged lease has three separate phases of investment: (1) a positive investment phase in the early years when the investor's cumulative cash outflows exceed its inflows; (2) a negative investment phase when the cumulative cash flows exceed the cumulative cash outflows; and (3) a positive investment phase in the later years when cumulative cash flows again are positive. (PX1663A at 7; PDX 9, J. Ellis.) FAS 13 does not alter the total income attributed to the transaction, but simply changes the timing of the income under GAAP. (J. Ellis, Tr. 3130–32, 3143–44; PX1663A at 19; PDX 20, J. Ellis.)
G. Wells Fargo's Trial Transactions
All of the domestic transit SILOs differed from traditional leveraged leases by including a service contract option at the end of the sublease period. (Oram, Tr. 499–500; DX626 at 20088.) The transactions were unusual in providing the lessor, Wells Fargo, with a choice at the end of the sublease period to impose a service contract or any sort of forced renewal. Wells Fargo's representative testified that “[u]sually, all choices are given to the lessee.” (Oram, Tr. 554–55.)
The negative amortization, or interest roll-up, of the non-recourse debt in the SILO transaction also was an unusual feature that had the effect of increasing Wells Fargo's claimed interest deductions. (D. Ellis, Tr. 2724–25; Gould, Tr. 2892–93; DX626 at 20089.)
Wells Fargo made its equity investment in the five trial transactions through trusts. On behalf of Wells Fargo, each trust entered into various transaction agreements. (Johnson, Tr. 1650–51; Stip. 1.1.2, NJT; Stip. 1.2.2, Caltrans; Stip. 1.3.2, WMATA; Stip. 1.4.2, Houston Metro; Stip. 1.5.1.3, Belgacom.) The following are the names and dates of the Wells Fargo trusts for each trial transaction: (1) NJT — January 31, 2001 trust with State Street Bank (Stip. 1.1.2); (2) Caltrans — December 18, 2001 trust with State Street Bank (Stip. 1.2.2); (3) WMATA — September 10, 2002 trust with Wilmington Trust Company (Stip. 1.3.2); (4) Houston Metro — April 15, 2002 trust with Wells Fargo Bank Northwest (Stip. 1.4.2); and (5) Belgacom — December 19, 1997 trust with First Security Bank (Stip. 1.5.1.3). Wells Fargo reported each trust's income and expenses as its own.
Although SILOs were different from traditional leveraged leasing transactions, Wells Fargo nevertheless prepared credit approval presentations (“CAPs”) just as it did for other transactions. In these CAPs, Wells Fargo representatives described the transactions to obtain internal approval. A CAP exists for each of the five trial transactions. (DX44, Belgacom; PX1000, Caltrans; PX821, NJT; PX1229, Houston Metro; PX1430, WMATA.)
Each CAP identifies the parties involved, the arranger promoting the transaction, and describes the structure of the transaction. (See, e.g., PX1000 at 11247; PX821 at 35882.) In particular, the CAP summarizes the defeasance arrangements, the service contract option (or other options in Belgacom), the mechanisms in place to remove any risk, and the expected yield, with tax benefits, to Wells Fargo. For the transit SILOs, the transaction is described both in narrative and schematic form. For example, an exhibit to the Caltrans CAP depicts an overview of the transaction: Caltrans receives an “up-front benefit,” the nonrecourse loop debt amounts are immediately returned through the debt defeasance arrangement to the American International Group (“AIG”), and Wells Fargo's equity investment is placed in the equity defeasance arrangement, pledged to Wells Fargo, and then eventually returned to it. (PX1000 at 11306; see also PX821 at 35886, NJT; PX1229 at 252721, Houston Metro; PX1430 at 233394, WMATA; DX15 at 1299, Belgacom.)
After review, Wells Fargo executives approved the transactions by signing the CAP. Wells Fargo's tax department performed the final review, certifying that Wells Fargo had enough “tax capacity” to use the tax benefits it expected to claim from each transaction. (DX44 at 222361, Belgacom; PX1000 at 11249, Caltrans; PX821 at 35883, NJT; DX829 at 26162, Houston Metro; PX1430 at 233352, WMATA.) Having sufficient “tax capacity,” i.e., other taxable income against which to apply the expected depreciation and interest deductions, was a necessary condition for Wells Fargo to enter into each SILO transaction. (Rupprecht, Tr. 161–62; Johnson, Tr. 1892–93; Shinderman, Tr. 3811–13; PX73 at 43088; DX455.)
“Tax capacity” was important to Wells Fargo because the reduction in taxes, resulting from the depreciation and interest it intended to claim, provided the source of Wells Fargo's return on the transaction. (Rupprecht, Tr. 176–77.) In the Caltrans transaction, for example, the CAP states “the yield in this transaction is dependent upon Wells Fargo's ability to depreciate the equipment over 125% of the base Lease Term (33.75 years) using the Pickle method and to deduct the interest expense on the non-recourse debt.” (PX1000 at 11280.) According to the CAP, Wells Fargo expected a yield, including the tax benefits, of 11.45% in Caltrans. (PX1000 at 11246, 11280; Johnson, Tr. 1851.) Recognizing that tax benefits might be disallowed, however, Wells Fargo also calculated a return without tax benefits. According to the CAP, this return would be only 2.6%, which is less than Wells Fargo's cost of funds for the transaction. (PX1000 at 11280; Johnson, Tr. 1846–47, 1854.) Wells Fargo's reliance on tax benefits for the return also is present in each of the other trial transactions. (PX821 at 35881, 35912, NJT; PX1229 at 252648, 252681, Houston Metro; PX1430 at 233350, 233382, WMATA; DX44 at 222361, 222363, Belgacom.)
The SILO trial transactions were facilitated by so-called “arrangers,” such as Allco Finance, Capstar Partners LLC (“Capstar”), or ABN AMRO Bank Lease Advisory (Belgacom) (“ABN AMRO”), who worked on behalf of the tax-exempt entities. (McCalley, Tr. 624.) The arrangers identified the equipment owned by the tax-exempt entity that would be suitable for use in a SILO transaction. (McCalley, Tr. 591–92, 640–41; Whitman, Tr. 1271–73.) Using preliminary appraisals of value and remaining economic useful life, the arrangers estimated the tax benefits that could be generated from a SILO transaction. (McCalley, Tr. 640–41.) Once the arranger and the tax-exempt entity decided to go forward, the arranger began to solicit bids from prospective U.S. taxpayers to enter into a SILO transaction utilizing the identified equipment. (McCalley, Tr. 592; Whitman, Tr. 1274.) The arranger sometimes lined up the entities that would act as loop debt provider and equity payment undertaker, or solicited separate bids to fill these roles. (Whitman, Tr. 1353–55.) The competitive bids received from prospective equity investors contained specific information about the structure of the proposed SILO, including “pricing runs” that show the inducement fee to the tax-exempt entity.
Wells Fargo also retained its own “arrangers,” such as Trinity Advisors, Cornerstone Financial, Macquarie Corporate Finance, or Fleet Capital Leasing (“Fleet”), to provide assistance. Wells Fargo's arrangers developed the various schedules and numerical terms to be included in the SILOs, with a view to maximizing the “after tax yield” to Wells Fargo from the SILOs. The arrangers calculated the schedules and reports, called “ABC reports,” using a proprietary software program. (Whitman, Tr. 1366–67; Hackett, Tr. 3587.) The ABC reports took into account the value of the equipment, the term of the head lease, the closing date of the transaction, Wells Fargo's combined state and federal income tax rate, the interest rate on the non-recourse loan, and the rate of return on the equity collateral. Applying complex mathematical formulas, the ABC reports produced Wells Fargo's equity investment, the sublease rent schedules, the non-recourse loan repayment schedules, the loan amortization schedules, the purchase option price and payment schedule, the stipulated loss and termination value schedules, and the service contract basic fee schedule. (Whitman, Tr. 1372; Hackett, Tr. 3586–92.) In the transit SILOs, the arrangers used the software to assure that Wells Fargo's after-tax yield would be the same regardless of whether the fixed purchase option or the service contract option was selected.
As noted, all of the trial transactions employed a loop debt structure. A lender purportedly lends funds on a non-recourse basis to Wells Fargo, and on the closing date, the funds are paid to a debt payment undertaker, which in all cases is an affiliate of the lender. (Lynch, Tr. 3671–72.) The debt payment undertaker uses the funds to repay the non-recourse loan. The corporate parents whose affiliates served as lenders and debt payment undertakers were AIG, Financial Security Assurance (“FSA”), and Rabobank (for Belgacom). The debt defeasance structure permitted the loop debt providers to avoid having to include the nonrecourse loans on their balance sheets. The lenders and debt payment undertakers entered into arrangements that obviated the need for the debt payment undertaker to make actual payments to the lender.
For each transaction, Wells Fargo received an appraisal of the property that would be the subject of the SILO. (Rivello, Tr. 2137–39; PX717; PX842; PX1015; PX1255; PX1448.) As part of their promotion of the transactions, the arrangers typically hired the appraisers, before any taxpayer had committed to the transaction. In Caltrans and WMATA, for example, the arranger Allco retained Ernst & Young to appraise the railcars. (Whitman, Tr. 1298–1301; Rivello, Tr. 2170–71, 2201–02; PX983; PX1413.) If a transaction failed to close, Allco paid the appraiser's fees. If the transaction did close, Wells Fargo paid a fee to Allco, and a portion of this fee went to the appraiser. (Whitman, Tr. 1299–1301, 1403–04.)
The purported reason for the appraisal was to determine the “fair market value” of the property that would be subject to the SILO. In fact, however, the arrangers and appraisers worked together to increase the valuation of the SILO property, and thereby increase the “price” to be paid for the property. (McCalley, Tr. 643–44; Whitman, Tr. 1334–35.) Lessee advisors also worked to increase the property's appraised valuation. (Hackett, Tr. 3604–05.) The appraisals included “soft costs,” such as interest during a construction phase, managing the build process, and the creation of training manuals, among others. (Whitman, Tr. 1352–53; Rivello, Tr. 2204–06.) With all parties to the transaction working to inflate the property's value, since a higher value would result in the greatest benefit to all, there were no negotiations of terms as would occur in a typical sale of property. A higher value of the property benefitted all parties. (McCalley, Tr. 643–644; Webb, Tr. 1022–24.) Even though the appraiser was assessing the value of property owned by the tax-exempt entities, the appraisal report, with one exception, was not shared with them. (McCalley, Tr. 645–47, 688; Pohl, Tr. 911–12; Webb, Tr. 1024; Britton, Tr. 1213–14; Hackett, Tr. 3601.) WMATA received a brief summary of the fair market value and useful life of its property on the day of closing. (Pohl, Tr. 913–14; DX423.)
Donald Oram of Wells Fargo's Equipment Management Division reviewed the draft appraisals and related documents prior to closing. Mr. Oram recorded his conclusions about the appraisals in short memoranda or in the CAP. (PX822; PX999; PX1226; PX1426; DX44; Oram, Tr. 505–08.) Mr. Oram did not review the final appraisals before preparing his memoranda because they were unavailable. (Oram, Tr. 509–14.) Mr. Oram often thought the appraisers' valuations were too high. (Oram, Tr. 514–23; PX999; PX1226; DX223.) Nevertheless, Mr. Oram approved the appraisal for each trial transaction based upon the protections provided in the financial structure, not based on the value of the equipment. In the Caltrans SILO, for example, Mr. Oram wrote:
This transaction relies on structure, not collateral support, to mitigate our booked residual risk. This risk is effectively mitigated through the use of Service Contracts, Cash Defeasance accounts, and a requirement to purchase Residual Value Insurance.
(PX999 at 164632.) In his WMATA and Houston Metro memoranda, Mr. Oram explained that the service contract option and cash defeasance accounts provided “leverage” to Wells Fargo, and the means to ensure payment of its expected return. (PX1226 at 165085; PX1426 at 60831.)
Wells Fargo retained outside law firms, such as Winston & Strawn, King & Spalding, or Watson, Farley & Williams, as tax counsel in all of the SILO transactions. The law firms worked with Wells Fargo's arrangers to develop the particular SILO structures reflected in Wells Fargo's bids, and prepared the transactional documents, often using previous SILO deals as “precedent documentation.” The law firms also were involved in the generation of the appraisal reports and the “service contract opinion reports,” which addressed the commercial feasability of the service contract. (Rivello, Tr. 2199; Shuman, Tr. 2409–12.)
The parties stipulated to the documents comprising each of the five trial transactions. (Joint Stip., April 2, 2009.) Each of the SILOs included a participation agreement listing the operative documents, and providing that execution of all of the operative documents was a condition precedent to the transaction. (PX678, PX757, Belgacom; PX833–34, NJT; PX1076–77, Caltrans; PX1319–20, Houston Metro; PX1515, WMATA.)
H. Other SILO Characteristics
1. Tax-Exempt Entity's Use and Possession of the Assets
In each SILO transaction, the tax-exempt entity had acquired and was using the property before it entered into the transaction. (Pohl, Tr. 915; Webb, Tr. 989; Bronte, Tr. 1116–17; Britton, Tr. 1212; DX15 at 1294, 1304; DX44 at 222362.) The WMATA rail cars had been in operation for up to seventeen years prior to the SILO transaction. (Pohl, Tr. 915.) Despite the execution of the lease documents, the SILO transaction did not alter the tax-exempt entity's continuing use of the SILO property. Also, the transit agencies did not segregate or treat the SILO rail cars or buses any differently than their other equipment. (Pohl, Tr. 921–22; Webb, Tr. 985, 999; Bronte, Tr. 1119; Britton, Tr. 1219–20.) Caltrans, for example, has spent millions of dollars of its own money to overhaul the rail cars subject to the SILO transaction. (Bronte, Tr. 1121–23; DX252 at 54–56.) There is no evidence that the transit agencies entered into SILOs as a way to dispose of the rail cars or buses. The transit agencies needed their rail cars and buses at the time of entering into the SILO transactions, and they expected to continue using these assets in service. (Pohl, Tr. 921–22; Webb, Tr. 1071; Bronte, Tr. 1118; Britton, Tr. 1198.)
Similarly, Belgacom did not alter its use of the cellular telecommunications equipment in any way as a result of the SILO transaction. Just as before the SILO, Belgacom continued as the legal owner of the property, and claimed tax ownership and depreciation deductions under Belgian law. (DX186 at 002-03; DX703.) Thus, Wells Fargo and Belgacom were both claiming tax ownership and depreciation deductions in their respective countries for the same equipment.
2. Termination of the SILO Through a Pre-funded “Purchase Option”
Each SILO transaction, like a LILO, contains a mechanism for the tax-exempt entity to terminate the transaction, the pre-funded “purchase option.” In the transit SILOs, the “fixed purchase option” (“FPO”) arises at the end of the lease-back terms. (PX908 at 180367, NJT; PX1081 at 10325, Caltrans; PX1324 at 24857, Houston Metro; PX1518 at 59767, WMATA.) In the Belgacom SILO, “early buy-out options” (“EBOs”) arise 3-1/2 years before the end of the lease-back terms. (PX757 at 9187; PX758 at 9237.) In each transaction, the tax-exempt entity can exercise its option simply by giving notice to Wells Fargo. Exercise of the option then terminates the SILO, including the head leases or equipment agreements, and the SILO ends. The SILO property has never left the possession or control of the tax-exempt entity.
The tax-exempt entities do not use any of their own funds to exercise the FPO or EBO and terminate the transaction. The options are fully funded with money supplied by Wells Fargo at closing. The “books are cleared” by offsetting accounting entries and the return to Wells Fargo of the money it put into the transaction. This money had been set aside in a secure account for Wells Fargo's benefit until the FPO or EBO date. (McCalley, Tr. 634; Shinderman, Tr. 3771–72; PX821 at 35910; PX1229 at 252680; PX1430 at 233381; PX1000 at 11278; DX44 at 222363.)
Wells Fargo required the tax-exempt entities to state in Tax Indemnity Agreements that they had not, at the time of closing, made any determination on whether to exercise the FPOs or EBOs. (PX912 at 180248.) Wells Fargo required these statements to support its claim for tax benefits. The evidence, however, strongly supports a conclusion that the FPOs and EBOs would almost certainly be exercised to terminate the transactions. Id. For example, William Bassett of Caltrans testified “the probabilities were very high that we would exercise that ....” (Bassett, Tr. 4077.) Capstar's John Hackett wrote to Houston Metro that “we fully anticipate that you will buy the buses back with the defeasance proceeds ....” (DX276 at 180.) In the NJT transaction, the request for board approval of the SILO described the projected completion date as “approximately 26 years” from approval, which is the FPO date at the end of the lease-back. (DX345 at 4500; Webb, Tr. 1060–61.) NJT has engaged in other similar transactions with purchase option dates that have already passed, and in every case, NJT has exercised the option to terminate the transaction at that point. (Webb, Tr. 1066–68.) The EBO dates in the Belgacom SILO also have passed, and in both lots, Belgacom exercised the EBOs. (PX653, PX658.) Defendant's expert, Dr. Thomas Lys, confirmed that the FPO was nearly certain to be exercised. (Lys, Tr. 4506.)
3. Wells Fargo's Options if the FPOs Were Not Exercised
In the transit SILOs, if the transit agency failed to terminate the transaction through exercise of the purchase option, Wells Fargo then would have two choices: (a) to demand the delivery of some or all of the rail cars or buses to Wells Fargo for resale; or (b) to require the transit agency to arrange a “service contract” at the transit agency's expense. Wells Fargo also could combine these choices by electing the delivery of some vehicles, and a service contract as to other vehicles. Under the service contract procedure, the transit agency, or another entity which the transit agency must find and propose for Wells Fargo's approval, would have to use the vehicles for a defined multi-year term after the end of the lease-back period. (PX908 at 180368–70, NJT; PX1081 at 10326–29, Caltrans; PX1324 at 24858–60, Houston Metro; PX1518 at 59769–71, WMATA.) The service contract term varied from seven to fourteen years among the four transit SILOs. (PX904 at 180481, NJT; PX1077 at 10252, Caltrans; PX1320 at 24777, Houston Metro; PX1515 at 59651, WMATA.) The transit agency would not know which choice Wells Fargo would make until only eleven or twelve months before losing its equipment, or being required to use it under a new service contract. (See, e.g., DX706 at 22–25.)
If Wells Fargo elected to impose a service contract, the transit agency would not only need to arrange a service contract, but also fulfill other requirements: (a) find an “operator” acceptable to Wells Fargo to run the transit service, and negotiate an operating agreement; (b) arrange for refinancing of the outstanding non-recourse debt; (c) in Caltrans and WMATA, obtain and pay for a letter of credit for the benefit of the refinancing lender; (d) in Caltrans, WMATA, and Houston Metro, procure and pay for residual value insurance in coverage amounts specified at closing, for the benefit of Wells Fargo; (e) satisfy the equipment's physical “return conditions;” and (f) at Wells Fargo's request, enter into new defeasance arrangements for the benefit of Wells Fargo, to secure payment of amounts owed to Wells Fargo under the service contract. (PX904 at 180469, 180476; PX908 at 180368–71, NJT; PX1077 at 10246, 10252; PX1081 at 10326–29, Caltrans; PX1320 at 24777; PX1324 at 24858–59, Houston Metro; PX1515 at 59651; PX1518 at 59769–72, WMATA; DX706A at 7–20; PX821 at 35882; PX1000 at 11252, 11256, 11278; PX1229 at 252653, 252680; PX1430 at 233356–57, 233381; Johnson, Tr. 1765–66.)
Other service contract requirements in each SILO are: (i) arrange for the purchase of additional equipment by the service recipient, if necessary; (ii) arrange for the service recipient to have rights to land and infrastructure, if necessary; (iii) satisfy Wells Fargo's credit policies by the service recipient; and (iv) provide an “opinion of independent tax counsel” selected by Wells Fargo stating that entry into the service contract by the transit agency, or anyone related to it under IRC § 168(h)(4) will not “result in any material adverse federal income tax consequences” to Wells Fargo, if the transit agency wants to be the service recipient, and continue to use its equipment. (See, e.g., PX1515 at 59643; PX1518 at 59769.)
The transit agency must meet all of the above requirements in the eleven to twelve months after Wells Fargo provides notice that it intends to impose a service contract. If the transit agency fails to meet all of the service contract conditions and requirements, the transaction effectively would revert to the FPO. (See, e.g., PX908 at 180377, §§ 16(h)(A), 17(i)–(j); PX1518 at 59772.)
4. Belgacom's Exercise of the EBOs
The Belgacom SILO did not contain the service contract option. Instead, the agreement provided that if Belgacom did not terminate the SILO at the EBO dates, the leasebacks would continue for another 3-1/2 years until the end of their original terms. At that point, Belgacom would need to comply with significant “return conditions.” (Rupprecht, Tr. 168; PX679 at 8252; PX758 at 9236–37.) Belgacom would be required to purchase the equipment, renew the lease-back for up to four one-year terms, or surrender the equipment to Wells Fargo. (PX679 at 8252–53; PX758 at 9236–37.) Any renewals or purchase would be at specially defined “fair market rental value” or “fair market sales value,” which assumed that the return conditions had been satisfied. (PX678 at 8210; PX757 at 9193.)
Upon entering into the Belgacom SILO, Wells Fargo expected Belgacom to terminate the transaction at the EBO point. (Rupprecht, Tr. 160–61, 167, 173–74.) Wells Fargo stated in its CAP that “[t]he EBO is expected to be exercised.” (DX44 at 222364.) Wells Fargo described the return conditions as “strict and onerous,” and one of the reasons that Belgacom would exercise the pre-funded EBO. Id. In annual reviews of the Belgacom SILO, Wells Fargo stated:
The lease provides an early buyout option to the Sublessee in the 10th year and [Wells Fargo] is expecting Belgacom to exercise this option. The original return provisions of the lease were written with the intention of being overly onerous to make the lease-end return of any equipment an unattractive option.
(PX622 at 241813; see also PX199, PX626–27, PX635, DX702 at 20408–09.) As expected, Belgacom terminated both the 1997-3 and 1997-4 SILOs in 2007 and 2008 by exercising the EBOs. (PX653, PX658, PX741; Rupprecht, Tr. 204.)
I. The SILO's Financial Structure
The financial structure of the SILOs, though composed of multiple components, effectively consists of two circular flows of money, a debt loop and an equity loop. In the debt loop, the SILO's head lease seemingly provides for a large payment at closing from Wells Fargo to the tax-exempt entity. Each payment is funded by the proceeds of a nonrecourse loan made to Wells Fargo, and from a smaller investment by Wells Fargo. In each SILO, however, all the proceeds of the non-recourse loan are given immediately to a debt payment undertaker, which is an affiliate of the lender. Also, most of Wells Fargo's contribution is transferred to an equity payment undertaker, which is intended to fund the FPO or EBO at a later date. The tax-exempt entity receives only a modest incentive payment at closing.
The sublease in each SILO seemingly provides for rent payments by the tax-exempt entity to Wells Fargo during the lease-back period. However, the tax-exempt entity does not supply any of its own funds to pay rent. Instead, the debt payment undertaker agrees to make the rent payments from the proceeds it received from its affiliate at closing. Wells Fargo does not receive rent payments because it has assigned its rights to the lender as collateral for the non-recourse loan. The rent payments are set to match in timing and amount the payments due on the non-recourse loan. (Lynch, Tr. 3700.) Thus, during the lease-back period, the rental and debt service obligations are satisfied by offsetting book-keeping entries within the lender and debt payment undertaker group, and no cash changes hands between the parties to the leases. 6
