Pre-Inspection of
Return

7213A- Unauthorized
Browsing Through Taxpayer Files: Pre-Taxpayer Browsing Protection Act:
Inspection of Return
[2001-1
USTC ¶50,357] D. William Wewee, Plaintiff v.
United States of America
, Defendant
U.S.
District Court, Dist. Ariz., CV 98-455 TUC JMR,
3/29/2001
[Code
Sec. 6103 ]
Unauthorized disclosure: Tax return information: Evidence: Burden of
proof: Summary judgment.--Summary judgment was appropriate because a
tax return preparer failed to provide evidence in support of his claim
that an IRS agent unlawfully disclosed his tax return information when
he placed a transcript of the preparer's tax return in the preparer's
tax preparer's penalty file. Although the preparer suspected that other
IRS employees saw his return after it was placed in the file, he
developed no evidence indicating that any disclosure took place at all.
[Code
Secs. 7213A and 7431
]
Unauthorized inspection: Tax return information: Effective date.--A
tax return preparer's claim that the IRS inspected his tax return for
the tax year at issue without appropriate authorization under Code Sec. 7213A ,
although not addressed by the government in its motion for summary
judgment, was not considered. The provision applied to violations
occurring on or after
August 5, 1997
, which was almost one year after the alleged offense.
ORDER
ROLL,
District Judge:
Pending
before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgement [sic].
Defendant's motion is granted as Plaintiff has failed to produce any
evidence to support his claim that Defendant unlawfully disclosed his
tax return information in violation of 26 U.S.C. §6103.
Procedural
History
In
September of 1998, Plaintiff filed his complaint, styled as "Bivens
Complaint for Civil Rights Damages" and alleged eight causes of
action under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution and under Internal Revenue Code 26
U.S.C. §§6103 and 7431(a)(1). Plaintiff filed his complaint against
seven employees of the Internal Revenue service and the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS). In April of 1999, the Court dismissed Plaintiff's first
through seventh causes of action with prejudice and substituted the
United States
as the sole defendant in the remaining count. The only remaining claim
alleged by Plaintiff is for the "unlawful inspection and numerous
unauthorized disclosures of Plaintiff's confidential tax return
information" pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §§6103 and 7431. Defendant
moves for summary judgment on this claim, pursuant to Rule 56 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Background
Plaintiff
is an accountant who prepares tax returns and, at times, represents tax
payers who are under investigation by the IRS. In 1996, IRS Agent
Raymond N. Eatman conducted an audit of the 1992 and 1993 tax returns of
a taxpayer who is not a party to this action. Based on his examination,
Agent Raymond determined that an understatement of the taxpayer's 1992
and 1993 tax returns had occurred. On
September 9, 1996
, Agent Raymond obtained a copy of that taxpayer's Individual Master
File (IMF), which indicated that the taxpayer had a paid tax return
preparer for that year.
In
order to determine the tax preparer's identity, Agent Eatman submitted
two requests for transcripts from his group secretary, who had access to
the IRS's computer system known as IDRS or Integrated Data Retrieval
System, which enables an IRS employee to get access to taxpayers
accounts. Agent Eatman requested a CFINQ and an INOLES transcript. The
CFINQ transcript identified Plaintiff as the tax preparer and indicated
that he resided at "6401 N. Via Piccolina,
Tucson
,
Arizona
." The CFINQ also contained a phone number for Plaintiff at
520-544-0947. The INOLES transcript showed the tax return preparer as
"Bill Wewee, Wewee & Assoc. P.C. 829 No. Circle #120, Colorado
Springs, CO. 80909."
After
reviewing these documents, Agent Eatman decided to pursue a possible
Return Preparer Penalty against Plaintiff for allegedly reporting
unrealistic positions on his client's tax returns and received
permission to conduct the investigation on
September 17, 1996
. While conducting his investigation, Agent Eatman submitted a request
for an INOLES transcript, an MFTRA transcript, and an AMDISA transcript,
all of which are identified by the IRS Return Prepare Program Procedures
as appropriate IDRS research. 1
On
September 18, 1996
, because he had not yet received the transcripts ordered the day
before, Agent Eatman requested an RTVUE transcript for Plaintiff's most
recently filed tax return. An RTVUE is essentially a line by line
transcript of a Form 1040 tax return. According to Agent Eatman, he
needed the RTVUE in order to verify Plaintiff's most recent address
because the documents previously obtained in the investigation of
Plaintiff's client listed two different addresses for the Plaintiff.
