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6323 - Alabama
6323 - Alabama2
6323 - Alaska
6323 - Alaska2
6323 - Allocation of Liens
6323 - Arizona
6323 - Arkansas
6323 - Arkansas2
6323 - Assignment of Funds p1
6323 - Assignment of Funds p2
6323 - Assignment of Funds p3
6323 - Assignment of Funds p4
6323 - Bankruptcy p1
6323 - Bona Fide Purchaser for Value p1
6323 - Bona Fide Purchaser for Value p2
6323 - Bona Fide Purchaser for Value p3
6323 - Bona Fide Purchaser for Value p4
6323 - California
6323 - California2 p1
6323 - California2 p2
6323 - Claims After Death
6323 - Clerk's Error
6323 - Colorado
6323 - Condemnation Proceedings
6323 - Conflicts of Law p1
6323 - Conflicts of Law p2
6323 - Conflicts of Law p3
6323 - Connecticut
6323 - Consideration
6323 - Constructive Trust
6323 - Contract Assignment p1
6323 - Contract Assignment p2
6323 - Conveyance by Taxpayer p1
6323 - Conveyance by Taxpayer p2
6323 - Copyright Act
6323 - Debenture Holders
6323 - Decedent
6323 - Deeds of Trust
6323 - Delaware
6323 - Disclosure of Lien
6323 - Distribution of Proceeds
6323 - District of Columbia
6323 - District of Columbia2
6323 - District Where Filed p1
6323 - District Where Filed p2
6323 - Employee's Claims
6323 - Equitable or Secret Lien
6323 - Equitable Principles
6323 - Escrow
6323 - Escrow2
6323 - Estate Claims
6323 - Estoppel p1
6323 - Estoppel p2
6323 - Extension
6323 - Fact-Finding p1
6323 - Fact-Finding p2
6323 - Fact-Finding p3
6323 - Fact-Finding p4
6323 - Fact-Finding p5
6323 - Fact-Finding p6
6323 - Fire Insurance Proceeds p1
6323 - Fire Insurance Proceeds p2
6323 - Florida
6323 - Florida2
6323 - Form of Notice
6323 - Garnishment
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6323 - Hawaii
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6323 - Indiana
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6323 - Inherited Property p1
6323 - Inherited Property p2
6323 - Interest on Mortgage
6323 - Interpleader p1
6323 - Interpleader p2
6323 - Interpleader p3
6323 - Interpleader p4
6323 - Interpleader p5
6323 - Interpleader p6
6323 - Interpleader p7
6323 - Interpleader2 p1
6323 - Interpleader2 p2
6323 - Iowa
6323 - Iowa2
6323 - Judgment Creditor p1
6323 - Judicial Sale
6323 - Jurisdiction p1
6323 - Jurisdiction p2
6323 - Jurisdiction p3
6323 - Kentucky
6323 - Kentucky2
6323 - Louisiana
6323 - Maritime Liens
6323 - Marshalling of Assets
6323 - Maryland
6323 - Maryland2
6323 - Massachusetts
6323 - Michigan p1
6323 - Michigan P2
6323 - Michigan2
6323 - Minnesota
6323 - Mississippi
6323 - Mississippi2
6323 - Missouri
6323 - Montana
6323 - Money Forfeited to State
6323 - Mortgage
6323 - Name Changed
6323 - Nebraska
6323 - New Hampshire
6323 - New Hampshire2
6323 - New Jersey
6323 - New York p1
6323 - New York p2
6323 - New York p3
6323 - New York2
6323 - North Carolina
6323 - North Carolina2
6323 - North Dakota
6323 - Tax Lien Not Filed
6323 - Notice or Knowledge of Lien p1
6323 - Notice or Knowledge of Lien p2
6323 - Notice or Knowledge of Lien p3
6323 - Obligatory Disbursement Agreement
6323 - Ohio
6323 - Ohio2
6323 - Oklahoma
6323 - Oklahoma2
6323 - Oregon
6323 - Oregon2
6323 - Partners and Partnerships
6323 - Pennsylvania p1
6323 - Pennsylvania p2
6323 - Pennsylvania2 p1
6323 - Pennsylvania2 p2
6323 - Personal Property of Another
6323 - Personality p1
6323 - Personality p2
6323 - Possessory Liens
6323 - Prior Law p1
6323 - Prior Lien of Attorney
6323 - Prior Lien of U.S. p1
6323 - Prior Lien of U.S. p2
6323 - Priority over Attachment Lien p1
6323 - Priority over Attachment Lien p2
6323 - Priority over Chattel Mortgages
6323 - Priority over Landlord's Lien
6323 - Priority Recorded Mortgage p1
6323 - Priority Recorded Mortgage p2
6323 - Priority Recorded Mortgage p3
6323 - Property Subject to Lien p1
6323 - Property Subject to Lien p2
6323 - Property Subject to Lien p3
6323 - Protection of Property
6323 - Purchaser p1
6323 - Purchaser p2
6323 - Purchaser p3
6323 - Purchaser p4
6323 - Purchaser p5
6323 - Purchaser p6
6323 - Purchaser p7
6323 - Purchasers Entitled to Notice
6323 - Receivership Expenses
6323 - Recordation of Interest p1
6323 - Recordation of Interest p2
6323 - Recordation of Interest p3
6323 - Recordation of Interest p4
6323 - Recordation of Interest p5
6323 - Refiling
6323 - Release by Other Creditors
6323 - Remanded Cases
6323 - Res Judicata p1
6323 - Res Judicata p2
6323 - Revival of Judgment
6323 - Rhode Island
6323 - Rhode Island2
6323 - Seamen
6323 - Security Interest p1
6323 - Set-Off p1
6323 - Set-Off p2
6323 - Set-Off p3
6323 - Set-Off p4
6323 - Sheriff's Clerk


