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[87-1 USTC ¶9364] Great Western Savings, a Federal Savings
and Loan Association, Plaintiff v. The
Elliott H. Kajan, Kajan & Gross, 9777 Wilshire Blvd., Beverly
Hills, Calif. 90212, James D. Sage, Jeffrey J. Hultman, 9301
Corbin Ave., Northridge, Calif. 91308, for plaintiff. Robert C.
Bonner, United States Attorney, Charles H. Magnuson, Assistant
United States Attorney, Los Angeles, Calif. 90012, for defendants. FINDINGS OF 1. GREAT WESTERN SAVINGS ("GREAT WESTERN") is a federally
chartered Savings and Loan Association. 2. During December, 1978, GREAT WESTERN loaned the amount of
$40,000 to WAYNE D. WILLIAMS and CORAZON G. WILLIAMS ("the
WILLIAMS"). The loan was evidenced by a promissory note and
the debt was secured by a purchase money first deed of trust
recorded 3. During December, 1980, GREAT WESTERN loaned an additional amount
of $66,000 to the WILLIAMS. The second loan was evidenced by a
promissory note and the debt was secured by a second deed of
trust, recorded December 24, 1980, encumbering the Subject
Property. 4. Subsequent to the recordation of GREAT WESTERN'S two deeds of
trust, the Los Angeles District Office of the Internal Revenue
Service (" 5. The WILLIAMS subsequently defaulted in their payment of GREAT
WESTERN'S two loans. Thereafter, GREAT WESTERN instructed the
trustee of the second deed of trust, CALIFORNIA RECONVEYANCE
COMPANY (the "Trustee"), to commence non-judicial
foreclosure proceedings under the second deed of trust. 6. When foreclosure becomes necessary on real property securing
multiple loans issued by GREAT WESTERN, it is the policy of GREAT
WESTERN to foreclose on the most junior loan. It is also the
policy of GREAT WESTERN to thereafter instruct the Trustee to
reconvey any senior GREAT WESTERN deed of trust and also cancel
the corresponding promissory notes secured by the deeds of trust.
That policy was followed in the instant action. 7. In order to comply with the discharge of liens provisions
contained under §7425
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended (26
U.S.C.) (the "Code"), the Trustee issued to the 8. On November 17, 1981, under the mistaken assumption that the 9. On December 3, 1981, a Trustee's Deed conveying the Subject
Property to GREAT WESTERN was recorded. 10. After the Trustee's Deed conveying the Subject Property to
GREAT WESTERN was recorded, and under the mistaken assumption that
the foreclosure sale under the second deed of trust had eliminated
all other liens encumbering the Subject Property, including the
Non-Discharged Liens, GREAT WESTERN cancelled the promissory note
in the amount of $40,000 and effectuated the reconveyance of its
first deed of trust. 11. On December 17, 1981, the 12. On February 1, 1982, in reviewing the request to release its
right of redemption, the 13. GREAT WESTERN presently remains as the owner of the Subject
Property. 14. Any conclusion of law deemed to be a finding of fact is hereby
found as a fact. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Section
7425(b)(1) of the Code provides, inter alia,
that a sale of property on which the United States has a lien,
made pursuant to an instrument creating a lien on the property,
shall be made subject to and without disturbing such lien if
notice of such lien was filed in the place provided by law for
such a filing more than 30 days before such sale and the United
States is not given notice of such sale. 2. The UNITED STATES was not given proper notice of the
Non-Discharged Liens in connection with the foreclosure
proceedings under GREAT WESTERN'S second deed of trust.
Accordingly, the Non-Discharged Liens were not extinguished by the
sale under the second deed of trust and, thus, remained as viable
and subsisting liens against the Subject Property. §7425(b)
of the Code. 3. A necessary consequence of the operation of §7425(b)
of the Code is that when a nonjudicial foreclosure sale
takes place without notice being given to the United States of its
junior tax liens, the lien being foreclosed is normally
extinguished and, therefore, the tax liens are promoted in
priority. Southern Bank of Lauderdale County v. Internal
Revenue Service [85-2
USTC ¶9670 ], 770 F.2d 1001 (11th Cir. 1985). 4. GREAT WESTERN seeks in this proceeding to avoid this result by
obtaining rescission of the Trustee's deed and the sale taken
under the second deed of trust, and, further, to rescind the
reconveyance of the first deed of trust and cancellation of the
promissory note secured thereunder, thereby allowing it to
thereafter conduct a new "power of sale" foreclosure
accompanied by the giving of proper notice to the 5. If California law were all that were involved, the Court, in
furtherance of the longstanding policy of California law to
correct forfeitures (and the accompanying windfall) which occur by
reason of action taken under a mistake, would hold that GREAT
WESTERN could rescind both the sale under the second deed of trust
and the later reconveyance of the first deed of trust, and the
Court would reinstate the liens of the deeds of trust with
priority over the subsequent Non-Discharged Liens. Brackett v.
