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Refund Fraud
 
9.5.4 Refund
Fraud and Return Preparer Investigations
9.5.4.1
(07-29-2002)
Overview
- Fraudulent refund
investigations fall within two groups, Multiple Claims for
Refunds and Unscrupulous Return Preparers.
9.5.4.1.1 (07-30-1998)
Multiple Claims for Refund
- Multiple claims for
refund results from federal income tax return(s) that
are supported by fabricated and false Forms W–2, Wage
and Tax Statement(s). The return(s) may be filed by one,
two, or more subjects in collusion with intent to
defraud the government.
9.5.4.1.1.1 (07-29-2002)
Investigative Techniques (Multiple Claims for
Refund)
- In the multiple
claims for refund investigations, the investigation
is directed toward:
- the
authenticity of return(s) and supporting
document(s)
-
ascertaining the responsible return(s)
preparer and filer
9.5.4.1.1.2 (07-29-2002)
Investigation of Multiple Claims For Refund
- Investigations in
this group originate in a variety of ways such as:
- The IRS
Campus may forward information indicating
that multiple returns have been filed by the
same taxpayer.
- The head of
office of the operating division may forward
to the Special Agent in Charge (SAC) returns
indicating false claims for refunds, which
were secured during collection activity.
- A postman
may report the delivery of numerous
government checks to an address or person
showing unusual interest in the mail.
- The U.S.
Postal Service or IRS may note an excessive
number of mail-forwarding requests.
- An audit
may disclose a nonexistent address,
taxpayer, employer, or excessive deductions.
- A return
preparer or filer may, in the presence of an
informant, boast about how much he or she
received in refunds.
- Scrupulous
return preparers, may report suspicious
return preparers to the IRS.
- Special agents
should understand the provisions of 18 USC §287 and
be prepared to coordinate their investigative
activities with investigations conducted by the
Secret Service, the U.S. Postal Service, or other
government agency. It is not unusual for this type
of return preparer or filer to be involved in
violations of other federal statutes.
- The Secret Service
is interested in knowing of an investigation of
counterfeiting and forgery statutes (see text,
Secret Service Records).
- The Postal Service
is interested in the use of the mails to defraud the
federal government.
- The assistance of
the United States Attorney's office may be utilized
to obtain an arrest or search warrant.
- A violation of 18
USC §287 occurs upon the filing of a fabricated
federal income tax return wherein a false
representation is made that the tax has been
overpaid and there is a claim made for a refund of
the overpayment.
9.5.4.1.1.3 (07-29-2002)
Fraudulent Claims Indicators
- The following are
indicators special agents should look for in these
investigations:
- Multiple
filing may be confined to a single IRS field
office or may extend to many field offices.
- The name
used on a fraudulent return may be an alias,
a fictitious name, or a variation of a
preparer or filer's name.
- The address
is usually the address of a hotel, a motel,
a rooming- house, a post office box number,
or general delivery. However, residential
street numbers have been used on occasion.
- Attached to
the returns are fabricated and false Form
W-2 (sometimes handwritten) showing
fictitious employer(s), salary, or tax
withheld.
- The name of
the employer shown may or may not be an
existent firm or person. If the name is that
of an existent firm or person, an
out-of-state address is frequently shown.
- Usually the
only income reported on the return is salary
under $5,000 from one employer.
- Form 1040A
is used more often than Form 1040.
- If the
preparer or filer is acquainted with the IRS
pre-refund audit tolerance, the amount
claimed for dependents and other deductions
will keep the claimed refund within amounts,
eliminating the possibility of detection by
a pre-refund audit.
- Early
detection of this claim enables the IRS to
stop the issuance and delivery of refund
checks to fraudulent claimants.
9.5.4.1.1.4 (09-02-1999)
Characteristic Features of Multiple Fraudulent
Returns
- Some of the
characteristic features of multiple fraudulent
returns which will lead to their detection as
fictitious are listed below:
- A
substantial refund is claimed solely on the
basis of the number of exemptions listed.
- An
unrealistic amount is shown as tax withheld.
- Absence of
or unrealistic social security information
shown. Unless an exempt occupation, such as
state government employment, is involved, a
Social Security number should be shown and
the correct amount of Social Security
deduction listed.