More Bankruptcy Pages:

6323 - Bankruptcy p2
6323 - Bankruptcy p3
6323 - Bankruptcy p4
6323 - Bankruptcy p5
6323 - Bankruptcy p6
6323 - Bankruptcy p7
6323 - Bankruptcy p8
6323 - Bankruptcy p9
6323 - Bankruptcy p10
6323 - Bankruptcy p11
6323 - Bankruptcy p12
6323 - Bankruptcy p13
6323 - Bankruptcy p14
6323 - Bankruptcy p15
6323 - Bankruptcy p16
6323 - Bankruptcy p17
6323 - Bankruptcy p18
6323 - Bankruptcy p19
6323 - Bankruptcy p20
6323 - Bankruptcy p21

Bankruptcy Page 1

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Harry M. Herckner, Appellant v. United States of America , Appellee.

U.S. District Court, Dist. N.J. ; Civ. 04-5898 (GEB), March 18, 2005 .

Unpublished opinion affirming an unreported BC-DC N.J. decision.

[ Code Secs. 6323 and 6871]

Collection: Liens: Bankruptcy: Unsecured claim. --

The IRS could abandon its secured status and elect to be treated as an unsecured creditor in a debtor's bankruptcy plan. The debtor filed a voluntary Chapter 7 petition after the IRS filed federal tax liens against property jointly owned by the debtor and his wife. After the bankruptcy petition was filed, the IRS stated that it held an unsecured priority claim in its proof of claim. The presence of pre-petition liens did not require the IRS to pursue secured claims. The debtor's arguments to the contrary were based on readily distinguishable law.




¬ Caution: The court has designated this opinion as NOT FOR PUBLICATION. Consult the Rules of the Court before citing this case.®


MEMORANDUM OPINION



BROWN, District Judge: This is an interlocutory appeal from a decision of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey ("the Bankruptcy Court") denying Appellant's motion for summary judgment. This Court has appellate jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §158(a). 1 The Court, having considered the parties' submissions and decided the matter without oral argument pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 78, and for the reasons set forth below, will affirm the order below.