Banegas, 116 6. Fairness and equity dictate such treatment here, but the Court
cannot order it insofar as the rescission of the foreclosure sale
under the second deed of trust is concerned by reason of the
operation of federal law embodied in §7425
of the Code. While state law defines the property
interest to which liens attach, federal law defines the priority
and effect of tax liens on that interest. Southern Bank of
Lauderdale County v. Internal Revenue Service [85-2 USTC ¶9670 ], 770 F.2d 1001 (11th Cir. 1985). 7. With respect to the requested rescission of the foreclosure sale
under the second deed of trust, the interest of the United States
in having a uniform method of protecting itself against private
sales takes precedence over state law concepts of equity and
fairness in correcting the effect of a mistake. Since federal law
determines the priority of a federal tax lien, the congressionally
prescribed result of §7425(b)(1)
of the Code governs, and it is not open to state
legislatures or courts to prescribe different remedies. Southern
Bank of 8. This Court believes that the Southern Bank case is the
law of the Ninth Circuit and follows it. The result is that the
foreclosure sale under the second deed of trust may not be
rescinded with the effect of eliminating the priority of the
Non-Discharged Liens. 9. Section
7425 of the Code does not affect GREAT WESTERN'S action
in causing the lien of the first deed of trust to be reconveyed
following the foreclosure sale. That section deals only with
private sales under "power of sale" provisions in deeds
of trust. Considerations of enforcement of federal tax liens in
accordance with the intent of Congress are not impacted by a
rescission of the reconveyance and a determination that the
reinstated first lien takes priority over the Non-Discharged
Liens. See Little v. 10. In a situation where a deed of trust is reconveyed in error,
rescission and cancellation of the reconveyance and reinstatement
of the lien of the deed of trust is allowable.Duley v.
Westinghouse Electric Corporation, 97 Cal. App. 3d 430, 158
Cal. Rptr. 668 (1979). Accordingly, judgment will enter decreeing
rescission of the reconveyance of the first deed of trust and
reinstatement of the first deed of trust as a lien prior to the
Non-Discharged Liens. 11. Any finding of fact deemed to be a conclusion of law is hereby
concluded as a matter of law. [87-1 USTC ¶9364] Great Western Savings, a Federal Savings
and Loan Association, Plaintiff v. The
Elliott H. Kajan, Kajan & Gross, 9777 Wilshire Blvd., Beverly
Hills, Calif. 90212, James D. Sage, Jeffrey J. Hultman, 9301
Corbin Ave., Northridge, Calif. 91308, for plaintiff. Robert C.
Bonner, United States Attorney, Charles H. Magnuson, Assistant
United States Attorney, Los Angeles, Calif. 90012, for defendants. FINDINGS OF 1. GREAT WESTERN SAVINGS ("GREAT WESTERN") is a federally
chartered Savings and Loan Association. 2. During December, 1978, GREAT WESTERN loaned the amount of
$40,000 to WAYNE D. WILLIAMS and CORAZON G. WILLIAMS ("the
WILLIAMS"). The loan was evidenced by a promissory note and
the debt was secured by a purchase money first deed of trust
recorded 3. During December, 1980, GREAT WESTERN loaned an additional amount
of $66,000 to the WILLIAMS. The second loan was evidenced by a
promissory note and the debt was secured by a second deed of
trust, recorded December 24, 1980, encumbering the Subject
Property. 4. Subsequent to the recordation of GREAT WESTERN'S two deeds of
trust, the Los Angeles District Office of the Internal Revenue
Service (" 5. The WILLIAMS subsequently defaulted in their payment of GREAT
WESTERN'S two loans. Thereafter, GREAT WESTERN instructed the
trustee of the second deed of trust, CALIFORNIA RECONVEYANCE
COMPANY (the "Trustee"), to commence non-judicial
foreclosure proceedings under the second deed of trust. 6. When foreclosure becomes necessary on real property securing
multiple loans issued by GREAT WESTERN, it is the policy of GREAT
WESTERN to foreclose on the most junior loan. It is also the
policy of GREAT WESTERN to thereafter instruct the Trustee to
reconvey any senior GREAT WESTERN deed of trust and also cancel
the corresponding promissory notes secured by the deeds of trust.