Later that same day, Agent Eatman received Plaintiff's INOLES
transcript, which contained his correct address.
Agent
Eatman completed the penalty file on September 18th, and recommended
that a Preparer Return Penalty be assessed against Plaintiff. On
September 19th, Agent Eatman received the remainder of the transcripts
he had requested the day before. Agent Eatman placed virtually all of
the transcripts regarding Plaintiff into the Return Preparer Penalty
File. 2 Agent Eatman
affirms that he did not display or disclose Plaintiff's RTVUE with
anyone. Agent Eatman does not know whether any other IRS employees
reviewed any of the transcripts placed into the Return Preparer Penalty
file.
Discussion
Summary Judgment Standard
Summary
judgment is proper where no genuine issue as to any material fact
exists, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S.
317, 322 (1986). Material facts are those which, under applicable
substantive law, may affect the outcome of the case. A dispute is
genuine when "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477
U.S.
at 248. While "reasonableness" is generally a fact question
for the jury, it is a question of law, thus allowing summary judgment,
where undisputed facts leave no room for a reasonable difference of
opinion. West v. State Farm Fire & Gas.
Co.
(9th Cir. 1989) 868 F.2d 348, 350.
Summary
judgement [sic] for a defendant is appropriate when the plaintiff
fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an
element essential to that party's case and on which that party will bear
the burden of proof at trial. Celotex, 477
U.S.
at 322. The initial burden rests on the moving party to point out the
absence of any genuine issue of material fact, but the moving party need
not support its motion with affidavits or other supporting materials.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex, 477
U.S.
at 323. Once satisfied, the burden shifts to the opponent to demonstrate
through production of probative evidence that an issue of fact remains
to be tried.
Id.
at 323-24. The Court must accept the non-movant's evidence as true and
view all inferences in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Eisenberg
v. Insurance Co. of
North America
, 815 F.2d 1285, 1289 (9th Cir. 1987).
In
this case, Defendant argues that summary judgment is appropriate because
no disclosure of Plaintiff's tax return information took place.
Defendant further argues that, in the alternative, even if Defendant
disclosed Plaintiff's tax return information, such disclosure would have
been authorized under 26 U.S.C. §6103(h)(1). A review of the arguments
follows.
1.
Disclosure of Tax Return Information
According
to §6103, "[r]eturns and return information shall be confidential,
and except as authorized by this title--no officer or employee of the
United States shall disclose any return or return information obtained
by him in any manner in connection with his service as such an officer
or an employee or otherwise or under the provisions of this
section." The term " 'disclosure' means the making known to
any person in any manner whatever a return or return information."
26 U.S.C. §6103(b)(8). Violations of §6103 by "any officer or
employee of the United States" who "knowingly, or by reason of
negligence, inspects or discloses any return or return information with
respect to a taxpayer in violation of any provision of §6103" are
grounds for civil actions by the taxpayer pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §7431.
However,
26 U.S.C. §6103 provides for situations in which disclosure is
appropriate. For example, according to §6103(h)(1), "[r]eturns and
return information shall, without written request, be open to inspection
by or disclosure to officers and employees of the Department of the
Treasury whose official duties require such inspection or
disclosure for tax administration purposes." 26 U.S.C. §6103(h)(1)
(Emphasis added). Tax administration includes assessment, collection,
enforcement, litigation, publication, and statistical gathering
functions under such laws, statutes, or conventions. 26 U.S.C. §6103(B)(4)(b).
In
this case, Plaintiff argues that Agent Eatman unlawfully disclosed his
1995 tax return information when Agent Eatman placed the RTVUE in
Plaintiff's Tax Preparer's Penalty file. 3 Plaintiff
alleges Agent Eatman unlawfully disclosed the tax return information to
(1) Scott Schmidt, IRS Group Manager, (2) Sandra Mann, IRS Return
Program Coordinator, (3) Jose Gonzales, IRS Appeals' Officer, and (4)
all other IRS employees who have access to Plaintiff's Tax Preparer
Penalty file. 4 Plaintiff
argues that Agent Eatman was not "required" to obtain his 1995
tax return information in order to access a tax preparer penalty upon
him because Agent Eatman could have telephoned him to get his correct
address. In addition, Plaintiff argues that because time was not of the
essence, Agent Eatman could have waited for Plaintiff's INOLES
transcript, which arrived a day after it was requested and contained his
address. Plaintiff also maintains that Agent Eatman obtained his RTVUE
in violation of IRS policy because the IRS Return Preparer Program
Procedures did not list the RTVUE as appropriate research material.