I. BACKGROUND

Harry Herckner ("Appellant") and his wife, Pamela Herckner, are delinquent in the filing of their 2000 individual income tax returns. 2 The IRS properly filed federal tax liens against properties jointly owned by Mr. and Mrs. Herckner in Burlington County and Ocean County , New Jersey and Citrus County , Florida for the delinquent taxes and attendant civil penalties. On February 2, 2004 , Mr. Herckner filed a voluntary Chapter 7 petition and identified the real and personal property to which the federal liens would have attached. On May 13, 2004 , the IRS filed a proof of claim based upon the 2000 joint federal income tax liability and civil penalties. In its proof of claim, the IRS stated an unsecured priority claim in the amount of $177,227.61 and an unsecured general claim in the amount of $26,311.42. Appellant then commenced an adversary proceeding asserting that the claims filed by the IRS should be reclassified as fully secured claims. The Bankruptcy Court denied Appellant's motion for summary judgment and this appeal followed.



II. ANALYSIS


A. Standard of Review



Bankruptcy Rule 8013 provides, in pertinent part:

On appeal the district court ... may affirm, modify, or reverse a bankruptcy judge's judgment, order, or decree or remand with instructions for further proceedings. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the bankruptcy court to judge the credibility of witnesses.


FED. R. BANKR. P. 8013 (2005). "A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conclusion that a mistake has been committed." United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). A bankruptcy court's conclusions of law, on the other hand, are subject to plenary review. See Brown v. Pennsylvania State Employees Credit Union, 851 F.2d 81, 84 (3d Cir. 1988). Where mixed questions of law and fact are presented, the appropriate standard must be applied to each component of the appeal. See In re Sharon Steel Corp., 871 F.2d 1217, 1222 (3d Cir. 1989).


B. The IRS May Elect To Be Treated As An Unsecured Creditor



A creditor may surrender its security in a bankruptcy proceeding and instead make an unsecured claim against the estate. See Hoxworth v. Blinder, 74 F.3d 205, 209 (10 th Cir. 1996) ("[T]he [Bankruptcy C]ode allows [the creditor] to make an unsecured proof of claim against the estate, and not assert its secured lien against assets traced into the estate."). A secured creditor can pursue one of three courses:

(1) he may prove his claim as an unsecured claim and surrender his security; (2) he may prove his claim as a secured claim, give credit thereon for the value of the security, and share in the general assets as to the unsecured balances; or (3) he may not file a claim at all and rely solely upon his lien.


Delaney v. City and County of Denver , 185 F.2d 246, 251 (10 th Cir. 1950). For example, in In re Krahn, 124 B.R. 78 (Bkrtcy. D. Minn. 1990), the court held that the IRS could not resuscitate a pre-petition lien, emphasizing that it had voluntarily abandoned its secured status to assert a priority unsecured claim. See Krahn, 124 B.R. at 80-81. Therefore, this Court concludes that the IRS can elect to abandon its secured status under pre-petition liens and proceed as an unsecured creditor.

The Court is not persuaded by Appellant's position that the presence of pre-petition liens dictates that the IRS must pursue secured claims. 3 As correctly pointed out by the IRS and Trustee in their respective briefs, each of the cases cited by Appellant to support this position are readily distinguishable on the facts. In each of these cases, the IRS had filed secured claims in a bankruptcy proceeding, but then attempted to have the claims treated as priority claims in a Chapter 11 plan filed in the same proceeding. See U.S. v. TM Bldg. Products, Ltd. [ 98-2 USTC ¶50,845], 231 B.R. 364, 367-68 (S.D. Fla. 1998); In re DiMaria, 202 B.R. 634, 640 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Fla. 1996); In re Reichert, 138 B.R. 522, 525 (Bkrtcy. W.D. Mich. 1992). Each court correctly held that secured claims are not entitled to priority treatment. See e.g. DiMaria, 202 B.R. at 640 (holding that "the IRS is not entitled to claim both the benefits of its right to encumbered property and the status afforded to unsecured claims under §507"). None of these cases, however, address the situation where, as here, the IRS opts to abandon its pre-petition liens and file unsecured claims rather than secured claims.