At the FPO and EBO dates, the “purchase” by the tax-exempt entity terminating the transaction is funded by a combination of (a) the money supplied by Wells Fargo and set aside in the equity payment undertaking arrangement, and (b) the termination of the outstanding debt by either a final payment from the debt payment undertaker to the lender, or the offset of a “prepaid rent loan,” payable to the tax-exempt entity at that time against the purchase price. In all cases, the tax-exempt entity does not supply any funds to exercise the FPO or EBO, and the original non-recourse debt is paid without Wells Fargo having to supply any funds. The money set aside in the equity payment undertaking arrangement is returned to Wells Fargo. This “equity loop” may be extended past the FPO or EBO dates if the transaction is not terminated at this point. If so, the SILO structure still provides for the return of Wells Fargo's entire investment to it.
II. Discussion
A. Standards for Decision
The Court conducts a de novo review in tax refund suits. See George E. Warren Corp. v. United States, 135 Ct. Cl. 305, 314 [49 AFTR 1617], 141 F.Supp. 935, 940 (1956) (“[t]he tax laws contemplate a trial de novo”); Gingerich v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 231, 240 [99 AFTR 2d 2007-3430] (2007) (“[a] tax refund suit is a de novo proceeding.”). Thus, a tax refund suit “is not an appellate review of the administrative decision that was made by the IRS; instead, the Court must make an independent decision as to whether the taxpayer is due a refund.” D'Avanzo v. United States, 54 Fed. Cl. 183, 186 [90 AFTR 2d 2002-7023] (2002) (citing Int'l Paper Co. v. United States, 36 Fed. Cl. 313, 322 [78 AFTR 2d 96-6075] (1996)). In conducting a de novo review, the Court must give “no weight ... to subsidiary factual findings made by the [IRS] in its internal administrative proceedings.” Id. (quoting Cook v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 110, 113 [85 AFTR 2d 2000-1017] (2000)).
In a tax refund suit, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that it has overpaid its taxes for the year in question in the exact amount of the refund sought. See Helvering v. Taylor, 293 U.S. 507, 515 [14 AFTR 1194] (1935); Lewis v. Reynolds, 284 U.S. 281 [10 AFTR 773] (1932); Dysart v. United States, 169 Ct. Cl. 276, 340 [15 AFTR 2d 205] F.2d 624 (1965). The burden of proof includes “both the burden of going forward and the burden of persuasion.” Gingerich, 77 Fed. Cl. at 240 (quoting Sara Lee Corp. v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 330, 334 [72 AFTR 2d 93-6421] (1993)). In meeting its burden, the plaintiff must prove its case by a preponderance of the evidence. Ebert v. United States, 66 Fed. Cl. 287, 291 [96 AFTR 2d 2005-5163] (2005). To prevail in this suit, Wells Fargo must carry its burden of proving that it is entitled to the deductions it has claimed for depreciation, interest, and transaction costs in connection with the SILO tax shelters.
B. The Substance of the Transactions Determines Their Tax Treatment.
A primary guiding principle of tax law is that the substance, not the form, of a transaction determines its tax consequences. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469–70 [14 AFTR 1191] (1935). In applying this principle, courts look to the “objective economic realities of a transaction rather than to the particular form the parties employed.” Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 573 [41 AFTR 2d 78-1142] (1978). The forms, titles, or labels on the parties' various agreements are not controlling. Id.; see also, Comm'r v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 333 [33 AFTR 593] (1945) (courts should not “permit the true nature of a transaction to be disguised by mere formalisms.”); BB&T Corp. v. United States, 523 F.3d 461, 471 [101 AFTR 2d 2008-1933] (4th Cir. 2008) (taxpayer may not “claim tax benefits ... by affixing labels to its transactions that do not accurately reflect their true nature.”); Halle v. Comm'r, 83 F.3d 649, 655 [77 AFTR 2d 96-2125] (4th Cir. 1996) (“surrounding circumstances and economic realities” will overcome any “presumption” generated by the transaction's form.).
In the present case, Wells Fargo asserts that it was the owner for tax purposes of the equipment used in the WMATA, Houston Metro, NJT, Caltrans, and Belgacom SILO transactions, and therefore is entitled to claim depreciation deductions for the equipment under IRC §§ 167 and 168. Wells Fargo's burden is to show that, in substance, it became the owner of the SILO equipment, not merely that it intended to become the owner, or that the transactional documents label it the owner. See Frank Lyon, 435 U.S. at 572–73.
1. No Benefits and Burdens of Ownership
A taxpayer's claim of property ownership will not be respected unless the taxpaying entity actually bears the current “benefits and burdens of ownership.” Coleman v. Comm'r, 16 F.3d 821, 826 [73 AFTR 2d 94-1209] (7th Cir. 1994) (citing Frank Lyon, 435 U.S. at 582–84). The possibility of future ownership is not sufficient. Rather, the issue is whether the “transaction, as it stands at the time in question, sufficiently shifts the benefits and burdens of ownership such that the transaction should, for tax purposes, be treated as if it were a sale.” Kwiat v. Comm'r, 64 T.C.M. (CCH) 327, 1992 [1992 RIA TC Memo ¶92,433] WL 178603, at 8 (1992). Wells Fargo thus must prove that it acquired the benefits and burdens of ownership when it entered into the SILO transactions during 1997–2002.
Determining the attributes of ownership in any particular case largely is a factual inquiry. The “critical fact,” however, is whether the taxpayer has undertaken “substantial financial risk” of loss of its investment, based on the value of the underlying property. Coleman, 16 F.3d at 826. As the Supreme Court explained in Frank Lyon, the important inquiry is “whose capital was committed to the [property] ... [and therefore, who is] entitled to claim depreciation for the consumption of that capital.” 435 U.S. at 581. In the Frank Lyon case, the Supreme Court respected a sale/leaseback transaction because the taxpayer was, in fact, exposed to a “real and substantial risk” of whether it could repay a recourse loan and whether it could “recoup its investment.” Id. at 576–77, 579. In contrast, in Swift Dodge v. Comm'r, 692 F.2d 651 [51 AFTR 2d 83-333] (9th Cir. 1982), the court held that an agreement purporting to be a lease was not a genuine lease because the user of the property, and not the lessor, bore the burdens of ownership. The user was responsible for insurance, expenses, and taxes, and most “importantly,” the user also “assumed the risk of depreciation.” Id. at 654; see also Aderholt Specialty Co. v. Comm'r, 50 T.C.M. (CCH) 1101, 1985 [¶85,491 PH Memo TC] WL 15115, at 1 (1985) (recharacterizing lease because the purported lessor had no risk of loss); cf. Estate of Thomas v. Comm'r, 84 T.C. 412, 435 (1985) (respecting sale/leaseback because taxpayer “bore risk” that it could not “recoup its cash outlay.”).
Other courts have addressed the tax treatment of LILO and SILO transactions similar to Wells Fargo's, and have applied the above principles. With one exception, the court disallowed the claimed tax deductions. AWG Leasing Trust v. United States, 592 F.Supp.2d 953 [101 AFTR 2d 2008-2397] (N.D. Ohio 2008); BB&T Corp. v. United States, 2007 WL 37798 [99 AFTR 2d 2007-376], at 1 (M.D.N.C., Jan. 4, 2007), aff'd, 523 F.3d 461 [101 AFTR 2d 2008-1933] (4th Cir. 2008). In the AWG and BB&T cases, the court concluded that the taxpayer lacked a substantial risk of loss to its initial cash outlay in the transaction. In the cases involving jury trials, the jury returned a verdict each time disallowing the claimed tax benefits. Altria Group, Inc. v. United States, No. 1:06-cv-09430 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2009); Fifth Third Bancorp & Subs. v. United States, No. 1:05-cv-350 (S.D. Ohio, April 18, 2008). The one exception to date is Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. v. United States, 2009 WL 3418533 [104 AFTR 2d 2009-6966], at 1 (Fed. Cl. Oct. 21, 2009), to be discussed below.
In AWG, the taxpayer entered into a SILO transaction like those at issue here, with a head lease, lease, and purchase option. Debt and equity undertaking payment arrangements funded the loop debt, rent and purchase option. Just as in the Wells Fargo SILOs, if the tax-exempt entity did not elect the purchase option, the taxpayer could impose a service contract. AWG, 592 F. Supp.2d at 966–72.
In summarizing its reasons for concluding that the SILO transaction did not transfer a depreciable ownership interest to plaintiffs, the district court observed that:
(i) no substantive benefits or burdens of ownership are transferred between the parties during the Initial Leaseback Period; (ii) no significant cash flows between the parties exist during the Initial Leaseback Period; (iii) the AWG transaction creates little, if any, risk for the Plaintiffs throughout the Head Lease; and (iv), most importantly, it is nearly certain that AWG will exercise the Fixed Purchase Option in 2024, thus ensuring that Plaintiffs never actually acquire economic ownership of the Facility.
Id. at 981–82. The court further noted that “[t]he Plaintiffs did not take legal title of the Facility,” and that “[s]imply described, the Plaintiffs enjoyed almost none of the attributes of ownership during the sublease term to 2024.” Id. at 982–83. In holding that the taxpayer did not acquire any of the benefits and burdens of ownership, the court stated that “the structure ... effectively protects the Plaintiffs from any possible risk of financial loss, including the loss of its initial [] equity investment,” whether or not the purchase option is exercised. Id. at 983.
In BB&T, the taxpayer entered into a LILO transaction. There was a lease and leaseback with different lengths. There was a fully funded purchase option that the tax-exempt entity could exercise to terminate the transaction. There were debt and equity payment undertaking arrangements that funded the loop debt, sublease rent and purchase option. BB&T, 523 F.3d at 466–70. The taxpayer could impose a renewal lease if the purchase option were not exercised. In upholding summary judgment, and determining that the taxpayer did not retain significant and genuine attributes of a lessor, the court held:
First, each right and obligation BB&T obtained under the Head Lease it simultaneously returned to [the lessee] via the Sublease for the duration of the Basic Lease Term, leaving BB&T only a right to make an annual inspection of the Equipment. Second, although the transaction ostensibly provides for the exchange of tens of millions of dollars in rental payments during the Basic Lease Term, the only money that has (and that may ever) change hands between BB&T and [the lessee] is the $6,228,702 BB&T provided as [the lessee's] “incentive for doing the deal.” (J.A. at 325.) [The lessee] has therefore not only continued to use the Equipment just as it had before the transaction, it has done so without paying anything to BB&T. Third, [the lessee], through the purchase option, can unwind the transaction without ever losing dominion and control over the Equipment or having surrendered any of its own funds to BB&T, and has no economic incentive to do otherwise. BB&T therefore does not expect [the lessee] to “walk away” from the Equipment. (J.A. at 85.) Finally, regardless of whether [the lessee] bucks this expectation, the structure of the transaction insulates BB&T from any risk of losing its initial $12,833,846 investment in the government bonds or incurring the obligation to invest additional funds.
Id. at 473.
Like the transaction structures in AWG and BB&T, the Court concludes here that Wells Fargo does not have any funds at risk. In each of the five trial transactions, Wells Fargo employed 100 percent loop debt, where the debt payment undertaker and the nonrecourse lender were affiliates, and the entire loan proceeds immediately were transferred back to the lender group at closing. The equity defeasance account also was deposited with an affiliate of the lender. In three of the five trial transactions (WMATA, NJT, Caltrans), AIG was the lender, meaning that at closing, all of the transaction funds were deposited with an AIG affiliate, except for the inducement fee paid to the tax-exempt entity. The loan proceeds were not invested in the property or equipment, or retained by either the tax-exempt entity or Wells Fargo. Moreover, the debt and equity undertaking payment arrangements eliminated the need for the tax-exempt entity to actually pay rent under the lease-backs, or for Wells Fargo to actually make any debt service payments. The “rent” and “debt” payments in each SILO simply are accounted for as offsetting entries within the lender group. The debt will be completely paid without Wells Fargo having to supply any funds, whether the FPOs and EBOs are exercised or not. In contrast, in Frank Lyon, the taxpayer alone was liable for repayment of recourse debt, “to which it exposed its very business well-being.” Frank Lyon, 435 U.S. at 576–77, 582. The taxpayer also was dependent upon the lessee for payment of rent to service the debt. Id.
The Court also must examine as an element of property ownership whether Wells Fargo assumed any risk that the property would decline in value. In each of the five trial transactions, Wells Fargo's investment was immediately placed in an equity defeasance arrangement, in which it had a security interest, and to which the lender had no recourse. Upon any early termination of a SILO, Wells Fargo would receive the equity portion of the Termination Value or Stipulated Loss Value payments. These payments are funded by the proceeds of the equity defeasance arrangements and a strip surety policy so that Wells Fargo recovers its initial investment plus the interest earned on the equity collateral, regardless of any decline in value of the SILO equipment. Upon exercise of the FPOs and EBOs, Wells Fargo receives a return on its investment as if it had invested directly in a portfolio established in the equity defeasance arrangement, without regard to the value of the SILO equipment. Wells Fargo's “Net Economic Return” is guaranteed simply by the SILO transaction structure. See AWG, 592 F.Supp.2d at 983–84 (termination value payments protect taxpayer's investment); BB&T, 523 F.3d at 470 (letter of credit provided to support early termination payments).
Even if the FPOs were not exercised in the transit SILOs, a decline in the value of the SILO property would not prevent Wells Fargo from recouping its entire investment in each transaction. The ability of Wells Fargo to put a service contract in place assures recovery of its initial investment plus the desired yield through the service contract's Basic Fees and the residual value insurance that must be purchased for its benefit. Wells Fargo's Richard Johnson testified that “[t]he service contract was, as I have noted before, designed to protect our residual value.” (Johnson, Tr. 1775.) The renewal lease in BB&T and the service contract in AWG served the same function. BB&T, 523 F.3d 468–69; AWG, 592 F.Supp.2d at 971–72, 984.
In the Belgacom transaction, the service contract is not necessary for Wells Fargo to recover its investment. The remainder of the Lease automatically is continued after the EBO, if the EBO is not exercised, and Wells Fargo recoups its investment from the post-EBO Lease payments alone.
This case is very different from Frank Lyon, where the lessee had renewal options, but the exercise of the options was at the lessee's unconstrained choice, and the taxpayer did not have the ability to impose a renewal upon the lessee. In Frank Lyon, the taxpayer's investment return was dependent upon the property's value, and its initial investment was at risk if the property declined in value. As the Supreme Court observed, the lessee in Frank Lyon could choose not to exercise its renewal options and “walk away” from the property at the end of the lease-back. Frank Lyon, 435 U.S. at 583. The taxpayer thus was “gambling” that the rents it might otherwise obtain after the lease-back would be sufficient to “recoup its investment.” Id. at 579.
Here, Wells Fargo is not gambling at all. Its minimum return is fixed from the start, and if necessary, Wells Fargo can force the tax-exempt entities to stay in the game, with the predetermined results, to recoup its initial investment. The elimination of any risk from the taxpayer's initial investment and return is a distinguishing feature of both SILOs and LILOs. (Shinderman, Tr. 3752–53, 3783, 3797–98, 4017–19; DX1664, Ex. 16.)
2. No Transfer of Rights and Duties of Ownership at Closing
The Court must consider whether any rights and duties of ownership of the SILO equipment transferred to Wells Fargo at closing. See BB&T, 523 F.3d at 473; AWG, 592 F.Supp.2d at 982–83. Here, the Court finds that WMATA, NJT, Caltrans, Houston Metro, and Belgacom all retained legal title, as well as the right to exclusive possession, use and quiet enjoyment of the SILO property throughout the lease-back term. The tax-exempt entity also remained responsible for all maintenance and insurance. They retained the right to all profits, and were responsible for all losses, resulting from the operation of the equipment. In substance, nothing changed for the tax-exempt entities from before the SILO transaction, except they had given up tax deductions that they could not use in the first place.
In the Belgacom transaction, Belgacom continued to claim tax ownership and tax deductions for the equipment under Belgian law, (DX186, DX703), while Wells Fargo claimed tax ownership and tax deductions under U.S. law. Thus, Belgacom sold to Wells Fargo, for a fee, only the right to claim tax deductions under U.S. law. Although the interpretation of Belgian tax law is beyond the purview of the Court, the Belgacom SILO transaction created a “double dip” where one party claims tax ownership under Belgian law, and another party claims tax ownership under U.S. law.
3. No Payments During the Lease-back Period
The Court has examined the evidence to determine the extent to which payments, if any, occurred between the lessee and lessor during the SILO lease-back period. In the five trial transactions, the Court has identified only a circular flow of funds between the lender's affiliated entities, and no payments at all between the lessee and lessor, except for the incentive fee to the lessee at the time of closing. See BB&T, 523 F.3d at 473; AWG, 592 F.Supp.2d at 982–83. Although the Head Leases and Equipment Agreements seemingly provide payments of millions of dollars, all of those funds, other than the incentive fee payment, were immediately diverted to debt payment undertakers, as part of the loop debt, or to equity undertaking arrangements, where the funds were invested in securities and pledged to Wells Fargo until the FPO date. Due to the offsetting rent and debt schedules, no other money changes hands after closing, and the tax-exempt entities continue to use their property as before the SILO transaction, without paying anything to Wells Fargo.
Not a single dollar of the SILO funds was used to purchase or build the SILO equipment. Rather, the circular flow of funds results in the lender and Wells Fargo receiving all of their cash back at a later date. The five trial transactions thus are significantly different from the sale/leaseback in Frank Lyon, where the sale proceeds actually were used to construct the lessee's new building. 435 U.S. at 565–66. There, the transaction had a commercial purpose. In this case, however, the tax-exempt entities sold their tax benefits to Wells Fargo for relatively modest incentive fees, and Wells Fargo invested in the equity undertaker's portfolio of securities. As the Fourth Circuit explained in BB&T:
[We,] like the district court, conclude that in substance, the transaction is a financing arrangement, not a genuine lease and sublease. All that BB&T has done is paid [the lessee] approximately $6 million dollars to sign documents meeting the formal requirements of a lease and sublease, arranged a circular transfer of funds from and then back to ABN [the lender/debt payment undertaker], and invested approximately $12 million in government securities.
BB&T, 523 F.3d at 475.
This Court agrees with the Fourth Circuit's description of the SILO transactions, except that the Fourth Circuit perhaps has been too charitable. The heart of these transactions is that Wells Fargo paid a fee to tax-exempt entities to acquire valuable tax deductions that the tax-exempt entities could not use. Wells Fargo also invested an amount with an equity undertaker that it could have done directly, without involving any tax-exempt entities or their equipment. Aside from these two elements, the circular flow of funds adds nothing to the transaction, except to eliminate any risk to Wells Fargo and to produce more claimed tax deductions. The involvement of lenders like AIG, appraisers like Ernst & Young, and law firms like King & Spalding is “window dressing” serving only to generate fees and lengthy documents to give the SILOs an appearance of validity. The Indiana district court hit the mark when it described the SILO as a “blatantly abusive tax shelter” that is “rotten to the core.” Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Coop., Inc. v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 588 F.Supp.2d 919, 921, 928 (S.D. Ind. 2008), aff'd 582 F.3d 721 (7th Cir. 2009).
Certainly, taxpayers are entitled to structure their affairs with an eye on the tax consequences, and to minimize the taxes they might legally owe. Superior Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 280 U.S. 390, 395–96 (1930); BB&T, 523 F.3d at 471. In Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 [13 AFTR 806] (2d Cir. 1934), aff'd 293 U.S. 465 [14 AFTR 1191] (1935), Judge Learned Hand observed that “[a]ny one may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to increase one's taxes.” Id. The Court, however, agrees with the district court in Hoosier Energy that this principle must yield when an abusive SILO tax shelter is involved:
That principle does not apply to the [Hoosier Energy] SILO transaction, at least based on the record before the court at this point. For the reasons stated, the transaction appears to have had one motivating force: abusive and fraudulent use of tax deductions by a party who had no significant benefits or burdens of ownership of the property in question. The volume of paper used to dress up this central purpose does not affect its core illegality.
Hoosier Energy, 588 F.Supp.2d at 930.
The IRS was entitled to view these SILO transactions for what they are, not what they purport to be. As the Fourth Circuit observed in BB&T, citing an Abraham Lincoln riddle from Rogers v. United States, 281 F.3d 1108, 1118 [89 AFTR 2d 2002-1115] (10th Cir. 2002), “How many legs does a dog have if you call a tail a leg?”
The answer is “four,” because “calling a tail a leg does not make it one.” Id. Here, BB&T styled the LILO as a lease financed by a loan, but did not in substance acquire a genuine leasehold interest or incur genuine indebtedness. Accordingly, ... whether it has “reached the point where the tax tail began to wag the dog,” Hines, 912 F.2d at 741, we conclude that the Government was entitled to recognize that tail for what it was, not what BB&T professed it to be.
BB&T, 523 F.3d at 477. The Court agrees fully with the Fourth Circuit's analysis in BB&T, and concludes that, looking at the substance of the SILO transactions, Wells Fargo did not become the owner for tax purposes of the SILO equipment, and is not entitled to the depreciation amounts claimed.
C. Whether Wells Fargo is Entitled to Interest Deductions
IRC § 163(a) provides a deduction for “interest paid or accrued within the taxable year on indebtedness.” To claim this deduction, a taxpayer must prove that the payment is “compensation for the use or forbearance of money.” Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 498 [23 AFTR 808] (1940). The indebtedness also must be genuine and serve a useful purpose. Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 365–66 [6 AFTR 2d 5851] (1960). The indebtedness must be in substance, and not merely in form. BB&T, 523 F.3d at 475. The fact that a purported borrower may sign a loan document providing for a legal obligation to repay the loan does not alone give the debt any substance. Id. at 476.