- Special agents
should look for the following items to detect false
social security numbers:
- Social
Security numbers should appear 000-00-0000.
- They always
being with a number 0 to 7; never begin with
an 8 or a 9.
- Prior to
January 1966, the middle two digits had to
be odd if the number was under ten (01, 03,
05, 07 or 09) and even for higher numbers
(10, 12, 14, etc.). Presently, as each area
exhausts their sequence of numbers in the
odd and even categories, they will start
using the even numbers under ten then the
odd numbers above ten.
- The first
three digits of the Social Security number
identify the area of issuance. A list of
numbers and their assigned areas of issuance
are shown in Exhibit 9.5.4–1.
- The percent
and maximum amount withheld should agree
with the law for the year involved.
- Absence of or an
unrealistic Employer's Identification Number shown
on Form W–2. These should always appear 00–0000000
with the first two digits being the code number of
the IRS field office. For example, a Tennessee
Employer's Identification Number should ordinarily
begin 62– and the following 7 digits should be
within the limits of the numbers assigned thus far.
- Unusual delivery
instructions such as different addresses being shown
on Form W–2 and the tax return, a boulevard address
in small towns, a taxpayer's use of Post Office Box,
General Delivery, and mail forwarding services.
- Similarity of
information, format, or writing on several returns.
Frequently, investigations involving numerous
returns being filed by one person can be detected by
his or her continued use of similar names as to
taxpayers, employers, exemptions, and types of
deductions claimed; or similarity in the arrangement
of the information and the printing, handwriting or
typewriting appearing on the returns.
- Undeliverable
refund checks resulting from the taxpayer's
miscalculations of intentional design.
- In instances where
the taxpayer plans to receive the refund check at an
address other than the one listed on the return, the
scheme may be to file a change of address with the
Postal Service prior to delivery of the check. The
scheme may also be to recover the check after it has
been returned to the Service by later providing
forwarding instructions.
- Undeliverable
refund checks frequently include those the taxpayer
failed to intercept.
- Refund checks
retrieved by the taxpayer after they have been
returned to the IRS leave a trail of forwarding
instructions.
9.5.4.1.1.5 (07-29-2002)
Detection of the Fraudulent Claims
- The investigation
is not over upon the detection of the fraudulent
filing. Additional investigative responsibilities
may include the following:
- Special
agents must analyze the false documents to
determine if a specific scheme or technique
is being used and if there are any
additional false returns. Computer generated
extracts of refund information are available
to help special agents identify additional
returns having similar characteristics to
those already discovered. These extracts
(routines) are described in the Law
Enforcement Manual Part 9, Criminal
Investigation.
- Special
agents must be familiar with surveillance
techniques (see IRM 9.4.6, Surveillance) to
identify and locate subjects.
- Special
agents must understand the meaning of
Probable Cause and be acquainted with IRM
9.4.12, IRM 9.4.9, and IRM 9.6.2 relating to
arrests, searches, and complaints,
respectively.
- Special agents may
ask the postmaster or postal inspector for a
description of the renter of each postal box and,
with the postmaster's cooperation, arrange a
surveillance of the postal box. The Postal
Inspection Service will make available equipment
that gives a signal when the postal box is opened.
Special agents should discuss with their Supervisory
Special Agent (SSA) whether they should arrest the
person opening the box and picking up the check, or
should the arrest be delayed.
- Special agents
should utilize the services of the Office of
Forensic Science and Support for handwriting and
typewriting comparisons. Special agents should be
acquainted with the procedures prescribed in IRM
9.4.11, Investigative Services.
- To identify the
subject's handwriting and typewriting to the returns
filed, special agents should:
- Obtain
copies of refund checks which may have been
cashed; have handwriting analyses made of
the endorsements; and follow through with
inquiries. Such inquiries may lead to the
identification of the negotiator of the
checks by disclosing the name of the person
or firm that cashed or deposited the checks.
- Examine all
post offices' records where the boxes are
rented in order to obtain a specimen of the
renter's handwriting.
- Identify
references given by the renter applying for
a box and determine, in the investigation of
fake references, how the renter arranged to
intercept and reply to the postal
authorities' inquiry.
- Special
agents should obtain printed, typewritten,
and handwriting specimens in order to have
an expert compare these specimens with
handwriting, printing, and typewriting on
tax returns, check endorsements, and
forwarding instructions.