For example, in U.S. v. TM Bldg. Products, Ltd. [ 98-2 USTC ¶50,845], 231 B.R. 364 (S.D. Fla. 1998), the IRS filed a proof of claim and amended proof of claim, both times listing both secured and unsecured claims. TM Bldg. [ 98-2 USTC ¶50,845], 231 B.R. at 367. The IRS then filed objections to the debtors Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization. Id. As a result, the debtor amended its Plan prior to the confirmation hearing. Id. During the confirmation hearing, the IRS urged denial of confirmation, but never objected to the Plan's classification of its claims as secured rather than priority. Id. at 368. On appeal, the IRS argued that its secured claims should have been treated as unsecured priority claims. The district court affirmed the Chapter 11 Plan and declined to permit the IRS to treat its secured claims as unsecured priority claims. The court emphasized that "the presence or absence of a recorded Notice of Federal Tax Lien at the time a petition for Chapter 11 relief is filed will control how a claim ... is treated in bankruptcy." TM Bldg. [ 98-2 USTC ¶50,845], 231 B.R. at 370-71.

The situation in TM Bldg. is much different than that presented here. Here, the IRS actually filed unsecured priority claims. The TM Bldg. decision cannot be construed to affect the creditor's right to abandon its pre-petition liens and pursue unsecured priority claims. Similarly, DiMaria and Reichert do not support Appellant's position in this case. These cases merely hold that a filed secured claim may not also be treated as a priority claim in a Chapter 11 Plan. 4

Therefore, this Court holds that the IRS may abandon its security interest and elect to be treated as an unsecured creditor. Accordingly, this Court affirms the Bankruptcy Court's order denying Appellant's motion for summary judgment.



III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Bankruptcy Court denying Appellant's motion for summary judgment is affirmed. An appropriate form of order is filed herewith.

1 Pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8003, Appellant is required to file a motion for leave to appeal. Despite Appellant's failure to request leave to appeal, this Court will grant leave to appeal under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8003(c) and reach the merits of the action.

2 For the purposes of this section, the Court relies on the party's Joint Stipulation of Facts.

3 Appellant further contends that "[h]ad the IRS identified its claim as secured, the Trustee would have been required to abandon some or all of Mr. Herckner's assets under 11 U.S.C. §554." Appellant Brief at 2. However, Section 554 merely provides that the trustee or the court may determine that property should be abandoned because it is either burdensome to the estate or of inconsequential value and benefit to the estate. See 11 U.S.C. §§554(a) and (b) (2005). Further, Appellant offers no further support for this contention.

4 This Court finds that allowing the IRS to proceed as an unsecured creditor does not constitute a violation of 26 U.S.C. §6334. Appellant has cited no authority to support this position. Further, as the IRS points out, it has not levied on Appellant's property. Moreover, as discussed supra, this Court finds that the Bankruptcy Code permits the IRS to abandon its security interest and pursue unsecured priority claims.

 

 

In re Dwight M. Bolden, Debtor.

U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Cent. Dist. Calif. ; LA 04-29732 TD, June 21, 2005 .

[ Code Secs. 6321, 6323 and 6871]

Bankruptcy: Chapter 7: Tax Lien: Secured claim: Priority: Abandonment: Turnover: Administrative costs. --

The Bankruptcy Court upheld the trustee's motion for turnover of the debtor's home, and denied the debtor's motion to compel abandonment of the property, where the debtor claimed that the total tax liens against his home far exceed its value. The court held that the turnover order would facilitate an expeditious sale of the property and provide unsecured creditors with significant benefits. Under the Bankruptcy Code, the trustee is allowed to avoid tax penalty liens of the IRS and Franchise Tax Board. After avoiding the IRS tax penalty liens, the trustee is permitted to preserve those avoided liens for the benefit of the estate. Thus, turnover of the property will confer a sizable amount in avoided tax penalties and associated interest for the substantial benefit of the estate.





MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE TRUSTEE'S MOTION FOR AVOIDANCE AND TURNOVER OF TAX PENALTY LIENS AND DEBTOR'S MOTION FOR ABANDONMENT




INTRODUCTION



DONOVAN, Bankruptcy Judge: On April 6, 2005 , I announced my tentative decisions in two matters in Dwight M. Bolden's (Mr. Bolden) chapter 7 case. The first matter was the chapter 7 trustee's (trustee) motion for turnover of real property, Mr. Bolden's home. The second matter was Mr. Bolden's motion to compel the chapter 7 trustee to abandon real property, Mr. Bolden's home. After hearing oral argument, the hearings were continued to May 18, 2005 , and on May 18, 2005 , the hearings were continued again to June 1, 2005 . At the June 1 hearings, I withdrew my April 6 tentative decisions and announced my final rulings. This memorandum will supplement my findings of fact and conclusions of law announced orally on June 1.