In the present case, the Court concludes that Wells Fargo cannot claim an interest deduction from the non-recourse loop debt. All of the loan proceeds in each SILO transaction were immediately returned to an affiliate of the lender, acting as debt payment undertaker, and then to the common parent, the original source of the funds. (Lynch, Tr. 3675.) On the day of closing, the loan funds were routed through the accounts shown on the cash flow memos, and the lenders did not relinquish the use of the money except for the brief one-day loop. Neither Wells Fargo nor the tax-exempt entity ever had the use of the funds. The full proceeds were paid to the debt payment undertaker as a non-refundable fee, and became an asset solely of the debt payment undertaker. (See, e.g., PX1088 at 10415; DX243.) The debt payment undertaker then agreed to make the debt service payments on the loop debt. Thus, Wells Fargo did not need to pay any principle or interest on the loan, and the loan proceeds effectively were used to repay the loan. The economic reality of the non-recourse loan was reflected in the lender's own internal accounting for the loop debt. In three of the trial transactions, AIG eliminated the loan from its books through offsetting entries, and in Belgacom, Rabobank assigned the loan a “zero solvency rating.” (Lynch, Tr. 3700; DX187 at 19820.)
The Fourth Circuit stated with regard to similar loop debt, it is “difficult to see how the “interest” [] paid could represent “compensation for the use or forbearance of money.”” BB&T, 523 F.3d at 476 (citing Halle, 83 F.3d at 652). The district court in AWG reached the same conclusion, finding that the “loans at issue lack any substantive business purpose other than creating this “loop debt” between the Plaintiffs, AWG, and the German banks to generate tax benefits for the Plaintiffs.” AWG, 592 F.Supp.2d at 993. In Belgacom, ABN AMRO acknowledged that, while the “cash flow is circular,” there is a “tax benefit” to the purported borrower. (DX12 at 1120.)
Except for Consolidated Edison, all of the SILO and LILO transaction cases that have considered a tax deduction for loop debt interest have denied the claim. BB&T, 523 F.3d at 475–77; AWG, 592 F.Supp.2d at 990–94; Fifth Third, No. 1:05-cv-350 (S.D. Ohio, April 18, 2008) (jury verdict); Altria, No. 1:06-cv-09430 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2009) (jury verdict); see also, Hines v. United States, 912 F.2d 736, 741 [66 AFTR 2d 90-5483] (4th Cir. 1990) (interest expense in sale/leaseback disallowed where “the lease and debt payments between the three parties [lessor, bank, lessee] were structured to be offsetting. The circularity meant that the transaction became self-sustaining after the payments at closing with virtually no further financial input necessary from any of the parties.”); Flecyn v. United States, 691 F.Supp. 205, 212 [62 AFTR 2d 88-5026] (C.D.Cal. 1988) (interest deductions disallowed because the loan and interest payments “were simply parts of a circularization of funds.”). The Court agrees that Wells Fargo is not entitled to an interest deduction attributable to the loop debt on the non-recourse loan.
D. Whether the Transactions Have Any Economic Substance
Wells Fargo is not entitled to its depreciation, transaction cost, and interest deductions if the SILO transactions lack economic substance. The Federal Circuit has held that “the economic substance doctrine require[s] disregarding, for tax purposes, transactions that comply with the literal terms of the tax code but lack economic reality.” Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340, 1352 [98 AFTR 2d 2006-5249] (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. denied 549 U.S. 1206 (2007). Under the economic substance doctrine, Wells Fargo must prove that the SILO transactions had (1) objective economic substance, and (2) a non-tax business purpose. Coltec, 454 F.3d at 1355–56; H.J. Heinz Co. v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 570, 583–85 [99 AFTR 2d 2007-2940] (2007). If Wells Fargo fails to meet either requirement, the claimed deductions should be disallowed.
In Coltec, the taxpayer sold one of its businesses in 1996 for a gain of $240.9 million. The taxpayer then met with its tax advisors from Arthur Andersen to discuss a strategy for offsetting the gain. Arthur Andersen proposed a tax avoidance transaction that involved three steps. First, the parent company would reorganize a dormant subsidiary into a special purpose entity. Second, the parent would transfer property and contingent liabilities to the newly reorganized subsidiary in exchange for stock in that subsidiary. Third, the subsidiary would sell the stock to a third party for a nominal sum, creating a significant loss because the sale price of the stock would be drastically lower than its basis. Using this form of transaction, the taxpayer generated a $378.7 million capital loss that could be offset against the aforementioned $240.9 million capital gain. Coltec, 454 F.3d at 1343.
Although Coltec is not a SILO or LILO tax shelter case, the creation of a transaction for the purpose of avoiding taxes is the same in Coltec as it is here. The Federal Circuit held that the transaction employed “had no meaningful economic purpose, save the tax benefits to Coltec,” and that the “transaction must be ignored for tax purposes.” Id. at 1347. Citing Rothschild v. United States, 407 F.2d 404 [23 AFTR 2d 69-637] (Ct. Cl. 1969) and Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 [14 AFTR 1191] (1935), the Federal Circuit observed:
[O]ur predecessor court inRothschild stated, “Gregory v. Helvering requires that a taxpayer carry an unusually heavy burden when he attempts to demonstrate that Congress intended to give favorable tax treatment to the kind of transaction that would never occur absent the motive of tax avoidance.” 407 F.2d at 411 (quotingDiggs v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue , 281 F.2d 326, 330 [6 AFTR 2d 5095] (2d Cir. 1960)). Other circuits have similarly held that “[e]conomic substance is a prerequisite to the application of any Code provision allowing deductions [and therefore that] ... [t]he taxpayer has the burden of showing that the form of the transaction accurately reflects its substance, and the deductions are permissible.” In re CM Holdings, Inc., 301 F.3d at 102.
Coltec, 454 F.3d at 1355–56; see also Frank Lyon, 435 U.S. at 584 (Noting that a transaction must not be “shaped solely by tax avoidance features”); Jade Trading, LLC v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 11, 48 [100 AFTR 2d 2007-7123] (2007) (“The objective economic substance test requires that a taxpayer prove that a transaction had a “realistic financial benefit” beyond tax avoidance.” (quoting Coltec, 454 F.3d at 1356 n.16.))
1. Reasonable Possibility of Any Non-tax Profit
In examining objective economic substance, the taxpayer's subjective motivation is not relevant or determinative. Coltec, 454 F.3d at 1356. Instead, each transaction must be examined objectively, and a determination must be made whether the transaction provided a reasonable possibility of profit, exclusive of tax benefits. Id.; see also Black & Decker Corp. v. United States, 436 F.3d 431, 441–42 [97 AFTR 2d 2006-841] (4th Cir. 2006); Gilman v. Comm'r, 933 F.2d 143, 146–47 [67 AFTR 2d 91-1016] (2d Cir. 1991); Rice's Toyota World, Inc. v. Comm'r, 752 F.2d 89, 91 [55 AFTR 2d 85-580] (4th Cir. 1985); Stobie Creek Invs., LLC v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 636, 672–73 [102 AFTR 2d 2008-5442] (2008); Jade Trading, 80 Fed. Cl. at 48. Further, where the non-tax benefits are deferred over multiple years, present value adjustments to the future benefits are appropriate to assess the transaction's “actual and anticipated economic effects.” ACM P'ship v. Comm'r, 157 F.3d 231, 259 [82 AFTR 2d 98-6682] (3rd Cir. 1998); see also United States v. Broderson, 67 F.3d 452, 457 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[S]um of payments in a lease stream does not accurately represent the value of the lease stream because it fails to account for the time value of money.”).
Applying these principles here, the Wells Fargo SILO transactions lack objective economic substance. The source of the non-tax, economic benefit to Wells Fargo, when the SILOs terminate at the FPOs and EBOs, is simply the return of its investment from the equity defeasance arrangements in 15–25 years, plus the interest earned. Wells Fargo could have realized this same return simply by investing in the portfolio of the equity defeasance arrangement, without involving the transit agencies, or Belgacom, or their equipment, in any way. Moreover, as Defendant's expert, Professor Lys, demonstrated, the net present value of these non-tax investment proceeds is less than the total cost to Wells Fargo of participating in the transactions. On a net present value basis, each SILO is a losing proposition without the tax benefits. (DX701.) The net loss of each SILO is due to: (a) the significant transaction costs that Wells Fargo paid to arrangers, law firms, appraisers, insurers and lenders to create the intricate agreements that it hoped would provide millions in tax deductions, and insulate it from any risks; (b) the incentive payment that Wells Fargo had to pay to the tax-exempt entities to purchase their tax deductions and gain their participation in the SILO; and (c) the cost of funds to Wells Fargo to engage in the transactions. Though the mountains of paper defy comprehension without careful study, the bottom line is that the SILOs provide no reasonable possibility of profit at all, absent a claim for the tax deductions.
Wells Fargo's cost of funds alone turns the SILOs into a losing proposition. Wells Fargo's witness, Richard Johnson, agreed that the cash-on-cash, non-tax return calculated is less than Wells Fargo's cost of funds for its leasing business. (Johnson, Tr. 1854, 1966–67; see also, PX1000 at 11280.) Thus, aside from the net present value analysis and the lengthy deferral of payments until the FPO and EBO dates, there was no reasonable possibility of profit from the SILOs simply because the expected non-tax investment return was less than Wells Fargo's cost of funds.
The district court in AWG held that the SILO did have economic substance because the internal rate of return, absent tax benefits, was approximately 3.4 percent. AWG, 592 F.Supp.2d at 980. The court found that the taxpayer could have “expected to make a small, but guaranteed, pre-tax profit” sufficient to establish economic substance. Id. In the present case, when all transactional and funding costs are considered, the non-tax return is negative. Thus, if not for the tax deductions, no rational business entity would seriously contemplate a SILO transaction. See Stobie Creek, 82 Fed. Cl. at 691 (“[A] reasonable investor would take into account the costs and fees associated with entering and completing a transaction in evaluating whether an investment had a reasonable possibility of making a profit.”). The Court concludes that, absent the claimed tax benefits, the five SILO transactions presented at trial lack objective economic substance.
2. Existence of Any Non-tax Business Purpose
Wells Fargo's SILO transactions lack subjective economic substance because there was no non-tax business purpose. See Coltec, 454 F.3d at 1355. Without the claimed tax benefits, and without the company's tax capacity to use the claimed tax benefits, Wells Fargo would not have entered into the SILO transactions. (Johnson, Tr. 1892.) As noted, “tax capacity” refers to the company having other revenue from business operations against which the SILO tax deductions could be applied and thereby reduce taxes. The motivating reason for the Wells Fargo SILOs was the desire to reduce the company's taxes as much as possible. There were no non-tax reasons that would justify Wells Fargo's entering into these transactions.
The lack of any arms' length negotiations of many substantive terms is a further indication of a questionable transaction. The key terms of the SILOs were determined by tax considerations, and Wells Fargo's constraints to eliminate risk. The transaction terms were more the product of a software model, than any negotiations or commercial realities. (Webb, Tr. 1055–56; Britton, Tr. 1227; Whitman, Tr. 1372; Hackett, Tr. 3587–92.) There is precious little evidence of the parties negotiating a rent schedule, an interest rate on the non-recourse loan, or amortization schedules of the loan based upon any commercial realities. As Defendant's expert, Morris Shinderman, observed, and Plaintiff's Mr. Gould agreed, the enormous negative amortization of the non-recourse loan schedules is unusual, and not what would be seen in a normal commercial leasing transaction. (Shinderman, Tr. 3760–61, 3766; Gould, Tr. 2892–93.) The effect of the “interest roll-up” simply is to increase claimed interest deductions. (Shinderman, Tr. 3780–81; D. Ellis, Tr. 2724–25.) The large rent prepayments, on paper, in the WMATA and Caltrans SILOs also are very unusual. (Shinderman, Tr. 3769.) In Belgacom, the equipment selected for the transaction was based entirely upon tax considerations. The parties were intent upon using equipment that was “qualified technological equipment” under the U.S. tax code. (DX15 at 1304.)
Similarly, the Court found the appraisals of the fair market value and the remaining useful life of the SILO equipment to be suspect in all five trial transactions. As an example, the 45 NJT light-rail vehicles had an acquisition cost of $144 million, but Marshall & Stevens appraised them at $160 million. (Webb, Tr. 1020–22; PX808; PX824.) Some of the fair market value appraisals of the Belgacom equipment also were “far too high.” (Chastain, Tr. 4395.) All parties to the SILO transactions would benefit from higher appraisals pushed to the limits of reality. A higher fair market value and longer useful life would make the value of the transaction larger, increasing the available tax deductions to Wells Fargo, and also increasing the transaction fees to the other participants. From the vantage point of the tax-exempt entities, they received cash at closing in exchange for tax deductions that they could not use, but otherwise nothing changed. The reference in Senator Grassley's November 17, 2003 letter to the statement of a knowledgeable municipal manager is most telling: “People giving him money which he never had to pay back, for doing something that he was already doing.” (PX223.)
Wells Fargo asserts that it structured the SILO transactions to comply with FAS 13, and to take advantage of the “front-loading” of income required under FAS 13. Wells Fargo argues that the desire to recognize “front-loading” under FAS 13 is a legitimate non-tax business objective that gives the SILO transactions economic substance. However, the Court concludes that the financial benefits of improper tax deductions cannot provide a non-tax business purpose for the transaction. Such a bootstrap argument has been rejected in other cases:
[The taxpayer's] intended use of the cash flows generated by the [transaction] is irrelevant to the subjective prong of the economic substance analysis. If a legitimate business purpose for the use of the tax savings “were sufficient to breathe substance into a transaction whose only purpose is to reduce taxes, [then] every sham tax-shelter device might succeed.”
Am. Elec. Power, Inc. v. United States, 136 F.Supp.2d 762, 791–92 [87 AFTR 2d 2001-917] (S.D. Ohio 2001), aff'd, 326 F.3d 737 [91 AFTR 2d 2003-2060] (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Comm'r, 113 T.C. 254, 287 (1999), aff'd, 254 F.3d 1313 [87 AFTR 2d 2001-2626] (11th Cir. 2001)).
Finally, while it is true that “the tax laws affect the shape of nearly every business transaction,” Frank Lyon, 435 U.S. at 580, it is also true that “there is a material difference between structuring a real transaction in a particular way to provide a tax benefit (which is legitimate), and creating a transaction, without a business purpose, in order to create a tax benefit (which is illegitimate).” Coltec, 454 F.3d at 1357. Here, the SILO was nothing more than a sequel to the LILO structure that the IRS determined was without any economic substance. See Rev. Rule 1999-14. Once the SILO structure came to the attention of the IRS, and the tax benefits again became unavailable, taxpayers immediately stopped entering into SILOs, just as happened with LILOs. The SILO transaction simply was another way to transfer tax deductions from tax-exempt entities that could not use them.
E. The Consolidated Edison Case is Distinguishable.
In the recent decision in Consolidated Edison Company of New York, our Court allowed the taxpayer's 1997 tax year deductions in a LILO transaction. In that case, a utility, Con Ed, entered into a transaction with a Dutch utility known as Electriciteitsbedrijf Zuid-Holland, N.V. (“EZH”). The facility subject to the transaction was a “gas-fired, combined cycle cogeneration plant” located in the Netherlands, known as “RoCa3.” Con Ed, 2009 WL 3418533 [104 AFTR 2d 2009-6966], at 1. In the 1990s, Con Ed provided electricity to over eight million people in New York City and Westchester County, New York. The New York Public Service Commission (“PSC”) regulated all of Con Ed's operations prior to the mid-1990s, when the PSC deregulated New York State electric companies to encourage competition. The PSC ordered Con Ed and other utilities to submit plans describing how they would restructure their operations to create a more competitive market. The plans were to include proposed corporate structures, including unregulated subsidiaries, that would achieve the PSC's restructuring goals. Id. at 2.
The PSC authorized Con Ed to invest in unregulated subsidiaries that would later participate in energy infrastructure projects and market technical services worldwide. In pursuit of these company objectives, Con Ed sought to enter into one or more LILO investments to offset losses it expected to sustain as a result of deregulation in New York State, including losses from divestiture of some of its assets. Id. at 3. Against this background, Con Ed invested in the Dutch utility plant as a way to expand its international investments, diversify its assets, and develop strategic alliances abroad. Id.
The Court found a legitimate business purpose in Con Ed's LILO investment, and ruled that the transaction was not made simply to achieve tax avoidance. Specifically, the Court noted the following non-tax reasons for Con Ed to engage in this venture:
[T]he ability to pursue new opportunities and alternatives in a deregulated market; the expectation of making a pretax profit through the RoCa3 Transaction; plaintiff's entry into Western European energy markets; the potential for benefits from the output of the RoCa3 Facility due to the life of the plant beyond the Sublease Basic Term; technical benefits to Con Ed of operating a state of the art plant in its own field of expertise; the ability to further develop and share Con Ed's own cutting edge technology; and environmental benefits, including gaining expertise, while involved with a world-class, environmentally friendly plant and improving plaintiff's environmental public image.
Id. at 89.
Con Ed is a distinctly unique case, easily distinguishable from Wells Fargo's SILO transactions. The fact that a New York utility would want to invest in a Dutch utility for all of the reasons mentioned above presents a materially different set of circumstances than are presented here. In the course of its 159-page slip opinion, the Court in Con Ed repeatedly emphasized the fact-dependent basis for the outcome, stating:
• “[E]ach transaction ... must be evaluated on its own merits,” id. at 1;
• “The conclusions of the court offered in this opinion are based on the specific and unique facts which led to, and were part of, the RoCa3 Transaction,” id.;
• “The [expert] reports in the record before the court ... are specific to the RoCa3 Transaction and Facility and should be reviewed on their own merits, and not compared to separate, unrelated transactions, which do not even invoke electric generating facilities,” id. at 5;
• “[E]ach LILO transaction is developed and formed differently, based on specific relationships, the chronology, the financial relationships, the nature of the property involved, and any number of other variables,” id. at 38;
• Determining whether the taxpayer has acquired a true leasehold interest in the property “is a question of fact which must be ascertained from the intention of the parties as evidenced by the written agreements read in light of the attending facts and circumstances,” id. at 43 (citing Grodt & McKay Realty, Inc. v. Comm'r, 77 T.C. 1221, 1237 (1981);
• In critiquing the position of a key Government expert, the Court noted “[f]or the most part, his testimony failed to address the unique characteristics of the RoCa3 Transaction,” id. at 52;
• “[T]he parties have presented volumes of exhibits and testimony, including expert testimony, unique to the RoCa3 Transaction, id. at 122;
• “After presiding over the lengthy trial, examining and reexamining the trial transcripts and exhibits entered into the record and reviewing the written submissions of the parties, the court is persuaded, as is evident throughout this opinion, that the plaintiff has established, through its witnesses and the exhibits, that the RoCa3 Transaction was a unique LILO transaction, which provided tax and bookkeeping advantages to the plaintiff; was, in form, a true lease; possessed economic substance; and, therefore, should be respected as qualifying for the tax deductions claimed.” Id. at 128.
The Court in Con Ed distinguished AWG and BB&T by observing that “considerations of economic substance are factually specific to the transaction involved.” Id. at 115. Applying that same test here, which this Court agrees is correct, the present case is much more like AWG and BB&T. The five Wells Fargo trial transactions lack economic substance, and therefore the claimed deductions must be denied.
III. Conclusion
Based upon the foregoing, the Court denies Plaintiff's claim for a tax refund as to the WMATA, NJT, Caltrans, Houston Metro, and Belgacom transactions presented at trial. The Court will schedule a status conference with counsel for the parties during the next 45 days to address the need for further proceedings, if any, regarding the remaining transactions at issue. If further proceedings are not necessary, the Court will enter a final judgment in favor of Defendant, and dismiss Plaintiff's complaint with prejudice. Pursuant to RCFC 54(d), the Court finds that Defendant is the prevailing party, and awards costs to Defendant.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
THOMAS C. WHEELER
Judge
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1
The cited sections of the Internal Revenue Code are found in 26 U.S.C. §§ 163, 167, and 168 (2006). For convenience, the Court will refer to Internal Revenue Code provisions as “IRC § ___.”
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2
Rev. Rul. 99-14, 99-1 C.B. 835, modified and superseded by Rev. Rul. 2002-69, 2002-2 C.B. 760.
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3
This statement of the facts constitutes the Court's principal findings of fact under Rule 52(a) of the Court of Federal Claims (“RCFC”). Other findings of fact and rulings on mixed questions of fact and law are set forth in the later analysis.
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4
In this opinion, the Court will refer to the trial transcript by witness and page as “Name, Tr. ___,” and to trial exhibits as “PX___” for Plaintiff's exhibits, and “DX ___” for Defendant's exhibits. The parties' pretrial stipulations of fact, filed on April 2, 2009, are referred to as “Stip. ___.” For lengthy exhibits, page citations include the numerical portion of Bates numbers. Demonstrative exhibits from Plaintiff and Defendant are referred to as “PDX ___” and “DDX ___” respectively.
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5
“GSM” is a popular Global System for Mobile communications, used throughout the world.
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6
An exception exists in the Belgacom transaction, where Merrill Lynch, the equity payment undertaker, makes a few payments to Wells Fargo during the lease-back period.
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7
The FTA designated Richard Steinmann as its deponent at the FTA's Rule 30(b)(6) deposition. (PX366.) The deposition testimony of Mr. Steinmann is found in PX365 and PX375.