- Special
agents should obtain prior and subsequent
years' returns, if any.
- Special agents must
determine if employers' names correspond with those
on Forms W–2 and tax returns filed. These employers
should be contacted to determine if the persons
listed on the returns are on their payroll.
- Special agents
should contact the State Unemployment Compensation
office to verify information on the Forms W–2. The
State Unemployment Compensation office maintains
records pertaining to FUTA tax information on
employers and their insured employees. This office
can determine if an employer, employee, or Social
Security number listed on a tax return exists in
that state. This state office can also supply, by
telephone, all information shown on the application
for the Social Security number.
9.5.4.1.1.6 (07-29-2002)
Multiple Refund Identification by Automated Data
Processing
- The purpose of
automated data processing (ADP) identification is to
assist in identifying returns filed by individuals
filing multiple false claims for refund and returns
prepared by unscrupulous tax practitioners
(so-called tax experts or refund mills).
- To have the
Individual Master File (IMF) checked the SAC should
submit a request, in triplicate, to the Chief, CI,
Attention: Fraud Detection Center Support, through
the Director, Field Operations.
- The request should
contain the following data to utilize this program:
- Tax year to
be checked.
- Which of
the routines is to be used (1), (2), (3) or
(4). (See LEM 9, IRM 9.14, Criminal
Investigation.)
- Lowest ZIP
code number (five digits) or the geographic
area to be checked.
- Highest ZIP
code number (five digits) of the geographic
area to be checked. (High ZIP code need not
be furnished for Routine (3).
- Only one
ZIP code is used for Routine (4).
- Reason for
request. Priority will be given to search
the IMF to identify returns in an opened
investigation over a possible multiple
filing search.
- A single request
for Routines (1) or (2) can consist of a maximum of
2099 zip codes. For example, a single request may
specify a low ZIP code number of 30000 and a high of
32098. For Routine (3) and Routine (4) a single ZIP
code constitutes a request. Since some field offices
may not have a range of 2099 ZIP code numbers,
Headquarters may incorporate ZIP code numbers of
other field offices in the request to the National
Computer Center to make maximum use of the program.
- To provide security
and establish priorities, the Director, Refund Fraud
has been designated to coordinate this program with
the National Computer Center.
9.5.4.1.1.7 (07-29-2002)
Assistance of the Postal Service in Multiple
Refund Schemes
- Part 232.3d of the
Postal Service Manual instructs postal employees to
report to their Inspection Service suspicious
activities engaged in by the holders of post office
boxes. Should an employee note such suspicious
activity, i.e., a quantity of tax refund checks
directed to a post office box, in the normal course
of his or her duties, and volunteer this information
to an Inspector, the information would be made
available to the IRS, if apparently indicative of
criminal activity.
- The situation in
(1) above is to be distinguished from the process of
systematically scanning or watching incoming mail
for the purpose of identifying alleged violators of
the Internal Revenue Code and notifying IRS of the
names of the alleged violators. This has been
determined to satisfy sufficiently the definition of
a mail cover and, therefore, local Postal Officials
should not be requested to have employees institute
such a watch on the mail without requesting an
official mail cover.
- A request for
delivery of a refund check to a specific address
will be made by the local special agent to the local
Postal Inspector. The Postal Inspector will arrange
to have an employee of the Postal Service put the
refund check in the Post Office box or deliver the
check to a residence address in a regular delivery.
The Postal Inspector will notify CI of the
approximate time the check will be delivered to the
desired address.
- It has been
determined by the Legal Liaison Officer, Chief
Inspector's Office, U.S. Postal Service that a
prison mail room is not part of the U.S. Postal
system. Consequently, prison officials can make
additions to addresses without violating postal
regulations. In this regard, it is possible to
request from prison officials that all of a
prisoner's mail going to IRS be directed to the
Resident Agent in Charge (RAC) of the appropriate
IRS Campus. As appropriate, IRS should establish
coordination with local prison officials concerning
assistance in redirecting any mail leaving the
prison.
9.5.4.1.1.8 (07-29-2002)
The Questionable Refund Program (QRP)
- The purpose of the
Questionable Refund Program (QRP) is to detect and
stop fraudulent and fictitious claims for refunds on
income tax returns.