FACTS



Mr. Bolden filed a voluntary chapter 7 bankruptcy petition on September 14, 2004 . At the time of filing, Mr. Bolden listed in his schedules $587,875 in assets ($570,000 in real property and $17,875 in personal property), and $585,895.09 in liabilities ($570,000 in secured claims and $15,895.09 in unsecured, non-priority claims). In schedule I, Mr. Bolden states that he is self-employed by the Law Offices of Bolden & Martin (Bolden & Martin), where Mr. Bolden has been employed for 15 years. Mr. Bolden's current monthly income is $4,000. Mr. Bolden's statement of financial affairs states that as of September 29, 2004 , his income for the year to date was $43,258.50. Mr. Bolden further states that his yearly income in 2002 was $57,678, and that he received no income in 2003. In schedule J, Mr. Bolden indicates that his current monthly expenditures are $4,425.

Mr. Bolden's main asset is his residence, located at 5641 Sherbourne Drive in Los Angeles (the property). The property contains a 4 bedroom, 4 bathroom, 3,034 square foot house on a 9,250 square foot lot. The house was built in 1959. The house has an attached garage, central heating and air, a fireplace, and a private pool. The trustee listed the house for sale on January 17, 2005 , for $924,500.

Mr. Bolden valued the property at $570,000 on schedule A. Schedule D indicates that there are three secured claims against the property: (1) a 1989 first deed of trust held by Cenlar Mortgage (Cenlar) in the amount of $285,000, (2) an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) tax lien in the amount of $285,000; and (3) a California Franchise Tax Board tax lien listed in an "unknown" amount.

The evidence shows that the IRS has eight secured tax liens against the property totaling $1,324,632.52, comprised of $450,672.75 in unpaid taxes, $249,022.93 in penalties, and $624,936.84 in interest. Each secured tax lien was recorded on a different date, with respect to different taxes owed, and with its own priority. All of the secured tax claims are for unpaid income taxes. The secured tax liens relate to the following tax years: 1989; 1990; 1993-1995; and 1999-2001. The secured tax liens were assessed on the following dates: December 12, 1994 ; September 14, 1992 ; March 13, 1995 ; May 27, 1996 ; December 15, 1997 ; April 28, 2003 ; May 5, 2003 ; and April 14, 2003 , respectively. The IRS filed one proof of claim in this case to cover its eight separate tax liens.

The property also is subject to unsecured priority tax claims held by the IRS in the total sum of $537,369.60. Mr. Bolden's Schedule E acknowledges delinquent taxes for 2002 and 2003 owed to both the IRS and the Franchise Tax Board in "unknown" amounts. The evidence provided by the IRS indicates that these taxes were assessed in 1999-2003 and relate to the 1998-2003 tax periods, for income, FICA, and FUTA taxes.

The IRS also asserts unsecured general claims against Mr. Bolden totaling $940,773.45, for income, FICA, and FUTA taxes for 1994 and 1999-2003.

Additionally, as of December 27, 2004 , Bolden & Martin owed the California Employment Development Department (EDD) $213,296.63 in unpaid taxes. The EDD filed a notice of state tax lien against Bolden & Martin as a result of its failure to pay its state tax liability.

The penalty portions of the IRS secured tax liens total $339,272.

On Schedule C, Mr. Bolden claimed a $50,000 homestead exemption pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure §704.730(a)(1). The trustee has not objected to this exemption. Mr. Bolden now claims that he is entitled to a $75,000 homestead exemption, but he has not yet amended his schedules to reflect this change.