That policy was followed in the instant action. 7. In order to comply with the discharge of liens provisions
contained under §7425
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended (26
U.S.C.) (the "Code"), the Trustee issued to the 8. On November 17, 1981, under the mistaken assumption that the 9. On December 3, 1981, a Trustee's Deed conveying the Subject
Property to GREAT WESTERN was recorded. 10. After the Trustee's Deed conveying the Subject Property to
GREAT WESTERN was recorded, and under the mistaken assumption that
the foreclosure sale under the second deed of trust had eliminated
all other liens encumbering the Subject Property, including the
Non-Discharged Liens, GREAT WESTERN cancelled the promissory note
in the amount of $40,000 and effectuated the reconveyance of its
first deed of trust. 11. On December 17, 1981, the 12. On February 1, 1982, in reviewing the request to release its
right of redemption, the 13. GREAT WESTERN presently remains as the owner of the Subject
Property. 14. Any conclusion of law deemed to be a finding of fact is hereby
found as a fact. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Section
7425(b)(1) of the Code provides, inter alia,
that a sale of property on which the United States has a lien,
made pursuant to an instrument creating a lien on the property,
shall be made subject to and without disturbing such lien if
notice of such lien was filed in the place provided by law for
such a filing more than 30 days before such sale and the United
States is not given notice of such sale. 2. The UNITED STATES was not given proper notice of the
Non-Discharged Liens in connection with the foreclosure
proceedings under GREAT WESTERN'S second deed of trust.
Accordingly, the Non-Discharged Liens were not extinguished by the
sale under the second deed of trust and, thus, remained as viable
and subsisting liens against the Subject Property. §7425(b)
of the Code. 3. A necessary consequence of the operation of §7425(b)
of the Code is that when a nonjudicial foreclosure sale
takes place without notice being given to the United States of its
junior tax liens, the lien being foreclosed is normally
extinguished and, therefore, the tax liens are promoted in
priority. Southern Bank of Lauderdale County v. Internal
Revenue Service [85-2
USTC ¶9670 ], 770 F.2d 1001 (11th Cir. 1985). 4. GREAT WESTERN seeks in this proceeding to avoid this result by
obtaining rescission of the Trustee's deed and the sale taken
under the second deed of trust, and, further, to rescind the
reconveyance of the first deed of trust and cancellation of the
promissory note secured thereunder, thereby allowing it to
thereafter conduct a new "power of sale" foreclosure
accompanied by the giving of proper notice to the 5. If California law were all that were involved, the Court, in
furtherance of the longstanding policy of California law to
correct forfeitures (and the accompanying windfall) which occur by
reason of action taken under a mistake, would hold that GREAT
WESTERN could rescind both the sale under the second deed of trust
and the later reconveyance of the first deed of trust, and the
Court would reinstate the liens of the deeds of trust with
priority over the subsequent Non-Discharged Liens. Brackett v.