In
response, Defendant argues that Agent Eatman never showed nor discussed
the RTVUE transcript with anyone else and that Agent Eatman does not
know whether any other IRS employee reviewed any of the transcripts in
the file. Significantly, Defendant insists that summary judgment is
appropriate on this ground alone because Plaintiff has failed to develop
any evidence to indicate that any disclosure took place at all. In
addition, Defendant argues that even if disclosure occurred, the
disclosure would have been for tax administrative purposes as permitted
under §6103(h)(1) because any agent with access to Plaintiff's Tax
Preparer Penalty file would be assisting in the assessment of a tax
preparer penalty against Plaintiff pursuant to §§6694-6695.
Defendant
further maintains that the fact that the Return Preparer Program
Procedures failed to list an RTVUE as an appropriate research document
does not mean that Agent Eatman's retrieval violated policy because no
policy existed that specifically prohibited the retrieval. Moreover,
Defendant notes that "[r]ules contained in the Internal Revenue
Manual and other internal IRS documents, such as district guidelines, do
not have force and effect of law, are not binding on the IRS, and do not
convey rights to taxpayers." United States v. Caceres [79-1
USTC ¶9294], 440 U.S. 741, 751-52(1979).
Upon
review, summary judgment is appropriate in this case because Plaintiff
has failed to produce any evidence to show that any disclosure occurred.
Plaintiff should have conducted further investigation, including the
taking of depositions or affidavits, of individuals he suspected of
having been exposed to his 1995 tax return. As previously indicated,
summary judgement [sic] for a defendant is appropriate when the
plaintiff fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence
of an element essential to that party's case and on which that party
will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex, 477
U.S.
at 322. Here, Plaintiff must show that some disclosure has occurred or
else he has no claim. Plaintiff failed to do so. Consequently, summary
judgment must be granted.
2.
Unauthorized Inspection of Tax Return
Although
Defendant does not address this claim in its Motion for Summary
Judgment, Plaintiff also asserts that Defendant inspected his
1995 tax return without appropriate authorization. According to §7213A,
it is unlawful for any officer or employee of the United States, such as
Agent Eatman, to willfully inspect any return or return
information except as authorized by Title 26. Congress enacted §7213A,
also known as the Taxpayer Browsing Protection Plan, on
August 5, 1997
, to protect taxpayers. The enactment of this section, however applies
to violations occurring on and after
August 5, 1997
. The alleged offense in this case occurred in September of 1996.
Therefore, Plaintiff's claim is not covered by the act and cannot be
considered.
Accordingly,
IT
IS ORDERED that Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
1
Agent Eatman appropriately submitted a request for the following master
file transcripts: (1) a Business Master File transcript, which contains
Plaintiff's employer identification number and is required to determine
whether any other miscellaneous penalties have been assessed against the
tax preparer's business; (2) an Individual Master File transcript, which
contains Plaintiff's taxpayer's identification number for the tax years
at issue and is required to determine whether any other miscellaneous
penalties have been assessed against the tax preparer personally; (3) an
INOLES transcript for Plaintiff's taxpayer identification number, which
shows the name and address of the tax preparer; and (4) an AMDISA
transcript for the taxpayer's identification number and verifies the
statute of limitation dates for assessment of the Return Preparer
Penalty.
2
One of the exceptions was the AMDISA transcript for the client taxpayer,
which was placed in that client's taxpayer's examination file.
3
The Parties agree that the RTVUE retrieved and placed into Plaintiff's
Tax Preparer Penalty file is a tax return or tax return information as
defined under 26 U.S.C. §6103.
4
Plaintiff's
June 12, 2000
, Rule 26(a)(1) disclosure contained a list of twenty names of
individuals who may have discoverable information. However, Plaintiff
has provided no evidence to show that any of those individuals, or
anyone else, has been unlawfully exposed to his 1995 tax return
information due to its placement in the Tax Preparer Penalty file.