Mr. Bolden has refused to cooperate with the trustee's efforts to sell the property. Four property visits were scheduled for potential buyers. On February 4, 2005 , the trustee's broker, Ron Bombiger, advised Mr. Bolden's attorney by fax of a property visit scheduled for February 5, 2005 , at 11:00 a.m. On the same day, the trustee's broker advised Mr. Bolden's attorney by fax of additional property visits scheduled for (1) February 8 at 5:00 p.m.; (2) February 10 at 5:00 p.m.; and (3) February 12 at 11:00 a.m. Mr. Bolden's attorney responded to the first notice by stating that he was unable to contact Mr. Bolden and that the broker's 24-hour notice was "stupid and rude." In response to the second notice, Mr. Bolden's attorney left a telephone message for the trustee's attorney stating that discussions with Mr. Bolden were underway regarding making the property available for prospective buyers' visits. Mr. Bolden did not make the property available for buyers' visits on the scheduled dates. A "For Sale" sign was placed on the property by the trustee's broker on February 7, 2005 . Mr. Bolden apparently removed the "For Sale" sign from the property. Due to Mr. Bolden's lack of cooperation, the trustee's real estate broker has not had reasonable access to the property to facilitate the trustee's efforts to sell the property.

Mr. Bombiger's telephone log shows that between January 25, 2005 , and February 16, 2005 , 41 people called to inquire about the property. These people required an interior viewing of the property before deciding whether to submit a purchase offer to the trustee. On February 17, 2005 , the trustee's real estate broker received a written offer to purchase the property for $975,000. The offer was made subject to inspection of the property.

On February 18, 2005 , the trustee filed a motion for turnover of the property. On March 14, 2005 , Mr. Bolden filed a motion to compel the trustee to abandon the property. On April 6, 2005 , the IRS filed a memorandum in support of the trustee's motion for turnover of the property. On May 13, 2005 , Cenlar filed a joinder to the trustee's motion for turnover of the property and in opposition to Mr. Bolden's motion to compel abandonment.


DISCUSSION




A. Mr. Bolden's Motion for Abandonment



Mr. Bolden opposes the trustee's turnover motion, and pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §554(b) and Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 6007(b), Mr. Bolden seeks an order compelling the trustee to abandon the property. 1 Section 554(b) requires the court to find that the property to be abandoned is either burdensome or of inconsequential value and benefit to the estate.

Mr. Bolden's basis for requesting an order compelling abandonment is his claim that the total tax liens against his home far exceed its value. Mr. Bolden contends that the property is of inconsequential value and benefit to the bankruptcy estate. Mr. Bolden analyzes the estate's interest in the property as follows:

                                                                                  

                                                                                  

Fair Market Value                                                      $ 925,000.00

                                                                                  

Cost of 

Sale

 (6%)                                                       (55,500.00)

                                                                                  

Payoff First Trust Deed                                                (330,000.00)

                                                                                  

IRS Tax Lien                                  (1,324,632.52)

                                                         

State FTB Tax Lien                            (532,588.79)

                                                         

State EDD Tax Lien                            (213,296.63)

                                                         

Total Tax Liens                                                     ( 2,400,517.94)

                                                                                  

Net [Deficiency] From 

Sale

 [Before Homestead                       ($ 2,126,017.00)

Exemption]                                                                        

                                                                                  

Homestead Exemption                                          (75,000.00 2 2 At this

                                                               time, Mr. Bolden has

                                                                  claimed a $50,000

                                                           homestead exemption, not

                                                           a $75,000 exemption. Mr.

                                                              Bolden states that he

                                                                 will be claiming a

                                                                  $75,000 homestead

                                                            exemption and bases his

                                                                    analysis on the

                                                              anticipated homestead

                                                                        exemption.)

                                                                                  

Net [Deficiency] To Estate                                        ( $ 2,201,017.94)

                                                                                  



Based on this analysis, Mr. Bolden concludes that a sale of the property for $925,000 will not satisfy the liens on the property but that other costs and fees would be incurred by the trustee and other professionals in connection with the sale of the property. Thus, Mr. Bolden asserts that the property would provide inconsequential value and benefit to the estate and should be abandoned by the trustee.