- The goal is to
investigate and prosecute promoters and
conspirators. Investigative priorities are the
responsibility of each Assistant Special Agent in
Charge (ASAC) as based upon local prosecution
standards. Emphasis should be given to
investigations with a greater potential for
continuing loss.
- Special agents
should maintain close relationships with tax
preparers and should expeditiously respond to
information on alleged schemes.
- Special agents,
working in conjunction with the IRS Campus
Questionable Refund Detection Teams (QRDT), should
take reasonable steps to ascertain the magnitude of
the scheme and the number of participants.
- Investigative steps
should include the following:
- contacting
the preparer or transmitter
- identifying
the person controlling the refund address
- determining
the existence of mail forwarding
instructions
- contacting
lending institutions and establishing the
falsity of wage and income documents
9.5.4.1.1.8.1
(07-29-2002)
Procedures for IRS Campus Identified QRP
Schemes
- Effective
October 1, 1996, all QRP schemes referred to a
field office will be input as primary
investigations into the Criminal Investigation
Management Information System (CIMIS) database
by personnel in the Fraud Development Centers
(FDC) at the IRS Campuses.
- The Form 4930
will be prepared at the IRS Campus, and entries
will be made in items 1–10, 12–18, 23, 24, 27,
29, and 71. The original Form 4930 will
accompany the referral to the field office. A
copy of the Form 4930 will be retained in the
scheme file maintained at each FDC.
- The
investigation number for each of these
investigations will contain a specific
identifier for each FDC.
- The first two
digits, normally the field office number, will
identify the IRS Campus where the investigation
was initiated.
- After the
primary is initiated, CIMIS will place them in a
QRP group investigation pool. Each field office
will be assigned a group pool number for QRP
referrals and this number will appear in the
Lead SSN field (Item 1) of the Form 4930.
- The QRP has
been assigned pool number 9999. For example, the
group pool number for Los Angeles will be
000-95-9999.
- These primary
investigations will appear in the field office
inventory and will appear in the CIMIS reports
and statistical summaries as any other open
primary investigation in the field office.
- Effective
January 1999, all QRP schemes must be linked to
one national General Investigation (GI). The GI
number (009910003) is assigned to all FDCs.
9.5.4.1.1.8.2
(07-29-2002)
Field Office Procedures for IRS Campus
Identified QRP Schemes
- Upon receipt of
the QRP Scheme referral from the IRS Campus, the
receiving field office will promptly assign a
special agent to evaluate the referral, and
update the Form 4930 to reflect the
investigation assignment and the due date of the
evaluation of the referral.
- The due date is
90 days from the receipt of the referral by the
field office.
- The name of the
primary investigation should not be changed. If
a subject investigation is initiated as a result
of the evaluation of the QRP primary
investigation, the Form 4930 initiating the
subject should reflect the name of the target of
the investigation. This will not be consistent
with the name on the primary investigation. Even
though they are not consistent, the primary
investigation will still be linked to all
subject investigations initiated.
- The field
office is responsible for closing QRP primary
investigations as well as subject investigations
which are initiated as a result of the
evaluation of the QRP scheme referral. These
investigations should be closed in a manner
consistent with all other primary and subject
investigations.
- At the
conclusion of the criminal aspects of a false
refund investigation, the SAC will forward a
memorandum containing the true name and Social
Security number of the filer to the RAC. The RAC
will then notify the operating divisions via
two-way memo to have the taxpayer's account
adjusted and collection action initiated.
9.5.4.1.1.8.3
(07-29-2002)
Procedures for Field Office Identified QRP
Schemes
- In the event
the field office rather than the IRS Campus
opens a QRP primary investigation, the field
office must call the appropriate IRS Campus QRP
coordinator to receive a scheme number. This
will help to prevent duplicating open primary
investigations on schemes the IRS Campus is
already tracking.
- The field
office is responsible for closing all QRP
primary investigations and subject
investigations in a manner consistent with all
other primary and subject investigations.
- At the
conclusion of the criminal aspects of a false
refund investigation, the SAC will forward a
memorandum containing the true name and Social
Security number of the filer to the RAC. The RAC
will then notify the operating divisions via
two-way memo to have the taxpayer's account
adjusted and collection action initiated.