Banegas, 116 6. Fairness and equity dictate such treatment here, but the Court
cannot order it insofar as the rescission of the foreclosure sale
under the second deed of trust is concerned by reason of the
operation of federal law embodied in §7425
of the Code. While state law defines the property
interest to which liens attach, federal law defines the priority
and effect of tax liens on that interest. Southern Bank of
Lauderdale County v. Internal Revenue Service [85-2 USTC ¶9670 ], 770 F.2d 1001 (11th Cir. 1985). 7. With respect to the requested rescission of the foreclosure sale
under the second deed of trust, the interest of the United States
in having a uniform method of protecting itself against private
sales takes precedence over state law concepts of equity and
fairness in correcting the effect of a mistake. Since federal law
determines the priority of a federal tax lien, the congressionally
prescribed result of §7425(b)(1)
of the Code governs, and it is not open to state
legislatures or courts to prescribe different remedies. Southern
Bank of 8. This Court believes that the Southern Bank case is the
law of the Ninth Circuit and follows it. The result is that the
foreclosure sale under the second deed of trust may not be
rescinded with the effect of eliminating the priority of the
Non-Discharged Liens. 9. Section
7425 of the Code does not affect GREAT WESTERN'S action
in causing the lien of the first deed of trust to be reconveyed
following the foreclosure sale. That section deals only with
private sales under "power of sale" provisions in deeds
of trust. Considerations of enforcement of federal tax liens in
accordance with the intent of Congress are not impacted by a
rescission of the reconveyance and a determination that the
reinstated first lien takes priority over the Non-Discharged
Liens. See Little v. 10. In a situation where a deed of trust is reconveyed in error,
rescission and cancellation of the reconveyance and reinstatement
of the lien of the deed of trust is allowable.Duley v.
Westinghouse Electric Corporation, 97 Cal. App. 3d 430, 158
Cal. Rptr. 668 (1979). Accordingly, judgment will enter decreeing
rescission of the reconveyance of the first deed of trust and
reinstatement of the first deed of trust as a lien prior to the
Non-Discharged Liens. 11. Any finding of fact deemed to be a conclusion of law is hereby
concluded as a matter of law. 86-2 USTC ¶9618] United States of America, Plaintiff v.
Robert F. Aden, et al., Defendants U.S. District Court, Dist. Wyo., C85-399, Francis Leland Pico, Cheyenne, Wyo. 82003, Teresa J. Rasmussen,
Mark G. Fraase, Department of Justice, Washington, DC 20530, for
plaintiffs. Jeffrey C. Gosman, 139 W. Second, Casper, Wyo. 82601
for Charles R. Anderson, Denise Anderson, Joe R. Wilmetti, for
Meester Inc., William F. Swanton, P.O. Box 3191, Casper, Wyo.
82602, for Alfred Meester and Rose M. Meester. CORRECTED MEMORANDUM OPINION JOHNSON, District Judge: This is an action to reduce federal tax assessments against Robert
F. Aden and Carol J. Aden (Aden) to judgment, enforce outstanding
federal tax liens against the interests of the Adens in certain
real property located in Casper, Wyoming; and to foreclose the
federal tax liens on the interest of the Adens in that real
property. Jurisdiction vests by virtue of 28 U.S.C. §§1340 and
1345 and 26 U.S.C. §§7402
and 7403
. Summary judgment may not be granted unless the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file,
together with affidavits, if any, show that there exists no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Cayce v. Carter Oil
Company, 618 F.2d 669, 672 (10th Cir. 1980). The fact that
cross-motions for summary judgment have been filed does not permit
the entry of summary judgment if disputes remain as to material
facts. Buell Cabinet Co., Inc. v. Sudduth, 608 F.2d 431
(10th Cir. 1979). However, cross-motions for summary judgment will
allow the Court to infer that there is no evidence which needs to
be considered other than that which has been filed by the parties.
Securities and Exchange Commission v. American Commodity
Exchange, Inc., 546 F.2d 1361 (10th Cir. 1976). Following a complete examination of the materials filed by both
sides, we find no dispute as to the material issues of fact. On
November 21, 1980, the Adens entered into a contract for deed for
the purchase of certain real property located in During the pendency of the contract for deed, and prior to default
by the Adens, the Initially, we note that similar issues were raised in United
States v. Hernandez, Civil No. C85-384 (D. Wyo.). In Hernandez
we held that a purchaser's release of all equitable interests
under a contract for deed, in the state of The United States' position in this case is that the declaration of
a forfeiture, as opposed to an abandonment, is a "nonjudicial
sale" of which the United States must receive notice under §7425(b)
in order to extinguish a federal tax lien. We do not
agree. The purchaser of property under a contract for deed is vested only
with an equitable interest in the property. Hollabaugh v.
Kolbet, 604 P.2d 1359 ( Accordingly, we follow those decisions which have held that a
declaration for forfeiture, under the law of their respective
states, is not a sale of property within the meaning of §7425(b)
; Title 26 U.S.C. Brookbank, Inc. v. Hubbard [83-2 USTC ¶9507 ], 712 F.2d 399 (9th Cir. 1983); Runkel v.