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Tuesday, January 19, 2010

Restaurant entrepreneur was liable for trust fund penalty

Charles Erwin v. U.S., (CA 4 1/13/2010) 105 AFTR 2d ¶ 2010-351

The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, affirming a district court, has held that a restaurant entrepreneur was a responsible person liable for a trust fund penalty under Code Sec. 6672 . The taxpayer, who served as a corporate officer and director, selected business sites, hired and fired employees, and negotiated and personally guaranteed loans and other contracts for the company.
Background. Where an employer fails to properly pay over its payroll taxes, IRS can seek to collect a penalty equal to 100% of the unpaid taxes from a “responsible person,” i.e., a person who: (1) is responsible for collecting, accounting for and paying over payroll taxes; and (2) willfully fails to perform this responsibility. ( Code Sec. 6672(a) )
Facts. Charles Erwin, an entrepreneur who in his lifetime owned or operated at least 60 restaurants, joined with three other businessmen to form GC Affordable Dining, Inc., (GCAD), a franchisee of Golden Corral Franchising System, Inc. GCAD eventually opened and operated five Golden Corral restaurants. Erwin, who at all times owned at least a one-third interest in the company, also served as its director and vice president, secretary, and treasurer. While his business partners also served as directors and officers, two managers oversaw the day-to-day operations, payroll, and accounting. Erwin and his partners personally guaranteed construction and operating lines of credit for GCAD with the bank and secured a construction line of credit for a corporation established as a flow-through real estate holding company for GCAD. Erwin participated in selecting sites for the restaurants and signed lease-related documents for all restaurant locations.
Despite early profits, the GCAD restaurants began to lose money, and Erwin and his partners eventually replaced the two managers. In December of '98, Erwin and his partners learned that Barry and Buddy Light (the Light brothers), who had been hired to handle GCAD's accounting and payroll, had failed to pay the entire quarterly payroll tax withholdings for the third quarter of '98. The partners made a capital call for approximately $150,000 and wired the money to the Light brothers. Erwin, who contributed $95,000 of this, personally instructed the Light brothers not to be late with tax payments under any circumstances. Despite this admonition, the Light brothers failed to pay the payroll taxes for the fourth quarter of '98 in full.
In late '98, Erwin and one of his business partners sent the Light brothers $50,000 for additional payment to a favored food vendor and instructed them not to pay the rent because he would handle it directly. Erwin also negotiated a release for GCAD from obligations under one of its leases. The landlord agreed to send $1.65 million to a company financing GCAD's restaurant building and equipment to cover rents that GCAD owed on that and other leases.
In August '99, Erwin and his two partners learned that GCAD had not paid its withholding taxes in full for the first three quarters of '99. In December of '99, the partners made another capital contribution of $50,000 to help cure these deficiencies, but GCAD never paid the taxes in full. Erwin and his partners continued to employ the Light brothers until February 2000.
After terminating the Light brothers, Erwin took control of GCAD accounting functions, including payroll. GCAD remained current on its payroll withholding payments. In late 2000, Erwin became the 100% owner of GCAD, and shortly thereafter dissolved the corporation. Between August '99 and the close of business in 2000, the GCAD restaurants generated approximately $5 million in sales revenue. Rather than paying the outstanding '98 and '99 tax deficiencies, GCAD continued to pay rent and supplier expenses.
IRS assessed tax deficiencies against Erwin in the amount of the unpaid payroll withholding taxes owed by GCAD for the fourth quarter of '98 and the first three quarters of '99, plus interest.
Appellate Court's conclusion. The Fourth Circuit concluded that, as a matter of law, Erwin was a responsible person under Code Sec. 6672 during the periods at issue. Erwin at all times owned at least one-third of the stock of closely-held GCAD and served as its secretary, treasurer, vice president, and director. He signed loan documents and leases on GCAD's behalf, showing that he shared responsibility for establishing the corporation's financial policy. He approved restaurant site selection and regularly reviewed sales data. He held quarterly meetings with his partners and weekly telephone calls with the general manager to discuss the restaurants. He directed or negotiated payments to certain creditors to reduce GCAD debt, which he had personally guaranteed. He hired and fired upper-management employees. Although Erwin delegated many of GCAD's day-to-day financial responsibilities to others, he infused capital into GCAD and admonished the Light brothers, over whom he had significant control, to stay current with the company's tax obligations.
The Court rejected Erwin's defense that others in the company may have been just as, or even more, responsible for GCAD's failure to remit payroll taxes. Code Sec. 6672 imposes liability on all responsible persons, not just the most responsible person.
The Fourth Circuit also found that Erwin, by preferring GCAD's other creditors to IRS, had willfully failed to remit GCAD's payroll taxes for the fourth quarter of '98 and the first three quarters of '99. GCAD generated several million dollars in gross receipts after August '99 and paid rent and food vendors with those funds instead of paying IRS.
Following the lead of every other circuit to consider the question, the Fourth Circuit adopted the rule that when a responsible person learns that withholding taxes have gone unpaid in past quarters for which he was responsible, he has a duty to use all current and future unencumbered funds available to the corporation to pay those back taxes. Accordingly, as of August '99, Erwin had a duty to use all unencumbered funds to reduce GCAD's tax liability from the prior quarters.
Even assuming that Erwin did not act willfully prior to learning of the full extent of the tax deficiencies in August 99, his conduct after that point unquestionably evidenced willfulness as a matter of law. During the third quarter of '99, GCAD paid just a fraction of its payroll tax liability. Although Erwin and his business partner each made capital contributions to cover the deficiency in December of '99, GCAD still owed over $100,000 for that quarter alone and had not satisfied deficiencies from '98 and the first two quarters of '99. Erwin was on notice that GCAD owed substantial payroll taxes to IRS. Yet Erwin and his business partners continued to rely on the Light brothers to address the problem for several more months. His failure to assess and remedy the payroll tax deficiencies immediately on learning of them in August '99 constituted unreasonable willful conduct. The Court found that this was particularly so given that, at Erwin's direction, GCAD paid other creditors during this period. As a result, the Court held that Erwin was liable for any outstanding third-quarter '99 deficiencies.

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Friday, January 15, 2010

The IRS has issued final regulations ( TD 9473 , 11/24/09) relating to the payment of tax liabilities under installment agreements. The final regulations are effective 11/25/09.

Section 6159 permits the IRS to enter into installment agreements for the payment of any unpaid tax. Taxpayers may request an administrative review of an IRS decision to terminate an installment agreement and may appeal rejections of proposed installment agreements. Reg. 301.6159-1(c) explains that a proposed installment agreement is not accepted until the IRS notifies the taxpayer or the taxpayer's representative of the acceptance. Acceptance of an installment agreement does not reduce the taxes, interest, or penalties owed. The penalties may continue to accrue at a reduced rate following the agreement's acceptance, however, as provided in Section 6651(h) .

The IRS generally has discretion to accept or reject any proposed installment agreement. Acceptance is required in the case of a liability of an individual for income taxes, however, if all of the following requirements are satisfied:

(1) The aggregate liability (not including interest, penalties, additions to tax, and additional amounts) does not exceed $10,000.
(2) The taxpayer (and the taxpayer's spouse, if the liability relates to a joint tax return) has not during any of the preceding five tax years (a) failed to file any income tax return, (b) failed to pay any required income tax, or (c) entered into an installment agreement for the payment of any income tax.
(3) The IRS determines that the taxpayer is financially unable to pay the liability in full when due.
(4) The installment agreement requires the taxpayer to make full payment of the liability within three years.
(5) The taxpayer agrees to comply with the provisions of the Code while the agreement is in effect.
Section 6159(a) was amended by the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (AJCA) to allow the IRS to enter into installment agreements that provide for partial payment of a tax liability. The AJCA also added Section 6159(d) , which requires the IRS to review partial payment installment agreements every two years.

A commenter to proposed regulations asked that the regulations explicitly allow taxpayers to request a modification or termination of an existing installment agreement, as was stated in existing Reg. 301.6159-1(c)(3) . The IRS adopted this recommendation in Reg. 301.6159-1(e)(3) . The IRS also adopted the commenter's suggestions that the regulations require the taxpayer to comply with the installment agreement terms while a modification request is being considered and that a proposed modification will not result in a suspension of the limitations period on collection. The IRS rejected the commenter's recommendations, however, that a taxpayer's request to modify an existing agreement should be exempt from user fees, because user fees were outside the scope of the regulation project.

Prop. Reg. 301.6159-1(e)(2)(ii)(C) stated that the IRS may modify or terminate an installment agreement if the taxpayer fails to provide a financial condition update as requested. The commenter asked that the regulations explicitly state whether the IRS may terminate an installment agreement if the taxpayer provided materially inaccurate or incomplete information. The IRS revised Reg. 301.6159-1(e)(1)(i) to reflect this recommendation. The IRS may also terminate an installment agreement if collection of any liability covered by the agreement is in jeopardy.

Reg. 301.6159-1(e)(4) provides that unless the IRS determines that tax collection is in jeopardy, the IRS will provide written notice to the taxpayer at least 30 days in advance of modifying or terminating an installment agreement that is not being done at the taxpayer's request.

The taxpayer may administratively appeal, to Appeals, the modification or termination of an installment agreement. The request for an appeal must be made in the manner provided by the IRS and be done during the 30-day period beginning the day after the modification or termination is to take effect.

Reg. 301.6159-1(f) prohibits a levy from being made to collect a tax liability that is the subject of an installment agreement:

While a proposed installment agreement is pending with the IRS.
For 30 days immediately following the rejection of a proposed installment agreement.
While an installment agreement is in effect.
For 30 days immediately following the termination of an installment agreement.
Furthermore, if the taxpayer timely appeals the rejection or termination of an installment agreement, a levy may not be made while the rejection or termination is being considered by Appeals.

These prohibitions on levy do not apply, however, if:

The taxpayer files a written notice with the IRS waiving the restriction on levy.
The IRS determines that the proposed installment agreement was submitted solely to delay collection.
The IRS determines that the collection of tax to which the agreement (or proposed agreement) relates is in jeopardy.
Even when a levy is prohibited, the IRS may take other actions to protect its interests with respect to the liability identified in the installment agreement or proposed agreement. These actions include:

Crediting an overpayment against the liability.
Filing or refilling notices of federal tax lien.
Taking action to collect from someone who is liable for the tax covered by the installment agreement or proposed agreement, but not named in the agreement.
Reg. 301.6159-1(h) requires the IRS to provide each taxpayer who is a party to an installment agreement with an annual statement. The statement must indicate the initial balance owed at the beginning of the year, the payments made during the year, and the remaining balance at year-end.

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Wednesday, January 13, 2010

A taxpayer could not deduct medical expenses incurred in connection with fathering two children by means of in vitro fertilization. The taxpayer was not infertile, and the procedures were not for the treatment of a medical condition or for the purpose of affecting any structure or function of the taxpayer’s own body. Instead, the procedures affected the bodies of two gestational carriers.
William Magdalin Petitioner-Appellant v. Commissioner of IRS Respondent-Appellee.
U.S. Court of Appeals, 1st Cir.; 09-1153, December 17, 2009.
Affirming the Tax Court, 96 TCM 491, TC Memo. 2008-293.
JUDGMENT
Petitioner William Magdalin appeals a decision of the tax court holding non-deductible certain expenses he incurred in connection with fathering two children via in vitro fertilization of an anonymous donor's eggs with petitioner's sperm and placement of the resulting embryos in unrelated gestational carriers who gave birth to them. Petitioner stipulated in the tax court proceedings that he was not infertile and that he had had two children via natural processes with his now ex-wife.
This court reviews the tax court's factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. Drake v. Comm'r, 511 F.3d 65, 68 (1st Cir. 2007). “Clear error exists, if, on the entire record, the court is ‘left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.’” Haffner's Serv. Stations, Inc. v. Comm'r, 326 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2003) (quoting Mitchell v. United States, 141 F.3d 8, 17 (1st Cir. 1998)). We agree with the tax court and therefore summarily affirm its decision. As the court concluded, the various expenses incurred by petitioner were not for the treatment of any underlying medical condition suffered by the taxpayer; as noted, he stipulated that he was not infertile and that his previous children had been produced by natural processes in conjunction with the woman who was his wife at the time. In addition, the procedures were not for the purpose of affecting any structure or function of taxpayer's own body. Rather, they affected the bodies of the gestational carriers who, petitioner agrees, were not his dependents. Consequently, the tax court properly affirmed the Commissioner's disallowance of the deductions. The decision of the tax court is summarily affirmed. See First Circuit Local Rule 27.0(c).
Affirmed.