Mr. Bolden suggests the following as his expected order of distribution of sale proceeds, as prescribed by §724(b) 3 , should the property be turned over to the trustee and sold: (1) Cenlar's deed of trust; (2) Mr. Bolden's homestead exemption; (3) admin istrative claims; and (4) tax claims secured by liens. According to Mr. Bolden, the distribution scheme he envisions would satisfy only a small portion of the secured debt and leave nothing for unsecured creditors. Based on his analysis, Mr. Bolden concludes that the property is of little, no, or even negative value to the estate, and the trustee should be ordered to abandon it.


B. Trustee's Motion for Turnover



The trustee contends that Mr. Bolden makes two errors in his analysis. According to the trustee, Mr. Bolden first incorrectly lumps the eight IRS tax liens together as if they were a single secured claim against the property, and secondly, Mr. Bolden assumes incorrectly that his homestead exemption claim will be paid prior to avoided liens.

The trustee notes that there are eight tax liens, each recorded on a different date, each respecting different taxes owed, and each with its own priority in relation to other liens. The evidence here confirms that the tax liens constitute separate liens, not a single blanket lien and that there are eight separate and distinct IRS secured tax liens, each with its own priority, for eight separate and distinct tax years.

The trustee and the IRS persuasively argue that the avoided tax liens will come ahead of Mr. Bolden's homestead exemption for purposes of distribution. It is true, as Mr. Bolden argues, that the trustee cannot contest the validity of a claimed exemption after the 30-day period for objecting has expired and no extension has been obtained, even if a debtor has no colorable basis for the exemption, citing Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638, 112 S.Ct. 1644 (1992). Mr. Bolden claimed a $50,000 homestead exemption on his Schedule C. The trustee did not object to the homestead exemption claim within the 30-day period allowed following the conclusion of the creditors meeting. Pursuant to Rule 4003(b) and the holding in Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, an objection at this time would be time-barred, and the $50,000 exemption claimed by Mr. Bolden at the outset would be allowed whether or not Mr. Bolden had a colorable statutory basis for claiming it. On the other hand, the trustee can contest the priority of the exemption with respect to competing liens. The basic rule of "first in time, first in right" is used to determine the priority of competing liens. United States v. City of New Britian [ 54-1 USTC ¶9191], 347 U.S. 81 (1954).

Pursuant to §522(c)(2), exempt property, such as that represented by Mr. Bolden's homestead exemption claim, remains liable for debts secured by a lien that is not avoided or for which a notice of such things as a federal tax lien has been filed. 4 The homestead exemption does not have precedence over the tax liens. Generally, a debtor is not entitled to claim a homestead exemption on property that is subject to an IRS levy. Treas. Reg. on Proc. and Admin. §301.6334-1(c); United States v. Estes [ 71-2 USTC ¶9677], 450 F.2d 62, 65 (5th Cir. 1971); Davenport v. United States [ 91-2 USTC ¶50,531], 136 B.R. 125, 127-28 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1991) (a state-created homestead exemption is ineffective against a federal tax lien, but the proceeds of a sale of property are subject to a valid tax lien under §522).

It has been recognized that the IRS has its own exemption scheme and that a "[state] homestead exemption does not erect a barrier around a taxpayer's home sturdy enough to keep out the Commissioner of Internal Revenue." United States v. Estes [ 71-2 USTC ¶9677], 450 F.2d at 65 (no provision of a state's law may exempt property or rights in property from levy for the collection of federal taxes owed). The Supreme Court has concluded that the Supremacy Clause allows the federal government to "sweep aside state-created exemptions." United States v. Rodgers [ 83-1 USTC ¶9374], 461 U.S. 677, 701 (1983).

The holder of a properly filed tax lien need not file an objection to a homestead exemption in order to challenge the homestead exemption. Braddock v. United States ( In re Braddock), 149 B.R. 636, 639 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1992). Requiring holders of tax liens to file objections to the homestead exemption would render §522(c)(2) superfluous. Id. (tax liens are entitled to priority over homestead exemptions even where the IRS did not object to the homestead exemption). In other words, §522(c)(2) neutralizes Mr. Bolden's claim that he is entitled to collect on his homestead exemption claim here because no timely objection to his $50,000 claim was filed by the trustee. 5

The trustee here contends that the property should not be abandoned because the liens that he seeks to avoid will confer a benefit on the estate and should be turned over to the trustee pursuant to §542(a). 6