United States [76-1
USTC ¶9152 ], 527 F.2d 914 (9th Cir. 1975); Sigel
v. United States of America, Civil No. 4-85-440 (D.C. Minn. We observe that the Andersons have filed a counterclaim against the
United States for attorney's fees under the Equal Access to
Justice Act, 26 U.S.C. §7430
. The Finally, there remains one matter for the Court to decide. The Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED 1. Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment as against defendants
Robert F. Aden and Carol J. Aden Perkins is granted. 2. Judgment is entered in favor of plaintiff against defendant
Robert F. Aden and Carol J. Aden Perkins in the amount of
$36,114.26, plus accrued interest, penalties and other additions
to tax as provided by law. 3. Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment as against Meester,
Inc., Alfred Meester, Rose Meester, Charles R. Anderson, Jr.,
a/k/a Gus Anderson, and Denise Anderson is denied. 4. Defendants Meester, Inc., Alfred Meester, Rose Meester, Charles
R. Anderson, Jr., a/k/a Gus Anderson, and Denise Anderson's
Motions for Summary Judgment against plaintiff are granted. 5. The [88-2 USTC ¶9398] Delta Savings & Loan Association,
Inc., Plaintiff-Appellant v. Internal Revenue Service, Defendant-Appellee
(CA-5), Ronald J. Vega, Gauthier, Murphy, Sherman, McCabe, Chehardy &
Ellis, 3500 N. Hullen, Metairie, La. 70002, for
plaintiff-appellant. Michael L. Paup, Wynette J. Hewett, Howard M.
Soloman, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. 20530, for
defendant-appellee. Before WISDOM, GARWOOD, and JONES, Circuit Judges. GARWOOD, Circuit Judge: Plaintiff-appellant Delta Savings & Loan Association, Inc.
(Delta) appeals the district court's grant of the motion of
defendant-appellee Internal Revenue Service ( Facts and Proceedings Below The facts of this case are undisputed. The The district court granted the motion of the Discussion Delta's sole contention on appeal is that the redemption amount
which the The basic premise of Delta's argument is that the automatic stay
prevented Delta from pursuing its deficiency claim against the
Olanos. Delta does not question the generally accepted
interpretation of section 2410(d) first set forth in Equity
Mortgage Corp. v. Loftus [74-2 USTC ¶9757 ], 504 F.2d 1071 (4th Cir. 1974). In that
case, the Fourth Circuit stated: "Where the purchaser at the sale is the person whose lien is
being foreclosed, the amount paid by him includes the amount of
the debt underlying his lien to the extent that the lien is
satisfied by the sale. Where the lien is fully satisfied, the
purchaser is not to receive less than the amount due him at the
time of the sale. Where the lien attaches to other property,
however, or where, after the sale, the purchaser still has the
right to sue for the unpaid balance of the amount due him, the
amount paid does not include this unpaid balance." Accord Mikulec v. United States
[87-2 USTC ¶9430 ], 705 F.2d 599, 601 (2d Cir. 1983); see
also 26 C.F.R. §301.7425-4(b)(2)
(ii) (stating that "[w]here, after the sale, the
holder of the lien being foreclosed has the right to the unpaid
balance of the amount due him, the amount legally satisfied by
reason of the sale does not include the amount of such lien to the
extent a deficiency judgment may be obtained therefor"). Nor
does Delta dispute the fact that, as a general proposition, a
lienholder that has not been fully paid after foreclosing on the
property subject to the lien has a right under The problems with Delta's argument are essentially twofold. First,
Delta is simply wrong when it contends that the automatic stay
prevented it from pursuing its deficiency claim against the Olanos.
All that the automatic stay does is to force creditors and other
interested parties to seek the bankruptcy court's approval before
taking certain types of action against a debtor or against
property of the estate. See In re Doan's Truck Repair, Inc.,
34 B.R. 180, 183 (Bankr.D.Wyo. 1983). Nothing in section 362(d)
expressly limits the ability to obtain relief from the automatic
stay to secured creditors seeking only to foreclose on specific
property. See In re Holtkamp, 669 F.2d 505, 508 (7th Cir.