9.5.4.1.2 (07-29-2002)
Return Preparer Program (RPP)
- This program involves
claims on federal income tax returns prepared by
unscrupulous return preparers who claim excessive
deductions and exemptions on returns prepared for
clients. The clients may or may not have knowledge of
the excessive deductions and exemptions claimed.
- These preparers develop
a large clientele through a reputation for saving
clients' money, and often charge exorbitant fees on the
basis of large refunds to be obtained.
- Most unscrupulous
return preparers have the refund checks mailed to their
office, exact an exorbitant fee, forge the endorsement,
and negotiate the check without the client's knowledge.
- Investigations in this
group originate from a variety of sources, such as:
- Letters of
complaint from the public and information from
informants concerning returns' preparers.
- Complaints from
ethical practitioners and professional
societies.
- Screening of
returns by IRS Campus personnel.
- Identification
of suspect preparers by CI and other IRS
personnel.
9.5.4.1.2.1 (07-29-2002)
Procedures for IRS Campus Identified Return
Preparer Program Schemes
- Effective October
1, 1999, all RPP schemes referred to a field office
will be input as primary investigations into the
CIMIS database by personnel in the FDC at the IRS
Campuses.
- The Form 4930 will
be prepared at the IRS Campus and entries will be
made in items 1–10, 12–18, 23, 24, 27, 29, and 71.
The original Form 4930 will accompany the referral
to the field office. A copy of the Form 4930 will be
retained in the scheme file maintained at each FDC.
- The investigation
number for each of these investigations will contain
a specific identifier for each FDC.
- The first two
digits, normally the field office number, will
identify the IRS Campus where the investigation was
initiated.
- After the primary
is initiated, CIMIS will place them in a RPP group
investigation pool. Each field office will be
assigned a group pool number for RPP referrals and
this number will appear in the Lead SSN field (Item
1) of the Form 4930.
- The RPP has been
assigned pool number 8888. For example, the group
pool number for Los Angeles will be 000-95-8888.
- These primary
investigations will appear in the field office
inventory and will appear in the CIMIS reports and
statistical summaries as any other open primary
investigation in the field office.
- Effective January
1999, all RPP schemes must be linked to one national
general investigation. The general investigation
number (009910005) is assigned to all FDCs.
9.5.4.1.2.2 (07-29-2002)
Field Office Procedures for Return Preparer
Program Scheme Referrals
- Upon receipt of the
RPP Scheme referral from the IRS Campus, the
receiving field office will promptly assign an agent
to evaluate the referral, and update the Form 4930
to reflect the investigation assignment and the due
date of the evaluation of the referral.
- The due date is 90
days from the receipt of the referral by the field
office.
- The name of the
primary investigation should not be changed. If a
subject investigation is initiated as a result of
the evaluation of the RPP primary investigation, the
Form 4930 initiating the subject should reflect the
name of the target of the investigation. This will
not be consistent with the name on the primary
investigation. Even though they are not consistent,
the primary investigation will still be linked to
all subject investigations initiated.
- The field office is
responsible for closing RPP primary investigations
as well as subject investigations which are
initiated as a result of the evaluation of the RPP
scheme referral. These investigations should be
closed in a manner consistent with all other primary
and subject investigations.
- At the conclusion
of the criminal aspects of a false refund
investigation, the SAC will forward a memorandum
containing the true name and Social Security number
of the filer to the RAC. The RAC will then notify
the operating divisions via two-way memo to have the
taxpayer's account adjusted and collection action
initiated.
9.5.4.1.2.3 (07-29-2002)
Procedures for Field Office Identified Return
Preparer Program Schemes
- In the event the
field office rather than the FDC opens a RPP primary
investigation, the field office must call the
appropriate IRS Campus RPP coordinator to receive a
scheme number. This will help to prevent duplicating
open primary investigations on schemes the IRS
Campus is already tracking.
- The field office is
responsible for closing all RPP primary
investigations and subject investigations in a
manner consistent with all other primary and subject
investigations.
9.5.4.1.2.4 (09-02-1999)
Investigative Techniques (Unscrupulous Return
Preparers)
- The investigative
techniques used in these investigations are
different from the techniques used in multiple
claims for refund investigations. These
investigations are directed toward:
- Determining
the responsibility for the overstatement of
the deductions and exemptions claimed.