Labels:

Friday, January 8, 2010

Charles Tummino, Plaintiff v. United States of America, Internal Revenue Service, Defendant.
U.S. District Court, Dist of Ore., Portland Div.; 06-CV-955-AC, December 14, 2009.
OPINION AND ORDER
Discussion
lity
1. Abusive tax shelter
Where the validity of the underlying tax liability is properly at issue, the Court will review the matter on a de novo basis. Goza v. C.I.R., 114 T.C. 176, 181 (2000) (citing H.R. Conf. Rep. 105-599, at 266 (1998)); see also Medlock v. United States, 325 F.Supp.2d 1064, 1076 (C.D. Cal. 2003). Therefore, this court reviews the question of Tummino's underlying tax liability de novo. To establish that Tummino participated in the promotion of an abusive tax shelter, the IRS must prove that he (1) participated in the sale of an investment plan and (2) made or furnished a statement with respect to tax benefits which he knew or had reason to know was false or fraudulent as to a material matter. 68 U.S.C. §6700(a); see also U.S. v. Campbell, 897 F.2d 1317, 1320 (5th Cir. 1990); U.S. v. Kuan, 827 F.2d 1144, 1147 (7th Cir. 1987).
Tummino argues that the IRS had not factually established that anything he did promoted an abusive tax shelter. Tummino claims generally that “there are many disputed facts.” (Pl. Mem. ¶ 35.) However, Tummino's arguments dispute the application of the law to the facts rather than the facts themselves. As discussed below, the IRS properly relied on the elements laid out in §6700(a), and elaborated on by Campbell and Kuan, in establishing the abusive nature of Tummino's behavior under the statute. Here, the first element of §6700 is satisfied by Tummino's admission that he contracted with Alpha to develop a sales force and to market the pay phone program.
To satisfy the second element, the IRS must prove that Tummino (1) made or furnished a statement with respect to tax benefits (2) which he knew or had reason to know (3) was false or fraudulent (4) as to a material matter. Campbell, 897 F.2d at 1317. First, Tummino made statements with respect to tax benefits in the marketing and training materials that he distributed to sales agents and customers, including a pamphlet and a video. Tummino alleges that after he left Alpha in 1998, Alpha hired a marketing company, SPA, to become Alpha's sole marketing agent. He further alleges that SPA discarded Tummino's marketing materials for the pay phone program in favor of materials developed by SPA. (Pl. Mem. ¶ 13-14.) Tummino, however, has failed to present even a scintilla of evidence to support these allegations.
To oppose summary judgment, Tummino relies exclusively his own conclusory allegations and those of his former attorney. “When the nonmoving party relies only on its own affidavits to oppose summary judgment, it cannot rely on conclusory allegations unsupported by factual data to create an issue of material fact.” Hansen v. U.S., 7 F.3d 137, 138 (9th Cir. 1993). As discussed in this court's prior ruling in this case, because Tummino's attorney has simply asserted having personal knowledge of “many” of the facts referred to in Tummino's opposition to summary judgment (Douglas Decl. ¶ 1), this court cannot ascertain which portions of the declaration are based on personal knowledge. Tummino's supplemental briefing on the motion for summary judgment offers no additional evidence to support his claim that his work was supplanted by that of SPA. Accordingly, this court concludes that the declaration of Tummino's attorney along with Tummino's own unsupported claims are insufficient under Rule 56(e) to oppose summary judgment.
Second, Tummino knew or had reason to know that the statements made were false or fraudulent. Tummino was a sophisticated business person with extensive experience in the sale of securities and insurance. He was aware of the importance of consulting with experts in particular fields when entering into new businesses. This is evidenced by his consultation with an attorney about whether participation in the pay phone program constituted the sale of securities.
Tummino claims that he sought the advice of a tax consultant and relied on the advice of Alpha's accountant with regard to the propriety of the pay phone program, but the record contains no evidence that he conferred with a tax consultant prior to entering into the pay phone program. Instead, Tummino relies only on the conclusory and general statements in his attorney's declaration, which this court already has found to be insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Tummino's alternative argument in his supplemental briefing, that he did not know or have reason to know that his statements were false because they were based on other literature promoting pay phone services, similarly fails, as he presents insufficient evidence that such literature existed or that he consulted such literature prior making statements concerning the tax benefits of the payphone program. 2 As a result, Tummino has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he knew or should have known that he was supplying false statements about the tax benefits of the pay phone programs.
Third, Tummino has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the statements he made in promotion of the pay phone program were false or fraudulent. In fact, Tummino does not even contest the IRS determination that the deductions and credits that he promised as a part of the pay phone program were not allowable.
Fourth and finally, Tummino's statements made in promotion of the pay phone program were material. A matter is considered material under §6700 “if it would have a substantial impact on the decision making process of a reasonably prudent investor.” U.S. v. Buttorff, 761 F.2d 1056, 1062 (5th Cir. 1985) (quoting S. REP. NO. 97-494, at 267 (1982)). In Buttorff, the Fifth Circuit held that this test was met where the taxpayer assured customers that the purported tax benefits of the tax shelter were lawful, despite consistent rejection of similar shelters by the courts. Id. The taxpayer in Buttorff counseled his clients not to seek separate opinions from lawyers or accountants. Id. Many of the victims of the tax shelter in Buttorff testified that had they known of the IRS's treatment of these shelters, they probably would not have invested in them. Id.
In this case, it strains reason to think that the tax shelter component of the pay phone program was not a material consideration to those who enrolled in it. The only evidence in the record on this point is Tummino's acknowledgment that the tax credit is what attracted the customers of the payphone program. Further, the target market for the program is similar to that in Buttorff: apparently unsophisticated investors who were not in the business the previous year and to whom the taxpayer gave certain assurances regarding return on investment and taxability. No evidence allows a reasonable inference other than that the tax credit is what interested customers in the pay phone program and that, as with victims in Buttorff, they would have been less likely to invest in the pay phones had they known of the IRS's treatment of the deductions and tax credits promised by Tummino. Thus, the promise of deductions and tax credits as a result of investment in the pay phone program is material.
Accordingly, Tummino has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to any of the elements of the IRS's conclusion that Tummino committed a violation of §6700.
2. Penalty
Tummino also argues that the IRS miscalculated the penalty under §6700 because it “assumes, without supporting factual basis, that [Tummino] actively promoted all 31,000 sales.” (Pl. Mem. ¶43.) Any person who “makes or furnishes or causes another person to make or furnish” a statement which the person knows or has reason to know is false or fraudulent as to any material matter is subject to the penalty under the statute. §6700(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added). Tummino does not contest the total number of phone sales made under the program. Nor does he contest the fact that he continued to have a financial interest in the pay phone program after he ceased to actively participate in the program. Furthermore, as discussed earlier, Tummino does not provide sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Alpha and SPA discarded the marketing and training materials developed by Tummino to market the pay phone program.
Taxpayers who violate §6700 are subject to “a penalty equal to the $1,000 or, if the person establishes that it is lesser, 100 percent of the gross income derived (or to be derived) by such person from such activity” with respect to “each activity.” §6700(a)(2). Thus, Tummino is subject to the lesser of $31,000,000 (31,000 sales multiplied by $1,000 per sale) or $1,437,450 (the total income derived by Tummino from the pay phone program). Because Tummino fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the IRS properly counted the number of sales as applied to the calculation of the penalty and does not contest the total income derived from the pay phone program, the court will not disturb the IRS's determination that Tummino's liability is $1,437,450.
C. Collectibility
Where the validity of the underlying tax liability is not at issue, the court will review the administrative determination for abuse of discretion. Goza, 114 T.C. at 181 (citing H.R. Conf. Rep. 105-599, at 266 (1998)); see also Medlock, 325 F.Supp.2d at 1076. Having determined the underlying tax liability to be established, the court reviews the question of Tummino's doubts as to collectibility under an abuse of discretion standard. An abuse of discretion is a “‘plain error,’ namely, ‘discretion exercised to an end not justified by the evidence, a judgment that is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts as are found.’” Medlock, 325 F.Supp.2d at 1076 (citing Wing v. Asarco, Inc., 114 F.3d 986 (9th Cir. 1997)). An abuse of discretion occurs when a decision is based “on an erroneous view of the law or a clearly erroneous assessment of the facts.” Fargo v. Commissioner, 447 F.3d 706, 709 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).
Tummino fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the IRS abused its discretion by concluding that he had dissipated assets and including those assets in the minimum acceptable offer. The Internal Revenue Manual (“IRM”) provides that when the taxpayer can show that assets have been dissipated to provide for necessary living expenses, these amounts should not be included in the reasonable collection potential (“RCP”). I.R.M. 5.8.5.4(4). 3 If the assets have been dissipated with a disregard of the outstanding tax liability, the IRS should consider including the value in the RCP. I.R.M. 5.8.5.4(5). If the taxpayer does not provide information showing the disposition of funds from dissipated assets, the IRS should consider including a portion or all of these values in an acceptable offer amount. I.R.M. 5.8.5.4(6). The IRM further provides that an offer may be returned at any time during processing if the taxpayer fails to provide information necessary to determine whether it should be accepted. 5.8.7.2.2.2(1). Consistent with these provisions, the IRS reasonably requested documents from Tummino pertaining to the disposition of the funds drawn from Tummino's IRA.
Tummino alleges that, contrary to the assertion of the IRS, he provided evidence that the withdrawals from his IRA were not dissipated assets. (Pl. Mem. ¶9.) Tummino, however, has not produced copies of any of the information that he alleges he submitted to the IRS for review. Even after Tummino obtained additional discovery, he failed to provide evidence that the withdrawals from his IRA were not dissipated assets. As a result, Tummino fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the IRS abused its discretion by concluding that Tummino had dissipated assets and including those assets in the minimum acceptable offer. Therefore, the court will not disturb the IRS's determination of collectibility.
Conclusion
The United States' motion for summary judgment (#28) is GRANTED.
DATED this 14th day of December, 2009.

Footnotes


1
The parties have consented to jurisdiction by magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §631(c)(1).
2
Even if this court accepted Tummino's allegation of reliance on other literature as a basis for his knowledge, or lack thereof, of the tax benefits of pay phone programs, a review of Tummino's claims as to the contents of the "thesis" on which he relies reveal no literature discussing the tax benefits of pay phone programs.
3
The Secretary of Treasury or his designees may prescribe regulations to carry out the duties and power of the Secretary, including collection of receipts. 31 U.S.C. §321 (2009). The IRM establishes the organization and procedures of the IRS under the authority granted by §321.

Labels:

Charles Tummino, Plaintiff v. United States of America, Internal Revenue Service, Defendant.
U.S. District Court, Dist of Ore., Portland Div.; 06-CV-955-AC, December 14, 2009.
OPINION AND ORDER
Discussion
lity
1. Abusive tax shelter
Where the validity of the underlying tax liability is properly at issue, the Court will review the matter on a de novo basis. Goza v. C.I.R., 114 T.C. 176, 181 (2000) (citing H.R. Conf. Rep. 105-599, at 266 (1998)); see also Medlock v. United States, 325 F.Supp.2d 1064, 1076 (C.D. Cal. 2003). Therefore, this court reviews the question of Tummino's underlying tax liability de novo. To establish that Tummino participated in the promotion of an abusive tax shelter, the IRS must prove that he (1) participated in the sale of an investment plan and (2) made or furnished a statement with respect to tax benefits which he knew or had reason to know was false or fraudulent as to a material matter. 68 U.S.C. §6700(a); see also U.S. v. Campbell, 897 F.2d 1317, 1320 (5th Cir. 1990); U.S. v. Kuan, 827 F.2d 1144, 1147 (7th Cir. 1987).
Tummino argues that the IRS had not factually established that anything he did promoted an abusive tax shelter. Tummino claims generally that “there are many disputed facts.” (Pl. Mem. ¶ 35.) However, Tummino's arguments dispute the application of the law to the facts rather than the facts themselves. As discussed below, the IRS properly relied on the elements laid out in §6700(a), and elaborated on by Campbell and Kuan, in establishing the abusive nature of Tummino's behavior under the statute. Here, the first element of §6700 is satisfied by Tummino's admission that he contracted with Alpha to develop a sales force and to market the pay phone program.
To satisfy the second element, the IRS must prove that Tummino (1) made or furnished a statement with respect to tax benefits (2) which he knew or had reason to know (3) was false or fraudulent (4) as to a material matter. Campbell, 897 F.2d at 1317. First, Tummino made statements with respect to tax benefits in the marketing and training materials that he distributed to sales agents and customers, including a pamphlet and a video. Tummino alleges that after he left Alpha in 1998, Alpha hired a marketing company, SPA, to become Alpha's sole marketing agent. He further alleges that SPA discarded Tummino's marketing materials for the pay phone program in favor of materials developed by SPA. (Pl. Mem. ¶ 13-14.) Tummino, however, has failed to present even a scintilla of evidence to support these allegations.
To oppose summary judgment, Tummino relies exclusively his own conclusory allegations and those of his former attorney. “When the nonmoving party relies only on its own affidavits to oppose summary judgment, it cannot rely on conclusory allegations unsupported by factual data to create an issue of material fact.” Hansen v. U.S., 7 F.3d 137, 138 (9th Cir. 1993). As discussed in this court's prior ruling in this case, because Tummino's attorney has simply asserted having personal knowledge of “many” of the facts referred to in Tummino's opposition to summary judgment (Douglas Decl. ¶ 1), this court cannot ascertain which portions of the declaration are based on personal knowledge. Tummino's supplemental briefing on the motion for summary judgment offers no additional evidence to support his claim that his work was supplanted by that of SPA. Accordingly, this court concludes that the declaration of Tummino's attorney along with Tummino's own unsupported claims are insufficient under Rule 56(e) to oppose summary judgment.
Second, Tummino knew or had reason to know that the statements made were false or fraudulent. Tummino was a sophisticated business person with extensive experience in the sale of securities and insurance. He was aware of the importance of consulting with experts in particular fields when entering into new businesses. This is evidenced by his consultation with an attorney about whether participation in the pay phone program constituted the sale of securities.
Tummino claims that he sought the advice of a tax consultant and relied on the advice of Alpha's accountant with regard to the propriety of the pay phone program, but the record contains no evidence that he conferred with a tax consultant prior to entering into the pay phone program. Instead, Tummino relies only on the conclusory and general statements in his attorney's declaration, which this court already has found to be insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Tummino's alternative argument in his supplemental briefing, that he did not know or have reason to know that his statements were false because they were based on other literature promoting pay phone services, similarly fails, as he presents insufficient evidence that such literature existed or that he consulted such literature prior making statements concerning the tax benefits of the payphone program. 2 As a result, Tummino has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he knew or should have known that he was supplying false statements about the tax benefits of the pay phone programs.
Third, Tummino has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the statements he made in promotion of the pay phone program were false or fraudulent. In fact, Tummino does not even contest the IRS determination that the deductions and credits that he promised as a part of the pay phone program were not allowable.
Fourth and finally, Tummino's statements made in promotion of the pay phone program were material. A matter is considered material under §6700 “if it would have a substantial impact on the decision making process of a reasonably prudent investor.” U.S. v. Buttorff, 761 F.2d 1056, 1062 (5th Cir. 1985) (quoting S. REP. NO. 97-494, at 267 (1982)). In Buttorff, the Fifth Circuit held that this test was met where the taxpayer assured customers that the purported tax benefits of the tax shelter were lawful, despite consistent rejection of similar shelters by the courts. Id. The taxpayer in Buttorff counseled his clients not to seek separate opinions from lawyers or accountants. Id. Many of the victims of the tax shelter in Buttorff testified that had they known of the IRS's treatment of these shelters, they probably would not have invested in them. Id.
In this case, it strains reason to think that the tax shelter component of the pay phone program was not a material consideration to those who enrolled in it. The only evidence in the record on this point is Tummino's acknowledgment that the tax credit is what attracted the customers of the payphone program. Further, the target market for the program is similar to that in Buttorff: apparently unsophisticated investors who were not in the business the previous year and to whom the taxpayer gave certain assurances regarding return on investment and taxability. No evidence allows a reasonable inference other than that the tax credit is what interested customers in the pay phone program and that, as with victims in Buttorff, they would have been less likely to invest in the pay phones had they known of the IRS's treatment of the deductions and tax credits promised by Tummino. Thus, the promise of deductions and tax credits as a result of investment in the pay phone program is material.
Accordingly, Tummino has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to any of the elements of the IRS's conclusion that Tummino committed a violation of §6700.
2. Penalty
Tummino also argues that the IRS miscalculated the penalty under §6700 because it “assumes, without supporting factual basis, that [Tummino] actively promoted all 31,000 sales.” (Pl. Mem. ¶43.) Any person who “makes or furnishes or causes another person to make or furnish” a statement which the person knows or has reason to know is false or fraudulent as to any material matter is subject to the penalty under the statute. §6700(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added). Tummino does not contest the total number of phone sales made under the program. Nor does he contest the fact that he continued to have a financial interest in the pay phone program after he ceased to actively participate in the program. Furthermore, as discussed earlier, Tummino does not provide sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Alpha and SPA discarded the marketing and training materials developed by Tummino to market the pay phone program.
Taxpayers who violate §6700 are subject to “a penalty equal to the $1,000 or, if the person establishes that it is lesser, 100 percent of the gross income derived (or to be derived) by such person from such activity” with respect to “each activity.” §6700(a)(2). Thus, Tummino is subject to the lesser of $31,000,000 (31,000 sales multiplied by $1,000 per sale) or $1,437,450 (the total income derived by Tummino from the pay phone program). Because Tummino fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the IRS properly counted the number of sales as applied to the calculation of the penalty and does not contest the total income derived from the pay phone program, the court will not disturb the IRS's determination that Tummino's liability is $1,437,450.
C. Collectibility
Where the validity of the underlying tax liability is not at issue, the court will review the administrative determination for abuse of discretion. Goza, 114 T.C. at 181 (citing H.R. Conf. Rep. 105-599, at 266 (1998)); see also Medlock, 325 F.Supp.2d at 1076. Having determined the underlying tax liability to be established, the court reviews the question of Tummino's doubts as to collectibility under an abuse of discretion standard. An abuse of discretion is a “‘plain error,’ namely, ‘discretion exercised to an end not justified by the evidence, a judgment that is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts as are found.’” Medlock, 325 F.Supp.2d at 1076 (citing Wing v. Asarco, Inc., 114 F.3d 986 (9th Cir. 1997)). An abuse of discretion occurs when a decision is based “on an erroneous view of the law or a clearly erroneous assessment of the facts.” Fargo v. Commissioner, 447 F.3d 706, 709 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).
Tummino fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the IRS abused its discretion by concluding that he had dissipated assets and including those assets in the minimum acceptable offer. The Internal Revenue Manual (“IRM”) provides that when the taxpayer can show that assets have been dissipated to provide for necessary living expenses, these amounts should not be included in the reasonable collection potential (“RCP”). I.R.M. 5.8.5.4(4). 3 If the assets have been dissipated with a disregard of the outstanding tax liability, the IRS should consider including the value in the RCP. I.R.M. 5.8.5.4(5). If the taxpayer does not provide information showing the disposition of funds from dissipated assets, the IRS should consider including a portion or all of these values in an acceptable offer amount. I.R.M. 5.8.5.4(6). The IRM further provides that an offer may be returned at any time during processing if the taxpayer fails to provide information necessary to determine whether it should be accepted. 5.8.7.2.2.2(1). Consistent with these provisions, the IRS reasonably requested documents from Tummino pertaining to the disposition of the funds drawn from Tummino's IRA.
Tummino alleges that, contrary to the assertion of the IRS, he provided evidence that the withdrawals from his IRA were not dissipated assets. (Pl. Mem. ¶9.) Tummino, however, has not produced copies of any of the information that he alleges he submitted to the IRS for review. Even after Tummino obtained additional discovery, he failed to provide evidence that the withdrawals from his IRA were not dissipated assets. As a result, Tummino fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the IRS abused its discretion by concluding that Tummino had dissipated assets and including those assets in the minimum acceptable offer. Therefore, the court will not disturb the IRS's determination of collectibility.
Conclusion
The United States' motion for summary judgment (#28) is GRANTED.
DATED this 14th day of December, 2009.

Footnotes


1
The parties have consented to jurisdiction by magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §631(c)(1).
2
Even if this court accepted Tummino's allegation of reliance on other literature as a basis for his knowledge, or lack thereof, of the tax benefits of pay phone programs, a review of Tummino's claims as to the contents of the "thesis" on which he relies reveal no literature discussing the tax benefits of pay phone programs.
3
The Secretary of Treasury or his designees may prescribe regulations to carry out the duties and power of the Secretary, including collection of receipts. 31 U.S.C. §321 (2009). The IRM establishes the organization and procedures of the IRS under the authority granted by §321.