The trustee notes that §724(a) states: "The trustee may avoid a lien that secures a claim of a kind specified in section 726(a)(4) of this title." While §726 deals generally with the distribution of property of the estate, §726(a)(4) provides that the fourth priority in distribution of property of the estate is "in payment of any allowed claim, whether secured or unsecured, for any fine, penalty, or forfeiture, or for multiple, exemplary, or punitive damages, arising before the earlier of the order for relief or the appointment of a trustee, to the extent that such fine, penalty, forfeiture, or damages are not compensation for actual pecuniary loss suffered by the holder of such claim." Taken together, §§724(a) and 726(a)(4) establish a statutory basis to allow the trustee to avoid tax penalty liens of the IRS and Franchise Tax Board. Here, the tax penalty liens (with the exception of the IRS' trust fund recovery penalty) were assessed against Mr. Bolden before the order for relief, as fines or penalties, and not as compensation for actual pecuniary loss. The tax penalties were punitive in nature and assessed to punish a failure to pay taxes.

The Supreme Court has explained that the bankruptcy statute "manifests a congressional purpose to bar all claims of any kind against a bankrupt except those based on a 'pecuniary' loss." Simonson v. Granquist [ 62-1 USTC ¶9298], 369 U.S. 38, 82 S.Ct. 537, 538-39 (1962). The Court reasoned: "Tax penalties are imposed at least in part as punitive measures against persons who have been guilty of some default or wrong. Enforcement of penalties against the estates of bankrupts, however, would serve not to punish the delinquent taxpayers, but rather their entirely innocent creditors." Id. at 539. This congressional intent to protect innocent creditors from delinquent taxpayers has been preserved in present §724(a).

The trustee contends further that §§551 and 349(b) accord him the statutory right to preserve any liens avoided under §724(a) for the benefit of the estate. Section 551 states in pertinent part: "Any transfer avoided under section ... 724(a) of this title ... is preserved for the benefit of the estate but only with respect to property of the estate." Section 349(b) states in pertinent part: "Unless the court, for cause, orders otherwise, a dismissal of a case other than under section 742 of this title --(1) reinstates --*** (B) any transfer avoided under section ... 724(a) of this title ...." Further, Collier on Bankruptcy states that §551 applies to §724(a) dealing with fines, penalties, and forfeitures. 5-551 Collier on Bankruptcy --15th Edition Revised ¶551.01. Thus, I conclude, that after avoiding the IRS tax penalty liens under §724(a), the trustee has the statutory right under §§551 and 349(b) to preserve the liens avoided for the benefit of the estate.

Ultimately here, turnover of the property will confer a benefit on the estate because the trustee will avoid what he estimates is $339,272 in tax penalties and interest on tax penalties for the benefit of the estate, as follows:

                                                                               

                                                                               

  IRS    Total  Principal Amount of   Amount of     Amount    Amount Balance    

   Lien    Amount   Amount   Penalties   Interest to  Avoided and  Paid to  Available  

 Recordation Claimed     of    to Petition    Petition    Preserved    IRS on  for        

   Date     as a    Taxes       Date     Date/Amount   for Estate    Lien   Subsequent 

         Lien on                      of Interest   (Penalties          Liens      

         Petition                      Attributed   + Interest                    

           Date                            to           on                        

                                      Penalties    Penalties)                    

                                                                               

       

       

       


2/12/93
 $279,803$70,565   $38,582   $170,656/$60,325  $98,907   $180,896  $386,104 

                 (1990)               7 7 $38,                                 

                                       582 ¸                                   

                                     ($38,582 +                                

                                     $70,565) ´                                

                                      $170,656                                 

                                                                               

 
2/8/95
 $260,081$54,770   $45,532   $159,779/$72,532  $118,064  $142,017  $244,087 

                 (1989)               8 8 $45,                                 

                                       532 ¸                                   

                                     ($45,532 +                                

                                     $54,770) ´                                

                                      $159,779                                 

                                                                               


7/11/95
 $185,401$61,676   $29,901   $93,824/$30,635  $60,536   $124,865  $119,222 

                 (1995)               9 9 $29,                                 

                                       901 ¸                                   

                                &nb