-
Establishing whether such overstatements
were made with corrupt intent.
9.5.4.1.2.5 (07-29-2002)
Investigation of Multiple Fraudulent Returns
Prepared by Unscrupulous Return Preparers
- The returns in this
group of investigations are usually of authentic
origin but are fraudulent because of overstated
deductions or exemptions.
- Some of the most
flagrant violations have been committed by
unscrupulous return preparers who have been
illiterate, trusting clientele.
- Occasionally, it
has been established that a preparer has conspired
with the taxpayer to file a false and fraudulent
return.
- Internal Revenue
Code §7206(2) (see IRM 9.1.1) is used in the
prosecution of the preparer in the former
investigations; and either this section or 18 USC
§371 is used in the latter type of investigation.
These are not the only statutes that may be invoked.
Title 18 USC §371 is the conspiracy statute and the
techniques of investigation of conspiracy
investigations are set forth in IRM 9.1.3.
9.5.4.1.2.6 (07-29-2002)
Developing the Investigation
- Multiple refund
investigations involving unscrupulous preparers are
developed by patient and painstaking interviews of
the clientele to determine responsibility for
fraudulent returns.
- Facts can often be
obtained expeditiously and with less alarm by
interviewing each client prior to a formal subject
interview.
- If the client
interview discloses information or records which are
material to the investigation, the client testimony
can be obtained later under oath.
- In an effort to
evaluate allegations, consideration should be given
to using a special agent in an undercover status.
The undercover agent can have a return prepared and
learn the practitioner's modus operandi and obtain
evidence.
- The investigation
should establish if the fraud is attributable to the
preparer, the client, or both. An interview should,
therefore, be designed to ascertain:
- The name of
the person that recommended the preparer and
the identity of others known to have used
the preparer's services. It is advisable to
obtain prior years' returns filed by the
client. Prior year returns not prepared by
the subject can be used for comparison.
- Information
and records used in the preparation of the
return.
- Any
memorandum or notes the preparer made of
information
furnished.
- Any
discussion between the preparer and client
regarding the amount of deductions and
exemptions to be claimed.
- Any
suggestions made by the preparer that more
deductions should be claimed. These
suggestions should be fully explained.
- If each
deduction claimed is the same amount
furnished to the preparer by the client,
obtain documents and statements concerning
amounts claimed. If the amount claimed is
different than that which was furnished to
the preparer, obtain the client's
explanation.
- If the
client knew that an excessive amount had
been claimed, determine why he or she
permitted it; and if the client did not
know, how it escaped him or her.
- The
circumstances of the client's signing the
return. Was the return signed before or
after it was completed? If the client signed
the return in blank, why? If the return was
completed before the client signed it, did
the client review the contents? How could
any excessive amounts escape him or her?
- Did the
client know a refund was claimed?
- Why the
client believed he or she was to receive a
refund.
- The
client's literacy, knowledge, or training in
tax matters.
- The amount
of the preparer's fee and was the amount
charged based on the refund to the obtained?
- Where the
refund check was to be mailed; if to the
preparer's address, why?
- Did the
client cash the refund check?
- Obtain an
explanation of the check cashing. Determine
if it was cashed by the preparer; did the
preparer take a fee from the proceeds; and
was possession of the check by the preparer
used to coerce payment of an exorbitant fee?
- Did the
preparer endorse the client's name to the
check? If so, did the client authorize it?
- The questions
listed above are submitted as an outline for a
preparer interview. Other pertinent questions may
arise as the interview proceeds. During the preparer
interview, if possible, obtain copies of:
- any
memorandums or notes made during interviews
with clients
- any
memorandums, documents, and data furnished
to the preparer by the client for use in
preparing the client's return
- any list of
fees charged, list of clients, retained
copies of returns filed, or other pertinent
material that the preparer maintains
- The preparer's
employees should be interviewed to establish
procedures for the preparation of returns. The
outline for the interview of the subject preparer
should also be used for all employees preparing
returns.
- The pattern of
investigations most susceptible to the development
of successful criminal prosecution are those
investigations involving:
- returns
having claims that are completely without
basis
- clientele
testify that deductions were listed without
their knowledge
- the actions
of the practitioner corroborate the
testimony of his or her clientele
- Special agents
should not use possible legitimate deductions as
evidence.