1982); 2 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶362.07[1], at 362-53 (15th
ed. 1987). More importantly, Delta's argument would fail even if
it had been denied relief from the automatic stay in respect to a
suit against the Olanos personally on the debt or even if section
362(d) never allowed a lift of stay for such purposes. Delta's
foreclosure did not relieve Olanos of their remaining obligation
on their debt to Delta. Assuming there were sufficient assets in
the Olanos' bankruptcy estate, Delta could still ultimately
receive some further payment on its obligation, 2
and its failure to receive any such payment would be the result
not of its foreclosure, but rather of the degree to which the
Olanos were insolvent and the debt was finally discharged in the
bankruptcy proceeding. Second, Delta's interpretation of the language of section 2410(d)
is simply not consistent with the purpose of that section and section
7425(d) . The reason for allowing the government to
redeem property that was sold to a foreclosing superior lienholder
at essentially the same price that the lienholder paid for it is
not to ensure that the lienholder never realizes any loss on its
loan. The secured creditor whose foreclosure does not entirely
discharge the debtor's obligation continues to bear the risk of
the debtor's inability to pay more than the amount of indebtedness
discharged by the foreclosure. The statutory purpose is to
encourage the lienholder to bid at least a fair price on the
property being foreclosed by allowing the government to redeem the
property at the same price that the lienholder pays for it (plus
interest); if the superior lienholder pays the debtor at least a
fair price, this somewhat inures to the benefit of the government
as a creditor by reducing the debtor's obligations; the government
is not obliged to redeem; if the lienholder pays less than a fair
price, the government in redeeming the property is able to capture
any differential between the price paid and the property's fair
market value. As the Senate Finance Committee stated in its
explanation of this provision: "By exercising its power of redemption the
Government can purchase property sold at distress prices and
resell the property at a profit. This profit, of course, is
applied in satisfaction of the taxpayer's liability. In some
instances this procedure is the only means by which the Government
can collect taxes due. In all instances, however, the exercise of
this power, where redeemed property is sold at a profit, inures to
the benefit of delinquent taxpayers." S.Rep. No. 1708, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. 31-32, reprinted in 1966 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News 3722, 3753. If we were to accept Delta's interpretation of
section 2410(d), it would provide no incentive for a secured
creditor of a debtor to whom section
362(a) applied to bid a fair price at its foreclosure
sale. On the contrary, there would be every incentive for such a
creditor to bid a below-market price in an attempt to maximize its
gains by reselling the foreclosed property at a substantial
profit--knowing that any redemption by the government would have
to be for the full amount of the debt--while also pursuing its
deficiency claim against the debtor. On the other hand, under our
interpretation, a creditor such as Delta could adequately protect
itself, from the risk that government below-market redemption
would diminish recovery of its debt, by purchasing the property at
foreclosure by credit on its debt of an amount equal to the lesser
of the property's market value or the balance of the debt. Because
Delta's interpretation of section 2410(d) is not mandated by the
language of section 2410(d) and would frustrate the policy that
Congress sought to implement in that section and in section
7425(d) , we decline to adopt it. Conclusion We conclude that the amount the AFFIRMED. 1
Section 1346(f) provides the district courts with exclusive
jurisdiction of civil actions brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2409a.
Section 2409a, in turn, waives the federal government's sovereign
immunity for particular types of quiet title actions. Although
this action was not formally denominated a quiet title action, we
believe that it is in substance such an action, the theory being
that the 2
See 11 U.S.C. §506(a); 3 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶506.04[1]
(15th ed. 1988). [81-2 USTC ¶9490]Thomas Jerry Myers, Plaintiff-Appellant v. (CA-5), U. S. Court of Appeals, 5th Circuit, Unit
A, No. 80-3245, 647 F2d 591, David M. Touchstone, 3821 Southern Ave., Before BROWN and TATE, Circuit Judges, and SMITH *,
District Judge. TATE, Circuit Judge: Property owner Thomas Jerry Myers brings this appeal from a
judgment of the district court that upheld the validity of an
Internal Revenue Service levy made pursuant to the provisions of
the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, 26 U. S. C. §§ 6323 et seq.
The property in question had been foreclosed upon and sold, and
the federal tax liens cancelled, pursuant to The judgment below is therefore affirmed. Facts The facts of this case are largely undisputed. On |