Labels:

Charles Tummino, Plaintiff v. United States of America, Internal Revenue Service, Defendant.
U.S. District Court, Dist of Ore., Portland Div.; 06-CV-955-AC, December 14, 2009.
OPINION AND ORDER
Discussion
lity
1. Abusive tax shelter
Where the validity of the underlying tax liability is properly at issue, the Court will review the matter on a de novo basis. Goza v. C.I.R., 114 T.C. 176, 181 (2000) (citing H.R. Conf. Rep. 105-599, at 266 (1998)); see also Medlock v. United States, 325 F.Supp.2d 1064, 1076 (C.D. Cal. 2003). Therefore, this court reviews the question of Tummino's underlying tax liability de novo. To establish that Tummino participated in the promotion of an abusive tax shelter, the IRS must prove that he (1) participated in the sale of an investment plan and (2) made or furnished a statement with respect to tax benefits which he knew or had reason to know was false or fraudulent as to a material matter. 68 U.S.C. §6700(a); see also U.S. v. Campbell, 897 F.2d 1317, 1320 (5th Cir. 1990); U.S. v. Kuan, 827 F.2d 1144, 1147 (7th Cir. 1987).
Tummino argues that the IRS had not factually established that anything he did promoted an abusive tax shelter. Tummino claims generally that “there are many disputed facts.” (Pl. Mem. ¶ 35.) However, Tummino's arguments dispute the application of the law to the facts rather than the facts themselves. As discussed below, the IRS properly relied on the elements laid out in §6700(a), and elaborated on by Campbell and Kuan, in establishing the abusive nature of Tummino's behavior under the statute. Here, the first element of §6700 is satisfied by Tummino's admission that he contracted with Alpha to develop a sales force and to market the pay phone program.
To satisfy the second element, the IRS must prove that Tummino (1) made or furnished a statement with respect to tax benefits (2) which he knew or had reason to know (3) was false or fraudulent (4) as to a material matter. Campbell, 897 F.2d at 1317. First, Tummino made statements with respect to tax benefits in the marketing and training materials that he distributed to sales agents and customers, including a pamphlet and a video. Tummino alleges that after he left Alpha in 1998, Alpha hired a marketing company, SPA, to become Alpha's sole marketing agent. He further alleges that SPA discarded Tummino's marketing materials for the pay phone program in favor of materials developed by SPA. (Pl. Mem. ¶ 13-14.) Tummino, however, has failed to present even a scintilla of evidence to support these allegations.
To oppose summary judgment, Tummino relies exclusively his own conclusory allegations and those of his former attorney. “When the nonmoving party relies only on its own affidavits to oppose summary judgment, it cannot rely on conclusory allegations unsupported by factual data to create an issue of material fact.” Hansen v. U.S., 7 F.3d 137, 138 (9th Cir. 1993). As discussed in this court's prior ruling in this case, because Tummino's attorney has simply asserted having personal knowledge of “many” of the facts referred to in Tummino's opposition to summary judgment (Douglas Decl. ¶ 1), this court cannot ascertain which portions of the declaration are based on personal knowledge. Tummino's supplemental briefing on the motion for summary judgment offers no additional evidence to support his claim that his work was supplanted by that of SPA. Accordingly, this court concludes that the declaration of Tummino's attorney along with Tummino's own unsupported claims are insufficient under Rule 56(e) to oppose summary judgment.
Second, Tummino knew or had reason to know that the statements made were false or fraudulent. Tummino was a sophisticated business person with extensive experience in the sale of securities and insurance. He was aware of the importance of consulting with experts in particular fields when entering into new businesses. This is evidenced by his consultation with an attorney about whether participation in the pay phone program constituted the sale of securities.
Tummino claims that he sought the advice of a tax consultant and relied on the advice of Alpha's accountant with regard to the propriety of the pay phone program, but the record contains no evidence that he conferred with a tax consultant prior to entering into the pay phone program. Instead, Tummino relies only on the conclusory and general statements in his attorney's declaration, which this court already has found to be insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Tummino's alternative argument in his supplemental briefing, that he did not know or have reason to know that his statements were false because they were based on other literature promoting pay phone services, similarly fails, as he presents insufficient evidence that such literature existed or that he consulted such literature prior making statements concerning the tax benefits of the payphone program. 2 As a result, Tummino has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he knew or should have known that he was supplying false statements about the tax benefits of the pay phone programs.
Third, Tummino has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the statements he made in promotion of the pay phone program were false or fraudulent. In fact, Tummino does not even contest the IRS determination that the deductions and credits that he promised as a part of the pay phone program were not allowable.
Fourth and finally, Tummino's statements made in promotion of the pay phone program were material. A matter is considered material under §6700 “if it would have a substantial impact on the decision making process of a reasonably prudent investor.” U.S. v. Buttorff, 761 F.2d 1056, 1062 (5th Cir. 1985) (quoting S. REP. NO. 97-494, at 267 (1982)). In Buttorff, the Fifth Circuit held that this test was met where the taxpayer assured customers that the purported tax benefits of the tax shelter were lawful, despite consistent rejection of similar shelters by the courts. Id. The taxpayer in Buttorff counseled his clients not to seek separate opinions from lawyers or accountants. Id. Many of the victims of the tax shelter in Buttorff testified that had they known of the IRS's treatment of these shelters, they probably would not have invested in them. Id.
In this case, it strains reason to think that the tax shelter component of the pay phone program was not a material consideration to those who enrolled in it. The only evidence in the record on this point is Tummino's acknowledgment that the tax credit is what attracted the customers of the payphone program. Further, the target market for the program is similar to that in Buttorff: apparently unsophisticated investors who were not in the business the previous year and to whom the taxpayer gave certain assurances regarding return on investment and taxability. No evidence allows a reasonable inference other than that the tax credit is what interested customers in the pay phone program and that, as with victims in Buttorff, they would have been less likely to invest in the pay phones had they known of the IRS's treatment of the deductions and tax credits promised by Tummino. Thus, the promise of deductions and tax credits as a result of investment in the pay phone program is material.
Accordingly, Tummino has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to any of the elements of the IRS's conclusion that Tummino committed a violation of §6700.
2. Penalty
Tummino also argues that the IRS miscalculated the penalty under §6700 because it “assumes, without supporting factual basis, that [Tummino] actively promoted all 31,000 sales.” (Pl. Mem. ¶43.) Any person who “makes or furnishes or causes another person to make or furnish” a statement which the person knows or has reason to know is false or fraudulent as to any material matter is subject to the penalty under the statute. §6700(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added). Tummino does not contest the total number of phone sales made under the program. Nor does he contest the fact that he continued to have a financial interest in the pay phone program after he ceased to actively participate in the program. Furthermore, as discussed earlier, Tummino does not provide sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Alpha and SPA discarded the marketing and training materials developed by Tummino to market the pay phone program.
Taxpayers who violate §6700 are subject to “a penalty equal to the $1,000 or, if the person establishes that it is lesser, 100 percent of the gross income derived (or to be derived) by such person from such activity” with respect to “each activity.” §6700(a)(2). Thus, Tummino is subject to the lesser of $31,000,000 (31,000 sales multiplied by $1,000 per sale) or $1,437,450 (the total income derived by Tummino from the pay phone program). Because Tummino fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the IRS properly counted the number of sales as applied to the calculation of the penalty and does not contest the total income derived from the pay phone program, the court will not disturb the IRS's determination that Tummino's liability is $1,437,450.
C. Collectibility
Where the validity of the underlying tax liability is not at issue, the court will review the administrative determination for abuse of discretion. Goza, 114 T.C. at 181 (citing H.R. Conf. Rep. 105-599, at 266 (1998)); see also Medlock, 325 F.Supp.2d at 1076. Having determined the underlying tax liability to be established, the court reviews the question of Tummino's doubts as to collectibility under an abuse of discretion standard. An abuse of discretion is a “‘plain error,’ namely, ‘discretion exercised to an end not justified by the evidence, a judgment that is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts as are found.’” Medlock, 325 F.Supp.2d at 1076 (citing Wing v. Asarco, Inc., 114 F.3d 986 (9th Cir. 1997)). An abuse of discretion occurs when a decision is based “on an erroneous view of the law or a clearly erroneous assessment of the facts.” Fargo v. Commissioner, 447 F.3d 706, 709 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).
Tummino fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the IRS abused its discretion by concluding that he had dissipated assets and including those assets in the minimum acceptable offer. The Internal Revenue Manual (“IRM”) provides that when the taxpayer can show that assets have been dissipated to provide for necessary living expenses, these amounts should not be included in the reasonable collection potential (“RCP”). I.R.M. 5.8.5.4(4). 3 If the assets have been dissipated with a disregard of the outstanding tax liability, the IRS should consider including the value in the RCP. I.R.M. 5.8.5.4(5). If the taxpayer does not provide information showing the disposition of funds from dissipated assets, the IRS should consider including a portion or all of these values in an acceptable offer amount. I.R.M. 5.8.5.4(6). The IRM further provides that an offer may be returned at any time during processing if the taxpayer fails to provide information necessary to determine whether it should be accepted. 5.8.7.2.2.2(1). Consistent with these provisions, the IRS reasonably requested documents from Tummino pertaining to the disposition of the funds drawn from Tummino's IRA.
Tummino alleges that, contrary to the assertion of the IRS, he provided evidence that the withdrawals from his IRA were not dissipated assets. (Pl. Mem. ¶9.) Tummino, however, has not produced copies of any of the information that he alleges he submitted to the IRS for review. Even after Tummino obtained additional discovery, he failed to provide evidence that the withdrawals from his IRA were not dissipated assets. As a result, Tummino fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the IRS abused its discretion by concluding that Tummino had dissipated assets and including those assets in the minimum acceptable offer. Therefore, the court will not disturb the IRS's determination of collectibility.
Conclusion
The United States' motion for summary judgment (#28) is GRANTED.
DATED this 14th day of December, 2009.

Footnotes


1
The parties have consented to jurisdiction by magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §631(c)(1).
2
Even if this court accepted Tummino's allegation of reliance on other literature as a basis for his knowledge, or lack thereof, of the tax benefits of pay phone programs, a review of Tummino's claims as to the contents of the "thesis" on which he relies reveal no literature discussing the tax benefits of pay phone programs.
3
The Secretary of Treasury or his designees may prescribe regulations to carry out the duties and power of the Secretary, including collection of receipts. 31 U.S.C. §321 (2009). The IRM establishes the organization and procedures of the IRS under the authority granted by §321.

Labels:

Charles Tummino, Plaintiff v. United States of America, Internal Revenue Service, Defendant.
U.S. District Court, Dist of Ore., Portland Div.; 06-CV-955-AC, December 14, 2009.
OPINION AND ORDER
Discussion
lity
1. Abusive tax shelter
Where the validity of the underlying tax liability is properly at issue, the Court will review the matter on a de novo basis. Goza v. C.I.R., 114 T.C. 176, 181 (2000) (citing H.R. Conf. Rep. 105-599, at 266 (1998)); see also Medlock v. United States, 325 F.Supp.2d 1064, 1076 (C.D. Cal. 2003). Therefore, this court reviews the question of Tummino's underlying tax liability de novo. To establish that Tummino participated in the promotion of an abusive tax shelter, the IRS must prove that he (1) participated in the sale of an investment plan and (2) made or furnished a statement with respect to tax benefits which he knew or had reason to know was false or fraudulent as to a material matter. 68 U.S.C. §6700(a); see also U.S. v. Campbell, 897 F.2d 1317, 1320 (5th Cir. 1990); U.S. v. Kuan, 827 F.2d 1144, 1147 (7th Cir. 1987).
Tummino argues that the IRS had not factually established that anything he did promoted an abusive tax shelter. Tummino claims generally that “there are many disputed facts.” (Pl. Mem. ¶ 35.) However, Tummino's arguments dispute the application of the law to the facts rather than the facts themselves. As discussed below, the IRS properly relied on the elements laid out in §6700(a), and elaborated on by Campbell and Kuan, in establishing the abusive nature of Tummino's behavior under the statute. Here, the first element of §6700 is satisfied by Tummino's admission that he contracted with Alpha to develop a sales force and to market the pay phone program.
To satisfy the second element, the IRS must prove that Tummino (1) made or furnished a statement with respect to tax benefits (2) which he knew or had reason to know (3) was false or fraudulent (4) as to a material matter. Campbell, 897 F.2d at 1317. First, Tummino made statements with respect to tax benefits in the marketing and training materials that he distributed to sales agents and customers, including a pamphlet and a video. Tummino alleges that after he left Alpha in 1998, Alpha hired a marketing company, SPA, to become Alpha's sole marketing agent. He further alleges that SPA discarded Tummino's marketing materials for the pay phone program in favor of materials developed by SPA. (Pl. Mem. ¶ 13-14.) Tummino, however, has failed to present even a scintilla of evidence to support these allegations.
To oppose summary judgment, Tummino relies exclusively his own conclusory allegations and those of his former attorney. “When the nonmoving party relies only on its own affidavits to oppose summary judgment, it cannot rely on conclusory allegations unsupported by factual data to create an issue of material fact.” Hansen v. U.S., 7 F.3d 137, 138 (9th Cir. 1993). As discussed in this court's prior ruling in this case, because Tummino's attorney has simply asserted having personal knowledge of “many” of the facts referred to in Tummino's opposition to summary judgment (Douglas Decl. ¶ 1), this court cannot ascertain which portions of the declaration are based on personal knowledge. Tummino's supplemental briefing on the motion for summary judgment offers no additional evidence to support his claim that his work was supplanted by that of SPA. Accordingly, this court concludes that the declaration of Tummino's attorney along with Tummino's own unsupported claims are insufficient under Rule 56(e) to oppose summary judgment.
Second, Tummino knew or had reason to know that the statements made were false or fraudulent. Tummino was a sophisticated business person with extensive experience in the sale of securities and insurance. He was aware of the importance of consulting with experts in particular fields when entering into new businesses. This is evidenced by his consultation with an attorney about whether participation in the pay phone program constituted the sale of securities.
Tummino claims that he sought the advice of a tax consultant and relied on the advice of Alpha's accountant with regard to the propriety of the pay phone program, but the record contains no evidence that he conferred with a tax consultant prior to entering into the pay phone program. Instead, Tummino relies only on the conclusory and general statements in his attorney's declaration, which this court already has found to be insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Tummino's alternative argument in his supplemental briefing, that he did not know or have reason to know that his statements were false because they were based on other literature promoting pay phone services, similarly fails, as he presents insufficient evidence that such literature existed or that he consulted such literature prior making statements concerning the tax benefits of the payphone program. 2 As a result, Tummino has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he knew or should have known that he was supplying false statements about the tax benefits of the pay phone programs.
Third, Tummino has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the statements he made in promotion of the pay phone program were false or fraudulent. In fact, Tummino does not even contest the IRS determination that the deductions and credits that he promised as a part of the pay phone program were not allowable.
Fourth and finally, Tummino's statements made in promotion of the pay phone program were material. A matter is considered material under §6700 “if it would have a substantial impact on the decision making process of a reasonably prudent investor.” U.S. v. Buttorff, 761 F.2d 1056, 1062 (5th Cir. 1985) (quoting S. REP. NO. 97-494, at 267 (1982)). In Buttorff, the Fifth Circuit held that this test was met where the taxpayer assured customers that the purported tax benefits of the tax shelter were lawful, despite consistent rejection of similar shelters by the courts. Id. The taxpayer in Buttorff counseled his clients not to seek separate opinions from lawyers or accountants. Id. Many of the victims of the tax shelter in Buttorff testified that had they known of the IRS's treatment of these shelters, they probably would not have invested in them. Id.
In this case, it strains reason to think that the tax shelter component of the pay phone program was not a material consideration to those who enrolled in it. The only evidence in the record on this point is Tummino's acknowledgment that the tax credit is what attracted the customers of the payphone program. Further, the target market for the program is similar to that in Buttorff: apparently unsophisticated investors who were not in the business the previous year and to whom the taxpayer gave certain assurances regarding return on investment and taxability. No evidence allows a reasonable inference other than that the tax credit is what interested customers in the pay phone program and that, as with victims in Buttorff, they would have been less likely to invest in the pay phones had they known of the IRS's treatment of the deductions and tax credits promised by Tummino. Thus, the promise of deductions and tax credits as a result of investment in the pay phone program is material.
Accordingly, Tummino has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to any of the elements of the IRS's conclusion that Tummino committed a violation of §6700.
2. Penalty
Tummino also argues that the IRS miscalculated the penalty under §6700 because it “assumes, without supporting factual basis, that [Tummino] actively promoted all 31,000 sales.” (Pl. Mem. ¶43.) Any person who “makes or furnishes or causes another person to make or furnish” a statement which the person knows or has reason to know is false or fraudulent as to any material matter is subject to the penalty under the statute. §6700(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added). Tummino does not contest the total number of phone sales made under the program. Nor does he contest the fact that he continued to have a financial interest in the pay phone program after he ceased to actively participate in the program. Furthermore, as discussed earlier, Tummino does not provide sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Alpha and SPA discarded the marketing and training materials developed by Tummino to market the pay phone program.
Taxpayers who violate §6700 are subject to “a penalty equal to the $1,000 or, if the person establishes that it is lesser, 100 percent of the gross income derived (or to be derived) by such person from such activity” with respect to “each activity.” §6700(a)(2). Thus, Tummino is subject to the lesser of $31,000,000 (31,000 sales multiplied by $1,000 per sale) or $1,437,450 (the total income derived by Tummino from the pay phone program). Because Tummino fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the IRS properly counted the number of sales as applied to the calculation of the penalty and does not contest the total income derived from the pay phone program, the court will not disturb the IRS's determination that Tummino's liability is $1,437,450.
C. Collectibility
Where the validity of the underlying tax liability is not at issue, the court will review the administrative determination for abuse of discretion. Goza, 114 T.C. at 181 (citing H.R. Conf. Rep. 105-599, at 266 (1998)); see also Medlock, 325 F.Supp.2d at 1076. Having determined the underlying tax liability to be established, the court reviews the question of Tummino's doubts as to collectibility under an abuse of discretion standard. An abuse of discretion is a “‘plain error,’ namely, ‘discretion exercised to an end not justified by the evidence, a judgment that is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts as are found.’” Medlock, 325 F.Supp.2d at 1076 (citing Wing v. Asarco, Inc., 114 F.3d 986 (9th Cir. 1997)). An abuse of discretion occurs when a decision is based “on an erroneous view of the law or a clearly erroneous assessment of the facts.” Fargo v. Commissioner, 447 F.3d 706, 709 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).
Tummino fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the IRS abused its discretion by concluding that he had dissipated assets and including those assets in the minimum acceptable offer. The Internal Revenue Manual (“IRM”) provides that when the taxpayer can show that assets have been dissipated to provide for necessary living expenses, these amounts should not be included in the reasonable collection potential (“RCP”). I.R.M. 5.8.5.4(4). 3 If the assets have been dissipated with a disregard of the outstanding tax liability, the IRS should consider including the value in the RCP. I.R.M. 5.8.5.4(5). If the taxpayer does not provide information showing the disposition of funds from dissipated assets, the IRS should consider including a portion or all of these values in an acceptable offer amount. I.R.M. 5.8.5.4(6). The IRM further provides that an offer may be returned at any time during processing if the taxpayer fails to provide information necessary to determine whether it should be accepted. 5.8.7.2.2.2(1). Consistent with these provisions, the IRS reasonably requested documents from Tummino pertaining to the disposition of the funds drawn from Tummino's IRA.
Tummino alleges that, contrary to the assertion of the IRS, he provided evidence that the withdrawals from his IRA were not dissipated assets. (Pl. Mem. ¶9.) Tummino, however, has not produced copies of any of the information that he alleges he submitted to the IRS for review. Even after Tummino obtained additional discovery, he failed to provide evidence that the withdrawals from his IRA were not dissipated assets. As a result, Tummino fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the IRS abused its discretion by concluding that Tummino had dissipated assets and including those assets in the minimum acceptable offer. Therefore, the court will not disturb the IRS's determination of collectibility.
Conclusion
The United States' motion for summary judgment (#28) is GRANTED.
DATED this 14th day of December, 2009.

Footnotes


1
The parties have consented to jurisdiction by magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §631(c)(1).
2
Even if this court accepted Tummino's allegation of reliance on other literature as a basis for his knowledge, or lack thereof, of the tax benefits of pay phone programs, a review of Tummino's claims as to the contents of the "thesis" on which he relies reveal no literature discussing the tax benefits of pay phone programs.
3
The Secretary of Treasury or his designees may prescribe regulations to carry out the duties and power of the Secretary, including collection of receipts. 31 U.S.C. §321 (2009). The IRM establishes the organization and procedures of the IRS under the authority granted by §321.