- Special agents
should keep in mind that the clients may be as
culpable as the practitioner. Client culpability
should be resolved as soon as possible.
9.5.4.1.2.7 (07-29-2002)
Embezzlement of the Client's Tax Payment
- These are
investigations in which the unscrupulous preparer
accepts payment for the tax liability of the client
at the time of preparation of the return but does
not file the return or pay the tax. In these
investigations, the preparer cannot be charged with
violation of IRC §7203; however, IRC §7201 has been
recommended in several instances.
- In one
investigation tried under IRC §7201,
U.S. vs. Mesheski,
the court held that such acts involve only the crime
of embezzlement under state law, and do not come
within the definition of attempt to evade or defeat
tax.
- Other courts have
disagreed with that conclusion, and found that the
defendant intended to cheat not only his or her
clients by embezzling their money but also the
government by evading the clients' taxes
U.S. vs. Charles L. O.
Edwards.
Exhibit 9.5.4.1-1 (09-02-1999)
List of First Three Digits of SSN and their Assigned
Areas of Issuance
|
LIST OF FIRST THREE
DIGITS OF SSN AND THEIR ASSIGNED AREAS OF
ISSUANCE |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Number(s) |
Area |
Number(s) |
Area |
|
001–003 |
New Hampshire |
501–502 |
North Dakota |
|
004–007 |
Maine |
503–504 |
South Dakota |
|
008–009 |
Vermont |
505–508 |
Nebraska |
|
010–034 |
Massachusetts |
509–515 |
Kansas |
|
035–039 |
Rhode Island |
516–517 |
Montana |
|
040–049 |
Connecticut |
518–519 |
Idaho |
|
050–134 |
New York |
520 |
Wyoming |
|
135–158 |
New Jersey |
521–524 |
Colorado |
|
159–211 |
Pennsylvania |
525–585 |
New Mexico |
|
212–220 |
Maryland |
526–527 |
Arizona |
|
221–222 |
Delaware |
528–529 |
Utah |
|
223–231 |
Virginia |
530 |
Nevada |
|
232–236 |
West Virginia |
531–539 |
Washington |
|
(1) 232, 237–246 |
North Carolina |
540–544 |
Oregon |
|
247–251 |
South Carolina |
545–573 |
California |
|
252–260 |
Georgia |
574 |
Alaska |
|
261–267 |
Florida |
575–576 |
Hawaii |
|
268–302 |
Ohio |
577–579 |
District of
Columbia |
|
303–317 |
Indiana |
580 |
Virgin Islands |
|
318–361 |
Illinois |
(2) 580–584 |
Puerto Rico |
|
362–386 |
Michigan |
586 |
Guam |
|
387–399 |
Wisconsin |
(3) 586 |
American Samoa |
|
400–407 |
Kentucky |
(3) 586 |
Philippine Islands |
|
408–415 |
Tennessee |
587–588 |
Mississippi |
|
416–424 |
Alabama |
589–595 |
Florida |
|
425–428 |
Mississippi |
596–599 |
Puerto Rico |
|
429–432 |
Arkansas |
600–601 |
Arizona |
|
433–439 |
Louisiana |
602–626 |
California |
|
440–448 |
Oklahoma |
627–645 |
Texas |
|
449–467 |
Texas |
646–647 |
Utah |
|
468–477 |
Minnesota |
648–649 |
New Mexico |
|
478–485 |
Iowa |
700–729 |
Railroad Retirement
Board |
|
486–500 |
Missouri |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
(1) Area 323:
Number 30 (middle 2 digits of SSN) allocated to
N. Carolina by transfer from W. Virginia. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
(2) Area
580: Numbers 01–18 (middle 2 digits of SSN)
associated to the Virgin Islands; number 20 and
above allocated to Puerto Rico. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Area 586: Numbers
01–18 (middle 2 digits of SSN) allocated to
Guam; numbers 20–28 allocated to American Samoa;
numbers 30–58 reserved for possible future
allocation to other Pacific possessions or trust
territories; numbers 60–78 allocated during
initial registration of armed services personnel
for assignment to those who were natives of the
Philippine Islands; number 80 and above not
allocated. |
|