Labels:

Charles Tummino, Plaintiff v. United States of America, Internal Revenue Service, Defendant.
U.S. District Court, Dist of Ore., Portland Div.; 06-CV-955-AC, December 14, 2009.
OPINION AND ORDER
Discussion
lity
1. Abusive tax shelter
Where the validity of the underlying tax liability is properly at issue, the Court will review the matter on a de novo basis. Goza v. C.I.R., 114 T.C. 176, 181 (2000) (citing H.R. Conf. Rep. 105-599, at 266 (1998)); see also Medlock v. United States, 325 F.Supp.2d 1064, 1076 (C.D. Cal. 2003). Therefore, this court reviews the question of Tummino's underlying tax liability de novo. To establish that Tummino participated in the promotion of an abusive tax shelter, the IRS must prove that he (1) participated in the sale of an investment plan and (2) made or furnished a statement with respect to tax benefits which he knew or had reason to know was false or fraudulent as to a material matter. 68 U.S.C. §6700(a); see also U.S. v. Campbell, 897 F.2d 1317, 1320 (5th Cir. 1990); U.S. v. Kuan, 827 F.2d 1144, 1147 (7th Cir. 1987).
Tummino argues that the IRS had not factually established that anything he did promoted an abusive tax shelter. Tummino claims generally that “there are many disputed facts.” (Pl. Mem. ¶ 35.) However, Tummino's arguments dispute the application of the law to the facts rather than the facts themselves. As discussed below, the IRS properly relied on the elements laid out in §6700(a), and elaborated on by Campbell and Kuan, in establishing the abusive nature of Tummino's behavior under the statute. Here, the first element of §6700 is satisfied by Tummino's admission that he contracted with Alpha to develop a sales force and to market the pay phone program.
To satisfy the second element, the IRS must prove that Tummino (1) made or furnished a statement with respect to tax benefits (2) which he knew or had reason to know (3) was false or fraudulent (4) as to a material matter. Campbell, 897 F.2d at 1317. First, Tummino made statements with respect to tax benefits in the marketing and training materials that he distributed to sales agents and customers, including a pamphlet and a video. Tummino alleges that after he left Alpha in 1998, Alpha hired a marketing company, SPA, to become Alpha's sole marketing agent. He further alleges that SPA discarded Tummino's marketing materials for the pay phone program in favor of materials developed by SPA. (Pl. Mem. ¶ 13-14.) Tummino, however, has failed to present even a scintilla of evidence to support these allegations.
To oppose summary judgment, Tummino relies exclusively his own conclusory allegations and those of his former attorney. “When the nonmoving party relies only on its own affidavits to oppose summary judgment, it cannot rely on conclusory allegations unsupported by factual data to create an issue of material fact.” Hansen v. U.S., 7 F.3d 137, 138 (9th Cir. 1993). As discussed in this court's prior ruling in this case, because Tummino's attorney has simply asserted having personal knowledge of “many” of the facts referred to in Tummino's opposition to summary judgment (Douglas Decl. ¶ 1), this court cannot ascertain which portions of the declaration are based on personal knowledge. Tummino's supplemental briefing on the motion for summary judgment offers no additional evidence to support his claim that his work was supplanted by that of SPA. Accordingly, this court concludes that the declaration of Tummino's attorney along with Tummino's own unsupported claims are insufficient under Rule 56(e) to oppose summary judgment.
Second, Tummino knew or had reason to know that the statements made were false or fraudulent. Tummino was a sophisticated business person with extensive experience in the sale of securities and insurance. He was aware of the importance of consulting with experts in particular fields when entering into new businesses. This is evidenced by his consultation with an attorney about whether participation in the pay phone program constituted the sale of securities.
Tummino claims that he sought the advice of a tax consultant and relied on the advice of Alpha's accountant with regard to the propriety of the pay phone program, but the record contains no evidence that he conferred with a tax consultant prior to entering into the pay phone program. Instead, Tummino relies only on the conclusory and general statements in his attorney's declaration, which this court already has found to be insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Tummino's alternative argument in his supplemental briefing, that he did not know or have reason to know that his statements were false because they were based on other literature promoting pay phone services, similarly fails, as he presents insufficient evidence that such literature existed or that he consulted such literature prior making statements concerning the tax benefits of the payphone program. 2 As a result, Tummino has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he knew or should have known that he was supplying false statements about the tax benefits of the pay phone programs.
Third, Tummino has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the statements he made in promotion of the pay phone program were false or fraudulent. In fact, Tummino does not even contest the IRS determination that the deductions and credits that he promised as a part of the pay phone program were not allowable.
Fourth and finally, Tummino's statements made in promotion of the pay phone program were material. A matter is considered material under §6700 “if it would have a substantial impact on the decision making process of a reasonably prudent investor.” U.S. v. Buttorff, 761 F.2d 1056, 1062 (5th Cir. 1985) (quoting S. REP. NO. 97-494, at 267 (1982)). In Buttorff, the Fifth Circuit held that this test was met where the taxpayer assured customers that the purported tax benefits of the tax shelter were lawful, despite consistent rejection of similar shelters by the courts. Id. The taxpayer in Buttorff counseled his clients not to seek separate opinions from lawyers or accountants. Id. Many of the victims of the tax shelter in Buttorff testified that had they known of the IRS's treatment of these shelters, they probably would not have invested in them. Id.
In this case, it strains reason to think that the tax shelter component of the pay phone program was not a material consideration to those who enrolled in it. The only evidence in the record on this point is Tummino's acknowledgment that the tax credit is what attracted the customers of the payphone program. Further, the target market for the program is similar to that in Buttorff: apparently unsophisticated investors who were not in the business the previous year and to whom the taxpayer gave certain assurances regarding return on investment and taxability. No evidence allows a reasonable inference other than that the tax credit is what interested customers in the pay phone program and that, as with victims in Buttorff, they would have been less likely to invest in the pay phones had they known of the IRS's treatment of the deductions and tax credits promised by Tummino. Thus, the promise of deductions and tax credits as a result of investment in the pay phone program is material.
Accordingly, Tummino has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to any of the elements of the IRS's conclusion that Tummino committed a violation of §6700.
2. Penalty
Tummino also argues that the IRS miscalculated the penalty under §6700 because it “assumes, without supporting factual basis, that [Tummino] actively promoted all 31,000 sales.” (Pl. Mem. ¶43.) Any person who “makes or furnishes or causes another person to make or furnish” a statement which the person knows or has reason to know is false or fraudulent as to any material matter is subject to the penalty under the statute. §6700(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added). Tummino does not contest the total number of phone sales made under the program. Nor does he contest the fact that he continued to have a financial interest in the pay phone program after he ceased to actively participate in the program. Furthermore, as discussed earlier, Tummino does not provide sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Alpha and SPA discarded the marketing and training materials developed by Tummino to market the pay phone program.
Taxpayers who violate §6700 are subject to “a penalty equal to the $1,000 or, if the person establishes that it is lesser, 100 percent of the gross income derived (or to be derived) by such person from such activity” with respect to “each activity.” §6700(a)(2). Thus, Tummino is subject to the lesser of $31,000,000 (31,000 sales multiplied by $1,000 per sale) or $1,437,450 (the total income derived by Tummino from the pay phone program). Because Tummino fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the IRS properly counted the number of sales as applied to the calculation of the penalty and does not contest the total income derived from the pay phone program, the court will not disturb the IRS's determination that Tummino's liability is $1,437,450.
C. Collectibility
Where the validity of the underlying tax liability is not at issue, the court will review the administrative determination for abuse of discretion. Goza, 114 T.C. at 181 (citing H.R. Conf. Rep. 105-599, at 266 (1998)); see also Medlock, 325 F.Supp.2d at 1076. Having determined the underlying tax liability to be established, the court reviews the question of Tummino's doubts as to collectibility under an abuse of discretion standard. An abuse of discretion is a “‘plain error,’ namely, ‘discretion exercised to an end not justified by the evidence, a judgment that is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts as are found.’” Medlock, 325 F.Supp.2d at 1076 (citing Wing v. Asarco, Inc., 114 F.3d 986 (9th Cir. 1997)). An abuse of discretion occurs when a decision is based “on an erroneous view of the law or a clearly erroneous assessment of the facts.” Fargo v. Commissioner, 447 F.3d 706, 709 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).
Tummino fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the IRS abused its discretion by concluding that he had dissipated assets and including those assets in the minimum acceptable offer. The Internal Revenue Manual (“IRM”) provides that when the taxpayer can show that assets have been dissipated to provide for necessary living expenses, these amounts should not be included in the reasonable collection potential (“RCP”). I.R.M. 5.8.5.4(4). 3 If the assets have been dissipated with a disregard of the outstanding tax liability, the IRS should consider including the value in the RCP. I.R.M. 5.8.5.4(5). If the taxpayer does not provide information showing the disposition of funds from dissipated assets, the IRS should consider including a portion or all of these values in an acceptable offer amount. I.R.M. 5.8.5.4(6). The IRM further provides that an offer may be returned at any time during processing if the taxpayer fails to provide information necessary to determine whether it should be accepted. 5.8.7.2.2.2(1). Consistent with these provisions, the IRS reasonably requested documents from Tummino pertaining to the disposition of the funds drawn from Tummino's IRA.
Tummino alleges that, contrary to the assertion of the IRS, he provided evidence that the withdrawals from his IRA were not dissipated assets. (Pl. Mem. ¶9.) Tummino, however, has not produced copies of any of the information that he alleges he submitted to the IRS for review. Even after Tummino obtained additional discovery, he failed to provide evidence that the withdrawals from his IRA were not dissipated assets. As a result, Tummino fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the IRS abused its discretion by concluding that Tummino had dissipated assets and including those assets in the minimum acceptable offer. Therefore, the court will not disturb the IRS's determination of collectibility.
Conclusion
The United States' motion for summary judgment (#28) is GRANTED.
DATED this 14th day of December, 2009.

Footnotes


1
The parties have consented to jurisdiction by magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §631(c)(1).
2
Even if this court accepted Tummino's allegation of reliance on other literature as a basis for his knowledge, or lack thereof, of the tax benefits of pay phone programs, a review of Tummino's claims as to the contents of the "thesis" on which he relies reveal no literature discussing the tax benefits of pay phone programs.
3
The Secretary of Treasury or his designees may prescribe regulations to carry out the duties and power of the Secretary, including collection of receipts. 31 U.S.C. §321 (2009). The IRM establishes the organization and procedures of the IRS under the authority granted by §321.

Labels:

Charles Tummino, Plaintiff v. United States of America, Internal Revenue Service, Defendant.
U.S. District Court, Dist of Ore., Portland Div.; 06-CV-955-AC, December 14, 2009.
OPINION AND ORDER
Discussion
lity
1. Abusive tax shelter
Where the validity of the underlying tax liability is properly at issue, the Court will review the matter on a de novo basis. Goza v. C.I.R., 114 T.C. 176, 181 (2000) (citing H.R. Conf. Rep. 105-599, at 266 (1998)); see also Medlock v. United States, 325 F.Supp.2d 1064, 1076 (C.D. Cal. 2003). Therefore, this court reviews the question of Tummino's underlying tax liability de novo. To establish that Tummino participated in the promotion of an abusive tax shelter, the IRS must prove that he (1) participated in the sale of an investment plan and (2) made or furnished a statement with respect to tax benefits which he knew or had reason to know was false or fraudulent as to a material matter. 68 U.S.C. §6700(a); see also U.S. v. Campbell, 897 F.2d 1317, 1320 (5th Cir. 1990); U.S. v. Kuan, 827 F.2d 1144, 1147 (7th Cir. 1987).
Tummino argues that the IRS had not factually established that anything he did promoted an abusive tax shelter. Tummino claims generally that “there are many disputed facts.” (Pl. Mem. ¶ 35.) However, Tummino's arguments dispute the application of the law to the facts rather than the facts themselves. As discussed below, the IRS properly relied on the elements laid out in §6700(a), and elaborated on by Campbell and Kuan, in establishing the abusive nature of Tummino's behavior under the statute. Here, the first element of §6700 is satisfied by Tummino's admission that he contracted with Alpha to develop a sales force and to market the pay phone program.
To satisfy the second element, the IRS must prove that Tummino (1) made or furnished a statement with respect to tax benefits (2) which he knew or had reason to know (3) was false or fraudulent (4) as to a material matter. Campbell, 897 F.2d at 1317. First, Tummino made statements with respect to tax benefits in the marketing and training materials that he distributed to sales agents and customers, including a pamphlet and a video. Tummino alleges that after he left Alpha in 1998, Alpha hired a marketing company, SPA, to become Alpha's sole marketing agent. He further alleges that SPA discarded Tummino's marketing materials for the pay phone program in favor of materials developed by SPA. (Pl. Mem. ¶ 13-14.) Tummino, however, has failed to present even a scintilla of evidence to support these allegations.
To oppose summary judgment, Tummino relies exclusively his own conclusory allegations and those of his former attorney. “When the nonmoving party relies only on its own affidavits to oppose summary judgment, it cannot rely on conclusory allegations unsupported by factual data to create an issue of material fact.” Hansen v. U.S., 7 F.3d 137, 138 (9th Cir. 1993). As discussed in this court's prior ruling in this case, because Tummino's attorney has simply asserted having personal knowledge of “many” of the facts referred to in Tummino's opposition to summary judgment (Douglas Decl. ¶ 1), this court cannot ascertain which portions of the declaration are based on personal knowledge. Tummino's supplemental briefing on the motion for summary judgment offers no additional evidence to support his claim that his work was supplanted by that of SPA. Accordingly, this court concludes that the declaration of Tummino's attorney along with Tummino's own unsupported claims are insufficient under Rule 56(e) to oppose summary judgment.
Second, Tummino knew or had reason to know that the statements made were false or fraudulent. Tummino was a sophisticated business person with extensive experience in the sale of securities and insurance. He was aware of the importance of consulting with experts in particular fields when entering into new businesses. This is evidenced by his consultation with an attorney about whether participation in the pay phone program constituted the sale of securities.
Tummino claims that he sought the advice of a tax consultant and relied on the advice of Alpha's accountant with regard to the propriety of the pay phone program, but the record contains no evidence that he conferred with a tax consultant prior to entering into the pay phone program. Instead, Tummino relies only on the conclusory and general statements in his attorney's declaration, which this court already has found to be insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Tummino's alternative argument in his supplemental briefing, that he did not know or have reason to know that his statements were false because they were based on other literature promoting pay phone services, similarly fails, as he presents insufficient evidence that such literature existed or that he consulted such literature prior making statements concerning the tax benefits of the payphone program. 2 As a result, Tummino has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he knew or should have known that he was supplying false statements about the tax benefits of the pay phone programs.
Third, Tummino has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the statements he made in promotion of the pay phone program were false or fraudulent. In fact, Tummino does not even contest the IRS determination that the deductions and credits that he promised as a part of the pay phone program were not allowable.
Fourth and finally, Tummino's statements made in promotion of the pay phone program were material. A matter is considered material under §6700 “if it would have a substantial impact on the decision making process of a reasonably prudent investor.” U.S. v. Buttorff, 761 F.2d 1056, 1062 (5th Cir. 1985) (quoting S. REP. NO. 97-494, at 267 (1982)). In Buttorff, the Fifth Circuit held that this test was met where the taxpayer assured customers that the purported tax benefits of the tax shelter were lawful, despite consistent rejection of similar shelters by the courts. Id. The taxpayer in Buttorff counseled his clients not to seek separate opinions from lawyers or accountants. Id. Many of the victims of the tax shelter in Buttorff testified that had they known of the IRS's treatment of these shelters, they probably would not have invested in them. Id.
In this case, it strains reason to think that the tax shelter component of the pay phone program was not a material consideration to those who enrolled in it. The only evidence in the record on this point is Tummino's acknowledgment that the tax credit is what attracted the customers of the payphone program. Further, the target market for the program is similar to that in Buttorff: apparently unsophisticated investors who were not in the business the previous year and to whom the taxpayer gave certain assurances regarding return on investment and taxability. No evidence allows a reasonable inference other than that the tax credit is what interested customers in the pay phone program and that, as with victims in Buttorff, they would have been less likely to invest in the pay phones had they known of the IRS's treatment of the deductions and tax credits promised by Tummino. Thus, the promise of deductions and tax credits as a result of investment in the pay phone program is material.
Accordingly, Tummino has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to any of the elements of the IRS's conclusion that Tummino committed a violation of §6700.
2. Penalty
Tummino also argues that the IRS miscalculated the penalty under §6700 because it “assumes, without supporting factual basis, that [Tummino] actively promoted all 31,000 sales.” (Pl. Mem. ¶43.) Any person who “makes or furnishes or causes another person to make or furnish” a statement which the person knows or has reason to know is false or fraudulent as to any material matter is subject to the penalty under the statute. §6700(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added). Tummino does not contest the total number of phone sales made under the program. Nor does he contest the fact that he continued to have a financial interest in the pay phone program after he ceased to actively participate in the program. Furthermore, as discussed earlier, Tummino does not provide sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Alpha and SPA discarded the marketing and training materials developed by Tummino to market the pay phone program.
Taxpayers who violate §6700 are subject to “a penalty equal to the $1,000 or, if the person establishes that it is lesser, 100 percent of the gross income derived (or to be derived) by such person from such activity” with respect to “each activity.” §6700(a)(2). Thus, Tummino is subject to the lesser of $31,000,000 (31,000 sales multiplied by $1,000 per sale) or $1,437,450 (the total income derived by Tummino from the pay phone program). Because Tummino fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the IRS properly counted the number of sales as applied to the calculation of the penalty and does not contest the total income derived from the pay phone program, the court will not disturb the IRS's determination that Tummino's liability is $1,437,450.
C. Collectibility
Where the validity of the underlying tax liability is not at issue, the court will review the administrative determination for abuse of discretion. Goza, 114 T.C. at 181 (citing H.R. Conf. Rep. 105-599, at 266 (1998)); see also Medlock, 325 F.Supp.2d at 1076. Having determined the underlying tax liability to be established, the court reviews the question of Tummino's doubts as to collectibility under an abuse of discretion standard. An abuse of discretion is a “‘plain error,’ namely, ‘discretion exercised to an end not justified by the evidence, a judgment that is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts as are found.’” Medlock, 325 F.Supp.2d at 1076 (citing Wing v. Asarco, Inc., 114 F.3d 986 (9th Cir. 1997)). An abuse of discretion occurs when a decision is based “on an erroneous view of the law or a clearly erroneous assessment of the facts.” Fargo v. Commissioner, 447 F.3d 706, 709 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).
Tummino fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the IRS abused its discretion by concluding that he had dissipated assets and including those assets in the minimum acceptable offer. The Internal Revenue Manual (“IRM”) provides that when the taxpayer can show that assets have been dissipated to provide for necessary living expenses, these amounts should not be included in the reasonable collection potential (“RCP”). I.R.M. 5.8.5.4(4). 3 If the assets have been dissipated with a disregard of the outstanding tax liability, the IRS should consider including the value in the RCP. I.R.M. 5.8.5.4(5). If the taxpayer does not provide information showing the disposition of funds from dissipated assets, the IRS should consider including a portion or all of these values in an acceptable offer amount. I.R.M. 5.8.5.4(6). The IRM further provides that an offer may be returned at any time during processing if the taxpayer fails to provide information necessary to determine whether it should be accepted. 5.8.7.2.2.2(1). Consistent with these provisions, the IRS reasonably requested documents from Tummino pertaining to the disposition of the funds drawn from Tummino's IRA.
Tummino alleges that, contrary to the assertion of the IRS, he provided evidence that the withdrawals from his IRA were not dissipated assets. (Pl. Mem. ¶9.) Tummino, however, has not produced copies of any of the information that he alleges he submitted to the IRS for review. Even after Tummino obtained additional discovery, he failed to provide evidence that the withdrawals from his IRA were not dissipated assets. As a result, Tummino fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the IRS abused its discretion by concluding that Tummino had dissipated assets and including those assets in the minimum acceptable offer. Therefore, the court will not disturb the IRS's determination of collectibility.
Conclusion
The United States' motion for summary judgment (#28) is GRANTED.
DATED this 14th day of December, 2009.

Footnotes


1
The parties have consented to jurisdiction by magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §631(c)(1).
2
Even if this court accepted Tummino's allegation of reliance on other literature as a basis for his knowledge, or lack thereof, of the tax benefits of pay phone programs, a review of Tummino's claims as to the contents of the "thesis" on which he relies reveal no literature discussing the tax benefits of pay phone programs.
3
The Secretary of Treasury or his designees may prescribe regulations to carry out the duties and power of the Secretary, including collection of receipts. 31 U.S.C. §321 (2009). The IRM establishes the organization and procedures of the IRS under the authority granted by §321.

Labels:

Charles Tummino, Plaintiff v. United States of America, Internal Revenue Service, Defendant.
U.S. District Court, Dist of Ore., Portland Div.; 06-CV-955-AC, December 14, 2009.
OPINION AND ORDER
Discussion
lity
1. Abusive tax shelter
Where the validity of the underlying tax liability is properly at issue, the Court will review the matter on a de novo basis. Goza v. C.I.R., 114 T.C. 176, 181 (2000) (citing H.R. Conf. Rep. 105-599, at 266 (1998)); see also Medlock v. United States, 325 F.Supp.2d 1064, 1076 (C.D. Cal. 2003). Therefore, this court reviews the question of Tummino's underlying tax liability de novo. To establish that Tummino participated in the promotion of an abusive tax shelter, the IRS must prove that he (1) participated in the sale of an investment plan and (2) made or furnished a statement with respect to tax benefits which he knew or had reason to know was false or fraudulent as to a material matter. 68 U.S.C. §6700(a); see also U.S. v. Campbell, 897 F.2d 1317, 1320 (5th Cir. 1990); U.S. v. Kuan, 827 F.2d 1144, 1147 (7th Cir. 1987).
Tummino argues that the IRS had not factually established that anything he did promoted an abusive tax shelter. Tummino claims generally that “there are many disputed facts.” (Pl. Mem. ¶ 35.) However, Tummino's arguments dispute the application of the law to the facts rather than the facts themselves. As discussed below, the IRS properly relied on the elements laid out in §6700(a), and elaborated on by Campbell and Kuan, in establishing the abusive nature of Tummino's behavior under the statute. Here, the first element of §6700 is satisfied by Tummino's admission that he contracted with Alpha to develop a sales force and to market the pay phone program.
To satisfy the second element, the IRS must prove that Tummino (1) made or furnished a statement with respect to tax benefits (2) which he knew or had reason to know (3) was false or fraudulent (4) as to a material matter. Campbell, 897 F.2d at 1317. First, Tummino made statements with respect to tax benefits in the marketing and training materials that he distributed to sales agents and customers, including a pamphlet and a video. Tummino alleges that after he left Alpha in 1998, Alpha hired a marketing company, SPA, to become Alpha's sole marketing agent. He further alleges that SPA discarded Tummino's marketing materials for the pay phone program in favor of materials developed by SPA. (Pl. Mem. ¶ 13-14.) Tummino, however, has failed to present even a scintilla of evidence to support these allegations.
To oppose summary judgment, Tummino relies exclusively his own conclusory allegations and those of his former attorney. “When the nonmoving party relies only on its own affidavits to oppose summary judgment, it cannot rely on conclusory allegations unsupported by factual data to create an issue of material fact.” Hansen v. U.S., 7 F.3d 137, 138 (9th Cir. 1993). As discussed in this court's prior ruling in this case, because Tummino's attorney has simply asserted having personal knowledge of “many” of the facts referred to in Tummino's opposition to summary judgment (Douglas Decl. ¶ 1), this court cannot ascertain which portions of the declaration are based on personal knowledge. Tummino's supplemental briefing on the motion for summary judgment offers no additional evidence to support his claim that his work was supplanted by that of SPA. Accordingly, this court concludes that the declaration of Tummino's attorney along with Tummino's own unsupported claims are insufficient under Rule 56(e) to oppose summary judgment.
Second, Tummino knew or had reason to know that the statements made were false or fraudulent. Tummino was a sophisticated business person with extensive experience in the sale of securities and insurance. He was aware of the importance of consulting with experts in particular fields when entering into new businesses. This is evidenced by his consultation with an attorney about whether participation in the pay phone program constituted the sale of securities.
Tummino claims that he sought the advice of a tax consultant and relied on the advice of Alpha's accountant with regard to the propriety of the pay phone program, but the record contains no evidence that he conferred with a tax consultant prior to entering into the pay phone program. Instead, Tummino relies only on the conclusory and general statements in his attorney's declaration, which this court already has found to be insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Tummino's alternative argument in his supplemental briefing, that he did not know or have reason to know that his statements were false because they were based on other literature promoting pay phone services, similarly fails, as he presents insufficient evidence that such literature existed or that he consulted such literature prior making statements concerning the tax benefits of the payphone program. 2 As a result, Tummino has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he knew or should have known that he was supplying false statements about the tax benefits of the pay phone programs.
Third, Tummino has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the statements he made in promotion of the pay phone program were false or fraudulent. In fact, Tummino does not even contest the IRS determination that the deductions and credits that he promised as a part of the pay phone program were not allowable.
Fourth and finally, Tummino's statements made in promotion of the pay phone program were material. A matter is considered material under §6700 “if it would have a substantial impact on the decision making process of a reasonably prudent investor.” U.S. v. Buttorff, 761 F.2d 1056, 1062 (5th Cir. 1985) (quoting S. REP. NO. 97-494, at 267 (1982)). In Buttorff, the Fifth Circuit held that this test was met where the taxpayer assured customers that the purported tax benefits of the tax shelter were lawful, despite consistent rejection of similar shelters by the courts. Id. The taxpayer in Buttorff counseled his clients not to seek separate opinions from lawyers or accountants. Id. Many of the victims of the tax shelter in Buttorff testified that had they known of the IRS's treatment of these shelters, they probably would not have invested in them. Id.
In this case, it strains reason to think that the tax shelter component of the pay phone program was not a material consideration to those who enrolled in it. The only evidence in the record on this point is Tummino's acknowledgment that the tax credit is what attracted the customers of the payphone program. Further, the target market for the program is similar to that in Buttorff: apparently unsophisticated investors who were not in the business the previous year and to whom the taxpayer gave certain assurances regarding return on investment and taxability. No evidence allows a reasonable inference other than that the tax credit is what interested customers in the pay phone program and that, as with victims in Buttorff, they would have been less likely to invest in the pay phones had they known of the IRS's treatment of the deductions and tax credits promised by Tummino. Thus, the promise of deductions and tax credits as a result of investment in the pay phone program is material.
Accordingly, Tummino has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to any of the elements of the IRS's conclusion that Tummino committed a violation of §6700.
2. Penalty
Tummino also argues that the IRS miscalculated the penalty under §6700 because it “assumes, without supporting factual basis, that [Tummino] actively promoted all 31,000 sales.” (Pl. Mem. ¶43.) Any person who “makes or furnishes or causes another person to make or furnish” a statement which the person knows or has reason to know is false or fraudulent as to any material matter is subject to the penalty under the statute. §6700(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added). Tummino does not contest the total number of phone sales made under the program. Nor does he contest the fact that he continued to have a financial interest in the pay phone program after he ceased to actively participate in the program. Furthermore, as discussed earlier, Tummino does not provide sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Alpha and SPA discarded the marketing and training materials developed by Tummino to market the pay phone program.
Taxpayers who violate §6700 are subject to “a penalty equal to the $1,000 or, if the person establishes that it is lesser, 100 percent of the gross income derived (or to be derived) by such person from such activity” with respect to “each activity.” §6700(a)(2). Thus, Tummino is subject to the lesser of $31,000,000 (31,000 sales multiplied by $1,000 per sale) or $1,437,450 (the total income derived by Tummino from the pay phone program). Because Tummino fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the IRS properly counted the number of sales as applied to the calculation of the penalty and does not contest the total income derived from the pay phone program, the court will not disturb the IRS's determination that Tummino's liability is $1,437,450.
C. Collectibility
Where the validity of the underlying tax liability is not at issue, the court will review the administrative determination for abuse of discretion. Goza, 114 T.C. at 181 (citing H.R. Conf. Rep. 105-599, at 266 (1998)); see also Medlock, 325 F.Supp.2d at 1076. Having determined the underlying tax liability to be established, the court reviews the question of Tummino's doubts as to collectibility under an abuse of discretion standard. An abuse of discretion is a “‘plain error,’ namely, ‘discretion exercised to an end not justified by the evidence, a judgment that is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts as are found.’” Medlock, 325 F.Supp.2d at 1076 (citing Wing v. Asarco, Inc., 114 F.3d 986 (9th Cir. 1997)). An abuse of discretion occurs when a decision is based “on an erroneous view of the law or a clearly erroneous assessment of the facts.” Fargo v. Commissioner, 447 F.3d 706, 709 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).
Tummino fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the IRS abused its discretion by concluding that he had dissipated assets and including those assets in the minimum acceptable offer. The Internal Revenue Manual (“IRM”) provides that when the taxpayer can show that assets have been dissipated to provide for necessary living expenses, these amounts should not be included in the reasonable collection potential (“RCP”). I.R.M. 5.8.5.4(4). 3 If the assets have been dissipated with a disregard of the outstanding tax liability, the IRS should consider including the value in the RCP. I.R.M. 5.8.5.4(5). If the taxpayer does not provide information showing the disposition of funds from dissipated assets, the IRS should consider including a portion or all of these values in an acceptable offer amount. I.R.M. 5.8.5.4(6). The IRM further provides that an offer may be returned at any time during processing if the taxpayer fails to provide information necessary to determine whether it should be accepted. 5.8.7.2.2.2(1). Consistent with these provisions, the IRS reasonably requested documents from Tummino pertaining to the disposition of the funds drawn from Tummino's IRA.
Tummino alleges that, contrary to the assertion of the IRS, he provided evidence that the withdrawals from his IRA were not dissipated assets. (Pl. Mem. ¶9.) Tummino, however, has not produced copies of any of the information that he alleges he submitted to the IRS for review. Even after Tummino obtained additional discovery, he failed to provide evidence that the withdrawals from his IRA were not dissipated assets. As a result, Tummino fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the IRS abused its discretion by concluding that Tummino had dissipated assets and including those assets in the minimum acceptable offer. Therefore, the court will not disturb the IRS's determination of collectibility.
Conclusion
The United States' motion for summary judgment (#28) is GRANTED.
DATED this 14th day of December, 2009.

Footnotes


1
The parties have consented to jurisdiction by magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §631(c)(1).
2
Even if this court accepted Tummino's allegation of reliance on other literature as a basis for his knowledge, or lack thereof, of the tax benefits of pay phone programs, a review of Tummino's claims as to the contents of the "thesis" on which he relies reveal no literature discussing the tax benefits of pay phone programs.
3
The Secretary of Treasury or his designees may prescribe regulations to carry out the duties and power of the Secretary, including collection of receipts. 31 U.S.C. §321 (2009). The IRM establishes the organization and procedures of the IRS under the authority granted by §321.

Labels:

Monday, January 4, 2010

Many important tax changes go into effect in 2010 apart from the numerous indexing changes that were covered at. These non-indexing changes result from various laws that were enacted and regs and other guidance issued over the past few years. This Practice Alert reviews the non-indexing tax law changes for 2010 for businesses.
Deduction for domestic production activities increases. For tax years beginning after 2009, the Code Sec. 199 deduction for domestic production activities increases. Taxpayers will be able to claim a deduction generally equal to 9% (up from 6% for tax years beginning in 2007-2009) of the lesser of: (1) the taxpayer's “qualified production activities income” (QPAI) for the tax year or (2) taxable income (modified adjusted gross income, for individual taxpayers) without regard to this deduction, for the tax year. ( Code Sec. 199(a) ; Reg. § 1.199-1(a) ) The deduction is further limited to 50% of the W-2 wages of the employer for the tax year.
Reduced domestic production activities deduction for oil-related activities. For tax years beginning after 2009, the otherwise allowable Code Sec. 199 deduction of a taxpayer with oil-related QPAI is reduced by 3% of the least of (1) oil-related QPAI for the tax year; (2) QPAI for the tax year; or (3) taxable income (or for individuals, AGI), determined without regard to the domestic production activities deduction. ( Code Sec. 199(d)(9)(A) )
Smaller employers may establish combined plans. For plan years beginning after 2009, employers with 500 or fewer employees may establish a combined defined benefit-401(k) plan (a “DB(k) plan”). In general, the defined benefit rules apply to the defined benefit portion of the plan and the defined contribution rules apply to the defined contribution portion of the plan. The 401(k) component must have automatic enrollment and must meet minimum matching contribution requirements. ( Code Sec. 414(x)(2) )
Nonspouse beneficiary rollover option mandatory for qualified plans. Under Sec. 108(f) of the Worker, Retiree, and Employer Recovery Act of 2008 (WRERA, P.L. 110-458 ), qualified retirement plans must offer nonspouse beneficiaries the opportunity to roll over an inherited plan account balance to an IRA set up to receive the rollover on the nonspouse beneficiary's behalf, effective for plan years beginning after Dec. 31, 2009. For earlier plan years, could, but were not required to, offer nonspouse beneficiaries this rollover option.
New limitation on deduction of farm losses. For tax years beginning after 2009, the farming loss of a taxpayer, other than a C corporation, is limited for any tax year in which any applicable subsidies are received. The loss is limited to the greater of (a) $300,000 ($150,000 for a married person filing separately), or (b) the taxpayer's total net farm income for the prior five tax years. Applicable subsidies are (1) any direct or counter-cyclical payments under title I of the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (or any payment elected in lieu of any such payment), or (2) any Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) loan. ( Code Sec. 461(j) ) For partnerships and S corporations, the limit is applied at the partner or shareholder level. ( Code Sec. 461(j)(5) ) Total net farm income is an aggregation of all income and loss from farming businesses for the prior five tax years. Any loss that is disallowed under this rule in a particular year is carried forward to the next tax year and treated as a deduction attributable to farming businesses in that year. Farming losses due to fire, storm, or other casualty, or disease or drought, are disregarded for purposes of calculating the limitation.
Increased penalty for failure to file partnership or S corporation returns. Civil penalties apply for failure to file a partnership and S corporation returns. The penalty is a statutory dollar amount times the number of partners or shareholders for each month (or fraction of a month) that the failure continues, up to a maximum of 12 months. The base amount on which a penalty is computed for a failure with respect to filing either a partnership or S corporation return for a tax year beginning after Dec. 31, 2009, increases from $89 to $195 per partner or shareholder. ( Code Sec. 6698(b)(1) and Code Sec. 6699(b)(1) )
Electronic filing changes go into effect. Beginning in 2010, IRS will allow the electronic filing of Schedule R (Form 941), Allocation Schedule for Aggregate Form 941 Filers, using the Employment Tax e-file System. Schedule R is a new form that must be completed by consolidated Form 941 filers, beginning with the first quarter 2010 Form 941. Form 2678, Employer/Payer Appointment of Agent, must be mailed to the applicable address listed on the instructions for the agent to be eligible to file Schedule R. After receiving IRS approval, the agent must file one Form 941 return for each tax period, using the agent's own employer identification number (EIN), regardless of the number of employers for whom the agent acts. The agent must maintain records that will disclose the full wages paid for each of his or her clients, as reported on the Schedule R. (IRS Publication 3823, Employment Tax e-file System Implementation and User Guide)
Standard mileage rate changes. The optional mileage allowance for owned or leased autos (including vans, pickups or panel trucks) is 50¢ per mile for business travel after 2009 (5¢ less than the 55¢ allowance for business mileage during 2009). For 2010, the depreciation component of the mileage rate is 23¢ per mile (up from 21¢ per mile for 2009 and 2008).
Employers that require employees to supply their own autos may reimburse them at a rate that doesn't exceed 50¢ per mile for employment-connected business mileage during 2010 (down from 55¢ per mile for 2009), whether the autos are owned or leased. The reimbursement is treated as a tax-free accountable-plan reimbursement if the employee substantiates the time, place, business purpose, and mileage of each trip. Additionally, an employee's personal use of lower-priced company autos during 2010 may be valued at 50¢ per mile if the conditions specified in Reg. § 1.61-21(e)(1) are met. ( Rev Proc 2009-54, 2009-51 IRB )
Many business tax breaks expired at the end of 2009. Unless Congress acts to retroactively revive them, all of the following business tax breaks won't be available this year because they expired at the end of 2009. Note that tax breaks that would be extended by the “Tax Extenders Act” as passed by the House of Representatives in December of 2009 (see Weekly Alert ¶ 1 12/17/2009 ) are indicated with an asterisk.
... Additional first-year 50% bonus depreciation for qualified property under Code Sec. 168(k)(2) (but note that certain aircraft and long-production-period property continues to be eligible if placed in service in 2010). In addition, the $8,000 increase in the first-year depreciation limit for passenger automobiles that are qualified property also expired at the end of 2009.
... For tax years beginning in 2010, (a) the maximum amount that may be expensed under Code Sec. 179 is $134,000 (down from $250,000 for tax years beginning in 2008 or 2009); and (b) the maximum annual expensing amount generally is reduced dollar-for-dollar by the amount of Code Sec. 179 property placed in service during the tax year in excess of $530,000 (down from $800,000 for tax years beginning in 2008 or 2009).
... Incremental research credit under Code Sec. 41 .*
... Election to accelerate AMT and research credits in lieu of additional first-year depreciation under Code Sec. 168(k)(4) .
... Five-year depreciation for farming business machinery and equipment under Code Sec. 168(e)(3)(B)(vii) .*
... Fifteen-year straight-line cost recovery for qualified leasehold improvements, qualified restaurant buildings and improvements, and qualified retail improvements under Code Sec. 168(e)(3)(E)(iv) , Code Sec. 168(e)(3)(E)(v) , and Code Sec. 168(e)(3)(E)(ix) .*
... Deduction allowable for income attributable to domestic production activities in Puerto Rico under Code Sec. 199 .*
... Expensing of “brownfields” environmental remediation costs under Code Sec. 198(h) .*
... Credit for construction of new energy efficient homes under Code Sec. 45L .
... Encouragement of contributions of capital gain real property made for conservation purposes under Code Sec. 170(b)(1)(E) and Code Sec. 170(b)(2)(B) . *
... Enhanced charitable deduction for contributions of food inventory under Code Sec. 170(e)(3)(C) . *
... Enhanced charitable deduction for contributions of book inventories to public schools under Code Sec. 170(e)(3)(D) .*
... Enhanced deduction for corporate contributions of computer equipment for educational purposes under Code Sec. 170(e)(6)(G) .*
... The active financing exception from Subpart F of the Code. ( Code Sec. 953 , Code Sec. 954 )*
... The look-through treatment of payments between related controlled foreign corporations. ( Code Sec. 954(c) )*
... Seven-year straight line cost recovery period for property used for land improvement and support facilities at motorsports entertainment complexes. ( Code Sec. 168(i)(15) )*
... The railroad track maintenance credit. ( Code Sec. 45G )*
... Film and television producers' election to expense the first $15 million of production costs incurred in the U.S. ($20 million if the costs are incurred in economically depressed areas in the U.S.). ( Code Sec. 181 )*
... The credit for training mine rescue team members. ( Code Sec. 45N )*
... Election to expense 50% of the cost of qualified underground mine safety equipment. ( Code Sec. 179E )*
... The credit for eligible small business employers equal to 20% of the sum of differential wage payments to activated military reservists. ( Code Sec. 45P )*
... The tax treatment of interest-related dividends, short-term capital gain dividends, and other special rules applicable to foreign shareholders that invest in regulated investment companies (RICs). ( Code Sec. 871(k) )*
... Suspension on the taxable income limit for purposes of claiming depletion deductions on a marginal oil or gas well. ( Code Sec. 613(c)(6) )
... The new markets tax credit. ( Code Sec. 45(f)(1) )*

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